MASTER  NEGATIVE 

NO.  93-81407-1 


<  u 


MICROFILMED  1993 
LUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES/NEW  YORK 


as  part  of  the  .      r,    •    *» 

Toundaiioiis  of  Western  Civilization  Preservation  Project 


NATIONAL  END 


Funded  by  the 
OWMENT  FOR  THE  HUMANITIES 


Reproductions  may  not  be  made  without  permission  from 

Columbia  University  Library 


COPYRIGHT  STATEMENT 


The  copyright  law  of  the  United  States  -  Title  17,  United 
States  Code  -  concerns  the  making  of  photocopies  or 
other  reproductions  of  copyrighted  materiaL 

Under  certain  conditions  specified  in  the  law,  libraries  and 
archives  are  authorized  to  furnish  a  photocopy  or  other 
reproduction.  One  of  these  specified  conditions  is  that  the 
photocopy  or  other  reproduction  is  not  to  be  "used  for  any 
purpose  other  than  private  study,  scholarship,  or 
research."  If  a  user  makes  a  request  for,  or  later  uses^  a 
photocopy  or  reproduction  for  purposes  in  excess  of  "fair 
use,"  that  user  may  be  liable  for  copyright  infringement. 

This  institution  reserves  the  right  to  refuse  to  accept  a 
copy  order  if,  in  its  judgement,  fulfillment  of  the  order 
would  involve  violation  of  the  copyright  law. 


A ITHOR: 


GROTE,  GEORGE 


TITLE: 


HISTORY  OF 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DATE: 


1881 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


Master  Negative  # 

?3  -SiHof- 


BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MTCRGFORM  TARHKT 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


884 
G9131 


I 


h 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


Grotc,   Georre.    1794-1871. 

A  history  of  Greece,    fron  the   earliest  period 
to  the   close  of  the  generation  contemporary  with 
Alexan'^.cr  the  Great.     Nev;  York,  /imerican  book 
exchange^    1031  • 

4  V. 


! 


Vols.   1-2,    2d  ed. 


o 


^m^ 


TECHNICAL  MICROFORM  DATA 

fxA^n  n/?^n— -~--^-7^-                     REDUCTION     RATIO:        J  I  )C 
IMAGE  PLACEMENT:    lA    IlA    IB     JIB  - 

2^7.L  P^LMED:___fil3l^3_ INITIALS         <S/^_P 

RLMEDBY:    RESEARCH  PIJBLICATION.q  INC   WOOnRRrnnP^rT 


GUIDE  TO  CONTENTS 

for 
A  HISTORY  OF  GREECE:  FROM  THE  EARLIEST  PERIOD  TO  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  GENERATION 

CONTEMPORARY  WITH  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 


REEL        MASTER  NEGATIVE  # 


DATE 


VOLUME 


93-81406-1 


1881 


93-81406-1 


1881 


93-81407-1 


1881 


93-81407-1 


1881 


REEL  2 

■    m  ■■■■■  ■■■■■  mmmmm        mmmmm 

VOLUME  3 

1881 
VOLUME  4 

1881 


c 


Association  for  Information  and  Image  Management 

1100  Wayne  Avenue,  Suite  1100. 
Silver  Spring,  Maryland  20910 

301/587-8202 


Centimeter 

1         2        3 


lii 


iiiii 


4 

1 


5 

J 


6 


8 


liiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiil 


iiiiiiii 


10     n 
J 


IIIIIIIIIMIIIillllMII 


12       13       14 

lllllljllllllllljllllllll 


15    mm 


IM 


I    I   [ 


Inches 


IIIII 


T 


TTT 


.0 


I    I    I   I   I 

3 


I.I 


1.25 


m 

171 
1^1^  U. 


2.8 
3.2 

M 


1.4 


T 


2.5 


2.2 


2.0 


1.8 


1.6 


TTT 


TTT 


MRNUFflCTURED   TO   PIIM   STfiNDPRDS 
BY    PPPLIED   IMPGE,     INC. 


Columbia  ®nit)f  r^Eftp 

mtl)cCttpofilfttJlork 

THE  LIBUAHIES 


Becjuest  of 

Frederic  Bancroft 

1860-1945 


I 


'>■! 
t'Sl 
III 

ll-t 

I;' 

}.' 

!:•: 

I 

I. 
I* 
t 


i 


I 


1 


!<1 
4| 


HISTORY  OF  GREECE 


FBOM  THE 


EARLIEST  PERIOD  TO  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  GEXERATION 
CONTEMPORARY  WH'H  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT 


BX 


GEORGE    GROTE 


-♦-♦^- 


IN    FOUR    VOLUMES.— VOL.    Ill 


■>•»- 


>    I  »  ' 


AMEBICAN    BOOX    EXCHANGE 
♦     751    Ei^oAi) W.A  If 


OOITTEK"TS  OF  VOLUME  III 


PART  IL-CONTINUATION  OF  HISTORICAL  GREECE. 


J.  Campbell, 

PBINTER. 

16  Vaudewater  £t.,  N  >C 


,      CHAPTER  LVIIt 

From  the  Resolution  of  the  Athenians  to  Attack  Syractse,  down  to  the 
First  Winter  after  their  Arrival  in  Sicily. 

PAGE 

Prepaiations  for  the  expedition  against  Sicily — general  enthusiasm  and 

saiiguiine  hopes  at  Athens 43 

AbuiKlance  in  the  Athenian  treasury— display  of  wealth  as  well  as  of  force 

ill  the  armament 44 

mutilation  of  the  Herman  at  Athens.    Numbers  and  sanctity  of  the  Hermae.  45 

Violent  excitement  and  religious  alarm  produced  by  the  act  at  Athens 45 

The  authors  of  the  act  unknown— but  it  was  certainly  done  by  design  and 

conspiracy 46 

Various  parties  suspected— great   probability  beforehand   that   it  would 

induce  the  Athenians  to  abandon  or  postpone  the  expedition 47 

The  political  enemies  of  Alkibiades  take  Advantage  of  the  reigning  excite- 
ment to  try  and  ruin  him 48 

An.Kiety  of  the  Athenians  to  detect  and  punish  the  conspirators — rewards 

offered  for  information 48 

Infi^rmations  given  in— commissioners  of  inquiry  appointed 48 

First  accusation  of  Alkibiades,  of  having  profaned  and  divulged  the  Eleu- 

sinian  mysteries 49 

Violent  speeches  in  the  assembly  against  Alkibiades  unfavorably  received..  49 
He  denies  the  charge  and  demand**  immediate  trial— his  demand  is  eluded 

by  his  enemies 50 

Departure  of  the  armament  from  Peiraeus— splendor  and  exciting  character 

of  the  spectacle 50 

Solemnities  of  parting,  on  shipboard  and  on  the  water's  edge 51 

Full  muster  of  the  armament  at  Korkyra 52 

Progress  to  Khegium— cold  reception  by  the  Italian  cities 52 

Feeling  at  Syracuse  as  to  the  approHclnng  armament— disposition  to  under- 
value its  n'lagnitude,  and  even  to  question  its  intended  coming 53 

Strenuous  exhortations  of  Hermokrates.  to  be  prepared 53 

Temper  and  parties  in  the  Syracasan  assembly 54 

Reply  of  Atheaagoras,  the  popular  orator 54 

Interposition  of  the  Strategi  to  moderate  the  violence  of  the  debate 55 

Relative  position  of  Athenagoras  and  other  parties  at  Syracuse 56 

Pacitic  dispositions  of  Athenagoras 56 

His  general  denunciations  against  the  oligarchical  youth  were  well  founded.  57 
Active  preparations  at  Syracuse  on  the  approach  of  the  Athenian  arma- 
ment   57 

Discouragement  of  the  Athenians  at  Rhegium  on  learning  the  truth  respect- 
ing the  poverty  of  Egesta 57 

5 


6 


CONTEXTS  OF   VOL.   III. 


The  Athenian  generals  discuss  their  plan  of  action-opinion  of  Nikias. . . .    ^"^  M 

Opnnuu  ot  Alkibiades '     to 

( )pinion  of  I^iniaciius 53 

Superior  disceTiinient  of  Lainaciius-pian  of"  Al'kibi'ades" preferred 59 

Alkji.iades  at  Alessene-Naxos  joins  tlie  Athenians.    Empty  display  of  the 
armament.. *^  "^      o^*<*j.  wj.  luc 

Alkibiades  at  Katana-tiie  Athenians  masters  of  Katana-they  establish 

iJifir  station  there.     Refusal  of  Kamurina ^uiibii 

Ahiiijiiules  is  summoned  home  to  talce  liis  trial. .  ci 

Fetdings  and  pri)ceedmgs  at  Athens  since  the  departure  of  "thearnianieiit ' '    61 
i.uinoer  ot  citizens  imprisoned  on  suspicion— increased  agony  of  the  public 


G3 


Peisander  and  Charikles  the  commissioners  of  inauirv r/ 

Information  of  Diokleides  "0 

3Iore  prisoners  arrested-increased  terror  in '  the  city— Andokides  ainonff 
the  persons  imprisoned «*"vi.6 

Audokides  is  solicited  by  his  fellow-prisoners'to'stand  "forward  and  trive 
infonnation— he  complies ^         ^ 

Andokides  designates  the  authors  of  the  mutilation  oif"  the  HermtB— conse- 
quence of  his  revelations 65 

Questionable  authority  of  Andokides,  as  to  what  lieliimseifreaiiy  stated  in 
information ^  gg 

Belief  of  ilie  Athenians  in  his  in^rmation-itstranqiiiliizinff  effects 66 

Anxiety  and  alarm  revived  respectint?  the  persons  concerned  in  thHnrnfnn.V- 


ti(m  of  tlie  Kleusinian  mysteries 


pectmg  the  persons  concerned  in  the  prof  ana- 


Revlval  of  the  accusiitiou  against  Alkibiades! .... g8 

Ind.ctinent  presented  by  Thessalus,  son  of  Kimon.  against  Alki blades." .'     " "    69 
Kt'solution  to  send  tor  Alkibiades  home  from  Sicily  to  be  tried  '   '     fiQ 


69 


Alkibiades  quits  the  army  as  if  to  come  home:  makes  his  escape  at  Thurii 

and  retires  to  Peloponnesus. .» ' 

Conduct  of  the  Athenian  i)ublic  in  reference  to  Aikibiades-how  "far'biain- 

able.    Conduct  ot  his  enemies 71 

Mischief  to  Athens  from  the  banishment  of 'Aikibiades.    'Languid  oiiera"- 

tions  ot  the  Sicdian  armament  under  Nikias,  . .  72 

Increase  of  confidence  and  preparations  at  Syracuse,   arising"  "from  "the 

delays  of  N  ikias ^  r-^ 

Maneuver  of  Nikias  from  Katana-he  lands  his  forces  in  the  Great  Ila'rbor 

ot  by  racuse r-o 

Ret  urn  of  tiie  Syracusiin  army  from  Kataiia  to  the  Great  Hart)or— Dreoara^ 

tious  for  hghtiug  Nikias f    f^i** 

Feehugs  of  the  ancient  soldier.— Harangue  of  Nikias! 74 

Battle  near  the  Olympieion— victory  of  the  Athenians  75 

Lmibated  confidence  of  tlie  Syracusans-they  garrison 'the  "oiympieion— 

JNikias  re-embarks  his  army,  and  returns  to  Katana  75 

He  determines  to  take  up  his  winter  quarters  at  Katana,  and  sendsto  Athens 

for  re-einforceraents  of  horse r-a 

His  failure  at  Messene,  through  the  betrayal  "by  "AJkibiades' ..." 76 

balutarv  lesson  to  the  Syracusans.  arising  out  of  the  recent  defeat-mis- 

chiefs  to  the  Athenians  from  the  delay  of  Nikias  73 

Conhdence  of  the  Athenians  at  home  in  Nikias-tlieirgoodtemper-thev 

send  to  him  the  re-enforcements  demanded ....  ^    — 

Deterni.ned  feeling  at  Syracuse-improved  measures  of  "defense-^recom 

mendations  ot  Hermokrates 

Enlargement  of  the  fortifications  of  Syracuse." "  "improvement  of  their  situa" 

anon.    Increase  ot  the  ditriculties  of  Nikias 

Hermokrates  and  Euphemus— counter-envoys  at  Kamarina 7q 

Speech  of  Euphemus  gX 

Tlie  Kamarinaeans  maintain  practical  neutrality to 

\\  inter  proceedings  of  Nikias  from  his  quarters  at  kacana ^ 

V.T?^'"^*^"  ^"^'^y^  ^nt  to  solicit  aid  from  Corinth  and  Sparta ft! 

Alkibiades  at  Sparta— liis  intense  hostility  to  Athens  83 


<  i 


n 


78 


i 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.  III. 


PAQK 

Speech  of  Alkibiades  In  the  Lacedaemonian  assembly 83 

Great  effect  of  his  speech  on  the  Peluponnesians 80 

Misrepresentations  contained  in  the  speech 86 

Resolutions  of  the  Spartans, 87 

The  Lacedaemonians  send  Gylippus  to  Syracuse 88 

CHAPTER  LIX. 

From  the  Commencrment  of  the  Siege  of  Syracuse  by  Nikias,  down  to  the 
Second  Athenian  Expedition  under  Demosthenes,  and  the  Resumption 
of  the  General  War. 

Movements  of  Nikias  in  the  early  spring 88 

Local  condition  and  fortifications  of  Syracuse,  at  the  time  when  Nikias 

arrived. — Inner  and  Outer  City 89 

Localities  without  the  wall  of  the  outer  city — Epipolae 89 

Possibilities  of  the  siege  when  Nikias  first  arrived  in  Sicily— increase  of  diiffi- 

culties  through  his  delay 90 

Increased  importance  of  the  upper  ground  of  Epipolse.    Intention  of  the 

Syracusans  to  occupy  the  summit  of  Epipolae 90 

The  summit  is  suiT)rised  by  the  Athenians 91 

The  success  of  this  surprise  was  essential  to  the  effective  future  prosecution 

of  the  siege 91 

First  operations  of  the  siege,— Central  work  of  the  Athenians  on  Epipolse, 

called  The  Circle 92 

First  counter-wall  of  the  Syracusans 9.3 

Its  direction,  south  of  the  Athenian  Circle — its  completion 93 

It  is  stormed,  taken,  and  destroyed,  by  the  Athenians 93 

Nikias  occupies  the  southern  cliff— and  prosecutes  his  line  of  blockade  south 

of  the  Circle 94 

Second  counter- work  of  the  Syracusans— reaching  across  the  marsh,  south 

of  Epipolae,  to  the  river  Anapus  95 

This  counter- work  attacked  and  taken  by  Lamachus— general  battle— death 

of  Lamachus 95 

Danger  of  the  Athenian  Circle  and  of  Nikias — victory  of  the  Atlienians 9(5 

Entrance  of  the  Athenian  fleet  into  the  Great  Harbor 96 

The  southern  portion  of  the  wall  of  blockade,  across  the  marsh  to  the  Great 

Harbor,  is  prosecuted  and  nearly  finished 97 

The  Syracusans  offer  no  farther  obstruction— despondency  at  Syracuse- 
increasing  closeness  of  the  siege .' 97 

Order  of  the  besieging  operations  successively  undertaken  by  the  Athenians    98 
Triumphant  prospects  of  the  Athenians,    Disposition  among  the  Sikels  and 

Italian  Greeks  to  favor  them 98 

Conduct  of  Nikias— his  correspondents  in  the  interior  of  Syracuse 99 

Confidence  of  Nikias— comparative  languor  of  his  operations 99 

Approach  of  Gylippus— he  despairs  of  relieving  Sj^racuse 100 

Progress  of  Gylippus,  in  spite  of  discouraging  reports 100 

Approach  of  Gylippus  is  made  known  to  Nikias,  Facility  of  preventing  his 
farther  advance— Nikias  despises  him,  and  leaves  him  to  come  unob- 
structed.   He  lands  at  Himera  in  Sicily 101 

Blindness  of  Nikias — egregious  mistake  of  letting  in  Gylippus 101 

Gylippus  levies  an  army  and  marches  across  Sicily  from  Himera  to  Syracuse  10-.2 
The  Corinthian  Gongjdus  reaches  Syracuse  before  Gylippus— just  in  time 

to  hinder  the  tOAvn  from  capitulating 102 

G3'lippus  with  his  new-levied  force  enters  Syracuse  unopposed 103 

Unaccountable  inaction  of  Nikias 10.3 

Vigorous  and  aggressive  measures  of  Gylippus.  immediatel}'  on  arriving 104 

Gylippu:.  surprises  and  captures  the  Athenian  fort  of  Labdalum 105 

He  begins  the  construction  of  a  third  counter-wall,  on  the  north  side  of  the 

Athenian  Circle 105 

Nikias  fortifies  Cape  Plemmyrium 105 


8 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   III. 


PAGE 

Inconveniences  of  Plemmyrium   as  a  maritime   station— mischief  which 

ensues  to  the  Athenian  naval  strength 106 

Operatjons  of  Gylippus  in  tlie  field— his  defeat 107 

His  decisive  victor}-— the  Athenians  are  shut  up  within  their  lines.    Tlie 
Syracusan  counter-wall  is  carried  on  so  far  as  to  cut  the  Athenian  line  of 

blockade 107 

Further  defenses  provided  by  Gylippus,  joining:  the  higher  part  of  Epipolai 

with  the  city  wall jqq 

Confidence  of  Gylippus  and  the  Syracusans— aggressive  plans  against  the 

Athenians,  even  on  the  sea 108 

Discouragement  of  Nikias  and  the  Athenians KX) 

Nikias  sends  home  a  dispatch  to  Atliens.  soliciting  re-en forceraents ... . . . . '.  109 

Dispatch  of  Nikias  to  the  Athenian  people 109 

Resolution  of  the  Athenians  to  send  Demosthenes  with  a  second  armanieiit    112 

Remarks  upon  the  dispatch  of  Nikias 112 

Former  dispatches  of  Nikias 113 

Effect  of  his  dispatch  upon  the  Athenians .,.!.!.!...      113 

Treatment  of  Nikias  by  the  Athenians "114 

Capital  mistake  committed  by  the  Athenians Ury 

Hostilities  from  Sparta  certain  and  impending n6 

Resolution  of  Sparta  to  invade  Attica  forthwith,  and  to  send  further  re- 
enforcements  to  Sicily 116 

CHAPTER  LX. 

From  the  Resolution  of  direct  HosTiLmss  between  Athens  and  Sparta 
DOWN  to  the  Destruction  of  the  Athenian  Armament  in  Sicily. 


Active  warlike  preparations  throughout  Greece  during  the  winter  of  414- 
413  B.c 

Invasion  of  Attica  by  Agis  and  the  Peloponnesian  force— fortification  of 
Dekeleia 

Second  expedition  from  Athens  against  Syracuse,  under  Demosthenes 

Operations  of  Gyhppus  at  Syracuse.  He  determines  to  attack  the  Athe- 
nians at  sea 

Naval  combat  in  the  harbor  of  Ryrncuse- the  Athenians  victorious 

Gjiippus  surprises  and  takes  Plemmyrium 

Important  consequences  of  the  capture ,[] 

Increased  spirits  and  confidence  of  the  Syracusans,  even  for  seafight. . ..... 

Efforts  of  the  Syracusans  to  procure  further  re-enforcement  from  the  Sicilian 
towns 

Conflicts  between  the  Athenians  and  Syracusans  in  the  Great  Harbor. ...... 

Defeat  of  a  Sicilian  re-enforcement  marching  to  aid  Syracuse 

Renewed  attack  hy  G3'Iippus  «>u  the  Athenians ,\ 

Disadvantages  of  the  Athenian  fleet  in  the  harbor.  Their  naval  tactics 
impossible  in  the  narrow  space 

Improvements  in  Syracusan  ships  suited  to  the  narrow  space 

The  .Syracusans  threaten  attack  upon  the  Athenian  naval  station .. 

Additional  preparations  of  Nikias— battle  renewed 

Comi)lete  defeat  of  the  Athenians ....[... 

Danger  of  the  Athenian  armament— arrival  of  Demosthenes  with  the  second 
armament 

Voyage  of  Demosthenes  from  Korkyra 

Imposii  g  effect  of  his  entry  into  the  Great  Harbor 

Revived  courage  of  the  Athenians.  Judicious  and  decisive  resolutions  of 
Demosthenes 

Position  and  plans  of  Demosthenes .............. 

Nocturnal  march  of  Demosthenes  to  surprise  Epipolse,  and  turn  the  Syra- 
cusan line  of  defpn^e 

Partial  success  at  first— complete  and  ruinous  defeat  finally! ... ....[..  . 


117 

118 
118 

119 
119 
120 
121 
121 

122 
122 
122 
183 

123 
124 
124 
12.'> 
125 

126 
127 

127 

127 
128 

128 
129 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.    III. 


9 


1.36 
136 

187 


Disorder  of  the  Athenians— great  loss  in  the  flight  ^^?^ 

Elate  spirits  and  renewed  aggressive  plans  of  the  SvVacusans ' !  .* ! 3? 

D.diber.uion  and  different  opmions  of  the  Athenian  generals  i-5i 

Demosthenes  insists  on  departing  from  Sicily-Xikias  opposes  him 131 

^SS'^Sl^^'^^^St^^Z^^^Z^S^''''''  th.Gri;j; Harbor::::::::::  ip 

Dl£SSS!;^^:flS"^ '".^'^^.^':^^^  Harb.^:  neither  acUn^  nor  rearing-::,  l^ 

Increase  of  force  and  confidence  in  Syracuse-Nikiasat  length  consentsto  ^'^ 
retreat.    Orders  for  retreat  privately  circulated  ^      consents  to 

hchpse  of  the  moon— Athenian  retreat  postponed      10? 

^chorS '^''"''*'^'''"'^'^   ^"^  sigas-differently  interpreted-opinion"of '  Phiio- 

^S-eaT  Ha  Jbor''^  .''^  ^''^  Syracusans-defeat'  of  the  Athenian'  fleet  'in  the  ^'^ 

Partial  success  ashore  "against  Gylippus :   

The  Syracusans  determine  to  block  up  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  and  d est rov 
or  capture  the  whole  Atlienian  armament.  aestroy 

Large  views  of  Syracusans  against  the  power  of  Athens-new  hazards  now 
opened  to  endanger  that  power "^i^ius  now 

Vast  numbers  and  miscellaneous  origin  of  the  combatants  now' engaged  in 

fighting  for  or  against  Svracuse cngageu  m 

The  Syracusans  block  up  the  mouth  of  the  harbor     i'^i 

gerfera1s'^"^''.^^''^.!^^^  ^^'"''^  ^^*'''*  '^^^'  0"t-preparations  made"by  the 

E.>:hortations  of  Nikias  on  putting  the  c'lWs  aboard.' '. JS 

Agony  of  Nikias-his  efforts  to  encourage  the  officers  .  iqq 

Bold  and  animated  language  of  Gylippus  to  the  Syracusan  fleet 140 

%^^SoirJSrr|-it  ^"^^^^^^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^'-^^^  Harbor-sympathizi-ng 

f  otfi"^'^  ?■  'l»e, -Athenian  fleet  to  break"  out-battle  in  "the^Great  Harbor 141 

thi  Ithe^Sis  ^^^^^'^^^  struggle-intense  emotion-total  defeat  of     [ 

^Hliem '.'?^^.''.''^'''"'  ''^  ancien't 'times-strong  emotions  ■wliich'a'ccompaiii'ed  ^^ 

Causes  of"  the  defeat  of  'the  'Atlieiiians: : : : : JIJ 

!•  eehngs  of  the  victors  and  vanquished  after  the  "battle " " : 144 

Resolution  of  Demosthenes  and  Nikias  to  make  a  second" a"ttem"r;t-"the 
armament  are  too  much  discouraged  to  obey  auempt    the 

Jfn/    ^?"i'^"''  determine  to  retreat  by  land-they"  postpone  their  retreat 
under  tal.se  communications  from  Syracuse. . .  ^  reireai 

1  lie  Syracusans  block  up  the  roads  tolntercept  their  retreat iS 

Retreat  of  tlie  Athenians-miserable  conditioA  of  the  a?mv        : : : ]ia 


V,*?/!!?'-'?  <^«»fli^'lr"o  progress  made  by  the  retreating  armV    ".  '^' '  {^ 

lartV^yeTr^''^^^^^^^^  °^  ^^'^  parties-change  of  feeling  in"  "the 

Night  march  of  the  Athenians",  in  "an'  altered  direction,' to  Ward  the"  "southern  ^"^^ 

149 


sea . 


gets  across  the  river  Erineus .... : 150 


Separationof  the  two  divisions  under' Ixikias  and" 'Demosthenes" 'The 'first  ^* 
^.division  under  Nikias  jrets  across  the  riv^r  FHn.n.  ^^'""■'^"enes.     ine  nrst  ^_ 

ir  division  ui 

nder  

LIS  overtakes 

gets  to  the  river  Asinarus- intolerable  thirst  and  suffering  of" 'the 
d  his  division  become  prisoners 


suiTendeV''^'''""^^'"  ^^^^^tbenes  is  pursued,  overtaken,' and' forced  to 


vlippus  overtakes  and  attacks  "the 'division  of  Nikias 1^ 

iKiai  erets  to  the  riv^r  AQinni«iia_ir.f/-Ki^«^ui^  *-u:-..J  ''I'j'l'}^". v.-,-*  *''* 


Gv 
N 

soldiers— he  an „  ^.. 

Total  numbers  captured 


prisoners 153 

153 


Hard  treatmeu  t  and  sufferings  "of  the  Athenian  prisoners'  at  Syracuse : : : : : : :  IM 


10 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  Ill 


11 


PAGE 


PAGE 

Treatment  of  Nikias  and  Demosthenes— difference  of  opinion  among  the 

con<iueiors 154 

Influence  of  the  Corinthians— efforts  of  Gylippus— both  the  generals  are 

slain 154 

Disp^race  of  Nikias  after  his  death,  at  Athens— continued  respect  for  the 

memory  of  Demosthenes  155 

Opinion  of  Thuoydides  about  Nikias 155 

How  far  that  opinion  is  just 156 

Opinion  of  the  Athenians  about  Nikias— their  steady  over-confidence  and 

over-esteem  for  him.  arising  from  his  respectable  and  religious  character.  156 
Over-confidence  in   NikiaL>  was  the  greatest  personal  mistake  which  the 

Athenian  public  e  ver  committed 157 

CHAPTER    LXI. 

From  the  Destruction  op  the  Athenian  Armament  in  Sicily  down  to  the 
Oligarchical  Conspiracy  of  the  Four  Hundred  at  Athens. 

Consequences  of  the  ruin  of  the  Athenian  armament  in  Sicily  158 

Occupation  of  Dekeleia  bj-  the  Lacedasmonians-  its  ruinous  effects  upon 

Athens 158 

Athens  becomes  a  military  post— heavy  duty  in  arms  imposed  upon  the 

citizens 159 

Financial  pressure 159 

Athens  dismisses  her  Thracian  mercenaries— massacre  at  I^Iykalessus 160 

The  Thracidns  driven  back  with  slaughter  by  the  Thebans 160 

Athenian  station  of  Naupaktus— decline  of  the  naval  superiority  of  Athens.  161 

Naval  battle  near  Naupaktus— indecisive  result 161 

Last  news  of  the  Athenians  from  Syracuse— ruin  of  the  army  there  not 

olRcially  made  known  to  them 162 

Reluctance  of  the  Athenians  to  believe  the  full  truth.  162 

Tern>r  and  atliiction  at  Athens 163 

Energetic  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Athenians— Board  of  Probuli 163 

Prodigious  etl»'ct  of  the  catastrophe  upon  all  Greeks— enemies  and  allies  of 

Athens  as  well  as  neutrals-  and  even  on  the  Persians 164 

Motions  of  King  Agis 164 

The  Eubanins  apply  to  Agis  for  aid  in  revolting  from  Athens — the  Lesbians 

also  apply  and  are  preferred 165 

Tlie  Chians.  with  the  same  view,  make  application  to  Sparta 165 

Envoys  from  Tissaphernes  and  Pliarnabazus  come  to  Sparta  at  the  same 

time 165 

Alkibiades  at  Sparta— his  recommendations  determine  the  I^cedasmonians 

to  send  aid  to  Chios 166 

Synod  of  the  Peloponnesian  allies  at  Corinth— measures  resolved 166 

Isthmian    festival  —  scruples   of   the   Corinthians  —  delay  about  Chios  — 

suspicions  of  Athens 167 

Peloponnesian  fleet  from  Corinth  to  Chios— it  is  defeated  by  the  Athenians.  167 
Small  squadron  starts  from  Sparta  imder  Chalkideus  and  Alkibiades  to  go 

to  Cliios  168 

Energetic  advice  of  Alkibiades — his  great  u.sef ulness  to  Sparta 168 

Arrival  of  Alkibiades  at  Chios— revolt  of  the  island  from  Athens 169 

General  population  of  Chios  was  disinclined  to  revolt  from  Athens 169 

Di.^may  occasioned  at  Athens  by  the  revolt  of  Chios— the  Athenians  set  free 

and  appropriate  their  reserved  fimd 170 

Ath»^!iian  force  dispatched  to  Chios  under  Strombichides 171 

Activity  of  the  Chians  in  promoting  revolt  among  the  other  Athenian  allies 

— AlkiVjiades  determines  Miletus  to  revolt 171 

First  alliai.ce  between  the  Peloponnesians  and  Tissaphernes  concluded  by 

Chalkideus  at  Miletus 172 

Dishonorable  and  disadvantageou-i  conditions  of  the  treaty 172 

Energetic  eilorts  of  Athens— deUiOcratical  revolution  at  Samos 173 


Peloponnesian  fleet  at  Kenchreas— Astyochus  is  sent  as  Spartan  admiral  to 

Ionia • 174 

E.xpedition  of  the  Chians  against  Lesbos 1 74 

Ill-success  of  the  Cliians— Lesbos  is  maintained  by  the  Athenians 174 

Harassing  operations  of  the  Athenians  against  Chios  ...  175 

Hardships  suffered  bj'^  the  Chians— prosperity  of  the  island  up  to  this  time..  176 

Fresh  forces  from  Athens— victory  of  the  Athenians  near  Miletus 176 

Fresh  Peloponnesian  forces  arrive — the  Athenians  retire,  pursuant  to  the 

strong  recommendation  of  Phrynichus .   .  177 

Capture  of  lasus  by  the  Peloponnesians— rich   plunder— Amorges  made 

prisoner 178 

Tissaphernes  begins  to  furnish  pay  to  the  Peloponnesian  fleet.    He  reduces 

the  rate  of  i>ay  for  the  future 178 

Powerful  Athenian  fleet  at  Samos— unexpected  renovation  of  the  navy  of 

Athens 179 

Astj'ochus  at  Chios  and  on  the  opposite  coast 1^9 

Pedaritus,  Lacedasmonian  governor  at  Chios — disagreement  between  him  * 

and  Astyochus 180 

Astyochus  abandons  Chios  and  returns  to  Miletus — accident  whereby  he 

escaped  the  Athenian  tleet 180 

The  .Athenians  establish  a  fortified  post  in  Chios  to  ravage  the  island 181 

Dorieus  arrives  on  the  Asiatic  coast  with  a  squadron  from  Thurii  to  join 

Astyochus— maritime  contests  near  Knidus  181 

Second  Peloponnesian  treaty  with  Tissaphernes  concluded  by  Astyochus 

and  Theramenes 182 

Comparison  of  the  second  treaty  with  the  first 183 

Arrival  of  a  fresh  Pelopon  lesian  squadron  under  Antisthenes  at  Kaunus— 

Lichas  comes  out  as  Spartan  commissioner 183 

Astyochus  goes  with  the  fl?et  froin  Miletus  to  join  the  newly  arrived  squad- 
ron—he defeats  the  .\thenian  squadron  under  Charminus 184 

Peloponnesian  fieet  at  Knidus  —  double-dealing  of  Tissaphernes  —  breach 

between  him  and  Lichas 184 

Peloponnesian  fieet  masters  Rhodes  and  establishes  itself  in  that  island 185 

Long  inaction  of  the  fleet  at  Rhodeu— paral3'zing  intrigues  of  Tissaphernes— 

corruption  of  the  Lacedaemonian  officers 185 

CHAPTER  LXn. 

TWENTY-PIRST    YeAR  OP  THE  WaR.— OLIGARCHY  OP  FoUR    HitnDRED  AT  ATHENS. 

Rally  of  .\thens  during  the  year  after  the  defeat  at  Syracu.se.  b.c.  412 187 

Commencement  of  the  conspiracy  of  the  Four  Hundred  at  Athens— Alki- 
biades   187 

Order  from  Sparta  to  kill  Alkibiades 1S8 

He  escapes,  retires  to  Tissaphernes.  and  becomes  adviser  of  the  Persians. . .  188 
He  advises  the  satrap  to  assist  neither  of  the  Grecian  parties  heartily— but 

his  advice  leans  toward  Athens,  with  a  view  to  his  own  restoration 189 

Alkibiades  acts  as  negotiator  for  Tissaphernes  at  Magnesia 189 

Diminution  of  the  rate  of  pay  furnished  b^'  Tissaphernes  to  the  Pelopon- 
nesians    1% 

Alkibiades  opens  correspondence  with  the  Athenian  otllceis  at  Samos.    He 

originates  the  scheme  of  an  oligarchical  revolution  at  .Athens 191 

Conspiracy  arranged  betAveen  the  Athenian  officer  and  Alkibiades 191 

Oligarchical  Athenians— the  hetaeries  or  political  clubs.    Peisander  is  sent 

topush  forward  the  conspiracy  at  Athens 102 

Credulity  of  the  oligarchical  conspirators 192 

Opposition  of  Phrynichus  at  Samos  to  the  conspirators  and  to  Alkibiades. . .  193 

Maneuvers  and  counter-maneuvers  of  Phrynichus  and  .Alkibiades 194 

Proceedings  of  Peisander  at  Athens— strong  opposition  among  the  people 
both  to  the  conspiracy  and  to  the  restoration  of  Alkibiades 195 


12 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IIL 


13 


PAGB 

Unwilling  vote  of  the  assembly  to  relinquish  their  d?mocracy  under  the 
promise  of  Persian  aid  for  the  \var.    Peisander  is  sent  back  to  negotiate 

with  Alkibiades 196 

Peisander  brings  the  oligarchical  clubs  at  Athens  into  organized  action 

against  the  democracy 196 

Peisander  leaves  Atliens  for  Samos— Antiphon  takes  the  management  of 

the  oligarchical  conspiracy— Theraraenes  and  Phrynichus 197 

Military  operations  near  the  Asiatic  const 108 

Keg(>tiati(»ns  of  Peisander  with  Alkil)iades 199 

Tricks  of  Alkibiades— he  exaggerates  his  demands  with  a  view  of  breaking 

off  the  negotiation -indignation  of  the  oligarchs  against  him 199 

Reconciliation  l>etween  Tissaphernes  and  the  Peloponuesians 200 

Third  convention  concluded  between  them 2()1 

Third  convention  compared  with  the  two  pieceding 201 

Loss  of  Oropus  b\-  Atliens 202 

Peisander  and  his  colleagues  persist  in  the  oligarchical  conspiracy  without 

Alkibiades 202 

The  attempt  to  subvert  the  democracy  at  Samos— assassination  of  Hyper- 
bolus  and  others 2r)3 

The  democracy  at  Samos  is  sustained  by  tlie  Athenian  armoment 204 

Tlie  Athenian  Parali— defeat  of  the  oligarchical  conspiracy  at  Samos 204 

The  Paralus  is  sent  to  Athens  with  the  news 204 

Progress  of  the  oligarchical  conspiracy  at  Athens— dexterous  management 

of  Antiphon 205 

Language  of  the  conspirators— juggle  about  naming  Five  Thousand  citizens 

to  exercise  the  political  franchise  exclusively 205 

Assassination  of  the  popular  speakers  by  Antiphon  and  the  oligarchical 

party 206 

Return  of   Peisander  to  Athens— oligarchical  government  established  in 

several  of  the  allied  cities , 206 

Consummation  of  the  revolution  at  Athens— last  public  assembly  at  Kolonus.  207 

AlKiIition  of  the  Graphe  Paranonn>n .* 208 

New  erovemment  proposed  by  Peisander- oligarchy  of  Four  Hundred 2CS 

Fictitious  and  nominal  aggregate  called  the  Five  Thousand 208 

The  Four  Hundred  install  themselves  in  the  senate-house,  expelling  the 

senators  by  armed  forcp 209 

Remarks  on  this  revolution.. .' 210 

Attachment  to  constitutional  forms  at  Athens— use  made  of  this  sentiment 

by  Antiphon  to  destroy  the  constitution 211 

Demagogues  the  indispensable  counterpoise  and  antithesis  to  the  oligarchs.  212 

Proceedings  of  the  Four  Hundred  in  the  government 213 

Thev  make  overtures  for  peace  to  Agis  and  to  the  Spartans 21.3 

They  send  envoys  to  the  camp  at  Samos 214 

First  news  of  the  revolution  is  conveyed  to  the  camp  by  Chaereas — strong 

sentiment  in  the  camp  against  the  Four  Hundred 214 

Ardent  democratical  manifestation  and  emphatic  oath  taken  both  by  the 

Athenian  armament  at  Samos  and  by  the  Samians 215 

The  Athenian  democracy  is  reconstituted  by  the  armament— public  assem- 
bly of  the  soldiers—  new  generals  chosen 215 

Alkibiades   opens    correspondence  with  the   democratical    armament  at 

Samos 210 

Alkibiades  comes  to  Samos  on  the  invitation  of  the  armament 217 

Confidence  placed  by  the  armament  in  his  language  and  pr«>mises— they 

choose  him  one  of  their  generals 218 

New  position  of  Alkil)iades— present  turn  of  his  ambition 218 

The  envoys  of  the  Four  Hundred  reach  Samos— are  indignantly  sent  back 

bj-  the  armament .* 219 

Eagerness  of  the  armament  to  sail  to  Peiraeus— is  discountenanced  by  Alki- 
biades—his  answer  to  the  envoys 219 

Dissuasive  advice  of  Alkibiades — how  far  it  is  to  be  commended  as  saga- 
cious   220 


PAGE 

Envoys  sent  from  Argos  to  the  "  Athenian  Demos  at  Samos" 221 

Return  of  the  envoys  of  the  Four  Hundred  from  Samos  to  Athens— bad 

prospects  of  the  oligarchy • 221 

Mistrust  and  discord  among  the  Four  Hundred  themselves.    An  opposition 

party  formed  under  Theramenes ■ •  • 221 

Theramenes  demands  that  the  Five  Thousand  shall  be  made  a  reality 222 

Measures  of  Antiphon  and  the  Four  Hundred— their  solicitations  to  Sparta 

—construction  of  the  fort  of  Eetioneia  for  the  admission  of  a  Spartan 

garrison ^"r^ 

Unaccountable  backwardness  of  the  LacedaBinomans -"224 

Assassination  of  Phrynichus— Lacedaemonian  Meet  hovering  near  Peiraeus. .  225 
Rising  at  Athens  against  the  Four  Hundred— demolition  of  the  new  fort  at 


Eetioneia. 


226 


Decline  of  the  Four  Hundred— concessions  made  by  them— renewal  of  the 

public  Assembly ■  •  • 227 

Lacedaemonian  fleet  threatens  Peiraeus— passes  by  to  Euboea ^^8 

Naval  battle  near  Eretria— Athenians  defeated— Euboea  revolts 228 

Dismay  at  Atliens— her  ruin  inevitable  if  the  Lacedaemonians  had  acted  ^ 
with  energy • •  — ;  —  229 

II-..    i.^ ir.... J„,^^l   r.».^  »^..«-  r1,-wr.T»i f\\£k  HiiTnrwr»»'ar>v  in  ciinsit«.nf»f»   rPSr.r»rHn  Hou 


The  Four  Fiundred  are  put  down- the  democracy  iii  substance  restored. 


Restoration  of  the  complete  democracy,  all  except  pay 2.j2 

PseF)hism  of  Demophaiitus— democratical  oath  prescribed 2:« 

Flight  of  most  of  the  leaders  of  the  Four  Hundred  to  Dekeleia 234 

Theramenes  stands  forward  to  accuse  the  remaining  leaders  of  the  Four 
Hundred,  especially  in  reference  to  the  fort  at  Eetioneia  and  the  embassy 


to  Sparta. 


2:34 


Antiphon  tried,  condemned,  and  executed 2.^6 

Treatment  of  the  Four  Hundred  generally -  •  •  • .- 2:36 

Favorable  judgment  of  Thucydides  on  the  conduct  of  the  Athenians 23* 

Oligarchy  at  Athens,  democracy  at  Samos— contrast 238 

• 

CHAPTER  LXm. 

The  Restored  Athenian  Democracy,  after  the  Deposition  of  the  Four 
Hundred,  down  to  the  Arrival  of  Cyrus  the  Younger  in  Asia  Minor. 

Embarrassed  state  of  Athens  after  the  Four  Hundred 240 

Peloponnesian  fleet— revolt  of  Abydos  from  Athens .240 

Strombichides  goes  from  Chios  to  the  Hellespont— improved  condition  of 

the  Chians 240 

Discontent  in  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  at  Miletus 241 

Strombichides  returns  from  Chios  to  Samos 241 

Peloponnesian  squadron  and  force  at  the  Hellespont— revolt  of  Byzantium 

from  Athens 242 

Discontent  and  meeting  against  Astyochus  at  Miletus 242 

The  Spartan  commissioner  enjoins  the  Milesians  to  obey  Tissaphernes— dis- 
content of  the  Milesians 24.3 

Mindarus  supersedes  Astyochus  as  admiral 243 

Phenioian  fleet  at  Aspendus —duplicity  of  Tissaphernes 244 

Alkibiades  at  Aspendus— his  double  game  between  Tissaphernes  and  the 

Phenicians  sent  back  from  Aspendus  without   action— motives  of  Tissa- 

phernes      «i « 

Mindarus  leave's'  Miletus  with  his  fleet -goes  to  Chios— Thrasyllus  and  the 

Athenian  fleet  at  Lesbos 2|5 

Mindarus  eludes  Thrasyllus  and  reaches  the  Hellespont ^46 

Athenian  Hcdlespoutine  squadron  escapes  from  Sestos  in  the  night. ^6 

Thrasyllus  and  the  Athenian  fleet  at  the  Hellespont ^7 


14 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


Battle  of  Kynossema— victory  of  the  Athenian  fleet "«" 

Rejoieiiip:  at  Atliens  for  the  victorj- 248 

Bridge  across  the  Eunpus,  joining  Euboea  with  Foeotia  240 

Revolt  of  Kyzikus 249 

Zeal  of  Pharnabazus  against  Athens— importance  of  Pei-sian  money 2tD 

Tissapheriies  again  courts  the  Peloponuesians 2M) 

Alkil)iadea  returns  from  Aspendus  to  Samoa 1^1 

Farther  combats  at  the  Hellesf>ont 251 

Theramenes  sent  out  with  re-enforcements  from  Athens 252 

Kenewe<l  troubles  at  Korkj  ra 253 

Alkibiades  is  seized  by  Tissaphernes  and  confined  at  Sardis 253 

Es(rape  of  Alkibiades — concentration  of  the  Athenian  fleet — Mindarus  be- 
sieges Kyzikus ;:^54 

Battle  of  Ky/ikus— victory  of  the  Athenians — Mindarus  is  slain  and  the 

whole  Peloponnesian  lieet  taken 254 

Disctturagement  of  the  Spartans — proposition  to  Athens  for  peace 255 

The  Lacedaemonian  Endius  at  Athens— his  propositions  for  peace 255 

Refused  by  Athens— opposition  of  Kleophon 256 

Grounds  of  the  opposition  of  Kleophon 256 

Question  of  policy  as  it  then  stood  between  war  and  peace 256 

Strenuous  aid  of  Pharnabazus  to  the  Peloponnesians— Alkibiades  and  the 

Athenian  fleet  at  the  Bosphonis 257 

The  Athenians  occupy  Chrysopolis  and   levy  toll  on  the  ships   passing 

through  the  Bosphorus 258 

The  Lacedupmunians  are  expelled  from  Thasus 259 

Klearchus  the  Lacedaemonian  is  sent  to  Byzantium 259 

'Ihrasyllus  sent  from  Athens  to  Ionia  259 

Thrasyllus  and  Alkibiades  at  the  Hellespont 2(J0 

Pylus  is  retaken  by  the  Lacedaemonians — disgrace  of  the  Athenian  Anytus 

for  not  relieving  it 261 

Capture  of  Chalkedon  by  Alkibiades  and  the  Athenians 2<51 

Convention  concluded  by  the  Athenians  with  Pharnabazus 202 

Byzantium  captured  b3'  the  Athenians 262 

Pharnab^izus  conveys  some  Athenian  envoys  toward  Susa  to  make  terms 
with  the  Great  King 263 


CHAPTER  LXTV. 

From  the  Arrival  of  Cyrus  the  Younger  in  Asia  Minor  down  to  the 

Battle  of  Arginus^. 

Cj'nis  the  younger— effects  of  his  coming  down  to  Asia  Minor 264 

Pharnabazus  detains  the  Athenian  envoys ;a65 

Lysander— Laceda-moniaii  admiral  in  Asia 265 

Proceedings  of  the  preceding  admiral,  Kratesippidas 266 

Lysander  visits  C>'rus  at  Sardis 266 

His  dexterous  policj* — he  acquires  the  peculiar  esteem  of  Cj'nis 267 

Abundant  pay  of  the  Peloponnesian  armament  furnished  bj'  Cyrus 268 

Factions  organized  by  Lysander  among  the  Asiatic  cities 268 

Proceedings  of  Alkibiades  in  Thrace  and  Asia 269 

His  arrival  at  Athens 269 

Feelings  and  details  connected  with  his  arrival 270 

Unanimous  welcome  with  which  he  is  received 270 

Effect  produced  upon  Alkibiades .^ 271 

Sentiment  of  the  Athenians  toward  him .....' 271 

Disposition  to  refrain  from  dwelling  on  his  previous  wrongs  and  to  give  him 

a  new  trial 272 

Mistaken  confidence  and  intoxication  of  Alkibiades 272 

He  protects  the  celebration  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries  by  land  against  the 

garrison  of  Dekeleia 273 

Fruitless  attempt  of  Agis  to  surprise  Athens 2^3 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   III. 


15 


page 
Alkibiades  sails  with  an  armament  to  Asia— ill-success  at  Andros— entire 

failure  in  respect  to  hopes  from  Persia 274 

Lysander  at  Ephesus— his  cautious  policy,  refusing  to  fight— disappoint- 

'ment  of  Alkibiades 274 

Alkibiades  goes  to  Phokaea.  leaving  his  tleet  under  the  command  of  Antio- 

chus— oppression  bv  Alkibiades  at  Kyme 275 

Complaints  of  the  Kymaeans  at  Athens— defeat  of  Antiochus  at  Notium 

during  the  absence  of  Alkibiades 275 

Dissatisfaction  and  complaint  in  the  armament  against  Alkibiades 276 

Murmur  and  accusation  against  him  transmitted  to  Athens 276 

Alteration  of  sentiment  at  Athens— displeasure  of  the  Athenians  against 

him 277 

Reasonable  grounds  of  such  alteration  and  displeasure 277 

Different  behavior  toward  Nikias  and  toward  Alkibiades 278 

Alkibiades  is  dismissed  from  his  cojumand— ten  generals  named  to  succeed 

him— he  retires  to  the  Chersonese 278 

Konon  and  his  colleagues -capture  and  liberation  of  the  Rhodian  Dorieus 

by  the  Athenians 279 

Kallikratidas  supersedes  Lysander— his  noble  character 280 

Murmurs  and  ill-will  against  Kallikratidas— energy  and  rectitude  whereby 

he  represses  them 280 

His  spirited  behavior  in  regard  to  the  Persians 281 

His  api^eal  to  the  Milesians— Pan-hellenic  feelings 281 

He  fits  out  a  commanding  fleet— his  successes  at  Lesbos— he  liberates  the 

captives  and  the  Athenian  garrison  at  Methymna 282 

Noble  character  of   this  proceeding— exalted  Pan-helienic   patriotism  of 

Kallikratidas 283 

He  blocks  up  Konon  and  the  Athenian  fleet  at  Mitylene 283 

Triumphant  position  of  Kallikratidas 2S4 

Hopeless  condition  of  Konon— his  stratagem  to  send  news  to  Athens  and 

entreat  relief 284 

Kallikratidas  defeats  the  squadron  of  Dioraedon 285 

Prodigious  effort  of  the  Athenians  to  relieve  Konon— large  Athenian  fleet 

equipped  and  sent  to  Arginusa^ 285 

Kallikratidas  withdraws  most  of  his  fleet  from  Mitylene,  leaving  Eteonikus 

to  coutiniie  the  blockade  — 285 

The  two  fleets  marshaled  for  battle.    Comparative  nautical  skill  reversed 

since  the  beginning  of  the  war 286 

Battle  of  Arginusae —defeat  of  the  Lacedaemonians- death  of  Kallikratidas..  287 
It  would  have  been  better  for  Greece,  and  even  for  Athens,  if  Kalliki'atidas 

had  been  victor  at  Arginusae 287 

Safe  escape  of  Eteonikus  and  his  fleet  from  Mitylene  to  Chios 288 

Jov  of  Athens  for  the  victory— indignation  arising  from  the  fact  that  the 

Athenian  seamen  on  the  disabled  ships  had  not  been  picked  up  after  the 

battle 289 

State  of  the  facts  about  the  disabled  ships,  and  the  men  left  in  them 289 

Dispatch  of  the  generals  to  Athens,  affirming  that  a  storm  had  prevented 

them  from  saving  the  drowning  men 290 

Justifiable  wrath  and  wounded  sympathy  of  the  Athenians— extreme  excite- 
ment among  the  relatives  of  the  drowned  men 200 

The  generals  are  superseded  and  directed  to  come  home 291 

Examination  of  the  generals  before  the  Senate  and  the  people  at  Athens.. . .  291 
Debate  in  the  public  assembly— Theramenes  accuses  the  generals  as  guilty 

of  omitting  to  save  the  drowning  men 292 

Effect  of  the  acctisation  by  Theramenes  upon  the  assembly 2'.*i 

Defense  of  the  generals— they  affirm  that  they  had  commissioned  Thera- 
menes himself  to  undertake  the  duty 292 

Reason  why  the  generals  had  not  mentioned  this  commission  in  their 

<lispatch  .*^ 293 

Different  account  given  by  Diodorus 294 

Probable  version  of  the  way  in  which  the  facts  really  occurred 294 


16 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   ITT. 


Justification  of  the  generals— how  far  valid  ?~The  alleged  storm.    Escaoe 

of  Eteonikus ^    296 

Feelings  of  the  Athenian  public— how  the  case  stood"  before  t hem-decision 

adjoumod  to  a  future  assembly 297 

Occurreuce  of  the  festival  of  Apaturia— the  great  "famiiy'soiemni'ty  of  the 

Ionic  rflce oqq 

Burst  of  feeling  at  the  Apaturia— misrepresented  by  Xenophon! 298 

PiopoPition  of  Kalhxenus  in  the  Senate  against  the  geueials— adopted  and 

submitted  to  the  pubhc  assemblv 299 

Injustice  of  the  resolution —by  depriving  the  generalsof'the  customarv 

secunties  for  jiuhcial  trial.    Psephism  of  Kannonus  300 

Opposition  taken  by  Euryptolemus  on  the  ground  of  constitutional  form— 

Graphe  Paranomon oqj 

Excitement  of  the  assembly— constitutional  ini pediment  overruled 301 

The  Prytanes  refuse  to  put  the  question— their  opposition  overruled  "  all 

except  that  of  Sokrates '         3QJ 

Altered  temper  of  the  assembly  when  the'di-cussion'hadbegim— amend- 
ment moved  and  developed  by  Euryptolemus. ...  qo2 

Speech  of  EurjTDtolemus gj^l 

His  amendment  is  rejected— the  proposition  of  Kailixenus  is  carried 303 

The  SIX  generals  are  condemned  and  executed 304 

Injustice  of  the  proceeding— violation  of  the  democraticai' maxims  and 
sentiments oqa 

Earnest  repentance  of  the  people   sooii  afterward— disgrace  and  end  of 
Kailixenus o/vj 

Causes  of  the  popular  excitement. . ... ..............".'." 305 

Generals— not  innocent  men 3^ 


CHAPTER  LXV. 

From  the  Battle  of  Arginus-e  to  the  Restoration  of  the  Democracy  at 
Athens,  Ab'TER  the  Expulsion  of  the  Thirty. 

Alleged  propositions  of  peace  from  Sparta  to  Athens— doubtful 308 

Eteonikus  at  Cliios — distress  of  his  seamen— conspiracy  suppressed 308 

Solicitations  from  Chios  and  elsewhere  that  Lysander  should  be  sent  out 
again gog 

Arrival  of  Lysander  at  Ephesu.s— zeal  of  his  partisans— Cvrus         309 

Violent  revolution  at  Miletus  by  the  partisans  of  Lvsander  310 

Cyrus  goes  to  visit  his  dying  father— confides  his  tributes  to  Lvsander 310 

Inaction  of  the  Athenian  fleet  after  the  battle  of  Arginusse.    Ooerations  of 

Lvsander ^  qn 

Both  fleets  at  the  Hellespont '.".".*.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.".'. tvi 

Athenian  fleet  at  .^gospotami .*.' 3}.^ 

Battle  of  .Egospotami— surprise  and  capture  of  the  enVii-e  Athetiian  fleet  " "  31^ 
Capture  of  the  Athenian  commanders,  all  except  Konon  " '  313 

Slaughter  of  the  captive  generals  and  prisoners. . .  *  314 

Tlie  Athenian  fleet  supposed  to  have  been  betrayed  by  its  oWn  commander^  314 
Distress  and  agony  at  Athens,  when  the  defeat  of  .Egospotami  was  made 

known  there «^c 

Proceedings  of  Lvsander ii- 

Miserable  condition  of  the  Athenian  Kleruchs.'and^f  the  friends  of  Atiien.s  '  "^ 
m  the  allfed  dependencies.    Sufferings  in  Athens  qir 

Amnesty  proposed  by  Patrokleides.  and  adopted.  qir 

Oath  of  mutual  harmony  sworn  in  the  acropoUs. .  317 

Arrival  of  Lvsander.    Athens  is  blocked  up  by  sea  and  land 31  ■^ 

Resolute  holding-out  of  the  Athenians— their  propositions  lor'capitul'ati'ne 
are  refused . .  ^    "i«"iig 

Pretenses  of  Theramenes— he  is  sent  as  envov— his  stiidied  cieiav qis 

Misery  and  famine  in  Athens— death  of  Kleophon    ,  "^ ^JJ 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  Til. 


17 


PAGE 

The  famine  becomes  intolerable— Theramenes  is  sent  to  obtain  peace  on 

anv  terms  -debate  about  the  terms  at  Sparta 319 

Peace  is  granted  by  Sparta,  against  the  general  sentiment  of  the  allies 319 

Surrender  of  Athens  —  extreme  wretchedness  —  number  of  deaths  from 

famine o*U 

Lysander  enters  Athens— return  of  the  exiles— demolition  of  the  Long  Walls 

—dismantling  of  Peirajus— fleet  given  up 320 

The  exiles  and  the  oligarchical  party  in  Athens— their  triumphant  behavior 

and  devotion  to  Lysander 321 

Kritias  and  other  exiles— past  life  of  Kritias 321 

Kritias  at  the  he?/J  of  the  oligarchs  at  Athens 322 

Oligarchical  leaders  named  at  Athens 322 

Seizure  of  Strombichides  and  other  eminent  democrats 323 

Nomination  of  the  Thirty,  under  the  dictation  of  Lysander 323 

Conquest  of  Samos  by  Lysander— oligarchy  restored  there 324 

Triumphant  retm-n  "of   Lysander   to   Sparta— his  prodigious   ascendency 

throughout  Greece •  .•  •  •  ■ •  •  ••••,••  ^^ 

Proceedings  of  the  Thirty  at  Athens— feelings  of  oligarchical  men  like  Plato  32o 
The  Thirty  begin  their  executions  —  Strombichides  and  the  imprisoned 

generals" put  to  death— other  democrats  also  326 

Senate  appointed  by  the  Thirty— is  only  trusted  to  act  under  their  intimida- 
tion.   Numerous  executions  without  trial 326 

The  senate  began  by  condemning  willingly  every  one  brought  before  them.  326 
Discord  among  the  Thirtv— dissentient  views  of  Kritias  and  Theramenes. .  327 
Lacedaemonian  garrison  "introduced— multiplied  executions  by  Kjitias  and 

the  Thirty .• ; ; .-••.„  ^"^ 

Opposition  of  Theramenes  to  these  measures— violence  and  rapacity  still 

farther  increased— rich  and  oligarchical  men  put  to  death 328 

Plan  of  Kritias  to  gain  adherents  by  forcing  men  to  become  accomplices  in 

deeds  of  blood— resistance  of  Sokrates 328 

Terror  and  discontent  in  the  city— the  Thirty  nominate  a  body  of  Three 

Thousand  as  partisan  hoplites 329 

They  disarm  the  remaining  hoplites  of  the  city 330 

Murders  and  spoliations  by  the  Thirty.    Seizure  of  the  metics SSO 

Seizure  of  Lysias  the  rhetor  and  Ids  brother  Polemarchus.    The  former 

escapes— the  latter  is  executed 3AI 

Increased  exasperation  of  Kritias  and  the  majority  of  the  Thirty  against 

Theramenes v;*^  •-•.• '^ 

Theramenes  is  denounced  by  Kritias  in  the  senate— speech  of  Kritias '662 

Reply  of  Theramenes ^I*' 

Extreme  violence  of  Kritias  and  the  Thirty *>* 

Condemnation  of  Theramenes 335 

Death  of  Theramenes— remarks  on  his  character aw 

Increased  tyranny  of  Kritias  and  the  Thirty 336 

The  Thirty  forbid  intellectual  teaching 337 

Sokrates  and  the  Thirty 338 

Growing  insecurity  of  the  Thirty •  •  • *» 

Gradual  alteration  of  feeling  in  Greece  since  the  capture  of  Athens *» 

Demand  by  the  aUies  of  Sparta  to  share  in  the  spoils  of  the  war— refused 

by  Sparta 339 

Unparalleled  ascendency  of  Lysander ^^^ 

His  overweening  ambition— oppressive  dominion  of  Sparta 340 

Disgust  excited  in  Greece  by  the  enormities  of  the  Thirty , 340 

Opposition  to  Lvsander  at  Sparta— King  Pausanias 341 

Kaflikratidas  compared  with  Lysander 341 

Sympathy  at  Thebes  and  elsewhere  with  the  Athenian  exiles *ta 

Thrasybulus  seizes  Phyle— rep  Ises  the  Thirty  in  their  attack 342 

Farther  success  of  Thrasybulus— the  Thirty  retreat  to  Athens -WS 

Discord  among  the  oligarchy  at  Athens— seizure  of  the  Eleusinians 344 

Thrasybulus  establishes  himself  in  Peirasus 345 

The  Thirty  attack  him  and  are  defeated— Kritias  is  slain 34s 


18 


CONTEXTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


19 


PAGE 

Colloquy  during  the  burial-truce— language  of  Kleokritus 346 

Discouragement  of  the  oligarchs  at  Athens— deposition  of  the  Thirty  and 

ai>pointment  of  the  Ten— the  Thirty  go  to  Eleusis 347 

The  Ten  carry  on  the  war  against  the  exiles 34g 

Increasing  st  reugtli  of  Thrasybulus .*  *         348 

An-'val  of  Lysander  in  Attica  with  a  Spartan  force ......]]]    348 

Straitened  condition  of  the  exiles  in  Peira^us 349 

Spartan  King  Pausanias  conducts  an  expedition  into  Attica:  opposed  to 

Lysander 342 

His  dispositions  unfavorable  to  the  oligarchy:  reaction  against  the  Thirty. '.  349 

Pausanias  attacks  Peirseus:  his  partial  success 3.^0 

Peace-party  in  Athens— sustained  bv  Pausanias 351 

Pacification  granted  by  Pausanias  and  the  Spartan  authorities .351 

The  Spartans  evacuate  Attica— Thrasybulus  and  the  exiles  are  restored— 

harangue  of  Thrasybulus 353 

Restoration  of  the  democracy 353 

Capture  of  Eleusiis— entire  reunion  of  Attica— flight  of  the  sunriVors  of  the 

Tliirty 353 

Summary  relating  to  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  Athenian  empire . . . . .' ." .' '. '. '. '.'."  353 
Appendix  in  explanation  of  the  Plan  of  Syracuse  and  the  operation  dui-ing 

the  Athenian  siege 361 

CHAPTER  LXVI. 

I'rom  the  Restoration-  of  the  Democracy  to  the  Death  of  Alkibiades. 

Miserable  condition  of  Athens  during  the  two  preceding  years 3G9 

Immediate  relief  caused  by  the  restoration— unanimous  sentiment  toward 

the  renewed  democracy  369 

Amnesty— treatment  of  the  Thirty  and  the  Ten .* .....[...[[.[[...  370 

Disfranc  hising  proposition  of  Phormisius 371 

The  pi  opositioii  rejected— speech  composed  by  Lysius  against  it.... ........  iVt'l 

Revision  of  the  laws— the  Noniothetw 372 

Decree  thai  no  criminal  inquiries  should  be  carried  back  beyond  the  archon- 

ship  of  F.ukleides— B.C.  403 370 

Oath  taken  by  the  senate  and  the  dikasts  modified .....]...]...[..  373 

Farther  precautions  to  insure  the  observance  of  the  amnesty 373 

Absence  of  harsh  reactionary  feeling,  both  after  tne  Thirty  and  after  tlie 

Four  Hundred 374 

Generous  and  reasonable  behavior  of  the  Demos— contrasted  with  that  of 

the  oligarchy 374 

Care  of  the  people  to  preserve  the  rights  of  private  property ............  370 

Repayment  to  the  Lace^lsemonians 376 

The  Horsemen  or  Knights 376 

Revision  of  the  la  ws— Xikomachus 377 

Adoi)tion  of  the  fuller  Ionic  alpliabet,  in  place  of  the  old  Attic,  for  writing 

up  the  laws 373 

Memorable  epoch  of  the  archonship  of  Eukleides.    The  rhetor  Lysias . . ....  378 

Other  changes  at  Athens— abolition  of  the  Board  of  KellenotamiBe- restric- 
tion of  the  ritfht  of  citizen.ship 379 

Honorarj-  reward  to  Thrasybulus  and  the  exiles cSO 

Position  and  views  of  Alkibiades  in  Asia 3feO 

Artaxerxes  :vinemon  the  new  king  of  Persia.    Plans  of  Cyrus— Alkibiades 

wishes  to  reveal  them  at  Susa 380 

The  Lacedaemonians  conjointly  with  Cyrus  requirc  Phamatiaaus  to  piit  him 

to  death  ;;.»; 381 

Assassination  of  Alkibiades  by  order  of  Phamabaziis.... .... ..!............    382 

Character  of  Alkibiades : *  agg 


CHAPTER  LXVII. 
The  Drama.— Rhetoric  and  Dialectics.— The  Sophists. 


PAGE 


392 
393 
393 


Athens  immediately  after  Eukleides-political  history  little  known 384 

Extraordinary  development  of  dramatic  genius ^ 

Gradual  enlargement  of  t/agedy -^ 

Abundance  of  new  tragedy  at  Athens ^-^ 

Accessibility  of  the  theater  to  the  poorer  citizens -g^ 

Theorikon  or  festival-play ^o 

Effect  of  the  tragedies  on  the  public  mind  of  Athens. '^f 

Scschvlus.  Sophokles,  and  Euripides-modiflcations  of  tragedy 387 

Popularity  arising  from  expenditure  of  money  on  the  festivals  388 

Growth  ahd  development  of  Comedy  at  Athens ^J 

Comic  poets  before  Aristophanes-Kratinus,  etc . • •  •  ••  ^J 

Exposure  of  citizens  by  name  in  Comedy-  forbidden  for   a   time-then 

reiiewed-Krates  and  the  milder  Comedy ^ 

Aristophanes •  •  •  •  •  ■  •  •  •  •. •.•  •  • oni 

Co  iiedy  in  its  effect  on  the  Athenian  mind •.•;■• : ;. VrX 

Mistaken  estimate  of  the  comic  writers,  as  good  witnesses  or  just  critics. 

Avor.sion  of  Solon  to  the  drama  when  nascent.   ..... ...^ 

Di-  imatic  poetry  as  compared  with  the  former  kinds  Ol  poetry 

Ethical  sentiment,  interest,  and  debate,  infusejl  into  the  fli'ama. .......... .  394 

The  drama  formed  the  stage  of  transition  to  rhetoric,  cbalectics,  and  ethical  ^^^ 

PracticaWahie  and 'necessit.y  of  rhetorical  accomplishments 395 

Rhi'toric  and  dialectics • ' :i  • '   v:  : ' '  ^ ' '  i  'L::.:'^'„1 Qor 

Empedokles  of  Agrigentum-first  name  in  the  rhetorical  movement 397 

Zeiio  of  Elea-first  name  in  the  dialectical  movement ^'^ 

Eleatic  school— Parmenides •  ■ :"V  '-61.,: 

Zeno  and  Melissus-their  dialectic  attacks  upon  the  opponents  of  Par-  ^^^ 

zJ!Jo"at^  Atiiens-iiis'conversationboth  withPerikles"  and  with  Sokrates. ., . .  399 
Eariy  maniflstation  and  powerful  efficacy  of  the  negative  arm  m  Grecian  ^^^ 

RKric^an^ddiaiectics-men  of  active  lifeandmen  of ' speculation-two 

separate  lines  of  intellectual  activity  ••■;•:•••••■••■•; •„  '^V  ■.•■,«;;.■ 

Sending  antithesis  between  these  two  intellectual  classes-vein  of  igno- 

ranee  at  Athens  hostile  to  both •  •  • .- ,  •  • •  ^^ 

Gradual  enlargement  of  the  field  of  education  at  Athens-increased  knowl- 

edee  and  capacity  of  the  musical  teachers •  •  •  ..■ •  -. •••.••  ^^ 

The  Sophists-true  Greek  meaning  of  that  word-mvidious  sentiment  im-  ^^ 

TlL^'^nilSe^Sophist  applied  V  Plato' in  a  in  his  polemics 

aeainst  the  eminent  paid  teachers • •  ••  • y^'-L'-': Ant 

Mkconcei>t-ons  arisin.g  f  rom  Plato's  peculiar  use  of  the  word  Sophist.     404 

Paki  teachers  or  Sophists  of  the  Sokratic  age-Protagoras  Gorgias.  etc.  .  404 
pfato  and  tiie  Sophists-two  different  points  of  view-the  reformer  and 

theorist  against  the  practical  teacher ........ ... ............. ....  100 

The  SophistI  were  professional  teachers  for  active  life,  like  Isokrates  and 

MSinTei-pretations'  of  the'diaio^es' of  Plato'as  carrjnng  evidence  against  ^^ 

The  SopESas  paid  teachers-no  proof  that'  they' were  greedy  or  exo'rbi- 
tnnt nroceedinc:  of  Protagcfras •. ■' '  J  Vxl"  ' 

The  SopEs  as  rhetorical  teachers-groundless  accusations  against  them 
in  that  capacity  made  also  against  Sokrates,  Isokrates,  and  othei-s.        .      408 

Thmsvmachus-his  rhetorical   precepts-Prodikus-his  discnmmation  of  ^^ 

Pi:jS^^i^^?^^"  T^th-his  opini^is  about  the  Pagan' gods ! ! ! ! ! !  4 10 
His  v^w  of  the  cognitive  process  and  its  relative  nature «" 


20 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


21 


PAGE 


Gorprias-his  treatise  on  physical  subjects-misrepresentations  of  the  scope 

Ot  it .•.■..•■....... •••.....,,,,, 

Unfounded  accusations  against  the  Sophists 412 

They  were  not  a  sect  or  school  with  common  doctrines  or  method -11101' 

were  a  protession  with  strong  individual  peculiarities  '  410 

The  Athemau  character  was  not  really  corrupted  between "  480"  b  c  '  and      " 

40o  B.C 

Prodikus— the  choice  of  Hercules 

Protagoras— real  estimate  exhibited  of  him  hy  Plato 

Hippias  of  Ells— how  he  is  represented  by  Plato  

Gorgias,  Polus.  and  Kallikles 

Doctrine  advanced  by  Polus 

Doctrine  advanced  by  Kallikles— anti  social 

Kallikles  is  not  a  Sophist ] ' ' 

The  doctrine  put  into  his  mouth  could' never"  have  been  laid  down  in  anv 

public  lecture  among  the  Athenians ^ 

Doctrine  of  Thrasymachus  in  the  "  Republic"  of  Plato J 

Such  doctrine  not  common  to  all  the  Sophists— what  is  offensive  in  it  is 'the 

manner  in  which  it  is  put  forward .... 

Opinion  of  Thrasymachus  afterward  brought  "ou"t"by'G'la'uko'n-'w'ith' less 

brutality  and  much  greater  force  of  reason 
Plato  against  the  Sophists  generally.     His  category  of  a'ccusatlon"  "compre"- 

hends  all  society  with  all  the  poets  and  statesmen 
It  IS  unjust  to  try  either  the  Sophists  or  the  statesmen  of  Athens  by  tlie 

standard  of  Plato "^ 

Plato  distinctly  denies  that  Athenian  corruption"  "was  to  be  "i*m"puted  to  the 
Sophists 

The  Sophists  were  not  teachers  of  mere  words  apart  from  action 

General  good  effect  of  their  teaching  upon  the  youth 

Great  reputation  of  the  Sophists-evidence  of  respect  for  intellect  and'a 
good  state  of  pubhc  sentiment 

CHAPTER  LXVin. 

SOKRATES. 

Different  spirit  shown  toward  Sokrates  and  toward  the  Sophists 

Birth  and  family  of  Sokrates 

His  phvsical  and  moral  qualities 

Xenophon  and  Plato  as  witnesses 

Their  pictures  of  Sokrates  are  in  the  main  accordant 

Habits  of  Sokrates '[ 

Leading  peculiarities  of  Sokrates !.....!...!!. 

His  constant  publicity  of  hfe  and  indiscriminate  conversation 

Reason  why  Sokrates  was  shown  up  by  Aristophanes  on  the  stage 

His  persuasion  of  a  special  religious  mission 

His  Dapmon  or  Geniu.s — other  inspirations .   . ' 

Oracle  from  Delphi  declaring  that  no  man  was  wi.ser  than  he 

His  mission  to  test  the  false  conceit  of  wisdom  in  others . 
Continence  of   the  religious  motive  with  the  inquisitive  and "  intellectual 
impulse  in  his  mind— numerous  enemies  whom  he  made 

Sokrates  a  religious  missionary,  doing  the  work  of  philosophy 

Intellectual  peculiarities  of  Sokrates 

He  opened  ethics  as  a  new  subject  of  soientiflc  discussiori         

Circumstances  which  turned  the  mind  of  Sokrates  toward  ethical  speciila- 

Limits  of  scientific  study  as  laid  down  bv  Sokrates 

He  confines  study  of  human  affairs  as  distinguished  from'  'divine— to"  man 

and  society "*»" 

Importance  of  the  innovation— multitude  oif  new  and'accessibie'pheijomena 
brought  under  discussion *^  ^^jy^^^^ua, 


411 


41.3 
415 
416 
418 
419 
419 
420 
420 

421 
423 

423 

425 

425 

436 

427 
427 
427 

428 


429 
429 
4.30 

4m 

4.31 
4.32 
43^ 
433 
433 
434 
4.3.5 
435 
436 

4.37 
437 
438 
438 

4.39 
439 

441 

441 


PAGE 

Innovations  of  Sokrates  as  to  method-dialectic  method-inductive  dis-  ^^ 

Com'Sc'^mllft'oT analytical '  consciousness'  "of"  "the  'mental  opeVations-  ^^ 

genera  and  species • •   ••   ■  ••• .,0 

ci-Vi/ rites  eomnared  with  previous  philosophers •  •  • •  •  •   •  .•  •  t*-^ 

Gr^i?  s^p  mSde  by  Sokrates  inSaying  the  foundation  of  formal  logic, 

afterward  expanded  bv  Plato,  and  systematized  by  Anstotle 444 

DialecSl  process  employed  by  Sokrates-essential  connection  between  ^^ 

Es'^entiaf  Sllnec^Von'^llso  V,etw'ee'nth  logical"  dis- 
tribution  of  subject-matter-One  in  Many  and  Many  in  One. 440 

Persuasion  of  religious  mission  in  Sokrates,  prompting  him  to  extend  his 
coUoouial  cross-examination  to  noted  men vVi • 

hS^  cross  examining  purpose  was  not  confined  to  noted  men,  but  of  urn-  ^^^ 

L^actog  Heas  which'  dire'cted '  the  scrutiny' of'  Sokrate's-contrast  b'et"w"e"en 

the  special  professions  and  the  general  duties  of  social  life 448 

Platonic  dialogues-discussion  whether  virtue  is  teachable •  44y 

Conceit  of  knowledge  without  real  knowledge-uni versa  prevalence  of  it.  .  449 
Su?h  confident    persuasion,   without  science,  belonged    at   that   time  to 
astronomy  and  physics,  as  well  as  to  the  subjects  of  man  and  society-it 

is  now  confined  to  the  latter - •  • .- .••.•■•  •  •  •  •  •  ;•  *„" " 

Sokrates  first  lays  down  the  idea  of  ethical  science,  comprising  the  appro- 

priate  ethical  end  with  theory  and  precepts. ,    -^. *  ;^:;;' "f  "^i; 

Earnestness  with  which  Sokrates  inculcated  self-examination-effect  of  his  ^^^ 

Pr'eTpToriiranT  poSdvrex'hort^ti       of"  Sokrates'  chietiy' brought  out  'by  ^^ 

Tlfirwls^nSt  t'he  pecu'liariiy  of  Sokrate's-his  "powerful"  method "  oif"  stirring 
UD  the  analytical  faculties •  •  •  • :C-    :'  «„'^ 

Negative  and  indirect  scrutiny  of  Sokrates  protluced  strong  thirst,  and 
active  efforts  for  the  attainment  of  positive  truth  ••••••■••   1?i 

Inductive  process  of  scrutiny  and  Baconian  spirit  of  Sokrates — .... . . .  ^^ 

Sokratic  method  tends  to  create  minds  capable  of  forming  conclusions  for 
them.selves— not  to  plant  conclusions  ready ^made^. ^o 

Grecian  dialectics  -their  many-sided  handling  of  subjects-force  of  the  ^^ 

The  ^sn!bjecte"to'  which'  they'  were  applied-^'m'an  and  society-essentiaUy 

required  such  handling— reason  why ;;^-  •^-  -i^-'l t-? 

Real  distinction  and  variance  between  Sokrates  and  the  Sophists.   4.^^ 

Prodijrious  efficacy  of  Sokrates  in  forming  new  philosophical  minds      4M 

Genenil  theory  of  Sokrates  on  ethics-he  resolved  virtue  mto  knowledge  or 

wisdom li  •■:{.■■  i'  ■  "i dkq 

This  doctrine  defective  as  statmg  a  part  for  the  whole ...   :•:•■•  v  •••.••••  *  f^i 
He  was  led  to  this  general  doctrine  by  the  analogy  of  special  professions. . .  4(.0 

Constant  reference  of  Sokrates  to  duties  of  practice  and  detail 4t)U 

The  derivative  reasonings  of  Sokrates  were  of  larger  range  than  his  general 

doctrine • a(\i 

Political  opinions  of  Sokrates •  • : 

Long  period  during  which  Sokrates  exercised  his  vocation  as  a  pubhc  con-  ^^ 

Accusation  against  li'iin'by  Me'letus,  Anytus,  and  Lykon • •  4G3 

The  real  ground  for  surprise  is  that  that  accusation  had  not  been  preferred  ^^^ 

Inevitable  'unpopiilaritv  incurred  by  Sokrates  in  his  mission .   ■^'^^ 

It  was  only  from  the  general  toleration  of  the  Athenian  democracy  and 

population  that  he  was  allowed  to  go  on  so  long. .  •••••••:•••• *^* 

Particular  circumstances  which  brought  on  the  trial  of  Sokrates 4ba 

UnpolSilartty  arising to'sokrates  "from"  his  connection  with  Krit'ias  and  Alki-  ^^ 
blades  


22 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IIL 


23 


Enmity  of  the  poets  and  rhetors  to  Sokrates  ''^^ 

Indictment-grounds  of  the  accnsers-eflfect  of  the'''ciouds''  of  AristoDh 
anes  m  creatmg  prejudice  against  Sokrates.  Ansioph- 

grounds'".  .'^^^'.''.'^^^^^^^^  teaching   was  partly  founded    on   political 

Pervei-sion  of  the  poets  alleged  against  him' jfl 

Remarks  of  Xenophon  upon  these  accusations i^ 

H^  pofi[fcS'rrlc!'tt"rPes" '^:'.:^.'^"^"^"  P^^"'  "''  '^^  Sokratic  Ethical  ti.eory;:  m 


con- 


'^  curr^nce^  .*^^'"^\^;'.^'^*^^  "^^^  *"'""^*'^ '  ''P^'^'  ^"'°''  P^^*>'  "^y" ^^^^  "«^ '^  '^' 

Small  majority  by  which  he  was 'condemned Ilj 

Sokrates  elefended  himself  like  one  wno  did  notcam  tn  h;.«'^V;;,itV^i ::l. 


The  ["Platonic  Apology 


wno  did  not  care  to  be  acquitted  . .... . .  471 


Sentiment  of  Sokrates  about  death 

Effect  of  his  defense  upon  the  Dikasts 

^Sfose^JTiE!^  .^.'''!!*f  ^""^  ^^^^  Sokrates  might  have  bi;en  acqiiitt^  if  he  iiad 

The  sentence— how  passed  in  Athenian  procedure 

histehavfof  ^.^'?."^'*''  '''  ^'^''P''^^  s«°i«  counter-penalty  against  himself- 
^  bf  havtor''''.  ^.^^'!^.  '"  ^^^  ^'•'^^^^  ^ainsthim  in'  consequence  of  his 
Sentence  of  death-resAiuteadherence  of  Sokrates  to  his  own'  convictions ' ' 
Satisfaction  of  Sokrates  with  the  sentence  on  deliberate  con vic^t?on 

^'^l^ii^'I^JS^J^'''  '^^'^-^^   ^^^"^-  ^-  --P^  '^^  -eans  of 
Originality  of  Sokrates '.'.",]', 

Views  taken  of  Sokrates  as  a  moral  preacher  and  as  a  skentic-the "first 
inadequate— the  second  incorrect .....   •         si^t^pnc    me  ni  st 


472 
473 
474 

474 
475 

475 

476 

476 

477 


478 
479 


Sokrates  positive^and  practical  in  his  end-negative  only  in  nis  means  4«0 

Two  points  on  which  Sokrates  is  systematically  negativi  4^ 

Method  of  Sokrates  of  universal  application  iS} 

Condemnation  of  Sokrates-one  of  the  misdeed.s  of  intolerance Sa 

dumber  of  personal  enemies  made  by  Sokrates  ...   !«? 

his  condemnation  brought  on  by  himself. .  Two 

The  Athenians  did  not  repent  it.. ^''.i.'!!!.*!!.'!!!.'!'.*.!;;! 484 

CHAPTER  LXIX. 
Cyrus  the  Younger  and  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks. 

Spartan  empire .p  . 

March  of  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks. . . . . .". t^t 

Persian  kings -Xerxes— Artaxerxes  Longimanus. ." j^ 

Darius  Nothus ' ^ 

?rt'h  an1l^e7uTa',^iS  ^1%^'.  "8»™«  "P-^ion^  ogainstA.hens. : ! ! !  i ! !  i  |i 

His  esteem  for  the  Greeks— his  hopes  of  the  crown "  iS? 

Death  of  Darius  Nothus-succession  of  Artaxerxes  Mnemon 22^ 

Secret  preparations  of  C>tus  for  attacking  )iis  brother  i«5 

Klearclius  and  otlier  Greeks  in  the  service  of  Cvrus      Iko 

Strict  administration  and  prudent  behavior  of  Cyrus Ion 

Cyrus  collects  his  army  at  Sardis. . .  l"ix 

The  Ten  Thousand  Greeks-their  position  aAd  circumstances' 40? 

Xenophon ^•'^ 

How  Xenophon  came  to  join  the  'Cyreian  a'rmv'.'.'. ml 

Cyrns  marches  from  Sardis— Kolossae-Kelajn®. aoo 

Peltifi— Keramon-Agora,  Kaystru-Pedion 4^ 


PAGB 

Distress  of  Cyrut;  for  money-Epyaxa  supplies^  :::::::.:::'.  m 

Tiivmbrium-Ty riueum-review  of  the  Greeks  by  Lyi us ^^^ 

Ikoniui ii— Lykaonia-Tyana '."'.'.".'.  494 

Kiss  over  '^^;'^'^''^^^i^^;^y::^.  assistsCynis  "with'mon^y ! '.".'. 495 

f^n;' n  Tar   i'-^niTt    y  o7tl\e  Greeks-^^        refusal  to  go  farther 49o 

klearohus  tdes  to  suppress  the  mutiny  by  seventy-he  fails 4J-> 

lie  ?iies  persuasion  -his  discourse  to  the  soldiers ^Jb 

S^.lS^.e:^SsS''S^I^sI^^^th^  soldieWround'to'Cyrus:::::  49. 

The  sokJiers  ag^^^^^^     accompany  Cyrus  farther-increase  of  pay 49. 

March  on ward-f rom  Tarsus  to  Issus  . .  ^.^^^^ ••••••;     ^^ 

Flight  of  Abrokomas-abandonment  of  the  passes ^^ . 

Gates  of  Kilikia  and  Syria • y^--\ 4  ♦') 

Desertion  of  Xenias  and  Passion-pmdence  of  Cyrus.     . . . -^ 4a 

Cv  us  m  trches  from  the  sea  to  Thapsakus  on  the  Eup^^^^^^^^^  •  -^ 

Prvctical  reluctance  of  the  army-they  ford  the  Euparates ^  ^ 

PviS'chilSiaS^angerousdisputebetween'^he  soldiei^  of  Klearchus  ^^ 

F^^i!;^>V^^^"-t.•easonof  Oronte^  ^;| 

Discour-;e  of  Cvrus  to  his  offi  -ers  and  soldiers. ,.._    ^ 

Concept  ioM  formed  b v  Cyrus  of  Grecian  superiority 5()4 

Present  of  Cvi'us  to  the  prophet  Silanus 5^3 

rsr-Tur>i;;r^j;!,^S^.t;r<rt??!2id„g'sa™y-prep.^^^^^ 

battle  506 

Baa  le'o^KmfaxrSisy- victory  of'theGi^eeks'on  iheirside:  '.W. 507 

Iinpetuous  attack  of  Cyrns  upon  his  broth.n'-Cyrus  is  slam -|^ 

^^jf^'S^Sy^  ^[;^^^S^  •  Vict^ri;^us  a^itude  of  the  ^ 
Greeks 510 

K^'c^rushkdScc^^^^^^^ 
Greece 

CHAPTER  LXX. 
Retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks. 
of  the  Greeks  on  learning  the  death  of  Cynl^    Klearchus  offers  ^^^ 


-their  reply— language  of 


Dismav 

the  throne  to  Ari#us •■•••■•••   '  1 'a:.:. 

Artaxerxes  summons  the  Greeks  to  surrendei 

AdS'l^fuses  the  throne.'butinvites'theGreeks  to  join  ^'i'm  f  or'retreat^ 
The  Greeks   rejoin  Ari^us-interchange  of  oaths-resolution   to   retn 

tc^Gi nf*v •  •  •  • 

^^.:£^^SlS:^^^^i^T^^  S,r  Ui^o-rder  Of  the  a.™y !  i ! : 

¥i";rlS-il-;f  c-Sc-rSI  'SSS  t°"v'i,Crfur„ishea-  .ith  proVisiuns. 

March  over  tlie  canals.   ....-•  •■  •  •  •    • 

\bundant  supplies  obtained  in  the  villages 

Visit  of  Tissaphernes-nejotiat mn^^     _  .^^    -^  •  ^  •  ■   ---  -  coiidu'ct'  the 
Convention    concluded   witli    1  l^.•^apnernes.  \\  no  tu^aj^fs  tv^  ^^^ 

Greeks  home 


.511 
512 

.M.3 
.513 
.514 
514 

515 
.515 
516 


24 


CONTEXTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IIL 


25 


^Il'i^Si^^SSr^^                                           toward  C^^f  ^ 
Secret  despair  of  Klearchus  ..         " *^' ^ "^  Arueus 5^7 

""^t^J^^SliX"'  Tissapherne^they  enter  within  ti^e  Wall  ''' 

Suspicions  between^the  Gree!:s  and  Ti'S^pKiel         '  ^^^^^  Zab 5^ 

K  earchus  converses  with  Tissaphernes-ind  is  tal iced  over l^] 

KI(-archus,  with  tlie  other  Grecian  eenerals  visit  Ti-«cnr>w.;"  •■ '  i-- ' ' '^^' 

Tissaphernes  seizes  the  GreekTene^als^  V^^^^  ^-- 

Persian  court  and  there  put  to  death  ^  '''''  "''"^  pnsoiie.s  to  the 

Menon  IS  reserved  to  perish  in  torture-sentinients  of'Oiieen  Parvs^iVic S 

How  Klearchus  came  to  he  imposed  upon ....  ^  Parysat.s ^^ 

The  army  is  convened  in  general  assembly-sp^eclVof  XenoDhon ?S 

Favorable  augury  from  a  man  sneezin-  ^enopnon 528 

Kncouraj,'mg  topics  in:*isted  on  by  Xenojihon *^^ 

SSlspfepo^i"  "■*•"'•■'=''  •'>•  '"■■'=I«'e-''-t'>e  annyconfinnVhenewgen-.  °^ 

'^bml-erv'.'"'. '".  .*'.°^".™''''. """  '^""fi J'-^n^^'.  with  soidjerlike  resource  and  ^ 

Approach  of  the  Perkiaii'  Mithridates-tiie  Greeks  retuw  ail  nirlev t»> 

ca."lrv  '"'^''""'■^^'"""'■"'''^"■"'^  "»''■•  "^■■•■■hl.ami^by  the  Persian  ^ 

't;^ltfu°l  ^l^cS^S.Ur,','"""''''"^'"'^'^^  tbe- attacks  Of- the  cavahy.  =*= 
Tis.saphernes  renews  the  attach  with  some  effect i^ 

''°™/„"'r;eVf'i'^'t':;;;.S'rd"^  """''"'■    '"'"'>-  "'"'  '°  ■•'•^•'  '"e  caval.V;a„d  "^ 
Victoiy  of  the  Greeks-prowess  of  Xenophon. '*.'.".".".'.'.! ! '.'.'.][][ JH 


536 
* 

ener-y  of  the  Karduchiansr """    ^--^nngs  from  .the  acti^i^y"  and 

Extreme  dan^-er  of  their  situation  ^^ 

'  rhTiPo^T  "^  ^^  """^  another  road  to  tuni  the  enemy's  position S^ 

The  Karduchians  are  defeated  and  the  road  cleared    *^"''"'''° gj 

Danger  of  Xenophon  with  the  rear  division  and  baegaee ^S 

Anxiety  of  the  Greeks  to  recover  the  ho<lies  of  the  Jhiln   Kn 

l^^'  T.^'^''  ^l'^  "^•''''  Kentrites.  the  northern  boumiarv  of  Karduchia KX 

Difficulties  of  passing  th-^  Kentrites-dream  of  Xenophon  ^^'^'^"''^'* g^ 

They  discover  a  ford  and  pass  the  river  -^^^""pnon 540 

^llJg?^.'!^  '';^.'^.  '^^.  f!'.''.^^'''^  '*'^^''  the  Karduchians  and"  effects'  his"  pas'-  ^^^ 

March  through  Armenia."    HeavV  siiow  and  severe  mM ^"^^ 

They  ford  the  Eastern  Euphrates  or  Murad  ^^ 

Distressing  marches— extreme  micoi-i-  f nr.r«  ..Ui^  ,: :.  j  l.'  • 543 

Rest 
After 

^beIweenX;uii;hirai;r«;^SpL?;b'o"u^S^^-'^^^^ 


PAGE 

They  turn  the  pass  by  a  flank-march  and  force  their  way  over  the  moun-  ^^^ 
IVlSch'  throiigh'the  country  of 'the  Taochi-exhaustiou  of  provisions-cap-  ^^^ 

Throiigh  fhe'chalybes,'the  bravest  fighters  whom'  they  had  yet  seen-the 

Skytliini .•••••«•/, • 'r    i 

Thev  reach  the  flourishing  city  of  Gymnias •-..-•••• • r i-'   ' ;  ^^f 

First  sight  of  the  sea  from  the  mountain -top  Theches- extreme  dougat  of  ^^  ^ 

the  soldiers 'r  ,\ 

Passage  tlirough  the  Makrones • ;••-":    1 "r  " 

Through  the  Kolchians-who  oppose  them  and  are  defeated •> ; 

Kolchiau  villages— unwholesome  honey ;': 

Arrival  at  Trapezus  on  the  Euxine  (Trebizoud)  .  •••••••■■  •  •  •  • ;  •   •  •  •  .•  ■•,■  -  \  '"^^ 

Joy  of  the  Greeks-their  discharge  of  vows  to  the  Gods-their  festivals  and  ^^^^ 

ApSfix  on'  tii'e  'Geogi-aphy  'of '  t:h'e  "Retreat  between  'the  'Tigris  and  the  ^ 
Karduchian  Mountains '^'^ 

CHAPTER  LXXI. 

Proceedings   op   the   '"ex   Thousand   Guekics   from   ths   time   that  they 

REACHKO   TllAPEZUS    TO  TUEIR  JUNCTION  WITH  THE  LACEDEMONIAN  AR^iV   IN 

Asia  Minor. 

Greek  cities  on  the  Euxine— Sinope  with  her  colonies  Kerasus,  Kotyora,  ^_ 

o«-i  T*p'i|'jp/ns  • ••    "•••'■•    •••••   •>•*•' 

Indigenous  in  habitant  s-their'relations  with  the  Greek  colonists 55.J 

Feelings  of  the  Greeks  on  the  Euxine  when  the  Ten  Thousand  descended  ^^ 

among  them , •.;••, tir 

Uncertainty  and  danger  of  what  they  miglit  lo ■  •  •   •  •  o«>^ 

Plans  of  the  army-Cheirisophus  is  sent  to  Byzantium  to  procure  vessels  for  ^^^ 

transporting  ihein  • • •••:•••:•.•••: r--- 

Regulations  for  the  army  proposed  by  Xenophon  during  his  absence o.h 

Adopted  by  the  army— their  intense  repugnance  to  Xurther  raarchuig. ......  oM 

Measures  for  procuring  transports.      Maraudhig  expeditious  for  supplies  _ 

against  the  Colchians  and  the  Drilae -  •   • ••■•••   ;»i« 

The  army  leave  Trapezus  and  march  westward  along  the  coast  toKerasus..  JoJ 
Acts  of  (iisorder  and  outrage  committed  by  various  soldiei-s  near  iverasus. .  5».» 

3Iarch  to  Kotyora -hostilities  with  the  Mosynceki -•^■' 

•--  " —  ■^'- -  *- '"-■  r>uu 

501 


r>ri 

sea , [-,•« 

Envoys  sent  by  the  army  to  Sinope  to  procure  vessels j_^  ;i 

Poverty  and  increasing  disorganization  of  the  ariny  —  •  •  • .- •  •  ■  ■  • V' .'  t 

Ido  IS  of  Xenophon  about  founding  a  new  city  in  the  Euxine  with  the  army.  ;.«.- 
Sacriiice  of  Xenophon  to  ascertain  the  will  of  the  gods— treachery  of  the 

ijrophet  Silanus •. .•   ■•••   : ••;  ^^'^ 

Sil.inus,  Timasion,  and  others  raise  calumnies  against  Xenophon— geneial 

assembly  of  the  army ^' 

Accusations  against  Xenophon— his  speech  in  defense ■■■■■■,■ ;^ ;* 

He  carries  the  soldiers  with  him— discontent  and  flight  of  Sdanus. ...._. *b4 

Fresh    maneuvers  of  Tim  ision— fresh  calumnies  circulated  against  Xeuo- 

phon— renewed  discontent  of  the  army ^7 

Xenophon  convenes  the  assembly  again f'l 

His  addi-ess  in  defense  of  himself •S:^i 

I  lis  remonstrance  against  the  disorders  m  the  army •.  •  •  •  ■  •  • :  ^^ 

Vote  of  the  array  unanimously  favorable  to  Xenophon-disapproving  the 

disordei.-s  and  directing  trial ^* 


26 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   III. 


Xenophon's  appeal  to  universal  suffrage  as  the  legitimate  political  author^^^^ 

iry.    Success  of  his  ai)peal s/j~ 

Xenophon  recommends  trial  of  the  generals  before' a  tribunal  formed  of  '    ' 

the  lochages  or  captams.    Satisfaction  of  the  army  with  Xenophon  508 

Manner  m  which  discipline  was  upheld  by  the  officers  56* 

Coniplete  triumph  of  Xenophon.    His  influence  over  the  army  derived  from      "" 

his  courage,  his  frankness,  and  his  oratory  . .  5C() 

Iinproved  feeling  of  the  army-peace  with  the  Paphlagonian  Korylas'. '.'.""  5,0 

The  army  pass  by  sea  to  Sinope  *-      &  .  50 

Return  of  Cheirisophus— resolution  of  the  army  to  elect' a' single  cenerai—    ' 

they  wish  to  elect  Xenophon.  who  declines-Clieirisophus  is  chosen .  CTO 

The  army  pass  by  sea  to  Herakleia-they  wish  to  ext<»rt  money  from  the 

Herakleots— opposition  of  Cheirisophus  and  Xenophon  .  ^-i 

Dissatisfaction  of  the  army-they  divide  into  three  factions,    i "  The  Area-  ' 

dians  and  Achceaiis.    2.   A  division  under  Cheirisophus.    3.   A  division 

under  Xenophon ^  r^ 

Arcadian  division  ■■*"-*•  ■^--'-  — '      ^  "        • -    ' 

danger  and  ar 

board  of  genen 
Distress  for  provisions  at  Kalpe-unwillin^ess  to  move  .«   tx.^  xu^t.-  ^n 

unfavorable  sacnHces-ultiinate  victory  over  the  troops  of  the  country     572 
Malt  at  Kalpe-comtottable  quarters— idea  that  they  were  about  to  seiUe 
there  as  a  colony ■      "^  .^^ 

Arrival  of  Kleauder,  the  Spartan  harm'ost,' from' Byzantium.' together' witli  ^" 
Dexippus •      b       '-'   """.._ 

Disorder  in  the  army:  mutiny  against'kleander  arising  from"  'the  treachery  '"' 
of  Dexippus ^'•'  ^^. 

IndignRtion  and  threats  of  Kleauder— Xenophon  "persuades  the  arm'y  to  *"* 

submit— fe:ir  of  ."-paita ,     .  "^        ,--^ 

Satisfaction  given  to  KJeander,  by  the  voluntary  surrender  of  Agasia's  with  '" 


the  mutinous  soldiers 


0(0 


Appeal  to  the  mercy  of  Kleander,  who  is  completely  soothed 576 

Kieander  takes  the  command,  expiess-ng    the  upmost    friendship 'both 

toward  the  array  and  toward  Xenophon 575 

Unfavorable  sacrifices  ma^ce  Kleander  throw  up  the  command  and  sail 

away er-g 

March  of  the  army  across  the  countri'  from  Kalpe  to  ciialkedon 577 

Fharnabazus  bribes  Anaxibius  to  carry  the  army  across  the  Bosi)h'orus  into 

Europe— false  promises  of  Anaxibius  *o  the  aiTny 577 

Intention  of  Xenophon  to  leave  the  army  immediately  and  go  home—first 

proposition  addressed  to  him  by  Seuthes  of  Thrace    "  577 

The  army  cross  over  to  Byzantium-fraud  and  harsh  dealing  of  Anaxibius 

who  solids  the  army  at  once  out  of  the  town . .  577 

Last  ordei-s  of  Anaxibius  as  the  soldiers  were  going  out  of  the  gates 578 

AVrathandmutmy  of  the  soldiers  in  going  away— they  rush  again  into  the 

gates  and  muster  within  the  town 57a 

Terror  r.f  Anaxibius  and  all  within  the  town 579 

Tile  e.xasperated  soldiers  masters  of  Byzantium— danger  of  all  within  it- 
conduct  of  Xenophon 5^ 

Xenophon  musters  the  soldiers  in  military  order  and  harangues  them 581 

Xenophon  calms  the  army  and  persuades  them  to  refrain  from  assaulting 
the  town— message  sent  by  them  to  Ana.vibius— they  go  out  of  Bvzantium 

and  agree  to  ac«^ept  Kfpratadas  as  their  commander '  581 

Remarkable  effect  produced  by  Xenophon— evidence  which  it  affords  of  the 

susceptibility  of  the  Greek  mind  to  persuasive  influences  58^ 

Xenophon  leaves  the  army  and  goes  into  Byzantium  witli  the  view  of  sail- 
ing home.    Kcpratadas  is  dismissed  from  the  command  58,3 

Dissension  among  the  commanders  left 5.S4 

Distress  of  the  army- Aristarchus  arrives  from  Sparta  to  supersede  Klean- 
der Pol  us  on  his  way  to  supersede  Anaxibius 534 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


27 


PAGB 


585 

585 


Pharnabazus  defrauds  Anaxibius,  who  now  employs  Xenophon  to  convey  ^^ 
the  Cvreians  across  back  to  Asia ;  ■ ;  •   •,•.  —  l V  Vil -'^v  ^ 

Aristarchus    hinders    the    crossing-his     cruel   dealing   toward   the   sick 
Cvreians  left  in  Byzantium •   •  -  • -"i 

His' treacherous  scheme  for  entrapping  Xenophon «»o 

Xenophon  is  again  implicated  in  the  conduct  of  the  army-he  opens  nego- 

tiations  with  Seuthes ,•  •  ^i-  •  •  v  •  Vi kk7 

Po  ition  of  Seuthes-his  liberal  offers  to  the  army  •••••••• ^^i 

Xenophon  introduces  him  to  the  army,  who  accept  the  offers 5H, 

Serv  ce  of  the  army  with  Seuthes,  who  cheats  them  of  most  of  their  pay      .  5bi 
The  army  suspect  the  probity  of  Xenophon-  unoust  calumnies  against  him 

-he  exposes  it  in  a  public  harangue  and  regains  their  confidence 588 

Change  of  interest  in  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  become  anxrous  to  convey 

the  Cvreians  across  into  Asia,  in  order  to  make  war  against  the  satraps. .    588 
Xenophon  crosses  over  with  the  army  to  Asia-his  poverty-he  is  advised 

^  to  sacrifice  to  Zeus  Meilichios-beneflcial  effects -;:■; 

He  condM. 'ts  the  army  across  Mount  Ida  to  Pergamus  •:•••■■•••.•••••  :;;•••  %,^. 
His  unsuccessful  attempt  to  surprise  and  capture  the  rich  Persian  Asidates.  5  h) 
III  a  second  attempt  he  captures  .\sidates-valuable  booty  seeurecL  5i)l 

General  sympathy  expressed  for  Xenophon-large  share  personally  allotted  ^^^ 

The  CniiVns'are'  i'ncoinj'orated  in't'he'army  of"  "the  Lacedaemonian  general 
Thiinbron-Xenophon  leaves  the  army,  depositing  his  money  m  the  temple  ^^^ 

nS^su:Vse^ii\ent"returnto  A^^^^  the  Cj-reians  as  a  part 

of  the  Lacedaemonian  army :  •  •  *  •; "   "  ■"i -"I'ii  *^v.'^"^o "  'v.L'  io 

Xeiio])hon  in  the  Spaitan  service  with  Agesilaus  agamst  Athens-he  is 

He  settlers  at'skil'lus  near'o'lympi'a,' on  an  "estate"  consecrated  t'o  Artemis 
Charms  of  the  residence-good  hunting-annual  public  sacrifice  offered  by 

LcSlife^of  Xeno"p"ho'n-"exp"elled 'from  "Skilius"  after  the  battle  of  "Leuktra 

—afterward  restored  at  Athens •••;•••,;,•■    „,;  * J W' 

Great  impression  produced  by  the  retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand  upon  the 

Greek  mind ^^ 


591 

592 
592 

593 

593 


CHAPTER  LXXII. 


Greece  under  the  Lacedjemonian  Empire. 


Sequel  of  Grecian  affairs  generallj-— resumed  

Spartan  empire— how  and  when  it  commenced 

Oppression  and  suffering  of  Athens  under  the  Thii-ty •  ■  •  •  •  -•••■• 

Alteration  of  Grecian  feeling  toward  Athens-the  Thirty  are  put  down  and 

The  Kntffhts  <^r  Horsemen^  'the  'ricliest  proprietors  at  Athens,  were  the  great 
supporters  of  the  Thirty  in  their  tyranny ,  •  •  ;•  1;  •  :■;  .• ; "  AAoi^-'^H 

The  state  of  Athens,  under  the  Thirty,  is  a  sample  of  that  which  occurred 
in  a  large  number  of  other  Grecian  cities  at  the  commencement  of  the 

G?earpmVer'of"Lysande'r-h"e  establishes  in"mostof"  the  cities  Delcarchies, 

alona:  witii  a  Spartan  harmost    ••••:•; y ; '." " ' '  '„'  ;.„MfV 

Intimidation  exercised  everywhere  by  Lysander  in  favor  of  his  ou  n  parti- 
sans   

Oppressive  action  of  these  Dekarchies 

In  some  points  probably  worse  than  the  Thirty  at  Athen^.^.....^.  ..^..  •  .•• 
Bad  conduct  of  the  Spartan  h".rmosts-harsh  as  well  as  corrupt.    No  jus- 
tice to  be  obtained  against  them  at  Sparta  ••••••• •  •  -^  •  >;,:!,,,• '" 

Contrast  of  the  actual  empire  of  Sparta,  with  the  promises  of  freedom 
which  she  had  previously  held  out 


595 
595 
596 


596 
597 

597  1 

597 

598 
598 
599 

600 

600 


28 


CONTEXTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


29 


llfuI^^^^^^aT^elZTy^'  ""^^"^"^^  -^^«  ^y  Sparta-by  the  Spartan"^"' 

""tt^^lS^i^i^ir^-^^  '""^  P^*»«  '-^'^-^-  toward  -the-  close  of  "^ 
Lnn{,'uage  of  Brasidas contrasted  with  th^'nn't'^'^e  i ','"    i G()3 

Kuilty  of  little  or  nS  oppression                              ^^^^^'^  autonomy,  but  was 
Imperial  Sparta  did  this  and  much  worso^hpr  'hn'^-'r:.'^'* y:, 600 

more  complained  of  than  the  fact  of^tTemDh-e'^^^  ^""^  decemvi,^  are 

This  IS  the  more  to  be  regretted  as  Snarta  ffi  v,,.' A': 606 

^  tunitj  for  organizing  a  good  and  stab^ronnfl//  ."'''''  fx"  a^^^irable  oppor- 
Sp  n-ta  inight  have  recogSzefl  Uxe  co2fe5eracv^o7?^^^^^^^^  ^r^^'^^-  607 

have  been  made  to  work  well       ^""^^"^^^c>  of  Delos,  which  might  now 

^'^^SIX^^""  ■^^'=""=  ""'^^^  toPeWW/accoriing  to  ,he  .rea.y  conciuded  '^ 

^Sasan^Jik^MLS?"^-  Ti-Phernes  S.^i'^lr/Srvic.o.  and  satrap  .o  tiie  "" 

IS  superseded  bv  Derkvllidas     ^  ^  iH-.success  and  recall-he 

Condu.'t  of  tho  C.vreians  loose  as  topillflVe ^^^ 

'  tilers  aiSl^S^i!:!'^^^^^^^  Tissaph^nes  andattacksPha^aba^sm  ''' 


the 


614 


Invasion  and  cV.'nqSJsi  of  "Eoiis  bv  nirkvfilll.    '"'"^namly  refused. . .: 
person  of  Meidii"  ^  DerkjJlidas,  who  gets  possession  of 

yS^^^^Se^Z^;^^ Scepsis  and-  Get^s/depositig- Meidias; 

in'Bll&r.':'"''^^  "  "•"'••''  """  P''^™a'«'^s-andmkes-.interquarte«  "" 
''X^^rtr,:'c?.S£:f  »^--"^'-"-  of  Spartawith  the  improved  con.  "" 


lit-  captures  and  ganisons  Atarneus 
He  makes  war 


pa'ge 
Great  power  of  the  Spartans-they  take  revenge  upon  those  who  had  dis- 

Tll2^l^^^tis^aS|rEipterritory:-He  retire 

The  Efeians  are  obliged  to  submit  to  hard  terms  of  peace.     . . . ^ 

imrta  refuses  to  restore  the  Pisatans  to  the  Olympic  presidency. . ...  .^^  .^.  b^ 

T?fumphaiU  pos?tiou  of  Sparta-she  expels  the  Messemans  trom  Pelopon-  ^^ 
nesus  and  its  neighboi-hood 

CHAPTER  LXXin. 
Agesilaus  Kino  op  Sparta.-The  Corinthian  War. 


dr^umstances' which  then  became  operative  on  Spartu^-- 6-6 

Contrast  between  Spa-  ta  in  4:^^  b  c.  and  Sparta  after  404  bc 0.. 

Tmrpase  of  neculation.  iuequalitv,  and  discontent  at  Sparta •  o^' 

Smon?es^of  Isokrates  and  Xenophon  to  the  change  of  character  and  ^^ 

Power oftyS'er-his arroganceand  ambitious projects-flatteiV laVished  ^ ^^ 

upon  him  by  sophists  and  poets —  ^ Z:^ 

Rei  1  no^ition  of  the  kings  at  Sparta ; •  •  • •  •, " " 

hI  ntdgues  to  make  himself  king  at  Sparta-he  tries  in  vain  to  move  the 
oracS  hL  fa^^^  laid  for  the  production  of  sacred  documents, 

'  as  vet  Ivine  hidden,  by  a  son  of  Apollo • .  - ; .•  •  •  •  • 

H&  aim  aVthe  kingsluV  fails-nevertheless  he  still  retams  prodigious  rnflu-  ^^^ 

Diath  o^AgiJ'Sigof  Spar-ta-doubt  as;^to"thelegithiVacyof  ^^^^^ 

ides     Agesilaus,  seconded  by  Lysander,  aspires  to  the  throne O-^- 

Character  of  Agesilaus • ^yrV-i-: 6:53 

pmd  iced  bv  Diopeithes -Eluded  bj-  the  interpretation  of  T^ysander         .^  •  0o3 
Agesilaus  is  preferred  as  king-suspicions  whicn  always  remamed  attached  ^ 

V^iiS^S:^iT'^^-^^e  ^nciliat^s  "the-  Ephor^.g^t  ^^^^ 

enc-  at  Sparta-his  energy,  combined  with  unscrupulous  pai  tisanship . . . .  6.^4 

Dangerous  conspiracy  at  Sparta-terror-striking  sacr.fice^. ....   ...  —^a-  ^'^ 

Cliaracter  and  position  of  the  chief  conspirator  lunadon-state  of  parties 

at  Sparta— increasing  number  of  malcontents ^  •?" 

Police  of  the  Ephors— information  laid  before  them ":^" 

Widespread  discontent  reckoned  upon  by  the  conspiratoi^  . .  .^  .  .^.  ■  •  •  ^■^- •  •  ^.i< 
\larm  of  the  Ephors-their  maneuvers  for  appreheiuhug  Kinadon  privatelx  bU 
Kinadon  is  seized,  interrogated,  and  execuled-his  accomplices ai-e  arrested,  ^^^ 

and  the  conspiracy  broken  up ^^ 

Dangerous  discontent  indicated  at  Sparta „ 

Proceedings  of  Derkyllidas  and  Pharnabazus  in  Asia.  ...  -•;•••••  -^—„.^:i  ""''' 
Persian   preparations /or   reviving   the   maritime  war   against  bpaita      ^^^ 

renewed  activity  of  Konon .'  ,  v  '  't i'  L « in 

Agesilaus  is  sent  with  a  land-force  to  Asia,  accompanied  by  Lysander 040 

T^r^e  nlans  of  \eesilaus  for  conquest  in  the  interior  ot  Asia ••••■••  ""*^ 

G^^eral  wUHngnlss  of  the  Spartan  allies  to  sen-e  in  the  expedition,  but 

refusal  from  Thebes,  Corinth,  and  Athens •  ■ •  • :  •  • -.•  •  ■  ^^ 

Aiesilfus  compares  himself  with  Aganiemnon-goes  to  sacrifice  at  Aulis- 

IS  contemptuously  hindered  by  the  Tiicbans "** 


30 


CONTEXTS  OF  VOL.   III. 


"^IJIhlrnef  ''^^^^"^'^  **  Ephesus-he  concludes  a  fresh  armistice  with  Tissa^^°^ 
''tEiy^uri^X^I™*'^  ™  Lysander-offensive  to   ^' 


Phmnabazus    he  retires  for  th7pu7po^"rf  ol-gauSinra^force^^^^^^^^^  &43 

His  humanity  toward  captives  and  deserted  cliiidreri S^ 

"^^S^f  !uL^s  ^^KS;;T!"P''"''"  "'  "^^^^  prisoner^ifferent  prac- 

Efforts  oi  Agesilaus  to  train  his  army  and  to  procure  eaVaViT Iu»1 

Sanltr  '"''"''''''^     '*"  ''^''  ''^''''"''^  Tissapliernes  and  gains  a  victory' near 
Artaxerxes  «i"'^"^  t;„„.,..i —  ^^   .      ••••••-•_..... t>i< 


Tlthriuster."^'^  Tissaphernes  to  be  put  to  death'and  superseded' by 


647 
648 


649 
649 


"" l^'Kil^'^^TS,^. j;^"  ^'"^P  """^  Agesilaus-the  satraps  in  Xsia 
Commencement  of  action  at  sea  against  Sparta-the  Athenian " 'konon 
ut  Joast^f  Kad^     ^'^'  """"^  "'°°^''''  *'^«°^°^^"^«  »  "^^t  of  eiglity  ^if  on 
''corn'fl;et'a^Rbs'^^^^^  '^^'^'^  empiVel^konan  capWes'  an  Eg^^tian 
"^as  \veil'kVon  i^^^";f  ^^«^"^o»i^"s-Agesilaus  is  appointed  to  command  at  sea 

Sever  ity  of  the  Laceden'monians  toward  the"  RJiotiian  Dorieus-contraiit  of  ^^ 
the  former  treatment  of  the  same  man  bv  Alliens  «"^>-contras^;  oi 

g^^i^^"'^*^^^  o^  a  nmltitude  compared  with  that  of  mdividuals «5i 

tfturts  of  Agesilaus  to  augmeiit  the  fleet— he  names  Peisander  admiral ftki 

Operatioiis  of  Agesilau^  against  Pharnabazus ^^^sanaei  admiial tol 

gilt^n%rSi^ihrXtef  ^^^^  "'*"  ^''^^  ^""^  Surprises  liis  camp-oflfense     ^ 

Pei-sonal  conference  between  Agesi'laus  a'nd'PhArn'abazus.'. ^ 

'  chaSc^e'r^f  tS.s'':^"!^"  ^^'*^^^^"^  ""^  ''''  ^^"  «^  Pharnabazus-  ^ 
Promising  position   and  lar^^e  preparations  for  Asiatic' land- warfare  "of 

Agesilaus-he  is  recalled  with  Tiis  army  to  Peloponnesus. . . .  655 

Ji^fTorts  and  proceedings  of  Konon  in  command  of  the  Persian  fleet— his 

personal  visit  to  the  Pei-sian  court ....  ^erhian  neei    ms 

Pharnabazus  is  named  admiral  jointly  with  Konon '.'.'. Tl^^ 

''peLuder?hi"ad^rf"''^  ""'"''  °'  '"'  l-« tomonian ' heet^eaVh  of  ";* 

D07 


CHAPTER  LXXn^. 

From  the  Battle  of  Knidus  to  the  Rebuilding  op  the  Long  Walls  ok 

Athens. 

-ar 658 

her  allies  after 

Great  power  of  Sparlarsti^tchiii^eV;;; Vo^NortleViTaVe^^^^^  •  ^ 


Ihe  Persian  ra.uiey   did  not  create  host i  it v  against  Spaila    but  merelv 
XenLphon"'      "''^"  tendencies  pre-existing.'  pfilo-Laco'JfiLn  sentin?en?^J,V 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   III. 


31 


660 


PAGE 

TVar  between  Sparta  and  Thebes— the  Boeotian  war 661 

Active  operations  of  Sparta  against  Boeotia— Lysander  is  sent  to  act  from 

Herakleia  on  the  northward— Pausanias  conducts  an  army  from  Pelo- 
ponnesus    661 

The  Thebans  apply  to  Athens  for  aid— remarkable  proof  of  the  altered 

sentiment  in  Greece 662 

Speech  of  the  Theban  envoy  at  Athens 662 

Political  feeling  at  Athens— good  effects  of  the  amnesty  after  the  expulsion 

of  the  Thirty 663 

Unanimous  vote  of  the  Athenians  to  assist  Thebes  against  Sparta 663 

State  of  the  Boeotian  confederacy— Orchomenus  revolts  and  joins  Lysander, 

who  invades  Ba^otia  with  his  army  and  attacks  Haliartus 664 

Lysander  is  repulsed  and  slain  before  Haliartus 664 

Pausanias  arrives  in  Boeotia  after  the  death  of  Lysander— Thrasybulus  and 

an  Athenian  army  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Thebans 665 

Pausanias  evacuates  Boeotia  on  receiving  the  dead  bodies  of  Lysar.der  and 

the  rest  for  burial 665 

Anger  against  Pausanias  at  Sparta;  he  escapes  into  voluntary  exile;  he  is 

condemned  in  his  absence 666 

Condemnation  of  Pausanias  not  deserved 6i  6 

Si»arta  not  less  unjust  in  condemning  unsuccessful  generals  than  Athens —  667 
Cliaracter  of  Lysander— his  mischievous  influence  as  well  for  Sparta  as  for 

Greece  generally 667 

His  plans  to  make  himself  king  at  Sparta  -discourse  of  the  sophist  Kleon. . .  608 
Encouragement  to  th?  enemies  of  Sparta  from  the  death  of  Lysander— alli- 
ance against  her  between  Thebes,  Athens,  Corinth,  and  Argos— the  Eu- 

bceans  and  others  join  the  alliance 663 

Increased  importance  of  Tliebes— she  now  rises  to  the  rank  of  a  primary 

power— the  Theban  leader  Ismenias 669 

Successful  operations  of  Ismenias  to  the  north  of  Baeotia — capture  of  Hera- 
kleia from  Sparta 669 

Synod  of  anti-Spartan  allies  at  Corinth— their  confident  hopes— the  LacedaR- 

monians  send  to  recall  Agesilaus  from  Asia 670 

Large  muster  near  Corinth  of  Spartans  and  Peloponnesians  on  one  side,  of 

anti-Spartan  allies  on  the  other 6«'l 

Boldness  of  the  language  against  Sparta— speech  of  the  Corinthian  Timo- 

laus 671 

Tlie  anti-Spartan  allies  take  up  a  defensive  position  near  Corinth— advance 

of  the  Lacediemonians  to  attack  them 671 

Battle  of  Corinth— victory  of  the  Laceda?monians  in  their  part  of  the  battle; 

their  allies  in  the  other  parts  being  worsted 672 

Lacedaemonian  ascendency  within  Peloponnesus  is  secured,  but  no  farther 

result  gained 672 

Agesilaus— his  vexation  on  being  recalled  from  Asia — his  large  plans  of 

Asiatic  conquest 673 

Regret  of  the  Asiatic  alUes  when  he  quits  Asia— he  leaves  Euxenus  in  Asia 

with  4,0CX)  men 673 

Agesilaus  crosses  the  Hellespont  and  marches  homeward  through  Thrace, 

Macedonia,  and  Thessalj^ 674 

Agesilaus  and  his  army  on  the  northern  frontier  of  Boeotia — eclipse  of  the 

sun— news  of  the  naval  defeat  at  Knidus 675 

Bieotians  and  their  allies  mustered  at  Koroneia 675 

Battle  of  Koroneia— Agesilaus  with  most  of  his  army  is  victorious;  while 

the  Thebans  on  tlieir  side  are  also  victorious 670 

Terrible  combat  between  the  Thebans  and  Spartans :   on  the  whole  the 

result  is  favorable  to  the  Thebans 677 

Victory  of  Agesilaus,  not  without  severe  wounds— yet  not  very  decisive — 

his  conduct  after  the  battle 67V 

Army  of  Agesilaus  withdraws  from  Boeotia    he  goes  to  the  Pythian  games — 

sails  homeward  across  the  Corinthian  Gulf— his  honorable  reception  at 

Sparta 678 


32 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   IIL 


PAQK 

Results  of  the  battles  of  Corinth  and  Koroneia.    Sparta  had  gained  nothing 

by  the  former,  and  had  rather  lost  by  the  latter 678 

Reverses  of  Sparta  after  the  defeat  of 'Knidus.  Loss  of  the  insular  empire 
of  Sparta.    Nearly  all  her  maritime  allies  revolt  to  join  Phamabazus  and 

Konon 679 

Abvdos  holds  faithfully  to  Sparta,  under  Derkyllidas 679 

Derkyllidas  holds  both  Abydos  and  the  Chersonesus  opposite,  in  spite  of 

Phamabazus— anjcer  of  the  latter 080 

Pharnabazus  and  Konon  sail  with  their  fleet  to  Peloponnesus  and  to  Corinth  Gt»l 
Assistance  and  encouragement  given  by  Phamabazus   to   the   allies   at 

Corinth— remarkable  fact  of  a  Persian  satrap  and  fleet  at  Corinth 081 

Pharnabazus  leaves  the  fleet  with  Konon  in  the  Saronic  Gulf,  and  aids  him 

with  money  to  rebuild  the  Long  Walls  of  Athens 081 

Konon  rebuilds  the  Long  Walls    nearty  co-operation  of  the  allies GS3 

Great  importance  of  this  restoration— how  much  it  depended  upon  accident  68^ 
Maintenance  of  the  lines  of  Corinth  against  Sparta,  was  one  essential  con- 
dition to  the  power  of  rebuilding  the  Long  Walls.    The  lines  were  not 
maintained  longer  than  the  ensuing  year 683 

CHAPTER  LXXV. 

From  the  Rebuilding  of  the  Lono  Walls  of  Athens  to  the  Peace  of 
^  Antalkidas. 

Large  plans  of  Konon— organization  of  a  mercenary  force  at  Curinth 684 

Naval  conflicts  of  the  Corinthians  and  Lacedaemonians,  in  the  Coiinthian 
Gulf 6^4 

Land-warfare— the  I^acedaemonians  established  at  Sikyon— the  anti-Spartan 
allies  oc-cupving  the  lines  of  Corinth  from  sea  to  sea 685 

SulTerings  of  the  Corinthians  from  the  war  being  carried  on  in  their  terri- 
tory.   Many  Corinthian  proprietors  become  avei-se  to  the  war 685 

Growth  and  manifestation  of  the  philo-Laconian  pai  ty  in  Corinth.  Oli- 
garchical form  of  the  government  left  ojjen  nothing  but  an  appeal  to 
force 685 

The  Corinthian  Government  forestall  the  conspiracy  by  a  coup  d'6tat 086 

Numerous  persons  of  the  philo-Laconian  party  nre  banished:  nevertheless 
Pasimelus  the  leader  is  spared,  and  remains  at  Corinth 687 

Intimate  political  union  and  consolidation  between  Corinth  and  Argos 687 

Pasimelus  admits  the  Lacedaemonians  within  the  Long  Walls  of  Corinth. 
Battle  within  those  walls 688 

The  Lacedtemonians  are  victorious— severe  lose  of  the  Argeians 688 

The  Lacedcvmonians  pull  down  a  portion  of  the  Lung  Walls  between 
Corinth  and  Lechaeum,  so  as  to  open  a  free  passage  across.  They  capture 
Kromniyon  and  Sidus 689 

Effective  warfare  carried  on  by  the  light  troops  under  Iphikrates  at  Corinth 
— militarj-  genius  and  improvements  of  Iphikrates —  080 

The  Athenians  restore  the  Long  Walls  between  Corinth  and  Lecha'um— 
expedition  of  the  Spaitan  king  Agesilaus.  who,  in  concert  with  Teleutias, 
retakes  the  Long  Walls  and  captures  Lechseum C{<0 

Alarm  of  Athens  and  Thebes  at  the  capture  of  the  Long  Walls  of  Corinth. 
Propositions  sent  to  Sparta  to  solicit  peace.  The  discussions  come  to  no 
result 091 

Advantages  derived  by  the  Corinthianj  from  possession  of  Peiraeum.  At 
the  instigation  of  the  exiles,  Agesilaus  marches  forth  with  an  army  to 
attack  it 091 

Isthmian  festival— Agesilaus  disturbs  the  celebration.  The  Corinthian 
exiles,  under  his  protection,  celebrate  it :  then,  when  he  is  gone,  the 
Corinthians  from  the  city,  and  perform  the  ceremony  over  again 692 

Agesilaus  attacks  Peiraeum,  which  he  captures,  together  with  the  FTeraeum, 
many  prisoners,  and  much  booty 693 


33 


PAGE 


607 
698 

698 


Triumphant  position  of  Agesilaus.    Danger  of  Corinth.    The  Thebans  send 

fr.'^h  eiivo.  s  to  solicit  peace— contemptuously  treated  by  Agesilaus  693 

Sndden  arrival  of  bad  news,  which  spoils  the  triumph...   .'..  693 

Destruction  of  a  Lacedaemonian  mora  by  the  light  troops  under  iphikrates'  694 

Daring  and  well-planned  maneuver  of  Ipliikrates '  604 

Few  of  the  mora  escape  to  Lechaeum ggg 

The  Lacedifimonians  bury  the  bodies  of  the  slain,  under  truce  asked' and 

obtained.    Trophy  erected  by  Iphikrates 695 

Groat  etfect  produced  upon  the  Grecian  mind  by  this  event.    Peculiar  ifeeV     * 

ings  of  Spartans:  pride  of  the  relatives  of  the  slain. . . .  696 

Mortification  of  Agesilaus— he  marches  up  to  the  walls  of  Corinth  and  defies 

Iphikrates— he  then  goes  back  humiliated  to  Sparta.       .  696 

Success  of  Iphikrates  —  he    retakes  Krommyon,   Sidu.s.  and 'Peirseum  — 

Corinth  remains  pretty  well  undisturbed  by  enemies.     The  Athenians 

recall  Iphikrates gg-r 

E.\i)edition  of  Agesilaus  against  Akarnania—siiccessful,  after 'some  'delay— 

the  Akarnanians  submit  and  enroll  themselves  in  the  Lacedaemonian 

confederacy  

The  Lacedaemonians  under  Agesipolis  invade  Argos.*. 

Maneuver  of   the  Argeians  respecting  the  season  of  the  hoiytruce  " '  Ae-e- 

sipohs  consults  the  oracles  at  Olympia  and  Delphi  .  '  u^o 

Earthquiike  in  Argos  after  the  invasion  cf  Agesipolis— he  disregards  "it 609 

He  marches  up  near  to  Argo.s— much  plunder  taken— he  retires  700 

Transactions  m  Asia-<ifforts  of  Sparta  to  detach  the  Great  King  "from 

*\inons ^{)fi 

The  Spartan  Antalkidas  is  sent  as  envoy 'to  "tiribazus".*" 'Konon  and  other  ' 
envoys  sent  also  from  Athens  and  the  anti-Spartan  allies  70O 

Antalkidas  offers  to  surrender  the  Asiatic  Greeks  and  demands'  iinivereai 

acceSrro'thoTeTenni'^    ^'^'^'^. '''.'''^.'^-'^'''  anti-Spartan  allies  retul?to 

Hostility  of  Sparta  to  all  the  ijartia'lcon'f'edera'ci'es  of' Greece"  no'w'firetnro- 
claimed  under  tlie  name  of  universal  autonomy  ^ 

Sn-  S^A.?;^ih  iSo  ^''''''''*  of  Tiribazus,  who  espouses  privately  t'lie 'cause  of 
Sparta  though  the  propositions  for  peace  fail.  Tiribazus  seizes  Konon- 
Konon  s  career  is  now  closed,  either  by  .leath  or  imprisonment 

T^Sn'^v?i''%\?.T.fj'^^l^^^  ""'^"^-  '''^''''^'  «""  continues  hostile 

to  spai  ta.  btiuthas  is  sent  down  to  act  against  the  Lacedaemonians  in 
^oma ^ 

^'brSs^'slSn ""''''' ''''''''  Thimbron  and  the  Lacedemonian"  army.' '  "fhiml  ^ 

Dipliridas  is  sent  to  succeed  Thimbron .".'.".'.'.'.'." I^ 

Lacedemonian  fleet  at  Rhodes-intestine  dispute's  in' the  island. 7^ 

Ihe  Athemaus  send  aid  to  Evasroras  at  Cypms.    Fidelity  with  w'hich  tii'ev 

adhered  to  him,  though  his  afhance  had  now  become  inconven^nt         ^  704 
Thrasybulus  is  sent  with  a  fleet  from  Athens  to  the  As  ItT  eoastHiiis 

acquisitions  in  the  Hellespont  and  Bosphorus. . .  coast-his 

le^ZLVt'^^tt^ll^XT'''  ^^^"^  contributions  alongthe  Asiatic  ^ 

Character  of  Thrasybulus i^5 

'^Swnfan"''*'*'.'''^^  Thrasybulus-Rhodes  stili' holds  out'  'against"  tli'e  Lace"-  ^ 

"^  v.tj'S'"'*  '*"  ^"""^  ^"^  command ' at'  the  'lieiiespont  'in '  place  of "  Derkviiidas-  ""^^ 
TI  f  AH? T"'^  proceedings-he  deprives  Athens  of  the  tolls  of  the  stra  t  700 

lln!    iTll  ^T^  Iphikrates  with  his  pelcists  and  a  fleet  to  the  Helle's- 

nK;    ^V^^^'*^^^^''^'"  ^"  sui-prise  Anaxibius 707 

Defeat  and  death  of  Anaxibius ^Xi 

The  i^fand  o^^^inJ^^i"  masters  of  the  Hellespont  and 'the  strait  dues! ! .' . !  708 
1  ne  isiana  ot  ^gma— its  past  historv. .  r«J 

Ihe    Egmetaus  are  constra-ned   by  Sparta  into  "war  with  ■Athens'"The 

I^s  remaSro  nl"^  ««  i«  supei^eded  b>  Hier 

nis  remarkable  popularity  among  the  seamen. 

H  G.  111—2  


701 
(01 


01 


708 


34 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.  III. 


CONTEXTS  OF  VOL    IIL 


35 


PAOB 

Hierax  proceeds  to  Rhodes,  leaving  Gorgopas  at  JEgina.  Passage  of  the 
Lace<l;i?inoniiin  Antalkidas  to  Asia 709 

Gor^'itpas  is  surprised  in  .E;,'ina,  defeated,  and  slain  by  the  Athenian 
Cliabrias.  who  goes  to  assist  Evagoras  in  Cyprus 710 

The  Lacedaemonian  seamen  at  JEgina  unpaid  and  discontented.  Teleutias 
is  sent  thither  to  conciliate  them 710 

Sudden  and  successful  attack  of  Teleutias  up«3n  the  Peirajus 711 

Unprepared  and  unguarded  condition  of  Peirseus— Teleutias  gains  rich 
plunder  and  siiils  away  in  safety 711 

He  is  enabled  to  pay  his  seamen— activity  of  the  fleet— great  loss  intlicted 
upon  Athenian  commerce 712 

Financial  condition  of  Athens.    The  Theorikon .................[.  7l;;J 

Direct  j  iropeity  taxes 713 

Antalkidas  goes  up  with  Tiribazus  to  Susa— his  success  at  the  Persian 
court— he  brings  down  the  terms  of  peace  asked  for  by  Sparta,  ratified  by 
the  Great  King,  to  be  enforced  by  Sparta  in  his  name.' 714 

Antalkidas  in  command  of  the  Lacedamoniau  and  Syracusan  fleets  in  the 
Hellespont,  with  I'ersian  aid.    His  successes  against  the  Athenians 714 

Distress  and  discouragement  of  Athens— anxiety  of  the  anti-Spartan  alhes 
for  peace 715 

Tiribiizus  summons  them  all  to  Sardis  to  hear  the  convention  which  had 
been  sent  down  b^'  the  Great  King 715 

Terms  of  the  convention,  called  the  peace  of  Antalkidas .!.!.'!...]..  715 

Congress  at  Spai'ta  for  acceptance  or  rejection.  All  parties  accept.  The 
Thebans  at  tirst  accept  imder  reserve  for  the  Boeotian  cities 715 

Agesilaus  refuses  to  allow  the  The'oan  reserve,  nnd  reijuires  unconditional 
acceptance.  His  eagerness,  from  hatred  of  Thebes,  to  get  int »  a  war 
with  them  single-handed.  The  Thebans  are  obliged  to  accept  uncon- 
ditionally    71g 

Agesilaus  forces  the  Corinthians  to  send  away  their  Argeian  aiixiliaries. 
The  phil«>Argeian  Corinthians  go  into  exile:  the  philo-I^aconian  Corin- 
thiauij  are  restored Tjg 

CHAPTER  LXXYI. 

From  the  Peace  of  Antalkidas  Down  to  the  Subjugation  of  Olynthus  by 

Sparta. 

Peace  or  convention  of  Antalkidas.  Its  import  and  character.  Separate 
partnership  between  Sparta  and  Persia 717 

Degradation  in  the  form  of  the  convention— a  fiat  drawn  up,  issued,  and 
enforced  by  Persia  ui'ou  Greece 713 

Gradual  loss  of  Pan-hellenio  dignity  and  increased  submission  towards 
Persia  as  a  means  of  purchasing  Persian  help— on  the  part  of  Sparta 719 

Her  first  application  before  the  Peloponnesian  war;  subsequent  applica- 
tions  ^ 719 

Active  partnership  between  Sparta  and  Persia  against  Athens,  after  the 
Athenian  catastrophe  at  Syracuse.  Athens  is  ready  to  follow  her  ex- 
ample   719 

How  Sparta  became  ho.stile  to  Pei-sia  after  the  battle  of  JEgospotami.  The 
Persian  force  aids  Athens  against  her  and  breaks  up  her  maritime 
empire 72q 

No  exL-nse  for  the  subservience  of  Sparta  to  the  Persians— .slie' was  prob- 
ably afraid  of  a  revived  Athenian  empire 721 

Hellenism  betrayed  to  the  enemy,  first  by  Sparta,  next  by  the  otiier  leading 
states.  Evidence  that  Hellenic  iudependenc3  was  not  ('estined  to  last 
much  longer 722 

Promise  of  universal  autonomy— pojndar  to  the  Grwian  ear -how  carried 
out 1122 

The  Sp>artans  never  intended  to  grant,  nor  ever  really  granted,  general 
autonomy.  They  used  the  ^jromise  as  a  means  of  increased  power  to 
themselves 72<j 


Greek  princes  of  Salamis  are  dispossessed  by  a  Phenecian  dynasty  7->n 

Evagoras  dethrones  the  Phenician  and  becomes  despot  of  Salamis •f-'^'-i 

Able  and  beneficent  government  of  Evagoras  r^r 

His  anxiety  to  revive  Hellenism  in  Cyprus-he  looks"  to  "the  aid  of  Athens""'  720 

^rnr',w:<1.?/v.^?^^'*^^  '''^^  ^^^^''''  ^^^^^  ^^«  ^^««i»&  ^^ars  of  the  Pelo- 
l»unuc sKiu  \\  ar _,» 

^'i^^^^^^f^l''''}^^}^^^^^^i^^s-he  receives  aid  both  fro"m' "Athens  "and 
from  Egypt-he  is  at  first  very  successful,  so  as  even  to  capture  Tvre  727 

^'f^f!e^^^S^i^^.'^.'^!^.'''^^  «^  ^^«  P«--  --P-e  after  ^'J 
Evagoras,  after  a  ten  years'  war,  is  reduced",  but  o"btains  "an  "honorable 
P^«ace,^mamly  owing  to  the  dispute  between  the  two  satraps  jointly  com- 

7-8 

729 
730 

changed  for  the  worse.    Exposui^of  the  loni^rrislandTalso^''''"-''"™"''^  7-30 
Great  powers  gained  by  Sparta  through  the  peace  of  Antalkidas "'" She 
becomes  practically  mistress  of  Corinth  ami  the  CorinUdan   ilthmas 
Misolheban  tendencies  of  Sparta-especially  of  Agesilaus  ^^"^""^^^s- 

Sparta  organized  anti-Thebau    oligarchies  in  the  Bwotian  c"i"ties"  "witii  "a 

aKn  Vi^k"^^^'"  '7^..'^'^    ^^^^^  «"  t^^«  «it'es  seem  to  have  been  fivor 
able  to  rhebes,  though  Orchomenus  and  Thespiaj  were  adverse  7S1 

Mn?,v£^':Jf 'c  '■''f^'?  ^^^'^*-  .  ^^^""^^  ^-'^n^iu^^t  of  Sparta  toward  piataia" " " "  ^J 

""Sls'fro^n'tlien^'"^'^""^  ^^^^"^-    ^  politic^step  as  hkely  t's^ever  ''^ 

XX.!^tL^l^^;^l^^  'y  ^^^  P-tisan  spiri^'^S-Xgesiiaus;  "^ 

"^^s^f  1^:^^  t  l^iSfJS^^  t^w^rd'Mantinei^"  "They  require  the  ; 

^tE'?.vi'rOnw'^T^^^^At'^^*^  forces'it"  to"surre"nder;"b"y  damming"  up 

vniagef  ^  ^^^  Mantineians  are  forced  to  break  up  their  city^intS 

^V^nld^SS^i^'"'^''^'^^''  tii^irliV^s  to  the  m^iati;^n"of  Uie  f" 
Mantineia  is  pulled  down  and  dis"tribui:ed"i"nto"five  viifages '^i 

fenopW.:^."??!!!°!  ^^  ^^^''^  '^"^^''^  Mantineia^fcai"pa"rtiaUt"y"of  "^ 
Mischievous  influence 'of'  Sparta"  "during  "this  "period"  'of  "  iier  'ascendenc'v'in  ^^ 

decomposing  the  Grecian  world  into  the  smfUlest  fra-ments  ^       '^- 

^^^,Z^^^'P^''}ol^Lunineieiy,'as  only  one  among  a  str™s    f  oiher 'acts'of 
RS.n*'^^rfi'"\''M''"r^^*^°'  committed  by  Sparta  t<> ward  her  various  aHies       738 

^Spu?f>^rs  ^li^i^sr^^^::, ''-  ^^--'^^'^  ^^^^-'  -  ^-s.^-^-  Z 

slanffnrS'"^^  ^y  ""T.V'^  ^^'«  ^'^P^'^'-^"  Je^ders  of  acting  aga  nst  the^Per- 
kralef  ^^''''  ""^  ^^^  ^'^^'^^  Oreeks.-Panegyrical  di^ouni  of  Iso- 

"^Sll  l^t^^^f ^^S^  Of  "Ma^^edonian  power'during  I'' 

<41 


36 


CONTENTS  •OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IIL 


81 


PAGE 


^A^^mlttaffr^S   "'■-e'-Ores'*'-  Aeropu,,  Pansanias,  Amyntas": 

/-.I    11  •  1-        ^  i^.  ^^  ,  ^  '-''•^  luluun  «<>nfederacy r.,o 

Chalkuliansof  Olynthus-they  take  into  their  prc.tection" the  MacedonHn 
Cities  on  the  coast,  when  Amyntas  runs  away  iJefore  thS  IllyriaSsf   Com 


mencementof  the01ynthianc;,nf;deme7   -^  ""'"'"  "''^  inynans.    uom- 
Equal  and  liberal  principles  on  >^•hich  the  confede'racv  was  framed  f mm "»">;; 
'     dtSr.'"^;   /'""'^'":*.  :::":"^^^  *^>'  '^^^  Macedo,STx;i  a/eS^Ml^Sonla^^  ^ 

'^fM  9/^''v  ^Iru^  extend' ■theYrconfederaevamonp"  the' Grecian  citieV  in  ""^ 
Challadio  Thrace -their  hberal   pn>ceciure-sev-eralciterjo?n- other? 

Aka  fhus  a!H^^T "iMnS"^'"?-^;'  ^.'''  ""'^  ^^'^^'^  ^^  ^P^"  resistm.cl      . .  ^"^^"^  744 
ti^  «  ^r  V  o-^P'!"'^"^^  '"^'^'^^  t^^^'  proposition.    Olynthus  menaces     Thev 
then  solicit  Spartan  mtervention  against  her.  menaces,     itiey 

Si3eech  of  Kleigenes  the  Akanthi^m  envoy  at  Sparta 'S 

Envoys  from  Amj'ntas  at  Sparta ^       ^        it' 

O^J^ht;^*"!'^"'!'.'!'.^:'^  '^*''''  ^'"^'  vofeaJaiothe'Akant'hians'againsi  ^  ^ 

Anxiety  of  'the  Akantliians' 'for  "instant*  intein-ention.' 'The"  Sn^^  ^**" 

nndas  is  sent  against  Olynthus  at  once,  with  such  forcras  could  be  ^of 
ready.    He  checks  the  career  of  the  Oh'nthians  "^  ^^  ^""^  r.^ 

^."w  brother  of  Eudauiidas.  remains  behind  to  collect  fresh 'force  and 

t"?r'i^!UVnZe'aV%'h^?er  '°  ^^"^^^      ^^^  ^^^^^  througlf  t'hl%X^^ 

'^^h?^o^^S3Slr^;:^l!?;^r^"^-^^^-  Thebes  to  betmy  ^ 

The  opposnig  leaders-Leontiades  and  'ismenias-were'bo't'h  ■polemarchV 
Leontia^les  contrives  the  plot  and  introduces  Phcebidal  in?o  the  llXeia    749 


^Slus'^leTemlsllir*  """■'  P-'^Vended  ihanreaiafsiinstPhibidas:- Age-  '"" 

PtobldS  ....    ■^.  "^       ""^'"  ""*  J^">^ia,  bat  at  the  same  t i me'^Tnl 
''of  {hUpr^iiliS?  <^'"^«  I«m'^»ias  iib^tried  and  put  to  death.' "  Iniquity  ' 


^'',??M?'i''i  "''""."  "'  the  Spartans  ■aeaVn'st  Olyn-hns-Teieutias  issent 
:£!^^:iS^i^^^:'!«.^  considerable  Theban  contV?|e'f.tnerdas 


there 


51 
751 


i-esTuo  is  is  sent    o  ol^fh,?^  f  "^  Olyntlnans  under  the  walls  of  their  city.-  • 
of  a  feA-er  .^     .      ^^^^^"«  ^r*^°»  Sparta  with  a  re-enforcement.    He  dies 

Polybiades  succeeds  Agesipo'lis  as  co'mmand'e'r-^^  ''^ 

^  Sttrar^lnl^Jllii™  1„Ve^s  ^'^'IS.'.'!'.'!^.'-:'"""-    Ol^^^Z'^^'Sd''^^^'^;  ^^ 


CHAPTER  LXXVn. 

From  the  Sttbjttgatton  of  Olynthus  by  the  Lacedemonians  down  to  thk 
j^-ROM  THE  o  ^.^^^^jjggg  ^T  Sparta,  AND  Partial  Peace,  in  3a  b.c. 

PAGE 

Great  ascendency  of  Sparta  on  land  in  379  B.C. :,v  ^^^ 

Spa?ta  is  now  feared  as  the  great  despot  of  Greece-her  confederacy  with 

the  Persian  king  and  with  Diouysius  of  Syracuse <oo 

Strong  complaint  of  the  rhetor  Lysias  expressed  at  the  Olympic  festival  of  ^^^ 

D?inonstratioA'ag'a'ins't'  the  s'yrac'usan  despo'tbi'o'ny'sius  at  tiiat  festival 759 

Panegyrical  oration  of  Isokrates  •:,•■ ;•   -v i" A,.)^ 

Censm-e  upon  Sparta  pronounced  by  the  philo-Lacoman  Xenophon.  .....•■••   •  W 

His  manner  of  marking  the  point  of  transition  in  his  history-from  Spartan  ^ 

elorv  to  Spartan  disgrace • • w:  'a:  "^   "  V"  * 

Thebf  s  rnd?r  Leontiades  and  the  philo-Spartan  oligarchy,  with  the  Spartan 

eanis3n  in  the  Kadmeia-oppressive  and  tyrannical  government  .      ^bl 

Discontent  at  Thebesthough  under  compression.    Theban  exiles  at  Athens,  tbl 
The  Theban  exiles  at  Athens,  after  waiting  some  time  m  hopes  of  a  nsing 

at  Thebes,  resolve  to  begin  a  movement  themselves • .   ......  40^ 

Pelopidas  takes  the  lead-he,  vith  Mellon  and  five  other  exiles  miderakes 

the  task  of  destroying  the  rulers  of  Thebes.    Co-operation  of  Phylhdas 

the  secretary,  and  Charon  at  Thebes •  •  • «"■« 

Plans  of  Phvlfidas  for  admitting  the  conspirators  into  Thebes  and  the  gov- 

ernment  house— he  invites  the  poleniarchs  to  a  banquet. .   .  ..•...■  •••;•-  *^ 
The  scheme  very  nearly  frustrated-acoident  which  prevented  Chhdon  from 

delivering  his  message • •  •  ■ ' ;  —  ' " 

Pelopidas  and  Mellon  get  secretly  into  Thebes  and  conceal  themselves  in 

the   house  of   Charon.     Sudden  summons  sent  by  the  poleniarchs  to 

Charon     Charon  places  his  son  in  the  hands  of  Pelopidas  as  a  hostage- 

warning  to  the  poleniarchs  from  Athens— they  leave  it  unread. . ...... ... .   -W 

Phyllidas  brings  the  conspirators,  in  female  attire,  into  the  rooin  where  the 

poleniarchs  are  banqueting-Archias,  Philippus,  and   Xabeinchus  are  ^ 

assassinated .•  •  • i^i 

Leontiades  and  Hypates  are  slain  in  their  houses ;  • . . .  ^ •  « ^« 

Phyllidas  opens  the  prison  and  sets  free  the  prisoners.    Epaininondas  and 

many  other  citizens  appear  in  arms ._ ■ •  • •   *^ 

Universal  joy  amtjng  the  citizens  on  the  ensuing  morning  when  the  event 
was  known.    General  assembly  in  the  market-place— Pelopidas,  Mellon,  ^^ 

and  Charon  are  named  the  fii-st  Boeotarchs ; •  •   •  •   '*^ 

Aid  to  the  conspirators  from  private  sympathizers  m  Attica.    Alarm  ot  the 

Spartans  in  the  Kadmeia— they  send  for  re-enforcements. .  •'•-■■■■■-■  '^ 
Pelopidas  and  the  Thebans  prepare  to  storm  the  Kadmeia— the  Laceda?^ 
monian  garrison  capitulate  and  are  dismissed— several  of  the  oligarchical 
Thebans  are  put  to  death  in  trying  to  go  away  along  with  them     The  har- 

most  who  surrendered  the  Kadmeia  is  put  to  death  by  the  Spartans ibt 

Powerful  sensation  produced  bv  this  incident  throughout  the  Grecian  world  tbf 

It  alters  the  balance  of  power  and  the  tenure  of  Spartan  empire «WJ 

Indignation  in  Sparta  at  the  revolution  of  Thebes— a  Spartan  army  sent 
forth  at  once  under  King  Kleombrotus.    He  retires  from  Bceotia  without 

achieving  anything •, 1  •  /  •, , 

Kleombrotus  passes  by  the  Athenian  frontier— alarm  at  Athens— condemna- 
tion of  the  two  Athenian  generals  who  had  favored  the  enteqjnsc  of 

Pelopidas ; '  •  Vvl- '  v;-: V ••;,;• 

Attempt  of  Sphodrias  from  T'nespice  to  surprise  the  Peirseus  by  a  night- 

march.    He  fails • •■   •  •  • ;•     •i'"'^ 

Different  constructions  put  upon  this  attempt  and  upon  the  character  ot 

Sphodrias *  *" 


38 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  III. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IIL 


39 


PAGE 

Alarm  and  wrath  produced  at  Athens  hy  the  attempt  of  Sphodrias.  Tlie 
Lacedfeinonian  envoys  at  Athens  seized,  but  dismisse<l 770 

Trial  of  Sphodrias  at  Sparta.  He  is  acquitted,  greatly  through  the  private 
favor  and  sy nipatliies  of  Agesilaus 770 

Comparison  of  Spartan  with  Athenian  procedure 771 

The  Athenians  declare  war  against  Sparta  and  contract  alliance  with 
Thebes 771 

Exertii)ns  of  Athens  to  form  a  new  maritime  confederacy,  like  the  con- 
federacy of  Delos.    Thebes  enrolls  herself  as  a  member 772 

Athens  sends  round  envoys  to  the  islands  in  the  ^Cgean.  Liberal  princi- 
ples on  which  the  new  confederacy  is  formed.  The  Athenians  formally 
renounce  all  pretensions  to  their  lost  properties  out  of  Attica,  and  engage 
to  abstaiii  from  future  Kleruchies 772 

Envois  sent  round  by  Athens— Chabrias,  Timotheus,  Kallistratus 773 

Service  of  Iphikrates  in  Tlu-aoe  after  the  i>e:ice  of  Antalkidas.  He  marries 
the  daughter  of  the  Thraciau  prince  Kotys,  and  acquires  possession  of  a 
Thraoiau  seaport,  Drys 774 

Timotheus  and  Kallistratus— their  great  success  m  winnnig  the  islanders 
into  confederacy  with  Athens 774 

Synod  of  the  new  confederates  assembled  at  Athens— votes  for  wai*  on  a 
large  scale 775 

Members  of  the  confederacy  were  at  first  willing  and  harmonious— a  fleet  is 
equipped 776 

New  property-tax  imposed  at  Athens.    The  Solonian  census 776 

The  Solonian  census  retained  in  the  main,  though  with  modifications,  at  the 
restoration  imder  the  archbishop  uf  Eukleides  in  40'3  B.c 776 

Arohonship  of  Nausinikus  in  37K  b.c. — New  census  and  schedule  then  intro- 
duced, of  all  citizens  worth  W  mina'  and  upwards,  distributed  into  classes, 
and  entered  for  a  fraction  of  their  tottil  properly:  each  class  for  a  differ- 
ent fraction 777 

All  metics  worth  more  than  than  25  minee  were  registered  in  the  schedule; 
all  in  one  class,  each  man  for  one  sixth  of  his  property.  Aggregate 
schedule 778 

The  Symmories — containing  the  l:iOO  wealthiest  citizens — the  300  wealthiest, 
leaders  of  the  Symmories 778 

Citizens  not  wealthy  enough  to  be  included  in  the  S3'mmories,  yet  still 
entered  in  the  schedule  and  liable  to  property-tax.  Purpose  of  the  Sym- 
mories— extension  of  the  principle  to  the  trierarchy 779 

Enthusiasm  at  Thebes  in  defense  of  the  new  government  and  against 
Sparta.     Jlilitary  training— the  Sacred  Band 779 

Epaminondas 780 

His  previous  character  and  training— musical  and  intellectual,  as  well  as 
gymnastic.  Conversation  with  philosophers,  Sokratic  as  well  as  Pytha- 
gorean   780 

His  eloquence  —  his  unambitous  disposition  —  gentleness  of  his  political 
resentments 782 

Conduct  of  Epaminondas  at  the  Theban  revolution  of  379  b.c— he  acquires 
influence,  through  Pelopidas.  in  the  militaiy  organization  of  the  city 782 

Agesilaus  marclies  to  attack  Thebes  with  the  full  force  of  the  Spartan  con- 
federacy—good system  of  defense  adopted  by  Thebes— aid  from  Athens 
under  Chabrias 783 

Agesilaus  retires,  leaving  Phcebidas  in  command  at  Thespiee  —  desultory 
warfare  of  Phoebidas  against  Thebes— he  is  defeated  and  slain.  Increase 
of  the  Theban  strength  in  Bceotia  against  the  philo-Spartan  oligarchies  in 
the  Boeotian  cities 784 

Second  expedition  of  Age.silans  into  Boeotia — he  gains  no  decisive  advan- 
tage. The  Thebans  acquire  greater  and  greater  strength.  Agesilaus 
retires — he  is  disabled  by  a  hurt  in  the  leg 784 

Kleonibrotus  conducts  the  Spartan  force  to  invade  Bceotia — he  is  stopped  by 
Mount  Kithfpron,  being  unable  to  get  over  the  passes— he  retires  without 
reaching  B<i»otia 785 

Resolution  of  Sparta  to  ei^uip  a  large  fleet  under  the  admiral  Pollis.    The 


PAGK 

Athenians  send  out  a  fleet  under  Chabrias  -victory  of  Chabrias  at  sea  near 
Naxos.    Recollection  of  the  battle  of  Arginusse 785 

Extension  of  the  Athenian  maritime  confederacy,  in  consequence  of  the  vic- 
tory of  Naxos 786 

Circumnavigation  of  Peloponnesus  by  Timotheus  with  an  Athenian  fleet  — 
his  victory  over  the  Lacedaemonian  fleet  — his  success  in  extending  the 
Athenian  confederacy— his  just  dealing 786 

Financial  difficulties  of  Athens 787 

'She  becomes  jealous  of  the  growing  strength  of  Thebes— steady  and  victori- 
ous progress  of  Thebes  in  Boeotia 787 

Victory  of  Pelopidas  at  Tegyra  over  the  Lacedaemonians. 788 

The  Thebans  expel  the  Lacedajmonians  out  of  all  Boeotia  except  Orchome- 
nus— they  reorganize  the  Boeotian  federation 788 

They  invade  Phokis— Kleonibrotus  is  sent  thither  with  an  army  for  defense — 
Athens  makes  a  separate  peace  with  the  Lacedaemonians 789 

Demand  made  upon  the  Laceduemoniaus  from  Thessaly  for  aid  to  Phar- 
salus 789 

Polydamas  of  Pharsalus  applies  to  Sparta  for  aid  against  Pherae 7S9 

Jason  of  Pherce— his  energetic  character  and  formidable  power 700 

His  prudent  dealing  with  Polydamas 790 

The  Lacedaemonians  find  themselves  unable  to  spare  any  aid  for  Thessaly — 
they  dismiss  Polydamas  with  a  refusal.  He  comes  to  terms  with  Jason, 
who  becomes  Tagus  of  Thessaly 701 

Evidence  of  the  decline  of  Spartan  power  during  the  last  eight  years 791 

Peace  between  Athens  and  Sparta— broken  off  almost  immediately.  The 
Lacedaemonians  declare  war  again,  and  resume  their  plans  ujion  Zakyn- 
thus  and  Korkyra 792 

Lacedaemonian  armament  under  Mnasippus,  collected  from  all  the  confed- 
erates, invades  Korkyra 793 

Mnasippus  besieges  the  city — high  cultivation  of  the  adjoining  lands 793 

The  Korkyrasans  blocked  up  in  the  city — supplies  intercepted — want  begins 
— no  hope  of  safety  except  in  aid  from  Athens.  Re-enforcement  arrives 
from  Athens— large  Athenian  fleet  preparing  under  Timotheus 793 

Mnasippus  becomes  careless  and  insolent  from  over-confidence— he  offends 
his  mecernaries — the  Korkyrrcans  make  a  successful  sallj^ — Mnasippus  is 
defeated  and  slain — the  city  supplied  with  provisions 794 

Approach  of  the  Athenian  re-enforcement— Hypermenes,  successor  of  Mna- 
sippus, conveys  away  the  armament,  leaving  his  sick  and  much  property 
behind 794 

Tardy  arrival  of  the  Athenian  fleet— it  is  commanded  not  by  Timotheus  but 
by  Iphikrates — causes  of  the  delay— preliminary  voyage  of  Timotheus, 
very  long  protracted 795 

Discontent  at  Athens  in  consequence  of  the  absence  of  Timotheus— distress 
of  the  armament  assembled  at  Kalauria— Ii>hikrates  and  Kallistratus  ac- 
cuse Timotheus.    Iphikrates  named  admiral  in  his  place 795 

Return  of  Timotheus— an  accusation  is  entered  against  him,  but  trial  is  post- 
poned until  the  return  of  Iphikrates  from  Korkyra 796 

Rapid  and  energetic  movements  of  Iphikrates  towards  Korkyra— his  excel- 
lent management  of  the  voyage.  On  reaching  Kephallenia  he  learns  the 
flight  of  the  Lacedajmonians  from  Korkyra 796 

He  goes  on  to  Korkyra,  and  captures  by  surprise  the  ten  Syracusan  triremes 
sent  by  Dionj'sius  to  the  aid  of  Sparta    797 

Iphikrates  in  want  of  money— he  sends  home  Kallistratus  to  Athens— he 
finds  work  for  his  seamen  at  Korkyra — he  obtains  funds  by  service  in 
Akamania 797 

Favorable  tone  of  public  opinion  at  Athens,  in  consequence  of  the  success 
of  Korkyra— the  trial  of  Timotheus  went  olT  easily— Jason  and  Alketas 
come  to  support  him— his  qua'stor  is  condemned  to  death 798 

Timotheus  had  been  guilty  of  delay  not  justifiable  under  the  circumstances 
— though  acquitted,  his  reputation  suffered— he  accepts  command  under 
Persia 799 

Discotu-agement  of  Sparta  in  consequence  of  her  defeat  at  Korkyra,  and  of 


40 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  111. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IIL 


41 


PACK 

the  triunrphant  position  of  Iphikrates.  They  are  farther  dismayed  by 
earthquakes  and  other  divine  signs— Hehke  and  Bura  are  destroyed  by  an 
earthquake 799 

The  Spartans  again  send  Antalkidas  to  Persia  to  sue  for  a  fresh  interven- 
tion—the I'ei-sian  satraps  send  down  an  order  that  the  Grecian  belliger- 
ents shall  make  up  their  ditferences 799 

Athens  disposed  towards  peace bOO 

Athens  had  ceased  to  be  afraid  of  Sparta,  and  had  become  again  jealous  of 
Thebes fJCO 

Equivocal  position  of  the  restored  Plattea,  now  that  the  Lacedaemonians 
nad  been  expelled  from  Boeotia.  The  Platteans  try  to  persuade  Athens  to 
incorporate  them  with  Attica FOO 

The  Thel)ans  forestall  this  negotiation  by  seizing  Plat8Ba  and  expelling  the 
inhabitants,  who  again  take  refuge  at  Athens 801 

Strong  feeling  excited  in  Athens  against  the  Thebans.  on  accoimt  of  theii* 
dealings  with  Plata^a  and  Thespite.    The  Plataic  discourse  of  Isokrates. . .  803 

Increased  tendency  of  the  Athenians  towards  peace  with  Sparta — Athens 
and  the  Athenian  t  onf ederacy  give  notice  to  Thebes.    General  congress 

•    for  peace  at  Sparta 803 

Speeches  o."  the  Athenian  envoys,  Kallias,  Autokles,  Kallistratus 8«)3 

Kallistratus  and  his  policy b03 

He  proposes  that  Sparta  and  Athens  shall  divide  between  them  the  head- 
ship of  Greece- Si)arta  on  land,  Athens  at  sea — recognizing  general  au- 
tonomy   804 

Peace  is  concluded.  Autonomy' of  each  city  to  be  recognized:  Sparta  to 
withdraw  her  harmosts  and  garrisons 804 

Oaths  exchan.ired.  Sparta  takes  the  oath  for  hei  self  and  her  allies.  Athens 
takes  it  for  iu'i"self :  her  allies  take  it  after  her  successively 805 

The  oath  projjost'd  to  the  Thebans.  Epaminondas.  the  Theban  envoy,  in- 
sists upon  taking  the  oatli  in  the  name  of  the  Boeotian  federation 805 

Agesilaus  and  the  Spartans  require  that  he  sliall  take  it  for  Thebes  alone. . .  805 

l>aring  and  emphatic  speeches  delivered  by  l^paininondas  in  the  congress — 
protesting  against  the  overweening  pretensions  of  Snarta.  He  claims 
recognition  of  the  ancient  institutions  of  Ba'otia,  with  Thebes  as  president 
of  the  federation 805 

Indignatitin  of  the  Spartans,  and  especially  of  Agesilaus— brief  questions 
exchanged— Thebes  is  excluded  from  the  treaty.. 806 

General  peace  sworn,  including  Athens,  Sparta,  and  the  rest-^Thebes  alone 
is  excluded 806 

Advantageous  position  of  Athens — prudence  in  her  to  make  peace  now 807 

Terms  of  the  peace — compulsory  and  indefeasible  confederacies  are  re- 
nounced—voluntary alliances  alont^  maintained 807 

Real  point  in  debate  between  Agesilaus  and  Epaniincndas 808 

CHAPTER  LXXVin. 

Battle  of  Leuktra  and  its  Consequences, 

Measures  for  executing  the  stipulations  made  at  the  congress  of  Sparta 809 

Violent  impulse  of  the  Spartans  against  Thebes 809 

King  Kleombrotus  is  ordered  to  march  into  Bceotia,  out  of  Phokis 81'9 

He  forces  the  defenses  of  Bceotia  and  encamps  at  Leuktra 810 

Epaminondas  and  the  Thebans  at  Leuktra— discouragement  in  the  arm}', . .  811 

New  order  of  battle  adopted  by  Epaminondas 812 

Confidence  of  the  Spaitans  and  oi  Kleombrotus 813 

Battle  ot  Leuktra 813 

Defeat  of  the  Spartans  and  death  of  Kleombrotus 813 

Faint  adherence  of  the  Spartan  allies 814 

Sjiartan  camp  after  the  defeat— confession  of  defeat  by  sending  to  solicit 
the  burial-truce 814 


PAGB 

Great  surprise  and  immense  alteration  of  feeling  produced  throughout 

Greece  by  the  Theban  victory 815 

Effect  of  the  news  at  Sparta— heroic  self-command 816 

DitTerence  of  Athens  and  Sparta— Athens  equal  in  active  energy 817 

Re-enforcements  sent  f i-om  Sparta.  818 

Proceedings  in  Boeotia  after  the  battle  of  Leuktra.    The  Theban  victory  not 

well  received  at  Athens 818 

Jason  of  Pherae  arrives  at  Leuktra— the  Spartan  army  retires  from  Bceotia 

under  capitulation 819 

Treatment  of  the  defeated  citizens  on  reaching  Sparta— suspension  of  the 

law 820 

Lowered  estimation  of  Sparta  in  Greece— prestige  of  military  superiority 

lost 820 

Extension  of  the  power  of  Thebes.    Treatment  of  Orchomenus  and  Thespise  8-.il 

Power  and  ambition  of  Jason 821 

Plans  of  Jason— Pythian  festival 822 

Assassination  of  Jason  at  Phene 822 

Relief  to  Thebes  by  the  death  of  Jason— satisfaction  in  Greece 823 

Proceedings  in  Pelopomiesus  after  the  defeat  of  Leuktra.    Expulsion  of  the 

Spartan  harmosts  and  dekarchies 823 

Sky talism  at  Argos— violent  intestine  feud 824 

Discouragement  and  helplessness  of  Sparta 825 

Athens  places  herself  at  the  head  of  a  new  Peloponnesian  land  confederacy  825 
Accusation  preferred  in  the  Amphiktyonic  assembly  by  Thebes  against 

Sparta 825 

The  Spartans  are  condemned  to  a  fine— importance  of  this  fact  as  an  indi- 
cation   826 

Proceedings  in  Arcadia 827 

Re-establisliment  of  the  city  of  Mantineia  by  its  own  citizens 827 

Humiliating  refusal  experienced  by  Agesilaus  from  the  Mantineians — keenly 

painful  to  a  Spartan 828 

Feeling  against  Agesilaus  at  Sparta 829 

Impulse  among  the  Arcadians  toward  Pan-Arcadian^  union.     Opposition 

from  Orchomenus  and  Tegea 829 

Revolution  at  Tegea — the  philo-Spartan  party  are  put  down  or  expelled. 

Tegea  becomes  anti-Spartan,  and  favorable  to  the  Pan- Arcadian  union. . .  830 

Pan- Arcadian  union  is  formed .  .^ 830 

March  of  Agesilaus  against  Mantineia,     Evidence  of  lowered  sentiment  in 

Sparta 831 

Application  by  the  Arcadians  to  Athens  for  aid  against  Sparta;  it  is  refused: 

tliey  then  apply  to  the  Thebans 832 

Proceedings  and  Views  of  Epaminondas  since  the  battle  of  Leuktra 832 

Plans  of  Epaminondas  for  restoring  the  Messenians  in  Peloponnesus 833 

Also  for  consolidating  the  Arcadians  against  Sparta 833 

Epaminondas  and  the  Theban  army  arrive  in  Arcadia.    Great  allied  force 

assembled  there.    The  allies  entreat  him  to  invade  Laconia 834 

Reluctance  of  Epaminondas  to  invade  Laconia — reasonable  grounds  for  it. .  835 

Ho  marches  into  Laconia — four  lines  of  invasion 835 

He  crosses  the  Eurotas  and  approaches  close  to  Sparta 835 

Alarm  at  Sparta— arrival  of  various  allies  to  her  aid  by  sea 836 

Discontent  in  Laconia  among  the  Perioyki  and  Helots-Banger  to  Sparta 

from  that  cause 836 

Vigilant  defense  of  Sparta  by  Agesilaus 837 

Violent  emotion  of  the  Spartans,  especially  the  women.    Partial  attack 

upon  Sparta  by  Epaminondas 838 

He  retires  without  attempting  to  storm  Sparta:  ravages  Laconia  down  to 

Gythium.     He  returns  into  Arcadia 838 

Great  effect  of  this  invasion  upon  Grecian  opinion — Epaminondas  is  exalted 

and  Sparta  farther  lowered 8.38 

Foundation  of  the  Arcadian  MegalopoUs 839 

Foundation  of  Messene 840 


42 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   III. 


PAGE 

Abstraction  of  Western  Laconia  f  rom  Sparta 841 

Great  diminution  thereby  of  her  power,  wealth,  and  estimation Wl 

Periceki  and  Helots  established  as  freeiden  along  with  the  Messemans  on      _^ 

the  Laceda?monian  border ■ • ^ 

The  details  of  this  reorganizing  process  unhappily  unknown »V^ 

Megalopolis— the  Pan- Arcadian  Ten  Thousand »43 

Epaminondas  and  his  army  evacuate  Peloponnesus •  •  •  •  •  c4i 

The  Spartans  solicit  aid  from  Athens— language  of  their  envoys,  as  well  as 

those  from  Corinth  and  Phlius.  at  Athens o»* 

Reception  of  the  envoys— the  Athenians  grant  the  prayer Mb 

Vote  passed  to  aid  Sparta— Iphikrates  is  nanie<l  general »4b 

March  of  Iphikrates  and  his  army  to  the  Isthmus «4b 

Trial  of  Epaminondas  at  Thebes  for  retaining  his  command  beyond  the  legal 

time— his  honorable  and  easy  acquittal o4< 


PAET  11. 

CONTINUATION  OF  HISTORICAL  GREECE. 


CHAPTER  LVIII. 

FEOM  THE  RESOLUTION  OF  THE    ATHENIANS   TO  ATTACK   SYRACUSE, 
DOWN  TO  THE  FIRST  WINTER  AFTER  THEIR  ARRIVAL  IN  SICILY. 

For  the  two  or  three  months  imme<liately  succeeding  the  final  resolu- 
tion taken  by  the  Athenians  to  invade  Sicily  (described  in  the  last  chap- 
ter) the  whole  city  was  elate  and  bustling  with  preparation.     I  !';\ve 
already  mentioned  that  this  resolution,  though  long  opposed  by  IN  ikias 
with  a' considerable  minoril  v,  had  at  last  been  adopted  (chietly  through 
the  unforeseen  working  of  lliat  which  he  intended  as  a  counter-maneu- 
ver) with  a  degree  of  enthusiasm  and  unanimity,  and  upon  an  enlai^^ed 
scale  which  surpassed  all  the  anticipations  of  its  promoters.     Ihe 
prophets,  circulatoi's  of  oracles,  and  other  accredited  religious  advisers 
announced  generally  the  favorable  dispositions  of  the  gods    and 
promised  a  triumphant  result.     All  classes  in  the  city,  rich  and  poor 
—cultivators,  traders,  and  seamen— old  and  young— all  embraced  tho 
project  with  ardor;  as  requi;-ing  a  great  effort,  yet  promising  unpar- 
alleled results,  both  of  public  aggrandizement  and  individual  gam. 
Each  man  was  anxious  to  put  down  his  own  name  for  personal  ser- 
vice:  so  that  the  three  generals,  Nikias,  Alkibiades,  and  Lainacluis 
when  they  proceeded  to  make  their  selection  of  hoplites,  instead  of 
bein"-  forced  to  employ  constraint  or  incur  ill  will,  as  happened  wheii 
an  expedition  was  adopted  reluctantly  with  many  dissentients,  had 
only  to  choose  the  fittest  among  a  throng  of  eager  volunteers,     livery 
man  provided  himself  with  his  best  arms  and  with  bodily  accoutre- 
ments, useful  as  well  as  ostentatious,  for  a  long  voyage  and  for  tho 
exigencies  of  a  varied  laud  and  sea  .service.     Among  the  tnerarchs 
(or  rich  citizens  who  undertook  each  in  his  turn  the  duty  of  com- 
mandinn-  a  ship  of  war)  the  competition  was  yet  stronger.     Each  of 
them  accounted  it  an  honor  to  be  named,  and  vied  with  his  comrades 
to  exhibit  his  ship  in  the  most  finished  state  of  equipment       ihe 
state  indeed  furnished  both  the  trireme  with  its  essential  tackle  and 
oai-s,  and  the  regular  pay  for  the  crew;  but  the  trierarch,  even  la 

43 


44 


ATTACK  OX  SYRACUSE. 


MUTILATION  OF  THE  HERM^. 


45 


ordinary  cases,  iisuallv  innivml  various  expenses  U-sidcs,  to  make 
the  equipment  complete  and  to  keep  tlie  crew  togdber  Sucb  addi- 
tional outlay,  neither  exacted  nor  Uelinrd  by  hnv,  hut  pnly  by  cus- 
tom and  £?eneral  opinion,  was  dilTerent  in  every  individual  case 
a-cordino-?o  temper  and  circumstances.  But  on  the  present  occasion, 
zeal  and  forwardness  were  universal.  Each  trienirch  tried  to  procure 
for  his  own  ship  the  best  crew,  by  offers  of  additional  revvard  to  all, 
but  especially  to  the  Thranitiii  or  rowers  on  the  highest  of  the  tlnee 
tiers-  and  it  seems  that  the  seamen  were  not  appointed  especuiUy  to 
one  ship,  but  were  at  liberty  to  accept  these  offers  and  to  serve  in  any 
shiD  they  prefened.  Each  trierarch  spent  more  than  had  ever  been 
known  before-in  pay,  outtit,  provision,  and  even  external  decora- 
tion of  his  vessel.  Besides  the  best  crews  winch  Athens  herself 
could  furnish,  picked  seamen  were  also  re(iuired  from  the  subject- 
allies  and  were  l)id  for  in  the  same  way  by  the  trierarclis. 

Such  efforts  were  much  facilitated  by  the  fact  that  hve  years  hnd 
now  ehipsed  since  the  peace  of  Xikias,  witliout  any  considerable  war- 
like operations.     While  the  treasury  had  become  replenished  with 
fresh  accumulations,  and   the  triremes  increased  m   number--the 
miiitarv  population,  re-enforced  by  additional  numbers  of  youth  hnd 
for<-ott*en  both  the  hardships  of  the  war  and  the  pressure  of  epidemic 
disease.     Hence  the  fleet  now  got  together,  while  it  surpassed   in 
number  all  previous  armaments  of  Athens,  except  a  single  one  in  the 
second  year  of  the  previous  war  under  Perikles,  was  incomparably 
supcnior  even  to  that,  and  still  more  superior  to  all  the  rest  in  the 
other  in^edients  of  force,  matciial  as  well  as  moral;  in  picked  men 
universal  ardor,  ships  as  well  as  arms  in  the  best  condition,  an(l 
accessories  of  every  kind  in  abundance.     Such  was  the  confidence  ot 
success,  that  many  Athenians  went  prepared  for  trade  as  well  as  for 
combat-  so  that  the  private  stock  thus  added  to  the  public  outtit  and 
to  the  sums  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  generals,  constituted  an 
unparalleled  agirre^ate  of  wealth.   3luch  of  this  was  visible  to  the  eye, 
eoi^ributingto  iieiditen  that  general  excit(  ment  ot  Athenian  imagina- 
tion which  pervaded  the  whole  city  while  the  preparations  were  going 
forward:  a  minded  feelinsr  of  private  sympathy  j\nd  patriotism— a 
dash  of  uneasiness  from  retfeetion  on  the  distant  and  unknown  region 
wherein  the  fleet  was  to  act— yet  an  elate  confidence  in  Athenian 
force  such  as  had   never   before  been   entertained.      A\e   hear  ot 
Sokrates  the  philosopher,  and  Meton   the   astronomer,  as  forming 
exceptions  to  this  universal  tone  of  sanguine  anticipation:  the  famil- 
iar -enius  which  constantly  waited  upon  the  philosopher  is  supposed 
to  Imve  forewarned  him  of  the  result.     It  is  not  impossible  that  he 
may  have  been  averse  to  the  expedition,  though  the  fact  is  less  fully 
certified  than  we  could  wish.     Amidst  a  general  predominance  of  the 
various  favorable  religious  signs  and  prophecies  there  were  also  some 
unfavorable.     Usually,  on  all  public  matters  of  risk  or  gravity,  there 
were  prophets  who  gave  assurances  in  opposite  ways,  those  which 


turned  out  right  were  treasured  up;  the  rest  were  at  once  forgotten, 
or  never  long  remembered.  .  ^'         4.^  ^ 

After  bctvveen  two  and  three  months  of  active  preparations  the 
expedition  was  almost  ready  to  start,  when  an  event  happcmed  which 
fatally  poisoned  the  prevalent  cheerfulness  of  the  city.  This  was  the 
mutilation  of  the  Herni*,  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  events  m  all 

^'S'llemue^'  or  half-statues  of  the  god  Hernies,  were  blocks  of 
marble  about  the  height  of  the  human  figure.     The  upper  part  was^ 
"into  a  head,  face   neck,  and  bust;  the  lower  part  was  left  as  a 
Quulran-nilar  pillar,  broad  at  the  base,  without  arms,  body  or  legs, 
b  t  vi^^h^ue  signiiicant  mark  of  the  male  sex  in  front.    They  were 
Iti-ibuted  in  Ireat  numbers  throughout  Athens  and  always  m  the 
most  conspicu^ous  situations;   standing  beside  the  outer  doors  of 
mivate  houses  as  well  as  of  temples-neir  the  most  frequented 
porticoes-at  the  intersection  of  cross  ways-in  the  public  agoia 
^t^y^sL  thus  present  to  the  eye  of  every  Athenian  in  all  his  ac  s  of 
intercommunion,  either   for  business  or   pleasure,  with  his  fellow- 
rhizens      The  reli'-ious  feeling  of  the  Greeks  considered  the  god  to 
be  planied  or  domiciliated  where  his  statue  stood,  so  that  the  com- 
mnionship,  sympathy,  and  guardianship  of  Hermes  became  asso- 
ciUed  w  th  most  of  the  manifestations  of  conjunct  life  at  Athens 
poUtrcal,  social,  commercial,  or  gymnastic       ^^-'^^^^^^^')^^^^^^^ 
•an-ular  fasliion  of  these  statues,  employed  occasionally  for  other 
irods  besides  Hermes,  was  a  most  ancient  relic  handed  down  from  the 
f^rimiavi  rudeness  of  Pelasgian  workmanship;  and  was  popular  m 
\re-idia  as  well  as  peculiarly  frequent  in  Athens. 

iho^  U.C  CHl  ot'jiay,  415  B.C.!  iu  the  course  ot  ""«  »°V,t  oiu' 
Tii.ri.t  -ill  those  HeinuB,  one  of  the  most  peculiar  marks  ot  the  citj, 
vvc  e  m  t  .ted  by  unkuown  hands.  Their  characteristic  features 
vere  knocked  off  or  leveled,  so  that  nothing  was  left  except  a  mass 
ot  stone  with  no  resemblance  to  humanity  or  deity.  All  ^ere  tlius 
d "alt  wUh  n  the  same  wav,  save  and  except  very  few :  nay,  Andokides 
affin«r(andl  incline  to-believe  him)  that  there  was  but  <>«.  which 

'=1tlfot'cour"otpossil,le  for  any  one  to  sympathize  fully  with  the 
feeliiv'S  of  a  religion  not  his  own;  indeed  the  sentiment  with  which 
n  the  case  ot  persons  of  different  creed,  each  regards  the  strong 
emoTbns  growing  out  ot  causes  peculiar  to  the  other,  is  usually  one 
7s,  Z  se  that  sM.ch  trifles  and  absurdities  can  oec.vsion  a,ny  serious 
d  stress  or  excitement.     But  it  we  lake  that  reasonable  pains,  which 
fslncumbenlon  those  who  study  the  history  of  Gi>.ece   to  rea  ize  m 
our  minds  the  religious  and  political  associations  of      e  Athen urns 
noted  in  ancient  times  for  their  superior  piety,  as  well  as  loi  their 
accuracvTnd  ma"-uificenee  about  t!ie  visible  monuments  embodyin.| 
Unrtecii    -vcaiall  in  part  comprehend  the  intensity  of  mingled 
d  sLay  ten-oraml  wrath  which  beset  the  public  mind  on  the  morn- 


46 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


inir  after  this  nocturnal  sacrileire,  alike  unforeseen  and  nnparalleled. 
Amidst  all  the  ruin  and  impoveri.shment  Avhich  had  iK-en  inllieted  by 
the  Persian  invasion  of  Attica,  there  was  nothing  ^vhieli  -was  so  pro- 
foundly felt  or  so  long  remembered  as  the  dehberate  burning  of  the 
statues  and  temples  of  the  gods.     If  ue  could  imagine  the"  excite- 
ment of  a  Spanish  or  Italian  toun.  pn  finding  that  all  the  image?  of 
the  Virgin  had  been  defaced  during  the  same  night,  Ave  shoukthave 
a  parallel,  though  a  very  inadequate  parallel,  to  Avhat  was  now  felt  at 
Athens — where   religious  associations   and   persons  were  far  more 
intimately  jdlied  with  ail  civil  acts  and  with  all  the  proceedings  of 
everv-day  life — where,  too.  the   god   and   his   efficiency  were  inore 
forcibly  localized,  as  well  as  identified  with  the  presence'and  keeping 
of  the  statue.     To  the  Athenians,  when  they  went  forth  on  the  fol- 
lowing morning,  each  man  seeing  the  divine  guardian  at  his  doorway 
dishonored  and  defaced,  and  each  man  gnulually  coming  to  know 
that  the  devastation  was  general,  it  would  seem  that  the  tOAvn  had 
become  as   it  were   godless,  that  the  streets,  the   market-place,  the 
])orticoes,  were  robbed  of  their  divine  protectors;  and  wliat  AvasAvorse 
still,  that  these  protectors,  having  been  grossly  insulted,  carried  away 
Avith  them  alienated  sentiments — Avrathful  and  vindictive  instead  of 
tutelary  and  sympathizing.     It  Avas  on  the  protection  of  the  gods  that 
all  their  political  constitution   as  Avell  as  the  blessings  (>f  civil  life 
depended;    insomuch   that  the   curses  of  the  gods  w'cre  habitually 
invoked  as  sanction  and  punishment  for  grave  ofl'enses,  political  as 
Avell  as  others:  an  extension   and  generairzation  of  the  feeling  still 
attached  to  the  judicial  oath.     ThisAvas,  in  the  minds  of  the  peo'ple  of 
Athens,  a  sincere  and  literal  conviction — not  simply  a  form  of  speech 
to  be  pronounced  in  prayers  and   public  harangues,  Avilhout  being 
ever  construed  as  a  reality  in  calculating  consequences  and  detcnniii^ 
ing  practical  measures.     Accordingly  they  drew  from  the  mutilation 
of  the  Ilcrnijie  the  inference,  noteless  nj'itural  than   terrifying,  that 
lieaA-y  public  misfortune  Avas  impending  over  the  city,  and  tluit  the 
political  constitution  to  Avhich  they  were  attached  was  in  imminent 
ulanger  of  being  subverted. 

Such  was  the  mysterious  incident  Avhich  broke  in  upon  the  eager 
and  bustling  movement  of  Athens,  a  fcAV  days  before  the  SicilSm 
expedition  was  in  condition  for  starting.  In  reference  to  that  expe- 
dition, it  Avas  taken  to  heart  as  a  most  depressing  omen.  It  Avould 
doubtless  have  been  so  interpreted,  had  it  been  a  mere  undesigned  acci- 
dent happening  to  any  venerated  religious  object — just  as  we  are  told 
that  similar  misgivings  Avere  occasioned  by  the  occurrence,  about  this 
same  time,  of  the  melancholy  festi\al  of  the  Adonia,  wlien  in  the 
Avomen  loudly  bcAvailed  the  untimely  death  of  Adonis.  The  mutila- 
tion of  the  Hernue,  hoAvever,  Avas  something  much  more  ominous 
than  the  Avorst  accident.  It  proclaimed  itself  as  the  deliberate  act  of 
organized  conspirators,  not  inconsiderable  in  number,  whose  names 
and  final  purpobc  Avere  indeed  unknown,  but  Avho  had  begun  by 


OBJECTS  OF  THE  CONSPIRATORS. 


47 


rommilting  sacrilege  of  a  character  flagrant  and  unheard  of.  For 
intentional  mutilation  of  a  public  and  sacred  statue,  Avhere  the  mate- 
ii:il  afforded  no  temptation  to  plunder,  is  a  case  to  which  we  know 
no  parallel:  much  more,  mutilation  by  wholesale— spread  by  one 
band  and  iu  one  night  throughout  an  entire  city.  Though  neither 
the  parties  concerned,  nor  their  purposes,  Avere  ever  more  than 
prn-tialiy  made  out,  the  concert  and  conspiracy  itself  is  uuquestion- 

able 

It  seems  probable,  as  far  as  w^e  can  form  an  opinion,  that  the  con- 
spirators had  tAVO  objects,  perhaps  some  of  them  one  and  some  the 
other— to  ruin   Alkibiades— to  frustrate   or  delay  the  expedition. 
IIow  they  pursued  the  former  purpose,  Avill  be  presently  seen:  toward 
the  latter,  nothing  was  ostensibly  done,  but  the  position  of  Teukrus 
and  other  metics  implicated,  renders  it  more  likely  that  they  were 
induenced  by  sympathies  with  Corinth  and  Megara,  prompting  them 
to  intercept  an  expedition  Avhich  was  supposed  to  pronuse  great 
triumphs  to  Athens— rather  than  corrupted  by  the  violent  antipathies 
of  intestine  politics.      Indeed  the  two  objects  Avere  iutiimitely  con- 
nected with  each  other;  for  the  prosecution  of  the  enterprise,  while 
full  of  prospective  conciuest  to  Athens,  was  yet  more  pregnant  Avith 
future  power  and  wealth  to  Alkibiades  himself.     Such  chances  Avould 
disappear  if  the  expedition  could  be  prevented;  nor  Avas  it  at  all  impos- 
sible that  the  Athenians,  under  the  intense  impressicm  of  religious 
terror  consequent  on  the  mutilation  of  the  HerniiTe,  might  throw  up 
the  scheme  altouether.     Especially  Nikias.  excpiisitely  sensitive  in  his 
own  religious  conscience,  and  never  hearty  iu  his  Avish  for  going  (a 
fact  perfectly  known  to  the  enemy),  would  hasten  to  consult  his  pro- 
phets, and  luiixht  reasonably  be  expected  to  reucAV  his  opposition  on 
the  fresh  ground  offered  to^him,  or  at  least  to  claim  delay  until  the 
offended  gods  should  have  been  appeased.      We  may  judge  how 
much  such  a  proceeding  was  in  the  line  of  his  chamcter  and  of  the 
Athenian  character,  Avhen  we  find  him,  two  years  afterward,  Avith 
the  full   concurrence  of  his   soldiers,  actually  sacrificing   the    last 
opportunity  of  safe  retreat  for  the  half-ruined  Athenian  army  in 
Sicily,  and  refusing  even  to  alloAV  the  proposition  to  be  debated,  in 
consequence  of  an  eclipse  of  the  moou;  and  Avhen  we  refiect  that 
Spartans  and  other  Greeks  frequently  renounced  public  designs  if  au 
eartliquake  happened  before  the  execution. 

But  though  the  chance  of  setting  aside  the  expedition  altogether 
might  reasoliably  enter  into  the  plans  of  the  conspirators,  as  a  hkely 
consequence  of  the  intense  shock  inflicted  on  the  religious  mind  of 
Athens,  and  especially  of  Nikhis— this  calculation  Avas  not  realized. 
Probably  matters  had  already  proceeded  too  tar  even  for  Nikias  to 
recede.  Notice  had  been  sent  round  to  all  the  allies;  forces  were 
already  on  their  way  to  the  rendezvous  at  Korkyra;  the  Argeian  and 
Mantinean  allies  were  arriving  at  Peiraius  to  embark.  So  much  the 
more  eagerly  did  the  conspirators  proceed  in  that  which  1  have  stated 


48 


ATTACK  OX  SYRACUSE. 


SPEECHES  AGAINST  ALKIBIADES. 


49 


as  the  other  part  of  their  probable  plan;  to  work  that  exaggerated 
religious  terror,  which  they  had  themselves  artilically  b  rough  t°a  bo  lit 
for  the  ruin  of  Alkibiades.  ' 

Few  men  in  Athens  either  had  or  deserved  to  have  a  greater  num- 
ber of  enemies,  political  as  well  as  private,  than  Alkibiades;  many  of 
them  being  among  the  highest  citizens,  whom  he  olfended  by  his 
insolence,  and  whose  liturgies  and  other  customary  exhibitions  he 
r  outshone  by  his  reckless  expenditure.  His  importance  had  been 
already  so  much  increased,  and  threatened  to  be  so  much  more 
increased,  by  the  Sicilian  enterprise,  that  they  no  longer  observed  any 
measures  in  compassing  his  ruin.  That  which  the  mutilators  of  the 
Ilermae  seemed  to  have  deliberately  planned,  his  other  enemies  were 
ready  to  turn  to  profit. 

Amidst  the  mournful  dismay  spread  bv  the  discovery  of  so  unpar- 
alleled a  sacrilege,  it  appeared  to  the  Athenian  people— as  it  would 
have  appeared  to  the  Ephors  at  Sparta,  or  to  the  rulers  in  every 
oligarchical  city  of  Greece— that  it  was  their  paramount  and  impera- 
tive duty  to  detect  and  punish  the  authors.     So  loiiir  as  these  latter 
t^ere  walking  about  unknown   and  unpunished,  the  temples  were 
defiled  by  their  presence,  and  the  whole  city  was  accounted  under  the 
displeasure  of  the  gods,  who  would  inflict  upon  it  heavy  public  mis- 
fortunes.    Under  this  displeasure  every  citizen  felt  himself  compre- 
liended,  so  that  the  sense  of  public  security  as  well  as  of  private  com- 
fort  were  alike  unappeased,  until  the  ollenders  should  be  dis(  overed 
and  atonement  made  by  punishing  or  expelling  them.    Larue  rewards 
were  accordingly  proclaimed  to  any  person  who  could  Lnve  informa- 
tion, and  even  impunity  to  any  accomplice  whose  conVos.sion  miirht 
lay  open  the  plot.      Nor  did  the  matter  stop  here.      Once  under  this 
painful  shock  of  religious  and  political  terror,  the  Athenians  became 
eager  talkers  and  listeners  on  the  subject  of  other  recent  acts  of 
impiety.     Every  one  was  impatient  to  tell  all  that  he  knew,  and  more 
than  he  knew,  about  such  incidents;  while  to  exercise  any  strict 
criticism  upon  the  truth  of  such  reports,  would  argue  weakness  of 
faith  and  want  of  religious  zeal,  rendering  the  critic  himself  a  sus- 
pected man— "metuunt  dubitasse  videri."     To  rake  out  and  riiior- 
ously  visit  all  such  offenders,  and  thus  to  display  an  earnest  zeaffor 
the  honor  of  the  gods,  was  accounted  one  auxiliary  means  of  obtain- 
ing absolution  from  them  for  the  recent  outrage.    Hence  an  additional 
public  vote  was  passed,  promising  rewards  and  inviting  infoimation 
from  all  witnesses — citizens,  metics,  or  even  slaves— respectinir  any 
previous  acts  of  impiety  which  nnght  have  come  within  their  cou;- 
nizance;  but  at  the  same  trme  providing  that  informers  who  gave 
false  depositions  should  be  punished  capitally. 

While  the  Senate  of  Five  Hundred  were  invested  with  full  powers 
of  action,  Diognetus,  Peisander,  Charikles,  and  others  were  named 
commissioners  for  receiving  and  prosecuting  inquiries;  and  public 
assemblies  were  held  nearly  every  day  to  receive  reports.     The  first 


informations  received,  however,  did  not  relate  to  the  grave  and 
recent  mutilation  of  the  Herm*,  but  to  analogous  incidents  of  older 
dale :  to  certain  defacements  of  other  statues,  accomplished  in  drunken 
irolic — and  above  all  to  ludicrous  ceremonies  celebi'ated  in  various 
houses,  by  parties  of  revelers  caricaturing  and  divulging  the  Eleu- 
sinian  mysteries.  It  was  under  this  latter  head  that  the  first  impeach- 
ment was  preferred  against  Alkibiades. 

So  fully  were  the  preparations  of  the  armament  now  complete, 
that  the  trireme  of  Lamachus  (who  was  doubtless  more  diligent  about 
the  military  details  than  either  of  his  two  colleagues)  was  already 
moored  in  the  outer  harbor,  and  the  last  public  assembly  was  held 
for  the  departing  officers,  who  probably  laid  before  their  countrymen 
an  imposing  account  of  the  force  assembled — when  Pythonikus  rose 
to  impeach  Alkibiades.  "  Athenians"  (said  he),  "you  are  going  to 
dispatch  this  great  force  and  incur  all  this  hazard,  at  a  moment 
when  I  am  prepared  to  show  you  that  your  general  Alkibiades  is  one 
of  the  profaners  of  the  holy  mysteries  in  a  private  house.  Pass  a 
vote  of  impunity,  and  I  will  produce  to  you  forthwith  a  slave  of  one 
here  present,  who,  though  himself  not  initiated  in  the  mysteries, 
phall  repeat  to  you  what  they  are.  Deal  with  me  in  any  way  you 
choose,  if  my  statement  prove  untrue."  While  Alkibiades  strenu- 
ously denied  the  allegation,  the  Prytanes  (senators  presiding  over  the 
assembly,  according  to  the  order  determined  by  lot  for  that  year 
among  the  ten  tribes)  at  once  made  proclamation  for  all  uninithited 
citizens  to  depart  from  the  assembly,  and  went  to  fetch  the  slave 
(Andromachus  by  name)  wiiom  Pythonikus  had  indicated.  On  being 
introduced,  Andromachus  deposed  before  the  assembly  that  he  had 
been  with  his  master  in  the  house  of  Polytion,  v.lien  Alkibiades, 
Nikiades,  and  Meletus  went  through  the  sham  celebration  of  the 
mysteries;  many  other  persons  being  present,  and  especially  three 
other  slaves  besides  himself.  We  must  presume  that  he  verified  tJiis 
affirmation  by  the  describing  what  the  mysteries  were  which  he  had 
seen — the  test  which  Pythonikus  had  offered. 

Such  was  the  first  direct  attack  made  upon  Alkibiades  by  his 
enemies.  Pythonikus,  the  demagogue  Androkles,  and  other  speakers, 
'  having  put  in  evidence  this  irreverent  proceeding  (probably  in  sub- 
stance true),  enlarged  upon  it  with  the  strongest  invective,' imputed 
to  him  many  other  acts  of  the  like  character,  and  even  denounced 
him  as  cognizant  of  the  recent  mutilation  of  the  Hermae.  "All  had 
been  done"  (they  said)  "with  a  view^  to  accomplish  his  purpose  of 
subverting  the  democracy,  when  bereft  of  its  divine  protectors — a 
purpose  manifested  by  the  constant  tenor  of  his  lawless,  overbearing, 
antipopular  demeanor."  Infamous  as  this  calumny  was,  so  far  as 
regarded  the  mutilation  of  the  Hermae  (for  whatever  else  Alkibiades 
may  have  done,  of  that  act  he  was  unquestionably  innocent,  being 
the  very  person  who  had  most  to  lose  by  it,  and  whom  it  ultimately 
ruined),  they  calculated  upon  the  reigning  excitement  to  get  it  accrea- 


50 


ATTACK  OX  SYRACUSE. 


DEPARTURE  OF  THE  ARMAMENT. 


51 


ited,  and  probal)ly  to  procure  his  deposition  from  the  command, 
preparatory  to  public  trial.  But  in  spite  of  all  the  disquietude 
ari^inir  from  the  recent  sacrileire,  their  expectations  were  defeated. 
The  strenuous  denial  of  Alkiblades — aided  by  his  very  peculiar  posi- 
tion as  commander  of  the  armament,  as  well  as  by  the  retlection  that 
the  recent  outrage  tended  rather  to  spoil  his  favorite  projects  in 
Sicily — found  general  credence.  The  citizens  enrolled  to  serve  mani- 
fcslfCcl  strong  disposition  to  stand  by  him;  the  allies  from  Argos  and 
;Mantiueia  were  known  to  have  embraced  the  service  chietly  at  his 
instigation;  the  people  generally  had  become  familiar  with  liim  as 
the  intended  conqueror  in  Sicily,  and  were  loath  to  be  balked  of  this 
project.  From  all  which  circumstances  liis  enemies,  finding  little 
disposition  to  welcome  the  accusations  which  they  preferred,  were 
coinpelhd  to  postpone  them  until  a  more  suitable  time. 

But  Alkibiades  saw  full  well  the  dauger  (»f  having  such  charges 
lianiring  over  his  head,  and  the  peculiar  advantage  which  he  derived 
from  his  accidental  position  at  the  moment.  He  implored  the  people 
"to  investigate  the  charges  at  once;  proclaiming  Lis  anxiety  to  stand 
trial  and  even  to  suffer  death,  if  found  guilty-  accepting  the  com- 
mand only  in  case  he  should  be  acquitted — Jind  insisting  above  all 
things  on^he  mischief  to  the  city  of  sending  him  on  such  an  expedi- 
tion with  the  charge  undecided^  as  well  as  on  the  hardship  to  him- 
M  If  of  being  aspersed  by  calumny  during  his  absence,  without  power 
of  defense.  Such  a[)i>eals,  just  and  reasonable  in  themselves,  and 
luged  with  all  the  vehemence  of  a  man  who  felt  that  the  question 
was  one  of  life  or  death  to  his  future  prospects,  were  very  near  pre- 
vailing. II is  enemies  could  only  defeat  them  by  the  trick  of  putting 
up  fresh  spc  akers.  less  notorious  for  hostility  to  Alkibiades.  These 
men  affecterl  a  tone  of  candor— deprecated  the  delay  which  would  be 
occasioned  in  the  departure  of  the  expedition,  if  he  were  put  upon 
his  trial  forthwith— and  proposed  deferring  the  trial  until  a  certain 
number  of  days  after  his  return.  Such  was  tlie  determination  ulti- 
matelv  adopted:  the  supporters  of  Alkibiades  probably  not  fully 
appreciatii^g  its  consequences,  and  conceiving  that  the  speedy  depar- 
ture of  the  expedition  was  advisable  even  for  his  interest,  as  well  as 
asreeable  to  their  own  feelings.  And  thus  his  enemies,  though 
Imffled  in  their  first  attempt  to  bring  on  his  inunediate  ruin,  carried  a 
postponement  which  insured  to  them  leisure  for  thoroughly  poison- 
inir  the  public  mind  against  him.  and  choosing  their  own  time  for 
liis  trial.  They  took  care  to  keep  back  all  further  accusation  until 
he  and  the  armament  had  departed. 

The  spectacle  of  its  departure  was  indeed  so  imposing,  and  the 
moment  so  full  of  anxious  interest,  that  it  banished  even  the  rec- 
ollection of  the  recent  sacrilcL^e.  The  entire  armament  was  not 
nuistered  at  Athens;  for  it  had  been  judged  expedient  to  order  mo^t 
of  the  allied  contingents  to  rendezvous  at  once  at  Korkyra.     But  the 


Vtlienian  force  alone  was  astounding  to  behold.  There  were  one 
hundred  triremes,  sixty  of  wiiich  were  in  fidl  trim  for  rapid  nautical 
niovcment — while  the  remaining  forty  were  employed  as  transports 
or  the  soldiers.  There  were  1500  select  citizen  hoplites,  chosen 
iioni  the  general  muster-roll— and  700  Thetes,  or  citizens  too  poor  to 
l)e  included  in  the  muster-roll,  who  served  as  hoplites  on  shipboard 
i:pibata3  or  marines),  each  with  a  panoply  furnished  by  the  stale.  To 
ihese  must  be  adiled  500  Argeiau  and  250  Mantineian  hoplites,  paid 
!.v  Athens  and  transported  on  board  Athenian  shii)S.  The  number 
ot  horsemen  was  so  small,  that  all  were  conveyed  in  a  single  horse 
transport. 

But  the  condition,  the  equipment,  the  pomp  both  of  wealth  and 
force,  visible  in  the  armameur,  were  still  more  impressive  than  the 
numller.  At  davbreak  on  the  day  ai)poiiited,  when  all  the  ships  were 
ready  inPeirajus  for  departure,  tlie  military  force  was  marched  down 
ill  a  bodv  from  the  city  and  embarked.  They  were  accompanied  by 
nearly  tlie  whole  population,  metics  and  foreigners  as  well  as  citizens, 
so  that  the  appearance  was  that  of  a  collective  emigration  like  the 
flii^ht  to  Salamis  sixly-tive  years  before.  While  the  crowd  of  for- 
eigners, brought  thither  by  curiosity,  w^ere  amazed  by  the  grandeur  of 
the  spectacle— the  citizens  accompanying  were  moved  by  deeper  and 
more  stirring  anxieties.  Their  sons,  brothers,  relatives,  and  friends, 
Avere  just  starting  on  the  longest  and  largest  enterprise  w^iich  Athens 
bad  ever  undertaken;  against  an  island  extensive  as  well  as  powerful, 
known  to  uoinS  of  them  accurately— and  into  a  sea  of  undetined  pos- 
nihilities;  glory  and  protit  on  the  one  side,  but  hazards  of  unassignable 
inagnitude'on  the  other.  At  this  tinal  parting,  ideas  of  doubt  and 
danger  became  far  more  painfully  present  than  they  had  been  in  iiny 
of  the  preliminary  discussions; "and  in  spite  of  all  the  reassuring 
elfcct  of  the  unrivaled  arinament  before  them,  the  relatives  now 
separating  at  the  water's  edge  could  not  banish  the  dark  presentiment 
that  they  were  bidding  each  other  farewell  for  the  last  time. 

The  moment  immediately  succi^eding  this  farewell — when  all  the 
soldiers  were  already  on  board  and  the  Keleustes  was  on  the  point  of 
beginning  his  chant  to  put  the  rowers  in  motion— was  peculiarly 
solemn  and  touching.  !Silen(;e  having  bee«  enjoined  and  obtained, 
by  sound  of  trumpet^  the  crews  in  every  ship,  and  the  spectators  on 
shore,  followed  the  voice  of  the  herald  in  praying  to  the  gods  for 
suecess,  and  in  singing  the  p;x3an.  On  every  deck  were  seen  bowls 
of  wine  prepared,  out  of  which  the  otlicers  and  the  Epibata3  made 
libations,  with  goblets  of  silver  and  gold.  At  length  the  linal  signal 
was  given,  and  the  whole  fleet  quitted  Peineus  in  single  tile — dis- 
pljiying  the  exuberance  of  their  yet  untried  force  by  a  race  of  speed 
as  far  as  iEgina.  Never  in  Grecian  history  was  an  invocation  more 
unanimous,  emphatic,  and  imposing,  addressed  to  the  gods;  never 
was  the  refusing  nod  of  Zeus  more  stern  or  peremptory.     All  these 


52 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


CONFLICTING  PARTIES  AT  SYRACUSE. 


53 


details,  given  by  Thucydides,  of  the  triumphant  promise  which  no\'' 
issued  from  Peirseus,  derive  a  painful  interest  from  their  contrii&t 
with  the  sad  issue  which  will  hereafter  be  unfolded. 

The  fleet  made  straight  for  Korkyra,  where  the  contingents  of  the 
maritime  allies,  with  the  ships  for  burden  and  provisions,  were  found 
assembled.  The  armament  thus  complete  was  passed  in  review,  and 
found  to  comprise  184  triremes  with  two  Rhodian  pentekonters 
5,100  hoplites;  480  bowmen,  80  of  them  Kretan;  700  Rhodian  sliiiij- 
ers;  and  120  Megarian  exiles  serving  as  light  troops.  Of  vessels  of 
burden,  in  attendance  with  provisions,  muniments  of  war,  bakers, 
masons  and  carpenters,  etc.,  the  number  was  not  less  than  500- 
besides  which,  there  was  a  considerable  number  of  private  tradinir 
ships,  following  voluntarily  for  purposes  of  profit.  Three  fast-sailing 
triremes  were  dispatched  in  advance,  to  ascertain  which  of  the  ciliel 
in  Italy  and  Sicily  would  welcome  the  arrival  of  the  armament;  and 
especially  to  give  notice  at  Kgesta  that  the  succor  solicited  was  now 
on  its  way,  requiring  at  the  same  time  that  the  money  promised  by 
the  Egest*ans  should  be  produced.  Having  then  distributed  by  lot 
the  armament  into  three  divisions,  one  under  each  of  the  generals, 
Nikias,  Alkibiades,  and  Lamachus— they  crossed  the  Ionic  Gulf  from 
Korkyra  to  the  lapygian  promontory. 

In  their  progress  southward  along  the  coast  of  Italy  to  Phedum, 
they  met  with  a  very  cold  reception  from  the  various  Grecian  cities.' 
None  would  receive  them  within  their  walls  or  even  sell  them  pro- 
visions without.  The  utmost  wiiich  they  would  grant.was  the  liberty 
of  taking  moorings  and  of  watering;  and  even  thus  much  was  denied 
to  them  both  at  Tarentum  and  at  the  Epizephvrian  Lokri.  At 
Rhegium,  immediately  on  the  Sicilian  strait,  though  the  town  gate 
was  still  kept  shut,  they  were  so  far  more  hospitably  treated,  that  a 
market  of  provisions  was  fuinished  to  them  and  they  were  allowed 
to  encamp  in  the  sacred  precinct  of  Artemis,  not  far  from  the  walls. 
They  here  hauled  their  ships  ashore  and  took  repose  until  the  return 
of  the  three  scout  sliips  from  Egesta;  while  the  generals  entered  into 
negotiation  with  the  magistrates  and  people  of  Rhegium,  endeavoring 
to  induce  them  to  aid  the  armament  in  re-establishing  the  dispossessed 
Leontines,  who  were  of  common  Chnlkidian  origm  with  themselves. 
But  the  answer  returned  was  discouraging.  The  Rhcgines  would 
pro!nise  nothing  more  than  neutrality,  and  co-operation  in  any  course 
of  policy  which  it  might  suit  the  other  Italian  Greeks  to  adopt.  Prob- 
ably they,  as  well  as  the  other  Italian  Greeks,  were  astonished  and 
intimidated  by  the  mngnitude  of  the  newly-arrived  force,  anddesirtd 
to  leave  to  themselves  open  latitude  of  conduct  for  the  future— not 
without  mistrust  of  Athens  and  her  affected  forwardness  for  the  res- 
toration of  the  Leontines.  To  the  Athenian  generals,  however,  such 
a  negative  from  Rhegium  was  an  unwelcome  disappointment;  for 
that  city  had  been  the  ally  of  Athens  in  the  last  war,  and  they  had 
calculated  on  the  operation  of  Chalkidic  sympathies. 


It  was  not  until  after  the  muster  of  the  Athenians  at  Korkyra 
(about  July  415  B.C.)  that  the  Syracusans  became  thoroughly  con- 
vinced both  of  their  approach,  and  of  the  extent  of  their  designs 
a'^-ainst  Sicilv.  Intimation  had,  indeed,  reached  Syracuse,  from  several 
quarters,  of*^the  resolution  taken  by  the  Athenians  in  the  precedin-^ 
:>[arch  to  assist  Egesta  and  Leontini,  and  of  the  preparations  going  on 
in  consequence.  There  was,  however,  a  prevailing  indisposition  to 
credit  such  tidings.  Nothing  in  the  state  of  Sicily  held  out  any 
encoura-ivment  to  Athenian  ambition:  the  Leontines  could  give  no 
aid,  the'Egeslseans  very  little,  and  that  little  at  the  opposite  corner 
of  the  island;  while  the  Syracusans  considered  themselves  fully  able 
to  cope  with  anv  force  which  Athens  was  likely  to  send.  Some 
derided  the  intelligence  as  more  idle  rumor;  others  anticipated,  at 
most,  nothing  more  serious  than  the  expedition  sent  from  Athens  ten 
years  before.  No  one  could  imagine  the  new  eagerness  and  obstinncy 
with  which  she  had  just  thrown  herself  into  the  scheme  of  Sicilian 
conipiest,  nor  the  formidable  armament  presently  about  to  start. 
Nevertheless,  tiie  Syracusan  generals  thought  it  their  duty  to  make 
preparations,  and  strengthen  the  military  condition  of  the  state. 

Hermokrates,  however,  whose  information  was  more  complete, 
judged  these  preparations  insufficient,  and  took  advantage  of  a  pub- 
lie  assembly—held  seemingly  about  the  time  that  the  Athenians  were 
starting  from  Peineus— to  impress  such  conviction  on  his  country- 
men, as  well  as  to  correct  their  incredulity;  He  pledged  his  own 
credit  that  the  reports  wdiieh  had  been  circulated  were  not  merely 
true,  but  even  less  than  the  full  truth;  that  the  Athenians  were 
actually  on  their  way,  with  an  armament  on  the  largest  scale,  and 
vast  designs  of  conquering  all  Sicily.  ^Yhl\e  he  strenuously  urged 
that  the  city  should  be  put  in  immediate  condition  for  repelling  a  most 
formidable  invasion,  he  deprecated  all  alarm  as  to  the  result,  and 
held  out  the  firmest  assurances  of  ultimate  triumph.  The  very 
magnitude  of  the  approaching  force  w^onld  intimidate  the  Sicilian 
cities  and  drive  them  into  hearty  defensive  co-operation  with  Syra- 
cuse. Rarely,  indeed,  did  any  large  or  distant  expedition  ever  suc- 
ceed in  its  object,  as  might  be  seen  from  the  failure  of  the  P(u-sians 
dirainst  Greece,  by  which  failure  Athens  herself  had  so  largely 
profited.  Preparations,  however,  both  effective  and  immediate,  were 
indispensable;  not  merely  at  home,  but  by  means  of  foreign  missions, 
to  the  Sicilian  and  Italian  Greeks— to  the  Sikels— and  to  the  Cartha- 
ginians, who  had  for  some  time  been  suspicious  of  the  unmeasured 
aggressive  designs  of  Athens,  and  whose  immense  wealth  would  now 
be  especially  serviceable— and  to  Lacediemon  and  Corinth,  for  the 
purpose  of  soliciting  aid  in  Sicily,  as  well  as  renewed  invasion  of 
Attica.  So  confident  did  he  (Heraiokrates)  feel  of  their  powers  of 
defense,  if  properly  oruranized,  that  he  would  even  advise  the  Syra- 
cusans with  their  Sicilian  allies  to  put  to  sea  at  once,  with  all 
their  naval  force  and  two  months'  provisions,  and  to  sail  forthwith 


5i 


ATTxVCK  ON  SYHACUSE. 


SPEECH  OF  ATHENAGORAS. 


55 


to  the  friendly  liarbor  of  Tarentiim ;  from  whence  (hey  wonM  he  aMe 
to  nieet  tlie  Athenian  fleet  and  pivvent  it  even  from  crossiiio-  the  Ionic 
Gulf  from  Korkyra.  Tliey  would  thus  show  tliat  they  were  not  oiiJv 
tletermined  on  defense,  but  even  forward  in  eomiirir  to  blows-  iJi- 
only  way  of  taking  down  the  presumption  of  the  Athenians  who 
now  s])eeulated  uiHjn  Syr.-ieusan  lukewarnmess,  because  they  hml 
rendered  no  aid  to  Sparta  wiieu  she  solicited  it  at  tlie  be-innhi-  of 
the  war.  The  l^yracusans  would  probably  be  able  to  detei^  or 
ol.slructthe  advanre  of  the  exp.dition  until  winter  approached:  in 
whH'h  case,  ISikias  the  ablest  of  the  three  generals,  who  was  under- 
stood to  have  undertaken  tlie  scheme  against  his  own  consent,  would 
probably  avail  him>clf  of  the  pretext  to  return. 

Ihough  these  opinions  of  Hermokrates  were  espoused  further  by 
various  other  citizens  in  the  assembly,  the  greater  number  of  speakers 
held  an  opposite  language,  and  placed   little  faith  in  his  warninos 
VV  e  have  already  noticed  Hermokrates  nine  ye;irs  before  as  eiivov'iif 
Syniciise  and  chief  adviser  at  the  congress  of  Gela-lhen,  a.s  now 
watchful  to  bar  the  door  against  Athenian  interference  in  Sic  ily— 
tlien   as  now,  belonging  to  the  oliganliical  party,  and  of  sentiments 
hostile  to  the  existing  democratical  constitution;  but  brave  as  well  as 
intelliir<nit  in  foreign  affairs.     A  warm  and  even  angry  debate  aio^e 
upon  his  present  speech      Though  there  was  notliinir;  in  the  words 
of  Hermokrates  himself,  disparaging  either  to  the  democracy  or  to 
the  existing  magistrates,  yet  it  would  seem  that  iiis  partisans  wlio 
spoke  after  him  must  have  taken  up  a  more  ciiininative  tone   and 
must  have  exaggerated  that,  which  he  characterized  as  the  "haliitu'd 
quiescence  "of  the  Syracusans,  into  contemptible  remissness  and 
disorganization  under  those  administrators  and  generals  characterize  d 
or  worthless,  whom  tlie  democracy  preferred.     Amid  the  speakers 
who,  m  replying  to  Hermokrates  and  the  others,  indignantly  repelled 
sue^h  insinuations  and  retorted  upon  tlieir  authors— a  cili/e-n  naired 
Athenagoras  was  the  most  distinguished.     He  was  at  this  time  the 
leading  democratical  politician  and  the  most  popuhir  orator  in  Syra- 
cuse.  '^ 

"Every  one  (said  he),  except  only  cowards  and  bad  citizens,  must 
wish  that  the  Athenians  would  be  fools  enouirh  to  come  here  anel  put 
themselves  into  our  power.  Tlio  tales  which  you  have  iust  he  irel 
are  nothin^ij  better  than  fabrie-ations,  got  up  to  alarm  you;  and  I 
wonder  at  the  folly  e>f  these  alarmists  in  fancying  that  their  mkchina 
t.ons  are  not  eletected.  You  will  be  too  wise  to  take  measure  of  the 
future  from  their  reports:  you  will  rather  judge  from  what  able  men 
such  as  the  Athenians  are  likely  to  do.  Be  assureel  that  they  wi 
ne^Tr  le^ave  behind  them  the  Peloponnesians  in  menacin-  attitifde  to 
come  hither  and  court  a  fresh  war  not  less  formidable:  indeeel  I  tln'nk 
they  account  themselves  lucky  that  we  with  our  powerful  cities  have 
never  come  across  to  attack  them.  And  if  they  shoNkl  come  as  it  is 
pretended,  they  will  find  Sicily  a  more  formidable  foe  tLn  Rdopon 


r^psus-  nay     ur  own  city  alone  will  be  a  match  for  .twice  the  force 

iTI'  the  ;  c  ill  brin-  ae-ross.     The  Athenians,  knowing  all  this  well 

wUk^i  they  can  0    n     K  o    .  ^    business-  in  spite  of  all  the  tictions 

^1 A^  on  s  si^of  rw^:^^^  i,  anei  which  they  have 
VrPMvtrred  often  before,  sometimes  even  worse  than  on  the  present 

ie^^  s  on    n  ord^^^^^^^  you  and  get  themselves  nominated  to  the 

Mef  posts      One  of  these^lays,  I  fear  they  may  even  succeed   from 

^l-;aprecaut^^  ^^^H^^^^:^- 

;;;S^^U  ^ySgof  uS^t  ai^pHnt;  by  simple  persuasuju 
"S^^  chastLmeSt   to   tliese^  ceKispn^cn-s-and  ^^^a^^^^^ 


n^'tent      Or  do  vou  wish  not  to  be  unaer  equai  luus  ^^ilii  -v.  ...^.v  • 

Vnt  how  cin  you  pretend  that  citizens  of  the  same  6ity  should  not 

h  t  il7e  sime  riditsv     Some  one  will  tell  me  that  democracy  is 

therintX(MU  nor  just,  and  that  the  rich  are  the  perse^ns  best 

;^Jo  cmmSan^       B^t  I  allirm,  first   tluit  Jh^  P^ple  are  t  .  sum 
ioMl   'indlhe  oli^-'archv  merely  a  traction;  next,  tliat  iRU  men  a  o 

::''b;:f  u*k"es^t  the  a,greiate  jveaWi.  cxist:n,  n,   he  ^ 

intelli.re'ut  men   the  best  counselors— and  the  miiltiiuc  c.  me  uesu 

m  d       r^  King  anel  deciding  aft^r  such  advice,    ^--^^-l^:^;^ 

e  e  t-unctie>ns,  oneT  and  all.  linel  their  proper  phice.     But  J^^^^; 

t  ou^dnm^^^^  on  the  multitude  a  full  participation  in  a  1  hazaids, 

'S  ce^nl'nt  e^en  with  an  exorbitant  share  ^^^he  pubic  a^van- 
t-io-cs  but  La-asps  and  monopolizes  the  whole  tor  itsei  f.     This  i^  ]us 
wha^ou  young  and  powerful  men  are  aiming  a  ,  though  jou  will 
ne  ve^r  l^  able  to  keep  it  permanently  in  a  city  such  as  Syracuse.     Be 

b^iI^M  Vm:^>ryie4  alter  you? views.  -^ ^-^J^^Hr^^h- 
tl.e  nnbfc  'ielvanta<'-e  of  our  common  city.     Desist  tiom  piaciicin.,, 

well  10  bf  duped.     If  evea  tlicre  be  any  tiutli  1 1  ^yhat  }ou  t,,!}— an  I 

he  Alhenhius  do  co.ue-our  city  ^m  repel  then,  i.i  «  ".anr.e 

ohv  of  h"   reputation.     She  will  not  take  you  at  your  word,  and 

oo  ^  v"VconnAa»d.;rs,  in  order  to  put  the  yoke  <n>.'>"  '^r  own  ne  k. 

She  uiU  look  for  herself-construe  your  '=°'"'"''"'«  "  °;„,<;  '.^   !  J 

thov  reallv  mean— and  instead  of  sufternigyou  to  talk  lie   out  ot  h.r 

free  government,  will  take  effective  precautions  for  ma.ntam.ng  it 

"'immSely  after  lhi.s  vehement  speech  from  Athonagora.  one  of 
the  Strile-'i  who  presided  in  the  assembly  mterposed;  pe  ni  tung  no 
one  else  to 's^eak.'^.nd  abruptly  closing  the  -^^^y -/^^^^ ^. 
words-  "We  generals  deprecate  this  interchangeofpeison.il  \itu 
peralion.  and  trust  tliat  tli  hearers  present  will  not  suller  themselves 


56 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


APPROACH  OF  THE  ATHENIAN  ARMAMENT.   57 


to  be  biased  by  it.  Let  us  rather  take  care,  in  reference  to  the 
reports  just  communicated,  that  we  he  one  and  all  in  a  cor.ditidn 
to  repel  the  invader.  And  even  should  the  neces.^it}-  not  arise,  there 
is  no  harm  in  strengthening  our  public  force  with  horses,  arms,  and  the 
other  muuiments  of  war.  We  generals  shall  take  upon  ourselves  the 
care  and  supervision  of  these  matters,  as  well  as  of  the  missions  to 
neighboring  cities,  for  procuring  information  and  for  other  objects 
•  AVe  have  indeed  already  busied  ourselves  for  the  purpose,  and  we 
shall  keep  you  informed  of  what  we  learn." 

The   language  of  Athenagoras,  indicating  much  virul(  nee  of  partv- 
feeling,  lets  us  somewhat  into  the  real  workini;  of  politics  amonothe 
Syracusan  democracy.     Athenagoras  at  Svraciise  was  like  Kkon  at 
Athens— the  popular  orator  of  the  city.  '  But  lie  was  bv  no  menns 
the  most  mflueutial  person,  nor  had  he  the  principal  direction  of  pub- 
lic affairs.     Executive  and  magisterial  functions  belonged  chicflv  to 
Hermokrates  and  his  partisans,  the  opponents  of  Athenagoras.    Hcr- 
niokrates  has  already  ai>peared  as  taking  tbe  lead  at  the  "conuress  of 
Gela  nine  years  before,  and  will  be  set  n  througlout  the  crnTing  pe- 
riod almost  constantly  in  the  same  position;  while  the  political  lank 
of  Athenagoras  is  more  analogous  to  that  which  we  should  call  a  leader 
of  opposition— a  function  of  course  suspend<  d  under  pn  ssing  danaer 
so  that  we  hear  of  him  no  more.     At  Athens  as  at  Syracuse,  the  men 
who  got  the  real  power,  and  handled  the  force  and'trea.sures  of  the 
state,  were  chietly  of  the  rich  families— often  of  oligarchical  senti- 
ments, acquiescing  in  the  democracy  as  an  uncomfortable  neccssitv 
and  continually  open  to  be  solicited  by  friends  or  kinsmen  to  coio'- 
spire  against  it.     Their  proceedings  were  doubtless  ah^ays  liable  to 
the  scrutiny,  and  llieir  persons  to  the  animadversion,  of  the  public 
assembly:  hence  arose  the  intiuence  of  the  demagooue,  such  as  Ath- 
enagoras and  Kleon— tlie  bad  side  of  whose  charact'er  is  so  constant Iv 
kept  before  the  readers  of  Grecian  historj-.    By  whatever  disparairing 
epithets  such  character  may  be  surrounded,  it  is  in  reality  tlie  distin- 
guishing feature  of  a  free  government  under  all  its  foims— whet  her 
constitutional  monarehy  or  dc  mocracy.    Bv  the  side  of  the  real  polit- 
ical actors,  who  hold  principal  olBce  and  wield  personal  power,  there 
are  always  abundant  censors  and  critics— some  better,  others  worse 
in  respect  of  honesty,  candor,  wisdom,  or  rhetoric— the  most  dis- 
tinguished of  whom  acquires  considerable  importance,  Ihouirh  hold- 
ing a  function  essentially  inferior  to  that  of  the  authorized  maoic;iiate 
or  general. 

We  ol)serve  here  that  Athenagoras,  far  from  being  inclined  to  push 
the  city  into  war,  is  averse  to  it  even  bevond  reasonable  limit-  and 
denounces  it  as  the  interested  policy  of  the  oliirarchical  party  'TIii§ 
may  slkow  how-  little  it  was  any  constant  interest  or  policy  on  the 
part  of  the  persons  called  Demagogues,  to  involve  their  city  in  un- 
necessary war;  a  charge  which  has  been  frequently  advanced  asiainst 
tiiein,  because  it  so  happens  that    Kleon,  in  the  tirst  half  of  the 


Pcloponncsian  war,  discountenanced  the  propositions  of  peace  be- 
tween Athens  and  Sparta.  We  see  by  the  harangue  of  Athenagoras 
tiiat  the  oligarchical  party  were  the  usual  promoters  of  war;  a  fact 
which  we  should  naturally  expect,  seeing  that  the  rich  and  g; c;at,  ia 
most  connuuiiities,  have  accounted  the  pursuit  of  military  glory  more 
confonnable  to  their  dignity  than  any  other  c.-ireer.  At  Syracuse,  the 
ascendency  of  Hermokrates  was  much  increased  by  the  invasion 
of  the  Athenians — while  Athenagoras  does  not  again  appear.  The 
latter  was  egregiously  mi.^taken'in  his  anticipations  respecting  the 
conduct  of  Athens,  though  right  in  his  judgment  respecting  her  true 
political  interest.  But  it  is  very  unsafe  to  assume  that  nations  willl 
always  pursue  their  true  political  interest,  wiiere  present  temptations 
of  ambition  or  vanity  intervene.  Positive  information  was  in  this 
instance  a  surer  guide  than  speculations  d  priori  founded  upon  the 
probable  policy  of  Athens.  But  that  the  iiuputations  advanced  by 
Athenagoras  against  the  oligarchical  youth,  of  promoting  military 
organization  with  a  view  to  their  ow'ii  separate  interest,  were  not 
visionary — may  be  seen  by  the  analogous  case  of  Argos,  two  or  three 
years  before.  The  democracy  of  Argos,  contemplating  a  more  war- 
like and  aggressive  p  )li(ty,  had  been  persuaded  to  organize  and  train 
the  select  regiment  of  One  Thousauil  hoplites,  chosen  from  the  oli- 
garchical youth:  within  three  years,  this  regiment  subverted  the 
democratical  constitution.  Now  the  persons,  respecting  whose  de- 
signs Athenagoras  expresses  so  much  apprehension,  W(.' re  exactly  the 
class  at  Syracuse  corresponding  to  the  select  Thousand  at  Argos. 

The  political  views,  proclaimed  in  this  remarkable  speech,  are 
deserving  of  attention,  though  we  cannot  fully  understand  it  without 
having  before  us  those  speeches  to  which  it  replies.  Not  only  is 
democratical  constitution  forcibly  contrasted  with  oligarchy,  but  the 
separate  places  which  it  assigns  to  wealth,  intelligence,  and  multitude, 
are  laid  down  w  itli  a  distinctness  not  unworthy^of  Aristotle. 

Even  before  the  debate  here  adverted  to,  the  Syracusan  generals 
had  evidently  acted  upon  views  more  nearly  approaching  to  those  of 
Jlennokrates  than  to  tliose  of  Athenagoras.  Already  alive  to  the 
danger,  and  apprised  by  their  scouts  when  the  Athenian  armament 
was  passing  from  Korkyra  to  Khegium,  they  pushed  their  prepa- 
rations with  the  utmost  activity;  distributing  garrisons  and  sending 
envoys  among  their  Sikel  dependencies,  while'the  force  within  the 
city  was  mustered  and  placed  under  all  the  conditions  of  war. 

The  halt  of  the  Athenians  at  Khegium  afforded  inereased  leisure 
for  such  equi]mrent.  That  halt  was  prolonged  for  more  than  one 
rer-son.  In  the  tirst  place,  Nikias  and  his  colleagues  wished  to  nego- 
tiate with  the  Rhegines,  as  well  as  to  haul  ashore  and  clean  their  ships: 
next,  they  awaited  the  return  of  the  three  scout-ships  from  Egesta: 
lastly,  they  had  as  yet  formed  no  plan  of  action  in  Sicily. 

The  ships  from  Egesta  returned  with  disheartening  news.  In- 
stead of  the  abundant  wealth  which  had  been  held  forth  as  existing 


58 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


I 


SUPERIOR  DISCERNMENT  OF  LAMACIIUS. 


59 


in  that  town,  and  iipon  whicli  the  resohitions  of  the  Athenians  as  to 
Sicilian  operations  liad  been  inainlv  .cn-ouiuUd— it  liirred  out  tliat  no 
more  than  thirty  talents  in  all  could  be  produced.  "VMiat  Avas  yet 
wor*;e  the  elaborate  fraud,  whereby  the  Egcstaans  had  duped  the 
comm'issioners  on  their  tirst  visit,  was  now  exposed;  and  these  com- 
missioners, on  returning  to  Rhegium  fiom  their  second  visit  were 
condemned  to  the  mortilication  of  proclaiming  their  own  credulity, 
under  severe  taunts  and  re]iroaches  from  the  aimy.  Disappointed  in 
the  source  from  wiience  thev  had  calculated  on  ol)taining  money— 
for  it  appears  that  both  Alkibiades  and  Lamachus  had  sincerely 
relied  on  the  pecuniary  resources  of  Egesta,  though  Nikias  was  always 
mistrustful— the  irencrals  now  discussed  their  plan  of  action. 

j^^ikias— availing  himself  of  the  frauduUiu  conduct  on  the  part 
of  the  E^-estivan "^allies,  now  become  i^alpable— wi.-hed  to  circum- 
scribe his'' range  of  operations  witlun  the  rigorous  letter  of  the  vote 
which  the  Athenian  assembly  had  pai-scd.  He  proposed  to  sail  at 
once  against  Selinus;  then,  formally  to  require  the  Egestieans  to  pro- 
vide the  means  of  maiutainimr  the  ainumient.  or,  at  least,  of  main- 
t-uninn-  those  sixty  triremes  which  they  tlu  msclves  had  solicited. 
Since  this  requisition  would  not  be  realized,  he  Avould  only  tarry  long 
enoun-li  to  obt:iin  from  the  Selinuntines  some  tolerable  terms  of  accom- 
modiUion  with  E-esta,  and  then  return  home;  exhibiting,  as  they 
sailed  alonc'  to  all  the  maritime  cities,  this  great  display  of  Athenian 
naval  forcf?  And  while  he  would  be  ready  to  pn  tit  by  any  opiu^rtu- 
nitv  which  accident  nii-ht  present  for  serving  the  Leontmes  or  estab- 
lishing^ new  alliances,  he  strongly  deprecated  any  prolonged  stay  m 
the  ishmd  for  speculative  enterprises— all  at  the  cost  of  Athens. 

A"-ainst  this  scheme  Alkibiades  protested,  as  narrow,  timid,  and 
dlso-r^ceful  to  the  prodigious  force  with  which  tiiey  had  been  intrusted. 
He^proposed  to  begiirby  opening  negotiations  with  all  the  other 
Sicilian  Greeks— especially  iMessene,  convenient  loth  as  harbor  for 
their  tleet  and  as  base  of  their  military  operations— to  prevail  upon  them 
to  co-operate  against  Svracuse  and  Selii-i;<.  AV  ith  the  same  view,  he 
recommended  establishing  relations  with  I  lie  Sikels  of  the  interior,  m 
order  to  detach  such  of  tliem  as  were  subjects  cf  Syracuse,  as  well  as 
to  insure  supplies  of  provisions.  As  soon  as  it  had  been  thus  ascer- 
tained  what  extent  of  foreijrnaid  might  be  looked  for,  he  would  open 
direct  attack  forthwith  against  Syracuse  and  Selinus;  unless  indeed 
the  former  should  consent  to  re-establish  Leontini,  and  the  latter  to 

come  to  terms  with  Egesta.  1,1  .       1 

Lamachus,  delivering  his  opinion  last,  dissented  from  both  hiscol- 
lea<^ues.  lie  advised,  that  thev  should  proceed  at  once,  without  any 
delay,  to  attack  Svracuse,  and  fight  their  battle  under  its  walls.  Tiie 
Svracusans  (he  urijed)  were  now  in  terror  and  only  half-prepared  tor 
defense.  :\Iany  oi  their  citizens,  and  much  property,  Would  be  found 
still  liuijering. throughout  the  neighboring  lands,  not  yet  removed 
within  The  walls— and  might  thus  be  seized  for  the  subsistence  of 


their  army;  wiiile  the  deserted  town  and  harbor  of  Megara,  very 
n(;ur  to  Syracuse  both  by  land  and  by  sea,  might  be  occupied 
by  the  fleet  as  a  naval  station.  The  imjiosing  and  intimidating 
c'ifect  of  the  armament,  not  less  than  its  real  efficiency,  was  now  at 
the  maximum,  immediately  after  its  arrival.  If  advantage  were 
taken  of  this  tirst  impression  to  strike  an  instjuit  blow  at  their  principal 
enemy,  the  Syracusans  would  be  found  destitute  of  the  courage,  not 
loss  than  of  the  means,  to  resist:  but  the  longer  such  attack  was 
delayed,  the  more  this  tirst  impressi<m  of  dismay  would  be  effaced, 
giving  place  to  a  reactionary  sentiment  of  indifference  and  even  con- 
tempt, when  the  much-dreaded  armament  was  seen  to  accomplish  lit- 
tle or  nothing.  As  for  the  other  Sicilian  cities,  nothing  would  con- 
trihute  so  much  to  determine  their  immediate  adhesion,  as  successful 
operations  against  Syracuse. 

But  Lamachus  found  no  favor  with  either  of  the  other  two,  and 
being  thus  compelled  to  choose  between  the  plans  of  Alkibiades  end 
Kikias.  gave  his  support  to  that  of  the  former — which  was  the  mean 
term  of  the  three.  There  can  be  no  doubt — as  far  as  it  is  becoming 
to  pronounce  respecting  that  which  never  reached  execution — that 
the  plan  of  Lamachus  was  far  the  best  and  most  judicious;  at 
first  sight  indeed  the  most  daring,  but  intrinsically  the  fiafest, 
easiest,  and  speediest,  that  could  be  suggested.  For  uoioubt- 
edly  tlie  siege  and  capture  of  Syracuse  was  the  one  enterprise 
indispensable  towards  the  promotion  of  Athenian  views  in  Sicily. 
The  sooner  that  was  commenced,  the  more  easily  it  would  be 
accomplished:  and  its  difficulties  were  in  many  ways  aggravated,  in 
no  way  abated,  by  those  preliminary  precautions  upon  wliich  x\lkib- 
indes  insisted.  Anything  like  delay  tended  fearfully  to  impair  the 
etheiency,  real  as  well  as  reputed,  of  an  antaent  aggressive  armament, 
and  to  animate  as  well  as  to  strengthen  those  who  stood  on  the  defen- 
sive— a  point  on  which  we  shall  find  painful  evidence  presently.  The 
advice  of  Lamachus,  alike  soldier-like  and  far-sighted,  would  proba- 
bly have  been  approved  and  executed  either  by  Brasidas  or  by  Demos- 
thenes; while  the  dilator}-  policy  still  advocated  by  Alkibiades,  even 
after  the  suggestion  of  Lamachus  had  been  started,  tends  to  show 
that  if  he  was  superior  in  military  energy  to  one  of  his  colleagues,  he 
was  not  less  inferior  to  the  other.  Indeed,  when  we  find  him  talking 
of  besieging  Syracuse,  unlsss  the  Syracusans  would  consent  to  the 
re-establishment  of  Leontini — it  seems  probable  that  he  had  not  yet 
laiule  up  his  mind  peremptorily  to  besiege  the  cit}^  at  all;  a  fact  com- 
])letely  at  variance  with  those  unbounded  hopes  of  conquest  which 
lu*  is  reported  as  having  conceived  even  at  Athens.  It  is  possible 
that  he  m:iy  liave  thought  it  impolitic  to  contradict  too  abruptly  the 
tendencies  of  Nikias,  who,  anxious  as  he  was  chiefly  to  find  some 
pH'fext  for  carrying  back  his  troops  unharmed,  might  account  the 
proposition  of  Lamachus  too  desperate  even  to  be  discussed.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  latter,  though  the  ablest  soldier  of  the  three,  was  a  poor 


60 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


man,  of  no  political  position,  and  little  influence  among  the  hoplites. 
Had  lie  possessed,  along  with  his  own  straight loiward  military 
energy,  the  wealth  and  family  ascendency  of  either  of  his  colleagues, 
the  achievements  as  well  as  the  fate  of  this  splendid  armament  would 
have  been  entirely  altered,  and  the  Athenians  would  have  entered 
Syracuse,  not  as  prisoners,  but  tis  conquerors. 

Alkibiades,  as  soon  as  Ids  plan  had  l)ecome  adopted  by  means  of 
the  approval  of  Lamachus,  sailed  across  the  strait  in  ids  own  trireme 
fron)  lihegium  to  Messene.  Though  admitted  personally  into  the 
city  and  allowed  to  address  the  public  assembly,  he  could  not  induce 
them  to  conclude  any  alliance,  or  to  admit  the  armament  to  anything 
beyond  a  market  of  provisions  without  the  walls.  He  accc^rdingly 
returned  back  to  Rhegium,  from  whence  he  and  one  of  his  colleagues 
immediately  departed  with  sixty  triremes  for  Naxos.  The  Tsaxiaiis 
cordially  received  the  armament,  which  then  steered  southward  along 
the  coast  of  Sicily  to  Kataua.  In  the  latter  place  the  leading  men 
and  the  general  sentiment  were  at  this  time  favorable  to  Syracuse^  so 
that  the  Athenians,  tinding  admittance  refused,  were  compelled  to  sail 
further  southward,  and  take  their  night-station  at  the  mouth  of  the 
river  Terias.  On  the  ensuing  day  they  made  sail  with  their  ships  iu 
single  column  immediately  in  front  of  Syracuse  itself,  while  au 
advanced  squadron  of  ten  tiiremes  were  even  dispatched  into  the 
Great  Harbor,  south  of  the  town,  for  the  purpose  of  surveying  en 
this  side  the  city  with  its  docks  jind  fortifications,  and  for  the  further 
purpose  of  proclaiming  from  shipboard  ])y  the  voice  of  the  herald, — 
"The  Leontines  uow^  in  Syracuse  are  hereby  invited  to  come  forth 
without  apprehension  and"^  join  their  friends  and  benefactors,  the 
Athenians."     After  this  emjity  display  they  returned  back  to  Katana. 

We  may  remark  that  this  proceeding  was  completely  at  vaiiancc 
with  the  judicious  recomuiendation  of  Lamachus.  It  tended  to 
familiarize  the  Syracusans  with  the  sight  of  the  armament  piece- 
meal, without  any  instant  action — and  thus  to  abate  in  their  ndiids 
the  teiTor-striking  impression  of  its  first  arrival. 

:\.t  Katana,  A Iki blades  personally  was  adndtted  into  the  town,  and 
allowed  to  open  his  case  before  the  public  assembly,  as  be  had  been 
at  Messene.  Accident  alone  enabled  him  to  carry  Ids  point — for  the 
general  opinion  was  averse  to  his  projiositions.  "While  most  of  the 
citizens  were  in  the  assembly  listening  to  bis  discourse,  some  Athe- 
nian soldiers  without,  observing  a  postern-gate  carelessly  guarded, 
broke  it  open,  and  showed  themselves  in  the  market-i)lace.  The 
town  was  thus  in  the  power  of  the  Athenians,  so  that  the  leading  men 
who  were  friends  of  Syracuse  thought  themselves  lucky  to  escape  in 
safety,  while  the  general  assembly  came  to  a  resolution  accepting  the 
alliance  proposed  by  Alkibiades'  The  whole  Athenian  armament 
was  now  conducted  from  Rhegium  to  Katana,  which  was  established 
as  head-quarters.  Intimation  was  further  rtceived  from  a  party  at 
Kamarina,  that  the  city  ndght  be  induced  to  join  them,  if  the  arnia- 


ALKIETADES  SUMMONED  TO  TRIAL. 


61 


T 


ment  showed  itself:  accordingly  the  whole  armament  proceeded 
thither,  and  took  moorings  off  the  shore,  while  a  herald  was  sent  up 
to  the  city.  But  the  Kamariineans  declined  to  adnut  the  army,  and 
declared  that  they  would  abide  by  the  existing  treaty;  which  bound 
theiu  to  receive  at  any  time  one  single  ship— but  no  more,  unless 
thev  themselves  should  ask  for  it.  The  Athenians  were  therefore 
oblked  to  return  to  Katana.  Passing  by  Syracuse  both  going  and 
1  returning,  they  ascertained  the  falsehood  of  a  report  that  the  Syra- 
•eusans  were  putting  a  naval  force  afloat;  moreover  they  landed  near 
the  city  and  ravaged  some  of  the  neighboring  lands.  The  Syracusau 
cavalry  and  light  troops  soon  appeared,  and  a  skirmish  wdth  trifling 
loss  ensued,  before  the  invaders  retired  to  their  ships— the  first  blood 
shed  in  this  important  struggle,  and  again  at  variance  with  the  advice 
of  Lamachus. 

Serious  new^s  aw^aited  them  on  their  return  to  Katana.  They  found 
the  public  ceremonial  trireine,  called  the  Salaminiau,  just  arrived 
from  Athens— the  bearer  of  a  formal  resolution  of  the  assembly,  re- 
quiring Alkibiades  to  come  home  and  stand  his  trial  for  various 
alleued  matters  of  irreligion  combined  with  treasonable  purposes.  A 
few^other  citizens  specified  by  name  w^ere  commanded  to  come  along 
with  him  under  the  same  charge ;  but  the  trierarch  of  the  Salaminiau 
was  especially  directed  to  serve  him  only  with  the  summons,  without 
any  guard  or  coercion,  so  that  he  might  return  home  in  his  own  tri- 
reme. 

This  summons,  pregnant  with  moraentou§  results  both  to  Athens 
anil  to  her  enemies,  arose  out  of  the  mutilation  of  the  Herma?  (de- 
scribed a  few  pages  back)  and  the  inquiries  instituted  into  the 
authorship  of  that  deed,  since  the  departure  of  the  armament.  The 
extensive  and  anxious  sympathies  connected  with  so  large  a  body  of 
dejjarting  citizens,  combined  with  the  solemnity  of  the  scene  itself, 
had  for  the  moment  suspended  the  alarm  caused  by  that  sacrilege. 
But  it  speedily  revived,  and  the  people  could  not  rest  without  finding 
out  by  whom  the  deed  bad  been  done.  Considerable  rewards,  1000 
and  even  10,000  drachmas,  were  proclaimed  to  informers;  of  wiioni 
others  soon  appeared,  in  addition  to  the  slave  Andromachus  before 
mentioned.  A  metic  named  Teukrus  had  fled  from  Athens,  shortly 
after  the  event,  to  Megara,  from  whence  he  sent  inlitnation  to  the 
senate  at  Athens  that  he  had  himself  been  a  party  concerned  in  the 
recent  sacrilege  concerning  the  mysteries,  as  well  as  cognizant  of  the 
nuitilation  of  the  FIerm«— and  that  if  impunity  were  guaranteed  to 
him,  he  would  come  back  and  give  full  information.  A  vote  of  the 
senate  was  immediately  passed  to  invite  him.  He  denounced  by  name 
eleven  persons  as  having  been  concerned,  jointly  with  himself,  in  the 
mock  celebration  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries;  and  eighteen  different 
peisons,  himself  not  being  one,  as  the  violators  of  the  Hermte.  A 
woman  named  Agariste,  daughter  of  Alkma^onides— these  names 
bespeak  her  great  rank  and  family  in  the  city— deposed  further  that 


G2 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


INFORMATION  OF  DIOKLEIDES. 


63 


Allvibiadcs,  Axicclius,  and  Adeimantus,  Imd  gone  through  a  parody 
of  the  inystericj  in  a  similar  manner  in  tlie  honseof  Charmides.  And 
lastly  Lydus,  slave  of  a  citizen  named  Phcrekles,  stated  thai  the  like 
scene  had  been  enacted  in  tlie  honse  of  his  master  in  the  deme  Tlie- 
makus — giving  the  names  of  the  parlies  present,  one  of  uhom 
(I hough  asleep  and  unconseions  of  -what  was  passing)  he  stated  to  be 
lA'ogoras,  tlie  father  of  Andokides. 

Of  the  parties  named  in  these  different  d(  positions,  the  gi'eator 
iinmber  seem  to  liavc  fled  from  the  city  at  onee:  but  alHvho  remained 
"\\  ere  put  into  prison  to  stand  future  trial.  Tlie  informers  received 
the  promised  rewards,  after  some  debate  as  to  the  parties  entitled  to 
receive  the  reward;  for  Pythonikus,  the  citizen  who  had  produced 
the  slave  Andromachiis,  pretended  to  the  first  claim,  while  Andro- 
kles,  one  of  the  senators,  contended  that  the  senate  collectively  ouglit 
to  receive  the  money — a  strange  pretension,  which  we  do  not  know 
how  he  justitied.  At  last,  however,  at  the  time  of  the  Pnnathenaie 
festival,  Andromachus  the  slave  received  the  first  reward  of  10,0(-0 
drachmas, Teukrus  the  metic  the  second  reward  of  1000  drachmas. 

A  large  number  of  citizens,  many  of  them  of  the  first  consideration 
in  the  city,  were  thus  either  lying  in  prison  or  had  fled  into  exile. 
But  the  {ilarm,  the  agony,  and  the  suspicion,  in  the  public  mind, 
went  on  increasing  rather  than  diminishing.  The  information 
liitherto  received  had  been  all  partial,  and  with  the  exception  of 
Agariste,  all  the  informants  had  been  either  Slaves  or  metics,  not 
citizens;  while  Teukrus,  the  only  one  among  them  who  had  stated 
anything  respecting  the  mutilation  of  the  Ilerma?,  did  not  profess  to 
be  a  party  concerned,  or  to  know  all  those  who  were.  The  people 
liad  heanl  only  a  succession  of  disclosures — all  attesting  a  frequency 
of  irreligious  acts,  calculated  to  insult  and  banish  the  local  gods  who 
protected  their  country  and  constitution — all  indicating  that  there 
were  many  powerful  citizens  bent  on  prosecuting  such  designs,  in- 
terpreted as  treasonable — yet  none  communicating  any  full  or  satis- 
factory idea  of  the  Ilermokopid  plot,  of  the  real  conspirators,  or  of 
their  further  purj^oses.  The  eneni}'  was  among  them.selves,  yet  they 
knew  not  where  to  lay  hands  upon  him.  Amidst  the  gloomy  terrors, 
political  blended  with  religious,  which  distracted  their  minds,  all  tlic 
ancient  stories  of  the  la.st  and  worst  oppressions  of  the  Peisistratid 
despots,  ninety-five  j'ears  before,  became  again  revived.  Some  new 
despots,  they  knew  not  who,  seemed  on  the  point  of  occupying  the 
acro|X)lis.  To  detect  the  real  conspirators  was  the  only  way  of  pro- 
curing respite  from  this  melancholy  paroxN'sm:  for  which  purpose 
the  people  were  willing  to  welcome  questionable  witnesses,  and  to 
imi>rison  on  suspicion  citizens  of  the  best  character,  until  the  truth 
could  Ik?  ascertained. 

The  public  distraction  was  aggravated  by  Peisander  and  Chariklcs, 
who  acted  as  commissioners  of  investigation;  furious  and  unprin- 
cipled politicians,  at  that  time  professing  exaggerated  attachment  to 


the  democratical  constitution,  though  we  shall  find  both  of  them 
hereafter  among  the  most  unscrupulous  agents  in  its  subversion. 
These  men  loudlv  proclaimed  that  the  facts  disclosed  indicated  the 
b md  of  Hermokopid  conspirators  to  be  numerous,  with  an  ulterior 
dcsiffi  of  speedily  putting  dow^n  the  democracy.  They  insisted  on 
uressiiu^  their  investigations  until  full  discovery  should  be  attamed. 
And  tlfe  sentiment  of  the  people,  collectively  taken,  responded  to 
this  stimulus;  though  individually  every  man  was  so  afraid  of  be- 
coniin<'  himself  the  next  victim  arrested,  that  wiien  the  herald  con- 
vokedlhe  senate  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  informations,  the  crowd 
in  the  market-place  straightway  dispersed.  ^ 

It  was  amidst  such  eager  thirst  for  discovery  that  a  new  mformer 
appeared  Diokleides— who  professed  I.)  communicate  some  material 
i-icls  connected  with  the  mutilation  of  the  llermai,  affirming  that  the 
authors  of  it  w^ere  three  hundred  in  number.  He  recounted  that  on 
the  ni'dit  on  wiiich  that  incident  occurred,  he  started  from  At hen.s 
to  ^'•o  tT)  the  mines  of  Laureion;  wherein  he  had  a  slave  working  on 
hire  on  whose  account  he  was  to  receive  pay.  It  was  full  moon, 
and' the  niijht  was  so  bri-rht  that  he  began  his  journey,  mistaking 
it  for  daybreak.  On  reaching  the  propyla^um  of  the  temple  of 
Dionysus,  he  saw  a  body  of  men  about  300  in  number  descending 
from  the  Odeon  towanls  the  public  theater.  Being  alarmed  at  such 
an  unexpected  siirht,  he  concealed  himself  behind  a  pillar,  from 
whence  he  had  leisure  to  contemplate  this  body  of  men,  wdio  stood 
for  some  time  conversing  toirether,  in  groups  of  fifteen  or  twenty 
each  and  then  dispersed.  The  moon  was  so  bright  that  he  could 
chsee'rn  the  faces  of  most  of  them.  As  soon  as  they  had  dispersed, 
he  pursued  his  walk  to  Laureion,  from  whence  he  returned  next  day 
and  learnt  to  his  surprise  that  daring  the  night  the  Hermaj  had  been 
mutilated;  also  that  commissioners  of  inquiry  had  been  named,  and 
the  reward  of  10,000  drachmas  proclaimed  for  information.  Im- 
pressed at  oi  3  with  the  belief  that  the  nocturnal  crowd  whom  ho 
had  seen  were  authors  of  the  deed,  and  happening  soon  afterward  to 
see  one  of  them,  Eaphemus,  sitting  in  the  workshop  of  a  brazier,  ho 
took  him  aside  to  the  neiixhboring  temple  of  Hephaestus,  where  he 
mentioned  in  confidence  that  he  had  seen  the  party  at  work  and  couUl 
denounce  them,  but  that  he  preferred  being  paid  for  silence,  instead 
of  giviniz:  information  and  incurring  private  enmities.  Euphemus 
thaiiked'him  for  the  warning,  desiring  him  to  come  next  day  to  the 
house  of  Leoiroras  a^d  his  son  Andokides,  where  he  w^ould  see  them 
as  well  as  the  othet  parties  concerned.  Andokides  and  the  rest 
offered  to  him,  under  solemn  covenant,  the  sum  of  two  talents  (or 
13,000  draeliinas.  thus  overbidding  the  reward  of  10,000  drachmas  pro- 
claimed by  tiie  senate  to  any  truth-telling  informer),  with  admission 
to  a  partnership  in  the  benefits  of  their  conspiracy,  supposing  that  it 
should  succeed.  Up<')n  his  reply  that  he  would  consider  the  propo- 
sition, they  desired  him  to  meet  them  al  the  house  of  Kallias  son  of 


64 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


INFORMATION   OF  ANDOKIDES. 


65 


Teleklcs,  brother-in-law  of  Audokidcs:  which  meeting  accordingly 
took  phice,  and  a  sok'nm  bargain  was  concluded  in  the  acropolis. 
Andokides  and  his  friends  engaged  to  pay  the  two  talents  to  Dio- 
kleides  at  the  beginning  of  the  ensuing  montli,  as  the  price  of  his 
silence.  But  since  this  engagement  was  never  performed,  Diokleides 
came  with  liis  information  to  the  senate. 

Such  (according  to  the  report  of  Andokides)  was  the  story  of  this 
informer,  which  he  concluiled  by  designating  forty-two  individuals, 
out  of  the  three  hundred  whom  lie  liad  seen.  Tlie  tirst  names  whom 
he  specilied  were  those  of  Mantiiheus  and  Aphepsion,  two  senators 
actually  sitting  among  his  audience.  Next  came  tlie  remaining 
forty,  among  whom  were  Andokides  and  many  of  his  nearest  rela- 
tives— his  father  Leogoras,  his  tirst  or  second  cousins  and  brother-in- 
law,  Charmides,  Taureas,  Nisix?us,  Kallias  son  of  Alknueou,  Phryn- 
iclius,  Eukrates  (brother  of  Nikias  the  commander  in  Sicily),  and 
Kritias.  But  as  tiiere  were  a  still  greater  number  of  names  (assuin- 
tng  the  total  of  three  hundred  to  be  correct)  which  Diokle- 
ides  was  unable  to  specify,  the  commissioner  Peisander  proposed 
that  Mantitheiis  and  Aphepsion  should  be  at  once  seized  and 
tortured  in  order  to  force  them  to  disclose  their  accomplices;  the 
I'sephism  passed  in  the  archonship  of  Skamandrius.  whereby  it  was 
unlawful  to  apply  the  torture  to  any  free  Athenian,  being  tirst  abro- 
gated. Illegal,  not  less  than  cruel,  as  this  piopositi(m  was,  the  senate 
at  tirst  received  it  with  favor.  But  Mantitheus  and  Aphepsion,  cast- 
ing themselves  as  suppliants  upon  the  altar  in  the  senate-house, 
pleaded  so  strenuously  for  their  rights  as  citizens,  to  be  allowed  to 
put  in  bail  and  stand  trial  before  the  Dikastery,  that  this  was  at  last 
granted.  No  sooner  had  they  provided  their  suVeties,  than  they  broke 
tiieir  covenant,  mounted  their  horses  and  deserted  to  the  eiumy ;  with- 
out any  regard  to  their  sureties,  who  were  exposed  by  law  to  the  same 
trial  and  the  same  j^enalties  as  would  have  overtaken  the  olTendeis 
themselves.  This  sudden  flight,  together  with  the  news  that  a  Eau)- 
tian  force  was  assembled  on  the  borders  of  Attica,  exasperated  still 
further  the  frantic  terror  of  the  public  mind.  The  senate  at  once 
took  quiet  measures  for  seizing  and  imprisoning  all  the  remaining 
forty  whose  names  had  been  denounced;  while  b}' concert  with  the 
Strategi,  all  the  citizens  were  put  under  arms — those  who  dwelt  in  the 
city  mustering  in  the  market-])lace — those  in  and  near  the  long  walls. 
in  the  Theseium — those  in  PeiiuHis,  in  the  square  called  the  market- 
place of  Hippodamus.  Even  tlie  horsemen  of  the  city  were  convoked 
by  sound  of  trumpet  in  the  'sacred  precinct  of  the  Anakeion.  The 
senate  itself  remained  all  night  in  the  acropolis,  except  the  Prytaiies 
(or  tifty  .senators  of  the  presiiling  tribe),  who  passed  the  nigiit  in  the 
pul)lic  building  called  the  Tholus.  Every  man  in  Athens  felt  the 
terrible  sense  of  an  internal  conspiracy  on  the  point  of  breaking  out, 
perhaps  along  with  I'.n  iuvasit)n  of  the  foreigner — prevented  only  by 


the  timely  disclosure  of  Diokleides,  who  w^as  hailed  as  the  saviour  of 
the  city,  and  carried  in  procession  to  dinner  at  the  Prytaneium. 

Miserable  as  the  condition  of  the  city  was  generally,  yet  more  mis- 
erable was  that  of  the  prisoners  confined.  Moreover,  worse,  in  every 
way,  was  si  ill  to  be  looked  for — since  the  Athenians  would  know 
neither  peace  nor  patience  until  they  could  reach,  by  some  means  or 
other,  the  names  of  the  undisclosed  conspirators.  The  female  rela- 
tives and  children  of  Andokides  and  his  companions  were  by  permis- 
sion along  with  them  in  the  prison,  aggravating  by  their  tears  and 
mailings  the  atfliction  of  the  scene — when  Charmides,  one  of  the  par- 
ties confined,  addressed  himself  to  xlndokides  as  his  cousin  and  friend, 
imploring  him  to  make  a  voluntary  disclosure  of  all  that  he  knew,  in 
order  to  preserve  the  lives  of  so  many  innocent  persons  his  immediate 
kinsmen,  as  well  as  to  rescue  the  city  out  of  a  feverish  alarm  not  to 
be  endured.  ''You  know  (he  said)  all  that  passed  about  the  mutilation 
of  the  Hernia?,  and  your  silence  will  now  bring  destruction  not  only 
upon  yourself,  but  also  upon  your  fai.her  and  u!)on  all  of  us;  while  if 
you  inform  whether  you  have  been  an  actor  in  the  scene  or  not,  you 
will  obtain  impunity  for  yourself  and  us,  aiul  at  the  same  time  soothe 
the  terrors  of  the  city."  Such  instances  on  the  part  of  Charmides, 
aided  by  the  supplications  of  the  other  prisoners  present,  overcame 
the  reluctance  of  Andokides  to  become  informer,  and  he  next  day 
made  his  disclosures  to  the  senate.  "  Euphiletus  (he  said)  was  the 
chief  author  of  the  mutilation  of  the  Hermye.  He  proposed  the  deed 
at  a  convivial  party  where  I  was  present — but  I  denounced  it  in  the 
strongest  manner  and  refused  all  compliance.  Presently  I  broke  my 
collar-bone  and  injured  my  head,  by  a  fall  from  a  young  horse,  so 
badly  as  to  be  coniined  to  my  bed;  when  Eupliiletus  took  the  oppor- 
tunity of  my  absence  to  assure  the  rest  of  tl  e  comjiany  falsely  that  I 
had  consented,  and  that  I  had  agreed  to  cut  the  Hermes  near  my 
paternal  house,  which  the  tribe  ^Egeis  have  dedicated.  Accordingly 
they  executed  the  project  while  I  was  incapable  of  moving,  witliout 
my  knowledge:  they  presumed  that  /w^ould  undertake  the  mutilation 
of  this  particular  Hermes — and  you  see  that  this  is  the  onl}^  one  in  all 
Athens  which  has  escaped  injury.  When  the  conspirators  ascertained 
that  I  had  not  been  a  party,  Euphiletus  and  jMeletus  threatened  me 
with  a  terrible  revenge  unless  I  observed  silence:  to  which  1  replied 
that  it  was  not  I,  but  their  own  crime,  which  had  brought  them  into 
danger." 

Having  recounted  this  talc  (in  substance)  to  the  senate,  Andokides 
tendered  his  slaves,  both  male  and  femrde,  to  be  tortured,  in  order 
that  thev  might  confirm  his  story  that  he  was  in  his  bed  and  unable 
to  leave  it,  on  the  night  when  the  Hermie  were  mutilated.  It  appears 
that  the  torture  was  actually  applied  (according  to  the  custom  so 
cruelly  frequent  at  Athens  in  the  case  of  slaves),  and  that  tlie  senators 
thus  became  satislied  of  the  truth  of  what  Andokides  affirmed.     He 

H.  G.  in— a 


66 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


THE  ELUSINIAN  MYSTERIES. 


67 


mentioned  twenty-two  names  of  citizens  as  havinc:  been  tlic  mnfilrtoi-s 
of  the  Henna).  Eii^liteen  of  these  names,  incliulin^^  l':iiphil(  tus  jiiid 
Meletus,  had  already  been  ^pccitied  in  tlie  infoinuition  of  Teukii;s; 
the  remaining  four  were  Pana'tius,  Dlakritiis,  Lysistratiis,  and  C  haio- 
dcmiis— all  of  whom  fled  the  instant  tliat  their  names  were  mentioiK  d, 
without  waitinir  the  chance  of  beinir  arrested.  As  soon  as  the  scimie 
heard  the  storv^of  Andokides,  they  proceeded  to  (p:estion  Diokk'itics 
over  a2:ain;  who  confessed  that  lie  had  given  a  false  deposition,  and 
he"-"-e5^  for  mercy,  mentioning  xMkihiades  the  Phegusian  (a  relnlivc 
ofihe  commander  in  Sicily)  and  Amiantiis  as  having  suborned  liim 
to  the  crime.  Both  of  them  fled  imniedisilely  on  this  revelation:  Init 
Diokleides  was  detained,  sent  before  the  Dikastery  for  trial,  and  put 

to  death.  ,  ,  . ,       .    -  ,  •       T^ 

The  foregoing  is  the  story  which  Andokides,  m  the  oration  I)e 
Mysteriis  delivered  between  fifteen  and  twenty  years  afterward,  rep- 
resented himself  to  have  communicated  to  the  senate  at  this  ]h  riloiis 
crisis.  But  it  probably  is  not  the  story  which  he  really  did  tell— etr- 
tainly  not  that  which  his  enemies  represented  him  as  having  tchi: 
least  of  all  does  it  communicate  tlie  whole  tiuth.  or  afford  any  satis- 
faction to  such  anxiety  and  alarm  as  are  described  to  have  been 
prevalent  at  the  time.  Nor  does  it  accord  wilh  the  brief  intinialion 
of  Thucydide.s,  who  tells  us  that  Andokides  impeached  hin:scl1  aim  g 
with  others  as  participant  in  the  mutilation.  Among  the  accomidKcs 
aoninst  whom  he  infomied,  his  enemies  afliinnd  tliat  his  own  nearest 
relatives  were  inclueled— though  this  latter  Hale'ment  is  denie-d  by 
himself.  We  may  be  sure,  therefe»re.  that  the  tale  which  Aueieik;el(  s 
really  told  was  se^me-thing  very  different  fremi  wl  at  now  slar.eis  in 
his  oration.  But  what  it  reallv  was.wc  cannot  make  e)ut.  Nor  should 
we  gain  much,  even  if  it  could  be  made  out— since  even  at  the  time 
neitTier  Thucydides  nor  other  intelliirent  critics  could  determine  bow 
far  it  was  true.  The  mutilation  of  the  Hermce  remaineel  to  tlicm 
always  an  unexplained  mystery;  though  they  aceounled  Andokides 
the  principal  organizer,  . 

That  which  is  at  once  most  important  and  most  mcontestal)Ie  is 
the  effect  produced  by  the  revelations  of  Andokides,  true  or  false,  on 
the  public  mind  at  Athens.  He  was  a  younir  man  of  i  ank  and  wealth 
in  the  city,  belonging  to  the  sacred  family  of  the  Kerykes— saie.1  to 
trace  his  pedigree  to  the  hero  Oelysseus— and  inve^-sted  on  a  previous 
occasion  with  an  important  naval  comnianel;  wheras  the  preceding 
informers  had  been  metics  and  slaves.  ^loreover,  he  was  making 
ce)nfession  of  his  own  guilt.  Hence  the  peo])le  reeeived  his  cnninui- 
nicatie>ns  with  implicit  confidence.  Tlu'v  were  so  delighted  te)  have 
got  to  the  bottom  of  the  teriiide  mystery,  tliat  the  public  mind  sub- 
sided from  its  furie)us  te-rrors  intei  ceiniparative  tranquillity.  Tlsc 
citizens  again  began  to  tiiink  themselves  in  .'^nfety  and  to  resume  their 
habitual  confidence  in  each  otlier,  while  the  hoplites  everywhere  ein 
guard  were  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes.     All  the  prisoners  ia 


custody  on  suspicion,  except  those  against  whom  Andokides  informed, 
were  forthwith  releasee! :  those  wlio  had  fled  out  of  apprehension  were 
allowed  to  return;  while  those  wiiom  he  named  as  guilty  were  tried, 
convicteel  and  put  to  death.  Such  of  them  as  had  already  fled,  were 
condemueel  to  death  in  their  absence,  and  a  reward  offered  for  their 
heads.  And  though  discerning  men  were  not  satisfied  with  the  evi- 
dence upon  which  these  sentences  were  pronounceel,  yet  the  general 
public  fully  l>elicyed  themselves  to  have  punished  the  real  offenders, 
and  were  thus  inexpressibly  relieved  from  the  depressing  sense  of 
uiiexpialed  insult  to  the  ge)ds,  as  well  as  of  danger  to  their  peJilical 
constitution  from  the  withdrawal  of  divine  protection.  Andokides 
himself  was  pardoned,  .and  was  for  the  time  an  object,  apparently, 
even  of  public  gratituelc;  so  that  his  father,  Leogonis,  who  had  been 
amon.!^  the  parties  imprisoned,  ventured  to  indict  a  senator  named 
Speiisippns  for  illegal  ])roceedings  toward  him.  and  obtained  au 
almost  unanimous  verdict  from  the  Dikastery.  But  the  character  of 
a  statue-breaker  and  an  informer  could  never  be  otherwise  than 
odious  at  Athens.  Andokides  w^as  cither  banished  by  tlve  indirect 
elfect  of  a  general  disqualifying  decree;  or  at  least  found  that  he  had 
nridc  so  many  enemies,  anel  incurred  so  much  obloquy,  by  his  con- 
duct in  thi^  affair,  as  to  make  it  necessary  for  him  to  quit  the  city, 
lie  remaineel  in  banishment  for  many  years,  and  seems  never  to  have 
got  clear  of  the  hatred  which  his  conduct  in  this  nefarious  proceeding 
so  well  merited. 

But  the  comfort  arising  out  of  these  disclosures  respecting  the 
Herime,  though  genuine  anel  inestimable  at  the  moment,  was  soon 
SL^^d'm  disturbed.  There  still  remained  the  various  alleged  profana- 
tions of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries,  which  had  not  yet  been  investigated 
or  brought  to  atonement:  profanations  the  more  sure  to  be  pressed 
home  anel  worked  with  a  factitious  exaggeration  of  pious  zeal,  since 
the  enemies  of  Alkibiades  were  bent  upon  turning  them  to  his  ruin. 
Among  all  the  ceremonies  of  Attic  religion  there  was  none  more  pro- 
foundly or  universally  reverenceel  than  the  mysteries  of  Eleusis; 
originally  enjoined  by  the  godeless  Demeter  herself,  in  her  visit  to 
th;it  place,  to  Eumolpus  and  the  othe-r  Eleusinian  patriarchs,  and 
trimsmitted  as  a  precious  hereditary  privilege  in  their  families.  Cele- 
brate'd  annually  in  the  month  of  September  under  the  special  care  of 
the  Basileus  or  second  Archon,  these  mysteries  were  attended  by  vast 
crowds  from  Athens  as  well  as  from  other  parts  of  Greece,  present-, 
ing  to  the  eye  a  solemn  and  imposing  Fpectacle,  and  striking  the' 
imagination  still  more  powerfully  by  the  special  initiation  which 
they  conferred,  under  pledge  of  secrecy,  upon  pious  and  predisposed 
communicants.  Even  the  divulgation  in  words  tc  the  uninitiated, 
of  that  which  was  exhibited  to  the  eye  and  ear  of  the  assembly  in  th'e 
interior  of  the  Eleusinian  temple,  w\as  accounted  hiuhly  criminal: 
much  me>re  the  actual  mimicry  of  tliese  ceremonies  for  'the  amuse- 
ment of  a  convivial  party.     Moreover,  the  individuals  who  held  the 


68 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


creat  «;acred  offices  at  Eleusis  (the  Hierophant,  the  Daduch  or  Tordi- 
bearer  aiul  the  Kervx  or  Herald)— u  hieh  were  transiiiitted  by  mherit- 
•luce  in  the  EuinolpidiB  and  other  -reat  families  of  antiquily  and 
minortanee,  were  personally  insultcid  by  such  proceedings,  and  viiuii- 
caled  their  own  dignity  at  the  same  lime  that  they  mvoktd  ]miu^h- 
meut  on  the  oftenders  in  the  name  of  Demeter  and  Persephone,  llie 
mo<i  appalling  legends  were  current  among  the  Athenian  public,  nud 
repeated  on  proper  occasions  even  by  the  Hierophant  himself, 
respecting  the  divine  judgments  which  always  overtook  such  impious 

When  we  recollect  how  hisrhlv  the  Eleusinian  mysteries  were  ven- 
erated by  Greeks  not  born  In  Athens,  and  even  by  foreigners,  we 
shall  not  wonder  at  the  violent  indignation  excited  in  the  Athenian 
mind  by  persons  who  profaned  or  divulged  them;  especially  at  a 
moment  when  their  religious  sensibilities  had  been  so  keenly  wounded, 
and  so  tardily  and  recently  healed,  in  reference  to  the  Hermse.  It 
was  about  this  same  time  that  a  prosecution  was  instituted  against 
the  Melian  philosopher  Diauoras  for  irreligious  doctrines.  Having 
left  Athens  before  trial,  he  was  found  guilty  in  his  absence,  and  a 
reward  was  offered  for  his  life.  ■,..-, 

Probably  the  privileged  sacred  families  connected  with  the  mys- 
teries were  foremost  in  calling  for  expiation  from  the  state  to  the 
majesty  of  the  Two  offended  goddesses,  and  for  punishment  on  the 
delinquents.  And  the  enemies  of  Alkibindes,  personal  as  well  as 
political  found  the  opportunitv  favorable  for  reviving  that  charge 
ao-aiu^t  him  which  they  had  artfully  suffered  to  drop  before  his  depart- 
ure to  Sicily.  The  matter  of  fact  alleged  against  him— the  mock- 
celebration  of  these  holy  ceremonies— was  not  only  in  itselt  probable 
but  proved  by  reasonably  good  testimony  against  him  and  some  of 
Lis  intimate  companions.  Moreover,  the  overbearing  insolence  ot 
demeanor  habitual  with  x\lkibiades,  so  glaringly  at  variance  with  the 
equal  restraints  of  democracy,  enabled  his  enemies  to  impute  to  hiiu 
not  only  irreligious  acts,  but  anti-constitutional  pui-poses;  an  associa- 
tion of  ideas  which  was  at  this  moment  the  more  easily  accredited 
since  his  divulgation  and  parody  of  the  mysteries  did  not  stand  alone, 
])Ut  was  interpreted  in  conjunction  with  the  recent  mutilation  ol  the 
Hernue— as  a  manifestation  of  the  same  anti-jmtriotic  and  irreligious 
feeling,  if  not  part  and  parcel  of  the  same  treasonable  scheme.  And 
the  alai-m  on  this  subject  was  now  renewed  by  the  appearance  of  a 
Laceda.'mouian  army  at  the  isthmus,  professing  to  contemplate  some 
enterpri>e  in  conjunction  with  the  Ba'otians— a  ixirpose  not  easy  to 
understand,  and  presenting  every  appearance  of  being  a  cloak  for. 
hostile  designs  against  Athens.  So  fully  was  this  believed  among 
the  Athenians  that  they  took  arms  and  remained  under  arms  one 
whole  night  in  the  sacred  precinct  of  the  Theseium.  No  enemy 
indeed  appeared,  either  without  or  within:  but  t^ie  conspiracy  had 
only  been  prevented  from  breaking  out  (so  they  imagined)  by  the 


INDICTMENT  AGAINST  ALKIBIADES. 


69 


recent  inquiries  and  detection.  Moreover,  the  party  in  Argos  con- 
nected with  Alkibiades  were  just  at  this  time  suspected  of  a  plot  for 
tlic  subversion  of  thei;'  own  democracy;  which  still  farther  aggravated 
the  presumptions  against  him,  while  it  induced  the  Athenians  to  give 
iij)  to  the  Argeian  democratical  government  the  oligarchical  hostages 
taken  from  that  town  a  few  months  before,  in  order  that  it  might  put 
tlio-e  hostages  to  death   whenever  it  thought  fit. 

Such  incidents  materially  aided  the  enemies  of  Alkibiades  in  their 
iiiiieniitting  efforts  to  procure  his  recall  and  condemnation.  Among 
thcni  were  men  very  different  in  station  and  temper:  Thessalus  son 
of  Kimon,  a  man  of  the  highest  lineage  and  of  hereditary  oligarch- 
iciil  politics— as  well  as  Androkles,  a  leading  demagogue  or  popular 
oiator.  It  was  the i'ormer  who  preferred  against  him  in  the  senate 
the  memorable  impeachment  whiph,  fortunately  for  our  information, 
is  recorded  verbatim. 

'' Thessalus  son  of  Kimon,  of  the  Deme  Lakiadae,  hath  impeached 
Alkibiades  son  of  Kleinias,  of  the  Deme  Skambonidiie,  as  guilty  of 
crime  in  regard  to  the  Two  Goddesses  Demeter  and  Persephone — in 
iniinickiag  the  mysteries  and  exhibiting  them  to  his  companions  in 
his  own  iiouse— wearing  the  costume^of  the  Hierophant— applying 
to  himself  the  name  of  llierophant;  to  Polytion  that  of  Daduch;  to 
Theodoras  that  of  Herald— and  addressing  his  remaining  compan- 
ions as  Mysts  and  Epopts;  all  contrary  to  the  sacred  customs  and 
canons,  of  old  established  by  the  Eumolpidae,  the  Kerykes,  and  the 
Eleusinian  priests." 

Similar  impeachments  being  at  the  same  time  presented  against 
other  ciii/.eiis  now  serving  in  Sicily  along  with  Alkibiades,  the  ac- 
cusers moved  that  he  and  the  rest  might  be  sent  for  to  come  home 
and  take  their  trial.  We  may  observe  that  the  indictment  against 
him  is  quite  distinct  and  special,  making  no  allusion  to  any  supposed 
treasonable  or  anti-constitutional  projects.  Probably  however  these 
suspicions  were  pressed  by  his  enemies  in  their  preliminary  speeches, 
for  the  purpose  of  inducing  the  Athenians  to  remove  him  from  the 
eonunand  of  the  army  forthwith,  and  send  for  him  home.  For  such 
a  step  it  was  indispensable  that  a  strong  case  should  be  made  out: 
hut  the  public  w^as  at  length  thoroughly  brought  round,  and  the  Sal- 
aminian  trireme  was  dispatched  to  Sicily  to  fetch  him.  Great  care 
however  was  taken,  in  sending  this  summons,  to  avoid  all  appearance 
of  prejudgment,  or  harshness,  or  menace.  The  trierarch  was  for- 
bidden to  seize  his  person*  and  had  instructions  to  invite  him  simply 
to  accompany  the  Salaminian  home  in  his  own  trireme;  so  as  to 
avoid  the  hazard  of  offemiing  the  Argeian  and  Mautineian  allies 
serving  in  Sicily,  or  the  army  itself. 

It  was  on  the' return  of  the  Athenian  army — from  their  unsuccess^ 
ful  attempt  at  Kamarina,  to  their  previous  quarters  at  Ivataiia — that 
they  found  the  Sakniinian  trireme  newly  arrived  from  Athens  Avith 
this  grave  requisition  against  the  general.     We  may  be  sure  that 


Ljtrtiiway  ia»j8-<l 


70 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


AlUibiadcs  received  privnte  intimation  from  his  friends  nt  Athens,  hy 
the  <iame  trireme,  c(^mmunicatin£r  to  him  the  temper  of  the  people; 
so  that  his  resohition  was  speedily  taken.  Professnii:  to  obey,  lie 
dcn-irted  in  his  own  trireme  on  tlie  voyage  homeward,  along  wi'li 
tlie  otlier  persons  accused;  the  Salaminian  trireme  being m  company. 
But  as  soon  as  tliev  arrived  at  Thiirii  in  coasting  along  Italy  he  ami 
his  companions  quitted  the  vessel  and  disappeared.  After  a  fruitUss 
search  on  the  part  of  the  Salaminian  trierarch,  the  two  triremes  ^V(■l•e 
obli"-ed  to  return  to  Athens  without  him.  Both  Alkibiades  and  he 
rest"of  the  accused  (one  of  whom  was  his  own  cousm  and  namesake) 
were  tried  condemned  to  death  on  nonappearance,  and  their  prop 
ertv  confiscated;  while  the  Eumolpidse  and  tlie  other  Lleusini;in 
sacred  families  pronounced  him  to  be  accursed  by  the  gods,  for  lii> 
desecration  of  the  mysteries— and  .recorded  the  condemnation  ou  u 

plate  of  lead,  ,       .,  .  n     ♦     i  •„  ^„, 

1^-obiblv  his  disappearance  and  exile  w^ere  acceptable  to  his  cne- 
mies  at  Athens:  at  any  rate,  they  thus  made  sure  of  getting  rid  of 
him-  while  had  he  come  back,  his  condemnation  to  death,  thouiili 
pr.)bable,  could  not  be  regarded  as  certain.     In  considering  the  con- 
duct of  the  Athenians  toward  Alkibiades,  we  have  to  remark  tlnit 
the  people  were  guilty  of  no  act  of  injustice.     He  had  committee  - 
at  least  there  was  fair  reason  for  believing  that  he  had  committtd- 
an  act  criminal  in  the  estimation  of  every   Greek-the  divulgation 
and  profanation  of  the  mysteries.     This  act- alleged  against  him  in 
the  indictment  very  distinctly,  divested  of  all  supposed  ulterior  pur- 
pose   treasonable   or  otherwise— was  legally  pi. nishable  at  Athens, 
and 'was  universally  accounted  guilty  in   public   estimation:  as  nn 
offense  at  once  airainst  the  religious  sentiment  of  the  people  and 
a'-uinst  the  public  safety,  by  offending  the  two  goddesses  (Denietrr 
and  Persephone),  and  driving  them  to  withdraw  their  favor  and  pro- 
tection     The  same  demand  for  legal  punishment  would  have  been 
supposed  to  exist  in  a  Christian  Catholic  country,  down  to  a  very 
recent    period  of   history— if  instead    of  the    Eleusinian   mysteries 
we  suppose  the  Sacriticc  of  the  Mass  to  have  been  the  ceremony  ruli- 
culed-  though  such  a  proceeding  would  involve  no  breach  of  obliga- 
tion to  secrecy.     Nor  ought  we  to  judge  what  would  have  been  tlie 
meti-sure  of  penalty  formerly  awarded  to  a  person  convicted  of  sucli 
an   offense,  by  consulting  the  tendency  of  penal  legislation   dunn- 
the  la<t  «ixty  years.     Even  down  to  the  last  century  it  would  have 
been  visited  with  somethini::  sharper  than  the  draught  of  hemlock, 
which  is  the  worst  that  could  possibly  have  befallen  Alkibiades  at 
Athens— as  we  may  sec  by  the  condemnation  and  execution  ot  tlic 
Chevalier  de  la  Barre  at  Abbevilh^  in  17r36.     The  uniform  tendeney 
of  Christian  legislation,  down  to  a  recent  period,  leaves  no  room  l(n' 
reproaching^  the  Athenians  with  excessive  cruelty  in  their  penal  visil- 
atiun  of  offenses  against  the  religious  sentiment.-   On  the  contrary, 


CONDUCT  OF  HIS  ENEMIES. 


71 


the  Athenians  are  distinguished  for  comparative  mildness  and  toler- 
ance, as  we  shall  tind  various  opportunities  for  remarking. 

Now,  in  reviewing  the  conduct  of  the  Athenians  toward  Alkibi- 
ades, we  must  consider  that  this  violation  of  the  mysteries,  of  which 
he  was  indicted  in  good  legal  form,  was  an  action  for  which  he  really 
deserved  punishment — if  any  one  deserved  it.  Even  his  enemies  did 
not  fabricate  this  charge,  or  impute  it  to  him  falsely;  though  they 
were  guilty  of  insidious  and  unprincipled  maneuvers  to  exasperate 
the  public  mind  against  him.  Tlieir  machinations  begin  with  the 
mutilation  of  the  Hermae:  an  act  of  new  and  unparalleled  wicked- 
ness, to  which  historians  of  Greece  seldom  do  justice.  It  was  not, 
like  the  violations  of  the  mysteries,  a  piece  of  indecent  pastime  com- 
mitted within  four  w^alls,  and  never  intended  to  become  know^n.  It 
was  an  outrage  essentially  public,  planned  and  executed  by  conspir- 
ators for  the  deliberate  purpose  of  lacerating  the  religious  mind  of 
Athens,  and  turning  the  prevalent  terror  and  distraction  to  political 
profit.  Thus  much  is  certain;  though  we  cannot  be  sure  who  the 
conspirators  were,  nor  what  was  their  exact  or  special  purpose. 
That  the  destruction  of  Alkibiades  was  one  of  the  direct  purposes  of 
the  conspirators,  is  highly  probable.  But  his  enemies,  even  if  they 
were  not  among  the  original  authors,  at  least  took  upon  themselves 
half  the  guilt  of  the  proceeding,  by  making  it  the  basis  of  treacher- 
ous machinations  against  his  person.  How  their  scheme,  which  was 
originally  contrived  to  destroy  him  before  the  expedition  departed, 
at  tirst  failed,  was  then  artfully  dropped,  and  at  length  elToetually 
revived,  after  a  long  train  of  cahunny  against  the  absent  geuci'.il, 
has  been  already  recounted.  It  is  among  the  darkest  chapters  of 
Athenian  political  history,  indicating,  on  the  part  of  the  people, 
strong  religious  excitability,  without  any  injustice  tow^ard  Alkibi- 
ades: but  indicating,  on  the  part  of  his  enemies,  as  well  as  of  the 
Hermokopids  generally,  a  depth  of  wicked  contrivance  rarely  paral- 
leled in  political  warfare.  It  is  to  these  men.  not  to  the  people,  that 
Alkibiacles  owes  his  expulsion,  aided  indeed  by  the  effect  of  his  own 
previous  character.  In  regard  to  the  Hermie,  the  Athenians  con- 
demned to  death — after  and  by  consequence  of  the  deposition  of 
Andokides — a  small  number  of  men  who  may  perhaps  have  been 
"innocent  victims,  but  wiiom  they  sincerely  believed  to  be  guilty;  and 
whose  death  not  only  tranquillized  comparatively  the  public  mind, 
but  served  as  the  only  means  of  rescue  to  a  far  larger  number  of 
prisoners  confined  on  suspicion.  In  regard  to  Alkibiades.  they  came 
to  no  collective  resolution,  except  that  of  recalling  him  to  take  his 
trial:  a  resolution  implying  no  wrong  in  those  who  voted  for  it, 
whatever  may  be  the  guilt  of  those  who  proposed  and  prepared  it  by 
perfidious  means. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  desperate  hatred  with  which  the  exile 
Alkibiades  afterwards  revenged  himself  on  his  countrymen,  it  has 


72 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


been  necepsarv  to  explain  to  what  extent  lie  had  just  irround  of  com, 
plaint  airainst  them.  On  being  informed  that  they  had  condemiicd 
him  to  d^eath  in  his  absence,  he  is  said  to  have  exclaimed—"  1  shall 
show  them  that  I  am  alive."    ile  fully  redeemed  his  word. 

The  recall  and  conseciuent  banishment  of  Alkibiades  was  mis- 
chievous to  Athens  in  several  ways.  It  transferred  to  ihe  enemy's 
camp  an  anury  exile,  to  make  known  her  weak  points,  and  to  rou.su 
the  sluggishness  of  Sjiarta.  It  offended  a  portion  of  the  Sicilian 
armament — most  of  all  probably  the  Argeians  and  Maniin-ians— 
and  slackened  their  zetd  in  the  cause.  And  what  was  worst  of  all. 
it  left  the  armament  altogether  under  the  paralyzing  command  of 
Nikias.  For  Lamachus,  though  still  equal  in  nominal  authority,  ar.d 
now  invested  with  the  conunand  of  one-half  instead  of  one-third  of 
the  armv,  appears  to  have  had  no  real  influence  except  in  the  f.tld, 
or  in  the  actual  execution  of  that  which  his  colleague  had  already 
resolved. 

The  armament  now  proceeded— as  Nikias  had  first  suggested— I o 
sail  round  from  Katana  to  Selinus  and  P^gesta.  It  was  his  purpose 
to  investigate  the  quarrel  between  the  two  as  well  as  the  tinancinl 
means  of  1he  latter.  Passing  through  the  strait  and  along  the  norih 
coast  of  the  island,  he  tirst  touched  at  Ilimera,  wliere  adnnttance  wjis 
refused  to  him;  he  next  captuied  a  !^ikanian  maritime  town  nanud 
Hykkara,  together  with  many  prisoners;  among  them  the  celebrated 
courtesan  Lais,  then  a  very  young  girl.  Having  handed  over  tliis 
place  to  the  Egestreans,  Ivikias  went  in  person  to  inspect  their  city 
and  condition^  but  coidd  obtain  !io  more  money  than  the  thirty 
talents  wiiich  had  been  before  announced  on  the  second  visit  of  the 
commissioners.  He  then  restored  the  prisoners  from  Hykkara  to 
their  Sikanian  countrymen,  receiving  a  ransom  of  120  talents,  and 
conducted  the  Atiienian  land-force  across  the  center  of  the  island, 
through  the  territory  of  the  friendly  Sikels  to  Katana;  making  an 
attack  in  his  way  upon  the  liostile  Sikel  town  of  Hybla,  in  which  he 
was  repulsed.     At  Katana  he  was  rejoined  by  his  naval  force. 

It  was  now  seemingly  about  the  middle  of  October,  and  three 
months  had  ehqised  since  the  arrival  of  the  Athenian  aimanunt  nl 
Rhegium,  during  which  period  they  had  achieved  nothing  1  eyond 
the  acquisition  o"f  Naxus  and  Katana' as  allies,  except  the  insiiinil.eai: 
capture  of  Hykkara.  But  Naxus  and  Katana.  as  Chalkidic  ciiits. 
had  been  counted  upon  beforehand  even  by  Nikias;  together  wiili 
Khegium.  which  had  been  found  reluctant,  to  his  great  disappoint- 
ment. AVhat  is  still  WM>rse  in  reference  to  the  character  of  the  j-eii- 
eral,  not  only  nothing  serious  had  been  achieved,  but  nothing  seii.'U^; 
had  been  attempted.  The  ]>recious  moment  pointed  out  by  Lamaehi-s 
for  action,  when  the  terrilic  menace  of  the  untried  armament  was 
at  its  maximum,  and  preparation  as  well  as  confidence  was  wnntini; 
at  Syracuse,  had  been  irreparably  wasted.  Eveiy  day  the  prepara- 
tions of  the  Syracusaus  improved  and  their  fears  diminished.     The 


NIKIAS  IN  THE  HARBOR  OF  SYRACUSE. 


73 


invader,  whom  they  had  looked  upon  as  so  formidable,  turned  out 
both  hesitating  and  timorous,  and  when  he  disappeared  out  of  their 
siudit  to  Hykkara  and  Egesta— still  more  when  he  assailed  in  vain 
the  insigniticant  Sikel  post  of  Hybla— their  minds  underwent  a  reac- 
tion from  dismay  to  extreme  eonfide.nce.  The  mass  of  Syracusan 
eilizens.  now  re-enforced  by  allies  from  Selinus  and  other  cit^^s 
called  upon  their  generals  to  lead  them  to  the  attack  of  the  Athenian 
^  ])ositi()n  at  Katana,  since  the  Athenians  did  not  dare  to  approach 
-  Syracuse;  while  Syracusan  horsemen  even  went  so  far  as  to  insult 
the  Athenians  in  their  camp,  riding  up  to  ask  if  thev  w^re  come  to 
slMc  as  peaceable  citizens  in  the  island,  instead  of  restoring'-  the 
Leontines.  Such  unexpected  humiliation,  acting  probably  on  the 
feelings  of  the  soldiers,  at  length  shamed  Nikias  out  of  his  inaction 
iind  comj)elled  him  to  strike  a  blow  for  the  maintenance  of  his  own 
reputation.  He  devised  a  stratagem  for  ai)proaching  Syracuse  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  elude  the  opposition  of  the  Syracusan  cavalry— 
informing  himself  as  to  the  ground  near  the  city  through  some  exiles 
^  serving  along  with  him. 

He  dispatched  to  Syracuse  a  Katann?an  citizen  in  his  heart  attached 

to  Athens,  yet  apparently  neutral  and  on  good  terms  with  the  other 

side,  as  bearer  of  a  pretended  message  and   proposition  from   the 

friends  of  Syracuse  at  Katana.     Many  of  the  Athenian  soldiers  (so 

tli3  message  ran)  were  in  the  habit  of  passing  the  night  within  tlie 

vudls  apart  from  their  camp  and  arms.     It  would  be  easy  for  the 

Syracusans,  by  a  vigorous  attack  at  daybreak,  to  surprise  them  thus 

imprepared  and  dispersed;  while  the  i)hilo-Syracusan  party  at  Ka- 

I  tana  promised  to  aid,  by  closing  the  gates,  assailing  the  Athenians 

i^vithm,  and  setting  fire   to  the  ships.    A  numerous  body  of  Kata- 

lUL'uns  (they  added)  were  eager  to  co-operate  in  the  olau  now  Dro- 

'"osed.  *  ^ 

This  communication,  reaching  the  Syracusan  cenerals  at  a  mo- 
ment when  they  were  themselves  elate  and  disposed  to  an  ao-«rres«iv- 
movement,  found  such  incautious  credence  that  they  sent  back  the 
messenger  to  Katana  with  cordial  assent  and  agreement  for  a  precise 
day.  Accordingly,  a  day  or  two  before,  the  entire  Syracusan  force 
hv;is  marched  out  towaids  Katana,  and  encamped  for  the  night  on 
tue  river  Symaethus,  in  the  Leonline  territory,  within  about  eio-ht 
miles  from  Katana.  But  Nikias,  with  whom'^the  whole  proceedTn'^ 
on^mated,  choosing  this  same  day  to  put  on  shipboard  his  army  t(> 
pether  with  his  Sikel  allies  present,  sailed  by  niirht  southward  alou"^  the 
coast,  rounding  the  island  of  Ortygia.  into  the  great  Inubor  of  Syra- 
cuse. Arrived  thither  by  break  of  day,  he  diseml)aiked  his  troops 
uno]iposed  south  of  the  mouth  of  the  Anapus,  in  the  interior  of  the 
gieat  harbor,  near  the  hamlet  which  stretched  tov.ards  the  temple  of 
/^eiis  Olympius.  Having  broken  down  the  neighboring  bridge  where 
lie  Helonue  road  crossed  the  Anapus,  he  took  up  a  position  protected 
m  various  embarrassing  obstacles— houses,  walls,  trees,  and  standing 


74 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


^•ater— liesides  the  steep  ground  of  the  Olympieion  itself  on  his  left 
wni<^-  so  that  he  could  choose  his  own  time  for  tij»hlin.£r.  and  u as 
out  of  the  attack  of  the  Svracusan  horse.  For  the  protection  of  Ins 
ships  on  the  shore,  he  provided  a  palisade  work  by  cuttinji  down  tlio 
iiei'-hhorin*^  trees,  and  even  took  precautions  for  his  rear  by  throwing 
un  a  h;v-tv  fence  of  wood  and  stones  touching  the  shore  of  the  inner 
h\\  called  Daskon.  He  had  full  leisure  for  such  defensive  works. 
Mnce  the  enemv  within  the  walls  made  no  attempt  to  disturb  him. 
while  the  Svracusan  horse  onlv  discovered  his  maneuver  on  arriviig 
l^efore  ttie  lines  at  KaUina:  and  though  they  lost  no  time  in  returning. 
the  march  back  was  a  lens:  one.  Such  was  the  contidence  of  the 
SvHHUsims  however,  that  even  after  so  long  a  march  they  offeivd 
battie  forthwith:  but  as  Nikias  did  not  quit  his  position,  tiny 
retn\iteil  to  take  up  their  nidit-station  on  the  other  side  of  the  Htlo- 
rine  road— probablv  a  road  txirdered  on  each  side  by  walls. 

On  the  next  mornins.  Mikias  marched  out  of  his  position  and 
formcMl  his  troops  in  order  of  battle,  in  two  divisions,  each  eight 
deep  His  front  division  was  intended  to  attack;  his  rear  division 
(in  hollow  square  with  the  bantrage  in  the  middle)  was  held  in  re- 
serve near  the  camp  to  lend  ai^l  where  aid  might  be  wanted;  cavalry 
there  wa*  none.  The  Svracusan  hoplites,  seimingly  far  more  nu- 
merous than  his,  presented  the  lew  in  mass  of  the  city,  without  any 
selection-  thev  were  rnnsred  in  the  (ieeper  order  of  sixteen,  alongside 
of  their  'Selinuntine  allies.  On  the  right  wing  were  posted  thtir 
horsemen  tlrc  Ust  part  of  their  force,  not  less  than  1200  in  num- 
l»er  to'^'lher  with  2liO  horsemen  from  Gela,  20  from  Kamarina. 
ab<Mit  50  bowmen,  and  a  company  of  darters.  The  hoplites,  though 
full  of  couni'^  had  little  training:  and  their  array,  never  precisely 
kept  was  on  this  occasion  further  disturbed  by  the  immediate 
viriiiitv  of  the  citv.  Some  had  gone  in  to  see  their  families— others, 
hurrying  out  to  join,  found  the  battle  already  begun,  and  took  rank 

wherever  thev  could.  .  •,•       ..     i  • 

Thucvdides,  in  describins:  this  battle,  gives  us,  according  to  his 
practice  a  statement  of  the  motives  and  feelings  which  animated 
the  combatants  on  l>oth  sides,  and  which  furnished  a  theme  for  the 
brief  liai-anirue  of  Nikias.  This  apixjars  surprising  to  one  ac(U^ 
tomed  to  modern  warfare,  where  the  soldier  is  under  the  influence 
slmplv  of  professional  honor  and  disgrace,  without  any  thought  of 
the  cause  for  which  he  is  ti<ihtin2:.  In  ancient  times,  such  a  motive 
wa«  onlv  one  amone  manv  others,  which,  according  to  the  circuin- 
st\nce« *of  the  case^  contributed  to  elevate  or  depress  the  soldier s 
mind  at  the  eve  of  action.  Nikias  iKlverted  to  the  recognized  inili- 
tarv  pre-eminence  of  chosen  Argeians,  Mantineians,  and  Athenians 
—a'^  compared  to  the  Svracusan  levy  in  mass,  who  were  full  of 
iK'lief  in  their  own  superioritv  (this  is  a  striking  confesv^ion  of  the 
deplonible  change  which  had  l)een  wrought  by  his  own  delay),  but 
who  would  come  short  in  actual  couflict,  fiom  want  of  discipline. 


VICTORY  OF  THE  ATHENIANS. 


75 


l^Ioreover,  he  reminded  them  that  they  were  far  away  from  home— 
ind  that  defeat  would  render  them  victims,  one  and  all,  of  the  Syra 
cu<an  cavalry.  He  little  thought,  nor  did  his  prophets  forewarn 
liini,  that  such  a  calamity,  serious  as  it  would  liave  been,  was  even 
doirable  for  Athens — since  it  would  have  saved  her  from  the  far 
more  overwhelming  disasters  which  will  be  found  to  sadden  the 
coming  chapters  of  tliis  history. 

While  the  customary  sacritices  were  being  performed,  the  slingcrs 
and  bowmen  on  both  sides  became  engaged  in  skirmishing.  i>ut 
presently  the  trumpets  sounded,  and  Nikhis  ordered  his  tirst  (iivi^io:l 
of  hoplites  to  charge  at  once  rapidly,  lief(jre  the  Syracu.^ans  expeeied 
it.  Judging  from  his  previous  backwardness,  they  never  imagined 
tliat  he  would  be  the  first  to  give  orders  for  chargiiig;  n<^r  was  it 
until  they  saw  the  Athenian  line  actually  advancin;j  tow;;rd  tln'm 
that  thev  lifted  their  own  arms  from  the  ground  and  came  forward 
to  give 'the  meeting.  The  shock  was  bravelv  encountered  ou  Im>iIi 
sides,  and  for  some  time  the  battle  continued  liand  to  iiand  with 
undecided  result.  There  happened  to  supervene  a  violent  .storm  of 
rain  with  thunder  and  lightning,  which  alarmed  the  Syracu>ans,  who 
construed  it  as  an  unfavorable  augury— while  to  the  more  practiced 
Athenian  hoplites,  it  seemed  a  mere  phenomenon  of  the  sea.s<m,  so 
that  they  still  farther  astonished  the  Syracusans  by  the  unabated  con- 
fidence with  which  they  continued  the  fight.  At  length  the  Syracusan 
annv  was  broken,  dispersed,  and  fled;  first,  Ix'fore  the  Argeians  on 
the  right,  next,  before  the  Athenians  in  the  center.  The  victors  pur- 
sued as  far  as  was  safe  and  practicable,  without  disordering  their 
ranks:  for  the  Svracusan  cavalry,  which  had  not  yet  l)een  engjigcd, 
checked  all  who  pressed  forward,  and  enabled  their  own  iufanliy  to 
retire  in  safety  behind  the  Helorine  road. 

So  little  were  the  S\Tacusans  dispirited  with  this  defeat,  th;'t  tliey 
did  not  retire  within  their  city  until  they  had  sent  an  adcvpiatc 
detachment  to  guard  the  neighboring  temple  and  sacred  precinct  of 
the  Olympian  &ns;  wherein  there  was  much  deposited  wealth  which 
they  feared  that  the  Athenians  might  seize.  Nikijis,  however,  w  itli- 
out"  approaching  the  sacred  ground,  contented  himself  with  occupy- 
inir  the  field  of  battle,  burnt  his  own  dead,  and  stripped  the  arms 
from  the  dead  of  the  enemy.  The  Syracusans  and  their  allies  lost 
250  men,  the  Athenians  50. 

Ou  the  morrow,  havinggranted  to  the  S\Tacusans  their  dead  bodies 
for  burial  and  collected  the  ashes  of  hi*s  own  dead,  Nikias  re-em- 
barked his  troops,  put  to  sea,  and  sailed  back  to  his  former  station  at 
Katana,  He  conceived  it  impossible,  without  cavalry  and  a  farther 
stock  of  money,  to  maintain  his  position  near  Syracuse  or  to  prose- 
cute immediate  oi>erations  of  siege  or  blockade.  And  as  the  winter 
wjis  now  approaching,  he  determined  to  take  up  winter  quarters  at 
Katana— though  considering  the  mild  winter  at  Syracuse,  and  the 
danger  of  marsh  fever  near  the  Great  Harbor  in  summer,  the  change 


74 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


VICTORY  OF  THE  ATHENIANS. 


75 


^♦ater— Ixjsides  the  steep  ground  of  the  Olympieion  itself  on  his  left 
wine::  so  that  he  could  choose  his  own  time  for  tighlinir,  and  ^vas 
out  of  the  attack  of  the  Syracusan  horse.  For  the  protection  of  his 
ships  on  the  shore,  he  provided  a  palisade  work  hy  cuttinjj  down  tlie 
neiuhhoriner trees,  and  even  took  precautions  for  his  rear  by  throwing 
up  a  hasty  fence  of  wood  and  stones  touching  the  shore  of  the  inner 
bay  called  Daskon.  He  had  full  leisure  for  such  defensive  works, 
since  the  enemy  within  the  walls  made  no  attempt  to  disturb  him, 
while  the  Syracusan  horse  only  discovered  his  maneuver  on  arriving 
before  tlie  lines  at  KaUma;  and  though  they  lost  no  time  in  returning, 
the  march  back  was  a  long  one.  Such  was  the  contidence  of  the 
Syracu^ans,  however,  that  even  after  so  long  a  march  they  offered 
battle  forthwith;  but  as  Nikias  did  not  quit  his  position,  they 
retreated  to  take  up  their  night-station  on  the  other  side  of  the  Ilelo- 
rine  road— probablv  a  road  bordered  on  each  side  by  walls. 

On  the  next  morninjj,  Nikias  marched  out  of  his  position  and 
formed  his  troops  m  order  of  battle,  in  two  divisions,  each  eight 
deep.  His  front  division  was  intended  to  attack;  his  rear  divit^ion 
(in  hollow  square  with  the  baggage  in  the  middle)  was  held  in  re- 
serve near  the  camp  to  lend  ai/i  where  aid  might  be  wanted;  cavalry 
there  was  none.  The  Syracusan  hoplites,  seemingly  far  more  nu- 
merous than  his,  presented  the  levy  in  mass  of  the  city,  without  any 
selection;  they  were  ranged  in  the  deeper  order  of  sixteen,  alongside 
of  their  Selinuntine  allies.  On  the  right  wing  were  posted  their 
horsemen,  tlrc  best  part  of  their  force,  not  less  than  1200  in  num- 
her,  toiret'her  with  200  horsemen  from  Gela,  20  from  Kamarina, 
about  So  bowmen,  and  a  company  of  darters.  The  hoplites,  though 
full  of  courage,  had  little  training;  and  their  array,  never  precisely 
kept,  was  on  this  occasion  further  disturbed  by  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  city.  Some  had  gone  in  to  see  their  families— others, 
hurrvihg  out  to  join,  found  the  battle  already  begun,  and  took  rank 
wherever  they  could. 

Thucvdides,  in  describing  this  battle,  gives  us,  according  to  his 
practice,  a  statement  of  the  motives  and  feelings  which  animated 
the  combatants  on  both  sides,  and  which  furnished  a  theme  for  the 
brief  harangue  of  Nikias.  This  appears  surprising  to  one  accus- 
tomed to  modern  warfare,  where  the  soldier  is  under  the  intluence 
simply  of  professional  honor  and  disgrace,  without  any  thought  of 
the  ca'use  for  which  he  is  fighting.  In  ancient  times,  such  a  motive 
was  only  one  among  many  "others,  which,  according  to  the  circiun- 
stanccs'of  the  case,  contributed  to  elevate  or  depress  the  soldier's 
mind  at  the  eve  of  action.  Nikias  adverted  to  the  recognized  mili- 
tary pre-eminence  of  chosen  Argeians,  3Iantineians,  and  Athenians 
—as  compared  to  the  Syracusan  levy  in  mass,  who  were  full  of 
belief  in  their  own  superiority  (this  is  a  striking  confession  of  the 
deplorable  change  which  had  *i)een  wrought  by  his  own  delay),  but 
who  would  come  short  iu  actual  couflict,  fiam  want  of  discipline. 


Moreover,  he  reminded  them  that  they  were  far  away  from  home— 
and  that  defeat  would  render  them  victims,  one  and  all,  of  the  Syra 
cusan  cavalry.  He  little  thought,  nor  did  his  i)rophets  forewarn 
him,  that  such  a  calamity,  serious  as  it  would  have  been,  was  even 
desirable  for  Athens— since  it  would  have  saved  her  from  the  far 
more  overwhelming  disasters  which  will  be  found  to  sadden  the 
coming  chiipters  of  this  history, 

While  the  customary  sacrifices  were  being  performed,  the  slingers 
and  bowmen  on  both  sides  became  engaged  in  skirmishing.  ]>ut 
presently  the  trumpets  sounded,  and  Nikias  ordered  his  tirst  tiivisiuii 
of  hoplites  to  charge  at  once  rapidly,  before  the  Syracusans  expected 
it.  Judging  from  his  previous  backw  ardness,  they  never  imagined 
tliat  he  would  be  the  first  to  give  oreiers  for  charging;  nor  wa.s  it 
uulil  they  saw  the  Athenian  line  actually  advancing  toward  tlieni 
that  they  lifted  their  own  arms  from  the  ground  and  came  forward 
to  give  the  meeting.  The  shock  was  bravelv  encountered  on  both 
sides,  and  for  some  time  the  battle  continued  hand  to  hand  with 
undecided  result.  There  happened  to  supervene  a  violent  storm  of 
rain  with  thunder  and  lightning,  which  alarmed  the  Syracusaiis,  who 
construed  it  as  an  unfavorable  augury— while  to  the  more  practice(l 
Athenian  hoplites,  it  seemed  a  mere  phenomenon  of  the  season,  so 
that  they  still  farther  astonished  the  Syracusans  by  the  unabated  con- 
fidence with  which  they  continued  the  fight.  At  length  the  Syracusan 
army  was  broken,  dispersed,  and  fled;  first,  before  the  Argeians  on 
the  right,  next,  before  the  Athenians  in  the  center.  The  victors  i)ur- 
sued  as  far  as  was  safe  and  practictable,  without  disordering  their 
ranks:  for  the  Syracusan  cavalry,  which  liatl  not  yet  been  engaged, 
checked  all  who  pressed  forward,  and  enabled  their  own  infantry  to 
retire  in  safety  behind  the  Helorine  road. 

So  little  were  the  Syracusans  dispirited  wMth  this  defeat,  tln't  tliey 
did  not  retire  within  their  city  until  they  had  sent  an  ade^quate 
detachment  to  guard  the  neighboring  temple  and  sacred  preeinct  of 
the  Olympian  Zeus;  wiierein  there  was  much  deposited  wealth  which 
they  feared  that  the  Athenians  might  seize.  Nikias,  however,  with- 
out approaching  the  sacred  ground,  contented  himself  with  occupy- 
ing the  field  of  battle,  burnt  his  ow^n  dead,  and  stripped  the  arms 
from  the  dead  of  the  enemy.  The  Syracusans  and  their  allies  lost 
250  men,  the  Athenians  50. 

On  the  morrow,  having  granted  to  the  Syracusans  their  dead  bodies 
for  burial  and  collected  the  ashes  of  his  ow^u  dead,  Nikias  re-em- 
barked his  troops,  put  to  sea,  and  sailed  back  to  his  former  station  at 
Katana.  He  conceived  it  impossible,  without  cavalry  and  a  farther 
stock  of  money,  to  maintain  his  position  near  Syracuse  or  to  prose- 
cute immediate  operations  of  siege  or  blockade.  And  as  the  winter 
was  now  approaching,  he  determined  to  take  up  winter  quarters  at 
Katana— though  considering  the  mild  winter  at  Syracuse,  and  the 
danger  of  marsh  fever  near  the  Great  Harbor  in  summer,  the  change 


76 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


INACTION  OF  NIKIAS. 


77 


of  season  might  well  be  regarded  ns  a  questionable  gain.  Bnl  lio 
proposed  to  employ  the  interval  in  scndiFjg  to  Athens  for  eavalryand 
moiu'v,  as  well  as  \n  procuring  the  like  re -enforeenienis from  his  Sicil- 
ian allies,  whose  numbers  he  calculated  now  on  increasing  by  ijic 
accession  of  new  cities  after  his  recent  victory — and  to  get  together 
magazines  of  every  kind  for  beginning  the  siege  of  Syracuse  in  the 
sprmg.  Dispatching  a  trireme  to  Athens  with  these  requisiiions,  he 
sailed  with  his  forces  to  ^lessene,  within  which  there  was  a  favorable 
party  who  gave  hopes  of  opening  the  gates  to  him.  Such  a  corre- 
spondence had  already  been  conunenced  before  the  departure  of  Alki- 
biades:  but  it  was  the  lirst  act  of  revenge  which  the  departing  general 
took  on  his  country,  to  betray  the  proceedings  to  the  phiio-Syracus:in 
party  in  Messene.  Accordingly  tliese  latter,  watching  their  o])p(.r- 
tunity,  rose  in  arms  before  the  arrival  of  Nikias,  put  to  death  the  ir 
chief  antagonists,  and  held  the  town  by  force  again.-<t  the  Atlietuans; 
who  after^  fruitless  delay  of  thirteen  days,  wilh  scanty  supplies  and 
under  stormy  weather,  were  forced  to  return  to  Naxos,  where  th(y 
established  apalisaded  camp  and  station,  and  went  into  winter  quar- 
ters. 

The  recent  stratagem  of  Nikias,  followed  by  the  movement  info 
the  harbor  of  Syracuse  and  the  battle,  had  been  ably  planned  and 
executed.  It  served  to  show  the  courage  and  discipline  of  the  army, 
as  well  as  to  keep  up  the  spirits  of  the  soldiers  themselves  and  to 
ol)vi;ite  those  feelings  of  disappointment  which  tlie  previous  inelli- 
ciency  of  the  armament  tended  to  arouse.  But  as  to  other  residts, 
the  victory  was  barren;  we  may  even  say,  positively  mi.^chievons — 
since  it  imparted  a  momentar}-  stimulusVhich  served  as  an  CAcnse 
to  Nikias  for  the  three  months  of  total  inaction  which  followed— and 
since  it  neither  weakened  nor  humiliated  the  Syracusans,  but  gave 
them  a  salutary  lesson  which  they  turned  to  accoimt  while  Is ikiiis 
was  in  his  winter  quarters.  His  apathy  during  these  first  eight 
months  after  the  arrival  of  the  expedition  at  Khegium  (from  .Inly. 
415  B.C.,  to  March.  414  n.c),  was  the  cause  of  very  deplorable  eahinii- 
ties  to  his  army,  his  country,  and  himself.  Abundant  proofs  of  this 
will  be  seen  in  the  coming  events:  at  present  we  have  only  to  torn 
back  to  his  own  predictions  and  recommendations.  All  the  diflkid- 
ties  and  dangers  to  be  surmounted  in  Sicily  had  been  foreseen  by 
himself  and  impressed  uj^on  the  Athenians:  in  the  first  instance,  as 
grounds  against  undertaking  the  expedition — but  the  Athenians, 
though  unfortunately  not  allowing  them  to  avail  in  that  cai)acity, 
fully  admitted  their  reality,  and  authorized  him  to  demand  whatever 
force  was  necessary  to  overcome  them,  lie  had  thus  been  allowed 
to  bring  with  him  a  force  calculated  upon  his  own  ideas,  together 
with  supplies  and  implements  for  besieging:  yet  when  arrived,  he 
seems  only  anxious  to  avoid  exposing  that  force  to  any  serious  enter- 
prise, and  to  find  an  excuse  for  conducting  it  back  to  Athens.  That 
Syracuse  was  the  grand  enemy,  and  that  the  capital  point  of  the 


enterprise  was  the  siege  of  that  city,  was  a  truth  familiar  to  himself 
as  well  as  to  every  man  at  Athens:  upon  the  formidable  cavalry  of 
the  Syracusans,  Nikias  had  himself  insisted,  in  the  preliminary 
debates.  Yet — after  four  months  of  mere  trifling,  and  pretense  of 
action  so  as  to  evade  dealing  with  the  real  difficulty— the  existence 
of  this  cavalry  is  made  an  excuse  for  a  farther  postponement  of  four 
months  until  re-enforcements  can  be  obtained  from  Athens.  To  all 
the  intrinsic  dangers  of  the  case,  predicted  by  Nikias  himself  with 


tious— and  allowing  the  Peloponnesians  time  to  interfere  against 
Attica  as  well  as  to  succor  Sicily.  It  was  the  unhappy  weakness  of 
this  commander  to  shrink  from  decisive  resolutions  of -every  kind, 
and  at  any  rate  to  postpone  them  until  the  necessity  became  immi- 
nent: the  consequence  of  which  was  (to  use  an  expression  of  the 
Corinthian  envoy,  before  the  Peloponnesian  war,  in  censuring  the 
dilatory  policy  of  Sparta),  that  never  acting,  yet  always  seeming 
about  to  act,  he  found  his  enemy  in  double  force  instead  of  single, 
at  the  moment  of  actual  conflict. 

Great  indeed  must  have  been  the  disappointment  of  the  Athenians, 
when,  after  having  sent  forth  in  the  month  of  June  an  expedition  of 
unparalleled  efliciency,  they  receive  in  the  month  of  November  a  dis- 
patch to  acquaint  them  that  the  general  has  accomplished  little 
except  one  indecisive  victory;  and  that  he  has  not  even  attempted 
anything  serious — nor  can  do  so  unless  they  send  him  further  cavalry 
anil  money.  Yet  the  only  answer  which  they  made  was  to  grant 
and  ])rovide  for  this  demand  without  any  public  expression  of  dis- 
content or  disappointment  against  him.  And  this  is  the  more  to  be 
noted,  since  the  removal  <af  Alkibiades  afforded  an  inviting  and  even 
valuable  opportimity  for  proposing  to  send  out  a  fresh  colleague  in 
his  room.  If  there  were  no  complaints  raised  against  Nikias  at 
Athens,  so  neither  are  we  informed  of  any  such  even  among  his  own 
soldiers  in  Sicily;  though  ^7i^^>  disappointment  must  have  been  yet 
greater  than  that  of  their  countrymen  at  home,  considering  the  ex- 
pectations with  which  they  had  come  out.  We  may  remember  that 
the  delay  of  a  few  days  at  Eion,  under  perfectly  justifiable  circum- 
stances, and  while  aw^aiting  the  arrival  of  re  enforcements  actually 
sent  for,  raised  the  loudest  murmurs  against  Kleon  in  his  expedition 
against  Amphipolis,  from  the  hoplites  in  his  own  army.  The  con- 
trast is  instructive,  and  will  appear  yet  more  instnictive  as  we  ad- 
vance forward. 

Meanwhile  the  Svracusans  were  profiting  by  the  lesson  of  their 
recent  defeat.  At  t^he  next  public  assembly  wliich  ensued,  Hermok- 
rates  addressed  them  in  a  mingled  tone  of  encouragement  and  ad- 
monition. While  praising  their  bravery,  he  deprecated  their  want  of 
tactics  and    discipline.     Considering  the  great   superiority  of  the 


78 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


RESULTS  OF  DELAY. 


79 


enemy  in  this  last  respect,  he  rccrardcd  tlie  recent  battle  as  giving 
good  promise  for  the  future;  and  he  appealed  uith  satisfaction  to 
Hhe  precautions  taken  by  Kikias  in  fortifyinc:  his  camp,  as  well  as  to 
1  is  speedy  retreat  after  the  battle.  He  pressed  them  to  diminish  the 
excessive  number  of  fifteen  generals,  whom  they  had  hittherto  been 
f  ccustomed  to  nominate  to  the  crmn^ard— to  reduce  the  number  to 
three,  conferring  upon  them  at  the  same  lime  fuller  powers  than  had 
been  before  enjoyed,  and  swearing  a  solemn  oath  to  leave  them  un- 
lettered in  the  exercise  of  such  powers— lastly,  to  enjoin  upon  these 
generals  the  most  strenuous  efforts,  during  the  coming  winter,  for 
trainino:  and  arming,  the  whole  population.  Accordingly  Ilerniok- 
rates  himself,  with  Herakleides  and  Sikanus,  were  named  to  the 
command.  Ambassadors  were  sent  both  to  Sparta  and  to  Corinth, 
for  the  purpose  of  entreating  assistance  in  Sicily,  as  well  as  of  pre- 
vailing on  the  Peloponnesians  to  recommence  a  direct  attack  against 
Attica;  so  as  at  least  to  prevent  the  Athenians  from  sending  further 
re-enforcements  to  Nikias,  and  perhaps  even  to  bring  about  the  recaU 

of  liis  ai-my. 

But  by  far  the  most  important  measure  which  marked  the  nomi- 
nation of  the  fiew  generals  was  the  enlargement  of  the  line  of  fortiti- 
cations  at  Syracuse.  They  constructed  a  new  wall,  inclosing  an  ad- 
ditional space  and  covering  both  their  Inner  and  their  Outer  City  to 
the  westward— reaching  from  the  Outer  sea  to  tlie  Great  Harbor, 
across  the  whole  space  fronting  the  rising  slope  of  the  hill  of  Epipo 
la3— and  stretchiiig  far  enough  westward  to  inclose  the  sacred  pre- 
cinct of  Apollo  Temenites.  This  was  intended  as  a  precaution,  in 
order  that  if  Nikias,  resuming  operations  in  the  spring,  should  beat 
them  in  the  field  and  confine  them  to  their  walls,  he  might  neverthe- 
less be  prevented  from  carrying  a  wall  of  circumvallation  from  sea  to 
Bca  without  covering  a  great  additional  extent  of  ground.  Besides 
this,  the  Syracusans  fitted  up  and  garrisoned  the  deserted  town  of 
Megara,  on  the  coast  to  the  north  of  Syracuse;  they  established  a 
regular  fortification  and  garrison  m  the  Olympieion  or  temple  of 
Zeus  Olvmpius,  which  they  had  already  garrisoned  after  the  recent 
battle  with  ^'ikias;  and  they  planted  stakes  in  the  sea  to  obstruct  the 
convenient  landing-places.  All  these  precautions  were  useful  to 
them;  and  we  may  even  say  that  the  new  outlying  fortification,  in- 
closinc:  the  Temenites,  proved  their  salvation  in  the  coming  siege— by 
BO  lengthening  the  circumvallation  neces.sary  for  the  Athenians  to 
construct,  that  Gyhppus  had  time  to  arrive  before  it  was  finished. 
But  there  was  one  further  precaution  which  the  Syracusans  omitted 
at  this  moment,  when  it  was  open  to  them  without  any  hindrance— 
to  occupy  and  fortify  the  Euryalus,  or  the  summit  of  the  hill  of  Epip- 
ol«.  Hiid  they  done  this  now,  probably  the  Athenians  could  never 
have  made  progress  with  their  .lines  of  circumvallation:  but  they  did 
not  think  of  it  until  too  late— as  we  shall  presently  see. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  remark,  in  reference  to  the  general 


scheme  of  Athenian  operations  in  Sicily,  that  if  Nikias  had  adopted 
Wie  plm  originally  recommended  by  Lamachus— or  if  he  had  begun 
bis  ilerman.nt  besieging  operations  against  Syracuse  in  the  summer  or 
nutumn  of  415  B.C.,  instead  of  postponing  them,  as  he  actually  did, 
to  the  spring  of  414  B.C.— he  would  have  found  none  of  these  addi- 
tional defenses  to  contend  against,  and  the  line  of  circumvallation 
neces'^arv  tor  his  purpose  would  have  been  shorter  and  easier.  Besides 
these  pcimanent  and  irreparable  disadvantages,  his  winter's.maction 
at  Naxos  drew  upon  him  the  further  insult  that  the  Syracusans 
in-irched  to  his  former  quarters  at  Kataua  and  burned  the  tents 
wliieh  they  found  standing— ravaging  at  the  same  time  the  neighbor- 

"'"Kamarina  maintained  an  equivocal  policy  which  made  both  parties 
lione  to  ffain  it;  and  in  the  course  of  this  winter  the  Athenian  envoy 
Eimliemris  with  others  was  sent  thither  to  propose  a  renewal  of  that 
alliance  between  the  city  and  Athens,  which  had  been  concluded  ten 
years  before.  Hermokrates  the  Syracusan  went  to  counteract  his 
object;  and  both  of  them,  according  to  Grecian  custom,  were  admitted 
to  address  the  public  assembly.        .        ,        .  ,    .  ,  ^^^  . 

Hermokrates  bei^au  by  denouncing  the  views,  designs,  and  past 
history  of  Athens.  ^  He  did  not  (he  said)  fear  her  power,  provided  the 
Sicilian  cities  were  united  and  true  to  each  other:  even  against  Syra- 
cuse alone,  the  hasty  retreat  of  the  Athenians  after  the  recent  battle  l^id 
shown  how  little  they  confided  in  their  own  strength      What  he  did 
fear  wjis  the  delusive  promises  and  insinuations  of  Athens,  tending 
to  disunite  the  island,  and  to  paralyze  all  joint  resistance.     Eyciy  one 
knew  that  her  purpose  in  this  expedition  was  to  subjugate  all  bicily 
-that  Leontini  and  Egesta  served  merely  as  convenient  pretenses  to 
put  forward— and  that  she  could  have  no  sincere  sympathy  for  Chal- 
kidians  in  Sicily,  when  she  herself  lield  in  slavery  the  Chalkidians  la 
Euboea     It  was,  in  truth,  nothing  else  but  an  extension  of  the  same 
scheme  of  rapacious  ambition,  whereby  she  had  reduced  her  louiaii 
allies  and  kinsmen  to  their  present  wretched  slavery,  now  threatened 
a-ainst  Sicily.     The  Sicilians  could  not  too  speedily  show  her  that 
they  were  no  lonians,  made  to  be  transferred  from  one  master  to 
another    but  autonomous   Dorians  from  the  center  of  autonomy, 
Peloponnesus      It  would  be  madness  to  forfeit  this  honorable  position 
throu'di  jealousy  or  lukewarmness  among  themselves.     Let^not  the 
Kaniju-iniaus  imagine  that  Athens  was  striking  her  blow  at  Syracuse 
alone:  they  were  themselves  next  neighbors  of  Syracuse,  and  would 
'  be  the  first  victims  if  she  were  conquered.     They  might  wish,  tro:u 
apDrehension  or  envy,  to  see  the  superior  power  of  Syracuse  humbleil : 
hut  this  could  not  happen  without  endangering  their  own  existence 
They  ou'^ht  to  do  for  her  what  they  would  have  asked  her  to  do  lE 
the  Athenians  had  invaded  Kamarina-instead  of  lending  mere  y 
nominal  aid,  as  they  had  hitherto  done.     Their  former  alliance  with 
Athens  was  for  purposes  of  mutual  defense,  not. binding  them  to  aid 


80 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


SPEECH  OF  EUPIIEMUS. 


81 


her  in  schemes  of  pure  acrgrcssion.  To  hold  jiloof,  give  fair  words  to 
l)()th  parties,  and  leave  Syracuse  to  fight  tlie  l)attle  of  Sicily  single- 
handed,  was  as  unjust  as  it  was  dishonorable.  If  she  came  off  victor 
in  the  struggle,  she  would  take  care  that  the  Kainarinjcaus  should  be 
no  gainers  by  such  a  j)olicy.  Tlie  state  of  affairs  was  so  plain  that  he 
(Ilermokrates)  could  not  pretend  to  enlighten  them:  but  he  solemnly 
appetded  to  their  sentiments  of  common  blood  and  lineage.  The 
J)ori:ius  of  Syracuse  were  assailed  by  their  eternal  enemies  the  lonians, 
and  ought  not  to  be  now  betrayed  by  tlieir  own  brother  Dorians  of 
Ka  marina. 

Euphenms,  in  rei)ly,  explained  the  prr-ceedings  of  Athens  in  refer 
ence  to  her  empire,  and  vindicated  her  against  the  charges  of  ller- 
iilokrates.  Though  addressing  a  Dorian  assend)ly,  he  did  not  fear  to 
take  his  start  from  the  position  laid  clown  by  Ilermokrates,  that 
loniaus  were  the  natural  enemits  of  L-(i iiins.  Under  this  feeling, 
Athens,  as  an  Ionian  city,  h:id  looked  about  to  strengthen  herself 
against  the  supremacy  of  her  j^owerlul  Dorian  neighbors  in  Pelopon- 
nesus, Finding  herself,  after  the  lepulsc  of  ti)e  Persian  king,  at  the 
liead  of  those  lonians  Jind  otljer  Greeks  who  had  just  revolted  from 
him,  she  had  made  use  of  her  i)osilion  as  well  as  of  her  superior  navy 
to  shake  off  the  illegitimate  ascendency  of  Sparta.  Her  empire  was 
justified  by  regard  for  her  own  sa.fety  a^jMin-t  bparta,  as  well  ashy 
the  immense  superiority  of  her  nuiritiujc  (fforls  in  the  rescue  of 
Greece  from  the  Persians.  Even  in  reference  to  her  allies,  she  had 
good  ground  for  reducing  them  to  s\d)jeclion,  because  they  had  made 
themselves  the  instruments  and  auxiliaries  of  the  Persian  king  in  liis 
attempt  to  conquer  her,  Pn.denJial  views  for  assured  safety  to  her- 
relf  had  thus  led  her  to  the  acquisil-ion  of  her  present  empire,  and  the 
same  views  now  brought  her  to  Sicily.  He  was  prei)ared  to  show 
that  the  interests  of  Kamarina  Aveie  in  full  accordance  with  those  of 
Athens,  The  main  purpose  of  Alliens  in  Sicily  was  to  prevent  her 
Sicilian  enemies  from  sending  aid  to  her  Peloponnesian  enemies — to 
accomplish  which,  powerful  Sicilian  allies  were  indispensable  to  her. 
To  enfeeble  or  subjugate  her  Sicilian  allies,  would  be  folly:  if  she 
did  this,  they  would  not  serve  her  purpose  of  keeping  the  Syracusans 
employed  in  their  own  island.  Hence  her  desire  to  re-establish  the 
expatriated  Leontines,  powerful  and  free,  though  she  retained  the 
("halkidians  in  Euboea  as  subjects.  Near  home  she  wanted  nothing 
but  subjects,  disarmed  and  tribute-paying — while  in  Sicily  she 
required  independent  and  efiicient  allies;  so  that  the  double  conduct, 
which  Herinokrates  reproached  as  inconsistent,  i)roceid(d  from  one 
and  the  same  root  of  public  prudence.  Pursuant  to  that  motive, 
Athens  dealt  differently  with  her  different  allies,  accoiding  to  the 
circumstances  of  each.  Thus  she  respected  the  autonc^my  of  Chios 
and  Methymna,  and  maintained  equal  relations  with  other  islanders 
near  Peloponnesus;  and  such  were  the  relations  which  she  now  w  ishcd 
to  establish  in  Sicily. 


>i 


j^o— it  w\is  Syracuse,  not  Athens,  whom  the  Kamarinfeans  and 
other  Sicilians  had  really  ground  to  fear.  Syracuse  was  aiming  at 
the  acqnisitivon  of  imperial  sway  over  the  island;  and  that  which  she 
had  already  done  toward  the  Leonfines  showed  what  she  was  prepared 
to  do,  when  tli:j  ti:ne  came,  against  Kamarina  and  others.  It  was 
under  this  apprehension  that  the  Kamarin;eans  had  formerly  invited 
Athens  into  Sicily,  it  would  be  alike  unjust  and  impolitic  were  they 
now  to  repudiate  her  aid,  for  she  could  accomplish  nothing  without 
them;  if  they  did  so  on  the  present  occasion,  they  would  repent  it 
hcrciiftcr  wdien  exposed  to  the  hostility  of  a  constantly  encroaching 
neighbor,  and  when  Athenian  auxiliaries  could  not  again  be  had. 
He  repelled  the  imputations  which  Herinokrates  had  cast  upon  Ath- 
cus— but  the  Kamarinseans  were  not  sitting  as  judges  or  censors  upon 
her  merits.  It  was  for  them  to  consider  whether  that  meddlesome 
disposition,  with  which  Athens  was  reproached,  was  not  highly  ben- 
eficial as  the  terror  of  oppressors,  and  the  shield  of  weaker  states, 
throughout  Greece.  He  now  tendered  it  to  the  Kamarinaeans  as 
their  only  security  against  Syracuse;  calling  upon  them,  instead 
of  living  in  perpetual  fear  of  her  aggression,  to  seize  the  present 
opportunity  of  attacking  her  on  an  equal  footing,  jointly  with 
Athens. 

In  these  two  remarkable  speeches,  we  find  Ilermokrates  renewing 
substantially  the  same  line  of  counsel  as  he  had  taken  up  ten  years 
before  at  the  congress  of  Gela — to  settle  all  Sicilian  difference's  at 
linine,  and,  above  all  things,  to  keep  out  the  intervention  of  Athens; 
who,  if  she  once  got  footing  in  Sicily,  would  never  rest  until  she 
r.'dnced  all  the  cities  succL'Ssively.  This  w^as  the  natural  point  of 
view  for  a  Syracusan  politician;  but  by  no  means  equall}^  natural, 
nor  equally  conclusiv^e,  for  an  iidiabitant  of  one  of  tlie  secondary 
Sicilian  cities — especially  of  the  conterminous  Kamarina.  And  tlie 
oration  of  Euphemus  is  an  able  pleading  to  demonstrate  that  the 
Kaniarinoeans  had  far  more  to  fear  from  Syracuse  than  from  Athens. 
His  arguments  to  this  point  are  at  least  highly  plausible,  if  not  con- 
vincing: but  he  seems  to  lay  himself  open  To  attack  from  the  opposite 
quarter.  If  Athens  cannot  hope  to  gain  anj^  subjects  in  Sicily,  what 
motive  has  she  for  interfering  ?  This  Euphemus  meets  by  contend- 
ing that  if  she  does  not  interfere,  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies  will 
come  across  and  render  assistance  to  the  enemies  of  Athens  in  Pelo- 
ponnesus. It  is  manifest,  however,  that,  under  the  actual  circum- 
stances of  the  time,  Athens  could  have  no  real  fears  of  this  nature, 
find  that  her  real  motives  for  meddling  in  Sicily  were  those  of  hope 
and  encroachment,  not  of  self-defense.  But*^it  shows  how*  little 
likely  such  hopes  w^re  to  be  realized — and  therefore  how  ill-advised 
the  whole  plan  of  interference  in  Sicily  was — that  the  Athenian  envoy 
could  say  to  the  Kamarin;eans,  in  the  same  strain  as  Nikias  had 
spoken  at  Athens  when  combating  the  wisdom  of  the  expedition — 
"  Such  13  the  distance  of  Sicily  from  Athens,  and  such  the  difliculty 


82 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


ALKIBIADES  AT  SPARTA. 


83 


of  ,2:iiarclin.<^  cities  of  great  force  and  ninple  territory  combined,  that 
if  we  wislied  to  hold  you  Sicilians  as  subjects,  we  should  be  unable 
to  do  it:  wo  can  only  r(  tain  ycu  5'S  fne  and  powrrful  allies."  "VVluit 
Isikias  said  at  Athens  to  dissurde  his  couuUynien  fi(  ni  the  enterprise, 
imder  sincere  couvietion,  Euphemus  repealed  at  Kaniarina  for  the 
purpose  of  coneiliatin.Lr  that  city;  probably  ^xithout  believing  it  liim- 
self,  yet  the  anticipation  was  not  on  that  account  the  less  true  and 
reasonable. 

The  Kamarina?ans  felt  the  force  of  both  speeches,  from  Ilermok- 
rates  and  Euphemus.  Their  inclinations  carried  them  towards  lie 
Athenians,  yet  not  without  a  certain  misgiving  in  case  Athens  should 
prove  ccmpletely  successful.  Towards  the  Syracusans,  on  the  con- 
trary, they  entertained  nothing  hut  unqualified  apprehension,  and 
jealousy  of  very  ancient  date— and  even  now,  their  great  fear  was  of 
probable  suffering  if  the  Syracusans  succeeded  against  Athens  with- 
out their  co-operation.  In  this  dikmma,  they  thought  it  safest  to 
give  an  evasive  answer,  of  friendly  sentiment  towards  botli  j  arties, 
but  refusal  of  aid  to  either;  1. oping  thus  to  avoid  an  inexpiable 
breach,  whichever  way  the  idlimate  success  might  tuin. 

For  a  city  coniparativ(  ly  weak  and  situated  like  Kamarina,  such 
was  perhaps  the  least  hazaidous  policy.  In  December,  415  B.C.,  no 
luinian  being  could  venture  to  pi(dict  how  the  struggle  between 
Kikias  and  the  Syracusans  in  the  coming  year  would  turn  out;  nor 
were  the  Kamarimeans  prompted  by  any  hearty  feeling  to  take  the 
extrem.e  chances  with  cither  party.  JNIatters  had  borne  a  different 
aspect  indeed  in  the  preceding  month  of  July,  415  B.C.,  when  the 
Athenians  first  arrive  d.  Had  the  vigorous  policy  urged  by  Lamaclms 
])een  then  followed  up,  the  Atlie  nians  woidel  always  liave  appeared 
likely  to  succeed — if  indeed  tlie^y  had  not  already  beeome  conquerejrs 
of  Syracuse:  so  that  waverers  like  the  Kamarina^ans  would  have 
remained  attached  to  them  from  policy.  The  best  wa}"  to  obtain 
alliens  (Lamachus  had  conteneled)  was  to  be  prompt  and  decisive  in 
action,  and  to  strike  at  the  cajiital  point  at  once  while  the  intimi- 
dating effect  of  their  arrival  was  fresh.  Of  tlie  value  of  his  advice, 
an  emphatic  illustration  is  afforded  by  the  conduct  of  Kamarina. 

Throughout  the  rest  of  the  winter,  Nikias  did  little  or  nothing. 
Tie  merely  dispatched  envoys  for  the  purpose  of  conciliating  the 
Sikels  in  the  interior,  where  the  autonomous  Sikels,  who  dwelt  in 
the  central  regions  of  the  island,  for  the  me)st  part  declared  in  his 
favor — especially  the  powerful  Sikel  prince  Archonides— sending 
provisions  and  even  money  to  the  camp  at  Naxos.  Against  some 
refractory  tribes,  Nikias  sent  detachments  for  purposes  of  compulsion; 
while  the  Syracusans  on  their  part  did  the  like  to  counteract  him. 
Such  Sikel  tribes  as  had  become  dependents  of  Syracuse  stood  aloof 
from  the  struggle.  As  the  spring  a])proached,  Nikias  transferred  his 
position  from  Naxos  to  Katana,  re-establishing  that  camp  which. the 
Syracusans  had  de.stre)yed. 


Tie  further  sent  a  trireme  to  Carthage,  to  invite  co-operation  from 
ih-it  eitv  and  a  second  to  the  TynlKiniau  inariUme  cities  on  the 
southern  coast  of  Italy,  some  of  whom  had  proffered  to  him  their 
services,  as  ancient  enemies  of  Syracuse,  and  now  realized  heir 
promises  From  Carthage  nothing  was  obtamed.  To  the  bikels, 
Kta3ans,  and  all  the  other  allies  of  Athens,  Nikias  also  sent  orders 
fe  bricks,  iron  btirs,  clamps,  and  everything  suitable^,  for  the  wall  of 
c-re'umvallation.  which  was  to  be  commenced  with  the  first  burst  of 


re-enforcements.  Here  again  we  are  compelled  to  iiotie^c  the  lament- 
•ible  ce)nseeiucnces  arising  out  of  the  inaction  of  Nikias.  Had  he 
commenced  the  siege  of  Sysacuse  on  his  first  arriva  .  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  any  such  envoys  would  have  been  sent  to  Fele)pon- 
nesus  at  all;  at  any  rate,  they  woulel  not  have  arrived  in  time  to  pro- 
d-ice decisive  effects.  After  exerting  what  inlluence  they  could  upon 
the  Italian  Greeks  in  their  voyage,  the  Syracusan  env(.ys  reaeheel 
Corinth  where  they  found  the  warmest  recepliem  and  ootained 
promises  of  speedy  succor.  The  Corinthians  iuruished  envoys  of 
tluir  own  to  accompany  them  to  Sparta,  anel  to  back  their  request 
for  Lacedemonian  aid.  ,         i         *  i 

Thev  fe)und  at  the  congress  at  Sparta  another  advocate  upon  whom 
tlcy  mild  not  reasonably  have  counted- Alkibiades.     lliat  exde 
had  crossed  over  from  Thurii  to  the  Eleian  pe)rt  of  Kyllene  m  Pelo- 
i)e)nnesus  in  a  merchant-vessel,  and  now  appeared  at  Sparta  on  special 
inviuition  and  safe-ce)nduct  from  the  Lacedaemonians;  of  whom  he 
^vas  at   first   vehemently   afraid,  in  consequence  e)f  having  raiseel 
n«'-;iinst  them  that  Pclopounesian  combination  whicn  hael  given  them 
so  much  trouble  before  the  battle  of  Mantineia.     He  now  appearc;d 
too,  biirnin-  with  hostility  against  his  country,  and  eager  to  inflic 
upon  her  all  the  mischief  in  his  power.     Haying  been  the  chief  evil 
ireniiis  to  plunge  her,  mainly  for  selfish  ends  of  his  own,  into  this 
ili-starred  venture,  he  was  now  about  to  do  his  best  to  turn  it  into 
her  irreparable  ruin.    His  fiery  stimulus,  and  unmeasured  exaggera 
lions,   supplied   what  was  wanting  in   Ce)rmthian   and   Syracusan 
eloeiuence,  and  inflamed  the  tardy  good-wil  of  the  Spai-tan  Ephois 
into  comparative  decision  and  activity.     His  harangue  in  th(3  Spartan 
con-ress  is  given  to  us   by  Thucydides-who   may  possibly  have 
heard  it,  as  he  was  then  himself  in  exile.     Like  the  earlier  speech 
which  he  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Alkibiades  at  Athens,  it  is  charac- 
teristic in  a  high  degree;  and  interesting  in  another  point  ()f  view  as 
the  latest  compe)8ed  speech  of  any  length  which  we  hud  in  his  history. 
I  .<ive  here  the  substance,  without  professing  to  translate  the  we)rcls. 
"First  I  must  address  you,  Lacedasmonians,  respe^*ing  the  prej 


84 


ATTACK  OX  SYRACUSE. 


SPEECH  OF  ALKIBIADES. 


85 


udices  current  against  me  personally,  before  I  can  hope  to  find  a 
fair  hearing  on  public  matters.     You'know  it  was  I  who  renewed  niv 
public  connection  with  Sparta,  after  my  ancestors  before  me  1i;kI 
quarreled   with  you  and   renounced  it.      Moreover,   I  assiduously 
cultivated  your  favor  on  all  points,  especially  by  attentions  to  youV 
prisoners  at  Athens:  but  while  I  was  showing  all  this  zeal  towards 
you,  you  took  the  opportunity  of  the  peace  which  you  made  witii 
Athens  to  employ  my  enemies  as  your  agents— thus  strengthening 
their  hands,  and   dishonoring  me.     It   was   this   conduct  of  yours 
which  drove  me  to  unite  with  the  Argeians  and  Mantideians;  nor 
ought  you  to  be  angry  with  me  for  mischief  which  you  thus  drew 
upon  yourselves.     Probably  some  of  you  hate  me  too,  without  any 
good  reason,  as  a  forward  partisan  of  democracy.     My  family  wtrc 
always  opposed  to  the  Peisistratid  despots;  and  as  all  opposition,  to  a 
ruling  One  or  Few,  takes  the  name  of  The  People,  so  fiom  that  time 
forward  we  continued  to  act  as  leaders  of  the  people.     Moreover  our 
established  constitution  was  a  democracy,  so  that  I  had  no  choice  but 
to  obey:  though  I  did  my  best  to  maintain  a  moderate  line  of  politi- 
cal conduct  in  the  midst  of  the  reigning  license.     It  was  not  my 
family,  but  others,  who  in  former  times  as  well  as  now,  led  tlio 
people  into  the  w^orst  courses — those  same  men  who  sent  me  into 
exile.     I  always  acted  as  leader,  not  of  a  partv,  but  of  the  eutiro 
city;  thinking-it  right  to  uphold  that  constitution  in  which  Athens 
had  enjoyed  her  grandeur  and  freedom,  and  which  I  found  already 
existing.     For  as  to  democracy,  all  we  Athenians  of  common  sense 
well  knew  its  real  character.    *l*ersonally,  I  liave  better  reason  than 
any  one  else  to  rail  against  it — if  one  could  say  anything  new  about 
such  confessed  folly;  but  I  did  not  think  it  safe  to  change  the  govern- 
ment, while  you  were  standing  by  as  enemies. 

"  So  much  as  to  myself  personally:  I  shall  now  talk  to  you  about 
the  business  of  the  meeting,  and  tell  you  something  more  than  you 
yet  know.  Our  purpose  in  sailing  from  Athens  was  first  to  conquer 
the  Sicilian  Greeks— next,  the  Italian  Greeks— afterwards,  to  make  an 
attempt  on  the  Carthaginian  empire  and  on  Carthage  herself.  If  al!  or 
most  of  this  succeeded,  we  were  then  to  attack  K'loponnesus.  AVc 
intended  to  bring  to  this  enterprise  the  entire  power  of  the  Sicilian  and 
Italian  Greeks,  besides  large  numbers  of  Iberian  and  other  warlike  bar- 
baric mercenaries,  together  witli  many  new  triremes  built  from  the 
abundant  forests  of  Italy,  and  large  supplies  both  of  treasure  and  pn;- 
vision.  We  could  thus  blockade  Peloponnesus  all  round  with  our  ih  el, 
and  at  the  same  time  assail  it  with  our  land-force ;  and  we  calculated,  by 
taking  some  towns  by  storm  and  occupying  others  as  permanen't 
fortified  positions,  that  we  should  easily  conquer  the  whole  peninsula, 
and  then  become  undisputed  masters  of  Greece.  You  thus  hear  the 
whole  scheme  of  our  expedition  from  the  man  who  knows  it  best; 
and  you  may  depend  on  it  that  the  remaining  generals  will  execirte 
all  this,  if  they  can.     Nothing  but  your  intervention  can  liiuder  them. 


If  indeed  the  Sicilian  Greeks  were  all  united,  they  miglit  hold  out; 
but  the  Syracusans  standing  alone  cannot— beaten  as  they  already 
hive  been  in  a  general  action,  and  blocked  up  as  they  are  by  se:'. 
If  Syracuse  falls  into  the  hands  of  the  Athenians,  all  Sicily  and  all 
Italy  will  share  the  same  fate;  and  the  danger  which  I  have  described 
will  be  soon  upon  you. 

"It  is  not  therefore  sun  ply  for  the  safety  of  Sicdy— it  is  for  the 
safety  of  Peloponnesus— that  I  now  urge  you  to  send  across,  forth- 
with, a  fleet  with  an  army  of  hoplites  as  rowers;  and  what  I  consider 
still  more  important  than  an  army— a  Spartan  general  to  take  the 
supreme  command.  Moreover  you  must  also  carry  on  declared  and 
vi'^orous  war  against  Athens  here,  that  the  Syracusans  may  be 
encouraijed  to  hold  out,  and  that  Athens  may  be  in  no  condition  to 
send  a<lditional  re-enforcements  thither.  You  must  further  fortify 
and  permanently  garrison  Dekeleiain  Attica:  that  is  the  contingency 
which  the  Athenians  have  always  been  most  afraid  of,  and  which 
therefore  vou  may  know  to  be  your  best  policy.  You  will  thus  get 
into  your  own  hands  the  live  and  dead  stock  of  Attica,  interrupt  the 
working  of  the  silver  mines  at  Laureiou,  deprive  the  Athenians  of 
their  profits  from  judicial  fines  as  well  as  of  their  landed  revenue, 
and  dispose  the  subject-allies  to  withhold  their  tribute. 

"None  of  you  ought  to  think  the  worse  of  me  because  I  make  this 
viirorous  onset  upon  my  country  in  conjunction  with  her  enemies— I 
who  once  passed  for  a  lover  of  my  country.  Nor  ought  you  to  inls- 
trust  my  assurances  as  coming  from  the  reckless  passion  of  an  exile. 
The  worst  enemies  of  Athens  are  not  those  who  make  open  war  like 
you,  but  those  who  drive  her  best  friends  into  hostility.  I  loved  my 
country  while  I  was  secure  as  a  citizen— I  love  her  no  more,  now 
that  I  am  wronged.  In  fact,  I  do  not  conceive  myself  to  be  assailing 
a  country  still  mine:  I  am  rather  trying  to  win  back  a  country  now- 
lost  to  me.  The  real  patriot  is  not  he,  wdio  having  unjustly  lost  his 
country,  acquiesces  in  patience — but  he  whose  ardor  makes  him  try 
every  means  to  regain  her. 

"Employ  me  without  fear,  Lacedaemonians,  in  any  service  of  dan- 
ger or  sufi'ering:  tlie  more  harm  I  did  you  formerly  as  an  enemy,  the 
more  good  I  can  now  do  you  as  a  friend.  But  above  all,  do  not 
shrink  back  from  instant  operations  both  in  Sicily  and  jn  Attica, 
upon  which  so  much  depends.  You  will  thus  put  down  the  power 
of  Athens,  present  as  well  as  future:  you  will  dwell  yourselves  in 
safely;  and  you  will  become  the  leaders  of  undivided  Hellas,  by  free 
consent  and  without  force." 

Enormous  consequences  turned  upon  this  speech— no  less  masterly 
in  reference  to  the  purpose  and  the  audience,  than  infamous  as  an 
indication  of  the  character  of  the  speaker.  If  its  contents  became 
known  at  Athens,  as  they  probably  did,  the  enemies  of  Alkibiadcfi 
Would  be  supplied  with  a  justification  of  their  most  violent  politictd 
attacks      That  imputation  which  they  had  taken  so  much  pains  to 


S6 


ATTACK  ON  SYRACUSE. 


fasten  upon  him,  citing  in  proof  of  it  alike  liis  profligate  expenditure, 
overbearing  insolence,  and  derision  of  the  religious  ceremonies  of 
the  state — that  he  detested  the  denioeraey  in  his  lieart,  submitted  to 
it  only  from  necessity,  and  was  ^vaichiug  for  the  first  safe  oppor- 
tunity of  subverting  it — appears  here  in  his  own  language  as  matler 
of  avowal  and  boast.  The  sentence  of  condemnation  .-igainst  him 
■would  now  be  luianimously  approved,  even  by  those  who  at  the  time 
had  deprecated  it ;  while  the  people  would  be  more  tirndy  peisujidcd 
than  before  of  the  reality  of  the  association  between  irreligious  maui- 
festations  and  treasonable  designs.  Doubtless  the  inferences  so 
drawn  from  the  speech  would  be  unsound,  because  it  represented, 
not  the  actual  past  sentiments  of  Alkibiades,  bi:t  those  towhieh  lie 
now  found  it  convenient  to  lay  claim.  As  far  as  so  very  seltish  a 
politician  could  be  said  to  have  any  pieference,  demociacy  was,  in 
some  respects,  more  convenient  to  him  than  oligardiy.  Though 
offensive  to  his  taste,  it  held  out  larger  prospects  to  his  love  of  sIkav. 
Ids  adventurous  ambition,  and  his  rapacity  for  foreign  plunder; 
while  under  an  oligarchy,  the  jealous  restraints,  andrej)u!sesimj)Osed 
on  him  by  a  few  equals,  would  be  perhaps  more  galling  to  his  temper 
than  those  arising  from  the  whole  people.  lie  takes  credit  in  his 
speech  for  moderation  as  opposed  to  the  standing  license  of  democ- 
racy. But  this  is  a  pretense  absurd  even  to  extravagance,  which 
Athenians  of  all  parties  would  have  listened  to  with  astonij-hnient. 
Such  license  as  that  of  Alkibiades  himself  hv.d  never  been  sec  u  at 
Athens;  and  it  was  the  adventurous  instincts  of  the  democracy 
toward  foreign  conquest — combined  with  llxir  imperfect  apprehen- 
sion of  the  limits  and  conditions  under  vhl'h  jilone  their  (nij^ire 
could  be  permanently  maintained — which  he  >;imijlated  up  to  the 
highest  point,  and  then  made  use  of  for  hi^  o.^  n  power  and  protit. 
As  against  himself,  he  had  reason  for  accusing  his  political  enemies 
of  unworthy  maneuvers;  and  even  of  gross  ])( lltical  wickedness,  if 
they  were  authors  or  accomplices  (as  seems  probable  of  some)  in  the 
mutilation  of  the  Herma?.  But  most  certainly,  tlieir  public  Jidvice  to 
the  commonwealth  was  far  less  mischievous  than  his.  And  if  we 
are  to  strike  the  balance  of  personal  political  merit  between  Alkib- 
iades and  his  enemies,  we  must  take  into  the  comparison  his  fraud 
upon  the  simplicity  of  the  Laceda?monian  envoys,  recounted  in  the 
last  preceding  chapter  but  one  of  this  history. 

If  then  that  portion  of  the  speech  of  Alkibiades  wherein  he  touches 
upon  Atheniku  politic?;  and  his  own  past  conduct,  is  not  to  be  taken  s.s 
historical  evidence,  just  as  little  can  we  trust  the  following  poition 
in  which  he  professes  io  describe  the  real  purposes  of  Athens  in  her 
Sicilian  expedition.  That  any  such  vast  designs  as  '.nose  which  he 
announces  were  ever  really  contemplated  even  by  himself  and  his 
immediate  friends,  is  very  improbable;  that  they  were  contemplated 
by  the  Athenian  public,  by  the  armament,  or  by  Nikias,  is  utterly 
incredible.     The  tardiness  and  timid  movements  of  the  armament 


I 


KESOLUTIONS  OF  THE  SPARTAKS. 


87 


M.pri"  tlie  first  ci.'lit  months  after  arriving  at  Rlicgmm)  recornmended 

n  NMltias   iwti.ilv  aduntted  even  by  Alkibiades  opposed  only  by 

e  .mav ail iu.'  wisdom  of  Lan.aelius,  aud  not  strongly  censured  when 

l,e  unavai     ,  ^^^^^^  ^^^^^  minds  were  not  at 

fil-s      lly  ma  e  -  P  .'""n'to  the  s'eg«  of  Syraeuse;  that  they  counted 
.nianees  nid  money  in  Sicily  wliieh  they  did  not  find;  aud  that 
"iV    who   a"  el      om^thens  iith  large  lulpes  of  bnlliant  and  easv 
onme"  were  soon  taught  to  see  the  reality  with  different  eyes      It 
ASiules  had  himself  coneeived  at  Athens  the  designs  which  he 
l<^esi'd  to  reveal  in  his  speech  at  Sparta,  there  can  be  little  do  ib 
I  'he  would  have  espoused  the  schem.^  of  Lanmchus--o.r  rather 
ml  1  have  originated  it  himself.     We  tind  him  indeed  in  Ins  speech 
vered  at  Athens  before   the  determination  to  s,ul,  holding  out 
1,  es  mat  bv  means  of  conquests  in  Sicily,  Athens  miglit  be<M,.ie 
■tie ss    r  :d   Greece.     But  this  is  there  put  as  an  alteniativc  aud  as 
avo  nble     »^iliility-is  noticed  only  iu  one  place,  without  e.xp.m- 
;  ,;   or  am,   ification-and  shows  that  the  speaker  did  not  reckon 
i  m  fin  U  •'  any  such  expectations  prevalent  among  lus  hearers 
\    P, iidc   dnild  not  have  venture<l  to  promise.  ...  his  discourse  at 
\1     ,rill^?esultswiiicl.  he  after u-ards  talked  ot  at  Spa.-ta  as  hav- 
i  .     ten  a^ti ally  coutemplated-Sicily,  Italy.  Carthage,  Iberian  mer- 
m,-  I'^ec      11  ei.din-  in  a  blockading  licet  la.-ge  enough  to  gird 
,  n    Pel  ,p.;.  .esus.     Ha.l  lie  put  forth  such  promises,  the  charge  ot 
ve  ile  f.  1      which  Nikias  ur^e.l  against  him  would  probably  have 
■n     el  eed  by  every  one.    ^His  speech  at  Sparbi,  though  .1  has 
s^d  wit .  son.e  as  .a  fragment  of  true  Grecian  history,  seems  m 
irmVlittle  better  than  a  gigantic  romance,  dressed  up  to  alar...  his 

''''intended  for  this  purpose,  it  was  eminently  suitable  and  effective. 
Tl  fl  •  ceto  nft  .  a..s  l.a<l  already  been  partly  moved  by  the  represen  ta- 
t.'ns   run.  Corinth  and  Syracuse,  aud  w<-re  «f "  1?[X«;^, '°4^ 
envoys  to  the  latter  phice  with  encoui-agement  to  hold  out  ag.unst 
A  hens      But  the  pc'ace  ot  Nikias.  ami  the  alliance  succeeding  it, 
^  1     ubsi^aed  betwc^m  Athens  and  Sparta.     It  ^f  1  [f !  -'eo^tmcC^ 
li.lly  and  indirectly  violated  in  many  ways  b'lt  both  the  con  r« 
p:,rties  considered  it  as  subsisting,  nor  would  ""iS"^  o' « '«'"  y^' ^" 
eat  to  break  their  oaths  openly  and  avowedly.    .P"-^,,  '''^.^-f  ""7"| 
well  as  from  the  distance  of  Sicily,  g.vat  eve.i  '"  t'^'' '=f""  ''',"; 
the  more  na.itical  Athenians-the  KP''or^could  mrt  yet  make  .p  the  r 
minds  to  dispatch  thither  any  positive  a.d.     It  7f,,«^f,^''y    °  '';  ' 
point  of  hesitation  between  the  w.U  and  tW,-  d<-'e>|i."'Qt  "  «  ^""^  ^etic 
aad  vindictive  exile  from  Athens  found  them.     His  ^-^"^'fPf^'^. 
of  the  dinovr  in.nending— brought  home  to  their  o«n  door»,  ami 
a  > .'  irin    U  prmxed  from  the  best  informed  of  all  vvitnesses-over- 

c'lle   Leir  reLtance  at  once;  while  he  at  the  »^''"f 'V"'',.^°;"],lVo 
the  precise  steps  whereby  tlieir  intertei-en-e  would  be  lendered  ot 
...osl  av^u'    The  transfer  of  Alkibiades  to  Sparta  thus  reverses  the 


88      SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 


LOCAL  CONDITION  OF  SYRACUSE. 


89 


superiority  of  force  between  the  two  contending:  chiefs  of  Greece— 
"Momeiilunique  fuit  inulntus  Curio  rerum."  He  htul  not  yet  sliown 
his  power  of  (luing  liis  country  good,  us  we  sh.'dl  tiiid  him  hereal'ler 
engaged,  during  tlie  hiter  ytars  of  the  wtir:  his  first  achievements 
were  but  too  succes.sful  in  doing  lier  harm. 

The  Lacedicmonians  forthwith  resolved  to  send  an  auxiliary  force 
to  Syracuse.  But  as  this  could  not  be  done  before  the  spring,  they 
nominated  Gylippus  commander,  directing  him  to  proceed  thilher 
without  delay,  and  to  take  counsel  with  the  Corinthians  for  opera- 
tions as  speedy  as  the  case  admitted.  We  do  not  know  that  Gylip- 
pus had  as  yet  given  any  positive  evidence  of  that  consnnmiate  skill 
and  activity  wliich  we  shall  presently  be  called  upon  to  describe. 
He  was  probably  chosen  on  account  of  hi>  superior  acquaintance 
with  the  circum.slances  of  the  Italian  and  Sicdian  Greeks;  since  his 
father  Kleandridas,  after  having  been  banished  from  Sparta  fourteen 
years  before  the  Peloponnesian  war,  for  taking  Athenian  bribes,  had 
been  donuciliated  as  a  citizen  at  Thurii,  Gylippus  desired  the 
Corinthians  to  send  immediately  two  triremes  for  him,  to  Asine  in 
the  Messenian  Gulf,  and  to  prepare  as  many  others  as  their  dockjj 
could  furnish. 


CHAPTER  LIX. 

FBOM  THE  COMMTIXCEMENT  OP  THE  SIEOE  OF  SYHACFSE  BY  NIKTAS 
— DOWN  TO  THE  SECOND  ATHENIAN  EXPEDITION  UNDER  DEMOS- 
THENES  AND   THE    KESUMi'TION    OF   THE   GENERAL   WAR. 

The  Athenian  troops  at  Katana,  probably  tired  of.  inaction,  were 
put  in  motion  in  the  early  sj^ring,  even  before  the  arrival  of  ihere-en- 
force»nents  from  Athens,  and  sailed  to  the  deserted  walls  of  jlesrara, 
not  far  from  Syracuse,  which  the  S\'racus'ins  had  recently  garri.soned. 
Having  in  vain  attacked  the  Syracusan  garrison,  and  laid  Maste 
the  neighboring  fields,  they  re-embarked,  landed  agam  for  similar 
purposes  at  the  mouth  of  tlie  river  Terias,  and  then,  after  an  insig- 
nificant skirmish,  returned  to  Katana.  An  expedition  into  the 
inteiior  of  the  island  procured  for  them  the  alliance  of  the  Sikel  town 
of  Kentoripa;  and  the  cavjdry  being  now  arrived  from  Athens,  they 
prepared  for  operations  against  Syracuse.  Nikias  had  received  from 
Athens  250  horsemen  fuliy  equipped,  for  whom  horses  w^ere  to  he 
procured  in  Sicilv,  80  horse-bowmen  and  300  talents  in  monev.  Me 
was  not  long  in  furnishing  tiiem  with  horses  from  Egesta  and  Katana, 
from  which  cities  he  also  received  some  further  cavalry — so  that  he 
was  presently  able  to  mn.ster  6o0  cavalry  in  all. 

Even  before  this  cavalrv  could  be  mounted,  Nikias  made  his  first 
approach  to  Syracuse,     j^or  the  Syracusau  generals  on  their  side, 


apprised  of  the  arrival  of  the  re-enforcements  from  Athens,  and 
aware  that  besieging  operations  were  on  the  point  of  being  com- 
menced, now  thought  it  necessary  to  take  the  precaution  of  occupy- 
ing and'guarding  the  roads  of  access  to  the  high  ground  of  Epipohe 
wliich  overhung  their  outer  city. 

Syracuse  consisted  at  this  time  of  two  parts,  an  inner  and  outer 
citv.  The  former  was  comprised  in  the  island  of  Ortygia,  the  origi- 
nal settlement  founded  by  Archias,  and  within  which  the  motleri 
city  is  at  this  moment  included:  the  latter  or  outer  city,  afterwar  I 
known  by  the  name  of  Achradina,  occupied  the  high  ground  of  tho 
peninsula  north  of  Ortygia,  but  does  not  seem  to  have  joined  the 
inner  city,  or  to  have  been  comprised  in  the  same  fortification.  This 
outer  city  was  defended,  on  the  north  and  east,  by  the  sea.  with  rooks 
presenting  great  difficulties  of  landing — and  by  a  sea  wall;  so  that  on 
these  sides  it  was  out  of  the  reach  of  attack.  Its  wall  on  the  land 
side,  beginning  from  the  sea  somewhat  eastward  of  the  entnmce  of 
the  deft  now  called  Santa  Bouagia  or  Panagia,  ran  in  a  direction 
westward  of  south  as  far  as  the  termination  of  the  high  ground  of 
Achradina,  and  then  turned  eastward  along  the  stone  quarries  now 
known  as  those  of  the  Capucins  and  Novanteris,  where  the  ground 
is  in  part  so  steep,  that  probably  little  fortification  was  needed.  This 
fortified  hiirh  land  of  Achradina  thus  constituted  the  outer  city; 
while  the  lower  ground,  situated  between  it  and  the  inner  city  or 
Ortygia,  seems  at  this  time  not  to  have  been  included  in  the  fortifica- 
tions'^of  cither,  but  was  employed  (and  probably  had  been  employed 
even  from  the  first  settlement  in  the  island),  partly  for  religious  pro- 
cessions, games,  and  other  multitudinous  ceremonies— partly  for  the 
burial  of  the  dea<l,  which,  according  to  invarial)le.Grer"ian  custom, 
was  performed  without  the  walls  of  the  city.  Extensive  catacombs 
yet  remain  to  mark  the  length  of  time  during  Which  this  ancient 
Xckropolis  served  its  purpose. 

To  the  north-west  of  the  outer  city-wall,  in  the  direction  of  lly3 
port  called  Trogilus,  stood  an  unfortffied  suburb  which  afterward 
became  enlarged  into  the  distinct  walled  town  of  Tyche.  West  of 
the  southern  part  of  the  same  outer  city-wall  (nearly  south-west  of 
the  outer  city  itself)  stood  another  suburb — .-ifterward  known  and 
fortified  as  Neopolis,  but  deriving  its  name,  in  the  year  415  h.c. 
from  having  within  it  the  statue  and  consecrated  gnmnd  of  Apollo 
Temenites  (which  stood  a  little  way  up  on  the  ascent  of  the  hill  of 
EpipolaO,  ♦'ind  stretching  from  thence  down  southward  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Great  Harbor.  Between  these  two  suburbs  lay  a  ])road 
open  space,  the  groujid  rising  in  gi'adual  acclivity  from  Aci;radina 
to  the  westward,  and  diminishing  in  breadth  as  it  rose  higher,  until 
at  length  it  ended  in  a  small  conical  mound  called  in  modern  times 
the  Belvedere.  This  acclivity  formed  the  eastern  ascent  of  tlie  long 
ridge  of  high  ground  called  Ei)ipol8e.  It  was  a  triangle  upon  an 
inclined  plane,"of  which  Achradina  was  the  base:  to  tiie  north  as 


90     SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 


THE  ATHENIANS  ON  EPIPOL^. 


91 


well  as  to  the  south,  it  was  suddenly  broken  off  by  lines  of  limestone 
clilT  (forming  the  sides  of  the  trinngle),  about  fifteen  or  twenty  feet 
high,  and  quite  precipitous,  except  in  some  few  openings  made  for 
convenient  ascent.  From  the  western  point  or  apex  of  tlie  trianiilc, 
the  descent  was  easy  and  gradual  (excepting  two  or  three  special 
mounds  or  cliffs,  towards  the  city,  the  interior  of  which  was  visible 
from  this  outer  slope. 

According  to  the  warfare  of  that  time,  Nikias  could  only  take 
Syracuse  by  building  a  wall  of  circumvallation  so  as  to  cut  off  its 
supplies  by  land,  and  at  the  same  time  blockading  it  by  sea.  Now 
looking  at  the  inner  and  outer  city  as  above  described,  at  the  moniint 
when  he  first  reached  Sicily,  we  see  that  (after  defeating  the  Syra- 
cusans  and  driving  them  within  their  walls,  which  would  be  of 
course  the  first  part  of  the  process)  he  might  have  carried  his  block- 
adinir  wall  in  a  direction  nearly  southerly  from  the  innermost  point 
of  the  cleft  of  Santa  Bonagia,  l)etween  the  city-wall  and  the  Temc- 
uites,  so  as  to  reach  the  Great  Harbor  at  a  spot  not  far  westward  of 
the  junction  of  Ortygia  with  the  mainland.  Or  he  might  have 
landed  in  tb«^  Great  Harbor,  and  executed  the  same  wall,  beginiiiui; 
from  the  opposiie  end.  Or  he  might  have  preferred  to  construct  two 
blockading  walls,  one  for  each  city  separately:  a  short  wall  woiild 
have  sufficed  in  front  of  the  isthmus  joining  Ortygia,  while  a  sepa- 
rate wall  might  have  been  carried  to  shut  up  the  outer  city,  across 
the  unfortified  space  constituting  the  Nekropolisopjiosite  to  Ortygin. 
Such  were  the  possibilities  of  the  case  at  the  time  when  Nikias  fir>t 
reached  llhegium.  But  during  the  many  months  of  inaction  wliidi 
he  had  allowed,  the  Syracusans  had  barred  out  both  these  possibili- 
ties, and  had  greatly  augmented  the  dilficulties  of  his  intended  enter- 
prise. They  had  constructed  a  new  wall,  covering  both  their  inner 
and  their  outer  city — stretching  across  the  whole  front  which  faced 
the  slope  of  Epipola?,  from  the  Great  Harbor  to  the  ojiposite  sea  near 
Santa  Bonagia — and  expanding  westward  so  as  to  include  witliia 
it  the  statue  and  consecrated  ground  of  Apollo  Temenites.  with  the 
cliff  near  adjoining  to  it  known  by  the  name  of  the  Temenite  Cliff. 
This  was  done  for  the  express  purpose  of  lengthening  the  line  indis- 
pensable for  the  besiegers  to  make  their  w%all  a  good  blockade.  Afti  r 
it  was  finished,  Nikias  could  not  begin  his  blockade  from  the  side  of 
the  Great  Harl)or,  since  he  Avould  have  been  obstructed  by  the  pre- 
cipitous southern  cliff  of  Epipol?e.  He  was  under  the  necessity  of 
beginning  his  wall  from  a  portion  of  the  higher  ground  of  EpipoltT. 
and  of  carrying  it  both  along  a  greater  s}>ace  and  higher  up  on  llie 
slope,  until  he  touched  the  Great  Harbor  at  a  point  further  reirioved 
from  Ortvffia. 

Syracu.-e  having  thus  become  assailable  only  from  the  side  of  Lpip- 
olae,  the  necessity  so  created  for  carrying  on  operations  much  high'  i" 
up  on  the  slope  gave  to  the  summit  of  that  eminence  a  greater  impor- 
tance than  it  had  before  po3t>essed.    Nikias,  doubtless  furnished  wiiU 


(Tood  local  information  by  the  exiles,  seems  to  have  made  this  dis- 
eovery  earlier  than  the  Syracusan  generals,  who  (having  been  occu- 
pied in  auirmenting  their  defenses  on  another  point  where  they  were 
vet  more  vulnerable)  did  not  make  it  until  immediately  before  the 
onenin"-  of  the  spring  campaign.  It  was  at  that  critical  moment  that 
thcv  ]n\)claimed  a  full  muster,  for  break  of  day,  in  the  low  mead  ou 
thc^eft  bank  of  the  Anapus.  After  an  inspection  of  arms,  and 
probably  final  distribution  of  forces  for  the  approaching  struggle,  a 
chosen  reo-iment  of  GOO  hoplites  was  placed  under  the  orders  of  an 
Autirian  exile  named  Diomilus,  in  order  to  act  as  garrison  of  Epipolse, 
•1^  well  as  to  be  in  constant  readiness  wherever  they  might  be  wanted 
These  men  were  intended  to  occupy  the  strong  ground  ou  the  sum 
mit  of  the  hill,  and  thus  obstruct  all  the  various  approaches  to  it, 
seeinin'dy  not  many  in  number,  and  all  narrow. 

Bnt  before  they  had  yet  left  their  muster,  to  march  to  the  summit, 
intelli"-ence  reached  them  that  the  Athenians  were  already  in  posses- 
sion o?  it.  Nikias  and  Lamachus,  putting  their  troops  on  board  at 
katana,  had  sailed  during  the  precedin,!^  night  to  a  landing-place  not 
far  from  a  place  called  Leon  or  the  Lion,  which  was  only  six  or 
seven  furlon<'-s  from  Epipokt,  and  seems  to  have  lain  betw^een  Megara 
and  the  petunsula  of  Thapsus.  They  here  landed  their  hoplites,  and 
placed  their  fieet  in  safety  under  cover  of  a  palisade  across  the  nar- 
row isthmus  of  Thapsus,  before  day  and  before  the  Syracusans  had 
any  intimation  of  their  arrival.  Their  hoplites  immediately  moved 
forward  with  rapid  step  to  ascend  Epipohe,  mounting  seemingly  from 
the  north-east,  by  the  side  towards  Megara  and  furthest  removed  from 
Svracuse;  so  that  they  first  reached  the  summit  called  Euryalus, 
near  the  apex  of  the  "triangle  above  described.  From  hence  they 
commanded  the  slope  of  Epipolae  beneath  them  and  the  town  of 
Syracuse  to  the  eastward.  They  were  presently  attacked  by  the 
Syracusans,  who  broke  up  their  muster  in  the  mead  as  soon  as  they 
heard  the  new^s.  But  as  the  road  by  which  they  had  to  march, 
approaching  Euryalus  from  the  south-west,  was  circuitous,  and 
hardly  less  than  three  English  miles  in  length,  they  had  the  mortifi- 
cation of  seeing  that  the  Athenians  were  already  masters  of  the  posi- 
tion; and  when  they  hastened  up  to  retake  it,  the  rapid  pace  had  so 
disordered  their  ranks,  that  the  Athenians  attacked  them  at  great 
advautaire,  besides  having  the  higher  ground.  The  Syracusans  were 
driven  iKick  to  their  city  with  loss,  Diomilus  with  half  his  regiment, 
being  slain;  while  the"  Athenians  remained  masters  of  the  high 
ground  of  Euryalus,  as  well  as  of  the  upper  portion  of  the  slope  of 

Epipola;.  .     ,  ^.  . 

This  was  a  most  important  advantage— indeed  seemingly  essential 
to  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  siege.  It  was  gained  by  a  plan 
both  well  laid  and  well  executed,  grounded  upon  the  omission  of  the 
Syracusans  to  occupy  a  post  of  which  they  did  not  at  first  perceive 
tlie  importance— ami  which  in  fact  only  acquired  its  pre-eminent 


92     SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

importance  from  the  new  enlarfirement  made  by  the  S}Tacusans  in 
their  fortitications.  To  that  extent,  therefore,  it  depended  upon  a 
favorable  aeeident  which  could  not  hsive  been  reasonably  expected  to 
occur  The  capture  of  Syracuse  was  certain,  upon  the  supposition 
that  the  attack  and  sieij:e  of  the  city  had  been  commenced  on  the  first 
ariival  of  the  Atheni:\ns  in  the  ishmd,  without  giving  time  for  any 
improvement  in  its  defensibility.  But  the  moment  such  delay  was 
allowed  success  ceased  to  be  certain,  depending  more  or  less  upon 
tills  favorable  turn  of  accident.  The  Syracusans  actually  did  a  great 
deal  to  create  additional  dithculty  to  the  besiegers,  and  might  have 
done  more,  especiallv  in  regard  to  the  occupation  of  the  high  groimd 
above  Epipohe.  Had  they  taken  this  precaution,  the  effective  prose- 
cution of  the  siege  would  have  been  rendered  extremely  difficult,  if 
not  completely  frustrated.  ,    ,    .    . 

On  the  next  morning,  Nikias  and  Lamachus  marched  tlicir  army 
down  the  slope  of  Epipoke  near  to  the  Syracusan  Avails,  and  olTercd 
battle  which  the  enemv  did  not  accept.  They  then  withdrew  the 
Atheuian  iroops;  after  which  their  first  operation  was  to  construct  a 
fo't  on  the  hiuh  ground  called  Labdahmi,  near  the  western  end  of  the 
upper  northern  cliffs  bordering  Epipokt,  on  the  brink  of  the  cliiT. 
an(i  h)oking  iiortlnvard  towards  Meg:ira.  This  was  intended  as  a 
place  of  security  wherein  both  treasures  and  stores  might  be  depositcHl, 
so' as  to  leave  the  army  unincumbered  in  its  motions.  The  Athenian 
eavahy  being  now  con'ipleted  by  the  new  arrivals  from  Egesta,  Nikias 
descended  fTom  Labdalum  to  a  new  position  called  Syke,  lower 
down  on  Epipoke,  seemingly  about  midway  between  the  northern 
and  snullurn  eliils.  He  here  constructed,  with  as  much  rapidity  as 
i)ossible,  a  walled  inelosure,  called  the  Circle,  intended  as  a  center 
from  whence  the  projected  wall  of  cireumvallation  was  to  start  north- 
ward towards  the  sea  at  Trogilns,  southward  towards  the  Great  Har- 
bor. This  circle  appears  to  have  covered  a  considerable  space,  and 
was  inrtiier  i)rotected  t)V  an  outwork,  the  front  of  which  measured 
one  thousand  feet.  Astounded  at  the  rapidity  with  which  the  Athe- 
nians executed  this  construction,  the  Syracusans  marched  their  forces 
out,  and  ])repared  to  give  battle  in  order  to  interrupt  it.  But  when 
the' Athenians,  relinquishing  the  work,  drew  up  on  their  side  in  battle 
order,  the  Synieusan  generals  were  so  struck  with  their  manifest 
superiority  in  soldier-'lil^e  array,  as  compared  with  the  disorderly 
tnm  of  their  own  ranks,  that  they  withdrew  their  soldiers  back  into 
the  city  without  venturing  to  engage;  merely  leaving  a  body  of  horse 
to  harass  the  operations  of  the  besiegers,  and  constrain  them  to  keep 
in  masses.  The  newly-acquired  Athenian  cavalry,  however,  were 
here  brouixht  for  tiie  tifst  time  into  elfective  combat.  Y>'ith  the  (tid 
of  one  tribe  of  their  own  hoplites,  they  charged  the  Syracusan  horse, 
drove  tliem  oil  with  some  loss,  and  erected  their  trophy.  This  is  the 
only  occ:isiou  ou  which   we  read  of  the  Athenian  cavalry  being 


4 


FIRST  COUNTER- WALL  OF  TIIE  SYRACUSANS.     93 

brought  into  conflict:  though  Nikias  had  made  the  absence  of  cavalry 
the  great  reason  f(jr  his  prolonged  inaction. 

Interruption  being  thus  checked,  Nikias  continued  his  blockading 
operations;  first  completing  the  Circle,  then  beginning  his  wall  of 
cireumvallation  in  a  northerly  direction  from  the  Circle  towards  Tro- 
gilus:  for  which  purpose  a  portion  of  his  forces  were  employed  in 
bringing  stones  and  wood,  and  depositing  them  in  proper  places  along 
the  intended  line.  So  strongly  did  Hermokrates  feel  the  infei-iority 
of  the  Syracusan  hoplites  in  the  field,  that  he  discouraged  any  fresh 
general  action,  and  proposed  to  construct  a  counter-wall  or  cross-wall; 
tr:ivcrsing  the  space  along  which  the  Athenian  cireumvallation  must 
necessarily  be  continued,  so  as  to  impede  its  further  progress.  A 
tenable  counter-wall,  if  they  could  get  time  to  carry  it  sufficiently  far 
to  a  defensible  terminus,  would  completely  defeat  the  intent  of  the 
besiegers :  but  even  if  Nikicis  should  interrupt  the  work  by  his  attacks, 
the  Syracusans  calculated  on  being  able  to  provide  a  sufficient  force 
to  repel  him,  during  the  short  time  necessary  for  hastily  constructing 
the  palisade  or  front  outwork.  Such  palisade  would  serve  them  as 
a  temporary  defense,  while  they  finished  the  more  elaborate  cross- 
wall  behind  it;  and  would,  even  at  the  worst,  compel  Nikias  to  sus- 
pend all  his  proceedings  and  employ  his  whole  force  to  dislodge  them. 

Accordingly  they  took  their  start  from  the  postern  gate  near  the 
grove  of  ApoiloTemenites;  a  gate  in  the  new  wall  erected  four  or 
live  months  before  to  enlarge  the  fortified  space  of  the  city.  From 
this  point,  which  was  lower  down  on  the  slope  of  Epipol*  than  the 
Athenian  Circle,  they  carried  their  palisade  and  counter-wall  up  the 
slope,  in  a  direction  calculated  to  intersect  the  intended  line  of  hos- 
tile cireumvallation  southward  of  the  Circle.  The  nautical  population 
from  Ortygia  could  be  employed  in  this  enterprise,  since  the  city  was 
still  completely  undisturbed  by  sea  and  mistress  of  the  Great  Harbor 
—the  Athenian  fleet  not  having  yet  moved  from  Thapsus.  Besides 
this  active  crowd  (^f  workmen,  the  sacred  olive-trees  in  the  Temenite 
grove  were  cut  down  to  serve  as  materials;  and  by  such  efforts  the 
work  was  presently  finished  to  a  sulficient  distance  for  ti-aversing 
and  intercepting  the  blockading  wall  intended  to  come  southward 
from  the  Circle.  It  seems  to  have  terminated  at  the  biink  of  the 
precipitous  southern  cliff  of  Epipoke,  which  prevented  the  Atheni- 
ans from  turning  it  and  attacking  it  in  flank;  while  it  was  defended 
ill  front  by  a  stockade  and  topped  with  wooden  towers  for  discharge 
of  missiles.  One  tribe  of  hoplites  was  left  to  defend  it,  while  the 
crowd  of  Syracusans  who  had  either  been  employed  ou  the  work  or 
on  guard,  returned  back  into  the  city. 

During  all  this  process,  Nikias  had  not  thought  it  prudent  to  inter- 
rupt them.  Employed  as  he  seems  to  have  been  on  the  Circle,  and 
on  the  wall  branching  out  from  the  Circle  northward,  he  was  unwill- 
ing to  march  across  the  slope  of  Epipolye  to  attack  them  with  half 
uis  forces,  leaving  his  own  rear  exposed  to  attack  from  the  numerous 


94     SIEGE  OF  SYIiACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 


COUNTER- WALL  TAKEN   BY  THE  ATHENIANS.     95 


Byracusans  in  the  city,  and  his  own  Circle  only  partially  guarded. 
3Ioreover,  by  such  delay  he  was  enabled  to  ])rosecutc  his  own  part  of 
the  cirrumvrdlation  without  hindrance,  and  to  watch  for  an  oppor- 
tunity of  assaulting  the  new  counter-wall  with  advantage.  Such  an 
opportunity  soon  occuned,  just  at  the  time  when  he  had  accom- 
plished the  farther  important  object  of  destroying  the  aqueducts 
which  sup])Hed  tiic  city,  partially  at  least,  with  water  for  drinkiiiL^ 
The  Svrneusans  ajipear  to  have  been  filled  with  confidence  both  by 
the  completion  of  their  counter-wall,  which  seemed  an  effective  ImV 
to  the  besieffcrs.  and  by  his  inaction.  The  tribe  left  on  giinrd 
prest^ntly  beiran  to  relax  in  their  vigilance;  instead  of  occupying  the 
wall,  tents  were  erected  behind  \C\o  shelter  them  from  the  midday 
pun;  while  some  even  permitted  themselves  to  take  repose  during  that 
hour  within  the  city  walls.  Such  negligence  did  not  escape  tlic 
Athenian  generals,  who  silently  ]>repared  an  assault  for  midday. 
Three  hundred  chosen  hoplites,  with  some  light  troops  clothed  in 
panoplies  for  the  occasion,  were  instructed  to  sally  out  .""Suddenly  and 
run  across  straight  to  attack  the  stockade  and  counter -wall;  while 
the  main  Athenian  force  marched  in  two  divisions  under  Nikias  and 
Laninehus.  half  toward  the  city  walls  to  prevent  any  succor  from 
coming  out  of  the  gates.hulf  toward  the  Temenite  postern  gate  from 
wiience  the  stockade  and  cross-wall  commenced.  The  rapid  forward 
movement  of  the  chosen  300  was  crow^ned  with  full  success.  They 
captured  both  the  stockade  and  the  counter-wall,  feebly  defended  by 
its  icuards;  who,  taken  by  surj>rise,  abandoned  their  post  and  tUd 
along  behind  tbeir  wall  to  enter  the  city  by  the  Temenite  postern 
gate!'  Before  all  of  them  could  get  in,  however,  both  the  pursuing 
800  and  the  Athenian  division,  which  marched  straight  to  that  point, 
had  partially  came  up  with  them:  so  that  some  of  these  assailants 
even  forced  their  way  along  with  them  through  the  gate  into  the 
interior  of  the  Temenite  city-wall.  Here,  however,  the  Syraeusau 
strength  within  was  too  much  for  them:  these  foremost  Athenians 
and  Argeians  were  thrust  out  again  with  loss.  But  the  general 
movement  of  the  Athenians  had  been  completely  triumphant.  They 
pulled  down  the  counter-wall,  plucked  up  the  palisade,  and  carried 
the  materials  away  for  the  use  of  their  own  circumvallation. 

As  the  recent  Symcnsan  counterwork  had  been  carried  to  the 
brink  of  the  southern  cliff,  which  rendered  it  unassailable  in  flank— 
Nikias  was  warned  of  the  necessity  of  becoming  master  of  this  clilT, 
so  as  to  deprive  them  of  the  same  resource  in  future.  Accordingly, 
without  staving  to  finish  his  blockading  wall  regularly  and  con- 
tinuously from  the  Circle  southward,  across  the  slope  of  EpipolfP. 
lie  left  the  Circle  under  cruard  and  marched  across  at  once  to  take 
possession  of  the  southern  cliff  at  tlie  point  where  the  blockading 
wall  was  intended  to  reach  it.  This  point  of  the  southern  clifT  lie 
immediately  fortified  as  a  defensive  position,  whereby  he  accom- 
plished two  objects.     First,  he  i)reveDted  the  Syracusaus  from  again 


employing  the  cliff  as  a  flank  defense  for  a  second  counter-wall. 
Xext,  he  acquired  the  means  of  providing  a  safe  and  easy  road  of 
communication  between  the  high  ground  of  Epipolae  and  the  low- 
marshy  ground  beneath,  which  divided  Epipoke  from  the  Great 
Harbor,  and  across  which  the  Athenian  wall  of  circumvallation  must 
necessarily  be  presently  carried.  As  his  troops  would  have  to  carry 
on  simultaneous  operations,  partly  on  the  high  ground  above,  partly 
on  the  low  ground  beneath,  he  could  not  allow  them  to  be  separated 
from  each  other  by  a  precipitous  cliff  which  would  prevent  ready 
mutual  assistance.  The  intermediate  -space  between  the  Circle  and 
^lie  fortified  point  of  the  cliff  was  for  the  time  left  with  an  unfinished 
wall,  with  the  intention  of  coming  back  to  it  (as  was  the  fact  after- 
ward done,  and  this  portion  of  wall  was  in  the  end  completed).  The 
Circle,  though  isolated,  was  strong  enough  for  the  time  to  maintain 
itself  against  attack,  and  was  adequately  garrisoned. 

By  this  new  movement,  the  Syracusaus  were  debarred  from  carry- 
ing a  second  counter-wall  on  the  same  side  of  Epipola?,  since  the 
enemy  were  masters  of  the  terminating  cliff  on  the  southern  side  of 
the  slope.  They  now  turned  their  operations  to  the  lower  ground  or 
marsh  between  the  southern  cliff  of  Epipolae  and  the  Great  Harbor; 
being  as  yet  free  on  that  side,  since  the  Athenian  fleet  was  still  at 
Thapsus.  Across  that  marsh — and  seemingly  as  far  as  the  river 
Anapus,  to  serve  as  a  flank  barrier — they  resolved  to  carry  a  palisade 
work  with  a  ditch,  so  as  to  intersect  the  line  which  the  Athenians 
must  next  pursue  in  completing  the  southernmost  portion  of  their 
circumvallation.  They  so  pressed  the  prosecution  of  this  new  cross 
palisade,  beginning  from  the  lower  portion  of  their  own  city-walls, 
and  stretching  in  a  south-westerly  direction  across  the  low  ground 
us  far  as  the  river  Anapus,  that  by  the  time  the  new  Athenian  forti- 
lication  of  the  cliff  was  completed,  the  new  Syraeusau  obstacle  was 
completed  also,  and  a  stockade  with  a  ditch  seemed  to  shut  out  the 
besiegers  from  reaching  the  Great  Harbor, 

Lamachus  overcame  the  difficulty  before  him  with  ability  and 
bravery.  Descending  unexpectedly,  one  morning  before  daybreak, 
from  his  fort  on  the  cliff  at  EpipohB  into  the  low  ground  beneath,  and 
providing  his  troops  with  planks  and  broad  gates  to  bridge  over  the 
marsh  where  it  was  scarcely  passable,  he  contrived  to  reach  and  sur- 
prise the  palisade  with  the  first  dawn  of  morning.  Orders  were  at  the 
same  time  given  for  the  Athenian  fleet  to  sail  round  from  Thapsus  into 
the  Great  Harbor,  so  as  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  and  get 
on  the  rear  of  the  new  palisade  work.  But  before  the  fleet  could 
arrive,  the  palisade  and  ditch  had  been  carried,  and  its  defenders 
driven  off.  A  large  Syraeusau  force  came  out  of  the  city  to  sustain 
them,  and  retake  k;  bringing  on  general  action  in  the  low  ground 
between  the  CI  iff  of  Epipolae,  the  Harbor,  and  the  river  Anapus.  The 
superior  discipline  of  the  Athenians  proved  successful  ••  the  Syra- 
cusaus were  defeated  and  driven  back  on  all  sides,  so  that  their  right 


96     SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

win?  fled  into  the  city,  and  their  left  (including  tbe  larger  portion  of 
their  best  foice,  the  horsemen),  along  the  banks  of  the  river  Anapus, 
to  reach  the  bridi^^e.  Flushed  with  victory,  the  Athenians  hoped  to 
cut  them  olf  from  this  retreat,  and  a  chosen  body  of  300  hoplites  ran 
fast  in  hopes  of  t^ettini;  to  the  bridge  first.  In  this  hasty  movement 
they  fell  into  such  disorder  that  the  Syracusan  cavalry  turned  upon 
them,  put  them  to  flight,  and  threw  them  back  upon  the  Athenian 
ri'^ht  wint^  to  which  t1ie  fugitives  communicated  their  own  panic  and 
disorder.  °' The  fate  of  the  battle  appeared  to  be  turning  against  the 
Athenians,  when  Lamachus,  Who  was  on  the  left  wing,  hastened  to 
their  aid  with  the  Argeian  hoplites  and  as  many  bowmen  as  he  could 
collect.  His  ardor  carried  him  incautiously  forward,  so  that  he 
crossed  a  ditch,  with  very  few  followers,  before  the  remaining  troops 
could  follow  him.  He  was  here  attacked  and  slain,  in  single  combat 
with  a  horseman  named  Kallikrates:  but  the  Syracusans  were  driven 
back  when  his  soldiers  came  up,  and  hnil  only  just  time  to  snatch 
and  carry  oft"  his  dead  body,  with  which  they  crossed  the  bridge  and 
retreated  behind  the  Anap'us.  The  rapid  movement  of  this  gallant 
ofticer  was  thus  crowned  with  complete  success,  restoring  the  victory 
to  his  own  right  wing;  a  vicloiy  dearly  purchased  by  the  forfeit  of 

his  own  life. 

Meanwhile  the  visible  disorder  and  temporary  flight  of  tlie  Atiie- 
nian  right  winif,  and  the  withdrawal  of  Lamachus  from  the  left  to 
re-enforce  it,  imparted  fresh  courage  to  the  Syracusan  right,  which 
had  fled  into  the  town.  They  again  came  forth  to  renew  the  contest; 
while  their  generals  attempted  a  diversion  by  sending  out  a  detach- 
ment from  the  north-western  gates  of  the  city  to  attack  the  Athenian 
Circle  on  the  mid-slope  of  Epipola\  As  this  Circle  lay  completely 
apart  and  at  considerable  disiance  from  the  battle,  they  hoped  to  find 
the  jrarrison  unprepared  for  attack,  and  thus  to  carry  it  by  surprise. 
Their  maneuver,  bold  and  well-timed,  was  on  the  point  of  succccd- 
in"-  Thev  carried  with  little  difliculty  the  covering  outwork  in 
front,  and  the  Circle  itself,  probably  stript  of  part  of  its  garrison  to 
re-enforce  the  combatants  in  the  lower  ground,  was  only  saved  bytlie 
presence  of  mind  and  resource  of  Nikias,  who  was  lying  ill  witlmi 
it.  He  directed  the  attendants  to  set  Are  to  a  quantity  of  wood 
which  lav,  together  with  the  battering  engines  of  the  army,  in  front 
of  the  Circle  wall,  so  that  the  flames  prevented  all  farther  advance 
on  the  part  of  the  assailants,  and  forced  them  to  retreat.  The  flanus 
also  served  as  a  signal  to  the  Athenians  engaged  in  the  battle  beneatli, 
who  immediately  sent  re-enforcements  to  the  relief  of  their  general; 
while  at  the  same  time  the  Athenian  fleet,  just  arrived  from  Tfeip- 
sus,  was  seen  sailing  into  tlie  Great  Harbor.  This  last  event,  llneat- 
ening  the  Syracusans  on  a  new  side,  drew  off  their  whole  attentioii 
to  the  defense  of  their  city.  Their  combatants  from  the  flehl  iiiul 
their  detachment  from  the  Circle,  were  each  brought  back  within  luc 
walls. 


PROGRESS  OF  THE  ATHENIAN  WORKS. 


97 


Had  the  recent  attempt  on  the  Circle  succeeded,  cnrrying  with  it 
the  death  or  capture  of  Nikias,  and  combined  with  the  death  of 
Lamachus  in  the  field  on  that  same  day — it  would  have  greatly 
brightened  the  prospects  of  the  Syracusans,  and  might  even  have 
arrested  the  farther  ])rogress  of  the  siege,  from  the  want  of  an  author- 
ized commander.  But  in  spite  of  such  imminent  hazard,  the  actual 
result  of  the  day  left  the  Athenians  completely  victorious,  and  the 
Syracusans  more  discouraged  than  ever.  What  materially  contribu- 
ted to  their  discouragement  was  the  recent  entrance  of  the  Athenian 
fleet  into  the  Great  Harbor,  wherein  it  was  henceforward  perma- 
nently established,  in  co-operation  with  the  army,  in  a  station  near 
the  left  bank  of  the  Anapus. 

Both  ami}'-  and  fleet  now  began  to  occupy  themselves  seriously 
with  the  construction  of  the  southernmost  part  of  the  wall  of  circum- 
vallation,  beginning  immediately  below  the  Athenian  fortified  point 
of  descent  from  the  southern  cliff  of  Epipolai  and  stretching  across 
the  lower  marshy  ground  to  the  Great  Harbor.  The  distance  between 
these  two  extreme  points  was  about  eight  stadia  or  nearly  an  English 
mile:  the  wall  was  double,  with  gates,  and  probably  towers,  at  suit- 
able intervals— inclosing  a  space  of  considerable  breadth,  doubtless 
roofed  over  in  part,  since  it  served  afterward  with  the  help  of  the 
adjoining  citadel  on  the  clift*,  as  shelter  and  defense  of  the  whole 
Athenian  army.  The  Syracusans  could  not  interrupt  this  process, 
nor  could  they  undertake  a  new  counter-wall  up  the  mid-slope  of 
EpipoUe,  without  coming  out  to  fight  a  general  battle,  which  they 
(lid  not  feel  competent  to  do.  Of  course  the  Circle  had  now  been  put 
into  condition  to  defy  a  second  surprise. 

But  not  only  were'they  thus  compelled  to  look  on  without  hinder- 
ing the  blockading  wall  toward  the  harbor.— It  was  now^  for  the 
tiist  time,  that  they  began  to  taste  the  real  restraints  and  privations  of 
a  siege.  Down  to  this  moment  their  communication  with  the 
Anapus  and  the  country  beyond,  as  well  as  with  all  sides  of  the  Great 
Harbor,  had  been  open  and  unimpeded;  whereas  now,  the  arrival  of 
the  Athenian  fleet  and  the  change  of  position  of  the  Athenian  army, 
had  cut  them  off  from  both,  so  that  little  or  no  fresh  supplies  of  pro- 
vision could  reach  them  except  at  the  hazard  of  capture  from  the 
hostile  ships.  On  the  side  of  Thapsus,  where  the  northern  clilT  of 
Epipoke  affords  only  two  or  three  practicable  passages  of  ascent, 
Ihey  liad  before  been  blocked  up  by  the  Athenian  army'and  fleet;  and 
a  portion  of  the  fleet  seems  still  to  have  been  left  at  Thapsus.  Noth- 
ing now  remained  open,  except  a  portion,  especially  the  northern 
rortion,  of  the  slope  of  Epipohe.  Of  this  outlet  the  besieged,  espe- 
cially their  numerous  cavalry,  doubtless  availed  themselves,  for  the 
jHirpose  of  excursions  and  of  bringing  in  supplies  But  it  was  both 
J<^nger  and  more  circuitous  for  such  purposes  than  the  plain  near  the 
Great  Harbor  and  the  Ilelorine  road:  moreover,  it  had  to  pass  by  the 
hi;3^h  and  narrow  pass  of  Euryalus,  and  might  thus  be  rendered  i^a- 
H.  G.  III.— 4 


98     SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

vailable  to  the  besieged,  wlicnevcr  Nilda.s  thoiicrht  fit  to  occupy  nnd 
fortify  that  position.  Unfortunately  for  himself  and  liis  army'  ho 
omitted  this  easy  but  capital  precaution,  even  at  the  moment  mLiu 
he  must  have  known  Gylippus  to  be  appioaeliin<r. 

In  regard  to  the  works  actually  undertaken,  the  order  followed  by 
Nikias  and  Lamachus  can  be  satisfactorily  explained.  Hayini,^  estab- 
lished their  fortified  post  on  the  center  of  the  slope  of  Epipola?,  iliev 
were  in  condition  to  combat  opposition  and  attack  any  counter-wail 
on  whichever  side  the  enemy  might  erect  it.  Comnfencinjr,  iu  the 
first  place,  the  execution  of  the  northern  portion  of  the  blockadiri'^ 
line,  they  soon  desist  from  this,  and  turn  their  attention  to  the 
southern  portion,  because  it  was  here  that  the  Syracusans  con- 
structed their  two  first  counter-works.  In  attacking  the'second  counter. 
work  of  the  Syracusans,  across  the  marsh  to  the  Anapus,  tliey  chose 
a  suitable  moment  for  bringing  the  main  fleet  round  from  f  luipsus 
into  the  Great  Harbor,  with  a  view  to  its  co-operation.  After  clear- 
ing  the  lower  ground,  they  probably  deemed  it  advisable,  in  order  to 
establish  a  safe  and  easy  communication  with  their  fleet,  that  the 
double  wall  across  the  marsh,  from  EpipolaB  to  the  Harl')or  should 
stand  next  for  execution;  for  which  there  was  this  farther  reason- 
that  they  thereby  blocked  up  the  most  convenient  exit  and  eliannel 
of  supply  for  Syracuse.  There  are  thus  plausible  reasons  assiiinahle 
why  the  northern  portion  of  the  line  of  blockade,  from  the  Aiheniiin 
camp  on  Epipolae  to  the  sea  at  Trogilus,  was  left  to  the  Inst,  and 
was  found  open— at  least  the  greater  part  of  it— by  Gvlippus. 

While  the  Syracus  iis  thus  began  to  despair  of 'their  situation,  the 
prospects  of  the  Athenians  were  better  than  ever:  promisinir  cv'rhun 
and  not  veiy  distant  triumph.  The  reports  circulatinir  throujih  tiic 
neighboring  cities  all  represented  them  as  in  the  full  tide  of  success, 
so  that  many  Sikel  tribes,  hitheito  wavering,  came  in  to  tender  their 
alli;mce,  while  three  armed  pentekonters  also  airived  from  the  Tyr- 
rhenian coast.  Moreover,  abundant  supplies  weie  furnished  from  flic 
Italian  Greeks  generally.  Nikias,  now  sole  commander  since  ihe 
death  of  Lamachus.  had  even  the  glory  of  receiving  and  discussins^ 
proposals  from  Syncuse  for  capitulat'ion— a  necessity  which  wjis 
openly  and  abundantly  canvassed  within  the  city  itself.  The  ill-suc- 
cess of  Ilermokrates  and  his  colleagues  luuf  caused  them  to  be 
recently  displaced  from  their  functions  as  generals— to  which  Her 
akleides,  Eukles,  and  Tellias  were  appointed.  But  this  chaiiL'-e  did 
not  inspire  the  Syracusans  with  confidence  to  hazard  a  fresh  hatile, 
while  the  temper  of  the  city,  during  such  period  of  forced  inaclion, 
was  melancholy  in  the  extreme.  Though  several  propositions  for 
surrender,  perhaps  unolfi(;ial,  yet  seemingly  sincere,  were  made  to 
Nikias,  nothing  definite  could  be  agreed  lipbn  as  to  the  terms.  Had 
the  Syracusan  government  been  oligarchical,  the  present  distress 
would  have  exhibited  a  l.irge  body  of  malcontents  upon  whcni  he 
cuuld  Lave  worked  with  advantage;  but  the  democratical  character 


CONFIDENCE   OF  NIKIAS. 


99 


•of  the  government  maintained  union  at  home  in  this  trying  emer- 
gency. 

We  must  take  particular  note  of  these  propositions  in  order  to 
uadersland  the  conduct  of  Nikias  during  the  present  critical  interval. 
He  had  been  from  the  beginning  in  secret  correspondence  with  a 
party  in  Syracuse;  who,  thoagii  neither  numerous  nor  powerful  in 
themselves,  were  now  doubtless  both  more  active  and  more  influen- 
tial than  ever  they  had   been   before.     From  them  he  received  con- 
stant and  not  unreasonable  assunmces  tiiat  the  city  was  on  the  point 
of  siirrendeiing  and  could   not  possibly  hold  out.     And  as  the  tone 
of  opinion  without,  as  well  as  within,  conspired  to  raise  such  an 
impression  in  his  mind,  so  he  sulTered  himself  to  be  betrayed  into  a 
fatal  languor  and  secui-ity  as  to  the  farther  prosecution  of  t*he  besieg- 
ing operations.     The  injurious  consequences  of  liie  death  of  Lama- 
chus now  became  evident.     From  the  time  of  the  departure  from 
Katana  down  to  the  battle  iu  which  that  g;Ulant  officer  perished  (a 
period  seemingly  of  about  three  month.-i,  from  about  March  to  June 
414:  iJ.c),  the  operations  of  tlie  siege  bad  been  conducted  with  great 
vigor  as  well  as  unremitting  perseverance;  wiiile  the  building-work, 
especially,  had  been  so  rapidly  executed  as  to  fill  the  Syracusans 
with  amazement.     But  so  soon  as  Nikias  is  left  sole  commander,  this 
vis,^orous    march   disappears  and    is  exchanged  for  slackness  and 
apathy.     The  wall  across  the  low  ground  near  the  harbor  might  have 
been  expected  to  i)roceed  more  rapidly,  because  the  Athenian  posi- 
tion generally  was  much  stronger— the  chance  of  opposition  from 
the  Syracusans  was  much  lessened— and  the  fleet  had  been  brought 
into  the  Great  Harbor  to  cooperate.     Yet  in  fact  it  seems  to  have 
proceeded  more  slowly:  Nikias  builds  it  at  first  as  a  double  wall, 
lliou'j:hit  would  havd  been  ymxcticable  to  complete  the  whole  fine  of 
blockade  with  a  single  wall  before  the  arrival  of  Gvlippus  and  after- 
ward, if  necessary,  to  have  doubled  it  either  wliolly  or  partially; 
instead  of  employing  so  much  time  iu  completing  tins  one  portion, 
that  Gylippus  arrived  before  it  was  finished,  scarcely  less  than  two 
months  after  the  death  of  Lamachus.     Both  the  besiegers  and  their 
commander  now  seem  to  consider  success  as  certain,  without  any 
chance  of  eifective  interruption  from  within— still  less  from  without; 
so  that  they  may  take  their  time  over  the  work,  without  caring 
wliether  the  ultimate  consummation  comes  a  month  sooner  or  later. 

Though  such  was  the  present  temper  of  the  Athenian  troops, . 
iNikias  could  doubtless  have  spurred  them  on  and  accelerated  the 
operations,  had  he  himself  been  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  doing 
so.  Hitherto,  we  have  seen  him  always  overrating  the  gloomy  con- 
tingencies of  the  future,  and  disposed  to  calculate  as  if  the 'worst 
w:is  to  happen  which  possibly  could  hapjien.  But  a  great  part,  of 
\vh;it  passes  for  caution  in  his  character,  was  iu  fact  liackwardnesa 
"mi  inertia  of  temperament,  aggravated  by  the  melancholy  addition 
or  a  painful  internal  complaint.     If  he  wasted  iu  indolence  the  first 


i]  I 


100    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

six  months  after  his  arrival  in  Sicily,  and  tiirnpcl  to  inadequate  ac- 
count the  prv?$ent  two  months  of  triumphant  position  before  h^yincuse 
—both  these  mistakes  arose  from  tlie  same  c:iuse;  from  n  hu  t:mee  to 
act  except  under  the  pressure  and  stimulus  of  some  obvious  neces- 
sity Accordiuirly  he  was  always  l)ehindhand  with  events:  but 
when  necessity  became  terrible,  so  as  to  subdue  the  energies  of  other 
men— then  did  lie  come  forward  and  display  unwonted  viuor,  iis  we 
shall  see  in  the  following  chapter.  But  now.  relieved  from  all 
uro-ency  of  apparent  danger,  and  misled  by  the  delusive  hopes  held 
oxS.  througli  his  correspondence  in  the  toNvn,  combined  with  the 
atmosphere  of  success  which  exhilarated  his  own  armament— Nikias 
fancied  the  surrender  of  Syracuse  inevitable,  and  became,  for  one 
brief  moment  preceding  his  calanutous  end,  not  merely  snnguim'. 
but  even  careless  and  presumptuous  in  the  extreme.  NolhiDg 
short  of  this  presumptiou  could  have  let  in  his  destroying  enemy 

Gylippus.  .         .  1      .    o.  ., 

That  officer— named  by  the  Lacedaemonians  commander  m  Sicily, 
at  the  winter  meeting  which  Alkibiades  had  addressed  at  Sparta- 
had  employed  himseTf  in  getting  together  forces  for  the  puipose  of 
the  expedition.  But  the  Lacedaemonians,  though  so  far  stinmlated 
by  the  representations  of  the  Athenian  exile  as  to  ])romise  aid,  were 
not  forward  to  perform  the  promise.  Even  the  Corinthians,  dicul- 
edly  the  most  iieartv  of  all  in  behalf  of  Syracuse,  were  yet  so  tardv, 
that  in  the  month  of  June,  Gylippus  was  still  at  Lcukas,  ^^ith  Ins 
armament  not  quite  ready  to  sail.  To  embark  in  a  sipiadron  for  Sicily 
against  the  numerous  and  excellent  Athenian  Heet,  now  acting  there, 
was  a  service  not  tempting  to  any  one,  and  demanding  botli  i)ers()ual 
daring  and  devotion.  :VIoreover.  every  vessel  from  Sicily,  between 
]\Iarchand  June,  414  B.C..  brought  intelligence  (if  pr<  gressive  success 
on  the  part  of  Nikias  and  Lamachus— thus  rendering  the  prospects 
of  Corinthian  auxiliaries  still  more  discouraging. 

At  length,  in  the  month  of  June,  arrived  the  news  of  that  defeat 
of  tlie  Svracusans  wherein  Lamachus  was  slain,  and  of  its  iini)0itant 
consequences  in  forwarding  the  operations  of  the  besiegers.  Gnat 
as  those  consequences  were,  they  were  still  farther  exai'gerated  by 
report.  It  was  confidently  affirmed,  l)y  messenger  after  messenger, 
that  the  wall  of  circumvallation  had  been  completed,  and  that 
Syracuse  was  now  invested  on  all  sides.  Both  Gylippus  and  tlie 
Corinthians  were  so  far  misled  as  to  believe  this  to  be  the  fact,  aim 
despaired,  in  consequence,  of  being  able  to  render  any  effective  aid 
against  the  Athenians  in  Sicily.  But  as  there  still  remained  hopes 
of  being  able  to  preserve  the  Greek  cities  in  Italy.  Gylippus  thoii-lit 
it  important  to  pass  over  thither  at  once  with  his  own  little  squadn-n 
of  four  sail— two  Lacedremonians  and  two  Corinthians- and  the 
Corinthian  captain  Pythen;  leaving  the  Corinthian  main  squadron  to 
follow  as  soon  as  it  was  ready.  Intending  them  to  act  only  in  Italy, 
Gylippus  did  not  fear  falling  in  with  the  Athenian  fleet.     He  tirst 


BLINDNESS  OF  NIKIAS. 


101 


sailed  to  Tarentum,  friendly  and  vrtwm  in  his  cause.  From  hence  he 
und'M-took  a  visit  to  Thurii,  Avhere  his  father  Kleandridas,  exiled 
from  8i)art:i,  had  formerly  resided  as  citizen.  After  trying  to  profit 
bv  this  opening  for  the  puVpo.seof  gaining  the  Thurians,  and  finding 
nothing  but  rc^fusal,  he  passed  on  farther  scmthvvanl.  until  became 
opposite  to  the  TerimiMiu  Gulf,. near  the  south-eastern  Cdpa  of  Italy. 
Here  a  violent  gust  of  wind  off  the  land  overtook  him,  exposed  his 
vessels  to  the  greatest  dangers,  and  drove  him  out  lo  sea,  untd  at 
k'nii:th,  standing  in  a  northerly  direction,  he  was  foriunate  enough 
to  iind  shelter  again  at  Tarentiira.  But  such  w^as  the  damage  which 
his  ships  had  sustained,  that  he  was  forced  to  remain  hjre  while  they 
were  hauled  ashore  and  refitted. 

So  untoward  a  delay  threatened  to  intercept  altogether  his  farther 
pro'iress.  For  the  Thurians  had  sent  intimation  of  his  visit,  as  well 
as  of  the  number  of  his  vessels,  to  Nikias  at  Syracuse;  treating  with 
contempt  tlu;  idea  of  four  triremes  coming  to  attack  the  powerful 
Athenian  fi.'ct.  In  the  present  sanguine  phase  of  his  character, 
Nikias  .sympathized  with  the  flattering  tenor  of  the  message  and 
overlooked  the  gravity  of  the  fact  announced.  He  despised  Gylip- 
pus as  a  mere  private-^r,  nor  would  he  even  take  the  precaution  of 
sending  four  ships  from  his  numerous  fleet  to  watch  and  intercept 
the  new  comer.  Accordingly  Gylippus,  after  having  refitted  his 
.ships  at  Tarenluin.  advanced  southward  along  the  coast  without 
opposition  to  the  Epizephyrian  Lokri.  Here  he  first  learnt,  to  his 
irreat  satisfaction,  that  Syracuse  was  not  yet  so  completely  block- 
aded, but  that  an  army  might  still  reach  and  relieve  it  from  the  inte- 
rior, entering  it  bv  the  Euryalus  and  the  heights  of  Eplpokie. 
Having  didiberated  whether  he  should  take  the  chance  of  running 
his  ships  into  the* harbor  of  Syracuse,  despite  the  watch  of  the 
Athenian  fleet— or  whether  he  should  sail  through  the  strait  of  Mes- 
sina to  Himera  at  the  north  of  Sicily,  and  from  thence  levy  an  army 
to  cross  the  ishnid  and  relieve  Syracuse  by  land— he  resolved  on  the 
latter  course,  and  passed  forthwith  through  the  strait,  which  he 
found  altogether  unguarded.  After  touching  both  at  Rhegium  and 
ai  Messene,  he  arrived  safely  at  Himera.  Even  at  Phegium,  there 
was  no  Athenian  naval  force;  though  Nikijis  had  indeed  sent  thither 
four  Atiicnian  triremes,  after  he  had  l)een  apprised  that  Gylippus 
had  reacheil  Lokri— rather  from  excess  of  precaution,  than  because 
h<'  thought  it  necessary.  But  this  Athenian  squadron  reached 
Rhegium  too  late;  Gylippus  had  already  passed  the  strait,  and  for- 
time>miting  his  enemy  with  blindness,  landed  hiin  unopposed  on 
the  fatal  soli  of  Sicily. 

The  blindness  of  Nikias  would  indeed  appear  unaccountable,  were 
it  not  that  we  shall  have  worse  yet  to  recount.  To  appreciate  his 
misjudunnent  fully— and  to  be  sensible  that  we  are  not  making  him 
resjionsible  for  results  which  couht  not  have  been  foreseen— we  have 
only  to  turn  back  to  what  had  been  said  six  mouths  before  by  the 


102    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

exile  Alkibiades  at  Spnrta:— "Send  forthwith  an  army  to  Sicily  (lie 
exiiovtcd  the  Lacedjemonians) — but  .send  at  the  m-me  time,  irhat  will  be 
vet  more  vnlnuble  thnn  <(ii  anmj—a  Spartan  to  take  the  supreme  com- 
viand."  It  was  in  fultiilmeiit  of  such  recommendation,  the  wisdom 
of  which  will  abundantly  appear,  that  Gylippus  had  been  appointed. 
And  had  he  even  rca.ched  Syracuse  alone  in  a  tlshing-boat,  the  ellcet 
If  his  presence,  carrying-  the  great  name  of  Si)arta  with  full  assur- 
ance of  Spartan  intcrvmlion  to  come,  not  to  mention  his  great  per- 
i;onal  ability— would  have  suiliced  to  give  new  life  to  the  besieged. 
Yet  Nikias— havinL^  through  a  lucky  accident,  timely  notice  of  his 
approach,  when  a  Mpiaiiron  of  four  *^ships  would  have  prevented  his 
reaching  the  island— disdains  even  this  most  easy  precaution,  and 
iiei:leci?himas  a  fivcbooterofno  significance.  Such  neglect  too  is  the 
more  .suri)risinir,  since  the  well  known  philo-Lac<mian  tendencies  of 
Nikias  would  have  led  us  to  expect,  that  he  would  overvalue,  rather 
than  undervalue,  the  imposing  ascendency  of  the  Sjiaitan  name. 

Gvlippus,  on  arriving  at  Ilimera  ^is  commander  named  by  Sparta 
and'annouuciiur  himself  as  forerunner  of  Peloponnesian  re-enlorce- 
ments,  met  with  a  heartv  welcome.  The  Himcneans  agreed  to  aid 
him  with  a  bodv  of  hopl'ites,  and  to  furnish  panoplies  for  the  seamen 
in  his  vessels.  V)n  sending  to  Selinus,  Gela,  and  some  of  the  Sikel 
tribes  in  the;  interie)r,  he  receiveel  equally  favorable  assurarices;  so 
that  he  was  enabled  in  no  very  long  time  to  ge  t  te)gether  a  respe'ct- 
able  force.  The  interest  of  Athens  among  the  Sii;els  had  l)eea 
recently  weakeneel  bv  the  death  of  one  of  her  most  ae  live  partisans. 
the  Sikel  prince  Arclninides— a  circumstance  which  be)th  enabled 
Gylippus  to  obtain  more  of  their  aid,  and  facilitated  his  mare-h  aere)ss 
the  island.  He  was  enableel  to  undertake  this  inland  march  from 
Himera  to  Syracuse,  at  the  head  of  700  hoiilites  from  his  own  vessels, 
seamen  anel  epibata?  taken  teigether— 1000  hoplites  and  light  troops, 
with  100  horse,  from  Himera— some  he)rse  and  light  tre)ops  from 
Selinus  and  Gela— and  1000  Sikels.  AVith  these  forces,  some  of 
whom  joined  him  on  the  nmre-h,  he  reacluel  Euryalus  and  the  heights 
of  Epipola'  above  Svracuse— assaulting  anel  cai)iuring  the  Sikel  fe.rt 
of  letse  in  his  way,  but  witliout  exiu'riencing  any  other  opposiiion. 

His  arrival  was  all  but  too  late— and  mirht  have  been  actually  t(-o 
late,  had  not  the  Corinthian  adnural  Gongylus  got  to  Syrae-use  a  lit  lie 
before  him.  The  Corinthian  fleet  of  twelve  triremes,  under  Erasiniehs 
— havinir  starteel  from  Leukas  later  than  Gylippus,  but  as  soon  as  it 
was  ready— was  now  on  its  way  to  Syracuse.  But  Ge)ngylus  had 
been  detained  at  Leukas  by  some  accident,  so  that  he  did  iu>[  depart 
until  after  all  the  re>l.  Yet  he  re-aclied  Syracuse  the  soonest;  pre^b- 
ably  striking  a  straiuditer  course  across  the  sea,  and  favored  by 
weather,  ife  got  safely  into  the  harbor  of  Syiacuse,  escaping  the 
Athenian  guarefship;  whose  watch  doubtless  partemk  of  the  general 
neirligence'  of  the  besieging  eiperations. 

The  arrival   of  Gungyius  at   that   moment  w^as  an   accielcnt   of 


GYLIPPUS  ENTERS  SYRACUSE. 


103 


unspeakable  me)me'nt — and  was  in  fact  nothing  less  than  the  salva- 
tion of  the  city.  Among  all  the  causes  e)f  ele.'spair  in  the  Syracusan 
mind,  there  was  none  me^re  powerful  than  the  circumstance  that  they 
Lad  not  as  yet  heard  of  any  relief  approaching,  or  of  any  active  inter- 
vention in 'their  favor,  from  Peloponnesus.  Their  discouragement 
increasing  from  day  to  day,  and  the  interchange  of  propositions  with 
Nikias  becoming  niore  frequent,  matters  had  at  last  so  lipened  that  a 
public  assembly  was  just  about  te)  be  held  to  sanction  a  definitive 
capitulation.  It  was  at  this  critical  juncture  that  Gongylus  arrived, 
apparently  a  little  before  Gylippus  "reached  Himera.  He  was  the 
first  te)  announce  that  be)th  the  Corinthian  fleet,  and  a  Spartan  ce)m- 
m  inder,  we're  now  actually  on  their  voyage,  and  might  be  expe^cted 
innnediately— intelligence 'which  lllled  the  Syracusans  with  enthusi- 
asm anel  wiUi  reneweel  courage.  Th(?y  instantly  threw  aside  all  ielca 
of  caj)itulation,  and  resolved  to  holel  out  to  the  last. 

It  was  not  long  before  they  received  intimation  that  Gylippus  had 
reached  Ilimera  (which  Gongylus  at  his  arrival  ce)uld  not  know)  and 
was  raisuig  an  army  to  march' acre)ss  for  their  relief.  After  the  inter- 
val necessary  for  his  ])reparatie)ns  anel  for  his  march  (probably  not 
less  than  between  a  fortnight  and  three  \yeeks),  they  learnt  that  he 
was  ap])roaching  Syracuse  by  the  way  of  Euiyaius  anel  EpipoliB.  He 
was  presently  seen  coming,  having  ascended  Epipolaj  by  Euryalus; 
the  same  way  by  which  the  Athenians  had  come  from  Ivatana  in  the 
spring,  wheif  they  ce)mmenced  the  siege.  As  he  descended  the  slope 
of  EpipoUt,  the  whole  Syracusan  fe)rc(3  went  out  in  a  body  to  hail  his 
arrival  and  accompany  him  into  the  city. 

Few  incidents  throughout  the  whole  siege  of  Syracuse  appear  so 
unaccountable  as  the  fact  that  the  pre)cee(rmgs  ami  march  of  Gylip- 
pus, from  his  landing  at  Himera  to  the  moment  of  his  entering  the 
town,  were  ace'oraplished  without  the  smallest  resistance  on  the  part 
of  Nikias.  After  this  instant  the  besiegers  pass  from  incontestible 
snpen-iority  in  the  field,  and  apparent  certainty  of  prospective  capture 
of  the  city,  to  a  state  of  inferiority,  not  e)nly  excluding  all  he)pe  of 
e;i])ture,  but  even  sinking  step  by  step  into  iUjsedute  ruin.  Yet 
Nikias  had  remained  with  his  eyes  shut  and  his  iiands  lied;  not 
making  the  least  effort  to  obstruct  so  f:ital  a  consummation.  After 
having'despised  Gylippus  in  his  voyage  along  the  coast  of  Italy  as  a 
freebooter  with  four  ships,  he  now  despises  him  not  le^ss  at  the  head 
of  an  army  marching  from  Himera.  If  he  was  taken  unaware,  as 
lie  really  appears  to  have  been,  the  fault  was  altogether  his  own,  and 
the  ignorance  such  as  we  must  almost  call  voluntary.  For  the 
approach  of  Gylippus  must  have  been  well-known  to  him  before- 
hand. He  must  have  learnt  fremi  the  four  ships  which  he  sent  to 
Hhegium,  that  Gvlippus  had  alreaely  toue:hed  thiiher  in  passing 
through  the  strait,"  on  his  way  to  Himera.  He  must,  therefore,  have 
been  well  aware  that  the  purpe)se  was  to  attempt  the  relief  of  Syracuse 
by  au  army  from  the  interior;  and  his  correspondence  among  the 


104    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

SikcO  tril)os  must  liavc  placed  him  in  cognizance  of  the  equipment 
goini^  on  ut  Ilimera.  Moreover,  when  we  recollect  that  G)ii]ipus 
renciicd  that  place  without  troops  or  arms — that  he  had  to  obtain 
forces  not  merely  from  Ilimera,  but  also  from  Selinus  and  Gcla,  as  well 
as  to  sound  the  Sikel  towns,  not  all  of  them  friendly;  lastly,  that  he 
had  to  march  all  across  the  island,  partly  through  hostile  territory,  it 
is  impossil)le  to  allow  less  interval  than  a  fortnight,  or  three  weeks, 
between  his  landing  at  Himera  and  his  arrival  at  Epipohe.  Faitlier, 
Nikias  must  have  learnt,  through  his  intelligence  in  the  interior  of 
Syracuse,  the  important  revolution  which  had  taken  place  in  Syra- 
cusan  o]union  through  the  arrival  of  Gongylus,  even  before  the  hind- 
ing  of  Gylip|)us  in  Sicily  was  known,  lie  was  apprised,  fnrni  that 
moment,  that  he  had  to  take  measures,  not  only  against  renewed 
obstinate  hostilitv  within  the  town,  but  airainst  a  fresh  invjidint!: 
enemy  without.  Lastly,  that  enemy  had  first  to  mnrch  all  across 
Sicily,  during  which  march  he  might  have  been  embarra*^sed  and 
perhaps  defeated;  and  could  then  j.pproach  Syracuse  only  by  one 
road;  over  tlie  hiuh  irround  of  Euryalus  in  fhe  Athenian  rear — 
through  passes  few  in  number,  easy  to  defend,  by  which  Nikias  bad 
himself  tirst  approached,  and  through  which  he  h;  d  only  got  bv  a 
well-laid  plan  of  surprise.  Yet  Nikias  leaves  these  passes  unoccupied 
and  undefended;  he  takes  not  a  single  new  precaution;  the  relieving 
armv  enters  Svr.-jcuse  as  it  were  over  a  broad  and  free  plain. 

If  we  are  amazed  at  the  insolent  carelessness  with  which  Nikias 
disdained  the  commonest  ]>recauti(>ns  for  repelling  the  foreknown 
approach,  b}'  sea,  of  an  enemy  formidable  even  single-handed — what 
are  we  to  saj^  of  that  nnaccot.ntable  blindness  which  led  him  to 
neglect  the  same  <'nemv  \\h(n  C(  niimr  at  the  hetid  of  a  relieving 
army,  and  to  omit  the  n-ost  obvious  means  of  defense  in  a  crisis  upon 
which  his  future  ftite  turned  ?  Homer  would  have  designated  snch 
neglect  as  a  temporary  delirium  inflicted  by  the  fearful  inspiration 
of  Ate:  the  historian  has  no  such  explanatory  njime  to  give — andean 
oidy  note  it  as  a  sad  :iud  suitable  prelude  to  the  calamities  too  nearly 
at  hand. 

At  the  moment  ^hen  the  fortunate  Spartan  auxiliary  was  thus 
allowed  to  march  quietly  into  Syracuse,  the  Athenian  double  wall  of 
circumvallation  between  the  southern  clilT  of  Epipohe  and  the  Great 
Harbor,  eight  stadia  long,  was  all  but  completed:  a  few  yards  only 
ot  the  end  close  to  the  harbor  were  wanting.  Bui  Gylippns  cared 
not  to  interrupt  its  ccmpletion.  He  ained  at  higher  objects,  and 
he  knew  (what  Nikias  unhappily  never  felt  and  never  lived  to  learn) 
the  inunen>e  advi-ntage  of  turning  to  active  account  that  first  im- 
pression, and  full  tide  of  contidence,  which  his  arrival  had  just 
infused  into  the  Syracusans.  Haidly  liad  he  accomplished  his  junc- 
tion with  them,  when  he  marshalled  the  united  force  in  order  of  bat- 
tle, and  marched  up  to  the  lines  of  the  Athenians.  Amazed  as  they 
were,  and  struck  dumb  by  his  unexpected  arrival,  they  loo  formed 


SUDDEN  CHANGE  OF  AFFAIRS. 


105 


in  battle  order,  and  awaited  liis  approach.  His  tirst  pror^e-din'r 
rairked  how  much  the  odds  of  the  game  were  chan-'-ed:  He^sen^  a 
lu  raid  to  tender  to  tliem  a  tive  days  armistice,  on  condition  that  tle-v 
sho'ild  collect  their  effects  and  withdraw  from  the  isl  uid  Nik i  is 
(lisdained  to  return  any  reply  to  this  insuhin-  proposal;  b  U  his  co'i- 
duct  showed  how  much  he  felt,  as  well  as  Gvlippus  that  the  tide 
wa^  now  turned.  For  when  the  Spartan  cJmmander,  perceivin.- 
iio.v  tor  the  hrst  tune  the  disorderly  trim  of  his  Syracusan  hoplitef 
thought  fit  to  retreat  into  more  open  ground  farther  removx^d  froni 
the  walls,  probably  in  order  that  he  might  have  a  better  field  for  his 
CHvahy— Nikias  declined  to  follow  him,  and  remuued  in  nosiiiou 
close  to  his  o^yn  fortirications.  This  was  tantamount  toa  confession 
ot  nifenority  in  the  field.  It  was  a  virtual  abandoiun  -nt  of  the  cai)- 
tiire  of  Syracuse— a  tacit  admission  that  the  Athenians  could  hope 
for  nothing  better  in  the  end,  than  the  humiliating  offer  which  the 
hc'iald  had  just  made  to  them.  So  it  soeni^  to  have  been  fedt  l)v  both 
parties;  for  from  this  time  forward,  the  Syracusans  become  and  con- 
tinue aggressors,  the  Athenians  remaining  always  on  the  defensive 
except  tor  one  brief  instant  after  the  arrival  of  Demosthenes 

Alter  drawing  olf  ins  troops  and  keeping  them  encamped  for  that 
night  on   the   Temenite  clitf  (seem! iiuly  within  the  added  fortitied 
luclosure  ot  Syracuse),  Gylippns  brought  them  out  ai,niin  the  next 
morning,  and  marshalled  them  in  front  of  the  Athenian  lines   as  if 
about  to  attack.     But  while  the  attention  of  the  Athenians  was  thus 
engaged,  he  sent  a  detachment  to  surprise  the  fort   of  Labdalum 
which  was  not  within  view  of  their  lines.     The  enterprise  was  com- 
pletely successful.     The  fort  was  taken,  and  the  garrison  put  to  the 
sword;  while  the  Syivacusans  gained  another  unexpected  advanta-e 
(luring  the   day.  by  the   capture  of  one   of  the   Athenian   triremes 
which  was  watching  their  harbor.     Gvlippus  pursued  his  successes 
<i'"hvely,  by  immediately  beginning  the  construction  of  a  fresli  coun- 
icr- wall,  from  the  outer  city-wall  in  a  north-westerly  direction  aslant 
up  the  slope  of  Lpipohx);  so  as  to  traverse  the  intended  line  of  the 
Atlunian  circumvallation  on  the  north  side  of  their  Circle  and  reii- 
clLT  blockade  impossible.     He  availed  himself,  for  this  purpose  of 
toaes  laid  by  the  Athenians  for  their  own  circumvallation,  at 'the 
ame    ime  alarming  them   by  threatening  attack  upon  their  lower 
^\ all  (between  the  southern  cliff  of  Epipohe  and  the  Great  Harbor) 
-Which  was  now  just  tinished,  so  as  to  leave  their  troops  disposable 
«;r  action   on   the   higher  ground.     Airainst   one  part  of  the  wall 
ihcu  seemed  weaker  than  the  rest,  he  attempted  a  nocturnal  sur- 
P  ise,  but  hndmg  the  Athenians  in  vigilant  guard  without,  lie  was 
lorcc'd  to  retire.     Tliis  part  of  the  wall  was  now  heightened,  and  the 
Amenians  took  charge  of  it  themselves,  distributing  their  allies  aloiiff 
nje  remainder.  ° 

These  attacks  however  appear  to  have  been  chiefly  intended  as 
^.i^ersioiis,  m  order  to  hinder  the  enemy  from  obstructing  ilie  com- 


106    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 
1  .i„„  ^f  11,0" rmmter-n-all.     N'™"  was  llic  time  for  Nikias  to  adort 

1  h^e  of    <  iiv      llV  niolved  to  fortify  Care  lMcn.ir.vn«„i-ll,e 

I'l^^ch  ^uis  O  nl^ia  to  the'ir.ainlaiul)  so  as  to  picven    any  exit  0 

;:a'  r  J<r;o  aie'Vie  V,'';^'o!^l,n.s,  an.,  t^^t  a  .ucce.f...  p,o.e- 
'"^ib  lor,:"::^t  ';;:iS^''"irS  -o   sn..i,.inry,  we 

from  tlK.  nnmerous  ^/^^'"'^  »  "'^;'  .^ ,  C^.,^4   Mislaii.ed  hi  tliis 
pic  of  Zens  f>  y"M>  "«■>;>;{''/ '^  for  desertion,  vvlii<h 

-r  fl^.riJSdl^.ern^VJtiS^y'of^.tch  .^         ^As  ..;^ 

Atl.eniau  hope,  of  s.ktoss  no^y  ?«;';' «d.  bo  .'     ,  ..,f,  '^^li,, ^.i  „, 

-??S™  s?H£c'  S:-i:ij'?r' = 


FORT  AND  STATION  AT  PLEMMYRIUM.         107 

wlik'li  it  liad  set  sail  firtceri  months  before,  from  the  harbor  of 

I\'i  liens. 

The  erection  of  the  new  forts  at  Plemmyrium,  while  by  witii'lraw- 
uvx  the  Athenian  forces  it  left  Gylippus  unopposed  in  the  prosecu- 
timi  of  his  counter-wall,  at  the  same  time  emboldened  him  by  the 
nmnifest  decline  of  hope  which  it  implied.  Day  after  day  he  brought 
out  his  Syracusans  in  baltle-array,  phinting  them  near  the  Athenian 
lilies;  but  the  Athenians  showed*no  disimsition  to  attack.  At  leu^-lh 
he  took  advanlage  of  wdiat  he  thought  a  favorable  opportunity  to 
m:ike  the  attack "liimsclf;  but  the  ground  was  so  hemmed  in  by  vari- 
ous walls— the  Athenians  foriilied  lines  on  one  side,  the  Syracusan 
front  or  Temenitic  fortification  on  another,  and  the  counter-wall  now 
iu  course  of  construction  on  a  third— that  his  cavalry  and  darters  had 
no  space  to  act.  Accordingly,  the  Syracusan  hoplites,  having  to 
fiirht  without  these  aiixiiiaries,  were  beaten  and  driven  ba-k  with 
loss,  the  Corinthian  Gongyius  being  among  the  slain.  On  the  next 
day!  Gylippus  had  the  prudence  to  take  the  blame  of  this  defeat 
upon  h'imself.  It  was  a  consequence  of  his  own  mistake  (he  publicly 
confessed)  in  liaving  made  choice  of  a  coniined  space  wherein  neither 
cavalry  nor  darters  could  avail.  He  would  presently  give  them 
another  opportunitv,  in  a  fairer  field,  and  he  exhorted  them  to  show 
their  inbred  superiority  as  Dorians  and  Peloponuesians,  by  chasing 
these  lonians  with  their  rabble  of  islanders  out  of  Sicily.  Accord- 
iiiijly,  after  no  long  time,  he  again  brought  them  up  in  order  of  bat- 
tles taking  care,  hov.ever,  to  keep  in  the  open  space,  beyond  the 
extremity  of  the  walls  and  fortifications. 

On  this  occasion,  Nikias  did  not  decline  the  combat,  but  marched 
out  into  the  open  space  to  meet  him.  He  probably  felt  encour- 
aged  by  the  result  of  the  recent  action;  but  there  was  a  further  and 
more  pressing  motive.  The  counter  wall  of  intersection,  which  the 
Syracusans  were  constructing,  was  on  the  point  of  cutting  the  Athe- 
nian line  of  circumvallation— so  that  it  was  essential  lor  Nikias  to 
attack  without  delay,  unless  he  formally  abnegated  all  further  hoi)e  of 
successful  siege.  Nor  could  the  arm.y  endure,  in  spite  of  altered  for- 
tune, irrevocably  to  shut  themselves  out  from  such  hope,  without  one 
struggle  more.  'Both  armies  were  therefore  ranged  in  battle  order  on 
tlie  "open  space  bevond  the  walls,  higher  Up  the  slope  of  Epipol«; 
Gvlippus  placing  hfs  cavalry  and  darters  to  the  right  of  his  line,  on 
the  highest  and  most  open  ground.  In  the  midst  of  the  action 
between  the  hoplites  on  both  sides,  these  troops  on  the  right  charged 
the  left  flank  of  the  Athenians  with  such  vigor,  that  they  completely 
broke  it.  The  whole  Athenian  army  underwent  a  thorough  defeat, 
and  only  found  shelter  within  its  fortified  lines.  And  in  the  course 
of  the  very  next  night,  the  Syracusan  counter-wall  was  pushed  so  far 
as  to  traverse  and  get  bevond  the  projected  line  of  Athenian  block- 
ade, reaching  presently 'as  far  as  the  edge  of  the  northern  cliff: 


106    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

T)\.tion  of  the  counter-wnll.  Now  was  the  time  for  Nikins  to  adopt 
vi'^onu]^  a-messive  measures  b(^th  against  this  wall  and  siganist  the 
Svircusansin  the  tidd— unless  he  chose  to  relincunsh  all  hope  of 
ever  bein-  able  to  beleaguer  Syraeuse.  And  indeed  he  seems  actu- 
MJlv  to  have  relinquished  such  hope,  even  thus  early  after  lie  luid 
K-Jmed  (•(  rtnin  master  of  the  eity.  For  he  now  undertook  a  measure 
altooether  new;  hi-hlv  important  in  itself,  but  mdieatmg  an  altered 
scheme  of  policv.  ^  ife  resolved  to  fortify  Cape  riemiryrmm-ll.e 
roeky  promonloVy  which  forn.s  one  extremity  of  the  ram)W  enlrnnce 
of  the  Gnat  Harbor,  immediately  se»uth  of  the  pomt  of  Oitygia-and 
to  make  it  a  secure  main  station  lor  the  th  .t  :,n(  sioies.  Ihe^^  tleet 
hrd  been  hitherto  stationed  in  ek^se  neiL;hl  ori.ocd  of  he  land-force 
in  a  fortili(d  peisition  at  the  extremity  of  tlie  double  bloekaduig  u:;ll 
between  the  southern  cliff  of  Epipola-  and  the  great  Harbor.  Ii<  m 
such  a  station  in  the  interior  of  the  harbor,  it  was  oifl  cult  lor  the 
Athenian  trire-mes  to  perfoim  the  duties  incundHnt  on  them-of 
wateliiui^  the  two  ports  (  f  Svrai  use  {ov.v  on  each  side  e.t  the  islhmus 
which  ioins  Ortvgia  to  ihe*  mainland)  so  as  to  prevent  any  exU_  of 
ships  from  wiihin,  or  ingress  of  ships  fiom  wilhout-and  of  ensurnig 
the  unobMiucted  adn.isvion  by  sea  of  supplies  for  their  own  aiiny. 
For  both  these  purposes,  the  statical  e)f  Tien  inyrium  \yas  lar  more 
convenient-  anel  Nikias  now  saw  that  hei.eelorward  his  operatKjas 
would  be  for  the  most  part  maritime.  \Viihout  ccu.fess.ng  ite^pen ly 
be  thus  practicallv  acknowledged  that  the  superiority  e)l  land-force 
had  passed  to  the  side  of  his  opponents,  and  that  a  successlul  piose- 
cutie^n  of  the  blockade  h;ul  becenne  impossible'. 

Three  forts,  one  of  considerable  size,  and  two  subsidiary,  were 
erected  on  th^  sea-board  of  Cape  Plemmynum.  wli.eh  beeame  the 
stati.>n  fen-  triremes  as  well  as  for  ships  e>t  burden.  1  hough  the  s  u- 
ation  was  found  convenient  for  all  naval  operations,  it  ^"t.iled  ^d^ 
serious  disadvantages ;  being  destitute  ot  any  spring  of  ^vatel^  such 
a.  tin- memorable  Vount:  in  of  Arethusa  on  the  <'l>P^-^^%;;;^';:;  .^ 
Ortv'ia  So  that  for  supplies  e)f  water,  and  of  wood  also,  the  Cle^^s 
of  the  villus  had  to  range  a  considerable  distance,  exposed  to  surprise 
?ron  the  uuuM-ons  Syn.cusan  eavalry  placed  in  garrison  at  the  tem- 
Dlc  Of  Zeus  Olvmpius.  Da v  :.fter  day  losses  were  sustained  in  tlu. 
Planner,  besides  \he  increased  facilities  give^  ^  ^'^^''^^^''' :^^ 
soon  fatallv  diminished  the  eHiciene-y  of  each  ship  s  crev^  As  t 
Athenian  hopes  of  sue-cess  now  declined,  both  the  shnes  and  the 
numerous  foix>igners  who  served  in  the.r  navv  ^c^^f  ";^\^li;^r;;f  ^. 
steal  awav  And  thouirh  the  ships  of  wa-.  de)wn  to  this  tune,  had 
^m!  s^elv  at  all  engaged  in  act^ial  warfare,  yet  they  had  been  f<^ 
manv  months  conlinually  at  sea  and  on  the  ,^^''^^^"1'' ^l  "  'nu- 
onn6rtunity  e)f  haulin-  ashore  to  refit.  Hence  the  naya  force,  no^^ 
XitTbe  called  into  action  as  the  chief  hope  f/l^^' Athenians  w.. 
found  lamentably  degenerated  from  that  ostentatious  perfection  in 


FORT  AND  STATION  AT  PLEMMYRIUM.         107 

>vhi('li  it  had   set  sail  fifteen  months  before,  from  the  harbor  of 

I'l'ie  erection  of  the  new  forts  at  Plemmyrium,  while  by  withdraw- 
in.^  the  xVtheni.m  forces  it  left  Gylippus  unopposed  in  the  pre)secu- 
timi  of  his  counter-wall,  at  the  same  time  embeddeiied  liim  by  t lie 
iivuiifest  decline  of  hope  which  it  implied.  Day  after  day  he  brought 
out  liis  Svracusan^  in  baltlc-array,  planting  them  near  the  Athe-niau 
lines-  but  the  Athenians  showed  no  disi)osilion  to  attack.  At  length 
he  took  advantage  of  what  he  thought  a  favorable  opportunity  to 
midve  the  attack  himself;  but-  the  ground  was  so  hemmc  d  m  by  vari- 
0-1^  walls— the  zVthenians  forlilied  lines  on  one  side,  tiie  Syracusan 
f'-ont  or  Temenitic  fortification  on  another,  and  the  counter-wall  nov/ 
iu  course  of  construction  on  a  third— that  his  cavalry  and  darters  had 
no  .^pace  to  act.  Acconlindy,  the  Syracusan  hoplites,  having  to 
fi.-ht  without  these  auxiliaries,  Avere  beaten  and  ehuven  ba-.c  witli 
bss  the  Corinthian  Gouiivlus  being  among  the  slain.  On  the  next 
(lav'  Gylippus  had  the  prudence  to  lake  the  blame  of  this  defeat 
ui)ou  liiinself.  It  was  a  conseeiuence  of  his  own  mistake  (he  publicly 
confe>sed)  iu  having  maelc  choice  of  a  conlined  space  wherein  neither 
cavalry  nor  darters  could  avail.  He  would  presently  give  them 
iiuolher  opportunitv,  in  a  fairer  field,  and  he  exhorted  them  to  show 
their  inlired  superiority  as  Dorians  and  Peloponnesians,  by  chasing 
these  lonians  with  their  rabble  of  islanders  out  of  Sicily  Accord- 
ino-ly  after  no  long  time,  he  again  brought  them  up  m  order  of  bat- 
tle' taking  care,  however,  to  keep  in  the  open  space,  beyond  the 
ext'remity  of  the  walls  and  fortifications. 

On  this  occasion,  Nikias  did  not  decline  the  combat,  but  marched 
out  into  the  open  space  to  meet  him.  He  probably  telt  encour- 
ao-ed  by  the  result  of  the  recent  action;  but  there  was  a  further  and 
more  pressing  motive.  The  counter  wall  of  intersection,  which  the 
Syracusans  were  constructing,  was  on  the  point  of  cutting  the  Athe- 
nian line  of  circumvallalion— so  that  it  was  essential  tor  Nikias  to 
attack  without  delay,  unless  he  formally  abnegaled  all  further  hope  ot 
successful  siege.  Nor  could  the  army  endure,  in  spite  ot  altered  for- 
tune irrevocably  to  shut  themselves  out  from  such  hope,  without  erne 
stru'^He  more  'Both  armies  were  therefore  ranged  in  battle  order  on 
the  open  space  bevond  the  walls,  higher  Up  the  slope  of  Epipokc; 
Gvlippus  placing  his  cavalry  and  darters  to  the  right  of  his  line,  on 
tlic  hi'diest  anel  nu)st  open  ground.  In  the  midst  of  the  action 
between  the  hoplites  on  both  sides,  these  troops  on  the  right  charged 
the  left  flank  of  the  Athenians  with  such  vigor,  that  they  ce)mple'tely 
hroke  it  llie  whole  Athenian  armv  unelerwent  a  thorough  deleat, 
and  only  found  shelter  within  its  fortified  lines.  And  m  the  course 
of  the  very  next  night,  the  Syracusan  counter-wall  Avas  pushed  so  tar 
as  to  traverse  and  get  bevond  the  projected  line  of  Athenian  blc)ck- 
ade,  reaching  presently 'as  far  as  the  edge  of  the  northern  clitl; 


108    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

so  that  Syracuse  was  now  safo,  unless  tlic  enemy  slioii/d  not  only 
recover  their  superiority  in  the  liekl,  but  also  become  strong  enouu'u 
to  slorm  and  cany  the  new-built  wall. 

Further  {iefeiis^e  was  also  obtained  by  the  safe  arrival  of  the  Corin- 
thian, Anibrakiotic,  and  Leukadian  tleet  of  twelve  triremes  under 
Erasinides,  wiiich  Nikias  had  vainly  endeavoreil  to  intercept,  lie 
had  sent  twenty  sail  to  the  southern  coast  of  Italy;  but  the  new- 
comers were  fortunate  enough  to  escape  them. 

Enisinides  and  his  division  lent  their  hands  to  the  execution  of  a 
work  which  conii)leted  the  scheme  of  delensc  for  the  city.  Gylippus 
took  tlie  precaution  of  constructing  a  fort  or  redoubt  on  the  hi^ii 
ground  of  Epipoi^e,  so  as  to  command  the  approticii  to  Syracuse  from 
the  high  ground  of  Euryaius;  a  step  whicli  llerniokrates  had  not 
thought  of  until  too  late, 'and  whicli  Xikias  had  never  thought  of  at 
all,  during  his  period  of  triumph  anil  mastery.  He  erected  a  new 
fort  on  a  suitable  point  of  the  hig'i  ground,  backed  b}'  three  fortiticd 
positions  or  encampments  at  proper  distances  in  the  rear  of  it,  in- 
tended for  bodies  of  troops  to  su]iport  the  advanced  post  in  csise  it 
was  attacked.  A  continuous  wall  was  then  carried  from  this  ad- 
vanced post  down  the  slope  of  Epipohe,  so  as  to  reach  and  join  the 
counter- w:dl  recently  constructed;  whereby  this  counter-wall,' already 
trav<'rsing  and  cutting  the  Athenian  line  of  circumvallation,  becnme 
in  fact  prolonged  up  the  whole  slope  of  Epipohe,  and  barred  iill 
direct  access  from  the  Athenians  in  their  existing  lines  up  to  the 
Hunnnit  of  that  eminence,  as  well  as  up  to  the  northern  clilT.  The 
Syracusans  had  ninv  one  continuous  and  uninterrupted  line  of  de- 
fense; a  long  siniiie  wall,  resting  at  one  extremity  on  the  new-built 
fort  upon  the  high  ground  of  Epipolo? — at  liie  other  extremity,  upon 
the  city- wall.  This  wall  was  only  single;  but  it  was  defended  along 
its  whole  length  by  the  permanent  detachments  occupying  the  three 
several  fori itied  positions  or  encampments  just  mentioned.  One  of 
these  positions  was  occupied  by  nalive  Syracusans;  a  second  by  Sici- 
lian Greeks;  a  third  by  other  allies.  Such  was  the  improved  and 
s\'stematic  scheme  of  defense  which  the  genius  of  Gylippus  lirst  pro- 
jected, and  which  he  brought  to  execution  at  the  present  moment:  a 
scheme,  the  full  value  of  which  will  be  appreciated  when  we  come 
to  describe  the  proceedings  of  the  second  Athenian  armament  under 
Demosthenes. 

Not  content  with  having  placed  the  Syracusans  out  of  the  reach  of 
danger,  Gylippus  took  advantage  of  their  renewed  confidence  to  in- 
fuse into  ihem  i)roJects  of  retaliation  against  the  enemy  who  had 
Lrouglil  them  so  near  to  ruin.  They  began  to  equip  their  ships  in 
the  harbor,  and  to  put  their  seamen  under  training,  in.hopes  of  quali- 
fying themselves  to  contend  with  the  Athenians  even  on  their  own 
clement;  while  Gylippus  himself  quitted  the  city  to  visit  the  various 
cities  of  the  island,  and  to  get  together  further  re-enforcements,  naval 
as  well  as  military.     And  as  it  was  foreseen  that  !Nikias  ou  liis  part 


NIKIAS  SOLICITS  RE-ENFORCEIVIENTS.  109 

would  probably  demand  aid  from  Athens-envoys,  Syracusan  as  well 
rcointhian.  were  dispatched  to  Peloponnesus,  to  urge  the  neces- 
'itv  of  forwading  additional  troops-even  in  merchant-vessels,  if  no 
Semes  could  bS  spared  to  convey  them.  Should  no  reenf  orcements 
re-  eh  'he  Athenian  canip,  the  Syracusans  wel  knew  that  its  ethcien- 
rvivis^  diminish  bv  every  month's  delay,  while  their  own  strength 
i^spite  of  to^^^^  g^'«^^^i^«  with  their  mcreased 

^fSdoidrconvietionwaspres^  sii^tain  the  ardor  of  the 

Sv-acus ans,  it  was  not  less  painfully  felt  amidst  the  Athenian  camp 
now  b  ocked  up  like  a  besieged  city,  and  enjoying  no  f^'f^  "^oven.en 
cKcept  tlirough- their  ships  and  their  command  ^^?/l^«  f '^- ,  ^n^t 
s,w  tl  at  if  Gvlippus  should  return  with  any  considerab  e  additiona 
foL  even  nie  ittack  upon  him  by  land  would  become  too  power  ul 
resist-besides  the  increasing  disorganization  of  his  fleet.     He  be- 
c  me  convinced  that  to  remain  as  they  were  was  absolute  rum.     As 
all  Do^s  bililv  of  prosecuting  the  siege  of  Syracuse  successfully  was 
'iw^at  an  eiKi.  a  Lund  judgment  would  have  dictated  that  his  posi- 
i     he  harbor  had  become  useless  as  well  as  dangerous,  and  tha 
te  sooner  it  was  evacuated  the  better.    Probably  Demosthenes  won. d 
hive  acted  thus  under  similar  circumstances;  but  such  foresight  and 
K^lS  wTre'iiot  in  the  character  of  Nikias-^who  was  atraidmore^ 
over  of  the  blame  which  it  would  bring  down  upon  him  at  home    f 
not  from  his  own  army.     Not  venturmg  to  quit  his  position  without 
0  dersn^o     Athens,  he  determined  to  send  home  thither  an  undis- 
gaised  account  of  his  critical  position,  and  to  solicit  either  re-enforce- 
ineiits  or  instructions  to  return. 

I  waJiiow  indeed  the  end  of  September  (b.c.  414),  so  that  he  could 
not  hope  even  for  an  answer  before  midwinter,  nor  for  re-enforce- 
ments (if  such  were  to  be  sent)  until  the  ensuing  spring  was  far  ad- 
vanced     Nevertheless  he  determined  to  encounter  this  risk,  antl  to 
trust  to  vigilant  precautions  for  safety  during  the  interval-precau^ 
tions  whicli.  as  the  result  will  show,  were  within  a  hairs  breadth  of 
provinn-  insufficient.     But  as  it  was  of  the  last  importance  to  him  to 
make  his  countrymen  at  home  fully  sensible  of  the  grave  danger  of 
his  position,  he  resolved  to  transmit  a  written  dispatch ;  not  trusting  to 
the  oral  statement  of  a  messenger,  who  might  be  ^vanting  either  in 
courac^c   in  presence  of  mind,  or  in  competent  expression,  to  impiess 
the  full  and  sad  truth  upon  a  reluctant  audience      Accordmgly  he 
sent  home  a  dispatch,  which  seems  to  have  reached  Athens  ^^^^^^1}^^^^^ 
end  of  November,  and  was  read  formally  in  the  public  assenil  y  b^ 
the  secretary   of  the   city.     Preserved  by  Thucydides  verba   m^^^^^^ 
stands  as  one  of  the  most  interesting  remnants  of  antiquity,  and  ^Nell 
deserves  a  literal  translation. 

-Our  previous  proceedings  have  been  already  made  known  to  you 
Athenians,  in  many  other  dispatches;  but  the  Vrf^^^^TlVu  hive 
as  to  require  your  deliberation  more  than  ever,  when  you  shall  have 


110    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

heard  the  situation  in  wliich  we  stand.  After  we  hafl  overcome  in 
many  engagements  tlie  Synicusans,  against  whom  we  were  sent,  anil 
had  built  the  fortified  lines  which  we  now  occupy — there  came  upon 
us  the  Lacedtemonian  Gyiippus,  with  an  army  partly  Peloponnesian, 
partly  Sicilian.  Him  too  we  defeated,  in  the  tirst  action;  but  in  a 
second  we  were  overwhelmed  by  a  crowd  of  cavalry  and  darters,  aiul 
forced  to  retire  within  our  lines.  And  thus  the  superior  number  of 
enemies  has  compelled  us  to  suspend  our  circumvallation,  and  remain 
inactive:  indeed  we  cannol  employ  in  the  field  even  the  full  force 
Avhich  we  possess,  since  a  portion  of  our  hoplilcs  are  necessarily 
required  for  tlie  protection  of  our  walls.  Meanwhile  the  enemy  have 
carried  out  a  single  intersecting  counter-wall  beyond  our  line  of  cir- 
cumvallation, so  "that  we  can  no  longer  continue  the  latter  to  comple- 
tion, unless  we  had  force  enough  to  attack  and  slorm  their  counter- 
wall.  And  things  liave  come  to  such  a  pass  that  wc,  who  profess 
to  besiege  others,  are  ourselves  rather  the  party  besieged— by  land  at 
least,  since  the  cavalry  leave  us  scr.rc(;  any  liberty  (»f  motion.  P'ar- 
ther,  the  enemy  have  sent  envoys  to  Peloponnesus  to  obtain  re-enforce- 
ments, while  Gyiippus  in  person  is  going  round  the  Sicilian  cities; 
trying  to  stir  up  to  action  such  of  them  as  are  now  neutral,  and  to 
get,  fiom  the  rest,  additional  naval  and  military  supplies.  For  it  is 
their  detennination  (as  I  understand)  not  merely  to  assail  our  lines  on 
shore  with  their  land-force,  but  also  to  attack  us  by  sea  with  their 

ships. 

•'Be  not  shocked  when  I  tell  you  that  they  intend  to  become 
aggressors  even  at  sea.  Tlicy  know  well  that  our  fleet  was  at  first 
itiTiiuh  condition,  with  dry  ships  and  excellent  crews:  but  now  the 
ships^have  rotted,  from  remaining  too  long  at  sea,  and  the  crews  are 
ruined.  Nor  have  we  the  means^of  hauling  our  ships  ashore  to  refit: 
since  tiie  enemy's  fleet,  equal  or  superior  in  numbers,  always  appears 
on  the  point  of  attacking  us.  We  see  them  in  constant  practice,  iuid 
they  can  choose  their  own  moment  for  attack.  ^Moreover,  they  can 
keep  their  ships  high  and  dry  more  than  we  can;  for  they  are  not 
engaged  in  maintaining  watch  upon  others;  while  to  us,  who  are 
obHged  to  retain  all  our  fleet  on  guard,  nothing  less  Ihan  prodigious 
superiority  of  number  could  insure  the  like  facility.  And  were  wc 
to  relax  ever  so  little  in  our  vigilance,  we  should  no  longer  be  sure 
of  our  supplies,  which  we  bring  in  even  now  with  difficulty  ch)sc 
under  their  walls. 

"Our  crews,  too,  have  been  and  are  still  wasting  aw\ay,  from  vari- 
ous causes.  Among  the  seamen  who  are  our  own  citizt  hs,  many,  in 
going  to  a  distance  for  wood,  for  water,  or  for  pillage,  are  cut  oif  by 
the  Syracusan  cavalry.  Such  of  them  as  are  slaves,  desert,  now  that 
our  superiority  is  gone  and  that  we  have  come  to  e<iual  chances  wi;h 
our  enemy;  while  the  foreigners  whom  we  pressed  into  our  service 
make  off 'straight  to  some  of  the  neighboring  cities.  And  those 
who  came,  tempted  by  high  pay,  under  the  idea  uf  enriching  them- 


DISPATCH  OF  NIKIAS. 


Ill 


selves  by  traffic  rather  tl-n  of  flghting^w  tha^^ 

in  full  competence  to  c^^^^^^^^  as  they  can  amidst 

go  over  to  him  f  P^f  f  "^'^^^^^^^  a^^^^^        some  wiio  while  traffick- 
[hewideareaof  bicdy    Nay  huecuee^  ^ 

ing  here  on  then- own  account^^^^^^^^  discipline  of 

^i:^^:^^tJ^^^Tu^^^^         of  tUe  oar. 

general  can  "^'"'"J^^-V^'^J   'j  -^.^^  supplementary  recruits  e  se- 

tempers  to  govern— nor  t."  1 1'  '  ,  ,„  i„ni. 

where,  as  the  enemy  ctm  eas.lv  ''"  *''';"  "'"?/'''  brou-ht  out  wilh 
We  Have  nothing  but  the  ""S  ";\\^^'^  „^:;^'  ^  t'^^.ty?  fe-  Naxus  and 
„.,  both  to  make  goo,!  "/•^.^j:  °^'  «;i  '^'J.  '^  f^  '  „  flca»t  .strength.  And 
Kutana,  our  only  P'%'="V  f  ther  t>ohit-  f  the  Italian  cities,  from 
it  our  enemy  gam  but  one  f.u  tl  e    P^     \  ^';  i„,t  „«_  u„der  the 

whence  we  now  draw  our  »  IH    '?■  *  "»^'f ,  ';j,,,„'e„fo.c,.inentarriv. 

^^r:l^^'^i^^"^^  ^^^'^ «"'  ''-'^  '"^  -" '" 

tri1un!>ha;.t  close,  <"^«"  ,^f  1';'"' ^I'^ould  easily  Have  found  to  send 
..pieasanter  »«^'«\\''^""''=;';,ef^,r  seeing  that  the  full  knowledge 
you;  but  «^'y<-';''>:  "«  '"f/°,'i„,  i  to  vour  deliberations.  More- 
of  tlie  state  of  affairs  ''*=',? 'l!l;'"Xv  to  tell  vou  the  truth  without 
over;  I  thought  it  even  ^If  .^•^'.■f^.  '"^''jy  ",(,  '  ^uioQs,  that  you  never 
disiruise ;  underslaiiding  as  I  do  j  """".  '^'7,^^^^  a^suranct^,  yet  are 
listen  willingly  to  any  b«t  th«  '"o,t  fa^oiab^^^^  thoroughly 

ansrv  in  the  end  if  they  turn  to  ""'■^^^n  t  whic  vou  ori.'iaally  sent 
salistied  that  in  regard  to  the  force    ga.n^^  vluch  vou  on^^^,^^  ^^ 

us.  both  yo-'r.«''»"'''^;\^,^i\„'rs  united  against  us,  an<l  that 
di*-redil.  But  now  that  all  ^'f '  ^ '^. " ,  p„,„  '  „ue^us  you  must 
farther  re-enforee„.ents  are  ex,«<^tel    ion  W 

take  your  resolution  with  full  '"'ow;^"?^;ii,.uUi„,  You  must  either 
strength  to  contend  ''Sa".''l  ou r  p  «-«°^  a tc.md  army?  land-force  as 
send  for  us  lio.ne-or  you  must  »«"'\"^  f  .^''^'''^  {[^J'.  't„,rcther  with 
well  as  naval,  not  inferior  to  that  ^,1'  f'^^^^.^'^^'^'.^'a  successor 
a  considerable  supply  or  ■"""^y.    ^oj   74  from  a  disease  in  the 

[0  f'P'^'-^'^'l^  ™^f  ^^:y 3  :^o  ^sk  this  indulgence  at.  your 
kidnej's.     1  thmk  m^stll  eiuiii  ^^     ^  service  in 

hands:  for  while  my  health  ^^^^^  '^Jj  .^^^.^^^^oTiQ  eSd.  do  it  at  the 
various  mllilarv  commands.     But  ^''^^^^.^^^/.^      the  new  succors 

forestall  you,  as  they  have  already  once  done. 


112    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

Such  was  the  memorable  dispatdi  of  Xikias  whkli  was  read  to  the 
pub  ic  assembly  ot  Athens  about  the  end  (,f  November  or  beoinn    ' 
of   Deeen.ber  414   ii.c.-b.ou.,^ht   by  olHeers  who  slren^^thened    t1 
eject  b\    their  own  oral  eotunumieations,  and   answered   all   Mich 
mquines  as  were  put  to  them.     We  have  mu(  h  reason  to  re<n-et\  ,t 
ThucydKies  gives  no  account  of  the  debate  which  so  ^doomy  a  reve 
la  ion  ca  led  forth,     lie  tells, us  merely  the  result,     f  lie  Alhe n  ans 
R'o  ml  to  comply  with  the  second  portion  of  the  alternative  piu  hy 
iNikia*;  not  to  send  for  the  present  armament  home,  but  to  re-enfoicp 
It  by  a  second  powertul  armament  both  of  land  and  naval  force  iri 
prosecution  ot  the  same  objects.     But  they  declined  his  other  pe 
sonal  request,  and  insisted  on  continuing  him  in  comnw.nd;  passin. 
a  vote   however,    to  name  Menander    and    Euthydemus    ottic.  ■> 
already  m  the  army  before  Syracuse,  joint  commanders  alon!I^wih 
h.m    ,n  order   o  assi.t  him  in  his  laborious  duties.     Tin  v  sc  ntEu  iv 
medon  speedily,  about  the  winter  solstice,  in   comma,  d  of  ten  tVi- 
remes  to  Syracuse,  currym,^ one  hundred  and  twenty  taU.ils  of  silver 
ogether  with  assurances  of  coming  aid  to  the  sulTerimr  armv.     Ami 

t  u'Lr''V'v'^  ^^  ''T^'  ''  ^^'^^'  '^"^  formidable  force,  under  Denio.s- 
thenes  and  Lurymedon,  to  go  thitheras  re-en forcemeit  in  the  eaiUe't 
months  of  the  spring.     Demosthenes  was  directed  to  employ  h  is  • 
actively  in  getting  such  larger  force  ready  ^^ 

This   letter  of  Nikias— so   authentic-so  full  of  matter-and  «:o 
characteristic  of   the  manners  of  the  time-siunests  several  serious 
reflections,  in  reference  both  to  himself  .nd  to  the  Atlieninn  pc  p 
As  to  himself    here  is  n.^thing  .o  le.narkable  as  the  sentence  of  nm- 

Sicily.  \\  hen  vye  find  him  lamentinglhe  wear  and  tear  of  the  aima- 
ment,  and  treating  the  fact  as  notorious,  that  even  thrbeit  n  vl 
orce  could  only  maintain  itself  in  good  condition  tor  a  ^hort  time- 
ANhat  graver  condemnation  could  be  pas.H-d  upon  iha^e  eiuht  months 
v^hich  he  wasted  in  trifling  measures,  after  hislnrival  in  Sicily   hZe 

nrdv^ToV'^^lb^n'^'^'-tfi^"'''^'"^  ^Vhen  he  announces  ^hat  tile 
aruv.il  of  Gjhppuswith  his  au.xiliary  force  before  Syracuse  m:ide 
the  difference  to  the  Athenian  army  between  triumph  and    on'eU     ' 

had  donf  hi"  TJ^tT^^'  T''''^'  "^^^r"^^'  ^^"-^'^^^  ^^«^''^'  ^vhether    S 
had  done  his  best  to  anticipate,  and  what  piecauiions  he  had  him- 
self taken  to  prevent,  the  coming  of  the  Spartan  general.     To  which 
the  answer  must  be,  that  so  far  from  anticipating  the  arrival  of  new 
enemies  as  a  possible  danger,  he  had  almost  InviU'd   them   fn  in 
abroad  by  lus  delay-and  that  he  had  taken  no  piVcaui^s  at  •  U 
d?^o:I/'^''^I^  "r^'  /— rned  and  having  suftil^icnt  ml^;^  ft  h^ 
cisposal.      Ihe  desertion  and   demoralization   (,f  his  navaf  force 
doubtless  but  too  real.  was.  as  ]ie  himself  points  out    mainly  the 
consequence  of  this  turn   of  fortune,  and  was  also  the  ti^^t\cm 
mencement  of  that  unmanageable  temper  of  the  Athe  ian  'o llLiv 
numbered  among  his  difficulties.     For  it  would  be    n  i^a^^^^ 


FORMER  DISPATCHES  OF  NIKIAS. 


113 


unfortunate  army  not  to  recognize  that  they  first  acquiesced  patiently 
in  piolonged  inaction,  because  their  general  directed  it;  jind  next, 
did  their  duty  most  gallantly  in  the  operations  of  the  siege  down  to 
tlie  (k'ath  of  L:imaclius. 

If  even  with  our  imperfect  knowledge  of  Ih'j  case,  the  ruin  com- 
plained of  by  Nikias  bj  distinctly  traceable  to  his  own  remissness 
aiul  oversight,  much  more  must  this  conviction  have  been  felt  by 
intclligeiit  Athenians,  both  in  the  camp  and  in  the  city,  as  we  shall 
see  by  the  conduct  of  Demosthenes  hereafter  to  be  related.  Let  us 
conceive  th.3  series  of  disp:it(;hes,  to  which  Nikias  himself  alludes  as 
hiving  been  transmitted  home,  from  their  commencement.  We 
must  recollect  that  the  expedition  was  originally  sent,  from  Athens 
with  hopes  of  the  most  glowing  character,  atid  with  a  consciousness 
of  extraordinary  effor:s  about  to  be  rewarded  with  com-nensurate 
triiiinphs.  For  some  months,  the  dispatches  of  the  general  disclose 
nothing  but  movements  either  abortive  or  inglorious;  adorned  indeed 
hy  one  barren  victory,  but  accompanied  by  an  intimation  that  h  3 
must  wait  till  the  spring,  and  that  re-enforcements  must  be  sent  to 
hiin,  before  he  can  undertake  the  really  serious  enterprise.  Though 
tlie  disappointment  occasioned  by  this  news  at  Athens  must  have 
hcvn  moitifying.  nevertheless  his  requisition  is  co  nplied  with;  and 
the  dispatches  of  Nikias,  daring  the  spring  and  summer  of  414  B.C., 
hecoaie  cheering.  The  siege  of  Syracuse  is  described  as  proceed^ 
iiiii;  successfully,  and  at  length,  about  July  or  August,  as  being  oa 
point  of  coming  tj  a  triumphant  close — in  spite  of  a  Spartan  adven- 
turer named  Gyiippus,  making  his  way  across  the  Ionian  sea  with  a 
force  too  conteinplible  to  be  noticed.  Suddenly,  without  any  inter- 
mediate step  to  smooth  the  transition,  comes  a  disp  itch  announcing 
thtit  this  :idventurer  has  marched  into  Synicuse  at  the  head  of  a 
powerful  army,  and  that  the  Athenians  are  thrown  upon  the  defen- 
sive, without  power  of  proceeding  with  the  siege.  This  is  followed, 
aftir  a  slioit  time,  by  the  gloomy  and  almost  desperate  communica- 
tion above  translated. 

When  we  thus  look  at  the  dispatch,  not  merely  as  it  stands  sin'jly, 
but  as  falling  in  series  with  its  antecedents — the  natural  effect  which 
,  we  should  suppose  it  likely  to  produce  upon  the  Athenians  would  be, 
a  vehement  burst  of  wrath  and  displeasure  against  Nikias.  U|)on 
the  most  candid  and  impartial  scrutiny,  he  deserved  nothing  less. 
And  when  we  consider,  further,  the  character  generally  ascribed  by 
historians  of  Greece  to  the  Athenian  peoj^le;  that  they  are  repiesented 
as  fickle,  ungrateful  and  irritable,  by  standinu;  In.bit — as  aljaiulonino" 
upon  the  most  trifling  grounds  those  whom  they  had  once  esteemed, 
forgetting  all  prior  services,  visiting  upon  innocent  generals  the 
unavoidable  misfortunes  of  war,  and  impelled  by  nothing  better  than 
dcmagoiiic  excitements — we  naturally  expect  that  the  i)lame  really 
deserved  by  Nikias  would  be  cx;igiierated  beyond  all  due  measure, 
aud  break  forth  in  a  storm  of  violence  and  fury.     Yet  what  is  the 


114    SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

actual  resolution  takon  in  consccnionce  of  his  dispatch,  after  the  full 
and  free  debate  of  tlie  Athcniar.  assembly  ?     Not  a  \vord  of  bliinioor 
displeasure  is  proclaimed.     Doubtless  tliere  mu^t  have   been   indi- 
vidual speakers  who  erilieised  him  as  he  deseived.     To  suppose  llie 
contrary,  would  be  to  think  meanly  indeed  of  the  Athenian  asscnibly. 
But  the  general  vote  was  one  not  simply  impv.tinir  no  blame,  hut 
even  pronouncing  continued  and  unabated  coiitidenre.     The  people 
positively  refuse  to  relieve  him  from  the  command,  thouuh  he  him- 
self solicits  it  ill  a  manner  sincere  and  even  touching.     So  great  is 
the  value  which  they  set  upon  his  services,  and  the  esteenrwliidi 
they  entertain  for  his  character,  that  they  will  not  avail  themselves 
of  the  easy  opportunity  which  he  himself  piovides  to  get  rid  of  hini. 
It  is  not  by  way  of  compliment  to  the  Athenians  that  I  make  llic^c 
remarks  o..  their  present  j^rocecding.     Qidle  the  contrary.     The  nii!«- 
placed  confidence  of  the  Athenians  in   Isikias — on  more  than  one 
previous  occasion,  but  especially   (^n  this — betrays  an  incapacity  of 
appreciating  facts  immediately  before  their  eyes,  and  a  blindness  to 
decisive  and  nmltipliid  evidences  of  incompetency,  winch  is  one  of 
the  least  creditable  manifestations  of  their  iH)litical  histor}-.     But  we 
do  learn   from  it  a  clear  lesson,  that   the  habitual  defects  of  the 
Athenian  character  were  very  different  from  what  liistorians  rom- 
monly   impute  to  them.      In-tead   of  being  tickle,  we  find   tl.eni 
tenacious  in   the    extreme    of  confidence  once   bestowed,    and  of 
schemes  once  embaiked  upon:   instead  of   imrratitude   for  services 
actually  rendered,  we  find  credit  given  for  services  which  an  officer 
ought  to    have  rendered,  but  has  not:    instead    of  angry  cap'.ious- 
ness,    we  discover  an   indulgence   not   merely   generous   but    even 
culpable,  in  the  midst  of  dis.ippointment  and  humili.ition:  instead 
of  a    public  assembly,  wherein,  as    it    is  commonly  depicted,   the 
criminative  orators  were  onmipotent,  and  could   bring  to  condem- 
nation any  unsuccessful  general  however  meritorious — we  see  that 
even    grave    and  well  founded    accusations    make    no    impression 
upon  the  people  in  opposition  to  pre-established  personal  (stccm:— 
and  personal  esteem  for  a  man  who  not  only  was  no  demagogue,  init 
in  every  respect  the  opposite  of  a  demagogue;    an  oligarcli  by  taste, 
sentiment,  and  position,  who  yielde<l  to  the  democracy  nothing  more 
than  sincere  obedience,  coupled  with  gentleness  and  munificence  in 
his  private  bearing.     If  Kleon  liad  committed  but  a  small  part  of 
thost*  caj)ital  blunders  which  discredit  the  military  career  of  NiUin^^. 
he  would  have  been  irretrievably  ruined.     So  much  weaker  was ///« 
hold  upon  his  countrymen,  by  means  of  demagogic  excellences,  as 
compared  with  those;  causes  which  attracted  confidence  to  Nikias— 
his  great  family  and  position,  liis  wealth  dexterously  expended,  his 
known  inforrujitibiliiv  r.irainst  bribes,  and  even  comparative  :tbseucc 
of  personal  ambition,  his  personal  courage  combined  with  reputation 
for  caution,  his  decorous  private  life  and  ultra-religious  habits.    All 
this  assemblage  of  negative  merits,  and  decencies  of  daily  life,  in  a 


CAPITAL  MISTAKE  MADE  BY  ATHENIANS.      115 

citizen  whose  station  might  have  enabled  him  to  act  with  the  iuso- 
leuce  of  Alkibiades,  placed  Nikias  on  a  far  firmer  basis  of  public 
esteem  than  the  mere  power  of  accusatory  speech  m  the  public 
assembly  or  the  dikastery  could  have  done.  It  entitled  hitu  to  inive 
the  most  indulgent  construction  put  upon  all  his  short-comings,  aiid 
spread  a  fatal  varnish  over  his  glaring  incompetence  for  all  grave 
and  responsible  command. 

The  incident  now  before  us  ia  one  of  the  most  instructive  in  all 
history,  as  an  illustration  of  the  usual  sentiment,  and  strongest 
CiUi-^es  of  error,  prevalent  among  the  Athenian  democracy — and  as 
a  refutation  of  that  exaggerated  mischief  which  it  is  common  to 
impute  to  the  person  called  a  Deuujgogue.  Happy  would  it  have 
been  for  Athens  had  she  now  had  ivleon  present,  or  any  other 
(h'inigogue  of  equal  power,  at  that  public  assembly  which  took  the 
mi'liinelioly  resolution  of  sending  fresh  forces  to  Sicily  and  con- 
tiiiuiag  Nikias  in  the  command!  The  case  was  one  in  which  the 
accusatory  eloquence  of  the  demagogue  was  especially  called  for,  to 
e.xposc  the  real  past  mismanagement  of  Nikias — to  break  down  that 
undeserved  confidence  in  his  ability  and  caution  which  had  grown 
intf)  a  sentiment  of  faith  or  routine — to  prove  how  nuich  mischief  he 
had  already  done,  and  ho w^  much  more  he  would  do  if  continued. 
I'idiickily  for  Athens,  she  had  now  no  demagogue  who  could  con- 
vince the  assembly  beforehand  of  this  truth,  and  prevent  them  from 
taking  the  most  unwise  and  destructive  resolution  ever  passed  in  the 
Pn\'x. 

What  makes  the  resolution  so  peculiarly  discreditable,  is  that  it 
was  adopted  in  defiance  of  clear  and  present  evidence.  To  persist 
in  the  siege  of  Syracuse,  under  j^'esent  circumstances,  was  sad  mis- 
judgment;  to  persist  in  it  with  Nikias  as  commander,  was  hardly 
le>s  than  insanity.  The  first  expedition,  though  even  Mr//;  was  rash 
ami  ill-conceived,  nevertheless  presented  templing  hopes  which 
explain,  if  they  do  not  excuse,  the  too  light  estimate  of  impossibility 
of  iasliug  possession.  Moreover  there  was  at  that  time  a  confusion 
—between  the  narrow  objects  connected  with  Leontini  and  Egesta, 
and  the  larger  acquisitions  to  be  realized  through  the  siege  of 
Syracuse — which  prevented  any  clear  an.d  unanimous  estimate  of 
tile  undertaking  in  the  Athenian  mind.  But  now,  the  circumstances 
of  Sicily  were  fully  known:  the  mendacious  promises  of  Egesta  had 
been  exposed;  th  >  hopes  of  allies  for  Athens  in  the  island  were  seen 
t'^  be  futile;  while  Syracuse,  armed  with  a  Spartan  general  and 
Pi'loponnesian  aid,  had  not  only  become  inexpugnable,  but  had 
assumed  the  aggressive:  lastly,  the  chance  of  a  renewal  of  Pelopon- 
msian  hostility  against  Atlica  had  been  now  raised  into  certainty. 
^\liile perseverance  in  the  siege  of  Syracuse,  therefore,  under  circum- 
>^t,inoes  80  unpromising  and  under  such  necessity  for  increased  exert- 
ions at  home,  was  a  melancholy  imprudence  in  itself — perseverance 
ill  employing  Nikias  converted  that  imprudence  into  ruin,  which 


116    SIEGTE  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  SECOND  EXPEDITION. 

even  the  addition  of  an  energetic  colleague  in  the  person  of  Demos- 
Ihenes  was  not  sufticient  to  avert.  Those  who  study  the  comluci  of 
tlie  Athenian  people  on  this  occasion,  will  not  be  disposed  to  repiat 
against  thtni  the  charge  of  tickleness  whieli  forms  one  of  the  sliiiid. 
iug  reproaches  against  democracy.  TJieir  mistake  here  arose  ii„in 
the  very  oppoelte  quality;  from  inability  to  get  clear  of  two  senij- 
ment.5  which  had  become  deeply  engraven  on  their  minds— idea.s  of 
Sicilian  conquest,  and  contidence  in  Nikias. 

A  little  more  of  this  alleged  fickleness— or  easy  escape  from  past 

associations  and  impressibihty  to  actual  circumstances- would  have 

been  at  the   present  juncture  a  tutelary  quality  to  Athens.      She 

would   then  have   appreciated   more   justly   the"  increased   hnzards 

thickening  around  her  both  in  Sicily  and  at  home.     War  with  Sparta 

though  not   yet  actually  ])roclainied,  luul  become  impend inu-  ami 

inevitable.     Even  in  the  preceding  winter,  the  Lacedamonians  liad 

hstened  favorably  to  the  recommendation  of  Alkibiades  that  tliev 

should  establish  a  fortitied  post  at  DekeJeia  in  Attica.     They  had  not 

yet  indeed  brought  themselves  to  execution  of  this  resolve;  for  the 

peace  between  them  and  Athens,  though  indirectly  broken  in  many 

ways,  still  subsisted  in  name— and  th^y  hesitated  to  break  it  openly 

partly  because  they  knew  that  th"  breach  of  peace  had  been  on  the 

their  side  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war;  attributing  to 

this  fault  their  capital  misfortune  at  Sphakteria.     Athens  on  her  side 

had  also  scrupulously  avoided  direct  violation  of  the  Laceda-moniau 

territory,  in  s])ite  of  nmch  solicitation  from  her  allies  at  Arijos.    JJut 

Ik  r  reserve  on  this  point  gave  way  during  the  present  sumnTer,  iiroh- 

ably  at  the  time  when  her  prospect  of  taking  Syracuse  appeared 

certain.     The  Laceda'monians  having  invaded  and  plimdeied  the 

Argeian  territory,  thirty  Athenian  triremes  were  sent  to  aid  in  its 

defense,  under   Pythodorus  with  two  colleagues.      This  armament 

disembaiked  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Laconia  near  Prasiie  and  eom- 

mitted  devastations:  which  directactof  hostility— coming  in  addilhm 

to  the  marauiling  excursions  of  the  garrison  of  Pylusrand  to  the 

refusal  of  pacific   redress  at  Athens— satisfied  the  Laceda-monians 

that  the  peace  had  been  now^  first  and  undeniably  broken  by  their 

enemy,  so  that  they  might  with  a  safe  conscience  recommence  the 

"war. 

Such  was  the  state  of  feeling  between  the  two  creat  powers  of 
Central  Greece  in  November,  414  B.C.,  when  the  envoys  arrived  from 
Syracuse— envoys  from  Nikias  on  the  one  part,  from  Gvlippusand 
the  Syracusans  on  the  other- each  urgently  calling  far  further  sup- 
port. The  Corinthians  and  Syracusans  vehemeiitly  pressed  tlieir 
claim  at  Sparta;  Alkibiades  also  renewed  his  instances  for  the  occu- 
pation of  Dekeleia.  It  was  in  the  face  of  such  impending  liability  to 
renewed  Peloponnesian  invasion  that  the  Athenians  took  their 
resx)lution,  above  commented  on,  to  send  a  second  army  to  Syracuse 
and  prosecute  the  siege  with  vigor,     If  there  were  any  hesitation  yet 


ACTIVE  PREPARATIONS  THROUGHOUT  GREECE.    117 

remaining  on  the  part  of  tho  Laceda-monians,  it  disappeared  so  soon 
as  they  were  made  aware  of  the  imprudent  resolution  of  Athens; 
which  not  only  created  an  imperative  necessity  for  sustaining  Syra- 
cuse, but  also  rendered  Athens  so  much  more  vulnerable  at  home,  by 
removing  the  l)etter  part  of  her  force.  Accordingly  very  soon  after 
the  vote  passed  nt  Athens,  an  equally  decisive  resolution  for  direct 
hostilities  was  adoi)ted  at  Sparta.  It  was  determined  that  a  Pelopon 
nesian  allied  force  should  be  immediately  prepared,  to  be  sent  at  the 
first  opening  of  spring  to  Syracu^e;  :nid  that  at  the  same  time  Attica 
should  be  invaded,  and  the  post  of  Dekeleia  fortified.  Orders  to  this 
effect  were  immediately  transmitted  to  the  whole  body  of  Pelopon- 
nesian allies;  especially  requisitions  for  imj.lements,  materials,  and 
workmen,  toward  the  construction  of  the  projected  fort  at  Dekeleia. 


CHAPTER  LX 

FIIOM  TITK  RESrMPTTOX  OF  DIRECT  TIOSTTLITTE9  BETWEEN  ATTTEISTS 
AND  SPARTA  DOWN  TO  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ATHENIAN 
AILMA.MENT  IN   SICILY. 

The  Syracusan  war  now"  no  longer  stands  apart,  as  an  event  by 
itself,  hut  becomes  absorbed  in  the  general  war  rekindling  through- 
out Greece.  Never  w'as  any  winter  so  actively  and  extensively 
employe'd  in  military  preparations  as  the  winter  of  414-413  B.C.,  the 
months  immediately  preceding  that  wijich  Thucydides  terms  the  nine- 
teenth spring  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  but  which  other  historians 
call  the  beginning  of  the  Dekeleiau  war.  While  Eurymedon  went 
with  his  ten  triremes  to  Syracuse  even  in  midwinter,  Demosthenes 
exerted  himself  all  the  winter  to  get  together  the  second  armament 
for  early  spring.  Twenty  other  Athenian  triremes  were  farther  sent 
round  Peloponnesus  to  the  station  of  Naupaktus — to  prevent  any 
Corinthian  re-enforcements  from  sailing  out  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf. 
Against  these  latter,  the  Corinthians  on  their  side  prepared  twenty-five 
fresh  triremes,  to  serve  as  a  convoy  to  the  transports  carr3'ing  their 
hoplites.  In  Corinth,  Sikyon,  and  B(Potia,  as  well  as  at  Laceda?mon, 
levies  of  hoplites  were  going  on  for  the  armament  to  Syracuse — at 
the  same  time  that  everything  was  getting  ready  for  the  occupation 
of  Dekeleia.  Lastly,  Gylippus  Avas  engaged  with  not  less  activity 
in  stirring  up  all  Sicil}'  to  take  a  more  decisive  part  in  the  coming 
year's  struggle. 

From  Cape  Taenarus  in  Laconia,  at  the  earliest  moment  of  spring, 
C'ml)arkcd  a  force  of  600  Lacedaemonian  hoplites  (Helots  and  Neoda- 
modes)  under  the  Spartan  Ekkritus,  and  300  Boeotian  hoplites  under 
tlic  Thebans  Xenon  and  Nikon,  with  the  Thespian  Hegesandrus. 


r 


118 


RESOIPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


OPERATIONS  OF  GYLIPPUS. 


119 


They  were  directed  to  cross  the  sea  southward  to  Kyreiio  in  Libyo., 
and  from  tlience  to  make  tlicir  way  alon.u;  the  African  coast  to  Sicilv! 
At  the  same  time  a  body  of  700  hoplites  under  Alcxarchus — paiilv 
Corintliians,  partly  liired  Arcadians,  i>artly  Sikonians,  under  con- 
siraint  from  tl;tir  powerful  neiuhbors — dei)arted  from  the  noith-wt-st 
of  Peloponnesus  and  the  mouth  of  tlie  Corinthian  Gulf  for  Sicily-- 
tiie  Corinthian  triremes  watching  them  until  they  were  past  the 
Athenian  squadron  at  Nau})aktus. 

These  were  proceedings  of  importance:  but  tlie  most  important  of 
all  was  the  re-invasion  of  Attica  at  the  same  time  by  the  great  force 
of  the  Peloponnesian  alliance,  under  the  S})artan  king  Agis,  sou  (,f 
Archidamus.  Twelve  years  had  elapsed  since  Attica  last  felt  the 
hand  of  the  destroyer,  a  little  before  the  siege  of  Spliakleria.  The 
plain  in  the  neighborhood  of  Athens  was  now  first  laid  wa>te,  alter 
which  the  inviulers  proceeded  to  their  special  purpo.-e  of  erecting:  a 
fortitied  post  for  occupation  at  Dekeleia.  The  work,  apportiomd 
among  the  allies  present,  who  had  come  prepared  with  the  means  of 
executing  it,  was  comj^leted  during  the  present  sununcr,  and  a  g;ir- 
rison  was  established  there  com))os«>d  of  contingents  relieving  each 
other  at  intervals,  under  the  conunand  of  king  Agis  himself.  Deke- 
leia was  situated  on  an  outlying  eminence  belonging  to  the  ranuu 
called  Parnes,  about  fourteen  miles  to  the  north  of  Athens — near  tlie 
termination  of  the  plain  of  Athens,  and  commanding  an  extensive 
view  of  that  ])lain  as  well  as  of  the  plain  of  Eleusis.  The  hill  on 
winch  it  stood,  if  not  the  fort  itself,  was  visible  even  from  the  walls 
of  Athens.  It  was  admirably  situated  both  as  a  cenlnd  point  for 
excursions  over  Attica,  and  for  communication  with  Bo'otia;  uliile 
the  road  from  Athens  to  Oropus,  the  main  communication  with 
Eub<Ta,  passed  through  the  gorge  immediately  under  it. 

We  read  with  amazement,  and  the  contemporary  world  saw  ^vith 
yet  greater  amazement,  that  while  this  important  work  was  actually 
going  on,  and  while  the  whole  Pelopoimesian  confederacy  was  renew- 
ing  its  pressure  with  redoubled  force  upon  Athens — at  that  very 
moment,  the  Athenians  sent  out,  not  only  a  fleet  of  thirty  tiircRus 
imder  Charikles  to  annoy  the  coiists  of  Peloponnesus,  but  also  the 
great  armament  which  they  had  resolved  u})on  under  Demosthenes, 
to  push  offensive  operations  against  Syracuse.  The  force  under  the 
latter  general  consisted  of  GO  Athenian  and  o  Cliian  triremes;  of  UH)0 
Athenian  hoplites  of  the  best  class,  chosen  from  tlie  citizen  niustcr- 
roli;  Avith  a  considerable  munber  of  hoplites  besides,  from  the  sul)- 
ject  allip^  and.  elsewhere.  There  had  been  also  engaged  on  hire  VM 
pe'ltasts  from  Thrace,  of  the  tribe  called  Dii;  but  these  men  did  not 
arrive  in  time,  so  that  Demosthenes  set  sail  without  them.  Charikles 
having  gone  forward  to  take  aboard  a  body  of  allies  from  Argos,  the 
two  fleets  joined  at  .Egina.  inflicted  some  devastations  on  the  coasts 
of  Laconia,  an<l  establislunl  a  strong  post  on  the  island  of  Kythera  to 
encourage  deserliuu  among  the   Ilelots.      From    hence    Charikles 


fnvned  with  the  Argeians,  while  Demosthenes  conducted  his  arm a- 

n..nt  round  Peloponnesus  to  Korkyra.     On  the  Eleian  coast  he  de- 

"    ve  1  a  transport  carrying  hoplites  to  Syracuse,  though  the  men 

'e'med  ashore:  next  he  proceed.-d  to  Zakyntluis  and  Ivephal  enm, 

,.,'     whence  he  enga-ed   some   jidditional  hoi)lites-and  to  AnaK- 

n-iuni   in  order  to  procure  darters  and  slingcrs  Irom  Akarnania.     It 

.'.I  ere  that  he  was  met  by  Eurymedon  with  ids  ten  triremes,  wno 

ul  .rone  forwp.rd  to  Svracuse  in  tlie  winter  wuh  the  pecuniary  remit- 

H  c?un'rntly  reqnirJd.  and  was  now  returning  to  act  as  colleague 

If  DenvJsth.-nes  in  the  command.     The  news  brought  by  Lurymedou 

on  Sicily  was  in  every  way  discouraging.     \ el  the  two  athiurals 

meundeTthenecessitvof  sparing  ten  tiiremes  from  then- fleet   o 

re  enforce  Konon  at  Naupaktus.  who  was  not  strong  enough  atone  to 

eon  end  a-ainst  the  Cormthiui   fleet  which  watched  him  from  the 

on  o^ite  cT)ast.     To  make  good  this  dinuuHtion,  Eurymedon  went 

forward  to  Korkyra,  with  the  vieu-  of  obtaining  tioin  the  Ivorky- 

TVMK  lifteen  fresh    triremes   and   a   contingent  of   hoplites— while 

Demosthenes  was  getting  together  the  Akarnanian  darters  and  sliu.sicjrs. 

Furvmedon  not  onlv  brought  back  word  of  tlse  distressed  condition 
0^  die   Vthenians  in  the  harbor  of  Syracuse,  but  had  also  learned 
diirinohis  way  back,  their  lieavy  additional  loss  by  the  capture  ot 
the  fm-t  at  Plemmyrium.     Gvlippus  returned  to  Syracuse  early  in  the 
.nrin-Miearlv  about  the  time  when  Agis  invaded  Attica  and  when 
il.,no'thene.s  quitted  P/iRuas.     He  returned  with  tresh  re-eniorce- 
meut  from  the  interior,  and  with  redoubled  ardor  lor  decisive  opera- 
tions ao-ainst  Nikias  before  aid  could  arrive  from  Athens.     It^^was 
his  tirsf  care,  in  conjunction  with  llerniokrates,  to  inspire  the  Syra- 
ciKins  with  courage  for  fighting  the  Atlienians  on  shiplxard.     Such 
was  the  acknowledired  superiority  of  the  latter  at  sea  that  this  was 
a  ta^k  of  some  diflicultv,  calling  for  all  the  eloquence  and  ascendency 
of  the  two  leaders :  ' '  The  Athenians  (said  Ilermokrates  to  his  country- 
men) have  not  been  always  eminent  at  sea  as  they  now  are:  they 
were  once  landsmen  like  you,  and  more  than  vou-they  w(  re  only 
forced  on  shipboard  by  the  Persian  invasion,      fhe  only  way  to  oeal 
with  hold  men  like  them,  is  to  show  a  front  bolder  still.     Ine}/  have 
often  by  their  audacity  tlaunted  enemies  of  greater  real  force  tlian 
themselves,  and  they  must  now  be  taught  that  others  can  i-lay  the 
same  <?ame  with  theni.     Go  right  at  them  before  tliey  expect  it-and 
you  Afill  gain  more  by  thus  surprising  and  intimidating  them  than 
you  will  suffer  by  their  superior  sckmce."     Such  le.^sons,  a<idrcsscd 
to  men  already  in  the  tide  of  success,  were  presently  efhcacious,  and 
a  naval  attack  was  resolved.  •  i,„,i 

The  town  of  Svracuse  had  two  ports,  one  on  each  side  of  he  island 
of  Ortygia.  The  lesser  port  (as  it  was  called  afterward,  the  1  ortus 
Lakkius)  lay  northward  of  Ortygia,  between  that  island  and  the  low 
ground  or  Nekropolis  near  the  outer  city:  the  other  hiy  on  the  oppo- 
site side  of  the  Isthmus  of  Ortygia,  within  the  Great  Harbor.     Both 


120 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


CAPTURE  OF  PLEMMYRIUM. 


121 


of  them  (it  nppt'ars)  wore  protected  against  attack  from  without  by 
piles  ami  stakes  planted  in  tlie  bottom  in  front  of  them.  But  the 
lesser  ]>ort  was  the  more  secure  of  the  two,  and  the  principal  docks 
of  the  Syracusans  were  situated  within  it;  tlie  Syracusau  tket.  eighty 
triremes  strong,  being  distributed  between  tliem.  The  entire  Athe- 
nian fleeX  was  stationed  under  the  fort  of  Plenmiyrium,  immediately 
opposite  to  the  southern  point  of  Ortygia. 

GyHppus  laid  his  plan  with  great  al-ility,  so  as  to  take  the  Athe- 
nians complete  by  surprise.  Having  trained  ai:d  prej)are(l  the  uaval 
force  as  thoroughly  as  lie  could,  he  marched  out  liis  land-force  sec  retly 
by  night,  over  Kpipoke  and  round  by  the  rigltt  kmk  of  the  Aiinpus, 
to  the  neighborhood  of  the  fort  Plemmyrium.  "With  the  first  dawn 
of  morning,  the  Syracu?;an  fleet  sailed  out,  at  one  and  the  s;  me  siiiniil, 
from  botirthe  poi'ts;  45  triremes  out  of  the  lesser  pc.rt;  o5  out  of  the 
other.  Both  squadrons  tried  to  round  the  sculhern  i.oint  of  Oilygia, 
so  as  to  unite  and  to  attack  the  enemy  at  Plemmyrium  in  concert. 
The  Athenians,  though  unprejiared  and  confused,  hastened  toman 
60  ships;  with  25  of  which  they  met  the  85  Syr;,cu.-ans  sailing  f(»rth 
fnmi  the  Great  Harbor— while  with  the  other  35  Ihey  encounteieil 
the  45  from  the  lesser  port,  immediaiely  outside  of  the  mc.uth  of  the 
Great  Harbor.  In  the  former  of  these  two  actions  the  Syracusans 
were  at  first  victors;  in  the  second  also,  the  Syracusans  fn  ni  the  out- 
side forced  their  way  into  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbor,  and  joined 
their  comrades.  But  being  little  accustomed  to  naval  warfare,  they 
presently  fell  into  complete  confusion,  partly  in  consequence  of  llieir 
unexpected  success;  so  that  the  Atiienians,  recovering  from  the  first 
shock,  attacked  them  anew,  and  completely  defeated  them;  sinking 
or  disabling  eleven  ships,  cf  three  of  which  the  crews  weie  nuide 
prisoners,  the  rest  being  mostly  slain.  Three  Athenian  triremes  were 
dest  roved  also. 

But' this  victory,  itself  not  easily  won,  was  more  than  counter- 
balanced by  the  irreparable  loss  of*  Plemmyrium.  During  the  first 
excitement  at  the  Athenian  naval  station,  when  the  ships  were  in 
course  of  l)eing  manned  to  meet  the  unexpected  onset  from  both  ports 
Jit  once,  the  garrison  of  Plenmiyrium  went  to  the  water's  edge  to 
'watch  and  encourage  their  countrymen,  leaving  their  own  walls 
thinly  guarded,  and  little  suspecting  the  presence  of  their  enemy  on 
the  land  side.  This  was  just  what  Gylippus  had  anticipated.  He 
attacked  the  forts  at  daybreak,  taking  the  garrison  completely  by 
surprise,  and  captured  them  after  a  feeble  resistance;  first  the  greatest 
and  most  important  fort,  next  the  tw  o  i^nniller.  The  garrison  sought 
safety  as  they  could,  on  board  the  transports  and  vessels  of  burden  at 
the  station,  and  rowed  across  the  Great  Harbor  to  the  land  camp  of 
Kikias  on  the  other  side.  Those  who  fled  from  the  greater  fort, 
■which  was  the  first  taken,  ran'some  risk  from  the  Syracusans  tri- 
remes, which  were  at  that  moment  victorious  at  sea.  But  by  the  time 
that  the  two  lesser  forts  were  taken,  the  Atheuian  fleet  had  regained 


its  superiority,  so  that  there  was  no  danger  of  similar  pursuit  in  the 
crossing  of  the  Great  Harbor. 

This  well-concerted  surprise  was  no  less  productive  to  the  captors 
than  fatal  as  a  blow  to  the  Athenians.  Not  only  were  many  men  slain, 
and  many  made  prisoners,  in  the  assault — but  there  were  vast  stores 
of  every  kind,  and  even  a  large  stock  of  money  found  within  the 
fort;  partly  belonging  to  the  military  chest,  partly  the  property  of 
the  trierarchs  and  of  private  merchants,  who  had  deposited  it  there 
as  in  the  place  of  greatest  security.  The  sails  of  not  less  than  forty 
triremes  were  also  found  there,  and  three  triremes  which  had  been 
dragged  up  ashore.  Gylippus  caused  one  of  the  three  forts  to  be 
pulled  down,  and  carefully  garrisoned  the  other  two. 

Great  as  the  positive  loss  was  here  to  the  Athenians  at  a  time  when 
their  situation  could  ill  bear  it — the  collateral  damage  and  peril  grow- 
ing out  of  the  capture  of  Plemmyrium  were  yet  more  seridus,  besides 
the  alarm  and  discouragement  which  they  spread  among  the  army. 
The  Syracusans  were  now  masters  of  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  on 
hoth  sides,  so  that  not  a  single  storeship  coidd  enter  without  a  con- 
voy and  a  b;Utle.  What  was  of  not  less  detriment — the  Athenian 
fleet  was  now  forced  to  take  station  under  the  fortified  lines  of  its 
own  land  force,  and  was  thus  cramped  up  on  a  small  space  in  the 
innermost  portion  of  the  Great  Harbor,  between  the  city-wall  and 
the  river  Anapus;  the  Syracusans  being  masters  everywhere  else, 
with  full  communication  between  their  posts  all  round, "hemming  in 
the  Athenian  position  both  by  sea  and  by  land. 

To  the  Syracusans,  on  the  contrary,  the  result  of  the  recent  battle 
proved  every  way  encouraging;  not  merely  from  the  valuable  acquisi- 
tion of  Plemmyrium,  but  even  from  the' sea-fight  itself ;  which  had 
indeed  turned  out  to  be  a  defeat,  but  which  prcimised  at  first  to  be  a 
vietory,  had  they  not  thrown  away  the  chance  by  tlieir  own  disorder, 
h  removed  all  supersliiious  fear  of  Athenian  nautical  supeilority; 
while  their  position  was  so  muc^i  improved  by  having  acquired  the 
eommand  of  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  that"  they  began  even  to 
assume  the  aggressive  at  sea.  They  detached  a  squadron  of  twelve 
triremes  to  the  coast  of  Italy,  for  the  purpose  of  intercept insr  some 
merchant  vessels  coming  with  a  supply  of  money  to  the  Athenians. 
So  little  fear  was  there  of  an  enemy  at  sea,  that  these  vessels  seem  to 
have  been  coming  without  convoy,  and  were  for  the  most  part  des- 
troyed by  the  Syracusans,  together  with  a  stock  of  sliip-timber  which 
the  Athenians  had  collected  near  Kaulonia.  In  touching  at  Lokri 
on  their  return,  they  took  aboard  a  company  of  Thespian  hoplites 
^vho  had  made  their  way  thither  in  a  transport.  Thev  were  also 
fortunate  enough  to  escape  the  squadron  of  twentv  t;irernes  winch 
Nikias  detached  to  lie  in  w^ait  for  them  near  Megara— with  the  loss  of 
one  ship  however,  including  her  crew. 

One  of  this  Syracusan  squadron  had  gone  forward  from  Italy  with 
envoys  to  Peloponnesus,  to  communicate  the  favorable  news'of  the 


I 


122 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


RENEWED   ATTxVCK   BY  GTLIPPUS. 


123 


capture  of  Plrmmvrium,  .ind  to  arcolcrate  as  mucli  as  possible  the 
operations  nirainst  Atticn,  in  ordc-r  that  no  rc'-enforccmt-nts  might  be 
sent  from  tlR'nce.  Atllic^  same  time,  other  envoys  went  from  Syra- 
cuse— not  merely  Syraciisans,  but  also  Corinthians  and  Laccdfc- 
monian.^ — to  visit  tile  cities  in  the  interior  of  Sicily.  They  made 
known  everywhere  the  prodigious  improvements  in  Syraousau 
alTairs  arisini  from  the  c:ain  of  Plemmyrium,  as  well  as  the  iiisimii- 
ficaiit  eliaracter  of  the  recent  naval  defeat.  Tliey  strenuously  pleaded 
for  further  aid  to  Svracuse  without  delay;  since  there  were  now  good 
hopes  of  being  able'to  crush  the  Athenians  in  the  harbor  completely, 
before  tlie  re-enforcements  about  to  1)0  dispatched  could  reach  llura. 

While  these  envoys  \<ere  absent  on  their  mission,  the  Great  Ihiibor 
was  the  scene  of  nulch  desultory  conflict,  though  uot  of  any  conipie- 
hensive  single  battle.  Since  the  loss  of  Plemmyrium,  the  Athenian 
naval  statHrui  was  in  the  north-west  interior  corner  of  that  haihor, 
adjoining  the  fortilicd  lines  occupied  by  their  land  army.  It  was 
inclosed  and  ju-otected  by  a  row  of  ])Os!s  or  stakes  stuck  in  the  liot- 
toni  and  standing  out  oV  the  water.  The  Syracusans  on  their  side 
liad  also  planted  a  stockade  in  Iront  of  the  interior  i-orl  of  Orlygi^, 
to  defeml  their  ships,  their  sliip-houses,  t;nd  their  docks  witliiii. 
As  the  two  stations  were  not  far  apart,  each  parly  watdied  for 
opportunities  of  occasional  attack  o:  annoyance  by  n^issile  weapons 
to  the  Other;  and  daily  skirmishes  of  tiiis  soit  took  ]'lace,  in  vhidi 
on  the  whole  the  Athenians  seem  to  have  bad  tiic  adv;inti;ge.  They 
even  formed  iheplan  of  breaking  through  the  outworks  (.f  iheSyia- 
cusan  dockyard  and  burning  the  shijis  within.  Tliey  biouLht  u]^  a 
ship  of  the  largest  size,  with  wooden  towers  and  .-ide  deft  uses, 
against  the  line  of  posts  fronting  the  dockyard,  and  trie  d  to  force  ihe 
entrance,  either  bv  means  of  divers  who  sawed  ihem  through  at  llie 
bottom,  or  by  boat-crews  who  fastened  ropes  around  them  and  thus 
unfixed'  or  plucked  them  out.  All  this  was  done  under  cover  ol'  ilie 
great  vessel  with  its  towers  manned  by  light-armed,  ^^ho  exeliiuigcd 
showers  of  missiles  with  the  Syracusiui  bowmen  on  the  topofilie 
ship-houses,  and  prevented  the*  latter  from  coming  r.ear  enough  !o 
interrupt  tlie  operation.  The  Athenians  contrived  thus  to  remove 
many  of  the  posts  planted— even  the  most  dangerous  among  llieiii, 
those  which  did  not  reach  to  the  surface  of  the  water,  and  wliK'h 
therefore  a  ship  approaching  could  not  see.  But  they  gained  little 
by  it,  since  tiie  Syracusans  were  able  to  plant  others  in  their  room. 
On  tiie  Avhole,  no  serious  damage  was  done  either  to  the  dockyard  or 
to  the  ships  within.  And  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  Great  Harbor 
stood  sul»stantiallv  unaltered,  during  all  the  time  that  the  envovs 
were  absent  on  their  Sicilian  tour— i>robably  three  weeks  or  a  nicntli. 

These  envovs  had  found  themselves  almost  everywhere  well  n- 
ceived.  The  'prosp.ects  of  Syracuse  were  now  so  triumphant,  sinu 
those  of  Nikias,  with  his  present  force  so  utterly  hopeless,  that  the 
waverers  thought  it  time  to  declare  themselves;  and  all  the  Greek 


cities  in  Sicily,  except  Agrigentum,  whicli  still  remained  neutral  (and 
of  course  except  iS'axos  and  Katanli),  resolved  on  aiding  the  winning 
cause.  From  Kamarina  came  500  hoplites,  400  darters,  and  800 
bowmen;  from  Gela,  live  triremes,  400  darters,  and  200  horsemen. 
Bi'sides  these,  an  additional  force  from  the  other  cities  was  collected, 
to  march  to  Syracuse  in  a  body  across  the  interior  of  the  island,  under 
tlie  conduct  of  the  envoy,>i  theuiselves.  But  this  part  of  the  scheme 
was  frustrated  by  Nikias,  who  was  rendered  more  vigilant  by  the 
present  desperate  condition  of  his  allairs,  than  he  had  been  in  refer- 
ence to  the  cross-march  of  Gylippus.  At  his  instance,  the  Sikel 
tribes,  Kentoiipes,  and  llalikyan,  allies  of  Athens,  were  prevailed 
upon  to  attack  the  approaching  enemy.  They  planned  a  skillful 
ambuscade,  set  upon  them  miaWare,  and  dispersed  ihem  with  the 
loss  of  800  men.  All  the  envoys  were  also  slain,  except  the  Corin- 
thian, Avho  conducted  the  remaining  force  (about  1500  in  number)  to 
i^yniciise. 

This  reverse — which  seems  to  have  happened  about  the  time  when 
Demosthenes  with  his  armament  were  at  Korkyra  on  the  way  to 
Syracuse— so  greatly  dismayed  and  mortified  the  Syracusans,  that 
Gylippus  thought  itadvisabfe  to  postpone  awhile  the  attack  which  he 
iiilended  to  have  made  inunediately  on  the  re-enforcement  ariiving. 
The  delay  of  these  few  days  proved  nothing  less  than  the  salvation 
of  the  Athenian  army. 

It  was  not  until  Desmosthenes  was  approaching  Rhegium,  within 
two  or  three  dtiys'  sail  of  Syracuse,  that  the  attack  w^as  dcternuned 
on  without  furtlier  delay.  Preparation  in  every  way  had  been  made 
for  it  long  before,  especially  for  the  most  eifective  employment  of 
the  naval  force.  Tiie  captains  and  ship-masters  of  Syracuse  and 
Corinth  had  now  become  fully  aware  of  the  superiority  of  Athenian 
nautical  maneuver,  and  of  the  causes  upon  wiiieh  that  superiority 
depended.  The  Athenian  trireme  was  of  a  build  comparatively 
liirlit,  fit  for  rapid  motion  through  the  w^ater,  and  for  easy  change  of 
direelion:  its  prow  was  narrow,  armed  with  a  sharp  projecting  beak 
at  the  end,  but  hollow  and  thin,  not  calculated  to  force  its  way 
through  very  strong  resistance.  It  ^'as  never  intended  to  meet,  in 
direct  impact  and  collision,  the  prow  of  an  enemy:  such  a  proceed- 
ing passed  among  the  able  seamen  of  Athens  for  gross  aw  kward- 
uess.  In  advancing  against  an  enemy's  vessel,  they  evaded  the 
direct  shock,  .steered  so  as  to  pass  by  it— then  by  the  excellence  an<l^ 
exactness  of  their  rowing,  turned  swiftly  round,  altered  their  (lirec- 
tion,  and  came  back  before  the  enemy ^could  alter  his:  or  perhai>s 
rowed  rapidly  round  him — or  backed  their  ship  stern  foremost — uuiil 
tlie  opi){)rtunb\^  was  found  for  driving  the  beak  of  their  ship  ag.iinst 
some  weak  part  of  his— against  the  midships,  the  quarter,  the  stern, 
or  the  oar-bhides  without!  In  such  maneuvers  the  Athenians  were 
unrivaled:  but  none  such  could  be  performed  unless  there  were 
ample  sea-room— which  rendered  their  present  naval  station  the  most 


124 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIAN  FLEET. 


125 


di^advantatrcous  that  could  be  imagined.     They  were  cooped  upiu 
the  inmost  part  of  a  harbor  of  siuftll  ditneusious,  close  on  the  staliou 
of  their  enemies,  and  with  all  the  shore,  except  their  own  lines,  in 
possession  of  those  enemies;  so  that  they  could  not  pull  round  fiom 
want  of  space,  uor  could  thev  back  waier  because  they  durst  not 
come  near  shore.     In  this  contracted  area,  the  only  mode  of  lighting 
possible  was  by  straiirhtlorward  collision,  prow  agamst  prow;  u  pro- 
cess which  no*t  only'shutout  all  their  superior  maneuvermg,  but  was 
unsiiited  to  the  build  of  their  triremes.     On  the  other  hand,  the 
Svracusans  under  the  advice  of  the  able  Corinthian  steersman  Ansto, 
•altered  the  construction  of  their  triremes  to  meet  tlie  special  exigency 
of  the  case,  disreLrardiuir  all  idea  of  what  had  been  generally  loukd 
upon  as  o-ood  nautical  maneuvering.     Instead  of  the  long,  thni,  hol- 
low  and""  sharp,  advancinfl:  beak,   striking  the  enemy  considemhly 
ai)ove  the  water-level,  and  tlierefore  doing  less  damage— they  short- 
ened the  prow,  but  made  it  excessivelv  heavy  and  solid— and  lowered 
the  elevation  on  the  projecting  beak,  so  that  it  became  not  so  nmeli 
calculated  to  pierce,  as  to  break  in  and  crush  by  main  force  all  the 
opposino-  part  of  the  enemy's  ship,  not  far  above  the  water.     What 
were  called  the  epotids— "earcaps"  or  nozzles  projecting  forward 
to  the  ri"-ht  and  left  of  the  beak,  were  made  peculiarly  thick  and  sus- 
tained bv  under-beams  let  into  the  hull  of  the  ship.     In  the  Attic 
build   the  b -ak  stood  forward  very  prominent,  and  the  epoluls  oa 
each  side  of  it  were  kept  back,  serving  the  same  purpose  as  what  are 
called  catheads  in  modern  shii)s,  to  which  the  anchors  are  suspended; 
but  in  the  Corinthian  build,  the  beak  projected  less  and  the  epolids 
more— so  that  thev  served  to  strike  the  eiiemv  :  instead  ol  having  oue 
sin^de  l)eak,  the  Corinthian  ship  might  be  said  to  have  three  noz/Jes. 
The  Svracusans  relied  on  the  narrowness  of  the  space,  tor  sliuttiug 
out  the  Athenian  evolutions,  and  bringing  the   contest  to  nothing 
more  tlian  a  straightforward  collision;  in  which  the  weaker  ve>se 
would    be    broken   and   stove   in   at   the   prow,  and   thus   rendered 

untnayageable.  .,-,,.  i    i 

i  Iavin«'  completed  these  arrangements,  their  land-force  was  marcheil 
out  undn-  Gylippus  to  threateu  cne  side  of  the  Athenian  lines,  whik 
the  cavalry  and  the  garrison  of  the  Olympieion  marched  up  to  lla' 
other  side.  The  Athenians  were  putting  liieinselves  in  poMtion  to 
defend  their  walls  from  what  seemed  to  be  a  land-attack,  when  tlie\ 
saw  the  Syracusan  licet,  eiirhty  triremes  strong,  sailing  out  Ironi  us 
dock  prepared  for  action;  uptm  which  they  too,  though  at  lust  con- 
fused bv  this  unexpected  appearance,  put  their  crews  on  shii-bouin, 
and  went  out  of  their  palisaded  slat  ion,  seventy-tive  triremes  m 
number  to  meet  the  enemv.  The  whole  day  passed  off,  howevei. 
in  desultory  and  indecisive  skirmish,  with  trilling  advantage  to  tiie 
Svracusj\ns,  wlio  disabled  one  or  two  Athenian  ships,  yet  merelv  tiieu 
to  invite  the  Athenians  to  attack,  without  choosing  themselves  to 
force  on  a  close  and  general  action. 


It  w^as  competent  to  the  Athenians  to  avoid  altogether  a  naval 
action  (at  least  until  the  necessity  arose  for  escorting  fresh  supplies 
into  the  harbor)  by  keeping  within  their  station;  and  as  Demosthe- 
nes was  now  at  hand,  prudence  counseled  such  reserve.  Nik  las, 
himself,  too,  is  said  to  have  depreciated  immediate  fighting,  but  to 
have  been  out-votedby  his  two  newly-appointed  colleagues  Henander 
iiud  Euthydenius;  who,  anxious  to  show  what  they  could  do  without 
Demosthenes,  took  their  stand  upon  Athenian  maritime  honor,  which 
peremi)torily  forbade  them  to  shrink  from  the  battle  when  offered. 

Though  on  the  next  day  the  Syracusans  made  no  movement,  yet 
Nikias,  foreseeing  that  they  would  speedily  recommence,  and  no  way 
encouraged  by  the  equal  manifestations  of  the  preceding  day, 
caused  every  trierach  to  repair  what  damage  his  ship  had  sustained, 
and  even  took  tlie  precaution  of  further  securing  his  naval  station  by 
mooring  merchant  vessels  just  alongside  of  the  openings  in  the  pali- 
stide.  about  200  feet  apart.  The  prows  of  these  vessels  were  pro- 
vided with  dolphins — or  beams  lilted  up  on  high  and  armed  at  the 
end  with  massive  heads  of  iron,  which  could  be  so  let  fall  as  to  crush 
any  ship  entering;  any  xitheiiian  trireme  which  might  be  hard- 
pressed,  would  tjius  be  enabled  to  get  tlirough  this  opening  where 
110  enemy  could  follow,  and  choose  lier  own  time  for  sailing  out 
again.  Before  night,  such  arrangements  were  completed.  At  the 
earliest  dawn  of  next  day,  the  Syracusans  re-appeared,  with  the  same 
demonstrations  both  of  land-force  and  naval  force  as  before.  The 
Athenian  fleet  having  gone  forth  to  meet  them,  several  hours  were 
spent  in  the  like  indecisive  and  partial  skirmishes,  until  at  length  the 
Syracusan  fleet  sailed  back  to  the  city — again  without  brinn-iug  on 
any  general  or  close  combat.  The  Athenians,  construing  such 
retirement  of  the  enemy  as  evidence  of  backwardness  and  unwilling- 
ness to  fight,  and  supposing  the  day's  duty  at  an  end,  retired  on  their 
side  within  their  own  station,  disembarked,  and  separated  to  get 
their  dinners  at  leisure — having  tasted  no  food  that  day. 

But  ere  they  had  l)een  long  ashore,  they  were  astoni'slied  tc^see  the 
Syracusan  fleet  sailing  back  to  renew  the  attack,  in  full  battle  crier. 
This  was  a  maneuver  suggested  by  the  Corinthian  Aristo,  the  ;;b  est 
steersman  in  the  fleet,  at  whose  instance  the  Syracusan  admirals 
had  sent  back  an  urgent  request  to  the  city  authorities  that  an 
abundant  stock  of  ])rcvisions  might  for  that  "day  be  brought  down 
[*  to  the  sea-shore,  and  sale  be  rendered  compulsory,  so  that  no  time 
sliould  De  lost  when  the  fleet  returned  thither,  in  taking  a  hasty  meal 
without  dispersion  of  the  crews.  Accordingly  the  fleet,  after  ji  short 
out  sutflcient  interval,  allowed  for  refreshment  thus  close  at  liaud, 
was  brouirht  back  unexpectedly  to  the  enemy's  station.  Confounded 
at  the  sight,  the  Athenian  crews  forced  themselves  aa:ain  on  board. 
most  of  them  yet  without  refreshment,  and  in  the  midst  of  murmurs 
and  disorder.  On  sailing  out  of  their  station,  the  indecisive  skir- 
mishing again  commenced,  and  continued  for  some  time— until  at 


126 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


VOYAGE  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


127 


Icncrth  the  Athenian  captains  became  f^o  impatient  of  prolonged  and 
eximusting  fatigue,  that  they  resolved  to  begin  of  themselves,  and 
make  the  action  close  as  Aveli  as  general.  Accordingly  the  word  of 
command  was  given,  and  tliey  rowed  forward  to  make  the  attack, 
whieli  was  cheerfully  received*  by  the  Syracusans.  By  receiving  tiie 
attack  instead  of  making  it,  the  latter  were  better  enabled  to  insure 
a  straightforward  collision  of  i)row  against  prow,  excluding  all  cir- 
cuit, backiiig,  or  evolutions,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy:  at  any  rate, 
their  steersnien  contrived  to  realize  this  plan,  and  to  crush,  stave  in, 
or  damage,  the  forej^art  of  many  of  the  Athenian  triremes,  simply 
by  sui>eri()r  weight  of  material  and  solidity  on  their  own  side.  The 
Syracusan  darters  on  the  deck,  monover,  as  soon  as  the  combat 
bc'came  close,  were  both  numerous  and  destructive;  while  their  little 
boats  rowed  immediately  under  the  sides  of  the  Athenian  triremes, 
broke  the  blades  of  their'oars,  tmd  shot  darts  in  through  the  oar-holes 
against  the  rowers  within.  At  length  the  Atlienians,  after  snstaiiiiii;^ 
tiie  combat  bravely  for  some  time,  found  themselves  at  such  disad- 
vantage that  they  were  compelled  to  give  way  and  seek  shelter  witliin 
their  own  station.  The  arnu'd  merchant-vessels  which  Nikias  had 
planted  before  the  openings  in  the  palisade  were  now  found  of  great 
use  in  checking  the  pursuing  Syracusans,  two  of  whose  triremes,  iu 
the  excitement  of  victory,  inished  forward  too  near  to  them  and  vvcre 
disabled  by  the  heavy  iiiiplements  on  board — one  of  them  being  cap- 
tured with  all  her  crew.  The  general  victory  of  the  Syracusans, 
however,  was  complete:  seven  Athenian  triremes  were  sunk  or  dis- 
abled, many  others  were  seriously  damaged,  and  numbers  of  seamen 
either  slain  or  made  jirisoners. 

Overjoved  with  the  restdt  of  this  battle,  which  seems  to  have  been 
no  less  skillfully  planned  than  bravely  executed,  the  Syracui^ans  now 
felt  confident  of  their  superiority  by  sea  as  v.ell  as  on  land,  and  ccjn- 
templated  notliing  less  than  the  complete  destruction  of  their  enemies 
in  the  hr.rbor.  Tiie  generals  were  already  concerting  measures  fur 
ren(»\ved  attack  both  by  land  and  by  sea,  and  a  week  or  two  more 
would  probably  have  seen  the  ruin  of 'this  once  triumphant  besieging 
armament,  now  full  of  nothing  Imt  discouragement.  The  mere  sloj)- 
pasre  of  supplies,  in  fact,  as  the  Syracusans  were  masters  of  tlie 
mouth  of  the  harl)or,  would  De  sure  to  starve  ii  out  in  no  len.ir 
time,  if  they  maintained  their  superiority  at  sea.  All  their  calcuLi- 
tions  were  suspended,  however,  and  the  hopes  of  the  Athenians  tor 
the  time  revived,  by  the  entry  of  Demosthenes  and  Eurynic don 
with  the  second  arma-nent  into  the  Great  Harbor,  which  seems  to 
have  taken  ])lace  on  the  very  day.  or  on  the  second  day,  after  the 
recent  battle.  So  important  weVe  the  consequences  which  tiiruci 
upon  that  postjwnement  of  the  Syracusan  attack,  occasioned  by  the 
recent  defeat  of  their  re-enforcing  army  from  the  interior.  So  liH'^' 
did  either  party  think,  at  tliat  moment,  that  it  wouhl  have  been  a 
mitigation  of  calamity  to  Athens,  if  Demosthenes  had  not  arrived  m 


time;  if  the  ruin  of  the  first  armament  had  been  actually  consum- 
in;itcd  before  the  coming  of  the  second  ! 

Demosthenes,  after  ob.ainiiig  the  required  re-enforcements  at  Kor- 
kvra,  had  crossed  tlie  Ionian  sja  to  tiie  islands  called  Cho^nides  on 
the  coast  of  Iai)ygia,  where  he  took  aboard  a  band  of  150  Messapian 
darters,  tlirougir  the  friendly  aid  of  the  native  prince  Artas,  with 
whom  an  ancient  alliance  was  renewed.  Passing  on  further  to  Met- 
apontum,  already  in  alliance  with  Athens,  he  was  there  reinforced 
with  two  triremes  and  three  hundred  darters,  with  which  addition 
he  sailed  on  to  Tiiurii.  Here  he  found  himself  cordially  welcomed; 
for  the  philo- Athenian  party  was  in  full  ascendency,  htiving  recently 
L'ot  the  better  in  a  vehement  dissension,  and  passed  ;i  sentence  of 
banishment  against  their  opponents.  Tliey  not  only  took  a  formal 
resolution  to  acknowledge  the  same  friends  and  the  stmie  enemies  as 
the  Atlienians,  but  equipped  a  regiment  of  700  hoplites  and  ;300  dart- 
ers to  acconij)any  Demosthenes,  who  remaini d  there  louii,-  enough  to 
pass  his  troops  in  review  and  verify  the  completeness  of  each  divi- 
sion. After  having  held  this  review  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Syharis, 
he  marched  his  troops  by  land  through  the  Tiuu'ian  territory  to  the 
banks  of  the  river  [lyliis  which  divided  it  from  Krotun.  He  was 
k're  met  by  Krotoniate  envoys,  who  forbade  the  access  to  their 
territory:  upon  which  he  mirched  down  the  river  to  the  seashore, 
got  on'  shipboard,  and  pursued  his  voyage  southward  along  tiie 
coast  of  Italy — touching  at  the  various  towns,  all  except  the  hostile 
Lokri. 

His  entry  into  the  harbor  of  Syracuse — accomplished  in  the  most 
ostentatious  trim,  with  deeorations  and  musical  {accompaniments — 
was  no  less  imposinn"  from  ihe  magniludi;  of  his  force,  than  critical 
in  respect  to  oi)portuiiity.  Taking  Athenians,  allies,  and  mercenary 
forces  together — he  conducted  73  triremes,  5,000  hoplites,  and  a  large 
number  of  light  troops  of  every  description;  archers,  slingers,  dart- 
ers, etc.,  with  other  requisites  for  effective  operation.  At  the  sight 
of  such  an  armament,  not  inferior  to  the  lirsl  wliich  had  arrived 
under  Nikias,  the  Syracusans  lost  for  a  moment  tlie  confidence  of 
their  recent  triumpli,  and  were  struck  with  dismay  as  well  as  won- 
der. That  Athens  could  be  rash  enougii  to  spare  such  an  armament, 
at  a  moment  when  the  full  burst  oi"  Peloponnesian  hostility  was 
reopening  upon  her,  and  when  Dekeleia  was  in  course  of  being  forti- 
fied— was  a  fact  out  of  all  reasonable  probability,  and  not  to  be  cred- 
ited unless  actually  seen.  And  probably  the  Syracu.sans,  though 
tliey  knew  that  Demosthenes  was  on  his  wa}--,  had  no  idea  before- 
hand of  t!ie  magnitude  of  his  armament. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  hearts  of  the  discomfited  and  beleaguered 
Athenians  again  revived  as  they  welcomed  their  new  comrades.  Tliey 
saw  themselves  again  masters  by  land  as  well  as  by  sea;  and  tiiey 
di>played  their  renewed  superiority  by  marching  out  of  their  lines 
i'ortiivvith  and  ravaging  the  lands  near  the  Anapus;  the  Syracusans 


128 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


DECISIVE  PLAN  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


129 


not  venturing  to  engas:^  in  a  general  action,  and  merely  watcbinff 
the  movement  with  some  cavalry  from  llie  Olympieion. 

But  Demosthenes  was  not  imposed  upon  by  this  delusive  show  of 
power,  so  soon  as  he  had  made  himself  master  of  the  full  state  of 
ull'airs,  and  had  compared  his  own  means  with  those  of  tie  enemy. 
He  found  the  army  of  Nikias  not  merely  worn  down  with  long-con- 
tinued toil,  and  disheartened  by  previous  defeat,  but  also  weakened 
in  a  terrible  degree  by  the  marsh  fever  general  toward  the  clo^e  of 
summer,  in  the  low  ground  where  they  were  encamped. 

He  saw  that  the  Syracusans  were  strong  in  multiplied  allies,  ex- 
tended forlitications,  a  leader  of  great  ability,  and  general  belief 
that  theirs  was  the  winning  cause.  Moreover,  he  felt  deei>ly  tiie* 
position  of  Athens  at  home,  and  her  need  of  all  her  citizens  jigninst 
enemies  within  sight  of  her  own  walls.  But  above  all,  he  came  pene- 
trated with  the  deplorable  effects  which  had  resulted  from  the  mis- 
take of  Nikias,  in  wasting  irreparably  so  much  precious  time,  and 
frittering  away  tiie  tirst  terror-striking  impression  of  his  splendid 
armament.  All  these  considerations  determined  Demosthenes  to  act 
without  a  moment's  delay,  while  the  impression  produced  by  his 
arrival  was  yet  unimpaired — and  to  aim  one  great  and  decisive  blow, 
such  as  might,  if  successful,  make  the  conquest  of  Syracuse  auain 
probable.  If  this  should  fail,  he  resolved  to  abandon  the  whole 
enterprise  and  return  home  w  ith  his  armament  forthwith. 

By  means  of  the  Athenian  lines,  he  had  possession  of  the  southern- 
most portion  of  the  slope  of  Epipohe.  But  all  along  that  slope  from 
east  to  west,  immediately  in  front  or  to  the  north  of  his  position, 
stretched  the  counter-wall  built  bv  the  Svracusans;  beginnini;  at  tl.c 
city-wall  on  the  lowest  ground,  and  reaching  up  tirst  in  a  north-wes- 
terly, next  in  a  westerly  direction,  until  it  joined  the  fort  on  the 
upper  ground  near  the  cliff,  where  the  road  from  Euryalus  down  to 
Syracuse  passed.  The  Syracusans  as  defenders  were  on  the  north 
side  of  this  counter-wall;  he  and  the  Athenians  on  the  south  side. 
It  was  a  complete  bar  to  his  progress,  and  he  could  not  stir  a  step 
without  making  himself  master  of  it;  toward  which  end  there  were 
only  two  possible  nieans — eitlier  to  storm  it  in  front,  or  to  turn  it 
from  its  western  extremity  by  marching  round  up  to  the  Euryalus. 
He  began  by  trying  the  tirst  method,  liut  the  wall  was  abundantly 
manned  and  vigorously  defended;  his  battering  machines  were  all 
burnt  or  disqualified,  and  every  attempt  which  he  made  was  eoni- 
pletely  repulsed.  There  remained  only  the  second  method — to  turn 
the  wall,  ascending  by  circuitous  roads  to  the  heights  of  Euryalus 
beliind  it,  and  then  attacking  the  fort  in  which  it  terminated. 

But  the  march  necessary  fortius  purpose — tirst,  up  the  valley  of 
the  Anapus,  visible  from  tlie  Syracusau  posts  above;  next,  ascending 
to  the  Euryalus  by  a  narrow  and  winding  path — was  so  diflicult,  tluit 
even  Demosthenes,  naturally  sanguine,  despaired  of  being  able  to 
force  his  way  up  in  the  daylight,  against  an  eueuiy  seeing  the  attack. 


H '  wa^  th  'refore  constrained  to  attempt  a  night-surprise,  for  Avhich, 
Kikias  an  I  his  other  colleagues  consenting,  he  accordingly  made  pre- 
pu-atioas  on  the  largest  and  most  effective  scale.  He  took  the  command 
himself,  aloag  with  Menander  and  Eurymedon  (Nikias  being  left  to 
coainiuid  within  the  lines) — conducting  hoplites  and  light  troops, 
toi^i'ther  with  masons  and  carpenters,  and  all  other  matters  necessary 
for  establisliiag  a  fortified  post — lastly,  giving  orders  that  every  man 
should  carry  with  him  provisions  for  five  days. 

Fortune  so  far  favored  him,  that  not  only  all  the^e  preliminary 
arrangements,  but  even  his  march  itself,  was  accomplished  without 
any  suspicion  of  the  enemy.  At  the  beginning  of  a  moonlight  night, 
he  quitted  the  lines,  moved  along  the  low  ground  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Anapus  an  1  parallel  to  that  river  for  a  considerable  distance — then 
following  various  roads  to  the  right,  arrived  at  the  Eurj^alus  or 
highest  pitch  of  EpipohB,  where  lie  found  himself  in  the  same  track 
by  which  the  Athenians  in  coming  from  Katana  a  year  and  a  half 
before — andGylippus  in  coming  from  the  interior  of  the  island  about 
ten  inoiuhs  before — had  ])assed,  in  order  to  get  to  the  slope  of  Epi- 
pohe  above  Syracuse.  He  reached  without  being  discovered,  the 
extr.'in?  Syraeusan  fort  on  the  high  ground — assailed  it  completel}'  by 
siuprise— and  captured  it  after  a  feeble  resistance.  Some  of  the  gar- 
rison within  it  were  sliin;  but  the  greater  part  escaped,  and  ran  to 
give  the  alarm  to  the  three  fortified  camps  of  Svracusans  and  allies, 
which  w^erc  placed  one  below  another  behind  the  long  continuous 
wall,  on  tho  declivity  of  Epipohe — as  well  as  to  a  chosen  regiment  of 
six  hundred  Syracusan  hoplites  under  Hermokrates,  who  formed  a 
ni'j^'it -watch  or  bivouac.  This  regiment  hastened  up  to  the  rescue, 
but  D  unosthenes  and  the  Athenian  vanguard,  charging  impetuously 
forward,  drove  them  back  in  disorder  upon  the  fortified  positions  in 
thi'ir  rear.  Even  Gylippus,  and  the  Synicusan  troops  advancing 
upward  out  of  these  positions,  were  at  first  carried  back  by  the  same 
retreating  movement. 

So  far  the  enterprise  of  Demosthenes  had  been  successful  beyond 
all  reasonable  hope.  He  was  master  not  only  of  the  outer  fort  of  the 
Syracusan  position,  but  also  of  the  extremity  of  their  counter-wall 
which  rested  upon  that  fort:  the  counter- wall  was  no  longer  defensi- 
ble, now  that  he  had  got  on  the  north  or  Syracusan  side  of  it— so 
that  the  men  on  the  parapet,  where  it  joined  the  fort,  made  no  resis- 
tance and  fled.  Some  of  the  Athenians  even  began  to  tear  down  the 
parapets,  and  demolish  this  part  of  the  counter-wall;  an  operation  of 
extreme  importance,  since  it  would  have  opened  to  Demosthenes  a 
emninunicatio!!  with  the  southern  side  of  the  counter-wall,  leading 
directly  towards  the  Athenian  lines  on  Epipohe.  At  any  rate,  his 
plan  of  turning  the  counter- wall  was  already  carried — if  he  could 
only  have  maintained  himself  in  his  actual  position,  even  without 
advancing  farther — and  if  he  could  have  demolished  two  or  three  hun- 
dred yards  of  the  upper  cxtiemitv  of  the  wall  now  in  his  power. 

H.  G.  III. -5 


130 


RESU3IPTI0N  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


RENEWED  AGGRESSIVE  PLANS. 


131 


Wlicther  it  would  Imvc  born  possilne  for  liim  to  maintain  lilmsclf 
Avithout  farther  advance.  uuUl  duy  broke,  and  thus  avoid  the  unknown 
perils  of  n  nii;i»t-baltl('.  we  cannot  say.  But  both  he  and  his  nic-ii,  tdo' 
nuich  flushed  with  success  to  think  of  hallinii:.  hastened  forward  lo 
complete  their  victory,  aaid  to  prevent  tlie  disordered  Syracusans 
from  again  re-covering  :i  tirm  array.  I'nfortunjitely  however  their 
ardor  of  pursuit  (ns  it  constantly  happened  with  Grecian  hoplites)(lis. 
turbed  the  reuularitv  of  their  own  ranks,  so  that  they  were  not  iu 
coiidition  to  sland  the  sh(.ck  of  the  B(eolian  hoplites,  just  enieig((l 
from  their  position,  and  marching  up  in  steady  and  excellent  onkr 
to  the  scene  of  action  The  Pxeotians  charged  them,  ar.d  aflcr  a 
short  resistance,  broke  them  complelely,  forcing  them  to  take  fli;:lit. 
The  fu"-itives  of  the  v:in  were  thus  driven  back  upon  their  own  com- 
rades advancing  from  behind— still  under  tlie  impression  of  succe.s.';- 
ignorant  of  what  had  passed  in  front— and  themselves  urged  on  by 
the  fresh  troops  closing  up  in  their  rear. 

In   this  manner  tlie  whole  army  presently  became  one  scene  of 
clamor  and  confusion,  wherein  there  was  neither  coiiHiiaml  nor  ukd- 
ience,  nor  could  anv  one  discern  what  was  passing.     '1  he  light  of  tlio 
moon  rendered  objects  and  tigures  generally  visible,  without  beiii:,^ 
sullicleut  to  discriminate  friend  from  foe.     The  l)eaten  Athenians, 
thrown  back  upon  their  comrades,  were  in  many  cases  mistaken  for 
enemies  and  slain.     The  Svracusans  and   Ba-otiuns  shouting  aloud 
and  pursuing  their  advantage,  became  intermingled  with  the  fore- 
most Athenians,  and  both  armies  thus  grouped  into  knots  which  only 
distin-niished  each  other  by  mutual  demand  of  the  watchword,  llitit 
test  aCo  soon  failed,  since  eaeh  ])arty  got  acquainted  with  the  watch- 
word of  the  other— esix'cially  that  of  the  Athenians,  among  whom 
the  confusion  was  the  areatest,  became  well-known  to  the  ISvniciis- 
ans,  who  kept  together  in  larger  parties.     Above  all,  the  etlect  of 
tlie  psean  or  war-sliout,  on  both  sides,  was  remarkable.     T  he  Doriaus 
in  the  Athenian  armv  (fiom  Argos,  Korkyra,  and  other  plaees)  niml 
a  piean  not  distimiuishable  fio.a  that  of  the  Syiacusans:  accordin.dv 
their  shout  struck  terror  into  the  Athenians  themselves,  who  fanciia 
that  they  had  enemies  in  their  own  rear  and  center.     Such  disorder 
and  panic  presently  ended  in  a  gent.Tal  flight.     The  Atiienians  bur- 
ried  back  by  the  same  roads  v>hicli  they  had  ascended;  but  tlicse 
roads  were  found  too  narrow  for  terrified  fugitives,  and    many  of 
them  threw  awav  their  arms  in  order  to  scramble  or  jump  down  the 
cliffs   in  which  most  of  them  perished.     Even  of  those  who  salc-iy 
effected  their  descent  into  the  plain  below,  many  (<  sj^ccially  thenc\\- 
comcrs  belonging  to  the  armament  of  Demosthenes)  lest  tncir  ^^ay 
throu'^h  ignorance;  and  were  cut  off  the  next  day  by  the  Syraciisiu 
borsef    With  terrible  loss  of  numbers,  and  broken  spirit,  the  xUiie- 
Dians  at  length  bmnd  shelter  within  llieir  own  lines.     Their  less  oi 
arms  was  even  greaier  than  that  of  men.  from  the  throwing  away  oi 
shields  by  tliose  soldiers  who  leaped  the  cliff. 


The  overjoyed  Syracusans  erected  two  trophies,  one  upon  the  road 
to  EpipoliP,  the  other  ujion  the  exact  and  critical  spot  where  the  Breo- 
lians  had  first  wi'ihstood  and  first  repelled  the  enemy.  By  a  victory, 
so  uaexi)ected  and  overwh(>lming,  their  feelings  were  restored  to  the 
same  pitch  of  confidence  which  had  animated  them  before  the  arrival 
of  Demosthenes.  Again  now  masters  of  the  field,  they  again  in- 
dulged the  hope  of  storming  the  Athenian  lines  and  destroying  the 
armament;  to  which  end,  however,  it  was  thought  necessary  to 
obtain  additional  re-enforcements,  and  Gylippus  went  in  person  Avitli 
this  commission  to  the  various  cities  of  Sicily — wdiile  Sikanus  with 
fifteen  triremes  was  dispatched  to  Agrigentum,  then  understood  lo 
be  wavering,  and  in  a  political  crisis. 

During  the  absence  of  Gylippus,  the  Athenian  generals  w^ere  left 
to  moarii  their  recent  reverse,  and  to  discuss  the  exigencies  of  their 
untoward  position.  The  whole  armamant  was  now  full  of  discour- 
agement and  weariness;  impatient  to  escape  from  a  scene  where  fever 
daily  thinned  their  numbers,  and  wiiere  they  seemed  destined  to 
nothing  but  dishonor.  Such  painful  evidences  of  increasing  disorgan- 
ization only  made  Demosthenes  more  strenuous  in  enforcing  the  res- 
olution which  he  had  taken  before  the  attack  on  Epipobje.  He  had 
done  bis  best  to  strike  one  decisive  bknv:  the  chances  of  war  had 
turned  out  against  him,  and  iiiflicted  a  humilating  defeat;  he  now 
therefore  insisted  on  reliniiuishing  the  whole  enterprise  and  return- 
ing home  forthwith.  The  season  was  yet  favorable  for  the  voyage 
(it  seems  to  have,  been  the  beginning  of  August),  while  the  triremes 
recently  brought,  as  yet  unused,  rendered  them  masters  at  sea  for  the 
present.  It  was  idle  (he  added)  to  waste  more  time  and  money  in 
staying  to  carry  on  war  against  Syracuse,  which  they  could  not  now 
hope  to  subdue;  especially  when  Athens  had  so  much  need  of  thera 
all  at  home,  against  the  garrison  of  Dekcleia. 

This  proposition,  though  espoused  and  seconded  by  Eurymedon, 
was  peremptorily  opposed  by  Nikias;  wiio  contended,  first,  that  their 
present  distress  and  the  unpromising  chances  for  the  future,  though 
he  admitted  the  full  reality  of  both,  ought  not  nevertheless  to  be  pub- 
licly proclaimed.  A  formal  resolution  to  retire,  passed  in  the  pres- 
ence of  so  many  persons,  would  inevitably  become  known  to  the 
enemy,  and  therefore  could  never  be  executed  with  silence  and  sec- 
re(^y — as  such  a  resolution  ought  to  be.  But  furthermore,  be  (Nikias) 
took  a  decided  objection  to  the  resolution  itself.  He  would  never 
coas'int  to  carry  back  the  arm  unent,  without  specific  authority  from 
home  to  do  so.  Sure  he  w^a-^  that  the  Athenian  people  would  never 
tolerate  such  a  proceeding.  When  submitted  to  the  public  assembly 
at  home,  the  conduct  of  the  generals  would  be  judged,  not  by^  per- 
sons who  had  been  at  Syracuse  and  cognizant  of  the  actual  facts, 
hut  by  hearers  who  would  learn  all  that  the\^  knew  from  the  artful 
speeches  of  criminative  orators.  Even  the  citizens  actually  serving 
—though  now  loud  in  cries  of  suffering,  and  impatient  to  get  home 


132 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


ATHENIANS  REMAIN  INACTIVE. 


133 


— would  alter  their  tone  when  they  were  safe  in  the  public  assemhlv; 
and  would  turn  round  to  denounce  their  generals  as  having  heiii 
bribed  to  brinir  away  the  army.  Speakini,^  his  own  personal  feeliiiiis. 
he  knew  too  well  the  tempers  of  liis  c(nuitrynien  to  expose  himself 
to  llie  danger  of  thus  perishing  under  a  charge  alike  unmerited  and 
disgraceful.  Sooner  would  he  incur  any  extremity  of  risk  from  tiie 
,  enemy.  It  must  be  recollected  too  (he  added)  tliat  if  thiir  alT.iirs 
'  were  now  bad,  those  c>f  Syracuse  were  as  bad,  and  even  worse.  For 
more  than  a  year,  the  war  hud  been  imj)osing  upon  llie  Sj'racusaiis 
a  ruinous  cost,  in  subsistence  for  foreign  allies  as  well  as  in  kcci)iug 
up  outlying  posts — so  that  they  had  already  spent  2,000  taleiils, 
besides  heavy  debts  contracted  and  not  paid.  They  cordd  not  con- 
tinue in  this  course  longer:  yet  the  suspension  of  their  payments 
would  at  once  alienate  their  allies,  and  leave  them  helpless.  The 
cost  of  the  war  (to  which  Demosthenes  had  alluded  as  a  reason  for 
returning  home)  could  be  nuich  better  borne  by  Athens;  while  a 
little  farther  pressure  would  utterly  bre:dv  down  the  Syracusans. 
He  (Nikias)  therefore  advised  to  remain  where  they  were  and  con- 
tinue the  siege;  the  more  so  as  their  lleet  had  now  become  unques- 
tionably the  superior. 

Both  Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon  protested  in  the  strongest 
language  against  the  proposition  of  Nikias.  Especially  they  treated 
the  plan  of  remaining  in  the  Great  Harbor  as  fraught  with  ruin,  and 
insisted,  at  the  very  least,  on  quitting  this  position  without  a  mo- 
ment's delay.  Even  admitting  (for  aigumenl)  the  scruples  of  Nikias 
against  abandoning  the  Syracusan  Avar  without  formal  authority 
from  home,  they  still  urged  an  immediate  transfer  of  their  camp 
from  the  Great  Harbor  to  Thapsus  or  Kalana.  At  cither  of  these 
stations  they  could  prosecute  operations  against  Syracuse,  with  ail 
the  advantage  of  a  wider  range  of  country  for  supplies,  a  healthier 
spot,  and  above  all  of  an  ojien  sea,  which  w  as  absolutely  indispensa- 
ble to  the  naval  tactics  of  Athenians;  escaping  from  that  narrow 
basin  which  condemned  them  to  inferiorit}'  even  on  their  own  proper 
element.  At  all  events  to  remove,  and  remove  forthw  ith,  out  of  the 
Great  Harbor — such  was  the  pressing  requisition  of  Demosthenes 
and  Euryme(ion. 

But  even  to  the  modified  motion  of  transferring  the  actual  position 
to  Thapsus  or  Katana,  Nikias  refused  to  consent.  He  insisted  on 
remaining  as  they  were — and  it  appears  that  Menauder  and  Euthy- 
demus  (colleagues  named  by  the  assembly  at  home  before  the 
departure  of  the  second  armament)  must  have  voted  under  the  intlu- 
ence  of  his  authority;  Avhereby  the  majority  became  on  his  side. 
Nothing  less  than  being  in  a  minorit)',  probabfy,  would  have  indue  ed 
Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon  to  submit — on  a  point  of  such  tran- 
scendent importance. 

It  was  thus  that  the  Athenian  armament  remained  without  quitting 
the  Harbor,  yet  apparently  quite  inactive,  during  a  period  which 


cannot  have  been  less  than  between  three  weeks  and  a  month,  until 
(ivlippa^  returned  to  Syracuse  w^th  fresh  re-enforcements.  Through- 
out the  army,  hope  of  success  appears  to  have  vanished,  while  anxiety 
for  return  had  become  general.  The  opinions  of  Demosthenes  and 
Enrvniedon  were  doubtless  well  known,  and  orders  for  retreat  Avero 
expected,  but  never  (;ame.  Nikias  obstinately  refused  to  give  them, 
duVinir  the  whole  of  this  fatal  interval;  Avhicli  plunged  the  army  into 
tlie  abyss  of  ruin,  instead  of  mere  failure  in  their  aggressive  enter- 
prise. 
So  unaccountable  did  such  obstmacy  appear  that  many  persons 

cave  Nikias  credit  for  knowing  more  than  he  chose  to  reveal.  Even 
Thiicydides  thinks  that  he  Avas  misled  b^^  that  part}^  in  Syracuse, 
Willi  whom  he  had  always  kept  up  a  secret  correspondence  (seem- 
ingly apart  from  his  colleagues),  [ind  who  still  urged  him,  by  special 
inessages.  not  to  go  away;  assuring  him  that  Syracuse  could  not 
possibly  go  on  longer.  Without  fully  trusting  these  intimations,  he 
coiikl  not  bring  himself  to  act  against  them.  He  therefore  hung 
back  from  day  to  day,  refusing  to  pronounce  the  decisive  Avord. 

Nothing  throughout  the  Avhole  career  of  Nikias  is  so  inexplicable 
a^  his  guilty  fatuity — for  Ave  can  call  it  by  no  lighter  ntime,  seeing 
thit  it  involved  all  the  brave  men  around  him  in  one  conunon  ruin 
wi'li  himself— at  the  present  critical  juncture.  Hoav  can  wesui)pose 
liim  to  have  really  b  'lieved  that  the  Syracusans,  noAV  in  the  tl:)od- 
tide  of  success,  and  Avhen  Gylippus  Avas  gone  forth  to  procure  addi- 
tional forces,  Avould  break  down  and  be  unfd)le  to  carry  on  the  Avar? 
Chililish  as  such  credulity  seems,  wx'  are  nevertheless  compelled  to« 
adinil  it  as  real,  to  such  an  extent  as  to  counterbalance  all  the  press- 
inirmotives  for  departure;  motives  enforced  by  discerning  colleagues 
as  well  as  by  the  complaints  of  the  army,  and  brought  home  to  his 
own  observation  by  the  experience  of  the  late  na\'al  defetit.  At  any 
rate,  it  served  as  an  excuse  for  that  fatal  Aveakness  of  his  clniracter 
which  made  him  incapable  of  taking  resolutions  founded  on  pros- 
pective calculations,  and  chained  him  to  his  actual  position  until  he 
was  driven  to  act  by  imminent  necessity. 

But  Ave  discern  on  the  present  occasion  another  motiA^e,  which 
counts  for  much  in  dictating  his  hesitation.  The  other  generals 
think  with  satisfaction  of  going  ])ack  to  their  country,  and  rescuing 
the  force  which  A'ct  remained,  even  under  circumstances  of  disap- 
pointment and  failure.  Not  so  Nikhis:  he  knows  too  avcU  the 
reception  v.iuch  he  had  deserved,  and  Avhich  might  possibly  bo  in 
store  for  him.  AvoAvedly  indeed,  he  anticipates  reproach  from  the 
Athenians  against  the  generals,  but  only  uruuerlted  reproach,  on  the 
special  ground  of  bringing  aAvay  the  army  Avithout  orders  from 
home— adding  some  harsh  critiefsms  upon  tlie  injustice  of  the  popu- 
lar judgment  and  the  perfid ,"  of  his  own  soldiers.  But  in  the  first 
place,  Ave  may  remark  that  Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon,  though  as 
much  responsible  as  he  was  for  this  decision,  had  no  such  fear  of 


134 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


ECLIPSES  CONSIDERED  AS  SIGNS. 


135 


popular  injustice;  or  if  they  hail,  saw  clearly  that  the  obliirationof 
hravinijj  it  was  here  imperative.  And  in  the  next  place,  no  man  ever 
liad  so  little  reason  to  complain  of  the  p<)j)ular  judirmcnt  as  ]Sikui>. 
The  mistakes  of  the  people  in  rc2:ard  1o  him  had  always  btcii  llmsc 
or  indulirence,  over-esteem,  and  over-coustaney.  But  JNikias  I'oixsiiw 
too  well  that  he  would  have  more  to  answer  for  at  Athens  tliaii  llu; 
simple  fact  of  sanctioning'  retreat  luuler  existinic  circumstances.  He 
could  not  but  nMuemlxr  the  j)rldc  and  sjinguine  hopes  U!uler  Avliich 
lie  had  oriii-iiially  conducted  the  cxprdilion  out  of  IViia-us.  con- 
trasted with  the  miserable  se(iue1  and  ignominious  close — even  if 
the  account  had  been  now  closed,  without  worse.  He  could  not 
but  be  conscious,  more  or  less,  hovr  much  of  all  this  was  o\Yiug  to 
Ids  own  misjudgmeat;  and  under  such  impiessions  the  idea  of 
meeting  the  free  criticisms  and  scrutiny  of  his  fellow-cili/.eiis  (evcD 
putting  aside  the  chance  of  judicial  trial)  nuist  have  been  iiisiip- 
porlably  humiliating.  To  Nikias — a  perfectly  brave  man.  and  suf- 
fering withal  under  an  incurable  disease — life  at  Athens  had  ncitlKr 
charm  nor  honor  left.  Hence,  as  much  as  from  any  other  rcjisou, 
lie  was  induced  to  withhold  the  order  for  departure;  clinging  to  the 
hope  tliat  some  unforeseen  bo(m  of  fortune  miglit  yet  turn  up— and 
yielding  to  the  idlest  delusions  from  correspondents  in  the  interior  of 
Syracuse. 

Nearly  n  month  after  the  night-battle  on  Epipokr.  Gylippns  ar.d 
Sikanus  both  returned  to  Syracuse,  'i'he  latter  htsd  b(  en  unsuccc.ssii.l 
at  Agrigentum,  where  the  j>hilo-Syracu.-an  i>;u'ty  had  been  sent  iulo 
])anisliment  before  his  arrival;  but  Gylipi^us  brought  with  him  a  con- 
siderable force  of  Sicilian  Greeks,  together  with  those  Peloponnesian 
Ijoplites  who  ha'l  started  from  Cape  Ta-narus  in  the  early  spring,  and 
who  had  made  their  way  from  Kyrene  tirst  along  the  coast  of  Africa 
and  then  across  to  Selinus.  Such  increase  of  strength  immediately 
determined  the  Syracusans  to  resume  the  airgressive,  both  by  lard 
juid  by  sea.  In  the  Athenians,  as  they  saw  the  new  allies  ninrcliin.;; 
in  over  E])ipoUe.  it  ])roduced  a  deeper  despondency,  combined  with 
bitter  regret  that  they  had  not  adojited  the  projiosilicn  of  deiuirtin;,' 
iinmediaiely  after  the  battle  of  Ei)ipoIfe.  when  Demosthenes  tiist  pn>- 
po^ed  it.  The  late  interval  of  lingering  hopeless  inaction  with  continued 
sickness  had  further  weakened  their  strenirth,  and  Demosthenes  now 
again  pressed  the  resolution  for  immediate  departure.  Whatever  fan- 
cies Nikias  may  have  indulured  about  Syracusan  eudiarrassmeutswere 
dissipated  by  tlie  arrival  of  Gylippnis;  nor  did  he  venture  to  persist  in 
his  former  peremptory  opposition — though  even  now  he  seems  to 
have  assented  against  Ids  own  conviction.  He  however  insisted  with 
good  reason  tliat  no  formal  or  public  vote  should  be  taken  on  the 
occasion — but  that  the  order  should  be  circulated  through  the  camp, 
as  i)rivately  as  possible,  to  be  nady  for  departure  at  a  given  signal. 
Intimation  was  sent  to  Katana  that  the  armament  was  on  the  i)oiutof 
coming  away — with  orders  to  forward  no  further  supplies. 


This  plan  w^as  proceeding  successfully:  the  ships  were  made  ready 
—much  of  the  property  of  the  army  had  already  been  conveyed 
aboard  without  awakening  the  suspicion  of  the  enemy — the  signal 
would  have  been  hoisted  on  the  ensuing  morning — and  within  a  few 
hoars  this  fated  armament  would  have  found  itself  clear  of  the  har- 
bor, with  comparatively  small  loss — when  the  gods  themselves  (I 
speak  in  the  language  and  feelings  of  the  Athenian  camp)  interfered 
to  forbid  its  departure.  On  the  very  night  before  (the  27th  August, 
413  B.C.) — which  was  full  moon — the  moon  was  eclipsed.  Such  a 
portent,  impressive  to  the  Athenians  at  all  times,  was  doubly  so  under 
their  present  despondency,  and  many  of  them  construed  it  as  a  divine 
])rohil)ition  against  departure  until  a  certain  time  should  have  elapsed, 
with  expiatory  ceremonies  to  take  olf  the  effect.  They  made  known 
their  wish  for  postponement  to  Nikias  and  his  colleagues;  but  their 
interference  was  superfluous,  for  Nikias  himself  was  more  deep»ly 
affected  than  any  one  else.  He  consulted  the  prophets,  who  declared 
that  the  army  ought  not  to  decamp  until  thrice  nine  days,  a  full 
circle  of  the  moon,  should  h.ive  passed  over.  And  Nikias  took  upon 
himself  to  announce  that  until  after  the  interval  indicated  by  them, 
he  would  not  permit  even  any  discussion  or  proposition  on  the  sub- 
ject. 

The  decision  of  the  prophets,  which  Nikias  thus  made  his  owni.was 
aseutence  of  death  to  the  Athenian  army:  vet  it  went  along  with  the 
ufeneral  feeling,  and  was  obeyed  without  hesitation.  Even  Demos- 
thenes, though  if  he  had  commanded  alone  he  might  have  tried  to 
overrule  it,  found  himself  compelled  to  jdeld.  Yet,  according  to 
Philochorus  (himself  a  professional  diviner,  skillful  in  construing  the 
religious  meaning  of  events),  it  was  a  decision  decidedly  w^-ong;  that 
is,  wrong  according  to  the  canonical  principles  of  divination.  To  men 
plauning  escape  or  any  other  operation  requiring  silence  and  secrecy, 
an  eclipse  of  the  moon,  as  hiding  light  and  producing  darkness,  was 
(he  aHirnied)  an  encouraging  sign,  and  ought  to  have  made  the  Athe- 
nians even  more  willing  and  forward  in  quitting  the  harbor.  We  are 
told,  too,  that  Nikias  had  recently  lost  by  death  Stilbides,  the  ablest 
prophet  in  his  service;  and  that  he  was  thus  forced  to  have  recourse 
to  prophets  of  inferior  ability.  His  piety  left  no  means  untried  of 
appeasing  the  gods,  by  prayer,  sacrifice,  and  expiatory  ceremonies, 
continued  until  the  necessity  of  actual  conflict  arrived. 

The  impediment  thus  Anally  and  irreparably  intercepting  the  Athe- 
nian departure  was  the  direct  though  luduteuded  consequence  of  the 
delay  previously  caused  by  Nikias,  We  cnnnot  doubt,  however,  that 
when  the  eclipse  first  happened,  he  regarded  it  as  a  sign  conflrinatory 
of  the  opinion  which  he  had  himself  before  delivered,  and  that  ho 
eongratulated  himself  upon  having  so  long  resisted  the  proposition 
forgoing  away.  Let  us  add  that  all  those  Athenians  who  were  pre- 
disposed to  look  upon  eclipses  as  signs  from  heaven  of  calamity 
about  to  come,  would  find  themselves  strengthened  in  that  belief  by 


186 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


CONFIDENCE  OF  THE  SYRACUSANS. 


137 


the  unparalleled  woes    even    now  impending  over  this    unhappy 

^^U^liat  interpretation  the  Syracusans,  confident  and  victorious,  put 
on  ihe  eclip-e,  we  are  not  told.     But  tliey  knew  well  how  to  intcrprt't 
the  tact  wniiii  .speedilv  came  to  their  knowledge,  tiiat  the  Alhciuaus 
Ind  fully  lesolved  to  make  a  furtive  escape,  and  had  only  been  i.ie- 
vented  bv  the  eclipse.     Such  a  resolution,  aniouutuig  to  an  untquiv- 
ocal  conles^ion  ot  helples^^ne.s,  emboldened  the  Syracusans  yet  iur- 
ther  to  crush  them  as  they  were  in  the  harbor,  and  never  to  peinut 
ihen'i  to  occupv  even  any  other  post  in  Sicily.     Accordingly  Gyhppus 
cau«^ed  his  triremes  to  be  manned  and  practiced  for  several  (lays:  he 
then  drew  out  ids  land  force,  and  made  a  demonstration  of  no  jrriat 
si-uiticance  a-ainst  the  Athenian  lines.     On  the  morrow  he  Inoiig  it 
out  all  his  forces,  both  land  and  naval;  with  the  former  of  which  lie 
l.eset  the  Atlienian  tines,  while  the  tieet,  76  triremes  in  number,  vas 
directed  to  sail  up  to  the  Athenian  naval  station.      Ihe  Atheuiau 
fleet   m  triremes  strong,  sailed  out  to  meet  it,  and  a  close   genera , 
and  desperate  action  took  place.     The  fortune  of  Athens  had  tied. 
The  Syracusans  tirst  beat  the  center  division  ot  the  ^Xtlunians;  next, 
the  right  division  under  Eurymedon,  who  in  attempting  an  evolnticn 
to  outflank  the  enemy's  left,  forgot  those  inirrow  limits  ot  the  Inubor 
which  were  at  every  turn  the  ruin  of  the  Athenian  rnarnu r-neaicd 
the  land  too  mucli-and  was  pinned  up  against  it    in  the  recess  of 
Daskon.  bv  the  vigorous  attack  of  the  Syracusans.   lie  was  here  slain. 
and  Ids  division  destroyed:  successively,  the  entire  Athenian  fleet  was 
beaten  and  driven  ashore,  .  .         ,, 

Few  of  the  defeated  ships  could  get  into  their  own  station     Nost 
of  them  were  forced  ashore  or  grounded  on  points  without  those 
limits;  upon  which   Gylippus  marched  down   his  l«»^'^l-f*'>^^.^ ,  ^^^^^'^ 
water's  ed-e,  in  order  to  prevent  the  retre^at  of  the  crews  as  ^^ell  a    o 
assist  the  Svracusan  seamen  in  hauling  off  the  ships  as  prizes,    lib 
march,  however,  was  so  hurried  and  disorderly  that  the  '1  ynl'^n' 
troops    on  guard  at  the  flank  of  the  Athenian  station,  sallied  on 
aaailis't  them  as  they  approached,  beat  the  foremost  ;>f /bem^^^^ 
drove  them  away  from  the  shore  into  the  marsh  called  L}Sime   la. 
More  Svracusan  troops  came  to  their  aid;  but  the  Athenians  aH 
anxious  above  all  things  for  the  protection  of  their  ships,  cnme  fo  1 
in  greater  numbers;  and  a  general  battle  ensued  in  which  the    a 
>ve?e  victorious.     Though  they  did  not  inflict  much  loss  upon 
enemy,  yet  they  saved  most  of  their  own  triremes  which  I'i'd   '   " 
driven  ashore,  together  witli  tlie  crews-and  carried  tlic^i  m  o 
naval  station.     Except  for  this  success  on  land,  the  ^^^"Jue  A  1  un 
fleet  would  have  been  destroyed:  as  it  was,  the  deteat  ^^as  still  co 
plele,  and  eighteen  triremes  were,  lost,  all  their  crews  /^^"'^;f/ ;  '"^ 
This  was  probably  the  division  of  Eurymedon,  which  Inumj?  ^^'^ 
driven  ashore  in  the  recess  of  Daskon,  was  too  tar  off  from  the  Atlie^ 
uia2>  station  to  receive  any  land  assistance.     As  the  Athenians  \\eie 


h'.uiling  in  their  disa])led  triremes,  the  Syracusans  made  a  last  effort 
to  destroy  them  by  means  of  a  fire-shi]),  for  which  tlie  wind  liappened 
to  he  favorable.  But  the  Athenians  found  means  to  prevent  her 
approach,  and  to  extinguish  the  flames. 

Here  was  a  complete  victory  gained  over  Athens  on  her  own  ele- 
jy^f^^ut — gained  with  inferior  numbers — gained  even  over  the  fresh, 
and  yet"  formidable  fleet  recently  brought  by  Demosthenes.  It  told 
but  too  plainly  on  wdiich  side  the  superiority  now  lay — how"  well  the 
Syracusans  had  organized  their  naval  strength  for  the  specialties  of 
their  own  harbor— how  ruinous  had  been  the  folly  of  Nikias  in  re- 
taining his  excellent  seamen  imprisoned  within  that  petty  and  un- 
wholesome lake,  where  land  and  water  alike  did  the  work  of  their 
enemies.  It  not  only  disheartened  the  Athenians,  but  belied  all  their 
p;ist  experience,  and  utterly  confounded  them.  Sickness  of  the 
whole  enterprise,  and  repentance  for  having  undertaken  it,  now  be- 
came uppermost  in  their  minds;  yet  it  is  remarkable  that  we  hear  of 
no  complaints  against  Nikias  separately.  But  repentance  came  too 
late.  The  Syracusans,  fully  alive  to  the  importance  of  their  victory, 
sailed  round  the  harbor  in  triumph  as  again  their  own,  and  already 
looked  on  the  enemy  within,  it  as  their  prisoners.  They  determined 
to  close  up  and  guard  the  mouth  of  it,  from  Plemmyrium  to  Ortygia, 
so  as  to  leave  no  farther  liberty  of  exit. 

Nor  were  they  insensible  how  vastly  the  scope  of  the  contest  was 
now  widened,  and  the  value  of  the  stake  before  them  enhanced.  It 
was  not  merely  to  rescue  their  own  city  from  siege,  nor  even  to  repel 
and  destroy  the  besieging  army,  that  they  were  now  contending.  It 
was  to  extinguish  the  entire  power  of  Athens,  and  liberate  the  half 
of  Greece  from  dependence;  for  Athens  could  never  be  expected  to 
survfve  so  terrific  a  loss  as  tliat  of  the  entire  double  armament  before 
Syracuse.  The  Syracusans  exulted  in  the  thought  that  this  great 
aehieveinent  w(7tild  be  theirs;  that  their  city  was  the  field,  and  their 
navy  the  chief  instrument  of  victory;  a  lasting  source  of  glory  to 
them,  not  merely  in  the  eyes  of  contemporaries,  but  even  in  those  of 
]K)sterit3\  Their  pride  swelled  when  they  reflected  on  the  Pan-Hel- 
k'iiic  importance  which  the  siege  of  Syracuse  had  now  actpiired,  and 
when  they  counted  up  the  number  and  variety  of  Greek  warriors 
who  were  now  flghting,  on  one  side  or  the  other,  between  Euryalus 
and  Plemmyrium,  AVith  the  exception  of  the  great  struggle  between 
Athens  and  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy,  never  before  had  combat- 
ants so  many  and  so  miscellaneous  l)een  engaged  under  the  same  ban- 
ners, Greeks  continental  and  insular — Ionic,  Doric,  and  yEolic — 
aiitonomus  and  dependent — volunteers  and  mercenaries — from  Mile- 
tus and  Chios  in  the  east  to  Selinus  in  thw  west — were  ail  here  to  be 
found;  and  not  merely  Greeks,  l.>ut  also  the  barbaric  Sikels,  Egeste- 
aus,  Tyrrhenians  and  lapygians.  If  the  Lacedjiemonians,  Corinth- 
ians, and  Boeotians,  were  lighting  on  the  side  of  Syracuse — the  Argei- 
aus  and  Mantineians,  not  to  mention  the  great  insular  cities,  stood  in 


138 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


EXHORTATIONS  OF  NIKIAS. 


139 


arms  a«^ainst  her.  The  jumble  of  kinship  amon?:  the  comhatants  on 
both  sides,  as  well  as  the  eross  action  of  different  loeal  nntipalhies,  is 
put  in  lively  antithesis  hv  Thucydides.  But  amidst  so  vast  an 
a-scuibled  ninnber.  of  \viii(-hthev  were  the  chiefs,  the  paymasters,  and 
the  center  of  combination— the  Syracusans  might  well  feel  a  sense  of 
personal  iifrgrandizement,  and  a  consciousness  of  the  great  blow 
which  they'^wcre  al)out  to  strike,  sufficient  to  exalt  them  for  tliu 
time  above  the  level  even  of  their  great  Dorian  chiefs  in  Pel(,puii- 

nesus.  ,  .  , 

It  was  their  first  operation,  occupying  three  dnys,  to  close  up  the 
mouth  of  the  Great  Harbor,  whicii  was  nearly  one  mile  broad,  witii 
vessels  of  every  descrii^tion.  trirenns,  traders,  boats,  etc.,  anchored 
in  an  oblique  direction,  and  chained  together.  They  at  the  same 
time  prepared  their  naval  force  with  redoubled  zeal  for  the  desperate 
stru*>-'de  which  tiiey  knew  to  be  coming.  They  then  awaited  the 
efforts  of  the  Athenians,  who  watched  their  proceedings  with  sadness 

and  anxiety.  .     .     ^     ^ 

Nikias  imd  his  colleagues  called  together  the  principal  officers  to 
deliberate  what  was  to  be  done.  As  they  had  few  provisions remaiii- 
in<^  and  had  counter- ordered  their  further  supplies,  K)me  instant  and 
de'sperate  effort  was  indisi>ensable;  and  the  only  ]K)iiil  in  debate  wa^, 
wiielher  they  should  l)urn  their  fleet  and  ri  tire  by  land,  or  make  a  fresli 
maritime  exertion  to  break  out  of  the  harbor.  Such  had  been  the 
impression  left  bv  the  recent  sea-light,  that  many  in  the  camp  leamd 
to  the  former  sclieme.  But  the  generals  resolved  upon  first  trying 
the  latter,  and  exhausted  all  their  ccmibinations  to  give  to  it  the 
greatest  possible  effect.  Thev  now  evacuated  the  upper  portion  of 
thfir  lines,  both  on  the  higher  ground  of  KpijK)hv,  and  even  on  the 
lower  o-round,  such  portion  as  was  nearest  to  the  southern  cliff;  eon- 
fining  themselves  to  a  limited  fortified  .space  close  to  the  shore,  just 
adequate  for  their  sick,  their  wounded,  and  their  stores;  in  order  to 
spare  the  necessity  for  a  large  garrison  to  defend  them,  and  thus 
leave  nearlv  tiieir  whole  force  disposable  for  sea-service.  They  then 
made  readv  everv  trireme  in  the  station,  which  could  be  rendend 
ever  so  iniperfectlv  seaworthv.  constraining  every  fit  man  to  serve 
aboard  them,  without  distinct  ion  of  age,  rank,  or  country.  The  tri- 
remes were  manned  with  double  crews  of  soldiers,  hoplites  as  w(  11 
as  bow^nen  and  darters— the  latter  mostly  Akarnanians,  while  the 
bnplites,  stationed  at  the  pfow  with  orders  to  board  the  enemy  as 
quickly  as  possible,  were  furnished  with  grappling  irons  to  detain 
tlie  enemv's  ship  immediitelv  after  the  moment  of  the  collisK.n.  in 
order  that'  it  miirlit  not  be  withdrawn  and  the  collision  repeated,  willi 
all  its  injurious  effects  arisimx  from  the  strength  and  massiveness  ot 
the  Svracusan  epotids.  The  best  consultation  was  held  with  the 
steersmen  as  to  arrangement  and  maneuvers  of  every  trireme,  and 
no  precaution  omitted  whicli  the  scanty  means  at  hand  allowed.  In 
tlie  well-kuowu   impossibility   of  obtaining  new  provisions,   every 


man  was  anxious  to  hurry  on  the  strugirle.  But  Nikias.  as  he  mus- 
im'dthemon  the  shore  immediately  before  iro'm^  aboard  saw  but 
too  plainly  that  it  was  the  mere  stress  of  desperation  which  im- 
pelled them;  that  the  elaslicity,  the  disciplined  confidence  the  mari- 
time pride,  habitual  to  the  Athenians  on  shipboard— was  extinct  or 
diady  and  faintly  burning.  ' 

lie  did  his  best  to  revi^•c  them,  by  exhortations  unusually  emphatic 
and  impressive.     "Recollect  (he  said)  that  you  too,  not  less  than  the 
.Syracusans,  .are  now  fighting  for  your  own  safety  and  for  vour 
country;  for  it  is  only  by  victory  in  the  coming  struggle  that  any  of 
vou  can  ever  hope^  to  see  his  country  again.     Yield"  not  to  despair 
like  raw  recruits  after  a  first  defeat:  you,  Athenians  and  allies  i\un- 
ihar  with  the  unexpected  revolutions  of  w^ar,  will  hope  now  for  tiie 
fair  turn  of  fortune,  and  fight  with  a  spirit  worthv  of  the  great  force 
which  you  see  here  around  you.     We  generals  have  now  made  effec- 
tive provision  against  our  two  great  advantaires— the  narrow  circuit 
of  the  harbor,  and  the  thickness  of  the  enemy's  prows      Sad  as  the 
the  necessity  is,  we  have  thrown  aside  all  our  Athenian  skill  and 
tactics  and  have  prepared  to  fight  under  the  conditions  forced  upon 
us  by  the  enemy— a  land  battle  on  shipboard.     It  will  be  for  you  to 
conquer  in  this  last  desiderate  struggle,  where  there  is  no  friendlv 
shore  to  receive  you  if  you  give  way.     You,  hoplites  on  the  deck 
as  soon  as  you  have  the  enemy's  trireme  in  contact,  keep  him  fast' 
and  relax  not  until  you  have  swept  awav  his  hoplites  and  mastereci 
ins  deck      1  ou,  seamen  and  rowers,  must  yet  keep  up  your  coura^-e 
m  spite  of  this  sad  failure  in  our  means,  and  subversion  of  our  tactics' 
lou  are  better  defended  on  deck  above,  and  you  have  more  triremes 
to  help  you,  than  in  the  recent  defeat.     Such  of  you  as  are  not 
Atiieman  citizens,  I  entreat  to  recollect  the  valuable  privilcn-es  which 
you  have  hitherto  enjoyed  from  serving  iu  the  navy  of  Athens 
Ihoiigli  not  really  citizens,  you  have  been  reputed  and  treated  as 
sucu:  you  have  acquired  our  dialect,  you  have  copied  our  l«abits 
and  Have  thus  enjoyed  the  admiration,  the  imposing  station   and  the 
security,  arising  from  our  great  empire,     Partaking  as  you  do  freely 
m  he  benelits  of  that  empire,  do  not  now  betray  it  to  these  Sicilians 
ami  tormtluans  whom  you  have  so  often  beaten.    For  such  of  you  as 
are  Athenians,  I  again  remind  you  that  Athens  has  neither  fresh  tri- 
remes, nor  tresh  hoplites,  to  replace  those  now  here.    Unless  you  are 
now  victorious,  her  enemies  near  home  will  find  her  defenseless-  and 
our  countrymen  there  will  become  slaves  to  Sparta,  as  you  will  to 
aracuse     Recollect,  every  man  of  you,  that  you  now  going  aboard 
in.  Jr  ^^^'f  ""^  Athens-her  hoplites.  her  ships,  her  entire  remain- 
^>  city,  and  her  splendid  name.     Bear  up  then  and  conquer  every 
man  with  his  best  mettle,  in  this  one  la.st  stru-de-f or  Athens  as 
^veii  as  yourselves,  and  on  an  occasion  which  will  never  return  " 

It,  in  translating  the  dispatch  written  home  ten  months  before  by 
I  iMUus  to  the  people  of  Athens,  we  were  compelled  to  remark  that 


140 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


LAST  BATTLE  IN  THE  HARBOR. 


141 


the  greater  part  of  it  was  llic   bitterest  condemuation  of  his  own 
l)revYous  policy  as  conimaiuler— so  we  arc  liere  carried  back,  wiien 
we  liml  hull  striving  to  palliate  the  ruinous  ettects  cf  that  coiitiiicd 
space  of  water  whicli  paralyzed  the  Atheuiaii  seamen,  to  his  own 
obstinate   improvidence  in  forbidding   the  e-ress  of  the  fleet  whin 
insisted  on  by  Demosthenes.     His  liearers  probably  were  too  ir:n(.li 
absorbed  with  the  terrible  present  to  revert  to  irremediable  mistakes 
of  the  past.     Immediately  on  the  conclusion  of  his  touching  address 
the  order  was  given  to  go  aboard,  and  the  seamen  tookiheir  places. 
But  when  the  triremes  were  fully  manned,  and  the  trierarchs,  after 
superintending  the  embrirkation,'were  themselves  about  to  enter  niul 
pu^h  olf— the  agonv  of  Nikias  was  too  great  to  be  repressed.    Feeling 
more  keenly  than  Iiiiv  man  the  intensity  of  this  last  death  struggk-, 
and  the  seriovis,  but  *inevital)le  sbortcomings  of  the  armament  in  its 
present  condition— be  still  thought  that  he  had  not  said  enough  for 
the  occasion.     He  now^  renewed'  his  appeal  personally  to  the  tner- 
arehs— all  of  them  citizens  of  rank  and  wealth  at  Athens.     They 
were  all  familiarlv  known  to  him,  and  he  addressed  himself  to  every 
man  separately  bv  his  own  name,  his  father's  name,  and  his  tril)e- 
adjurin"-  him  by \lie  deepest  and  most  solenm  motives  which  could 
touch  the  human  feelings.     Some  he  reminded  of  their  own  previous 
glories,  others  of  the  achievements  of  illustrious  ancestors,  iniploiiDg 
them  not  to  dishonor  or  betray  these  precious  titles:  to  all  alike  he 
recalled  the  charm  of  their  beloved  country,  with  its  full  political 
freedom  and  its  unconstrained  license  of  individual  agency  to  every 
man-  to  all  alike  he  appealed  in  the  names  of  their  wives,  their  chil- 
dren, and  their  paternal  gods.     He  cared  not  for  being  suspected  of 
trenching  upon  the  commonplaces  of  rhetoric:  he  caught  at  every 
topic  which  could  touch  the  inmost  affections,  awaken  the  inbied 
patriotism,  and  rekindle  the  abated  courage  of  the  oflicers  whom  he 
w-as  sending  forth  to  this  desperate  venture.     He  at  length  con- 
strained himself  to  leave  off,  still   fancying  in  his  anxiety  that  le 
ouu:Iit  to  say  more— and  proceeded  to  marshal  the  land-force  tor  the 
defense  of  the  lines,  as  well  as  along  the  shore  where  they  migit 
render  as  much  service  and  as  much  encouragement  as  possible  to 
combatants  on  shipboard.  . 

Very  different  was  the  spirit  prevalent,  and  very  opposite  the  l3urn- 
ing  words  uttered,  on  the  seaboard  of  the  Syracusan  station,  as  ilie 
letulers  were  mustering  their  men  imnu  diately  before  embarkation. 
They  had  been  apprised  of  the  grappling  irons  now  about  to  be 
employed  by  the  Athenians,  and  had  guarded  against  them  in  par 
by  stretching  hides  along  their  bows,  so  that  the  "iron-hand'  nngUi 
slip  off  without  acquiring  any  hold.  The  preparatory  movements 
even  within  the  Athenian  station  being  perfectly  visible,  Gylippus 
sent  the  fleet  out  with  the  usual  prefatory  harangue.  He  coiiipli- 
meiited  them  on  the  great  achievements  which  they  had  already  per- 
formed in  breaking  down  the  naval  power  of  Athens,  so  long  helQ 


irresistible.  He  reminded  them  that  the  sallj^  of  their  enemies  was 
only  a  last  effort  of  despair,  seeking  nothing  l)ut  escape,  undertaken 
without  confldence  in  themselves,  and  under  the  necessity  of  throw- 
ing aside  all  their  own  tactics  in  order  to  copy  feebly  those  of  the 
Syiacusans.  He  called  upon  them  to  recollect  the  destructive  pur- 
poses which  the  invaders  had  brought  with  them  against  Syracuse,  to 
iutlict  with  resentful  hand  the  finishing  stroke  upon  this  half-ruined 
armament,  and  to  taste  the  delight  of  satiating  a  legitimate  revenge. 

The  Syracusan  fleet — 76  triremes  strong,  as  in  the  last  battle — was 
:he  first  to  put  off  from  shore;  Pythen  with  the  Corinthians  in  the 
center,  Sikanus  and  Agatharchus  on  the  wings.  A  certain  propor- 
tion of  them  were  placed  near  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  in  order  to 
guard  the  barrier;  while  the  rest  w^ere  distributed  around  the  harbor, 
in  order  to  attack  the  Athenians  from  different  sides  as  soon  as  they 
should  approach.  Moreover,  the  surface  of  the  harbor  swarmed  with 
the  light  craft  of  the  Syracusans,  in  many  of  which  embarked  youth- 
ful volunteers,  sons  of  the  best  families  in  the  city;  boats  of  no  mean 
service  during  the  battle,  saving  or  destroying  the  seamen  cast  over- 
board from  disabled  ships,  as  well  as  annoying  the  fighting  Athenian 
triremes.  The  day  was  one  sacred  to  Herakles  at  Syracuse;  and  the 
prophets  announced  that  the  god  would  insure  victory  to  the  Syra- 
cusans, provided  they  stood  on  the  defensive,  and  did  not  begin  the 
attack.  Moreover,  the  entire  shore  round  the  harbor,  except  the 
Athenian  station  anel  its  immediate  neighborhood,  w\as  crowded  with 
Syracusan  soldiers  and  spectators;  while  the  walls  of  Ortygia,  imme- 
diately overhanging  the  w'ater,  were  lined  wnth  the  feebler  popula- 
tion of  the  c\\j,  okl  men,  women,  and  children.  P'rom  the  Athenian 
station  presently  came  forth  110  triremes,  under  Demosthenes,  Me- 
nander,  and  Euthydemus — with  the  customary  pjran,  its  tone  prob- 
ahly  partaking  of  the  general  sadness  of  the  camp.  They  steered 
across  direct  to  the  mouth  of  the  liarl)or,  beholding  on  all  sides  the 
armed  enemies  ranged  along  the  shore,  as  well  as  the  unarmed  mul- 
titudes wdio  were  imprecating  the  vengeance  of  the  gods  upon  their 
heads;  while  for  them  there  was  no  sympathy,  except  among  the 
fellow-sufferers  within  their  own  lines.  Inside  of  this  narrow^  basin, 
rather  more  than  five  English  miles  in  circuit,  194  ships  of  w^ar,  each 
manned  with  more  than  200  men.  were  about  to  join  battle — in  the 
presence  of  countless  masses  around,  all  with  palpitating  hearts,  and 
near  enough  both  to  see  and  hear;  the  most  picturesque  battle  (if  we 
could  abstract  our  minds  from  its  terrible  interest)  probably  in 
history,  without  smoke  or  other  impediments  to  vision,  and  in  the 
clear  atmosphere  of  Sicily — a  serious  and  magnified  realization  of 
those  Naumachia?  wiiich  the  Roman  emperors  used  to  exhibit  with 
gladiators  on  the  Italian  lakes,  for  the  recreation  of  the  people. 

The  Athenian  fleet  made  directly  for  that  portion  of  the  barrier 
"Where  a  narrow  opening  (perhaps  closed  by  a  movable  chain)  ha4 
been  left  for  merchant-vessels.     Their  first  impetuous  attack  broke 


142 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


CAUSES  OF  THE  ATHENIAN  DEFEAT. 


143 


thrnigli  the  Syracusan  squadron  defending  it,  and  tlicy  were  already 
attempting  to  sever  its  connecting  bonds,  -vviien  tiie  enemy  from  all 
sides  crowded  in  upon  tliem  and  forced  tliem  to  desist.  Prescnily 
tlie  battle  became  general,  and  the  combat  ants  wcie  (distributed  in 
various  parts  of  tlie  harbor.  On  both  .«-ides  a  lierce  vm\  {lesperale 
couraiie  >vas  displayed,  even  greater  tlian  had  been  shown  on  any  of 
the  former  occasions.  At  the  lir^t  ontet  the  skdl  and  tactics  of  tliu 
steersmen  shone  conspicuous,  avcU  seconded  by  zeal  on  the  ]!art  of 
the  rowers  and  by  their  ready  obedience  to  (he  voice  of  the  Keleusles. 
As  the  vessels  neared,  the  bowmen,  slingcrs,  and  throwers  on  the 
deck  hurled  clouds  of  missiles  against  tlie  enemy— next  was  heard 
the  loud  crash  of  the  two  impinging  metallic  fronts,  resounding  :ill 
along  the  shore.  When  the  vessels  were  thus  oiue  in  contact  they 
were  rarelv  allowed  to  separate:  a  strenuous  hand-light  then  com- 
menced by  the  hoplites  in  each,  trying  rtspectively  to  board  and 
master  their  enemy's  deck.  It  was  not  always,  however,  that  each 
trireme  had  its  own  single  and  special  enemy:  sometimes  one  ship 
had  two  or  three  enemies  to 'contend  with  at  once— sometimes  she 
fell  aboard  of  one  unsought  and  became  entangled.  After  a  certain 
time,  the  fiiiht  still  obstniately  continuing,  all  sort  of  battle  order 
became  lost";  the  skill  of  the  steer.-men  was  of  little  avail  and  the 
voice  of  the  Kcleustes  was  drowned  amid  the  universal  din  and 
mingled  cries  from  victors  as  well  as  vanquished.  On  botii  sides 
emulous  exhortations  were  poured  forth,  together  with  reproach  and 
sarcasm  addressed  to  any  siup  which  appeared  llinching  from  the 
contest;  though  factitious  stimulus  of  this  sort  was  indeed  but  little 

needed. 

Such  was  the  heroic  courage  on  both  sides,  that  for  a  long  tmie 
victory  was  altogether  doubtful,  and  the  whole  harbor  was  a  scene  of 
partial  encounters,  wherein  sometimes  Syracusans,  sometimes  Athe- 
nians, prevailed.  According  as  success  thus  fluctuated,  so  followed 
the  cheers  or  wailiu<rs  of  the  spectators  ashore.  At  one  and  the  same 
time,  every  variety  of  human  enu)lion  might  be  witnessed;  according 
'as  attention  was 'turned  toward  a  victorious  or  a  defeated  ship.  It 
was  amonu-  the  spectat(n-s  in  tlie  Athenian  station,  above  all,  whose 
entire  life  and  liberty  were  staked  fn  the  combat,  that  this  emotion 
ndixht  be  seen  cxaoirerated  into  agony,  and  overpassing  the  excite- 
mc-nt  even  of  the  cond»atants  themscives.  Those  among  them  w  ho 
looked  toward  a  portion  of  the  harbor  where  their  friends  seemed 
winnin-::  were- full  of  joy  and  thanksgiving  to  the  gods:  such  of  their 
neiiil-bors  as  contemplated  an  Athenian  ship  hi  difficulty  gave  vent 
to  their  feelings  in  shrieks  and  lamentations;  while  a  tliird  grou]), 
with  their  eyes  fixed  on  some  porth)n  of  the  combat  still  disputed, 
were  plunged  in  all  the  agitations  of  doubt,  manifested  even  in  the 
tremulous'swing  of  their  ])odies,  as  hope  or  fear  alternately  predomi- 
nated. During  all  the  time  that  the  combat  remained  undecided,  the 
Athenians  on  shore  were  distracted  by  all  these  manifold  varieties  of 


intense  sympathy.  But  at.  length  the  moment  came,  after  a  long- 
hiotnicted  struggle,  when  victory  began  to  declare  in  favor  of  the 
t^yraciisans,  who,  perceiving  that  their  enemies  were  slackening, 
redoubled  their  efforts  as  well  as  their  sliouts,  and  puslied  them  bac^k 
toward  the  land.  All  the  Athenitiu  trirenios.  abandoning  farther 
ivsi.  tance,  were  thrust  ashore  like  shipwrecked  vessels  in  or  near 
their  own  station;  a  few  being  even  captured  before  they-could  arrive 
there.  The  diverse  manifestations  of  sympathy  among  the  Atheni^m^^ 
ill  the  station  itself  were  now  exchanged  for  one  unanimous  shriek  of 
airony  and  despair.  The  boldest  of  them  rushed  to  rescue  the  slii])s 
and  their  crews  from  pursuit,  others  to  man  their  walls  in  case  of 
attack  from  land;  many  were  even  paralyzed  at  tlie  sight,  and  ab- 
sorbed with  the  thoughts  of  their  own  irretrievable  ruin.  Their 
souls  were  doubtless  still  farther  subdued  by  the  wild  and  cnthusi- 
a«;tic  joy  which  burst  forth  in  maddening  shouts  from  the  hostile 
crowds  around  the  harbor,  in  response  to  their  own  victorious  coni- 
ndcs  on  shipboard. 

finch  was  the  close  of  this  awful,  liearf -stirring,  and  decisive  com- 
bat. The  modern  historian  strives  in  vain  to  conve}^  the  impression 
vi  it  which  appears  in  the  condensed  and  burning  phrases  of  Tliucyd- 
i'kN.  We  tind  in  his  descripti(m  of  battles  generally,  and  of  this 
haltle  beyond  all  others,  a  depth  and  abundance  of  human  emotion 
whi"h  has  now  passed  out  of  military  proceedings.  The  Greeks  who 
li'liit,  like  the  Greeks  wdio  look  on,  are  not  soldiers  withdrawn  from 
the  (oniinunity.  and  specialized,  as  well  as  hardened,  by  h)ng  profes- 
sional training — but  citizens,  with  all  their  passions,  instincts,  syin- 
jwtiiies,  joys,  and  sorrows,  of  domestic  as  well  as  political  life. 
^toivover,  the  non-military  population,  in  ancient  times,  had  an 
iiiieivst  of  the  most  intense  kind  in  the  result  of  the  struggle;  which 
inade  Uie  difference  to  them,  if  not  of  life  and  death,  at  least  of  the 
txlivmity  of  hapjuness  and  misery.  Hence  the  strong  light  and 
shade,  the  Homeric  exhibition  of  undisguised  i!n])ulse,  the  tragic 
detail  if  personal  motive  and  suffeiing,  which  pervades  this  and  otlier 
r.iilit;>ry  descriptions  of  Thucydi*les.  When  we  read  the  few  but 
most  vehf'inent  words  which  he  employs  to  depict  the  Athenian  camp 
under  this  fearful  trial,  we  must  recollect  that  tlrjse  were  not  only 
iiKii  whose  all  was  at  stake,  but  that  they  were,  moreover,  citizens 
full  of  impressibility  —  sensitive  and  demonstrative  Greeks,  and, 
iadci'd,  the  most  sensitive  and  demonstrative  of  all  Greeks.  To 
rcprcs-*  all  manifestations  of  strong  emotion  was  not  considered,  in 
tuicicnt  times,  essential  to  the  dignity  of  the  human  character. 

Amidst  all  the  deep  pathos,  however,  which  the  great  historian  has 
imparled  to  the  final  battle  at  Syracuse,  he  has  not  exj)lained  the 
causes  u]K)n  which  its  ultimate  issue  turned.  Considering  that  the 
Athenians  were  superior  to  their  enemies  in  number,  as  110  to  76 
triremes — that  they  fought  with  courage  not  less  heroic — and  that 
the  action  was  on  their  own  element;  we  might  have  anticipated  for 


144 


RESUMPTION   OF   HOSTILITIES. 


DESPAIR  OF  THE  ATHENIANS. 


145 


them,  if  not  a  victory,  at  least  a  drawn  batllr,  with  equal  loss  on 
both  sides.  But  we  may  observe — 1.  The  uumber  of  110  triremes 
was  formed  by  inchiding  some  hardly  seaworthy.  2.  The  crews  were 
compo>ed  p;irtly  of  nieu  not  used  to  sea-servite:  and  tlie  Akarnniii.in 
darters  especially  were,  for  this  reason,  uuliaudy  with  their  missiles. 
3.  Tlmugh  the  water  had  been  hitherto  the  element  favorable  to 
Athens,  yet  Jier  superiority  in  this  respect  was  declining,  and  lier 
enemies  approaching  nearer  to  her,  even  in  the  open  sea.  But  the 
narrow  dimensions  of  the  harbor  would  have  nullified  her  superiority 
rt  all  times,  and  placed  her  even  at  great  disadvantage — without  the 
means  ot  twisting  and  turning  her  triremes  so  as  to  strike  only  at  a 
vulnerable  point  of  the  enemy — compared  with  the  thick,  heavy, 
straightforward  butting  of  the  Syracusans;  like  a  nimble  pugilist  of 
light  weight  contending,  in  a  very  confined  ring,  against  suixii.T 
weight  and  muscle.  For  the  mere  laud-fight  on  ship-l)oard,  Athenians 
had  not  only  no  advantage,  but  had  on  the  contrary  the  odds  against 
them.  4.  The  Syracusans  enjo3'ed  great  advantage  from  having 
nearly  the  whole  harbor  lined  round  with  their  soldiers  and  friends; 
not  simply  from  the  force  of  encouraging  sympathy,  no  mean  auxil- 
iary— but  because  any  of  their  triremes,  it  compelled  to  fall  back 
before  an  Athenian,  found  protection  on  the  shore,  and  could  return 
to  the  fight  at  leisure;  while  an  Athenian  in  the  same  predicament 
had  no  escape.  5.  The  numerous  light  craft  of  the  Syracusais 
doubtless  rendered  great  service  in  this  battle,  as  they  h.-id  done  in 
the  preceding — though  Thucydides  does  not  again  mention  thtm. 
6.  Lastly,  both  in  the  Athenian  and  Syracusan  chai-acters — the  pres- 
sure of  necessity  was  less  potent,  as  a  stinudus  to  action,  than  hopcliil 
confidence  and  elation,  with  the  idea  of  a  fiood-tide  yet  mounting. 
In  the  character  of  some  other  races,  the  Jews,  for  instance,  the  coii- 
parative  force  of  these  motives  appears  to  be  reversed. 

About  60  Athenian  triremes,  little  nu)re  than  half  of  the  fleet  whic  h 
came  forth,  were  saved  as  the  wreck  from  this  terrible  conflict.  Tie 
Syracusans,  on  their  part,  had  also  sulfered  severely;  only  HO  trirenus 
remaining  out  of  76.  The  triumph  with  which,  nevertlu  less,  (.u 
returning  to  the  city,  they  erected  their  trophy,  and  the  exuliatioii 
which  reigned  among  the  vast  crowds  encircling  the  harbor,  wiis 
beyond  all  measure  or  precedent.  Its  clamorous  nianifestations  were 
doubtless  but  too  well  heard  in  the  neighboring  camp  of  the  Alh*  n- 
ians,  and  increased,  if  anything  could  increase,  the  soul-si;li(luii;g 
extrenuiy  of  distress  which  paralyzed  the  vanquished.  So  utUiiy 
did  the  pressure  of  sulfering,  anticipated  as  well  as  actual,  benumb 
their  minds  and  extinguish  their  most  sacred  associations,  that  r.<> 
man  among  them,  not  even  the  ultra-religious  Nikias,  thought  of 
l)icking  up  the  floating  bodies  or  asking  for  a  truce  to  bury  the  dead. 
This  obligation,  usually  so  serious  and  imi)erative  upon  the  survivors 
afttr  a  battle,  now  passed  imheeded  amidst  the  sorrow,  terror,  and 
despair  of  the  living  man  himself. 


Such  despair,  however,  was  not  shared  by  the  generals;  to  their 
honor  be  it  spoken.  On  the  afternoon  of  this  terrible  defeat,  Demos- 
thenes proposed  to  Nikias  that  at  daybreak  the  ensuing  morning  they 
should  man  all  the  remaining  ships — even  nov^  more  in  iiumber  than 
the  Syracusan — and  make  a  fresh  attempt  to  break  out  of  the  harbor. 
To  this  Nikias  jigreed,  and  both  ])roceeded  to  try  their  influence  in 
^rciting  the  resolution  executed.  But  so  irreparably  was  the  spirit  of 
the  seamen  broken,  that  nothing  could  prevail  upon  them  to  go  again 
on  ship-board:  they  would  hear  of  nothing  but  attempting  to  escai>e 
by  land.  Preparations  were  therefore  made  for  commencing  thi'ir 
march  in  the  darkness  of  that  very  night.  The  roads  were  still  open, 
and  had  they  so  marched,  a  portion  of  them,  at  least,  might  even  yet 
have  been  saved.  But  then?  occurred  one  more  nustake — one  farther 
postponement — which  cut  off  the  last  hopes  of  this  gallant  and  fated 
remnant. 

The  Syracusan  Hermokrates,  fully  anticipating  that  the  Athenians 
would  decamp  that  very  night,  was  eager  to  prevent  their  retreat, 
bjcause  of  the  mischief  which  they  might  do  if  established  in  any 
other  part  of  Sicily.  He  pres.sed  Gylippus  and  the  military  authori- 
ties to  send  out  forthwith,  and  block  up  the  principal  roads,  pas.ses, 
and  fords,  by  which  the  fugitives  would  get  off.  Though  sensible 
of  the  wisdom  of  his  advice,  the  generals  thought  it  wholly  unexecut- 
able.  Such  was  the  universal  and  unbounded  joy  which  now  per- 
vaded the-  city,  in  consequence  of  the  recent  victory,  still  farther 
magnified  ])y  the  circumstance  that  the  day  was  sacred  to  Herakles — 
so  wild  the  jollity,  the  feasting,  the  intoxication,  the  congratulations, 
amidst  men  rewarding  themselves  after  their  recent  effort  and  tri- 
umph, and  amidst  the  necessary  care  for  the  wounded— that  an  order 
to  arm  and  march  out  woultl  have  been  as  little  heeded  as  the  order 
to  go  on  ship-board  was  by  the  desponding  Athenians.  Perceiving 
that  he  could  get  nothing  done  until  the  next  morning,  Hermokrati's 
resorted  to  a  stratagem  in  order  to  delay  the  departure  of  the  Athen- 
ians for  that  night.  At  the  moment  when  darkness  was  beginning, 
he  sent  down  some  confidential  friends  on  horseback  to  the  Athenian 
wall.  These  men,  riding  up  near  enough  to  make  themselves  heard, 
'  and  calling  for  the  sentries,  addressed  them  as  messengers  from  the 
private  correspondents  of  Nikias  in  Syracuse,  who  hadsent  to  warn 
him  (they  aflirmed)  not  to  decamp  during  tlie  lught,  inasmuch  as  the 
8yracu.sans  had  already  beset  and  occupied  the  roads;  but  to  begin 
his  march  quietly  the  next  morning,  after  adequate  preparation. 

This  fraud  (the  same  as  the  Athenians  had  themselves  practiced 
two  years  before,  in  order  to  tempt  the  Syracusans  to  march  out 
against  Katana)  was  perfectly  successful:  tlie  sincerity  of  the  infor- 
mation was  believed,  and  the  advice  adopted.  Had  Demosthenes 
been  in  command  alone,  we  may  doubt  whether  he  would  have  been 
so  easily  duped;  for  granting  the  accuracy  of  the  fact  asserted,  it  was 
not  the  less  obvious  that  the  difliculties,  instead  of  being  diminished. 


116 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


SPEECH  OF  NIKIAS. 


147 


would  l>c  increased  tenfold  on  the  following  day.  We  have  seen, 
liowever,  on  more  than  one  previous  occasion,  how  fatally  Nikias 
was  misled  by  his  treacherous  advices  from  the  pi. ilo- Athenians  at 
Syracuse.  An  excuse  for  inaction  was  always  concinial  to  his  char- 
acter; and  the  pnscnt  reconinuiulation,  moreover,  fell  in  but  too 
happily  with  the  temper  of  the  army— now  benumbed  with  depression 
uv.d  terror,  like  those  unfoitimate' soldiers,  in  the  retreat  of  the  Ten 
1  housand  Greeks,  who  were  yielding  to  the  lethariry  of  extreme  cold 
on  the  snows  of  Armenia,  *an<l  Avhom  Xenophon  vainly  tried  to 
J. rouse.  Having  remained  over  that  night,  the  generals  determined 
also  to  stay  the  next  day— in  order  that  the  ai my  might  carry  away 
v.  iih  them  as  much  of  their  baggage  as  possible— sending  forward  a 
messenger  to  the  Sikels  in  the  Interior  to  ncjuest  that  they  would 
meet  the  army,  and  bring  with  them  a  supply  of  provisions.  Gylip- 
pus  and  Hermokrates  had  thus  ample  time,  on  the  following  day,  to 
send  out  forces  and  occui>y  ail  the  positions  convenient  for  obstruct- 
ing the  Athenian  march.  They  at  the  same  time  towed  into  Syra- 
cuse as  prizes  all  the  Athenian  triremes  which  had  been  driven 
ashore  in  the  rtcent  battle,  and  which  now  lay  like  worthless  hulks, 
unauarded  and  unheeded— seemingly  even  those  within  the  station 

itself. 

It  was  on  the  next  day  but  one  after  the  maritime  defeat  that  Nikias 
and  Demosthenes  put  their  iirmy  in  motion  to  r.ttempt  retreat.  The 
camp  had  loiii;-  been  a  scene  of  sickness  and  death  from  the  prevalence 
of  marsh  fever;  but  since  the  recent  battle,  the  number  of  wounded 
men  and  the  unburied  bodies  of  the  slain,  had  rendered  it  yet  more 
pitiable.  Forty  thousand  ndserable  men  (so  prodigious  was  the  total, 
includins:  all  ranks  and  functions)  now  set  forth  to  quit  it,  on  a  march 
of  which  few  could  see  the  end;  like  the  pouring  forth  of  the  popula- 
tion of  a  large  city  starved  out  l»y  blockade.  IVIany  had  little  or  no 
provisions  to  carry — so  low  had  the  stock  become  reduced;  but  of 
those  wiio  had,  every  man  carried  his  own— even  the  horsemen  and 
hoplites,  now  for  the  first  time  either  already  left  without  slaves  by 
desertion,  or  knowing  that  no  slave jcould  now  be  trusted.  But 
neither  such  melancholy  equality  of  sunering.  nor  the  number  of  suf- 
ferers, counted  for  much  in  the  way  of  alleviation.  A  dowiieast 
stupor  and  sense  of  abasement  possessed  every  man;  the  more  intol- 
erable, when  they  recollected  the  exit  of  the  annament  from  Peirieus 
two  years  before,  with  prayers,  and  solemn  pa'ans.  and  all  the  splen- 
did dreams  of  conquest— .set  against  the  humiliation  of  the  closing 
scene  now  before  them,  without  a  single  trireme  left  out  of  two  pro- 
diiiious  fleets. 

But  it  was  not  until  the  army  had  actually  begun  its  march  that 
the  full  measure  of  wretchedness  was  felt  and  manifested.  It  w:!S 
then  that  the  necessity  first  became  prochiinied,  which  no  one  proba- 
bly spoke  out  beforehand,  of  leaving  behind  not  merely  the  unburied 
bodies,  but  also  the  sick  and  the  wounded.     The  scenes  of  woe  which 


marked  this  hour  passed  endurance  or  description.  The  departing 
soldier  sorrowed  ;md  shuddered,  with  the  seuiiment  of  an  unper- 
formed duty,  as  he  turned  from  the  unburied  bodies  of  the  slain;  but 
far  more  terrible  was  the  trial,  when  he  had  to  tear  himself  from  the 
living  sufferers,  who  implored  their  comrades,  with  wailing  of  agony 
and  distraction,  not  to  abandon  them.  Appealing  to  all  the  claims 
of  pious  friendship,  they  clung  round  their  knees,  and  even  crawled 
aloug  the  line  of  march  uniil  their  strength  failed.  The  silent 
dejection  of  the  previous  day  was  now"  exchanged  for  universal  tears 
and  groans,  and  clamorous  outbursts  of  sorrow,  amidst  which  the 
army  could  not  without  tiie  utmost  difficulty  be  disengaged  and  put 
iu  motion. 

After  such  heart-rending  scenes,  it  might  seem  that  their  cup  of 
bitterness  was  exhausted;  but  worse  was  yet  in  store — and  the  terrors 
of  the  future  dictated  a  struggle  against  all  the  nuseries  of  past  and 
present.  The  generals  did  tiieir  best  to  keep  up  some  sense  of  order 
as  well  as  courage;  and  Xikias,  particularly,  in  this  closing  hour  of 
his  career,  displayed  a  degree  of  energy  and  heroism  which  he  had 
never  before  seemed  to  possess.  Though  himself  among  the  greatest 
personal  sufferers  of  all,  from  his  incurable  complaint,  he  w^as  seen 
everywhere  in  the  ranks,  marshaling  the  troops,  heartening  up  their 
dejection,  and  addressing  them  with  a  voice  louder,  more  strenuous, 
and  more  commanding  than  w^as  his  wont. 

"Keep  up  your  hope  still,  Athenians  (he  said),  even  as  we  are 
now;  others  have  been  saved  out  of  circumstances  worse  than  ours. 
Be  not  too  nnich  humiliated,  either  with  your  defeats  or  with  your 
present  unmerited  hardship.  I  too,  having  no  advantage  over  any 
of  you  in  strength  (nay,  you  see  the  condition  to  which  I  have 
been  brought  by  my  disease),  and  accustomed  even  to  superior  splen- 
dor and  good  fortune  in  private  as  w^ell  as  public  life — I  too  am 
plunged  in  the  same  peril  with  the  humblest  soldier  among  you. 
Xevertheless  my  conduct  has  been  constantly  pious  toward  the 
gods,  as  well  as  just  and  blameless  tow^ard  men;  in  recompense  for 
which,  my  hope  for  the  future  is  yet  sanguine,  at  the  same  time  that 
oiir  actual  misfortunes  do  not  appal  me  in  proportion  to  tlieir  intrin- 
sic magnitude.  Perhaps,  indeed,  they  may  from  this  time  forward 
abate;  for  our  enemies  have  had  their  full  swing  of  good  fortune, 
and  if  at  the  moment  of  our  starting  we  were  under  the  jealous 
wrath  of  any  of  the  gods,  we  \u\v3  already  undergone  chastisement 
amply  sufficient.  Other  people  before  us  have  invaded  foreign 
lauds,  and  b}'  thus  acting  under  common  human  impulse,  have 
incurred  sufferings  within  the  limit  of  human  endurance.  We  too 
may  reasonably  hope  henceforward  to  have  theolfended  god  dealing 
with  ns  more  mildly — for  we  are  now  objects  fitter  for  his  compas- 
sion than  for  his  jealousy.  Look  moreover  at  your  own  ranks,  hoplites 
so  numerous  and  so  excellent:  let  that  guard  you  against  excessive 
despair,  and  recollect  that  wherever  you  may  sit  down,  you  are  your- 


148 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


CHANGE  OF  FEELING. 


149 


selves  at  once  a  city;  there  is  no  city  in  Sicily  that  can  cither  repulse 
your  attack  or  expel  you  if  you  clioose  to  stay.  Be  careful  your- 
selves to  keep  your  march  firm  and  orderly,  every  man  of  you  with 
this  conviction — that  whatever  spot  he  may  be  forced  to  figijt  in,  that 
spot  is  his  country  and  his  fortress,  and  must  be  kept  by  victorious 
elfort.  As  our  provisions  are  very  scanty,  we  shall  hasten  on  niglu 
and  day  alike;  and  so  sooiijis  you  reach  any  friendly  village  of  tlii' 
Sikels,  who  still  remain  constant  to  us  from  hatred  to  Syracuse,  tlien 
consider  yourselves  in  security.  We  have  sent  forward  to  apprise 
them,  and  entreat  them  to  'meet  us  with  supplies.  Once  more,  sol- 
diers, recollect  that  to  act  like  brave  men  is  now  a  matter  of  neecssily 
to  you — and  that  if  you  falter,  there  is  no  refuge  for  you  anywhtic 
Whereas  if  you  now  get  clear  of  your  enemies,  such  of  you  as  are 
not  Athenians  will  again  enjoy  the  sight  of  home,  while  such  of  you 
as  are  Athenians  wilt  live  to  renovate  the  great  power  of  our  city, 
fallen  though  it  now  be.  It  is  men' that  maks  a  city — iwt  icalU,  nor 
s/i  ips  wit /to  u  t  m  en." 

The  efforts  of  both  commanders  were  in  full  hannony^  with  these 
strenuous  words.  The  army  was  distributed  into  two  divisions;  the 
hopliles  marching  in  a  hollow  oblong,  with  the  bagggage  and  un- 
armed in  the  imerior.  The  front  division  was  commanded  by 
Nikias,  the  rear  by  Demosllunes.  Direciing  their  course  toward 
the  Sikel  territory,  in  the  interior  of  the  island,  they  first  marched 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Anapus  until  they  came  to  the  ford  of  that 
river  which  they  found  guarded  by  a  Syracusan  detachment.  They 
forced  the  passage  however  without  much  resistance,  and  accom- 
plished on  that  day  a  march  of  about  five  miles,  under  the  delay 
arising  from  the  harassing  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  light  troops. 
Encamping  for  that  night  on  an  eminence,  they  recommenced  their 
march  with  the  earliest  dawn,  and  halted,  after  about  two  miles  and 
a  half,  in  a  deserted  village  on  a  plain.  They  were  in  hopes  of  tiiid- 
ing  some  provisions  in  the  houses,  and  were  even  under  the  neccs>ity 
of  carrying  along  with  them  some  water  from  this  spot;  there  bcini; 
none  to  be  found  farther  on.  As  their  inl ended  line  of  march  lind 
now  become  evident,  the  Syracusans  profited  by  this  halt  to  get  on 
before  them,  and  to  occupy  in  force  a  jiosition  on  the  road,  ealkd 
the  Aknean  cliif.  Here  tile  road,  ascending  a  high  hill,  formed  a 
sort  of  ravine  boidered  on  each  side  by  steep  cliffs.  The  Syracusans 
erected  a  wall  or  barricade  across  the  whole  breadth  of  the  road,  and 
occupied  the  high  ground  on  each  side.  But  even  to  reach  this  pass 
was  beyond  the  competence  of  the  Athenians;  so  tmprncticablc  was 
it  to  get  over  the  ground  in  the  face  of  overwhelming  attacks  from 
the  enemy's  cavalry  and  light  troops.  They  were  compelled  after  a 
short  march,  to  retreat  to  their  camp  of  the  night  before. 

Every  hour  added  to  the  distress  of  their  position;  for  their  food 
was  all  but  exhausted,  nor  could  any  man  straggle  from  the  niaiu 
body  without  encountering  certain  destruction  from  the  cavalry. 


Accordinglv,  on  the  next  morning,  they  tried  one  more  desperate 
effort  to  get  over  the  hilly  ground  into  the  interior.  Starting  very 
early,  they  arrived  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  called  the  Akra^an  cliff, 
where  they  found  the  barricades  placed  across  the  road,  with  ileep 
tiles  of  Svracusan  hoplites  behind  them,  and  crowds  of  light 
troops  lining  the  cliffs  on  each  border.  They  made  the  most  strenu- 
ous and  obstinate  efforts  to  force  this  inexpugnable  position,  bwt  all 
their  struggles  were  vain,  while  they  suffered  miserably  from  the 
missiles  of^the  troops  above.  Amid  all  the  discouragement  of  this 
repulse,  they  were  yet  farther  disheartened  by  storms  of  thunder  and 
lightning,  which  occurred  during  the  time,  and  which  they  construed 
as' portents  significant  of  their  impending  ruin. 

This  fact  strikingly  illustrates  both  the  change  which  the  last  two 
years  had  wrought  in  the  contending  parties— and  the  degree  to 
which  such  religious  interpretations  of  phenomena  depended  for 
their  eflicacy  on  predisposing  temper,  gloomy  or  cheerful.  In  the 
first  battle  between  Nikias  and  the  Syracusans,  near  the  Great  Har- 
bor, some  months  before  the  siege  was  begun,  a  similar  thunder-storm 
had  taken  place:  on  that  occasion,  the  Athenian  soldiers  had  contin- 
ued the  battle  unmoved,  treating  it  as  a  natural  event  belonging  to 
the  season— and  such  indifference  on  their  part  had  still  farther 
imposed  upon  the  alarmed  Syracustuis.  Now,  both  the  self-confi- 
dence and  the  religious  impression  had  changed  sides. 

Exhausted  by  their  fruitless  efforts,  the  Athenians  fell  back  a 
short  space  to  repose,  when  Gylippus  tried  to  surround  them  by 
sending  a  detachment  to  block  up  the  narrow  road  in  their  rear. 
This  however  they  prevented,  effecting  their  retreat  into  the  open 
plain,  where  they  passed  the  night,  and  on  the  ensuing  day, 
attempted  once  more  the  hopeless  march  over  the  Akrsean  cliff.  But 
they  were  not  allowed  even  to  advance  so  far  as  the  pass  and  the 
barricade.  They  were  so  assailed  and  harassed  by  the  cavalry  and 
darters,  in  flank  and  rear,  that  in  spite  of  heroic  effort  and  endur- 
ance, they  could  not  accomplish  a  progress  of  so  much  as  one  single 
mile.  Extenuated  by  fatigue,  half-starved,  and  with  numbers  of 
wounded  men,  they  were  compelled  to  spend  a  third  miserable  night 
in  the  same  fatal  plain. 

As  soon  as  the  Syracusans  had  retired  for  the  night  to  their  camp, 
Nikias  and  Demosthenes  took  counsel.  They  saw^  plainly  that  the 
route  which  thev  had  originally  projected,  over  the  Akra^an  cliff  into 
the  Sikel  regions  of  the  interior  and  from  thence  to  Katana  had 
become  impracticable ;  and  that  their  unhappy  troops  would  be  still 
less  in  condition  to  force  it  on  the  morrow  than  they  had  been  on  the 
dav  preceding.  Accordingly  they  resolved  to  make  oft*  during  the 
night,  leaving  numerous  fires  burning  to  mislead  the  enemy;  but 
completely  to  alter  the  direction,  and  to  turn  down  toward  the 
southern  coast  on  which  lay  Kamarina  and  Gela.  Their  guides 
informed  them  that  if  they  coidd  cross  the  river  Kakyparis,  which 


150 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


GYLIPPUS  ATTACKS  NIKIAS. 


151 


ft'll  into  the  sea  south  of  Syracii<:e,  on  the  soiilh-enstern  roni^t  of 
Sicily — or  Ji  river  still  farther  on  called  the  Eriiieus — tiiey  niiirht 
march  up  the  right  bank  of  either  into  the  regions  of  the  Interior. 
Accordingly  they  broke  up  in  the  night,  amidst  confusion  and  alarm; 
in  spite  of  which  the  front  division  of  tiie  army  under  iNikias  got 
into  full  march,  and  made  considerable  advance.  By  daybreak  this 
division  reached  the  south-eastern  coast  of  the  islandnot  far  souijj  of 
Syracuse  and  fell  into  the  track  of  the  Ilelorine  road,  whi(h  tli(  v 
pursued  until  they  arrived  at  the  Kakyparis.  Even  here,  however, 
they  found  a  Syr  cusan  detnchment  beforehand  with  them,  rjiiviiiii:  a 
redoubt,  and  blocking  up  the  lord;  nor  could  Nikias  ]i;iss  it  wiihout 
forcing  his  w;iy  through  them.  He  marched  straight  forward  to  the 
Erineus,  which  he  crossed  xjn  the  same  day,  and  encamped  his  troops 
on  some  high  ground  on  the  other  side. 

Except  at  the  ford  of  the  Kakyi>aris.  his  marcli  had  been  all  dnv 
unobstsucted  by  the  enemy.  He  thought  it  wiser  to  pu^h  his  troops 
as  fast  as  possible  in  order  to  arrive  at  some  i)lace  both  of  snfety  and 
subsistence,  without  concerning  himself  about  the  rear  division  under 
Demosthenes.  That  division,  the  larger  half  of  the  army,  started 
both  later  and  in  greater  disorder.  Ujiaccountable  ]>anics  ;ind  dark- 
ness made  them  part  company  or  miss  their  way,  so  that  Demosthe- 
nes, with  all  his  efforts  to  keep  them  together,  made  little  j^ngrcss, 
and  fell  much  behind  Nikias.  He  was  overtaken  by  the  Syracnisans 
during  the  forenoon,  seemingly  before  he  reached  the  Kakyparis — 
and  at  a  moment  when  the  foremost  division  was  nearly  six  miles 
ahead,  between  the  Kakyparis  and  the  Erineus. 

When  the  Syracusans  discovered  at  dawn  that  their  enemy  had 
made  off  in  the  night,  their  first  impulse  was  to  accuse  Gylippus  of 
treachery  in  having  permitted  the  escape.  Such  ungrateful  sur- 
mises, however,  were  soon  dissipated,  and  the  cavalry  set  forth  in' 
rapid  pursuit,  until  they  overtook  the  rear  division,  which  they 
immediately  began  to  attack  and  impede.  The  advance  of  Demos- 
thenes had  been  tardy  before,  and  his  division  disorganized;  but  he 
was  now  compelled  to  turn  and  defend  himself  against  an  indefati- 
gable enemy,  who  presently  got  before  him,  and  thus  stopped  him 
altogether.  Their  numerous  light  troops  and  cavalry  assailed  him  on 
all  sides  and  without  intermission;  employing  nothing  but  missiles, 
however,  and  taking  care  to  avoid  any  close  encounter.  While  this 
unfortunate  division  were  exerting  their  best  efforts  both  to  defend 
themselves,  and  if  possible  to  gt4  forward,  they  found  themselves 
inclosed  in  a  walled  olive  ground,  through  the  middle  of  which  the 
road  passed;  a  farm  bearing  the  name,  and  probably  once  the  prop- 
erty, of  Polyzxdus,  brother  of  the  despot  Gelon.  "  Entangled  and 
huddled  up  in  this  inclosure,  from  whence  exit  at  the  farther  end  in 
the  face  of  an  enemy  was  found  impossible,  they  were  now  over- 
whelmed with  hostile  missiles  from  the  walls  on  all  sides.  Though 
unable  to  get  at  the  enemy,  and  dejirived  even  of  the  resources  of 


an  active  despair,  they  endured  incessant  harassing  for  the  greater 
imrt  of  the  day,  without  refreshment  or  repose,  and  with  the  number 
of  their  wouniled  continually  increasing;  until  at  length  the  remain- 
ing spirit  of  the  unhappy  sufferers  was  thoroughly  broken.  Per- 
cerviiig  their  condition,  Gylippus  sent  to  them  a  herald  with  a  proc- 
lamation; inviting  all  the  islanders  among  them  to  come  out  from 
the  rest,  and  promising  them  freedom  if  they  did  so.  The  inhabi- 
tants of  some  cities,  yet  not  many — a  fact  much  to  their  honor — 
availed  themselves  of  this  offer,  and  surrendered.  Presently,  how- 
ever, a  larger  negotiation  was  opened,  which  ended  by  the  entire 
division  capitulating  upon  terms,  and  giving  up  their  arms.  Gylip- 
pus and  the  Syracusans  engaged  that  the  lives  of  all  should  be 
spared;  that  is,  that  none  should  be  put  to  death  either  by  violence, 
or  hy  intolerable  bonds,  or  by  starvation.  Having  all  been  disarmed 
they  were  forthwith  conveyed  away  as  prisoners  to  Syracuse — 6,000 
in  number.  It  is  a  remarkable  proof  of  the  easy  and  opulent  cir- 
cumstances of  many  among  these  gallant  sufferers,  when  we  are  told 
that  the  money  which  they  had  about  them,  even  at  this  last  moment 
of  pressure,  was  sufficient  to  till  the  concavities  of  four  shields. 
Disdaining  either  to  surrender  or  to  make  any  stipulation  for  himself 
personally,  Demosthenes  was  on  the  point  of  killing  himself  with  his 
own  sword  the  moment  that  the  capitulation  was  concluded;  but  his 
intention  was  prevented  and  he  was  carried  off  a  disarmed  prisoner 
by  the  Syracusans. 

'On  the  next  day  Gylippus  and  the  victorious  Syracusans  overtook 
Xikias  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Erineus,  apprised  him  of  the  capitu- 
lation of  Demosthenes,  and  smnmoned  him  to  capitulate  also.  He 
tlemamled  leave  to  send  a  liorseman,  for  the  purpose  of  verifying 
the  statement;  and  on  the  return  of  the  horseman,  he  made  a  jiirop- 
ositiou  to  Gylippus — that  his  army  should  be  permitted  to  return 
home,  on  condition  of  Athens  reimbursing  to  Syracuse  the  whole 
expense  of  the  war,  and  furnishing  hostages  until  payment  should  be 
made,  one  citizen  against  each  talent  of  silver.  These  conditions 
were  rejected ;  but  Nikias  could  not  yet  bring  himself  to  submit  to 
the  same  terms  for  his  division  as  Demosthenes.  Accordingly  the 
Syracusans  recommenced  their  attacks,  while  the  Athenians,  in  spite 
of  hunger  and  fatigue,  sustained  as  they  best  could  until  night.  It 
Avas  the  intention  of  Nikias  again  to  take  advantage  of  the  nigiit  for 
the  purpose  of  getting  away.  But  on  this  occasion  the  Syracusans 
were  on  the  watch,  and  as  soon  as  they  heard  movement  in  the  camp, 
they  raised  the  paean  or  war  shout;  thus  showing  that  they  were  on 
tlie  look-out.  and  inducing  the  Athenians  again  to  lay  down  the  arms 
which  they  had  taken  up  for  departure.  A  detachment  of  800 
Athenians,  nevertheless,  still  persisting  in  marching  off,  apart  from 
the  rest,  forced  their  way  through  the  posts  of  the  Syracusans.  These 
men  got  safely  away,  and  nothing  but  the  w-ant  of  guides  prevented 
them  from  escaping  altogether. 


t 


152 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


TOTAL  NUMBERS  CAPTURED. 


153 


During  all  this  painful  retreat,  the  personal  resolution  displayed 
by  Nikias  was  excniphiry.  His  sick  and  feeble  frame  was  made  lo 
bear  up,  and  even  to  hearten  up  stronger  men,  against  the  extremity 
of  hardship,  exhausting  the  last  fragment  of  hope  or  even  possibiliiy. 
It  was  now  the  sixth  day  of  the  retreat — six  days  of  constant  priva- 
tion, suffering,  and  endurance  of  attack — yet  Nikias  early  in  tiie 
morning  attempted  a  fresh  march  in  order  to  get  to  the  river  Asin- 
arus,  which  falls  into  the  same  sea,  south  of  the  Erineus,  but  is  a 
more  considerable  stream,  flowing  deeply  imbedded  between  lofty 
banks.  This  w-as  a  last  effort  of  despair,  with  little  hope  of  final 
escape,  even  if  they  did  reach  it.  Yet  the  march  was  accomplished, 
in  spite  of  renewed  and  incessant  attacks  all  the  way,  from  the  Syia- 
cusan  cavaliy ;  who  even  got  to  the  river  before  the  Athenians,  occu- 
pying the  ford,  and  lining  the  high  banks  near  it.  Here  the  resolution 
of  the  unhappy  fugitives  at  length  gave  way:  when  they  reached  tlie 
river,  their  strength,  their  patience,  their  spirit,  and  their  hojies  for 
the  future  were  all  extinct.  Tormented  with  raging  thirst,  and  com- 
pelled by  the  attacks  of  the  cavalry  to  march  in  one  compact  ni;  ss, 
they  rushed  into  the  ford  all  at  once,  treading  down  and  tumbling  over 
each  other  in  the  universal  avidity  for  drink.  Many  thus  perished 
from  being  pushed  down  upon  the  points  of  the  spears;  or  lost  their 
footing  among  the  scattered  articles  of  baggage,  and  were  thus  borne 
down  under  water.  Meanwhile  the  Syracusans  from  above  poured 
upon  the  huddled  mass  showers  of  missiles,  while  the  Peloponnesian 
hoplites  even  descended  into  the  river,  came  to  close  quarters  with 
them,  and  slew  considerable  numbers.  So  violent,  nevtrlheless,  was 
the  thirst  of  the  Athenians,  that  all  other  suffering  was  endured  in 
order  to  taste  relief  by  drinking.  And  even  when  dead  and  wounded 
were  heaped  in  the  river — w  hen  the  water  was  tainted  and  turbid 
■with  bk)od,  as  well  as  thick  with  the  mud  trodden  up — still  the  new- 
comers pushed  their  way  in  and  swallowed  it  with  voracity. 

Wretched,  helpless,  and  demoralized  as  the  army  now  was,  Nikias 
could  think  no  further  of  resistance.  He  accordingly  surrendered 
himself  to  Gylippus,  to  be  dealt  with  at  the  discretion  of  that  general 
and  of  the  Laceda?monians;  earnestly  imploring  that  the  slaiighler  of 
the  defenseless  soldiers  miglit  be  arrested.  Accordingly  Gylippus 
gave  orders  that  no  more  should  be  killed,  but  that  the  rest  should  be 
secured  as  captives.  Mjmy  were  slain  before  this  order  was  under- 
stood; but  of  those  who  remained,  almost  all  were  made  capiive, 
very  few  escaping.  Nay,  even  the  detachment  of  oOO,  who  had 
broken  out  in  the  night,  having  seemini!:ly  not  known  whither  to 
go,  were  captured  and  brought  in  by  troops  sent  forth  for  the  pur- 
pose. The  triumph  of  the  Syracusans  was  in  every  way  complete; 
they  hung  the  trees  on  the  banks  of  the  Asinarus  with  Athenian 
panoplies  jts  thropy,  and  carried  back  their  prisoners  in  joyous  proces- 
sion to  the  city. 

The  number  of  prisoners  thus  made  is  not  positively  specified  by 


Thucydidcs,  as  in  the  cn^e  of  the  division  of  Desmosthenes,  which 
had  capitulated  and  laid  down  their  arms  in  a  ma^s  within  the  walls 
of  (he  olive-ground.  Of  the  captives  from  the  division  of  Nikias,  the 
larirer  proportion  were  seized  by  private  individuals,  and  fraudulently 
secreted  for  their  own  protit;  the  number  obtained  for  the  state  being 
comparatively  small,  seemingly  not  more  than  lO'JO.  Tlie  various 
Sicilian  towns  became  soon  full  of  these  prisoners,  sold  as  slaves  for 
])iivate  account. 

Not  less  than  40,000  persons  in  the  aggregate  had  started  from  the 
Athenian  camp  to  commence  the  retreat,  six  days  before.  Of  these 
probably  many,  either  wounded  or  otherwise  incomjietent  even  wlien 
the  march  began,  soon  found  themselves  uiuible  to  keep  up,  and  were 
left  belli tul  to  perish.  Each  of  the  six  days  was  a  day  of  hard  fight- 
ing and  annoyance  from  an  indefatigable  crowd  of  light  troops,  with 
little,  and  at  last  seemingly  nothing,  to  eat.  The  number  was  thus 
successively  thinned,  by  wounds,  privations,  and  straggling;  so  that 
the  6,000  taken  with  nc'mosthenes,  and  perhaps  3,000  or  4.000  cap- 
tured with  Nikias,  formed  the  melancholy  remnant.  Of  the  strag- 
glers during  the  mandi.  however,  we  are  glad  to  learn  that  many 
contrived  to  escape  the  Syracusan  cavalry  and  get  to  Katana — 
where  al<o  those  who  afterward  ran  away  from  their  slavery  under 
private  masters  found  a  refuge.  These  fugitive  Athenians  served  as 
auxiliaries  to  repel  the  attacks  of  the  Syracusans  upon  Ivatana. 

It  was  in  this  manner,  chietlv,  that  Athens  came  to  receive  again 
within  her  bosom  a  few  of  those  ill-fated  sons  whom  she  had  drafted 
fortli  in  two  such  splended  divisions  to  Sicil3\  For  of  those  who 
were  carried  as  prisoners  to  Syracuse,  fewer  yet  could  ever  have  got 
home.  They  wei-e  placed,  for  safe  custody,  along  with  the  otlier 
])risoners,  in  the  stone-(iuarries  of  Syracuse — of  which  there  were 
several,  partly  on  the  southern  descent  of  the  outer  city  toward 
tlie  Nekropolis,  or  from  the  higher  level  to  the  lower  level  of 
Aehradina — partly  in  the  suburb  afterw^ard  called  Neapolis,  under 
the  soutluMii  clilf  of  Epipola?.  Into  tiiese  quarries — deep  hollows,  of 
confined  space,  with  precipitous  sides,  and  open  at  the  top  to  the 
sky— the  miserable  prisoners  were  plunticd,  lying  huddled  one  upon 
anDther,  without  the  suuiiiest  protection  or  convenience.  For  sub- 
sistence they  received  each  day  a  ration  of  one  pint  of  wheaten 
bread  (lialf  the  daily  ration  of  a  slave)  with  no  more  than  half  a  pint 
of  water,  so  that  they  were  not  preserved  from  the  pangs  either  of  hun- 
ger or  of  thirst.  Moreover,  the  heat  of  the  midday  sun,  alternatingw^itli 
the  chill  of  the  autumn  nights,  was  alike  afflicting  and  destructive; 
while  the  wants  of  life  having  all  to  be  performed  where  they  were, 
without  relief — tlie  filtii  and  stench  presently  became  insupportable. 
Sick  and  wounded  even  at  the  moment  of  airlval,  many  of  them 
speedily  died;  and  happiest  was  he  who  died  the  first,  leaving  an  un- 
concious  corpse,  wdiich  the  Syracusans  w^ould  not  take  the  trouble  to 
remove,  to  distress  and  infect  the  survivors.    Under  this  condition  and 


ataHi!  ■.'T■^r  »t'  -  -^■»■^'^■^lla^■i  ij&'  \f!£'i,:^UMm 


154 


RESOIPTIOX  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


OPINION  OF  THUCYDIDES   ABOUT   NIKIAS.      155 


treatment  tliey  remained  for  seventy  days,  probably  Pervinc:  as  a  spec- 
taele  for  llie  triunipliaiit  Syracusan  jiopiihitioii.  willi  tlitir  wives  and 
children,  to  come  and  look  down  upon,  and  to  conirratulate  tli(  niselvcs 
on  their  own  narrow  escape  from  snlferiugs  siiniliar  in  kind  at  least,  if 
not  deiz-ree.  After  that  time  the  novelty  of  the  spectacle  had  worn  olT; 
while  the  place  must  have  become  a  den  of  al  oniinaiion  and  a  nui- 
sance intolerable  even  to  the  citizens  thenis<  Ives,  Accordinirly  tlioy 
now  removed  all  the  survivinii- j>ri>f,nr'r.' ,  except  the  native  Athenians 
and  the  few  Itallaii  or  Sicilian  Greeks  amonf?  them.  All  those  so 
removed  were  sohl  for  slaves.  I'he  dead  liodies  were  probably  at  the 
same  time  taken  away,  and  tljc  prison  n  ndered  somewiiat  less  loath- 
some. What  became  of  the  remaininu' j)risoneis  weave  not  told.  It  may 
bepresunud  thtit  i hose  who  dould  survive  so  iireat  an  extremity  of  suf- 
fering might  after  a  certain  time  be  allowed  to  net  back  to  Athens  on 
ransom.  Perhaps  some  of  tliem  may  have  obtained  tlieir  release— as 
was  the  case  (we  are  told)  with  several  of  those  who  liad  been  sold  to 
private  masters— by  the  elegance  of  their  accomplishments  and  the 
dignity  of  their  deineanor.  "  The  dramas  of  Euripides  were  so  pecul- 
iarly popular  throughout  all  Sicily  that  those  Athenian  prisoners 
who  knew  by  heart  considerable  portions  of  them  won  the  affections 
of  their  masters.  Some  e\en  of  the  stragglers  from  the  army  are 
atbrmed  to  have  procured  for  themselves,  by  the  same  attiaction, 
shelter  and  hospitality  during  tl-.eirflight.  Euripides, we  are  informed, 
lived  to  receive  the  thanks  of  several  among  these  unhappy  sufferers, 
alter  their  return  to  Athens.  I  cannot  refrain  from  mentioning  this 
story,  though  I  fear  its  trustworthiness  as  matter  of  fact  is  much 
inferor  to  its  pathos  and  interest. 

Upon  the  treatment  of  Nikias  and  Demosthenes,  not  merely  the 
Syraciisans.  but  also  the  allies  present,  were  consulted,  and  nnicli 
difference  of  opinion  was  fo\md.  To  keep  them  in  continenient 
simplv,  without  putting  them  to  death,  was  aj^parently  the  opinion 
a<lvocated  by  Ilermokrates.  But  Gylippus,  then  in  full  ascendency 
and  an  obiect  of  deep  gratitude  for  his  irivaluable  services,  solicited 
as  a  reward  to  himself  to  be  allowed  to  conduct  ihem  back  as  pris- 
oners to  Sptu'ta.  To  achieve  this  would  have  earned  for  him  signal 
honor  in  the  eyes  of  his  countrymen;  for  while  Demosthenes,  from 
Ids  success  Hi  Pylus,  was  their  hated  enemy,  Niki-as  had  always 
shown  himself  their  friend,  as  far  as  an  Athenian  could  do  so.  It 
was  to  him  that  they  owed  the  release  of  their  prisoners  taken  at 
Sphakteria;  and  he  had  calculated  upon  this  obligation  when  he  sur- 
rendered himself  j)risoner  to  Gylippus,  and  not  to  the  Syracusans. 

In  spite  of  all  his  influence,  however,  Gylip]>us  could  not  canV 
this  point.  First,  tht;  Corinthians  both  strenuously  opposi  d  liini 
themselves,  and  prevailed  on  the  other  allies  to  do  the  same.  Afraid 
that  the  wealtii  of  Nikias  would  always  procure  for  him  the  ineans 
of  escaping  from  imprisonment,  so  as  to  do  them  farther  injury— 
they  insisted  on  his  being  put  to  death.     Next,  those  Syracusans. 


wlio  had  been  in  secret  correspondence  with  Nikias  durinir  the  siege, 
were  yet  more  anxious  to  get  him  put  out  of  the  Avay;  being  apfji-e- 
Ijcnsive  that,  if  tortured  by  their  political  opponenls\  he  might  dis- 
close their  names  and  intrigues.  Such  various  influences  prevailed, 
so  tliat  Nikias,  as  well  as  Demosthenes,  was  ordered  to  be  put  to 
death  by  a  decree  of  the  public  assend)ly,  mucli  to  the  discontent  of 
Gylippus.  Hermokrates  vainly  opposed  the  resolution,  but  perceiv- 
ing that  it  was  certain  to  be  carried,  Ik;  sent  to  them  a  private  inti- 
mation before  the  discussion  closed;  and  procured  fortlunn,  through 
one  of  the  sentinels,  the  means  of  dying  by  their  own  hands.  Their 
])odies  were  publicly  exposed  before  the  city  gates  to  the  view  of  the 
Syracusan  citizens;  while  the  day  on  which  the  final  capture  of 
IS'ikias  and  his  army  was  accomplished,  came  to  be  celebrated  as  an 
annual  festival,  uiuler  the  title  of  the  Asinaria,  on  the  tweniy-sixth 
day  of  the  Dorian  month  Karneius. 

Such  was  the  close  of  the  expedition,  or  rather  of  the  tw^o  expedi- 
tions, undertaken  by  Athens  against  Syracuse.  Never  in  Grecian 
history  had  a  force  so  large,  so  costly,  so  eiiicient,  and  full  of  prom- 
ise and  confidence,  been  sent  forth;  never  in  Grecian  history  had 
ruin  .so  complete  and  sweeping,  or  victory  so  glorious  and  unex- 
pected, been  witnessed.  Its  consecpieuces  were^felt  from  one  end 
of  the  Grecian  world  to  the  other,  as  will  appear  in  the  coming- 
chapters.  ^ 

The  esteem  and  admiration  felt  at  Athens  towards  Nikias  had  been 
throughout  lofty  and  unshaken;  after  his  death  it  was  exchanged 
for  disgrace.  His  name  w^as  omitted,  while  that  of  his  colleague 
Demostlienes  was  engraved,  on  the  funeral  pillar  erected  to  com- 
memorate the  fallen  warriors.  This  difference  Pansanias  explains 
by  saying  that  Nikias  w^•ls  conceived  to  have  disgraced  himself  as  a 
military  man  by  his  voluntary  surrender,  which  Demosthenes  had 
disdained. 

Tlie  opinion  of  Thucydides  deserves  special  notice,  in  the  face  of 
this  judgment  of  his  countrymen.  While  he  savs  not  a  word  about 
Demosthenes,  beyond  the  fact  of  his  being  put  to  death,  he  adds  in 
reference  to  Nikias  a  few  words  of  marked  svmpathv  and  commen- 
dation. "Such,  or  nearly  such,  (he  says)  were  the  reasons  why 
Aikias  was  put  to  death;  though  /te  assairedly,  amonu*  ail  Greeks 
of  my  time,  le:ist  deserved  to  come  to  so  extreme  a  pitch  of  ill-for- 
tune, considering  his  exact  performance  of  established  duties  to  the 
divinity." 

If  we  were  judging  Nikias  merely  as  a  private  man,  and  setting 
his  personal  conduct  in  one  scale,  against  his  personal  sutferiiiir  on 
the  other,  the  remark  of  Thucydides^  w^ould  be  natural  and  intelligi- 
)1''.  But  the  general  of  a  great  expedition,  upon  wiiose  conduct  the 
lives  of  thousands  of  biave  men  as  well  as  the  most  momentous 
laerests  of  his  country,  depend,  cannot  be  tried  by  any  such  stand- 
aid.    His  private  merit  becomes  a  secondary  point  in  the  case,  us 


l< 


156 


RESUMPTION  OF  HOSTILITIES. 


CHARACTER  OF  NIKIAS. 


157 


compared  with  the  discharge  of  his  respousible  public  duties,  by 
which  lie  nuist  stand  or  fall. 

Tried  bv  this  more  appropriate  standard,  what  are  we  to  say  of 
Nikias  ?  "^We  are  compelled  to  say,  that  if  hi»  personal  suffering 
could  possibly  be  regarded  iu  the  li.iiht  of  an  atonement,  or  set  in 
anetpialion  auainst  the  mischief  bnnight  by  himself  bothou  hisarniy 
and  his  country — it  would  not  be  gieater  than  his  deserts.  I  shall 
uot  here  repeat  the  separate  points  in  his  conduct  which  justify  lliis 
view,  and  which  have  been  set  forth  as  they  occurred,  in  the  pieced- 
ing  pages.  Adndtting  fully  both  the  good  intentions  of  ^'ikius, 
and  his  personal  bravery,  rising  even  into  heroism  during  the  hist 
few  days  in  Sicily— it  is  not  the  less  incontestable,  that  lirst,  the 
failure  of  the  enterprise — uext,  the  destruction  of  the  arnuuneiit— is 
to  be  traced  distinctly  to  his' lamentable  misjudgment.  Somelinics 
petty  trilling— sometimes  apathy  and  inaction — sometimes  iM-6sun\p- 
tuous  neglect — sometimes  obstinate  blindness  even  to  urgent  ami 
obvious  necessities — oue  or  other  of  these  his  sad  mental  defeels,  will 
be  found  operative  at  every  step  whereby  this  fated  armament  sinks 
down  from  exuberant efliciency  into  the^ast  depth  of  aggregate  ruin 
and  individual  misery.  His  improvidence  and  incapacity  stand  pro- 
claimed, not  merely  In  the  narrative  of  the  historian,  but  even  in  liis 
own  letter  to  the  AUienians.  and  in  his  own  speeches  both  before  tliu 
expedition  and  during  its  closing  misfortunes,  when  contrasted  with 
the  reality  of  his  proceedings. "  The  man  whose  llagrant  inc()nii)e- 
tency  could  brir.g  such  wholesale  ruin  upon  two  tine  arm;  nients 
intrusted  to  his  command,  uiion  the  Athenian  maritime  empire,  and 
ultimately  upon  Athens  herself— must  appear  on  the  tablets  of  history 
under  the  severest  condemnation,  even  though  his  personal  virtues 
had  been  lofter  than  those  of  IS'ikias. 

And  yet  our. great  historian— after  devoting  two  immortal  l)ooks 
to  this  expedition— after  setting  forth  emphatically  both  the  gloiy  ()f 
its  dawn  and  the  wretchedness  of  its  close,  with  a  dranudic  genius 
parallel  to  the  CKdij^us  Tyrannus  of  Sophokles— when  he  comes  to 
.recount  the  melancholy  end  of  the  two  <  onnnanders,  has  no  words 
ito  spare  for  Demosthenes  (far  the  abler  othcer  of  the  two,  who  per- 
ished bv  no  faidt  of  his  own),  but  reserves  his  flowers  to  strew  on 
the  grave  of  Nikias.  the  author  of  the  whole  calamity— "  What  a 
pity  !    Such  a  respectable  and  religious  man!" 

Thucydid(s  is  here  the  more  instiuctive,  b( cause  he  exactly  repre- 
sents the  sentiment  of  the  general  Athenian  public  towards  Nikias 
during  his  life-time.  They" could  not  bear  to  condemn,  to  mistru^t, 
to  dismiss,  or  to  do  without,  so  respectal)le  and  religious  a  citizen. 
The  private  qualiiies  of  Nikias  were  not  only  lield  to  entitle  him  to 
the  most  indulgent  construction  of  all  his  i)ublic  short-comings,  but 
also  insured  to  him  credit  for  political  and  military  competence 
altogether  disproportionate  to  his  deserts.  When  wc  tind  Thucydides, 
after  narrating  so  much  improvidence  and  mismanagement  on  the 


trrand  scale,  still  keeping  attention  fixed  on  the  private  morality  and 
jecoruin  of  Nikias,  as  if  it  constituted  the  main  feature  of  his 
character — we  understand  how  the  Athenian  people  originally  came 
both  to  over-estimate,  this  unfortunate  leader,  and  continued  over- 
estimating him  with  tenacious  fidelity  even  after  glaring  proof  of  his 
iiieapacity.  Never  in  the  political  history  of  Athens  did  the  people 
make  so  fatal  a  mistake  in  placing  their  confidence. 

In  reviewing  the  causes  of  popular  misjudgment,  historians  are  apt 
to  enlarge  prominently,  if  not  exclusively,  on  demagogues  and  the 
demagogic  intluences.     Mankind   being  usually  considered  in  the 
light  of  governable  material,  or  as  instruments  for  exalting,  arming, 
aud  decorating  their  rulers — .vhatever  renders  them  more  difficult  to 
handle  in  this  capacity,  ran1;s  first  in  the  category  of  vices.     Nor  can 
it -be  denied  that  this  was  a  real  and  serious  cause.     Clever  crimina- 
tive speakers  often  passed  themselves  off  for  something  above  their 
real  worth:  though  useful  and  iudisi)ensable  as  a  protection  against 
worse,  they  sometimes  deluded  the  people  into  measures  impolitic  or 
unjust.    But,  even  if  we  grant,  to  the  cause  of  misjudgment  here 
indicated,  a  greater  practical  efficiency  than  history  will  fairly  sanc- 
tion—still it  is  only  one  among  others  more  mischievous.   'Never 
dul  any  man   at  Athens,   by  mere  force  of  demtigogic  qualities, 
acquire  a  measure  of  esteem  at  once  so  exaggerated  and   so  durable, 
combined  with  so  nuich  power  of  injuring  his  fellow-citizens,  as  the 
anli-deniagogic  Nikias.     The  man  who,  over  and  above  his  shabby 
maneuver  about  the  expedition  against  Si)hakteria,  and  his  improv- 
ident sacrifice  of  Athenian  interests  iu  the  alliance  with    Sparta, 
ended  by  biinging  ruin  on  the  greatest  armament  ever  sent  forth  by 
Athens,  as  well  as  upon  her  maritime  empire — was  not  a  leather- 
seUcr  of  impudent  and  abusive  ehxpience,   but  a  man  of  ancient 
family  and  hereditary  wealth — imuuficent  and  a-rable,  having  credit 
not  merely  for  the  largesses  which  he  bestowed,  but  also  for  all  the 
hisolences,  which  as  a  rich  ma?i  he  might  have  committed,  but  did 
not  comnut — free  from  all  pecuniary  corruption — a  brave  man,  and 
above  all,  an  ultra-religious  mau,  believed  therefore  to  stand  higli  in 
the  favor  of  the  gods,   and  to  be  fortunate.     Such  was  the  esteem 
which  the  Athenians  felt  for  this  union  of  good  qualities  purely  ]ier- 
sonal  and  negative,  with  eminent  station,  that  they  presumed  the 
hiirher  aptitutles  of  command,  and  presumed  them  unhappily  after 
proof  that  they  did  not  exist — after  proof  that  what  they  had  sup- 
posed to  be  caution  was  only  apathy  and  mental  weakness.     No 
demagogic  arts  or  eloquence  would  ever  have  created  in  the  people 
so  deep-seated  an   illusion  as  the  imposing  respectability  of  Nikias. 
Xow  it  was  against  the  overweening  ascendency  of  such  decorous 
and  piiiiis  incompetence,  when  aided  by  wealth  and  family  advan- 
taiiVN,  that  the  demagogic  accusatory  eloquence  ought  to  have  served 
iisa  natural  bar  and  corrective.     Performitig  the  functions  of  a  con- 
stituiioual  opposition,  it  afforded  the  only  chance  of  that  tutelary 


158    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAMENT. 


AGIS  AT  DEKELEIA. 


159 


exposure  wherchv  MuikUts  and  short -mm  ini^s  mitiht  be  arrested  in 
time.  How  iiisuttlcient  was  tlie  check  which  it  provided— even  at 
Athens,  where  every  one  denounces  it  as  havinir  prevailed  iu  de- 
vouring excess — the  history  of  Nikias  is  an  ever-living  testimouy. 


CHAPTER  LXI. 

FROM  TTTE  DESTEUCTIOX  OF  THE  ATTTEXTAN  AKMA^rP.NT  IN  SICn.Y, 
DOWN  TO  THE  OLIGAUCniCAL  CONSPIKACY  OF  THE  FOUR  HUN- 
UKED  AT  ATHENS. 

In  the  preceding  chapter,  we  followed  to  its  melancholy  close  the 
united  armament  of  Nikias  and  Demosthenes,  first  in  the  liarhor  and 
lastly  in  the  neighborhood  of  Syracuse,  towards  the  end  of  Septem- 
ber 418  B.C. 

The  first  impression  which  we  derive  from  the  perusal  of  that 
narrative  is,  sympathy  for  the  parties  directly  concerned— chiefly  for 
the  number  of  iiall ant  Athenians  who  thus  miserj.bly  perisheil,  i^aitly 
also  for  the  Syracusan  victors,  themselves  a  few  months  before  on 
the  verge  of  apparent  ruin.  But  the  distant  and  collateral  effects  of 
the  catastrophe  throughout  Greece  were  yet  more  momentous  than 
those  within  the  island  in  which  it  occurred. 

I  have  nlreadv  mentioned,  that  even  at  the  moment  when  Demos- 
thenes with  his 'powerful  armament  left  Peiraus  to  go  to  Sicily,  tlio 
hostilities  of  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy  against  Athens  herself 
had  been  already  recommenced.  Not  only  was  the  Spartan  king 
Ads  ravaging  A^ttic^a,  but  the  far  more  important  step  of  fortifying 
Dekeleia.  for  the  abode  of  a  permanent  garrison,  was  in  course  of 
completion.  That  fortress,  having  been  begun  about  the  middle  of 
]^Iarch.  was  probably  by  the  month  of  June  in  a  situation  to  slu  Iter 
its  ii-arrison,  which  consisted  of  contingents  periodically  furnished, 
and'relieving  each  other  alternately,  from  all  the  different  states 
of  the  confederacy,   under  the  permanent  conmiand  of  king  Ag'.s 

himself. 

And  now  becran  that  incessant  marauding  of  domiciliated  enemies 
—destined  to  last  for  nine  years  until  the  tinnl  capture  of  Athens- 
partiallv  contemplated  even  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian 
^v;,r— and  recently  enforced,  with  full  comprehension  of  its  disastrous 
effects,  by  the  virulent  antipathy  of  the  exile  Alkibiades.  The  earlier 
invasions  of  Attica  had  been  all  temporary,  continuing  for  five  or 
six  weeks  at  the  farthest,  and  leaving  the  country  in  reposed  for  the 
remainder  of  the  year.  But  the  Athenians  now  underwent  from 
lienceforward  the  fatal  experience  of  a  hostile  garrison  within  fifteen 
miles  of  their  city;  an  experience  peculiarly  p/ainful  this  siuunier,  as 


well  from  its  novelty  as  from  the  extraordinary  vigor  which  Agis 
di>r'layed  in  his  operations.     His  excursions  were  so  widely  ex  ten  dt^d 
that  no  part  of  Attica  was  secure  or  coidd  be  rendered  productive. 
Not  only  were  all  the  sheep  and  cattle  destroyed,  but  the  slaves  too, 
esperially  the  most  valuable  slaves  or  artisans,  began  to  desert  to 
Dekeleia  in  great  numbers:  more  than  20,000  of  tliem  soon  disap- 
pearv  d  in  this  way.     So  terrii)ie  a  loss  of  income  both  to  proprietors 
of  laad  and  to  employers  in  the  city  was  further  aggravated  by  the 
iiici  eased  cost  and  ditViculty  of  import  from  Eulxea."    Provisions  nnd 
caitle  from  that  island  had  previously  come  over  land  from  Oropiis, 
hiii  as  that  road  was  com]detcly  stopped  by  the  garrison  of  Dekeleia,* 
they  were  now  of  necessity  sent  round  Cape  Suiiiuni  by  sea;  a  tran- 
sit more  circuitous  and  expensive,  besides  im'ing  open  to  attack  from 
the  enemy's  privateers.     In  the  midst  of  such  heavy  privations,  the 
(leiii-nds  on  citizens  and  metics  for  military  duty  were  nuditplied 
heyond  measure.     The  presence  of  the  enemy  at  Dekeleia  forced 
then  to  keep  watch  day  and  night  throughout  their  long  extent  of 
Avail,  comprising  both  Athens  and  Peiranis:  in  the  day  tiiiie  the  hop- 
lites  of  the  city  relieved  each  other  on  guard,  but  at  night  nearly  all 
of  them  were  either  on  the   battleuients  or  at  the  various  military 
stations  in  the  city.     Instead  of  a  city,  in  fact,  Athens  was  reduced 
to  the  condition  of  something  like  a  nulitary  post.     .Aforeover  the  rich 
citizens  of  the  state,  who  served  as  horsemen,  shared  in  the  general 
haidsliip;  being  called  on  for  daily  duty  in  order  to  restrain  at  least, 
since  they  could  not  entirely  prevent,  the  excursions  of  the  garrison 
of  Dekeleia:   their  efficiency   was  however  soon   impaired" by  the 
laming  of  their  horse-  on  the"  hard  and  stony  soil. 

Besides  the  personal  efforts  of  the  citizens,  such  exigences  pressed 
heavily  on  the  financial  resources  of  the  state.  Alreafly  the  immense 
expense  incurred,  in  fitting  out  the  two  large  armaments  for  Sicily, 
had  exhausted  all  the  accuuudations  laid  by  in  the  treasury  during 
tlie  interval  since  the  peace  of  ^Mkias;  so  that  the  attacks  from 
Dekeleia,  n:)t  only  imposing  heavy  adilitional  cost  but  at  the  same 
lime  abridging  the  means  of  payinu-,  brought  the  finances  of  Athens 
into  positive  embarrassiuent.  With  the  view  of  increasing  her 
revenues,  she  altered  the  principle  on  which  her  subject-allies  had 
hitherto  been  assessed.  Instead  of  a  fixed  sum  of  anmlal  tribute,  she 
now  required  from  thetn  payment  of  a  duty  of  5  per  cent,  on  all 
imports  and  exports  by  sea.  'How  this  new  principle  of  assessment 
worked  we  have  unfortunately  no  information.  To  collect  the  duty, 
aiul  take  precautions  against  evasion,  an  Athenian  custom-house 
o'tieer  must  have  been  recpiired  in  each  allied  city.  Yet  it  is  ilifficult 
to  iindersfatid  how  Athens  could  have  enforced  a  system  at  once 
novel,  extensive,  vexatious,  and  more  burdensome  to  the  payers — 
when  we  couie  to  see  how  nuich  her  hold  over  those  payers,  as  well 
as  her  naval  force,  became  enfeebled,  before  the  close  even  of  the 
actual  year. 


160    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  AR^IAMENT. 

Her  impoverished  finances  also  compe11»'(l  lier  to  dismiss  a  body  of 
Thn'.eian  menenarics,  vvliose  aid  woultl  itave  been  very  useful 
ai?:iiiist  the  enemy  at  Dekek'in.  These  Thraeian  pellasts,  1300  in 
luimlKT,  had  been  hired  at  a  draehma  per  day  each  man  to  go  with 
Demosthenes  to  Syracuse,  but  had  not  reached  Athens  in  time.  As 
K)on  as  they  came  thither,  the  Athenians  placed  them  under  tlic 
command  of  Diilrephes,  to  conduct  them  back  to  their  native 
(^.„m,trv — witli  iust ructions  to  do  damage  to  the  Bceotians,  as  oppor- 
tunity might  occur,  in  his  way  through  the  Euripus.  Accordingly 
Diil replies",  putting  them  on  siupboard,  sailed  round  Sunium  and 
northward  along  Ihe  eastern  coast  of  Attica.  After  a  short -disem- 
barkation near  Tanagra,  he  passed  on  to  Chalkis  in  Eubiea  in  tlie 
narrowest  part  of  the  sliait,  from  wlu  nee  he  crossed  in  the  night  to 
the  Bo?otian  coast  opposite,  andjnr.rched  up  some  distance  from  the 
sea  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  Bcrotian  town  Mykalessus.  lie 
arrived  here  unseen — lay  in  wait  near  a  temi>le  of  liermes  about  two 
miles  distant — and  fell  upon  the  town  unexpectedly  at  break  of  day. 
To  the  Mykallessians— dwelling  in  the  center  of  Ikrotia,  not  far  from 
ThelK's  and  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  sea— such  an  assault 
-was  not  less  unexpected  than  formidable.  Their  fori iticat ions  were 
ii^i^Ur — in  some  parts  low,  in  other  parts  even  tumbling  down;  nor 
bad  they  even  taken  the  precaution  to  close  their  gates  at  night :  so 
that  the  barbarians  under  Diitrephes,  entering  the  town  uithout  the 
sinalkst  dilhculty,  began  at  once  the  work  of  pillage  and  destruction. 
The  s(!ene  which  followed  was  something  alike  novel  and  revoliiiig 
to  Grecian  eyes.  Not  only  were  all  the  houses,  and  even  the  tenij^les. 
phuukred— but  the  Thracians  farther  manifested  that  raging  ihiKst 
of  blood  which  seemed  inherent  in  their  race.  Tliey  slew  every 
Jiving  thing  that  came  in  their  way;  men,  women,  children,  horses, 
cattle,  etc.  They  burst  into  a  echool  wherein  many  boys  had  just 
been  assendtled,  and  massacred  them  all.  This  K-ene  ol  bloodshed, 
conmii-ttcd  by  barbarians  who  had  not  been  seen  in  Greece  since  the 
days  of  Xerxes,  was  recounted  w  ith  horror  and  sympathy  throughout 
alfGrecian  communities,  though  Mykalessus  was  in  itself  a  town  of 
fcccond-rate  or  thirtl-rate  magnitude. 

The  succor  brought  from  Thebes,  by  [Mykalessian  fugitives,  arrived 
iinha|)pily  only  in  time  to  avenge,  not  to  save,  the  inhabitants.  The 
Thracians  were  already  retiring  with  the  booty  which  they  could 
carry  away,  when  the*  Bceotarch  Skirihondas  overtook  them  both 
with  cavalrv  and  hoplites;  after  having  put  to  death  some  greedy 
plunderers  who  tarried  too  long  in  the  town.  He  compelled  them  to 
relinquish  most  of  their  booty,  and  pursued  them  to  the  sea-shore; 
not  without  a  brave  resistance  fn>m  these  jK-ltasts,  who  had  a  pecu- 
liar way  of  lighting  which  disconcerted  the  Thebaus.  But  when 
they  arrived  at  the  seashore,  the  Athenian  ships  did  not  think  it  sate 
to  approach  very  ckxse,  so  that  not  less  than  250  Thracians  were  slain 
before  they  could  get  aboard;  and  the  Athenian  commander  Diitrc- 


NAVAL  BATTLE  NEAR  NAUPAKTUS.  161 

phes  was  so  severely  wounded  that  he  died  shortly  afterward      The 
rest  pursued  then-  vovaii'e  homew^ard  ^ 

Meanwhile  the  ijnportant  station  of  Naupaktus  and  the  mouth  of 
the  Conntlnan  Gulagam  became  the  theater  of  naval  eneoimto     ?t 
will  be  recollected  that  this  was  the  scene  of  the  memorable  Srie. 
guued  by  the  Athenian  admiral  Phornnon  in  the  second    ear  of  t^^ 
Peioponnpsian  ^yar,  wherein  the  nautical  superiority  of  Al^nfover 
hereaenues   as  to  ships,  crews,  and  admiral,  had  been  soSscen 
dently  manifested      In  that  respect,  matters  had  now  con      erabW 
changed.     While  the  navy  of  Athens  had  fallen  off -since  U^d'a^  of 
Piioi  nion  that  of  her  enemy  had  improved:  Ariston  and     her  skill 
ful  Cormthian  steersmen,  not  attempting  to  copv  Athenian  tar     . 
had  studied  the  best  mode  of  coping  with  th 'i5^^ an  flud  n^od^^^^^ 
the  build  of  their  own  triremes,  accordingly,  at  Corinth  as  wdl  as  ai 
Smcuse.      Seventeen  years  before,  Phomiion  with  eigliLIa  Atle 
nuin  triremes  woukl  have  thought  himself  a  full  match  for  twenty" 
five  Corinthian.     But  the  Athenian  admiral  of  this  yea,    Konon  aho 
a  perfectly  brave  man,  now  judged  so  differently,  that  he  constrained 
Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon  to  re-enforce  his-ei 'dUeen  tri^eme^^^^^^ 
ten  others-out  of  the  best  of  their  fleet,  at  a  Ume  wlertrevZd 
certaudy  none  to  spare-on  the  ground  that  the  CoHnUi  •  i7flcet 
opposite  of  2o  sail  was  about  to  assume  the  offensive  a?4instWni^ 
sld^v';rl''[n'''^  ^T  •  '^^'  'T'  ^"  '''^'''''^^^  Konon  w7  Isom^^^^^^^ 

£79.  s  — s:  sir  ;;;?;;:;;£";{£»:« 

louL,:  each  of  these  promontories  was  occupied  bv  a  friendh  Hn^ 
oce  t  Ims  support  ns  tHe  line  of  triremes  .t  l,„.l.llanl        Tl^is  w^^' 

i,rn   r"''"'^''  ''"'  ",°f  '"^''l""  ll>«  Atl.enians  to  sail  thro  .4Th^ 
■  or  maueiiver  round  it  auj  in  tlie  rear  of  it.     Aecordinn-l  -''vC 

"  umLcio^cm  tiont  of  the  Connthians,  nether  party  vcntuj-ino- 
I-  ill  uck;  lor  the  straisiitf,)rward  collision  was  dest,u:tiw  to  hf 
■  I ayimn  s  „ps  «-ith  tlieir  sharp,  but  li.dit  and  feeble  b"k!^wi?ile  it 

u,J  n"'"'^''  V  ■'"  "'?  ^"^''^  ^^'■^-  •'"'!  'I"«k  eixitids  or  "i   proicrti  ns 

i>-ii  111  uegan  the  attack  on  their  side— vet  not  advinr-ino-  fo,. 
Shns'  %n  l.r'rl  1  •"«  nV'"---erius  andtohuio,  o'  tt 
;«  a  a"e-  to  either  mri?''  T.""  ""r- '  '^"".""""'S^vith  no  decisive 
I'l'telv  TknM,.,T  ..  P?  ?,•  ^^'""^  <^  '""'""■"'  lrir<'ines  wore  corn- 
ier frl/.f'        "-''  V""  "'''""  •"■  ""  <'«"iP'-''l  liy  swininiin<r  to 

n     tends  ashore:  on  the  Atbcniu.i  si.Ie,  not  one  trireme  becSn  e 

;     ,f ^   ''■'","■■'?,??«'•   '""    «'™'>    were    so    much   damaffed    by 
"•lUl  Ifonvanl  colbston  win,  the  stronger  bows  of  Ihe  enc'my,  tha^ 
H.  G.  Ill,— 6 


162  AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAI^i^.,  A 

thcv  bocnme  nlinost  usrlef^s  after  they  ffot  hack  to  Nanpnktiis.  Tiie 
Vthcnian^  had  so  far  the  sulvantacre  that  they  niamtaiiu'd  their  station, 
Avhilc  the  CoriiJl'iiaiis  did  not  venture  to  renew  the  liirht:  moreover, 
hoth  the  wind  and  the  current  set  toward  the  northern  shore,  so 
that  the  tloatiM'^  fragments  and  dead  bodies  came  into  I'osses^on  of 
the  Athenians."  Each  party  tliought  itself  entithd  to  erect  «v  trophy; 
hut  the  real  veeliiiix  of  victory  lav  on  ilie  side  oi  ( (.rinih.  and  tli;il  o 
defeat  on  the  siileV  Athens.  Tlie  reputed  maritime  superiority  of 
the  latter  was  felt  hy  hotli  parties  to  have  sustained  a  dun  in  ul  ion; 
and  ^f.ch  assuredly  would  have  been  the  impression  of  1  hormion, 
had  he  been  alive  to  witness  the  conflict. 

Thi**  battle  appears  to  have  taken  place,  so  far  as  we  can  maUeoiit, 
a  short  time  before  the  arrival  of  Demosthenes  at  Syracuse  about  the 
close  of  tlie  month  of  May.  We  cannot  doubt  that  the  Athenians 
most  anxiouslv  expected  news  from  that  otlicer,  with  some  accoiiiu 
of  victories  obtained  in  Sicily,  to  console  them  for  havmo-  sent  l.im 
away  at  a  moment  when  his  services  were  so  cruelly  wanted  at  l.omc^ 
Perhaps  thev  mav  even  have  indulaed  hopes  of  the  near  captiue  of 
Syracuse  as  u  means  of  restoring  their  cripi^.led  tmances.  Tiic-ir 
disappointment  wmild' be  all  the  more  bitter  when  they  came  to 
receive  toward  the  end  of  June  or  beiiinnin-  ot  July,  dispntel.es 
announcimr  the  capital  defeat  of  nemosthenes  in  ^''%f  ;'"^;^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
EiMpokB  and  the  consequent  cxtinclion  of  all  hope  that  ^Nr.Kue 
could  ever  1k^  taken.  After  tlicse  di>palehes,  we  may  perhaps  (h)ul. 
whether  any  others  subsequently  reached  Athens,  llie  generals 
would  not  write  home  during  the  month  of  iptl^^<'=;''<^"  "^'"^'^l'^^^^^^^^^^ 
succeeding,  when  Demosthenes  was  i>ressing  for  retrent,  and  iMKias 
re^^i^tin-  it  They  mi-ht  possibly,  however,  write  immediately  oa 
takin-lheir  resolution  to  retreat,  at  the  time  when  they  sent  to 
Katana  to  forbid  farther  supplies  of  PJ^^^'^j;^'"-^--^"^;  "^,';,^n,^^^^^^^^ 
last  practicable  opportunity-for  closely  afterward  f«^^^y.^  '^ 
naval  defeat,  and  the  blockiuir  up  of  the  mouth  of  he  Great  1. 1  or 
The  mere  absence  of  intelligence  would  satisfy  the  Athenians  tli-.t 
theh-  affairs  in  Sicily  were  proceeding  badly.  But  the  ^lo^ing  senc 
of  calamities,  down  to  the  final  catastrophe,  would  on  .v  con  , 
their. knowled-e  indirectly;  ptirtly  through  tju^  triuniphnnl  disp.i  1  . 
transmitted  from  Syracuse  to  Sparta,  Corinth,  and  1  nel.es-p.nll} 
throu-h  individiKd  soldiers  of  their  own  armament  ^yho  <'^^'»Pe<  • 

Accordin-  to  the  tale  of  Plutarch,  the  news  wtislirst  made  kno^n 
at  Athens  throu-li  a  strano-er,  who  arriving  at  Peintus,  went  into  j 
barbel's  sho)),  and  be^ran  to  converse  about  it  as  upon  a  theme  ulm 
must  of  course  be  uppermost  in  every  one's  mind.     The  -'•^b.n  >  - 
barber,  hearing  for  the  first  time   such  fearfu    tidings    nm         o 
Athens  to  communicate  it  to  thearchons  as  well  r,s  to  the  P"»'';^  " 
the  market  place.     The  public  assembly  being  rorthwitli  C'onvo^ecl. 
he  was  brou-ht  before  it,  and  called  upon  to  produce  lii^/"y  ^'^^^^^ 
which  he  was  unable  to  do.  as  the  stranger  h  d  disapp^'ared.     lie  ^'i^ 


TERROR  AND  AFFLICTION  AT  ATHENS.  163 

consequently  treated  as  a  fabricator  of  uncertified  rumors  for  the  dis 
turbauce  of  the  public  tranquillity,  and  even  put  to  the  torture 
How  much  of  this  improbable  tale  may  be  true,  we  cannot  determine' 
but  we  may  easily  beheve  that  neutrals,  passing  from  Corinth  or 
Megara  to  Peiiieus,  were  the  earliest  communicants  of  the  mis- 
fortiiues  of  Nikias  and  Demosthenes  in  Sicily  during  the  mouths  of 
July  and  August.  Presently  caine  individuaJ  soldiers  of  the  urma- 
nieiit,  wlio  had  got  away  from  the  defeat  and  found  a  passa"-e  home- 
so  that  the  bad  news  was  but  too  fully  confirmed.  But  the  Athe- 
nians were  long  before  they  could  bring  themselves  to  believe  even 
upon  the  testimony  of  these  fugitives,  how  entire  had  been  the 
destruction  of  their  two  splendid  armaments,  without  even  a  feeble 
renmant  left  to  console  them. 

As  soon  as  the  full  exteiit  of  their  loss  was  at  length  forced  unon 
their  convictions,  the  city  presented  a  scene  of  the  deepest  afiiictiou 
dismay  and  terror.     Over  and  above  the  extent  of  private  mournin-' 
from  the  loss  of  friends  and  relatives,  which  overspread  nearly  the 
whole  city— there  prevailed  utter  despair  as  to  the  public  safety 
Not  merely  was  the  empire  of  Athens  apparently  lost,  but  Athens 
herselt  seemed  utterly  defenceless.      Her  treasury  was  empty   lier 
docks  nearly  destitute  of  triremes,  the  flower  of  her  hoplites  as  well 
as  of  her  seamen  had  perished  in  Sicily  without  leaving-  their  like 
behind,  and  her  mai-itinie   reputation  was   irretrievably  damaged- 
while  her  enemies,  on  the  contrary,  animated  by  feelin<rs  of  exifber- 
ant  conlidence  and  triumph,  were  farther  strengthened  by  the  acces- 
sion ot   their  new   Sicilian  allies.      In  these  melancholy   months 

(October,Isovember,  41;]  B.C.)  the  Athenians  expected  nothiugless  than 
a  vigorous  attack,  both  by  land  and  sea,  from  the  Peloponnesian  and 
bieihan  forces  united,  with  the  aid  of  their  own  revolted  allies-aa 
attack  which  they  knew  themselves  to  be  in  no  condition  to  repel 

Amid  so  gloomy  a  prospect,  without  one  ray  of  hope  to  dicer 
them  on  any  side,  it  was  but  poor  satisfaction  to  vent  their  displeas- 
urc  on  the  chief  speakers  wiio  had  recommended  their  recent  disas- 
trous expedition  or  on  those  prophets  and  reporters  of  oracles  ^vho 
md  promised  them  the  divine  blessing  upon  it.  After  this  first 
hurst  both  ot  grief  and  anger,  however,  they  began  gradually  to  look 
tlieir  actual  situation  in  the  face;  and  the^nol•e  energetic  speakers 
would  doubtless  admini«>;er  the  salutary  lesson  of  remindino-  them 
low  much  had  been  achieved  by  their  forefathers,  sixty-seven  vears 
bL'fore,  when  the  approach  of  Xerxes  threatened  them  with  dangera 
not  less  overwhelniing.  Under  the  peril  of  the  moment,  the  eueu-gy 
ot  despair  revived  in  their  bosoms:  they  resolved  to  get  together  as 
speeaiyjis  they  could  both  ships  and  money-to  keep  watch  over 
ilicii  allies  especially  Eubffia— and  to  defend  themselves  to  the  last 
A  board  of  ten  elderly  men,  under  the  title  of  Probuli,  was  named 
10  review  the  expenditure,  to  suggest  all  practicable  economies,  and 
propose  for  the  future  such  measures  as  occasion  might  seem  to 


164    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAMENT. 

require.     The  propositions  of  tliose  Probiili  were  for  the  most  purt 

adopted,  witli  a  degree  of  UM:niimity  and  pronipitiide  rarely  seen  in 

an  Athenian  assenil)ly — springing  out  of  tliat  pressure  and  alarm  of 

the  moment  whieh  sileneed  all  eritieism.     Among  other  eeononiics, 

the  Athenians  abridged  the  costly  splendor  of  their  chorie  and  lilurirjc 

ceremonies  at  home,  and  brought  baek  the  recent  garrison  which 

^they  had  established  m\  the  J>.aei)nian  coast.     They  at  the  same  time 

T collected  timber,  commenced  the  construction  of  new  ships,  and  fur- 

■  titled  Cape  Sunium  in  order  to  protect  their  numerous  transport  ships 

in  the  piussage  from  Eubtea  to  Peirivus. 

While  Athens  was  thus  struggling  to  make  head  against  her  mis- 
fortunes, all  the  rest  of  Greece  was  lull  of  excitement  and  aggressive 
scheming  against  her.  So  grave  an  event  as  the  destructionof  this 
great  armament  had  never  happened  since  the  expedition  of  Xerxes 
against  Greece.  It  not  only  roused  the  most  distant  cities  of  the 
Grecian  world,  but  also  the  Persian  satraps  and  the  court  of  Susa. 
It  stimulated  the  enemies  of  Athens  to  redoubled  activity;  it  embokl- 
eued  h^r  subject-allies  to  revolt;  it  pushed  the  neutral  states,  who  all 
feared  what  she  would  have  done  if  successful  against  Syracuse,  now 
to  declare  war  against  her,  and  put  the  finishing  stroke  to  her  lower 
as  well  as  to  her  ambition.  All  of  them,  enemies,  subjects,  and  neu- 
trals, alike  believed  that  the  doom  of  Athens  was  sealed,  and  that  the 
-coming  spring  would  see  her  captured.  Earlier  than  the  ensuing  spring, 
the  Laceda;monians  did  not  feel  disposed  to  act;  but  they  sent  round 
their  instructions  to  the  allies  for  operations  both  by  land  and  sea  to 
be  then  commenced;  all  these  allies  being  prepared  to  do  their  best, 
in  hopes  that' this  effort  would  be  the  last  required  from  them,  and 
the  most  richly  rewarded.  A  fleet  of  100  triiemes  was  directed  to  he 
prepared  against  the  spring:  50  of  these  beii  g  imposed  in  equal  pro- 
portion on  the  Laceda-monians  themselves  and  the  Boeotians — 15  un 
Corinth — 15  on  the  Phocians  and  Lokrians — 10  on  the  Arcadians,  with 
Pellene  and  Sikyon — 10  on  Megara,  Trazen,  Epidaurus,  and  Heimi- 
one.  It  seems  to  have  been  considered  that  the.-e  ships  might  be  built 
and  launched  during  the  interval  l)etween  Sej)tember  and  ]\huch. 
The  same  large  hopes,  which  had  w orked  upon  men's  minds  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  w  ere  now  again  rife  in  the  bosoms  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians;  the  rather  as  that  powerful  force  from  Sicily,  which  they 
had  then  been  disappointed  in  obtaining,  might  now  be  anticipated 
with  tolerai)le  assurance  as  really  forthcoming. 

From  the  smaller  allies,  contributions  in  money  were  exacted  for 
the  intended  fleet  by  Agis,  Avho  moved  about  during  this  autumn 
with  a' portion  of  the  garrison  of  Dekeleia.  In  the  course  of  his  cir- 
cuit, he  visited  the  town  of  Herakleia.  near  the  Maliac  Gulf,  and 
levied  large  contributions  on  the  neighboring  CEta^ans,  in  reprisal 
for  the  plunder  which  they  had  taken  from  that  town,  as  well  as 
from  the  Phthiot  Acha-ans  and  other  subjects  of  the  Thessalians, 
though  the  latter  vainly  entered  their  protest  against  hisproceediugs. 


ALLIES  OF  ATHENS. 


165 


It  was  during  the  marcirof  Agis  through  Boeotia  (hat  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Eubtea  (probably  of  Chalkis  and  Eretria)  applied  to  liim, 
entreating  his  aid  to  enable  them  to  revolt  from  Athens;  which  he 
readily  promised,  sending  for  Alkamenes  at  the  head  of  aOO  Neoda- 
mode  hoplites  from  Sparta,  to  be  dispatched  across  to  the  ishmd  as 
hannost.  Having  a  force  permanently  at  hii?  disposal,  Avith  full 
liberty  of  military  a(;ti()n,  the  Spartan  king  at  Dekeleia  was  more 
intluontial  even  than  the  aulhorilies  at  home,  so  that  the  disaffected 
allies  of  Athens  addressed  themselves  in  preference  to  him.  It  was 
not  long  before  envoys  from  L(!sbos  visited  him  for  this  purpose. 
So  powerfully  was  their  claim  enforced  by  the  Pioootians  (their  kins- 
men of  the  ^Eolic  race),  who  engaged  to  furnish  ten  triremes  for 
their  aid,  provided  Agis  would  send  ten  others— that  he  was  induced 
to  postpone  his  promise  to  the  Eubfeans,  and  to  direct  Alkamenes  as 
harmos  to  Lesbos  instead  of  Euba'a,  without  at  all  consulting  the 
authorities  at  Sparta. 

The  threatened  revolt  of  Lesbos  and  Euboea,  especially  the  latter, 
was  a  vital  blow  to  the  empire  of  Athens.  But  this  was  not  the 
worst.  At  the  same  tune  that  these  tw^o  islands  were  nea:otiatin«" 
with  Agis,  envoys  from  Chios,  the  first  and  most  p(nverful  of  all 
Athenian  allies,  had  gone  to  Sparta  for  the  same  purpose.  The 
government  of  Chios— an  oligarchy,  but  distinguished  for  its  prudent 
management  and  caution  in  avoiding  risks— considering  Athens  tobe 
now  on  the  verge  of  ruin,  even  in  the  estimation  of  the  Atlieniana 
themselves,  thought  itself  safe,  together  with  the  opposite  city  of 
Erythr.-e,  in  taking  measures  for  achieving  independence. 

Besides  these  three  great  allies,  wliose^  exanq)le  in  revolting  was 
sine  to  be  follow^ed  by  others,  Athens  was  now  on  the  point  of  "being 
assaileil  by  other  enemies  yet  more  unexpected— the  two  Persian  s;v 
traps  of  the  Asiatic  seaboard,  Tissaphernes  and  Pharnabazus.  No 
sooner  was  the  Athenian  catastrophe  in  Sicily  known  at  the  court  of 
Susa,  than  the  Great  King  claimed  from  these  twosatnqys  the  tribute 
(hie  from  the  xlsiatic  Greeks  on  the  coast;  for  which  they  had  ahvaya 
stood  enrolled  in  the  tribute  records,  though  it  had  nev(u-  been  actu- 
ally levied  since  the  complete  establishment  of  the  Athenian  enquire. 
The  only  v»^ay  to  realize  this  tribute,  for  which  the  satraps  were  thus 
made  debtors,  was  tO  detach  the  towns  from  Athens,  and  break  up 
lier  enquire;  for  which  purpose  Tissrqdiernes  sen.t  aii-envoyto  Sj>arta 
in  conjunction  with  those  of  the  Chiansand  Erytlmeans.  He  invited 
the  Lacedicmoidans  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  the  Great  King,  for 
joint  operations  against  the  Athenian  empire  in  Asia;  pronfi'sing 
to  furnish  pay  and  maintenance  for  any  forces  which  they  might 
send,  at  the  rate  of  one  drachma,  per  day  for  each  man  of  tlie  shq^s' 
crews.  He  further  hoped  by  means  of  this  aid  to  reduce  Amorges, 
the  revolted  son  of  the  late  satiap  Ptesuthnes,  who  was  est;d)lisTied 
in  the  strong  maritime  town  of  lasus,  with  a  Grecian  mercenary 
force  and  a  considerable  treasure,  and  was  in  alliance  with  Athens. 


16G    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAMENT. 

The  Great  King  bad  sent  down  a  peremptory  mandate  tliat  Amorgcs 
should  either  be  broucrbt  prisoner  to  Susa  or  i-\i\m. 

\t  the  same  moment,  tbouiih  witliout  any  concert,  tliere  nnivod 
at  Sparta  Kalliuehus  and  Tiniauoras— two  Grecian  exiles  m  the  ser- 
vice of  riiarnabazus,  brinains:  pro])('sili<)ns  of  a  similar  chanieter  from 
that  salnip  whose  tiovernment  comprehended  TJirygia  and  the  coas^t 
hinds  north  of  yEolis,  from  the  Tropontis  to  the  north-east  corner  of 
the  riaiatic  (inlf.  Eairer  to  have  lie  assistance  of  a  Ltictda'nioimn^ 
fleet  in  order  to  detacir  the  Hellespontine  Greeks  from  Athens,  and 
realize  the  tribute  required  by  the  court  of  Susa.  Tliarnabazus  was  at 
Ih'e  <i\\ne  time  desirous  of  fofestallinu-  Tissaphernes  as  themidiumof 
alliance  between  Sparta  and  the  Great  King.  The  two  missionsliav- 
iu«'  thus  arrived  simultaneously  at  Sparta,  a  strong  c(mi]ietilion  aroso 
between  them— one  striving  to  attract  the  luojected  expedition  to 
Chio<;  the(»ther  to  the  Helhspont:  for  whuh  latter  puri-ose,  halli- 
geitus  had  brought  twenty-live  ttijents,  which  he  tendered  as  a  liist 

payment  in  part.  .     . 

From  all  quarters,  new  eneimcs  were  thus  sprmging  up  ngainst 
Athens  in  the  jjour  of  her  distress,  so  that  the   l.acednnioniaiis  had 
only  to  choose  which  they   would   i)r(fer;  a  <  hoice  in  whi(  h  llicy 
were  much  nuided  by  the* exile  Alkibiades.     It  so  hnppened  that  Ins 
family  friend  Kndius  was  at  this  moment  one  of  the  JJoard  of  Epliois; 
while  his  personal  enemy   King  Agis.  with  whose  wife  Tmuya  lie 
carrieclou  an  intriirue,  was  absent  in  command  at  Dekeleia.    Know- 
in"-  well  the  liieal  power  and  inii)oit:in(  e  of  Chios,  Alkibiades  stiemi- 
ou^lv  exhorled  the  Spartan  authorities  to  devote  their  lirst  .-ittention 
to  that  island.     A  Peria-kus  named   Phryuis,  being  sent  thither  to 
examine  whether  the  resources  alleged  by  the  envoys  were  really 
forthcominir,  brought  back  a  satisf.-ictory  report,  that  the  Chiaii  tlcit 
WMS  not  less  than  sixty  triremes  strong:  upon  which  the  LaeecaMno- 
nians  ccmcluded  an  alliance  with  Chios  ar.d  ErythifC,  engaging  to 
send  a  fleet  of  forty  sail  to  their  aid.     Ten  of  these  triremes,  now 
rea<ly  in  the  Lacedtvmonian  ports  (probably  at  Gythium),  were  dircclod 
immediately  to  sail  to  Chios,  under  the  admiral  Melnnchridas.    It 
seems  to  have  been  now  midwinter— but  Alkibiades.  and  still  moru 
the  Chian  envovs,  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  promp.t  action,  for  lour 
thtit  the  Athenians  should  detect  the  intrigue.     However,  an  (avtli- 
quake  just   liien    intervening,  was  construed  by  the  Si)artans  as  u 
mark  of  divine  displeasure,  so  that  they  would  not  persist  in  seiuhniT 
cither  tlie  same   commander  or   the   .^ame  ships.     Chalkideus  a\:i> 
named  to  su{)er>ede  .Melaiichridas;  while  Ave  new  shii>s  weredirectcjl 
to  be  equii)ped,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  sail  in  the  early  spring  along  wiiu 
the  lariicr  fleet  from  Corinth. 

As  soon  as  sprinir  arrivd.  three  Spartan  commissioners  ^yere  seia 
to  Corinth  (in  compliance  w^h  the  pressing  instances  of  the  CliKin 
envoys)  to  transport  across  the  isthmus  from  the  Corinthian  to  tlie 
Saronic  Gulf,  the  thirty-nine  triremes  now  iu  the  Corinthian  port  ol 


ISTHMIAN  FESTIVAL. 


1G7 


Lecliffium.  It  was  at  first  proposed  to  send  off  all,  at  ons  and  the 
panic  time,  to  Chios — even  those  vviiich  Agis  had  been  equippin"-  for 
the  assistance  of  Lesbos;  although  Kalligeitus  declined  anv  coirceru 
with  Chios,  and  refused  to  contribute  tor  this  purpose  any  of  the 
money  which  he  had  brougiit.  A  gemaal  synod  of  deputies  from 
the  allies  was  held  at  Corinth,  wherein  it  was  determined,  Aviih  the 
concurrence  of  Agis,  to  dispatch  the  fleet  first  to  Chios  under  Chalk- 
ideus—next,  to  Lesbos  under  A Ikamenes— lastly,  to  the  Hellespont, 
under  Klearchus.  But  it  was  judged  expedient  to  divide  the  fleet' 
and  hriug  across  twenty-one  triremes  out  of  the  thirty  nine,  so  as  to 
distract  the  attention  of  Athens,  and  divide  her  means  of  resistance. 
bo  low  was  the  estimate  formed  of  these  means,  that  the  Laeedien.o*- 
nians  did  not  scruple  to  dispatch  their  expetlitiou  openly  from  the 
Saronic  Gulf,  where  the  Athenians  would  have  full  knowledge  of  its 
liunibei-s  and  of  its  movements. 

Ihirdly  had  the  tweiity-onc  triremes,  however,  been  brought  across 
to  Kenchreie,  when  a  fresh  obstacle  arose  to  delay  their  departure. 
The  Isthmian    festival,  celebrated   every    alternate  year,  and   kept 
especially  holy  by  the  Corinthians,  was  just  apiiroaching.     They 
would  not  consent  to  begin  any  military  operations  until  it  was  con- 
cluded, though  Agis  tried  to  elude  their  scruples  by  offering  to  adopt 
the  intended  expedition  as  his  own.     It  was  duriuii;  the  delay  which 
thus  ensued  that  the  Athenians   were  first  led  to  conceive  suspici(ms 
about  Chios,  whither  they  dispatched  Aiistokrates,  one  of  the  gener. 
{lis  of  the  year.     The  Chian  authorities  strenuously  denied  ail  pro- 
jects of  revolt,  and  being  required  by  Aiistokrates  to  furnish  some 
evidence  of  their  good  faith,  scut  back  along  with  him  seven  triremes 
to  the  aid  of  Athens.     It  was  much  against" their  oAvn  will  that  they 
^vel•e  compelled  thus  to  act.     But  being  aware  that  the  Chian  people 
Avere  in  general  averse  to  the  idea  of  revolting  from  Athens,  they  did 
not  feel  confidence  enough  to  proclaim  their  secret  designs  without 
some  manifestation  of  support  fr(;m  Peloponnesus,  which  had  been 
so  much  delayed  that  they  knew  not  when  it  would  arrive.     The 
Athenians,  in  their  present  state  of  weakness,  perhaps  thoudit  it  pru- 
dent to  accept  insufficient  assurances,  for  fear  of  driving  this  power- 
ful island  to  open  revolt.     Nevertheless,  during  the  Isthmian  festival, 
to  which  they  were  invited  along  with  other  Greeks— they  discovered 
further  evidences  of  the  plot  which  was  going  on,  and  resolved  to 
keep  strict  watch  on  the  motions  of  the  fic\a  now  assembled  at  Ken- 
chre»,  suspecting  that  this  squiidron  was  intended  to  second  the 
re\-oltiug  party  in  Chios. 

Shortly  after  the  Isthmian  festival,  the  squadron  actually  started 
iioni  Ivenchreaj  to  Chios,  under  Alkamenes;  hut  an  equal  number  of 
Athenian  ships  watched  them  as  they  sailed  along  the  shore,  and 
tried  to  tempt  them  further  out  to  sea,  with  a  view  to  fight  them. 
Alki'menes,  however,  desirous  of  nvoiding  a  battle,  thought  it  best  to 
return  back;  upon  which  the  Athenians  also  returned  to  Peiraius, 


1G8    AFTER  Tin:  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAME:>^T. 

mistrusting  tlie  fidelity  of  the  seven  Cliian  triremes  -svliich  formed 
part  of  tiieir  ticet.  Reappearing  presently  with  a  larger  squadron  of 
87  triremes,  tliey  pursued  Alkamenes  (wiio  bad  agtiin  begun  his 
voyaije  alomr  the  shore  southward)  and  attaeked  him  near  the  unia- 
habited  harbor  ealled  Peineum,  on  the  frontiers  of  Corinth  and  Epi- 
daurus.  Tiiev  liere  gained  a  vietory,  captured  one  of  his  ships,  aitd 
damaired  or  di'sabled  most  of  the  ren^ainder.  Alkamenes  himself  was 
slain, "and  ihe  ships  were  run  ashore,  where  on  the  morrow  the  IVlo- 
ponnesian  land- force  arrived  in  sufficient  numbers  to  defend  tiiL':;i. 
So  inconvenient,  however,  was  their  station  on  this  desert  spot  tiiut 
they  at  tirst  determined  to  burn  llie  vessels  and  depart.  It  was  not 
without  dillicultv  that  they  Avere  intluced,  partly  by  the  instances  of 
King  Aais,  to  guard  the  ships  until  an  opportunity  could  be  found 
for  eludimr  the  blockadinij^  Athenian  fieet;  a  part  of  which  still  kcj)t 
watch  ofi:  the  shore,  while  the  rest  were  stationed  at  a  neighboriug 

islet. 

The  Spartan  Ephors  had  directed  Alkamenes,  at  the  moment  of 
his  departure  from  Kenchreie,  to  disptitch  a  messenger  to  Sparta,  iu 
order  that  the  five  triremes  under  Clialkideus  and  Alkibiades  might 
leave  Laconia  at  the  same  moment.  And  tiiese  latter  appear  to  have 
been  actually  under  wav,  when  a  second  messenger  brought  the  news 
of  the  defeat  and  death^of  Alkamenes  Jit  Peineum.  Besides  the  dis- 
couraL^ement  arising  from  such  a  check  at  the  outset  of  their  plans 
against  Ionia,  the  Ephors  thought  it  impossible  to  begin  operations 
with  so  small  a  squadron  as  five  triremes,  so  that  the  departure  of 
Chalk ideus  was  for  the  present  countermanded.  This  resolution, 
perfectly  natural  to  adopt,  was  only  reversed  at  the  strenuous  in- 
stance of  the  Athenian  exile  Alkibiades,  who  urged  them  to  per- 
mit Clialkideus  and  himself  to  start  forthwith.  Small  as  the  squad- 
ron was,  yet  as  it  would  reach  Chios  before  the  defeat  at  Peiraunn 
became  public,  it  miurht  be  passed  off  as  the  precursor  of  the  main 
fieet:  while  he  (Alkibiades)  pledged  himself  to  procure  the  revolt  of 
Chios  and  the  other  Ionic  cities,  through  his  personal  connection 
with  the  leading  men— who  would  repose  contidence  in  his  assur- 
ances of  the  helplessness  of  Athens,  as  well  as  of  the  thorough  deter- 
mination of  Sparta  to  stand  by  them.  To  these  arguments,  Alki- 
biades added  an  appeal  to  the  persontd  vanity  of  Endius;  whom  lie 
instigated  to  assume  for  himself  the  glory  of  liberating'Ionia  as  well 
as  ot'^first  commencing  the  Persian  alliance,  instead  of  leaving  this 
enterprise  to  Kin 2:  Agis. 

By  these  arguinenis— assisted  doubtless  by  Ids  personal  mfluence 
since  his  advice  respecting  Gylippus  and  respecting  Dekeleia  had 
turned  out  so  successfid— Alkibiades  obtained  the  consent  of  the 
Spartan  Ephors,  and  sailed  along  with  (nialkidcus  in  the  five  tri- 
remes to  Chios.  Nothing  less  than  his  energy  and  ascendency  could 
have  extorted,  from  men  both  dull  and  backward,  a  determination 
appar^intly  so  rash,  yet,  in  spite  of  such  appearance,  admirably  con- 


REVOLT  OF  CHIOS. 


169 


ceived,  and  of  the  highest  importance.  Had  the  Chians  waited  for 
the  tieet  now  blocked  up  at  Peineum,  their  revolt  would  at  least  have 
been  long  delayed,  and  perhaps  miuht  not  have  occurred  at  all-  the 
aecomphshment  of  that  revolt  by  the  little  squadron  of  Alkibiades 
was  the  proximate  cause  of  all  the  Spartan  successes  in  Ionia  and 
was  ultimately  the  means  even  of  disengagino:  the  fleet  at  Peirium 
bv  distractmg  the  attention  of  Athens.  So  well  did  this  unprineinled 
exile,  while  playing  the  game  of  Sparta,  know  where  to  intlict  the 
dangerous  wounds  upon  his  country. 

Therewas,  indeed,  little  danger  in  crossing  the  JEo-can  to  Ionia 
with  ever  so   small   a  squadron;  for  Athens  in  her  Resent  desU- 
tute  condition  had  no  fieet  there,  and  although  Strombichides  was 
detached  wi  1  eight  triremes  from  the  blockading  fieet  off  Peira^um  to 
pursue  Clialkideus  and  Alkibiades  as  soon  as  their  departure  wag 
known,  he  was  tar  behind  them,  and  soon  returned  without  success 
To  keep  their  voya.-e  secret,  they   detained   the  boats  and  vessels 
which  they  met,  and  did  not  liberate  them  until  they  reached  Korv- 
kiis  in  Asni  Minor,  the  mountainous  land  southward  of  Ervthrffi 
They  were  here  visited  by  their  leading  partisans  from  Chios,  who 
urged  them  to  sail  thither  at  once  before  their  arrival  could  be  mo- 
claimed.     Accordingly   they   reached    the    town   of    Chios  (on  the 
eastern  coast  of  the  island,  immediately  opposite  to  Erythrae  on  the 
contment)  to  the  astonishment  and  dismay  of  every  one,  except      e 
oligarchical  plotters  wlio  had  invited  them.     By  the  contrivance  of 
these  latter   the  Council  was  found  just  assembling,  so  that  Alkibi- 
ades was  adnHttcMl  without  delay,  and  invited  to  state  his  case      Su  - 
pressing  all  mention  of  the  defeat  at  Peira^iun,  he  represented  Ids 
^qiia.h-on  as  the  foremost  of  a  large  Lac:eiUemonian  fleet  actuallvat 
ea  and  approaching-and  atfirmed  Athens  to  be  now  helpless  bv  sea 
ier.,llt  ^>:1^\"^1' Incapable  of  maintaining  any  further  hold  upon 
.       \     „^."'t'*  ^^^>''^'  impressions,  and  while  the  population  were 
et  under  their  first  impulse  of  surprise  and  alarm,  the  oli-irchical 

TFr!  t  :';: '  ^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^^  ^>f  ^^^oUing.     The  example  was?ollowed 

^}  i^i\thr«,  and  soon    afterward    by  Klazomena?,  determined   bv 

ree  triremes  from  Chios.     The  Klazomenians  had  hitherto  dwel^ 

on  an  islet; close  to   the  continent;  on  wliich  latter,  however   a 

1 '  It  ion  of  their  town  (called  Polichne)  was  situated,  which  they  now 

itsoived.iu  anticipation  of  attack  from  Athens,  to  fortitV  as  their 

a  n  resuience      Both  the  Chians  and  ErythiTcans  also  actively  em- 

1'1<    ed  themselves  in  fortifying  their  towns  and  preparing  for  war 

iollZfV''-^  ^'''  T^'T  ^^  ^'^^'  ^'^'^'^^^  ''^  <^'^'^^«'  '''^  fi"^l  occasion 
l-'f^^^  by  previous   revolts  of  other 

e  rLf  '''?~¥''^'?'''^^'^^"'^''^^''  ^^''''^"^^  ^^f«"^^^.  Amphipolis, 
observe  fi,?/^n\''A?J^  '■'  ^?.'V'"0'^ly  intimated  by  historians,  we  may 
h  r  mvn  1  '  t^^'^\f  ti^C"«  '^''^  "ot  systematically  interfere  to  impose 
el  ■  nf  wr'''''Vr'''  >^,^^^'^""?^^"t  upon  her  allies-next,  that  the 
t'npia  of  Athens,  though  upheld  mainly  by  an  established  belief  iu 


170    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAMENT. 

her  ^nporior  force,  was  nevertheless  hy  no  means  odious  nor  the 

Dropo<ition  of  revolliiig  from  her  iicceptable,  to  the  general  popiiln- 

tionof  her  allies.     She  liaci  at  this  moment  no  force  in  lonia;  and 

the  oli-archical  crovernment  of  Chios,  wishing  to  revolt,  was  only 

rirevenfecl  from  openly  declaring  its  intention  by  the  reluctance  of  its 

own  populatlon-a  reluctance  which  it  overcame  Partly  ^Y  s^^Pnse 

'iri^in-'-  tnnn  the  sudden  arrival  of  Alkibiades  and  Chalkideus,  partly 

i)V  th?  fallacious   assurance   of  a  still  greater   Peloponnesian  force 

annroachin-      Nor  would   the    Chian    oligarchy   tlumselves   luive 

delerminedlo  revolt  had  thev  not  been  persuaded  that  such  was  new 

the  safer  course,  inasmuch  as  Athens  was  runied,  and  her  poAver  to 

T>rolect,  not  less  than  lier  ]K)wer  to  (M^l^ress,  at  an  end       1  he  envoys 

or  Ti^'^iiphernes  liad  accompanied  those  of  Chios  to  Sparta,  so  that 

the   Chian  ^^overnment  saw  plainlv  that  the  mist ortunes  of  Athens 

had  onlvthe  etTect  of  reviving  tho  aggressions  and  pretensions  of 

their  former  foreisiu   master,  airainst  whom  Athens   had   protic  ed 

tliem  for  the  last  tiftv  vears.     ^^\^  may  well  doubt,  therelore,  whether 

this  prudent  government  looked  upon  the  change  as  on  the  ^vhole 

advanta<'-eous.     Ihit  thev  had  no  motive  to  stand  by  Athens  in  her 

mi-fortmies   and  srood  policv  seemed  now  to  advise  a  timely  nmou 

with  Sparta'as  thc^  prep(  ndeVant  force.     The  sentiment  enteitnine.l 

toward  Athens  bv  her   allies  (as  I  have  before  observed)  was  more 

ne-ative  than  positive.     It  was  favorable  ratlier  than  otherwise,  m 

th? minds  of  the  general  population,  to  whom  she  caused  little  actual 

hardship  or  oppression ;  but  averse,  to  a  certain  extent,  in  Jhe  immls 

of  their  ieadinir  men-since  she  wounded  tlieir  dignity,  and  otTeiided 

that  love  of  town  autonomy  whicli  was  iustincuvc  in  the  Grcciau 

political  mind.  ,  .       ,     r.,,    ■.  „  „,„„  ot 

The  revolt   of    Chios,  speedily  proclaimed,  filled  every  man  at 
Athens  with  dismav.     It  was  the  most  fearful  symptom   as  we  las 
the  heaviest  aggravation,  of  their  fallen  condition;  especially  as  Ihcr 
was  everv  reason  to  appreliend  that  the  exampeot  this  lust  aiu 
irroatest  amon- the  allies  would  be  soon  loHowed  by  the  rest. 
Athenians  had  no  fleet  or  force  even  to  attempt  its  ^^^^^''ill^ 
they  now  felt  the  full  importance  of  that  reserve  of  1,000  talciN 
which  Perikles  had  set  aside  in  the  first  year  of  the  war  against    1  c 
special  emerirencv  of  a  hostile  fleet  approaching  Peineus.      1 1'^ P  "" 
altv  of  death  ha(fb(>en  decreed  against  any  one  who  should  pio  o 
to\lev.)te  this  fund  to  any  other  purpose;  and  m  spite  ot  se    i c 
financial  pressure,  it  had  remained  untouched  ^«^twentyyears.  Jo^^ 
however,  thougli  the  special  contingency  foreseen  had  not  yet  an  u. 
matters  were  ?ome  to  such   an  extremity  that  the   on  y  chan  <^^^^^^^^ 
savin<-  the  remainin- empire  was  by  the  appropriation  of  th  f  "^o"  .]: 
An  imanimous  vote  was  accordingly  passed  to  abrogate  the  j  uu 
enactment  (or  standing  order)  against  proposing  any  other  mode  o 
appropriation;  after  whi(;li  the  resolution  was  taken  to  devote  tuib 
money  to  present  necessities. 


ATHENIAN  FORCE  DISPA'^CHED  TO  CHIOS.      171 

By  means  of  this  new  fund  they  were  enabled  to  find  pay  and 
cqiiipmen   for  all  the  triremes  ready  or  luarlv  ready  in  their  harbor 
and  thus  to  spare  a  porlicui  from  their  blockading  fleet  off  Peineum- 
out  of  which  htrombich.des  with  his  squadion  of  eight  triremes  was 
dispatched  immediately  to  lonia-followed,  after  a  short  interval   by 
llirasykles  w.  h    welve  otuers.     At  the  same  time,  the  seven  Cl'iiau 
triremes,  which  also  formed  part  of  this  fleet,  were  cleared  of  their 
crews;  among  wliom  such  as  were  slaves  were  liberated   wiiile  the 
freemen  were  put  in  custody.     Besides  fitting  out  an  equal  number 
of  fresh  ships  to  keep  up  tlie  numbers  of  the  blockading  fleet   the 
Athenians  worked  with  the  utmost  ardor  to  get  ready  t^iirty  addil 
lona  triremes.     The  ext r.me  exigency  of  the  situation:  si nce"^  Chic  s 
kd  revolted,  was  felt  by  every  one;  yet  with  all  their  efl'orts   the 
force  which  they  were  enabled  to  send  was  at  first  lamentably  in'ade- 
quate.     btrombichides,  arriving  at  Samos,  and  finding  Chios    Ery- 
three,  and  Klazomen^i^  already  in  revolt,  re-enfoiced  his  little  squad- 
ron  with  one  feamian  trireme  and  sailed  to  Teos  (on  the  contiTe 
at  the  southern  coast  of  that  isthmus,  of  wiiich  Klazomeiue  is  o    the 
northern),  m  hopes  of  preserving  that  place.     But  he  had  not  bem 
ong  there  when  Chalkideus  arrived  from  Chios  with  twentvVl  reS 
triremes,  all  or  mostly  Chian;  while  the  forees  of  Erythrte  and  Khi^ 
zomenre  approached  by  land.     Strombichides  was  obi  ge^to  make  a 
asty  night  back  to  Samos,  vainly  pursued  by  the  Chhrn  flec^t     Upon 
this  evidence  of  Athenian   weakness,  and  the  superiority  of    the 
enemy  the  Teians  admitted  into  their  town  the  land  foi^e^vhho  t^ 
by  the  help  of  which  they  now  demolished  the  wall  formerl     n    t 

0  the  troops  of  Tissaphernes  lending  their  aid  in  the  demolition   te   " 

own  was  laid  altogether  open  to  the  satraP,  who  moreovei   c'li le 

liimself  shortly  afterward  to  complete  the  work  "'^^^^^^^   ^^""^ 

Having  themselves  revolted  from  Athens,  the  Chian  government 

^ ere  prompted  by  considerations  of  their  own  safety  t^S^ to 
^I'^lrT'  i"^'"^T  ^i^'Pendencies;  and  AlkibiiLs  now  Uk^ 
^^t^^^^^^^^  to  make  an  attempt  oii 

•    if;      •  ''''?  f '^?'  ^^  ^.^^""'^  ^^"^  important  city,  the  first  amon- 

Ite  continental  allies  of  Athens-by  his  own  res?,urces  and  t  k  s? 

f  C  liios,  before  the  fleet  could  arrive  from  PeiiU'um-  in  order  tiat 

;  conlingly  he  and  CMialkideus  left  Chios  with  a  fl^et  of  twentC-^fiv^* 
remes,  twenty  of  them  Chian,  together  with  the  five  whici'they 

S'wM  .rn'''"='^'^^  ''''''  '^'  five  had  been  1^^ 

mo^ll  rP'''^'"i  i'^''"'  ^^'^'  I'eloponnesian  crews  having  been 
rmed  as  hophtes  and  left  as  garrison  in  the  island.  Conductln-  his 
ouge  as  secretly  as  possible,  he  was  fortunate  enough  to  pass  un 
tf  bil^ -^  '^'^^-ff^  ^l^tion  at  Samos,  where  Str^iWclE  1^  I 
4  t^b  Tl  r^'V  ^  ^^^'A^vkl^s  ^vith  the  twelve  fresh  triremes 
irom  the  blockading  fleet  at  Peirieum.     Arriving  at  Miletus,  where 


172    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMxUlENT. 

lie  po'isessed  cstiibli^^hcd  connections  among  the  leading  men,  and 
had  already  laid  bis  train,  as  at  Ciiios,  for  revolt— Alkibiades  pre- 
vailed on  tliem  to  break  with  Athens  forthwith:  so  that  when  Sliom- 
bichides  and  Thrasykles,  who  came  in  pursuit  the  moment  ihey 
learnt  his  movenienls,  approached,  they  found  the  port  shut  against 
them  and  were  forced  to  take  up  a  station  on  the  ueighboriup-  island 
of  Lade.  So  anxious  were  the  Chians  for  the  success  of  Alkibiudcs 
in  this  enterprise  tliat  they  advanced  wilh  ten  fresh  triremes  along 
the  Asiatic  coast  as  far  as  Aniea  (opposite  to  Samos,  in  order  to  hear 
the  result  and  to  tender  aid  if  required.  A  message  from  Chalkulcus 
apprised  them  that  he  was  master  of  JNIiletus,  and  that  Amorges  (the 
Persian  ally  of  Athens,  at  lasus)  was  on  his  wi^y  at  the  head  of  an 
army  upon  which  they  returned  to  Chios— but  were,  unexpectedly 
seen  in  the  way  (off  the  temple  of  Zeus,  between  Lebedos  and  Ivol- 
ophon)  and  pursued,  bv  sixteen  fresh  ships  just  arrived  from  Athens, 
under  the  conmiand  of"  Diomedon.  Of  the  ten  Chian  triremes,  one 
found  refuire  at  Ephesus,  and  five  at  Teos:  the  remainmg  lour  were 
obli'^ed  to  fun  ashore  and  became  prizes,  though  the  crews  all  escaped. 
In  fpite  of  this  check,  however,  the  Chians  had  come  agam  with 
fresh  ships  and  some  land-forces,  as  soon  as  the  Athenian  fleet  had 
gone  back  to  Samos— and  procured  the  revolt  both  of  Lebedos  and 

Erie  from  Athens.  ,      ,    .  .•,     ^    ^     ♦ 

It  was  at  Miletus,  immediately  after  the  revolt,  that  the  first  treaty 
was  concluded  between  Tissaphernes,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the 
Great  Kin<^— and  Chalkideus,  for  Sparta  and  her  allies.  Probably 
the  aid  of^  Tissaphernes  was  considered  necessary  to  maintain  the 
town  when  the  Athenian  fleet  was  watching  it  so  closely  on  the 
neicrhboriuir  island;  at  least  it  is  difficult  to  explain  otherwise  an  || 
agreement  so  eminently  dishonorable  as  well  as  disadvantageous  to     ■ 

the  Greeks*  ^^ 

"The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  have  concluded 'alliance 
with  the  Great  King  and  Tissaphernes,  on  the  following  conditions: 
The  king  shall  possess  whatever  teriitory  and  cities  he  himselt  had, 
or  his  predecessors  had  before  him.  The  king,  and  the  Lacedemon- 
ians with  their  allies,  shall  jointly  hinder  the  Athenians  from  dcriv- 
inff  either  money  or  other  advantages  from  all  those  cities  anUicu 
have  hitherto  furnished  to  them  any  such.  They  shall  jointly  carr) 
on  war  airainst  the  Athenians,  and  shall  not  renounce  the  war  against 
Hiem,  except  by  joint  consent.  Whoever  shall  revolt  froin  the  king 
shall  be  treated  as  an  enemy  bv  the  Lacedamonians  and  their  allies, 
Avhoever  shall  revolt  from  the  Lacediemouians  shall  m  like  manner 
be  treated  as  an  enemy  by  the  king."  r^^r^AoA 

As  a  first  step  to  the  execution  of  this  treaty,  [Mdetus  was  handea 
over  to  Tissapherdes,  who  immediately  caused  a  citadel  to  be  ereccQ 
and  placed  a  garrison  within  it.  If  fully  carried  out,  indeed,  tlie 
terms  of  the  treaty  would  have  made  the  Great  King  master  not  oni) 
of  all  the  Asiatic  Greeks  and  all  the  islanders  in  the  ^gean,  but  ai^o 


REVOLUTIOX  AT  SA^IOS. 


173 


of  all  Thessaly  and  Bceotia  and  the  full  ground  whicdi  had  once 
ho.'ii  covered  by  Xerxes.  Besides  this  monstrous  stipulation,  the 
treaty  further  bound  the  Laceda'inonians  to  aid  the  king  in  keening 
enslaved  any  Greeks  who  might  be  under  his  dominion.  Nor  did  it 
ou  the  other  liand,  secure  to  them  any  pecuniary  aid  from  him  for 
the  payment  of  their  armament— which  was  then-  irreat  motive  for 
courting  his  alliance.  We  shall  find  the  LaeedcCmonian  authorities 
•  themselves  hereafter  refusing  to  ratify  the  tieatv,  on  the  ground  of 
its  exhorbitant  concessions.  But  it  stands  as  a  melancholy  evidence* 
of  the  new  source  of  mischief  uow^  opening  upon  the  Asiatic  and 
insular  Greeks,  the  moment  that  the  empire  of  Athens  was  broken 
up— the  revived  pretensions  of  their  ancient  lord  and  master,  whom 
nothing  had  hitherto  kept  in  check,  for  the  last  tifty  years,  except 
Athens,  first  as  representative  and  executive  airent,  next  as  successor 
and  mistress  of  the  confederacy  of  Delos.  We  thus  see  against  what 
evils  Athens  had  hitherto  protected  them;  we  shall  presently  see 
what  is  partially  disclosed  in  this  very  treatv,  the  manner  in  whicli 
Sparta  realized  her  promise  of  conferring  autbnomvon  each  separate 
Grecian  state. 

The  great  stress  of  the  war  had  now  been  transferred  to  Ionia  and 
the  Asiatic  side  of  the  ^i^gean  sea.  The  enemies  of  Athens  had  antici- 
pated that  her  entire  empire  in  that  quarter  would  fall  an  easy  prey: 
yet  in  spite  of  two  such  serious  detections  as  Chios  and  3Iiletus  she 
showed  an  unexpected  energy  in  keeping  hold  of  the  remainder.  'Her 
great  and  capital  station,  from  the  present  time  to  the  end  of  the  war, 
was  Samos;  and  a  revolution  which  now  happened,  insurino-  the 
fidelity  of  that  island  to  her  alliaii'-e,  was  a  condition  indispensable  to 
her. power  of  maintaining  the  struggle  in  Ionia. 

We  have  heard  nothing  about  Samos  throughout  the  whole  war, 
sioce  its  reconquest  by  the  Athenians  after  the  revolt  of  440  b.c.  :  but 
we  now  find  it  under  the  government  of  an  oligarchy  called  the 
(xeomori  (the  proprietors  of  land)— as  at  Syracuse  before  the  rule  of 
Gelou.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  these 'Gcomori  were  disposed  to 
follow  the  example  of  the  Chian  oligarchy,  and  revolt  from  Athens; 
while  the  people  at  Samos,  as  at  Chios,  were  averse  to  such  a  change.' 
Inder  this  state  of  circumstances  tiie  Chian  oliirarehy  had  themselves 
conspired  with  Sj)arta  to  trick  and  consti-aiu  their  Demos  by  surprise 
into  revolt,  through  the  aid  of  five  Peloponnesian  ships.  "The  like 
would  have  happtuied  at  Samos  had  the  people  remained  quiet.  But 
they  profited  by  the  recent  warning,  forestalled  the  designs  of  their 
oligarchy,  and  rose  in  insurrection,  with  the  help  of  three  Athenian  tri- 
remes which  then  chanced  to  be  in  the  jiort  The  oligarchy  were  com- 
pletely defeated,  but  not  without  a  violent  and  bk^oVly  strui>:i>:le;  two 
hundred  of  them  being  slain  and  four  hundred  banished.  "This  rev- 
olution secured  (and  probably  nothing  less  than  a  democratical  revo- 
lution could  have  secured,  under  the  existing  state  of  Hellenic  affairs) 
the  adherence  of  Samos  to  the  Athenians;  who  immediately  recog- 


>s- 


174    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAMENT. 

iiizod  the  ROW  dcmocracv,  and  -ranted  to  it  the  privilc.ffe  of  an  equnl 
and  autonomous  ally,  the  8aniinn  people  eontiscated  and  divided 
anion"-  tliemselves  the  property  of  such  of  the  Geoniori  as  were  slain 
or  banished;  tlic  survivors  were  deprived  of  all  polilical  jiivdeues, 
and  the  other  citizens  (the  Dcmus)  were  forbidden  to  uitermarry  witli 
them  We  may  fairlv  suspect  that  this  latter  prohibition  was  only 
the  retaliation  of  a  similar  exclusion,  which  the  oligarchy  when  in 
power  had  enforced  to  maintain  the  purity  of  their  own  blood  >V  Imt 
they  had  enacted  as  a  privilege  was  now  thrown  back  upon  them  as 

an  insult.  ,     ,.      ^    x  •     i      i 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Athenian  blockading  fleet  was  surprised  and 
defeated  with  the  loss  of  four  triremes,  by  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  at 
PeircTum  which  was  thus  enabled  to  get  to  Kenchrett,  and  to  retjt  in 
order  that  it  miirht  be  sent  to  Ionia.  The  sixteen  Peloponnesian  ships 
which  had  fought  at  Svracuse  had  already  come  back  to  Lecianiin, 
in  spite  of  the  obstructions  thrown  in  their  way  by  the  Athenian 
squadron  under  llippokles  at  Naupaktus.  The  Laceda-moniaii 
admiral  Astvochus,  was  sent  to  Kenchrcw  to  take  the  command  and 
proceed  to  I?)nia  as  admiral-in-chief:  but  it  was  some  time  before  he 
could  depart  for  Chios,  whither  he  arrived  uilh  only  four  triremes, 
followed  by  six  more  afterward. 

Before  he  reached  that  island,  however,  the  Chians,  zealous  in  the 
new  part  which  thev  had  taken  up,  and  interested  for  their  own 
safety  in  multiplving^lefections  from  Athens,  had  themselves  under- 
taken the  prosecution  of  the  plans  concerted  .by  Auis  and  the  i.ace- 
da^monians  at  Corinth.  Thev  originated  an  expedition  of  theu"  own 
with  thirteen  triremes,  under  a  Laceda-monian  Pencrkiis  named 
Deiniadas,  to  procure  the  revolt  of  Lesbos;  with  the  view  if  success- 
ful of  proceeding  afterward  to  do  the  stune  among  the  Hellespontine 
dependencies  of  ^Athens.  A  land-force  under  the  Spartan  Eualas. 
partlv  Peloponnesian,  partlv  Asiatic,  marched  along  the  coast  ot  the 
main'-land  northward  toward  Kvme,  to  co-operate  in  both  these 
obiects.  Lesbos  was  at  this  time  divided  into  at  least  live  separate 
city  irovernments— Methymna  at  the  north  of  the  island,  Mitylene 
towanl  the  south-ea.^t,  Antissa,  Eresus,  and  Pyrrha  on  the  west. 
Whether  these  governments  were  oliLnirchical  or  democratical  we  ao 
not  know:  but  the  Athenian  kleruchs  who  had  been  sent  to  Mityk-nc 
after  its  revolt  sixteen  vears  before,  must  have  long  ago  disappeared^ 
The  Chiaii  fleet  first  went  to  Methymna  and  procured  the  revolt  ot 
that  place,  where  four  triremes  were  left  in  guard,  while  the  remain- 
ing nine  sailed  forward  to  Mitylene,  and  succeeded  in  obtaining  tliat 
important  town  also.  . 

Their  proceedings,  however  were  not  unwatched  by  the  Atlieniaii 
fleet  at  Samos.  Unable  to  recover  possession  of  Teos,  Diomedon  liad 
been  obliged  to  content  himself  with  procuring  neutrality  irom  that 
town,  and  admission  for  the  vessels  of  Athens  as  well  as  of  her  ene- 
mies; he  had  moreover  failed  in  au  attack  upon  Erie.     But  he  had 


ATHENIANS  HARASS  CHIOS. 


175 


since  been  strengthened  partly  by  the  democratical  revolution  at 
Siiinos,  partly  by  the  arrival  of  Leon  with  ten  additional  triremes 
from  Athens:  so  that  these  two  commanders  were  now  enabled  to 
f^ail,  with  twenty-tive  triremes,  to  the  relief  of  Lesbos.  Reaching 
Hitylene  (the  largest  town  in  that  island)  V4!ry  shortly  after  its  revolt, 
they  sailed  straight  into  the  harbor  when  no  one  expected  them, 
«?iz('d  the  nine  Chiaii  ships  with  little  resistance,  and  after  a  success- 
fil  battle  on  shore,  regained  possession  of  the  city.  The  Lacedfc- 
nionian  admiral  Astyochus — who  had  only  been  three  days  arrived  at 
(liios  from  Kenchrete  with  his  four  triremes — saw  the  Athenian  fleet 
piiss  through  the  channel  between  Chios  and  the  main-land,  on  its 
Tay  to  Lesbos;  and  immediately  on  the  same  evening  followed  it  to 
tlial  island,  to  lend  what  aid  he  could,  with  one  Chian  trireme  added 
to  his  own  four,  and  some  ho])lites  on  board.  He  sailed  first  to 
Pyrriia,  and  on  the  next  day  to  Eresus,  on  the  west  side  of  the  island, 
■Kheve  he  first  learned  the  recapture  of  3Iitylene  by  the  Athenians, 
lie  was  here  also  joined  by  three  out  of  the  four  Chian  triremes 
which  had  been  left  to  defend  that  place,  and  which  had  been  driven 
away,  with  the  loss  of  one  of  their  number,  by  a  portion  of  the 
Athenian  fleet  pushing  on  thither  from  Mitylene.  Astyochus  pre- 
vailed on  Eresus  to  revolt  from  Athens,  ami  having  armed  the 
population,  sent  them  by  land  together  with  his  own  hoplites  under 
Eieonikus  to  Methymna,  in  hopes  of  preserving  that  place — whither 
he  also  proceeded  with  his  fleet  along  the  coast.  But  in  spite  of  all 
his  endeavors,  jNIethymna  as  well  as  Eresus  and  all  Lebos  was 
recovered  by  the  Alheniiins,  while  he  himself  was  obliged  to  return 
witii  his  force  to  Chios.  The  land  troops  which  had  marched  along 
the  main-land,  with  a  view^  to  further  operations  at  the  Hellespont, 
were  carried  back  to  Chios  and  their  respective  homes. 

The  recovery  of  Lesbos,  which  the  •Athenian  now  placed  in  a 
better  posture  of  defense,  w-as  of  great  importance  in  itself,  and 
arrested  for  the  moment  all  operations  against  them  at  the  Helles- 
pont. Their  fleet  from  Lesbos  w^as  first  employed  in  the  recovery  of 
Ivltizomenae,  which  they  again  carried  back  to  its  original  islet  near 
the  shore — the  new  town  on  the  mainland,  called  Polichna,  though 
ill  course  of  being  built,  being  not  yet  suflicientl}^  fortified  to  defend 
iisclf.  Tiie  leading  anti-Athenians  in  the  town  made  their  escape, 
ami  went  further  up  the  country  to  Daphnus.  Animated  by  such 
JiKlitional  success — as  well  as  by  a  victory  which  the  Athenians,  who 
were  blockading  .Miletus,-  gained  over  Chalkideus,  wherein  that 
.oliicer  was  slain — Leon  and  Diomedon  thought  themselves  in  a  con- 
dition to  begin  aggressive  measures  against  Chios,  now  their  most 
active  enemy  in  Ionia.  Their  fleet  of  twent3'-five  sail  was  well 
equipped  with  Epibatte;  who,  though  under  ordinary  circumstances 
tii'jy  were  Thetes  armed  at  the  public  cost,  yet  in  the  present  stress  of 
affairs  were  impressed  from  the  su[)erior  lio]dites  in  the  city  muster- 
roll.    They  occupied  the  little  islets  called  G£nusi:Le,  near  Chios  on 


176    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAMENT. 


ATHENIANS  AT  MILETUS. 


177 


tUe  north-east — as  well  as  the  forts  of  Sidussa  and  Pteleus  in  the 
territory  of  Erythra?;  from  which  positions  they  began  a  series  of 
harassing  operations  against  Chios  itself.  Disembarking  on  the 
island  at  Kardamyle  and  Bolissus,  they  not  only  ravaged  the  neigh- 
borhood,  but  intlieted  upon  the  Cliian  forces  a  l)io()dy  defeat.  Alkr 
two  further  defeats,  at  FJiana^  and  at  Leukonir.m,  the  Chians  lu 
longer  dared  to  quit  their  fortilications;  so  tliat  the  invaders  wen 
^  left  lo  ravage  at  pleasure  the  whole  territory,  being  at  the  same  tinie 
-   masters  of  tlie  sea  around,  and  blocking  up  the  ])ort. 

The  Athenians  now  retaliated  upon  Chios  the  hardships  nndr 
which  Attica  itself  was  suffering;  hardships  the  more  painfully  fet, 
inasmuch  as  this  was  the  tirst  time  that  an  enemy  had  ever  been  sen 
in  the  island  since  the  repulse  of  Xerxes  from  Greece,  and  tiv 
organization  of  the  confcnk^racy  of  Delos,  more  than  sixty  yean 
before.  The  territory  of  Chios  was  highly  cultivated,  its  conimen ; 
extensive,  and  its  wealth  among  the  greatest  in  all  Greece.  In  fact 
under  the  Athenian  empire,  its  prosperity  had  been  so  marked  iuk 
so  uninterrupted,  that  Thucydides  cypresses  his  astonishment  at  the 
undeviatiug  prudence  and  circumspection  of  the  govern nu  nt,  in  spite 
of  circumstances  well  calculated  to  tempt  them  into  extiavag.-iice. 
"Except  tSparla  (he  says),  Chios  is  the  only  state  that  1  know,  which 
maintained  its  soIxt  judgment  throughout  a  career  of  jirosjierity, 
and  became  even  more  watchful  in  regard  to  security,  in  pioiortiea 
as  it  advanced  in  power."  He  adds,  that  the  stej)  of  revolting  fioni 
Athens,  though  the  Chian  government  now  discovered  it  to  Lave 
Ix'cn  an  error,  was  at  any  rale  a  jiardonable  error;  for  it  was  under- 
taken under  the  impression,  universal  throughout  Greece  and  jtrev- 
alent  even  in  Athens  herself  after  the  disaster  at  Syracuse,  that 
Athenian  power,  if  not  Athenian  independence,  was  at  an  end— aiifl 
undertaken  in  coniunction  with  allies  seeminirlv  more  than  snllicieiit 
to  sustain  it.  This  remarkable  observation  of  ThucydidesMonblU.ss 
includes  an  imhrect  censure  upon  his  ow.n  city,  as  abusing  her  pros- 
perity for  purposes  of  unmeasured  aggrandizement;  a  censure  not 
undeserved  in  reference  to  the  enterprise  against  Sicily.  But  it 
counts  at  the  same  time  as  a  valuable  testimony  to  the  condition  of 
the  allies  of  Athens  under  the  Athenian  en.pire,*  and  goes  far  in  reply 
to  the  charge  of  practical  oppression  against  the  imperial  city. 

The  operations  now  carrying  on  in  Chios  indicated  such  an 
unexpecled  renovation  in  Athenian  affairs  that  a  party  in  the  island 
began  to  declare  in  favor  of  re-union  with  Athens.  The  Chiau 
government  were  forced  to  summon  Astyochus,  with  his  four  Pelo- 
ponnesian  ships  from  Erythroe,  to  strengthen  their  hands,  and  keep" 
down  opposition;  by  seizing  hostages  from  the  suspecied  parties,  as 
well  as  by  other  precautions.  AVhile  the  Chians  were  thus  end:  ngcrtd 
at  home,  the  Athenian  interest  in  Ionia  was  still  further  fortitied  hy 
the  arrival  of  a  fresh  armament  from  Athens  at  Samos.  Phrynichu^i, 
Ouomakles,  and  Skironides  conducted  a  licet  of  forty  eight  triremes, 


sDme  of  them  employed  for  the  transportation  of  hoplites;  of  which 
latter  there  were  aboard  1000  Athenians,  and  1500  Argeians  Five 
hundred  of  these  Argeians,  having  come  to  Athens  without  arms, 
were  clothed  with  Athenian  panoplies  for  service.  The  newly-arrived 
armament  immediat(;ly  sailed  from  Samos  to  Miletus,  where  it 
effected  a  disembarkation,  in  conjunction  with  those  Athenians  who 
had  heen  before  watching  the  place  from  the  island  of  Lade.  The 
3Iilesians  marched  forth  to  give  them  battle;  mustering  800  of  their 
own  hoplites,  together  with  the  Peloponnesian  seamen  of  the  five 
triremes  brought  across  by  Chalkideiis,  and  a  body  of  troops,  chietly 
cavalry,  yet  with  a  few  mercenary  hoplites,  under  the  satrap  Tissa- 
phernes.  Alkibiades  also  was  present  and  engaged.  The  Argeians 
were  so  full  o*f  contempt  for  the  loniaus  of  Miletus  who  stood  oppo- 
site to  them  that  they  rushed  forward  to  the  charge  with  great  neg- 
lect of  rank  or  order;  a  presumption  which  they  expiated  by  an 
entire  defeat,  with  the  loss  of  300  men.  But  the  Athenians  on  their 
^ving  were  so  completely  victorious  over  the  Peloi)onnesians  and 
others  opposed  to  them,  that  all  the  army  of  the  latter,  and  even  the 
Milesians  themselves  on  returning  from  their  pursuit  of  the  Argeians, 
were  forced  to  shelter  themselves  within  the  walls  of  the  town.  The 
issue  of  this  combat  excited  much  astonishment,  inasmuch  as  on  each 
side  Ionian  hoplites  were  victorious  over  Dorian. 

For  a  moment,  the  Athenian  army,  masters  of  the  field  under  the 
walls  of  JNIiletu^  indulged  the  hope  of  putting  that  city  under  block- 
ade, by  a  wall  across  the  isthmus  which  connected  it  with  the  con- 
tinent. But  these  hopes  soon  vanished  when  they  were  :>])prised.  on  the 


pressing  instance  of  Hermokrates  and  under  his  command,  for  the 
purpose  of  striking  the  final  blow  at  Athens— so  at  least  it  was 
antieipated,  in  the  beginning  of  412  B.C.  The  remaining  33  triremes 
being  Peloponnesian,  the  whole  fleet  was  placed  under  the  temporary 
command  of  Theramenes  until  he  could  join  the  admiral  Astyochus. 
Theramenes,  halting  first  at  the  island  of  Lerus  (off  the  coast  toward 
'  the  southward  of  Miletus,  was  there  first  informed  of  the  recent 
victory  of  the  Athenians,  so  that  he  thought  it  prudent  to  take  station 
for  the  night  in  the  neighboring  Gulf  of  lasus.  Here  he  was  found  by 
Alkibiades,  who  came  on  horseback  in  all  haste  from  Miletus,  to  the 
Milesian  town  of  Teichiussa  on  that  Gulf.  Alkibiades  strenuously 
urged  him  to  lend  immediate  aid  to  the-  Milesians,  so  as  to  prevent 
the  construction  of  the  intended  wall  of  blockade;  representing  that 
if  that  city  were  captured,  all  the  hopes  of  the  Peloponnesians  in 
Ionia  would  be  extinguished.  Accordingly  he  prepared  to  sail 
thither  the  next  morning;  but  during  the  night  the  Athenians 
tliought  it  wise  to  abandon  their  position  near  Miletus  and  return  to 
Samos  with  their  wounded  and  their  baggage.     Having  heard  of  the 


178    ^VFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAMENT. 

afrivnl  of  Thcramenes  with  liis  fleet,  they  preferred  leaving  their 
victory  unimproved,  to  tlie  Iiazurd  of  a  ijeucral  battle.  Two  out  of 
the  three  commanders,  indeed,  were  at  first  inclined  to  take  the  latter 
course,  insisting  that  the  maritime  lionor  of  Athens  would  be  tarnished 
by  retiring  before  the  enemy.  But  the  ti.ird,  Plirynichus,  opposed 
with  so  much  omphMsis  the  proposition  of  tighting,  tiiat  he  at  length 
induced  his  collcngues  to  retire.  The  lleet  (he  said)  had  not  come 
prepared  for  fi^-liting  a  nav;d  battle,  but  full  of  hoj^lites  for  land- 
operations  against  ^lilctus:  the  numbers  of  the  newly-arrived  Pelo- 
ponnesians  weie  not  accurately  known:  and  a  defeat  at  sea.  under 
existing  circumstances,  wouUrbe  utter  ruin  to  Athens.  TluKydides 
bestows  much  praise  on  Plirynichus  for  the  wisdom  of  this  advice, 
wiiich  was  forthwith  acted  upon.  The  Athenian  fleet  sailed  back  to 
8amos;  from  which  ])lace  the  Argeian  hoplites,  sulky  with  their 
recent  defeat,  demanded  to  be  conveyed  home. 

On  the  ensuing  morning  the  Pefoponnesian  fleet  sailed  from  the 
Gulf  of  lasus  to  Miletus,  t^xpecling  to  find  and  tight  the  Athenians, 
and  leaving  their  masts,  sails,  and  Vigaing  (as  was  usual  when  going 
into  action)  at  Teicluussa.  Finding  Miletus  already  relieved  of  the 
enemy,  thev  stayed  there  only  one  day  in  order  to  re-enforce  them- 
selves witirthe  25  triremes  winch  Chalkideus  had  originally  brought 
thither,  and  which  had  been  since  blocked  up  by  the  Athenian  fleet 
at  Lade— and  then  sailed  back  to  Teichiu.r-s.a  to  pick  up  the  tackle 
there  deposited.  Being  now  not  far  from  lasus,  the  residence  of 
Amorges,  Tissapliernes  persuaded  them  to  attack  it  by  sea,  in  co-opera- 
ticm  w'ith  his  forces  by  land.  No  one  at  lasus  was  aware  of  the 
arrival  of  tiie  Peloponnesian  fleet:  the  triremes  a}i])roaching  were 
supposed  to  be  Athenians  and  friends,  so  that  the  place  was  entered 
and  taken  by  surprise;  though  strong  in  situation  and  fortifications, 
and  defended  by  a  powerful  band  of  Grecian  mercenaries.  The 
capture  of  lasus.  in  which  the  Syracusans  distinpiished  themselves, 
was  of  sisrnal  advantage  from  the  abundant  plunder  which  it  dis- 
tributed among  the  army;  the  place  being  rich  from  ancient  date, 
and  probably  containing  the  accumulations  of  the  satrap  Pissuthiies, 
father  of  An'iorges.  It  "was  handed  over  to  Tissaphernes.  along  with 
all  the  prisoners,  for  each  head  of  whom  he  paid  down  a  Daric  staler, 
or  twentv  Attic  drachma^— and  along  with  Amorges  himself,  who  had 
been  taken  alive  and  whom  the  satrap  was  thus  ena])led  to  send  up 
to  Susa.  Tlie  Grecian  mercenaries  captured  in  the  place  were 
enrolled  in  the  service  of  the  captors,  and  sent  by  land  under  Pednri- 
tus  to  Ervthrai,  in  order  that  they  might  cross  over  from  thence  to 
Chios. 

The  arrival  of  the  recent  re-enforcements  to  both  the  opposmg 
fleets,  and  the  capture  of  lasus,  took  place  about  the  autiuunal  eqni- 
iiox  or  the  end  of  September;  at  which  ]K'riod,  the  Pek^ponnesian 
fleet  being  assembled  at  Miletus,  Tissapliernes  paid  to  them  the 
wages  of  the  crews,  at  the  rate  of  one  Attic  drachma  per  head  per 


POWERFUL  ATHENIAN  FLEET  AT  SA^IOS.      179 

(liom  as  ^^e  had  promised  by  his  envoy  at  Sparta.  But  he  at  the 
.ime'tinie  gave  notice  for  (he  future  (partly  at  the  instigation  of 
Vlkibiades,  of  which  more  hereafter),  that  he  could  not  continue  so 
lijch  a  rate' of  pay,  unless  he  should  receive  express  instructions  from 
Susa'  and  that  until  such  instructions  came,  he  should  give  only  half 
a  drachma  per  day.  Thcramenes,  being  only  conmiander  for  the 
interim,  until  the  junction  with  Astyochus,  was  indifferent  to  the 
nite  at  which  the  men  w^ere  paid  (a  miserable  jealousy  which  marks 
tiie  low  character  of  many  of  these  Spartan  ollicers):  but  the  Syra- 
cu«an  Hermokrales  remonstrated  so  loudly  against  the  reduction, 
tint  he  obtained  from  Tissapliernes  the  promise  of  a  slight  increase 
above  the  half  drachma,  though  he  could  not  succeed  in  getting  the 
entire  drachma  continued.  For  the  present,  however,  the  seamea 
were  in  good  spirits;  not  merelv  from  having  received  the  high  rate 
of  pav  but  from  the  plentiful  booty  recently  acquired  at  lasus; 
while Istyochus  and  the  Chians  were  also  greatly  encouraged  by  the 
arrival  of  so  large  a  fleet.  Nevertheless,  the  Athenians  on  their  side 
were  also  re-enforced  by  thirtv-tive  fresh  triremes,  which  reached 
Simos  under  Stroml)ichides,  Cliarminus,  and  Euktemon.  The  Athe- 
nian fleet  from  Chios  was  now  recalled  to  Samos,  where  the  com- 
manders mustered  their  whole  naval  force,  with  a  view  of  redivid- 
ingit  for  ulterior  operations. 

Considering  that  in  the  autumn  of  the  preceding  year,  immediately 
after  the  Syracusan  disaster,  the  navy  of  Athens  had  been  no  less 
scanty  in  number  of  ships  than  defective  in  equipment— we  read 
with  amazement  that  she  had  now  at  Samos  no  less  than  104  triremes 
in  full  condition  and  disposable  for  service,  besides  some  others 
specially  destined  for  the  transport  of  troops.  Indeed  the  total  num- 
ber which  she  had  sent  out,  putting  together  the  separate  squadrons, 
had  been  128.  So  energetic  an  effort,  and  so  unexpected  a  renova- 
tion of  affairs  from  the  hopeless  prostration  of  last  year,  was  such  as 
no  Grecian  state  except  Athens  could  have  accomplished;  nor  even 
Athens  herself,  had  she  not  been  aided  by  that  reserve  fund,  conse- 
crated twenty  years  before  through  the  long-sighted  calculation  of 
Pcriklcs.  .,.11 

The  Athenians  resolved  to  employ  thirty  triremes  in  making  a  land- 
ing, and  establishing  a  fortified  post,  in  Chios;  and  lots  being  drawn 
among  the  generals,  Stronibichides  with  two  others  were  assigned  to 
the  command.  The  other  seventv-four  triremes,  remaining  masters 
of  the  sea,  made  descents  near  .Miletus,  trying  in  vain  to  provoke  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet  out  of  that  harbor.  It  was  some  time  before 
Astyochus  actually  went  thither  to  assume  his  new  command— being 
engaged  in  operations  near  to  Chios,  wdiich  island  had  been  left  com- 
paratively free  by  the  recall  of  the  Athenian  fleet  to  the  general 
muster  at  Samos.  Going  forth  with  twenty  triremes— ten  Pelopon- 
nesian and  ten  Chian— he  made  a  fruitless  attack  upon  Pteleus,  the 
Athenian  fortified  post  in  the  Erythrtean  territory;  after  which  he 


180    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAMEMT. 

sailed  to  Klazomcnrc,  recently  re-transferred  from  the  continent  lu 
the  neighboring:  islet.  He  here  (in  conjunction  with  Tamos,  Ww  ]\r 
sisui  general  of  the  district)  enjoined  the  Klazomenians  aaain  lo 
break  with  Athens,  to  leave  their  islet,  and  to  take  up  their  residence 
inland  at  Dai)hnus.  where  the  philo-Peloponnesian  party  anions 
them  still  remained  established  since  the  former  revolt.  This 
demand  being  rejected,  he  attacked  Klazomenie,  but  'was  repulsed 
although  the  town  was  unforlilied;  and  was  preseutlv  driven  off  by 
a  severe  storm,  from  which  he  found  shelter  at  Kymc  and  PholuTu. 
Some  of  his  ships  sheltered  themselves  during  the  same  storm  on  cer- 
tain islets  near  to  and  belonging  to  Klazomenn';  on  which  tiiev 
remained  eight  days,  destroying  and  plundering  the  property  of  tlie 
inliabitants,  and  tlien  rejoined  Astyochus.  That  admiral  was  now- 
anxious  to  make  an  attempt  on  Lesbos,  from  wliich  he  received 
envoys  promising  revolt  from  Athens.  But  the  Corinthians  and 
others  in  his  fleet  were  so  averse  to  ;he  enterprise  that  he  was  forced 
to  relinquish  it  and  sail  back  to  Chios;  his  fleet,  before  it  arrived 
there,  being  again  dispersed  by  the  storms,  frequent  in  the  month  of 
Kovember. 

Meanwhile  Pedaritus,  dispatched  by  land  from  Miletus  (at  the 
head  of  the  mercenary  force  made  prisoners  at  lasus.  as  well  as  of 
500  of  the  Peloponnesian  seamen  who  had  originally  crossed  the  sea 
with  Chalkideus  and  since  served  as  hoplites),  had  reached  Erythra?, 
and  from  thence  crossed  the  channel  to  Chios.  To  him  and  to  the 
Chians,  Astyochus  now  proposed  to  undertake  the  expedition  to  Les- 
bos, but  he  experienced  from  them  the  same  reluctance  as  from  the 
Corinthians— a  strong  proof  that  the  tone  of  feeling  in  Lesbos  had 
been  found  to  be  decidedly  philo- Athenian  on  the  former  expedition. 
Pedaritus  even  peremptorily  refused  to  let  him  have  the  Cliian  tri-' 
remes  for  any  such  purpose— an  act  of  direct  insubordination  in  a 
LacedcTmonian  ofticer  toward  the  admiral-in-chief,  which  Astvochns 
resented  so  strongly  that  he  immediately  left  Chios  for  ^feletns. 
carrving  away  with  him  all  the  Peloponnesian  triremes,  and  tellini: 
the  Chians,  in  terms  of  strong  displeasure,  that  they  might  look  in 
vain  to  him  for  aid,  if  they  shoulil  come  to  need  it.  He  halted  uilh 
his  fleet  for  the  night  under  the  headland  of  Korykus  (in  the  Erv- 
thrjran  territory),  on  the  north  side;  but  while  tlit're  he  received  an 
intimation  of  a  supposed  plot  to  betray  Erythiie  by  means  of 
prisoners  sent  back  from  the  Athenian  station  at  Samos.  Instead  of 
pursuing  his  voyage  to  Miletus,  he  therefore  returned  on  the  next 
day  to  Erythne  to  investigate  this  plot,  which  turned  out  to  be  a 
stratagem  of  the  prisoners  themselves  in  order  to  obtain  their  libera- 
tion. 

The  fact  of  liis  thus  going  back  to  Erythra?,  instead  of  pm-siiing 
his  voyage,  proved,  by  accielent,  the  salvation  of  his  fleet.  For  it  so 
happened  that  on  that  same  night  the  Athenian  fleet  under  Stronibi- 
chides — thirty  triremes  accompanied  by  some  triremes  carrying  hop- 


ATHENIAN  POST  NEAR  CHIOS. 


181 


lies— had  its  station  on   the  southern  side  of  the  same  headland. 
\eitlier  knew  of  the  position  of  the  other,  and  Astyochus,  had  he 
^ne  forward  the  next  day  toward  Miletus,  would  have  fallen  in  with 
tiie  superior  numbers  of  his  enemy.     He  further  escaped  a  terrible 
storm  whi(!h  the  Athenians  encountered  when   they  doubled  the 
iicadland  going  northward.     Descrying  three  Chian  triremes,  they 
ira've  chase!  but  the  storm  became  so  violent  that  even  these  Chians 
ii-ul  o-rcat  ciilflculty  in  makin;^  their  own  harbor,  while  the  three  fore- 
most" Athenian  ships  w^ere  wrecked  on  the  neighboring  shore,  all  the 
crews  either  perish  ins;  or  becoming  prisoners.     The  rest  of  the  Athe- 
nian fleet  found  shelter  in  the  harbor  of  Phoenikus  on  the  opposite 
main-land,  under  the  lofty  mountain  called  Mimas,  north  of  Erythrai. 
As  soon'  as  weather  permitted,  they  pursued  their  voyage  to  Les- 
bos from  which  island  they  cotnmenced  their  operations  of  invading 
Cldo^  and  establishing  in  it  a  permanent  fortified  post.     Having  trans- 
ported their  land -force  across  from  Lesbos,  they  occupied  a  strong 
maritime  site  called  Delphinium,  seemingly  a  projecting  cape  havmg 
a  sheltered  harbor  on   each  side,  not  far  from  the  city  of  Chios. 
Thev  bestowed  great  labor  and  time  in  fortifying  this  post,  both  on 
the  land  and  the  sea  side,  during  which  process  they  were  scarcely 
interrupted  at  all  either  by  the  Chians  or  by  Pedaritus  and  his  garrison, 
whose  inaction  arose  not  merelv  from  the  discouragement  of  the  pre- 
vious defeats,  but  from  the  political  dissension  which  now  reigned 
in  the  city.     A  strong  philo-Athenian  party  had  pronounced  itself; 
and  though  Tydeus,  its  leader,  was  seized  by  Pedaritus  and  put  to 
death,  still  his  remaining  partisans  were  so  numerous  that  the  gov- 
ernment was  brought  to  an  oligarchy  narrower  than  ever— and  to  the 
extreme  of  jealous  precaution,  liot  knowing  whom  to  trust.     In  spite 
of  numerous  messages  sent  to  Meletus,  entreating  succor  and  repre- 
sendug  the  urgent  peril  to  which  this  greatest  among  all  the  Ionian 
allies  of  Sparta  was  exposed— Astyochus  adhered    to  his  parting 
menaces,  and  refused  compliance.     The  indignant  Pedaritus  sent  to 
prefer  complaint  against  him  at  Sparta  as  a  traitor.     Meanwhile  the 
fortress  of  Delphinium  advanced  so  near  toward  completion  that 
Chios  began   to  suffer  from  it  as  much  as  Athens  suffered  from 
Dekeleia,  with  the  further  misfortune  of  being  blocked  up  by  sea. 
The  slaves  in  this  wealthy  island— chiefly  foreigners  acquired  by  pur- 
chase, but  more  numerous  than  in  any  other  Grecian  state  except 
Laconia— were  emboldened  by  the  manifest  superiority  and  assured 
position  of  the  invaders  to  desert  in  crowds;  and  the  loss  arising  not 
merely  from  their  flight,  but  from  the  valuable  information  and  aid 
wiiich  they  gave  to  the  enemy,  was  immense.     The  distress  of  the 
island  increased  everv  day,  and  could  only  be  relieved  by  succor 
from  without,  which  Astyochus  still  withheld. 

That  oflicer,  on  reachins?  Miletus,  found  the  Peloponnesian  force 
on  the  Asiatic  side  of  the^'^gean  just  re-enforced  by  a  squadron  of 
twelve  triremes  under  Dorieus;    chiefly  from  Thurii,   which  had 


182    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  AR:MAMEXT. 

iindtTgone  a  political  revolution  since  the  Atlirni;ni  disaster  at  Syra- 
ciise,  and  was  now  decidedly  in  the  hands  of  the  active  phi'o-I^neon- 
ian  party;  the  chief  persons  friendly  to  Athens  having  Ixen  <xil((l; 
Dorieus  and  his  squadron,  crossing  theyEgean  in  its  southern  latiuidc. 
liad  arrived  safely  at  Knidus,  a\  hich  had  already  been  conriueicd  hv 
Tissaphernes  fr(»in  Athens,  nnd  liad  received* a  Persinn  gnnisoii. 
Orders  were  sent  from  ]\Iiletus  that  half  of  this  newly  arriv((i  Kjuad- 
ron  sliould  roniain  on  guaid  at  Knidus,  while  the  other  linlf  sliouUl 
cruise  near  the  Tiii-pian  Cr.pe  to  intercept  the  trading- vessels  from 
Egypt.  But  the  Alhcniar.s,  who  luul  nlso  learned  the  airivjil  of 
Dorieus,  sent  a  powerful  s(piadron  from  Samos,  which  cap'.ured  jill 
these  six  triremes  off  Cape  Triopium,  though  the  crews  escnpcd 
ashore.  Tliey  further  made  an  attempt  to  recover  Knidus,  which 
was  ver}' nearly  successful,  as  the  town  was  unfortitied  on  the  sea- 
side. On  the  morrow  the  attack  was  renewed;  hut  additional  de- 
fenses liad  been  provided  during  the  night,  while  the  crews  of  the 
ships  captured  near  Triopium  had  <(  me  in  to  help;  so  that  the  Athen- 
ians were  forced  to  return  to  Samos  without  ;iny  further  advantr.ge 
than  that  of  ravagimr  the  Knidian  territorv.  As*tvo(hus  took  no  step 
to  intercept  them,  nor  did  he  think  himself  strong  enough  to  kiej)  the 
Fca  against  the  74  Athenian  triremes  at  Samos,  though  his  fleet  at 
JMiletus  was  at  this  moment  in  high  condition.  The  rich  booty 
acquired  at  lasus  was  unconsumed;  the  ^lihsians  weie  zejilous  in 
the  confederate  cause;  while  the  pay  fi(  ni  Ti>saiihernes  continued 
to  be  supplied  with  tolerable  regularity,  yet  at  the  reduced  rate  men- 
tioned a  little  above. 

Though  the  Peloponnesians  had  hitherto  no  ground  of  complaint 
(such  as  they  soon  came  to  have)  against  the  satrap  for  irregularity  of 
payment,  still  the  powerful  fleet  now  at  ^Sliictus  insjured  the  com- 
manders with  a  new  tone  of  confidence,  so  that  the}'  became  ashamed 
of  the  stipulations  of  that  treaty  to  which  Chalkidelis  and  Alkibiades, 
when  first  landing  at  Miletus  with  their  scanty  armament,  had  sub- 
mitted. Accordingly  Astyochus,  shortly  after  his  arrival  at  ]\Iilelus, 
and  even  before  the  departure  of  Theramenes  (whose  functions  had 
expired  when  he  had  handed  over  the  fleet),  insisted  on  a  fresh  treaty 
with  Tissaphernes,  which  was  agreed  on,  to  the  following  effect: 

"Convention  and  alliance  is  conchuled,  on  the  following  condi- 
tions, between  the  Lacedjemonians  with  their  allies — and  King  Darins, 
his  sons,  and  Tissapheines.  The  LacedaMuonians  and  their  allies 
sliall  not  attack  or  injure  any  territory  or  any  city  which  belongs  to 
Darius  or  has  belonged  to  his  father  or  ancestors;  nor  shall  they  raise 
any  tribute  from  any  of  the  said  cities.  Neither  Darius  nor  any  of 
his  subjects  shall  attack  or  injure  the  Lacedaemonians  or  their  allies. 
Should  the  Lacedaimonians  or  their  allies  have  any  occasion  for  the 
king— or  should  the  king  have  any  occasion  for  the  Laceihenionians 
or  their  allies — let  each  meet  as  much  as  may  be  the  wishes  expressed 
by  the  other.     Both  will  carry  on  jointly  the  war  against  Athens  and 


COMPARISON  OF  THE  TREATIES. 


183 


i.or  dii-^-  neither  party  shall  bring  the  war  to  a  close,  "^.ithout 
^nh?l  consent  The  king  shall  pay  and  keep  any  army  which  he 
;;;  V  u  ive  sent  for  an.l  which  may  l,e  employed  n  us  territory.  It 
"  ^f  IhnV.  ics  ivirties  to  this  convention  shall  attack  the  kings 
f'^lv\h^^t^^n^^^oio  hinder  them,  and  to  defend  the  king 
^''l  ^A^'^l^^^y  And  if  any  one  within  the  king's  territory, 
r^wi  1^^  the  e  Ti  :.;•  s.dneet  to  h^m,  shall  attack  the  Laced..mon- 
•  InTor  thei^- jxllie.s,  the  king  shall  hinder  them  and  lend  his  best 

'i'n"d'!Tl''it*'with  the  eyes  of  Panhellenic  patriotism,   this  second 

i  of  K  leas.  It  did  not  formally  proclaim  that  all  those 
Sin  cife  whLh  had  ever  belonged  to  the  king  or  to  his  a  nee  s- 
ms  X  Id  ^  yy^  considered  as  his  subjects;  nor  did  it  pledge  the 
L ced e  in  ians  to  aid  the  king  in  hindering  any  of  them  rom 
i^  i  dm'  1  eir  liberty.  It  stilf  admitted,  however,  by  ^mP^^^^  i^"' 
fl,  n  ■i'-he(l  extent  of  the  king's  dominion,  the  same  as  at  the  maxi- 
ma I'r  is  predecessors-tile  like  undetlned  r,ghtsof  he  kiii^  o 
Hi  ilc  with  G  ecian  affairs-tlie  like  unquahtied  abandonment  of 
the  Greeks  on  the  continent  of   Asia.     The  conclusion  of  this 

:twa    til;- last  act  performed  ^YJ^^^^-J^^-'^I'T^^ 
sea  shortly  aftersvard,  on  his  voyage  home,  in  a  small  boat-no  one 

^T^vm^us  now  alone  in  command,  was  still  importuned  by  the 
ur^    suheihUions  of  th.  distressed  Chians  for  reHef ,  and  m  spi  e  o 
U  reluctance  was  comoelled  by  the   murmurs  of  his  own  aimyto 
e  Id  a    e      to  theni-wiKMi  a  new  incident  happened  which  gave  hnu 
at  leist  a  -ood  pretext  for  dire.'ting  his  attention   southward.     A 
Pelono  mesim  smiaclron  of  27  triremes  under  the  command  of  Antis- 
tlie  J^  lu  Nil''  s  arted  from  Cape  Malea  about  the  winter  tropic  or 
cb  e  of  4iVrc.,  had  flrst  crossed  the  sea  to  Melos,  where  it  disperscH 
t  a  Athenian  triremes  and  captured  thix^e  of  tl^em-tlien  a    c^^^^^^ 
from  apprehension  that  these  fugitive  Athenians  ^^-^^"^^^^ "  "^'^'^    . 
it.  approach  at  Samos,  had  made  a  long  circuit  ^"^^^^f^^^^^^  J^  .^H '  ,^"^1 
thus  ultimately  reached  Kaunas  at  ^l^^^^thveastern  extern it^o^ 
Asia  Minor.     This  was  the  squadron  which  I^^^^^^^.^'^/^r,    "  ^/^^  ;^: 
fforas  had  caused  to  be  equipped,  having  c^ome  oyer  for  tli^      n    bo^^ 
a  year  before  as  envoys  from  the  satrap  Pharnabazus.     An   sdiu   . 
WIS  instructed  flrst  to  get  to  Miletus  and  put  1""^^^;/;"/.^  ,";^^|,.;''  J 
the  main  Lacedaemonian  fleet;    nciit,  to  ^^^^^'^^'V^f  T.  \V'    Hdles 
another  squadron  of  equal  force,  under  Klearchus,  to  the  llcll^^^^^ 
pont,  for  tiie  purpose  of  co-operating  ^^it^  P^'^u•n.d)a7.  s  aga  u^t ^th^^ 
Athenian  dependencies  in  that  reg  on.     Eleven  ^P^^^^ans   the  cluet 
of  whom  was  Lichas  accompanied  Antisthenes.   ^^  be      taclicd  to 
Asty<5l:hus  as  advisers,    according  to  a  pnictice    .";>^,;^^,"^.'^^^  .^^j^^^ 
the  Lacedaemonians.     These  men  were  not  ^"  ^  f  ^f;^.^,.^,^;j;h^ 
the  state  of  alfairs  at  Miletus,  and  exercise  control  co-oidinate  witli 


384    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMA3IENT. 


SPARTAN  FLEET  AT  RHODES. 


185 


Astyochiis — hut  even  empowered,  if  they  saw  reason,  to  dismiss  tliat 
admiral  liimself,  upon  whom  the  comphiintsof  Pe(hiiitus  from  Chios 
had  cast  suspicion;  and  to  api>oint  Anlistlienes  in  liis  i)l;icc. 

No  sooner  had  Astyoclms  learnt  at  Miletus  the  arrival  of  Aiitis- 
thenes  at  Kaunus,  than  he  postponed  all  idea  of  lending-  aid  to  Chios, 
and  sailed  immediately  to  secure  his  junction  with  the  twenty-sevca 
new  triremes  as  well  as  with  the  new  Spartan  counselors.  In  his  voyaije 
southward  he  captured  the  city  of  Kos,  unfortilied  and  half  ruined 
by  a  recent  earthquake,  and  then  passed  on  to  Knidus;  where  llie 
inhabitants  strenuously  urged  him  to  go  forward  at  once,  even  with- 
out disembarking  his  men,  in  order  that  he  might  surprise  au 
Atlienian  squadron  of  twenty  triremes  under  Charmiuus;  which  had 
been  dispatched  from  Samos,  after  the  news  received  from  3Ielos,  iu 
order  to  attack  and  repel  the  squadron  under  Antisthenes.  Ciiai- 
minus,  having  his  station  at  Syme,  was  cruising  near  Rhodes  and  the 
Lykian  coast,  to  watch,  t-liough  he  had  not  been  able  to  keep  back, 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet  just  arrived  at  Kaunus.  In  this  position  he 
was  found  by  the  far  more  numerous  lleet  of  Astyochus,  the  approach 
of  which  ho  did  not  at  all  expect.  But  the  rainy  and  hazy  weather 
liad  so  dispersed  it,  that  Charmiuus,  seeing"^t  first  only  a  iew  shii)s 
apart  from  the  rest,  mistook  them  for  the  smaller  sqimdron  of  new- 
comers. Attacking  the  triremes  thus  seen,  he  at  tir.st  gained  con- 
siderable advantage — disabling  three  and  damaging  scWeral  others. 
But  presently  the  dispersed  vesst  Is  of  the  main  lleet  came  in  sight 
and  closed  round  him,  so  that  he  was  forced  to  make  Die  best  speed 
in  escaping,  lirst  to  the  island  called  Teutlussa,  next  to  Ilalikarnassus. 
He  did  not  effect  his  escape  without  the  loss  of  six  ships;  while  the 
victorious  Peloponnesians,  after  creeling  their  troph}'  on  the  island 
of  Syme,  returned  to  Knidus,  where  the  entire  fleet,  incduding  the 
twent3'-seven  triremes  newly  andved,  was  now  united.  The  Athe- 
nians in  Stunos  (whose  aifairs  were  now  in  confusion,  from  causes 
which  will  be  explained  in  the  ensuing  chai)ter)  had  kept  no  watch 
on  the  movements  of  the  main  Peloponnesian  fleet  at  .Miletus,  and 
seem  to  have  been  ignorant  of  its  departure  until  they  were  apprised 
of  the  defeat  of  Charmiuus.  They  then  sailed  down  to  Syme,  took 
up  the  sails  and  rigging  belonging  to  that  squadron,  which  had  beeu 
there  deposited,  and  then,  after  an  attack  upon  Lorynui,  carried  hack 
their  whole  fleet  (probably  including  the  remnant  of  the  squadron  of 
Charminus)  to  Samos. 

Though  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  now  assembled  at  Knidus  cou- 
sisted  of  ninety-four  triremes,  much  superior  in  number  to  the  Athe- 
nian, it  did  not  try  to  provoke  any  general  action.  The  time  of 
Lichas  and  his  brother  commissioners  was  at  first  spent  in  negotia- 
tions with  Tissaphernes,  who  had  jomed  them  at  Knidus,  andagninst 
wla^m  they  found  a  strong  feeling  of  discontent  prevalent  in  t^ie  fleet. 
That  satrap  (now  acting  greatly  under  the  advice  of  Alkibiades,  of 
which  al.-:o  more  in  the  cjining  chapter)  had  of  late  become  slack  in 


the  Peloponnesian  cause,  and  irregular  in  furnishing  pay  to  their 
seamen,  during  the  last  weeks  of  their  stay  at  Miletus.  He  was  at 
the  same  timy  full  of  promises,  paralyzing  all  their  operations  by 
as^in-ances  that  he  was  bringing  up  theVast'fleet  of  Phenicia  to  their 
aid:  hut  in  reality  his  object  was,  under  fair  appearances,  merely  to 
prolong  the  contest  and  waste  the  strength  of  both  parties.  Arrivino- 
in  I  he  midst  of  this  state  of  feeling,  and  discussing  with  Tissaphernes 
the  future  conduct  of  the  war,"  Lichas  not  only  expressed  displeasure 
at  his  past  conduct,  but  even  protested  against  the  two  conventions 
concluded  by  Chalkideus  and  by  Therainenes,  as  being,  both  the  one 
and  the  other,  a  disgnvce  to  the  Hellenic  name.  By  the  express 
terms  of  the  former,  and  by  the  implications  of  the  latter,  not  merely 
all  the  islands  of  the  ^geaii.  but  even  Thessaly  and  Bceotia,  were 
acknowdedged  as  subject  to  Persia:  so  that  Sparta,  if  she  sanctioned 
such  conditions,  would  be  menjly  imposing  upon  the  Greeks  a  Per- 
sioa  scepter,  instead  of  general  freedom,  for  which  she  professed  to 
be  straggling.  Licdias  declaring  that  he  would  rather  renounce  all 
prospect  of  Persian  pay,  than  submit  to  such  conditions,  proposed 
to  negotiate  for  a  fresh  treaty  upon  other  and  better  terms— a  prop- 
osition, which  Tissa|)liernes  lejected  with  so  much  indignation,  as  to 
depart  without  settling  anything. 

His  deseition  did  not  discourage  the  Peloponnesian  counselors 
Possessing  a  fleet  larger  than  they  had  ever  before  had  united  iii 
Asia,  tog.'ther  with  a  numerous  bodv  of  jdlies,  tjiev  calculated  on 
being  able  to  get  money  to  pay  their 'men  without  Persian  aid;  and 
an  invitation,  which  they  just  now  received  from  various  powerful 
men  at  Rhodes,  tended  to  strengthen  such  confidence.  The  island  of 
llliodes,  inhabited  by  a  Dorian  population  considerable  in  number  as 
well  as  distinguished  for  nautical  sldll,  was  at  this  time  divided  between 
three  separate  city  governments,  as  it  had  been  at  the  epoch  of  tlie" 
ilonieric  Catalogue— Lindus,  lalvsus,  and  Kamerius;  for  the  city 
called  Rhodes,  form  h1  by  a  coalescence  of  all  these  three,  dates  only 
tioni  two  or  three  years  after  the  period  which  we  have  now  reached 
invited  by  several  of  the  wealthy  men  of  the  island,  the  Pelopon- 
lUNiau  fleet  first  attacked  Kameirus,  the  population  of  which,  intimi- 
dated by  a  force  of  ninety-four  triremes,  and  altosrelher  uninformed 
'ji  their  approach,  abandoned  their  city,  which  had  no  defenses  and 
lied  to  the  mountains.  All  the  three  Rhodian  towns,  destitute  of 
lortitications,  were  partly  persuaded,  partly  frightened,  into  the  step 
or  revolting  from  Athens  and  alljfng  themselves  with  the  Pelopon- 
nesians. The  Athenian  fleet,  whose  commanders  were  just  now  too 
Jjiisy  with  political  intrigue  to  keep  due  military  watch,  arrived  from 
Nmios  too  late  to  save  Rhodes,  and  iiresently  returned  to  the  former 
Inland,  leaving  detachments  at  Chalke  and  Kos  to  harass  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians with  desultory  attacks. 

,™  I'cloponnesians  now  levied  from  the  Rhodians  a  contribution 
01  thirty-two  talents,  and  adopted  the  island  as  the  main  station  for 


186    AFTER  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ARMAME:sT. 


RALLY  OF  ATHENS. 


187 


f 


f 


I 


tlicir  fleet,  instead  of  ^liletiis.  We  can  explain  this  ehanire  of  place 
by  their  recent  unfriendly  discussion  ^vi^h  Tissnphcnies,  and  tlioir 
desire  to  be  more  out  of  his  reach.  Etit  wiiat  avc  cannot  so  erisily 
explain,  is — that  they  remtiined  on  the  islnnd  ^vitl^out  any  niovenuiit 
or  military  action,  and  actually  hauled  their  triremes  ashoie  for  llie 
space  of  no  less  than  eis^hty  days;  thai  is,  from  about  the  middle  of 
January  to  the  end  of  ^lan-h  441  r..c.  While  their  powerfnl  Heet  of 
ninety-four  triremes,  superior  to  that  of  Athens  at  Sjimos,  was  lying 
idle— their  all'es  in  Chios  were  known  to  be  suilerinu-  .severe  aiiil 
increasing  distress,  and  repeatedly  pressing  for  aid:  moreover  tlie 
prondse  of  sending  to  co-operate  with  Pharnabazns  against  the  Athe- 
nian dependencies  on  the  Hellespont,  remnined  nnp(  rformed.  AVe 
may  impute  such  extreme  ndlitary  slackness  mainly  to  the  insidious 
policy  of  Ti.ssaphernes.  now  j^laying  a  double  game  between  Sparta 
and  Athens.  lie  still  kei>t  up  intelligence  with  the  Peloponnesians  at 
Rhodes — paralyzed  their  energies  by  assurances  that  the  Phenician 
fleet  was  actually  on  its  way  to  aid  them,  and  ensured  the  success  of 
these  intrigt!es  by  bribes  distri1)nted.  ]xi>onally  among  the  geiurals 
and  the  trierarchs.  Even  Aslyochus,  the  gencral-in-chief  took  his 
fihare  in  this  corrupt  bargain,  against  which  not  one  stood  out  except 
the  Syracusan  Hermokrates.  Such  prolonged  inaction  of  the  arma- 
ment^ at  the  moment  of  its  greatest  force,  was  thus  not  simply  the 
fruit  of  honest  mistake,  like  the  tardiness  of  Nikias  in  Sicily— hut 
proceeded  from  the  dishonesty  and  personal  avidity  of  the  Pelopou- 
iiesiau  oflicers. 

I  have  noticed,  on  more  than  one  previous  occasion,  the  many 
evidences  which  exist  of  the  prevalence  of  personal  corruption— evcu 
in  its  coarsest  form,  that  of  direct  briberv — amonirthe  leadinc:  Greeks 
of  all  the  cities,  when  acting  individually.  Of  such  evidences  the 
incident  here  recorded  is  not  the  least  remarkable.  Nor  ought  this 
general  fact  ever  be  forgotten  by  those  who  discuss  the  question 
b 'tween  oligarchy  and  democracy,  as  it  stood  in  the  Grecian  world. 
The  confident  pretensions  put  forth  by  the  wer.lfhy  arid  oligarchical 
Greeks  to  superior  virtue,  public  as  well  as  private — and  the  (piiet 
repetition,  hy  various  writers  nioijern  and  ai:ci'  iit.  of  the  laudatory 
epithets  implying  such  assumed  virtue,  are  so  far  from  being  home 
out  by  history,  tliat  these  individuals  were  perpetually  ready  as  states- 
men to  betray  their  countrymen,  or  as  generals  even  to  hetray  the 
interests  of  their  soldiers,  for  the  purpose  of  acqu'ring  money  them- 
selves. Of  course  it  is  not  meant  that  this  was  tr.ie  of  all  of  them; 
but  it  was  true  sufficiently  often,  to  be  reckoned  upon  as  a  con- 
tingencv  more  than  probable.  If,  speaking  on  the  average,  the  lead- 
ing men  of  a  Grecian  conunuinty  were  not  above  the  commission  of 
political  misdeeds  thus  palpable,  and  of  a  nature  not  to  be  disguised 
even  from  themselves — far  less  would  they  be  above  the  vices,  always 
more  or  less  mingled  with  self-delusion,  of  pride,  power-seeking, 
party-antipathy  or  sympath}',   love  of  ease,  etc.    Aud  if  the  com- 


munity were  to  have  any  chance  of  guarantee  against  such  abuses,  it 
could  only  be  by  full  license  of  accusation  against  delinquents,  and 
certainty  of  trial  hefore  judges  identified  in  interest  with  the  people 
thenisclves.    Such  were  the  securities  which  the  Grecian  democracies, 
especially  that  of  Athens,  tried  to  provide;  in  a  manner  not  always 
wise,  still  less  ahvays  effectual — but  assuredly  justified,  in  the  amplest 
in:uiner,  by  the  urgency  and  prevalence  of  the  evil.     Yet  in  the  com- 
mon representations  given  of  Athenian  affairs,  this  evil  is  overlooked 
or  evaded;  the  precautions  taken  against  it  are  denounced  as  so  many 
evidences  of  democrat ical  ill-temper  and   injustice;  and  the  class  of 
men.  through  whose  initiatory  action  alone  such  precautions  were 
enforced,  are  held  up  to  scorn  as  demagogues  and  si/rophantM.     Had 
tluse  PeloponiU'>^ian  generals  and  trierarchs,  who  under  the  influence 
of  bfihes  wasted  two  important  months  in  inaction,  been  Athenians, 
there  might  have  heen  some  chance  of  their  being  tried  and  i)uidshed'; 
though  even  at  Athens  the  chance  of  impunity  to  offenders,  througli 
powerful  political  clubs  and  other  sinister  artifices,  was  muchgrearer 
tliau  it  ought  to  have  been.     So  little  is  it  consistent  with  the  truth, 
however  often  allirnied,   that  judical  accusation  w^as  too  easv,  and 
judicial  condenuiation  too  frequent.     When  the  judicial  precautions 
j)n)vided  at  Athens  are  looked  at,  as  they  ought  to  be,  side  by  side 
with   the  evil— they  will   be  found   imperfect,   indeed   both  in  the 
scii -m '  and  in  the  working,  but  certainly  neither  uncalled-for  nor 
uver-severe. 


CHAPTER  LXn. 

TWEXTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF   TIFE  WAR. — OLIGARCHY  OF  FOUR  HUNDRED 

AT  ATHElsS. 

AnorT  a  year  elapsed  between  the  catastrophe  of  the  Athenians 
n  -ar  Syracuse  tuid  the  victory  which  they  gained  over  the  Milesians, 
on  landing  near  Miletus  (froiii  September  413  B.C.,  to  September  412 
u.c).  After  the  first  of  those  two  events,  the  comi)lete  ruin  or 
Athens  had  appeared  both  to  her  enemies  and  to  herself,  iniDcnding 
:ind  irreparable.  But  so  astonishing,  so  rapid,  and  so  energetic  had 
heen  Jier  ralh',  that  at  the  time  of  the  second,  she  was  found  again 
cuTviug  on  a  tolerable  struggle,  though  with  impaired  resources  and 
oa  a  purely  defensive  S3^stenl,  against  enemies  both  bolder  and  more 
luimerous  than  ever.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  her  foreign 
iillairs  might  have  gone  on  thus  improving  had  they  not  been  cai- 
d:uigored  at  this  critical  moment  by  the  treason  of  a  fraction  of  her 
own  citizens,  bringing  her  again  to  the  brink  of  ruin,  from  which 
she  Was  only  rescued  by  tiie  incompetence  of  her  enemies. 

That  treason  took  its  first  rise  from  the  exile  Alki blades.     I  have 


188 


TWENTY  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


ADVICE  OF  ALKIBIADES. 


189 


already  recounted  liow  this  man,  alike  iinj^riiicipled  and  enorfretic 
had  tlirown  liimself  witli  liis  cliaraeteristie  ardor  into  tlie  service  of 
Sparfa,  and  had  indicated  to  her  the  best  means  of  aiding  Syracuse 
of  intlietiug  positive  injury  upon  Atliens,  and  lastly,  of  provokiii'^ 
revolt  among  the  Ionic  allies  of  the  latter.  It  uas  by  his  holdiuss 
and  personal  connections  in  loua  that  the  revolt  of  Chios  and  ^Miletus 
had  been  determined. 

In  the  course  of  a  few  months,  however,  he  had  grejitly  lost  llie 
confidence  of  the  Spartans.  The  revolt  of  the  Asiatic  dei>endcnci(s 
of  Athens  had  not  been  accomplished  so  easily  and  rapidly  as  lie  had 
predicted:  Chalkideus,  the  Spartan  commander  wilh  whom  lie  liad 
acted,  was  defeated  and  slain  near  Miletus:  the  Ei)hor  Endius,  by 
whom  he  was  chietly  protected,  retained  his  oflice  only  for  one  year, 
and  was  succeeded  by  other  Epliors  just  about  the  end  of  Septem- 
ber or  beginning  of  October,  when  the  Athenians  gained  their  second 
victory  near  3liletus,  and  were  on  the  point  of  blocking  up  the  town; 
lastly.  King  Agis,  the  personal  enemy  of  Alkibiades,  still  renuiiiRd 
to  persecute  him.  ]\Ioreover,  there  was  in  the  character  of  this  re- 
markable man  something  so  essentially  selfish,  vain  and  treaduious, 
that  no  one  could  ever  rely  upon  his  faithful  co-operation.  Accord- 
ingly, Jis  soon  as  any  reverse  occurred,  that  very  energy  and  ability, 
which  seldom  failed  him,  made  those  with  whom  he  acted  the  inoie 
ready  to  explain  the  uiischance  by  sui)posing  that  he  hud  betrayed 
them. 

It  was  thus  that,  after  the  defeat  of  >Iiletus,  King  Agis  was  en- 
abled to  discredit  Alkibiadis  as  a  traitor  to  Spnrla:  uj^on  whidi  the 
new  Ephors  sent  out  at  once  an  order  to  the  general  As:}ochus.  lojnit 
liim  to  death.  Alkibiades  IkuI  now  an  opportunity  of  lasting  tiic  dif- 
ference between  Spartan  and  Athenian  procediu-e.  Though  his  emmics 
at  Athens  were  numerous  and  virulent,  with  all  the  advantage,  so 
unspeakable  in  political  warfare,  of  being  able  to  raise  the  cry  of  irru- 
ligion  airainst  him;  vet  the  utmost  which  thev  could  obtain  was.  that 
lie  should  be  summoned  home  to  take  his  trial  before  the  Dikasteiy. 
.At  Sparta,  without  any  positive  grour.d  of  crimination  and  williout 
jiany  idea  of  judicial  trial,  his  enemies  prxjcure  an  order  that  he  shall 
be  put  to  death. 

Alkibiades  however  got  intimation  of  the  order  in  time  to  retire  to 
Tissaphernes.  Piol;.bly  he  was  forewaiiitd  by  Astyochus  himself, 
Dot  ignorant  that  ^o  monstious  a  deed  would  gi eat ly  alienate  the 
Chians  and  Milesians,  nor  forseeiug  the  full  misihief  which  nis  de- 
sertion would  bring  i!]ion  Sparta.  With  that  fie.xibiiily  of  (haiiicter 
which  enabled  him  at  oiice  to  master  and  take  up  a  new  pusiiion, 
Alkibiades  soon  found  means  to  insinuate  him.self  ir.to  the  conti(k'nce 
of  the  satrap.  lie  began  now  to  play  a  g:  me  neither  Spartan  nor 
Athenian,  but  Peisian  and  anti-Hellenic;  a  game  of  duplicity  lo 
which  Tissaphernes  himself  was  spontaneously  disposed,  hut  to 
which  the  intervention  of  a  dexterous  Grecian  negotiator  was  indis- 


pensable. It  was  by  no  means  the  interest  of  the  Groat  King  (Alki- 
biades urged)  to  lend  such  effective  aid  to  either  of  the  contending 
parties  as  would  enable  it  to  crush  the  other;  he  ought  neither  to 
bring  up  the  Phonician  fleet  to  the  aid  of  the  Lacedicmoniaus  nor  to 
furnish  that  abundant  pay  which  would  procure  for  them  iudefinite 
levies  of  new  Grecian  force.  He  oug!it  so  to  feed  and  prolong  the 
\v:ir,  as  to  make  each  party  an  instiuinent  of  exhaustion  and  iui- 
ipoverishment  against  the  other,  and  thus  himself  to  rise  on  the  ruins 
^ofboth:  first  to  break  down  the  Athenian  empire  by  means  of  the 
Peloponnesians,  and  afterw^ards  to  expel  the  Pelopounesians  them- 
selves—which might  be  effected  with  little  trouble  if  they  were  weak- 
ened by  a  protected  previous  struggle. 

Thus  far  Alkibiades  gave  advice,  as  a  Persian  counselor,  not  un- 
suitable to  the  policy  of  the  court  of  Susa.  But  he  seldom  gave  ad- 
vice without  some  view  to  his  own  profit,  ambition  or  antipathies. 
Cast  off  unceremoniously  by  the  Lacediemonians,  he  was  now  driveii 
to  seek  restoration  in  his  own  country.  To  accomplish  this  object 
it  was  necessary  not  only  that  he  should  preserve  her  from  being  al- 
together ruined,  but  that  he  should  present  himself  to  the  Athenians 
as  one  who  could,  if  restored,  divert  the  aid  of  Tissaphernes  from 
Lacedtemon  to  Athens.  Accordingly,  he  further  suggested  to  the 
satrap,  that  while  it  was  essential  to  his  interest  not  to  permit  land 
power  and  maritime  powder  to  be  united  in  the  same  hands,  whether 
Laecdiemonian  or  xVthenian — it  would  nevertheless  be  found  easier  to 
{y-range  matters  with  the  empire  and  pretensions  of  Athens,  than  with 
those  of  Lacedaemon.  Athens  (he  argued)  neither  sought  nor  pro- 
fessed any  other  object  than  the  subjection  of  her  own  maritiiue  de- 
pendencies, in  return  for  which  she  would  willingly  leave  all  the 
Asiatic  Greeks  in  the  hands  of  the  Great  King:  while  Sparta,  for- 
swearing all  idea  of  empire,  and  professing  ostentatiously  to  aim  at 
the  universal  enfranchisement  of  every  Grecian  city,  could  not  with 
the  smallest  consistency  conspire  to  deprive  the  Asiatic  Greeks  of  the 
same  privilege.  This  view  appeared  to  be  countenanced  by  the  ob- 
jection which  Theramenes  and  many  of  the  Peloi)onnesian  officers 
li:ul  taken  to  the  first  convention  concluded  by  Chalkideus  and  Alki- 
biades with  Tissaphernes;  obji'ctions  afterward  renewed  by  Lichas 
even  against  the  second  modified  convention  of  Theramenes,  and  ac- 
companied with  an  indignant  protest  against  the  idea  of  surrender- 
ing to  the  Great  King  all  the  tenitory  wdiich  had  been  ever  possessed 
by  his  predecessors. 

All  these  latter  arguments,  whereby  Alkibiades  professed  to  create 
in  the  mind  of  the  satrap  a  pn  fire  nee  for  Athens,  were  either  futile 
or  founded  on  false  assumptions.  For  on  the  one  hand,  even  Lichas 
Dover  refused  to  concur  in  surrendering  the  Asiatic  Greeks  to  Persia, 
^vliile  on  the  other  Iiand,  the  empire  of  Athens,  so  long  as  she  re- 
tained any  empire,  was  pretty  sure  to  be  more  formidable  to  Persia 
than  any  efforts  undertaken  by  Sparta  under  the  disinterested  pre- 


190 


TWENTY  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


ALKIBIADES  AND  THE  ATHENIANS. 


191 


tense  of  liborntinir  j^encrnlly  the  Grecian  cities.  Nor  did  Tissaplier- 
lU'S  at  all  lend  himself  to  any  such  positive  ini])ression:  though  be 
felt  stronirlv  the  force  of  the  negative  reconaneiulations  of  Alkiblades 
— that  he  >houl(l  do  no  more  for  Hie  Pelopontiesians  than  was  sufticieiit 
to  feed  the  war,  without  insuring  to  tlion  either  a  speedy  or  a  de- 
cisive success:  or  rather,  this  duplicity  was  so  congenial  to  liis  ori- 
ental mind,  that  there  was  no  need  of  Alkibiades  to  recommend  it. 
The  real  use  of  the  Athenian  exile,  was  to  assist  the  satrap  in  carry- 
ins:  it  into  execution;  and  to  provide  for  him  those  plausible  pre- 
tenses  and  justiticatious.  which  he  was  to  issue  as  a  substitute  for 
tlTeclive  supplies  of  men  and  money.  Established  along  with  Tis- 
fapheriies  at  jMagnesia— the  same  j^Iace  which  had  been  occupied 
:.b.)ul  tiftvvears^bet'ore  by  another  Alhenian  exile,  equally  uniuin- 
<ipled  and  yet  abler,  Themistokles— Alkibiades  served  as  interineter 
of  his  views  in  all  his  conversations  with  the  Greeks,  and  a])pearc(l 
to  1h'  thoroughly  in  his  confidence:  an  appearance  of  which  he  took 
adviintage  to  pass  himself  olf  falsely  upon  the  Athenians  at  Saniosas 
having  the  power  of  luniing  Pt  rsian  wealth  to  the  aid  of  Athens. 

TIkT  tirst  payment  made  by  Tissaphernes,  immediately  after  the 
captme  of  lasiis  and  of  the  revolted  Amorges,  to  the  IVloponnesians 
at  Miletus,  was  at  the  rate  of  one  drachma  per  head.  I'ut  notice  was 
iiiven  that  for  the  future  it  would  be  rechacd  one  half ;  a  reduclion 
Vor  which  Alkibiades  undeitook  to  furnish  a  reas(Ui.  The  Athenians 
(he  mucd)  uave  no  more  thtui  half  a  drachma;  not  because  they  could 
not  alford  more,  but  because,  from  their  long  experience  of  nautical 
affairs,  they  had  found  the  liigher  pay  si)oilcd  the  discipline  of  the 
seamen  by  "leading  them  into  excesses  and  over-indulgence,  as  uell 
as  by  inducing  too  ready  h  ave  of  absence  to  be  granted,  in  conlidcnce 
thal'tlie  hiuh  pay  would  bring  back  the  men  when  called  for.  Ashe 
])robably  never  expected  that  such  subterfuges  (emplo3X'd  at  a  moment 
wIk'ji  Athens  was  .so  poor  that  she  could  not  even  pay  the  half 
dnichma  per  head)  would  carry  conviction  to  any  one— so  he  iiiducid 
Tissaphernes  to  strengthen  their  efCect  by  individual  bribes  to  Ilie 
irem'rals  and  trierarchs;  a  mode  of  argument  which  was  found  cflVct- 
nal  in  silenciuir  the  com])l:!ints  of  all.  with  the  single  exception  ol 
the  Svracusan  llermokrates.  In  regard  to  other  Grecian  cities  who 
«mt  to  ask  pecuniarv  aid.  and  especially  Chios,  Alkibiades  spoke  out 
with  less  reserve.  They  had  been  hitherto  compelled  to  contribule 
to  Athens  (he  s;iid).  anirnow  that  they  had  shaken  off  this  payment, 
thev  must  not  shritdv  from  imposing  upon  theniselves  equal  or  even 
greater  burdens  in  their  own  defense.  Nor  was  it  anything  less  (he 
added)  than  sheer  impud<'nce  in  the  Cliians,  the  lichest  people  in 
(^,.^.,.cc— if  they  retiuired  a  foreign  military  force  for  their  protecliou, 
to  re(piire  at  the  same  time  that  others  should  furnish  the  meiuis  of 
]>aving  it.  At  the  same  time,  however,  he  intimated— by  vray  of 
keeping  up  hopes  for  the  future— that  Tissaphernes  was  at  preseut 
carrying  on  the  war  at  his  own  cost;  but  if  hereafter  remiltanccs 


should  arrive  from  Susa,  the  full  rate  of  pay  would  be  resumed,  with 
the  addition  of  aid  to  the  Grecian  cities  in  any  other  way  which  could 
be  reasonably  asked.  To  this  promise  was  added  an  assurance  that 
the  Plienician  fleet  w^as  now  under  equipment,  and  would  shortly  bo 
brought  up  to  their  aid,  so  as  to  give  them  a  superiority  which  v.ould 
render  resistance  hopeless:  an  assurance  not  merely  deceitful  but 
mischievous,  since  it  was  employed  to  dissuade  them  from  all  immed- 
iate action,  and  to  paralyze  tiieir  navy  during  its  moments  of  fulle^^t 
vigor  and  elliciency.  Even  the  reduced  rate  of  pay  was  furnished  so 
irregularly,  and  the  Peloponncsian  force  kept  so  starved,  that  the 
duplicity  of  the  satrap  became  obvious  to  everyone,  and  was  only 
canied  through  bv  his  bribery  to  the  officers. 

While  Alkihiades,    as  the  confidential  agent  and   interpreter  of 
Ti^^sapllernes,  was  carrying  on  thisanti-Peloponnesian  policvthrouHi 
the  autumn  and  winter  of  412—411  B.C.— partly  during  the  stav  7)f 
the  IVloponnesian  fleet  at  Miletus,  partly  after  it  had  moved  to  Kni- 
dus  Mud  Rhodes— he  was  at  the  same  time  opening  corresijondence 
with  the  Athenian  officers  at  Samos.     llis  breach  with  the  Pelopon- 
nesiaus,  as  well  as  his  ostensible  position  in  the  service  of  Tissapiicr- 
nes,  were  facts  well  known  among  llie  Athenian  armament-   jind  hi.s 
scheme  was,  to  procure  both  restoration  and  renewed  power  in  iiis 
native  city,  by  representing  himself  as  competent  to  bring  over  to  her 
the  aid  and  alliance  of  Persia,  through  his  ascendency  over  the  mind 
of  the  satrap.     His  hostility  to  the  democracv,  however,  was  so  gen- 
erally known,  that  he  despaired  of  accomplishing  his  return  unless 
he  could  connect  it  with  an  oligarchical  revolution"^;  whicli*  moreover 
was  not  less  gratifying  to  liis  sentiment  of  venireance  for  the  past' 
than  to  his  ambition  for  the  future.  Accordingly  he  sent  over  a  private 
message  to  theomcersand  trierarchs  at  Samos,  several  of  them  doubt- 
less his  personal  friends,  desiring  to  be  remembered  to  the  "  best  men'* 
m  the  armament— such  was  one  of  the  standing  phrases  bv  which  oli- 
garchical inen  knew  and  describcil  each  other— and  intlmatimx  his 
niixious  wish  to  come  again  as  a  citizen  among  theni,  brin-nno-  with 
him  Tissaplu-rnes  as  their  ally.     But  he  would  come  only Im "condi- 
tion ot  the  1  )rmation  of  an  oligarchical  government;  nor  would  he 
ever  again  set  foot  amid  the  odious  democracy  to  whom  he  owed 
his  banishment. 

Such  was  the  first  originating  germ  of  that  temporary  calamity 
vrhicli  so  near  brought  Athens  to  absolute  ruhi,  called  the  Oli^'-archy 
ot  lour  iPiiidred:  a  sugixestion  from  the  same  exile  who  had 
already  so  deeply  wounded  his  countiy  bv  sending  Gvlippus  to  Svra- 
cusx^  and  the  Lacedaemonian  garrison  to  Dekeleia.  As  vet,  no  man 
"1  Nunos  had  thought  of  a  revolution;  but  the  moment  that  the  idea 
^as  thus  started,  the  trierarchs  and  wealthy  men  in  the  armament 
caught  at  it  with  avidity.  To  subvert  the  (lemocracy  for  their  own 
protit,  and  to  be  rewarded  for  doing  so  with  the  treasures  of  Persia  as 
^^meaus  of  carrying  on  the  war  against  the  Peloponnesians— was  an 


192 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


extent  of  good  fortune  greater  than  they  could  possi])ly  have  liopcd. 
Amid  the"  exhaustion  of  tiie  public  treasure  at  Athens,  and  the  loss 
of  tribute  from  her  dependencies,  it  was  now  the  private  proprietors, 
and  most  of  all  the  weaUliy  proprietors — upon  whom  tlie  cost  of 
military  operations  fell;  from  which  burden  they  here  saw  the  pros- 
pect of  relief,  coui)led  with  increased  chance  of  victory.  Elate  wjih 
so  tempting  a  pro-nise,  a  deputation  of  them  crossed  over  from  Sanies 
to  tlie  mainhmd  to  converse  personally  with  Alkibiades,  wlio  jiiiiiiii 
renewed  his  assurances  in  person,  tliat  he  would  bring  not  only  Tis- 
saphernes,  but  the  Great  King  himself,  into  active  alliance  and  eo  op 
eralion  with  Atliens  provided  they  would  put  down  the  Atluniaii 
democracy,  which  he  allirmed  that  the  king  could  not  possibly  trust. 
He  doubtless  did  not  onut  to  set  forth  the  other  side  of  the  altrrna- 
tive;  that  if  tlie  proposition  were  refused,  Persian  aid  would  be 
thrown  heartily  into  the  scale  of  the  Peloponnesians;  in  which  case, 
there  was  no  longer  any  hope  of  safety  for  Athens. 

On  the  return'of  the  deputation  with  these  fresh  assurances,  the 
oliirarchical  men  in  Samos  came  t/)gether,  both  in  greater  minibir 
and  with  redoubled  ardor,  to  take  their  measures  for  subverting  the 
democracy.  They  even  ventured  to  speak  of  the  project  openly 
among  tlie  mass  of  the  armament,  who  listtned  to  it  with  nothing 
but  aversion;  but  who  were  silenced  at  least,  though  not  satisfied,  by 
being  told  that  the  Persian  treasury  would  be  thrown  open  to  them 
on  condition,  and  only  on  condition,  that  they  would  relinquish  iheir 
democracy.  Such  was  at  this  time  the  indispensable  need  of  foreign 
money  for  the  purposes  of  the  war — such  was  the  certainty  of  ruin,  if 
the  Persian  treasure  went  to  the  aid  of  the  enemy — that  the  most  denio- 
cratical  Athenian  might  well  hesitate  when  the  alternative  was  thus 
laid  before  him.  The  oligarchical  conspirators,  however,  knew  well 
that  they  had  the  feeling  of  the  armament  together  against  them— that 
the  best  which  they  could  expect  from  il  wasa  reluctant  acquiescence 
— and  that  Ihey  must  accomplish  the  revolution  by  their  own  hands 
and  management.  They  formed  themselves  into  a  political  confed- 
eracy (or  Jbleticria)  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  the  liest  measures 
toward  their  end.  It  was  resolved  to  send  a  deputation  to  Athens, 
with  Peisander  at  the  head,  to  make  known  the  new  prospect  and  to 
put  the  standing  oligarchical  clubs  (Ileta-ries)  into  active  co-operation 
for  the  purpose  of  violently  breaking  up  the  democracy;  and  further, 
to  establish  oligarchical  governments  in  all  the  remaining  dependen-, 
cies  of  Athens^  Thev  imagined  that  these  dependencies  would  be 
thus  induced  to  remain  faithful  to  her.  perhaps  even  that  some  of 
those  which  had  already  revolted  might  (ome  back  to  their  allegiance 
— when  once  she  should  be  relieved  from  her  democracy  and  placed 
under  the  rule  of  her  "  best  and  most  virtuous  citizens." 

Hitherto,  the  barL^ain  tendered  for  acceptance  had  been — subver- 
sion of  the  Athenian  democracy  and  restoration  of  Alkibiades,  on 
ouc  hand— against  hearty  co-operation,  and  a  free  supply  of  gold, 


OPPOSITION  OF  PHRYNICHUS.  193 

from  Persia  on  tJic  other.  But  what  security  was  there  th-if  ^„p1. 
biirgain  would  be  realized-or  that  when  the '^rstmrshn^^^^^^^^^^ 
been  brought  to  pass,  the  second  would  t  low'  There  ?.l  ^f  "^"^ 
lately  no  security  except  the  word  of  Alkib  ade's-  verv  lim.  f^T' 
trusted,  even  when  promising:  wiiat  wis  in  i\11  ,.;„  ^  "^^  ^^  ^^^^ 
form,  as  we  may  recJilect  froif.  hirm^m  rable  deZg  ffi^he^^  ""'''' 
daMuonian  envoys  at  Athens— anrl  nn  ti.o  i.^!.  '^i^JJing  wun  the  Lace- 

fo,-  something  in^tself  extrrvafe^nt  an  "'^^^^^  ^"'"^""'S 

souablc  motive  could  be  imagined  to  make ?he1^.;  T'- "''  T'""  '''''- 
forci-n  policy  accoi-dimr  to  the  intcresN  nf  All^  ^"'°  '''"P'^  '''** 

l,iin  wilh  s/cli  lively  fn  crest  i.f  t h?  subsa/u  ion  orr"" '"  !"'Pj''« 
democracy  at  Athens?  This  was  a  Quc^Hnn  w?i?i  ,,  "''»F<=''y  f<"- 
conspirators  at  Samos  not  onh  neve?  trmllJf  "'^  oligarchical 
but  which  they  had  everyCive  to  suoor^,^  ""^selves  to  raise, 
Alkibiades  coincided  fully  with  their  t^ominn^f^tof  suggestion  of 
TlK.ir  object  was  to  put^own  the  democr^c!  nnT'^''"'^  ambition. 
ll,e^ove.n,ment  for  tUen,selvc°  "a  pu ^0^  tM  "^ 

iseof  Persian  gold,  if  they  could  fcttacirXd  wfni'r'''"''.'?- 
as  a  stepping-stone,  whether  it  af terward  t,"ued  ou t  o  be  ^dr" '''' 
or  not.  The  probability  is,  that  having  a  stro"  g  in  ter^st  fnlv.l  f '"" 
It  (liemselves.  and  a  slill  stron-^er  interest  in  m-aMnl.  IVi  .""^  '^^'"8 
they  talked  each  other  into  a  sincere  ne^suasiof  1?,  '*''■?  ""^''""^ ''' 
10  this  fact,  we  shouhl  be  at  a  Sto  mXstind^.I  "l',' ''"''''"I'^S 
such  a  man  as  Alkibiades  on  such  a  n  after  l^^^  ,?"  ""?  '^"""^  "^ 

accepted  as  to  set  in  motion  a  whole  taino'  novd  nnd'"  ""P"'"'^ 
eveuts.  """iLiiamoi  novel  and  momentous 

There  was  one  man,  and  one  man  alone  so  fir  o«  „•„  i 
ventured  openly  to  call  it  in  question      This  wns  Ph,     •  l"""^'-  ^^'> 
the  generals  of  the  Heet   who  had   roeen.i,!  ^   Pl'O  nichus,  one  of 
.ifler  the  victory  of  Mile  us    a  c  e^r  ZXL'^T''  '''""^'''''  '^""■'sel 
personally  hostile  to  Alkibi.ades   and  fi,^^  f^  sag.acious  man,  but 

cl.arac,er'»nd  projects.     Thol  |i,  PI  rynTch"fs  tafo'?! '"  '^'T"^'  ^H 
the  chief  orirauizers  of  thn  nH^o-.i  •  *^i  ^^  ^'^^  afterward  one  of 

detached  f i?>r^  and  ho  ?iL  r^lHbi  J""''"'"'"^'  ''^^''''  '''  ^^^^^e 
circumstances  he  di^^Zc^^'^^l^-C  ""tik'/'".  '"'"^r' 
ait)  had  no  attachment  to  olicrnrehica  "ov  rn>  ^^^^^^J^^^  (he 
todemocratical;  nor  could  he  Kbornn  f""?"^''^  '■^^^^^^''  ^'^^'^ 
sliould  have  been  set  up      hTs  on Iv  n    -n^l  "^^  '^^'"'^'"-  ^'y  '^  ^^^^'  ^^ 

-yao         Moreo^e;  '^^'a!^^:^:::.^^'!^^.:!^^- 


194 


TWENTY  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE   WAR. 


PEISANDER  AT  ATHENS. 


195 


wa8  now  proposed  to  confer,  simultaneously  with  Athens  herself,  tbe 
ble^^in"-  of  oli'-arehical  government— would  receive  that  boon  with 
irdifference     Tljose  wlio  had   already   revolted,  would  not  come 
buck  •  tho^e  whoyet  remained  faithful,  would  not  be  the  more  inclined 
to  remain  so  longer.     Tlieir  object  would  be  to  obtain  autonomy, 
either  under  oliiiarchv  or  democracy,  us  tlie  cnse  might  be.     A.vsuv- 
edlv  they  would  not  expect  better  treatment  from  an  oligar(hio;il  irov- 
ernment  at  Athens,  than  from  a  democratical ;  for  they  knew  Uiat 
tho.*^  self-<!tylKl  *'  iiopd  and  virtuous"  men,  who  would  form  the  oli- 
garchy were,  as  nnnisters  of  democracy,  the  chief  advisers  and  msli- 
o^-itor^  of  the  people  to  iniquitous  deeds;  most  commonly  for  nothing 
but  their  own  individual  profit.     From  an  AtheDian  oligarchy,  the 
citizen-*  of  these  dependencies  had  nothing  to  expect  but  violent  exe- 
cutions without  any  judicial  trial:  but  under  the  democracy,  they 
could  obtain  shelter  and  the  means  of  appeal,  while  their  per.«ccnt()rs 
wore  liable  to  restraint  and  chastisement,  from   the  people  and  the 
pot>ular  Dikasteries.   8uch  (Phrynichus  affirmed  on  his  own  personal 
kuowled'^e)  wa§  the   genuine   feeling  among  the  de}.endeiu:ies  of 
Athens  "^Havin"-  thus  .«hown  the  calculations  of  the  conspirators- 
as  to  Alkibiades?  as  to  Persia,  and  as  to  the  allied  depeiidencies-lo 
be  all  illusorv,  Phrynichus  concluded  by  entering  his  Uecidtd  protest 
against  adoptin;;  the  propositions  of  Alkibiades.  i.x  v      ,    i 

But  in  this  protest  (borne  out  afterward  by  the  result)  he  stood 
nearly  alone.  The  tide  of  opinion,  among  the  oligaK  hical  coii.^pira- 
tors  ran  so  furiously  the  other  way,  that  it  was  resolved  to  dispatch 
Pei.^'andcr  and  otliefs  immediately  to  Athens  ^^^^^^^^'^^  f^ 
garchical  revolution  as  well  as  the  recall  of  Alkibiades;  ai  d  at  the 
same  time  to  propose  to  the  people  their  new -intended  ahy  Tk^sa- 

^^PlTrvnichus  knew  well  what  would  be  the  consequence  to  himself 
-if  this  consummation  were  brought  about,  as  he  fo^t-'^^'^^/ !' 
nrobably  would  be— from  the  vengeance  o7  his  enemy  Alk  bi,  des 
Hins    lirrccent  opposition.     Satistled  that  the  latter  would  (estroy 
iim   he  took  measures  for  destroying  Alkibiades  beforehand,  ma 
by  a  treasonable  communication  to  the  I-^ceda-monian  adnura  A  y 
odius  at  Miletus;  to  whom  he  sent  a  secret  account  of  the  intr  g^^^^^^ 
which  the  Athenian  exile  was  carrying  on  at  Samos  to  the  prcj m 
of  the  PeloT^onnesians,  prefaced  with  an  awkward  apology  foi    i  ^^ 
sacr  fice  of    he  interests  of  his  country  to  the  necessity  of  protect    ; 
idniself  against  a  personal  enemy.     But  Phrynichus  wa.  ""P;;^ff !  > 
informed  of  the  real  character  of  the  Spartan  commander,  oi  of  l^ 
relations  with  Tissaphernes  and  Alkibiades.     Not  merely  an. 
latter  now  at  Magnesia,  under  the  protection  of  the  satrap  am  o 
of  the  power  of  the  Laced(rmonians-l)ut  Astyochus  a  tniitnr  to  m^ 
dutvthrou-h  the  gold  of  Tissaphernes.  went  ^'P>hither  to  shm  t 
letter  of  Phrvnichus  to  the  very  person  whom  it  was  mten*  cu 
expose.     Alkibiades  forthwith  sent  intelligence  to  the  gcuenils  aiiu 


officers  at  Samos  of  the  step  taken  by  Phrynichus,  and  pressed  them 
to  put  him  to  death. 

The  life  of  Phrynicus  now  hung  by  a  thread,  and  was  probably 
preserved  only  by  that  respect  for  judicial  formalities  so  deeply  rooted 
ia  the  Athenian  character.     In  the  extremity  of  danger,  he  resorted 
to  a  still  more  subtle  artifice  to  save  himself.    He  dispatched  a  second 
letter  to  Astyochus,  complaining  of  the  violation  of  confidence  in 
regard  to  the  former,  but  at  the  same  time  intimating  that  he  was 
now  willing  to  betray  to  the  Lacedaemouians  the  camp  and  armament 
at  Samos.     He  invited  Astyochus  to  come  and  attack  the  place 
which  was  as  yet  unfortified— explaining  minutely  in  what  manner 
the  attack  could  be  best  conducted;  and  lie  concluded  by  savin5^that 
this,  as  well  as  every  other  means  of  defense,  must  be  pardoned  to 
one  whose  life  was  in  danger  from  a  personal  enemy.     Foreseeino- 
that  Astyochus  would  betray  this  letter  as  he  had  betrayed  the  for"^ 
mer,  Phrynichus  waited  a  proper  time,  and  then  revealed  to  the  camp 
the  intention  of  the  enemy  to  make  an  attack,  as  if  it  had  reached 
hini  by  private  information.     He  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  imme- 
diate precautions,  and  himself  as  general  superintended  the  work  of 
fortification,  which  was  soon  completed.     Presently  arrived  a  letter 
from  Alkibiades,  communicating  to  the  army  that  Phrynicus  had 
bc^trayed  them,  and  that  the   Peloponnesiaus  were  on  the  point  of 
making  an   attack.     But  this  letter,  arriving  after  the  precautions 
taken  by  order  of  Phrynicbus  himself  had  been  already  completed 
was  con.strued  into  a  mere  trick  on  the  part  of  Alkibiades  himself 
through  his  acquaintance  with  the  intentions  of  the  Peloponnesiaus' 
to  raise  a  charge  of  treasonable  correspondence  against  his  personal 
enemy.  ^  The  impression  thus  made  by  his  second  letter  effaced  the 
taint  which  had  been  left  upon  Phrynichus  by  the  first,  insomuch 
that  the  latter  stood  exculpated  on  both  charges. 

But  Phrynichus,  though  thus  Buccessful'^in*  extricating  himself 
n. -1  •  i^^^"-^'^^^^'  1^  1"^  maneuver  against  the  influence  and  life  of 
AUil)iades;  in  whose  favor  the  oligarchical  movement  not  only  went 
on.  but  was  transferred  from  Samos  to  Athens.  On  ariivin<r  at  the 
latter  place,  Pei.sander  and  his  companions  laid  before  tli?  public 
assembly  the  projects  which  had  been  conceived  by  the  oli"-archs  at 
feamos.  The  people  were  invited  to  restore  Alkibiades  and  renounce 
their  democratical  constitution;  in  return  for  which  they  were  assured 
of  oblaming  the  Persian  king  as  an  ally,  and  of  overcomino-  the  Pelo- 
pomiesians.  Violent  was  the  storm  which  these  propositions  raised 
m  the  public  assembly.  Miuiy  speakers  rose  in  animated  defense 
f  n  !  H"^;^cracy;  few,  if  any,  distinctly  against  it.  The  opponents 
<>i  Alkibiades  indignantly  denounced  the  mischief  of  restoring  him 
la  violation  of  the  laws,  and  in  reversal  of  a  judicial  sentence;  while 
tiie  hiimolpidic  and  Keryke.s,  the  sacred  families  connected  with  the 
J'^ieusiniun  mysteries  which  Alkibiades  had  profaned,  entered  their 


solemn  protest  on  religious  grounds  to  the  same  effect. 


Against  all 


19G 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


these  vehement  opponents,  whose  impassioned  invectives  obtained 
the  full  sympathy  of  (he  assembly,  Peisander  had   but  one  simple 
reply,     lie  called  them  forward  successively  by  name,  and  put  to 
each  the  question:   "  What  hope  have  you  of  salvaticm  for  the  city, 
when  the  Peloponnesians  have  a  naval  force  against  us  fully  equal  to 
ours,  together  with  a  greater  nund)er  of  allied  cities — and  when  the 
^kingas'wellas  Tissapliernes  are  supplying  them  with  money,  while 
T we  have, no  money  left?     What  hope  have  you  of  salvation,  unless 
\  we  can  persuade  the  king  to  come  over  to  our  side  V"    The  answer 
.  was  a  melancholy  negative— or  perhaps  not  less  melancholy  silence. 
"Well  then  (rejoinded  Peisander),  that  object   cannot  possibly  be 
attained  unless  we  conduct  our  political  affairs  for  the  future  in  a 
more  moderate  way,  and  put  the  powers  of  government  more  into  the 
hands  of  a  few,  and  unless  we  recall  Alkibiades,  the  only  man  now 
living  who  is  competent   to  do  the  business.     Under  present  cir- 
cumstances, we  surely  shall  not  lay  gi*eater  stress  upon  our  political 
constitution  than  upon  the  salvation  of  the  city;  the  rather  as  what 
we  now  enact  may  be  hereafter  mo^litied,    if  it  be  found   not  to 
answer." 

Airainst  the  proposed  oligarchical  change  the  repugnance  of  the 
assembly  was  alike  angry  and  unanimous.  But  they  were  silenced  by 
the  imperious  necessity  of  the  case,  as  the  araiament  at  S<\mos  had 
been  before;  and  admitting  the  alternative  laid  down  by  Peisander 
(as  I  have  observed  already),  the  most  democratical  citizen  might  be 
embarrassed  as  to  his  vote.  Whether  any  speaker,  like  Phrynichus 
at  Samos,  arraigned  the  fallacy  of  the  alternative,  and  called  upon 
Peisander  for  some  guarantee,  better  than  mere  asservation,  of  the 
benetits  to  come,  we  are  not  informed.  But  the  general  vote  of  the 
assembly,  reluctant  and  only  passed  .in  the  hope  of  future  change, 
sanctioned  his  recommendation.  He  and  ten  other  envoys,  mvested 
with  full  powers  of  negotiating  with  Alkibiades  and  Tissapheriics, 
were  dispatched  to  Ionia  immediately.  Peisander  at  the  same  time 
obtained  from  the  assembly  a  vote  deposing  Phrynichus  from  his  com- 
mand; under  the  accusation  of  having  traitorously  caused  the  loss  of 
lasus  and  the  capture  of  Amorges,  after  the  battle  of  Miletus— but  from 
the  real  certainty  that  he  would  prove  an  insuperable  bar  to  all 
negotiations  with  Alkibiades.  Phrynichus,  with  his  colleague  Ski- 
roiiides,  being  thus  displaced,  Leon  and  Diomedon  were  sent  to 
Saraos  as  commanders  in  their  stead;  an  appointment,  of  which,  as 
will  be  presently  seen,  Peisander  was  far  from  anticipating  the  cou- 

sequences. 

Before  his  departure  for  Asia,  he  took  a  step  yet  more  miportant. 
He  was  well  aware  that  the  recent  vote— a  result  of  fear  inspired  by 
the  war,  representing  a  sentiment  utterly  at  variance  with  that  of  the 
assembly,  and  only  procured  as  the  price  of  Persian  aid  against  a 
foreign  enemv— would  never  pass  into  a  reality  by  the  spontaneous 
act  of  the  people  themselves.  It  was  indeed  indispensable  as  a  first  step ; 


PEISANDER  LEAVES  ATHENS  FOR  SAMOS.      I97 

partly  as  an  authority  to  himself,  partly  also  as  a  confession  of  the 
temporary  weakness  of  the  democracy,  and  as  a  sanction  and  encour- 
agement for  the  oligarchical  forces  to  show  themselves      But  the 
second  step  yet  remained  to  be  performed ;  that  of  calling  tjie^e  forces 
into  energetic  actio.i--organizing  an  amount  of  violenctfsuflicient  to 
extort  from  the  people  actual  submission  in  addition  to  verbal  acuuies- 
ceuce— and  thus  as  it  were  tying  down  the  patient  while  the  process  of 
emascu  ation  was  being  consummated.  Peisander  visited  all  the  various 
political  clubs   conspiracies,  or  Hetferies,  which  were  habitual  and 
uot.H-ious  at  Athens;  associations,  bound  together  bv  oath  amonc-the 
wealthy  citizens,    partly  for  purposes  of  amusement,  but  chleflv 
pled-ing  the  members  to  stand  by  each  other  in  objects  of  political 
ambition,  in  judicial  trials,  in  accusation  or  defense  of  official  men 
after  the  period  of  office  had  expired,  in  carrying  points  through  the 
public  assembly,  etc.     Among  these  clubs  were  distributed  most  of 
the  best  citizens,  the  good  and  honorable  men,  the  elegant  men  the 
men  of  note,  the  temperate,  the  honest  and  moderate  men  »  etc    to 
employ  that  complimentary  phraseology  by  which  wealthy  and  anti- 
popular  politicians  have  chosen  to  designate  each  other,  in  ancient  as 
Avel  as  in  modern  times.     And  though  there  were  doubtless  indivi- 
duals among  them  who  deserved  these  appellations  in  their  best  sense 
yet  the  general  character  of  the  clubs  was  not  the  less  exclusive  and 
ohgarchical.     In  the  details  of  political  life,  thev  had  ditferent  par 
tin  in  ''1"^'"  ^^^^.^l^fferent  antipathies,  and  were6ftener  in  opposilion 
han  11  co-operation  with  each  other.    But  they  furnished    when 
taken  together,  a  formidable  anti-popular  force;  generally  either  in 
abeyance,  or  disseminated  in  the  accomplishment  of  smaller  political 
measure  and  separate  personal  successes-but  capable,  at  a  speci^U 
ciisis,  of  being  evoked,  organized,  and  put  in  conjoint  attack,  for  the 

S'^r'h  V-''  ^r^'^'^y-     '^"^'^^  ^^'^^^^  '^^'  im'portant  mivemen? 
lated  by  Peisander.  ^  He  visited  separately  each  of  these  clubs 
put  them  into  communication  with  each  other,  and  exhorted  them 
a  1  to  joint  aggressive  action  against  their  common  enemv  the  democ- 
S/ov^'erUrwm  ''^'''  ''  ""'""  '^''"^^'  intimidated  aiid  might  be 
Peis'lnilor  wf  ^'tf''^"*  necessary  measures  toward  the  same  puipose, 
tio     vhh  T?     A^^'"^"'  '^''^JJ  ^'''  colleagues  to  enter  upon  his  neilotial 
ment  nf  If' 'P  r"^'; .   ^"^  ^^^  ro-o])eration  and  aggressive  move- 
hcre..P  1  01  '  "  ''  .''^'*'f^  ^''  ^'''^  originated  was  Smsecute^i  with 
TASl  o  T  t'''^^  ^'?  •'^'^^"^^^-  ""'"'^  ^^'^'^  ^^^^1  ^"to  hands  more 
n  mn  ^f  i    J^  effective  than  his  own.     The  rhetorical  teacher  Anti- 
Slpn  ^^^^l"^e  Rhamnus,  took  it  in  hand  especiallv,  acquired  the 
tunnience  of  the  clubs,  and  drew  the  plan  of  campaiirn  against  the 
no.w^^^^"     ^^^  ^^^  ^  "^^"  estimable  in  private  life  and  not  open  to 
rnn.!^^^^^'  corruption:   in  other  respects,  of  pre-eminent  ability  in 
tomi  vance   judgment,  speech,  and  action.     The  profession  to  wiiieh 
ueionged,  generally  unpopular  among  the  democracy,  excluded 


II 


11 


198  TWENTY  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

• 

him  from  takin-  rank  as  a  speaker  cither  in  the  public  assemhly  or 
^hedikasterv:  for  a  rhetorical  teacher,  contemhno:  in  either  of  them 
a-iin<ta  private  speaker  (to  repeat  a  remark  ah'eadyonee  made),  ^vas 
considered  to  stand  at  the  same  unfair  advantage  as  a  fencmg-master 
fi.rhtin-  a  duel  with  a  gentleman  would  be  held  to  stand  in  modem 
times  "Himself  thus  debarred  from  the  showy  celebrity  ot  Athcman 
political  life,  Antiphon  became  only  the  more  consummate,  as  amns- 
ter  of  advice,  calculation,  scheming,  and  rhetorica  composition,  to 
a.si^t  thccelebrity  of  others;  insonuicli  that  his  silent  assistance  in  ^ 
political  and  judicial  dcbaU^s.  as  a  sort  of  chamber-counsel  was 
hh^hlv  appreciated  and  largely  paid.  Now  such  ^^•el•c  precisely'  he 
tafents  requiied  for  the  present  occasion;  while  An  iphon,  who  hated 
the  democracy  for  having  hitlierto  kept  bun  in  the  shade,  gladly 
bent  his  full  talents  toward  its  subversion.         ,     .     ,         ,.        ..„ 

Thu^  efllcient  was  the  man  to  whom  Peisander  in  depart.nir  chufly 
conlided  the  task  of  organizing  the  ami-popular  chibs.  for  the  con- 
summation of  the  revolution  already  in  immediate  pr()spect.     iiis 
chief  auxiliarv  was  Theramenes,  an(»ther  Athenian,  now  first  named, 
of  eminent  abiliiv  and  cunning.     His  father  (either  natural  or  hy 
adopti(m),  Ag.ion   was  one  of  the  Probuli,  and  had  formerly    .ecu 
founder  of  Aniphipolis.     Even  Phrynichus-whose  '^'»f  ^"J  >' ^^^;^^^':;;,^ 
already  had  occasi(m  to  appreciate,   and  who  from  hatied  to^^.ut 
Alkibiades  had  pronounced  himself  decidedly  against  the  oligarchica 
movement  at  Samos-became  zealous  in  ^^'^^^^'^'^^^^^^^^^^ 
Athens   after  his  dismissal  from  the  command.     He  brought  to  the 
side  of  Antiphon  and  Theramenes  a  contriving  head  not  inferior  to 
theirs,  coupled  with   daring   and   audacity   even   superior,      tnde 
such  skillful  leaders  the  anti-popular  force  of  Athens  was  orga m/e 
with  a  deep  skill,  and  directed  with  a  dexterous  wickedness,  uevci 
before  witnessed  in  Greece.  ,     . 

At  the  time  when  Peisander  and  the  other  envoys  reached  Ion  a 
(seemin'-ly  about  the  end  of  January  or  beginning  ot  lehruary,  41 1 
r  cTtlie'Peloponnesian  fleet  had  already  quilted  3Iiletus  and  gone 
io  Knidus  and  Rhodes,  on  wliich  latter  island  Leon  and  I>iome(km 
made  some  hasty  descents,  fnmi  the  neighboring  ^«^^"^^J^  ';^\'  ^^  ; 
At  the  same  time  the  Athenian  armament  at  C  hios  was  making  p  o  - 
ress  in  the  sie-e  of  that  place  and  the  construction  ot  the  neighh.a- 
ing  fort  at  Delphinium.  Pedaritus,  the  Laced;emonian  &^;'^;;"|i;  ,^^ 
the  island,  had  sent  pressing  messages  to  solicit  aid  from  the  lo^ 
ponnesslans  at  Rhodes,  but  no  aid  arrived;  and  \^\^'^^'>'^^^'^';rw  f, 
to  atteniDt  a  n-cneral  sallv  and  attack  upon  the  Athenians,  with  liis 
IVoSce  foreign  as  well  as  Chian.,  Though  at  lirst  he  obta.ncd 
some  success,  the  battle  ended  in  Ins  complete  defeat  ^fj^^^;^ 
with  great  slaughter  of  the  Chian  troops,  and  with  the  loss  of  nuny 
^vhos?  shields  were  captured  in  the  pursuit.  Ihe  Chians,  ow 
reduced  to  .greater  straits  than  before,  and  begmning  to  s  It e 
severely  from  famine,  were  only  enabled  to  hold  out  b\   a  paitial 


I 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  ALKIBIADES.  199 

rc-enforcement  soon  afterward   obtained    frnm   fi,o  -d  i 
guard-ships  at  .Miletus.    A  Smvt-mivZo^  t  ^  f  ^'loponnesian 

in  the  vessel  of  Antist Iienes  as  one  n ^  f.    ^''^/\^^'^«  ^^^^1  ^'ome  out 
ducted  this  re-enfoi^icfs'',.XrnfiV      ^I'^'^^^t^^«»'  '"'^Hnes,  con- 

Svracusan)  succeeding^  Sr  u    t   n       '"'"'  ^l^^''^^  ^^^^'"'-i'''"  ^^^^^ 
island.  ^   l^tdauus  in   the  general   cominaud  of  the 

It  was  while  Chios  seemed  thus  likely  to  be  recovered  bv  \fi, 
and  while  the  superior  Pelononiipci.,n  u«  f       ^^<^"veiea  Dy  Athens— 
by  Persian  intrigues  and  bXs-Uit  pfl  ,""?  ^'^''^'y''^^  ^^t  Rhodes 
open  his  negotf^ltions  ^^U^Allilli^;^? :;;^^^  ^^^    h""  ^^ 
enabled  to  announce  that  the  subversion  nf  til  ,1^  *     ^^'  ^''^^ 

was  already  begun  and  would  soon    ^^  democTacy  at  Athens 

required  thi  prfce  which  lad  ^  ^"^  ^^«  "ovv 

alliance  and  aid  to  Atheu     in^dnst  ?  r^^^^^     ^"  exchange-Persian 

^ades  knew  well  tli^a  t^Lif  p^.i^^^TS'^  ,^1^^  ^"^^■ 
chance  of  being  able  to  Derform  T  ^  1  .t,.  1  1  '^^^  "^^  ^^^^  ^e<i«t 
his  advice-or  had  rather  flL  J  1?;^  li^d  appeared  tofolloxv 

Alkibiades  as  an   ns    i  itnt  a^^^^^^^^  employing 

out  both  parties,  and  to  kecV  them  ne?r^^^^^  "^  endeavor  to  wea? 
should  ruin  the  other      RmL  xvf.  ^  ^r  '^^  equality  until  each 

self  with  the  caiS^^  At^en  'r^o  bS  !  "f^^^  ''  'V'"^^^  ^'•^^- 
ponnesians-es})e(.ia]Iv  at  a  '""o.m.M    IT    'jl'^'^'^'^^y  ^ith  the  P(.lo- 

vers.  ^    ^^P^  ^y  ^^^  ^^  ^^^s  chararteristic  maueu- 

Keceiving  the  envovs  himself  in  coniunction  wUi,   t^- 
and  speak  n-' on  behalf  nf  fi.o  inff  ^""J""eiion  with  Tissaphernes, 
extent  which  he  kne\v  tlrtt  the    \  h J.'n  '  ^'"'^'f  ,  ^'''  ^^^"^^"^s  to  au 

tlic'  coast  as  he  m    h  Xnk  f^rfh  ^     /""  i^^?  them  sailing  along 
territory      a  f!  ..  1,  ^"^ •     """^  "^'  through  all  these  new  nor  ioii.^  oF 

insult  which  exls^Jllie^r^^^  ,"'  "'"''-'•  *""  '•«*'^''''"'  *'  "«  "» 


! 

I 


il 


200  TAVENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  TIIE  WAR. 

concluded  about  forty  years  before  l^lwoc^nAth^^^^ 

bos,  Chios,  aud  bamos,  eic.  lu  i  .{-^,1  Peisinn  fleets  on  there 

n;"o!l'^i  ';;^ud'brn.e'"    aa  p-x-cC^.  and  .ncans  of  fu.r.ber  c.  n- 
ishina^,  It  ^^oul^l  uc  m^  v.  *,, .  ..pvivo  the  a"-e:ressive  ch.-positions 

Xerxes      Peitnde?  and- bis  comrades,  abruptly   breaking  oil    he 

Ss'  cted  thL^not  iSuse  be  c.w/no,,  l'"4,|;;--    «-''  tT,f 

instigated   and    {pro  cctm^^^^^^^  Tissapberuos,  into  Ibe  bos<n.ot 

lion   couple.1  js.t     tbc  .d   .    ec  o     1  ^   Jlenoun.ing.     Sucb  w.s  U.c 

l.oug  tbe  am.unent  »"  ■-i;^-;!;;'  i'^:Vt^^'l':i:ted  , be  ^prestige 

"o'fti'°.  ;bS:Senrcp"w^^^ 

satrap  t-'k  a  ^'ep  wel    cnlc;.b.^^^d  ^^  l^^  ">.„;;',!;,,;';j,'    .,  „o,.g„  per- 
SS-^K^ii^^^eU^gnod^a..^^^^^^ 

^:!^t^f^^.>l:lt■^i^%l'^l-«er,o^,..^.i■^^^^^^ 

„esian.,  wbo  bad  now  been  t-'  "l"''  l' V";^^  ^,1    u  1^  artn, lilv 

noHmd  be  furnisbed  tbem  vitli  pay  or  maintenanec  Je  do  of  ,  " 
?be  officers  had  bitbcrto  kept  tl.e  ">-^""^™  .^'I'^^^i.^i'^^rce  He  'as 
tinctly  see  bow  so  large  a  body  o    me    /",>-' ,  ^.^tsfe'ee  „«  '""^^ 

coast  o£  his  satrapy,  or  perhaps  be  dr  %en  '    ''^;^'"  °'Jg*'  \„dor 
municution  with  theja,  to  furnish  them  with  pa) .  and  to  conciuuL 


THIRD  TREATY  WITH  PERSIA. 


201 


them  a  third  convention— the  proposition  of  which  he  liad  refused  to 
entertain  at  Knidus.  He  therefore  went  to  Kaunus,  invited  the 
Peloponnesiau  leaders  to  Miletus,  and  concluded  with  them  near  that 
town  a  treaty  to  the  following  effect: 

"In  this  13tli  year  of  the  reign  of  Darius,  and  in  the  ephorship  of 
Alexippidas  at  Lacedaemon,  a  convention  is  hereby  concluded  by  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  with  Tissaphernes  and  Hieramenes 
and  the  sons  of  Pharnakes,  respecting  the  affairs  of  the  king  and  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,     The  territory  of  the  kin"-,  as 
much  of  it  as  is  in  x\sia,  shall  belong  to  the  king.     Let  the  king  deter- 
mine as  he  chooses  respecting  his  own  territory.     The  Lacedemo- 
nians and  their  allies  shall  not  approach  the  king's  territory  with  any 
mischievous  purpose— nor  shall  the  king  approach  that  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians and  their  allies  with  any  like  purpose.     If  any  one  amono- 
the  Lacedaemonians  or  their  allies  shall  approach  the  king's  territory 
with  mischievous  purpose,  the  Lacedtemonians  and  their  allies  shall 
hinder  him:  if  any  one  from  the  king's  territory  shall  approach  the 
Lacedicmonians  or  their  allies  with  mischievous  purpose,  the  king 
shall  hinder  him.     Tissaphernes  shall  provide  pay  and  maintenancc% 
for  the  fleet  now  present,  at  the  rate  nlready  stipulated,  until  the 
king's  fleet  shall  arrive;  after  that  it  shall  be  at  the  option  of  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  maintain  their  own  fleet  if  they  think  fit— or  if 
they  prefer,  Tissaphernes  shall  furnish  maintenance,  and  at  the  close 
of  the  war  the  Lacedaemonians  shall  repav  to  him  what  they  have 
received.     After  the  king's  fleet  shall  have  arrived,  the  two  fleets 
shall  carry  on  war  conjointly,  in  such  manner  as  shall  seem  good  to 
Tissaphernes  and  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies.     If  they  choose 
to  close  the  war  with  the  Athenians,  they  shall  close  it  only  by  joint 
consent,"  ^     ^  j 

In  comparing  this  third  convention  with  the  two  preceding,  we 
find  that  nothing  is  now  stipulated  as  to  anv  territory  except  the  con- 
tinent of  Asia;  which  is  insured  unreservedly  to  the  king,  of  course 
with  all  the  Greek  residents  planted  upon  it.  But  by  a  diplomatic 
finesse,  the  terms  of  the  treaty  implv  that  this  is  not  «?ahe  territory 
winch  the  king  is  entitled  to  claim—thouoh  nothing  is  covenanted  as 
to  any  remainder.  Next,  this  third  treaty  includes  Pharnabazus 
(the  son  of  Pharnakes)  with  his  satrapv  of  Daskylium;  and  Hiera- 
menes, with  his  district,  the  extent  and  position  of  which  we  do  not 
Know;  while  in  the  former  treaties  no  other  satrap  except  Tissapher- 
nes had  been  concerned.  We  must  recollect  that  the  Peloponnesiau 
fleet  included  those  twenty-seven  triremes,  which  had  been  brought 
across  by  Kalligeitiis  expressly  for  the  aid  of  Pharnabazus;  and  there- 
fore that  the  latter  now  naturally  became  a  party  to  the  general  opeia- 
tions.  Thirdly,  we  here  find,^for  the  first  time,  formal  announce- 
ment of  a  Persian  fleet  about  to  be  brought  up  as  auxiliary  to  the 
Peloponnesians.  This  was  a  promise  which  the  satrap  now  set  forth 
more  plainly  than  before,  to  amuse  them,  and  to  abate  the  mistrust 


202 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


ASSASSINATION  OF  IIYPERBOLUS  AND  OTHERS.    2()3 


which  tlicy  had  hcgun  to  conceive  ©f  liis  sincerity.  It  served  the 
temporary  purpose  of  restrainin.s:  them  from  any  immediate  act  of 
despair  hostile  to  liis  interests,  which  was  all  that  he  looked  for 
^\  hile  he  renewed  his  ]iayinents,  therefore,  for  the  moment  lie 
atlected  to  busy  hiniselt'  in  orders  and  preparations  for  the  fleet  from 
Phenicia. 

The  Peloponnesian  fleet  w;is  now  ordered  to  move  from  Rhodes. 
Before  it  quitted  that  island,  however,  envovs  cjime  thither  fioni 
Eretria  and  from  Oropus;  which  latter  place"^  (a  dependencv  on  the 
north-eastern  frontier  of  Attica),  thouirh  protected  bv  an  Alheniaii 
pirrison,  had  recently  been  surprised  and  cai)tured  bv 'the  Ra-otians. 
The  loss  of  Oropus  much  increased  the  facilities  for  the  revolt  of 
Eubtt'a;  and  these  envoys  came  to  entreat  aid  from  the  Peloponne- 
sian fleet,  to  second  the  island  in  that  design.  The  Peloponnesian 
commanders,  however,  felt  themselves  luider  prior  obliiration  to 
relieve  the  sufferers  at  Cnios,  toward  which  island  tluy 'first  bent 
their  course.  Rut  they  had  scarcely  j^assed  the  Triopian  cape,  when 
they  saw  the  Athenian  squadron  from  Cbalkedonffinn;  their  motions 
Though  there  was  no  wish  on  either  side  for  a' Iron  oral  l.attle,  yet 
they  saw  evidently  that  the  Athenians  would  not  jx-rmit  them  to 
pass  by  Samos,  and  get  to  the  relief  of  Chios,  without  a  battle.  Re- 
nouncing therefore  the  project  of  relievinir  (Miios.  they  again  concen- 
trated their  force  at  Miletus;  while  the  Athenian  fleetSvas  also  auain 
united  at  Samos.  It  was  about  the  end  of  3Iarch  411  b  .c,  that'^tlie 
two  fleets  were  thus  replaced  in  the  stations  which  thev.had'occupied 
four  months  previously. 

After  the  breach  with  Alkibiades,  and  still  more  after  this  manifest 
reconciliation  of  Tissaphernes  with  the  Peloi)OTmesians,  Peisander 
and  the  oligarchical  conspirators  at  Samos  had  to  consider  their  plan 
of  action.  They  would  not  have  begun  the  movement  at  first  hnd 
they  not  been  instigated  by  Alkibiades,  and  furnished  bv  him  with 
the  treacherous  delusion  of  Persian  alliance  to  cheat  and  paralyze  the 
people.  They  had  indeed  motives  enouirh,  from  their  own  personal 
ambition,  to  originate  it  of  themselves,  apart  from  Alkibiades;  but 
without  the  hopes— equally  useful  for  their  purj^ose  whether  false  or 
true— connected  with  his  name,  they  would  have  had  no  chance  of 
achieving  the  first  step.  Now,  however,  that  first  step  liad  been 
achieved,  before  the  delusive  expectation  of  Persian  irold  was  dissi- 
pated. The  Athenian  people  had  been  familiarized  with  the  idea  of 
a  subversion  of  their  constitution,  in  consideration  of  a  certain  ]>riee: 
it  remained  to  extort  from  them  at  the  point  of  the  sword,  without 
paying  the  price,  what  they  had  thus  consented  to  sell.  Moreover, 
the  leaders  of  the  scheme  felt  tliemselves  already  compromised,  so 
that  they  could  not  recede  with  safety.  Tliey  had  set  in  motion  their 
partisans  at  Athen.^,  where  the  system  of  murderous  intimidation 
(though  the  news  had  not  as  yet  reached  Samos)  was  already  in  full 
swing:  so  that  they  felt  constrained  to  persevere  as  the  only  chance 


of  preservation  to  themselves.  At  the  same  time,  all  that  faint  pre- 
tense of  public  benefit,  in  the  shape  of  Persian  alliance,  wjiich  had 
been  originally  attached  to  it  and  which  might  have  been  conceived 
to  enii  in  the  scheme  some  timid  patriots— was  now  entirely  with- 
drawn. Nothing  remained  except  a  naked  selfish,  and  unscrupulous 
scheme  of  ambition,  not  only  ruining  the  freedom  of  Athens  at 
home,  but  crippling  and  imperiling  her  before  the  foreign  enemy  at 
a  moment  when  her  entire  strength  was  scarcely  adequate  to  the 
contest.  The  conspirators  resolved  to  persevere,  at  all  hazards  both 
in  breaking  down  the  constitution  and  in  carrying  on  the  fureio-n 
war.  Most  of  them  being  rich  men,  they  were  content  (Thucvdid'es 
observes)  to  defray  the  cost  out  of  their  own  purses,  now  that  they 
were  contending,  not  for  tiieir  country,  but  for  their  ow^n  i)ower  and 
profit. 

They  lost  no  time  in  proceeding  to  execution,  immediately  after 
returning  to  Samos  from  the  abortive  confeience  with  Alkibiades 
AMule  they  dispatched  Peisander  with  five  of  the  envoys  back  to 
Athens,  to  consummate  what  was  already  in  progress  there— and  the 
remaining  five  to  oligarch ize  the  dependent  allies— they  organized  all 
their  partisan  force  in  the  armament,  and   began  to  take  measures 
for  putting  down  the  democracy  in  Samos  itself.     That  democracy 
had  been  the  product  of  a  forcible  revolution,  effected  about  tea 
months  before  by  the  aid  of  three  Athenian  triremes.     It  had  since 
preserved  Samos  from  revolting,  like  Chios:  it  was  now  the  means 
of  preserving  the  democracy  at  Athens   itself.      The  partisans  of 
l^eisander,  finding  it  an  invincible  obstacle  to  their  views   contrived 
to  gam  over  a  party  of  the  leading  Samians  now  in  authority  under 
It.     1  hree  hundred  of  these  latter,  a  portion  of  those  who  ten  months 
be  ore  had  risen  in  arms  to  put  down  the  pre-existing  oligarchy   now 
enlisted  as^  conspirators  along  with  the  Athenian  oligarchs   to  put 
down  the  Samian  democracy,  and-  get  possession  of  the  government 
lor  themselves.      The   new  alliance   was  attestea    and   cemented 
according  t.o   genuine   oligarchical   practice,  by  a  murder  without 
.ludicial  trial,  or  an  assassination- for  which  a  suitable  victim  was  at 
iiund.     Ihe  Athenian  Hyperbolus,   who  had  been  ostracized  some 
years  before  by  the  coalition  of  Nikias  and  Alkibiades,  together  with 
their  respective  partisans— ostracized  (as  Thucvdides   tells   us)  not 
rom  any  tear  of  his  power  and  over-transcendent  influence,  but  from 
lis  bad  (4iaracter  and  from  his  being  a  disgi-ace  to  the  city— and 
thus  ostracized  by  an  abuse  of  the  institution— was  now  resident  at 
bamos.      He  represented  the  demagogic  and  accusatory  ehxiuence 
ot  the  democracy,   the  check  upon  oflicial  delinquency;  so  that  he 
served  as  a  common  object  of  antipathy  to  Athenian  and  Samian 
ohgarchs.     Some  of  the  Athenian  partisans,  headed  by  Cliarminus, 
oiie  ot  the  generals,  in  concert  with  the  Samian  conspirators,  seized 
ilyperbolus  and  put  him  to  death;  seemingly  with  some  other  vic- 
tims at  the  same  time. 


204 


TWENTY  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WxVR. 


DEXTERITY  OF  ANTIPHON. 


205 


But  thouah  the=;e  joint  assassinations  served  as  a  pledge  to  each 
seetion  of  the  conspirators  for  the  fidelity  of  the  other  in  respeet  to 
further  operations,  they  at  tlie  same  time  ,irave  ^varning  tooppoiunts. 
Those  leading  men  at  Samos  who  remained  attached  to  the  democ- 
racy, lookiug  abroad  for  defense  against  the  coming  attack,  made 
earnest  appeal  Leon  and  Diomedon,  the  two  generals  most  recently 
arrived  from  Athens  in  substitution  for  Phryuichus  and  Skironides 
— men  sincerely  devoted  to  the  democracy,  and  adverse  to  all  oli- 
garchical change — as  well  as  to  the  trierarch  Thrasvllus,  to  Thrasy- 
bulus  (son  of  Lykus)  then  serving  as  a  hoplite,  and  to  many  others 
of  the  pronounced  democrats  and  patriots  in  the  Athenian  armament. 
They  made  appeal,  not  simply  in  the  behalf  of  their  own  personal 
safety  and  of  tlieir  own  democracy,  now  threatened  by  conspirators 
of  whom  a  portion  were  Athenians — but  also  on  grounds  of  public 
interest  to  Athens;  since,  if  Samos  became  oligarchizcd,  its  sympa- 
thy with  the  Athenian  democracy  and  its  fidelity  to  the  alliance 
would  be  at  an  end.  At  this  moment  the  most  recent  events  which 
had  occurred  at  Athens  (presently  to  be  told)  were  not  known,  and 
the  democracy  was  considered  as  still  subsisting  there. 

To  stand  by  the  assailed  democracy  of  Samos,  and  to  preserve  the 
island  itself,  now  the  mainstay  of  fhe  shattered  Athenian  empire, 
were  motives  more  than  sufficient  to  awaken  the  Athenian  leaders 
thus  solicited.  Commencing  a  personal  canvass  among  the  soldiers 
and  seamen,  and  invoking  their  interference  to  avert  the  overthrow 
of  theSamian  democracy,  they  found  the  general  sentiment  decidedly 
in  their  favor,  but  most  of  all,  among  the  Parali,  or  crew  of  the  conse- 
crated public  trireme  called  the  Paralus.  These  men  were  the  picked 
seamen  of  the  state;  each  of  them  not  merely  a  freeman,  but  a  full 
Athenian  citizen;  receiving  higher  pay  than*  the  ordinary  seamen, 
and  known  as  devoted  to  the  democratical  constitution,  with  an  active 
repugnance  to  oligarchy  itself  as  well  as  to  everything  which 
scented  of  it.  Tl^^  vigilance  of  Leon  and  Diomedon  on  the  defensive 
side  counteracted  the'  machinations  of  their  colleague  C'harminus, 
along  wuth  the  conspirators;  and  provided,  for  the  Samian  democ- 
racy, faithful  auxiliaries  constantly  ready  for  action.  Presently  the 
conspirators  made  a  violent  attack  to  overthrow  the  government;  but 
though  they  chose  their  own  moment  and  opportunity,  they  still 
found  themselves  thoroughly  worsted  in  the  struggle,  especially 
through  the  energetic  aid  of  the  Parali.  Thirty  of  their  number 
were  slain  in  the" contest,  and  three  of  the  most  guilty  afterward 
condenmed  to  banishment.  The  victorious  party  took  no  further 
revenge,  even  upon  the  remainder  of  the  three  hundred  conspirators 
— granted  a  general  amnesty — and  did  their  best  to  re-establish  con- 
stitutional and  hannonious  working  of  the  democracy. 

Chiereas,  an  Athenian  trierarch,  who  had  been  forward  in  the  con- 
test, was  sent  in  the  Paralus  itself  to  Athens,  to  make  communication 
of  w^hat  had  occurred.     But  this  democratical  crew,   on  reaching 


i 

! 


their  native  city,  instead  of  being  received  with  that  welcome  which 
they  doubtless  expected,  found  a  state  of  things  not  less  odious  than 
surprising.  The  democracy  of  Athens  had  been  subverted:  instead 
of  the  Senate  of  Five  Hundred,  and  the  assembled  people,  an 
oligarchy  of  Four  Hundred  self-installed  persons  were  enthroned 
with  sovereign  authority  in  the  Senate-house.  The  first  order  of 
the  Four  Hundred,  on  hearing  that  the  Paralus  had  entered  Peira?us, 
,^  was  to  imprison  tw^o  or  three  of  the  crew,  and  to  remove  all  the  rest 
'  "roni  their  own  privileged  trireme  aboard  a  common  trireme,  with 
orders  to  depart  forthwith  and  to  cruise  near  Euboea.  The  com-" 
niander  Cluereas  found  means  to  escape,  and  returned  back  to  Samoa 
to  tell  the  luiwelcome  news. 

The  steps  whereby  this  oligarchy  of  Four  Hundred  had    been 
gradually  raised  up  to  their  new  power,  must  be  taken  up  from  the 
time  when  Peisander  quitted  Athens— after  having  obtained  the  vote 
of  the  public  assembly  authorizing  him  to  treat  with  Alkibiades  and 
Tissaphernes— and  after  having  set  on  foot  a  joint  organization  and 
conspiracy  of  all  the  anti-popular  clubs,  which  fell  under  the  man- 
agement especially  of  Antiphon  and  Theramenes,  afterwards  aided 
by  Phrynichus.     All  the  nunnbers  of  that  board  of  Elders  called 
Probuli,  who  had  been  named  after  the  defeat  in  Sicily— with  Agnon, 
father  of  Theramenes,  at  their  head— together  with  many  other  lead- 
ing citizens,  some  of  whom  had  been  counted  among  the  firmest 
friends  of  the  democracy,  joined  the  conspiracy;  while  the  oligarchi- 
cal and  the  neutral  rich  came  into  it  with  ardor;  so  that  a  body  of 
partisans  was  formed  both  numerous  and  well  provided  with  money. 
Antiphon  did  not  attempt  to  bring  them  together,  or  to  make  any- 
public  demonstration,  armed  or  unarmed,  for  the  purpose  of  overaw- 
ing actual  authorities.     He  permitted  the  senate  and  the  public 
assembly  to  go  on  meeting  and  debating  as  usual ;  but  his  partisans, 
neither  the  names  nor  the  numbers  of  whom  were  publicly  known' 
received  from  him  instructions  both  w  hen  to  speak  and  what  lan- 
guage to  hold.     The  great  topic  upon  which  thev  descanted,  was  the 
costliness  of  democratical  institutirms  in  the  present  distressed  state 
of  the  finances,   wdien  tribute  from  the  allies  could  no  longer  be 
reckoned  upon— the  heavy  tax  imposed  upon  the  state  by  paying  the 
Senators,  the  Dikasts,  the  Ekklesiasts  or  citizens  who  attended  the 
public  assembly,  &c.     The  state  could  now  afford  to  pay  none  but 
those  soldiers  who  fought  in  its  defense,  nor  ought  any  one  else  to 
touch  the  public  money.     It  w^as  essential  (they  insisted)  to  exclude 
from  the  political  franchise  all  except  a  select  body  of  Five  Thousand, 
composed  of  those  who  were  best  able  to  do  service  to  the  city  by- 
person  and  by  purse. 

The  extensive  disfranchisement  involved  in  this  last  proposition 
was  quite  sufficiently  shocking  to  the  ears  of  an  Athenian  assembly. 
But  in  reality  the  proposition  was  itself  a  juggle,  never  intended  to 
become  reality,  and  representing  something^far  short  of  what  Anti- 


200 


TWENTY-FIKST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


LAST  ASSEMBLY  AT  KOLONUS. 


207 


plion  and  Iiis  partisans  intemlcMl.  Their  dcsig^i  Avas  to  appropriate 
the  powers  of  governiiicut  to  themselves  sini])ly,  "witliout  eontrol  or 
partnersliip;  leaviiiij  this  body  of  Five  Thousand  not  merely  uiieon- 
vened,  but  non-existent,  as  a  mere  empty  name  to  impose  upon  the 
citizens  scenerally.  Of  such  real  intention,  however,  not  a  word  was 
as  yet  spoken.  Tlie  projeeted  body  of  Five  Thousand  was  the 
theme  preaehed  upon  by  all  the  party  orators;  vet  williont  suhniit- 
tim^  any  substantive  motion  for  the  change,  which  could  not  be  yet 
done  without  illegality. 

Even  thus  indin'ctly  advocated,  the  project  of  cutting  down  the 
franchise  to  Five  Thousand,  and  of  suppressing  all  tlie  paid  civil 
functions,  was  a  change  sutilcieutly  violent  to  call  forth  abundant 
opponents.  For  such  opponents  Antiphon  was  fully  prepared.  Of 
the  men  who  thus  stood  forward  in  opposition  either  all.  or  at  least 
all  the  most  prominent,  were  successfully  taken  olf  by  private  assas- 
sination. The  tirst  of  th<'m  who  thus  perished  was  Androkles,  dis- 
tingui>hed  as  a  demagogue  or  popular  sjieaker,  and  marked  out  to 
vengeance  not  only  by  that  circumstance,  but  by  the  further  fact 
that  he  had  been  among  the  most  vehement  accusers  of  Alkibiades 
before  his  exile.  For  at  this  time,  the  breach  of  Peisander  with 
Tissaphernes  and  Alkibiades  had  .not  yet  become  known  at  Athens, 
so  that  the  latter  was  still  supposed  to  be  on  the  point  of  returning 
Jiome  as  a  member  of  the  contemplated  oligarchical  government. 
After  Androkles,  mnny  other  speakers  of  similar  sentiments  perished 
in  the  same  way,  by  unknown  hands.  A  band  of  Grecian  youths, 
strangers  got  together  from  different  cities,  was  organized  for  the 
business:  the  vit-tims  Avere  all  chosen  on  the  same  special  ground, 
and  the  deed  was  so  skillfully  perpetrated  that  neither  director  nor 
instiument  ever  became  known.  After  these  assassinations — sure, 
special,  secret,  and  systematic,  emanating  from  an  unknown  Directory 
like  a  Yehmic  tribunal— had  continued  for  some  time,  the  terror 
Avhich  they  inspired  became  intense  and  universal.  No  justice  could 
be  had,  no  inquiry  could  be  instituted,  even  for  the  death  of  the 
nearest  and  dearest  relative.  At  last,  no  man  dared  to  demand  or 
even  to  mention  inquiry,  looking  ui)on  himself  as  fortunate  that  he 
had  escaped  the  same  fate  in  his  own  person.  So  finished  an  organi- 
zation, and  such  well-aimed  blows,  raised  a  general  belief  that  the 
conspirators  were  much  more  numerous  than  they  were  in  reality. 
And  as  it  turned  out  that  there  were  persons  among  them  who  h.ul 
before  been  accounted  hearty  d<'mocrats,  so  at  last  di.^may  and  mis- 
tnist  became  universally  i>revalent.  No  one  dared  even  to  express 
indiirnation  at  the  nunders  going  on,  much  le.ss  to  talk  about  redreis 
or  revenge,  for  fear  that  he  might  be  communicating  with  one  of 
the  unknown  conspirators.  In  the  midst  of  this  terrorism,  all  oj^po- 
sition  ceased  in  the  .senate  and  public  assendjh',  so  that  the  speakers 
of  the  conspiring  oligarchy  appeared  to  carry  an  unanimous  assent. 

Such  was  the  condition   to  which  things  had   been  brought  in 


Athens,  by  Antiphon  and  the  oligarchical  conspirators  acting  under 
his  direction,    at   the  time  when   Peisander  and    the  five  "envoys 
arrived  thither  returning  from  Samos.     It  is  probable  that  they  had 
previously  transmitted  home  from   Samos  news  of  the  rupture  with 
Alkibiades,  and  of  the  necessity  of  prosecuting  the  conspiracy  with- 
out farther  view  either  to  him  or  to  the  Persian  alliance.     Such 
news  would  probably  be  acceptable  both  to  Antiphon  and  Phiyni- 
elms,   both  of  them   i)ersonal   enemies    of    Alkibiades;    especially 
Phrynielius,  who  had  iironouuced  him  to  be  incai)able  of  fraterniz- 
ing with  an  oligarchical  revolution.     xVt  any  rate,  the  plans  of  Anti- 
piioii  had  been  independent  of  all  view  to  Persian  aid,  and  had  been 
directed  to  carry  the  revolution  by  means  of  naked,  exorbitant,  and 
well-directed  fear,  without  any  intermixture  of  hope  or  any  prospect 
of  publie  l)enefit.     Peisander  found  the  reign  of  terror  fully  matured. 
He  had  not  come  direct  from  Samos  to  Athens,  but  had  halted  in  hi.s 
voyage  at  various  allied  dependencies— while  the  other  five  envoy.s, 
as  well  as  a  partisan  named  Diotrephes,  had  been  sent  to  Thasos  and 
elsewhere;  all  for  the  same  purpose,  of  putting  down  demoeracien 
in  those  allied  cities  where  they  existed,  and  establishing  oligarchies 
in  their  room.       Peisander  made   this  change  at  Teuos,    Aiidros, 
Karystus,  vEgina,  and  elsewhere;  collecting  from  these  several  plaee.s 
a  regiment  of  300  ho{)lites,  which  he  brought  with  him  to  Athens 
as  a  sort  of  body-guard  to  his  new  oligarchy.     He  could  not  know, 
niilil  he  reached  Peiraeus,  the  full  success  of  the  terrorism  organized 
hy  Antiphon  and  the  rest;  so  that  he  probably  came  prepared  to  sur- 
mount a  greater  resistance   than  he  actually  found.     As  the  facts 
tilood,  so  completely  had  the  public  opinion  and  spirit  been  subdued 
thai  he  wa^^  enabled  to  put  the  finishing  stroke  at  once,     His  arrival 
was  the  signal   for  cousumating  the  revolution;  first  by  an  extorted 
suspension  of  the  tutelary  constitutional  sanction— next,  by  the  more 
direet  employment  of  armed  force. 

First,  he  c(nivoked  a  public  assembly,  in  which  he  proposed  a 
decree,  naming  ten  commissioners  with  full  powers,  to  prepare  propo- 
sitions for  such  political  reform  as  they  should  think  advisable — and 
to  be  ready  by  a  given  day.  According  to  the  usual  practice,  this 
decree  must  previously  haVe  been  approved  in  the  Senate  of  Five 
Hundred,  before  it  was  submitted  to  the  people.  Such  was  doubtless 
tile  cjLse  in  the  present  instance,  so  that  the  decree  pa.ssed  without 
any  opposition.  On  the  day  fixed,  a  fresh  assembly  met,  which 
Peisander  and  his  partisans  caused  to  be  held,  not  in  the  usual  place 
(called  the  Pnyx)  within  the  city  \valls,  but  at  a  place  called  Kolonus, 
ten  stadia  (rather  more  than  a  mile)  without  the  walls,  north  of  the 
city.  Kolonus  was  a  temple  of  Poseidon,  within  the  precinct  of 
which  the  assembly  was  inclo.sed  for  the  occasion.  Such  an 
assembly  was  not  likely  to  be  numerous,  wherever  held,  since  there 
could  be  little  motive  to  attend  when  freedom  of  debate  was  extin- 
guished; but  the  oligarchical  con.spirators  now  transferred  it  without 


208 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


THE  FIVE  THOUSAND. 


209 


the  walls,  selecting  a  narrow  area  for  the  meeting — in  order  that  they 
might  lessen  still  further  the  chance  of  numerous  attendance — of  an 
assembly  whlcli  the}'  fully  designed  should  be  the  last  in  the  historv 
of  Atliens.  They  were  tluis  also  more  out  of  the  reach  of  an  armed 
Diovement  in  the  city,  as  well  as  enabled  to  post  their  own  armed 
partisans  around,  under  color  of  protecting  the  meeting  against  dis- 
turbance by  the  Laccdtcmonians  from  Dekeleia. 

The  proposition  of  the  newly-appointed  Decemvirs  (probably 
Peisander,  Antiphon,  and  other  partisans  themselves)  was  exceedingly 
short  and  simple.  They  merely  moved  the  abolition  of  the  celebrateil 
Graphe  Paranomon ;  that  is,  they  proposed  that  every  Athenian  citi- 
zen should  have  full  liberty  of  making  any  anti-constitutional  propo- 
sition that  he  chose — and  that  every  other  citizen  should  be  inter- 
dicted, imder  heavy  penalties,  from  prosecuting  him  by  Graphe 
Paranomon  (indictment  on  the  score  of  informality,  illegality,  or 
unconstitutionality),  or  from  doing  him  any  other  mischief.  This 
proposition  was  adopted  without  a  single  dissentient.  It  was  thousiht 
more  formal  by  the  directing  chiefs  to  sever  this  proposition  point- 
edly from  the  rest,  and  to  put  it,  singly  and  ai)art.  into  the  mouth  of 
the  special  commissioners;  since  it  was  the  legalizing  condition  of 
every  other  positive  change  which  they  were  about  to  move  after- 
ward. Full  liberty  being  tlius  granted  to  make  any  motion,  however 
anti-constitutional,  and  to  dispense  with  all  the  established  formali- 
ties, such  as  preliminary  authorization  by  the  senate — P('i^auder 
now  came  forward  with  his  substantive  propositions  to  the  following 
effect : — 

1.  All  the  existing  democrat ical  magistracies  were  suppressed  at 
once,  and  made  to  cease  for  the  future.  2.  No  civil  functions  what- 
ever were  hereafter  to  be  salaried.  3.  To  constitute  a  new  goveru- 
ment,  a  committee  of  five  persons  were  named  forthwith,  who  were 
to  choose  a  larger  body  of  one  hundred  (that  is,  one  hundred  includ- 
ing the  five  choosers  tliemselves).  Each  individual  out  of  this  body 
of  one  hundred  was  to  choose  three  persons.  4.  A  body  of  Four 
Himdred  was  thus  constituted,  who  were  to  take  their  seat  in  the 
Senate-house,  and  to  carry  on  the  government  with  unlimited  pow- 
ers, according  to  their  own  discretion.  5.  They  were  to  convene  the 
Five  Thousand  whenever  they  might  think  fit.  All  was  passed  with- 
out a  dissentient  voice. 

The  invention  and  employment  of  this  imaginary  aggregate  of  Five 
Thousand  was  not  the  least  dexterous  among  the  combinations  of 
Antiphon.  No  one  knew  who  these  Five  Thousand  were:  yet  the 
resolution  just  adopted  purported — not  that  such  a  number  of  citi- 
zens should  be  singled  out  and  constituted,  either  by  choice,  or  by 
lot,  or  in  some  determinate  manner  which  should  exhibit  them  to  the 
view  and  knowledge  of  others — but  that  the  Four  Hundred  should 
convene  The  Five  Thousand  whenever  they  thought  proper:  thus 
assuming  the  latter  to  be  a  list  already  made  up  and  notorious,  at 


least  to  the  Four  Hundred  themselves.  The  real  fact  was  that  the 
Five  Thousand  existed  nowhere  except  in  the  talk  and  proclamations 
ot' the  conspirators  as  a  supplement  of  fictitious  auxiliaries.  They 
did  not  even  exist  as  individual  names  on  paper,  but  simply  as  an 
iinpostorous  nominal  aggregate.  The  Four  Hundred  now  installed 
formed  the  entire  and  exclusive  rulers  of  the  state.  But  the  mere 
uanie  of  the  Five  Thousand,  though  it  was  nothing  more  than  a  name, 
served  two  important  purposes  for  Antiphon  and  his  conspiracy. 
First,  it  admitted  of  being  falsely  produced  (especially  to  the  arma- 
ment at  Samos)  as  proof  of  a  tolerably  nimierous  and  popular  body 
of  equal,  qualified,  concurrent  citizens — all  intended  to  take  their 
turn  by  rotation  in  exercising  tlie  powers  of  government;  thus  light- 
ening the  odium  of  extreme  usurpation  to  the  Four  Hundred,  and 
passing  them  olf  merely  as  the  eailiest  section  of  the  Five  Thousand, 
put  into  office  for  a  few  months,  and  destined  at  the  end  of  that  period 
to  give  place  to  anotlk)r  equal  section.  Next,  it  immensely  augmented 
the  means  of  intimidation  possessed  by  the  Four  Hundred  at  home, 
by  exaggerating  the  impression  of  their  supposed  strength.  For  the 
citizens  generally  were  made  to  believe  that  there  were  five  thousand 
real  and  living  partners  in  the  conspiracy;  while  the  fact  that  these 
partners  were  not  known  and  could  not  be  individually  identified, 
rather  aggravated  the  reigning  terror  and  mistrust — since  every  man, 
suspecting  that  his  neighbor  might  possibly  be  among  them,  was 
afraid  to  communicate  his  discontent  or  propose  means  for  joint 
resistance.  In  both  these  two  ways,  the  name  and  assumed  existence 
of  the  Five  Thousand  lent  strength  to  the  real  Four  Hundred  con- 
spirators. It  masked  their  usurpation  while  it  increased  their  hold 
on  the  respect  and  fenrs  of  the  citizens. 

As  soon  as  the  public  assembly  at  Kolonus  had  wi  Ji  such  seeming 
mianimity  accepted  all  the  propositions  of  Peisander,  they  w^ere  dis- 
missed; and  the  new  regiment  of  Four  Hundred  w^ere  chosen  and 
constituted  in  the  form  prescribed.  It  now  only  remained  to  install 
them  in  the  Senate-house.  But  this  could  not  be  done  without  force, 
since  the  senators  were  already  within  it;  having  doubtless  gone 
thither  immediately  from  the  assembly,  where  their  presence  (at  least 
the  presence  of  the  Prytanes,  or  Senators  of  the  presiding  tribe)  was 
essential  as  legal  presidents.  They  had  to  deliberate  what  they  would 
do  under  the  decree  just  passed,  which  divested  them  of  all  authority. 
It  was  even  possible  that  they  might  organize  armed  resistance;  for 
which  there  seemed  more  than  usual  facility  at  the  present  moment, 
since  the  occupation  of  Dekeleia  by  the  Lacedaemonians  kept  Athens 
in  a  condition  like  that  of  a  permanent  camp,  with  a  large  proportion 
of  the  citizens  day  and  night  under  arms.  Against  this  chance  the 
Four  Hundred  made  provision.  They  selected  that  hour  of  the  day 
when  the  greater  number  of  citizens  habitually  went  home  (probably 
to  their  morning  meal),  leaving  the  military  station,  with  the  arms 
piled  and  ready,  under  comparatively  thin  watch.    While  the  general 


210 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


REJyiARKS  ON  THE  REVOLT. 


211 


11 


body  of  lioplitcs  loft  the  station  at  this  hour  according  to  the  usual 
practice,  the  hoplites  (Andrian,  Tcnian  and  others)  in  Ihe  immediate 
contideuce  of  the  Four  Hundred  were  directed  by  ])rivate  order  to 
hold  themselves  prepared  and  in  arms  at  a  little  dislniice  off;  so  that 
if  any  symj^toms  should  appear  of  resistance  hv'wix  contemplated 
they  might  at  once  intei-fere  and  forestall  it.     Having  taken  this  pre- 
caution, the  Four  Hundred  marched  in  a  body  to  the  Senate-house, 
each  man  with  a  dagger  concealed  under  his  garment,  and  followed 
by  their  special  body-guard  of  120  young  men  from  various  Grecian 
cities— tiic  instruments  of  the  assassinations  ordered  by  Antiphon  and 
his  colleagues.     In  this  array  they  marched  into  the  Senate-house, 
where  the  senators  w<'re  assembled,  and  commanded  them  to  depart'; 
at  the  same  time  tendering  to  them  their  pay  for  all  tlie  remainder  of 
the  year  (seemingly  al)out  three  months  or  liiore  down  to  the  begin- 
ning of  Hekatomlnron,  the  month  of  new  nominations)  during  wdTich 
their  functions  ought  to  have  continued.     The  senators  were  no  way 
pre]iared  to  resist  the  decree  just  passed  under  the  forms  of  Icirality, 
with  an  armed  body  now  arrived  to  enforce  its  execution.  ^Tiiey 
obcn'ed  and  de])arted,  each  man  as  he  passed  the  door  receiving  the 
salary  tendered  to  him.    That  they  should  yield  obedience  to  superior 
force  under  the  circumstances  can  excite  neitiier  censure  nor  sur- 
prise; but  that  they  should  accept  from  the  hands  of  the  conspirators 
this  anticipation  oi'  an  unearned  salary  was  a  meanness  which  almost 
branded  them  as  accomplices,  and  dishonored  the  expiring  hour  of 
the  last  <lemocratical  authority.    The  Four  Hundred  now  found  them 
selves  triumphantly  installed  'in  the  Senate-house.     There  was  not  the 
least  resistance,  either  witliin  its  walls,  or  even  without,  by  any  por- 
tion of  the  citizens 

Thus  ]>erished,  or  seemed  to  perish,  the  democrac}^  of  Athens,  after 
an  uninterrupted  existence  of  nearly  one  hundred  years  since  the 
revolution  of  Kleisthenes.  So  incredible  did  it  appear  that  the 
numerous,  intelligent,  and  constitutional  citizens  of  Athens  should 
suffer  their  liberties*  to  be  overthrown  by  a  band  of  four  hundred 
conspirators,  while  the  great  mass  of  them  not  only  loved  their 
democracy,  but  had  arms  in  their  hands  to  defend  it— that  even  their 
enemy  and  neighbor  Agis  at  Dekcileia  could  hardly  imagine  the  revo- 
lution  to  be  a  fact  accomplished.  We  shall  see  presently  that  it  did 
not  stand — nor  would  it  probably  have  stood,  had  circumstances  even 
been  more  favorable— but  the  accomplishment  of  it  at  all,  is  an  inci- 
dent too  extraordinary  to  be  passed  over  without  some  words  in 
explanation. 

We  must  remark  that  the  tremendous  catastrophe  and  loss  of 
blood  in  Sicily  had  abated  the  energy  of  the  Athenian  character 
generally— but  especially,  had  made  them  despair  of  their  foreign 
relations  ;  of  the  possibility  that  they  couW  make  head  against 
enemies,  increased  in  number  by  revolts  among  tlieir  own  allies,  and 
farther  sustained  by  Persian  gold.     Upon  this  sentiment  of  despair  is 


brought  to  bear  the  treacherous  delusion  of  Alkibiades,  offering 
them  the  Persian  aid;  that  is,  means  o.f  defense  and  success  against; 
foreign  enemies,  at  the  price  of  their  democracy.  Reluctantly  the 
people  are  brought,  but  they  are  brought,  to  entertain  the  proposi- 
tion: and  thus  the  conspirators  gain  tlieir  first  capital  point — of 
familiarizing  the  people  with  the  idea  of  such  a  change  of  constitu- 
tion. The  ulterior  success  of  the  conspiracy — when  all  prosi)ect  of 
Persian  gold,  or  improved  foreign  position,  was  at  an  end — is  due  to 
the  combinations,  alike  nefarious  and  skillful,  of  Antiphon,  wielding 
and  organizing  the  united  strength  of  the  aristocratical  classes  at 
Athens;  strength  always  exceedingly  great,  but  under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances working  in  fractions  disunited  and  even  reciprocally  hostile 
to  each  other — restrained  by  the  ascendent  democratic;al  institutions 
—and  reduced  to  corrupt  what  it  could  not  overthrow.  Antiphon, 
about  to  employ  this  anti-popular  force  in  one  systematic  scheme  and 
for  the  accomplishment  of  a  predetermined  purpose,  keeps  still  within 
the  same  ostcnsibie  ctmstitutional  limits.  He  raises  no  mutiny;  he 
maintains  inviolate  the  cardinal  point  of  Athenian  political  morality 
—respect  to  the  decision  of  the  senate  and  political  assembly,  as  well 
as  to  constitutional  maxims.  But  he  knows  well  that  the  value  of 
these  meetings,  as  political  securities,  depends  upon  entire  freedom 
of  speech;  and  that  if  that  freedom  be  suppressecl,  the  assembly  itself 
becomes  a  nullit}' — or  rather  an  instrument  of  positive  imposture  and 
mischief.  Accordingly  he  causes  all  tlie  popular  orators  to  be  suc- 
cessively assassinated,  so  that  no  man  dares  to  open  his  mouth  on 
that  side;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  anti-popular  speakers  are  all 
loud  and  contident,  cheering  one  another  on,  and  seeming  to  represent 
all  the  feeling  of  the  persons  present.  By  thus  silencing  each  individ- 
ual leader,  and  intimidating  every  opponent  from  standing  forward 
as  spokesman,  he  extorts  the  formal  sanction  of  the  assembly  anci  the 
senate  to  measures  which  the  large  majority  of  the  citizens  detest. 
That  majority,  however,  are  bound  by  their  own  constitutional  forms: 
and  when  the  decision  of  these,  by  whatever  means  obtained,  is  against 
them,  they  have  neither  the  inclination  nor  the  courage  to  resist, 
hi  no  part  of  the  worUl  has  this  sentiment  of  constitutional  duty,  and 
submission  to  the  vote  of  a  legal  majority,  been  more  keenly  and 
universally  felt,  than  it  was  among  the  citizens  of  democralical 
Athens.  Antiphon  thus  finds  mea!is  to  employ  the  constitutional 
seuliinent  of  Athens  as  a  means  of  killing  the  coiistitntion :  the  mere 
empty  form,  after  its  vital  and  i)rotectivc  elficacy  has  been  abstracted, 
remains  simply  as  a  cheat  to  paralyze  individual  patriotism. 

It  was  this  cheat  which  rendered  the  Athenians  indisposed  to  stand 
forward  with  arms  in  defense  of  that  democracy  to  which  they  were 
attached.  Accustomed  as  they  were  to  unlimited  pacific  contentioa 
within  the  bounds  of  their  ccmstitution,  they  were  in  the  highest 
degree  averse  to  anything  like  armed  intestine  contention.  This  is  the 
natural  effect  of  an  established  free  and  equal  polity — to  substitute  the 


212 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


contests  of  the  tongue  for  those  of  the  sword,  and  somclinics,  even 
to  create  so  extreme  a  disinclipation  to  the  latter,  that  if  Uberty  be 
energeticall}'-  assailed,  the  counter-energy  uecesstiry  for  its  deicnse 
may  "probably  be  found  wanting.  So  dilficult  is  it  for  the  same  peo- 
ple to  have  both  the  qualities  requisite  for  making  a  free  con- 
stitution work  well  in  ordinary  times,  together  with  those  vcrv 
different  qualities  requisite  for  upholding  it  against  exceptional 
dangers  and  under  trying  emergencies,  None  but  an  Athenian 
of  e'xtraordinary  ability  like  Antiphon  would  have  understood  the 
art  of  thus  making  the  constitutional  feeling  of  his  countrymen 
subservient  to  the  success  of  his  conspiracy — and  of  maintaining  the 
form  of  legal  dealing  toward  assembled  and  constitutional  bodies, 
while  he  violated  them  in  secret  and  successive  stabs  directed  against 
individuals.  Political  assassination  had  been  unknown  at  Athens  (as 
far  {IS  our  information  reaches)  since  the  time  w  hen  it  was  employed 
about  fifty  years  before  by  the  oligarchical  party  against  Ephialtcs, 
the  coadjutor  of  Perikles.  But  this  had  been  an  iadividual  case,  and 
it  was  reserved  for  Antiphon  and  Phrynichus  to  organize  a  band  of 
assassins  working  systematically,  and  taking  off  a  series  of  leading  vic- 
tims one  after  the  other.  As  the  Macedonian  kings  in  aftertinies 
required  the  surrender  of  the  popular  orators  in  a  body,  so  the  authors 
of  this  conspiracy  found  the  same  enemies  to  deal  with,  and  adopted 
another  way  of  getting  rid  of  them;  thus  reducing  the  assembly  into 
a  tame  and  lifeless  mass,  capable  of  being  intimidated  into  giving  its 
collective  sanction  to  measures  which  its  large  majority  detested. 

As  Grecian  liistory  has  been  usually  written,  we  are  instructed  to 
believe  that  the  misfortunes,  and  the  con-uption.  and  the  degradation, 
of  the  democratical  states,  were  brought  upon  them  by  the  class  of 
demagogues,  of  whom  Kleon,  Hyperbolus,  Audrokles,  etc.,  stand  forth 
as  specimens.  These  men  are  represented  as  mischief-makers  and 
revilers,  accusing  without  just  cause,  and  converting  innocence  inlo 
treason. 

Now  the  history  of  this  conspiracy  of  the  Four  Hundred  presents 
to  us  the  other  side  of  the  picture.  It  shows  that  the  political 
enemies — against  whom  the  Athenian  people  were  protected  by  their 
democratical  institutions,  and  by  the  d(mag<)gues  as  living  organs  of 
those  institutions — were  not  fictitious,  but  dangerously  real.  It 
reveals  the  continued  existence  of  powerful  anti-popular  combina- 
tions, ready  to  come  together  for  treasonable  purposes  when  the 
moment  appeared  safe  and  temjiting.  It  manifests  the  character  and 
morality  of  the  leaders,  to  whom  the  direction  of  the  anti-popular  force 
naturally  fell.  It  proves  that  these  leaders,  men  of  uncommon  ability, 
required  nothing  more  than  the  extinction  or  silence  of  the  dema- 
gogues, to  be  enabled  to  subvert  the  popular  securities,  and  get  i»os- 
session  of  the  government.  We  need  no  better  proof  to  teach  us 
what  was  the  real  function  and  intrinsic  neces.sity  of  these  dema- 
gogues in  the  Athenian  system ;  taking  them  as  a  class,  and  apart 


MEASURES  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED.  213 

from  the  manner  in  wliich  Individuals  among  them  may  have  per- 
formed their  duty.     They  formed  the  vital  movement  of  all  that  was 
tutelary  and  public-spirited  in  democracy.     Aggressive  in  respect  to 
ollicial  delinquents,  they  were  defensive  in  respect  to  the  public  and 
the  constitution.    If  that  anti-popular  force,  which  Antiphon  found 
ready-made,  had  not  been  efficient,  at  a  much  earlier  moment,  in 
stifling  the  democracy— it  was  because  there  were  demagogues  to  cry 
aloud,  as  well  as  assemblies  to  hear  and  sustain  them.    If  Antiphon's 
conspiracy  was  successful,  it  was  because  he  knew  where  to  ftim  his 
blows,  so  as  to  strike  down  the  real  enemies  of  the  oligarchy  and  the 
real  defenders  of  the  people.     I  here  employ  the  term  demai>-()"-ae.^ 
because  it  is  that  commonly  used  by  those  who  denounce  the  cl.-iss  of 
men  here  under  review:  the  proper  neutral  phase,  laying  aside  odious 
associations,  would  be  to  call  them  popular  speakers  or  opposition 
speakers.     But  by  whatever  name  they  may  be  called,  it  is  impos- 
sible rightly  to  conceive  their  posilion  in  Athens,  without  lookiu"-  at 
them  m  contrast  and  antithesis  with  those  anti-popular  forces  aga?nst 
which  they  formed  the  indispensable  barrier,  and  which  come  forth 
into  such  manifest  and  melancholy  working  under  the  organizino- 
hands  of  Antiphon  and  Phrynichus.  ° 

As  soon  as  the  Four  Hundred  found  themselves  formally  installed 
in  the  Senate-house,  they  divided  themselves  by  lot  into  separate 
Prytanies  (probably  ten  in  number,  consisting  of  forty  members  each 
hke  the  former  Senate  of  Five  Hundred,  in  order  that  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  year  to  which  the  people  were  accustomed  miirht  not  be 
disturbed),  and  then  solemnized  their  installation  by  prayer  and  sacri- 
fice. They  put  to  death  some  political  enemies,  though  not  many 
they  further  imprisoned  and  banished  others,  and  made  large  chano-es 
in  the  administration  of  affairs;  carrying  evervthingwith  a  strictness 
and  rigor  unknown  under  the  old  constitution.  It  seems  to  have 
been  proposed  among  them  to  pass  a  vote  of  restoration  to  all  per- 
sons under  sentence  of  exile.  But  this  was  rejected  by  the  majority 
in  order  that  Alkibiades  might  not  be  among  the  number;  nor  did 
they  think  it  expedient,  notwithstanding,  to  pass  the  law,  reserving 
hiin  as  a  special  exception. 

They  further  dispatched  a  messenger  to  Agis  at  Dekeleia,  intima- 
ing  their  vnsh  to  treat  for  peace,  which  (they  affirmed)  he  ou'dit  to 
De  ready  to  grant  to  them,  now  that  "  the  faithless  Demos"  was  put 
(own.  Agis,  however,  not  believing  that  the  Athenian  people  would 
thus  submit  to  be  deprived  of  their  liberty,  anticipated  that  intestine 
Uissens^ions  would  certainly  break  out,  or  at  least  that  some  portion 
ot  the  Long  Walls  would  be  found  unguarded,  should  a  foreign  army 
appear.  While  therefore  he  declined  the  overtures  for  peace,  he  at 
the  same  time  sent  for  re-enforcements  out  of  Peloponnesus,  and 
marched  with  a  considerable  army,  in  addition  to  his  ov/n  garrison 
up  to  the  very  walls  of  Athens.  But  he  found  the  ramparts  carefully 
manned:  no  commotion  took  place  within:  even  a  sally  was  made  in 


214 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WxVR. 


DEMOCRATICAL  MANIFESTATION. 


215 


ii 


uliicli  some  advantnge  was  gained  over  liim.  He  llierefore  ppcrdily 
retired,  sending  bark  his  newly-arrived  re-enforecnients  to  Ptl<  pen. 
nesus;  while  the  Four  Hundred,  on  renewing  their  advanees  to  him 
for  peace,  now  found  thenii^elves  much  better  received,  and  \\('ie 
even  encouraged  to  dispatch  envoys  to  Sparta  itself. 

As  soon  as  they  had  thus  got  over  the  first  difficulties,  and  plnrrd 
matters  on  a  fooling  which  seemed  to  promise  stability,  ihey  dis- 
patched ten  envoys  lo  Samos.  Aware  beforehand  of  the  danger  ini- 
l»cnding  over  them  in  that  quarter  from  the  known  aversion^  of  llie 
soldiers  and  seamen  to  anything  in  the  nature  of  oligarchy,  tlicy  luid 
moreover  just  heard,  by  the  amval  of  Cl.rereas  and"  the  Paralus,  of 
the  joint  attack  made  by  tlie  Athenian  and  Santian  oligarchs,  and  of 
its  complete  failure.  Had  this  event  occmred  a  little  earlier,  it 
might  ]K'rhaps  have  deterred  even  some  of  their  own  number  from 
])roceeding  with  the  revolution  at  Athens,  Avhich  was  rtndcrcd  there- 
by almost  sure  of  failure,  from  the  first.  Their  ten  cnAoys  were  in- 
structed to  represent  at  Samos  that  the  recent  oligarchy  liad  been 
established  with  ne  views  injurious  to  the  city,  but  on  the' contrary 
for  the  general  benefit;  that  though  the  Council  now  inslalkd  con- 
Fisted  of  Four  Hundred  only,  yet  the  total  number  of  partisans  who 
had  made  the  revolution  jind  were  qualified  citizens  under  it,  wjis 
Five  Thousand:  a  nund)er  greater  (they  added)  than  had  (ver  been 
actually  assembled  in  the  Pnyx  under  the  d(  mot  racy,  evtn  for  llie 
most  important  debates,  in  consequence  of  the  unavoidable  absences 
of  numerous  individuals  on  military  service  and  foreiun  travel. 

What  satisfaction  might  liave  been  given,  by  this  allusion  to  tlie 
fictitious  Five  Thousand,  or  by  the  fallacious  reference  to  this  num- 
bers, real  or  pretended,  of  the  past  democratical  assemblies — luid 
these  envoys  carried  to  Samos  the  first  tidings  of  the  Athenian  re- 
volution— we  cannot  say.  They  were  forestalled  by  Clta-reas  the 
officer  of  the  Paralus;  who,  though  tlie  Four  Hundred  tried  to  de- 
tain him,  made  his  escape  and  hastened  to  Samos  to  communicate 
the  fearful  and  unexpected  change  which  had  occurred  at  Athens. 
Instead  of  hearing  that  change  described  under  the  treacherous  ex- 
tenuations prescribed  by  Antiphon  and  Phrynichus,  the  armament 
first  learned  it  from  the  lips  of  Chaereas,  who'told  them  at  once  tlie 
extreme  truth — and  even  more  than  the  truth.  He  recoucted  with 
indignation  that  every  Athenian,  who  ventured  to  say  a  word  against 
the  Four  Hundred  rulers  of  the  city,  was  punished  with  the  scourge 
— that  even  the  wives  and  children  of  persons  hostile  to  them  were 
outraged — that  there  was  a  design  of  seizing  and  imprisoning  the  rel- 
atives of  the  democrats  at  Samos,  and  putting  them  to  death  if  the 
latter  refused  to  obey  orders  from  Athens.  The  simple  narrative,  of 
what  had  really  occurred,  would  have  been  quite  sufficient  to  pro 
voke  in  the  armament  a  sentiment  of  detestation  against  the  Four 
Hundred.  But  these  additional  details  of  Chareas",  partly  untrue, 
filled  them  with  uncontrollable  wrath,  which  they  manifested  by 


open  menace  against  the  known  partisans-  of  the  Four  Hundred  at 
Sanios.  as  well  as  against  those  who  had  taken  part  in  the  recent 
oligarchical  conspiracy  in  the  island. -♦  It  was  not  without  difficulty 
jjiat  their  hands  were  arrested  by  the  more  refiecting  citizens  present, 
who  remonstrated  against  the  madness  of  such  disorderly  proceed- 
ings when  the  enemy  was  close  upon  them. 

But  though  violence  and  aggressive  insult  were  thus  seasonably 
cheeked,  the  sentiment  of  the  armament  was  too  ardent  and  unani- 
mous to  be  satisfied  without  some  solemn,  emphatic,  and  decisive 
declaration  against  Wm  oligarchs  at  Athens.  A  great  democratical 
maaifestation,  of  the  most  earnest  and  unposing  character  was  pio- 
elaiined,  chietly  at  the  instance  of  Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyllus.  The 
Athenian  armament,  broagiit  together  in  one  grand  assembly,  took 
ail  oath  by  the  most  stringent  sti'nclions — To  maintain  their  democ- 
racy— To  keep  up  friendship  and  harmony  with  each  other — To 
carry  on  the  war  against  the  Pelopouuesians  with  energy — To  be  at 
enmity  with  the  Four  Hundred  at  Athens,  and  to  enter  into  no  amic- 
able communication  with  them  whatever.  The  whole  arnianient 
swore  to  this  compact  with  enthusiasm,  and  even  those  who  had  be- 
fore taken  part  in  the  oligarchical  movements  were  forced  to  be  for- 
ward in  the  cereiuonv.  What  lent  double  force  lo  this  touehin!]: 
seeue,  was,  that  the  entire  Samiaii  population,  every  male  of  the  mil- 
itary age,  took  the  oath  along  with  the  friendly  armament.  Both 
pledged  themselves  to  mutual  fidelity  and  common  suffering  or  tri 
uniph.  whatever  might  be  tlie  issue  of  the  contest.  Both  felt  that  the 
IVlopoiuiesians  at  Miletus,  and  the  Four  Hundred  at  Athens,  were 
alike  their  enemies,  and  that  the  success  of  either  wouhl  be  their 
common  ruin. 

Pursuant  to  tins  resolution — of  upholding  their  democracy  and  at 
till'  same  time  sustaining  the  war  against  the  Peloponnesians,  at  all 
cost  or  peril  to  themselves — the  soldiers  of  the  armament  now  took  a 
step  unparalleled  in  Athenian  history.  Feeling  that  they  could  no 
longer  receiv^e  orders  from  Athens  under  her  present  oligarchical 
rulers,  with  whom  C'harminus  and  others  among  their  own  leaders 
were  implicated,  they  constituted  themselves  into  a  sort  of  communitv 
apart,  and  held  an  assembly  as  citizens  to  choose  anew  their  generals 
and  trierarchs.  Of  those  already  in  command,  .several  weie  deposed 
as  unworthy  of  trust;  others  being  selected  in  their  places,  especially 
Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyllus.  The  assembly  was  not  held  for  elec- 
tion alone.  It  was  a  scene  of  effusive  sympathy,  animating  eloquence 
and  patriotism  generous  as  well  as"  resolute.  The  united  armament 
felt  that  thci/  were  the  real  Athens;  the  guardians  of  her  constitution 
—the  uphohlers  of  lier  remaining  empire  and  glory — the  protectors  of 
her  citizens  at  home  against  those  conspirators  who  had  intruded 
themselves  wrongfully  into  the  Senate-house — the  sole  barrier,  even 
for  those  conspirators  themselves,  against  the  hostile  Peloponnesian 
fleet.     '' IVie  city  has  fe Dotted  from  W8 "  (exclaimed  Thrasybulus  and 


216 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


ALKIBIADES  COMES  TO  SAMOS. 


others  in  pregnant  words  wliich  embodied  a  wliole  train  of  feelinM 

"But  let  not   tliis  abate  our  courage:  for  they  are  only  the  les^r 

force— we  are  tlie  greater  and  ^le  self-sutlicing.     We  have  here  Vhe 

wliole  navy  of  the  state,  whereby  we  can  insure  to  ourselves  the  cuu 

tnbutions  trora  our  dependencies  just  as  well  as  if  we  started  from 

Athens.     We  have  the  hearty  attachment  of  ISamos,  second  in  power 

only  to  Athens  herself,  and  serving  us  as  a  militarv  station  iioaiimt 

the  enemy,  now  as  in  the  past.     We  are  better  able  to  obtain  supplies 

lor  ourselves  than   those  in  the  city  for  themselves;  for  it  is  only 

through  our  presence  at   Sanios   that   they  have  hitherto  kept  the 

mouth  of  Peir*us  open.     If  they  refuse  to  restore  to  us  our  demo- 

cratical  consiitution,  we  shall  be  better  able  to  exclude  them  from 

the  sea  than  they  lo  exclude  us.     What  indeed  does  the  city  do  now 

for  us  to  second  our  efforts  against  the  enemy?    Little  or  nothing 

We  have  lost  nothing  by  their  separation.     They  send  us  no  pav- 

they  leave  us  to  provide  maintenance  for  ourselves— they  are  now  out 

of  condition  for  sending  us  even  good  counsel,  which  is  the  great 

superiority  of  a  city  over  a  camp.     As  counselors,  we  here  are  better 

than  they-.  lor  they  have  just  committed  the  wrong  of  subverting  llie 

constitution  of  our  common  country,  while  we  are  striving  to  niaiii- 

tain  It,  and  will  do  our  ])est  to  force  them  into  the  same  track      Alki- 

biades.  if  we  insure  to  him  a  safe  restoration,  will  cheerfully  brinff 

the  alliance  of  Persia  to  sustain  us;  and  even  if  the  worst  comes  to 

the  worst— if  all  other  hopes  fail  us— our  powerful  naval  force  will 

alwjiys  enable  us  to  find  places  of  refuge   n  abundance,  with  city  and 

territory  adequate  to  our  wants." 

Sucli  was  the  encouraging  language  ot  Thrasyllus  and  Thrasybulu^^ 
winch  found  full  sympathy  in  the  armament,  and  raised  amonothem 
a  spirit  of  energetic  patriotism  and  resolution,  not  unworthy  of  their 
forefathers  when  refugees  at  Salamis  under  the  invasion  of  Xerxts 
To  regain  their  democracy  and  to  sustain  the  war  against  the  IVlo- 
ponuesians,  were  impulses  alike  ardent  and  blended  in  the  same  tide 
of  generous  enthusiasm:  a  tide  so  vehment  as  to  sweep  before  it  tlie 
reluctance  of  that  minority  who  had  before  been  inclined  lo  the  oli- 
.  garchical  moveujent.  But  besides  these  two  impulses,  there  was  also 
-  a  third  tending  towards  the  recall  of  Alkibiades;  a  coadjutor  if  in 
many  ways  useful,  yet  bringing  with  him  a  spirit  of  selfishness  and 
duplicity  uncongenial  to  the  exalted  sentiment  now  all-powerful  at 
bamos.  ^ 

This  exile  had  been  the  first  to  originate  the  oligarchical  conspiracy, 
Whereby  Athens,  already  scarcely  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  lier 
loreign  war,  was  now  paralyzed  iu  courage  and  torn  by  civil  discoid 
—preserved  from  absolute  ruin  only  by  that  counter-enthusiasm 
whieli  a  fortunate  turn  of  circumstances  had  raised  up  at  Sanios. 
Having  at  first  duped  the  conspirators  themselves  and  enabled  them 
to  (lupe  the  sincere  democrats,  by  promising  Persian  aid,  and  thus 
noatmg  the  plot  over  its  ftrst  and  greatest  difficulties— Alkibiades  had 


217 


found  himself  constrained  to  break  with  them  as  soon  as  the  time 
cnine  for  roalizing  his  pnmiises.  But  he  had  broken  off  with  so  much 
luldress  as  still  to  keep  up  the  illusion  that  he  muM  realize  them  if  he 
ciiose.  His  return  by  means  of  the  oligarchy  being  now  impossible, 
he  naturally  became  its  enemy,  and  this  new  antipathy  superseded  his 
feeling  or  revenge  against  the  democracy  for  having  banished  him. 
In  fact  he  was  disposed  (as  Phrynichus  liad  truly  said  about  him)  to 
avail  himself  indifferently  of  either,  according  as  the  one  or  the  other 
presented  itself  as  a  serviceable  agency  for  his  ambitious  views.  Ac-. 
cordingly,  as  soon  as  the  turn  of  aifa'irs  at  Samos  had  made  itself 
manifest,  he  opened  communication  with  Thrasybulus  and  the  de- 
inocratical  leaders,  renewing  to  them  the  same  promises  of  Persian 
alliance,  on  condition  of  his  own  restoration,  as  he  had  before  made 
to  Peisander  and  the  oligarchical  party.  Thrasybulus  and  his  cob 
leagues  either  sincerely  believed  him,  or  at  least  thought  that  his  re- 
storation afforded  a  possibility  not  to  be  neglected,  of  obtaining  Per- 
sian aid,  without  which  they  despaired  of  the  war.  Such  possibility 
would  at  least  infuse  spirit  into  the  soldiers:  while  the  restoration  was 
now  proposed  without  the  terrible  condition  which  had  before  accom- 
panied it,  of  renouncing  the  dcmocratical  constitution. 

It  was  not  without  (fiiKculty,  however,  nor  until  after  more  than 
one  assembly  and  discussionl^  that  Thrasybulus  prevailed  on  the 
armament  to  pass  a  vote  of  security  and  restoration  to  Alkibiades. 
As  Athenian  citizens,  the  soldiers  probably  were  unwilling  to  take 
upon  them  the  revers  il  of  a  sentence  solemnly  passed  by  the  demo- 
cratical  tribunal,  on  the  ground  of  irreligion  with  suspicion  of  trea- 
son. They  were,  however,  induced  to  pass  the  vote,  after  which 
Thrasybulus  sailed  over  to  the  Asiatic  coast,  brought  across  Alkibi- 
ades to  the  island,  and  introduced  him  to  the  assembled  armament. 
The  supple  exile,  who  had  denounced  the  democracy  so  bitterly  both 
at  Sparta,  and  in  his  correspondence  with  the  oligarchical  conspira- 
tors, knew  well  how  to  adapt  himself  to  the  sympathies  of  the 
dcMiocratictd  asscMuoly  now  before  him.  He  began  by  deploring  the 
sentence  of  banishment  passed  against  him,  and  throwing  the  blame 
0^  it,  not  upon  the  injustice  of  his  countrymen,  but  upon  his  own 
niihappy  destiny.  He  then  entered  upon  the  public  prospects  of  the 
momenf.  pledging  himself  with  entire  confidence  to  realize  the  hopes 
of  Persian  alliance,  and  boasting  in  terms  not  merely  ostentatious 
bill  even  extravagant,  of  the  ascendant  influence  which  he  possessed 
over  Tissaphernes.  The  satrap  had  promised  him  (so  the  speech 
wx'nt  on)  never  to  let  the  Athenians  want  for  pay,  as  soon  as  he  once 
eime  to  trust  them;  not  even  if  it  were  necessary  to  issue  out  his  last 
daric  or  to  coin  his  own  silver  couch  into  money.  Nor  would  he 
require  any  farther  condition  to  induce  him  to  trust  them,  except 
that  Alkibiades  should  be  restored  and  should  become  their  guarantee 
Not  only  would  he  furnish  the  Athenians  with  pay,  but  he  would, 
besides,  bring  up  to  their  aid  the  Phenician  fleet,  which  was  already 


218 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


THE  ENVOYS  REACH  SAMOS. 


219 


at  Aspendus— iDstead  of  placing  it  at  the  disposal  of  tlie  Peloncn- 
nesians.  ^  ' 

In  the  communication  of  Alkibiadcs  ^vith  Pci>andcr  and  his  cond- 
jutors,  Alkibiadcs  had  pretended  that  the  Great  Kinii- could  liave  no 
confidence  in  the  Atlieuians  unless  thev  not  onlv  restored  him   but 
abnegated  their  democracy.     On  this  occa.^ion,  ihe  latter  C(md'iti()ii 
was  withdrawn,  and  the  confidence  of  the  Great  King  was  said  to  lie 
more  easily  accorded.     But  altiiougli  Alkibiadcs  thus  presented  liini- 
ceif  wilha  new  falsehood,  as  well  as  with  a  new  vein  of  politieal 
sentmient,  his  discourse  Mas  cminentlv  successful.     It  answered  all 
the  vtirious  luirposes  which  he  contc mi.lated— parllv  of  intimidati'iMr 
and   disunitmg   the  oligarchical   conspirators  at   Imme  — partly  of 
exaltmghis  own  grandeur  in  the  eves  of  the  armament— partly  of 
sowmg  mistrust  between  the  Spartans  and  Tissaphernes.     It  wa's  in 
such  lull  harmony  with  both  the  reiiininirfeeliuus  of  the  armament- 
eagerness  to  jnit  down  the  Four  Hundred,  as  well  as  to  act  the 
better  of  their  Peloponnesian  enemies  in  Ionia— that  the  licarerswere 
not  disjwscd  to  scrutinize   narrowly   the  grounds   upon  Avhich  Lis 
assurances  rested.     In  the  fullness  of  contidence  and  enthusiasm   they 
elected  hnn  general  alo/jg  with  Thrasvbulus  and  the  rest,  conceiviii''- 
redoiibled  hopes  of  victory  over  theirVnemies  both  at  Athens  and  ni 
3Iiletus.     So  comi)letely  indeed  were  their  imaginations  tilled  with 
the  prospect  of  Persian  aid.  against  their  enemies  in  Ionia,  that  alarm 
for  tlie  danger  of  Athens  under  the  government  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred became  the  predominant  feeling;  and  many  voices  were  even 
rallied  in  favor  of  sailing  to  Peineus  for  the  rescue  of  the  city.     But 
Alkibiade^,  knowing  well  (what  the  aimament  did  not  know)  that 
li!s  own  promises  of  Pei'sian  pay  and  tlcc-t  were  a  mere  delusion, 
strenuously  dissuaded  such  a  movement,  which  w ould  have  left  the 
dependencies  in  Ionia  defenseless  against  the  Pel(»i»onnesians.     As 
soon  as  the  assembly  broke  up,  he  crossed  over  airain  to  the  mainland, 
under  pretense  of  concerting  measures  with  Tl^saphernes  to  realize 
his  recent  engagements. 

_  Relieved,  sul)stantially  thousrlj  not  in  strict  form,  from  the  penal- 
ties of  e.xile,  Alkihiades  was  thus  launched  in  a  new  career.  After 
having  tirst  played  the  game  of  Athens  airj,inst  Sparta,  next  that  of 
Sjuirat  against  Athens,  thirdly  that  of  Tissaphernes  atrainst  both— he 
now  processed  to  take  up  again  the  promotion  of  Athenian  interests. 
In  reality,  however,  he  was.  and  always  had  been,  plavinir  his  owa 
game,  or  obeying  his  own  self-interest,  ambition,  or  antipathy  lie 
was  at  this  time  ea-er  to  make  a  show  of  intimate  and  eonti'dcnlial 
communication  with  Tissaphernes,  in  order  that  he  miLdit  therei)V 
impose  upon  the  Athenians  at  Samos;  to  communicate  to  the  satir.p 
his  recent  election  as  general  of  the  Athenijui  force,  that  his  imi)or- 
tance  with  the  Persians  might  be  enhanced;  and  lastly,  by  passint; 
backward  and  forward  from  Tissaphernes  to  the  Athenian  camp. 
to|exhibU  an  apncHrauce  of  friendly  concert  between  the  two,  which 


niiglit  sow  mistrust  and  alarm  in  the  minds  of  the  Peloponnesians  In 
this  tripartite  maneuvering,  so  suitable  to  his  habitual  character  he 
was  more  or  less  successful;  especially  in  regard  to  the  latter  purpose 
For  though  he  never  had  any  serious  chance  of  inducing  Tissa- 
])hernes  to  assist  the  Athenians,  he  did  nevertheless  contrTbute  to 
alienate  him  from  the  enemy,  as  well  as  the  enemy  from  him 

Without  any  longer  delay  in  the  camp  of  Tissaphernes  than  was 
necessary  to  keep  up  the  faith  of  the  Athenians  in  his  promise  of 
Persian  aid,  Alkibiadcs  returned  to  Samos,  where  he  was  found  by 
the  ten  envoys  sent  by  the  Four  Hundred  from  Athens  on  their  first 
arrival.     These  envoys  had  been  long  in  their  voyage;  having  made 
a  considerable  stay  at  Delos,  under  alarm  from  ^intelligence  of  the 
previous  visit   of  Chiereas,  and  the  furious  indignation  which  his 
narrative  had  provoked.     At  length  thev  reached  Samos,  and  were 
invited  by  the  generals  to  make  their  communication  to  the  assembled 
armament.     Tliey  had  the  utmost  difticulty  in  procuring  a  hearing— 
so  strong  was  the  antipathy  against  them— so  loud  w^ere  the  cries 
that  the  subverters  of  the  democracy  ought  to  be  put  to  death 
Silence  being  at  length  attained,  they  proceeded  to  state  that  the  late 
revolution  had  been  brought  to  pass  for  the  salvation  of  the  city  and 
and  especially  for  the  economy  of  the  public  treasury,  by  suppressiu*^ 
the  salaried  civil  functions  of  the  democracy,  and  thus  lea\ing  more 
pay  for  the  soldiers:  that  there  was  no  purpose  of  mischief  in  the 
change,  still  less  of  betrayal  to  the  enemy,  which  might  already  have 
been  effected,  had  such  been  the  intention  of  the^Four  Hundred 
when  Agis  advanced  from  Dekeleia  up  to  the  walls:  that  the  citizens 
now  possessing  the  political  franchise,  were,  not  Four  Hundred  only 
but  Five  Thousand  in  number,  all  of  whom  would  take  their  turn  iii 
rotation  for  the  places  now  occupied  by  the. Four  Hundred:  that  the 
recitals  of  Chareas,  afiirming  ill-usage  to  have  been  offered  to  the 
relatives  of  the  soldiers  at  Athens,  were  utterly  false  and  calumnious 
biich  were  the  topics  on  which  the  envoys  insisted,  in  an  apolo- 
getic strain,  at  considerable  length,  but  without  any  effect  in  concil- 
lutiiig  the  soldiers  who  heard  them.     The  general  resentment  against 
the  l^our  Hundred  was  expressed  by  several  persons  present  in  public 
speech,   by  others  m  private  manifestation   of   feeling  against   the 
euvoys:  and  so  passionately  was  this  sentiment  aggravated— consist- 
ing not  only  of  wrath  for  what  the  oligarchy  had  done,  but  of  fear 
lor  what  they  might  do— that  the  proposition  of  sailing  immediately 
to  the  Peirjeus  was  revived  with  greater  ardor  than  before.     Alkibi- 
ades,  who  had  already  once  discountenanced  this  design,  now  stood 
lonvaril  to  repel  it  again.     Nevertheless  all  the  plentitude  of  his 
mtluence,  then  greater  than  .that  of  any  other  officer  in  the  armament 
and  seconded  by  the  esteemed  character  as  well  as  the  loud  voice  of 
ihrasybuliis,  was  retpiired  to  avert  it.    But  for  him  it  would  have 
oeen  executed.     While  he  repfoved  and  silenced  those  wiio  were 
most  clamorous  against  the  envoys,  he  took  •upon  himself  to  give 


220 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


RETURX  OF  THE  ENVOYS  TO  ATHENS. 


221 


{ 


to  the  latter  a  public  answer  in  the  name  of  the  collective  armi- 
meut.  "  We  make  no  objection  (he  said)  to  the  power  of  tlie  Five 
Thonsand:  but  the  Four  Hundred  must  1,-0  about  their  business  ami 
reinstate  tlie  Senate  of  Five  Hundred  as  it  was  before.  We  are  lumh 
obli!j:ed  for  what  you  have  done  in  the  way  of  economy,  so  as  to 
increase  the  pay  available  for  the  soldiers.  Above  all.  maintain  llie 
war  strenuously,  without  any  flinching  before  the  enemy.  For  if  the 
city  be  now  safely  held,  there  is  good  hope  that  we  may  make  up 
the  mutual  ditferences  between  us  by  amicable  settlement;  but  if 
once  either  of  us  perish,  either  we  here  or  you  at  home,  there  m\\ 
be  nothin*,^  left  for  the  other  to  make  up  with." 

With  this  reply  he  dismissed  the  envoys;  the  armament  reluctantly 
abandoning  their  wish  of  sailing  to  Athens. 

Thucydides  insists  much  on  the  capital  service  which  Alkibiadcs 
then  rendered  to  his  country,  by  arresting  a  project  which  would 
have  had  the  effect  of  leaving  all  Ionia  and  the  Hellespont  defenseless 
against  the  Peloponnesians.     His  advice  doubtless  turned  out  well  in 
the  result;  yet  if  we  contemplate  the  state  of  affairs  at  the  nionuiit 
when  he  gave  it,  we  shall  be  inclined  to  doubt  whether  prudential 
calculation  was  not  rather  againsc  liim,  and  in  favor  of  the  impulse 
of  the  armament.     For  what  was  to  binder  the  Four  Hundred  from 
patching  up  a  piece  with  Spnrta,  and  getting  a  Lacedaemonian  garri- 
son mto  Athens  to  help  them  in  maintaining  their  dominion?    Even 
apart  from  ambition,  this  was  their  best  chance,  if  not  their  only 
chance,  of  safety  for  themselves:  and  we  shall  presently  see  that 
they  tried  to  do  it— being  prevented  from  succeeding,  partly  indeed 
by  the  mutiny  which  arose  against  them  at  Athens,  but  still  more 
by  the  stupidity  of   the   Lacedtvmonians   themselves.      Alkibiades 
could  not  really  imagine  that  the   Four  Hundred  would  ohev  his 
mandate  delivered  to  the  envoys,  and  resign  their  power  voluniarily. 
But  if  they  remained  masters  of  Athens,  who  could  calculate  what 
they  would  do— after  having  received  this  declaration  of  hostility 
from  Samos— not  merely  in  regard  to  the  foreign  enemy,  but  even 
in  regard  to  the  relatives  of  the  absent  soldiers?    Whether  we  look 
to  the  legitimate  apprehensions  of  the  soldiers,  inevitable  while  their 
relatives  were  thus  exposed,  and  almost  unnervinu;  them  as  to  the 
hearty  prosecution  of  the  war  abroad  in  their  utteiMincertainty  with 
regard  to  matters  at  home— or  to  the  chance  of  irreparable  iniblic 
calamity,  greater  even  than  the  loss  of  Ionia,   bv  the  betrayal  of 
Athens  to  the  enemy— we  shall  be  disposed  to  conclude  that  the 
impulse  of  the  armament  was  not  merely  natural,  but  even  founded 
on  a  more  prudent  estimate  of  the  actual  chances,  and  that  Alkibi- 
ades was  nothing  more  than  fortunate  in  a  sanguine  venture.    And 
if,  instead  of  the  actual  chances,  we  look  to  the  chances  as  Alkibiades 
represented,  and  as  the  armament  conceived  them  upon  his  authority 
—viz     that  the  Phenician  fleet  was  #lose  at  hand  to  act  against  the 
Lacedajiuoniaus  in  lo^iia— we  shall  sympathize  yet  more"  with  tlie 


defensive  movement  homeward.     Alkibiades  had  an  advanta^-e  over 
every  one  else,  simply  by  knowing  his  own  falsehoods.  ° 

At  the  same  asseml)ly  were  introduced  envoys  from  Aro-os  bear- 
ing a  mission  of  recognition  and  an  offer  of  aid  to  the  Athenian 
Demos  in  Samos.     They  came  in  an  Athenian  trireme,  navi'^ated 
by  the  Parali   who   had    brought   home   Chaireas  in  the  Paralus 
from    Samos   to  Athens,    and    had    lieeu   then   transferred  into  a 
, common  ship  of  war,  and  sent  to  cruise  about  EubcBa.     Since  that 
♦time,  however,  they  had  been  directed  to  convey  La)spodias,  Aristo- 
phon,  and  Melesias,   as  ambassadors  from  the  Four  Huridred  to 
Sparta.     But  when  crossing  the  Argolic  Gulf,  probably  under  orders 
to  land  at  Prasia?,  they  declared  against  the  oligarchy,   sailed  to 
Argos,  and  their  deposited  as  prisoners  the  three  ambassadors,  who 
had  all  been  active  in  the  conspiracy  of  the  Four  Hundred.     Being 
then  about  to  depart  for  Samos,  they  were  requested  by  the  Arireians 
to  carry  thither  their  envoys,  who  were  dismissed  by  Alkibiades  with 
an  expression  of  gratitude,  and  with  a  hope  that  their  aid  would  be 
ready  when  called  for. 

Meanwhile  the  envoj^s  returned  from  Samos  to  Athens,  carryin*' 
back  to  the  Four  Hundred  the  unwelcome  news  of  their  total  failure 
with  the  armament.     A  little  before,  it  appears,  some  of  the  trier- 
archs  on  service  at  the  Hellespont  had  returned  to  Athens  also— 
Eratosthenes,  latrokles,  and  others,  who  had  tried  to  turn  their  squad- 
ron to  the  purposes  of  the  oliizarchical  conspirators,  but  had  been 
batfled  and  driven  off  by  the  in  flexible  democracy  of  their  own  sea- 
men.   If  at  Athens  the  calculations  of  these  conspirators  had  suc- 
ceeded more  triumphantly  than  could  have  been  expected  beforehand 
everywhere  else   they  had   completely   miscarried;    not  merely  at 
Samos  and  in  the  fleet,  but  also  with  the  allied  dependencies      At 
the  time  when  Peisander  quitted  Samos  for  Athens  to  consummate 
the  oligarchical  conspiracy  even  without  Alkibiades,  he  and  others 
had  pone  round  many  of  the  dependencies  and  had  effected  a  similar 
revolution  in  their  internal  government,  in  hopes  that  they  would 
thus  become  attached  to  the   new  oligarchy  at  Athens.      But  this 
anticipation  (as  Phrynichus  had  predicted)  was  nowhere  realized. 
the  newly-created  oligarchies  only  became  more  anxious  for  com- 
plete autonomy  than  the  democracies  had  been  before.     At  Thasos 
especially,  a  body  of  exiles  who  had  for  some  time  dwelt  in  Pelopon- 
nesus were  recalled,  and  active  preparations  were  made  for  revolt 
by  new  fortifications  as  well  as  by  new  triremes.     Instead  of  streno-th* 
enum-  their  hold  on  the  maritime  empire,  the  Four  Hundied  thus 
ound  that  they  had  actually  weakened  it;  while  the  pronounced 
lostihty  of  the  armament  at  Samos  not  only  put  an  end  to  all  their 
"opes  abroad,  but  rendered  their  situation  at  home  altocrether  ore- 
carious.  ^  ^ 

From  the  moment  when  the  coadjutors  of  Antiphon  first  learnt 
trough  the  arrival  of  Cha^reas  at  Athens,  the  proclamation  of  the 


222 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


ANTIPHON  AND  PHRYNICHUS. 


223 


deniocraoy  at  Samos— discord,  mistmst,  and  alarm  began  to  spread 
even  anionsr  their  own  members;  together  witli  a  conviction  that  the 
oligarchy  could  never  stand  except  tlirough  the  presence  of  a  Pelo- 
]Kmncsian  garrison  in  Athens.  Antiphon  and  Phrynichus,  the  lead- 
ing minds  who  directed  the  majority  of  the  Four  Hundred,  dispatch- 
ed envoys  to  Si>arta  for  concluding  peace  (these  envoys  never  leached 
Sparta,  being  seized  by  the  Parali  and  sent  ]>risoners  to  Argos,  as 
above  stated).  They  further  commenced  the  erection  of  a  special 
fort  at  Eelioneia,  the  projecting  mole  wliich  contracted  and  eoni- 
inMiidcd,  on  the  northern  side,  the  narrow  entrance  of  Peira'us. 
Against  their  ])roceedings,  liowever,  there  began  to  arise,  even  in  the 
tK)som  of  the  Four  Hundred,  an  opposition  minority  aiTecting  popu 
lar  sentiment,  among  whom  the  most  conspicuous  persons  were 
Theramenes  and  Aristocrates. 

Though  these  two  men  had  stood  forward  prominently  as  contriv- 
ers and  actors  throughout  the  whole  progress  of  the  conspiracy,  thty 
liad  found  themselves  bitterly  disappointed  by  the  result.  Individu- 
ally, their  ascendency  with  their  colleagues  was  inferior  to  that  of 
Peisander,  Kalla'schrus,  Phrynichus,  and  others;  while,  collectively, 
the  ill-gotten  power  of  the  Fo\ir  Hundred  was  diminished  in  value,  as 
much  as  it  was  aggravated  in  peril,  by  the  loss  of  the  foreign  empire  acd 
the  alienation  of  Uieir  Samian  armament.  Now  began  the  worlvings  of 
jealousy  aiid  strife  among  the  successful  conspirators,  each  of  wlioni 
iiad  entered  into  the  scheme  with  unbomided  expectations  of  per- 
sonal ambition  for  himself — each  had  counted  on  stcpi)ing  at  once 
into  the  first  place  among  the  new  oligarchical  body.  In  a  democracy 
(observes  Thucydides)  contentions  for  power  and  pre-eminence  pro- 
voke in  the  unsuecessful  competitors  less  of  fierce  antipathy  and  sense 
of  injustice  than  in  an  oligarchy;  for  the  losing  candidates  acquiesce 
with  comparatively  little  repugnance  in  the  unfavorable  vote  of  a 
large  miscellaneous  body  of  unknown  citizens;  but  they  are  angrvat 
being  put  aside  by  a  few  known  comrades,  their  rivals  as  well  as 
their  e(iuals:  moreover  at  the  moment  when  an  oligarchy  of  ambi- 
tious men  has  just  raised  itself  on  the  ruins  of  a  democracy,  every 
man  of  the  conspirators  is  in  exaggerated  expectation — every  oue 
thinks  himself  entitled  to  become  at  once  the  first  man  of  the  1  ody, 
and  is  dissatisfied  if  he  be  merely  put  upon  a  level  with  the  rest. 

Such  were  the  feelings  of  disappointed  ambition,  nungled  uilh 
despondency,  which  sjirung  np  among  a  minority  of  the  Four  Iliui 
dretl.  immediately  after  the  news  of  tlie  proclamation  of  the  denioe- 
lacy  at  Samos  among  the  armament.  Theramenes,  the  leader  of 
this  minority — a  man  of  keen  ambition,  clever  but  unsteady  and 
treacherous, 'not  less  ready  to  desert  his  party  than  to  l)etray  his 
country,  though  less  prepared  for  extreme  atrocities  than  many  of  his 
oligarchical  comrades — began  to  look  out  for  a  good  pretense  to  dis- 
conn'>ct  himself  from  a  precarious  enterprise.  Taking  advantage  of 
the  delusion  which  the  Four  Hundred  had  themselves  Iield  out  al)oiit 


the  fictitious  Five  Thousand,  he  insisted  that  since  the  dann-ers  that 
bes.'l  the  newly-formed  authority  were  so  much  more  formidable 
than  had  been  anticipated,  it  was  necessary  to  popularize  the  party 
by  enrolling  and  producing  these  Five  Thousand  as  a  real  instead  of 
a  lieiiiious  body. 

Such  an  opposition,  formidable  from  the  very  outset,  became  still 
bolder  and  more  developed  when  the  envoys  returned  from  Samos 
with  an  account  of  their  reception  by  the  armament,  as  well  as  of  the 
answer,  delivered  in  the  name  of  the  armament,  whereby  Alkibiades 
directed  the  Four  Hundred  to  dissolve  themselves  forthwith,  but  at  the 
same  time  approved  of  the  constitution  of  the  Five  Thousand,  coupled 
with  the  restoration  of  the  old  senate.    To  enroll  the  Five  Thousand  at 
ouce,  would  be  meeting  the  army  half-way;  and  there  were  hopes 
that  at  that  price  a  compromise  and  reconciliation  might  be  effected 
of  which  Alkibiades  had  himself  spoken  as  practicable.    In  addition 
to  the  formal  answer,  the  envoys  doubtless  brought  b:ick  inliuiatioii 
of  the  enraged  feelings  manifested  by  the  armament,  and  of  their 
eagerness,  uncontrollable  by  every  one  except  Alkibiades,   to  sail 
home  forthwith  and  rescue  Athens  from  the  Four  Hundred.     Hence 
arose  an  increased  conviction  that  the  dominion  of  the  latter  could 
not  last;  and  an  ambition,  on  the  part  of  others  as  well  as  Theramenes 
to  stand  forward  as  leaders  of  a  popular  opposition  against  it,  in  the 
name  of  the  Five  Thousand. 

Against  this  popular  opposition,  Antiphon  and  Phrynichus  exerted 
themselves  with  demagogic  assiduity  to  caress  and  keep  together  the 
majority  of  the  Four  Hutidred,  as  well  as  to  uphold  their  power 
without  abridgment.  They  were  noway  disposed  to  comply  with 
this  requisition  that  the  fiction  of  the  Five  Thousand  should  be  con- 
verted into  a  reality.  They  knew  well  that  the  enrollment  of  so  many 
l)artners  would  be  tantamount  to  a  democracy,  and  would  be  in  sut> 
stance  at  least,  if  not  in  form,  an  annihilation  of  their  own  power 
They  had  now  gone  too  far  to  recede  with  safety;  while  the  mena'- 
cing  attitude  of  Samos,  as  w^ell  as  the  opposition  growing  up  against 
them  at  homj  both  within  and  without  their  own  body,  served  only 
as  instigation  to  them  to  accelerate  their  measures  for  peace  with 
bparta  and  to  secure  the  introduction  of  a  Spartan  garrison. 

With  this  view,  immediately  after  the  return  of  their  envoys  from 
oamos,  the  two  most  eminent  leaders,  Antiphon  and  Phrynichus 
went  themselves  with  ten  other  colleagues  in  all  haste  to  Sparta  pre- 
pared to  puiv'iase  peace  and  the  promise  of  Spai-tan  aid  almost  at 
any  price.  At  the  same  time  the  construction  of  the  fortress  at 
Mioiieia  was  prosecuted  with  redoubled  zeal;  under  pretense  of 
(leteuding  tlie  entrance  of  Peineus  against  the  armament  from  Samos, 
II  the  threat  ;)f  their  coming  should  be  executed— but  with  the  real 
purpose  of  biinging  into  it  a  Lacedaemonian  fleet  and  army.  For 
this  latter  object  every  facility  was  •provided.  The  north-western 
corner  of  the  fortification  of  Peira^us,  to  the  north  of  the  harbor  and 


224 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


ASSASSINATION  OF  PHRYNICHUS.. 


225 


its  mouth,  was  cut  off  by  a  cross  wall  rcachinc:  southward  so  as  to 
join  tlie  harbor:  from  the  soutlR-rn  end  of  tliis  cross  wall,  and  form- 
ing an  angle  with  it,  a  new  wall  was  built,  fronting  the  harbor  nr.d 
ruaning  to  the  extremity  of  the  mole  which  narrowed  the  mouth  of 
the  harbor  on  the  northern  side,  at  which  mole  it  met  the  terniiii.r 
tion  of  the  northern  wall  of  Peiraius.  A  separate  citadel  was  thus 
inclosed,  defensible  against  any  attack  from  Peira?us — furnished  l»o- 
sides  with  di>tiuct  broad  gates  and  posterns  of  its  own,  as  well  ;is 
with  facilities  for  admitting  an  enemy  within  it.  Tlie  new  cross  wnil 
was  carried  so  as  to  traverse  a  vast  portico  or  open  market-house, 
the  largest  in  Peira'us:  the  larger  half  of  this  portico  thus  becnnic 
inclosed  within  the  new  ciladel,  and  orders  were  issued  that  all  tlio 
corn,  both  actually  warehoused  and  hereafter  to  be  imported  into 
Peincus,  should  Ix)  dei>osited  therein  and  sold  out  from  thence  for 
consumption.  As  Athens  was  sustained  almost  exclusively  on  com 
brought  from  Euboea  and  elsewhere,  since  the  permanent  orcuivitioii 
of  Dekeleia,  the  Four  Hundred  rendered  themselves  masters  by  this 
arrangement  of  all  the  suUistenceof  the  citizens,  as  well  as  of  tlic 
entrance  into  the  harbor;  eitlier  to  admit  the  Spartans  or  exclude  the 
armament  from  Samos. 

Though  Theramenes,  himself  one  of  the  generals  named  under  the 
Four  Hundred,  denounced,  in  conjunction  Avith  his  supporters,  the 
treasonable  purpose  of  this  new  citadel — yet  the  majority  of  the  Four 
Hundred  stood  to  their  resolution,  so  that  the  building  made  lapid 
progress  under  the  superintendence  of  the  general  Akxikles,  one  of 
the  most  strenuous  of  the  oligarchical  faction.  Such  was  the  habit  of 
obedience  at  Athens  to  an  established  authority,  when  once  consti- 
tuted— and  so  gi'cat  the  fear  and  mistrust  arising  out  of  the  general 
belief  in  the  reality  of  the  Five  Thousand,  unknown  auxiliaiies  sup- 
posed to  be  prepared  to  enforce  the  orders  of  tl»e  Four  Hurdrcd— 
that  the  people,  and  even  armed  citizen  hoplites,  went  on  working  at 
the  building,  in  spite  of  their  suspicions  as  to  its  design.  Though 
not  completed,  it  was  so  far  advanced  as  to  be  defensible,  when  An- 
tiphon  and  Phrynichus  returned  from  Sparta.  They  had  gone  thither 
prepared  to  surrender  everything — not  merely  their  naval  force,  hut 
their  city  itself — and  to  purchase  their  own  personal  safety  by  making 
tlie  Liicedjcmonians  masters  of  Pein^us.  Yet  we  read  with  astonish- 
ment that  the  latter  could  not  be  prevailed  on  to  contract  any  treaty, 
and  that  they  manifested  nothing  but  backwardness  in  seizing  this 
golden  opportunity.  Had  Alkibiades  been  now  playing  tlieir  game, 
as  he  had  been  doing  a  year  earlier,  immediately  before  the  revolt  of 
Chios — had  they  been  under  an}'  energetic  leaders  to  impel  them  into 
hearty  co-operation  with  the  treason  of  the  Four  Hundred,  who  com- 
bined at  this  moment  both  the  will  and  the  power  to  place  Athens  in 
their  hands,  if  seconded  by  an  adequate  force — they  might  now  have 
overpowered  their  gieat  enemy  at  home,  before  tlie  armament  at 
Samos  could  have  been  brought  to  the  rescue 


Considering  that  Athens  was  saved  from  capture  only  by  the  slack- 
ness and  stupidity  of  the  Spartans,  we  may  see  that  the  armament  at 
bamos  had  reasonable  excuse  for  their  eagerness  previouslv  manifested 
to  c:)rne  home;  and  that  Alkibiades,  in  combating  that  intention 
braved  an  ex  reme  danger  which,  nothing  but  incredible  good  fortune 
averted.     Why  the  Lacedremonians  remained  idle,  both  in  Pelopon 
nesus  and  at  Dekeleia.  while  Athens  was  thus  betrayed  and  in  tTe 
very  throes  of  dissolution,  we  can  render  no  account:  oossibly  t  e 
caution  of  the  Epliors  may  liave  distrusted  Antiphon  and  Phrvnicli  ^ 
from  the  mere  immensity  of  their  concessions.     All  that  tliev^  wonld 
promise  was,  that  a  Lacedaemonian  fleet  of  42  triremes  (partly  from 
Tareutuni  and  Lokri)-now  ai)out  to  start  from  Las  in  t  e  Laconic  i 
Gulf,  and  to  sail  to  Eubcea  on  the  invitation  of  a  disaffectc^'^^^^^^^ 
that  island-should  so  far  depart  from  its  straight  course  as  to  hover 
near  ^^gina  and  Peineus  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  opportunity 
for  attack  laid  open  by  the  Four  Hundred  ^ 

Of  this  squadron  however,  even  before  it  rounded  Cane  Malea 
Theramenes  obtained  intelligence,  and  denounced  it  as  intended  to 
operate  in  concert  with  the  Four  Hundred  for  the  occupation  of  Eeti- 
oneia  Meanwhile  Athens  became  daily  a  scene  of  greater  discontent 
and  disorder,  after  the  abortive  embassy  and  return  from  Sparta  of 
Antiphon  and  Phrvnicaius.  The  coeiTive  ascendency  of  ^he  Four 
Hundred  was  silently  disappearing,  while  the  hatred^  which   the  r 

em  l^Mtl?  H  f  ^  'IT'''^'  '""^f"''  ^''^'  '^''  ^'^'^^  their  traitorous  con- 
cert with  the  public  enemy,  became  more  and  more  loudly  manifest- 
ed  in  men  s  private  conversations,  as  well  as  in  gatherings  JeSetly^ot 
ogether  within  numerous  houses;  especially  the  house  of  t^ieSSo 
roll  (the  captain  of  the  peripoli,  or  youthful  hoplites  wlm  form^ed  he 
chief  police  of  the  country).     Such  hatred  was  not  Ion-  in  passing  • 
from  vehement  passion  into  act.     Phrynichus,  as  he  left'  the  Senate^ 
bouse,  was  assassinated   by  two  confederates,   one  of   them   a  nl 
ripohis,  or  youthful   hoplite,  in   the  midst  of  the  crowded  marl  e? 
place  and  in  full  daylight.     The  man  who  str  ck  X  blow  imde 

t%S"ofUil  Four's"  H^  ri  "^^"\"^"''  P"^  '"  tiZXl 
W  nnH  •  ^O"^^  Hundred  •  he  was  however  a  stranger,  from 
Argos  and  either  could  not  or  would  not  reveal  the  name  of  inv 
directing  accomplice.     Nothing  was  obtained  fro      him  exce  /4ne^ 

Fonf  r"'  fj^r''''^'  r'^  ^vide-spread  disaffection      &o?'lid 
lo  Hundred,  being  thus,  left  without  special  evidence    d  re 

si  fon  ''^s l"^'?"u^^^T'."-^^'  ?^  pronouncled   leader  of  t'^e  o> 

ie  r2~Ttr?i'\^"^T^^^^  ^^'"^  ^'-^  y^^"-'  afterwards,  under 

I  je  rule  ot  the  Thirty.     The  assassins  of  Phrvnichus  rem-iinino-  „n 

Sin  th":^^"^T^^^"^  Theramenes  and  his  a:;oci:rZ?a^ 
e£on  n  fl  7P<>«;t.on  than  before.  And  the  approach  of  the  Lac- 
MoS^Fnhl  "j^^er  Agesandridas-which,  having  now  taken  sta- 

0  fMr  niV  P  • '"''  ^'""u  "'^'^'^ ""  '^"'^'^""t  ^"  ^^■-•«a'  '-^"^l  was  hovering 
mur  off  Peineus,  altogether  out  of  the  straight  course  for  Eubcea— 

H.  G.  III.— 8 


226 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


DECLINE  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED. 


227 


lent  double  force  lo  all  their  previous  assertions  about  the  imminent 
dangers  connected  with  the  citadel  at  Eefioneia. 

Amidst  this  exaggerated  ahinn  and  discord,  the  general  body  of 
hoplites  became  penetrated  with  aversion,  every  day  incrcjisnii]:, 
against  the  new  citadel.  At  length  .the  hoplites  of  the  tribe  in  wiiicji 
Aristokrates  (the  warmest  partisan  of  Theramencs)  was  laxiarcii, 
being  on  duty  and  engaged  in  the  prosecution  of  the  building,  broke 
out  into  absolute  mutiny  against  it,  seized  the  person  of  Alcxikles, 
the  generjil  in  command,  and  put  him  under  arrest  in  a  neighboring 
house;  while  the  peripoli,  or  youthful  military  police,  stationed  ;a 
]VIun}chia,  under  Hermon,  abetted  tliem  in  the  x>roceeding.  News 
of  this  violence  was  speedily  conveyed  to  the  Four  Hundred,  ^vho 
were  at  that  moment  holding  session  in  the  Senate-house,  Theramenes 
himself  being  present.  Their  wrath  and  menace  were  at  first  vented 
against  him  as  the  instigator  of  the  revolt;  a  charge  against  which  lie 
could  only  vindicate  himself  by  volunteering  to  go  among  the  lure- 
most  for  the  liberation  of  the  prisoner.  He  forthwith  started  in 
liaste  for  the  Peirseus,  accompanied  by  one  of  the  generals  his  col- 
league, who  was  of  the  same  political  sentiment  as  himself.  A  third 
among  the  generals,  Aristarchus,  one  of  the  fiercest  of  the  oligarcfis, 
followed  him,  probably  from  mistrust,  together  with  some  of  the 
younger  Knights  (Horsemen  or  richert  class  in  the  state)  identified 
with  the  cause  of  the  Four  Hundred.  The  oligarchical  j^artisans  ran 
to  marshal  themselves  in  arms — alarming  exagirerations  being  ru- 
mored, that  Alexikles  had  been  put  to  death,  and  that  Peira'us  was 
under  armed  occupation;  while  at  PeiraMis  the  insurgents  imtigiiied 
tliat  the  hoplites  from  the  city  were  in  fidl  march  to  attack  them.  For 
a  time  all  was  confusion  and  angry  sentiment,  which  the  slightest  un- 
toward accident  might  have  infiamed  into  sanguinary  civil  carnage. 
Nor  was  it  appeased  except  by  earnest  entreaty  and  remonstranee 
from  the  elder  citizens  (aided  by  Thucydides  of  Pharsalus,  proxenns 
or  public  guest  of  Athens  in  his  native  town)  on  the  ruinous  madness 
of  such  discord  when  a  foreign  enemy  was  almost  at  their  gates. 

The  perilous  excitement  of  this  temporary  crisis,  which  brought 
into  full  daylight  every  man's  real  political  sentiments,  proved  ihc 
oligarchical  faction,  hitherto  exaggerated  in  number,  to  be  far  less 
Ipowerful  than  had  l)een  imagined  by  their  opponents.  And  the  Four 
Hundred  had  found  themselves  too  much  embarrassed  how  to  keep 
up  the  semblance  of  their  authority  even  in  Athens  itself,  to  be  aide 
to  send  down  any  considerable  force  for  the  protection  of  tlieir  citadel 
at  Eetioneia;  though  they  were  re-enforced,  only  eight  days  before 
llieir  fall,  by  at  least  one  supplementary  member,  probably  in  substi- 
tution for  some  predecessor  who  had  accidentally  died.  Theramenes. 
on  reaching  Peiranis,  ])egan  to  address  the  mutin(>us  hoplites  in  a 
tone  of  simulated  displeasure,  while  Aristarchus  and  his  oligareliicid 
companions  spoke  in  the  harshest  language,  and  threatened  tlieni  with 
the  force  which  they  imagined  to  be  presently  coming  down  fron^  the 


city.    But  these  menaces  were  met  by  equal  firmness  on  the  part  of  the 
hoplites,  who  even  ai)pealed  to  Theramenes  himself,  and  called  upon 
liiMi  to  say  whether  he  thought  the  construction  of  this  citadel  was  for 
the  good  of  Athens,  or  whether  it  would  not  be  better  demolished 
His  opinion  had  be;ju  fully  pronounced  beforehand;  and  he  replied 
that  if  they  thought  proper  to  demolish  it,  he  cordially  concurred 
AV ilhout  farther  delay,  hojilites  and  unarmed  people  mounted  pellmeli 
upon  the  walls,  and  commenced  the  demolition  with  alacrity  under 
the  g(!neral  shout— '^  Whoever  is  for  the  Five  Thousand  in  place  of 
the  !<  our  Hundred,  let  him  lend  a  hand  in  this  work  "    The  idea  of 
the  old  democracy  was  in  every  one's  mind,  but  no  man  uttered  the 
word;   the  fear  of  the  imaginary  Five  Thousand  still  continuing 
the  work  ot  demolition  seems  to  have  been  prosecuted  all  tliat  day 
and  not  to  have  been  completed  until  the  next  day  after  which 
the  hoplites  released  Alexikles  from  arrest,  without  doinff  him  anv 
injury.  °  ^ 

Two  things  deserve  notice,  among  these  details,  as  illustratino-  the 
Athenian  chafacter.  Though  Alexikles  was  vehemently  oligarchical 
as  well  as  unpopular,  these  mutineers  do  no  harm  to  his  person  but 
content  themselves  with  putting  him  under  arrest.  Next  they  do 
not  venture  to  commence  the  actual  demolition  of  the  citadel  until 
they  have  the  formal  sanction  of  Theramenes,  one  of  the  constituted 
generals  The  strong  habit  of  legality,  implajited  in  all  Athenian 
cilizens  by  their  democracy— and  the  care,  even  in  departino-  from 
It,  to  dei>art  as  little  as  possible— stand  plainly  evidenced  in  these 
pro^-eeihngs. 

Tiitujvents  of  this  day  gave  a  fatal  shock  to  the  ascendency  of  the 
^our  Hundred,     let  they  assembled  on  the  morrow  as  usual  in  the 
N'uateiouse;  and  they  appear,  now  when  it  was  too  late,  to  have 
(  n-ecled  one  of  their  members  to  draw  up  a  real  list,  givin^-  body  to 
the  fiction  of  the  Five  Thou-^and.     Meanwhile  the  ifoplites  in  Pei- 
rcTiis.  having  finished  the  leveling  of  the  new  fortifications,  took  the 
s  111  more  important  step  of  entering,  armed  as  they  were  into  the 
tlicater  of  Dionysus  hard   by  (in  PeiivTus,    but  on   the  ver-e  of 
Muiiyehia)and  there  hokling  a  formal  assembly;  probably  under  the 
convocation  of  the  general  Theramenes,  pursuant  to  the  forms  of 
the  antecedent    democracy.       They   here    took    the    resolution    of 
ajljourning  th  'ir  assembly  to  the  Anakeion  (or  temple  of  Castor  and 
loiliix,  the  Dio.stairi),  in  the  city  itself  aud  close  under  the  acropolis -i 
Whither  they  immediately  marched  aud  established  themselves  still 
retaining  their  arms.     So  nuicli  was  the  position  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred changed,  that  they,  who  had  on  the  preceding  day  been  on  the 
aggressive  against  a  spontaneous  outburst  of  mutineers  in  Peirieus 
were  now  thrown  upon  the  defensive  against  a  formal  assembly  all 
armed,  in  the  city  and  close  by  their  own  Senate-house.     Feeiino- 
iiiemselves  too  weak  to  attempt  any  force,  they  sent  deputies  to  thS 
^.uuiieiou  to  negotiate  aud  offer  concessions,     they  enga"-ed  to  pub- 


228 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


NAVAL  DEFEAT  OFF  ERETRIA, 


lish  the  list  of  The  Five  Tliousand,  and  to  convene  them  for  the  pur- 
pose of  providing  for  the  periodical  cessation  and  renewal  of  llie 
Four  Hundred,  by  rotation  from  the  Five  Tliousand,  in  such  order 
as  the  latter  themselves  should  determine.  But  they  entreated  that 
time  might  be  allowed  for  ellecting  this,  and  that  internal  ]Kace 
might  be  maintained,  without  which  there  was  no  hope  of  defense 
auaiust  the  enemy  w'ithout.  Many  of  the  hoplites  in  the  city  itself 
joined  the  assembly  in  the  Anakeion,  and  took  part  in  the  debates. 
The  i^osition  of  the  Four  Hundred  being  no  longer  such  as  to  inspire 
fear  the  tongues  of  speakers  were  now  again  loosed,  and  the  ears  of 
tiie  muliitude  again  opened — for  the  first  time  since  the  arrival  of 
Peisander  from  8amos,  w  ith  the  plan  of  the  oligarchical  conspiracy. 
Such  reiicwal  of  free  and  fearless  public  speech,  the  peculiar  life 
principal  of  the  denux-racy,  was  not  less  wholesome  in  tranquillizing 
intestine  discord,  than  in  heightening  the  sentiment  of  conunon 
patriotism  against  the  foreign  enemy.  The  assembly  at  length  dis- 
j)ersed,  after  naming  an  early  future  time  for  a  second  assembly,  to 
bring  about  the  re-eslablishmcnt  of  harmony,  in  the  theater  of 
Dionysus. 

On  the  day,  and  at  the  hour,  when  this  assembly  in  the  theater  of 
Dionysus  was  on  the  jjoint  of  coming  together,  the  news  ran  through 
Peiraeus  and  Athens,  that  the  forty-two  triremes  under  the  Lacede- 
monian Agesandridas,  having  recently  quitted  the  harbor  of  Megara, 
were  sailing  along  the  coast  of  Salamis  in  the  direction  towards  Pei- 
rfeus.  Sucli  an  event,  while  causing  universal  consternation  through- 
out the  city,  contirmed  all  the  previous  warnings  of  Theramenes  iis 
to  the  treasonable  destination  of  the  citadel  recently  demolished,  and 
every  one  rejoiced  that  the  demolition  had  been  accomplished  just  iu 
time.  Foregoing  their  intended  assembly,  the  citizens  rushed  wilh 
one  accord  down  to  Peiranis,  where  some  of  ihem  took  post  to  garri- 
son the  walls  and  the  mouth  of  the  harbor — others  got  aboard  the 
triremes  lying  in  the  harbor — others,  again,  launched  some  fresh 
trin^mes  from  the  boat-houses  into  the  water.  Agesandridas  rowed 
along  the  shore,  near  the  mouth  of  Peira-us;  but  found  nothing  to 
promise  concert  "svithin,  or  tempt  him  to  the  intended  attaek. 
Accordingly,  he  passal  by  and  moved  onward  to  Suniuni  in  ti 
.  {-outherlyciirection.  Having  doubled  the  cape  of  Sunium,  he  then 
J  turned  his  course  along  the  coast  of  Attica  northward,  luilted  for  a 
little  while  between  Thorikus  and  Prasiaj,  and  presently  took  station 
at  Oropus. 

Thoudi  relieved  when  thev  found  that  he  passed  bv  Peira-us  with- 
out  making  any  attack,  the  Athenians  knew  that  his  destination  must 
now  be  against  Eubaat  which  to  them  was  hardly  less  important 
than  Peirieus,  since  their  main  supplies  were  derived  from  that 
island.  Accordingly  they  put  to  sea  at  once  with  all  the  triremes 
which  could  be  manned  and  got  ready  in  the  harbor.  But  from  the 
hurry  of  the  occasion,  coupled  with  the  mistrust  and  dissension  now 


229 


reigning,  and  the  absence  of  their  great  naval  force  at  Samos— thrt 
crcnvs  muste^-ed  were  raw  and  ill-selecled,  and  the  armament 
mcmcient.  Polystratus,  one  of  the  members  of  the  Four  Hundred 
pcrh.psothersof  them  also,  were  al.o.ml;  men  who  liad  an  interest 
in  (leteat  rather  than  victory.  Thym  JcJiares  the  admiral  conducted 
tJiiMH  round  cape  Sunium  to  Eretria  in  l-:iibcea,  where  he  foundafevv 
otiiLM-  triremes,  which  made  up  his  whole  Ileet  to  36  sail 

He  had  scarcely  reached  the  harbor  and  disembarked  when  with 
our  allowmg  tmie  for  his  men  to  i)ro(Mire  refreshment— he  found  him 
V   self  compelled  to  tight  a  battle  with  the  forty-two  ships  of  A-esan- 
I    (liid;is.  who  had  just  sailed  across  from  Oropus,  and  was  all-eadv 
approaching  the  harbor.     Tins  suri^rise  had  been  brouo-ht  about  bv 
ti.,-  anti- Athenian  party  in  Eretria,  who  took  care  on  the  arrival  of 
Ihymociiares,  that  no  provisions  should   be  found  in  the  market 
place  so  th:it  his  men  were  compelled  to  disperse  and  obtain  them 
from  houses  at  the  e.xtre.nity  of  the  town;  Avhile  at  the  same  time  a 
^gnal  was  hoisted,  visible  at  Oropus  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  strait 
(less  than  seven  miles  bmd),  indicating  to  Agesandridas  the  precise 
moment  for  bringin- his  tleet  across  to  the  attack,  with  their  crews 
fresh  utter  the  mornm-  meal.     Thymochares,  on  seeing  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  ordered  his  men  aboard;  but  to  his  dSappoin  men 
many  ot  them  were  found  to  be  so  far  off  that  they  could  not  be 
brought  b:i(;k  in  time-so  that  he  was  compelle.l  to  sail  out  and  meet 
he  Peloponnesians  with  ships  very  in  adeqimtely  manned     In  a  \yin\l 
immediate  y  outside  of  tlie  Eretrian  harblJr.  hefvas,  after  a  shor  co^ 
test.  co.niDletelv  defeated   and  his  fleet  driven  back  upon  the  shore 
borne  of  his  ships  escaped  to  Chalkis,  others  to  a  fortified  post  .W 
soned  by  the  Athenians  themselves  not  far  from  Eretria:  yet  nol  less 
than  22  triremes,  out  ot  the  whole  3G,  fell  into  the  hands  of  Ao-esandri- 
(hi;  and  a  large  proportion  of  the  crews  were  slain  or  made  pHsoners 
0  those  seamen  who  escaped  too,  many  found  their  death  from  the 
li.nuU  of  the  Lretrians,  into  whose  city  they  fled  for  shelter.     On  the 
news  o    this  battle,  not  merely  Eretria,  but  also  all  Euba^a  (except 
)i;eus  in  the  north   of  the  island,  which  was  settled  by  Athenhn 
^^^"^  declared  its  revolt  from  Athens,  which  had  been  intS 
moie  than  a  year  before— and  took  measures  for  defendin<r  itself  in 
fc  )neevt  with  Agesandridas  and  the  Boeotians  ^ 

111  conid  Athens  endure  a  disaster,  in  itself  so  immense  and  aggra- 

w.e  i,  umh'r  the  jiresent  distressed  condition  of  the  citv      Her  last 

•et  was  destroyed;  her  nearest  and  most  precious  island  torn  from 

t  ir  ? v.  ''Vf'']^  T- 'f^  ''^  '^'^^  ^''''^  -^'"^^^^"^^  "^^'-^  t^  ii^'^  ^vants  than 
At    a  Itself,  but  wind;  was  now  about  to   become  a  hostile  and 

^TZ  r;-^'^7'   .  riif.P'-^vious  revolt  of  Euboea,  occurring  thirty- 
lour  >eais  before  during  the  maximum  ot  Athenian  power  Imd  be/n 
ven  then  a  terrible  blow  to  Athens,  and  formed  one  of  the  niain  cir 
cinns.ances  which  forced  upon  her  the  humiliation  of  the  Thirtv 
}ears  truce.     But  this  second  revolt  took  place  when  she  had  not 


230 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


PATRIOTIC  SPIRIT  NOW  PREVALENT. 


231 


li' 


only  no  means  of  reconquering  the  island,  but  no  means  even  of 
(kfendiuic  Peirieus  against  the  Moekage  by  the  enemy's  fleet. 

Tlie  dismay  :.nd"  terror  excited  by  the  news  at  Athens  was 
unbounded;  eVen  exceeding  what  had  been  felt  after  the  h>iciliiiii 
catastroplie,  or  the  revolt  of  Chios.  There  was  no  second  reserve 
now  in  the  treasury,  such  as  the  thousand  talents  which  had  rendered 
such  essenthd  service  on  the  last-mentioned  occasion.  In  additiou  to 
their  foreign  dangers,  the  Atiienians  were  further  weighed  down  by 
two  intestine  calamities  in  them>elves  hardly  supportable — alieratioli 
of  their  own  fleet  at  Samos,  and  the  discord,  yet  unappeased,  within 
tlieir  own  walls;  wherein  the  Four  Hundred  still  held  provisionally 
the  reins  of  government,  with  the  ablest  and  most  unscruiiiilmi's 
leaders  at  their  head.  In  the  depth  of  their  despair,  the  Athenians 
expected  nothing  less  than  to  see  the  victorious  fleet  of  Agesandriclas 
(more  than  sixty  triremes  strong,  including  the  recent  captures)  di! 
the  Peineus,  forbidding  all  importation,  and  threatening  them  with 
approaching  famine,  in  combination  with  Agis  at  Dekeleia.  The 
enterprise  would  have  been  easy,  for  there  were  neither  ships  nor 
seamen  to  repel  him;  and  his  arrival  at  this  critical  moment  would 
most  pn^bably  have  enabled  the  Four  Elundred  to  resume  their 
ascendency,  with  the  means  as  well  as  the  (lis]u)sition  to  introduce 
a  Lacedaemonian  garrison  into  the  city.  And  though  the  arrival  of 
the  Athenian  fleet  from  Samos  would  have  prevented  this  extremity 
yet  it  could  not  have  arrived  in  time,  except  on  the  supposition  of  a 
prolonged  blockade.  Moreover,  the  mere  transfer  of  the  fleet  from 
Samos  to  Athens  would  have  left  Ionia  and  the  Hellespont  defense- 
less agtunst  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Persians,  and  would  have  caused 
the  loss  of  all  the  Athenian  empire.  Nothing  could  have  saved 
Athens,  if  the  Laced;emonians  at  this  juncture  had  acted  with 
reasonable  vigor,  instead  of  confining  their  efforts  to  Euba\i,  now  an 
ca<^y  and  certain  conquest.  As  on  the  former  occasion,  when  An- 
tiplion  and  Phrynichus  went  to  Sparta  prepared  to  make  any  sacri- 
flee  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  Lacediemonian  aid  and  accommoda- 
tion— so  now,  in  a  still  greater  degree,  Athens  owed  her  salvalion 
only  to  the  fact  that  the  enemies  actually  Ix^fore  her  were  indolent 
and  dull  Spartans — not  enterprizing  Syracusans  imder  the  conduct  of 
Gylippus.  And  this  is  the  second  occasion  (we  may  add)  on  which 
Athens  was  on  the  brink  of  ruin  in  consequence  of  the  policy  of 
Alkibiades  in  retaining  the  armament  at  Samos. 

Fortunately  for  the  Athenians,  no  Asresandridas  appeared  ol! 
Peineus;  so  that  the  twenty  triremes,  which  they  contrived  toman 
as  a  remnant  for  defense,  had  no  enemy  to  repel.  Accordingly  the 
Athenians  were  allowed  to  enjoy  an  inti.'rval  of  repose  which  enabkd 
them  to  recover  partially  both  from  consternation  and  from  intestine 
discord.  It  was  their  first  proceeding,  when  the  hostile  fleet  did  not 
appear,  to  convene  a  public  assembly,  and  that  too  in  the  Pnyx  itself; 
the  habitual  scene  of  the  democratical  assemblies,  well-calculated  to 


re-inspire  that  patriotism  which  had  now  been  dumb  and  smoulder- 
ing for  the  four  last  months.     In  this  assembly  the  tide  of  opinion 
ran  vehemently  against  the  Four  Hundred.     Even  those  wiio  (like 
the  Board  of  Elders  entitled  Probuli)  had  originally  counseled  their 
appointment,    now  denounced   them   along  with   the   rest,   thou"-h 
severely  taunted  by  the  oligarchical  leader  Peisander  for  their  incoli- 
sistency.     Votes  were  finally  passed— 1.  To  depose  tlie  Four  Hun- 
dred—2.  To  place  the  whole  government  in  the  hands  of  The  Five 
Thousand— 3.  Every  citizen,   who  furnished   a  panoply  either  for 
himself,  or  for  any  one  else,  was  to  be  of  right  a  member  of  this 
body  of  The  Five  Thousand— 4.  No  citizen  was  to  receive  pay  for 
any  political  function,  on  pain   of  becoming  solemnly  accursed,  or 
excoimnunicated.    Such  were  the  points  determined  by  the  first  assem- 
bly held  in  the  Pnyx.     The  Archons.  the  Senate  of  Five  Hundred 
etc.,  were  renewed:  after  which  many  other  assemblies  were  also 
held,  in  which  Nomotliette,  Dikasts,  and  other  institutions  essential 
to  the  working  of  the  democracy,  were  constituted.     Various  other 
votes  were  also  passed;  especially  one,  on  the  proposition  of  Krilias 
seconded  by  Theramenes,  to  restore  Alkibiades  and  some  of  his 
friends  from  exile;  while  messages  wxtc  further  dispatched,  both  to 
him   and  to    the   armament   at   Samos,  doubtless    confirming  the 
recent  nomination  of  generals,  apprising  them  of  what  had  recently 
occurred  at  Athens,  as  well  as  bespeaking  their  full  concurrence  and 
unabated  efforts  against  the  common  enemy. 

Thucvdides  bestows  marked  eulogy  upon  the  general  s[jirit  of 
moderation  and  patriotic  harmony  which  now  rei!j:ned  at  Athens  uiul 
which  directed  the  political  proceedings  of  the  people.  But  he 'does 
not  countenance  the  belief  (as  he  has  been  sometimes  understood) 
nor  IS  It  true  in  point  of  fact— that  they  now  introduced  a  new  con- 
stitution. Putting  an  end  to  the  oligarchy,  and  to  the  rule  of  the 
i^our  Hundred,  they  restored  the  old  democracy,  seemin-dy  with  only 
two  modifications- first,  the  partial  limitation  of  the  riiiht  of  siiifrao-e 
--next,  the  discontinuance  of  all  payment  for  political  functioirs 
Ihe  impeachment  against  Antiphon,  tried  immediately  afterward 
went  betore  the  Senate  and  the  Dikastery,  exactly  accordin*'-  to  the 
m  (iemocratical  forms  of  procedure.  But  we  must  presume  that  the 
Senate,  the  Dikasts,  the  Nomothetse,  the  Ekklesiasts  (or  eiiizrns  who 
attended  the  assembly),  the  public  orators  who  prosecuted  sttife- 
enminals  or  defended  any  law  when  it  was  impugned— must  have 
worked  for  the  time  without  pay. 

.Moreover,  the  two  modifications  above-mentioned  were  of  little 
practical  effect.  The  exclusive  body  of  Five  Thousand  citizens,  pio- 
lessedly  constituted  at  this  juncture,  was  neither  exacllv  realized  nor 
long  retained.  It  was  constituted,  even  now,  more  as  a" nominal  liian 
as  a  real  limit;  a  nominal  total,  yet  no  longer  a  mere  bhmk  as  the 
jour  ilunclred  had  originally  produced  it,  but  containing  indeed  a 
number  of  individual  names  greater  than  the  total,  and  without  any 


232 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


assignable  line  of  demarkation.  The  mere  fact  that  every  one  who 
furnished  a  panoply  was  entitled  to  be  of  the  Five  Thousand— and 
not  they  alone,  but  others  besides — shows  that  no  care  was  taken  to 
adhere  eitlier  to  that  or  to  any  other  precise  number.  If  we  may 
credit  a  speech  composed  by  Lysias,  tlie  Four  llvmdred  had  them- 
selves (after  the  demoliliou  of  their  intended  fortress  at  Eetionein, 
and  wiieu  power  was  passing  out  of  their  hands)  appointed  a  com- 
mittee of  their  number  to  draw  up  for  the  first  time  a  ren.l  list  of  The 
Five  Thousand:  and  Polyslratus,  a  member  of  that  committee,  takes 
credit  with  the  succeeding  demixiiuy  for  having  made  the  list  com- 
pri>e  nine  thousand  nanies  iu^tead  of  five  thousand.  As  tills  list  of 
Polystratus  (if  indeed  it  ever  exisiod)  was  never  either  published  or 
adopted,  I  merely  notice  the  description  given  of  it  to  illustrate  my 
position,  that  the  number  Five  Tiiousaud  was  now  understood  on 
all  sides  as  an  indeiinite  expression  for  a  suffrage  extensive,  but 
not  universal.  The  number  had  been  first  invented  by  Antipliou 
and  the  leaders  of  the  Four  llundrtd,  to  cloak  their  own  usur[»ation 
and  intinddale  the  demoerac\  :  next,  it  served  the  puipot>e  of  Tiier- 
amenes  and  the  minority  of  tlie  Four  Hundred,  as  a  basis  on  whieh 
to  raise  a  sort  of  dynastic  opposition  (to  use  modern  phraseology) 
within  the  limits  of  the  oligarcliy— that  is,  witliout  appearing  to  over- 
step principles  acknowledged  by  the  oligarchy  themselves:  lastly,  it 
was  employed  b}'  the  den'.ocratical  pari}'  generally  as  a  convenient 
middle  term  to  slide  back  into  the  old  system,  with  as  little  dispute 
as  possii)le;  for  Alkibiadesand  the  arniamenl  had  sent  word  home  that 
they  adhered  to  the  Five  Thousand,  and  to  the  abolition  of  salaried 
civil  functions. 

But  exclusive  suffrage  of  the  so-called  Five  Thousand,  especially 
"with  the  expansive  numerical  construction  now  adopted,  was  of  little 
value  either  to  themselves  or  to  the  state;  while  it  was  an  insulting 
shock  to  the  feelings  of  the  exc  bided  multitude,  especially  to  brave 
and  active  seamen  like  the  Parali.  1  hough  prudent  as  a  step  of 
momentary  transition,  it  could  not  stand,  nor  was  jiny  attempt  made 
to  preserve  it  in  permanence — amidst  a  community  so  long  accus- 
tomed to  universal  citizenship,  and  where  the  necessities  of  def(  nse 
against  the  enemy  called  for  energetic  efforts  from  all  the  citizens. 

Even  as  to  the  gratuitous  functions,  the  members  of  the  Five 
Thousand  themselves  would  soon  become  tired,  not  less  than  the 
poorer  freemen,  of  serving  without  pay,  as  senators  or  in  other  wrys: 
so  that  noiliing  but  {.bsolute  financial  deficit  would  prevent  the  re- 
establisliment.  entire  or  partial,  of  the  pay.  And  tliat  deiicit  was 
never  so  cnmidete  as  to  stop  the  disbursement  of  the  Diol.ely,  or  dis- 
Iribution  of  two  oboli  to  each  citizen  on  occasion  of  various  religioi'S 
festivals.  Such  distribution  continued  without  interruption;  th()i:i;li 
perhaps  the  numbec*  of  occasions  on  which  it  was  made  may  have 
been  lessened. 

How  far,  or  under  what  restriction,  any  re-establishment  of  civil 


PSEPHISM  OF  DElIOriTANTUS.  233 

.!.n  s„.rrn..  of  .11  Athenians  -i.^o  .   ele,  ,io  "ri"'  „''7r'T'i;'  "'"' 

aftcr  that  event-at  0^^^^^^^^'^?'^;^^'''"^  about  eleven  ,n„„(l,s 
I..i^(June  or  July,  410  l"c    \v  len  tl      4  "'«  •"■«ll';>»sh.i.of  Glaukip- 

yc.ir,  piM-stiant  lo  the  ancient  de  uoeruVMl  ^  ,  ^"^  •'"-'  coniin? 
111.'  full  ileinoeraoy  not  mo  re  v  iu  itio^f  f,  f  .I'^^'f-^-^l'iWts  to  „1 
calloil  ford.  I,v  a  1  eeent    e,  lorition        ,'  "  '!"    '"•'  "'"'^  «f  '"'"-'inS 

ll"t  tl„s  first  -renewal  of  a rd  a„d  ,  11  '""Jf,  '",.'"'^''.""-'«'>  thou.Hft 
roviveil  democracy,  ou-ht  to  be  s    mn  f"»ct,onanes,  under  the 

l'"«lioi.  of  sentiment; a  aloH-ousio.'^^.  .  ""^  ""'"'"  ?"'"'^'"«  l"oc- 
'"II'  taken  in  the  preyed  n>v-tr.t<.  '""".  ^"''  l'<'art-stilTin? 
I'liaiitus  proposed  and  car  ied  a  ,'  Lnl  i«^f  T",  Accordingly  Demo'- 
fonu  of  an  oath  to  be  tXrbt-  I  'wi  •"■■* ''™'''''''  P'-e«cribinij  the 
cnlical  constitution  ^  """  -^"'^■°'^"i^  <o  stand  by  the  demo- 

(leniocracy  has  been  subverte  1  he  s h  ,  11  l  ^  magistracy  after  the 
maus.  Let  him  be  put  to  <  ea  1.  will  i  ,L  ,  -l"  ""''??  "^  «'<'  ^"'6- 
bi' confiscated  to  the  public  t,  H  1  •■      '^.''^''  "'"'  '''*  ^"^  prorierty 

K'  accoimtcl  holy  and  of  gZi  ,^i!o„s?l''''''''r'  "'■"■>''"  "'" '"^L 
s»ear  an  oath  timler  tbe  ?acd(i<eo  !,,''•  ^?'  •""  Athenians 
K-|.edive  tribes  and  denies  to  Idll  hi?,  '"''"f ;?"•■»  victims,  in  ilieir 
'I  will  kill  with  my  own  1  'in  r  Z  \i  i  ""-"  °''"'  ''«  <'>s  follows: 
vert  llic  ch-mocrac/a?  A  1  en"  or  wlm  si  .'n'.''?;  *"'''"  "''«  «''''"  ^»^ 
»*r  llie  democracy  has  ecT'subve  t«l  o  -^  ^'i  n  ""3'  ?"'"='' '"  f'""™ 
:.rpo.se  of  .naking^iinself  ^de  p  ,  0  ;i"  llteln  T  f  •""'"'^  ^"'  "'« 
1  *  hiinself.  And  if  any  „,„.  dse  s'l,^  1  [  m  ''  't ''  """1""  '"  ''st'<b- 
%<.■!■  to  be  holy  as  res,  ic"s  boiir 'n'  ','""■  ^ ''■'"  ''ccount  the 

:'"  enemy  of  ,h^  Athena^        An  ff  en '  '^'l  <  omons.  as  having  slain 

r^:^^^  ^''^ri^iS:!/?  W^^^ 

t  '■■  <-<"»|)  (at  Samos)  or  e  se vW, ere  '     l '  f    '  'a  n""-'  ••"  A"'ens.  or 

:'ST><1  tliinsrs  in  abumh  e      w  f,'  '"l^ "'■'?,"P"n  him  who  keeps 
I'-;  .  iiiinself  as Vi^ltirhisSiTv  .'.'"'  ^^"^  "^-^^  "'  "estru'c- 

-^i'^^a.theremarkabledecrecwhich•theA.hen,•ans„otonlypa,sed 


234  TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

m  ornate  and  public  assembly,  less  than  a  year  after  the  deposition  of 

Se  Four  Hundred,  but  also  eaused  to  be  engraved  on  a  eohmn  close 

t    the  door  of  the  Senate-house.     It  plainly  indK-ates,  not  n.eiely  that 

K  denrcmcvhad  returned,  but  an  unusual  nU.nsi  y  of  den.ocnit- 

V  ee   n"  along  ^vith  it.     The  constitution  which  ««  the  Athenians 

M,  swore  to  maintain  by  the  most  strenuous  measures  of  de  cnsp 

m   't  have  l^Jn  a  constitution  in  uhich  ««  Athenians  had  pol.u.al 

"i,  h,,_m't  one  of  Five  Thousand  privileged  persons  exe Uuln  ;:  ,h« 

re<       TWs  decree  becan.e  invalid  after  the  c.xpulsnm  of  the  Tlnrlj, 

bv  he  gen  ral  resolution  then  passed  not  to  act  upon  any  i'^lY%f. 

i;  fore  the  archonshinof  Kukleides,  unless  specially  re-e..a(1ed.    hut 

e  column    on  which  it  stood   engraved,  sl.ll   r.mau.ed   ami  the 

voids  were  read  upon  it  at  hast  down  to  the  time  ot  the  o.alor 

T  vkiiifTU'^  ci<'litv  years  aftenvaid.  ,     ,    ,  i  41  „ 

^■le'mere  disposition  of  the  Four  Hundred,  however,  and  the 
irn.'^fer  of  po  It  cal  power  to  the  Five  Thousand,  whuh  took  place 

n    he  fir  t  public  assembly  lu'ld  after  the  defeat  off  Eretnn-jva 
M,fh  Uiit  to'  mlice  most  of  the  violent  leaders  of  tlie  Four  Hniul,,, 
f    , >   '    1.  >?,    p.,  ■,.  \ibons      Peisaider.  Ale.xikles.  and  others,  went 
off  to    t  y  to  D^eie  a    Aristar<-l,us  alone  mode  his  flight  the  means 
of  inflict  M  a  new  wound  upon  his  countiy.     Being  atnong  the  mira- 
IKT  of  t^  c  "omrals,  he  availed  himself  of  this  authority  to  mare li- 
win^'ome  of  tlic  nidcst  among  tli.>se  Scythian  ar(  hers,  who  did  the 
^  ice  d"  U  of  tl*e  c  tv-to  (Enoe  on  the  l?<rotian  frontier,  wliielixvas 
^  hat  ^nunt  under  siege  by  a  body  of  Corinthians  o"'!  B™'!™ 
nil   Pi     \risf.rchus  in  concert  with  the  besiegers,  presented  h  niscl 

o  the  <n.7r\^on    and'  acquainted  them  th.at  Athens  and  Sparta  ha 
Inst  concluded  ceace   one  of  the  conditions  of  which  was  that  dm 

o  ihl " K."sunSred  to  the  Ba.olians      "«  ^^i^ "/« 'f , f^^^ 
ovdere.1  then,  to  evacuate  the  place,  under  the  1>  '"f  /  «'  ^    "'f,„'3 
return  home.     The  garrison,  having  been  ''"f '/ .  'P^,'^".'   "Pj/.t 
t..nt  wholly  ignorant  of  the  actual  condition  of  polities,  oiKjan  ' 
or^r^u^relcrve;  so  that  ti- .l>-otians  nccjmj.d  po^^n 
this  very  important  frontier  position-a  new  Ihoin  m  the  siuc 
Athens.'besides  Dekek'ia.  .    ^^.^^.   .„  j  ^u^  divorce 

Thus  was  the  Athenian  demorraey  a.i^am  ^'C^^^^jM^,^."^^^ 
between  the  citv  and  the  armament  at  Samos  ^^7"  In.nirc^ 
interruption  of  about  four  months  by  the  successtu    ^  P «  ^• 

he  Four  Hundred.  It  was  only  by  a  sort  of  "^^''^^^^^-^J  ;;\^,  i;,"! 
the  ineredible  backwardness  and  stupidity  of  her  ^^'^^f  J"  J'^;,, 
t  'It  \thens  eseaped  aHve  from  this  nefarious  a-gression  of  Ik  0^" 
^s^aml^SLeitizens.     That  the  yicjorious  cWerarv   bo^ 

animadvert  upon  and  punish  the  P^'V'V?^^^-^^-^."  ^^/^^^^^^ 

^vlIO  had  satiated  their  own  selfish  ambition  at  t»»^  ^^^  ^^^^^^„^ 

sulTering.  anxiety,  and  peril.,  to  their  ^^^^'^'Y^^'^^.Tl'^^^^^^^^^ 
ri-orous  justice.     But  the  circumstances  of  the  casejv ere  pc^ 
for  the  counter-revolution  had  been  accomplished  partly  by  me  a 


IMPEACmiENT  OF  ANTIPHON. 


235 


of  a  minority  among  the  Four  Hundred  themselves — Theramenes, 
Arislokrates,  and  others,  togeiher  wilii  the  Jjoaid  of  Elders  called 
Probuli — all  of  whom  had  been,  at  the  outset,  eitiier  principals  or 
accomplices  in  that  system  of  terrorism  and  assassination,  whereby 
the  democracy  had  been  overthrown  and  the  oligarchical  rulers 
established  in  the  Senate-house.  The  earlier  operations  of  the  con- 
spiracy, therefore,  though  among  its  worst  features,  could  not  be 
exposed  to  inquiry  and  trial,  without  compromising  these  parlies  as 
fellow-criminals.  Theramenes  evaded  the  dilliculty,  by  selecting  for 
auiinadversion  a  recent  act  of  the  majority  of  the  Four  Hundred, 
which  he  and  his  ])artisans  had  opposed,  and  on  which  therefore  he 
had  no  interests  adverse  either  to  justice  or  to  the  popular  feeling. 
He  stood  forward  to  impeach  the  last  embassy  sent  by  the  Four 
Hundred  to  Sparta — sent  with  instructions  to  purchase  peace  and 
alliance  at  almost  any  price — and  connected  with  the  construction  of 
the  fort  at  Eetioneia  for  the  reception  of  an  enemy's  garri.-^on.  This 
act  of  manifest  treason,  in  which  Autiphou,  Phrynichus,  and  ten 
other  known  envoys  were  concerned,  was  chosen  as  the  s])ecial 
matter  for  public  trial  and  punishment,  not  less  on  public  grounds 
than  with  a  view  to  his  own  favor  in  the  renewed  democracy.  But 
the  fact  that  it  was  Theramenes  who  thus  denounced  his  old  friends 
and  fellow-conspirators,  after  having  lent  hand  and  heart  to  their 
earlier  and  not  less  guilty  deeds — was  long  remembered  as  a  treacii- 
erous  betrayal,  and  employed  iu  after  days  as  an  excuse  for  atrocious 
injustice  against  himself. 

Of  the  twelve  envoys  who  went  on  this  mission,  all  except  Phry- 
nichus, Antiphon,  Archeptolemus,  and  Ouomakles,  seem  to  have 
already  escaped  to  Dekeleia  or  elsewhere.  Phrynichus  (as  I  have 
mentioned  a  few  pages  above)  had  been  assassinated  several  days 
before.  Respecting  his  memory,  a  condemnatory  vote  had  already 
been  just  passed  by  the  restored  Senate  of  Five  Hundred,  decreeing 
that  his  property  should  be  confiscated  and  his  house  razed  to  the 
{rrouiid;  and  conferring  the  gift  of  citizenship,  together  with  a  pecu- 
niary recompense,  on  two  foreigners  who  claimed  to  have  assassi- 
nated him.  The  other  three,  Antiphon,  Archeptolemus,  and  Ono- 
makles,  were  presented  in  name  to  the  Senate  by  the  generals  (of 
whom  probably  Theramenes  was  one)  as  having  gone  on  a  mission  to 
Sparta  for  purposes  of  mischief  to  Athens,  partly  on  board  an 
enemy's  ship,  partly  through  the  Spartan  garrison  at  Dekeleia.  Upon 
this  presentation,  doubtless  a  document  of  some  length  and  going 
into  particulars,  a  senator  named  Androu  moved — That  the  generals, 
aided  by  any  ten  senators  whom  Ihey  may  choose,  do  seize  the  three 
persons  accused,  and  hold  them  in  custody  for  trial;  That  the  Thes- 
niothette  do  send  to  each  of  the  three  a  formal  summons,  to  prepare 
themselves  for  trial  on  a  future  day  before  the  Dikastery,  on  the 
charge  of  high  treason — and  do  bring  them  to  trial  on  the  day 
numed;  assisted  by  the  generals,  the  ten  Senators  chosen  as  auxilia- 


236 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


OLIGARCHY  AND  DEMOCRACY. 


237 


rics,  and  any  other  citizen  who  may  please  to  take  part,  as  Ihf  ir 
accusers.  Each  of  the  tliree  was  to  be  tried  separately,  and  if  con- 
demned, was  to  be  dealt  with  accordiiiii:  to  the  penal  law  of  the  city 
against  traitors,  or  persons  guilty  of  treason. 

Though  all  the  three  persons  thus  indicated  were  in  Athens,  or  at 
least  were  supposed  to  l)e  there,  on  the  day  when  this  resolution  uas 
passed  })y  the  Senate— yet  before  it  was* executed,  Ononiakles  had 
tied;  so  that  Ati])hon  and  Archei>t()lcmus  only  were  imprisoned  for 
trial.  They  too  nuist  have  had  ample  opportunity  for  leaving  the 
city,  and  we  might  have  presumed  that  Antiphon  woidd  have  thought 
it  quite  as  necessary  to  retire  as  Peisander  and  Alexikles.  So  acute 
a  man  as  he,  at  no  time  very  popular,  must  have  known  that  now  at 
least  he  had  drawn  the  sword  against  his  lellow-eitizens  in  a  manner 
wliich  could  never  be  forgiven.  However,  he  chose  voluntarily  to 
stay:  and  this  man,  wiio  had  given  orders  for  takmg  olT  so  many  of 
the  democractical  speakers  by  private  assassination,  received  from 
the  democracy,  when  triumj)hant.  full  notice  and  lair  trial,  on  ji  dis- 
tinct and  s])ecitic  charge.  'J'he  speech  which  he  made  in  his  defense 
though  it  did  no!  procure  acquittal,  was  listened  to,  not  merely  with 
patience,  but  with  admiration;  as  we  may  judge  from  the  powerful 
and  lasting  effect  which  it  produced.  Thucydides  describes  it  as 
the  most  magnilicent  defense  against  a  capital  charge,  wliich  had 
ever  come  before  him;  and  the  poet  Agatlion,  doubtless  a  hearer, 
warndy  complimented  Antiphon  on  his  eloquence;  to  which  the 
latter  replied,  that  the  apj)roval  of  one  such  discerning  judge  was  in 
Ids  eye's  an  ample  compensation  for  the  unfriendly" verdict  of  the 
multituiie.  Both  he  and  Archeptolemus  were  found  guilty  by  the 
Diknstery  anil  condemned  to  the  penalties  of  treason.  They  Vere 
handed  over  to  the  magistrates  called  the  Eleven  (the  chiefs  of  ex<'- 
cutive  justice  at  Athens)  lobe  put  to  death  by  the  customary  draught 
of  hendock.  Their  properties  were  confiscated:  their  houses  were 
directed  to  be  razed,  and  the  vacant  site  to  be  marked  by  colunuis, 
with  the  inscription — "The  residence  of  Antiphon  the  traitor— cf 
Archeptolemus  the  traitor."  They  were  not  perndtted  to  be  burit  d 
either  in  Attica  or  in  any  territory  subject  to  Athenian  dominion. 
Their  children;  both  legitimate  and  illegitimate,  were  deprived  of 
the  citizenship;  and  the  citizen,  who  should  adopt  any  defendant 
of  either  of  them,  was  to  be  himself  in  like  manner  disfranchised. 

Such  was  the  sentence  passed  by  the  Dikastery,  puisuant  to  the 
Athenian  law  of  treason.  It  was  directed  to  be  engraved  on  the 
same  brazen  column  as  the  decree  of  honor  to  the  slayers  of  Phry- 
nichus.  From  that  column  it  was  transcribed,  and  has  thus  passed 
into  history. 

How  many  of  the  Four  Hundred  oligarchs  actually  came  to  trial  or 
were  punished,  we  have  no  means  of  knowing;  but  there  is  ground 
for  believing  that  none  were  put  to  death  except  Antiphon  and 
Archeptolemus — perhaps  also  Aristarchus,  the  betrayer  of  Q^^noe  to 


the  Boeotians.  The  latter  is  said  to  have  been  formally  tried  and 
condemned:  though  by  what  accident  he  afterward  came  into  the 
power  of  the  Athenians,  after  having  once  effected  his  escape,  we 
are  not  informed.  The  property  of  Peisander  (he  himself  having 
escai)ed)  was  confiscated,  and  granted  either  wholly  or  in  part  as  a 
recompen.se  to  Apollodorous,  one  of  the  a.ssassius  of  Phrynichus: 
probably  the  property  of  the  other  conspicuous  fugitive  oligarchs 
was  confiscated  also.  Polystratus,  another  of  the  Four  Hundred, 
who  had  only  become  a  member  of  that  body  a  few  days  before  its 
fall,  was  trieli  during  absence  (which  ab.sence  his  defenders  afterward 
accounted  for  by  saying  that  he  had  been  wounded  in  the  naval 
battle  off  Eretria)  and  heavily  fined.  It  seems  that  each  of  the  Four 
Hundred  was  called  on  to  go  through  an  audit  and  atrial  of  account- 
ability (according  to  the  practice  general  at  Athens  with  magistrates 
going  out  of  ofiice).  Such  of  them  as  did  not  appear  to  this  trial 
were  condemned  to  fine,  to  exile,  or  to  have  their  names  recorded  as 
traitors.  But  most  of  those  who  did  appear  seem  to  have  been  ac- 
quitted, partly,  we  are  told,  by  bribes  to  the  Logisla3  or  auditing 
officers — though  some  v/ere  condemned  either  to  line  or  to  partial 
political  disability,  along  with  tho.se  hoplites  who  had  been  the  most 
marked  partisans  of  the  Four  Hundred. 

Indistinctly  as  we  make  out  the  particular  proceedings  of  the 
Athenian  people  at  this  restoiation  of  the  democracy,  we  know  from 
Thucydides  tliat  their  prudc,'nce  and  moderation  were  exenqdary. 
The  eulogy,  which  he  be.stows  in  .^uch  emphatic  terms  upon  their 
behavior  at  this  juncture,  is  indeed  doubly  remarkable:  first,  because 
it  comes  from  an  exile,  not  friendly  to  the  democracy,  and  a  strong 
admirer  of  Antiphtm;  next,  because,  the  juncture  *^itself  was  one 
eminently  trying  to  the  popuhu-  morality  and  likely  to  degenerate, 
by  almost  natural  tendency,  into  excess  of  reactionary  vengeance  and 
persecution.  The  democracy  was  now  one  hundred  years  old,  dating 
from  Kleisthenes — and  fifty  years  old,  even  dating  from  the  final 
reforms  of  Ephialtes  and  Perikles;  so  that  self-government  .and 
political  equality  wave  a  part  of  the  habitual  sentiment  of  every  man's 
bosom— heightened  in  this  case  by  the  fact  that  Athens  was  not 
merely  a  democracy,  but  an  imperial  democracy,  having  dependencies 
abroad.  At  a  moment  when,  from  unparallelecr  previous  disasters,  she 
is  barely  able  to  keep  up  the  struggle  against  her  foreign  enemies,  a 
small  knot  of  her  own  wealthiest  citizens,  taking  advantage  of  her 
Weakness,  contrive  by  a  tissue  of  fraud  and  force  not  less  llagitious 
than  skillfully  combined,  to  concentrate  in  their  own  hands  the 
po\vers  of  the  state,  and  to  tear  from  their  countrymen  the  secuiity 
against  bad  government,  the  sentiment  of  equal  citizenship,  and  the 
long-established  freedom  of  speech.  Nor  is  this  all :  these  consjnra- 
tors  not  only  plant  an  oligarchical  sovereignty  in  the  Senate-house, 
but  also  sustain  that  sovereignty  by  inviting  a  foreign  garrison  from 
without,  and  by  betraying  Athens  to  her  Pelopouuesian  eneuues. 


238 


TWENTY-FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


Two  more  deadly  injuries  it  is  impossible  to  imagine;  and  from 
neither  of  them  would  Athens  liave  eseaped,  if  her  foreip^n  enemy 
had  manifested  reasonable  alacrity.  Considering  the  immense  peril, 
the  narrow  escape,  and  the  impaired  condition  in  which  Athens  \va.s 
left  notwithstiindini^  her  escape— we  might  well  have  expected  in  tl:e 
people  a  violence  of'reactionary  liostility  such  as  every  calm  observer, 
while  making  allowance  for  the  provocation,  must  nevertheless  have 
condemned;  and  perhaps  somewhat  analogous  to  that  exasperatiou 
which,  under  very  similar  circumstances,  had  caused  the  blc-c  dy 
massacres  at  Korkyra.  And  when  we  find  tliat  this  is  exa(  tly  the 
occasion  which  Thucydides  (an  observer  rather  less  than  impartiiil) 
selects  to  eulogize  their  good  conduct  and  moderation,  we  are  made 
deeply  sensible  of  the  good  habits  which  their  previous  democrjuy 
must  have  implanted  in  them,  and  which  now  served  as  a  corrective 
to  the  impulse  of  the  actual  moment.  They  had  become  familiar 
with  the  cementing  force  of  a  common  sentiment;  they  had  leanitd 
to  hold  sacred  the  inviolability  of  law  and  justice,  evtn  in  respect  to 
their  worst  enemy;  and  what  was  of  not  less  monunt,  the  frequency 
and  freedom  of  political  discussion  had  taught  them  not  only  to 
substitute  the  contentions  of  the  tongue  for  those  of  the  sword, 
but  also  to  conceive  their  situation  with  its  present  and  prospective 
liabilities,  instead  of  being  hurried  away  by  blind  retrospective 
vengeance  against  the  past. 

There  are  few  contrasts  in  Grecian  histor>'  more  memorable  or 
more  instructive,  than  that  between  this  oligarchical  conspiracy- 
conducted  by  some  of  the  ablest  hands  at  Athens— and  the  demo- 
cnitical  movement  going  on  at  the  same  time  in  Sanios,  among  the 
Athenian  armament  and  the  Samian  citizens.  In  the  former  we  have 
nothing  but  seltishness  and  personal  ambition  from  the  beginnirir: 
first,  ii  partnership  to  seize  for  their  own  advantage  the  powers  of 
government— next,  after  this  object  has  been  accomplished,  a  brea(  h 
among  the  partners,  arising  out  of  disappointment  alike  selfish.  AVc 
find  appeal  made  to  nothing  but  the  worst  tendencies;  either  tricks  to 
practice  upon  the  credulity  of  the  people,  or  extra-judicial  murders 
to  work  upon  their  fear.  In  the  latter,  on  the  contrary,  the  sentiment 
-invoked  is  that  of  common  patriotism,  and  equal,  public-minded 
sympathy.  That  which  we  read  in  Thucydides— when  the  soldiers 
of  the  armament  and  the  Samian  citizens  pledged  themselves  to  each 
other  by  solemn  oaths  to  uphold  their  democracy,  to  maintam 
harmony  and  good  feeling  with  each  other,  to  prosecute  energetically 
the  war  against  the  Peloponnesians,  and  to  remain  at  enmity  wiih  t!ie 
oligarchical  conspirators  at  Athens— is  a  scene  among  the  most 
dramatic  and  inspiriting  which  occurs  in  his  history.  jVloreover  we 
recognize  at  Samos  the' same  absence  of  reactionary  vengeance  as  at 
Athens,  after  the  attack  of  the  oligarchs,  Athenian  as  well  as  Samian, 
has  been  repelled;  althouirh  those  oligarchs  had  begnn  by  assassm- 
ating  Hyperbolas  and  others.     There  is  throughout  this  whole  demo- 


GENEROUS  IMPULSES  OF  DEMOCRACY. 


239 


crafual  movement  at  Samos  a  generous  exaltation  of  common  senti- 
ment over  personal,  and  at  the  same  time  an  absence  of  ferocity 
against  o|)poaents,  such  as  nothing  except  democracy  ever  inspired 
in  the  Grecian  bosom. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  this  was  a  special  movement  of  generous 
enthusiasm,  and  that  the  details  of  a  democratical  government 
correspond  to  it  but  imperfectly.  Neither  in  the  life  of  an  individual, 
nor  in  that  of  a  people,  does  the  ordinary  and  every-day  movement 
appear  at  ail  worthy  of  those  particular  seasons  in  which  a  man  is 
lilted  above  his  own  level,  and  becomes  capable  of  extreme  devotion 
and  heroism.  Yet  such  emotions,  though  their  complete  pre- 
dominance is  never  otherwise  than  transitory,  have  their  foundation 
iu  veins  of  sentiment  which  are  not  even  at  other  times  wholly 
extinct,  but  count  among  the  manifold  forces  tending  to  modify  and 
improve,  if  they  cannot  govern,  human  action.  Even  their  moments 
of  transitory  predominance  leave  a  luminous  tract  behind,  and  render 
the  men  who  have  passed  through  them  more  apt  to  conceive  again 
the  same  generous  impulse,  though  in  fainter  degree.  It  is  one  of 
the  merits  of  Grecian  democracy  that  it  did  raise  this  feeling  of  equal 
and  patriotic  communion;  sometimes,  and  on  rare  occasions,  like  the 
scene  at  Samos,  with  overwhelming  intensity,  so  as  to  impassion  an 
unanimous  multitude;  more  frequentlv,  in  feebler  tide,  yet  such  as 
gave  some  chance  to  an  honest  and  eloquent  orator  of  making 
successful  appeal  to  public  feeling  against  corruption  or  selfishness. 
If  we  follow  the  movements  of  Antiphon  and  his  fellow-conspirators 
at  Athens,  contemporaneous  with  the  democratical  manifestations  at 
Samos,  we  shall  see  that  not  only  was  no  such  generous  impulse 
included  in  it,  but  the  success  of  their  scheme  depended  upon  their 
heing  able  to  strike  all  common  and  active  patriotism  out  of  the 
Athenian  bosom.  Under  the  "cold  shade"  of  their  oligarchy— even 
if  we  suppose  the  absence  of  cruelty  and  rapacity,  which  would  prob- 
ably soon  have  become  rife  had  their  dominion  lasted,  as  we  shall 
presently  learn  from  the  history  of  the  second  oligarchy  of  Thirty — 
no  sentiment  would  have  been  left  to  the  Athenian  multitude  except 
fear,  servility,  or  at  best  a  tame  and  dumb  sequacity  to  leaders  whom 
they  neither  chose  nor  controlled.  To  those  who  regard  different 
forms  of  government  as  distinguished  from  each  other  mainly  by  the 
feelings  which  each  tends  to  inspire,  in  magistrates  as  well  as  citizens, 
the  contemporaneous  scenes  of  Athens  and  Samos  will  suggest 
instructive  comparisons  between  Grecian  oligarchy  and  Grecian 
domocracy. 


ta^ifa. 


■idihditiiiiibi^ia^iMiM 


240 


KESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


REVOLTS  IN  THE  HELLESPONT. 


241 


CHAPTER  LXIII. 

THE  RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCUACY,  AFTER  TIIE  DEPOSITION  OP 
THE  FOUR  IIUNDllICD,  DOWN  TO  TUE  ARRIVAL  OF  CYRUS  TIIE 
YOUNGER   IN   ASIA   MINOR. 

The  oligarchy  of  Four  Hundred  at  Athens  (installed  in  the  Senate- 
house  iibout  February  or  ^iarcli  411  B.C.,  and  deposed  about  July  of 
the  same  year),  after  four  or  live  mouths  of  dauger  and  distraelion 
such  as  to  briug  her  almost  within  the  grasp  of  her  enemies,  has  now 
Ih'cu  terminated  by  the  restoraliou  oi.  her  democracy;  with  what 
allendaut  circnmsiances  has  been  an. ply  detailed.  1  now  revert 
to  the  military  and  naval  operations  en  the  Asiatic  coast,  parlly 
contemporaneous  with  the  political  dissensions  at  Athens,  above 
described. 

It  has  already  been  stated  tliat  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  of  94  tri- 
remes, having  jemained  not  less  than  80  days  idle  at  Rhodes,  had  come 
back  to  Miletus  toward  the  end  of  March;  with  the  intention  of 
proceeding  to  the  rescue  of  Chios,  which  a  portion  of  the  Athenian 
armament^'under  Strombichldes  had  been  for  some  time  besieging, 
and  which  was  now  in  the  greatest  distress.  The  main  Athenian 
fleet  at  Samos,  however,  prevented  Aslyochus  from  elfecting  this 
object,  since  he  did  not  think  it  ad vi.^ able  to  hazard  a  general  battle. 
He  was  influenced  partly  by  the  bribes,  paitly  by  the  delusions  of 
Tissaphernes,  who  sought  only  to  wear  out  both  parties  by  protuict- 
cd  war,  and  who  now  profes.-ed  to  be  on  the  point  of  bringing  up  tiie 
Phenician  fleet  to  his  aid.  Astyochus  had  in  his  fleet  the  ships  which 
liad  been  brought  over  for  co-oper;ition  with  Pharnal)azus  at  tlie  Hell- 
espont, and  which  were  thus  equally  unable  to  reach  their  destina- 
tion. To  meet  the  difliculty,  the  ^'partan  Derkyllidas  was  sent  with 
a  body  of  troops  by  land  to  the  llellcsiiont,  there  to  join  Pharnabazus, 
in  acting  against  Abydos  and  the  neighl-oring  dependencies  of  Athens. 
AbvdosT  connected  with  !Miletus  by' colonial  ties,  set  the  example  of 
'revolting  from  Athens  to  Derkyllidas  and  Pharnabazus;  an  example 
followed,  two  days  afterward,  by  the  neighboring  town  of  Lamp- 
sakus. 

It  does  not  appear  that  there  was  at  this  time  any  Athenian  force 
in  the  Hellespont;  and  the  news  of  this  danger  to'^the  empire  in  a 
fresh  quarter,  when  conveyed  to  Chios,  alarmed  Slrombichides,  the 
commander  of  the  Athenian  besieging  armament.  The  Chians,  driven 
to  despair  by  increasing  famine  as  well  as  by  want  of  relief  from 
Astyochus,  and  having  recently  increased  their  fleet  to  oO  triremes 
against  the  Athenian  32,  by  tiie  arrival  of  12  shii)s  under  I^eon  (oh- 
tained  from  INIiletus  during  the  absence  of  Ast3'oclmsat  Rhodes),  had 
sallied  out  and  fought  an  obstinate  naval  battle  against  the  Atheni- 


ans, with  some  advantage.  NeverthlessStrombichides  felt  compelled 
immediately  to  carry  away  24  triremes  and  a  body  of  hopliics  for  the 
relief  of  tlie  Hellespont.  Hence  tiie  Chians  became  sufficiently  m;is- 
tcrs  of  the  sea,  to  provision  themselves  afresh,  though  the  Al'hcniun 
arm^unent  and  forllfled  post  still  remained  on  the  island.  Astyochus 
also  was  enabled  to  rec;dl  Leon  with  the  twelve  triremes  to  Miletus, 
and  thus  to  strengthen  his  main  fleet. 

The  present  appears  to  have  been  the  time,  when  the  oligarchical 
party  both  in  t]\e  town  and  in  the  camp  at  Samos,  were  laying  their 
plan  of  conspiracy  as  already  recounted,  aud  when  the  Athenian 
generals  were  divided  in  opinion — Charminus  siding  with  his  party, 
Leon  and  Dlomcdon  against  it.  Apprised  of  the  reigning  dissension' 
Astyochus  thouglit  it  a  favorable  opportunity  for  sailing  with  his 
whole  fleet  up  to  the  harbor  of  Samos,  and  offering  battle;  but  the 
Athenians  were  in  no  condition  to  leave  the  harbor.  He  accordingly 
returned  to  Miletus,  wdiere  he  again  remained  inactive,  in  expectation 
(real  or  pretended)  of  the  arrival  of  the  Pheniciau  ships.  But  the 
discontent  of  his  own  troops,  especially  the  Syracusan  conlingent, 
presently  became  uncontrollable.  They  not  only  murmured  at  the 
inaction  of  the  armament  during  this  ju'ccious  moment  of  disunion 
in  the  Athenian  camp,  but  also  detected  the  insidious  policy  of  Tissa- 
phernes in  thus  frittering  away  their  strength  without  result;  a  policy- 
still  more  keenly  brought  home  to  their  feelings  by  his  irre-ulajity 
in  supplying  tliem  with  pay  and  provision,  whicli  caused "seiinis 
distress.  To  appease  their  clamors,  Astyochus  was  compelled  to 
call  together  a  general  assembly,  the  resolution  of  which  w;is  pro- 
nounced in  favor  of  immediate  battle.  He  accordingly  sailed  from 
Miletus  with  his  whole  fleet  of  112  triremes  round  to  the  proiuonloiy 
of  Mykale  immediately  opposite  Samos— ordering  the  ;Mile^ian  hop- 
lites  to  cross  the  promontory  by  land  to  the  same  point.  The  Atlie- 
nian  fleet  now  consisting  of  only  .S2  sail,  in  the  absence  of  Strouibi- 
chides,  w^as  then  moored  near  Glauke  on  the  raaitdand  of  ^lykide: 
but  the  public  decision  just  taken  by  the  Peloponiscsians  to  fl<'ht  be- 
coming known  to  them,  they  retired  to  Samos',  not  being  wiilimr  to 
engage  with  such  inferior  numbers. 

it  seems  to  have  been  during  this  last  interval  of  inaction  on  the 
part  of  Astyochus,  that  the  oligarchical  party  in  Samos  made  their 
attempt  and  miscarried;  the  reaction  from  which  attempt  brouirht 
ahout,  with  little  delay,  the  great  democi-atical  manifestation,  and 
soleinn  collective  oath,  of  the  Athenian  armament— coupled  with  the 
nomination  of  new,  cordial,  and  unanimous  generals.  Tiiey  were 
now  in_  hiirh  enthusiasm,  anxious  for  battle  with  the  enemy;  and 
Strombichides  had  been  sent  for  immcdiatelv.  that  the  fleet  midit  be 
miited  against  the  main  enemy  at  :\Iiletus.  That  officer  had  r<>covcr- 
ed  Lampsakus,  but  Imd  failed  in  his  attempt  on  Abydos.  Having 
established  a  central  fortified  ^tn'-hm  at  Sestos,  he  now  rejoined  tiie 
fleet  at  Samos,  which  by  his  arrival  was  increased  to  108  sail.    He 


242 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


DISCONTENT  OF  THE  MILESIANS. 


243 


arrived  in  tlic  Tiidit,  wiion  the  Pt'lopon)ic?=i\n  fleet  was  preparino-  to 
renew  its  attack  Irom  31yknle  the  next  morning.  It  consisted  of^'lio 
ships,  and  was  tliercfore  si  ill  superior  in  number  to  the  Alheni-ms^ 
But  havinn:  now  h-aint  both  tiie  arrival  of  Strombieliides  and' the 
renewed  spirit  as  well  as  unanimity  of  the  Atlienians,  the  Pelonon 
ncsian  commanders  did  not  venture  to  persist  in  their  resolution  of 
fi.uditing.  They  returned  back  to  IMiletus,  to  the  mouth  of  which 
harbor  tlie  Atlienians  sailed,  and  had  the  satisfaction  of  offerino-  battle 
to  an  unwillinir  enemy.  *^ 

Such  confession  of 'inferiority  was  well-calculated  to  imbitter  still 
further  the  discontents  of  Ihe  Peloponnesian  fleet  at  Miletus     Tis- 
saphernes  had  become  more  and  more  i^aisimonious  in  furni^hiji-r 
pay  and  supplies;  while  the  recall  of  Alkibindes  to-  Samos  which 
happened  just  umv,  combined  with  the  uninterrupted  jipparent  inti- 
macy between  him  and  the  satrap,  contirmed  their  belief  that  the 
Litter  was  intentionally  cheatinu:  and  starving  them,  in  the  interest 
of  Athens.    At  the  same  time,  earnest  invilalions  arrived  from  Phar 
nabazus,  solicitiiiir  the  co-operation  of  the  fleet  at  the  Hellespont 
■with  liberal  promises  of  pay  and  maintenance.     Klearchus  who  had 
been  sent  out  with  the  last  squadron  from  Sparta  for  the  ex])ie^s 
puipose  of  going  to  aid  Phnriiabazus,  claimed  to  be  allowed  to  exe- 
cute his  orders;  while  Astvi.chus  also,  having  renounced  the  idea  of 
any  united  action,  thought  it  nowexi)edient  to  divide  the  fleet  wliieh 
he  was  at  a  loss  how  to  support.     Accor<linglv  Klearchus  was  ^eiit 
with  forty  triremes  from  j\Iiletus  to  the  Helk-^pont,  yet  wiih  instruct- 
ions  to  evade  the  Athenians  at  Samos  by  flrst  stretchino- out  west- 
ward into  the  .Egean.     Encountering  severe  storms,  he  was  forced 
wilh  the  greater  i)art  of  his  squadron  to  seek  shelter  at  Delos  and 
even  siifTered  so  much  damage  as  to  return  to  Miletus  from  whence 
he  himself  marched  to  the  Hellespont  by  land.     Ten  of  his  triiciius 
however,  under  the  :\reg:iriaii  Helixus,  weathered  the  storm  and  pur- 
sued their  voyage  to  the  Hellespont,  which  was  at  this  moment  un- 
guarded, siiu-c  Strombieliides   seems  to  have  brouirht  back   all  his 
S(piadron.     Helixus  passed  on  unopposed  to  Byzantium,  a  Doric  cily 
and   Megnriau   colony,  from  whence  secret  invitations' had  already 
reached  him,  and  which  he  now  induced  to  revolt  from  Athens    Thi's 
untoward  news  adinonished  the  Athenian  generals  at  Samo'^   wIhxc 
vii,^ilance  the  circuitous  route  of  Klearchus  had  eluded   of  the  neces- 
sity of  guarding  the  Hellespont,   whither  thev  sent  a  detachment 
and  even  attempted  in  vain  to  recapture  Bvzantium.     Sixteen  frc^li 
triremes  afterward  proceeded  from  Miletus  to  the  Hellespont  and 
Abvdos,  thus  enabling  the  Peloponuesians  to  watch  that  stn:.1t  as 
well  as  the  Bosphorus  and  Byzantium,  and  even  to  ravage  the  Thra- 
cian  Chersonese. 

Meanwhile  the  discontents  of  the  fleet  at  Miletus  broke,  out  into 
open  mutiny  against  Astyochus  and  Tissaphernes.  Unjmid'and  only 
half -fed,  the  sciimen  came  together  in  crowds  to  talk  over  their  '^Ticv- 


anccs;  denouncing  Astyochus  as  having  betrayed  them  for  his  ow^n 
protit  to  the  satrap,  who  was  treacherously  ruining  the  aniiament 
under  the  inspirations  of  Alkibiades.  Even  some  of  the  otlicers, 
whose  silence  luxd  been  hitherto  purchased,  began  to  hold  the  ?ame 
lauguage;  perceiving  that  the  mischief  was  becoming  irreparable,  and 
that  the  men  were  actually  on  the  point  of  desertion.  Above  all,  the 
iucorruptible  Hermokrates  of  Syracuse,  and  Dorieus  the  Thurian 
commander,  zealously  espoused  the  claims  of  their  seamen,  who 
being  mostly  freemen  (in  greater  proportion  than  the  crews  of  the 
Peloponnesian  ships),  went  in  a  body  to  Astyochus,  with  loud  com- 
plaints and  demand  of  their  arrears  of  pay.  But  the  Peloponnesian 
general  received  them  with  haughtiness  and  even  with  menace,  lift- 
ing up  his  stick  to  strike  the  commander  Dorieus  while  advocating 
their  cause.  Such  was  the  resentment  of  the  seamen  that  they  rushed 
forward  to  pelt  Astyochus  with  missiles;  he  took  refuge,  however,  on 
a  neighboring  altar,  so  that  no  actual  mishief  was  done. 

Nor  was  the  discontent  confined  to  the  seamen  of  the  ,fleet.  The 
Milesians  also,  displeased  and  alarmed  at  the  fort  which  Tissaphernes 
had  built  in  their  town,  watched  an  opportunity  of  attacking  it  by 
surprise,  and  expelled  his  garrison.  Though  the  armament  in  gen- 
eral, now  full  of  antipathy  against  the  satrap,  sympathized  in  this  pro- 
ceeding, yet  the  Spartan  commissioner  Lichas  censured  it  severely; 
intimating  to  the  Milesians  that  they,  as  well  as  the  other  Greeks  in 
tile  king's  territory,  were  bound  to  be  subservient  to  Tissaphernes 
within  all  reasonable  limits — and  even  to  court  him  by  extreme  sub- 
servience, until  the  war  should  be  prosperously  terminated.  It  ap- 
pears that  in  other  matters  also,  Lichas  had  enforced  instead  of  miti- 
gating tlij  authority  of  the  stitrap  over  them;  so  that  the  Milesians 
now  came  to  hate  him  vehemently,  and  when  he  shortly  afterward 
died  of  sickness,  they  refused  permission  to  bury  him  in  the  spo*" 
(probably  some  place  of  honor)  which  his  surviving  countrymen  had 
fixed  upon.  Though  Lichas  in  these  enforcements  only  carried  out 
the  stiiiulations  of  his  treaty  with  Persia,  yet  it  is  certain  that  the  Mi- 
lesians, instead  of  acquiring  autonomy  according  to  the  general  prom- 
ise-^ of  Sparta,  were  now  farther  from  it  than  ever,  and  that  imperial 
Athens  had  protected  them  against  Persia  much  better  than  Sparla. 

The  subordination  of  the  armament,  however,  was  now  almost  at 
an  end,  when  INIindarus  arrived  from  Sparta  as  admiral  to  suj^ersede 
Astyochus,  who  was  summoned  home  and  took  his  departure.  Both 
Hermokrates  and  some  Milesian  deputies  availed  themselves  of  this 
op|)ortunity  to  go  to  Sparta  for  the  purpose  of  preferring  complaints 
against  Tissaphernes;  while  the  latter  on  his  part  sent  thither  a:i 
envoy  named  Gaulites  (a  Karian  brought  up  in  equal  familiarity  with 
tlie  Greek  and  Karian  languages)  both  to  defend  himself  a^^ainst  the 
often-repeated  charges  of  Hermokrates,  that  he  had  been  treacher- 
ously withholding  the  pay  under  concert  with  Alkibhides  and  the 
Athenians — and  to  denounce  the  Milesians  on  his  own  side,  as  having 


244 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


MINDARUS  AT  CHIOS. 


245 


wrongfully  demolished  his  fort.     At  the  same  time  he  thoim-ht  it  ne 
cessary  to  put  forward  a  new  pretense,  for  the  purpose  of  stleji-then* 
ing  yie  negotiations  of  his  envoy  at  Sparta,  soothini:  the  impatience  of 
the  armament,  and  eoneilialiii-  tlie  new  admiral  Mindarus     He  -ui 
nouneed  that  the  Phenician  fleet  was  on  the  point  of  arrivinir  at  \<i) 
endus  in  Pamphylia,  and  that  lie  was  going  thither  to  meet  it  for  the 
purpose  of  bunging  it  up  to  the  seat  of  war   to  co-operate  with  the 
Pe  oponnesians.     IJe  invited  Liehas  to  aceompany  him.  and  vl^-■^.vm\ 
to  leave  Tamos  at  :\Iiletus,  as  deputy  during  his  absence,  with  orders 
to  furnish  pay  and  maintenance  to  the  tleet. 

Mindarus.  a  new  commanfler  without  anv  experience  of  the  men- 
dacity or  Tissaphernes,  was  imposed  upon  by  his  plausible  assurance 
and  even  captivated  by  the  near  prospect  of  so  powerful  a  re-enforce- 
^  :,  He  dispatched  an  oflicer  named  Philippus  with  two  triremes 
r^laud      ^^'^opiau  Cape  to  Aspeudus,  while  the  satrap  went  thither 

Here  again  was  a  fresh  delay  of  no  inconsiderable  length  while 
Tissaphernes  was  absent  at  Aspendus.  on  this  ostensible  purpose 
b>ome  time  elapsed  before  Mindarus  was  undeceived,  for  Phili pnus 
tound  the  Phenician  Heet  at  Aspendus.  and  wns  therefore  rt  first  full 
of  hope  that  it  was  really  coming  onward.  P>ut  the  satrap  soon 
showed  that  his  purpose  now,  as  heretofore,  was  nothing  better  than 
delay  and  delusion.  The  Phenicinn  ships  were  147  in  number-  a 
fleet  more  than  sufficient  f<»r  concludimr  the  maritime  war  if  brought 
up  to  act  zealously.  ]Jut  Tissrpheriies  aiTected  to  think  that  this  was 
a  small  force,  unworthy  of  the  majesty  of  the  Great  Kin?;  who  had 
oommanded  a  fleet  of  300  sail  to  be  fitted  out  for  the  service  He 
waited  for  some  time  in  pretended  expectation  that  more  ships  were 
on  their  way,  disregarding  all  the  remonstrance  of  the  Lacedtemoiiian 
onicers. 

Presently  arrived  the  Athenian  Alkibiades,  with  thirteen  Athenian 

triremes,  exhibiting  himself  as  on  the  best  terms  with  the  satrap     He 

too  had  made  use  of  the  approaching  Phenician  fleet  to  delude  his 

countrymen  at  ^^amos,  by  promising  to  go. and  meet  Tissaphernes  at 

•^P  *  A^lt'  ^  '^x  ^'*  ^It'terminehim,  if  possible,  to  employ  the  fleet  in 

Tiilu       u'~^"/.^  ""^  ^J*';  '"''>■  ^'^•''^'  ''"^  ^«  ^"^P^^y  it  J»  ^'^'^  of  Sparta. 
n  '»t*fL;^.'t^^r"»t»ve  of  the  promise  was  sufficiently  safe  for  he  knew 

wel  that  Tissaphernes  had  no  intention  of  applving  the  fleet  to  any 
really  eflicient  purpose.  But  he  was  thereby  enabTed  to  take  credit 
with  his  count ryinen  for  having  been  the  means  of  diverting  such  a 
lormidable  re-enforcement  from  the  enemy. 

Partly  the  apparent  confidence  between  Tissaphernes  and  Alkibia- 
Gcs-parily  the  impudent  shifts  of  the  former,  grounded  on  the  in- 
credible Pri, tense  that  the  fleet  was  insufficient  in  number-at  length 
fw^  ?^;^^*^T^^''^  the  present  was  only  a  new  manifestation  of 
^f.fw!ti  ^^  t^:^^.'^'"?  «»\1  vexatious  interval,  he  apprised  Mindani^ 
not  without  indignant  abuse  of  the  satrap-that  nothing  was  to  be 


hoped  from  the  fleet  at  Aspendus.  Yet  the  proccediijg  of  Tissapher- 
nes, indeed,  in  bringing  up  the  Phenicians  to  that  place,  and  still 
withholding  the  order  for  farther  advance  and  action,  was  in  every 
one's  eyes  mysterious  and  unaccountable.  Some  fancied  that  he  did 
it  with  a  view  of  levying  larger  bribes  from  the  Phenicians  them- 
selves, as  a  premium  for  being  sent  home  without  fighting,  as  it  ap- 
pears that  they  actually  were.  But  Thucydides  supposes  that  he  had 
no  other  motive  than  that  which  had  determined  his  behavior  during 
tiic  last  year— to  protract  the  war  and  impoverish  both  Athens  and 
Sparta,  l)y  setting  up  a  fresh  deception  which  would  last  for  some 
Aveeks,  and  thus  procure  so  much  delay.  The  historian  is  doubtless 
ri,i,^ht:  but  without  his  assurance  it  wou'.d  have  been  diflicult  to  be- 
lieve that  the  maintenance  of  a  fraudulent  pretense,  for  so  inconsider- 
able a  time,  should  have  been  held  as  an  adequate  motive  for  bring- 
ing this  large  fleet  from  Phenicia  to  Aspendus,  and  then  sending  Tt 
away  unemj^loyed. 

Having  at  length  lost  his  hope  of  the  Phenician  ships,  ^Mindarus  re- 
solved to  break  off  all  dealing  with  the  perfidious  Tissaphernes — the 
more  so  as  Tamos,  the  deputy  of  the  latter,  though  left  ostensibly  to 
p.iy  and  keep  the  fleet,  perfc^rmed  that'duty  with  greater  irre'j,-ularity 
than  ever — and  to  conduct  his  fleet  to  the  Hellespont  into  co-operation 
with  Pharnabazus,  who  still  continued  his  promis;^s  and  invitations. 
The  Peloponnesian  fleet  (73  triremes  strong,  after  deducting  13 
which  had  been  sent  under  Dorieus  to  suppress  sf)nie  disturbance  iu 
Khodes)  having  been  carefully  prepared  beforehand,  was  put  in  mo- 
tion by  sudden  order,  so  that  no  previous  intimation  might  reach  the 
Athenians  at  Samos.  After  having  been  delayed  some  days  at  Ikarus 
by  bad  weather,  Mindarus  reached  Chios  in  safety.  But  here  lie  was 
pin-sued  by  Thrasyllus,  who  passed,  with  55  triremes,  to  the  north 
ward  of  Chios,  and  was  thus  between  the  Lacediemonian  {idmiral  and 
the  Hellespont.  Believing  that  Mindarus  w-ould  remain  some  time  at 
Chios,  Thrasyllus  placed  scouts  both  on  the  high  lands  of  Lesbos  and 
on  the  continent  opposite  Chios,  in  order  that  he  might  receive  in- 
stant notice  of  any  movement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy's  fleet.  Mean- 
while he  employed  his  Athenian  force  in  reducing  the  Lesbian  town 


foreigners — who  succeeded  in  carrying  Eresus  after  failing  in  an  at- 
tack on  Methymoa.  Thrasyllus  found  before  Eresus  a  small  Athenian 
squadron  of  live  triremes  under  Thrasybulus,  who  had  been  dis- 
patched from  Samos  to  try  and  forestall  the  revolt,  but  had  arrived 
too  late.  He  was  further  joined  by  two  triremes  from  the  Hellespont, 
and  by  others  from  Methymna,  so  that  his  entire  fleet  reached  tlie 
miniber  of  67  triremes,  with  which  he  proceeded  to  lay  siege  to 
Eresus;  trusting  to  his  scouts  for  timely  warning  in  case  tile  enemy's 
fleet  should  move  northward. 


246 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


BATTLE  OF  KYNOSSEMA. 


247 


The  course  which  Thrasy'.lus  expected  the  Peloponnesian  flpot 
to  take,  was  to  sail  from  C  h'ios  iioithwanl  through  tlie  strait  wh'uh 
separates  the  north-eastern  portion  of  tliat  island  from  jAIount  ^limas 
on  the  Asiatic  main-land:  after  which  it  would  prohably  sail  pnst 
Eresus  on  the  western  side  of  Lesbos,  as  bein«?  the  shortest  tiac  k  lo 
the  Hellespont— thoufrh  it  mielit  al^o  go  round  on  llie  eastern  side 
])etween  Lesbos  and  the  continent,  by  a  somewhat  lon^irer  rouic. 
The  Athenian  scouts  were  planted  so  as  to  descry  the  Pciclponntsijm 
fleet  if  it  either  passed  through  this  strait  or  neand  the  island  of 
Lebos.  But  Mindarus  did  neither;  thus  eluding  their  watch  nnd 
reaching  the  Hellespont  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Athcnitiiis. 
Having  passed  two  clays  in  provisioning  his  sinps.  receiving  besides 
from  the  Chians  three  tessarakosts  (a  Ciiian  coin  of  unknown  vahu ) 
for  each  man  among  his  seamen,  he  departed  on  the  third  (!av  from 
Chios,  but  took  a  southerly  route  and  rounded  the  island  in  all  hnsic 
on  its  western  or  sea  side.*  Having  reached  and  passed  the  noitlicin 
latitude  of  Chios,  he  took  an  eastward  course,  wiih  Lesbos  at  son  e 
distance  to  his  left-hand,  direct  to  the  mainland;  which  he  loudnd 
at  a  harbor  called  Karterii  in  the  Phokaean  territory.  Here  he  slojipcd 
to  give  the  crew  their  morning  meal:  he  then  crossed  the  aic  of  ilie 
Gulf  of  Kyme  to  the  little  islets  called  Arginusa?  (close  on  the  Asi;ilic 
continent  opposite  Milylene),  where  he  again  lialted  for  supper. 
Continuing  his  voyage  onward  during  most  part  of  the  night,  he  was 
at  Hermatus  (on  the  continent,  directly  northward  and  opposite  lo 
JVIethymna)  by  the  next  day's  morning  meal:  then  still  hasleninir  for- 
ward after  a  short  halt,  he  doubled  "Cape  Lektum,  sailed  alonii  the 
Troad  and  past  Tenedos,  and  reached  the  entrance  of  the  llelles-poiit 
before  midnight;  where  his  shi])s  were  distributed  at  Sigeium. 
Rha'teium,  and  other  neighboring  places. 

By  this  well-laid  course,  and  accelerated  voyage,  the  Peloponnesiiiii 
fleet  completely  eluded  the  lookers-out  of  Thrasyllus,  and  reached 
the  opening  of  the  Hellespont  when  that  admiral  was  barely  apprised 
of  its  departure  from  Chios.  When  it  ariived  at  Harmaius,  how- 
ever, opposite  to  and  almost  within  sight  of  the  Athenian  station  at 
Methymna,  its  progress  could  no  longer  remain  a  secret.  As  it 
advanced  still  farther  along  the  Troad,'  the  momentous  news  circula- 
ted everywhere,  and  was  promulgated  through  numerous  fire-signals 
and  beacons  on  the  hill,  by  friend  as  well  as  by  foe. 

These  signals  were  perfectly  visible,  and  perfectly  intelligible,  to 
the  two  hostile  squadrons  now  on  guard  on  each  side  of  the  llelles- 
point:  18  Athenian  triremes  at  Sestos  in  Europe— 16  Peloponnesiau 
triremes  at  Abydos  in  Asia.  To  the  former,  it  was  destruction  to  be 
caught  bv  this  powerful  enemy  in  the  narrow  channel  of  the  Helles- 
point.  They  quitted  Sestos,  in  the  middle  of  the  night,  passing 
opposite  to  Abydos,  and  keeping  a  soutlierly  course  close  along  the 
shore  of  the  Chersonese,  in  the  direction  towards  Ela?us  at  the 
southern  extremity  of  that  peninsula,  so  as  to  have  the  chance  of 


.  \r.  ihn  nnpn  sea  and  of  ioining  Thrasyllus.  But  they  would 
''rinvc  b  cnXv'^  to  p  iss  elen  the  hostile  station  at  Abvdos  had 
:;;  1.  Pe  10  nesian  .nJardships  received  the  strictest  orders  from 
A  n  uns  trmsnutted  before  he  left  Chios,  or  perhaps  even  before 
h  lef  MiU'l  s  that  if  he  should  attempt  the  start^,  they  were  to  keep 
n% io  lint '  nd  special  look-out  lor  his  coming,  and  reserve  themselves 
to  rem    hi      such  a^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  ^'  needed   in  case  he  were 

in-  cl  ed  bv  Thrasyllus.  When  the  signals  first  announced  tl  e 
alt.ickai  uy  1  ^  Peloponnesian  jruard-ships  at  Abydos  could 
?:;trnow     '^a'  p^^^^^^^  ^he  main  Athenian 

S  t  iSi  nc't  be  ne:u-  upon  him.  Accordingly  they  acted  on  hese 
nui  1111^^' "  iw^Mino-  tbemselves   in  reserve  m  their  station  at 

'ri^X  "  ,nrdaySt%Sruvrivo,  and  they  should  be  better 
il,t?,;',;ie;i    tI'cv  U,n?..eg!ected  the  Atheuiun  Hellespontme  squadron 

''o:::^nJ'Z^tyn!^^h..  southern  point  of  the  Cherson- 
e,.  he^AtiKSs  we  deseried  by  the  fleet  of  Mindams  wluc  j 
InVcomVueni.'bt  before  lo  the  opposite  stations  o  bigeium  and 
Rurii^mTlio  latter  immediately  .save  chase ;  but  tUe  A  l.enmns, 
now  ithc  wide  s«.  contrived  to  escape  most  of  them  to  Imbros- 
-n^;,.  ti.o  ln«s  lio-.vever  of  four  triremes,  one  even  captured 
i^h^jTlle  c^e^'otKnea^be  temple  of  Prote^^^^^^^^ 

i    n  es  ^ro  H  X   en.oloye.l  for  one  day  .u  trying  to  storm  Lteus 
l"  i Vn  -    u  thi"  enteriH-is.',  tlie  fleet  retired  to  Abydos.     Befoie  all 
,™      Arrive  tlK-reThrasvllus  with  bis  fleet  arrived  in  baste   trom 
E     t   mud    msapH.^^^^^^  that  bis  scouts  had  been  eluded  and.. 
bU  caTctdatilins  b.ftiied.     Two  V^-P-'^-'^^Z^'^'H'n:^ 
been  more  adventurous  than  tbc  res   m  1''  '■^"  "«'.''« ^■^".'.'^"'"j^fiU^^ 
iuto  bis  bauds.     He  awaited  at  Kteus  the  letu  n  of  tlie  tu|iti  e 
Athenian  squadron  from  Iinbros,  and  then   began   to  piepaic  bis 
friromf.^   7fi  in  1111  mbcr   for  a  general  action.  ,    ^^, 

Xr  li  e  d  V v"ot  suih  preparation,  bis  fleet  was  brought  to  battle 
samn'northSd  towardl  S^stus  up  the  Hellespot.t,  by  s.ng  e  si,  ps 
•il.p-uf  alon.T  the  coast  of  the  Chersonese,  or  on  the  Euiopcan  siae. 
T  ^"^fto    m<«t  Xaneed  squad.,n  t.nder  Tbrasyllus,  stretched  eve,t 
bovond   the    head-land    ca  led    Kynossema,   or  the    Dogs    lomt). 
e  >  ,ohled  bv  tLe  legend  and  the  elmpel  of  the  Tro  an  que.  n  Heeuba 
it  '.vas  tlms"  nearly  opposite  Abydos  while   be  "j- "  ^"1"; ''  ""  ^^^^' 
Thrisvbolis  WIS  not  very  far  from  the  soutbern  mouth  ot  the  sti.iu, 
^a;h'op^i^  ba^^uul     Mindarus  on  his  side  ^--^y^Jl;; -^;>^^ 
eiditV-six  triremes  (ten   more   than  ^^^^'^^^  ^^^  f ..  "^'^L^^^^^^^^ 
extending  from   Abydos  to  Dardanus  on   the   As      c  shoi e     ti  o 
Svraeusans   under   Hermokrates    b.ing  on    t^^«./,;S     '  ^^Pf^^^^ 
Thr-wvtln<;   vviiile  Mindarus  wth  the  Peloponnesian  ships  w.is  ouiue 
Stop^W  to  m^ybulus.    Tbc  cpibata.  or  maritime  hopUtes  on 


248 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


BRIDGE  ACROSS  THE  EURIPUS. 


249 


board  the  ships  of  Mindarns  arc  said  fo  have  been  Riipcrior  to  llio 
Alhenians;  but  the  latter  l.ad  tlie  advMiita-c  in   skillful  njlots  •    ,] 
nautical  maneuverin-:  nevertheless  the  deseiipfion  of  the  battle  tells 
lis  how  nuich  Athenian  inaneuven.ig  had  fallen  off  sinee  the  Hori, 
ot  Piionnion  at  the  begnining  of  the  Peloponnesian  war;    nor  nvoi  Id 
that  eminent  seaman  have  selected  for  the  scene  of  a  naval  battle  I  o 
iiarroNv   waters  of  the  Hellespont.     lyiindarus  took  the  ao-rn.^i   . 
advancing  to  attack  near  the  European  shore,  and  trving  to  outH-uik 
.   his  opponents  on  both  sides,  as  well  as  to  drive  I  hem  up  auainst'll  e 
land       Ihrasyllus  on  one  wing,  and  Thiasvbulus  on  the  \>lher  bv 
rapid  movements,  extended  themselves  soa.^'to  frustrate  this  Mttemnt 
tooutrtank  them;  but  in  so  doing,  they  stripped  and  weakened  the 
center,  ^y\uch  was  even  deprived  ot  the  si-ht  of  the  left  win-  bv 
means  of  the  projecting   head-land   of  Kvnossema.     Thus   un'.uD- 
ported    the  center  was  vigorously  attacked  and  rouuhly  hanclled  I  v 
he  middle  division  ot  M.ndarus.     Its  ships  were  dViven  up  .g.-.init 
the  land   and  the  assailants  even  disemhaikc  d  to  push  their  vFctoiv 
against  the  men  ashore.     But  tliis  pnrtial  success  threw  the  (entral 
Peloponnesnm  division  itself  into  disorder,  while  Thrasybuh.s  and 

lliras^Mluscarried.^ii  a  C()i.tlict  at  tirsteqiial,  and  present lvvictoriou>; 
against  the  slups  on  the  light  and  left  of  the  enemy.  Having  (irivei'i 
back  botJi  these  two  divisions,  they  <  asilv  chased  a wav  the  disordeied 
ships  of  the  center,  so  that  the  whole  Peh.ponnesian  rieet  was  put  to 
llight.and  found  shelter  hrst  in  the  river  .Meidius.  next  in  Ahvdcx; 
Ihe  narrow  Ireadlh  of  the  lielloi  ont  forbade  either  Ion-  pursuit  or 
imnierous  captu.vs.  A'everlheUss  eight  Chian  ships,  f-ve  Corinthian, 
nvo  Ambnikian   and  as  many  Bceotian.  and  from  Sparta.  Syiacuse 

llnrV'"''  /^"'V^''"'-  ^''^  ^'^^^}-^^^^^n\o  the  hands  of  the  Athenia.n 
achnuals;  who  however  on  their  own  side  lost  tilt(en  shins  Thev 
erected  a  trophy  on  the  lu  ad-land  of  Kynossema.  near  the 'tomb  oV 
chapel  ol  Heeuba;  not  omitting  the  usualduliesof  burying  theirowu 
dead,  and  giving  up  those  of  the  enemy  under  the  customary  request 
lor  truce.  ''     ^ 

A  victory  so  incomplete  and  indecisive  would  liave  been  little 
valued  by  the  Athenians,  in  the  times  j.recedinu  the  Sicilian  exi)edi- 
Ih?.;  J-  f  T'''^  that  overwhelming  disaster,  followed  by  so  inany 
o  her  m.stortunes,  and  last  ot  all.  b^  the  defeat  of  TJivmocharis  with 
he  lexolt  of  Euba>a-their  spirit  IimI  heen  so  sadly  lowered,  tJiat  the 
trireme  which  brought  the  news  of  tlie  battle  of'Kvnossema  seein- 
n!nf  /7';!'-^  /»'e  end  of  August  411  b.c,  was  welcomed  with  the 
V      .     f  •    T^  triumph.     Tlay  b(gan   to  feel  as  if  the  ebb-tide 

;    1  ;rr  '''\'''^  ^^'^^'y'  '?'.^'^  ^''^'^  ^^^-"»  ^'^  ^»^»  ^"  their  favor, 

i  o!  hf  ^^"f  ^/«P^'«  ot  ultimate  niccess  in  the  war.  Anoiher 
AHmH  f  "  ""'^''"^^  .^'"■"    happened   to    strengthen   this   belief. 

^.nHinL^H-'"''  ,^*'^'"P^'''*''  to  re-enfor<e  himself  at  the  Hellespont  hv 
sending  llippokrates  and  Epikles  to  brinir  the  fleet  of  hfty  triremes 
now  acting  at  Euba^a.     This   was  in  itself  an  important  relief  to 


Athens,  by  withdrawing  an  annoying  enemy  near  home.  But  it  was 
still  further  enhanced  by  the  sui)sequent  misfortunes  of  the  fleet, 
which  in  passing  round  the  head-land  of  Mount  Athos  to  get  to  Ashi,' 
was  overtaken  by  a  terrific  storm  and  nearly  destroyed,  with  creat 
loss  of  bfe  among  the  crows;  so  that  a  remnant  only  under  Hippo- 
krntes  survived  to  join  ^lindarus. 

But  though  Athens  was  thus  exempted  from  all  fear  of  aggression 
on  the  side  of  Eubnca,  the  consequences  of  this  departure  of  t!:e  fleet 
were  such  as  to  demonstrate  how  irreparably  the  island  itself  had 
passed  out  of  her  supremacy.  The  inhabita'^nls  of  Chalkis  and  the 
other  cities,  now  left  without  foreign  defense  against  her,  employed 
themselves  jointly  with  the  Boeotians,  whose  interest  in  the  case  was 
even  stronger  than  their  own,  in  divesting  Eubcea  of  its  insular 
character,  by  constructing  a  mole  or  bridge  across  the  Euripus,  the 
narrowest  portion  of  the  Eiibnoan  strait,  where  Ciialkis  was  divided 
from  BcEotia.  From  each  coast  a  mole  was  thrown  out.  eacji  mole 
guarded  at  the  exlremity  byatow^er,  and  leaving  only  an  intermediate 
opening,  broad  enough  for  a  single  vessel  to  passed  throudi.  covered 
by  a  wooden  bridge.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Athenian  Theramenes, 
with  thirty  triremes,  presented  himself  to  obstruct  the  progress  of 
the  undertaking.  The  Euboeans  and  Boeotians  both  prosecuted  it  in 
such  numbi'rs,  and  with  so  much  zeal,  that  it  was  spe(>dily  brouirht 
to  completion.  Eiiba?a.  so  lately  the  most  important  island  attached 
to  Athens,  is  from  henceforward  a  portion  of  the  main-land,  alto- 
gether independent  of  her,  even  though  it  should  please  fortune  to 
re-establish  her  maritime  power. 

The  battle  of  Kynossema  produced  no  very  important  conse- 
quences, except  that  of  encouragement  to  the  Athenians.  Even  just 
after  the  action.  Kyzikus  revolted  from  them,  and  on  the  fourth  day 
after  it,  the  Atheiiian  fleet,  hastily  refitted  at  Sestos,  sailed  to  that 
place  to  retake  it.  It  was  unfortified,  so  that  they  succeeded  with 
little  difficulty,  and  imposed  upon  it  a  contribution:'  moreover  in  the 
voyage  thither,  they  gained  an  additional  advantage  bv  capturimr, 
off  the  southern  coast  of  the  Propontis.  those  eiirht  Peloponnesirrn 
triremes  which  had  accomplished,  a  little  while  before,  the  revolt  of 
Byzantium.  But  on  the  other  hand,  as  soon  as  the  Athenian  fleet 
had  left  Sestos,  Mindarns  sailed  from  his  station  at  Alwdos  toEhTus, 
and  recovered  all  the  triremes  captured  from  him  at  Kyncxsrm-i' 
which  the  Athenians  had  there  deno^ited;  except  some  of  theni 
which  Wi're  so  much  damaged,  that  the  inhabitants  of  Eh^us.  set 
tliein  on  fire. 

But  that  which  now  began  to  constitute  a  far  more  important  ele- 
ment of  the  war.  was.  the  difl'erence  of  character  bf^tween  Ti^sap-u'r- 
iies  and  Pharnabazus.  and  the  transfer  of  tlie  Pelopo^mesian  fleet 
from  the  satrapy  of  tlu^  former  to  that  of  the  latter.  Tissaphernos. 
jvhile  furnishing  neither  aid  nor  pay  to  the  Peloponnasjans,  had  by 
his  treacherous  promises  and  bribes  enerrated  all  their  proceedings 


250 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


BATTLES  AT  THE  HELLESPONT. 


251 


for  the  last  year,  with  tlie  deliberate  view  of  wastir^  both  tlie 
belligerent  parties.  Pharnabazus  was  a  brave  and  earnest  man,  wiio 
set  himself  to  assist  tliem  strenuously,  by  men  as  well  as  by  moiu'v, 
and  who  labored  hard  to  put  down  the  Athenian  power;  as  we  shiill 
find  him  laboring  equally  hard,  eighteen  years  afterward,  to  bring 
about  its  partial  renovation.  From  this  time  forward,  Persian  aiil 
becomes  a  reality  in  the  Grecian  war;  and  in  the  main — first  tliiough 
the  hands  of  Pharnabazus,  next  through  those  of  the  younger  Cyrus 
— the  determining  reality.  For  we  shall  find  thatwliile  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  are  for  the  most  part  well-paid,  out  of  the  Persian  treasury— 
the  Athenians,  destitute  of  any  such  resource,  are  compelled  to  rely 
on  the  contributions  which  they  can  levy  here  and  there,  without 
established  or  accepted  right ;  and  to  interrupt  for  this  purpose  even 
the  most  promising  career  of  success.  Twenty-six  years  nfter  this, 
at  a  time  when  Sparta  had  lost  Iier  Persian  allies,  the  Laccdapmoiiian 
Teleutias  tried  to  appease  the  mutiny  of  his  unpaid  seamen,  hy 
telling  them  how  much  nobler  it  was  to  extort  pay  from  the  enemy 
by  means  of  their  own  swords,  than  to  obtain  it  b}'  truckling  to  tlie 
foreigner;  and  probably  the  Athenian  generals,  during  these  pre- 
vious years  of  struggle,  tried  similar  appeals  to  the  generosity  of 
their  soldiers.  But  it  is  not  the  less  certain,  that  the  new  constant 
pay-master  now  introduced  gave  fearful  odds  to  the  Spartan  cause. 

The  good  pay  and  Iiearty  co-operation  which  the  Peloponnesians 
now  enjoyed  from  Pharnabazus,  only  made  them  the  mon  indignant 
at  the  previous  deceit  of  Tissaphernes.  Under  the  influence  of  this 
sentiment,  they  readily  lent  aid  to  the  inhabitants  Antandrus  in 
expelling  his  general  Arsakes  with  the  Persian  garrison.  Arsakes  had 
recently  committed  an  act  of  murderous  perfidy,  under  the  intiuenee 
of  some  unexplained  pique,  against  the  Delians  established  at 
Adramyttiura:  he  had  summoned  their  principal  citizens  to  lake  part 
as  allies  in  an  expedition,  and  had  caused  them  all  to  be  surrounded, 
shot  down,  and  ma.ssacred  during  the  morning  meal.  Such  an  a(  t 
was  more  than  sufficient  to  excite  hatred  and  alarm  among  the 
neighboring  Antandrians,  who  invited  from  Abydos,  across  the 
mountain  range  of  Ida.  a  body  of  Peloponnesian  hoplites;  by  whose 
aid  Antandrus  was  liberated  from  the  Persians. 

In  Miletus  a<5  well  as  in  Knidus.  Tissaphernes  had  already  experi- 
enced the  like  luuniliation:  Lichas  was  no  longer  alive  to  back  his 
pretensions:  nor  do  we  hear  that  he  obtained  any  result  from  the 
complaints  of  his  envoy  Gaulites  at  Sparta.  Under  these  circum- 
stances he  began  to  fear  that  he  had  incurred  a  w  eight  of  cnmily 
which  might  prove  seriously  mischievous,  and  he  was  not  without 
jealousy  of  the  popularity  and  possible  success  of  Pharnabiizus.  The 
delusion  respecting  the  Phenician  fleet,  now  that  .Alindarus  had 
openly  broken  with  him  and  quitted  Miletus,  was  no  longer  availahle 
to  any  useful  purpose.  Accordingly  he  dismissed  the  Phenician 
fleet  to  their  own  homes,  pretending  to  have  received  tidings  that  the 


Phoni(Man  towns  were  endangered  bv  sudden  attacks  from  Arabia 
and  Egypt:  wliile  lie  himself  quitted  Aspendus  to  revisit  Ionia,  as 
well  as  to  go  forward  to  the  Hellespont  for  the  purpose  of  renewing 
]K'rsonal  intercourse  with  the  dissatisfied  Peloponnesians.  He  wished, 
while  trying  again  to  excuse  his  own  treachery  about  the  Phenician 
tlcet,  at  the  same  time  to  protest  against  their  recent  proceedings  at 
Antandrus;  or,  at  the  least,  to  obtain  some  guarantee  against  repeti- 
tion of  such  hostility.  His  visit  to  Ionia,  however,  seems  to  have 
occupied  some  time,  and  he  tried  to  conciliate  the  Ionic  Greeks  by  a 
splendid  sacritice  to  Artemis  at  Ephesus.  Having  quitted  Aspendus 
(as  far  as  we  can  make  out)  about  the  beginning  of  August  (411  B.C.), 
lie  did  not  reach  the  Hellespont  until  the  month  of  November. 

As  soon  as  the  Phenician  fleet  had  disappeared,  Alkibiades  returned 
with  his  thirteen  triremes  from  Phaselis  to  Samos.  He,  too,  like 
Tissaphernes,  made  the  proceeding  subservient  to  deceit  of  his  own. 
lie  took  credit  with  his  countrymen  for  having  enlisted  the  good-will 
of  the  satrap  more  strongly  than  ever  in  the  cause  of  Athens,  and  for 
having  induced  him  to  abandon  his  intention  of  bringing  up  the 
Phenician  fleet.  At  this  time  Dorieus  was  at  Rhodes  with  thirteen 
triremes,  having  been  dispatched  l)y  Mindarus  (before  his  departure 
from  Miletus)  in  order  to  stifle  the  growth  of  a  philo-Athenian  party 
in  the  island.  Perhaps  the  presence  of  this  force  may  have  threat- 
ened the  Athenian  interest  in  Kos  and  Halikarnassus;  for  we  now 
find  Alkibiades  going  to  these  places  from  Samos,  with  nine  fresh 
triremes  in  atldition  to  his  own  thirteen.  Having  erected  fortifica- 
tions at  the  town  of  Kos,  he  planted  in  it  an  Atlienian  officer  and 
garrison.  From  Halikarnassus  he  levied  large  contributions;  upon 
what  pretense,  or  wdiether  from  simple  want  of  money,  we  do  not 
know.  It  >vas  toward  the  middle  of  September  that  he  returned  to 
Samos. 

At  the  Hellespont,  Mindarus  liad  been  re-enforced  after  the  battle 
of  Kynossema  by  the  squadron  from  Euboea;  at  least  by  that  portion 
of  it  which  had  escaped  the  storm  off  ]Mount  Athos.  .  The  departure 
of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  from  Euboea  enabled  the  Athenians  also  to 
send  a  few  more  ships  to  their  fleet  at  Sestos.  Thus  ranged  on  the 
opposite  sides  of  the  strait,  the  two  fleets  came  to  a  second  action, 
wherein  the  Peloponnesians,  under  Agesandridas,  had  the  advantage; 
yet  with  little  fruit.  It  was  about  the  month  of  October,  seemingly, 
that  Dorieus  wuth  his  fourteen  triremes  came  from  Rhodes  to  rejoin 
^'iliiidarus  at  the  Hellespont.  He  had  hoped  probably  to  get  up 
the  strait  to  Ab^'dos  during  the  night,  but  he  was  caught  by  daylight 
a  little  w\ay  from  the  entrance,  near  Rha^teium;  and  the  Athenian 
s^'outs  instantly  gave  signal  of  his  approach.  Twenty  Athenian 
triremes  were  dispatched  to  att:rt?k  him:  upon  which  Dorieus  fled, 
and  sought  safety  by  hauling  his  vessels  ashore  in  the  receding  bay 
near  Dardanus.  The  Athenian  Sipiadron  here  attacked  him,  but 
were  repulsed  and  forced  to  sail  back  to  Madytus.     Mindarus  was 


252 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


RENEWED  TROUBLES  AT  KORKYRA. 


253 


Inmself  a  spcctfitor  of  this  scene,  from  a  distance;  being  eniraffcd  in 
saerilicing  to  Athene  on  the  venerated  hill  of  Ilium.  He  imnictfiatelv 
hat,tened  to  Abydos.  where  lie  tilted  out  his  wliole  tieet  of  84  tif. 
remes;  Pharnab:'.zus  eo-operating  on  the  shore  with  his  land-force 
Having  lescuecithe  ships  of  Dorieus,  Ins  next  care  was  to  resist  ihc 
entire  Atlienian  tleet,  wliieh  presently  came  to  attack  him  under 
Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyllus.  xVn  obstinate  naval  combat  took  place 
betvycen  tlie  two  tieels,  which  lasted  nearly  the  whole  day  wilh  doubt 
lul  issue:  at  leiiglh,  toward  the  evening,  20  fresh  triremes  were  seen 
approaching.  They  proved  to  be  the  squadron  of  Alkibiades  sailiim 
Irom  tSamos:  having  i)robably  heard  of  the  re-junction  of  tlie  sqiuat- 
ron  of  Dorieus  with  the  main  Peloponiiesian  fleet,  he  liad  come  wiih 
]iis  own  countcrl;alaiicing  re-en r(>r((inent.  As  soon  as  his  piirj^le 
tiiig  or  signal  was  ascertained,  tlie  Athenian  fleet  became  aniniaied 
with  redoubled  spirit.  The  new-comers  aided  them  in  i»iessii;u- the 
acli(»u  to  vigorously,  that  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  was  driven  l;aek  h. 
Abydos,  and  there  run  ashore.  Here  the  Atlunians  still  followed 
ui)  their  success,  aud  endeavored  to  tow  them  all  off.  But  the  Per- 
sian land  ioice  i)rotected  them,  and  Pharnabazus  himself  was  seen 
foremost  in  the  combat;  even  pushing  iuto  the  water  in  peison,  as 
far  as  his  horse  coidd  stand.  1  he  main  Peloponnesian  fleet  was  linis 
preserved:  yet  the  Athenians  retired  with  an  important  victory, 
carrying  off  thirty  triremes  as  prizes,  and  retaking  those  which  Ihev 
had  themselves  lost  in  the  two  preceding  actions. 

]Mindarus  kept  his  defeated  fleet  umnployed  at  Abydos  during  the 
winter,  sending  to  Peloponnesus  as  well  as  among  his  allies  to  solicit 
re-euforeements;  in  the  mean  time,   he  engaged  jointly  with  Phaiiia- 
b:izus  in  operations  by  land  against   vaiious  Athenian  allies  on  the 
continent.     The  Athenian  adniirals,  on  their  side,  instead  of  keepii;<j 
their  fleet  unitt^l  to  ]irosecute  the  victory,  were  compelled  to  disj^rse 
a  large  portion  .of  it  in  flying  squadrons* for  collecting  money,  retain- 
ing only   forty  sail   at  ISestos;  while  Thrasyllus  in   person*  went  to 
Alliens  to  i)roejjum  the  victory  and  ask  for  re-enforcements.     Pursu- 
ant to  this  request,  thirty  tiir'emes  were  sent  ofit  under  Thciameiies; 
who  tirst  endeavored  without  success  to  impede  the  constructic.u  of 
the  bridge  between  Eubcea  and  Btt'otia,  and  next  sailed  on  a  vov.'ige 
rmong  tlie  islands  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  money.     He  acquired 
con>ider:ible   plunder  by   descents   upon   hos'tile  territory,  anel  also 
cxiorled  mony  fiom  vaiious  parlies,  eilher  contemplating  or  suppo^d 
to   contemplate   revolt,    among    the    dej)endencies   of  Athens.      At 
Pares,  where  the  oligarchy  established  by  Peisander  in   the  con.^pi- 
racy  of  the  Four  Hundied  still  subsisted.  Tin  ramencs  deposed  niai 
flned  the  men  who  had  exercised   it— eslablishing  a  democracv  in 
their  room.     From  hence  he  passe^l  to  Macedonia,  to  the  assistiiiice 
and  probably  into  the  ttmi-orary  pay,  of  Archelaus  kinir  of  lAIr.ce- 
donia,  whom  he  aided  for  sometime  in  the  siege  of  Pydna;  blocking 
up  the  town  by  sea  wliile  the  Macedonians  besieged  it  by  land.    The 


blockade  having  lasted  the  wiiole  w^inter,  Therameneswas  summoned 
away,  before  its  capture,  to  join  the  main  Athenian  fleet  in  Thrace: 
Archelaus  however  took  Pydna  not  long  afterward,  and  transported 
the  town  with  its  residents  from  the  sea-board  to  a  distance  more 
than  two  miles  inland.  We  trace  in  all  these  proceedings  the 
evidence  of  that  terrible  want  of  money  which  now  drove  the 
Athens  to  injustice,  extortion,  and  interference  with  their  allies, 
such  as  they  had  never  commitled  during  the  earlier  years  of  the  wjlr! 
It  is  at  this  period  that  we  And  mention  made  of  a  fresh  intestine 
conunotion  in  Korkyra,  less  stained  however  with  savai^^e  enormities 
than  that  recounted  in  the  seventh  year  of  the  war.  It  appears  that 
the  oligarchical  party  in  the  island,  which  had  been  for  the  moment 
nearly  destroyed  at  the  period,  had  since  gained  strength,  and  was. 
encouraged  by  the  misfortunes  of  Athens  to  lav  plans  for  pulling  the 
island  into  the  hands  of  the  Lacedoiinonians.  The  democratical 
leaders,  apprised  of  this  conspii-acy,  sent  to  Naupaktus  for  the 
Athenian  admiral  Konon.  He  came  with  a  detachment  of  GOO  Mes- 
senians,  by  the  aid  of  whom  they  seized  the  oliuarchic;d  conspirators 
in  the  market-place,  putting  a  few  to  death,  and  banishing  more  than 
a  thousand.  The  extent  of  their  alarm  is  attested  by  the  fact,  that 
fliey  liberated  the  slaves  aud  conferred  the  ri2.ht  of  citizenship  upon 
the  foreigners.  The  exiles,  having  retired  to  Uie  opposite  continent, 
came  back  shortly  atterward,  and  were  admitted,  bv  the  connivance 
of  a  party  within,  into  the  market-place.  A  serious  combat  took 
place  within  the  walls,  which  was  at  hist  made  up  by  a  compromise 
and  by  the  restoration  of  the  exiles.  We  know  nothing  about  the 
particulars  of  this  compromise,  but  it  seems  to  have  been  wisely 
drawn  up  and  faithfully  observed;  for  we  hear  nothing  about  Kor- 
kyra until  about  thirty-flve  years  after  this  period,  and  the  island  is 
then  presented  to  us  as  in  the  highest  perfection  of  cultivation  and 
prosperity.  Doubtless  the  emancipation  of  slaves,  and  the  admission 
ot  so  many  new  foreigners  to  the  citizenship,  contributed  to  this 
result. 

Meanwhile  Tissaphernes,  having  completed  his  measures  in  Ionia, 
arrived  at  the  Hellespont  not  long  after  the  battle  of  Abydos— seem- 
nidy  about  November  411  B.C.  He  w^as  anxious  to  retain  some 
credit  with  the  Peloponnesians,  for  which  an  opportunitv  soon  pre- 
.  sentcl  itself.  Alkibiades,  then  in  command  of  the  Athenian  fleet  at 
■bestos,  came  to  visit  him  in  all  the  pride  of  victory,  bringing  the 
customary  presents;  but  the  satrap  seized  his  person  and  senriiiin 
away  to  Sardis  as  a  prisoner  in  custody,  aflirmini>:  that  he  had  the 
Orreat  King's  express  orders  for  currying  on  war  with  the  Athenians. 
Here  was  an  end  of  all  the  delusions  of  Alkibiades,  respecting  pre- 
tended power  of  influencing  the  Persian  counsels.  Yet  these^delu- 
sions  had  already  served  his  purpose  by  procuring  for  him  a  renewed 
position  in  the  Athenian  camp,  which  liis  own  military  energy  en- 
abled him  to  sustain  and  justify.     - 


254 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


DISC0URAGE3IENT  OF  THE  SPARTANS.        255 


Toward  tlio  middle  of  this  winter  tlie  mpcriority  of  the  fleet  of 
Mindarus  at  Abydos,  over  the  Atlienian  fleet  at  ^estos,  had  T-eec  nie 
Fo  ffreat  (partly,  as  it  would  appear,  Ihroiiiih  re-enforcements cbtiiined 
bylhe  former— partly  throu.nh  the  disjiersion  of  the  latter  into  tlyiiig 
squadrons  from  want  of  pay)  that  the  Athenians  no  longer  darid  to 
maintain  their  position  in  the  Hellespont.  They  sailed  rour.d  the 
southern  point  cf  the  Chersonese,  and  took  station  at  Kardia  on  the 
western  side  of  the  isthmus  of  that  Peninsula.  Here,  about  the 
commencement  of  S|  i  'i\ii,  they  were  rejoined  by  Alkibiades;  who  liail 
found  means  to  esf  ape.irom  h'ardis  (along  with  Mantitheus,  ai  oilier 
Athenian  prisoner),  tirst  to  Klazcmcnsp,  and  next  to  Lcj-bos,  uliire 
lie  collected  a  small  squadron  of  five  triremes.  The  dispersed  sqiuid- 
rons  of  the  Athenian  fl«  et  being  now  all  summoned  to  conccntuite, 
Theramenes  came  to  Kardia  from  ^laccdonia.  ar.d  Tlirasybulus  from 
Thasos;  whereby  the  Athenian  fleet  was  rendered  superior  in  nnm- 
ler  to  that  of  Mindarus  News  was  breutht  that  the  latter  Lad 
11  oved  with  his  fleet  from  the  Hellespont  to  Kyzikus,  and  was  now 
(iii^aired  in  the  siege  of  that  place,  jointly  with 'Pharnabazus  and  the 
Persian  land -fence. 

His  viirorous  attaeks  liad  in  fact  already  carried  the  place,  vlien 
the  xXthenian  admirals  resolved  to  attack  him  there,  and  contrived 
to  do  it  by  surprise.  Having  passed  first  frem  Kardia  to  Elffiis  at 
tlie  south  e)f  the  C  hersonese.^they  sailed  up  the  Hellespont  to  Prokou- 
resus  by  night,  so  that  their  passage  escaped  the  notice  of  the  Pelo- 
poniiesijin  guard-ships  at  Abydos. 

Resting  at  Prokonnesus  one  nicht,  and  seizing  every  boat  on  lhe 
island,  in  order  that  tlicir  movements  might  be  kept  secret,  Alkibi- 
ades warned  the  assembled  seamen  tluit  they  must  prepare  for  a 
sea-fight,  a  land-fight,  and  a  wall-fight,  all  at  once.  "  We  have  do 
money  (said  he),  while  e)ur  enemies  liave  plenty  from  the  Great 
Kinjr."  Neither  zeal  in  the  men,  nor  contrivance  in  the  comman- 
ders?  was  wanting,  A  body  of  hoplites  were  landed  on  the  maii.lniui 
in  tlie  territory  of  Kyzikus.'  for  the  purpose  evf  operating  a.  diversion; 
after  which  the  fleet  was  distributed  into  three  divisions  under 
Alkibiades,  Theramenes,  and  Tlirasybulus.  The  former,  advaueir.ir 
near  to  Kyzikus,  with  his  single  elivision,  challenged  the  fled  of 
IVIindarus,  and  contrived  to  inveigle  him  by  pretended  fight  to  aelis- 
tance  from  the  harbor;  while  the  other  Athenian  divisions,  assisted 
by  hazy  and  rainy  weather,  came  up  unexpectedly,  cut  ofl"  his 
retreat,' and  forced  him  to  run  his  ships  ashore  en  the  neighboriii!: 
mainland.  After  a  gallant  and  hard-fought  battle,  partly  e>n  sliil-- 
board,  partly  ashore— at  one  time  unpromising  to  the  Athenians,  in 
spite  of  tlie-ir  superiority  of  number,  but  not  ver)'  intelligible  in  i'^" 
details,  and  elilTcrently  conceived  by  our  two  authorities^botli  the 
Pcloponnesinn  fleet  by  sea  and  the  forces  of  Phainabazus  on  Inrd 
were  completely  elefc-ateel.  Mindarus  himself  was  slain,  ami  tlie 
entire  fleet,  every  single  trireme,  was  captured,  except  the  Iriicniis 


of  Syracuse,  which  were  burnt  by  their  own  crews;  while  Kyzikus 
itself  surrenelered  to  the  Athenians  and  submitted  to  a  larue  contribu- 
tion; being  spared  from  all  other  harm.  The  booty  taken  by  the 
victors  was  abundant  and  valuable.  The  number  of  the  triremes 
thus  captured  or  destroyed  is  differently  given;  the  lowest  estimate 
states  it  at  60,  the  highest  at  80. 

This  capital  action,  ably  planned  and  bravely  executed  by  Alkibi- 
ades and  his  two  colleagues  (about  April  410,  B.C.),  changed  sensibly 
the  relative  position  of  the  belligerents.    The  Pelopoiuiesians  had  now 
no  fleet  of  importance  in  Asia,  tliough  they  probaljly  slill  ntained  a 
small  squadron  at  the  station  of  31iletus;  while  the  Athenian  fleet 
■was  more  powerful  and  menacing  than  ever.     The  dismay  of  the  ele- 
feated  army  is  fe^rcibly  portrayed  in  the  laconic  dispatch  sentby  Hip- 
pokrates  (secretary  of  the  late  aclmiial  Minelarus)  to  the  Ephors  at 
Sparta:— "All  honor  and  advantage  are  gone  fre)m  us:  Mindarus  is 
slain:  the  men  are  starving:  we  are  in  stniits  what  to  do."  The  Ei)hors 
doubtless  heard  the  same  deplorable  tale  from  more  than  one  witness; 
for  this  particular  dispatch  never  reached  them,  having  l)cen  inter- 
cepted and  carried  to  Athens.     So  discouraging  was  the  view  whie-h 
they  entertained  of  the  future,  that  a  LaccHhemonian  embassy  with 
Eudius  at  their  head,  came  to  Athens  to  propose  peace;  e)r  rather 
perhaps  Endius  (ancient  friend  and  guest  of  Alkibiaeles,  wlio  had 
already  been  at  Athens  as  envoy  before)  was  allowed  to  ce)ine  thitlier 
now  again  to  sound  the  temper  of  the  city,  in  a  soit  of  infoi-mal  man- 
ner which  admitted  of  being  easily  disavowed  if  nothing  came  e)f  it. 
For  it  is  remarkable  that  Xenophon  makes  no  mention  of  this  embas- 
sy: and  his  silence,  though  not  suflScient  to  warrant  us  in  question- 
ing the  reality  of  the  event— which  is  stated  by  Diodorus,  perhaps  on 
the  authority  of  Theopompus,  and  is  noway 'improbable  in  itself — 
nevertheless  leads  me  to  doubt  whether  the  Ephors  themselves  admit- 
ted that  they  had  made  or  sanctioned  the  proposition.     It  is  to  be  re- 
membered, that  Sparta,  not  to  mention  her  obligation  to  her  con- 
federates generally,  was  at  this  moment  bound  by  special  convention 
to  Persia  to  conchiele  no  separate  peace  with  Athc^ns. 

According  to  Diodorus,  Endius,  having  been  admitte^d  to  speak  in 
the  Athenian  assembly,  invited  the  Atheuiuns  to  make  peace  with 
Sparta  on  the  following  terms:— That  each  party  should  stand  just  as 
tiiey  were:  That  the  garrisons  on  both  sides  siiould  be  withdrawn: 
That  prisoners  should  be  exchanged,  one  Lacedaemonian  aijcainst  one 
Atlienian.  Endius  insisted  in  his  speech  on  the  mutual  mischief 
which  each  was  doing  to  the  e)ther  by  prolonging  the  war:  but  he 
contended  that  Athens  was  by  far  the  greater  sufferer  of  the  two,  and 
li:id  the  deepest  interest  in  acc(?lerating  peace.  She  had  no  money,  while 
q)arta  had  the  Great  King  as  a  pay-master:  she  was  robbed  of  the  pro- 
duce of  Attica  by  the  garrison  of  Dekeleia,  while  Pelopoiuiesus  was  un- 
disturbed: all  her  power  and  influence  depended  upon  superiority  at 
sea,  which  Sparta  could  dispense  with,  and  yet  retaiu  her  pre-eminence. 


256 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


QUESTION  OF  POLICY. 


If  we  may  l)elieve  Diodoriis,  all  the  most  intclli£;cnt  citizens  in 
Athens  recommended  that  this  proposition  should  beliccepted  Only 
tlie  demagogues,  tlie  disturbers,  iliose  \vho  were  aeeustomed  to  blow 
up  the  Ilaines  of  war  in  order  to  obtain  profit  for  themselves  opposed 
it.  Especially  the  demagogue  Kleophon.  now  enjovinir  great  i'nfluVnr- 
enlarged  upon  the  splendor  of  the  recent  victory*  and  u])on  the  ik'\\' 
cliances  of  success  now  openinsr  to  them;  insomuch  that  theassenblv 
ultimately  rejected  the  proposition  of  Endius. 

It  was  easy  for  those  who  wrote  after  the  battle  of  yEirospotarios 
and  the  capture  of  Athens,  to  be  wise  after  the  fact,  and  to  nviva 
the  stock  denunciations  against  an  insane  people  misled  by  a  conii]\t 
demagogue.  But,  if  abstracting  from  our  knoMledge  of  the  thial 
close  of  the  war,  we  look  to  the  tenor  of  this  proposition  (even  assum- 
ing it  to  have  been  formal  and  authorized)  as  well  as  the  time  at 
which  it  was  made— we  shall  hesitate  before  we  pronounce  Kleoplicm 
to  have  been  foolish,  much  less  corruj-a,  for  recommending  its  rejec- 
tion. In  reference  to  the  charge  of  corrupt  interest  in  the  continu- 
ance of  war,  I  have  already  made  some  remarks  about  Kleoplion 
tending  to  show  that  no  such  interest  can  fairly  be  ascribed  to  d(ma- 
gogues  of  that  character.  They  were  essentiallv  unwarlike  men  ard 
had  quite  as  much  chance  personally  of  losimi,  as  of  gaininir,  bv  a 
state  of  war.  Especially  this  is  true  respe<tinir  Kleophon  durlm'-'lhe 
last  years  of  the  war— since  the  financial  posture  of  Athens  wasllien 
so  unpiosperous,  that  all  her  availalile  means  were  exhausted  to  i^ro- 
vide  for  ships  and  men,  leaving  little  or  no  surplus  for  political  pecu- 
lators. The  admirals,  who  paid  the  seamen  by  raisins"  conlributieiis 
abroad,  might  possibly  enrich  then. selves,  if  so  inclined;  but  the 
politicians  at  home  had  much  less  chance  of  such  gains  than  they 
would  have  had  in  time  of  peace.  Besides,  even  if  Kleophon  were 
ever  so  much  a  gainer  by  the  contin,uance  of  war,  vet  assuminn-  Alli- 
ens to  be  ultimately  crushed  in  the  war,  he  was  certain  befonliar.d 
to  be  deprived,  not  only  of  all  his  gains  and  his  position,  but  of  his 
life  also. 

So  niuch  for  the  charge  against  him  Of  corrupt  interest.  The 
question  whether  his  advice  was  judicious,  is  not  so  easy  to  dispese 
of.  Looking  to  the  time  when  the  i^roposition  was  made,  we  n.u^t 
recollect  that  the  Peloponnesian  fled  in  Asia  had  been  just  annihila- 
ted, and  that  the  brief  epistle  itself,  from  llippokrates  to  theE]'l:ois, 
(iiyulging  in  so  emphatic  a  manner  the  di.-trcss  of  his  troops  was  at 
this  moment  before  the  Athenian  assembly.  On  the  other  hand,  lliu 
dispatches  of  the  Athenian  generals,  announcing  their  victory,  had 
excited  a  sentiment  .of  universal  triumph,  manifested  by  public 
thanksgiving,  at  Athens.  AVe  cannot  dmibt  that  Alkibiades  aiui  his 
colleagues  promised  a  large  career  of  con.ini::  success,  perhaps  the  re- 
covery of  most  part  of  the  lost  maritime  empire.  In  this  ten<i  er  of 
the  Athenian  people  and  of  their  generals,  justified  as  it  was  to  a 
great  degree  by  the  reality,  what  is  the  proposition  which  comes  irciu 


257 


Endnis?  What  he  proposes  is,  in  reality,  no  concession  at  all  Both 
parties  to  stand  in  their  actual  position— to  withdraw  garrisons— to 
restore  prisoners.  There  was  only  one  way  in  which  Athens  would 
haye  b(;en  a  gainer  by  accepting  these  propositicms.  She  would  have 
Milhdrawn  her  garrison  from  Pylus— she  would  have  been  relieved 
from  the  garrison  of  Dekeleia:  such  an  exchange  would  have  been  a 
considerable  advantage  to  her.  To  this  we  must  add  the  relief  aris 
ingtrom  simple  cessation  of  w^ar- doubtless  real  and  important  ' 

Now  the  question  is,  whether  a  statesman  like  Per'kles  wouldhave 
advised  his  countrymen  to  be  satisfied  with  such  a  measure  of  con- 
cession, immediately  after  the  great  victory  at  Kyzikus.  and  the  two 
smaller  victories  preceding  it?  I  incline  to  believe  that  he  would  not 
It  would  rather  have  appeared  to  him  in  the  light  of  a  diplomatic 
artihee  calculated  to  paralyze  Athens  during  the'interval  while  her 
enemies  were  defenseless,  and  to  gain  time  for  them  to  build  a  new 
fleet.  .Sparta  could  not  pledge  himself  either  for  Persia  or  for  her 
Peloponnesian  confederates:  indeed  past  experience  has' shown  that 
she  could  not  do  so  with  effect.  By  accepting  the  propositions,  there- 
fore Athens  would  not  really  have  obtained  relief  from  the  entire 
bun  en  of  war;  but  would  merely  have  blunted  the  ardor  and  tied 
up  the  hands  of  her  own  troops,  at  a  moment  when  they  felt  them- 
selyes  in  the  full  current  of  success.  By  the  armament,  most  certainly 
-and  by  the  generals.  Alkibiades,  Theramenes,  and  Thrasybulus— 
the  acceptance  of  such  terms  at  such  a  moment  would  have  been 
regarded  as  a  disgrace.  It  would  have  baulked  them  of  conquests 
ardently,  and  at  that  time  not  unreasonably,  anticipated;  conquests 
tencmig  to  restore  Athens  to  that  eminence  from  which  she  had  been  so 
recently  (leposed.  And  it  would  have  inflicted  this  mortification  not 
meiely  williout  compensating  gain  to  her  in  any  other  shape,'  but 
V  f  iT  probability  of  imposing  upon  ail  her  citizens  the  necessity 
of  redoul)led  efforts  at  no  very  distant  future,  when  the  moment  favor- 
aole  to  her  enemies  should  have  arrived. 

If  therefore   passing  from  the  vague   accusation,  that  it  was  the 
demagogue  kleophon  who  stood  between  Athens  and  the  conclusion 
pt  peace,  we  examine  what  were  the  specific  terms  of  peace  whichhe 
induced  his  countrymen  to  reject— we  shall  find  that  he  had  very 
.^trong  reasons,   not  to  say   preponderant  reasons,   for  his   advicc' 
Uiether  lie  made  any  use  of  this  ])!oi)osition,  in  itself  inadmissible 
'» try  and  invite  the  conclusion  of  peace  on  more  suitable  and  lastin*^ 
terms,  may  ^veIl  be  doubted.     Probably  no  such  efforts  would  have 
succeeded,  even  if  they  had  been  made:  yet  a  statesman  likePerikles 
^w)uid  have  made  the  trial,  in  a  conviction  that  Athens  was  carrvino- 
oat  he  war  at  a  disadvantage  which  must  in  the  lono-  run  «ink  he? 
A  mere  opposition  sjieaker  like  Kko])ho!i.  even  when  takinn-  what 
^\;is  probably  a  right  measure  of  the  actual  proposition  before  him 
(iia  not  look  so  far  vorvyard  into  the  future. 

-Meanwhile  the  Athenian  fleet  reigned  alone  in  the  Propontis  and 
H.  G.  IIL-9 


258 


RESTOI^.ED  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY. 


RECOVERY   OF  THASUS. 


259 


its  two  adjncent  strnits,  the  Posplionis  and  the  TTellcspont;  al- 
llunigh  the  ardor  and  generosity  of  Phnrnabazus  not  only  supplied 
maintenance  and  clothing  to  the  distressed  seamen  of  the  vancini.-hcd 
lleet.  bnt  also  encouniged  the  construction  of  fresh  sliips  in  the  Yi^m 
of  those  captuied.  AVJiilehe  armed  tlie  seamen,  gave  tliem  pr.y  for 
two  Dioutlis,  and  distributed  them  as  guards  ahing  the  C(^ast  of  the 
satrapy,  he  at  the  same  lime  granted  an  unlimited  supply  of  sliip> 
timber  from  the  abundant  forests  of  JMount  Ida,  and  assisted  the  olii- 
cers  in  putting  new  triremes  on  the  stocks  at  Anlandrus:  near  to  v iii(U 
(at  a  place  called  Aspaneus)  the  Idivan  wood  was  chieJiy  exported. 

Having  made  tliesc  arn  ngemc  nts  he  proceeded  to  lend  aid  at  CIi.il- 
kenlon,  Avhich  the  Athenians  had  aln  ady  begun  to  attack.  Tliclr 
fust  operation  after  the  victory  lad  been  to  sail  to  Peiinllius  find 
Selymbria,  both  of  whicli  had  before  revolted  from  Athens:  the 
former,  intimidated  by  the  recent  events,  admitted  them  and  rejoinul 
itself  to  Athens;  the  latter  resisted  sudi  a  lequisition,  but  ranscar.ed 
itself  from  att.ck  for  the  present  by  the  ]  aymenl  of  a  pecuniary  line. 
Alkibiade's  then  conducted  tluni  to  C  halkedon,  opposite  to  Byzantium 
on  the  southernmost  Asiatic  border  of  the  Posphorus.  To  be  masters 
of  those  two  straits,  the  Bosphorus  and  tlie  Hellespont,  was  a  point 
of  first-rate  moment  to  Atliens:  first,  1  ecause  it  enabled  her  to  seenie 
the  arrival  of  the  ce)rn-slii])s  from  the  Kuxine  for  her  ow  n  consump- 
tion; next,  l)ecause  she  had  it  in  lier  power  to  imjiose  a  tithe  or  (lu(; 
upon  all  the  trading  ships  passing — not  unlike  the  dues  imposed  ly 
the  Danes  at  the  Sounel  even  down  to  the  present  time.  For  the  op- 
posite reasons  of  course  the  importance  of  the  position  was  equally 
great  to  the  enemies  of  Athens.  Until  the  spring  (f  the  preceding 
year  Athens  hael  be'cn  undisputeel  mistress  of  both  the  straits.  But 
the  revolt  of  Abydos  in  the  flellespont  {about  Ajiril  411  B.C.)  and  that 
of  Byzantium  Avilh  Clialkedon  in  the  Bosphoru.s  (about  June  411  15. c.), 
haei  deprived  her  of  this  pre-eminence;  and  her  supplies  obtained 
eluring  the  last  few  months  coulel  only  have  come  tliiough  during 
those  intervals  when  her  fleets  there  stationed  had  the  preponderance, 
so  as  to  give  them  convoy.  Accordingly  it  is  highly  probable  that 
her  supplies  of  corn  from  tlie  Eiixine  during  the  autumn  of  411  u.c. 
hael  been  comparuively  restricted. 

Thouiih  Clialkedon  itself,  assisted  bv  Pharnabazus,  still  held  out 
against  Athens.  Alkibiaeles  now  took  possession  of  Chryseipolis.  its 
unfortifieel  seaport,  on  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Bosphorus  oppe»site 
Byzantium.  This  place  he  fortitieel,  established  in  it  a  scjuadron v.ith 
a  permanent  garrison,  and  erected  it  into  a  regular  tithing  port  for 
levying  toll  on  all  vessels  coming  out  of  the  Euxine.  The  Athenians 
seem  to  have  habituallv  levied  this  toll  at  Bvzantium,  until  the  revolt 
of  that  place,  among  their  constant  sources  of  revenue:  it  was  now 
re-establislieel  uneler  the  auspices  of  Alkibiades.  In  so  far  as  it  wai* 
levied  on  ships  which  brought  their  produe-e  for  sale  ami  consump- 
tion at  Athens,  it  was  of  course  idtiniately  paid  in  the  shape  of  ia* 


creased  price  by  Athenian  citizens  and  raeties.  Thirty  Tiiremes 
uneler  Therameues  were  left  at  Chrysopolis  to  enforce  this  levy  ta  con- 
voy friendly  merchantmen,  and  in  other  respects  to  serve  as  auuov- 
auce  to  the  eneni}'.  "^ 

The  remaining  lleet  went  partly  to  the  Hellespont,  partly  to  Thrace 
where    the    ehmmished   maritime   strength    of  the   Lacedaemonians 
alreaely  told   m  respect   to   the  adherence  of  the  cities.     At  Tha^us 
especially,  the  citizens,  headed  by  Ekphanlus,  expelled  the  Lacedte- 
nionian  harmost  Etonikus  with  his  srarrisou,  and  admitted  Thrasybu 
his  with  ail  Athenian  force.     It  wilf  be  recollected  that  this  was  one 
ot  the  cities  m*which  Peisander  and  the  Four  Hundred  conspirators 
(early  in  411  B.C.)  had  put  down  the  democracy  and  established  an 
oligarchical  government,  under  preteuse  that  the  allied  cities  w^ould 
be  faithful  to  Athens  as  soon  as  she  was  relieved  from  her  deniocrati- 
cal  institutions.     All  the  calculations  of  these  oligarclis  had  been  dis- 
appointed, as  Phrynichus  had  predicted  from  the  first.    The  Thasians 
as  soon  as  their  own  oligarchical  party  had  been  placed  in  possession 
of  the  government,  recalled   their  disaffected  exiles,  under  whose 
auspices  the  Laconiaji  garrison  and  harmost  had  since  been   intro- 
duced.    Etonikus,    now  expelled,   accused    the  Lacedaemonian  ad- 
miral Pasii)pidas   of   being  himself  ii  party  to  the  expulsion,  under 
bribes  from  Tissaphernes;  an  accusr.tion,  wiiich'  seems   improbable 
but  whicli   the  Lacedajmonians  believed,    and  accordingly  banisheei 
1  asippidas,  sending  Kratesippielas  to  replace  him.     The  new  admiral 
found  at  Chios  a  small  fleet  which  Pasippidas  had  already  hcmii  to 
collect  from  the  allies,  to  supply  the  recent  losses.  ° 

The  tone  at  Athens,  since  the  late  naval  victories,  had  become  more 
hopeful  and  energetic.     Agis,  with  his  garrison  at  Dekeleia,  thou<'U 
,  the  Athenians  could  not  hinder  him  from  ravaging  Attica  yet  on  ap- 
proaching one  day  near  to  the  city  w^alls  was  repelled  with  spirit  and 
success  by  Thrasylhis.     But  that  which  most  mortitied  the  Lacedaj- 
:  nionian   king  was   to   discei-n   from  his  lofty  station  at  Dekeleia  the 
;  abundant  inllux   into   the   Peirasus  of  corn-ships  from  the  Euxine 
I  again  renewed  in  the  autumn  of  410  B.C.,  since  the  occupation  of  the  ' 
Bosphorus  and  Hellespont  by  Alkibiades.     For  the  safe  reception  of 
these  vessels,  Thorikus  was  soon  after  fortified.     Agis  exclaimed  that 
It  was  fruitless  to  shut  out  the  Athenians  from  the  produce  of  Attica 
so  long  as  plenty  of  imported  corn  was  allowed  to  reach  them      Ac- 
cordingly  he   provided,  in  conjunction  with  the  Megariaus,  a  small 
squadron  of  fifteen  triremes,  with  whie;h  he  dispatched  Klearchus  to 
Byzantium  and  Clialkedon.     That  Spartan  was  a  public  guest  of  the 
Mzautines,  and  had  already  been  singled  out  to  command  auxiliaries 
nitended  for  that  city    He  seems  to  have  begun  his  voyage  durin*'-  the 
ensuing  winter  (B.C.  410—409),   and  reached   Byzantium  in  safety 
though  with   the  destruction  of  three  of  his  squadron  by  the  nine 
Athenian  triremes  which  guarded  the  Hellespont. 
lu  the  eiisuing  spring  thrasyllus  was  dispatched  from  Athens  at 


260 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN   DEMOCRACY 


DISGRACE  OF  ANYTUS. 


261 


the  head  of  a  lari^e  new  force  to  act  in  Ionia.     He  commanded  oO  tri- 
remi>s   1000  of  tlie  rei^ailar  hoplites,  100  liorsemen  and   500   seamen, 
with  the  means  of  annini;-  tliese  latter  as  peltasts;  also  transports  for 
his  troops  besides  the  triremes.     Having  rcpos(xl   his  arniMmcnt   lor 
three   days   at  Samos,  he  made  a  descent  at  Pygela,  and  next  suc- 
ceeded in  makim.^  himself  master  of  Kolophon  with  its  port  Nolmm. 
^He  next  threatened  Ephesus,  but  that  place  was  defended  by  a  power- 
^ful   force  wlTich  Tissaphernes   had   summoned,  under  proclamation 
'  "to  "-o  and  succor  the  «i;oddess  Artemis;"  as  well  as  by  twenty- live 
fresh%Tacusan  and  two  Selinusian  triremes  recently  arrived.     From 
these  enemies  Thrasyllus  sustamed  a  severe  defeat  near  Ephesus,  lost 
300  men,  and  was  compelled  to  sail  off  to  Notium ;  from  whence,  alter 
burying  his  dead,  he  proceeded  northward  toward  the  Hellespont. 
On  the  way  thither,  while  halting  for  a  while  at  Methymna  in  the 
north  of  Lesbos,  Thrasyllus  saw  the  twenty -five  Syracusan  tnremes 
passing  by  on  their  voyage  from   Ephesus  to  Abydos.     He  immedi- 
ately {Stacked  them,  captured  four  along  with  the  entire  crews,  and 
chased  the  remainder  back  to  their  station  at  Ei)hesus.     All  the  pri- 
soners taken  were  sent  to  Athens,  where  they  were  deposited  for 
custody  in  the  stone-quarries  of  Peira'us,  doubtless  in  retaliation  lor 
the  treatment  of  the  Athenian  prisoners  at  Syracuse:  tliey  contrived 
however  during  the  ensuing  winter  to  break  a  way  out  and  escape  to 
Dekeleia.     Among   the   prisoners  taken,  was  found  Alkibiades  the 
Athenian  (cousin    and   fellow-exile  of  the  Athenian  general  of  the 
same  name),  whom  Thrasyllus  caused  to  be  set  at  liberty,  while  the 
others  were  sent  to  Athens.  , 

After  the  delay  caused  by  this  pursuit,  he  brought  back  hisarma^ 
ment  to  the  Hellespont  and  joined  Alkibiades  at  Sestos.  Their  joint 
force  was  conveyed  over,  seemingly  about  the  commencement  of 
autumn,  to  L-mpsakus  on  the  Asiatic  side  of  the  Strait;  which  place 
they  fortilied  and  made  their  head  quarters  for  the  autumn  and 
winter,  maintaining  themselves  by  predatory  excursions  throughout 
the  ueiuboring  satrap  of  Pharnaba/Ais.  It  is  curious  to  learn,  how- 
ever,  that  when  Alkibiades  was  im)ceeding  to  marshal  the  army  alto^ 
gether(thehoplites,  pursuant  to  Athenian  custom,  taking  rank  accord- 
in"-  to  their  tribes),  his  own  soldiers,  never  yet  beaten,  refused  to  tra 
teniize  with  those  of  ThrasvUus,  who  had  been  so  recently  worsted  Jil 
Ephesus.  Nor  was  this  alienation  removed  until  after  a  joint  expedi 
tion  a'^-ainst  Abydos;  Pharnabazus.  presenting  himself  with  a  consul 
erable^force,  especially  cavalry,  to  relieve  that  place,  was  encountered 
and  defeated  in  a  battle  wherein  all  the  Athenians  present  took  part. 
The  honor  of  the  hoplites  of  ThrasyJlus  was  now  held  to  be  re-estJi?! 
lished  so  that  the  fusion  of  ranks  was  admitted  without  further  ditti- 
cultv  '  Even  the  entire  army,  however,  was  not  able  to  accomplisli 
the  conquest  of  Abydos;  which  the  Peioponnesians  and  Pharmibazus 
still  maintained  as  their  station  on  the  Hellespont. 
Aleauwhile  xVlhens  had   so  stripped  herself  of  force  by  the  large 


armament  recently  sent  wMth  Thrasyllus,  that  her  enemies  near  home 
were  encouraged  to  active  operations.  The  Spartans  dispatched  an 
expedition,  both  of  triremes  and  of  land-force,  to  attack  Pylus,  which 
had  remained  as  an  Athenian  post  and  a  refuge  for  revolted  Helots 
ever  since  its  first  fortification  by  Demosthenes  in  B.C.  425.  The 
place  was  vigorously  attacked  both  by  sea  and  by  land,  and  soon 
l)ecame  much  pressed.  Not  unmindful  of  its  distress,  tha  Athenians 
sent  to  its  relief  80  triremes  under  Anytus,  who  however  came  back 
widiout  even  reaching  the  place,  having  been  prevented  by  stormy 
weather  or  unfavorable  winds  from  doubling  Cape  Malea.  Pylus  was 
soon  afterw^ard  obliged  to  surrender,  the  garrison  departing  on  terms 
of  capitulation.  But  Anytus  on  his  return  encountered  great  dis- 
pleasure from  his  countrymen,  and  was  put  on  his  tihil  for  having 
hetrayed,  or  for  not  having  done  his  utmost  to  fulfill  the  tru.st  con- 
fided'to  him.  It  is  said  that  he  only  .saved  himscdf  from  condemna- 
tion by  bribing  the  Dikastery,  and  that  he  was  the  first  Athenian 
who  ever  obtained  a  verdict  by  corruption.  Whether  he  could  really 
have  reached  Pylus,  and  whether  the  obstacles  which  bafiied  him 
were  such  as  an  energetic  otficer  would  have  overcome,  we  have  no 
means  of  determining;  still  less,  wiiether  it  be  true  that  he  actually 
escaped  by  bribery.  The  stQiy  seems  to  prove,  however,  that  the 
gc'neral  Athenian  public  thought  him  des(>rving  of  condemnation, 
and  were  so  much  surprised  by  his  acquittal,  as  to  account  for  it  by 
supposing,  truly  or  falsely,  the  use  of  means  never  before  attempted. 

It  was  about  Hie  same  time  also,  that  the  ^legarians  recovered  by 
surprise  their  port  of  Nisaja,  whicli  had  been  held  by  an  Athenian 
garrison  since  B.C.  424.  The  Athenians  made  an  effort  to  retake  it, 
hut  failed;  though  they  defeated  the  Megarians  in  an  action. 

Thrasyllus,  during  the  summer  of  B.C.  409 — and  even  the  joint 
force  of 'Thrasyllus  and  xVlkibiades  during  the  autumn  of  the  same 
year— seem  to  have  effected  less  than  might  have  been  expected  from 
so  large  a  force:  indeed  it  must  have  been  at  some  period  during  this 
year  that  the  Lacedaemonian  Klearchus,  with  his  15  Megarian  ships, 
penetrated  up  the  Hellespont  to  Byzantium,  finding  it  guarded  only 
by  9  Athenian  triremes.  But  the*  operations  of  408  B.C.  were  more 
important.  The  entire  force  under  Alkibiades  and  the  other  com- 
manders was  mustered  for  the  siege  of  Chalkedon  and  Byzantium. 
The  Chalkedonians,  having  notice  of  the  project,  deposited  their 
moveable  property  for  safety  in  the  hands  of  their  neighbors  the  Bi- 
thynian  Thracians;  a  remarkable  evidence  Of  the  good  feeling  and 
confidence  between  the  two,  contrasting  strongly  with  the  pepetual 
hostility  which  subsisted  on  the  other  side  of  the  Bosjjhorus  between 
Byzantuim  and  the  Thracian  tribes  adjoining.  But  the  ])recautio!i 
was  frustrated  by  Alkibiades.  who  entered  the  territory  of  the  Bithy- 
Tiians  and  compelled  them  by  threats  to  deliver  up  the  effects  con- 
fided to  them.  He  then  proceeded  to  block  up  Chalkedon  by  a 
wooden  wall  carried  across  from  the  Bosphorus  to  the  Propontis; 


262 


RESTORED  ATHENIAN   DEMOCRACY. 


CAPTURE  OF  BYZANTIUM. 


263 


Ihoiiirli  the  continuity  of  tliis  -wall  was  intcrnipted  by  a  river,  jind 
S('t*niini!fly  by  sonu*  rough  ground  on  the  iir.medinte  brink  of  the 
river.  The  blockading  Avail  was  already  conijileted  wh(  n  Phariia- 
bazus  appeared  witli  an  army  for  the  relief  of  the  jilace.  and  advanced 
as  far  as  the  Herakleion  (or  leniple  of  llerakles)  belonging  lo  the 
Chalkedonians.  Protiting  by  his  a])pr(>ach,  Ilij^pokrates.  the  L:ut- 
dacmonian  liannost  in  the  town,  made  a  vigorous  sally:  but  the 
Athenians  rejulled  all  the  efforts  of  Pharnabazus  to  force  a  passage, 
through  their  lines  and  join  him— so  that,  after  an  obstinate  contest, 
the  sallying  force  was  driven  back  within  the  walls  of  the  town,  imd 
Hippokrates  himself  killed. 

Thebh)ckade  of  the  town  was  now  made  so  sure,  that  Alkibiadcs 
departed  with  a  portion  of  tlie  aimy  to  levy  money  and  get  together 
forces  for  the  siege  of  Byzantium  afterwaid.     During  liis  absence, 
Theramenes  and  Thrasyi)ulus  came  to  teinis  with  Pl::irnal  azus  for 
the  capitulation  of  Chalkcdon.     It  was  agreed  that  the  town  should 
again  become  a  tributaiy  dt  pendency  of  Athens,  on  the  t>anie  rale  of 
tribute  as  befoie  the  revolt,  and  that  the  arrears  during  the  subse- 
quent period    shruld   lie  paid  up.     3Ioreover  Pliarnabazus  himself 
engaged  to  pay  to  the  Athenians  20  talents  on   behalf  of  the  touii. 
and  {Tlso  to  escort  some  Athenian  envoys  up  to  Susa,  enabling  tlieiii 
to  subnut  ])roposilions  for  acccanmodiilion  lo  the  Great  King.     Until 
those  envoys  should  return,  the  Ath(  nians  covenanted   to  abstain 
from  hostilities  against  the  satrapy  of  l^harnabazus.     Oaths  to  this 
effect  were  mutually  exchanged,  after  the  return  of  Alkibiadcs  from 
his  expedition.      For  Pharnabazus  positively  reluscd  to  comj)lete  the 
ratification  with  the  other  generals,  until  Alkibiadcs  should  be  there 
to  ratify  in  person  also;  a  proof  at  once  of  the  great  individual  im- 
portance of  the  latter,  and  of  his  known  facility  in  finding  excuses  to 
evade  an  agreement.     Two  envoys  were  accordingly  sent  by  Pliar- 
nabazus to  ('hrysoi)olis,  to  receive  the  oaths  of  Alkibiadcs,  while  two 
relatives  of  Alkibiadcs  came   to  Chalkcdon  as  witnesses  to  those  of 
Pharnabazus.     Over  and  above  the  common  oath  shared  with  his 
colleagues,  Alkibiadcs  took  a  special  covenant  of  personal  friendship 
and  hospitality  with  the  satrap,  and  received  from  him  the  like. 

Alkibiadcs  had  employed  his  period  of  absence  in  capturini:: 
Selymbria,  fiom  whence  he  obtained  a  sum  of  money,  and  in  geuinu 
together  a  large  body  of  Thracians,  with  whom  he  marched  by  land 
to  Byzantium.  That  place  was  now  besieged,  immediately  after  the 
capitulation  of  Chalkcdon,  by  the  united  force  of  the  Athenians.  A 
wall  of  circumvallation -SNas  drawn  around  it,  and  various  attacks 
were  made  by  missiles  and  battering  engines.  These  however  the 
Lacedaemonian  garrison,  under  the  harmost  Klearchus,  aided  by 
some  Megariaus  under  Jlelixus  and  Bceotians  under  Kceratadas,  was 
perfectly  competent  to  rejicl.  I»ut  the  ravages  of  famine  were  not 
so  easily  dealt  with.  After  the;  blockade  had  lasted  some  time,  pro- 
visions began  to  fail;  so  that  Klearchus,  strict  and  harsh  even  uuder 


ordinary  circumstances,  became  inexorable  and  oppressive  from  ex- 
clusive anxiety  for  the  subsistence  of  his  soldiers;  and  even  locked  up 
the  stock  of  food  while  the  population  of  the  towi^w^ere  dving  of 
hunger  around  him.  Seeing  that  his  only  hope  was  from  external 
relief,  he  sallied  forth  from  the  city  to  entreat  aid  from  Pharnabazus; 
and  to  get  together,  if  possible,  a  Hcet  for  some  aggressive  operation 
that  ndglit  divert  the  attention  of  the  besiegers,  hlr  left  the  defense 
to  Iv(Bratadas  and  Ilelixus,  in  full  confidence  that  the  Bvzan tines 
were  too  nuicli  compromised  by  their  revolt  from  Athens  to  venture 
to  desert  Sparta,  whatever  might  be  their  suffering.  But  the  favor- 
able terms  recently  granted  to  Chalkcdon,  coupled  with  the  severe 
and  increasing  fauiine,  induced  K\'don  and  a  Byzantine  party  to  open 
the  gates  by  night,  and  adnuL  Alkibiadcs  with  the  Atbenhms  into  the 
wide  interior  square  called  the  Thrakion.  Helixus  and  Kceratadas, 
apprised  of  this  attack  only  when  the  enemy  had  actually  got  pos- 
session of  the  town  on  all  sides,  vainly  attempted  resistance,  and 
were  compelled  to  surrender  at  discretion.  They  were  sent  as  priso- 
ners to  Athens,  where  Kfcratadas  contrived  to  escape  during  the  con- 
fusion of  the  landing  at  Pein^us.  Favorable  terms  were  gi-anted  to 
the  town,  which  was  replaced  in  its  position  of  a  dependent  ally  of 
Athens,  and  probably  had  to  pay  up  its  arrears  of  tribute  in  the  same 
manner  as  Chalkcdon. 

So  slow  was  the  process  of  siege  in  ancient  times,  that  the  reduc- 
tion of  Chalkcdon  and  Byzantium  occupied  nearly  the  whole  3^ear; 
the  latter  place  surrendering  about  the  beginning  of  winter.  Both 
of  them,  however,  were  acquisitions  of  capital  importance  to  Athens, 
making  her  again  undisputed  mistress  of  the  Bosphorus,  and  iusur- 
hig  to  her  two  valuable  tributuaiy  allies.  Besides  this  inii^rovement 
in  her  position,  the  accommodtilion  just  concluded  with  Pharnabazus 
was  also  a  step  of  great  value,  aud  still  greater  promise.  It  was  plaiu 
that  the  satrap  had  grown  weary  of  bearing  all  the  brunt  of  the  war 
tor  the  benefit  of  tlie  Peloponnesians.  and  that  he  was  well-disposed 
to  assist  the  Athenians  in  conung  to  terms  with  the  Great  King.  The 
mere  withdrawal  of  his  hearty  support  from  Sparta,  even  if  nothing 
else  followed  from  it,  was  of  immense  moment  to  Athens;  and  thus 
much  was  really  achieved.  The  envoys,  five  Athenians  and  two 
Argeians  (all,  probably,  sent  for  from  Athens,  which  accounts  for 
some  delay),  were  directed  after  the  siege  of  Chalkcdon  to  meet 
Pharnabazus  at  Kyzikus.  Some  Lacjd  emoniau  envovs,  and  even 
the  Syracusan  Ilermokrates,  who  had  been  condemned  [uul  banished 
by  sentence  at  home,  took  advantage  of  the  same  escort,  and  all  pro- 
ceeded on  their  journey  upward  to  Susa.  Their  proirress  was 
arrested,  during  the  extreme  severity  of  the  winter,  at  Gordium  in 
rhrygiu;  and  it  was  while  pursuing  their  track  into  the  interior  at 
the  opening  of  spring,  that  they  met  the  young  prince  Cyrus,  son  of 
^J^'l^o  I^arius,  coming  down  in  person  to  govern  an  important  part  of 
Asia  Minor.     Some  Lacedicmoniau  envoys  (Bccotius  aiid  others)  were 


264         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 

travelins?:  down  along  with  liim,  after  having  fulfilled  their  mission 
at  the  Persian  court. 


CHAPTER  LXIV. 


FROM   THE  ARKIVAL   OF   CYRUS   THE   YOUNGER   IN  ASIA  MINOR   DOWN 

TO  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS/E. 

The  advent  of  Cjtus,  commonly  known  as  Cynis  the  younircr, 
into  Asia  Minor,  was  an  event  of  the  greatest  importance,  opening 
what  may  he  called  the  last  phase  in  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

He  was  the  younger  of  the  two  sons  of  the  Persian  king  Darius 
Nothus  by  the  criiff  queen  Parysatis,  and  was  now  sent  down  by  his 
father  as  satrap  of  Lydia,  Phrygi^i  the  greater,  and  Kappadokia;  as 
well  as  general  of  all  "that  military  divisi(ui  of  which  the  n)uster-])lace 
was  Kastolus.  His  command  did  not  at  this  time  comprise  the  Greek 
cities  on  the  coast,  which  were  still  left  lo  Tiss;i]>hernes  and  Pharna- 
bazus.  But  he  nevertheless  brought  down  with  him  a  strong  interest 
in  the  Grecian  war,  and  an  intense  anti-Athenian  feeling,  with  lull 
authority  fnmi  his  father  to  carry  it  out  into  act.  W'lia'.ever  this 
young  man  willed,  he  willed  strongly:  his  bodily  activity,  risini? 
supc  rior  to  those  temj^tations  of  sensuaf  iiuiulgence  which  ollen  ener- 
vated the  Persian  grandees,  provoked  the  admiration  even  of  Spar- 
tans: and  his  energetic  character  was  combined  with  a  certain  measure 
of  ability.  Though  he  had  not  as  yet  conceived  that  deliberate  phin 
for  mounting  the  Persian  throne  which  afterward  absorbed  his 
whole  mind,  and  was  so  n(ar  succeeding  by  the  help  of  the  Ten 
Thousand  Greeks— yet  he  se(  ms  to  have  had  frem  the  beginning  the 
sentiment  and  ambition  of  a  king  in  prospect,  not  those  of  a  satrap. 
He  came  down  well-aware  that  Athens  was  the  ifticient  enemy  hy 
whom  the  pride  of  the  Persian  kings  had  been  hnnd)led,  the  insular 
Greeks  kept  out  of  the  sight  of  a  Persian  ship,  and  even  the  continental 
Greeks  on  the  coast  ]iraetically  eman(  ipated— for  the  last  sixty  years. 
He  therefore  brought  down  with  him  a  strenuous  desire,  to  put  down 
the  Athenian  power,  very  different  from  the  treacherous  balancing  of 
Tissa.phernes  and  much  more  formidrible  even  than  tlic  straightforward 
enmity  of  Pharnal>azus.  v.  ho  had  less  money,  less  favor  at  ( ourt, 
and  less  of  youthful  ardor.  ^loreover,  PhaVnabazus,  after  having 
lieartily  espoused  tiie  cause  of  the  Peloponnesians  for  the  last  three 
Years,  had  now  become  weary  of  the  allies  wiiom  he  had  so  long 
tept  in  pay.  Instead  of  expelling  Athenian  intluence  from  his  coast 
with  little "^dithculty,  as  he  had  expected  to  do— he  found  his  satrapy 
plundered,  his  revenues  impaired  or  absorbed,  and  an  Athenian  fleet 
all  powerful  in  the  Propontis  and  Hellespont;  while  the  Laeedanio- 
niaii  fleet,  which  he  had  taken  so  much  pains  to  invite,  was  destroyed. 


PIIARNABAZUS  DETAINS  ATHENIAN  ENVOYS.    265 

Decidedly  sick  of  the  Poloponnesian  cause,  he  was  even  leaning 
toward  Athens;  and  the  envoys  whom  he  was  escorting  to  Susa 
might  perhaps  have  laid  the  foundation  of  an  altered  Persian  policy 
in  Asia  Minor,  wiien  the  journey  of  Cyrus  down  to  the  coast  over- 
threw all  such  calculations.  The  young  prince  brought  with  him  a 
fresh,  hearty,  and  youthful  antipathy  against  Athens, — a  power  in- 
ferior only  to  that  of  the  the  Great  King  himself — and  an  energetic 
determination  to  use  it  without  reserve  in  insuring  victory  to  the 
Peloponnesians. 

From  the  moment  that  Pharnabazus  and  the  Athenian  envoys  met 
Cyrus  their  further  progress  toward  Susa  became  impossible.  *  B-eo- 
tius,  and  the  other  Lacedtemonian  envoys  traveling  along  with  the 
young  prince,  made  extravagant  boasts  of  having  obtained  all  that 
they  asked  for  at  Susa;  while  Cyrus  himself  announced  his  powers  as 
unlimited  in  extent  over  the  whole  coast,  all  for  the  purpose  of  prose- 
cuting vigorous  war  in  conjunction  with  the  Lacedaemonians.  Phar- 
nabazus, on  hearing  such  intellig(.'nce  and  seeing  the  Great  Kinix's 
seal  to  the  words— '•  I  send  dow^n  Cyrus,  as  lord  of  all  those  who 
nuister  at  Kastolus  " — not  only  refuscdtolet  the  Athenian  envoys  pro- 
ceed onward,  but  was  even  obliged  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  young 
prince;  who  insisted  that  they  should  either  be  surrendered  to  him"i 
or  at  least  detained  for  some  time  in  the  interior,  in  order  that  no 
information  might  be  conveyed  to  Athens.  The  satrap  resisted  the 
tirst  of  these  retpiisitions  having  pledged  his  word  for  their  safety; 
hut  he  obeyed  the  second — detaining  them  in  Kapjiadokia  for  no  less 
than  three  years,  until  Athens  was  prostrate  and  on  the  point  of  sur- 
render, after  which  he  obtained  permission  from  Cyrus  to  send  them 
back  to  the  sea-coast. 

This  arrival  of  Cyrus  overruling  the  treachery  of  Tissaphernes  as 
well  as  the  weariness  of  Pharnabazus,  and  supplying  the  enemies  of 
Athens  with  a  double  flow  of  Persian  gold  at  a  moment  when  the 
stream  would  otherwise  have  dried  uji — was  a  paramount  item  in  that 
sum  of  causes  which  concurred  to  determine  the  result  of  the  war. 
But  important  as  the  event  was  in  itself,  it  was  rendered  still  more 
important  by  the  character  of  the  Lacedicmonian  admiral  Lysander, 
with  whom  the  young  prince  tirst  came  into  contact  on  reaching 
Sardis. 

Lysander  had  come  out  to  supersede  Kratesippidas  about  Decem- 
ber 408  B.C.,  or  January  407  n.c  He  was  the  last  (after  Brasidas  and 
Gylippus)  of  tliat  trio  of  eminent  Sj)artaus,  from  whom  all  the  capi- 
tal wounds  of  Athens  proceeded,  during  the  course  of  this  long  war. 
He  was  born  of  ])oor  i)arents,  and  is  even  said  to  have  been  of  that 
class  called  Mothakes,  being  only  enabled  by  the  aid  of  richer  men  to 
keep  up  his  contribution  to  the  public  mess,  and  his  place  in  the 
constant  drill  and  discipline,  He  was  not  only  an  excellent  olhcer, 
thoroughly  competent  to  the  duties  of  nulitary  conunand,  but  pos- 
sessed also  gretit  talents  for  intrigue,  and  for  organizing  a  political 


266        CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 

party  as  well  as  kcepinc:  up  its  disciplined  movements.  Though  in- 
diilvVt-nt  to  the  teuipialions  either  of  money  or  of  pleasure,  and 
Avillinirly  acqiiiesein.ir  in  the  poverty  to  which  he  was  born,  he  was 
alto'-eUier  unscrupulous  in  the  prosecution  of  ambitious  objects, 
either  for  his  countrv  or  for  himself.  His  family,  poor  as  it  was,  en- 
ioyed  a  diunitied  position  in  Sparta— belonging  to  the  gens  ot  the 
ilerakleidre,  not  connecte<l  by  any.  near  relationship  with  the  kings: 
moreover  his  pergonal  reputation  as  a  Spartan  was  excellent,  snice 
his-()bsei  vance  of  the  rules  of  discipline  had  been  rigt)rous  and  exem- 
i.ltiry.  The  habits  of  self-constraint  thus  acquired  served  him  m 
good  stead  when  it  became  necessary  to  his  ambition  to  court  the 
favor  of  the  great.  His  recklessness  aliout  falsehood  and  lurjiiry  i:^ 
illustrated  by  various  cuiTcnt  sayings  ascribed  to  him— sucli  as,  that 
children  were  to  be  taken  in  bv  ir.eans  of  dice,  men  by  means  of 
oaths.  A  seltish  ambition— for  promoting  the  power  of  his  country 
not  merely  in  connection  with,  but  in  subserviance  to,  his  own— 
iruided  him  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  his  career,  In  this 
main  quality,  he  aureed'with  Alkibiades;  in  reckless  immorality  of 
means,  he  w'ent  even  beyond  him.  He  seems  to  have  ])een  cruel;  an 
attribute  which  formed  no  part  of  the  usual  chaiacter  of  Alkibiades. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  love  of  personal  enjoyment,  luxury,  andosten- 
lation  which  counted  for  so  nuich  in  Alkibiades,  wasquUe  unknown 
to  Lysander.  The  basis  of  his  disposition  was  h^partan.  tending  to 
merie  appetite,  ostentation,  and  exi^ansiem  of  mind,  all  in  the  love  of 
comTnand  and  influence— not  Atlienian,  which  tended  to  the  develop- 
ment of  many  and  diversitied  impulses,  ambition  being  one,  but  only 
one,  among  tlie  nund)er.  . 

Kratesijipidas,  the  ]ir(decessor  of  Tiysander.  seems  to  have  enjoyed 
tlie maritime  command  for  more  than  the  usual  yearly  period,  having 
superseded  Pasippidas  during  the  nuddle  of  the  year  of  the  latter. 
But  the  maritime  power  of  Sparta  was  then  so  weak  (having  not  yet 
recovered  from  the  ruinous  defeat  at  Kyzikus),  that  lie  achieved 
little  or  nothintr.  We  hear  of  him  only  as  furthering,  for  his  own 
profit,  a  political  revolution  at  Chios.  Bribed  by  a  party  of  Chum 
exiles,  he  took  possession  of  the  acropolis,  reinstated  them  in  the 
island,  and  aided  them  in  deposing  and  expelling  the  party  then  in 
otlice,  to  the  number  of  600.  It  is  ])lain  that  this  was  not  a  quest  ion 
between  democracy  and  oligarchy,  but  between  two  oligarchical  par- 
lies, the  one  of  which  succeeded  in  purchasing  the  factious  agency 
of  the  St>artan  admiral.  The  exiles  whom  he  expelled  took  posses- 
sion of  Alarneus,  a  strong  post  belonging  to  the  Cliians  on  the 
mainland  opposite  I.esbos.  From  hi'uce  they  made  war,  as  well  as 
they  could,  upon  their  rivals  now  in  possession  of  the  island,  and 
also  upon  other  parts  of  Ionia;  not  without  some  success  and  prolit, 
as  will  appear  by  their  condition  about  ten  years  afterward. 

The  ])ractice  of  reconstituting  the  governments  of  the  Asiatic 
cities  thus  begun  by  Kratesippidas.  was  extended  and  brought  to  a 


LYSANDER'S  DEXTEROUS  POLICY. 


2G7 


system  by  Lysander;  not  indeed  for  private  emolument,  which  he 
always  despised — but  in  views  of  ambition.  Having  departed  from 
Peloponnesus  with  a  squadron,  he  re  enforced  it  at  Rhodes  and  theu 
sailed  onward  to  Kos  (an  Athenian  island,  so  that  he  could  only  have 
touched  there)  and  Miletus.  Ht;  took  up  his  final  station  at  Ephesus, 
the  nearest  point  to  Sardis,  where  Cyrus  was  expected  to  arrive;  and 
while  awaiting  his  coming,  augmented  his  fleet  to  the  number  of  70 
triremes.  As  soon  as  Cyrus  reached  Sardis  (about  April  or  May  407 
H.c).  Lysander  went  to  i>ay  his  court  to  him  along  with  some  Lace- 
da^nonian  envoys,  and  found  himself  welcomed  with  every  mark  of 
favor.  Preferring  bitter  complaints  against  the  double-dealing  of 
Tissaphernes — whom  they  accused  of  having  frustrated  the  king's 
orders  and  sacrificed  the  interests  of  the  empire,  under  the  seductions 
of  Alkibiades  — they  entreated  Cyrus  to  adopt  a  new  policy,  and 
execute  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  by  lending  the  most  vigorous 
aid  to  put  down  the  common  enemy.  Cyrus  replied  that  these  were 
the  express  orders  which  he  had  received  from  his  father,  and  that 
he  was  prepared  to  fulfill  them  with  all  his  might.  He  had  brought 
with  him  (he  said)  500  talents,  which  should  be  at  once  devoted  to 
the  cause;  if  these  were  insutficient,  he  would  resort  to  the  private 
funds  which  his  father  had  given  him;  and  if  more  still  were  needed, 
lie  would  coin  iuto  money  the  gold  and  silver  throne  on  which  he 
sat. 

Lysander  and  the  envoys  returned  the  warmest  thanks  for  these 
magnificent  promises,  wdlich  were  not  likely  to  prove  empty  words 
from  the  lips  of  a  vehement  youth  like  Cyrus.  So  sanguine  w^ere 
the  hopes  which  they  conceived  from  his  character  and  proclaimed 
sentiments,  that  they  ventured  to  ask  him  to  restore  the  rate  of  pay 
to  one  full  Attic  drachma  per  head  for  the  seamen;  which  had  been 
the  rate  promised  by  Tissaphernes  through  his  envoys  at  Sparta, 
when  he  first  invited  the  Lacedjemonians  across  the  ^gean,  and 
when  it  was  doul)tful  whether  they  would  come — but  actually  paid 
only  for  the  first  month,  and  then  reduced  to  half  a  drachma,  fur- 
iiisfied  in  practice  with  miserable  irregularity.  As  a  motive  for 
granting  this  increase  of  pay,  Cyrus  was  assured  that  it  would  deter- 
niine  the  Athenian  seamen  to  desert  so  largely,  that  the  war  would 
sooner  conn  to  an  end,  and  of  course  the  expenditure  also.  But  he 
refused  compliance,  saying  that  the  rate  of  pay  had  been  fixed  both 
by  the  kings  express  orders  and  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  so  that 
Ik;  could  not  depart  from  it.  In  this  reply  Lysander  was  forced  to 
ae(iuiescc.  The  envoys  were  treated  with  distinction,  and  feasted 
at  a  banquet;  after  which  Cyrus,  drinking  to  the  health  of  liysamh'r, 
desired  him  to  declare  what  favor  he  could  do  to  gratify  him  nipst. 
"  To  grant  an  additional  obolus  per  head  for  each  seaman's  pay;" 
replied  Lysander.  Cyrus  immediately  complied,  having  personally 
hound  hiniself  by  his  manner  of  putting  the  (piestion.  But  the 
answer  impressed  him  both  with  astonishment  and  admiration;  for 


2G8 


CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 


he  had  expcct(>(l  that  L^'sandcr  would  ask  sonic  favor  or  present  for 
himself — judgiui;-  him  not  only  Jiccordini^  to  the  analogy  of  most 
IVrsians,  but  also  of  Astyoehiis  and  the  otlieers  of  the  Peloponnesiiiii 
armamelit  at  Miletus,  wljose  corrupt  subservience  to  Tissaplieines 
had  probably  been  made  known  to  him.  From  such  corruption,  as 
well  as  from  the  mean  carelessness  of  Theramenes  (the  Spartan) 
respectinsi' the  condition  of  the  seamen,  Lysander's  conduct  stood  out 
in  pointed  and  honorable  contrast. 

The  incident  here  described  not  only  procured  for  the  seamen  of 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet  the  daily  pay  of  four  oboli  (instead  of  tJjree) 
per  man,  but  also  insured  to  Lysander  himself  a  degree  of  esteem 
and  confidence  from  Cyrus  which  he  knew  well  how  to  turn  to 
account.  I  have  already  remarked,  in  reference  to  Perikles  nnd 
Nikias,  that  an  established  reputation  for  personal  incorruptibility, 
rare  as  that  quality  was  among  Grecian  leading  politicians,  was 
among  the  most  precious  items  in  the  (•a{)ital  stock  of  an  ambitious 
man — even  if  looked  at  only  in  regard  to  the  durability  of  his  own 
influence.  If  the  proof  of  such  disinterestedness  was  of  so  nuicli 
value  in  the  eyes  of  the  Athenian  people,  yet  more  powerfully  did  it 
"work  upon  the  mind  of  Cyrus.  With  his* Persian  and  princely  ideas 
of  winning  adherents  by  munificence,  a  man  who  despised  presents 
was  a  phenomenon  commanding  the  higher  senttment  of  wonder  and 
respect.  From  this  time  forward  he  not  only  trusted  Lysander  widi 
implicit  pecuniary  confidence,  but  consulted  him  as  to  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war,  and  even  condescended  to  second  his  personal  ambi- 
tion to  the  detriment  of  this  object. 

Returning  from  Sardis  to  Ephesus,  after  such  unexampled  success 
in  his  interview  with  Cyrus,  Lysander  was  enabled  not  only  to  make 
good  to  his  fleet  the  full  aiTcar  actually  due,  but  also  to  pay  them 
for  a  month  in  advance,  at  the  increased  rate  of  four  oboli  per  man; 
•  and  to  promise  that  high  rate  for  the  future,  A  spirit  of  the  highest 
:  satisfaction  and  confidence  was  diffused  through  the  armament. 
But  the  ships  were  in  indifferent  condition,  having  been  hastily  and 
parsimoniously  got  up  since  the  late  defeat  at  Kyzikus.  Accordingly 
Lysander  employed  his  present  affluence  in  putting  them  into  better 
order,  procuring  more  complete  tackle,  and  inviting  picked  crews. 
He  took  another  step  pregnant  with  important  results.  Summoiung 
to  Ephesus  a  few  of  the  most  leading  and  active  men  from  each  of 
the  x\siatic  cities,  he  organized  them  into  disciplined  clubs  or  fac- 
tions, in  correspondence  with  himself.  He  instigated  these  clubs  to 
the  most  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  against  Athens,  promising 
that  as  soon  as  that  war  should  be  concluded,  they  should  be  invested 
and^  maintained  by  Spartan  influence  in  the  government  of  their 
respective  cities.  His  newly  established  influence  with  Cyms,  and 
the  abundant  supplies  of  which  he  was  now  master,  added  double 
force  to  an  invitation  in  itself  but  too  seducing.  And  thus,  while 
infusing  increased  ardor  into  the  joint  warlike  efforts  of  these  cities, 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  ALKIBIADES. 


269 


ho  at  the  same  lime  procured  for  himself  an  ubiquitous  correspond- 
ence, such  as  no  successor  could  manage;  rendering  tlic  continuance 
of  his  own  command  almost  essential  to  success.  The  fruits  of  his 
factious  maneuvers  will  be  seen  in  the  subsequent  Dekarchies  or 
oligarchies  of  Ten,  after  the  complete  subjugation  of  Athens. 

While  Lysander  and  Cyrus  were  thus  restoring  formidable  eflicacy 
to  their  side  of  the  contest  (during  the  summer  of  407  B.C.),  the  vic- 
torious exile  Alkibiades  had  accomplished  the  important  and  delicate 
step  of  re-entering  his  native  city  for  the  first  time.  According  to. 
the  accommodation  with  Pharnabazus,  concluded  after  the  reduction 
of  Chalkedon,  the  Athenian  fleet  was  precluded  from  assailing  his 
satrapy,  and  was  thus  forced  to  seek  subsistence  elsewhere.  Byzan- 
tium and  Selyrabria,  with  contributions  levied  in  Thrace,  main- 
tained them  for  the  winter:  in  the  spring  (407  B.C.),  Alkibiades 
brought  them  again  to  Samos;  from  whence  he  undertook  an  expe- 
dition airainst  the  coast  of  Karia,  levying  contributions  to  the  extent 
of  100  talents.  Thrasybulus,  with  thirty  triremes,  went  to  att-ick 
Thrace,  where  he  redu('ed  Thasos,  xVbdera,  and  all  those  towns  which 
had  revolted  from  Athens;  Thasos  being  now  in  especial  distress 
from  famine  as  w^ell  as  from  past  seditions.  A  valuable  contribution 
for  the  support  of  the  fleet  was  doubtless  among  the  fruits  of  this 
success.  Thrasyllus  at  the  same  time  conducted  another  division  of 
the  army  home  to  Athens,  intended  by  Alkibiades  as  precursors  of 
of  his  own  return. 

Befoi-e  Thrasyllus  arrived,  the  people  had  already  manifested  their 
favorable  disposition  towards  Alkibiades  by  choosing  him^anew 
general  of  the  armament,  along  with  Thrasybulus  and  Konon. 
Alkibiades  was  now  tending  homeward  from 'Samos  with  twenty 
triremes,  bringing  with  him  all  the  contributions  recently  levied. 
He  first  stopped  at  Paros,  then  visited  the  coast  of  Laconia,  and 
lastly  looked  into  the  LaccHhemonian  harbor  of  Gytheion,  where  he 
had  learnt  that  thirty  triremes  were  preparing.  The  news  which  he 
received  of  his  re-election  as  general,  strengthened  l)y  the  pressing 
invitations  and  encouragements  of  his  friends,  as  well  as  by  the  recall 
of  his  banished  kinsmen — at  length  determined  him  to  sail  to, Athens. 
He  reached  Peineus  on  a  marked  day— the  festival  of  the  Plynteria 
on  the  2r)th  of  the  month  Thargelion— (about  the  en<l  of  May,  407 
B.C.).  This  was  a  day  of  melancholy  solemnity,  accounted  unpro- 
pitious  for  any  action  (,)f  importance.  The  statue  of  the  goddess 
Athene  was  stripped  of  all  its  ornaments,  covered  up  from  every 
one's  gaze,  and  washed  or  cleansed  under  a  mysterious  ceremonial, 
by  the  holy  irens  called  Praxiergidje.  The  goddess  thus  seemed  to 
turn  away  her  face,  and  refuse  to  behold  the  returning  exile.  Such 
at  least  was  tlie  construction  of  his  enenues;  and  as  the  sul)sequent 
turn. of  events  tended  to  bear  them  out,  it  has  been  preserved:  wlnle 
the  nu)re  auspicious  counter-interpretation,  doubtless  suggested  by 
his  friends,  has  been  forgottea 


270 


CYRUS  THE  YCUXGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR 


EFFECT  PRODUCED  UPON  ALKIBIADES.         271 


rr 


The  most  cxtnivaa:;int  representations  of  the  pomp  and  splendor  of 
this  return  of  Alkihiades  to  Alliens,  were  givrn  by  some  authors  of 
anli(iuity — especially  by  Duris  at  Sumos.  an  author  about  two  f^vn- 
erations* later.  It  was  said  that  he  brought  uilh  him  2(H)  i)ro\v-ornn- 
ments  belonii^ini!:  to  captive  enemies'  ships,  or  (according  to  some) 
even  the  200  captured  ships  themselves;  that  his  trireme  was  orna- 
mented with  gill  and  silvered  shields,  and  sailed  by  purple  sails;  that 
Kallippides,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  actors  of  the  day,  per- 
formed the  functions  of  Keleustes,  pronouncing  the  chant  or  word 
of  command  to  the  rowers;  that  Chrysogonus,  a  flute-player  ■who  had 
gained  the  tirst  prize  at  the  Pythian  games,  was  also  on  board,  play- 
uvj:  the  air  of  return.  All  these  details,  invented  wilh  melaiicholv 
fa(  ility  to  illustrate  an  ideal  of  ostentation  and  insolence,  are  refuted 
by  the  more  simple  and  credible  narrative  of  Xenophon.  The  re- 
entry of  Alkibiades  was  not  merely  unostentatious,  but  even  mis- 
trustful and  apprehensive.  He  had  with  him  only  twenty  triremes; 
and  though  encouraged,  not  merely  by  the  assurances  of  his  friends, 
but  also  by  the  news  that  he  had  just  been  re-elected  general— he  was 
nevertheless  half-afrai<l  to  disembark,  even  at  the  instant  when  he 
made  fast  his  ship  to  the  (iuay  in  Peiranis.  A  vast  crowd  had  assem- 
bled there  from  the  city  and  the  p(n"t,  animated  by  curiosity,  inter- 
est, and  other  emotions  of  every  kind,  to  see  him  arrive.  But  so 
little  did  he  trust  their  sentiments,  that  he  hesitated  at  first  to  step 
on  shore,  and  stood  upon  the  deck  looking  about  for  his  friends  and 
kinsmen.  Presently  he  saw"  Euryptokmus  his  cousin  and  others,  by 
whom  he  was  heartily  welcomed,  and  in  the  midst  of  whom  he 
landed.  But  they  too  were  so  apprehensive  of  his  numerous  ene- 
mies, that  they  formed  themselves  into  a  sort  of  body-guard  to  sur- 
round and  protect  him  against  any  possible  assault,  during  his  march 
from  Peiracus  to  Athens. 

No  protection,  however,  was  required.  Not  merely  did  his  ene- 
mies attempt  no  violence  against  him,  but  they  said  nothing  in  oppo- 
sition when  he  made  his  defense  before  the  Senate  and  the  j^ublic 
^assembly.  Protesting  before  the  one  as  well  as  the  other,  his  inno- 
cence of  the  impiety  laid  to  his  charge,  he  denounced  bitterly  the 
injustice  of  his  enemies,  and  gently,  but  pathetically,  deplored  tlie 
uukindness  of  the  people.  His  friends  all  spoke  warmly  in  the  same 
strain.  So  strenuous  and  so  ]m)nounced,  was  the  seniiment  in  his 
favor,  both  of  the  Senate  and  of  tlie  i)ublic  assembly,  that  no  one 
dared  to  address  them  in  tlie  contrary  sense.  Tlie  sentence  of  con- 
demnation passed  against  him  was  canceled:  the  Eumolpichr  were 
directed  to  revoke  the  curse  which  they  had  ]>ronounced  upon  his 
head;  the  record  of  the  sentence  was  destroyed,  and  the  plate  of 
Irad,  upon  which  the  curse  was  engraved,  thrown  into  the  sea:  his 
confiscated  property  was  restored:  lastly,  he  was  proclaimed  genrral 
witii  full  powers,  and  allowed  to  prepare  an  expedition  of  100  tri- 
remes, 1500  hoplites  from  the  regular  muster-roll,  and  150  horsemen. 


AH  this  passed,  by  unopposed  vote,  amid  silence  on  tlie  part  of 
enemies  and  acclamations   from  friends— amid   unmeasured  prom- 
ises of  future  achievement  from  himself,  and  contident  assurances, 
im])ressed  by  his  friends  on  willing  hearers,  that  Alkibhides  was  the 
oiilv  man  competent  to  restore  the  empire  and  giandeur  of  Athens. 
The  general  expectation,  which  he  and  his  friends  took  every  pos- 
sible pains  to  excite,  was,  that  his  victorious  career  of  the  last  three 
'vcars  was  a  preparation  for  yet  greater  triumphs  during  the  next 
'   AVe  may  be  satisfied,  when  we  advert  to  the  apprehensions  ot  x\lki- 
bi-ules  on  entering  the  Peineus,  and  to  the  body-guard  organized  by 
his   friends,  that    this  overwhelming   and  uncontradicted  triumph 
<rreatiy  surpassed  the  anticipations  of  both.     It  intoxicated  him,  and 
fed  him  to  make  light  of  enemies  whom  only  just  betore  he  had  so 
murh  dreaded.     This  mistake,   together  with  tiie  carelessness  and 
iusoleiiee  arising  out  of  what  seemed  to  be  an  unbounded  ascen- 
dency proved  the  cause  of  his  future  ruin.     But  the  truth  is,  that 
these  enemies,  however  they  might  remain  silent,  had  not  ceased  to 
be  formidable.     Alkibiades  iiad  now  been  eight  years  in  exile,  Irom 
about  Augu-t  415  u.c,  to  May  407  i$.c.     Now  absence  w^as  m  many 
wivsa  ^'ood  thing  for  his  rei)utation;  since  his  overbearing  private 
di'iii-'an'or  had  been  kept  out  of  sight,  and  his  impieties  partially  loi- 
goltcn      There  was  even  a  disposition  among  the  majority  to  accept 
iiis  own  explicit  denial  of  tin;  fact  laid  to  his  charge;  and  to  dwell 
cWh'Wy  upon  the  unworthy  maneuvers  of  his  enemies  in  n'sisting  his 
(Ifniiiul    for   instant   trial    immediately    after    the    accnisation    was 
bioiehed   in  order  that  they  might  calumniate  him  during  his  ab- 
S'lice      lie  was  clmracterized  as  ^i  patriot  animated  by  the  noblest 
in>Mves   who  had  brought  both  first-rate  endowments  and  large  pri- 
vite  wealth  to  the  service  of  the  commonwealth,  but  had  been  ruined 
hv  a  coiHpiraey  of  corrupt  and  w^orthless  speakers,  every  way  infer- 
ior to  him-  men,  whose  only  chance  of  success  with  the  people  arose 
from  expellin"'  those  who  were  belter  than  themselves,  while  he 
(\IUibiades)   far  from  having  anv  interest  adverse  to  the  democracy, 
was  the  natural  and  worthy  favorite  of  a  democratical  people,     bo 
far  as  the  old  causes  of  unpopularity  were  concerned,  t^heretore 
time  and  absence  had  done  much  to  weaken  their  eltect,  and  to  assist 
his  friends  in  countervailing   them  by  pointing  to  the  treacherous 
political  maneuvers  employed  against  him. 

But  if  the  olil  causes  of  unpopularity  had  tnus,  comparatively 
spi^ikin--  passed  out  of  sight,  others  had  since  arisen,  of  a  grayer 
and  moT-e  ineifaceable  character.  His  vindictive  hostility  to  his 
country  had  been  not  merely  ostentatiously  proclaimed,  but  activc'ly 
manifested,  by  stabs  but  too  effectively  aimed  at  her  vitals.  1  he 
sendin'^  of  Gylippus  to  Syracuse— the  fortification  of  Dekeleia— the 
revolls'^of  Chios  and  Miletus— the  first  origination  of  the  conspiracy 
of  the  Four  Hundred— had  all  been  emphatically  the  mcjvsures  ot 
Alkibiades     Even  for  these,  the  enthusiasm  of  the  moment  attempted 


272 


CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN   ASIA  MINOR. 


THE  ELEUSINIAN  MYSTERIES. 


273 


some  excuse:  it  was  affirmed  that  he  had  never  ceased  to  love  his 
country,  in  spite  of  her  wrongs  toward  Iiim.  and  that  he  had  been 
compelled  liy  the  necessities  of  exile  to  serve  men  whom  he  detested, 
at  the  daily  risk  of  his  life.  Such  pretenses,  however,  could  not 
really  impose  upon  any  one.  The  treason  of  Alkibiades  during  tlio 
period  of  his  exile  remained  indefensible  as  well  as  undeniable,  and 
would  have  been  more  than  sufficient  as  a  theme  for  his  eneniios, 
had  their  tongues  been  free.  But  his  position  was  one  altogelhcr 
singular:  having  first  iiitiicted  on  his  country  immense  mischief,  lie 
had  since  rendered  her  valuable  service,  and  promised  to  render  still 
more.  It  is  true,  that  the  subsequent  service  was  by  no  niejins 
{ule(|uate  to  the  previous  mischief:  nor  had  it  indeed  been  rendered 
exclusively  by  him,  since  the  victories  of  Abydos  and  Kyzikus  belong 
not  less  to  Theramenes  and  Thrasvbulus  than  to  Alkibiades:  more- 
over,  the  pecidiar  present  or  capital  which  he  had  promised  to  bring 
with  him — Persian  alliance  and  i)ay  to  Athens  h:is  proved  a  com- 
plete delusion.  Still  the  Athenian  arms  had  been  eminently  success- 
ful since  his  junction,  and  we  may  see  that  not  merely  eonunou 
report,  but  even  good  judges,  such  as  Thucydides,  ascribed  this 
result  to  his  superior  energy  and  management. 

Without  touching  upon  these  particulars,  it  is  impossible  fully  to 
comprehend  the  very  peculiar  position  of  this  returning  exile  befonr 
the  Athenian  people  in  the  summer  of  407  u.c.  The  more  distant 
past  exhibited  him  as  among  the  worst  of  crim.inals — the  recent  j)as», 
as  a  valuable  servant  and  })atriot — the  future  proinised  continuance 
in  this  last  character,  so  far  as  there  were  any  positive  indications  to 
judge  by.  Now  this  was  a  case  in  which  discussion  and  recrimina- 
tion coidd  not  possibly  answer  any  useful  purpose.  There  was  every 
reason  for  re-appointing  Alkibiades  to  his  command;  but  this  could 
only  be  done  under  prohibition  of  censure  on  his  i)ast  crimes,  and 
provisional  acceptance  of  his  subsequent  good  deeds  as  justifying  the 
hope  of  yet  better  deeds  to  come.  The  popular  instinct  felt  this 
situation  perfectly,  and  imposed  absolute  silence  on  his  enemies. 
We  ere  not  to  infer  from  lience  that  the  people  had  forgotten  the 
past  deeds  of  Alkibiades,  or  that  they  entertained  for  liim  nothing 
but  unqualiiied  confidence  and  admiration.  In  their  pre.seut  very 
justifiable  sentiment  of  hopefulness,  they  determined  that  he  should 
have  full  scope  for  prosecuting  his  new  and  better  career,  if  he 
chose;  and  that  his  enemies  should  be  precluded  from  reviving  the 
mention  of  an  irreparable  past,  so  as  to  shut  the  door  against  him. 
But  what  was  thus  interdicted  to  men's  lips  as  unsea.sonable  was  not 
ciTaced  from  their  recollections;  nor  were  the  enemies,  though 
silenced  for  the  moment,  rendered  powerless  for  the  future.  All  this 
train  of  combustible  matter  lay  quiescent,  ready  to  be  fired  ]>y  any 
future  misconduct  or  negligence,  perhaps  even  by  blameless  ill- 
success,  on  the  part  of  Alkibiades. 

At  a  juncture  when  so  much  depended  upon  his  future  behavior, 


he  showed  (as  we  shall  see  presently)  that  he  completely  misinter« 
preted  the  temper  of  the  people.  Intoxicated  by  the  unexpected 
triumph  of  his  reception — according  to  that  fatal  susceptibility  so 
eonunou  among  distinguished  Greeks — he  forgot  his  own  past  his- 
tory, and  fancied  that  the  people  had  forgotten  and  forgiven  it  also; 
construing  their  studied  and  well-advised  silence  into  a  proof  of 
oblivion.  He  conceived  himself  in  assured  possession  of  public  con- 
fidence, and  looked  upon  his  numerous  enemies  as  if  they  no  longer 
existed,  because  they  were  not  allowed  to  speak  at  a  most  unseason- 
able hour.  Without  doubt,  his  exultation  was  shared  by  his  friends, 
and  this  sense  of  false  security  proved  his  future  ruin. 

Two  colleagues,  recommended  by  Alkibiades  himself — Adeimantus 
and  Aristokrates — were  named  by  the  people  as  generals  of  the  hop- 
lites  to  go  out  with  him,  in  case  of  operations  ashore.  In  less  than 
throe  months,  his  armament  was  ready;  but  he  designedly  deferre(l 
his  departure  until  that  day  of  the  month  Boednmiion  (about  the 
begiiniing  of  September)  when  the  Eleusinian  mysteries  were  celc* 
bnited.  and  when  the  solemn  processional  march  of  the  crowd  of 
conununicants  was  wont  to  take  place,  along  the  Sacred  Way  from 
Athens  to  Eleusis.  For  seven  successive  years,  ever  since  the 
establishment  of  Agis  at  Dekeleia,  this  march  h.ad  been  of  necessity 
diseontinued,  and  the  procession  had  been  traLsporle  I  by  sea,  to  tiie 
omission  of  many  of  the  ceremonial  details.  Alkibiades  on  this 
occasion  caused  the  land-march  to  be  renewed  in  full  pomp  and 
solemnity;  assembling  all  his  troops  in  arms  to  protect,  in  case  any 
attack  should  l)e  made  from  Dekeleia.  No  suidi  attack  was  haz- 
arded; so  that  he  had  the  satisfact;ion  of  reviving  the  full  regularity 
of  this  illustrious  scene,  and  escorting  the  numerous  communicants 
out  and  home,  without  the  smallest  interruption; — an  exploit  gratify- 
ing to  the  religious  feelings  of  the  people,  and  imparting  an  accept- 
able sense  of  undiminished  Athenian  power;  while  in  reference  to 
his  own  reputation,  it  was  especially  politic,  as  serving  to  make  his 
peace  with  the  Eumolpida3  and  the  Two  Goddesses,  on  whose  account 
lie  had  been  condemned. 

Immediately  after  the  mysteries,  he  departed  with  his  armament. 
'  It  appears  that  Agis  at  Dekeleia,  though  he  had  not  chosen  to  come 
out  and  attack  Alkibiades  when  posted  to  guard  the  Eleusinian  pro- 
cession, haa  nevertheless  felt  humiliated  by  the  defiance  offered  to 
liiin.  He  shortly  afterward  took  advantage  of  the  departure  of 
this  hirge  force,  to  summon  re-enforcements"from  Peloponnesus  and 
J>(eotia,  and  attempt  to  surprise  the  walls  of  Athens  on  a  dark  night. 
Ii  he  expected  any  connivance  within,  the  plot  miscarried;  alarm 
was  given  in  time,  so  that  the  eldest  and  youngest  hoplites,  were 
found  at  their  posts  to  defend  the  walls.  The  assailants— said  to 
liiive  amounted  to  28,000  men,  of  whom  half  were  hoplites,  with 
1300  cavalry,  900  of  them  Boeotians — were  seen  on  the  ensuing  day 
close  under  the  walte  of  t^ie  city,  which  were  amply  manned  wiUi  the 


274         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 

full  remainincr  strength  of  Athens.  In  Jin  obstinnte  cavalry  battk 
^vhicll  ensued,  the  Athenians  gained  the  advantage  even  over  the 
Bdotians.  Aszis  encamped  the  next  ni.iiht  in  the  p.irdeu  of  AUade 
nius-  a"ain  oii"  the  morrow  he  drew  up  his  troops  and  ollercd  nattk' 
to  the  Athenians,  who  arc  atllrnied  to  have  gone  lorlh  in  order  of 
Inttle  but  to  have  kept  under  the  protection  of  the  missiles  fi-om  the 
avails  'so  that  Auds  did  not  dare  to  attack  them.  We  may  well  doubt 
wliether  the  Atlienians  went  out  at  all,  since  they  had  been  for  yems 
accustomed  to  regard  themselves  as  inferior  to  the  Peloponnesiansiu 
the  field  Ao-is  now  withdrew,  satisfied  apparently  with  having 
olfered  kittle'' so  as  to  efface  the  affront  which  he  had  received  from 
the  march  of  the  Eleusiuian  communicants  in  defiance  of  his  ueigli- 

^"^ThTfiVst  exploit  of  Alkibiades  was  to  proceed  to  Andros.  now 
under  a  Lacediemonian  harmost  and  garrison.  Lauding  on  the 
island  he  plundered  the  fields,  defeated  both  the  native  troops  and 
llie  Laced'enu.nians,  and  forced  tliem  to  shut  themselves  up  witliiu 
the  town;  which  he  besieged  for  some  days  without  avail,  and  tlieii 
nroceeded  onward  to  Samos,  leaving  Konon  in  a  foiiified  post  witli 
twenlv  shi,>s  to  prosecute  the  siege.  At  Samos  he  first  ascertaiuul 
the  state  of  the  Feloponnesian  tleet  at  Ephesus-the  mt  uence  acqiiip 
ed  bv  Lvsander  over  Cyrus-the  strong  anti-Athenian  disj.ositions  of 
tlie  voun*--  prince— and  the  ample  rale  of  pay,  put  down  even  in  ad 
vance  of  which  the  Feloponnesian  seamen  were  now  in  actual  receip. 
He  now  first  became  convinced  of  the  failure  of  those  hopes  wliidi 
he  had  conceived,  not  without  liood  reason,  in  the  preceding  year- 
andof  which  he  had  doubtless  boasted  at  Alliens;  that  the  alhaice 
of  Persia  might  be  neutralized  at  least,  if  not  won  over,  through  the 
envovs  esccn^ed  to  Susa  by  Pharnabazus.  It  was  in  vain  that 
prevailed  upon  Tissaphernes  to  mediate  with  Cyrus,  to  mlroduec  to 
him  some  Athenian  envoys,  and  to  nculcate  upon  him  I'j^^^owui  i e  j 
of  the  true  interests  of  Persia;  that  is,  that  the  war  should  be  fed  and 
protracted  so  as  to  wear  out  both  the  Grecian  belligerent  par^.^'^' [:^f ' 
bv  means  of  the  other.  Such  a  policy,  uncongenial  at  all  tune  o 
the  vehement  temper  of  Cyrus,  had  become  yet  more  repugnant  to 
m  since  his  intercourse  with  Lvsander.  He  would  not  consent  even 
to  see  the  eiuov's,  nor  was  he  probably  displeased  to  put  a  slight  upon 
a  nei-hbor  and  rival  satrap.  Deep  was  the  despondency  among  tk 
Anienransat  Samos,  when  painfully  ^^^^^-'^^  }'^^  f  ^%^ 
Persi'i  must  be  abandoned  for  themselves;  and  further,  that  Peisi.ia 
pay  was  both  more  ample  and  better  a.ssured,  to  their  enemies,  llmu 

ever  it  had  been  before.  .  ,  .  ^  i      .„, 

LvLder  had  at  Ephesus  a  fieet  of  ninety  triremes,  which  he  em^ 

ploved  himself  in  repairing  and  augmenting   being  still  infcru.i  i 

number  to  the  Athenians.  In  vain  did  Alkibiades  attemp  to  provok 
n   out  to  a  general  action.     This  was  much  to  the.inleres   ot  tl 

Athenians,  apart  from  their  superiority  of  number,  smce  they  ^^tu. 


ALKIBIADES  GOES  TO  PHOKxEA. 


275 


kidly  provided  with  money,  and  obliged  to  levy  contributions  Avlierc- 
pver  lliey  could:  but  Lysander  was  resolved  not  to  fight  unless  he 
could  do  so  w'ith  advantage,  and  Cyrus,  not  afraid  of  sustaining  the 
protracted  expense  of  the  war,  had  even  enjoined  upon  hinT  this 
cautions  policy,  with  additional  hopes  of  a  Pheniciau  fleet  to  his  aid 
-which  in  his  mouth  was  not  intended  to  delude,  as  it  had  been  by 
Tissaphernes.  Unable  to  bring  about  a  general  battle,  and  having 
no  immediate  or  capital  enterprise  to  constrain  his  attention,  Alkibi- 
ades became  careless,  and  abandoned  himself  partly  to  the  love  of 
pleasure,  partly  to  reckless  predatory  enterprises  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  money  to  pay  his  army.  Tlirasybulus  had  come  from  his 
post  on  the  Hellespont  and  was  now  engaged  in  fortifying  Phoka3a, 
prol)ably  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  post  to  be  enabled  to  pil- 
l;ige  the  interior.  Here  he  was  joined  by  Alkibiades,  who  sailed 
across  with  a  squadron,  leaving  his  main  fleet  at  Samos.  He  left  it 
under  the  command  of  his  fjivorite  pilot  Antiochus,  but  with  express 
orders  on  no  account  to  fight  until  his  return. 

While  employed  in  his  visit  to  Phoka?a  and  Klazomenae,  Alkibi- 
ades, perhaps  hard-pressed  for  money,  conceived  the  unwarrantable 
project  of  enriching  his  men  by  the  plunder  of  the  neighboring  terri- 
tory of  Kyme,  an  allied  dependency  of  Athens.  Landing  on  this 
territory  unexpectedly,  after  fabricating  some  frivolous  calumnies 
agiiiust  the  Kynucans,  he  at  first  seized  much  property  and  a  con- 
siderable number  of  prisoners.  But  the  inhabitants  assembled  ia 
arms,  bravely  defended  their  possessions,  and  repelled  his  men  to 
their  ships;  recovering  the  plundered  property,  and  lodging  it  in 
safety  within  their  walls.  Stung  with  this  miscarriage,  Alkibiades 
sent  for  a  re-enforcement  of  hoplites  from  Mitylene,  and  marched  up 
to  the  walls  of  Kvme,  where  he  in  vain  challenu:ed  the  citizens  to 
come  forth  and  fight.  He  then  ravaged  the  territory  at  pleasure; 
while  the  Kyma^ans  had  no  other  resource,  except  to  send  envoys  to 
Athens,  to  complain  of  so  gross  an  outrage  inflicted  by  the  Athenian 
general  upon  an  unoffending  xVthenian  dejwndency. 

This  was  a  grave  charge,  and  nottheonlychargewiiich  Alkibiades 
bad  to  meet  at  Athens.  "During  his  absence  at  Phokica  and  Kyme, 
Anliochus  the  pilot,  whom  he  had  left  in  command,  disobeying  the 
express  order  pronounced  against  fighting  a  battle,  first  sailed  across 
from  Samos  to  Notium,  the  harbor  of  Kolophon — and  from  thence 
to  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  of  Ephesus,  where  the  Pelopoimcsiaii 
llwt  lay.  Entering  that  harl)or  with  his  own  ship  and  another,  he 
passed  close  in  front  of  the  prows  of  the  Peloponncsiau  triremes, 
ijisuiting  them  scornfully  and  defying  them  to  combat.  Lysander 
|uetaehed  some  ships  to  pursue  him,  and  an  action  gradually  ensued, 
whieh  was  exactly  that  which  Anliochus  desired.  But  the  Athenian 
I  fillips  were  all  in  disorder,  and  came  into  battle  as  each  of  them  sepa- 
l^itely  could ;  while  the  Peloponuesian  fleet  was  well-marshaled  and 
Kept  in  hand;  so  that  the  battle  was  all  to  the  advantage  of  the  lat- 


276 


CYRUS  TEE  YOUNGER  IN'  ASIA  MINOR. 


ALTERATION  OF  SENTIMENT. 


277 


1^ 


ter.  The  Atlienians,  compelled  to  take  flight,  were  piivsuod  to 
Notium — losinu:  fifteen  triremes,  several  along  with  their  full  crcvs. 
Antiochus  himself  was  slain.  Before  retiring  to  Ephesus,  Lysandcr 
luul  the  sutisfuction  of  erecting  his  trophy  on  the  shore  of  Notiuni; 
while  the  Athenian  tleet  was  carried  back  to  its  station  at  Samos. 

It  was  in  vain  that  Alk'ibiades,  hastening  back  to  Samos,  mustered 
the  entire  Athenian  tleet,  sailed  to  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  of  Ephe- 
sus, and  there  ranged  his  ships  in  battle  order,  challenging  the  enemy 
to  come  forth.  Lysander  would  give  him  no  opportunity  of  wipin';; 
off  the  late  dishonor.  And  as  an  additional  mortification  to  Athens. 
the  Laceda?monians  shortly  afterward  captured  both  Teos  and  Del- 
phinium; the  latter  "being  a  fortified  post  which  the  Athenians  bad 
held  for  the  last  three  years  in  the  island  of  Chios. 

Even  before  the  battle  of  Notium,  it  appears  that  complaints  niid 
dissatisfaction  had  been  growing  up  in  the  armament  against  Aiki- 
biades.  He  had  gone  out  with  a  splendid  force,  not  inferior  in  mini- 
ber  of  triremes  and  hoplites,  to  that  which  he  had  conducted  Muaiiist 
Sicily — and  under  large  promises,  both  from  himself  and  his  friends, 
of  achievements  to  come.  Yet  in  a  space  of  time  which  can  hardly 
liave  been  less  than  three  months,  not  a  single  success  had  been  :ic- 
complished;  while,  on  the  other  side,  there  was  to  be  reckoned,  the 
disappointment  on  the  score  of  Persia — which  had  great  effect  on  the 
temper  of  the  armament,  and  which,  though  not  his  fault,  was  con- 
trary to  expectations  which  he  had  held  out — the  disgiaceful  plunderof 
Kyme — and  the  defeat  at  the  Notium.  It  was  true  that  Alkibiadis 
had  given  peremptory  orders  to  Antiochus  not  to  fight,  and  that  the 
battle  had  been  hazarded  in  flagrant  disobedience  to  his  injunctions. 
But  this  circumstance  only  raised  new  matter  for  dissatisfaction,  of 
a  graver  character.  If  xVntiochus  had  been  disobedient — if  besides 
disobedience,  he  had  displayed  a  childish  vanit}'  and  an  utter  neglect 
of  all  military  precautions— who  was  it  that  had  chosen  him  for 
deputy;  and  that  too  against  all  Athenian  precedent,  putting  thepilof, 
a  paicl  officer  of  the  ship,  over  the  heads  of  the  trierarchs  whe)  paid 
their  pilots,  and  served  at  their  own  cost?  It  was  Alkibiades  mLo 
placed  Antiochus  in  this  grave  and  responsible  situation:  a  jiersoiial 
favorite,  an  excellent  convivial  companion,  but  destitute  of  all  (juali- 
ties  befitting  a  commander.  And  this  turned  attention  on  anoliicr 
]>oint  of  the  character  of  Alkibiades — his  habits  of  excessive  self- 
indulgence  and  dissipation.  The  loud  murmurs  of  the  camp  chariKtl 
liim  with  neglecting  the  interests  of  the  service  for  enjoyments  ^vilh 
jovial  parties  and  Ionian  women,  and  with  admitting  to  his  contidenee 
those  who  best  contributed  to  the  amusement  of  such  chosen  hours. 

It  was  in  the  camp  at  Samos  that  this  general  indignation  again'^t 
Alkibiades  first  arose,  and  was  from  thence  transmitted  formally  lo 
Athens,  by  the  mouth  of  Thrasybulus  son  of  Thrason— not  the 
eminent  Thrasybulus  (son  of  Lykus)  who  has  been  already  often 
mentioned  in  this  history,  and  will  be  mentioned  again.     There  cane 


at  the  same  time  to  Athens  the  complaints  from  Kyme,  against  the 
unprovoked  aggression  and  plunder  of  that  place  by  Alkibiades; 
and  seemingly  complaints  from  other  places  besides.  It  was  even 
ur<^e(l  as  accusation  against  him,  that  he  was  in  guilty  collusion  to 
bet'ray  the  fleet  to  PharnabazAis  and  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  that  he 
had  already  provi  led  three  forts  in  the  Chersonese  to  retire  to,  so 
soon  as  this  scheme  should  be  ripe  for  execution. 

Such  grave  and  wide-spread  accusations,  coupled  with  the  disaster 
at  Notium,  and  th'e  complete  disappointment  of  all  the  promises  of 
success — were  more  than  sufficient  to  alter  the  sentiments  of  the 
people  of  Athens  towards  Alkibiades.  He  had  no  character  to  fall 
back  upon ;  or  rather,  he  had  a  character  worse  than  none— such  as 
to  render  the  most  criminal  imputations  of  treason  not  intrinsically 
improbable.  The  comments  of  his  enemies,  wiiich  had  been  foi-cibly 
excluded  from  public  discussion  daring  his  summer  visit  to  Athens, 
were  now  again  set  free;  and  all  the  adverse  recollections  of  his  past 
life  doubtless  revived.  The  people  had  refused  to  listen  to  these,  in 
order  that  he  might  have  a  fair  trial,  and  might  verify  the  title, 
claimed  for  him  by  his  friends,  to  be  judged  only  by  his  subsequent 
exploits  achieved  since  the  year  411  B.C.  He  had  now  had  his  trial; 
he  had  been  found  w^anting;  anel  the  popular  confidence,  which 
had  been  provisionally  granted  to  him,  was  accordingly  withdrawn. 

It  is  not  just  to  represent  the  Athenian  people  (however  Plutarch 
and  Cornelius  Nepos  may  set  before  us  this  picture)  as  having  in- 
dulged an  extravagant  and  unmeasured  confidence  in  Alkibiades  in 
the  month  of  July,  elemanding  of  him  more  than  man  could  perform 
-and  as  afterward  in  the  month  of  D(;cember  passing,  with  childish 
abruptness,  from  confidence  into  wrathful  displeasure,  because  their 
own  impossible  expectations  w'cre  not  alreaely  realized.  That  the 
people  entertained  large  expectations,  from  so  very  considerable  an 
armament,  cannot  be  doubted:  the  largest  of  all,  probably  (as  in  the 
instance  of  the  Sicilian  expedition),  were  those  entertained  by  Alki- 
biaeles  himself,  and  promulgated  by  his  friends.  But  we  are  not 
called  upon  to  determine  what  the  people  would  have  done,  had 
Alkibiades,  after  performing  all  the  duties  of  a  faitliful,  skillful,  and 
enterprising  commander,  nevertheless  failed,  from  obstacles  beyond 
his  own  control,  in  realizing  their  hopes  and  his  own  promises.  No 
such  case  occurred;  that  which  did  occur  was  materially  different. 
Besides  the  absence  of  grand  successes,  he  had  further  been  negligent 
and  reckless  in  his  primary  duties — he  had  exposed  the  Athenian 
arms  to  elefeat,  by  his  disgraceful  selection  of  an  unworthy  lieutenant 
—he  had  violated  the  terntory  and  property  of  an  allieel  dependency^ 
at  a  moment  when  Athens  hiul  a  paramount  interest  in  cultivating 
by  every  means  the  attachment  of  her  remaining  allies.  The  truth 
is,  as  I  have  before  remarked,  that  he  had  really  been  spoiled  by  the 
intoxicating  reception  given  to  him  so  unexpectedly  in  the  city.  He 
had  mistaken  a  hopeful  public,  determined,  even  by  forced  silence 


278         CYRUS  THE   YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR 

ns  to  tlie  past,  to  give  him  the  full  benefit  of  a  nieritorions  fntuif 
l)ut  requiring  as  condition  ^rom  him  that  that  future  should  rc-illv  hi 
meritorious— for\a  public  of  assured  admirers,  whose  favor  he'luid 
already   earned   and   might   consider  ns  liis  own.     He   became  in 
altered  man  after  that  visit,   like  Miltiades  after  the  battle  of  Mara- 
thon; or  rather,  the  impulses  of  a  character  essentinllv  dissolute  and 
insolent,  broke  loose  from  that  restraint  under  which  they  had  behre 
been   partinlly  controlled.     At  the  time  of  the  ])attle  of  Kyzikus— 
when  Alkibiades  was  laboring  to  regain  the  favor  of  liis  injured  eouii- 
trymen  and  was  yet  uncertain  whether  he  shouJd  succeed— he  wouid 
not  have  committed  the  fault  of  quitting  his   fleet   and  leavin<r  it 
under  the  command  of  a    lieutenant  like  Antiochus.     If  tin  n  fore 
Athenian  sentiment  towards  Alkibiades  underwent  an  entire  chan"-e 
during  the  autumn  of  407  B.C.,  this  was  in  consequence  of  an  altcni- 
tion  in  7//.X  character  and  behavior;  an  alteration  for  the  worse,  just 
at  the  crisis  when  everything  turned   upon  his  irood  conduct/  anil 
upon  his  deserving  at  least,  if  he  could  not  command,  success.  '      ' 
AVe  mivy  indeed  observe  that  the  faults  of  Nikias  before  Syracuse 
and  in  reference   to  tlie  coming  of  Gvlijipus,  were  far  graver  and 
more  mischievous  than   tliose   of  Alkibiades  durimr   this  Unuinj,'- 
season  of  Jiis  career— and  the  disappointment  of  antecedent  hopes  at 
least  equal.     Yet  while    these  faults  and   disappointment   brouuht 
about  the  dismissal  and  disgrace  of  Alkii)iades,  thev  did  not  induce 
the  Athenians  to  dismiss  Nikias,   though  himself 'desirinu-  it— nor 
even  prevent  them  from  sending  him  a  second  armament  to  be  ruined 
along  with  the  first.     The  C(mtrast  is  most   instructive,  as  demon- 
strating upon  what  points  durable  esteem  iu  Athens  turned;  how 
long  the  most  melancholy  public  incompetency  could  remain  over- 
looked, when  covered  by  piety,  decorum,  good  intentions,  and  hidi 
station:  how  short-lived  was  the  ascendency  of  a  man  far  superior 
in  ability  and  eneriry,   l)esides  an   equal  station— when   his  moral 
qualities  and  antecedent  life  w^ere  such  as  to  i)rovoke  fear  and  hatrtd 
in  many,  esteem  from  none.     Yet  on  the  whole,  Nikias,  lookinii-  at 
him  as  a  public  servant,  was  far  more  destructive  to  his  country  than 
Alkibiades.     The  mischief  done  to  Athens  by  the  latter  was  done 
chiefly  in  the  avowed  service  of  her  enemies. 

On  hearing  the  news  of  the  defeat  of  Notium  and  the  accumulatfd 
complaints  against  Alkibiades,  the  Athenians  t^imply  voted  that  he 
should  be  dismissed  from  his  command;  naming  ten  new  licnerals  to 
replace  him.  He  was  not  brought  to  trial,  nor  do  we  know  whelhor 
any  such  step  was  proposed.  Yet  his  proceedings  at  Kvme,  if  thtv 
happened  as  we  read  them,  riclily  deserved  judicial  animadversion'; 
and  the  people,  had  they  so  dealt  with  him,  would  only  have  aekd 
up  to  the  estimable  function  ascribed  to  them  by  the  oliiiarchical 
Phrynichus— "  of  serving  as  refuge  to  their  dependent  allies,  and 
chastising  the  high-handed  oppressi.ms  of  the  optimates  against 
them."     In  the  perilous  position  of  Athens,  however,  with  reference 


KONON  xVND  HIS  COLLEAGUES. 


279 


to  the  foreign  war,  such  a  political  trial  would  have  been  productive 
of  much  dissension  and  mischief.  And  Alkibiades  avoided  the  ques- 
tion by  not  coming  to  Alliens.  xVs  soon  as  he  heard  of  his  dismissal, 
lie  retired  immediately  from  the  army  to  his  own  fortilied  posts  on 
the  Chersonese. 

The  ten  new  generals  named  were  Konon,  Diomedon,  Leon,  Peri- 
kles,  Era.siiiides,  Aristokrates,  Archestratus,  Protomachus,  Thrasyl- 
his,  Aristogenes.  Of  these,  Konon  was  directed  to  proceed  forlh- 
with  from  Andros,  with  the  twenty  ships  which  he  had  there,  to 
receive  the  fleet  from  Alkibiades;  "while  Phanosthenes  proceeded 
with  four  triremes  to  rei)lace  Konon  at  Andros. 

In  his  way  thither,  Phanosthenes  fell  in  with  Dorieus  the  Rhodian 
ajid  two  Tluuian  triremes,  wiiich  he  captured  with  every  man  aboard, 
Tliecaplives  were  sent  to  Athens,  where  all  were  placed  in  custody 
(incise  of  future  exchange)  except  Dorieus  himself.  The  latter  had 
b -en  eoudemned  to  death  and  banished  from  his  native  city  of  lihodes, 
lo^Tther  with  his  kindreil;  probably  on  the  score  of  political  disaf- 
IVelion,  at  the  time  when  Rhodes  was  a  member  of  the  Athenian 
ailiuiu-e.  Having  since  then  become  a  citizen  of  Thurii,  he  had 
served  with  (listinetion  in  the  fleet  of  jMindarus  both  at  Miletus  and 
die  Ib'llespoiit.  Tlie  Athenians  now  had  so  nuudi  compassion  upon 
Liin  that  they  released  him  at  once  and  uncondilionally,  without 
even  demanding  a  ransom  or  an  equivalent.  By  what  parlicular 
ch'cuiiistance  their  c(mipa.ssloii  was  (b  tcrinined,  forming  a  pleasing 
oxceplion  to  the  melancholy  habits  which  pervad(Ml  Grecian  warfare 
in  hoth  belligen'uts — we  shouUl  never  have  learnt  from  the  meager 
narrative  of'  Xenophoii,  But  we  ascertain  from  other  sources  that 
Dorieus  (the  son  of  Diagoras  of  Riiodes)  was  illusliious  beyond  all 
other  Greeks  for  his  virtories  in  the  pankralion  at  the  Olympic,^  Isth- 
mian, and  Nemean  festivals;  that  he  had  gained  the  first  prize  at 
three  Olympic  festivals  in  succession  (of  which  Olympiad  ^'6,  or  428 
ii.c.,  was  the  second),  a  distinetiuu  altogether  without  precedent,  be- 
sides 8  Isthmian  ami  7  Nemean  prizes;  that  his  father,  Diagoras, 
liis  brothers,  anil  his  cousins  were  all  celebrated  as  successful  ath- 
letes; lastly,  that  the  family  were  illustrious  from  old  date  in  their 
native  island  of  Rhodes,  and  were  even  descended  from  the  Messe- 
niau  hero  Aristomenes.  When  the  Athenians  saw  before  them  as 
their  prisoner  a  niiin  doubtless  of  magnificent  stature  and  presence 
(as  we  may  conclude  from  his  atheletic  success),  and  surrounded  by 
such  a  halo  of  glory  impressive  in  the  highest  degree  to  Giecian 
imagination— the  feelings  and  usages  of  war  were  at  once  overruled. 
Though  Dorieus  had  been  one  of  their  most  vehement  enemies,  they 
couldnot  bear  either  to  touch  his  person  or  to  exact  from  him  any 
condition.  Released  by  them  on  this  occasion,  he  lived  to  be  put  to 
death,  about  thirteen  years  afterward,  by  tlie  Lacediemonians. 

AVheii  Konon  reached  Samos  to  take  the  command,  he  found  the 
armament  in  a  state  of  great  despondency ;  not  merely  from  the  tlis- 


280         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 


KALLIKRATIDAS. 


281 


honorable  affair  of  Notium,  but  also  from  disappointed  hopes  con- 
nected with  Alkihiades,  and  from  difficulties  in  procuring  re<ru]iir 
pay.  So  painfully  was  the  last  inconvenience  felt  that  tlic'^iir.t 
measure  of  Konon  was  to  contract  the  numbers  of  the  armaiiKut 
from  above  100  triremes  to  70;  and  to  reserve  for  the  diminislKd  thtt 
all  the  abler  seamen  of  the  larger.  With  this  tieet  he  and  his  col- 
leagues roved  about  the  enemies'  coasts  to  collect  plunder  and  p;iv 

Apparently  about  the  same  time  that  Konon  superseded  AlUiliia- 
des  (that  is,  about  December  407  B.C.  or  January  400  B.C.),  the  year 
of  Lysander's  command  expired,  and  Kallikratidas  arrived  from 
Sparta  to  replace  him.  His  arrival  was  received  with  undisiruiMd 
dissatisfaction  by  the  leading  Lacedemonians  in  the  armamHii.  Iiv 
the  chiefs  in  the  Asiatic  cities,  and  by  Cyrus.  Now  was  felt  the  fuil 
intluence  of  those  factious  correspondences  and  intrigues  which  Lv- 
sander  had  established  with  all  of  them,  for  indirectly  working  out 
the  periH'tuityof  his  own  command.  While  loud  complaints ^Aviie 
heard  of  the  impolicy  of  Sparta  in  annually  chanirinir  her  adniinil- 
b<ith  Cyrus  and  the  rest  concurred  with  Lysander  in"  throwing  dilli- 
culties  in  the  way  of  the  new  successor. 

Kallikratidas,  unfortunately  only  shown  by  the  Fates,  and  not  suf- 
fered to  continue  in  the  Grecian  Avorld,  was  one  of  the  noMcst 
characters  of  his  age.  Besides  perfect  courjiire,  eneriry,  and  incor- 
ruptibility, he  was  distinguished  for  two  qualities,  botli  of  tluni  vcrv 
rare  among  eminent  Greeks— entire  straightforwardness  of  dealiiiL^ 
and  a  Panhellenic  patriotism  alike  comprehensive,  exalted,  and  mer- 
ciful. Lysander  handed  over  to  him  nothing  but  an  empty  purse; 
liaving  repaid  to  Cyrus  all  the  money  remaininc:  in  his  possession,' 
under  pretense  that  it  had  be(n  c'ontided  to" himself  iKrsoiiallv. 
Moreover,  on  delivering  up  the  lleet  to  Kalltkratidj.s  at  Ephesus,  liu 
made  boast  of  delivering  to  him  at  the  same  time  the  mastery  of  tlic 
sea,  through  the  victory  recently  gained  at  Notium.  "Conduct  the 
fleet  from  Ephesus  along  the  coast  of  Samos,  passing  bv  the  Atk- 
nian  station  (replied  Kallikratidas),  and  give  it  up  to  me  at  3Iileliis:I 
shall  tlien  believe  in  your  mastery  of  the  seas."  Lysander  hjid  nothinir 
else  to  say,  except  that  he  should  give  himself  no  further  troubled 
i)o\y  that  his  command  had  been  transferred  to  another. 

Kallikratidas  soon  found  that  the  leadinir  Lacedamonians  in  llie 
fleet,  gained  over  to  the  interests  of  his  predecessor,  openly  niur- 
nuired  at  his  arrival,  and  secretly  obstructed  all  his  measures;  iipou 
which  he  summoned  them  together,  and  said:  "I  for  my  part  :im 
quite  content  to  remain  at  home;  and  if  Lysander  or  any  one  else 
pretends  to  be  a  better  admiral  than  I  am,  1  liave  nothing  to  snv 
against  it.  But  sent  here  as  I  am  by  the  authorities  at  Sitarta  to  com- 
mand the  fleet.  I  have  no  choice  except  to  execute  tlieir  orders  in  the 
best  way  that  I  can.  You  now  know  how  far  my  ambition  reaches; 
you  know  also  the  murmurs  which  are  abroad  against  our  common 
city  (for  her  frequent  change  of  admirals).     Look"  to  it  and  give  me 


vonr  opinion.     Shall  I  stay  where  I  am— or  shall  I  go  home,  and 
communicate  what  has  happened  here:"  i  •,    r  n 

This  renionstran(;e,  alike  pomted  and  dignified,  produced  its  full 
pfToct  Every  one  replied  that  it  was  his  duty  to  stay  and  undertake 
the  conimand.     The  murmurs  and  cabals  were  from  that  moment 

discontinued.  „  ,  £  t  i      • 

His  next  embarrnssments  arose  from  the  maneuver  of  Lysander  m 
mvin"-  back  to  Cvrus  all  the  funds  from  whence  the  continuous  pay 
of  tl/army  was  derived.  Of  course  this  step  was  admirably  cjilcu- 
i-ited  to  m;ike  evervoue  reixret  the  alteration  of  command.  Kallikra- 
id'is  who  had  been  sent  out  without  funds,  in  full  reliance  on  the 
unexhausted  supplv  from  Sardis  now  found  himself  compelled  to  go 
thiihcr  in  person  and  solicit  a  renewal  of  the  bounty.  But  C  yrus, 
ei-or  to  manifest  in  every  wav  his  partiality  for  the  last  admiral,  de- 
ferred receivin--  him.— first  for  two  days,  then  for  a  further  interval, 
until  the  patience  of  Kallikratidas  was  wearied  out,  so  that  he  left 
Sinhs  in  dis^nist  without  an  interview.  So  intolerable  to  his  teel- 
ir.rs  was  thelurmilialion  of  thus  begging  at  the  palace  g;ites  that  he 
biitcrly  deolored  those  miserable  dissensions  among  the  Greeks  which 
con'^trliined  both  parlies  to  truckle  to  the  foreigner  for  money ;  swear- 
in^  that  if  he  survived  the  year's  campaign,  he  would  use  every  pos- 
sible effort  to  bring  about  an  accommodation  between  Athens  ^nd 

In  the  mean  time  he  put  forth  all  his  energy  to  obtain  money  in  some 
other  wav,  and  thus  get  the  fleet  to  sea;  knowing  well  that  the  way 
to  overcoiue  the  reluctance  of  Cyrus  was  to  show  that  he  could  do 
without  him.  Sailing  first  from  Ephesus  to  Miletus,  he  dispatched 
from  thence  a  small  ^squadron  to  Sparta,  disclosing  his  unexpected 
poverty,  an.l  asking  for  speedy  pecuniary  aid.  In  the  mean  time  he 
convoked  an  assembly  of  the  Milesians,  communicated  to  them  the 
mi>^si()n  iust  sent  to  Sparta,  and  asked  from  them  a  temporary  supply 
until  this  money  should  arrive.  He  reminded  them  that  the  neces- 
sitv  of  this  demand  sprang  altoixether  from  the  maneuver  of  Lysander 
iirnayin'-- back  the  funds  in  his  hands;  that  he  had  already  in  vain 
iil)i)li;'d  to  Cyrus  for  further  money,  meeting  only  with  such  insult- 
i!!"--  ne-dect  a's  could  no  longer  be  endured;  that  they  (the  Milesians), 
(hveliin  ••  amidst  the  Pershms.  and  liaving  already  experienced  the 
maximum  of  ill-usage  at  their  hands,  ought  now  to  be  foremost  in 
the  war  and  to  set  an  example  of  zeal  to  the  other  allies,  m  order  to 
liet  clear  the  sooner  from  dependence  upon  such  imperious  task- 
masters He  promised  that  when  the  remittance  from  Sparta  and 
the  hour  of  success  should  arrive,  he  would  richly  requite  tlieir  for- 
wardness "  Let  us,  with  the  aid  of  the  gods,  show  these  foreigners 
(lie  concluded)  that  we  can  punish  our  enemies  without  worshiping 

The  spectacle  of  this  generous  patriot  stmggling  against  a  degrad- 
ing dependence  on  the  foreigner,  which  was  now  becoming  unhappily 


282         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  IHINOR. 


PAN-IIELLENIO  PATRIOTISM. 


283 


familinr  to  tlic  lending  Greeks  of  hotli  sides — exeites  our  wnim  jjyni. 
patliy  and  admiration.  AVe  may  add  tliat  liis  laniriiage  to  the^lile- 
sians,  reminding  them  of  the  misery  Avliieh  tl.ey  had  eiidundfroni  the 
Persians  as  a  motive  to  exertion  in  Avar — is  full  of  insirnetion  as  to 
the  new  situation  oinned  for  the  Asiatic  Greeks  since  the  ])re:ikiii£j 
up  of  the  Athenian  power.  No  sncii  evils  liad  tliey  suffered  while 
Athens  was  competent  to  protect  them,  and  wliik'  they  were  willino- 
to  receive  protection  from  her — during  the  interval  of  more  than  titty 
years  between  the  complete  organization  of  tiie  confederacy  of  Dclos 
and  the  disaster  of  Nikias  before  Syracuse. 

Tlie  single-hearted  energy  of  Kallikratidas  imposed  upon  all  avIio 
heard  him,  and  even  inspired  so  iuu(  h  alarm  to  those  letiding  ]\Iik'>i- 
ans  who  were  playing  underhand  the  gauie  of  Lysander,  tlial  tluy 
were  the  tirst  to  ])r(»p()se  a  large  grant  of  money  toward  the  war,  and 
to  oiler  considerable  sums  from  their  own  purses;  an  ex:im])]e  jiroh- 
ably  soon  followed  by  other  allied  cities.  Some  of  the  friends  cf 
Lysander  tried  to  couple  their  offers  with  conditions;  demandiiiir  a 
warrant  for  the  destruction  of  their  political  enemies,  and  hoiuiis; 
thus  to  compromise  the  new  admiral.  But  he  strenuously  refused  iiil 
such  guilty  compliarces.  He  was  soon  able  to  collect  at  ]\Iil(tus 
lifty  fresh  triremes  in  addition  to  tUose  left  by  Lysander,  makiiiga 
fleet  of  140  sail  in  all.  The  Chians  liaving  furnished  him  with  aa 
outfit  of  five  drachmas  for  eadi  seaman  (equal  to  ten  days' pay  at 
the  usual  rate),  he  sailed  with  the  whole  fleet  north.ward  toward 
Lesbos.  Of  this  numerous  fleet,  the  greatest  which  had  yet  been  as- 
sembled throughout  the  war.  only  ten  triremes  were  LacuhemoDinii; 
while  a  considerable  proportion,  and  among  the  best  equipped,  were 
B(eotian  and  Eulxean.  In  his  voyage  tow  ard  Lesbos,  Kallikratidas 
seems  to  have  made  himself  master  of  Pli<d<a'a  and  Kyme,  pcrliaps 
with  the  greater  f;.eility  in  consequence  of  the  rec(  nt  ilf-treatnicnt  of 
the  Kyma'ans  by  Alkibiades.  He  then  sailc  d  to  attack  .Melhynuia,  on 
the  northern  coast  of  Lesbos;  a  town  not  (.nly  stiongly  attached  to 
the  Athenians,  but  also  defended  by  an  Athenijin  garrison.  Thoairh 
at  first  repulsed,  he  renewed  his  att'acks  until  at  length  he  took  the 
town  by  storm.  The  property  in  it  was  all  jdundered  by  the  soldiers, 
and  the  slaves  collected  and  sold  for  their  In  iiefit.  It  was  further 
demanded  by  the  allies,  and  expected  pursuant  to  ordinary  custom, 
that  the  ^Nlethynma'an  and  Athenian  prisoners  should  be  sold  also. 
Rut  Killikratidas  jK-remptorily  refused  compliance  and  set  them  all 
free  the  next  day;  declaring  that  so  long  as  he  was  in  command  not 
a  single  free  Greek  should  be  reduced  to  slavery  if  he  could  pre- 
vent it. 

No  on  who  has  familiarized  himself  with  the  details  of  Grecian 
warfare,  can'  feel  the  full  grandeur  and  sublimity  of  his  ]iroc(  cdinL'— 
which  stands,  so  far  as  I  know,  unparalleled  in  Grecian  history.  It  is 
not  merely  that  the  prisoners  were  spared  and  set  free:  as  to  that 
point,  analogous  cases  may  be  found,  though  not  very  frequent.    It 


is,  that  this  particular  act  of  generosity  was  performed  in  the  name 
and  for  the  recommendation  of  Panhellenic  brotherhood  and  Pan- 
lu'lkiiic  independence  of  the  foreigner:  a  comprehensive  principle, 
iiiiiiouneed  b}^  Kallikratidas  on  previous  occasions  as  well  as  on  this, 
but  now  carried  into  practice  under  emphatic  circumstances,  and 
coupled  with  an  explicit  declaration  of  his  resolution  to  abide  by  it  in 
all  future  cases.  It  is,  lastly,  that  the  step  was  taken  in  resistance  to 
formal  requisition  on  the  part  of  his  allies,  whom  he  had  very  im})er- 
fect  means  either  of  paying  or  controlling,  and  whom  therefoVe  it  was 
so  nnich  the  more  hazardous  for  him  to  ollend.  There  c:mnot  be 
any  doubt  that  these  allies  ftdt  personally  wronged  and  indignant  at 
the  loss,  as  well  as  confounded  with  the  proposition  of  a  rule  of  duty 
so  new  as  respected  the  relations  of  belligerents  in  Greece;  against 
which  too  (let  us  add)  their  murmurs  would  not  be  without  some 
foundation — "  If  ice  should  come  to  be  Konon's  ])risoiiers,  he  w^ll 
not  treat  tis  in  this  manner."  Reciprocity  of  dealing  is  absolutely 
essential  to  constant  moral  observance,  either  public  or  private;  and 
doubtless  Kallikratidas  felt  a  well-grounded  confidence,  that  two  or 
three  conspicuous  exam})les  would  sensjbly  modify  the  future  prac- 
tice on  both  sides.  But  some  one  must  begin  b}'  setting  such  exam- 
ples, and  the  man  who  does  begin — having  a  position  which  gives  rea- 
sonable chance  that  others  will  follow — is  the  hero.  An  admiiid  like 
Lysander  would  not  only  sympathize  heartily  with  the  complaints  of 
the  allies,  but  also  condemn  the  proceeding  as  a  dereliction  of  duty 
to8i):U'la;  even  men  belter  than  Lysander  would  at  first  look  coldly 
on  it  as  a  sort  of  Quixotism,  in  doubt  whether  the  example  would  bo 
copied:  while  the  Spartan  Ephors,  though  probably  tolerating  it  be- 
cause they  interfered  very  sparingly  wutli  their  admirals  afloat,  would 
certainly  have  little  sympathy  with  the  feelings  in  which  it  origi- 
nated. So  nuich  the  rather  is  Kallikratidas  to  be" admired,  as  bringing 
out  with  him  not  only  a  Panhellenic  patriotism  raie  either  at  Athens 
or  lSi)arta,  but  also  a  force  of  individual  character  and  conscience  yet 
rarer--enabling  him  to  brave  unpopularity  and  break  through  rou- 
tine, in  the  attempt  to  make  that  patriotism  fruitful  and  operative  in 
practice.  In  his  career,  so  sadly  and  prematurely  closed,  there  was 
at  least  this  circunistance  to  be  envied;  that  the  capture  of  Methymna 
att'ortled  him  the  opportunity,  wdiich  he  greedily  seized  as  if  he  had 
known  that  it  would  be  the  last,  of  putting  in  act  and  evidence  tiio 
full  aspirations  of  his  magnanimous  soul. 

Kallikratidas  sent  word  by  the  released  prisoners  to  Konon  that  he 
^vould  presently  put  an  end  to  his  adulterous  intercourse  with  the 
^ea;  which  he  now  considered  as  his  wife  and  lawfullv  appertaining 
to  luiu,  having  140  triremes  against  the  70  triremes  of  ivonou.  Tiiat 
admiral,  in  spite  of  his  inferior  numbers,  had  advanced  near  to  Me- 
jninua  to  try  and  relieve  it;  but  finding  the  place  already  captured 
!':' 1  retired  to  the  islands  called  Hekatonnesoi,  oil"  the  continent  bear- 
i!io  iiorLh-east  from  Lesbos.     Thither  he  was  followed  by  Kallikra- 


I 


284         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 

tidas,  who,  leaving 'Methymnu  at  nigbt,  found  liim  quitting  his  moor 
ini^s  at  break  of  day,  and  immediately  made  all  sail  to  try  and  cut 
him  off  from  the  southerly  course  towartl  Samos.  But  Konou. 
having  diminished  Ihe  number  of  his  triemes  from  100  to  70,  had 
been  able  to  preserve  all  the  best  rowers,  so  that  in  speed  he  ouliau 
Killaknilidas  and  entered  tirst  the  harbor  of  Mitylene.  His  pursuiis 
however  were  close  behind,  and  even  got  into  the  harbor  along  ^villl 
him,  before  it  could  be  closed  and  put  in  a  state  of  defense.  Con- 
strained  to  light  a  battle  at  its  entrance,  he  was  completely  defeatd: 
thirty  of  his  ships  were  taken,  though  the  crews  escai)ed  to  land;  aiid 
he  preserved  the  remaining  forty  only  by  hauling  them  ashore  undir 

the  wall. 

The  town  of  ^litylene,  originally  founded  on  a  small  islet  of 
Lesbos,  had  afterward  extended  across  a  narrow  strait  to  Leslies 
itself.  Ry  this  stnnt  (whether  bridged  over  or  not  we  are  not 
informed)  the  town  was  divided  into  two  portions,  and  had  two  har- 
bors, one  opening  northward  toward  the  Hellesjwnt,  the  ether 
southward  toward  the  promontory  of  Kane  on  the  main-hind.  Both 
these  harbors  were  undefended,  and  both  now  fell  into  the  o(cup:i- 
tion  of  the  Peloponnc  sian  fleet;  at  least  all  the  outer  i)ortien  of  vwh, 
near  to  the  exit  of  the  harbor,  wliich  Kallikratidas  kei)t  under  stiid 
watch.  He  at  the  same  time  sent  for  the  full  forces  of  Metliyiiiiia, 
and  for  hoplites  across  from  Chios,  so  as  to  block  up  WitylcLeby 
land  as  well  as  by  sea.  As  soon  as  his  success  was  annoiinetd,  too, 
money  for  the  fleet  (togetlier  with  separate  pre^ents  for  liiniMlf, 
which  he  declined  receiving)  was  imnudiately  sent  to  him  by  C>us; 
so  that  his  future  operations  bec;;me  e:isy. 

No  preparations  had  been  made  at  IN.ityhne  for  a  siege:  llo^tock 
of  provisions  had  been  accumulated,  and  tlie  crowd  wilhin  the  walls 
was  so  ccmsiderable  that  Konon  foie^aw  but  too  plainly  the  >iKidy 
exhaustion  of  his  means.  Nor  could  he  exj  ect  si.ccor  from  Athais, 
unless  he  could  send  intelligence  thither  of  his  cendili(-n;  of  Avbicb, 
as  he  had  not  been  able  to  ito  so,  the  Athenians  Kmained  altogttlier 
iirnorant.  All  his  ingenuity  wasrequirtd  to  get  a  Iriren.e  safe  out  of 
JtTie  harbor  in  the  face  of  the  enemy's  guard.  Putting  afloat  two  tri- 
remes, the  best  sailers  in  his  fleet,  and  picking  out  tl.e  bist  rowers  lor 
them  out  of  all  the  rest,  he  caused  thise  lowers  to  lo  aboard  hi  lore 
daylidit,  concealinu-  the  Epibatfc  or  maritime  soldiers  in  the  interior 
of  tht^  vessel  (instead  of  the  deck,  which  was  their  usual  place),  willi 
a  moderate  stock  of  provisions,  arid  keeping  the  vcskI  ^till  {(.vertu 
with  hides  or  sails,  as  was  custonn.ry  with  vessels  hauli  d  r.^hoitto 
protect  them  against  the  sun.  Thet-e  two  trirtmes  were  thi:s  made 
ready  to  depart  at  a  moment's  notice,  without  giving  any  indication  to 
the  enemy  that  they  were  so.  They  were  fully  manned  before  Cuiv- 
break,  the  crews  remained  in  their  position  all  day.  and  after  d;iiK 
were  taken  out  to  repo>e.  This  went  on  for  four  days  succc  ^sivolv, 
no  favorable  opporturiity  having  occurred  to  give  the  sigi  al  M 


EFFORT  TO  RELIEVE  KONON. 


285 


attempting  a  start.  At  length,  on  the  fifth  day  about  noon,  when 
many  of  the  Pelopounesian  crews  were  ashore  for  their  morning 
meal,  and  others  were  reposing,  the  moment  seemed  favorable,  the 
sitTual  was  given,  and  both  the  triremes  started  at  the  same 
moment  witli  their  utmost  speed ;  one  to  go  out  at  the  southern 
entrance  toward  the  sea  between  Lesbos  and  Chios— the  other 
to  depart  by  the  northern  entrance  toward  the  Hellespont.  In- 
stantly the  alarm  was  given  among  the  Pelopounesian  fleet:  the 
cables  were  cut,  the  men  hastened  aboard,  and  many  triremes  were 
put  in  motion  to  overtake  the  two  runaways.  That  which  departed 
southward,  in  spite  of  the  most  strenuous  efforts,  was  caught 
toward  evening  and  brought  back  with  all  her  crew  prisoners:  that 
which  went  toward  the  Hellespont  escaped,  rounded  the  northern 
coast  of  Lesbos,  and  got  safe  with  the  news  to  Athens;  sending 
intelligence  also  seemingly,  in  her  way,  to  the  Athenian  admiral 
Diomedon  at  Samos. 

The  latter  immediately  made  all  haste  to  the  aid  of  Konon,  with 
the  small  force  which  he  had  with  him,  no  more  than  twelve  triremes. 
I  The  two  harboi-s  being  both  guarded  by  a  superior  force,  he  tried  to 
get  access  to  Mitylene'' through  the  Eufipus,  a  strait  which  opens  on 
the  southern  coast  of  the  "island  into  an  interior  lake  or  bay, 
approaching  near  to  the  town.  But  here  he  was  attacked  suddenly 
by  Kallikratidas,  and  his  squadron  all  captured  except  two  triremes, 
his  own  and  another:  he  himself  had  great  difliculty  in  escaping. 

Athens  w\as  all  in  consternation  at  the  news  of  the  defeat  of  Konon 
and  the  blockade  of  Mitylene.  The  whole  strength  and  energy  of 
1  the  city  was  put  forth  to  relieve  him,  by  an  effort  greater  than  any 
which' had  been  made  throughout  the  whole  war.  We  read  with 
surprise  that  within  the  short^space  of  thirty  days,  a  fleet  of  no  less 
than  110  triremes  was  fitted  out  and  sent  from  Peir^eus.  Every  man 
of  age  and  strength  to  serve,  without  distinction,  was  taken  to  form  a 
good  crew;  not  only  freemen  ])ut  slaves,  to  whom  manumission  was 
promised  as  reward:  many  also  of  the  Horsemen  or  Knights  and 
citi/x-ns  of  highest  rank  went  aboard  as  Epibatjx?.  hanging  up  their 
bridles  like  Kimon  before  the  battle  of  Salamis  The  levy  w-as  in 
fact  as  democratical  and  as  equ:dizing  as  it  had  been  on  that  memo- 
rable occasion.  The  fleet  proceeded  straight  to  Samos.  whither  orders 
had  doubtless  been  sent  to  get  together  all  the  triremes  which  the 
allies  could  furnish  as  re-eu'forcenient?.,  as  well  as  all  the  scattered 
Athenian.  By  this  means  forty  additionnl  triremes  (ten  of  them 
Samian)\vere  assembled,  and  \he  whole  fleet,  150  sail,  went  from 
Samos  to  the  little  islands  called  Arginusa3,  close  on  the  main-land, 
opposite  toMalea,  the  south-eastern  cape  of  Lesbos. 

Kallikratidas,  apprised  of  the  approach  of  the  new  fleet  while  it 
was  yet  at  Samos,  ^vithdrew  the  greater  portion  of  his  force  from 
Mitylene,  leaving  fifty  triremes  under  Eteonikus  to  continue  the 
blockade.    Less  than  fifty  probably  would  not  have  been  suflScient, 


28G 


CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 


BATTLE  OP  ARGINUSiEJ. 


287 


iiiasnuu'li  as  two  harbors  Averc  to  be  watcbed ;  but  be  wns  tLus 
reduced  to  meet  tlie  Athenian  fleet  ^\\{h  inferior  numbers— 12o 
triremes  aiininst  150.  His  lleet  was  off  Cape  jMalea,  where  the  crews 
took  their  suppers,  on  the  same  evening  as  the  Athenians  su])podat 
the  opjiositc  islands  of  Arginusa\  It  was  his  project  to  j-ail  ncross 
the  intermediate  channel  in  the  night,  and  attack  Ibtni  in  the  inorn- 
iug  before  they  were  prepared;  but  violent  wind  and  lain  forced liim 
to  defer  all  movement  till  davlight.  On  the  tnsuing  morning  Idth 
parties  preparetl  for  the  greatest  naval  encounter  which  had  inkdi 
place  throughout  the  whole  war.  Kallikrali(his  was  advised  Lvliis 
pilot,  the  ^Icgarian  llermon,  to  retire  for  the  present  without  tight 
ing,  inasmuch  as  the  Athenian  Hcet  had  the  advantage  of  tliiity 
triremes  over  him  in  number.  He  re])lied  that  flight  was  disgrace- 
ful, and  that  Sparta  would  be  no  worse  oft'  even  if  he  should  peri.^li. 
The  answer  was  one  congenial  to  his  chivalicus  nature;  and  wcmav 
Well  conceive,  thai  haviiig  for  the  last  two  or  thiee  months  liccnloid 
and  master  of  the  sea,  he  recollected  his  own  hau^-hty  message  to 
Kouon,  and  thought  it  dishonor  to  incur  or  desirve,  by  retiring,  the 
like  taunt  u]>on  himself.  We  may  reniaik,  too,  that  the  disparity  of 
numbers,  though  serious,  was  by  no  means  such  as  to  Kndcr  the 
contest  hopeless,  or  to  serve  as  a  hgitimate  giouud  for  retreat  to  (lie 
who  j)rhled  himself  on  a  full  measure  of  Spartan  courage. 

The  Athenian  fleet  was  so  marshaled  that  its  great  {-^ticnglh  was 
placed  in  the  two  wings;  in  each  of  which  there  were  sixty  Atluiiiim 
shii)S,  distributed  into  four  etjual  divisions,  each  division  c(  nmumilod 
by  a  general.  Of  the  four  scjuadrons  of  tilleen  ships  each,  two  wet 
placed  in  front,  two  to  support  them  in  the  rear.  Aristokratcsiiiid 
Diomedon  commanded  the  two  front  scjuadrons  of  the  left  divisidi, 
Perikles  and  Erasinides  the  two  S(|uadr(»ns  in  the  rear:  on  the  right 
division,  Protomachus  and  Thiasvllus  commanded  the  two  in  fniit, 
Lysias  and  Aristogenes  the  two  in  the  rear.  The  center,  wlicicm 
were  the  Samians  and  other  allies,  was  left  weak  and  all  in  m'A' 
line:  it  appears  to  have  been  exactly  in  front  of  one  of  the  isks  of 
Arginusa\  while  the  two  other  divisions  were  to  the  right  and  I<lt 
of  that  isle.  "We  read  with  some  surprise  that  the  whole  Linda' 
monian  fleet  was  arranged  by  single  ships,  because  it  sailed  IkIIit 
and  maneuvered  better  than  ilie  Athenians;  who  formed  their  riihl 
and  left  divisions  in  deep  order,  for  the  express  purp(«se  of  hirdciiri: 
the  enemy  from  performing  the  nautical  maneuvers  of  the  did^rl'i^ 
and  the  periplus.  It  would  seem  that  the  Athenian  center,  l.nvii!: 
the  laud  immediately  in  its  r<'ar.  was  sujiposed  to  be  better  jtroltd'd 
against  an  enemy  "sailing  through  the  line  out  to  the  rear  and  sail- 
ing round  about  "  than  the  other  divisions,  which  were  in  tLc  opiii 
waters;  for  which  reason  it  was  left  weak,  with  the  ships  in  sii?''' 
line.  But  the  fact  which  strikes  us  the  most  is,  that  if  we  turn  back 
to  the  beginning  of  the  war,  we  shall  find  that  this  die  kjjlus  ami 
pariplus  were  the  special  maneuvers  of  the  Athenian  navy,  and  con- 


tinned  to  be  so  even  down  to  the  siege  of  Syracuse  the  Lacedie- 
monians  being  at  first  absolutely  unable  to  perform  them  at  all,  and 
coatinuing  for  a  long  time  to  perform  them  far  less  skillfully^  than 
the  Athenians.  Now,  the  comparative  value  of  both  parties  is  re- 
versed: the  superiority  of  nautical  skill  has  passed  to  the  Pelopon- 
lu'sians  and  their  allies:  the  precautions  whereby  that  superiority  is 
ncuti-alized  or  evaded,  are  forced  as  a  necessity  on  the  Athenians. 
H(AV  astonished  would  the  Athenian  admiral  Phormion  have  been 
it'  lie  could  have  witnessed  the  fleets  and  the  order  of  battle  at  Argi- 
uuste. 

Kallikratidas  himself,  with  the  ten  Lacedaemonian  ships,  was  on 
the  right  of  his  fleet:  on  the  left  were  Boeotians  and  Euboeans,  under 
lliG  Bojotian  admiral  Thrasoudas.  The  battle  was  long  and  ohsti- 
iiateiy  contested,  first  by  the  two  fleets  in  their  original  order;  after- 
warl,  when  all  order  was  broken,  by  scattered  ships  niiugled  together 
ami  contending  in  individual  combat.  At  length  the  brave  Kallikra- 
tidas perished.  His  ship  was  in  the  act  of  driving  against  the  ship 
of  ail  enemy,  and  he  himself  probably  (like  Brasldas  at  Pylus)  had 
phinted  himself  on  the  forecastle,  to  be  the  first  in  boarding  the 
enemy  or  in  prevent ing  the  enemy  from  boarding  him — when  the 
shock,  arising  from  impact,  threw  him  off  his  footing,  so  that  he  fell 
overboard  and  was  drowned.  In  spite  of  the  discouragement  spring- 
inii:  from  his  death,  the  ten  Laced;emonian  triremes  displayed  a 
courage  worthy  of  his,  and  nine  of  them  were  destroyed  or  dislibted. 
At  length  the  Athenians  were  victorious  in  all  parts:  "the  Peloponne- 
sian  fleet  gave  way,  and  their  flii^ht  became  general,  partly  to  Chios, 
partly  to  Phoka?a.  3Iore  than  sixty  of  their  ships  were  destroyed, 
over  and  above  the  nine  Lacediemoniaii.  seventy-seven  in  all;  makinsr 
a  total  loss  of  above  the  half  of  the  entire  fleet.  The  loss  of  the 
Athenians  was  also  severe— amounting  to  twenty-five  triremes.  They 
leliirned  to  Arginusa'  after  the  battle. 

The  victory  of  Arginusje  alfonh-d  the  most  striking  ]iroof  how 
much  the  democratical  energy  of  Athens  could  yet  accomplish,  in 
spite  of  s()  numy  years  of  exhausting  war.  But  far  better  would  it 
have  been  if  her  energy  on  this  occasion  had  been  less  efficacious  and 
successful.  1'he  def("^at  of  the  Peloponiiesian  fleet,  and  the  death  of 
their  admirable  leader — we  must  take  the  second  as  inseparable  from 
the  first,  sine..'  Kallikratidas  was  not  the  man  to  survive  a  defeat^ 
were  signal  niisfortunes  to  Athens  herself.  If  Kallikratidas  had 
gained  the  victory  and  survived  it,  he  would  certainly  have  been  the 
man  to  close  the  Pelo})onnesian  war;  for  Alitylene  must  immediately 
lave  surrendered,  and  Kouon  with  all  the  Athenian  fl'.et  there 
olocked  up  must  have  become  his  prisoners;  which  circumstance, 
comingut  the  back  of  a  defeat,  would  have  rendered  Athens  disposed 
tj>  acquiesce  in  any  tolerable  terms  of  peace.  Now  to  have  the  terms 
Jiictated  at  a  momoiit  when  her  power  was  not  wholly  prostrate,  by 
a  muu  like  Kallikratidas,  free  from  corrupt  personal  ambition,  and 


288         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 


JOY  OF  ATHENS  FOR  THE  VICTORY. 


289 


of  a  .crencroiis  Panliellciiic  patriotism— would   have   been   tlie  best 
fate  which  at  tliis  moment  could  befall  her;  while  to  the  Grecian 
world  generally  it  would  have  been  an  unspeakable  beuetit,  thai  in 
the  re-organization  which  it  was  sure  to  underi^^o  at  the  close  of  ilic 
war,  the  ascendant  individual  of  the  moment  should  be  penetrated 
with  devotion  to  the  great  ideas  of  Hellenic  brotherhood  at  home 
and  llelleaic  independence  against  the  foreii^^ner.     The  near  prosiK-ct 
oj  such  a  l)euetit  was   opened   by  that   rare   chance   which   threw 
Kallikratidas  into  the  command,  enabled  him  not  oulv  to  publish  h's 
lofty  profession  of  faith,  but  to  show  that  he  was  prepared  to  act 
upon  it,  and  for  a  time  floated  him  on  toward  complete  success.    Nor 
were  the  envious  gods  ever  more  envious,  then  when  thev  frustrated 
by  the  disaster  of  Argimisa',  the  consummation  which  thev  had  thin 
jseemed  to  premise.     The  ixrtinence  of  tliese  remarks  will  be  better 
undei-stood  in  the  next  cha])ter,  wlifui  I  come  to  recount  the  actual 
winding  up  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  under  the  auspices  of  the 
worthless,  but  able,  Lysander.     It  was  into  his  hands  that  the  com- 
mand was  re-transferred:  a  transfer  almost  from  the  best  of  Greek. 
to  the  worst.     We  shall  then  see  how  much  the  sufTerinirs  of  the 
Gncian   world,  and  of  Athens  especially,   were  agirravated  by  his 
individual  temper  and  tendencies — and  we  shall  then  feel  by'con- 
trast  how  much  would  have  been  gained  if  the  commander  arir.ed 
with  such  great  power  of  dictation  had  been  a  Panhel'enic  jiatriot. 
To  have  the  sentiment  of  that  patriotism  enforced,  at  a  moment  of 
break-up  and  re-arrangement  throughout  Greece,  bv  the  victorious 
leader  of  the  day,  with  single-hearted  honesty  and  resolution,  would 
have  been  a  stimulus  to  all  the  better  feelings  of  the  Grecian  mind 
nuchas  no  other  combination  of  circumstances  could  have  furnished. 
The  defeat  and  death  of  Kallikratidas  was  thus  even  more  deplora- 
ble as  a  loss  to  Athens  and  Greece,  than  to  Sparta  herself.     To  his 
lofty  character  and  ptitriotism,  even  in  so  short  a  career,  we  vaiulv 
seek  a  pandlel. 

The  news  of  the  defeat  was  speedily  conveyed  to  Eteonikus  at 
Mitylene  by  the  admiral's  signal-l.oat.  As  soon  as  he  heard  it,  he 
desired  the  crew^  of  the  signal-boat  to  say  nothmg  to  any  one,  but  to 
go  again  (nit  of  the  harbor,  and  then  return  with  wreaths  and  shouts 
of  triumph— crying  out  that  Kallikratidas  had  aained  the  victory  and 
had  destroyed  or  captured  all  the  Athenian  ships.  All  suspicion  of 
the  reality  was  thus  kept  from  Konon  and  the  besieged;  while 
Eteonikus  himself,  aliecting  to  believe  the  news,  offered  the  sacrifice 
of  thanksgiving;  but  gave  orders  to  all  the  tiiiemes  to  take  their 
meal  and  depart  afterward  without  losing  a  moment;  directing  the 
masters  of  the  trading  ships  also  to])Ut  theirprojierty  silentlv  aboard, 
and  get  off  at  the  same  time.  And,  thus,  with  little  or  no  delay, 
and  without  the  least  obstruction  from  Kon{m,-all  these  ships,  tri- 
remes and  merchantmen,  sailed  out  of  the  harbor,  and  were  carried 
ofi  in  safety  to  Chios,  ihe  wind  being  fair.     Eteonikus  at  the  same 


time  withdrew  his  land-forces  to  Methymna,  burning  his  camp. 
Konon  thus  finding  himself  unexpectedly  at  liberty,  put  to  sea  witli 
his  ships  when  the  A\ind  had  become  calmer,  and  Joined  the  main 
Athenian  fleet,  which  he  found  already  on  its  way  from  AruinusiT?  to 
Mitylene.  The  fleet  presently  came  to  Mitylene,  ami  from  thence 
parsed  over  to  make  an  attack  on  Chios;  which  attack  proving- 
unsuccessful,  they  went  forward  to  their  ordinary  station  at  Samos.° 

The  news  of  the  victory  at  Arginus.e  dilfused  joy  and  triumph  at 
Athens.  All  the  slaves  who  had  served  in  the  armament  were  manu- 
mitted and  promoted,  according  to  pro:nise,  to  the  rights  of  Platieans 
at  Athens— a  qualified  species  of  citizenship.  Yet  the  joy  was 
poisoned  by  another  incident  which  became  known  at  the  same  time, 
raising  sentiments  of  a  totally  opposite  character,  and  endinu-  in  one 
of  the  most  gloomy  and  disgraceful  proceedings  in  all  Athenian 
history. 

Not  only  the  bodie^i  of  the  slain  warriors  floating  about  on  the 
water  had  not  been  picked  up  for  burial,  but  the  wrecks  had  not  been 
visited  to  preserve  those  who  were  yet  living.  The  first  of  these  two 
points,  even  alone,  would  have  sufficed  to  excite  a  painful  sentiment 
of  wounded  piety  at  Athens.  But  the  second  point,  here  an  essential 
part  of  the  same  omission,  inflamed  that  sentiment  into  shame,  grief, 
and  indignation  of  the  sharpest  character. 

In  the  descriptions  of  tliis  event,  Diodorus  and  many  other  writers 
take  notice  of  the  first  point,  either  exclusively,  or  at  least  with 
slight  reference  to  the  second;  which  latter,  nevertheless,  stands  as 
far  the  gravest  in  the  estimate  of  every  impartial  critic,  and  was  also 
the  most  violent  in  its  effect  upon  Athenian  feelinjrs.  Twenty-tive 
Athenian  triremes  l)ad  been  ruined,  aloniji-  with  most  of  their  crews; 
that  i<.  lay  heeled  over  or  disabled,  with  their  oars  destroyed,  no 
niasts.  nor  any  means  of  moving— mere  hulls  ])artially  broken  by  the 
impact  of  an  enemy's  ship,  and  graduallv  filling  ancl  sinkiH<r.  "The 
original  crew  of  each  was  200  men.  The  field  of  battle  (if  we  may 
use  that  word  for  a  space  of  sea)  was  strewed  with  these  wrecks;  the 
men  remaining  on  l)oard  being  helpless  and  unable  to  o^t  away^for 
the  ancient  trireme  carried  no  boat,  nor  anv  aids  for  escape.  And 
there  were,  moreover,  floating  about  men  who  had  fallen  overboanl, 
•r  were  trying  to  save  their  lives  bv  means  of  accidental  spars  or 
'inpty  casks.  It  was  one  of  the  privileges  of  a  naval  victory  that 
the  party  who  gained  it  could  sail  over  the  field  of  battle,  and  thus 
Hsist  their  own  helpless  or  wounded  comrades  aboard  the  disabled  • 
Miips;  taking  captive,  or  sometimes  killing  the  corre>pondinix  per- 
sons belonging  to  the  enemy.  According  even  to  the  speeclj'lnade 
111  the  Athenian  public  assem])ly  afterward,  by  Eurvptoleinus,  the 
jetender  of  the  accused  geneials,  there  were  twelve'  triremes  with 
Ineu- crews  on  board  lying  in  the  condition  just  described.  This  is 
an  admission  by  the  defense,  and  therefore  the  minimum  of  the 
reuUty:  there  cannot  possibly  have  been  fewer,  but  there  were  prob- 
H.  G.  in.— 10 


f 


290         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 

ably  several  more,  out  of  tlic  wliole  twcntj^-fivc  Ptated  l.y  Xcnr 
plion.  No  step  being  taken  to  preserve  Hum,  the  siirvivinir  porlioi 
^vounded  as  well  as  uinvoinuU'd,  of  llu'sc  crcAvs,  wvw  Icli  to  1 
gradurdly  drowned  as  eaeli  disabled  ship  went  down.  If  any  of  iLc; 
escaped,  it  was  by  unusual  goodness  of  swinuuing— by  linding  sou: 
fortuuale  plank  or  spar — at  any  rate  by  the  disgrace  of  tlnouiii 
awav  their  arms,  and  b}'  some  method  such  as  no  wounded  111:111 
would  be  competent  to  employ. 

The  first  letter  from  the  generals  which  communicated  the  victoiy, 

<  uuide  known  at  the  same  time  the  loss  sustained  in  obtaining  it.  It 
announced,  doubtless,  the  fact  wliich  we  read  in  Xmophon,  tluit 
twenty-five  Athenian  triremes  had  been  lost,  with  ntarly  :ill  llicir 
crews';  specifying,  we  may  be  sure,  the  njime  of  each  tririn.e  \viiidi 
had  so  perished ;"for  each  trireme  in  the  Alheniiin  navy,  like  nuidcin 
ships,  had  its  own  name.  It  mentioned  at  the  s;;me  time  that  uo 
step  whatever  had  been  takeu  by  the  Nictorious  surviv(»rs  to  siivu 
their  wounded  and  drowning  conntiynun  (n  board  the  sinking 
ships.     A  storm  had  arisen  (sucli  was  the  leason  s.ssigntd),  soviokiil 

•     as  to  render  all  such  intervention  totally  impiaclieable. 

It  is  so  much  the  custom,  in  dialing  Aviih  Grician  history,  to  pre- 
sume the  Athenian  people  to  be  a  set  (/f  chi'.dren  or  nu.dmcn,  wlio.e 
feelings  it  is  not  worth  while  to  try  and  account  for— that  I  have 
been  obliged  to  state  these  circiinislames  hcmewhat  at  leiigili,  in 
order  to  show  that  the  mixed  Kutimer.t  excited  at  Atluns  hyllic 
news  of  the  battle  of  Arginusii?  was  jerftdly  natinal  and  jnsiit::il)le. 
Along  with  joy  for  the  victory,  there  was  blended  horror  and  rciiK  rn- 
at  the  fact  that  so  many  of  t'ne  brave  men  who  had  hdjied  to  gain 
it,  had  been  left  to  perish  unheeded.  Tlie  friends  and  relatives  (^f 
the  crews  of  these  lost  triremes  were  of  course  foremost  in  the  ex- 
pression of  such  indignant  emotion.  The  narrative  of  Xenoi)l!on, 
meager  find  confused  as  well  as  unfair,  presents  this  emotion  as  11  it 
were  s(miething  causeless,  factitious,  pumped  up  out  of  the  staiuliiii; 
irascibility  of  the  multitude  by  the  artifices  of  Tlu  laments,  K.-illixc- 
nus',  and  a  few  others.  But  whatever  may  have  been  done  by  these 
individuals  to  aggravate  the  public  excitement,  or  pervert  it  to  hn\ 
purposes,  assuredly  the  excitement  itself  was  spontaneous,  ineviialfle. 
'and  amply  justified.  The  very  thought  that  so  many  of  the  hnivc 
partners  in  the  victory  had  been  left  to  drown  miserably  on  the  sink- 
ing hulls,  without  any  effort,  on  the  part  of  their  generals  and  com- 
rades near,  to  rescue  them — was  enough  to  stir  up  all  the  .seiisiliili- 
ties,  public  as  well  as  private,  of  the^most  passive  nature,  evdi  in 
citizens  wiio  were  not  related  to  the  dc'vased — much  more  in  those 
who  were  so.  To  'ixpect  that  the  Athenians  wouUl  be  so  ahsdri)^! 
in  the  delight  of  the  victory,  and  in  gratitude  to  the  generals  who 
had  commanded,  as  to  overlook  such  a  desertion  of  peiishiug  war- 
riors, and  such  an  omission  of  symi)athetic  duty — is,  in  my  ju<l,i;" 
mcut,  altogether  preposterous;  and  would,   if   it  were  true,  only 


GENERALS  DIRECTED  TO  COME  HOME.         291 

^1dnhev'l^.d-hir''Mi    ''''  ^'^''''''''    P^'^1^^^'    ^^«"^^«   those 

uiij  '!liy  taii^deU        '  "'^'"^ ''''''''  ""'^^  ^'^^"^  they  have  been 

The  generals  in  their  public  letter  accounted  for  their  omission  bv 

no\e     i^i.s  ,  was  lius  true  as  matter  of  fact?    Next  had  there  been 
line  to  discharge  the  duty,  or  at  the  least  to  try  a nd  di.clm^^^ 
betore  the  storm  came  on  to  be  so  intolerable?     These  point.s  renSh ed 
exaniinaf.on.     The  gener.Js,  while  honored  with  a  vote  of  thank^ 
for  the  vic.ory,  were  superseded,  and  directed  to  come  hoiue-^^? 
except  Ivonoa,  who  having  been   blocked  up  at  Mitylene    vas'm 
coo(;erned  m   the  question.      Two    new  colleagues,   Philoldes  a 
A(  run  uitu.  were  named  to  go  out  and  join  him.''  Tl  e  iren  a.^^^^^^^^ 
ably  received  the  notice  of  tlreir  recall  at  Samos,  and  cr^Te  lone  hi 
consequence;  reaehnig  Alliens  seemingly  about    he  end  of  S^^ 
ber  or  begmnmg  o     October-the  batlle  of  Arainusie  h.win '^  bem 
fought  111  August,  403  b.c.     Two  of  the  generals   hoAvever    Proio 
machus  and  Aristogenes,  declined  to  come:  wanie(l  o    the  iis .  ^  s-" 
re  of  the  people,  and.not  confiding  in  their  own  case  to  meet  i'l 
fiiev  preferred  to  pay  the  price  of  voluntary  exile.     The  other  Vx' 
Peiikles    Lysias,  Diomedon,  Erasinides,  AHstokrates   ami  Thra'  i 
lus  (Archestratus,  one  of  the  original  ten,  having  died  a   MitvS 
J^nj.  wuhout  their  two  colleagues;  an  unpleas^lnt'uigiiy  ^^S 

On  their  first  arrival,  Archedemus,  at  that  time  an  icccnfMblr. 
popular  orator  and  exercising  some  magistracy  o  TiUXeThich 
ve  cannot  distUK'tly  make  out,  imposed  upon  Erasiliide^a  fine  to 
h  himted  amount  which  was  within  the  competenceofmatis  rates 
Mho  It  1(3  sanction  of  the  Dikastery-and  accused  him  be^c^  be' 
orcthoDikastery;  partly  for  general  misconduct  ii    his  comim^ 

"^'^ ::\^^Z^!^^'T'''  of  having  purloined  some  puE^^ 

»iii>n,i\  tioinl ha  Hi'lk'spout.     Ennin  iCs  was  found  truillv  nn.'l 

oud.mncHl  t„  be  iniprisouc-.l,  either  uulil  the  money  «"s  m     e^;,^, 

'>V;;:^:i  n'l'Lleed.*'''"'''^  ^■•^'"""'^'^'""  <^«-W  take  pllcelnlo  tSr 
Jliis  trial  of  Erasinides  took  place  before  tlie  ffenerals  were  sum 

I  tieent  battle  and  the  siibsetiiient  neglect  of  the  drownii  -  men' 

Ei,,ir^  ","'"'",' "'""  '■''  if  A.-ohedemu3  wished  to  in  pi,  c    o. 

ta      i'S.f.''"  ':r;''>'..''P^"-'  f";','  ,"'«  «'1'«>-  g<'nerals,  the  bianco ' 

ouil  ;?     {f      dr.tinclioa,  as  wdl  hereafter  appear,  not  wliollv  un- 

^"cee;i      UuoTT"'  '"'-^ '"''•''  '■'■■''S"  ''■■'''  cuertained,  it  .lid  not 
Se'n^l  M,  •    '"^  .?':.'";'•''-'  W'"-  to  explain  their  case  before  the 

of  i  ™    Iw,;  'f """,  "'  '""'   '""'^  ^"-^  deciddly  tmfavorable  to  aU 
out    u,  thougli  we  have  no  particulars  of  the  ilebate  which  passed 

P^4    th'u'lhe  n'ther  if  '"'  ^"T"'  ''"'■""^■•••«'-'^.   ^  rcsoluti.l,'  was 
f^seu  that  the  other  live  generals  present  should  be  placed  iu  cus- 


292 


CYRUS  THE  YOUInGEU  IN  ASIA  INIINOR 


DEFENSE  OF  THE  GENERALS. 


293 


tody,  as  well  as  Erasinides,  and  thus  h.indcd  over  to  tlie  public 
assembly  for  considenitioii  of  the  case 

The  public  asseinbiv  was  acordm-ly  licld,  and  the  generals  A\X're 
bro-nriit  before  it.  Wc  are  here  lohi  who  it  was  thai  appeared  as 
their^rincipal  aeeuser,  alon-- with  seven-i  others;  thoii-h  unfortu- 
n-ileiy  we  are  left  to  guess  what  were  the  topics  on  which  tluy  iii- 
s's'ed  Theramenes  was  the  man  who  denounced  them  most  velic- 
menllV  as  "uilly  of  leavinic  the  ercws  of  the  disabled  triremes  to  be 
d-owiied  and  of  neglecting  all  efforts  to  rescue  them.  He  appealal 
in  their  own  public  letter  to  the  people,  ollieially  communicating  the 
vicLorv  in  which  letter  thev  made  no  mention  of  liavjug  apponitcd 
any  one  to  undertake  the  duty,  nor  of  having  any  one  to  blame  lor 
not  performing- it.  The  omission  therefore  was  wholly  their  own; 
they  might  htive  performed  it,  and  ought  to  be  punished  for  so  cruel 

a  breaeli  of  duty.  .  .^       rr^    ,.,.,. 

The  o-enends  could  not  have  a  more  formiciable  enemy  than  Theinm- 
cnes      We  have  had  occasion  to  follow  him,  durmg  the  revoluliou 
of  the  Four  Hundred,  as  a  long-s.ghted  as  well  as  tortuous  politieian: 
he  had  since  been  in  hiuh  military  conun.ind,.a  partaker  m  victory 
with  Alkibiades  at  Kyzikus  and  elsewhere;  and  he  had  serveu  as 
trierarch  in  the  victory  of  Arginusie  itself.     His  authority  Ihere.oie 
Avas  naturally  hi-h,  and  told  for  much,  when  he  denied  the  .pislitica- 
tion  which  the -enerals  had  set  up,  founded  on  the  seventy  ot  the 
storm.    According  to  him,  they  might  have  picked  i.p  Lie  drowinng 
men   and  ou-ht  to  have  doiieso:  either  they  might  have  done  bo 
before  the  storm  came  on— or  there  never  was  any  storm  otsiUi- 
cient  o-ravity  to  prevent  them:  upon  their  luads  lay  the  responsibihty 
of  oimssion:     Xenophon,  in  his  very  meager  narrative,  does  not  tcl 
us  in  express  words  that  Theramenes  contradicted  the  generals  a. 
to  the  storm.     But  that  he  did  so  contradict  lliom.  point  blank,  is 
imi.lied   distinctly   in   that  which   Xenophon   aheges  him   to  have 
6;aid       It  seems  also  that  Thrasybulus-another  trierarch  at  Ai.iii- 
fiu^^iE  and  a  man  not  only  of  equal  consequence,  but  ()t  lar  more  esa- 
ma!)^e  character-ccmcurred  with  Theramenes  in  this  same  a(ius<:- 
lin:i  of  the  uenerals,  though  not  standing  forward  so  ri;V»^-"'J''  3 
in  the  case    ^He  too  therefore  must  have  denied  the  reality  ot  tlic 
s?o:m ;  or  at  least,  the  fact  of  its  being  so  instant  after  the  battle  or  .s<) 
terrible,  as  to  forbid  all  elTort  for  the  relief  of  these  drowning  sc  r.ih  n. 
The  case  of  the  ironerals,  as  it  .-food  before  the  Athenian  puo  (., 
wascompleielv  altered  when  men  like  Theramenes  and  Vj^'f} ';!;:• 
stood  fr-rwaixfas  their  accusers.     Doubtless  what  was  said  by  tli  s 
two  had  been  said  by  others  before,  in  the  senate  and  elsewhere;  ..m 
it  was  now  publicly  advanced  by  men  of  intluence,  as  we     i.s'   ' 
fectly  cognizant  of  the  fact.    And  we  are  thus  enabled  to  gathei  ii    i 
rectly  (what  the  narrative  of  Xenophon,  studiously  keeping  back    t 
case  against  the  generals,  does  not  directly  bring  forward)  that  though 
the  generals  ailirmed  the  storm,  there  were  others  present  who  Uclicu 


it— thus  putting  in  controversy  the  matter  of  fact  widch  formed  their 
soiituy  justification.  Moreover  we  come,  in  following  the  answer 
mi;le  by  the  generals  in  the  publi  ;  assembly  to  Theramenes  and 
Tiua^yhulus— to  a  new  point  in  the  ca^e,  which  Xenophon  lets  out 
as  il  were  indirectly,  and  in  that  confused  manner  which  pervades 
his  whole  narrative  of  the  transaction.  It  is,  however,  a  new  point  of 
exu-ome  moment.  The  generals  replivd  that  if  any  one  -was  to  blame 
for  not  having  picked  up  the  drowning  men,  it  was  Theramenes  and 
Tiirasybnlus  themselves;  for  it  was  liiey  two,  to  whom,  together 
with  vai-ious  other  trieiarchs  and  with  forty-eight  triremes,  the  o-ener- 
iils  had  expressly  confided  the  perform  ince  of  this  duty:  it  wa?  they 
two  who  were  responsible  for  its  omission,  not  the  generals.  Never- 
tliek'ss  they  (the  generals,  made  no  charge  against^ Theramenes  and 
Tiirasybulus— well  knowing  that  the  sformhtid  rendered  the perform- 
jiiiec  of  the  duty  absolutely  impossible,  and  that  it  was  therefore  a 
coinplete  justitieation  for  one  as  well  as  for  the  other.  They  (the 
generals)  at  least  could  do  no  more  than  direct  competent  men  like 
these  two  trierarchs  to  perform  the  task,  and  assign  to  them  an  ade- 
quate squadron  for  the  purpose;  while  they  themselves  with  the  main 
licet  went  to  attack  Eteonikus,  and  relieve  Mitylene.  Diomedon, 
one  of  their  number,  had  wished  after  the  battle  to  employ  all  the  ships 
in  the  fleet  for  the  preservation  of  the  drowning  men,  w'ithout  think- 
ing of  anything  else  until  that  was  done.  Erasinides,  on  the  contrary, 
wislK'd  that  all  the  fleet  should  move  across  at  once  against  I^Iitylene: 
Tlinisyllus  said  that  they  had  ships  enough  to  do  both  at  once."  Ac- 
0()r(liiii:ly  it  was  agreed  that  each  general  should  set  apart  three  ships 
from  his  division,  to  make  a  squadron  of  forty-eight  ships  under 
Thrasyhulus  and  Theramenes.  In  making  these  statements,  the 
generals  produced  pilots  and  others,  men  actually  in  the  battle,  as 
wiinesses  in  general  confirmation. 

Here,  therk,  in  this  debate  before  the  assembly,  were  tvro  new  and 
i'nportant  points  publicly  raised.  Fiist,  Theramenes  and  Thrasvbu- 
Ins  denounced  the  generals  as  guilty  of  the  death  of  these  nejrlected 
men:  next,  the  generals  affirmed  that  they  had  delegated  the  duty  to 
riierainencs  and  Thrasyhulus  themselves!  If  this  latter  were  really 
true,  how  can:e  the  generals  in  their  official  dispatch  first  sent  home, 
'I )  say  nothing  about  it?  Euryptolemus,  an  advocate  of  the  generals 
'■^P'aking  in  a  subsequent  sta'i:e  of  the  proc(>edings,  thouirhwe  can 
iirlly  doubt  that  the  same  topics  were  also  urged  in  this  very  a s- 
>'ia!)iy),  while  blaming  the  generals  for  such  omission,  ascribed  it  to 
■I'l  ill-placed  uood-nalure  on  their  part,  and  reluctance  to  brino-Tlie- 
lamciies  and  Thrasyhulus  under  the  displeasure  of  the  people.^ Most 
of  the  generals  (he  said)  were  disposed  to  mention  the  fact  in  tlieir 
othci  il  despatch,  but  were  dissuaded  from  doing  so  by  Perikles  and 
DioiuL'doii:  an  unhappy  dissuasion  (in  his  judgment),  which  Theram- 
enes and  Thrasyhulus  liad  ungratefully,  requited  by  turnhif  round 
{^ua  accusing  them  all.  "^ 


t 


294         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR.  ' 

This  roniarkable  stntoment  of  Euryptolrmus,  as  to  the  intention  of 
the  .enenils  in  uorkin-  the  ollieial  di  .pateh,  hrings  ns  to  a  closer 
consUhratioii  of  Avhat  ivally  passed  between  them  on  the  one  su'e, 
and  Then-menes  and  Thravsbuhis  on  the  other;  whieli  is  dilheult  to 
niake  out  (dearlv,  but  vhidi  Diodorrs  np.iesents  in  a  manner  com- 
ili-telv  diUcrent"  from  Xen.^du.n.  I):()dr)rus  states  that  tlie  irj  i.mls 
lore  'prevented  partly  bv  the  stonu,  partly  by  the  fati-ne  and  rduc- 
tunee  and  ahirm  of  their  own  seamen,  frem  takm?  any  steps  to  pick 
up  (what  he  ealb)ihe  dead  bodies  for  buna -that  they  sus peeled 
Theramenes  and  '1  h.rasybulus,  Avho  Avent  to  Athens  before  them,  et 
inlendin-  to  e.ceuse  thein  before  the  people-and  that  for  this  reason 
they  senThome  intimation  to  the  people  that  they  1«h1  g'ven  specinl 
orders  to  these  two  trierarchs  to  ]^erform  the  duty.  \N  la  n  the>e  kt- 
ters  Avere  read  in  the  laiblic  assembly  (Di<  dorus  says),  the  Atlamaus 
Avere  excessively  indiunant  aiiainsl  Theramenes:  who  however  de- 
fended "himself  elleetively  and  c(^mplete-ly.  throwini:- the  blame  brek 

P  n  the  -enerals.     He  was  thus  forced.  an:ainst  his  own  will  and  in 
"  lf-defen?e,  to  become  the  accuser  of  the  irenerals,  carrvmir  ui  li 

in  las  numerous  friends  and  partisans  at  Athens.     Anel  thus  Die 
laterals,  by  tryinir  to  ruin  Theramems,  finally  brought  ce)mleinna- 

tion  unon  themselves.  ,.,..••       v    i  4i...t  ii.„ 

Such  is  the  narrative  of  Diodorus,  in  which  it  is  implied  that  tlio 
<>-enerals  ne-ver  really  nave  any  special  orders  to  'i  hen. menes  anel 
Tl  >  bulus.  but  falsely  asserted  afterwaid  that  that  the-y  had  (  om^ 
so  in  onU-r  to  dise-redit*  the  accusation  of  Ther.menes  .gainst  tii  m- 
sel\"s.  To  a  certain  .xte-nt.  this  coineideMits  with  wna  was  ^^^^^ 
Theramenes  himself  two  years  afterwarel  in  his  deleuse  befoie  t. 
T  v^that  he-  was  not  the  first  to  accuse  the  ger.era  s-they  wee 
the  tifst  to  accuse  Inm.  affiming  that  tlu'y  had  orelered  h.m  to  uikIh- 
ke  the  duty,  a.ul  that  the-re  wns  no  sutticient  reason  to  laeve'iit  h.m 
}!om  pe-rforming  it-they  we.-ethe  l'^^>-nt^-''J^-^I"^-»^.f^::;;;;"  ^;i 
the  p<  rform.-mc  (■  of  the  duty  to  be  possible,  while  he'  ^^^^^^  ^. »  \^^ '^^ 
tlie  be-innimi-  that  the  violence  e)f  the  ste>rm  wj.s  such  as  even  to  fe- 
biel  any  movement  in  the  water;  much  more,  to  prevent  rescue-  of 

""'"l^lC:^^  "counts  of  Xe-nophon  and  Dioelorus  together  in^on;. 
bination   with  the  subsequent   aceusat.on  and  e  cfense   ot   ll.eun 
ene>s  at  the  time  of  the  Tiurtv,  and   blending  them  so  as  to  lejec 
as  little  as  pe>ssible  of  either,  i  think  it  pre,bable  that  the  order     i 
piekinir  up  the  exposed  men  was  really  gi^•c'n  by  tl';"  ^J'";;^^  ^  ^;^  J,    j 
!-am.-ne.s,  Thrasy])ulus.  and  e>ther  trurarchs;  ^'^  Vn     \J;  tt' o'nd  1 1' 
interval  xvas  allowed  to  elapse  be'tween  tlie  close  ot  the  bat    e  and    i. 
L  yiM-  of  such  orde-r;  next   that  the  forty-eight  tnremes  talked  of  t 
the  service,  and  proposed  to  be  furnished  by  drafts  of  three  m  t  ; 
each  -encM-al's  elivision,  were  prolKd)ly  neveT  ^^^^'^^^'^'^^-^V/.,  '  . 
assembled,  were  so  little  zealous  in  the  business  as  ^o  satisfy  bic 
selves  very  easily  that  the  storm  was  too  dangerous  to  biavt,  am 


THERAMENES  AND  THE  GENERALS. 


295 


that  it  was  now  too  late.  For  wiien  w^e  read  the  version  of  the  trans- 
action even  as  given  by  Euryptolemus,  w^e  see  plainly  that  none  of 
the  generals,  except  r)iomede)n,  was  eager  in  the  performance  of  the 
task.  It  is  a  memorable  fact  that  e)f  all  tiie  eight  generals,  not  one 
of  them  undertook  the  business  in  person,  although  its  purpose  was 
to  save  more  than  a  thousand  elrowning  comrades  from  deatli.  In  a 
proceeding  where  every  interval  even  of  five  minutes  was  ])recious, 
they  go  to  W'ork  in  the  most  eiihitory  maniu'r,  by  determining  that 
each  general  shall  furnish  three  ships  anel  no  more  from  his  division. 
Xow  we  know  frenn  the  statement  of  Xenophon,  that  toward  the 
close  of  the  battle  the  ships  on  both  sides  were  miu'li  elispersed. 
Such  collective  direction  therefore  woulel  not  be  epiickly  realized; 
nor,  until  all  the  eight  fractions  were  united,  te)gether  with  the 
Samiaus  anel  others,  so  as  to  make  the  force  complete,  would  Theram- 
enes feel  bounel  to  go  out  upon  his  preserving  visitation.  He 
eloubtlesselislikeel  the  service — as  we  see  that  me)st  e)f  the  generals  did 
—while  the  crews  also,  who  hael  just  got  to  lanel  after  having  gaineel 
a  victory,  were  thinking  m.ost  about  rest  anel  refreshment,  and 
mutual  congratulations.  All  were  glad  to  find  some  excuse  for  stay- 
ing in  their  me)oriugs  instead  of  going  out  again  to  buffet  what  was 
doubtless  unfavorable  weather.  Partly  from  this  want  of  zeal, 
coining  in  adelition  to  the  original  elelay,  partly  from  the  bael  weather, 
the  duty  remained  unexecuted,  and  the  seamen  on  boarel  the 
eiamageel  ships  were  left  to  perish  unassisted. 

But  presently  arose  the  elelicate  yet  unavoidable  question,  "How 
are  we  to  account  for  the  omission  of  this  sacred  duty  in  our  otlieaal 
dispatch  to  the  Athenian  people?  '  Here  the  generals  elift'ered  among 
themselves,  as  Euryptolemus  expressly  states:  Periklesand  Diomedoii 
carried  it,  against  the  jueigment  of  their  colleagues,  that  in  the  oJlici;d 
dispatch  (wiiich  was  ue'cessarily  such  as  coulel  be  agreed  to  by  all) 
nothing  shoulei  be  said  about  the  delegation  to  Theramenes  anel 
others,  the  whole  omission  being  referreel  to  the  terrors  of  the  storm. 
But  though  such  was  the  tenor  of  the  official  report  there  was  nothing 
to  liineler  the  generals  from  writing  home  anel  communicating  iueli- 
vidually  with  their  friends  in  Athens  as  each  might  think  tit;  anel  in 
these  unofficial  communications,  from  them  as  w'ell  as  from  others 
who  went  home  from  the  armament — communications  not  less  effica- 
cious than  the  official  dispatch  in  determining  the  tone  of  public  feel- 
ing at  Athens — they  did  not  elisguise  their  convictions  that  the  bla:ne 
ot  not  performing  the  duty  belongeel  to  Therainene.\s.  Having  thus  a 
man  like  Theramenes  to  thro^y  the  blame  upon,  they  eiid  not  take 
pains  to  keep  up  the  story  of  the  intolerable  siorm,  hut  intimated 
that  there  hael  been  nothing  to  hinder  Mm  fre)ni  performing  the  duty 
if  he  hael  chosen.  It  is  this  which  he  accuses  them  of  having 
advanced  against  him,  so  as  to  place  him  as  the  guilty  man  before  the 
Athenian  public:  it  was  this  which  maele  him  in  retaliation  and  self- 
dcfeuse,  violent  and  uuscrupulous  iu  denouncing  them  as  the  persons 


290         CYIiUS  THE   YOUNGER  IN  ASIxi  MINOR. 

really  blamable.  As  tliey  had  made  light  of  the  alleged  storm,  in 
t;.i>ting  the  blame  upon  him — so  he  again  made  light  of  it,  and  trealed 
it  as  an  in^ullicient  exeuse.  in  his  denunciations  against  them;  taking 
care  to  make  good  use  of  their  otlicial  dispatch,  which  virtually 
exonerated  him,  by  its  silence,  from  any  conc^ein  in  the  matter. 

Such  is  tbe  way  in  which  I  conceive  the  rehitions  to  have  stood 
between  ihi'  generals  on  one  side  and  'i'iieramenes  on  the  other;  havii!;; 
ri'gard  to  ali  that  is  said  both  in  Xenophon  and  in  Diodorus.  Bm 
the  comparative  account  of  bhime  and  recrimination  between  thcs-e 
two  parlies  is  not  the  most  important  feature  of  the  case.  The  really 
serious  iuiiuiry  is,  as  to  the  intensity  or  instant  occurrem-e  of  the 
storm.  AVus  it  really  so  instant  and  so  dangerous,  that  the  duty  of 
visiting  the  wrecks  could  not  l)e  ])erformed,  either  before  the  siiips 
went  back  to  Arginus;e,  or  afterward?  If  we  take  the  circunistanccs 
of  tlic  case,  and  apply  them  to  the  liai)its  and  feelings  of  the  English 
navy;  if  we  sup]M)sc  more  than  1000  seamen,  late  c«»nna(!es  in  tliu 
victory,  distributed  among  twenty  damauid  and  helpUss  hulls,  await- 
ing the  moment  when  these  hulls  wouhl  till  and  consign  them  all  ton 
watery  grave;  it  must  have  been  a  frightful  storm  indeed,  which 
would  force  an  English  admind  even  to  go  back  to  his  moorings, 
leaving  these  men  so  expos(d,  or  which  would  det(  r  him.  if  he  were 
at  his  moorings,  from  sending  out  the  Mry  tir>t  and  nearest  ships  at 
hand  to  save  Uiem.  And  gninling  the  danger  to  be  such  that  lie 
hesitated  to  give  the  order,  theie  would  probably  be  found  ollieers 
and  men  to  volunteer  against  the  n.ost  dtsi-crate  risks,  in  a  cause  so 
profoundly  moving  all  their  best  synijiathies.  Now  unforlunalely 
for  the  chiu-acter  of  Atiienian  generals,  ollit  crs.  and  men,  at  Arginusie 
— for  the  blame  bdon-'s,  though  in  um-cpjal  proportions,  to  all  of 
them — thefe  exists  here  strong  presumi)tive  proof  that  the  storm  on 
this  occasion  was  not  such  as  would  have  deterred  any  Grecian  sca- 
inen  animated  by  an  earnest  and  courageous  sense  of  duty.  We  have 
only  to  advert  to  the  conduct  and  escape  of  Eteonikus  and  the  IVlo- 
ponnesian  fleet  from  3Iitylene  to  Chios;  rccolkcting  that  Mityknc 
was  separated  from  the  pionumtor^'of  Kane  on  the  Asiatic  main-laiid. 
and  from  the  ishs  of  Artdnuste,  by  a  channel  only  120  stadia  bread— 
about  fourteen  English  miles.  Eionikus.  ai)pri>ed  of  the  defial  liy 
the  Peloponncsian  otlicial  signal-boat,  desired  that  boat  to  go  out  of. 
tiie  harbor,  and  then  to  sail  into  it  again  with  deceptive  false  news.' 
to  the  effect  that  the  Peloponuesians  had  gained  a  complete  vic'or; 
he  then  directed  his  seamen,  after  taking  their  dinners,  to  depari  iiu- 
medialely,  and  lie  masters  of  the  mereh.int  vessels  silently  to  i>i.i 
their  cargoes  aboard  and  get  to  sea  also.  The  whole  tleet,  liiienu: 
and  merchant. vessels  both,  thus  went  out  of  tlie  harbor  of  Miiykio 
and  made  straight  for  Chios,  whjther  they  arrived  in  .safet}-;  the  hkt- 
chant  vessels  carrying  their  sails,  and  having  what  Xenophon  calls 
"a  fair  wind."  Now  it  is  scarcely  possible  that  all  this  could  have 
taken  place  had  there  blown  during  this  lime  au  intolerable  storm  bc- 


FEELINGS  OF  TIIE  ATHENIANS. 


297 


twecn  Mitylene  and  Arginu- re.  If  the  weather  was  such  as  to  fdlow 
of  the  safe'transit  of  Eteonikus  and  all  his  fleet  from  Mitylene  to  Chios, 
it  was  not  such  as  to  form  a  legitimate  obstacle  capable  of  deterring 
liny  generous  Athenian  seamen,  still  less  a  responsible  oliicer,  from 
siving  his  comrades  exposed  on  the  wrecks  near  Arginus,T.  Least  of 
all  was  it  such  as  ought  to  have  hindered  the  attempt  to  save  them — 
even  if  such  attempt  had  proved  unsuccessful.  And  here  the  gravity 
of  the  sin  consists  in  having  remained  inactive  while  the  brave  men 
on  the  wrecks  were  left  to  be  drowned.  All  this  reasoning,  too,  as- 
sumes the  tleet  to  have  been  alreadv  broudit  Ijack  to  its  moorings  at 
ArLniHiste;  discussing  only  how  much  was  practicable  to  effect  after 
that  moment,  and  leaving  untouched  the  no  less  important  question 
why  the  drowning  men  were  not  picked  up  before  the  fleet  went 
back? 

1  have  thoughr  it  right  to  go  over  these  considerations,  indispens- 
ahle  to  the  fair  appreciation  of  so  memoral)le  an  event — in  order  that 
the  reader  may  understand  the  feelings  of  the  assembly  and  the  pub- 
lic of  Athens,  when  the  generals  stocMl  before  them,  rebutting  the 
accusations  of  Theramenes  and  recriminating  in  their  turn  a.u'ainst 
him.  The  assembly  had  before  them  tiie  grave  and  deplorable  fact, 
that  several  hundreds  of  brave  seamen  had  been  suifered  to  drown  on 
the  wrecks,  without  the  least  effort  to  rescue  them.  In  explanation 
of  this  fact,  they  had  not  only  no  justification,  at  once  undisputed 
and  satisfactory — but  not  even  any  straightforward,  consistent,  and 
imcontradicted  statement  of  fads.  There  weie  discrepancies  among 
the  generals  themselves,  comptu-ing  their  otlicial  with  tlieir  unc^llicial, 
as  well  as  with  their  present  statements — and  contradictions  between 
them  and  Theramenes,  each  having  denied  the  sufficiencry  of  the 
storm  as  a  vindication  for  the  neglect  imputed  to  the  other.  It  was 
impossible  that  the  assembly  could  be  satisfied  to  acquit  the  generals, 
on  such  a  presentation  of  the  case;  nor  could  they  well  know  how  to 
apportion  the  blame  between  them  and  Theramenes.  The  relatives 
of  the  men  left  to  perish  would  be  doubtless  in  a  state  of  violent 
resentment  against  one  or  other  of  the  two,  perhaps  against  both. 
Inder  these  circumstances,  it  could  hardly  have  been  the  sullicieucy 
•if  their  defense — it  nuist  have  been  rather  the  apparent  generosity  of 
theireonduct  towards  Theramenes,  in  formallv  disavowing  all  charge 
of  uei:lect  against  him,  though  he  had  advanced  a  violent  charge 
•iL^ainst  them — which  produced  the  result  that  we  read  in  Xenophon. 
file  defense  of  the  generals  was  listened  to  with  favor  and  seemed 
likely  to  prevail  with  the  majority.  i\Iany  individuals  present  offered 
ijiemselves  as  bail  for  the  generals,  in  order  that  the  latter  miglit  be 
liberated  from  custody:  but  the  debate  had  been  so  much  prolonged 
(We  see  from  hence  that  there  must  have  been  a  great  deal  of  speak- 
"'g)that  it  was  now  dark,  so  that  no  vote  could  be  taken,  because  the 
Aow  of  hands  was  not  distinguishable.  It  was  therefore  resolved 
tliiit  the  whole  decision  should  be  adjourn.ed  until  another  assembly; 


298 


CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR 


APxVTURIAN  FESTIVAL. 


299 


but  tlKitin  the  meantime  tlie  senate  should  meet  to  consulcr  Tvhat 
Avould  be  the  proper  mode  of  tryinj,^  and  judging  the  geuerals-aiid 
should  8ul)inil  a  pr()positi«)n  to  that  eftVtt  1 1      i     • 

It  so  chanced,  that  inuncdiatclv  aflur  this  first  assembly,  during 
the  interval  before  the  meeting  of  tlie  senate  or  the  hoUbng  of  the 
^-cond  asseml)iv,  the  three  days  of  tlic  solemn  annuallcslival  called 
AiKituria  intervened ;  early  days  in  the  month  ot  October.      1  iiis  Avas 
lie  characterislic  festival  cf  the  Ionic  race;   hanckd  down  from  a 
ivriod  anterior  to  the  constitution  of  Kleisthenes,  imd  to  the  ten  i.cv/ 
trihes  each  containinix  so  manv  demes— and  brmgmg  together  the 
citizeus'in  their  primitive  miio'ns  of  family,  gin^,  phratry,  etc..  the 
-.r,rre''-ite  of  which  hatl  oriirinallv  conslituled  the  four  Ionic  tubes, 
now  siiiierannuatcd.     At  the  Apaturia  the  fjunilv  ceremonies  uere 
tr)ne  throu-'ir  marritures  were  enrolled,  acts  c*f  adoption  were  pro- 
mul-ated  and  certilied,  the   names  of  youthful  citizens  tirst  entered 
on  the  "-entile  and  phratric  roll;  sacrifues  were  jointly  telebrated  by 
tlie<e  iTiinily   assemblaires    to  Zeus    Phiatrii.s,   Athene,    and  other 
deities  ace(mipanied  with  much  festivity  and  enjoyment.  ^  A  so  cm- 
iiitv  like  this,  celebrated  every  yc^ar.  naturally  provoked   in  each  ot 
these  little  unions,  questions  of  atrectiouate  interest— "Who  aretliObC 
that  were  with  us  last  year,  but  are  not  here  now?     Ihe  abse'ut- 
whe'-e  arc  they?     The  deceased— where  or  how  diel  they  die;?     ^ow 
the  crews  of  the  twentv-live  Athenian  triremes,  lost  at  the  battle  of 
Ar-inu'<a^   (at  lea^t  all  those  among   them  who  were  freemen)  liae 
bee'n  members  of  Lome  one  of  these  family  unions,  and  were  nnsseel 
on  this  occasion.     The  answer  to  the  above  inquiiy,  in  their  case, 
wemld  be  one  alike  melancholy  and  revolting— "They  fenight  like 
brave  men  and  had  their  full  share  in  the  vie:tory:  their  trireme  av:.s 
bre)ken  disabled,  and  made  a  wreck,  in  the  battle:  aboard  this  wretu 
Ihev  were  left  to  perish,  while  their  vie;te)rious  generals  and  comnides 
made  not  the  smallest  effort  to  preserve  them."     To  hear  this  about 
fathers   brothers,  and  friends— and  to  hear  it  in  the  midst  ot  a  sym 
mthizim--  family  cire-lc-v.-as   well-e  alculated  to  stir  up  an  agony  (.t 
l\v,uvc   i^-()rrow,  and  anixer,  united;   an  intole'iable  sentiment,  which 
leouire-n  as  a  satisfaction,  ami  seemed  even  to  impose  as  a  duty,  the 
punishment  of  th^se  who  had  left  these  brave  comrades  to  pe'iisli. 
Many  of  ihe  ge^ntile  unions,  in  spile  of  the  usually  festive  and  cheer- . ■ 
fid  character  of  the  Apaturia,  were  so  absorbed  by  this  sentinicn.., 
that  thevelolhed  tiiemselve'S  in  black  garments  and  shaved  their  hea(l^ 
in  token  <.f  mouruin-  resolving  to  present  themselves  in  this  gui^e 
at  the  eo-nin<'-  assembly,  and  to  jippcasethe  manes  ot  their  abanUoueu 
kinsmen  by  "every  possible  elforL  to  procure  retribution  on  the  geue- 

^"^Xenoplion  in  his  narrative  describes  this  burst  of  feeling  at  the 
\pitcria  a.s  false  and  factitious,  and  the  nu'U  in  menirnmg  as  a  niim- 
btr  of  hired  impostors,  got  up  by  the  artitjees  of  Theramenes^^^to 
destre^y  the  generals.     But  the  case  was -one  m  which  no  artince>\a3 


needed.  The  universal  and  self-acting  stimulants  of  intense  human 
sympathy  stand  here  so  prominently  niarked,  that  it  is  not  simply 
siinerltuous  but  even  misleaeling.  to  look  behind  for  the  golel  and 
macliinations  of  a  political  instigate)!-.  Theramenes  might  elo  all  that 
lid  Ci)uid  to  turn  the  public  elispleasure  against  the  generals,  and 
to  prevent  it  from  turning  against  himself:  it  is  also  certain  that 
he  did  much  to  aimihilate  their  defense.  He  may  thus  have 
h-ul  some  influence  in  diree-ting  the  sentiment  against  the'in,  but  lie 
could  have  had  little  e)r  none  in  creating  it.  Nay,  it  is  not  too  mueh 
to  snythat  no  factitious  agene;y  of  this  sort  could  ever  have  pre- 
vailed on  the  Athenian  public  to  desecrate  such  a  festival  I'.s  the 
Apaturia  by  all  the  insignia  of  mourning.  If  they  did  so,  it  could 
only  have  been  through  some  internal  e'motion  alike'  spontaneous  and 
violent,  such  as  the  late  event  was  well  calculateel  to  arouse.  ^ 

Moreover,  what  can  be  more  improbable'  than  the  allegalion  that  a 
n-reat  number  of  men  were  hired  to  personate  the  fathers  or  brothers 
of  (lecea.sed  Athenian  citizens,  all  well-known  to  their  really  surviving^ 
kinsmen?  What  men'e  impre)bable  than  the  story  that  numbers  of 
men  would  sulfer  themselves  to  be  hired,  not  merely  to  put  em  black 
clothes  for  the  day,  which  might  be  taken  oil  in  the  evening— but 
also  to  shave  their  heads,  thus  stamping  upon  themselves  an  inefface- 
able evielence  of  the  fraud,  until  the  hair  had  grown  again?  That 
a  cunning  man,  like  Tiieramenes.  should  thus  distribute  his  bribes  to 
anuniljcr  e)f  persons,  all  i)resenting  nake'd  heaels  which  testilied  his 
guilt,  when  tiiere  were  real  kinsmen  surviving  te)  prove  the  fact  of 
personation?  That  having  done  this,  he  should  never  be  arraigiu'd 
or  accused  tor  it  afterwarel— neither  during  the  prodigiou>  re.u-tioi 
of  fe'eliniz:  which  te)ok  place  after  the  condemnation  of  the  g;':ierals, 
which  Xenophon  himself  so  strongly  attests,  and  which  fell  so 
heavily  upon  Kallixenus  and  others— nor  by  his  bitter  e:ieiny 
Kritias  under  the  government  e)f  the  Thirty?  Not  only  Theramenes 
is  never  mentioneei  as  having  been  afterwarel  ace'used,  but  for  aught 
that  appears,  he  preserved  his  political  inljuen-e  a-id  standing,  with 
little,  if  any,  abatement.  This  is  one  fore-ible  reason  among  many 
others,  for  disbelieving  the  bribes  and  the  all-pr-rva  ling  macliinatioH 
which  Xenophe)n  represents  him  as  having  put  forth,  in  oixk-r  to 
procure  the  condemnation  of  the  generals.  His  speaking  in  the  tirst 
public  assembly,  and  his  numerous  partisans  voting  in  the  se  -ond, 
doubtless  contributeel  much  to  that  result— and  by  his  ow^n  elesire. 
But  to  ascribe  to  his  bribes  and  intrigues  the  violent  and  overruling 
emoth)n  e)f  the  Athenian  public,  is,  in  my  judgment,  a  supposition 
alike  unnatural  and  preposterous  both  with  regard  to  them  and  with 
reirard  to  him. 

When  the  senate  met.  after  the  Apaturia,  to  discharge  the  duty 
conlieled  to  it  by  the  last  ]niblic  assembly,  e)f  determining  in  what 
inuimer  the  generals  should  be  juelgeel.  anel  submitting  their  opinion 
for  the  consideration  of  the  next  assembly— the  senator  Kallixenus 


300         CYRUS  THE  YOUXGER  IN  ASLV  MINOR, 

(at  the  insti.^ation  of  Theramcnes,  if  Xonophon  is  to  be  believed) 
proposed,  and  the  mnjority  of  the  senate  adopted,  the  followinr 
resolution:  "The  Athenian  peoi)le,  bavins^  already  heard  in  thepre'- 
vious  assembly,  botli  the  aceiisation  and  the  defense  of  the  irenerals 
shall  at  once  come  to  a  vote  on  the  subjj^'ct  by  irilu's.  For  ea(  h  tribe 
two  urns  shall  be  plaeed,  and  the  iierald  of  each  tribe  shall  proclaim 
— All  citizens  who  think  the  .i!:enerals  guilty  for  not  having  rescued 
tlie  warriors  who  had  conquered  in  the  battle,  shali  ihnp  their  j)el)- 
bles  into  the  foremost  urn;  all  who  think  otlierwise,  into  the liindniost. 
Should  the  generals  be  pronouneeel  guiliy  (by  tlie  result  of  tin- 
voting),  they  shall  be  (k'livered  to  the  Eleven*  and  punished  wiih 
death;  tlieir  property  shall  b.e  confiscated,  the  tenth  part  beinuset 
apart  for  the  goddess  Atliene."  One  single  vole  was  to  end  nu-e  tlic 
.case  of  all  tlie  eight  generals. 

The  unparalleled  burst  of  mournful  and  vindictive  feeling  at  the 
festival  of  the  Apaturi;i,  e.\tei:d:ng  by  contagion  from  the  relatives 
of  the  deceased  to  m;iny  other  citizens— and  the  probability  ihus 
created  that  the  coming  assembly  would  sanction  the  most  violent 
measures  against  tlie  gtnerals — jTrobably  cmboldeiKd  Kallixemis  to 
propose  and  i)rompted  the  senate  to  adopt,  this  dej-lorable  resohiiion. 
As  soon  as  the  assend)ly  met,  it  was  read  i.nd  mov(  d  by  KalUxemis 
himself,  as  coming  from  the  senate  in  discharge  of  the  coirimissioii 
imposed  upc.n  them  by  the  people. 

It  was  heard  by  a  large  portion  of  the  ass(nd>ly  with  well-merited 
indignation.  Its  cnoniiity  ronsi.-tcd  in  bre;iking  throuuh  an  eslab- 
lished  constitutional  maxims  and  judicial  ]tiacticts  of  the  AiIk  iiian 
democracy.  It  depriv<d  the  aeeused  generals  of  all  fair  trial, 
alleging,  with  a  mere  faint  juvtense  of  truth  which  was  little  better 
than  utter  fabehood,  that  their  dc  fense  as  well  as  their  accusation 
liad  been  heard  in  the  |  reccdirg  a^.  embly.  Now  there  lias  leeii  no 
people,  ancient  or  mc  dern,  in  whose  vie\v  the  formalities  of  judicial 
trial  were  habitually  n, ore  sacred  and  iirtlispensable  than  in'tli.-it  of 
the  Athenians — formaliiies  including  ample  notice  beforehand  to  the 
accused  party,  with  a  nuaMind  and  sulticient  space  of  lime  for  liiiii 
to  make  his  defense  befcre  the  Dik.ists:  while  those  I)ika>ts  wde 
men  who  had  been  sworn  leforelnind  r.s  a  lody.  yet  were  seleetc dliy 
lot  for  each  occasion  as  ii:dividuals.  Fiom  airthese  securities  llie 
generals  were  now  to  be  debarrtd,  and  submitted,  for  their  live<. 
honors,  and  fortunes,  to  a  simple  vote  of  the  unsworn  public  assim- 
bly,  without  hearing  or  defense.  Nor  was  this  all.  One  single  vote 
was  to  be  taken  in  cciK^mnation  or  absolution  of  the  eight  geiienils 
collectively.  Now  there  w;.s  a  rule  in  Attic  judicial  procedure, 
called  the  psephism  of  Kannonus  (originally  adopted,  we  do  not 
know  when,  on  the  pioj osilion  of  a  citizen  of  that  name,  as  a  pseph- 
ism or  decree  for  ^ome  ]  articular  cas<' — but  since  generalized  into 
ccjinmon  practice,  and  grown  into  great  prescriptive  reverence), 
which  peremptorily  forbade  any  buch  cuUeclive  trial  or  sentence,  and 


EXCITEMENT  IN  THE  ASSEMBLY. 


301 


directed  that  a  separate  judicial  vote  should  in  all  cases  be  taken  foi 
" nst  each  accused  partv.  The  psephism  of  Kannonus,  together 
with  all  the  other  respected  maxims  of  Athenian  crimmal  justice, 
iv'is  here  audaciously  trampled  under  foot.  -, ,      -r 

Vs  soon  as  the  resolutioli  was  read  in  the  public  assembly,  Eury- 
pt^^emiis,  an  intimate  friend  of  the  generals,  denounced  it  as  grossly 
Fie'  lid  unconstitutional;  presenting  a  notice  of  UKhement 
rni  St  Kallixenus,  under  the  Graphe  Paranomon,  for  having  pro- 
uocd  a  resolution  of  that  tenor.  Several  other  citizens  supported 
KoUce  of  indictment,  which  according  to  the  received  pnic  ice  of 
Athen'  \vould  arrest  the  further  progress  of  the  measure  until  the 
rhUf 'its  proposer  had  been  consununated.  Nor  was  there  ever  any 
proposition^inide  at  Athens^  to  which  the  Graplie  Paranomon  more 
rloselv  and  riuhteoush'  a])plied.  .  ,,     xi  i  ^ 

B  t  the  numerous pirtisluis  of  Kallixcnus-espc.cially  t  .c  men  ^vl.o 
=too    b    in  luibU.of  niourtHt.-,  ^villl  «liaveu  ht.v.lH,  agitated  with  sad 
Kcd  eSions  and,  tbirst  of  vcsoance-wore  in  "O  •cmper  to  respe..t 
this  conslitutional  impcdiuicut  to  the  discussion  ot  Mliut  liad  alieady 
been  nasse     by  the  senate.     Tl.ey  loudly  clamored   that   '  it   vvai 
int';  en  bio  to  L  a  small  knot  of  citizens  thus  bin.lenn?   be  assein- 
•      ed,«Xfi-omdoin-wbatthevcb.,se:"  and  one  of  their  number 
Lvki^k  '    cv^"  vent  so  far  as  to  threaten  that  those  who  tendered 
Uie  ind  ct  nent  a-aii.st  Kallixenus  should  be  judged  by  the  sam-r  vote 
nlo,.rwii     the  .'?iicrals,  if  thev  would  not  let  th.i  assembly  proceed 
^^1  a  uWk"  ermine  on  the  motion  mst  read.     The  excited  di«^ 

mJitiou  of  the  lar-e  party  thus  congregated,  further  intian  cdb,'  this 
.nice  of  LykisknsSva^  wound  up  to  ^^^ ^^^^f^^]^^  ^y^'^y^ 
nihor  sneakers-  especially  by  one,  who   stood  torwaid  and  saKi— 
'  Uheniar^^  I \n'^^^^^^^  a  wrecked  man  in  the  battle:  I  escaped 

only  by  oettng  upon  an  empty  meal-tub;  but  my  comrac  es,  perislm  g 
01  thc\N^'^cks  ne  u-  me,  implored  me,  if  I  should  myselt  be  saved,  to 
ni  Ike  know^; tc>  the  Athc^ial.  people,  that  their  -^e-ra  s  -1  a l.^^^^^ 
to  death  warriors  who  had  bravely  conquered  m  behalf  of  then  coun- 
t?>^''    Even  in  the  most  traiuiuil  state  of  the  public  mind,  such  a 
communication  of  the  last  words  of  tl^ese  drc)wning  men  repo^^^^ 
an  ear-witness   wouldhave  been  heard  with  emotion;  but  under  the 
actua    pS^^^^^^       excitement,  it  went  to  the  inmost  depths  of  the 
he  u-erJ  souls  and^marked  the  generals  as  ^^-^^^^^V^'-  ,^^^^^^^^^^^ 
there  were  other  similar  statements  not  expressly  mentioned  to  us, 
hi  tin'  to  view  the  same  fact  in  other  ways,  and  all  contribu  ing  o 
a^S^c!  Uie  violence  of  the  public  nmnifestatnms;  ^^^^  J ;;  ^^^^^^ 
r?ached  such  a  point,  that  Eury]>tolemus  was  forced  to  withdiaAx  lu^ 
notice  of  indictment  against  Kallixenus.  ,,rcvent 

Now  however  a  new  form  of  resistance  sprung  up  still  prc^ent- 
inrMl^  oposition  from  being  taken  into  consideration  by  the  as- 
vem  y  ^  ^  me  of  the  Prvtanes-or  senators  of  the  presiding  ribe. 
ou    iit  (^^  on  the  tribe  Antiochis-the  legal  presidents  ot  tho 


302 


CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 


SPEECH  OF  EURYPTOLEMUS. 


303 


flsscmbly,  refused  to  cntertnin  or  put  the  question;  mIhcIi,  being 
illegal  and  unconstitutional,  not  only  ii  spiicil  them  with  aversion, 
hut  also  rendered  them  personally  open  to  penflties.  Kallixcnus 
employed  against  them  the  same  meiiaees  whieh  Lykiskushad  ullcrtcl 
against  Euryptolemus:  he  threatenid,  ;;n:idst  encouraging  ehimor  " 
from  many  persons  in  the  assemhly,  to  include  them  in  the  s;ime 
accusation  Avitli  the  generals.  So  intimidate  d  "vvere  the  Prytanes  by 
the  incensed  manifestations  of  the  as-emMy,  that  all  of  ihem,  e.\e(  pt 
one,  relinquished  their  oj-position,  and  agreed  to  put  the  queslicn. 
The  single  obstinate  Pry  tanis,  whose  refusal  r.o  nunaee  could  subdue, 
was  a  man  whose  name  we  read  with  pe(  uliar  interest  and  in  Avhoiu 
an  impregnable  adherence  to  law  and  duty  was  only  one  among 
many  other  titles  to  reverence.  \\  was  the  jihilosoi  her  ^okrates;  on 
this  trj'ing  occasion,  once  throughout  a  lite  of  se\(n1y  yeais.  dis- 
charging a  political  oflice,  among  the  fdt}'  m  i  ators  taken  by  lot  from 
llie  tribe  Antiochis.  Sokrates  could  not  be  indi.ced  to  withdraw  his 
protest,  so  that  the  question  was  ultimately  put  by  the  remaining 
Prvtanes  without  his  cojicurrence.  It  shi-uld  be  observed  that  his 
resistance  did  not  imply  any  ojiinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
the  generals,  but  applied  simj^ly  to  the  illeial  and  uncoiistiUitie  iial 
proposition  now  submitted  for  determining  iheir  fate;  a  proposition,  ' 
which  he  must  alieady  liave  oppo&ed  once  before,  in  his  capacity  of 
member  of  the  senate. 

The  constitutional  impediments  liaving  been  thus  violently  over- 
thrown, the  question  was  regularly  put  b}'  the  Prytar.es  to  the  assem- 
bly. At  once  the  clamorous  outcry  ceased,  and  those  who  had  raised 
it  resumed  their  behavior  of  Athenian  cili/.ens — patient  hearers  of 
speeches  and  opinions  directly  o|  posed  to  their  own.  Nothing  is 
more  deserving  of  notice  than  this  chanire  of  demeanor.  The  cham- 
pions of  the  men  drowned  on  the  wrecks  had  resolved  to  employ  as 
much  force  as  was  reepiired  to  eliminate  those  ju-eliminary  consiitu- 
tional  objections,  in  themselves  indisputalHe,  which  precluded  the 
iliscussion.  But  so  soon  as  the  discussion  was  once  begun,  they 
were  carefid  not  to  give  to  the  resolution  the  appearance  c  f  being 
carried  by  force,  Euryptolenuis,  the  personal  friend  of  the  generals, 
was  allowed  not  only  to  move  an  amendment  negativing  the  pro- 
position of  Kallixcnus,  but  also  to  develope  it  in  a  long  speech,  which 
Xenophon  sets  before  us. 

His  speech  is  one  of  great  skill  and  judgment  in  reference  to  the 
case  before  him  and  to  the  temper  of  the  jissembly.  Peginning  with 
a  gentle  censure  on  his  friends  the  generals  Pcrikles  and  Diomedon, 
for  having  prevailed  on  tlieir  colleagues  to  abstain  from  mentioning, 
in  their  first  ofKcial  letter,  the  orders  given  to  Theramenes, — he  rep- 
resented them  as  now  in  danger  of  becoming  victims  to  the  base  con- 
spiracy of  the  latter,  and  threw  himself  upon  the  justice  of  the  people 
to  grant  them  a  fair  trial.  He  besought  the  people  to  take  full  time 
to  instruct  themselves  before  they  pronounced  so  solemn  and  irrevu- 


rible  a  sentence— to  trust  only  to  their  own  judgment,  but  at  the 
vime  time  to  take  security  that  judgment  should  be  pronounced  after 
full  information  and  impartial  hearing-and  thus  to  escape  that  bit- 
mr  and  unavailing  remorse  which  would  otherwise  surely  ioUow. 

le  i>rovK)sed  that  the  generals  should  be  tried  each  separately,  ac- 
ronlin-  to  the  psephism  of  Kannonus— with  proper  notice,  and  ample 
time  allowed  for  the  defense  as  well  as  for  the  accusation ;  but  that  if 
found  n-uiltv  they  should  sulfer  the  heaviest  and  most  disgracelul 
ZalLit's-lds  own  relation  Pcrikles  the  first.     This  was  the  only  way 

f  slrikin-  the  guilty,  of  saving  the  innocent,  and  of  preserving 
Athens  from  thc^  ingratitude  and  impiety  of  condeinningr  to  death, 
without  trial,  as  well  as  contrary  to  law,  generals  who  had  .pist  ren- 
dered to  her  so  important  a  service.  And  what  cou  d  the  people  be 
afraid  of?  Did  they  fear  lest  the  power  of  trml  should  s  ip  out  of 
their  han.ls-that  they  were  so  impatient  to  leap  over  all  the  de  ay3 
prescribed  bv  the  law?    To  the  worst  of  public  traitors,  Aristarchus 

hey  had  irranted  a  day  with  full  notice  for  trial,  with  all  the  legal 
means  for  makini  his  defense:  and  would  tl^^jMiow  show  such^^fi^^^ 
errant  contrariety  of  measure  to  victorious  and  taithful  ofhceis?  J3e 
Sot  F  (lie  said)  the  men  to  act  thus,  Athenians  The  laws  are  your 
own  work;  it  is  thromrh  them  that  ye  chiefiy  hold  your  greatness: 
cherish  them,  and  attempt  not  any  proceeding  without  their  sane- 

'  Eurvptolemus  then  shortly  recapitulated  the  proceedings  after  the 
battle  with  the  violence  of  the  storm  which  had  prevented  approach 
to  the  wrecks;  adding,  that  one  of  the  generals,  now  in  peril,  Had 
himself  been  on  board  a  broken  ship,  and  had  only  escaped  by  a  tor- 
tunate  accident.  Gaining  courage  from  his  own  harangue,  he  con- 
cluded by  reminding  the  Athenians  of  the  brilliancy  of  the  victory, 
and  by  telling  them  that  they  ought  in  justice  to  wreath  the  brows 
of  the^conquerors,  instead  of  following  those  wicked  advisers  who 
pressed  for  their  execution.  ,  ,    ,.       o       n-    j- 

It  is  no  small  proof  of  the  force  of  established  habits  of  pub  ic  dis- 
cussion, that  the  men  in  mourning  and  with  shaven  heads,  who  had 
been  a  few  minutes  before  in  a  slate  of  furious  excitement,  slioukl 
patiently  hear  out  a  speech  so  effective  and  so  confiict.ing  with  their 
stron-est  sentiments  as  this  of  Euryptolemus.  Perhaps  others  mny 
hive  ^spoken  also;  but  Xenophon  does  not  mention  them,  it  is  re- 
mark djlc  that  he  does  net  name  Theramenes  as  taking  any  part  la 

this  last  debite.  ,  ,     -^         .  ^  _  „   ♦i.„f 

The  substantive  amendment  proposed  by  Euryptolemus  was,  that 
the  generals  should  be  tried  each  separately,  according  to  the  psep  nsin 
of  Kannonus;  implying  notice  to  be  given  to  each,  ot  the  day  ot  trm 
and  full  time  for  each  to  defend  hin-iself.  This  PfoP.ofition,  as  well 
as  that  of  the  Senate  moved  by  Kallixcnus,  was  submitted  to  the  Aote 
of  the  assembly;  hands  being  separately  held  up,  first  for  «ne,  next 
for  the  other.     The  Pry  lanes  pronounced  the  amendment  ot  J2.uijp- 


304         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 

tolcmiis  to  be  carried.  Rnt  a  cilizen  named  IMenekles  impcaclied 
their  decision  as  a  wrong  or  invalid,  alleginir  seemingly  some  iufor- 
mality  or  trick  in  pntling  tiie  ((iicstion,  or  perhaps  erroneous  report  of 
the  comparalivc  show  of  iiands  AVc  Jiiu.st  iceollecl  liiat  in  thi^  ca^e 
tiie  Prytanes  were  declared  partisans.  Ici'ling  that  they  were  doiu<r 
wrong  m  siiifering  so  iileg:d  a  proposition  as  that  of  Kaliixeniis  to  bS 
putal  ail.  and  that  tiie  adop.ion  of  it  would  be  j.^reat  public m-scliief 
they  would  hardly  scruple  to  try  and  defeat  it  even  by  some  unfair 
maneuver.  But  the  exception  takvn  bv  Meneklcs  con'strained  tluin 
to  put  the  question  over  again,  and  they  were  then  oblio-ed  to  pro-' 
iiounce  that  the  majority  were  in  fJvor  of  the  protiosition  of 
Kallixcnus. 

That  proposition  was  sliortly  afterw.ird  carried  into  elTect  by  dis- 
posing the  two  urns  for  each  irihe,  and  colJecting  the  votes  6i  the 
citizens  individually.  The  cond(  mnalorv  vote  prevailed,  and  all  the 
eight  generals  were  thus  found  guilty:  whether  by  a  large  or  small 
majority,  we  sliould  Iiave  been  ghid  to  learn,  but  are  not"^told.  llic 
majority  was  composed  mostly  of  those  who  acted  under  a  feelino-  of 
general  resentment  against  the  generals,  but  in  jmrt  al^o  of  thefricMids 
ami  partisans  of  Theramciies,  not  incoi  siderable  in  number  The 
six  generals  then  in  Athens— Porikles  (son  of  the  great  statesman  of 
that  name  by  Aspasia),  Diomedon,  Erasiiiides.  IhrasvUus,  Lysii.>; 
and  Aristokrates— \\c're  then  delivered  to  the  Eleven. "and  perisl;cd 
by  the  usual  draught  of  hemlock;  their  pioperty  being  confiscated  as 
the  decree  of  the  senate  prescribn  d. 

Respecting  the  condemnation  of  these  unfortunate  men  pro- 
nounced without  any  of  the  rec(^gnized  tutelary  preliminaries  for  ac- 
cused persons,  there  can  be  only  one  ojunion.  It  was  an  ;ict  of  vio- 
lent injustice  and  illegality,  deeply  dishon(U-in2:  the  men  who  jxissed 
It,  and  the  Athenian  character  generally.  In  either  case,  whether  the 
generals  were  guilty  or  innocent,  such  censure  is  deserved;  for  judi- 
cial precautions  are  not  less  essential  in  dealimr  with  the  guilty  than 
with  the  innocent.  Rut  it  is  deserved  in  an  aggravated  lorin,*  wiien 
we  consider  that  the  men  against  whom  suelVinjustice  was'peipe- 
trated.  had  just  come  from  achievinir  a  gh)rious  victory.  Against 
tlie  demoera'.ical  constitution  of  Athens,  it  furnishes  no^iirouml  for 
censure— nor  against  the  habits  and  icelinus  which  that  constitution 
tended  to  implant  m  the  individual  citizen.  Both  the  one  and  the 
other  strenously  forbade  the  dLvd:  nor  could  the  Athenians  ever  have 
so  disiionored  themselves,  if  they  had  not,  under  a  momentary  leio- 
cioiis  excitement,  risen  in  insurrection  not  less  against  the  forms  of 
their  o^yn  democracy,  than  against  tiie  most  sacred  restraints  of  their 
liabitual  constitutional  morality. 

If  we  wanted  proc^f  of  this,  the  facts  of  the  immediate  future 
would  abundantly  supply  it.  After  a  short  time  had  elapsed  every 
man  in  Athens  became  iieartily  ashamed  of  the  deed.  A  vote'  of  the 
public  asstniibly  was  passed,  decreeing  that  those  who  had  misuuidcd 


GENERALS  CONDEMNED  AND  EXECUTED.       305 

the  people  on  this  occasion  ought  to  be  brought  to  judicial  trial, 
tint  Kallixenus  whh  four  others  should  be  among  the  nund)er,  and 
that  bail  should  be  taken  for  their  appearance.  Tiiis  was  accordingly 
done  and  the  parties  were  kepi  under  custody  of  the  sureties  then i- 
sdves  wdio  were  resp  )nsil)le  for  their  appe;irance  on  the  day  of  trial. 
But  presently  b;):h  toreign  inisf(^rtunes  and  internal  sedition  began 
to  press  too  heavily  on  Athens  to  leave  any  room  for  other  thouglits, 
as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter.  Kallixenus  and  his  accomplices 
found  m  -an;  to  escap.^  before  the  day  of  trial  arrived,  and  remained 
in  exile  until  after  the  dominion  of  the  Thirty  and  the  restoration  of 
the  democracy.  Kallixenus  then  returned  under  the  general  amnesty. 
But  the  '••(Mieral  amnesty  protected  him  only  against  legal  pursuit, 
not  a-ainst  the  hostile  memory  of  the  people.  "  Detested  by  all,  he 
died  of  hunger"— says  Xeiioplion;  a  memorable  proof  how  much 
the  condemiiiition  of  "these  six  generals  shocked  the  standing  denio- 
eratical  sentiment  at  Athens. 

From   what  cause   did   this  temporary  burst  of  wrong  arise,  so 
forei<ni  to  the  habitual  character  of  the  people?     Even  under  the 
strom'-est  political  prov(jc<ition,  and  toward  the  most  hated  traitors, 
(a>^  EurvM)tolenius  himself  remarked  by  citing    the  case  of  Aristar- 
chus)   aher  the  Four  Hundred  as  well  as  after  the  Thirty,  the  Athe- 
nians' never  committed  the  like  wrong— never  deprived  an  accused 
party  of  the  customary  judicial  se;airities.     How  then  came  they  to 
do  it  here,  wdiere  the  Irenerals  coudemiied  were  ilot  only  not  traitors, 
hut  h;id    just  sisxnalized  tliemsjlves    by  a   victorious  combtit?      ISo 
TherauK'nes  could  have  brought  about  this  piienomenon;  no  deep-laid 
oli'-archical  plot  is,  in  my  judgment,  to  be  called  in  as  an  explana- 
tion     The  true  explanation  is  different,  and  of  serious  moment  to 
state      Political  hatred,  intense  as  it  might  be,  was  never  dissociated 
in  the  mind  of  a  citizen  of  Athens,  from  the  democratical  tonus  ot 
preecdure:  but  the  men,  wdio  stood  out  here  as  actors,  had  broken 
loose  from  the  obligations  of  citizenship  and  comuKmweallh.  and 
surrendered  themseives.   heart  and  soul,   to    the  fainily  sympathies 
and  antipathies;  feelings,  first  kindled,   and  justly  kmdied,  by  the 
thou"-ht  that  their  friends  and  relatives  had  been  left  to  perish  un- 
heeded on  the  wrecks— next,  intlamed  into  preternatural  and  over- 
whelinin<'-  violence  by  the  festival  of  the   Apaturia,  where  all  the 
reli-ious'traditions  connected  with  the  ancient  family  tie    all  those 
associations  which  imposed  upon  the  relatives  of  a  murdered  man 
the  duty  of  pursuing  the  murderer,  were  expanded  into  detail  and 
worked' up  by  their  api^ropriate  renovating  solemnity,      ihc  garb  ot 
mourning  and   the  shaving  of  the   head-phenomena  nnknown  at 
Athens  either  in  a  poliiical  assembly  or  in  a  religious  festival— were 
svinholsof  temporary  transformali(m  in  the  internal  man.     llecould 
think  of  nothing  but  his  drowning  relilives,  together  with  the  gen- 
erals as   having   abandoned  them   to  death,   and   his  own  duty  as 
survivor  to  insure   to   them   vengeance   and   satisfaction  lor  sucli 


306         CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  IN  ASIA  MINOR. 


CONDUCT  OF  THE  GENERALS. 


307 


.^i 


abandonment.  Under  this  pelf-jiutif\  ins:  impulse,  the  shortest  find 
surest  proceeding  jippeured  tlie  Lest,  ^\hatcvi■r  uniount  of*  political 
wrong  it  niiifht  entail;  na\%  in  this  case  it  appeared  the  only  jao- 
ceeding  really  sure,  since  the  inleri.o>ition  of  the  proper  jiuliciiil 
delays,  coupled  ^vitIl  severar.ce  of  trial  on  successive  days  accortiing 
to  the  pscphisni  of  Kannonus,v>ould  prol  ably  have  saved  the  lives 
of  live  out  of  the  six  generals,  if  n(.t  of  all  tlie  six.  When  we  r<  tlcet 
that  such  obsorliiniT  sctitinient  w;is  common,  at  one  and  the  same 
time,  to  a  large  proporlian  (;f  the  Athenians,  we  shall  see  the  e.\i)la- 
nation  of  that  misguided  vote,  bolh  of  the  Senate  and  of  the  Ekklesia, 
which  sent  the  six  generals  to  an  illegal  ballot— and  of  the  subsequent 
ballot  which  condemueil  them,  t^uch  is  the  natural  behavior  of  those 
who,  having  lor  the  moment  forgotten  their  sense  of  political  com- 
mon'weallh,  Ih'Cou  e  degraded  into  exclusive  family-men.  The  fan  ily 
allVctions,  productive  "as  they  are  of  nuich  gentle  sympathy  and 
mutual  hiippincss  in  tlie  interior  circle,  arc  abo  liable  to  generate 
disregard,  malice,  sometimes  even  ferocious  vegeance,  toward  others. 
Powerful  toward  good  generally,  they  are  not  less  powerful  occa- 
sionally toward  cvVi;  and  require,  not*  less  than  the  selfish  propensi- 
ties, constant  sulK^idinaling  control  from  that  moral  reason  wliich 
contemplates  for  its  end  tlie  security  and  happiness  of  all.  Arid 
when  a  mr.n,  either  fiom  h)W  civilisation,  has  never  known  this 
larirc  moral  reason — or  when  from  some  a(  cidcntal  stimulus,  right- 
eous in  the  origin,  but  wr«»ui:lil  u]^  into  faiialicism  by  the  conspiring 
force  of  religious  as  well  :!s  f..milyVympathies,  he  comes  to  place  his 
pride  and  virtue  in  discaiding  its^  siipremacy — there  is  scarcely  any 
amount  of  evil  or  injustice  which  he  may  not  be  led  to  i>crpetrate, 
by  a  l)lind  olK-dicne  e  to  the  narrow  instincts  of  relationship.  "  Ces 
))eres  de  famiile  sont  capables  de  tout" — was  the  satirical  remark  of 
Talleyrand  upoti  the  gross  public  jobbing  so  hugely  practiced  by 
tho-e  who  sought  i»lace  or  promotion  for  their  sons.  The  same 
words,  understood  in  a  far  more  awful  sense,  and  generalized  for 
other  cases  of  relationship,  sum  up  the  moral  of  this  melancholy  pro- 
ceeding at  Athens. 

Lastly,  it  m»i<t  never  be  forgotten  that  the  generals  themselves 
were  also  largely  respf)nsible  in  the  case.  Through  theunjustitiahle 
fury  of  ihemovenKMJt  against  them,  they  perished  like  innocent  meii 
— without  trial — '' Ihnndiii  ci  iiKUfcnxi,  t<f//t(jinnn  itmorvntiH,  juriir- 
v/it:"  but  it  does  not  follow  that  they  were  really  innexent.  I  fe-' 1 
pe'rsuaded  that  neither  with  an  English,  nor  Freneh,  nor  American 
fleet,  cou.ld  sue-h  e\ents  have  taken  plae'c  as  those  whidi  follo\yeel 
the  victory  of  Arginu>;v.  Neither  admiral  nor  seamen,  after  gaining 
a  victory  and  driving  f)lTthe  ene*mv,  coulel  have  e-ndured  the  thenights 
of  going  l);;e'k  to  their  anchorage,  leaving  their  own  elisableel  wrecks 
unmanageable  on  the;  wa!eis,  with  many  living  comrades  aboard, 
he'lpless,  ami  depending  upe)n  extianeous  sueeor  for  all  their  chance 
of  escape.     That  the  generals  at  Arginusa3  did  this,  stanels  confessed 


by  their  own  advocate  Euryptolemus,  though  they  must  have  known 
well  the  condition  of  disable'd  ships  after  a  naval  combat,  and  some 
ships  even  of  the  victorious  tleet  were  sure  to  be  disabled.  If  these 
fjenerals,  after  their  victory,  instead  e)f  sailing  back  to  land,  had 
eniploved  themselves  first  e)f  all  in  visiting  the  e'rijijiled  ships,  there 
■woiild'have  been  ample  time  to  perform  this  duty,  and  to  save  all  the 
jiving  men  aboard  before  the  storm  came  on.  This  is  the  natural 
inference,  even  upon  their  owni  showing;  this  is  what  any  English, 
French,  or  American  naval  commander  would  have  thought  it  an 
imperative  duty  to  do.  What  degree  of  blame  is  imputable  to 
Th  -ramenes.  ami  how  far  the  generals  Avere  discharged  by  shifting 
tiie  responsibility  to  him,  is  a  point  which  we  cannot  now  determine. 
Ihit  the  storm,  which  is  appealeel  to  as  a  juslitle-ation  of  both,  rests 
Uj).)n  evidence  too  questionable  to  serve  that  purpose,  where  the 
neiilect  of  duty  was  so  serious,  and  cost  the  lives  jM'obably  of  juore 
than  1000  brave  men.  At  least  the  Athenian  people  at  home,  when 
tliey  heard  the  criminations  and  recriminations  between  the  generals 
0  1  one  side  and  Theramejiesoii  the  either — each  of  them  in  his  charac- 
ter of  accus^'r  implying  that  the  storm  was  no  valid  obstacle,  though 
each,  if  pushed  for  a  defense,  fell  back  upon  it  as  a  resource  in  case  of 
„-e  I— the  Athenian  people  could  n  jt  but  look  upon  the  storm  more  as 
an  aftertiioughtto  excuse  previous  omis.sions,  than  as  a  terrible  reality 
nullifying  alT  the  ardor  and  re'solution  of  men  bent  on  doing  their 
duly.  It  was  in  this  way  that  the  intervention  e)f  Therameues  chietly 
contributed  to  the  destruction  of  the  generals,  not  by  the)se  maneu- 
vers ascribed  to  him  in  Xenophon:  he  destroyed  all  belief  in  the 
storm  as  a  real  and  all-(30vering  hindrance.  Tlie  general  impression 
of  the  public  at  Athens— in  my  opinion,  a  natural  anel  unavoidable 
inii)ressie:)n — was  that  there  had  been  most  culpable  negligence  in 
reuard  to  the  wrecks,  througli  which  negligence  alone  the  seamen  on 
boartl  perished.  This  negligence  elishonors,  more  or  less,  the  arma- 
niL'nt  at  Arginusic  as  wellas'the  generals:  but  tli'j  generals  were  the 
persons  responsible  to  the  public  at  home,  who  felt  for  the  fate  of 
the  eleserted  seamen  more  justly  as  w'cll  as  more  generously  than  their 
coniraeles  in  the  lleet. 

In  spite,  therefore,  of  the  guilty  proceeding  to  which  a  furiou.s 
exaggeration  of  such  setitiment  drove  the  Athenians — in  spile  of  the 
sympathy  wdiich  this  has  naturally  and  justly  ju-ocured  for  the  con- 
demned generals — the  verelict  of  imi)artial  history  will  pronounce 
that  the  sentiment  itself  was  well-founded,  and  that  the  generals 
ehserved  censure  and  disgrace.  The  Athenian  people  might  with 
justice  proclaim  to  them—"'  Whatever  be  the  grandeur  of  your  vie- 
tory,  we  can  neither  rejoice  in  it  ourselves,  nor  allow^  you  to  reap 
honor  from  it,  if  we  lincl  that  you  have  left  many  hundreds  of  those 
who  helped  in  gaining  it  to  be'drowned  on  boartl  the  wrecks,  without 
making  any  effort  to  save  them,  when  such  effort  might  well  have 
proved  successful."    And  the  coudemnatiou  here  pronounced,  while 


308 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS.E. 


it  served  ns  a  painful  aclmonitioa  to  subsequent  Athenian  generals, 
provided  at  the  same  time  an  efficacious  guarantee  for  the  pIe^el•va- 
lionof  cond)alan{s  on  the  wrecks  or  swimming  for-  their  lives  jiflcr  a 
naval  vietorv.  One  express  ca.-e  in  point  may  l»e  mentioned.  Thirty 
years  aflerw'ard  (u.c.  370)  the  Athenian  adndral  Ciiabrias  (hfealed, 
thoujxh  not  uitliout  considerable  loss,  the  Laceda'moniaii  fleit  near 
Kaxos.  Had  he  pursued  them  vigorously,  he  migiit  have  conipldcd 
liis  victory  bv  destroying  all  or  mo^t  of  tliem;  but  recollecting  wluU 
li:ul  happened  after  the  battle  of  Arginusrj,  he  abstained  from  pur5uit. 
devoted  his  attention  to  the  wrecks  of -his  own  fleet,  saved  fn.m 
death  those  citizens  who  were  yet  living,  and  picked  up  the  dead  fur 
iulermeut.  • 


CHAPTER  LXV. 

FROM    THE    BATTLE   OF   ARGINUS.E     TO    THE    RESTORATION    OF    THE 
DEMOCRACY  AT  ATI1E^•S,  AFTER  TUE  EXPULSION  OF  THE  THIRTY. 

The  victory  of  Arginusne  gave  for  the  time  decisive  mastery  of  the 
Asiatic  seas  to  the  Athenian  fleet;  and  is  even  said  to  have  sodiscour- 
:iir('d  the  Laeediemonians.  as  to  induce  them  to  send  propositions  of 
]H'ace  to  Athens.  But  this  statement  is  optn  to  much  doubt,  and  I 
think  it  most  probable  that  no  such  propositions  were  made.  Gieat 
j;S  the  victory  was,  wc  look  in  vain  for  any  posiiivc  results  accruing 
to  Athens.  After  an  unsuccessful  attempt  on  Chios,  the  victorious 
fl' et  went  to  kSamos,  Avhere  it  seems  to  have  remained  until  the  fol- 
lowing year,  without  any  further  movements  than  were  necessary 
for  the  purpose  of  procuring  money. 

IVIeanwhile  Eteonikus,  who  collected  the  remains  of  the  defeati  d 
PelopoiHiesian  fleet  at  Chios,  being  left  unsr.ppiied  w  iih  mon(  y  hy 
Cvrus,  foiuul  himself  much  straitened,  and  was  compelled  to  leave 
tlie  seamen  uni>aid.  During  the  later  summer  and  autumn,  tlie>e 
men  maintained  themselves  by  laboring  for  hire  on  the  (  hian  lands; 
but  when  winter  came,  this  resource  ceased,  so  that  they  foniul 
themselves  unable  to  procure  even  clothes  or  shoes.  In  such  for- 
lorn condition,  many  of  them  entered  into  a  conspiracy  to  assail  arid 
jdunder  the  town  of  Chios;  a  day  was.named  for  the  enterprise,  and 
it  was.ngreed  that  the  conspirators  should  now  each  other  by  wear- 
iiur  a  straw  or  reed.  Informed  of  the  design,  Eteonikus  was  at  the 
same  time  intimidated  by  the  number  of  these  straw-bearers:  he  saw 
thai  if  he  dealt  with  the  conspirators  openly  and  ostensibly,  thi-y 
ndirht  perhaps  rush  to  arms.and  succeed  in  plundering  the  town:  at 
any  rate  a  conflica  would  arise  in  which  many  of  the  allies  would  he 
fcslaiu,  w  hich  w  ould  produce  the  worst  ellect  upou  all  future  opera- 


LYSANDER'S  ARRIVAL  AT  EPHESUS. 


309 


tions  Accordingly,  resorting  to  stratagem,  he  took  with  him  a 
guard  of  flfteeii  men  armed  with  daggers,  and  marched  through  the 
town  of  Chios.  •  Meeting  presently  one  of  these  straw-bearers— a  man 
with  a  complaint  in  his  eyes,  coming  out  of  a  surgeon's  house— he 
directed  his  guards  to  put  the  man  to  death  on  the  spot.  A  crowd 
irathered  round,  with  astonishment  as  well  as  synipathy,  andinqun-ed 
on  what  ground  the  man  was  put  to  death;  upon  which  Eteondvus 
ordered  lus  guards  to  reply,  that  it  was  because  he  wore  a  straw\ 
The  news  being  dilTused,  the  remaining  persons  who  wore  straws 
became  so  alarmed  as  to  thi-ow  their  straws  away. 

Eteonikus  availed  himself  of  such  painc  to  demand  money  from 
the  Chians,  as  a  condition  of  ♦^arrying  away  his  starving  and  perilous 
armament.  Having  obtained  from  them  a  month's  pay,  he  immedi- 
ately put  the  troops  o:i  ship-board,  taking  pains  to  encourage  theiu 
and*m:ike  them  fancy  that  he  was  unacquainted  with  the  recent con- 

spiraev.  ,  ,11^ 

The  Chians  and  the  other  allies  of  Sparta  presently  P>sembled  at 
Ephesus  to  consult,  and  resolved,  in  conjunclioii  with  Cyrus,  to 
dispatch  envoys  to  the  Ephors,  requesting  that  Lysander  might  b3 
sent  out  a  second  time  as  admiral.  It  was  not  the  habit  of  Sparta 
ever  to  send  out  tiie  sa:ne  man  as  admiral  a  second  time,  after  his 
year  of  service.  Xevertheless  the  Ephors  complied  with  the  request 
substantially:  sending  out  Arakus  as  admiral,  but  Lysander  along 
with  him  under  the  title  of  secretary,  invested  with  all  the  real  powers 
of  commuid. 

Lysander.  having  reached  Ephesus  about  the  beginning  of  B.C. 
40").  immediately  applied  himself  with  vigor  to  renovate  both  Lace- 
d;enionian  power  and  his  own  influences  The  ]iartisans  in  the  vari- 
.ms  allied  cities,  whose  favor  he  had  assiduosly  cultivated  during  his 
last  year's  command— the  clubs  and  factious  conii)inations  which  he 
had  organized  and  stimulated  into  a  partnership  of  mutual  ambition- 
all  haiil'd  his  return  with  exultation.  Discountenanced  and  kept  down 
by  the  generous  patriotism  of  his  ])redecessors  lvaUikrati(las,  they  now 
sprann-lnto  renewed  activitv,  and  became  zealous  in  aiding  Lysander 
to  refit  and  augment  his  fleet.  Ts^or  was  (\vrus  less  hearty  m  his 
])reference  than  before.  On  arriving  at  Ephesus,  Lysander  went 
speedily  to  visit  him  at  Sardis,  and  solicited  a  renewal  of  the  pecu- 
niary aid.  The  young  prince  said  in  reply  that  all  the  funds  which 
he  had  received  from  Susa  had  already  been  expended,  with  much 
more  besides;  in  testimony  of  which  he  exhibited  a  specification  of 
the  sums  furnished  to  each  Peloponnesian  officer.  Nevertheless  such- 
w^as  his  partiality  for  Lysander,  that  he  complied  even  witli  the  addi- 
tional demand  now  made,  so  as  to  send  him  away  satisfied.  The 
latter  was  thus  enabled  to  retnrn  to  Ephesus  in  a  state  for  restoring 
the  effective  condition  of  his  fleet.  He  made  good  at  once  all  the 
arrears  of  pay  due  to  the  seamen— constituted  new  trierarchs— sum- 
moned Eteonikus  with  the  fleet  from  Chios  together  with  all  the 


310 


AFTER  TUE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUSiE. 


Hi 


other  scattered  squadron — and  directed  tliat  fresh  triremes  should  be 
immediately  put  on  the  stocks  at  Antaiidrus. 

In  none  of  the  Asiatic  towns  was  the  effect  of  Lysander's  second 
advent  felt  more  violently  than  at  j\Iiletus.  He  had  there  a  power- 
ful faction  or  association  of  friends,  who  had  done  their  ])est  lo  li;un- 
per  antl  annoy  Kallikraiidas  on  his  first  arrival,  hut  liad  been  put  to 
silence,  and  even  forced  to  make  a  show  of  zeal,  by  the  straiulitfor- 
Avard  resolution  of  that  noble-mined  adndral.  Enger  to  reimburse 
themS''lve3  for  this  humiliation,  they  now  formed  a  conspiracy,  wiih 
the  privity  and  concurrence  of  Lysander,  to  seize  the  ^iiovernnient  for 
themselves.  They  determined  (if  Plutarch  and  Diodorus  are  to  be 
credited)  to  put  down  the  existing-  democrncy,  and  establish  Jui  oli- 
garchy in  its  place,  But  we  cannot  believe  that  there  could  liave 
existed  a  democracy  at  ^liletus,  which  Imd  now  been  for  five  years 
in  dependence  u])on  Sparta  and  tbe  Persians  jointly.  AVe  nuist 
r.-ither  understand  the  movement  as  a  (ontlict  Ixtween  two  oliuarchi- 
cal  parties;  the  friends  of  Lysander  being  more  thorouirhly  self-seek- 
ing and  anti-popular  than  their  opponents— and  perhaps  even  crying 
them  down,  by  comparison,  as  a  democracy,  Lysander  lent  himself 
to  the  scheme — fanned  the  ambition  of  the  consj^irators,  who  were 
at  one  time  disposed  to  a  compromise — and  even  betrayed  the  gov- 
ernment into  a  false  security,  by  promises  of  si.pport  which  he  never 
intended  to  fulfill.  At  the  festival  of  the  Dionysia,  the  conspirators, 
rising  in  arms,  seized  forty  of  their  chief  ojiponents  in  their  houses, 
and  three  hundred  more  in  the  market-place;  while  the  government 
— confiding  in  the  promises  of  J^ysander.  \vh(>  afiec'ed  to  rej)r()ve, 
but  secretly  continued  instigaling,  the  insurgents-  m..de  but  a  faint 
resistance.  The  three  hundred  and  forty  leaders  thus  seized,  j^rob- 
ably  men  who  had  gone  lieartily  along  with  Kallikratidas,  were  all 
put  to  death;  anda  still  larger  number  of  citizens,  not  less  tjian  MdV.O, 
fied  into  exile.  ^Miletus  thus  passed  cemplelely  into  the  hands  of  the 
friends  and  partisans  of  Lysander. 

It  would  appear  that  factious  movements  in  other  towns,  less  re- 
volting in  respect  of  bloodshed  and  jXTfidy,  yet  still  of  similarcharac- 
ter  to  that  of  Miletus,  marked  the  re-ap[)earance  of  Lj'sander  in  Asia; 
placing  the  towns  more  and  more  in  the  hands  of  his  jiartisans. 
AVhile  thus  ac(iuiring  greater  ascendency  amoijg  tlie  allies,  Lysand<  r 
received  a  sununons  from  f'vrus  to  visit  him  at  Sardis.  The  vounir 
prince  had  just  been  sent  for  to  come  and  visit  his  father  Darius,  who 
■\v;is  both  old  and  dangerously  ill  in  ]\Iedia.  About  to  depart  for  this 
purpose,  he  carried  his  confidence  in  Lysaiuler  so  far  as  to  delegate 
to  him  the  management  of  his  satrapy  and  his  entire  revenues.  Be- 
sides his  adnuration  for  the  superior  energy  and  capacity  of  the  Greek 
character,  with  Avhich  he  had  0!dy  recently  contracted  acquaintance 
— and  Ix'sides  his  esteem  for  the  personal  disinteresledness  of  Lysan- 
der, attested  as  it  had  been  l)y  the  conduct  of  the  latter  in  the  first 
visit  and  banquet  at  Surdib — Cyrus  was  probably  induced  to  this  step 


INACTION  OF  THE  ATHENIAN  FLEET.  311 

i.^fTiP  f  .nr  of  raisin-  unto  hunseU  a  rival,  if  he  trusted  the  like 
^^  ^^n  u  Visi- ^-iMHl.e  At  the  same  time  that  he  handed 
power  to  auN      us  an    1     u.  Lysander,  he  assured 

Jum  01  ms  .  vt-.iti^    111  ,,\,],.,i    i-,r  f^ntre-iiinf  that  lie  would  by 

Laceda.nKm  ans;   HMU   a,  >,■  im^^^^^^ 

no  means  engaue  m  am  ^uuuxiik     j  ^..^cut  of  Ar'dnusse  hav- 

lK..m  sine,  the  f-''"''!'''>!<'''"\'-''l,;'r;:   ;,-,;„  \;=ese  -.vithout  the 

areto  cxphuii  the  '"■'<■''''''* ''''..{^''V'/.'bv  it   chiiin-  the  whole 
lK.arof  no  sefio..,^  ,>p^''-^""»'^  ^^i     ml  -e    n  H'C  com- 

genc-ral  action,  th.'V  ,f  «"I  .;°  >'^^,^^,'r';  ," , ,  l\vsa„cler.  liceim.g  W^ 
various  portions  ot  >!'« 'V  ^i.,v^rl'  f  •on  Eoliesns-Ptorincd  and 
»..ot  to.^,.ther,  ^^:'\jf::^/^^^^^,^'lJ^£,n  G.df.  named 
plnnderod  a  scn.i-Hellen  c  <"«"  '  V  V,,,  r._.,„,i  ,i„.,„.,.  proceeded 
L.d,vi.  whicl.  -■;-,».4'';;;r,  ^e  ,  ,1U  rmal.e  an  exc.ivs  on  across 
to  Unodes.     lie  «as  i-^-"  ""J'',^  ,  ,  „■    j   ^vliere  lie  had  an  inter- 

"."-• -^t;;',:  ';\  f  X  <'ant'     n^    )ckc"eia'.o  tiie  soa-eoas,      The' 
view   with   iVgis,  WAo  <.im«^    1  ihitlun-  wlien  thev  learnt 

Atheni-ans  were  pvep^jn^g  t^  ^^'"^^  y,,    ",Vr^  ,oon  at^e^^^  appeared 

unguarded,     l.vsander  wen    stnngh    t     Abj  d,^^^^^^^^^ 

land,  the  nei^^ld-oring  •''« •^<>'.L:'     ^^^^^    ;,^^^  ^^^^  bre.d 

j5J^i;^r^;:'4atthe^^d]:^^oi;;:!inS'at^^oo.y;  but  Lysander 
left  the  free  inhabitaulrf  uu touched. 


312 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS^. 


VICTORY  OF  /EGOSPOTAMI. 


313 


^ 


The  Athenian  fleet  seems  to  liave  been  employed  in  phirderin"- 
Chios  wlicn  it  received  news  that  the  Laeeda-nionian  comninnderAvas 
.It  the  Heilespont  eng.iired  in  tlie  sit-ire  of  Lampsakiis.  Either  from 
the  want  ot  money,  or  from  otlier  causes  which  we  do  not  understand 
Konon  .-.nd  liis  colh-a.irnes  were  partlv  inactive,  partly  behindhand 
y.iih  Ly>andcr,  tlironghout  all  this  summer.  Thcv  now  foHowed 
Lmi  to  the  Hellespont,  >ailinii-  out  on  the  sea-side  of  Chios  and  Lesbos 
away  from  the  Asiatic  coast,  which  was  all  unfriendly  io  them  They 
reached  Elreus,  at  the  southern  extrenuty  of  the  ( Iier^mese  with 
their  powerful  fleet  of  ISO  triremes  just  in  time  to  hear  wh'ile  at 
their  mornmij:  meal  that  Lys.iiider  was  already  master  of  Lamp- 
sakus;  upon  which  they  immediately  jnoceeded  up  the  siiail  to  Sestos 
and  from  thence,  after  stoi>{)inir  only  to  collect  a  few  provit^ions  still 
further  uj^ — to  a  place  cailed  .Ei^ospotnmi. 

.Egospotami  or  Goat's  River— a  name  of  fatal  srund  to  all  subse- 
quent Athenians— was  a  p'ace  which  had   n(;ih;r<r  to  nccnumjid  it 
except  that  it  was  directly  opposite  to  Lampsakus.  scparaied  by  a 
breadth  of  strait  about  one  mile  and  three  (piarters.     Ii  was  an  <  jxn 
beach,  without  liarbnr,  Without  ooo<l  ancliora-e.  wiihout  eiiher  hou-^es 
or  mhabitants  or  supplies;  so  that  evcrvlhing  r.ecessary  for  ihis  lar«>-c 
army  had  to  be  fetcl.ed  from  Sestos,  about  one  n.ile  and  ihiee  (luart- 
ers  distant  even  by  land,  and  yet  more  distant  by  s(  a   since  it  was 
necessary  to  round  a  headland.     Such  a  station  was  hi-hly  inconve- 
nient ard  dangerous  to  an  ancient  naval  armament,  Nvilhout  anv 
oriranized  commissariat;  for  the  seamen,  beinu;  compelled  to  cro  to  a 
distance  from  tlieir  slnps  in  order  to  ixct  tlieir^nuals.  v.cie  nof  easily 
reassembled.     Y<t  this  was  the  station  chosen  bv  the  Aihenian  .•'•ne- 
r;ils,  with  tlie  full  design  of  compelling  Lysander  to  tiuht  a  bailie 
Rut  the  Laced.emoMian  tidmiral,  who  was  at  Lamjisakus  in  a  harbor* 
Avith  a  well-lurnishcdtown  in  his  rear  and  a  land-force  to  co-operate' 
had  no  intention  of  accepting  the  challeniie  of  his  enemies  at  the 
moment  which  suited  their  convenience.    When  the  Athenians  sailed 
across  the  strait  the  next  mornmg,  thev  found  all  his  .-hips  fullv  man- 
ned—the men  having  already  t.iken  their  morsiing  meal— and*  ran''- 
<  din  perfect  onh-r  of  battle,  with  the  land  force  disj-o.scd  asluae  To 
lend  assistance;  but  with  strict  orders  to  await  attack  and  not  to 
move  forward.      Not  daring  to  atta.ck  him  in  such  a  position   yet 
imable  to  draw  him  out  by  maneuycrinc:  all  tlie  day,  the  Athen'iaiis 
were  at  length  obligecl  to  go  ba.ck  to  YE'jfospotami.'    But  Lvsander 
directed  a  few  swift  sailing  vessels  to  follow  them,  nor  would  lie  sulfer 
his  own  men  to  disembark  until  he  thus  ascertained  that  their  .seamen 
had  actually  dispersed  ashore. 

For  focir  successive  days  this  same  .^Jcene  was  repeated-  the  Athe- 
nians becoming  each  day  more  contident  in  their  own  suix'rior  ^nren«'•th 
and  more  iu]l  of  contempt  for  the  api^arent  cowardice  of  the  enemy. 
It  was  m  yain  that  Alkibiades— who  from  his  own  private  forts  in  the 
Chersonese  witnes.sed  what  was  p:issing— rode  up  to  the  station  and 


remonstrated  with  the  irenerals  on  the  exposed  condition  of  the  fleet 
on  this  open  shore;  uruentlv  advising  them  to  move  round  to  Sestos, 
where  they  would  be  both  close  to  tlieir  own  supplies  and  safe  from 
attack,  as  Lysander  was  at  L.mpsakus— and  from  whence  they  could 
o-o  forth  to  tiirht  whenever  they  chose.     But  the  Athenian  generals, 
especially  Tvdeus  and  ^lenantler,  disregarded  his  advice,  and  even 
dismissed  him  with  the  insulting  taunt,  that  they  were  now  in  com- 
mand, not  he.     Continuing  thus  in  their  exposed  po  iiion,  the  Athe- 
nian seamen  on  each  successive  day  became  more  and  more  careless 
of  their  enemy,  and  rash  in  dispersing  the  moment  they  returned 
back  to  their  own    shore.     At   length,  on   the   fifth   day,  Lysanoer 
ordered  the  scout  ships,  which  he  sent  fcrlh  Xo  watch  the  Athenians 
on  their  return,  to  hoist  a  bright  shic  Id  as  a  signal,  as  soon  as  they 
should  see  the  ships  at  their  anchorage  and  the  crews  ashore  m  quest 
of  their  meal.     The  moment  he  behekl  this  welcome  signal,  he  gave 
orders  to  his  entire  fleet  to  row^  ac-ross  as  swiftly  as  possible  fioni 
Lampsakus  to  yEgospotami,  while  Thorax  marched  along  the  strand 
with  the  land-force  in  case  of  need.     Nothing  could  be  more  coni- 
plete  or  decisive  than  the  surprise  of  the  Athenian  fleet.     All  the  tri- 
remes were  cau«i-ht  at  their  moorings  ashore,  some  entirely  deserted, 
others  with  one  Or  at  most  two  of  the  three  tires  oi  rowers  which 
formed  their  complement.     Out  of  all  the  total  of  180,  only  twelve 
were  found  in  tolerable  order  and  preparation;  the  trireme  of  Konon 
himself,   toiicther  with  a  S{!u:i(lron  ot  seven  under   his   immediate 
orilers— and  the  consecrated  ship  called  Paralus.' always  manned  by 
picked  Athenian  seamen,  being  among  them.     It  was  in  yam  that 
Konon,  on  seeing  the  fleet  of  Lysander  approaching,  employed  his 
utmost'  efforts  to  get  his  fleet  manned  and  in  some  condition  for 
resistance.      The  attempt  was  desperate,  and  the  utmost  which  he 
could  do  was  to  escape  himself  with  the  snvdl  s([uadron  of  tvrelve, 
including-  the  Paralus.      All  the  remaining  triremes,  nearly  170  in 
number,%vere  captured  by  Lysander  on  the  shore,  defenceless,  and 
seeminji'ly  without  the  least  attemj»t  on  the  part  of  any  one  t^  resist. 
lie  landed  and  made  prisoners  most  of  the  crews  ashore,  thoudiromc 
of  them  fled  and  found  shelt<M-  in  the  neighboring  forts.     Thi^^  pro- 
(rnnous  and  uni>aralleled  victory  was  obtained,  not  merely  wiihoiit 
the  loss  of  a  sini-le  ship,  but  almost  wiihout  th:it  of  a  single  man. 

Of  the  number  of  prisoners  taken  by  l^ysander— wliich  inu>t  have 
been  very  «n-eat  since  the  total  crews  of  ISO  triremes  were  not  less 
than  no  000  meii— we  hear  only  of  8,000  or  4.000  native  Athenians, 
thomdi  this  number  cannot  represent  all  the  native  Athenians  i\\  the 
fleet''  The  Athenian  licnerals  Philokles  and  Adeimantus  were  cer- 
tainly taken,  and  seeminglvall  except  Koncm.  Some  of  the  (h-ieated 
armament  took  refuge  in  Sestos.  which  however  surrendered  with 
little  resistance  to  the  victor.  He  admitted  them  to  capitulation  on 
condition  of  their  iroing  back  i.nmediately  to  Athens,  ami  nowhere 
else-  for  he  was  desirous  to  mulLTly '^*^  much  as  possible  the  num- 


IBgjiE-'  C  ■^'■.-  *-»    J..  -..  .J^'  t  '■■ 


314 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS^. 


DISTRESS  AT  ATHENS. 


815 


bcrs  assembled  in  that  city,  Unowin,!]c  well  that  it  would  be  the  sooner 
starved  out.  Konon  too  ^vas  wl-II  aware  that  to  go  haek  to  Alliens, 
after  the  ruin  of  the  entire  tleet,  was  to  become  c^ne  of  the  eertnin 
prisoners  in  a  doomed  city;  and  to  meet,  besides,  the  indignation  of 
his  fellow  citizens,  ^o  wefl-deserved  by  tlie  genends  collectively.  Ac- 
cordinirly  he  resolved  to  take  shelter  with  Evagoras,  i)rince  of  Salamis 
in  the  island  of  ('y|irus,  sending  the  Paralus  with  some  others  of  the 
twelve  fuiritive  triremes  to  make  known  the  fatal  news  at  Athens. 
But  before'he  went  thither,  he  crossed  the  strait— with  singular  daring 
under  the  circumslances — to  Cape  Abarnis  ra  ihe  terrihiry  of  Larnp- 
sakus,  Avhere  the  great  sails  of  Lysandei's  triremes  (alwa3s  taken  out 
when  a  trireme  was  made  ready  for  lighting)  lay  seemingly  unguarded. 
Tiiese  sails  he  t(>ok  away,  so  as  to  lessen  the  enemy's  powers  of  pur- 
suit, and  then  made  the' best  of  his  way  to  Cyprus. 

On  the  very  diiy  of  the  victory,  Lysander  sent  ofT  the  ^Milesian  pri- 
vateer, Theopompiis  to  proclaim  it  at  ^^parta,  who,  by  a  wonderful 
speed  of  rowing,  r.rrivcd  tiiere  and  made  it  known  on  the  third  day 
after  starting.  "The  captured  ships  were  towed  olf,  and  the  prisonc^rs 
carried  across  to  Lami^s.-dvus,  where  a  general  assembly  of  tiie  viclo 
rious  allies  v;as  convened,  to  determine  in  whnt  manner  the  ]iris()ners 
should  be  treateil.  In  tills  assembly  the  most  l)itter  inculpations  wc  re 
l>ut  forth  a'i-ainst  the  Athenians,  as  to  the  manner  in  which  they  had 
recentlv  dealt  Avith  their  cnplives.  The  Athenian  gene  ral  I'liilokles, 
having' captured  a  Corinthian  and  an  Andrian  trireme,  had  put  the 
crewslo  death  bv  hurling  them  headloiig  from  a  precipice.  It  was  not 
ditTicidt,  in  Grecian  warfare,  for  eacli  of  the  hclligert  iiis  to  cite  pre- 
cedents of  cruelty  against  the  other.  In  this  (!el>ate  soim'  speakers 
atlirmed  that  the  Athenians  had  deliberated  what  they  should  do  with 
their  prisoners,  in  case  they  had  been  victorious  at  ^:gM)pot:;nii:  and 
that  they  had  determined— ."hietly  on  the  motion  of  Philokies,  I  ul  in 
spite  of  the  opposition  of  Aaeimantus— that  they  would  cut  oil  the 
riirht  hands  of  all  who  were  captured.  Whatever  opinion  Philokies 
rnay  have  expressed  personally,  it  is  highly  improbable  thai  any  such 
determination  was  ever  taken  by  the  Athenians.  In  tiiis  assembly  of 
the  allies,  how(;ver,  besides  alf  that  could  be  said  against  Atlicns 
with  truth,  doubtless  the  most  extravagant  falsehoods  found  ready 
credence.  All  the  Athenian  prisoners  captured  at  ^Egospotami,  3,0t)0 
or  4,000  in  number,  were  massacred  forthwiUi— Philokies  hiniself  at 
their  head.  The  latter,  taunted  by  Lysander  with  his  cruel  execu- 
tion of  the  Corinthian  aiul  Andrian  crews,  (iis(hiined  to  return  any 
raiswer,  but  placed  himself  in  conspicuous  vestments  at  the  liea(l  of 
tlic  prisoners  led  out  to  execution.  If  we  may  believe  Pausanias, 
even  the  Ixulies  of  the  prisoners  were  left  unburied. 

Never  was  a  victory  more  complete  in  itself,  more  ovcrwhelnung  in 
its  consequences,  or  more  Un)i-oughly  disgraceful  to  the  defe.iied 
generals  taken  collectively,  than  that  of  /Egosi)otami.  Whether  it 
was  in  reality  very  glorious  to  Lysmider,  is  doubtful;  for  the  general 


belief  afterward — not  merely  at  Athens,  but  seemingly  in  other  parts 
of  Greece  also — held  that  tlie  Athenian  fleet  had  been  sold  to  perdi- 
tion by  the  treason  of  some  of  its  own  commanders.  Of  such  a  sus- 
])i(,'ion  both  Konon  and  Philokies  stand  clear.  Adeimantus  was 
named  as  the  ciiief  traitor,  and  Tydeus  along  with  him.  Konon  even 
jireferred  an  accusation  against  Adeimantus  to  this  effect,  probably 
by  letter  written  home  from  Cyprus,  and  ])erhaps  by  some  formal  de- 
claration made  several  years  afterward,  when  he  returned  to  Athens 
as  vielor  from  the  Ixittlc  of  Knidus.  The  truth  of  the  chai'ge  cannct 
be  positively  demonstrated,  but  all  the  circumstances  of  the  battle 
tend  to  render  it  probable,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  Ivonon  alone  among 
all  the  generals  was  found  in  a  decent  state  of  preparation.  Indeed 
we  may  add,  that  the  utter  impotence  and  inertness  of  the  numerous 
Athenian  ile(;t  during  the  whole  summer  of  405  B.C.,  conspire  to  sug- 
gest a  similar  explanation.  Nor  could  Lysander,  master  as  he  was  of 
all  the  treasures  of  Cyrus,  apply  any  portion  of  them  more  eflica- 
ciously  than  in  corrupting  one  or  more  of  tlie  six  Athenian  generals, 
so  as  to  nullify  all  the  energy  and  ability  of  Konon. 

Tiie  great  defeat  of  ^Egospot ami  took  place  about  September  405 
B.  c.  it  wtis  made  known  at  Peineus  by  the  Paralus,  which  arrived 
there  during  the  night,  coming  straiglit  from  the  Hellespont.  Such  a 
moment  of  distress  and  agony  had  never  been  experienced  at  Athens. 
The  terrible  disaster  in  Sicily  had  become  known  to  the  people  by 
degrees,  without  any  authorized  reporter;  but  here  was  the  otlieitd 
messenger,  fresh  from  the  scene,  leaving  no  room  to  question  the 
maiinitude  of  the  disaster  or  the  irreparable  ruin  impending  over  the 
city.  The  wailing  and  cries  of  woe,  first  beginning  in  Pinvus,  were 
transmitted  by  the  guards  stationed  on  the  Long  Walls  up  the  city. 
•'On  tiiat  night  (says  Xenoplion)  not  a  man  slept;  not  merely  from 
sorrow  for  the  past  calamity,  but  from  terror  for  the  future  fate  Avitli 
which  they  themselves  were  now  menaced,  a  retribution  for  what 
they  had  themselves  inflicted  on  the  ^Eginetans,  Melians,  Skion.Tans, 
and  others."  After  this  nigiit  of  misery,  they  met  in  public  assemlily 
on  the  following  day,  resoiVinnrto  make  the  best  preparations  they 
could  for  a  siege,  to  put  the  walls  in  full  state  of  defense,  and  to 
block  u])  two  out  of  the  three  ports.  For  Athens  thus  to  renounce 
her  maritime  action,  the  pride  and  glory  cf  the  city  ever  since  the 
battle  of  Salamis— and  to  confine  herself  to  a  defensive  attitude  withi:i 
her  own  wall  was  a  humiliation  which  left  nothing  worse  to  be  en-J 
dured  except  actual  ftiinine  and  surrender. 

Lysander  was  in  no  hurry  to  pass  from  the  TTellespont  to  Athens. 
lie  knew  that  no  further  corn-ships  from  the  Euxine,  and  suppliis 
from  other  (piarters.  could  now  reach  Athens;  and  that  the  power  of 
the  city  to  hold  out  against  blockade  must  necessarily  be  very 
limited;  the  more  limited,  the  greater  the  numbers  accumulated 
within  it.  Accordingly,  he  permitted  the  Athenian  garrisons  which 
capitulated,  tO  go  only  to  xVtheus,  and  nowhere  else.     His  first  meas- 


316 


AFTER  THE  CATTLE  OF  ARGINUS.E. 


OATH  OF  MUTUAL  ILVRMONY. 


317 


lire  was  tomakoliimself  master  of  Clialkcdon  andRyzanliiim,  where 
lie  placed  the  Laceda?nioniaii  Slhenelaus  as  Larmost  \vitli  a  garrLson. 
Kext  he  ]>assed  lo  Lesl-.os,  where  he  made  siiiiihir  arrangements  at 
3Iitylene  and  other  cities.  In  them,  as  well  as  in  the  otiier  cities 
which  now  came  under  his  pvAver,  he  constituted  an  oliiiarchy  often 
native  cilizeiis  chosen  from  among  his  most  (hiring  and  unscrupuU)US 
partisans,  and  c:dled  a  Dekarchy,  or  Dekadarehy,  to  govern  in  con- 
junction witli  the  Lacedtemonian  harmost.  Eteonikus  was  sent  to 
the  Thracian  cities  whicli  had  heen  in  dependence  on  Athens  to 
introduce  similiar  clKing»s.  In  Thasus,  however,  this  change  ^yas 
stained  i)v  much  hh^odshed:  tliere  was  a  numerous  philo-Atlieni;m 
party  whom  Lysander  caused  to  be  alhired  out  of  their  j)lace  of  con- 
cealment into  Uie  temple  of  llerakles,  under  the  false  assurance  of 
an  anmcstv;  when  assemhled  under  this  ])ledge.  they  were  all  put  to 
di'ath.  baiigi'.inarv  pror-eedings  of  the  like  character,  many  in  the 
I)resence  of^Lv.-ander  himself,  togetlier  with  large  expulsions  of 
citizens  ohnoxious  to  his  new  dekarchies,  sigiralized  everywhere  the 
suh.^ilution  of  Spp.rlaii  for  Athenian  ascendency.  But  nowhere, 
except  at  Samos,  did  the  citizens  or  the  philo-Atheniau  party  in  the 
cities  continue  anv  open  hostility,  or  resist  hy  force  Lysander's 
entrance  and  his  revolutionary  changes.  At  Srmios  they  still  held 
out:  the  people  liad  too  much  dread  of  that  oligarchy,  whom  they 
had  expelled  in  the  insurrecti(m  of412ii.c.,  to  yield  without  a  fur- 
ther sii-u'jule.  AVith  this  single  reserve,  every  city  in  alliance  or 
dependeiiee  up<m  Athens  suhmitted  without  resistance  both  to  the 
su])remacy  and   the    subversive  measures    of    the    Lacediumonian 

admiial. 

The  Alheni:^.ii  empire  was  thus  annihilated,  and  Athens  left 
altoii-ether  alone.  AVliat  was  hardly  less  painful— all  her  Kleruchs 
or  ot:t-cilizens  whom  she  hnd  formerly  pltinted  in  .Egina,  Melos,  and 
elsewhere  througiioiit  tlie  islands,  as  well  as  in  the  Chersonese,  were 
r.ovv  deprived  of  their  properties  and  driven  home.  The  leading 
I)hilo-At'i>.enia!i^,  too,  -i  Thasus.  liyzantium.  and  other  deper.deiit 
cities,  were  forced  to  abandon  their  hwmes  in  the  like  state  of  destitu- 
tion, and  to  seek  shelter  at  Athens.  Everything  thus  contributed  to 
agirravate  the  impoverishment,  and  the  manifold  sulTering,  physical 
as  well  as  moral  wiihin  her  walls.  Notwithstanding  the  press.ure  of 
present  calamitv,  however,  and  yet  worse  prospects  for  the  future, 
tlie  Athenians  prepared  as  best  they  could  for  an  honorable  resist- 
ance. 

It  was  one  of  their  first  measures  to  provide  for  the  restoration  of 
harmonv,  and  to  interest  all  in  the  derense  of  the  city,  by  removing 
cverv  sort  of  disabijitv  under  which  individual  citizens  might  now  be 
sullevinfr.  Accordingly  Patrokleiiles— having  tirst  obtained  special 
lu'rmission  from  the  people,  without  which  it  would  have  been 
unc{msiitution:d  to  make  any  proposition  for  abrogating  Sentences 
iudicially  passed,  or  releasing  debtors  regularly  inscribed  in  the  pub- 


lic registers— submitted  a  decree  such  as  had  never  been  mooted  since 
the  period  when  Athens  was  in  a  condition  equally- desperate,  during 
the  advancing  march  of  Xerxes.  All  debtors  to  the  state,  either 
recent  or  of  long  standing— all  olhcial  persons  now  under  investiga- 
tion by  the  Logistic  or  about  to  be  brought  before  the  dikastery  on 
the  usual  accountability  after  otlice— all  persons  who  Avere  liquidating 
bv  instalment  debts  due  to  the  ])Ublic,  or  had  given  bail  for  sums  thus 
Q;ving— all  persons  who  had  been  condemned  eitiier  to  total  dis- 
frandiisement,  or  to  some  specific  disqualification  or  disability— nay, 
even  all  those  who,  having  been  either  members  or  auxiliaries  of  the 
Four  Hundred,  had  stood  trial,  afterward,  and  had  been  condemned 
to  anv  one  of  the  above-mentioned  penalties- all  these  persons  were 
pardoned  and  released;  every  register  of  the  pemdty  or  condemnation 
being  directed  to  be  destroyed.  From  this  comprehensive  pardon 
were  excepted— Those  among  the  Four  Hundred  who  had  tied  from 
Athens  without  standing  their  trial— Those  who  had  been  condemned 
either  to  exile  or  to  death  by  the  Areopagus  or  any  of  the  other  con- 
stituted tribunals  for  homicide,  or  for  subversion  of  the  public  liberty. 
Not  merely  the  public  registers  of  all  the  condemnations  thus  released 
were  ordered  to  be  destroyed,  but  it  was  for))idden,  under  severe 
penalties,  to  any  piiv:ite  citizen  to  keep  a  copy  of  them,  or  to  make 
anv  allusion  to  such  misfortunes. 

tursuant  to  the  comprehensive  amnesty  and  forgiveness  adopted 
by  the  ]ieople  in  this  decree  of  Patrokleides,  the  general  body  of 
citizens  swore  to  each  other  a  solemn  pledge  of  mutual  harmony  in 
the  acropolis.  The  reconciliation  thus  introduced  enabled  them  the 
better  to  bear  up  under  their  distress;  especially  as  the  persons 
relieved  by  the  amnesty  were  for  the  most  part  not  men  politically 
disaffected,  like  the  exiles.  To  restore  the  latter,  Avas  a  measure 
which  no  one  thought  of:  indeed  a  large  proportion  of  them  had 
been  and  were  still  at  Dekeleia,  assisting  the  Lacedtemonians  in  their 
Avarfare  auniinst  xVthens.  But  even  the  most  prudent  internal  meas- 
ures could  do  little  for  Athens  in  reference  to  her  cai)ilal  dilficulty— 
tliat  of  procuring  subsistence  for  the  numerous  population  Avithin 
her  walls,  auiiiuented  every  day  by  outlying  garrisons  and  citizens. 
She  had  long  been  shut  oiit  from  the  produce  of  Attica  by  the  gar- 
rison at  Dekelia:  she  obtained  nothing  from  Euba^a,  and  since  the 
late  defeat  of  .Egospotami.  nothing  from  the  Eiixine.  from  Thrace, 
or  from  the  islands.  Perhaps  some;  corn  may  still  have  reached  her 
from  Cyprus,  and  her  small  remaining  navy  did  Avhat  Avas  ]>ossible 
to  keep  Peineus  supplied,  in  sjiite  of  the  menacing  ]irohibition  of 
Lvsander,  preceding  his  arrival  to  block  it  up  effectually;  but  to 
accumulate  any  stock  for  a  siege  Avas  utterly  impossible. 

At  length,  about  November 40")  B.C.,  Lysander  reached  the  Saronic 
Gulf,  having  sent  iniimation  beforehand  both  to  Agis  and  to  the 
Lacechemonlans  that  lie  was  approaching  Avitli  a  fleet  of  200  triremes. 
The  full  Lacediemoniau  and  Pcloponnesian  force  (all  except  the 


318 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGTNUS.E. 


Arirciaiis),  under  King  Pausaiiias,  was  marched  into  Attica  to  meet 
him,  fiml  encamped  in  the  precinct  of  Akademns,  at  the  gates  of 
Alliens:  Avliile  Lysan<ler,  first  comini:^  to  ^Egina  witli  liis  over- 
-vvhelniin'r  tleet  of'loO  sail— next,  ravaging  Sahimis— bh)cked  np  com- 
plelely  the  hai-bor  of  Peiranis.  It  was  one  of  his  first  mer.snres  to 
collect  logelh'jr  tho  remnant  which  he  could  find  of  the  ^ginetan 
and  McH.m  popiil:  tions,  whom  Athens  had  expelled  and  destroyed; 
and  to  restore  to  ;   em  the  possession  of  their  ancient  islands. 

Tlionub  allhoiK;  had  now  tied,  the  pride,  the  resolution,  and  tl;c 
dcspair^of  lilheus,  still  enabled  her  citizens  to  bear  up;  nor  Mas 
it  u'ltil  some  men  actuidly  began  to  die  of  hunger  that  they  sent  pr(>- 
po.^itions  to  entreat  peace.  Even  then  their  j^ropositions  weie  not 
without  dignitv.  They  proposed  to  Agis  to  become  allies  of 
Spnrta,  retaining  their  \valls  entire  and  their  fortified  harbor  of 
PeirjL'Us.  Agis  referred  the  envoys  to  the  Ephors  at  Sparta,  to 
whom  he  at  the  same  time  transmitted  a  statement  of  their  pro- 
])ositions.  But  the  Ephors,  not  deigning  even  to  admit  the  envoys 
to  an  intervu'W,  sent  messens.ers  to  meet  them  at  i^ellasia  on  the 
frontier  of  Laconia.  desiring  that  they  would  go  back  and  come  again 
jn-epared  Avitli  something  "more  admissible— and  acquainting  them 
nt  the  same  time  that  no  proposition  could  be  received  which 
did  TMit  include  tlie  demolition  of  the  Long  Walls,  for  a  continuous 
len-th  of  ten  stadia.  With  this  gloomv  reply  the  envoys  returned. 
Nofwithslanding  all  the  suffering  in  the  city,  the  senate  and  people 
would  not  consent  even  to  take  such  humiliating  terms  into  con- 
sideration. A  senator  named  Archestratus,  who  advised  that  they 
slumld  be  acce])ted.  was  placed  in  custody,  and  a  general  vote  was 
l^a^sotl,  on  the  proposition  of  Kleophon,  forbidding  any  such  motion 

in  future. 

tSuch  a  vote  demonstrates  the  courageous  patience  both  of  the 
senate  and  the  people:  but  unhappily  it  supplied  no  improved  pros- 
l^ects.  while  the  sntfering  within  the  walls  continued  to  become  more 
and  more  aiiirravaleil. '  Under  these  circumstances,  Theramenes 
offered  to  ao^is  envoy  to  Lvsander  and  Sparta,  affirming  tliat  he 
should  be  abl(?  to  detect  what  "the  real  intention  of  the  Ephors  wasm 
renard  to  Atliens— wiiether  they  really  intended  to  root  out  the 
population  and  Sv'U  them  as  slave>.  He" pretended  further  to  possos 
personal  intluence,  fomuled  on  circumstances  which  he  coukl  not 
divulge,  such  as  would  very  probably  insure  a  mitigation  of  tlie 
doomT  He  was  accordinglv*sent,  in  spite  of  strong  protest  from  tlie 
senate  of  Areopagus  and  others:  yet  with  no  express  powers  to  con- 
clude, but  simi>lv  to  in(piire  an«l  report.  We  hear  with  astonishn.int 
that  lie  n-mained  more  llian  three  months  as  companion  of  Lysandcr. 
who  (he  alleiifd)  had  detained  him  thus  long,  and  had  only  acquainted 
him.  after  the  fourth  month  had  begim,  that  no  one  but  the  Ephors 
liad  any  ]unver  to  irrant  Dcac  e.  It  .seems  to  have  been  the  object  of 
Thcraiiienes,  by  this  long  delay,   to  wear  out  the  patience  of  the 


SECOND  E:\IBASSY   of  THERxVMENES. 


319 


Athenians,  and  to  bring  them  into  such  a  state  of  intolerable  suf- 
fc'in^^  that  they  would  submit  to  any  terms  of  peace  which  would 
oiilv'brin.-'-  provisions  into  the  town.  In  this  scheme  he  completely 
succeeded;  and  considtM'ing  how  great  were  the  privjitions  of  the 
people  even  at  the  monicntOf  his  departure,  it  is  not  easy  to  mider- 
stand  how  they  could  have  been  al)le  to  sustain  protracted  and 
increasing  famine  for  three  months  longer. 

We  make  out  little  that  is  distinct  respecting  these  last  moments  of 
.imperial  Athens.  We  find  only  an  heroic  endurance  disi)!ayed,  to 
such  a  point  that  nund)ers  actually  died  of  starvation,  without  any 
Offer  to  surrender  on  humiliating  comlilions.  Amid  the  general 
acrimony,  and  exasperated  special  antipathies,  arising  out  of  such  a 
state  of  'miserv,  the  leading  men  who  stood  out  most  earnestly  tor 
prolonged  resistance  became  successively  victims  to  the  prosecutions 
of  the  enemies.  The  demagogue  Kleophon  was  condemned  and  put 
to  death,  on  the  accusation  of  having  evaded  his  military  dr.ty;  the 
senate  whose  temper  and  proceedings  he  had  denounced,  constituting 
itself  a  portion  of  the  DiUastery  which  tried  him— contrary  both  to 
the  forms  and  the  spirit  of  Athenian  judicatures.  Such  proceedings, 
however  though  denounced  bv  orators  in  subsequent  years  as  having 
contributed  toOetrav  the  city 'into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  appear  to 
have  been  without  any  serious  influence  on  the  result,  which  was 
brought  about  purely  by  famine. 

By  the  time  that  Theramenes  returned  after  his  hmg  absence,  so 
terrible  had  the  pressure  l)ecoine  that  he  was  sent  forth  again  f\ith 
instructions  to  conclude  peace  upon  any  term-;.  On  reaching  Sellasia, 
and  acquainting  the  Ephors  that  he  i)rought  with  him  unlimited 
powers  for  peace,  he  was  permitted  to  come  to  Sparta,  where  the 
as.semblvof  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy  was  convened,  to  settle 
on  what  terms  peace  should  be  granted.  The  leadhig  allies,  espe- 
cially Corinthians  and  Thebans,  recommended  that  no  agreement 
shoiild  be  entered  into,  nor  any  further  measure  kept,  with  this  hated 
enemy  now  in  their  power;  Imt  that  the  name  of  Athen-,  should  be 
rooted  out,  and  the  population  sold  for  slaves.  Maiy  of  the  other 
allies  .seconded  the  same  vie\vs,  which  would  have  prob  U)ly  com- 
manded a  majority,  had  it  not  been  for  the  re-^olute  oppo  Uion  of  the 
Lacedaunoniaus  themselves;  who  declared  unequivoeally  tliat^  they 
wo  dd  never  consent  to  annihilate  or  enslave  a  city  which  had  ren- 
der I  such  capital  service  to  all  Greece  at  the  time  of  the  gre.it 
common  danger  from  the  Persians.  Lysan  ler  further  calculated  on 
so  dealin'r  with  Athens,  as  to  make  her  into  a  d-pcnd-Micy,  ami  a'l 
instrument  of  increased  power,  to  Sparta  apart  from  her  allies  Peace 
was  accordingly  granted  on  the  following  conditions:  That  the  Long 
Walls  and  the'  fortitications  of  the  Periteus  sh.)uld  be  destroyed: 
That  the  Athenians  should  evacuate  all  their  foreign  p  )ssessions,  and 
confine  themselves  to  their  own  territory:  That  they  .should  surren- 
der all  their  ships  of  war:  Thai  they  should  readmit  all  their  exiles: 


.■-  ■»  ^~.  .aijitK.  -»■  ■jf^fti.tujaitjMrta.rifcfa^jf 


820 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUSiE. 


That  they  should  become  allies  of  Sparta,  following  her  leader- 
ship both  by  sea  and  land,  and  recognizing  the  same  enemies  and 
friends. 

AVilh  this  document,  written  according  to  Laceda?monian  practice 
on*  a  Skylale  (or  roll  intended  to  go  round  a  slick,  of  wiiich  the 
Laccd'Tmoniun  commander  liad  always  one,  and  the  Ephors  another, 
corrcj^ponding),  Tiieramcnes  went  back  to  Athens.  As  he  cnt(rcd 
the  city,  a  nu.^crable  crowd  tlockcd  round  him.  in  distress  and  terror 
lest  lie  should  have  failed  altogether  in  his  mission.  The  dead  and 
the  dying  had  now  become  so  numerous,  that  peace  at  any  price  was 
a  boon;  nevertheless,  when  he  announced  in  the  asscndjly  the  terms 
of  which  he  was  bearer,  strongly  rcconunt  nding  subnn>.>-i(in  to  the' 
Laccdiemonians  as  the  only  cour.^e  now  optn — there  was  still  a  high- 
spirited  minorit}'  wiio  entered  their  ])iotcst,  and  preferred  dcaili 
by  fandne  to  sucli  insupportable  disgrace.  The  large  majoiily 
however  accepted  them,  and  the  acceptance  was  made  known  to 
Lysander. 

It  was  on  the  IGtli  day  of  the  Attic  month  !>run3'chion  (aT)out  the 
beginning  of  April)  that  this  victorious  conimandcr  sailed  into  tlie 
Peirteus— twenty-seven  years  (almost  exactly)  tdter  that  hurpiise  of 
Plaftea  by  the  1  hebans,  a\  liich  ojiened  the  Pelopounesian  war.  Along 
Avilh  him  came  the  Athenian  exiles,  seveial  of  w  hom  appeared  to 
have  been  serving  with  his  army,  and  assisting  Inm  with  their  coun- 
sel. To  the  population  of  Athens  geneially,  liis  entry  was  an 
immediate  relief,  in  spite  of  the  cruel  degradation,  or  indeed  political 
extinction,  with  which  it  was  accompniiied.  At  least  it  averted  the 
suiferings  and  horrors  of  fannne,  aid  jki nutted  a  decent  interment 
of  the  many  unhappy  victims  who  had  aliejidy  perished.  Tl^ 
Laceda?monians,  botli  naval  and  military  force,  under  Lysander  and 
Agis,  continued  in  occupation  of  Athens  until  the  conditions  of  the 
peace  had  been  fulfilled.  All  the  triremes  in  Peiianis  were  cariieil 
away  by  Lysander,  except  twelve,  which  heiermitlcd  the  Athenians 
to  retain:  the  Ephors  in  their  ISkytale  had  left  it  to  his  di.-cretion 
"wliat  number  he  would  thus  allc^w.  The  iintlni^hcd  ships  in  the 
dockyards  were  burnt,  and  the  arsenals  them>elves  ruined.  To 
demoli>h  the  Long  AValls  and  the  fortifications  of  Peiia-ns,  was  how- 
ever a  work  of  some  time;  ;;nd  a  certain  ni.mber  of  days  were 
granted  to  the  Athenians,  within  Avhich  it  was  rtquiied  to  be  com- 
pleted. In  the  beginning  of  the  work,  the  Laccdamoniansand  their 
allies  all  lent  a  hand,  w  ith  the  full  pride  and  exultation  of  concpicr- 
ors;  andd  \v(,nien  i)iavin!X  the  Mhte  and  dancers  crowned  with 
^vleaths;  ndngled  with  joyful  e.\cl.';in;.tions  fn  ni  the  Pelcponne.^ian 
allies,  that  this  was  the  fust  clav  of  Grecian  freedom,  llow  n.anv 
days  were  allowed  for  the  humiliating  duty  imposed  upon  Athenian 
hands,  of  demolishing  the  elaborate,  tutelary,  and  commanding 
works  of  their  forefathers — we  are  not  told.  But  the  business  was 
not  completed  within  the  interval  named,  so  that  the  Athenians  did 


TRIUMPH  OF  THE  OLIGARCHS. 


321 


not  come  up  to  the  letter  of  the  conditions,  and  had  therefore  by 
strict  construction  forfeited  their  title  to  the  peace  granted.  The 
interval  seems  however  to  have  been  prolonged;  probably  con- 
sidering that  for  the  retd  labor,  as  well  as  the  melancholy  character, 
of  the  work  to  be  done,  too  short  a  time  had  been  allowed  at  first. 

It  appears  that  Lysander,  after  assisting  at  the  solemn  ceremony 
of  beginning  to  demolisii  the  walls,  and  making  such  a  breach  as  left 
Athens  without  any  substantial  means  of  resistance — did  not  remain 
to  complete  the  work,  but  withdrew  with  a  portion  of  his  fleet  to 
undertake  the  siege  of  Samos,  which  still  held  out  leaving  the  re-^ 
mainder  to  see  that  the  conditions  imposed  wx're  fufilled.  After  so  • 
long  an  endurance  of  extreme  misery,  doubtless  the  general  popula- 
tion thought  of  little  except  relief  from  famine  and  its  accompmi- 
ments,  without  any  disposition  to  contend  against  the  fiat  of  their 
conquerors.  If  some  high-si)irited  men  formed  an  exception  to  the 
pervading  impression,  and  still  kept  up  their  courage  against  better 
days — there  was  at  the  same  time  a  p  irty  of  totally  opposite  charac- 
ter, to  whom  the  prostrate  condition  of  Athens  was  a  source  of 
revenge  for  the  past,  exultation  for  the  present,  and  ambitious  pro- 
jects ifor  the  future.  These  were  partly  the  i-emnant  of  that  faction 
which  had  set  up  (seven  years  before)  the  oligarchy  of  Four  Hundred 
—and still  more,  the  exiles,  including  several  members  of  the  Four 
Hundred,  wdio  now  flocked  in  from  all  c|uarters.  Many  of  them  had 
been  long  .serving  at  Dekeleia,  and  had  fornied  a  part  of  the  forgs 
blockading  Athens.  These  exiles  now  revisited  the  acropolis  as  con- 
querors, and  .saw  wdth  delight  the  full  accomplishment  of  that  foreign 
occupation  at  which  many  of  them  had  aimed  seven  years  before, 
when  they  constructed  the  fortress  of  Eetioneia.  as  a  means  of  insur- 
ing their  own  power.  Though  the  conditions  imposed  extinguished 
as  once  the  imperial  cliaracter,  the  maritime  power,  the  honor,  and 
tiie  independence  of  Athens,  these  men  were  as  eager  as  Lysander 
to  carry  them  all  into  execution;  because  the  continuance  of  the 
Athenian  democracy  w^as  now  entirely  at  his  mercy,  and  because  his 
establishment  of  oligarchies  in  the  other  subdued  cities  plainly  inti- 
mated what  he  would  do  in  this  great  focus  of  Grecian  democratical 
impulse. 

Among  these  exiles  were  comprised  Aristodemus  and  Aristoteles, 
both  seemingly  persons  of  importance,  the  former  havi'mr  at  one  time 
been  one  of  the  Hellenc^tamijc,  the  first  financial  office  of  the  imperial 
democracy,  and  the  latter  an  active  member  of  the  Four  lIundreHl; 
also  Charikles,  who  had  ])een  so  distir;guished  for  liis  violence  in  the 
investigation  respecting  the  llernue — and  another  man.  of  whom  we 
now  for  the  first  time  obtain  historical  knowledge  in  detail — Kritias, 
son  of  KallaBschrus.  He  had  been  among  the  persons  accu.sed  as 
having  been  concerned  in  the  mutilation  of  the  Herma;,  and  seems  to 
have  been  for  a  long  time  important  in  the  political,  the  literary,  and 
the  philosophical  world  of  Athens.     To  all  three,  his  abilities  cj[uali- 

H.  G.  III.— 11 


322 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS.E. 


fied  bim  to  do  honor.  Both  his  poetry,  in  the  Soloninn  or  mornlizins: 
vein— and  his  eloquence,  publislied  specimens  of  wliieh  rcniiiined  in 
the  Augustan  a.L^e — ^vere  of  no  ordinary  merit.  His  ^V(•altlJ  wjis 
larjie,  and  his  family  among  the  most  ancient  and  consiiicuons  in 
Athens;  one  of  his  ancestors  had  been  friend  and  com]>:inion  of  the 
lawgiver  Solon.  He  was  himself  maternal  uncle  of  the  philosoplur 
Plato,  and  had  frequented  the  society  of  Sokrates  so  much  as  to  Imve 
]iis  name  intimately  associated  in  the  public  mind  with  that  renmrk- 
n])]e  man.  We  know  neither  the  cause,  nor  even  the  date  of  his 
exile,  except  so  far  as  that  he  was  not  in  banii^hment  immediately 
after  the  revolution  of  the  Four  Hundred — and  that  he  ?r^/.s  in  baii- 
ishment  at  the  time  wlien  the  generals  were  condemned  after  tiie 
battle  of  ArginustT  '  He  had  passed  the  linje,  or  a  part  of  the  linie  of 
his  exile  in  Thessaly,  where  betook  an  active  part  in  the  sanguinary 
feuds  carried  on  among  the  oligjircbical  parties  of  that  law!e:«s 
country.  He  is  said  to  have  em(>race(l,  along  with  a  leader  named 
(or  surnamed)  Prometheus,  what  passed  for  the  democratical  side  in 
Thessaly;  arming  the  Penestiv  or  serfs  against  their  masters.  AVhat 
the  conduct  and  "dispositions  of  Kritias  had  br(  n  before  this  period, 
we  are  imable  to  say.  But  he  brought  with  him  now,  on  returnii!!: 
from  exile,  not  merely  an  unmeasured  and  un]irincipled  lest  of 
power,  but  also  a  rancorous  impulse  toward  spoliation  and  blood- 
shed which  outran  even  his  ambition,  and  ultimately  ruined  both  his 
party  and  himself. 

Of  all  these  returning  exiles,  animated  with  mingled  vengeance 
and  ambition,  Kritias  Avas  decidedly  the  leading  man,  like  Antipiion 
among  the  Four  Hundred:  partly  from  his  abilities  j^artly  from  the 
superior  violence  with  which  he  carrie<l  out  the  common  sentiment. 
At  the  present  juncture,  he  and  his  fellow-exiles  beeair.e  th(|  nuKst 
important  persons  in  the  city,  as  enjoying  most  the  friendsiiip  and 
contidence  of  the  conquerors.  But  'the  oligarchical  party  at  home 
were  noway  behind  them,  either  in  servility  or  in  revolutionary  fer- 
vor, and  an  understanding  was  soon  established  between  the  two. 
Probably  the  old  ftiction  of  the  Four  Hundred,  though  put  down, 
liad  never  wholly  died  out.  At  any  rate,  the  political  Heta'ries  or 
clubs,  out  of  which  it  was  composed,  still  remained  prepared  for 
»fre.«h  co-operation  when  a  favorable  moment  should  arrive;  and  the 
catastrophe  of  ^Egospotami  had  made  it  i)lain  to  every  one  that  such 
moment  could  not  be  far  distant.  Accordingly  a  large  portion,  if  not 
the  majority,  of  the  senators  became  ready  (o  lend  themselves  to  the 
destruction  of  the  democracy,  and  only  anxious  to  insure  places 
among  the  oligarchy  in  prospect:  while  the  supple  Therann  nes, 
resunimg  his  place  as  oligarchical  leader,  and  abusing  his  missi(.n  as 
envoy  to  wear  out  the  patience  of  his  half-famished  countrymen,  had. 
during  Ids  three  months'  absence  in  the  tent  of  Lysander,  concerted 
arrangements  with  the  exiles  for  future  proceedings. 

As  soon  as  the  city  surrendered,  and  while  the  work  of  demolition 


NOMINATION  OF  THE  THIRTY. 


323 


was  yet  going  on,  the  oligarchical  party  began  to  organize  itself.  The 
meinhers  of  "the  political  clubs  again  came  together,  and  named  a 
managing  committee  of  Five,  called  Ephors  in  compliment  to  the 
Lacedaemonians,  to  direct  the  general  proceedings  of  the  party,  to 
convene  meetings  when  needful,  to  appoint  subordinate  managers  for 
the  various  tribes,  and  to  determine  what  propositions  were  to  be 
submitted  to  the  public  assembly.  Among  these  live  Ephors  were 
Kritias  and  Eratosthenes;  probably  Theramenes  also. 

But  the  oligaichical  party,  though  thus  organized  and  ascendant, 
with  a  coini)liant  senate  and  a  dispirited  people,  and  with  an  auxili-  * 
ary  enemy  actually  in  pos.session,  .still  thought  themselves  not  power- 
ful enough  to  carry  their  intended  changes  without  seizing  the  most 
resolute  of  the  democratical  leaders.  Accordingly  a  citizen  named 
Theokrilus  tendered  an  accusation  to  the  senate  against  the  general 
Stroml)i;"hides,  together  with  several  others  of  the  democratical  gene- 
rals anil  taxiarchs:  supported  by  the  deposition  of  a  slave  or  lowborn 
man,  named  Agoratus.  Although  Nikias  and  several  other  citizens 
tried  to  prevail  upon  Agoratus  to  leave  Athens,  furnished  him  with 
the  means  of  escape,  and  offered  to  go  away  with  him  themselves 
from  Munychia  until  the  political  state  of  Athens  should  come  into  a 
more  assured  condition — yet  he  refused  to  retire,  appeared  before  the 
senate,  and  accused  the  generals  of  being  concerned  in  a  conspiracy 
to  break  up  the  peace;  pretending  to  be  himself  their  accomplice. 
Upon  his  information,  given  both  before  the  senate  and  before  an 
assembly  at  Munychia,  the  generals,  the  taxiarchs,  and  several  other 
citizens,  men  of  high  worth  and  courageous  patriots,  were  put  into 
prison,  as  well  as  Agoratus  himself  to  stand  their  trial  afterward 
before  a  dikastery  consisting  of  3,000  members.  One  of  the  parties 
thus  accused,  Meneslratus,  being  admitted  by  the  public  as.sembly 
(on  the  proposition  of  Hagnodorus  the  brother-in-law  of  Kritias)  to 
become  accusing  witness,  named  several  additional  accomplices,  who 
were  also  forthwith  placed  in  custod}'. 

Thouffli  the  most  determined  defenders  of  the  democratical  con.sti- 
tutioii   were  thus  eliminated,  Kritias  and  Theramenes  still  further 
insured  the  success  of  their  proposition  by  invoking  the  presence  of 
Ly.sander  from  Samos.     The  demolition  of  the  walls  had  been  com- 
pleted, the  main  blockading  army  had  disbanded,  and  the  immediate  , 
pressure  of  famine  had  been  removed,  when  an  assembly  was  held  tO;^ 
deterniiiKj  on  future  modifications  of  the  constitution.     A  citizen  J 
named  Drakontides  m ived  that  a  Board  of  Thirty  should  be  named, 
to  draw  up  laws  for  the  future  government  of  the  city,  and  to  manage 
provisionally  the  public  affairs,  until  that  task  should  be  completed. 
Among  the  Thirty  persons  proposed,  pre-arranged  by  Theramenes 
and  the  oligarchical  tive  Yphors,  the  most  prominent  names  were 
those  of  Kritias  and  Theramenes:  there  were,  besides,  Drakontides 
himself:  Onoinakles,  one  oi   the  Four  Hundred  who  had  escaped; 
Arislotelcs  and  Ciiarikles,  both  exiles  ucwly  returned;  Eratosthenes, 


4i 


324  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUSiE. 

and   others  whom  we  do  not  know,  but  of  whom  prohribly  several 
rid  also  been  exiles  or  members  of  llie  Four  Hundred.     1  bou-li  this 
was  a  complete  abrogation  of  the  constituton.  yet  so  conscious  were 
the  conspirators  of  their  own  strength,  that  they  did  not  deem  it 
necessary  to  propose  the  formal  suspension  ol  the  Graphe  Paraiio- 
mon   as  had  been  done  prior  10  the  iustalhuion  of  the   former  olig- 
•irchv      Still   notwithstanding    the   seizure   of   the   leaders  and   the 
k-nei-alintimidation  prevalent,  a  loud  murmur  of  repugnance  was 
heard  in  the  assembly  at  the  motion  of   Drakontides.     but    J  hera- 
meues  rose  up  to  defy  the  murmur,  telling  the  assembly  that  the 
proDosition  numbered  many  partisans  even  among  the  citizens  them- 
selves  and  that  it  had  further  the  approbation  of  Lysander  and  the 
Lacedlrmouians.     This  was  presently  confirmed  by  Lysander  him- 
self who  addressed  the  assembly  in  person.     He  told  them  in  a  men- 
aciu"-  and  contemptuous  tone  that  Athens  was  now  at  his  mercy  since 
the  walls  had  not  been  demolished  before  the  day  specified,  and  con- 
sequently the  conditions  of  the  promised  peace  had  been  violated. 
He  added  that  if  they  did  not  adoi)t  the  recommendation  of   llieia- 
menes  they  would  be  forced  to  take  thought  for  their  personal  safety 
instead  of  for  their  political  constitution.     After  a  notlc^e  at  once  so 
plain  and  so  crushing  further  resistance  was  in  vain.     1  he  dissenti- 
ents all   quitted   the  assembly  in  sadness  and  indignation;  while  a 
remnant-according  to  Lvsias  inconsiderable  in  number  as  well  as 
worthless  in  charac^ter— stayed  to  vote  acceptance  of  the  motion. 

Seven  years  before  Theiamencs  had  carried,  m  conjunction  wita 
Antinhon  and  Phrynicus,  a  similar  motion  for  the  installation  of  the 
Four  Hundred;  extorting  acquiescence  by  domestic  terrorism  as  well 
as  by  multiplied  assassinations.  He  now,  in  conjunction  with  Kntias 
and'therest,  a  second  time  extingnished  the  constitution  of  his  cmin- 
iry  by  the  still  greater  humiliation  of  a  foreign  conqueror  dictatmg 
terms  to  the  Athenian  people  assembled  in  their  own  Pnyx.  Having 
ceen  the  Thirty  re-ularly  constituted,  Lysander  retired  from  Athens  to 
f  ni^h  the  siege  of  Samos  which  still  held  out.  Though  blocked  up 
hoth  by  land  and  sea,  the  Samians  obstinately  defended  themselves  lor 
Mjmc  months  lonaer  until  the  close  of  the  summer.  It  was  not  until 
ihe  last  extremity  that  they  cj.pitulated;  obtaining  permission  tor 
every  freeman  to  depart  in  safety,  but  with  no  other  property  except 
a  .in<de  oarment.  Lvsander  handed  over  the  city  and  the  properties 
to  the  tuK-ient  citizen^-tliat  is,  to  the  olitiarchy  and  their  parti..aiis 
who  had  been  partly  expelled,  partly  disfranchised  in  the  revolution 
ci<d't  years  before.  But  he  placed  the  government  of  Samos,  as  lie 
h-Rl  de-alt  with  the  other  cities,  in  the  hands  of  one  of  hisDekarchies, 
or  oligarchy  of  Ten  Samians  chosen  by  himself;  leaving  Ihorax  as 
Lacedfemonian  harmost,  and  doubtless  a  force  under  him. 

Uiwrn"-  thus  finished  the  war,  and  trodden  out  the  last  spark  ot  re- 
sistance,°Lysander  returned  in  triumph  to  Sparta.  So  imposing  a 
triumph  never  fell  to  the  lot  of  any  Greek,  either  before  or  aiter- 


TRIUMPHANT  RETURN  OF  LYSANDER. 


825 


ward      He  brought  with  him  every  trireme  out  of  the  harbor  of 
Peineus    exceptlwelve  left  to  the  Athenians  as  a  com^ession:  he 
bmu-ht'the  ]>row-ornainents  of  al!  the  ships  captured  at  ^gospotami 
•md  elsewhere:  he  was  loaded  wit'i  golden  crowns,  voted  to  him  by 
the  various  cities:  and  he  further  ,'xhibited  a  sum  ot  money  not  ess 
thau  470  talents,  the  remnant  of  th(.se  treasures  which  Cyrus  had 
.udedovertohim  for  the  prose.nition  of  the  war.     That  sum  had 
be^T-reater,  but  it  is  said  to  have  been  diminished  by  the  treachery 
of  Gvlippus   to  whose  custody  it  had  been  committed   and  who  sul- 
lied by  such  mean  peculation  the  laurels  which  he  had  so  gloriously 
earned  at  Syracuse.     Nor  was  it  merely  the  triumphant  evidences  of 
past  exploit^  which  now  decorated  this  returning  admiral.     He  wield- 
ed l)esides  an  extent  of  real  power  greater  than  any  individual  Greek 
either  before  or  after.     Imperial  Si^arta-as  she  had  now  become-- 
was  as  it  were  personified  in  Lysander,  who  was  master  of  almost  all 
the  insular  Asiaticand  Thracian  cities,  by  means  of  the  harmo.sts  and 
the  native  Dekarchjes  named  by  himself  and  selected  from  his  crea- 
tures    To  this  state  of  thinus  we  shall  presently  return,  when  we 
have  followed  the  eventful  history  of  the  Tliirty  at  Athens. 

These  Thirty  men— the  parallel  of  the  Dekarchie^  whom  Lysander 
had  constituted  in  the  other  cities— were  intended  for  the  same  pur- 
pose to  maintain  the  city  in  a  sttite  of  humiliation  and  dependence  upon 
Lace'dajmoii,  and  upon  Lysander  as  the  representative  of  Laceda^mon 
Thou'di  ai)pointe(l  in  the  pretended  view  of  drawing  up  a  scheme  or 
laws  and  constitution  for  Athens,  they  were  in  no  hurry  to  commence 
this  duty      They  appointed  a  new  senate,  composed  ot  compliani, 
assured,  and  oligarchical  persons;  including  many  of  the  returnea 
exiles  who  had  been  formerly  in  the  Four  Hundred,  and  maiiy  also 
of  the  preceding  senators  who  wefe  willing  to   serve  their  designs. 
They  further  named  new  magistrates  and  officers;  a  new  Board  ot 
Eleven,  to  manage  the  business  of  police  and  the  public  force  witu 
Satvrus,  one  of  their  most  violent  partisans,  as  chief;  a  Board  ot  len, 
to  irovern  in  Peineus;  an  archon  to  dve  name  to  the  year  l^ytnoao- 
donis— and  a  second  or  King-Archon,  Patrokles,  to  olfer  the  custom- 
ary sacritices  on  behalf  of  the  city.     While  tluis  securing  their  own 
ascendency,  and  placing  all  power  in  the  hands  of  the  most  violent 
oligarchial  partisans,  they  began  by  professing  reforming  principles 
of  the  strictest  virtue;  denouncinjx  the  abuses  of  the  past  democi acy, 
and  announciuir  their  determination  to  purge  the  city  ot  ^^^^i»-f^'">^J|;; 
Tlu!  philosopher  Plato— then  a  young  man  about  twenty-tour  yeais 
old.    of  anti-democratical  politic-s.  and  nephew   of  ^"^^'^^.7^''^^^.  7 
tirst  mislead,  together  with  various  others,  by  these  splendid  protes- 
sions.     He  conceived  hopes,  and  even  received  encouragement  tio  n 
his  relations,  that  he  mi-ht  play  an  active  part  unc  er  the  nevy  oli- 
garchy.    Thomrh  he  soon  came  to  discern  how  l\ttle  congen  al  las 
feelings  were  with  theirs,  yet  in  the  beginning  doubtless  such  iiouesi 
illusions  contributed  materially  to  strengthen  their  hands. 


826 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUSuE. 


In  execii  Jon  of  their  desiprn  to  root  out  evil-doers,  the  Thirty  first 
laid  hands  on  some  of  the  most  obnoxious  politicians  under  the  former 
derrorracy — "men (says  Xen(>pllon)^vilom every  one  knew  to  live  by 
jnakin.ii*  calumnious  aceusations  (railed  Sy<ophancy),  and  who  were 
picnounetd  in  their  enmity  to  theoliiLan  hial  citizens."  How  farmost 
(,r  these  men  had  been  honest  or  dishonest  in  their  previous  political 
conduct  umler  the  democracy,  we  have  no  means  of  determiiiiiiii:. 
I'ut  amor.Li-  tlum  were  comprised  Strombichides  and  the  other  demo- 
cratical  olficers  who  had  been  imprisoned  under  the  information  of 
AiJjoralus;  men  whose  chief  crime  consisted  in  a  strenuous  and  intlex- 
ibTe  attachment  to  the  denuKTacy.  The  persons  thus  seized  were 
brou<:ht  to  trial  before  the  new  senate  appointed  by  the  Thirty — con- 
trary to  the  vote  of  the  people,  which  had  decreed  Ihut  Strombichides 
{ind  his  cfin'panions should  be  tried  before  adikastery  of  2,000  citizens. 
But  the  dik.Mstery,  as  well  as  all  the  other  democratical  institutions, 
Avjis  now  abrogated,  and  no  judicial  body  was  left  except  the  newly 
constituted  senate.  Even  to  that  senate,  thouiih  composed  of  their 
own  partisans,  the  Thirty  did  not  choose  to  intrust  the  trial  of  the 
]»risoners,  with  that  secrecy  of  voting  which  was  well  known  at 
Athens  to  be  essential  to  the  hee  and  genuine  expression  of  sentiment. 
Whenever  prisoners  were  tried,  the  Thirty  were  themselves  present 
in  the  senate-house,  sitting  on  the  benches  previously  occupied  by 
the  Prytenes:  two  tables  were  placed  before  them,  one  signifying 
condeiimation — theother,  acijulttal;  and  each  senator  was  required  to 
deposit  his  pebble,  oj^rdy  before  them,  either  on  one  or  on  the  other. 
It  was  not  merely  judgment  by  the  senate — but  judgment  by  the 
senate  under  pressure  and  intimidation  by  the  all-powerful  Thirty. 
It  .'^eems  pro!)able  that  neither  anv  semblance  of  defense,  nor  any  ex- 
culj)atory  witnesses,  were  allowed;  but  even  if  such  fonualiti*  s  were 
not  whoily  dispensed  with,  it  is  certain  that  there  was  no  real  trial, 
aJiil  that  condenuiation  was  assured  beforehand.  Among  the  great 
iuiml)ers  whom  tlie  Thirty  brought  before  the  senate,  not  a  single 
man  was  aciiuitted  except  the  informer  Agoratus,  who  was  brought 
to  trial  as  an  accomplice  along  with  Strombichides  and  his  compan- 
ions, but  was  liberated  in  recompense  for  the  information  wiiich  he 
liad  given  against  them.  The  statement  of  Isokrates,  Lysias,  and 
others — tliat  the  victims  of  the  Thirty,  even  when  brought  before  tlu; 
senate,  were  put  to  death  untried — is  authentic  and  trustworthy: 
many  were  even  put  to  death  by  simple  order  from  the  Thirty,  them- 
eelves.  without  any  cognizance  of  the  senate. 

In  regard  to  the' persons  first  brought  to  trial,  however — whethor 
we  consider  them,  as  Xenophon  intimates,  to  have  been  notorious 
evil-doers,  or  to  have  been  innocent  sufferers  by  the  reactionaiy  ven- 
geance of  returning  oligarchical  exiles,  as  was  the  case  certainly  with 
Strond)ichides  and  the  otlicers  accus<'d  jdong  with  him — there  was 
little  neces.sity  for  any  couslraint  on  the  pari  of  the  Thirty  over  the 
senate.     That  body  jtself  partook  of  the  sentiment  which  dictated 


INDISCIimiNATE  EXECUTIONS. 


827 


the  condcmration,  and  acted  as  a  willing,  instrument;  wlnle  the 
Thirtv  themselves  were  unanimous,  Theramenes  bemg  even  more 
zealous  than  Kritias  in  these  executions,  to  demonstrate  his  sincere 
antipathy  toward  the  extinct  democracy.  As  yet  too,  suice  all  the 
,l,ersons  condemned  (justly  or  unjust'y)  had  been  marked  polit:wians. 
so  all  other  citizens  who  had  taken  no  conspicuous  part  m  po  itics, 
fveri  if  thev  dlsaoproved  of  the  condemnations,  had  not  been  led  to 
conceive  any  apprehension  of  the  like  fate  for  themselves.  Hei-e  then 
Theramenes,  and  along  with  him  aportion  of  the  Ihirty  as  wdl  as  of 
the  senate,  were  inclined  to  pause.  While  enough  had  ., ecu  done  to 
satiate  their  antipathies,  by  the  death  of  the  obnoxious  leaders  ot  die 
democracv— they  at  the  same  time  conceived  the  oligarchical  govern- 
ment to  be  securely  established,  and  contended  that  iurther  blood- 
shed would  onlv  endanger  its  stability,  by  spreading  alarm,  mulli- 
Dlving  enemies,  and  alienating  friends  as  well  as  neutrals 

But  the^e  were  not  the  views  either  of  Ivritias  or  ot  the  Thirty  gen- 
crallv  who  surveyed  their  position  with  eyes  very  different  from  the 
unstable  and  cunning  Theramenes,  and  who  had  brought  with  them 
from  exile  a  long  arrear  of  vengeance  yet  to  be  appeased.     Ivrititis 
knew  well  that  tlie  numerous  popuhition  of  Athens  vere  devotedly 
attached  and  had  good  reason  to  be  attached,  to  their  deiiocraoy; 
that  the  existini^-  government  had  been  imposed  upon  them  by  tt^rce, 
and  could  only'be   upheld  by  force;  that  its  friends  were  a  narrovv 
minority,  incapable  of  sustaining  it  against  the   multitude  around 
them  all  armed;  that  there  were  still  many  formidable  enemies  to  be 
got  rid  of  so  that  it  was  indis])ensable  to  invoke  the  aid  of  a  j  erma- 
iient  Lacedaemonian  garrison   in  Athens,  as  the  only  condiiion  not 
only  of  their  stability  as  a  government,  but  even  of  llieir  persona 
safety.    In  spite  of  the  opposition  of  Theramenes— ^schines   and 
Aristotoles,  two  among  the  Thirty,  were  dispatched  to   Sparta  to 
sohcitaid  from  Lysander;  who  procured  for  them  a  L->ceda>inoniau 
garrison  under  Kallibius  as  harmost,  which  they  engaged  to  mamtam 
without  any  cost  to  Sparta,  until  their  government  should  be  con- 
firmed by  putting  the  evil-doers  out  of  tlie  way.     Kalli])ins  was  not 
only  installed  as  master  of  the  acropolis— full  as  it  was  of  the  memen- 
tos of  Athenian  glory— but  was  f  urlher  so  caressed  and  won  over  uy 
-  the  Thirty,  that  he  lent  himself  to  everything  which  they  r.s.vcd. 
Thev  had  thus  a  Lacedannonian  military  force  constantly  at  their 
command,  besides  an  organized  band  of  youthful  satellites  and  assas- 
sins, ready  for  any  deeds  of  violence;  and  they  proc(;cdeu  to  .seize  :iml 
put  to  death  many  citizens  who  were  so  distinguished  for  their  cour- 
an-e  and  patriotism,  as  to  be  likely  to  serve  as  leaders  to  the  pul)iic 
discontent.     Several  of  the  best  men  in  Athens  thus  s  iccessively  per- 
ished, while  Thrasybulus,  Anvtus,  and  many  others  tearing  a  siiii"-'r 
fate,  fled  out  of  Attica,  leaving  their  propcirty  to  be  confiscated  and 
appropriated  by  the  oligarchs;  who  passed  a  decree  ot  exile  against 
them  in  their  absence,  ;is  well  as  against  Alkibiades. 


32S 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUSiE. 


TERROIl  AND  DISCONTENT. 


329 


These  successive  acts  of  vengonnce  and  violence  were  warmly  op- 
posed bv  Theramenes,  both  in  Uie  Council  of  Tliirty  and  in  the  senate. 
The  persons  hitlierto  executed  (he  said)  liad  deserved  Iheir  deatli  lie- 
cause  they  were  not  merely  noted  poliiieians  under  Ihe  democracy,  but 
al>o  of  persons  of  marked  hostility  to  oligarchial  men.  But  to  in- 
liict  the  same  fate  on  others,  who" had  manifested  no  such  hostility, 
simply  because  they  had  enjoyed  influence  under  the  democracy 
^v()uld  be  unjust:  "*Even  you  and  1  (lie  reminded  Krilias)  liave  boih 
said  and  done  many  thlmis  for  the  sake  of  popularity."  But  Kiifuis 
replied— *'AVe  cannot  airbrd  to  be  scrupulous;  we  arc  engaged  in  a 
scheme  of  aggressive  ambition,  and  must  get  rid  of  those  who  are 
best  able  to  hinder  us.  Though  we  are  Thirty  in  number,  aiul  not 
one— our  government  is  not  the  less  a  despotism,  and  must  be  guarded 
by  the  same  jealous  precautions.  If  you  thinlv  otherwise,"you  inust 
be  >imple-minded  indeed."  Such  were  the  sentiments  which  aniiiia- 
ted  tlie  majority  of  the  Tliirty  not  less  than  Kritias,  and  wliich 
prompted  them  to  an  endless  string  of  seizures  and  executions.  It 
was  not  merelv  the  less  obnoxious  democratical  politicians  who  be- 
came their  vie'tims,  but  men  of  courage,  wealth,  and  station,  in  every 
vein  of  political  feeling:  even  oligarchical  men,  the  best  and  mcst 
high-principled  of  that'party,  shared  the  same  fate.  A  mong  t  lie  most 
distinguished  sufferers  were,  Lykurgus,  belonging  to  one  of  the  most 
emincTit  sacred  Gentes  in  the  state;  a  wenlthy  man  named  Anliplion, 
who  had  devoted  his  fortune  to  the  public  service  with  exemplary 
patriotism  during  the  last  years  of  the  war,  and  had  furnished  two 
well-equipped  trTremes  at  his  own  cost;  Leon,  of  Salamis:  and  even 
Nikeratus  (son  of  Nikias,  who  liad  perished  at  Syracuhc).  a  man  who 
inherited  from  his  fatlur  not  only  a  large  fortune,  but  a  kiu^wn  re- 
puirnance  to  democratic:d  polities,  together  with  his  uncle  Eidu-ates, 
brother  of  the  same  Nikias.  These  were  only  a  few  among  the  nu- 
merous victims,  who  were  seized— pronounced  to  be  guilty  b.y  the 
senate  or  bv  the  TJiirty  themselves— handed  over  to  Satyrus  and  the 
Eleven— and  condemned  to  perish  by  the  customary  draught  of  hem- 
lock. 

The  circumstances  accompanying  the  seizure  of  Leon  deserve  par- 
ticular notice.  In  putting  to  death  him  and  the  other  victims,  the 
Thirty  had  several  objects  in  view,  all  tending  to  the  stability  of 
their  dominion.  First,  they  thus  got  rid  of  citizens  generally  known 
and  esteemed,  whose  abhorrence  Ihey  knew  themselves  to  (k>eive, 
and  whom  they  feared  as  likely  to  head  the  i^ublic  sentiment  against 
them.  Secondly,  the  property  of  these  victims,  all  of  Avhom  were 
rich,  was  seized'along  with  their  persons,  and  was  employed  to  pay 
the  satellites  whose  a'jency  was  indisjjensable  for  such  violences—- 
especiallv  Killibius  and  the  Lacedemonian  hoplites  in  the  acropolis. 
But  besides  murder  and  spoliation,  the  Thirty  had  a  further  purpose, 
if  possible,  yet  more  nefarious.  In  the  work  of  seizing  their  victims, 
they  not  only  employed  the  hands  of  these  pai\i  satellites,  but  also  sent 


r 


along  with  them  citizens  of  station  and  respectability,  whom  they 
constrained  by  threats  and  intimidation  to  lend  their  personal  aid  in 
a  service  so  thoroughly  odious.  By  sueli  participation,  these  citizens 
became  compromised  and  imbrued  in  crime,  and  as  it  were,  consent- 
ing p:irties  in  the  public  eye  to  all  the  projects  of  the  Thirty;  expos  -(l 
tollic  same  general  hatred  as  the  latter,  and  interest-'d  for  their  own 
safety  in  maintaining  the  existing  dominion.  Pursuant  to  their 
ireneral  pla:i  of  implieating  unwilling  citizens  in  their  misdeeds,  the 
Thirty  sent  for  live  citizens  to  the  Tholus  or  Goveinment-house,  and 
ordered  them,  with  terrible  menaces,  to  cross  over  to  Salamis  and 
bring  back  Leon  as  prisoner.  Four  out  of  the  five  obeyed:  the  fifih 
waslhe  philosopher  Sokrates,  who  refuso<l  all  concurrence  and  re- 
turned to  his  own  house,  while  the  other  four  went  to  Salamis  and 
took  part  in  the  seizure  of  Leon.  Tiiough  he  thus  braved  all  tlie 
wrath  of  the  Thirty,  it  appears  that  they  thought  it  expedient  to  leave 
him  untouched.  But  the  fact  that  they  singled  him  out  for  such  an 
atrocity — on  old  man  of  tried  virtue,  both  private  and  public,  and 
intellectually  commanding,  though  at  the  same  time  intellectually 
unpopular — shows  to  what  an  extent  they  carried  their  system  of  for- 
cing unwilling  participants;  wdiile  the  fiu'lher  circumstance  that  he 
was  the  only  person  who  had  the  coura-xe  to  refuse,  among  four 
others  who  yielded  to  intimidation,  shows  that  the  policy  was  for  the 
most  part  successful.  The  inilexible  resistance  of  Sokrates  on  this 
occasion  stands  as  a  worthy  parallel  to  his  conduct  as  Prytanis  in  the 
public  assembly  held  on  the  conduct  of  the  generals  after  the  battle 
of  Arginus.e  (described  in  the  preceding  chapter),  wdiercin  he  obsti- 
nately refused  to  concur  in  putting  an  illegal  question. 

Such  multiplied  cases  of  execution  and  spoliation  naturally  filled 
the  city  with  surprise,  indignation,  and  terror.  Groups  of  malcon- 
tents got  together,  and  voluntary  exiles  l)ccame  more  and  more  nu- 
merous. AH  these  circumstances  furnished  ample  material  for  the 
vehement  opposition  of  Theramenes,  and  tended  to  increase  his  party; 
not  indeed  among  the  Thirty  themselves,  but  to  a  certain  extent  in 
the  senate,  and  still  more  among  the  body  of  the  citizens.  He  warn- 
ed his  collea2:;.es  that  they  were  incurring  daily  an  increased  amount 
'of  public  odium,  and  that  their  government  cotild  not  ])ossil)ly  stand, 
unless  they  admitted  into  partnership  an  adequate  number  of  citizens, 
liaving  direct  interests  in  its  maintenance.  He  proposed  that  all  those 
competent  by  their  property  to  serve  the  state  either  on  horseback  or 
with  heavy "^armor,  should"^  be  constituted  citizens;  leaving  all  the 
])oorer  freemen,  a  far  larger  number,  still  disfranchised.  Kritias  and 
the  Tlnrty  rejected  this  proposition:  l)eing  doubtless  convinced — as 
the  Four  Hundred  had  felt  seven  years  before,  when  Theramenes 
demanded  of  them  to  convert  their  fictitious  total  of  Five  Thousand 
into  a  real  list  of  as  many  living  persons — that  "'  to  enrol  so  great  a 
number  of  partnej*s,  was  tantamount  to  a  downright  democracy." 
But  they  were  at  the  same  time  not  insensible  to  the  soundness  of  his 


330 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS.E. 


SEIZURE  OF  LYSTAS.. 


331 


advice-  moreover  thev  boi-an  to  be  afraid  of  biiii  personally,  and  1o 
suspect  that  be  was^likelv  to  lake  the  lead  iu  a  popii  ar  opposition 
jvriin^t  them,  as  he  bad  previously  done  against  ins  colle:.giies  of  the 
Four  HuiKh-ed.  Thev  therefore  resolved  to  ^o^'P^v  "i  ]wl  ^vlth  bis 
r<'eominendations,  and  aceordin-ly  prepared  a  li.l  ot  3,000  persons  to 
be  invested  ^^  ith  the  politieal  fraiubise;  chosen,  as  much  nspossd)le, 
from  tb.-ir  own  known  partisans  and  from  oligarchic-d  citizens,  be- 
sides this  body  tliey  also  counted  on  the  adbt^rence  ot  the  llorsenien, 
amouLMhe  ^vcath':est  citizens  of  the  state.  These  lIoi>emei:  or  Kuii:bts, 
takiulthem  as  a  class-thc  thousand  good  men  ol  Athens,  vhose 
virtues  Aristophanes  sets  forth  in  hostile  antithesis  to  the  allc^ucd 
dcnia"-o<'ic  vices  of  Kleon— remained  steady  supporters  ot  the  Ibirty 
throu -hout  all  the  enormities  of  their  career.  AN  hat  privileges  or 
funclU)ns  were  assiumcd  to  the  chosen  3.0(0.  mc  oo  not  hear,  except 
that  thev  couUl  notV^  coKdcnmed  uilhout  the  warrant  ot  the  sci.ale 
^•lale  any  other  xVtheniau  might  be  put  death  by  the  simple  hut  ot 

^  'a  bodl^of  partners  thus  chosen— not  merely  of  fixed  number,  but 
of  picked  oli-archical  sentiments— Avas  by  no  means  the  ad(  iti(»n 
Avhieh  Tlieramenes  desired.     Wiiile  he  ccmmented  on    he  lollv  o 
supposing  that  there  v, as   any  charm  in  the  number  o,000-as  it 
enlbodied  all  the  merit  of  the  city,  and  nothing  else  but  "hi it-he 
admonished  them  that  it  ^as  still  insulbcent  lor  their  delense.  t lie 
rule  was  one  of  pure  force,  and  yet  inferior  in  force  to  those  o^  ei 
Avhom  it  was  exereised.     Again  the  Thirty  acted  upon  his  admoni- 
tion, but  in  a  way  very  ditferent  from  that  which  he  ^•o"U'nipla  (_ 
Thev  proclaimed  a  general  muster,  and  examination  of  aims,  to  all 
the  hoplites  in  Athens.     The  3.000  were  drawn  up  in  arms  ^dt^'.^^^'  j'" 
in  the  market-place;  but  the  remaining  hoplites  ^^'^'^^''}i;:'^'^ 
^mall  scattered  companies  and  in  diflerent  places.     Aftei   ^^^^^'jr' 
was  over,  these  scattered  companies  went  home  to  their  meal,  leuing 
their  arms  piled  at  the  various  places  ot  muster.     Lut  adheients 
tlie  Thirtv,  bavinir  been  forewarned  and  kept  together,  were  .^ent  at 
the  proper  mouRmt.  along  with  the  Lacechemonian  nieiceuaries  to 
seize  the  deserted  arms,  which  were  deposited  under  the  custo<h     f 
Kallibius  in  the  acroplis.     All  the  hoplitc-s  in  Athens    except    he 
Three  Thousand  and   the  remaining  adherents  of  the  .  /'"'O' y/^;"-'* 
disarmed  by  this  crafty  maneuver,  in  spite  of  the  fruitless  lemon-^, 

Btrance  of  Theramene.s.  .:ti,r.vnf 

Kritiasand  his  colleairues,  now  relieved  from  all  feai  ^''thcr  or 
Theramenes,  or  of  any  other  internal  opposition  gave  loose,  mo  e 
unsparin-lv  than  ever,  to  their  malevolence  and  rapacity;  pu  tm 
to  death  both  manv  of  their  private  enemies,  and  many  ^'^^'^^  ^  ^,^_\\'"^ 
for  the  purpose  of  spoliation.  A  list  of  suspected  persons  ^vas  dia  v 
up  in  which  each  .)f  their  adlierents  was  allowed  to  insert  Mien 
nluues  as  he  chose,  and  from  which  the  victims  were  genend  y 
taken.     Among  iuformers  who  thus  gave  m  names  for  destiuction, 


I 


p.itrichus  and  iEschvlides  stood  conspicuous.  The  thiist  of  iM't.as 
W     under  as  well  a^  for  l)loodshed  only  increased  by  gra  location; 

Ivvv^i^  not  merely  to  pay  their  mercenaries,  but  also  to  enrich 
?^:ith'S  "tefr^^-t  ^^^  Thirty  stretched  everywhere  their 
n  I  tois  a.-ency,  which  now  mowed  down  mctics  as  we  1  as  cui- 
"^T^T^o^nis  and  Peison,  two  of  tlie  Thirty-  atlirmed  thai  many 
MuioMO-  he  mctics  were  liostile  to  the  oligarchy,  besides  being  opulent 
n  e  Acc()rdin-ly,  the  resolution  was  adopted  that  each  <.!  the 
r^^s  slm;^s  ngle  out  any  of  these  victims  tl.at  he  pleased,  lor  exe- 

.  im  and  pilla-nr  care  being  taken  to  include  a  few  poor  p./  so  is 
intl^S'IsSthatthe  the' real  purpose  of  the  spoilers  might  be 

^'u  1^^'^  e^^tion  of  such  scheme  that  the  orator  Lysi^  and  his 
bri  her  F  le^^^^^^^^^^        ^vere  both  taken    into  custody.      Both   were 

et^^s    wealthy  men.  an.l   engaged  in  a  manu  actory   of   shields, 
wherein  they  employed  120  slaves.     Theognis  and  Peison,  widi  some 
ottos   seized  Lysias  in  his  house,  while  entertaimng  some  friends  a 
d  nncT-  and  havinir  driven  away  his  guests,  lelt  hmi  under  the  guard 

m'i^^^^  attendants  to  register  and  appropriate  his 

V  d  table  slaves.     Lysias  tried  to  prevail  on  Peison  to  accept  a  bribe 
an    kthhescaix',  which  the  lattcrat  first  promised  to  do;  and  liav- 
hct    his  obtained  access  to  the  money-chest  ot  the  prisoner,  laid 
nm.ls  upon  all  its  contents,  amounting  ^o  between   three  .yu      or 
tal'M.ts.     In  vain  did  Lysias  implore  that  a  tnfle  might  be  left  f      h is 
necessary  subsistence:    the    only  answer  vouchsaU'd   ^as     that  he 
mi  -lit  tliink  himself  fortunate  if  he  escaped  with  life.     He  wa>  then 
conveyed  to  the  house  of  a  person  named  Damni]>pus,  where  .  aeog- 
nis  already  was,  having  other  prisoners  in  clnirge.     At  the  earnest 
"treaty  of  Lvsiks,  Damnippus  tried  to  j'^'^^'^^l  If  ^^^ms  to  connive 
athise'scape.^on  consideration  of  a  handsome  bribe;  but^^  while  thi^ 
conversation  was  going  on,  the  prisoner  av.nlecl  himsel    o     an  un- 
guarded  moment  to  get  off  through  the  back  door- which  t(Ktu- 
Sately  was  open,  together  with  two  other  doors  througn  wliH^l^  ^t 
was  necessarv  to  pass.     Having  first  obtained  retu-e  in  the  hou>e  of 
a  friend  in  Peiranis,  he  took  boat  during  the  ensuing  night  for  >le- 
-ara.     Polemarchus,  less  fortunate,  was  seized  m  the  street  b}  .b.. a- 
tosthenes,  one  of  the  Thirty,  and  immediately  lo<lged  ^^    J^  P';^;;;    ' 
where  the  fataldraught  of  hemlock  was  administered  to  hun,  wuh  ut 
delay,  without  trial,^ind  without  lilu-rty  of  defense.     While  his  ho  so 
was  plundered  of  a  large  stock  of  gold,  silver,  furniture  and  n^j   ;>' ^ ; ; 
ments-whilc  the  golden  earrings  wm-e  torn  from  the  ears  ot  ^^^^  *<; 
-and  while  700  shields,  with  120  slaves,  were  ^0"^-^^^^;,';^  ; ^f^"^     i 
with  the  workshop  and  the  two  dwelling-houses-the   Thirty  wo    d 
not  allow  even  a  decent  funeral  to  the  deceased,  but  caused  his  b(    y 
to  be  carried  away  on  a  hired  bier  from  the  prison,  ^\;t^  ^^^^\^.y';7^ 
and  a  few  scanty  appurtenances  supplied  by  the  sympathy  ot  puvatc 

frieuds. 


332 


AFTEK  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS^. 


REPLY  OF  TIIERAMENES. 


333 


Amid  such  atrocities,  increasing  in  number  and  turn(  d  more  and 
more  to  slnunelcss  robbory,  the  party  of  Theianicnes  daily  gained 
trround,  even  in  tlie  senate;  many  of  \vhoFe  members  profiled  notli- 
ing  by  satialinix  the  private  eiii)idlty  of  the  Thirty,  and  began  to  be 
Aveary  of  so  revolting  a  system,  as  well  as  alarmed  at  the  host  of  ene- 
mies whieh  they  were  rai.-ing  uj).  In  proposing  the  late  seizure  of 
the  metics,  the  Thirty  had  desired  TheranKnes  to  ir.alic  choiee  of 
any  victim  among  that  class,  to  be  destn\ved  and  plundered  lor  his 
own  personal  benefit.  Lut  he  rejected  the  suggestion  empbalieally, 
denouncing  the  enormity  of  the  measure  in  Ihc  indignant  terms 
-which  it  deserved.  So  much  was  the  antip:ithy  of  Krilias  and  the 
majority  of  the  Thirty  against  him,  ahvady  acrimonious  from  the 
eifects  of  a  long  course  of  Opposition,  exaspenUed  by  this  reliisal— so 
nuich  did  they  fe-ar  the  conse(4uences  of  incurring  the  obiocpiy  ()f 
such  measures"  themselves,  whde  Theramenes  enjoyed  all  the  credit 
of  opposing  them — so  satislied  were  they  that  their  government  could 
not  stand  with  this  dissension  among  jts  own  n;end;ers — that  they 
resolved  to  destroy  him  at  all  cost.  Having  canvassed  as  many  of 
the  sentitors  as  they  could,  to  persuade  tin  ni  that  Themmenes  v.ns 
conspiring  against  the  oligarchy,  th.ey  caused  the  most  daring  of  tin  ir 
satellites  to  attend  one  day  in  ihe  senate  hoiise,  close  to  the  railing 
which  fenced  in  the  senators,  with  daggeis  concealed  under  their 
garments.  So  soon  as  Therjimenes  .Miipeared,  Kritiijs  rose  and  de- 
nounced him  to  the  senate  as  a  public  enemy,  in  an  h;.rangue  which 
Xenophou  gives  at  considerable  length,  and  v»  hich  is  so  full  of  in- 
Flructive  evidence,  as  to  Gre'ck  peililical  feeling,  that  I  here  extract 
the  main  points  in  abridgment: 

"  If  any  of  you  imagine.  Senators,  that  more  people  are  peri.-hing 
than  the  occasion  retiuircs,  relhct,  that  this  happens  every  v  here  in  a 
time  of  revolution— and  that  it  must  especially  hnpiicn  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  oliganhy  at  Athens,  the  most  populous  city  in  Greece, 
and  Avhere  the  population  has  been  longest  ace  ustomed  to  freedom. 
You  know  as  well  as  we  do,  that  denn^cracy  is  to  both  of  us  ;ui  intol- 
erable government,  as  well  as  ince»mpatible  with  all  steady  aelherenee 
to  our  protectors  the  Laceda-monians.  It  is  under  their  auspices  that 
we  are  establishing  the  present  oligarchy,  and  that  we  dcstre)y,  as  far  ;:s 
we  can,  every  man  who  stands  in  the  way  of  it;  which  becomes  most 
of  all  indispensable,  if  such  a  man  be  found  jimong  our  own  boely. 
Here  stands  the  man— Theramenes— wliom  we  now  denounce  to  you 
as  vour  foe  not  less  than  ours.  That  such  is  the  fact,  is  plain  fioni 
his*  unmeasured  censures  on  our  proceedings;  from  the  difliculties 
wdiich  he  throws  in  our  way  wheiicver  we  \\ant  to  dispatch  any  of 
the  elemagogue^s.  Had  such'  been  his  policy  fre-m  the  beginning,  he 
would  indeed  have  been  our  enemy,  yet  we  coidd  not  with  justice 
liave  proclaimed  him  a  villain.  V>u\  it  is  he  who  first  originated  the 
alliance  which  binds  us  to  Sparta— who  struck  the  first  blow  at  the 
democracy- who  chiefly  instigated  us  to  put  to  dcatli  the  first  batch 


I 


of  accused  persons;  and  now,  when  you  as  well  as  we  have  thus  in- 
c  u  red  the  manifest  hatred  of  the  people,  he  turns  round  and  quar- 
rels with  our  proceedings,  in  oreier  to  msure  his  own  safety,  and 
e-  ve  us  to  pay  the  penalty.  He  must  be  dealt  with  not  only  as  an 
cnmxy,  but  as  a  traitor  to  you  as  well  as  to  us;  a  traitor  in  the  gram. 
as  hs  whole  life  proves.  Though  he  enje^yed  through  his  lather 
A-non  a  station  of  honor  under  the  elemocracy  he  was  foivmost  in 
^.ii)vertin<>-  it  and  getting  up  the  Four  Hundred:  the  moment  he 
uwtMt^l^^^^^^^^  ditliculties,    he    was    the    first    to 

nut  himself  Si  the  head  of  the  people  ngamst  them;  always  ready 
for  chan-e  in  both  directions,  and  a  willing   accomplice  in  those 
cKceutions  which"  changes  of  government  bring  with  them.     I    is 
h^  too   who-having  been  ordered  by  the  generals  after  the  battb 
'Vrgiiiusa)  to  picl^up  the  men  on  the  disabled  ships,  and  having 
ne-lected  the  task-accused  and  brought  to  execution  his  superiors, 
in  order  to  get  himself  out  of  dnng-r.    He  has  well  earned  his  sur- 
name of  Tl?e  Buskin,  fitting  both  legs,  but  constant  to  neither:  he 
has  shown  himself  reckless  both  of  honor  and  friendship,  lookmg  to 
nothiu'^  but  his  own  selfish  advancement;  and  it  is  for  us  now  to 
Lniard  against  his  doublings,  in  order  that  he  may  not  play  us  the 
same  tri?k     We  cite  him  before  you  as  a  conspirator  and  a  traitor 
a-ainst  you  as  well  as  against  us.     Look  to  your  own  safety,  and  not 
to  his    'For  depend  upon  it,  that  if  you  let  him  off,  you  will  hold 
out  powerful  encouragement  to  your  worst  enemies;  while  if  you 
condenm  him,  you  will  crush  their  best  hopes,  both  withm  and  with- 

^\liiramenes  was  probably  not  wholly  unprepared  for  some  such 
attack  as  this.     At  any  rate  he  rose  up  to  reply  to  it  at  once:  ^ 

-First  of  all,  Senators,  I  shall  touch  upon  the  charge  against  mc 
which  Kritiiis  mentioned  last-the  charge  of  having  accused  and 
brought  to  execution  the  generals.     It  was  not  I  who  l>cgan    he 
accusation  a-ainst  them,  but  they  who  began  it  against  me^     They 
said  that  thev  had  ordered  me  upon  the  duty,  and  that  I  had  neglec- 
ted it-  my  defense  was,  that  the  duty  could  not  be  executed  m  con- 
sequence of  the  storm:  the  people  believed  and  exonerated  me   but 
the  generals  were  rightfully  condemned  on  their  own   accusation, 
because  thci/  said  that  the  duty  might  have  been  P^[^o^P^cd-^\\^>i^; 
yet  it  had  Vemained  unperformed.     I  do  not  wonder  nidecd   that 
Kritias  has  told  such  falsehoods  against  me;  for  at  the  time  \yhen 
this  affair  happened,  he  was  an  exile  in  Thessaly,  employed  in  raising 
up  a  democnicy,  and  arming  the  Penest.^,  against  their  masteiv 
•Heaven  2:rant  that  nothing  of  what  he  perpetrated  there  may  occui  at 
Athens'^  I  agree  with  Kritias  ineleed,  that  whoever  wishes  to  cut 
short  your  government,  and  strengthens  those  who  conspire  iigainst 
you,  deserves  justly  the  severest  punishment.     But  to  whom  does 
this  charge  best  apply?    To  him,  or  to  me?    Lof  at  the  beh  v^^u 
of  each  o1  us,  and  then  judge  for  yourselves.     At  first  we  weie  dU_ 


334  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS^. 

nnrocd   so  far  as  the  condemnation  of  the  known  and   ohnoxious 
ckniaeocues.     But  ^vhcn   Kiitias  and  his  friends  began  to  seize  men 
of  staUon  and  di.unity,  then  it  ^vas  that  i  hegan  to  oppose  tlit-m      1 
knew  that  the  seizure  of  men  like  Leon,  ^lklas,  and  Antiphon,  would 
make  the  best  men  in  the  city  your  enemies.     1  opposed  the  execu- 
tion of  the  meties,  well  aware  that  all  that  body  would  be  alienated. 
I  opposed  the  disarming  of  the   citizens,  and  the  hiring  ot  foreign 
iruaids      And  when   I  saw  that  enemies  at  l-.ome  and  exiles  abroad 
^vere  multiplying   against   you,  I  dissuaded    you  iiom    ^^f^^^S 
Thrasybulus  and  Anvtus,  whereby  you  only  iurnishc  d  the  exiles  ^^llh 
competent  leaders.     The  man  who  gives  you  this  advice,  and  gives 
it  vou  openlv,  is  he  a  traitor-or  is  he  not  rather  a  genuine  friend 
It 'is  you  and  vour  supporters,  Kritias.  who  by  your  murders  and 
robberies  strengthen    the   enemies  of  the  government  and  betray 
your  friends.     Depend   upon  it.  that  Thn-.sybulus  and  Anvtus  are 
much  better  pleased  with  your  policy  tluni  ihey  would  ^r^fl^^ 
You  accuse  me  of  having  betrayed  the  Four  1  undicd;  but  1  did  not 
desert  them  until  they  were  themselves  on  the  point  of  betrayn^g 
Athens  to  her  enemies.     You  call  me  The  Buskin,  as  trying  to  h 
both  parties.     But  what  am  I  to  call  2/'^'/,  ^lio  ht  neither  of  ihtni? 
who  umler  the  democraev  were  the  most  violent  hater  of  the  people 
—and  who  under  the  oligarchy  have  become  equally  violent  as  a 
hater  of  oligarchical  merit?     1  am,  and  always  have  been    Ivnlias.  an 
enemy  both  to  extreme  den^.oeraey  and  to  oligarchical  tyranny.     1 
desire^  to  constitute  our  political  community  out  of  those  who  can 
serve  it  on  horseback  and  with  heavy  armor :-I  have  proposed  this 
once,  and  I  still  stan.l  to  it.     I  side  not  either  ^^  ith  democra.s  or  cl(^s- 
pots,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  dignitied  citizens      Prove  that  lam  now 
or  ever  have  been,  guilty  of  such  crime,  and  I  shall  confess  m}self 
deserving  of  ignominious  death."  i      +     <• 

This  K'ply  of  Theramenes  w^as  received  with  such  a  shout  ot 
fipolause  by  tlie  majority  of  the  senate,  as  showed  tliat  they  were 
resolved  to  acquit  him.  ^  To  the  fierce  antipathies  of  the  mort.lied 
Kritias,  the  idea  of  failure  was  intolerable:  indeed  he  hud  now  carrie. 
his  hostility  to'  such  a  point,  that  the  acquittal  of  his  enemy  would 
liave  been  his  own  ruin.  After  exchanging  a  few  words  with  the 
Thirty  he  retired  for  a  few  moments,  and  directed  the  E  even  with 
the  body  of  armed  satellites  to  press  clo:;e  on  the  railing  whereljy  the 
senators  were  fenced  round-while  the  court  before  the  senate-house 
was  tilled  with  the  mercenary  lioplites.  Having  thus  got  his  force 
in  hand,  Kritias  returned  and  again  addressed  the  senate:—  ^en- 
ators  (said  he),  I  think  it  the  duty  of  a  good  president  when  he  sees 
Jiis  friends  around  him  duped,  not  to  let  them  follow  their  o^^n 
counsel.  This  is  what  I  am  now  going  to  do:  indeed  these  men 
whom  vou  see  pressing  ujion  us  fnmi  without,  tell  us  plainly  tiai 
thev  Will  not  tolerate  the  acquittal  of  one  manifestly  working  to  tlu; 
ruin  of  the  oligarchy.    It  is  an  article  of  our  new  constitution,  that 


CONDEMNATION  OF  THERAMENES. 


335 


k 


i,o  man  of  the  Select  Three  Thousand  shall  be  condemned  without 
vmir  vote-  but  that  any  man  not  included  in  that  list  may  be  con- 
[Hniwd  bf  the  Thirty.  Now  I  take  upon  me,  with  the  concurrence 
of  all  my  colletigues,  to  strike  this  Theramenes  out  ot  that  list;  and 
Tve   bv  our  aulhority,  condemn  him  to  death." 

Tlmin'-'i  Theramenes  had  already  been  twice  concerned  in  putting 

down  tife  democracy,  yet  such  was  the  habit  of  all  Athenians  to  look 

or  nroteetiou  from  constitutional  forms,  that  he  probably  accounted 

himself  safe  under  the  favorable  verdict  of  the  senate,  and  was  not 

r-civired  for  the  monstrous  and  despotic  sentence  which   he  now 

K-ard  from  his  enemy.     He  sprang  at  once  to  the  Senatorial  Hearth 

-ihe  altar  and  sanctuary  in  the  interior  of  the  senate-house-and 

cvclaimed— "I  too,  Senators,  stand  as  your  suppliant,  asking  only 

for  bare  iustice.     Let  it  be  not  in  the  power  ot  Kritias  to  strike  out 

ne  or  any  other  mtui  whom  he  chooses -let  my  sentence  as  well  a3 

x^mrs  be  passed  according  to  the  law  which  these  Thirty  have  them- 

^s  Ives  prenared.     I  know  but  too  well,  that  this  altar  will  be  of  no 

av  il  ti  me  as  a  defense;  yet  I  shall  at  least  make  it  plain,  that  these 

men  are  as  imi  i  .us  toward  the  gods  as  they  are  netaiious  toward 

men      As  for  vou,  worthy  Senators,  I  wonder  that  you  wdl  not  stand 

forward  for  yJur  own  pefsonal  safety,  since  you  must  be  well-aware 

that  your  own  names  may  be  struck  out  of  the  Three  Thousand  just 

^'^BuuL^seMla'te*  remained  passive  and  stupified  by  fear  in  spite  erf 
these  moving  words;  which  perhaps  were  not  pertectly  heard,  since 
it  could  not  be  the  design  of  Kritias  to  permit  his  enemy  to  speak  d. 
second  tiaie.     It  was  probably  while  Therauienes  was  yet  speaking^ 
that  the  loud  voice  of  the  herald  was  heard   callino-  the  l^lf  ^^^   t^ 
come  forward  and  take  him  into  custody.    The   Eleven   f  vf^^ced 
into  the  senate,  headed  by  their  brutal  chief  Satyrus   and  followed 
bv  their  usual  attendants.     They  went  straight  up  to  the  altar,  tioni 
whence  Satyrus,  aided  by  the  attendants,  dragged  him  by  mam  force, 
while  Kriti-is  said  to  them-"  We  hand  over  to  you  this  m^^^^Th^'^^ 
menes,  condemned  according  to  the  laxy.     Seize  him   carry  him  of 
t.)  prison,  and  there  do  the  needful."    Lpon  which,  Theramenes  ^  as 
dn^red  out  of  the  senate-house  and  carried  in  custody  through  the 
mai¥et-place,  exclaiming  with  a  loud  voice   against   the   atrocious 
treatment  which  he  was  suffering.     "  Hold  your  tongue  (said  biityi  us 
to  him),  or  you  will  suffer  for  it."-'*  And  ff  I  do  hold  ray  tongue 
(replied  Theramenes),  shall  not  I  suffer  for  It  also?        ^^    .  ,       ,     , 
He  was  conveved  to  prison,  where  the  usual  draught  of  lieralock 
was  speedily    administered.      After    he    had    swallowed   it,  there 
remained  a  drop  at  the  bottom  of  the  cup,  which  he  jerked  out  on 
the  floor  (according  to   the   playful   convivial  practice  called  the 
Kottabus,  which  was  supposed  to  furnish  an  omen  ^y  \ts  sound  la 
falling,  and  after  which  the  person  who  had  just  drunk  handed  the 


336 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  AUGINUS.E. 


goblet  to  the  guest  whose  turn  came  next) — "  Let  this  (said  he)  be  for 
tlie  gentle  Krilias." 

The  scene  jiisl  described,  which  ended  in  the  execution  of  Thera- 
menes,  is  one  of  the  most  striking  and  tragical  in  ancient  history;  in 
spite  of  the  l)ald  and  meager  way  in  wliich  it  is  recounted  by  Xeno- 
phon,  who  has  thrown  all  the  iiiierest  into  the  two  speeches.  The 
atrocious  injustici  by  which  Theranienes  perished— as  well  as  the 
courage  and  self-possession  which  he  displayed  at  the  moment  of 
danger,  antl  his  cheerfulness  even  in  the  prison,  uot  inferior  to  that 
of  ISokrates  three  years  afterward — naturally  enlist  the  warmest  sym- 
pathies of  the  reader  in  hi*  favor,  and  have  tended  to  exalt  the  posi- 
tive estimation  of  his  character.  During  the  years  immediately  suc- 
ceeding the  restoration  of  the  democracy,  he  was  extolled  and  pitied 
as  one  of  the  tirst  martyrs  to  oligarchical  violence:  later  authors  went 
so  far  as  to  number  him  among  the  cho-rn  pupils  of  Sokrates.  Eut 
though  Theranienes  here  became  the  victim  of  a  much  worse  man 
than  liimself,  it  will  not  for  that  reason  be  proper  to  accoril  to  him 
our  adnnration,  which  his  own  coudu(  t  will  not  at  all  be  found  to 
deserve.  The  reproaches  of  Kritias  against  him,  fo\indcd  on  his  con- 
duct during  the  previous  conspiracy  of  the  Four  Hundred,  were  in 
the  main  well  founded.  After  having  been  one  of  llie  foremost 
originators  of  that  conspiracy,  he  ikseried  his  comrades  as  soon  as  he 
saw  that  it  was  likely  to  fail.  Kritias  had  doubtless  present  to  his 
mind  the  fate  of  Anliphon,  who  had  been  condcnund  and  executed 
under  the  accusation  of  Theranienes — togetlier  with  a  reasonable 
conviction  that  the  latter  would  again  turn  against  his  colleagues 
in  the  same  manner,  if  circumstances  should  em  uurage  him  to  do  so. 
jMoreover,  Kritias  was  not  wrong  in  denouncing  the  pertidy  of 
Theranienes  with  regard  to  the  generals  after  the  battle  of  Arginusa'; 
the  death  of  whom  "he  was  parlly  instrumental  in  bringing  ab(;ui, 
though  only  as  an  auxiliary  cause,  and  not  with  that  exireme  stretch 
of  nefarious  stratagem  wliich  Xenophon  and  others  have  imputed  to 
liim.  IFe  was  a  selfish,  cunning  and  faithless  man — ready  to  enter 
into  conspiracies,  yet  n(;ver  forseeing  their  con.«-equences — and  lireak- 
,  iiig  faith  to  the  ruin  of  colleagues  whom  he  had  tirst  encouraged, 
when  he  found  them  more  consistent  and  thorough-going  in  crime 
than  himself. 

Such  highhanded  violence,  by  Kritias  and  the  majority  of  the 
Thirtv — carried  throui»:h,  even  auainst  a  member  of  their  own  Board, 
1)V  intimidation  of  the  Senate — left  a  feeling  of  disLmst  and  dissension 
among  their  own  partisans  from  which  their  power  never  recovereil. 
Its  immediate  effect,  liowever,  was  to  render  tiiem,  apparently  and 
in  their  own  estimation,  more  powerful  than  ever.  All  open  mani- 
festation of  dissent  being  now  silenced,  they  proceeded  to  the  utter- 
most limits  of  cruel  and  licentious  tyranny.  They  made  proclaim- 
aliou  thai  every  one  uot  iuclutled  in  the  list  of  Three  Thousand 


INTELLECTUAL  TEACHING  F0RI3IDDEN.        337 

should  depart  without  the  walls,  in  order  that  they  might  be  undis- 
turbed masters  within  tlie  city:    a  policy   before  resorled   to  by 
Periander  of  (Corinth   and  other  Grecian   despots.     The   numerous 
f  u'dtives  excelled  by  this  order  distributed  themselves  partly  in  Fei- 
rajus    paniv  in  the  various  demes    of  Attica.      I^tli    in  one    and 
the  other  liowever,  they  were  seized    by  order  ot   the  Thirty  and 
many    of  them  put  to   death,  in   order  that  their    substance   and 
lands    mi-ht    be    appropriated   either   by    the    Thirty    themselves 
or  bv  some  favored   partisan.     The  denunciations  of  Batrachus, 
yEsclivlides  and  other  delators,  became  more  numerous  than  ever, 
ill  order  to  obtain  the  seizure  and  execution  of  their  private  enemies; 
and  the  oU'^utIiv  were  willing  to  purchase  any  new  adherent  by  thus 
gratifying  ilis  antipathies  or  his  rapacity.     The  subsequent  orators 
ullirmed  that  more  than  150J  victims  were  put  to  death  without  trial 
bv  the  Thirtv  on  this  numerical  estimate  little  stress  is  to  be  laiil, 
but  the  total  was  doubtless  prodigious.     It  became  more  and  more 
plain  that  no  man  was  safe  in   Attica,  so  that  Athenian  emigrants 
nanyin  «m'at  poverty  and  destitution,  were  multiphed  throughout 
the   neicrhborin-  territories-in   Megara,  l^hebes,  Oropus    Chalkis, 
Ar-os  ?tc      It  was  "not  everywhere  that  these   distressed   persons 
could  obtain  reception,  for  the  Lacedaemonian  govcn-nment,  at  the 
instance  of  the  Thirty,  issued  an  edict  prohibiting  all  the  members 
of  their  confederacy  from  htu-boring  fugitive  Athenians;  an  edict 
which  these  cities  generously  disobeyed,  though  ]>robably  thesrnaWer 
Pelop.mnesian  cities  complied.     Without  doubt  this  deen^e  was  pro- 
cured by  Lysander,  while  his  influence  still  ctmtinucd  unim]^aiied. 

But  it  was  not  only  a<rainst  the  lives,  properties,  and  hl>erties   of 
Athenian  citizens  that  the  Thirty  made  war.     Thev  were  not  less 
solicitous  to  extinguish  the  intellectual   force  and  education  of  the 
city  a  proiect  so  perfectly  in  harmony  both  with  the  sentiment  and 
practice  of  Sparta,  that  tliey  counted  on  the  support  of  their  foreigni 
allies.     Amomr  the   ordinances  which   they  promulgated   was  ones 
exrrressly  fori/ulding  every  one  "  to  teach  the  art  of  wo  ds ;     if  1  may 
be  allowed  to  translate  literally  the  Greek  expression,  which  bore  a 
most   comprehensive   siirnitication,    and   denoted   every   in.entional 
c^mimunication  of  logical,  rhetorical  or  argumentative  improvement 
-of  literary  criticism  and  composition— and  of  command  over  tho.e 
pomical  and  moral  topics  which  formed  the  ordinary  theme  of  dis- 
Slon.     Such  was  the  species  of  instruction  which  ^okra  es  and 
other  Sophists,  each  in  his  own  way,  communicated  to  the  At  u     an 
youth.    The  -reat  foreign  Sophists  (not  Athenian),  such  as  Prodd^us 
IZ  Pn^tagoras  had  been  (though  perhaps  neither  of  these  two  was 
now  alivef  were  doubtless  no  longer  in  the  city,  under  the  calanii- 
IZ  drcuLtances  whic-h  had  been  weighing  upon  ^-^^^'J^'^^ 
tlie  def.Mt  of   yEo-ospotami.      But  there  was  abundance  of  natno 
IeUer^orS^>phis1^    interior  in  merit  to  these  distinguished  n:mies. 
3-el  stilT illiit^ally  employed,  with  more  or  less  success,  in  communi. 


338 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  AIIGINUS.E. 


CJitini^  a  ppecif'S  of  instruction  luld  indispensable  to  every  liberal 
Athenian.  The  c^dict  of  the  Thirty  was  in  laet  a  general  suppression 
of  the  higher  class  of  teaehers  or  professors,  above  the  rank  of  the 
elementary  (teaelier  of  letters  or)  «rraminatist.  If  such  an  <'dict  could 
have  been  maintained  in  force  for  a  generation,  combined  Avitii  the 
other  mandates  of  the  Thirty — the  city  out  of  which  Sophokles  and 
Euri])ides  had  just  died,  and  in  which  Plato  and  Isokrates  were  in 
vigorous  age  (the  former  twenty-tive,  the  latter,  twenty-nine),  wouhl 
have  been  degraded  to  the  intellectual  level  of  the  meanest  commun- 
ity in  Greece,  It  was  not  uneonuuon  for  ji  Grecian  despot  to  sup- 
press all  those  assemblies  wheiein  youths  came  together  for  the 
purpose  of  common  training,  either  intellectual  or  gynmastic;  as 
well  as  the  public  banfjuets  jind  chds  or  associations — as  being  dan- 
gerous to  his  authority,  tending  to  elevation  of  courage,  and  to  a 
consciousness  of  i>olilical  rights  among  the  citizens. 

The  cnorniities  of  the  Thiity  had  ]>r()voked  severe  comments  from 
the  pldlosopher  vSokrates,  whose  life  was  sjient  in  conversniion  ou 
instructive  subjects  with  those  young  men  who  sought  his  society, 
though  he  never  took  m>oncy  from  any  pupil.  Sucli  comments 
having  excited  attention,  Kiitias  and  Cliarikles  sent  for  him,  re- 
minded him  of  the  prohibitive  law,  and  peremjitorily  commanded 
liim  to  abstain  for  the  futuie  from  all  (onversation  with  youths. 
8okrates  met  the  order  by  putting  somcquestioris.  to  those  who  gave 
it,  in  his  usual  style  of  puzzling  scnUiny;  destined  to  expose  the 
vagueness  of  the  terms — and  to  draw  the  line,  or  rather  to  show  that 
no  detinite  line  could  be  drawn — between  that  w  hich  was  permitted 
and  that  which  was  forbidden.  But  he  soon  perceived  that  his  in- 
terrogations produced  only  a  feeling  of  disgust  and  wrath,  menacing 
to  his  own  safety.  The  tyrants  ended  by  repeating  their  interdict; 
in  yet  more  peremptory  terms,  and  by  giving  Sokrates  to  understand, 
that  they  were  not  ignorant  of  the  censures  which  he  had  cast  upon 
them. 

Thougii  our  evidence  does  not  enable  us  to  make  out  the  precise 
dales  of  these  various  oppressions  of  the  Thirty,  yet  it  seems  proba- 
ble that  this  prohibition  of  teaching  must  have  been  among  their 
cailier  enactments;  at  any  rate,  considerably  anterior  to  the  death  of 
Tlierameiies,  and  the  g('n(ral  expulsion,  out  of  the  walls,  of  all  except 
the  privileged  Three  Thousand.  Their  dominion  continued,  without 
any  armed  o{)posilion  made  to  it,  for  about  eight  months  from  the 
capture  of  Athens  by  Lysander-^that  is,  from  about  Ai)ril  to  Decem- 
ber 404  B.C.  The  measure  of  their  ini(juity  then  l)eeame  full.  They 
liad  aceunudated  against  themselves,  both  in  Attica  and  among  the 
exiles  in  the  circumjacent  territories,  suiTering  and  exasperated  ene- 
mies; while  they  had  lost  the  sympathy  of  Thebes,  Megara,  and 
C'orintli — and  were  less  luartily  supported  by  Sparta. 

During  i\w>o  imjiortant  eight  months,  the  general  feeling  through- 
out Greece  had  become  maieriidiy  diirerent  both  toward  Athens  luid 


SPOILS  OF  THE  WAR. 


339 


toward  Sparta.     At  the  moment  when  the  long  war  was  first  brought 
towaicl  f^pa^ia.    ^  ^        ^  vengeance  iigauist  Athens  had  been 

\;,:^^:^^n^^Ao^  among  the  confederates  of  Spurta  and 
\^h  w'n'volted  members  of  the  extinct  Athenian  emp  re;  a  S(  nli- 
""';  ?l    ch  mSiS^am^      them  indeed  to  a  greater  degree  than 

'"       ^     hP  Sv^^^^^^^^^^  i-t'^i«^^*^l  it,  ami   granted    to 

among  the  i^P'i;  ;    f  JJ^^'"^^  ^  thdrallies  pressed  for 

Alliens  a  capitulatio    at  '^  ^,^"\^,  f/^^'^^y^^f,^  Uiev  were   determined 
^'^tlvt'i^  "m'"^;in^g    ol^;^  ^IciLt  syn.pathy-partly  by 

ill  liiH»:r:::;: 

.         ^in;w,  innocuous— the  ^neat  bond  of  common  tear  which 

isiiiiiliil 

ki.uls,  and  many  caj.nve  ,l7';'7'^^"',f^',;,'  io^ifot  all  the  allies,  so 
mr'ir.hfoir Vdo^:;  f  :^.^yV^  «r.he,n  ioUaly-not  .o 
'^:u';''':;ioni"'n;V,,ebaus.!nd\:onuajia^^ 

fearof  ollendm-  bp.iUci.    /"   '%  .         ,    he  had  included  not  only 
Delphi,  conunemora  u-e  of    ic    n  .^^^^^^  ^,,^  ^,„.^  ^J_ 

onmipotent  chnnid  have  withheld  from  the  allies  a 

silvc,  as  contrary  to  ^J^^'^XT'^^J^^-:^^^^^'^  - 
peculiar  morality  of  ^P'  ''■^. .,;)"  '  '  '.,;eliisivc  ailherence  to  the  old 
^IZ^'^^X  1-  ihUct:;!  to"ean.y.     U  was  not  without 


340 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS^E. 


difficulty  that  Lysandcr  and  liis  friends  obtained  admission  for  tlic 
treasure  into  Sparta;  under  special  proviso,  that  it  should  be  for  the 
exclusive  piiri)o.ses  of  llie  government,  and  that  no  private  citizen 
sliould  ever  circulate  gold  or  silver.  Tiie  existence  of  such  t.adilion- 
ary  rtpuirnance  among  the  Spartans  would  have  seemed  likely  to 
induce  them  to  be  just  toward  tlieir  allies,  since  an  equitable  diVtri- 
bution  of  the  treasure  would  have  gone  far  to  remove  the  difficulty; 
yet  they  nevertheless  kept  it  all. 

But  besides  such  special  offense  given  to  the  allies,  the  conduct  of 
Sl)arta  in  other  ways  showed  that  she  intended  to  turn  the  victory  to 
her  own  account.  Lysander  was  at  this  moment  all-powerlul,  play- 
ing his  own  game  under  the  name  of  Sparta.  His  position  was  lar 
greater  than  that  of  tlie  regent  Pausanias  had  been  after  the  victory 
of  Plataja;  and  his  talents  for  making  use  of  the  Dosiiion  incomi)aral)ly 
superior.  The  magnitude  of  his  successes,  as'  well  as  the  emineiit 
ability  which  he  had  displayed,  justitied  abundant  eulouy;  but  in  his 
case,  the  eulog}^  was  carried  to  the  length  of  something^ like  wor>hip. 
Altars  were  erected  to  him ;  pa?ans  or  hymns  were  com])osc(l  in  his 
honor;  the  Ei)hesians  set  up  liis  statue  iil  the  temple  of  their  goddess 
Artemis,  while  the  Samians  not  (mly  erected  a  statue  to  him  at 
Olympia,  but  even  altered  the  name  of  their  great  festival— the 
Heriea— to  Lf/»(hdri(t.  Seveial  contemporary  poets — Antilochus, 
Cha'rilus,  Nikeratus,  and  Antimachus— devoted  themselves  to  sin*'- 
his  glories  and  profit  by  his  rewards.  ° 

Such  excess  of  flattery  was  calculated  to  turn  the  head  even  of  the 
most  virtuous  Greek.  With  Lysander,  it  had  the  effect  of  substi- 
tuting, in  place  of  that  assumed  smoothness  of  manner  with  which 
he  began  his  conunand,  an  insulting  harshness  and  arroirance  cor- 
respoflding  to  the  really  unmeasured  ambition  which  he  cheiishcd. 
His  ambition  prompted  him  to  aggrandize  Sparta  sejjarately,  without 
any  thought  of  her  allies,  in  order  to  exercise  dominion  in  her  name. 
He  had  already  establish.ed  Dekarchies,  or  oligarchies  of  Ten,  in 
many  of  the  insular  and  Asiatic  cities,  and  an  oliuarehy  of  Thirty  in 
Athens:  all  compo.sed  of  veliemcnt  partisans  chosen  by  him.^elf, 
dependent  upon  him  for  support,  and  devoted  to  his  objects.  To  the 
eye  of  an  impartial  observer  in  Greece,  it  seemed  as  if  all  these  cities 
had  been  converted  into  dependencies  of  Sparta,  and  were  intended 
to  be  held  in  that  condition;  under  Spartan  authority,  exercised  by 
and  through  Lysander.  Instead  of  that  general  freetlom  which  had 
been  pnmiised  as  an  incentive  to  revolt^  acainst  Athens,  a  Spartan 
empire  had  been  constituted  in  place  of  the""'extinct  Athenian:  wilii 
a  tribute,  amounting  to  1000  talents  annually,  intended  to  be  assessed 
upon  the  component  cities  and  islands. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  under  such  a  state  of  feeling  on  the  part  of  the 
allies  of  Sparta,  the  enormities  perpetrated  by  the  Thirty  at  Athens 
and  by  the  Lysandrian  dekarchies  in  the  other  cities,  would  be  heard 
with  synjpalhy  for  the  sufferers;    and  without  that  strong  anti- 


I 


KALLIKRATIDAS  COMPARED  WITH  LYSANDER.  341 

Athenian  sentiment  ^^X^^^^^^^^^''  "^^ 

Lvsancler.  If  "l^  '«;^,f  "f,  ™:;^,"\,f  ^;l;^„';tle^^^  s,J<-c-e.s  as  a  con.- 
BVasidas,  who  oUended  then  <  n )  '>i       V  ^^.^^^^^^j         ^^st. 

mander-mueh  m">-«  2;""'',  „  ,er^^enins  insSlenee,  and  was  wor- 
Lvsaudcr,  who  displayed  ^"'O^  ""*-",  :,iterior  to  that  of  Piiusanias 
.iiiped  with  an  ostentat.mjs  «^       •  "{I    ;^;,\,,,  son  of  Pleislpa,.ax, 

aiUT  the  battle  "f  I'f^f  •  „^  -uncion  with  Agis.  Upon  hiui  the 
was  now  kinpt  fciwt  ,  m  coi   unciK  .,,•''•,.,,  force,  as  it 

feelinsot  jea lonsy  »S''^  ,{;''"«  '„ceossor  of  Asis;  n<,t  u.mco.n- 
did  alteiwai-d  upon  ■^^^''' V^.  ',  ^.i'l,  Hubsequent  events  usuhe. ) 
,„„ied  probably  with  ^";P''^'™|  \'Sorte rence  with  the  lesd  priyi- 
U,at  Lysander  was  aim.nK  at  souk^  ^,V  Pausanias  was  animated  by 
li...es  Nor  is  It  unl air  to  supP'>^e '.  'J  ,  „„a  that  tlie  rapacious 
Sivcs  more  patriotic  tuin  ^^r^^ol^  oligarchie's  both 
cruelty,   which  e^'T.  ''':''^„,i ;  ^^  "^^^^^^^       with  fears  for  the  stability 

.shocked  bis  '««'.%*';;;   "J'e.'ciiSe^  wealcencd  tbe  ".'A";"^ 

of  thesvslcni.     Afuitbci  ciicuni  ,  ^f  Eiiliors,  which  took 

of  Lysa-nder  at  Sparta  was  «  e  «n  .ual  ^'^^  -S  ^  October.  Those 
placi  about  the  end  "{^^'"^'^ZJ^iU  the  capture  of  Athens 
kphors.  under  whoin  "^  §  ''^  ,,7  ^,f,e,it  them  entirely  to  his  vn-vvs, 
';;br:"uroTXetn  Sj;:;en:ier  m  ..c,  and  gave  place  to  others 

more  disposed  to  second  l'™*'"";'^-  ,,„,.  ,,„„.  „„,ch  more  honorable 
i  remarked,  in  the  P'-'^^^f>'' ^  <^^^]  ^,;,  ^-^^^  for  Athens  and  for  the  ■ 

for  Sparta,  and  l'"^^'  ™"';'     f  p" C  nS  an  war  would  have  been 
rest  of  «reece   the  ctec- o   Ihc^ew  j^^^j,^.  ^^  ^,^,,,,,^^. 

-if  Kallikvatidas  had  S^'^f  :'^'\:'"-„^  f„r  himself  that  personal 
so  as  to  close  It  then,  and   to   >cx^uKC  I         ^^_^^  to  exercise  over 

ascendency  which  the  ^'  ^  "  '°""  ='^ '.nt  on  peace.  We  see  how 
the  numerous  ^f '^'•■■^»'^'-;  1^"  WaS  lo  c  ceneral  so  place  d.  when 
important  was  the  pcrs  al  d  ''"^^^  «;,.  ^,„-„„  the  year  after  the 
we  follow  the  F«ceedii  gs  of  L^    "U^      ^^.^^  ^  .icterm.n- 

battle  of  iEgospotami.  H>^f„^"™;;;.  re.ndatimr  both  the  measures 
i„5  circumsianee  tbro ugliout  Oi«e   ,  r e  Throughout  the 

of'Sparta  and  the    ate  of  tl  e  cmv  pu;  i,^a-oS  Ten  in 

latter,  rapacious  f'"!.  .""'^>„"iVhens-an  acting  under  the  P""'^!' f"''' 
n.ost  cities,  btit  of  Ihiity  in  Atiiw^^^  ^^  ,^,^  ambiHon. 

protection  of  ^P"'^'  '",'  ,  "air  he  intlnence  of  a  seltish  Jhirs  for 
Because  he  bapi>ened  to  be  ui  dcr  tuc  ^^^  _^^^^.,y  ^j    „  p..^. 

power,  the  measures  of  !^P^\';y' ;' "^  (,p„,.pc,  of  reference  to  her  own 
llellenic  spirit,  hut  even  »«  J .f^*'\'  "^fX;  acquisition  of  imperial 
confedcrales-and  wncen  rated  upon  ^h^^.^^^^j.^^^    ^^^^^    ^^,^,^  ,„ 

pr,!I)onderance  tor  j''.''^^  V.^.f^  i^^u  .t„re.  not  o.dy  such  narrow  and 
bkltffrVo'uUlCf  bCU  i-porative,  but 


342 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS.^. 


thr  lending  state  would  have  been  made  to  set  the  example  of  reeom- 
meiiding,  of  organizing,  and  if  necessary,  of  enforcing,  anangenicnts 
favoral)le  to  Pan-Hellenic  brotherhood.     Kallikrati'dns   would    not 
only  have  refused  to  lend  himself  to  Dekarcliies  governina;  by  his 
force  and  for  his  purposes,  in  the  subordinate  citit^s— but  lie  would 
liave   discountenanced   such   conspinicies,  wherever  thev  tended  lo 
arist'  spontaneously.     No  ruffian  like  Kritias,  nc  crafty  sclienier  like 
Tlieramenes,  would  liave  reckoned  upon  his  aid  as  they  j^rcsuimd 
upon  the  friendship  of  Lysander.     Probably  he  would  liave  left  the 
government  of  each  city  to  its  own  natural  tenden(  ies,  oliuarehic  al 
or  dem(»cratical ;  interfering  only  in  special  cases  of  actual  "and  pro- 
nounced   necessity.      Now    the    influence  of  an    ascendant    state, 
employed  for  such  purposes  and  emjiliatieally  diseardinu"  jill  private 
ends  for  the  accomplishment  of  a  stable  Pan-IIcllenic  sentiment  and 
fraternity — employed  too  thus,  at  a  moment  Avhen  so  manv  of  the 
Greek  toAvns  were  in  the  throes  of  re-organization,  havinir  to*  take  up 
a  new  political  course  in  reference  to  the  altered  circumstances— is 
an  element  of  which  the  force  could  hardly  have  failed  to  be  pro- 
digious as  well  as  benetieial.     What  degree  of  positive  trood  minlit 
have   been  wrought,  by  a  noble-minded   victor  under  such  special 
circumstances — we  cannot  presume  to  affirm  in  detail.     P>ut  it  would 
liave    been   no  mean   advantage,  to  have  preserved    Greece    from 
Ijeholding  and  feeling  sucii  enormous  powers  in  the  hands  of  ;i  man 
like  Lysander:  through  whose  management  the  wor.'-t  tendencies  of 
an  imperial   city  were  studiously   magnitied  bv  the  exoibiiaiu  e   of 
individual   ambition.     It  was  to'him  exclusivelv  that  the  Thirty  in 
'  Athens,  and  the  Dekarcliies   elsewhere,  owed   both  their  existence 
and  their  means  of  oppression. 

It  has  been  necessary  thus  to  explain  the  general  ehnuL^es  which 
liad  gone  on  in  Grece  and  in  Grecian  fe(  ling  (hiring  the  eiiiht  niontlis 
succeeding  the  capture  of  Athens  in  Marc! i  404  u.c.,  in  order  tiiat  we 
mny  understand  the  position  of  the  Thirty  oligarchs  or  Tyrants  at 
Athens,  and  of  the  Athenian  population  boUi  in' Attica  and'in  exile, 
about  the  beginning  of  Dec'ember  in  the  same  year— the  peri(;d  wiiieli 
we  have  now  reached.  We  see  how  it  was  th.at  Thebes,  Corinth,  e.nd 
Hegara,  who  in  March  had  been  the  bitterest  enemies  of  the  Atheni- 
ans, had  now  become  alienated  both  from  Si>arta  and  from  the  Lxs- 
andrian  Thirty,  wliom  they  viewed  as  viceroys  of  Athens  for  sei):uaie 
Spartan  benelit.  We  see  liow  the  basis  was  thus  laid  of  svmpatiiv  for 
the  suiTering  exiles  wdio  tied  from  Attica;  a  fcding  wiiic'h  tlie  recit;d 
of  the  endless  enormities  perpetrated  by  Kritias  and  his  colleamies 
intlamed  every  day  more  and  more.  We  discern  at  the  same  time  how 
the  Tliirty,  while  thus  incurring  enmity  both  in  and  out  of  Attica, 
were  at  the  same  time  losing  the  hearty  siipport  of  Sparta,  from  the 
decline  of  I^ysander's  influence  and  the  growing  opposition  of  his 
rivals  at  home. 

In  spite  of  formal  prohibition   from  Sparta— obtained  doubtless 


SYMPATHY   WITH  THE  ATHENIAN  EXILES.     343 
„„ae.-    ...e    influence    o^.^rC"^^^^^^^^^ 

Areliinus,  starluig  tiom  V;,^  .  •  ,  .^.^.i^,  Ismenias  and  othei  ^^^'\'V,f 
unhWc  and  w^th  subsfmtial  '|^  ^  "^^  ^^^  stated  variously  at  oO, 
^  , .     .It  luc  head  ot  a  small  band  o\^^' p.  .,,,,  .,  frontier  lortress 

^nr^t  newhat  above  100  n-n^^^  ^^  uV^r  road  between 
f^^^luntabism>rti.^ 

;Sed   all   the   outlying  torlle.^c..n  A  u     '  ^^^^  .i>i^i,ty  nuirehcd 
1  e^    pushed  his  l-n-l--e  wi  liou   u^^^^^  to  re  e  com. 

MiVfn  m  Athens  t()  attack  hu,atti^^^^^  i^_^  ^^^^  .^.  ^^^^^^  ^^^^ 

•  iiw.    l/ieedrenu)niau  hoplius  ^^""         ,      irui.ruts  or  Horse- 

,      .    {>r<,l,..>ly  tlK-";^'"7"^','^,    ,  '\,r     Auovvu  to  L^'ve  o<e,>,.,«l 

^  i)  s°mn,.mto.l   in   U"-'"'  !'''"'  A'   that  there  was  1.0  stoek  ot  provi- 

the  h"inas  of  the  garrison  al  PI  V^-     J^^  i.uH.u'  since  tUe  weall.er 

"this^tornivvas  eharaotenz.a  "^P    .".„,i„„_and  since  U  gave 

'^l  bien  verv  line  nnl.l  H.e  "»X,.,em  700  strong.  Tli..nsl^ 

1  to'receive  .•e-en^;.vc^>™'^^       .   !  ^^^^^     ,„,««  to  Ijcep  -hetr 

!  -i    ts    mlus    coutrive.1    to  .f^'\  ,^,,^^1  mile  of  ll.eir  position 

1.  ve-    vni^bt,  1>^^'>">\"'^V   uhen'  K  .i''    «ulcl.  Imd  just  broken 

uii  a  I'ittle  before  daybreak,  «!"-  '    !  ."''.^  ,,oise  in  rubbing  down 

lud  when  the  grooms  «"■«"'■  V''lionUtis  from  Pbvle  "ished 

eir  horses.     .>ust  at  that  moinei      be  hopl  „    „.epared  some 

po  1  th..m  at  a  running.  V^'^^  \'m^  scarcely  any  resistance. 

,•,.,.  in  tluir  beds— and  dispeis'U  "»•"  \    .       iiorsemcn  were  slam 

one      .     ve.l  and  twenty  ""1^^^  ^^^^^,.^' J^;,,;;:^,,  and  carried  back 

tBj:^:^  »o  noai^-"  ..."  P-ttUe  carry- 
iug  off  of  the  dead. 


344 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS^E. 


Tliis  succc5?sfnl  engngeiiiont  sensibly  cliaiiged  tlic  relative  situation 
of  parties  in  Attica;  encouragini^  the  exiles  as  much  as  it  depressed 
the  Thirty.  Even  amonur  the  i>artisans  of  tlie  hitter  at  Athens,  dis- 
sension began  to  arise.  The  niinorily  wiiieh  had  synipalhized  Aviih 
Theranienes,  as  well  as  th;it  portion  of  the  Three  Thousand 'vvho  were 
least  comprised  as  accomplices  in  the  lecent  enormities,  began  to 
waver  so  manifestly  in  tlieir  allfgianee  that  Kritias  and  his  colleagues 
felt  some  doubt  of  being  al>le  to  maintain  theniselves  in  the  city. 
They  resolved  to  secure  Eleusis  and  the  island  of  Salamis,  as  j)IacL'S 
of  .safety  and  resource  in  case  of  being  compelled  to  evacuate  Athens, 
They  accordingly  went  to  Eleusis  with  a  consideral)le  number  of  the 
Athenian  Horsemen;  under  pretense  of  examining  into  the  strength 
of  the  place  and  the  number  of  its  defenders,  so  as  to  deter- 
mine what  [imount  of  further  garrison  would  be  neces.sary.  All 
the  Eleusians  disposed  and  qualified  for  armed  service  were  ordered 
to  come  in  ptMsun  and  give  in  their  names  to  the  Thirty  in  a  building 
having  its  postern  ojjeningon  to  the  sea  beach,  aloiig  which  were  posted 
the  Horsemen  and  the  attendants  from  Athens.  Each  Eleusinian 
hoplite,  after  having  pres^'uled  him.sclf  and  returned  his  nanu*  to  the 
Thirty,  was  ordered  to  pass  out  through  this  exit  where  <acli  man 
successively  found  himself  in  the  i)ower  of  tlie  Horscm<'n,  and  was 
fettereil  by  the  attendants.  Lysiiuachus,  the  Hipparch  or  conunander 
of  the  Horstenmn,  was  directed  to  convey  all  these  prisoners  to 
Athens  and  hand  them  over  to  the  custody'  of  the  Eleven.  Having 
Ihus  s^^-izcd  tmd  curried  away  from  Eleusis  every  citizen  whose  senti- 
ments or  whose  energy  they  su>i>ected,  and  having  left  a  force  of 
their  own  adherents  in  tlie  ])iace,  the  Thirty  returned  to  Athens.  At 
the  same  time,  it  uppeai-s,  a  similar  visit  and  seizure  of  prisoners  was 
made  by  bome  of  them  in  Sidamis,  On  the  next  day  they  convoked 
r.t  Athens  their  Thi\^e  Thousand  privileiied  hoplites — together  with 
Jill  the  ix'maining  horsemen  who  had  not  been  employed  at  Eleusis  or 
8alamis  -in  the  Odeon,  half  of  which  was  occupied  by  the  Lacedae- 
monian g:irrison  lUKler  aims.  "'Gentlemen  (said  Kriti.MS,  addressing 
Lis  countrymen),  we  keep  up  the  government  not  less  for  your  benelit 
than  for  our  own.  You  must  therefore  share  with  us  iirthe  danger 
iis  well  as  in  th<*  honor  of  our  position.  Here  are  these  Eleusinian 
prisoners  awaiting  sentence:  you  must  pass  a  vote  condemning  them 
idl  to  death,  in  order  that  your  hopes  and  fears  may  be  identified 
"with  onrs.'""  He  tlien  pointwl  to  a  spot  immediately  before  him  and  in 
liis  view,  tlin-cting  eacJi  man  to  deposit  ujion  it  hisjicbble  of  condem- 
natioM  visibly  to  every  one.  I  liave  before  remarked  that  at  Athens, 
<yiien  voting  was  well  known  to  bi'  the  same  thing  as  voting  under  con- 
straint: tlierc  was  no  security  for  free  and  genuine  suffrage  except  by 
making  it  secret  as  well  as  numerous.  Kritias  was  obeyed  without 
reserve  or  exception:  i^robabl}- any  dissentient  would  have  been  })ut 
to  death  on  the  spot.  All  the  prisoners,  seemingly  three  hundred  in 
number,  were  coudemueil  by  the  same  vote  and  executed  forthwith. 


INHUMANITY  OF  KRITIAS. 


345 


Though  this  atrocity  g.v.  ^::^i^^:^:^^^f^^ 
the  most  violent  friends  of  '^"f';'*' ',  ,,W  ,   ,  j  4,,j  of  strengtl.ening 
uiunber  of  others,  f-'^'tr'Vo^n  Id  V  doubt,  to  the  bold  and 
them.     It  contributed  in  P'"  •," '-n"^^ ',!.'. ^„Uis,  live  duvs  after  his  late 
decisive  resolution  now  taUei    '>         '\J  "'  '^  ^^  Peinelis.     His  force, 
success,  of  mavcliin;,;  '^^  "','", i  still  no  niorc  tl,i.u.  lUOO  men;  ulto- 
though  s,.mewhat  !»«l-«;'^;  '^.^^^^ '\\„ '  ,1.  "ble  enl'erprise,  bad  he  not 
gether  inadequate  by  Us"" J;".;    >  ^     ?,^i  „  from  freih  comrades,  to- 
gouulcd  on  positive  ^"fP^^X    ,t^o    i  e  "itWc  support  from  disgust 
gcther  with  a  sUll  Jfreale .  »«      '^,<"  Hew  s  hi'lcSl  speedily  joined 
Sr  indilTerencc  t,,nyar.ls  <1'«  1    .  l>-     {,  ^j'^"^  ,f  them,  since  the  gen- 
by  many  sympathizing  c<'>"l   \m'r  ;  ^.    '^^^^     ,,^^,^y  ,„.„,or.     Some 
^;l  tt™^:hi^randXl t^^uis  were  whol,^   unarmed,  and 

cations  as  well  as  of  '"'"-^h  'C^l'  ^.1,  -  and  re.iuired  an  ampler 
it  with  Athens.  I  «l'^;^';^,,^,C  lousier.  Aciordingly  when 
force  to  defend  It  than  '  ''■y'\ '  '  ' ,  the  next  morning  to  attack  him, 
the  •riiirty  marched  o"^  "(  j^'  .  ,«  hop  ,"s  and  Hors.m-n.  and  with 
with  their  full  .f<^>''';^„".  ,^'''Ses-  c  in  vain  attempted  to  m,un- 
the  Lacedaemonian  ganison  ^';^'<  "^^  '  ,  , ;  ,  ,,,,i  ,i„,vn  to  Peiiunis. 
tain  ag-ainsl  them  the  great  «;  ff ;V';;^;;'  i  JI  .nychia-tlie  eastern- 
He  was  contpeled  to  con»^^^^^^^  ^^^^^  t^  ^„eBayof 

most  portion  of  the  ag!i.'e.'J'»«  '-'M'^"  ^  j,  '  ^rts  which  hail  once 
Plialernm,  and  '■'^"^'"^"'S  "»7\  '"t'  Thrasybulus  occupied  the 
sustained  the  naval  power  of  A  ens.  1  .^^ .;,;  i5^.„rtideion,  sil.i- 
temple  of  Artemis  >I""y^  •  "  d\' eess  ble  nlv  bv  astrc'i^toE  sU'cp 
ated  in  the  midst  ot  il;'Vy^''^''t  whose  file,  viere  ten  deep,  were 
ascent.     In  the  rear  of  his  l'"Pl'^'^;  :;^";^  ^^^,„  ,„  ,teep  ihat  ihese 

posted  the  ^^^l^^^:i,^^'^::<  ,he  hopli.es  in  their 
latter  could  cast  their  miss  esovi I  j    yi,,,,  Ci-st  mustered   in 

front.    Presently  lyi^;;!:.  '  f (ea  led  tli^ Tli W  ^^""^\  ^^'l" 

the  market-place  of.P«  f^."'' *'^'"''' ,,,,,,,  i.  mountinii  the  hill  in 
seen  ap|.roaching  with  their  f  1«;^^'"  .  ""^^.'^^f^-  S  .  fliiasybulus 
close  array.  With  hoplites  "<>  .I'f ,  'j  ^,*',,  ,^,i  ".  "',.'e,nii,din-  liiem  of 
-after  aii  animated  e^l|""-'^  '""'""  f;  „!  dwe  i k'  upon  the  ad- 
the  wrongs  whi<;li  the.v  had  ^/^r'^^;^  ',,„  .-lo^c  I'.nks  of  the 
vantages  of  their  P''^"">'  j,;^  '  i'    j^    es  and  would  force  Iheni  to 

enemy  to  tlie  d"Sl"«;'!^T,      f.     to  be  i  nble  to  resist  a  charge  with 
crouch  lUideiMbcir  sbi-ds   0  1^      b^^^ 

the  spear  in  froi  t— w.ulca  Vf"^."-,     ,,,.oi,het  (habimnllv  consnilcd 
standing  in  the  l'''f.''"^.\'^'''H  "  .'  VttTTbmve  aii.l  .levoU.l  patriot. 


346 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS.E. 


DEPOSITION  OF  THE  TIIIUTY. 


347 


troops  of  the  Tliirty  advanced  near  enough  in  apeendinjr  the  hill  the 
li-h  -armed  in  the  Vear  of  Thrasyhuhispoured  upon  them  a  shower  ot 
darf;  over  the  lieads  of  their  own  hoplitcs,  with  considerable  ( ITect. 
As  thev  seemed  to  waver,  seekin-  to  cover  themselves  with  their 
shields;  and  thus  not  seein-  well  hefore  th(;m-the  prophet,  himself 
seemin-lv  in  arms,  set  the  example  of  rushm-  forward,  was  he  tirst 
?o  closc^with  the  enemv,  and  perished  in  the  onset.  '1  hrasybu  us  with 
the  main  body  of  hoplites  followed  him,  charged  vigorous  y  down 

;.  hill  and  after  a  smart  resistance,  drove  them  back  in  disorder, 
^!  ith  the  loss  of  seventy  men.  What  w*?,s  of  still  greater  moment- 
Kiitiasand  Hippomachus,  who  headed  their  troops  on  the  lett,  were 
among  the  slain;  together  with  Charmjdes  son  of  Glaukon,  one  of 
the  ten  oligarchs  who  had  been  placed  to  manage  Peinrus 

This  crn-ataiid  important  advantage  left  the  troops  of  rhraysbulus 
in  possession  of  seventy  of  the  enemy's  dead,  whom  they  stripped  of 
their  arms   but  not  .>f  their  clothing,  in  token  ot.respect  for  leiloN- 
comVrvmen      So  disheartened,  luke-warm,  and  disunited  were  the 
hoplites  of  the  Thirty,  in  spite  of  their  great  superiority  ot  nuinlur, 
S they  sent  to  solicit  the  usual  tmce  for  burying  the  dead.     Micli 
request  being  of  course  -ranted,  tlie  two  contending  parties  bec.me 
iXmimrledNvith  each  other  in  the  performance  ot  tie  f""^''"^^!  ;  «;- 
t°es      Amid  so  impressive  a  scene,  their  common  feelings  as  Alhe- 
ni;^s  and  fellow  countrymen  were  forcibly  ^'^^^\^^^'\'^;^^;:i_ 
friendly  observations  were  inteirhanged  among  them.     Kleokiilus 
herald  of  the  Mvsts  or  communicants  in  the  Lleu^nian  mysteries, 
beon-i  g  to   one  of  the  most  respected  Gentes  in  the  >late-was 
amon^  the  exiles.     Ilis  voice  was  peculiarly  loud   and  the  fnnc  ion 
wSle  held  enabled  him  to  obtain  silence  whde  he  ;nldn>sed    o 
r  citizens  serving  with  the  Thirty  a  touch  ng  and  enjphatic  r<       n- 
s  ranee ---Why  are  you  thus  driving  us  mto  banishment    lelloA- 
dtoms"^    Why  are  you  seeking  to  kill  us?    We  have  never  done  you 
l^'l^st  hari^:  wc?  have  pamken  with  you  in  i^i|^>- n  -  and 
festivals:  we  have  been  your  companions  in  chouis,  in  ^chool   a 
in  army  we  have  braved  a  thousand  dangers  with  you  by  land  and 
lea  n  defense  of  our  common  safety  and  freedom.     I  adjure  vou  by 
our  ^omrmm  gods,  paternal  and  maternal-by  our  common  knnh 
and  companionship-desist  from    thus  wronging  yom   ^o  n    >    m 
obedience  to  these  nefarious  Thirty,  who  have  slain  ^^^/j;;;  >  ^^^^ 
in  eidit  months,  for  their  own  ]mvat(^u•alns,  as  the   ^lopnmsu.. 
in  ten  years  of  war.     These  are  the  men  who  have  plunue     us    no 
wicked  and  odious  war  one  against  anoihei-,  "^^'^^'V  \^t^^\^< 
gether  in  peace.     Re  assured  that  your  slam  m  this  battle  have  co^t 
us  as  many  tears  as  tlwy  have  cost  you."  ^...lum 

Such  altecting  api»eals.  proceeding  from  a  man  of  ^'^'^P^'f  ^^.^^.f '  ^ 
like  KkM.kritus'and  doubtless  from  others  also,  ^^^f,^"/;i  ^t  !,K  .J^ 
sensibly  on  the  minds  of  the  citizens  from  Athens,  that  »;,  ^ »  .^^ 
were  obliged  to  give  orders  for  immediately  returning:  which  llua- 


t   ii.r.,10-1,  it  misht  have  Taeen  in  his 
sybulus  did  not  attempt  to  preveiit  though  U^^^^^.^       ^  ^^^^^^  ^ 

V  ower  to  do  so.     But  then-  *'^^cendency  laa  appeared 

\v    eh  it  never  fully  f^ovcned      (^  the^^^^^ 

covU-ast  and  dispirited  m  the  ^^^^  marshaled  in  different 

e       while  the  privileged  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

c  vnpmies  on-uard,  were  ^7^^^>^^^^ '''conipromised  in  the  crimes 
Those  among  them  who  had  bee  i  ^  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  existing  authority ; 
;.f   he  Tliirty    were  strenuous  m  ^^^'^^lou  o  continuance  of 

u  ^c  a'  had  been  less  gu  by  P;^l^J^!^|^^not  be  permitted  to 
so  unholv  a  war,  declaring  ^l^i\\^^^^i,,:;i^Ue  Knights  or  ilorsemeu 
briu'^  AllKMis  to  utter  nun.  Ad  tl^^^«^-^^^^^  opposing  all  accommo- 
laU  eoniinued  ste.i.lfast  \>f!^^l^;^^  seriously  weakened 
dttion  with  the  exlles^  ye     he  Tl^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^  j^^^^^,  and  at  he 

bv  th:;  death  of  K'•^^l'^^^-^^^^^f  ^.^f.r  ncioled  among  them;  while  that 
same  ti  ne  the  most  cruel  and  ^^^H^jcipie*^  .  formerly  adhered 

mnv   both  in  the  senate  and  mi    of    '  J^^(      ^lic  meeting  among 
o  T^i'eraiuenes,  now  again  ^\^^;^^^^;\\/\^f  ealled  the  opposition  party 
]\   •,   ^vw  held   in  which  what  ma>  De  ^^^^  ,         ^^Q^e  enornuties 
;™n";eTl.'rty-ll.at  which  lu.do,n>os.^^ 

;  f  oTlius-becumc  predomuuint     ^/l^^^'f  Ten,  one  from  eacli 
t,ib.'    B"t  tlie  members  of  the  1  in  ty^c  pueulori,  it  not 

rcr,.il.le;  ^^-^Y'ru^.^^i^^Xincnm  to  ^-""J^Xofn 
,„(,re-aaheronts  of  J  '^  '"  ,;'^^,,e  vein  of  senti.nent.  were  c  o.  en 
cii-irikk-^— w  th  other^^ot  tu-^  »•""''>  -.^  members,  havui!; 

V  ,n^  be  Ten.  Cb;u-ikles  =^"'1"  f  ™°^^;n\e'  ll'e'>iselves  safe  at 
ti  »  U,  t  ibeiv  ■•»^f  "''!:"'^y-.  "Vh  cE  hey  h"S  had  the. precaution  to 
VUiens,  but  relived  1° ^ 'V,;;'';tnb«  their  partisans  and  the 
ociMinv  beforeliand.  Piobablj  a  uu  .  ,  ,  „^  ^ith  them. 
I  ,  .  l-emoi.ian  sarris  >n  also,  retired  th uuei  '"  ^  plainly  a  com- 
'"t  ie  1  o'minatim,  of  Oiis  «'«w  oli|a.^b>  o   J  >.  ^^^  ^P^  oligarehicat 

promise,  adopted  by  ^"l"'- /  "''^econrodation  ^vith  the  «xi  cs-  y 
'system  and  desire  to  come  to     ^f.  .  .maintaining  tl  e  oli^ 

Sl"  1  cldcai  Board,  'l'^""^*'"S ,  i''  L^s' men   ll.e  main  upholders  ot 
T  ;:  iallcr  was  the  P\VP<>^«  «;  ^^^^^^f  ''^."ia'snch  also  >vas  soon  sec, 
I'u.  firs*  Board  as  well  as  ot  t  le  ''*-"'"',•  ,  ■     colleasiues.     Instead  oi/ 
ir'e  turpoliey  of  K-^-^;--     eonuUation%vith  the  exiles  ... 
.tb-mpling  to  ..K.^'" 'H'oit  te.  "^  o^  ^'^     ^^,„.„  ,t  separately  l>f -.^V'^ 

uiaus  who  had  liop^d  boltei  thm,.  uo 


348 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARQINUS.E. 


But  the  forces  of  oliirarehy  Avere  more  and  more  enfeebled  at  Athens, 
as  well  by  the  secession  of  all  the  more  violent  spirits  to  Eleusis.  as 
bv  Hie  mistrust.  (lis(!or(l,  and  disaffection,  which  now  reicned  within 
tlie  city.  Far  from  being  able  to  abuse  power  like  their  predecessois, 
tile  Ten  did  not  even  fully  contide  in  their  Three  Thousand  hoplites, 
but  were  ol)liged  to  take  measures  for  the  defense  of  the  city  in  con- 
junction with  the  Hipparch  and  the  Horsemen,  who  did  double  duty 
—  on  horselj.nck  in  the  daytime,  and  as  hoplites  with  their  shields 
along  the  walls  at  night,  lor  fear  of  surprise — employing  the  Odeon 
a>  their  head -(pi  art  efs.  The  Ten  sent  envoys  to  t^parta  to  solicit  fur- 
ther aid;  while  the  Thirty  sent  envoys  thither  also,  from  Eleusis,  for 
the  same  purpose;  both  representing  that  the  Athenian  peoples  had 
nvnlted  from  Sparta,  and  reiinired  further  force  to  reconquer  them. 

Such  foreign  aid  became  daily  more  necessary  to  them,  since  the 
forces  of  Thrasybulus  in  Peiru3us  grew  stronger,  before  their  eyes,  in 
niimbeis.  in  arms,  and  in  hope  of  success;  exerting  themselves,  with 
successful  energy,  to  procure  additional  arms  and  shields — though 
some  of  tlie  shiefds,  indeed,  were  no  better  tiian  wood-work  or  wicker- 
work  whitened  over..  ]Many  exiles  Hocked  in  to  their  aid:  others 
seal  donations  of  money  or  arms.  Among  the  latter  the  orator 
Ly^  ias  stood  conspicuous,  transmitting  to  Peiueus  a  present  cf  2(»0 
shields  siS  well  as  2.000  drachmas  in  money,  and  hiring  besides  J^OO 
fresh  soldiers;  while  his  frientl  Thrasydicus,  the  leader  of  the  demo- 
cratical  interest  at  Jillis,  was  induced  fo  iurni>h  a  loan  of  two  talents. 
Others  also  lent  money;  some  Bonotians  furnished  two  talents, 
a  person  named  Gelarchus  contributed  the  large  sum  of  five  tal- 
ents, repaid  in  aifdtimes  by  the  people.  Proclamation  was  made 
by  Thrasyl)ulus.  that  all  metics  who  would  lend  aid  should  be  put 
(Hi  the  footing  t)f  isotely  or  e(pial  payment  of  taxes  with  citizens, 
except  from  the  metic-tax  and  other  special  burdens.  Within  a 
short  time  he  h:.d  got  together  a  considerable  force  both  in  heavy- 
;;rmed  and  light-ainud.  and  even  seventy  horsemen;  so  that  he  was 
in  coadiiinn  to  make  excursions  out  of  Peineus,  and  to  collect  wood 
and  provisions.  Kor  did  the  Ten  venture  to  make  any  aggressive 
inovenieat  out  of  Athens,  except  so  far  as  to  send  outrthe  Horsemen, 
who  slew  or  captured  stragglers  from  the  force  of  Thrasybulus.  Ly- 
siuK.chus  the  Hii)parch  (the  .sime  who  had  commanded  under  the 
Thirty  at  the  seizure  of  the  Eleusinian  citizens)  having  made  prison- 
ers some  young  Aiheniiiiis  bringing  in  provisions  from  the  country 
for  the  consumption  of  the  troops  in  Peira'us,  put  them  to  death — 
in  spite  of  remonstrances  from  several  even  of  his  own  men;  for  which 
cruelty  Thrasybulus  relaliated,  by  putting  to  death  aliorseman  n:inie(l 
Kallistratus,  made  prisoner  in  one  of  their  marches  to  the  neighbor- 
ing villages. 

in  the  established  civil  war  which  now  raged  in  Attica,  Thrasybu- 
lus and  the  exiles  in  Peiiu-us  had  decidedly  tlie  advantage;  maintain- 
ing the  offensive,  while  the  Ten  in  Athens',  and  the  remainder  of  the 


EXPEDITION  OF  KING  PAUSANIAS.  349 

TMrtv  at  Heusi.  were  cacU  f^J^;!::^^::^:^!:^^ 
8iou.6£  the  oUgurcucal  force  utothteeuvo^  ^^^^  ^^^^.^^^^^ 

eued  botl.  while  «'«  f «."!;.^  f/^,  '  .^"^^^^  auxiliary  foree  altereci  the 
Presently  however  tl'e  ■"  v al  ^'  ^^^  ^,g  oliffirchieal  envoj^  ha,l 
balance  ot  parties  Lj»a(lcr  w  o  ^  ^^  prevailed  wi  h  the 
expressly  requesled  to  he  bent  to  "^      ''^j'^  ^-       {f  „.ent  to  Eleusn 

;;';,hUro,n  Asia  mto  the  Spart.m  ;-«•,,,,.,„„,  „f  „ngarchs  ia 
ThearrivalofLysanclerbio  gh     neu\o       ^        ^    ^1^^^^ 

Attica  again  "'t^^-J;«P'-''-'*""vV;'l\rSts  by  prevent        all  entry  of 

and  even  '■e^l^^'^J  P"'/'^t''.™-id  havfpre^^  it  fronx  being  re.luc.d 

ships  or  stores.    Nothing  couU  '>;'y' •P'^;'',  ,.        ^.,,.-^  i„  his,  opera-. 

0  Surrender,  it  Lysandcr  ''f'   ''f,^"  j'^i^^l^t ,  .d  by  'bis  time  become 

tions.     IJut  the  gen.^ral  sentunent  ot  W""^;.      j,,e-'oii*u-chies  which 

Ugustcd  with  his  amb.tu,us  fj'lf^y- ;      ^^   "^  T  sentiment  not  wiUi- 

hc  had  everywhere  set  up  f^^"  ;/  ^i^^"^',"^    ^^  gpartans  who.  already 

ont  inrtuence  on  the  feehng»  'f  ,'';,.;.,  ""'ot  to  im.-rease  it  further 

consent  of  three  out  o  '^^^-X,'^^  force" of  the  co..fe<leraey,  for 
pedition  into  Att.c.t   at  the    c  d    f  t  c^^o^  ^^  ^^^^  j 

(vhich  he  imme.hately.ssad  P  '_«'Wn^™^;^i  i„V!u„ed  to  sympathr/.e 
tendencies  of  Lysander,  «  ^'l^^*^^'  ,\;\  'f  ,„u  dsBwhere  also-as  at 
withtliedentocracy;  .m       <rd>  a   A^^^^^^^^^  ^        ^^.^  i.Uentions  toward 

JIuntineia.     It  was  prohab  >  "«'^-'^  ^       ,„  u,,,,,  ,i,e  Peloi)onnes,an 
Athens  were  lenient  and  »""-I;>X     y'^^t  the  Ikeotlans  and  Corui- 
allies  obeyed  the  summon.s  SP>  <-  '    ^     \^.!^^\'^„,  ,,,^1  done  nothingto 
Ihians  still  declined,  on  the  S '' .         '  !;^4 ■^',  ™ f  of  the  altered  feel- 
vi„late  the  late  «'';™'>\'"'V\,  \,'i^';'  J  ;oe  down  to  the  period  of  tliat 
ln.,'B  of  Greece  durmg  the  las   yf."^' f'",'^,';, .';  .utcrly  hostile  to  Alliens 
convention,  these  two  ^t^''^^  ';  ."^  '  *"  /^^^    u  peJted  that  even  the 
than  any  others^m  '''«  ,;=°"  ^4^'^;;!; 'rtel    d.li  sUsh  LacedaMiioniau 
expedition  of  P^'"  j  "  ^.^  sep  r  te  .lepe.ideney  of  Sparta,  though 
views,  to  secure  Attica  as  a  bepai.n        i 

detached  from  Lysander.  .        -^   (.,|  by  Lysander  and  the 

On  approaching  Athens,  P;\"^;^;  'j;,  ^7,"  4r(k^    of  the  Acad.my 
forces .dieady  iu  ^ttuja    em. u  P^  ^  ^^^^,  before- 

near  tlie  city  gates.     Hi>  ^^J  ^'^     y? .  ^^e  vehement  reaction  against 

SSiSC:;e:;:;rt&ai;iiy  in  hiscauip,  with  prayers 


350 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS^. 


for  protectiou  and  cries  of  vengeance  against  the  oliirarchs.     Aniono- 
tli()se  vietnns  (a«;  I  have  already  stated)  were  [NikeraUis  the  son   and 
Lnkratcs  the  brollier,  of  Nlkias  wlu,  liad  perished  at  Syracuse   the 
f iiend  and  proxeuus  of  Sparta  at  Athens.     The  orplian  eh'ildren   both 
ot  rsikeiatus  and  Lukrates,  were  taken  to  Pausanias  by  their  relative 
Diognetus.  who  implored  his  protection  for  them,  recountinjv  at  the 
same  time  the  unmerited   execution  of  their  respective  fathers   Mud 
settm.ir  torth  their  family  claims  upon  the  justice  of  Sparta      This 
affeciinir   incident,    which   lias  been  specially  made  known' to  u< 
doubtle>s  did  not  stand  alone,  among  so  many  families  sullerin*'-  in  m 
the  same  cause.    Pausanias  was  furnished  at  once  with  ami^le  irimmds 
not  merely  tor  repudiating  the  Thirtv  altoirether,  and  sendin<r  ]..^^']l 
the  presents  which  tliey  tendered  to  him— but  even  for  refuSn-  t*» 
identify  himself  unreservedly  with  the  new  Oligarcliy  oi  Ten  which 
had  risen  upon  their  ruins.     The  voice  of  complaint— now  for  the 
t^rst  time  set  tree,  with  some  hopes  of  redres&-must  have  been  violent 
and  unm(;asured,  after  such  a  career  as  that  of  Kritias  and  his  collea- 
gues; while  the  tact  was  now  fully  manifested,  which  could  not  well 
have  come  forth  into  evidence  before,  that  the  persons  despoiled  and 
murdered  had  licen  chiefly  opulent  men.  and  very  frequently  even  oli- 
garcl  ica  men— not  i^oliticiaus  of  the  former  democracy.    Both  Pausa- 
luas.  and   the    Laccdiemonians  alone:  with  him   on  reachino-  Athens 
must  have  been  strongly  aiTected  by  the  facts  which  they  IcjTrnt   and 
by  the  loud  cry  for  sympathy  and  redress  which  poured  upon  them 
from  the  most  innocent  and  respected  families.     The  predisposition 
both  of  the  King  and  the  Ephors  against  the  policy  of  Lysander  was 
materially  strengthened;  as  well  as  their  inclination  to  brino-  about 
an  accommodation  of  parties,  instead  of  upholding  by  forei'^n  force 
an  anli-popular  few.  * 

Such  convictions  would   become  further  confirmed  as  Pausanias 
saw  and  heard  more  of  the  real  state  of  affairs.     At  flrst  he  lield  -i 
aiiguag-e  decidely  adverse  to  Thrasybulus  and  the  exiles,  sendino-  to 
them  a  heraJd  and  requiring  them  to  disband  and  go  to  their  respect- 
ive homes.     The  recpiisition  not  being  obeyed  he  made  a  faint  attack 
upon  Peineus,  which  had  no  effect.     Next  day  he  marched  down 
with  two  Lacedfeinonian  mora?  or  large  military  divisions,  and  three 
trilies  ot  the  Athenian  Horsemen   to  reconnoiter  the  ])lace   and  see 
where  a  line  ot  blockade  could  be  drawn.     Some  li-ht  troops  annoyed 
Jiim.    but  his  troops   repulsed   them   even   as  far  as  the  theater  of 
J  eiraMis,  wh(>re  all  the  forces  of  Thrasybulus  were  mustered   hc-.w- 
.*.r!iu'd  as  well  as  light-armed.     The  ]:aceda-monians  were  here  in'a 
(lisadvantap'ous  position,  i)iohably  in  the  mi<}si  of  houses  an<l  streefs 
so  tiiat  ad  the  li-ht-armed  «,f  Thrasybulus  were  emtJjled  to  set   upon 
tiiem  tuiiously  from  different  sides,  and  drive  them   out  a-ain  with 
l(,,s.s-two  of  the  Si)artan  polemarchs  being  here  slain.     Pausanias 
was  obbg,>(l  to  retreat  to  a  little  eminence  about  half  a  mile  off  where 
lie  mustered  his  whole  force,  and  formed  his  hoplites  into  a  very  deep 


PEACE-PARTY   IN  ATHENS. 


351 


phalanx.  Thmsybulus  on  his  side  w\is  so  encouraged  by  the  recent 
success  of  his  light-armed  that  he  ventured  to  bring  out  his  heavy- 
armed  only  eight  deep,  to  an  equal  conflict  on  V\q  open  ground. 
i>ut  he  was^here  completely  worsted,  and  driven  back  into  Peiraus 
with  the  loss  of  150  men,  so  that  the  Spartan  King  was  able  to  retire 
to  Athens  after  a  victory  and  a  trophy  erected  to  commemorate  it. 

The  issue  of  this  battle  was  one  extremely  fortunate  for  Thrasy- 
bidus  and  his  comrades,  since  it  left  the  honors  of  the  day  with  Pau- 
sanias so  as  to  avoid  provoking  enmity  or  vengeance  on  his  part, 
i  while  it  showed  plainly  that  the  conquest  of  Peirreus,  defended  by 
so  much  courage  and  military  efficiency,  would  be  no  easy  matter. 
It  disposed  Pausmiias  still  f  urtiier  toward  an  accomodation  ;  strcngth- 
eniiv  also  the  ^orce  of  that  party  in  Athens  which  was  favorable  to 
the  same  object,  and  adverse  to  thi  Ten  Oligarchs.  This  opposition 
party  found" decided  favor  with  the  Spartan  King  as  well  as  witli  the 
Ephor  Naukleidas  who  accompanied  him.  Numbers  of  Athenians, 
even  among  those  Three  Thousand  by  vdiom  tiie  city  was  now  ex- 
clusively occupied,  came  forward  to  deprecate  fuither  war  witii 
Peineus  and  to  entreat  that  Pausanias  would  settle  the  quarrel  so  as 
to  leave  them  all  at  amity  with  Laced-iMUon.  Xeuophon  indeed, 
according  to  that  narrow  and  partial  spirit  wliicli  pervades  his  Hi'l- 
lenica.  notices  no  sentiment  in  P.msanias  except  his  jealousy  of 
Lysander;  and  treats  the  oj^x-jsition  agiinst  tlie  Ten  at  Athens  as 
having  been  got  up  by  his  intrigues.  But  it  seems  plain  that  this 
is  not  a  correct  account.  Pausanias  did  not  create  the  discord, 
but  found  it  already  existing;  and  had  to  clioose  which  of  the 
parties  he  would  adopt.  The  Ten  took  up  the  oligarchical  g  ime 
after  it  had  been  thoroughly  dishonored  and  ruln-'d  by  ihe  Tlnrty. 
They  inspired  no  confidence  nor  had  they  any  hold  upon  the  citi- 
zens in  Athens,  except  in  so  far  as  these  latter  dreaded  reactionary 
violence  in  case  Thrasybulus  and  his  companions  shouhl  re-enter  by 
force.  Accordingly  when  Pausanias  was  there  at  the  head  of  a  force 
competent  to  prevent  such  dangerous  reaction,  the  cilizens  at  onco 
mtmifested  their  dispositions  against  tlie  Ten  and  favorable  to  peace 
with  Peirneus.  To  second  this  pacilic  party  was  at  once  the  e.isiest 
course  for  Pausanias  to  take,  and  the  most  likely  to  popularize  Sparta 
in  Greece,  wdiereas  he  would  s'U'ely  have  entailed  upon  iier  still  more 
bitter  curses  from  withimt,  not  to  mention  the  loss  of  men  to  herself, 
if  he  had  employed  the  amount  of  force  requisite  to  uphold  the  Ten 
and  subdue  Peineus.  To  all  this  we  have  to  add  his  jealousy  of 
Lysander,  as  an  important  predisposing  motive,  but  only  as  auxiliary 
anionii:  manv  others. 

Under  such  a  state  of  facts  it  is  not  surprisinr  to  learn  that -Pausa- 
nias encouraged  solicitations  for  peace  from  Thrasybulus  and  the 
exiles,  and  that  he  granted  them  a  ti'uce  to  enable  tlieni  to  send 
envoys  to  Sparta.  Along  with  these  envoys  went  Kephisophon  and 
Mclitus,  sent  for  the  same  purpose  of  entreating  peace  by  the  party 


s:j2 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ARGINUS.E. 


ATHENIAN  EMPIRE. 


353 


opposed  to  the  Ten  at  Athens,  under  the  snnetion  both  of  Pansanins 
anil  of  the  accompanying  Ephors.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Ten  find- 
ing themselves  discountenanced  by  Paiis.iiiias,  sent  envoys  of  their 
own  to  outbid  the  others.  They  tendered  tliemselves,  their  walls, 
and  their  city,  to  be  dealt  with  as  the  Lacediemoninus  chose;  reciuir'- 
inir  that  Thrasybulus,  if  he  pretended  to  be  the  friend  of  Sparta, 
should  make  the  same  unqujiiilied  surrender  of  Peiranis  and  ^hmy- 
chia.  All  the  three  sets  of  envoys  M'ere  liecird  before  the  three 
Ephors  remaininu  at  Sparta  and  the  Lacedaemonian  assembly;  who 
took  the  best  resolution  which  the  case  admitted  to  bring  to  pass  an 
amicable  settlement  betvveen  Athens  and  Peiraus,  and  to  leave  the 
terms  to  be  fixed  by  fifteen  conunissioners  who  were  sent  thither 
forthwith  to  sit  in  conjun(;tion  witli  Pausanias.  Tliis  Board  deter- 
mined that  tiic  exiles  in  Peirjrus  should  be  rc-adihitted  to  Alliens, 
that  an  accomodation  should  take  iiiacCj  and  that  no  man  should  he 
molested  for  past  acts  except  the  Thirty,  the  Eleven  (who  had  been 
the  instruments  of  all  executions),  and  Hie  Ten  who  had  governed  in 
Peirajus.  But  Eleusis  was  recognized  as  a  government  separate  frcni 
Athens,  and  left  (as  it  already  was)  in  jiosse^sion  of  tlie  Thirty  and 
their  coadjutors;  to  serve  as  a  refuge  for  all  those  who  might  feel 
their  future  safety  compromised  at  Athens  in  consequence  of  their 
past  con(Uict. 

As  soon   as  these  terms  were  proclaimed,  accepted,  and  sworn  to 
by  all   parties,  Pausanias  with   all    the   Lactdiemouians  evaeuaied 
Attica.     Thrasybulus  and  the  exiles  niarched  up  in  solemn  proces- 
sion from  Peinrus  to  Athens.     Tlieir  first  act  was  to  go  up   lo   the 
acropolis,  now  relieved   from  its  Laceda'nionian  garrison,  and  there 
to  offer  sj^crifice  and  thanksgiving.     On  descending  from  thence  a 
general  assemlily  was  held  in  which — unanimously  and  without  oppo- 
sition, as  it  should  seem — the  democracy  was  restored.     The  govern- 
ment of  the  Ten,  which  could  have  no  basis  except  the  sword  of  the 
foreigner,  disappeared  as  a   matter  of  course.     But  Thrasybulus, 
Avhile  he  strenuously  enforced  upon  his  comrades  from  Peirtxus  a 
full  respect  for  the  oaths  which  they  had  sworn  and  an  mireserved 
harmony  with  their  newly  acquired  fellow-citizens,  admonished  the 
assembly  emphatically  as  to  the  past  events.     "You  city-men  (he 
said),  I  advise  you  to  take  just  measure  of  yourselves  for  fhe  futuie. 
and  to  calculate  fairly  what  ground  of  superiority  you  have  so  as  to 
pretend  to  rule  over  us.    Are  you  juster  than  we?    Why,  the  Demos, 
though  poorer  than  you,  never  at  any  time  wronged  you  for  the  i)ur- 
poses  of  plunder;  while  you.  the  wealthiest  of  all,  have  done  many 
base  deeds  for  the  sake  of  gain.     Since  then  you  have  no  justice  to 
boast  of,  are  you  superior  to  us  on  the  score  of  courage?     There  can- 
not be  a  better  trial  than  the  war  which  has  just  ended.     Again,  can 
you  pretend  to  be  superior  in  policy?  you,  who,  having  a  foriified 
city,  an  armed  force,  plenty  of  money,  and  the  Pelopon^iesians  for 
your  allies  have  been  overcome  by  men  who  had  nothing  of  the  kind 


to  aid  them?  Can  you  boast  of  your  hold  over  the  Lacedgemonians? 
Why,  they  have  just  handed  yon  over  like  a  vicious  dog  with  a  clog 
tied  to  him,  to  the  very  Demos  whom  you  have  wronged,  and  are 
now  gone  out  of  the  country.  But  you  liave  no  cause  to  be  uneasy 
for  the  future.  I  adjure  you,  my  friends  from  Peiraius,  in  no  point 
to  violate  the  oaths  which  we  have  just  sworn.  Show,  in  addition 
to  your  other  glorious  exploits,  that  you  are  honest  and  true  to  your 
cn'-iagements." 

The  archons,  the  senate  of  Five  Hundred,  the  public  assembly,  and 
the  Dikasteries  appear  to  have  been  now  revived,  as  thev  had  stood 
in  the  democracy  prior  to  the  capture  of  tlie  city  by  Lvsander.  This 
important  restoration  seems  to  have  taken  place  sonie  time  in  the 
spring  of  403  B.C.,  though  we  cannot  exactly  make  out  in  what 
month.  The  first  archon  now  drawn  w^as  Eukleides.  who  gave  his 
name  to  this  memorable  year;  a  year  never  after\vard  forgolten  by 
Athenians. 

Eleusis  was  at  this  time,  and  pursuant  to  the  late  convention,  a 
city  independent  and  separate  from  Athens,  under  the  government  of 
the  Thirty  and  comprising  their  w^armest  partisans.  ItWas  not  likely 
that  this  separation  would  last;  but  the  Thirty  were  themselves  the 
parties  to  give  cause  for  its  termination.  Tiiey  were  getting  too-ether 
a  mercenary  force  at  Eleusis,  wlien  the  whole  force  of  AtheiLs  was 
marched  to  forestall  their  designs.  The  generals  at  Eleusis  came 
forth  to  demand  a  conference,  but  were  seized  and  put  to  death;  the 
Tlurty  themselves  and  a  few  of  the  most  obnoxious  individuals,'  fled 
out  of  Attiea;  while  the  rest  of  the  Eleusinian  occupants  were  per- 
suaded by  their  friends  from  Athens  to  come  to  an  equal  and  honor- 
able accommodation.  Again  Eleusis  beeaijK'  incorporated  in  the 
same  community  with  Athens;  oaths  of  mutual  annesty  and  harmonv 
beuig  sworn  by  every  one. 


We  have,  now  passed  that  short,  but  bitter  and  sanguinary  interval 
occupied  by  the  Thirty,  which  succci'dr.d  so  immediately  upon  th^ 
extmetion  of  the  empn-e  and  independence  oi  Athens,  as  to  leave  no 
opportiuuty  for  pause  or  reflection.  A  few  wor.^s  respecting  the  rise 
aiicl  tall  of  that  empire  are  now  required— snmiaing  up  as  it  were 
the  political  moral  of  the  events  recorded  in  the  present  and  in  the 
preceding  volume,  between  477  and  405  B.C. 

I  related  in  the  forty  fifth  cliapter  tlie  s'eps  by  which  Athens  first 
a  ^quired  her  empire-raised  it  to  its  maximum,  including  both  mari- 
niie  and  inland  dominion— then  lost  the  inland  portion  of  it-  whi-h 
loss  was  ratified  by  the  Thirty  years'  Truce  concluded  with  Sparta 
mi  I  he  1  eloponnesian  confederacy  in  445  b.c.  Her  maritime  empire 
^vas  based  upon  the  confederacy  of  Delos,  formed  by  the  islands  in 
n.  G.  HI.-13 


354 


REVIEW-477-405  B.C. 


-ATHENIAN  EMPIRE. 


355 


the  ^<^can  and  the  tcwns  on  the  seaboard  imnri'diately  after  tlic 
battles  of  Platiea  and  Irlykale,  for  the  purpose  not  merely  ot  expell- 
ing the  Persians  from  the  yEgean.  but  of  keepino-  il:eni  ;iw:iy  per- 
manently. To  the  aecomplishment  of  this  impori.-mt  objeet  h^pnrla 
was  altogether  inadequate;  nor  would  it  ever  have  been  accdnijilislud, 
if  Alliens  had  not  displayed  a  combination  of  military  energy,  nav;ii 
discipline,  power  of  organization,  and  honorable  devotion  t()  a  gic;:! 
Pau-llelleuic  purpose — such  as  had  never  been  witnessed  in  Grieitin 
history. 

The  Confederacy  of  Delos  was  formed  by  the  free  and  spontaneous 
^.association  of  many  diiferent  towns,  all  alike  indcpcnch  nt;  tov.ns 
which  met  in  synod  and  deliberated  by  equnl  vote — took  by  their 
majority  resolutions  binding  npon  all— and  chose  Atluns  j^s  tht  ir 
chief  to  enforce  these  resolutions,  as  well  as  to  suj^erintend  geneinlly 
the  war  against  the  common  enenn  .  But  it  wjis.  from  the  begiimiiiLS 
a  compact  which  permanently  bound  ench  individual  state  to  the 
remainder.  None  had  liberty,  eillur  to  rere<?e  or  to  withhold  the 
contingent  imposed  by  authofity  of  the  eon  mon  synod,  or  to  tnke 
any  separate  step  inconsistent  with  its  obligations  to  the  eon<"edei:uy. 
No  union  less  stringent  than  this  could  have  jui vented  the  rene^v';il 
of  Persian  ascendency  in  the  ^gean.  Sec( ding  or  disobedient  stal(s 
were  thus  treated  as  guilty  of  trea.«on  or  revolt,  which  it  was  the  (hily 
of  Athens,  as  chief,  to  repress.  Ker  first  repressions,  ag.iinsl  ^N'axos 
and  other  states,  were  undertaken  in  ]>ro>ectition  of  such  duty;  in 
W'hich  if  .she  had  been  wanting,  the  conlederacy  would  have  lalitn  lo 
pieces,  and  the  comnum  eneniy  would  liave  re-appeared. 

Now  the  only  way  by  which  the  confedersicy  was  saved  from  Hill- 
ing to  pieces,  was  by  being  transformed  int(- nn  Alheni;in  eii.i.irc. 
Such  transformation  (as  Thucydides  plainly  intimates)  did  not  nrisc 
from  the  ambition  or  deep-laid  ]>rojeets  of  Alliens,  but  from  the 
reluctance  of  the  larger  confederates  to  discharge  tiie  obligations 
imposed  by  the  common  synod,  and  from  the  uu warlike  chanicterof 
the  confederates  generally— which  made  tliem  desirous  lo  comnmti' 
military  service  for  money-payment,  while  Athens  on  her  ]niil  \\:;s 
not  less  anxious  to  perform  the  service  and  obtain  the  money.  By 
gradual  and  unforeseen  stages,  Athens  thus  passed  f r(  m  consulate  lo 
I  empire;  in  such  manner  that  no  one  tould  point  out  the  precise 
moment  of  time  when  the  confederacy  of  Dch^s  ceased,  and  wlun 
/the  empire  began.  Even  the  transfer  of  the  common  fund  from 
Delos  to  Athens,  which  was  the  palpd)le  mnnifestation  of  a  chan.::o 
already  realized,  was  not  an  act  of  high  handed  injustice  in  tlin 
Athenians,  but  warranted  by  prudential  views  of  the  existing  state (-f 
affairs,  and  even  proposed  by  a  leading  member  of  the  confet'eracy. 

But  the  Athenian  emi)ire  came  to  include  (between  4G0— 446  nc) 
other  cities  not  parties  to  the  confederacy  (♦f  Delos.  Athens  h:;(l 
conquered  her  ancient  enemy  the  island  of  TKirina,  and  had  ac(}iiirc'<l 
supremacy  over  Megara,  Ba^otm,  Phokis,  and  Lokris,  and  Achaia  iv 


Peloponnesus.    The  Megarians  joined  her  to  escape  the  oppression  of 
their  neighbor  Corinth;  her  influence  over  Bffiotia  was  acquired  by 
allying  herself  with  a  democratical   party   in   the   Baotian    cities 
against   Sparta  who   had   been   actively   interfering  to  sustain  the 
opposite  })arty  and  to  renovate  the  ascendency  of  Thebes.    Athens 
was,  for  the  time,  successful  in  all  these  enterprises;  but  if  we  follow 
the  details,  we  shall  not  find  her  more  open  to  reproach  on  the  score 
of  aggresadve  tendencies  than  Sparta  or  Corinth.     Her  empire  was 
now  at  its  maximum;  and  had  she  been  able  to  maintain  it— or  even 
to  keep  possession   of  the   Megarid  separately,  which  gave  her  the 
means  of  barring  out  all  invasions  from  Peloponnesus— the  future 
course  of  Grecian  history  would  have  been  materially  altered      But 
her  em])ire  on  land  did  not  resf  upon  the  same  footing  as  her  empire 
at  sea.     The  exiles  in  Me-^ra  and  Bceotia,  etc.,  and  the anti- Athenian 
party  gen-ndly  in  those  pL    v;— combined  with  the  rashness  of  her 
general  Tolmides  at  Konmeia— deprived  her  of  all  her  land-depend- 
eiieies  near  home,  and  even  threatened  her  with  the  loss  of  Euba^a 
rhe  peace  concluded  in  445  b.c.  left  her  with  all  her  maritime  an(i 
insular  empire  (including  Eulxca),  but  with   nothing  more;  wiiile 
by  the  loss  of  Megara  she  was  now  open  to  invasion  fromPelooon- 
nesus.  ^ 

On  this  footing  she  remained  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponneslan 
war  fourteen  years  afterward.  I  have  shown  that  that  war  did  not 
arise  (as  has  been  so  often  asserted)  from  ag-iessive  or  ambitious 
schemes  on  the  part  of  Athens,  but  that,  on  the  contJ-arv,  the  aores- 
sioti  was  all  on  the  side  of  her  enemies,  who  were  full  of  hopeslhat 
they  could  put  her  down  with  little  delay;  while  she  was  not  merelv 
conservative  and  defensive,  but  even  discouraged  by  the  certainty  of 
destrucrive  invasion,  and  only  dissuaded  from  concessions,  alike 
inprudent  and  inglorious,  by  the  extraordinary  influence  and  resolute 
wisdom  of  Perikles.  That  great  man  comprehended  well  both  the 
conditions  and  the  limits  of  Athenian  empire.  Athens  was  now 
nnderstood  (especially  since  the  revolt  and  reconqucst  of  the  power- 
till  island  of  bamos  in  440  b.c.)  by  her  su])jects  and  enemies,  as  well 
^s  by  her  own  citizens  to  be  mistress  of  the  sea.  It  was  the  care  of 
leriklesto  keep  that  belief  within  definite  boundaries,  and  to  pre- 

acquisitions  which  could  not  be  permanently  maintained.  But  it 
^^:ls  also  his  care  to  enforce  upon  his  countrynien  the  lesson  of  main-i 
t.  i.iing  their  existing  empire  unimpaired,  and  shiinkimr  from  no 
cloitrequis,  e  for  that  end.  Though  their  whole  empirS  was  now 
mii  f,  ''^''■'"  '"^  ^'-ancesof  a  perilous  war,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  pro- 
poTiey    ""^  «^i^-cess,  provided  that  they  adhered  to  this  conservative 

adw''f'^^"-f /'^^f'^'^li*'  ""^  ^^'"^  '''^'■'  '^'^  ^^^^^^^  ^'"^^  that  Athens  did 
f  om  he  1  /  '^'  ^>-^t'^^^^7^y^='i'^;  yoars  of  suiTering  and  trial, 
irom  the  destructive  annual   invasion,  the  yet    more    destructivi 


3o6 


REVIEW— 477-405  B.C. 


pc'.tilence.  and  the  revolt  of  Mitylene-but  years  wliieh  still  left  her 

cmp   e  unimpaired,  and  the  promises  of  Penkles  in  lair  chnnee  of 

I  cii-milized      In  the  seventh  year  of  the  war  oecurred    he  imex- 

pec  ?d  victory  at  Sphakteria  and  the  capture  of  the  Lacediemonmn 

pri^oners      this  phiced  in   the   hands  ot   the  Athenians  a   c.ipitnl 

Llvuntage,  impartin-    to    them    prodigious    contidence    of    tuture 

LccUs'' while   thci"  enemies  were   in  a  proportional   degree  dis- 

1  carteued.     It  was  in  this  temper  that  they  h.st  departed  from  the 

CO  .ervative  precept  of  Perikles,  and  attempted   to  recover  (m  4^4 

E  c  )  both  MeSua  and  Boeotia.     Had  the  great  statesman  been  ahve, 

he  mio-ht  have  turned  this  moment  of  superiority  to  better  account, 

and  inight  perhaps  have  contrived  even  to  get  possession  of  Megara 

a  poiiif  of  unspeakable  importance  to'Athens,  since  it  protec  ed  her 

a-aiust  invasion)  in  exchange  for  the  Spartan  cap  ives.      But  the 

crT-neral  feeling  of  contidence   which  then  animated    all   parties  at 

Athens,  determined  them  (in  424  B.C.)  to  grasp  at  this  and  much 

more  bv  force.     Thev  tried  to  reconquer  both  Megara  and  Boeolia: 

ii  the  former  they  failed,  though  succeeding  so  far  as  to  capture 

Nis-ra;  in  the  latter  they  not  only  failed,  but  suffered  the  disastrous 

^Ir^'i^f  the  autumn  of  that  same  year  424  B.C.  too,  that 
Brasidas  broke  into  their  empire  in  Thrace,  and  robbed  them  o 
ikanthus,  Stageira,  and  sc>me  other  towns,  including  ^^^^^ 
precious  possession-Amphipolis.  Again  ^^  f  ^"^V^^^^  ^^^V^,^!  ^^. 
hms-partly  from  the  discouragement  caused  by  the  di.a.^tei  at 
Deliuni  partly  from  the  ascendency  of  Nikias  and  the  peace  party- 
diu^ned^^^^^^  conservative  policy  of  Perikles;  no   by  ambi  lous 

ove4ct  0^^  by  iaaction-oniitting  to  do  all  that  might  have  been 

done  to  TuTCst  the%rogress  of  Brasidas      AVe  must  iiowever    nev. 
fop.et   that  their  capital  loss-Amphipolls-was  owing  altogether  to 
the'^mpmvidence  of  their  oUicers.  and  could  not  have  been  obviated 

^'Brnthou-h  that  groat  man  could  not  have  prevented  the  loss,  he 
^vould  assuredlv  have  deemed  no  efforts  too  great  to  recover  it;  aiul 
r  1  i^.  n'spect'his  policy  was  espoused  by  Kleon,  in  opposition   o 
^^il  i  s  and  the  peace  party.     The  latter  thought  it  wise  to  make  the 
;      elclr  a  yearf  ^vhidl  so  utterly  failed  of  its  effect,  t^nt  iSikm. ^^  - 
obiio-cd,  even  in  the  midst  of  it,  to  conduct  an  armament  to  1  alk   c 
ia  ordeV  to  preserve  the  empire  against  yet  further  l«ssj.vs      h 
Xikias  and  his  friends  would  hear  ot  nothing  but  peace ;  and  after  he 
expedition  of  Kleon  against  Amphipolis  in  the  ensuing  }J^Yp\tn 
tailed  partly  throu-h  his  military  incapacity,  partly  through  the  x  a 
of  hearty  concurrence  in  his  political  opponents),  they  conchid   I 
what  is  called  the  paio'  of  Kikias  in  the  ensuing  spring.     In  this,  too. 
heir  calculations  ire  not  less  signally  falsitied  than  in  the  previou 
truce-  thev  stipulate  that  Amphipolis  shall  be  restored,  but  it  l^,  as 
far  t'rom  bl^ng  1^^^^^^^^    us  cvei-     To  make  the  error  still  graver  and 


ATHENIAN  EMPIRE. 


357 


more  irreparable,  Nikias,  with  the  concurrence  of  Alkibindes,  con- 
tracts the  alliance  with  Sparta  a  few  months  after  the  peace,  and 
gives  up  the  captives,  the  possession  of  whom  was  the  only  hold 
which  Athens  still  had  upon  the  Spartans. 

We  thus  h;ive,  during  the  four  years  succeeding  the  battle  of 
Dcliuni  (424-20  B.C.),  a  series  of  departures  from  the  conservative 
])i>licy  of  Perikles;  departures,  ii.'t  in  the  way  of  ambitious  over- 
acquisition,  but  of  languor  and  unwillingness  to  make  efforts  evea 
for  the  recovery  of  capital  losses.  Those  who  see  no  defects  in  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  democracy,  except  those  of  over-ambition  and 
l.)ve  of  war,  p-irsuant  to  the  jests  of  Aristophnnes — overlook  alto- 
gi'ther  these  opposite  but  serious  blunders  of  Nikias  and  the  peace 
party. 

Next  comes  the  ascendency  of  Alkibiades,  leading  to  the  two 
years'  campaign  in  Peloponnesus  in  conjunction  with  Elis,  Argos, 
and  Mantineia,  and  ending  in  the  complete  re-establishment  of  Lace- 
diemouian  supremacy.  Here  was  a  diversion  of  Athenian  force  from 
its  legitimate  purpose  of  preserving  or  re-establishing  the  empire,  for 
inland  projects  which  'Perikles  could  never  have  approved.  The 
island  of  .>Ielos  uUtloubtedly  fell  within  his  general  conceptions  of 
tenable  empire  for  Athens.  But  we  may  regard  it  as  certain  that  he 
would  htive  recommended  no  new  projects,  exposing  Athens  to  the 
reproach  of  injustice  so  long  as  the  lost  legitimate  possessions  in 
Thrace  remained  unconqueretl. 

We  now  come  to  the  expedition  against  Syracuse.  Down  to  that 
period,  the  empire  of  Athens  (except  the  'possessions  in  Thrace) 
remained  undiminished,  and  her  general  powTr  nearly  as  great  as  it 
had  ever  been  since  445  B.C.  That  expedition  w^as  the  one  great  and 
f;ital  departure  from  the  Periklcan  policy,  bringing  upon  Athens  an 
amount  of  disaster  from  which  she  never  recovered.  It  was  doubt- 
less an  error  of  over-ambition.  Acquisitions  in  Sicily,  even  if  made, 
lay  out  (d'  the  conditions  of  permanent  em]Mre  for  Athens;  and  how- 
ever inii)osing  the  ilrst  effect  of  success  might  have  been,  they  would 
only  have  disseminated  her  strength,  muliiplied  her  enemies  and 
weakened  her  in  all  quarters.  But  though  the  expedition  itself  Avas 
thus  iiidisp'.itably  ill  advised,  and  therefore  ought  to  count  to  the  dis- 
credit of  the  public  judgment  at  Athens— we  are  not  to  impute  to 
thai  public  an  amount  of  blame  in  any  way  commensurate  to  the 
magiiitule  of  the  disaster,  except  in  so  f:ir*as  they  were  guilty  of 
UiUiieasured  and  unconquerable  esteem  for  Nikias.  Though  Perikles 
Nvould  liave  strenuously  opposed  the  ]uoject.  yet  he  could  not  pos- 
S!l)ly  have  foreseen  the  enormous  ruin  in  v>-hieh  it  would  end;  nor 
emikl  such  ruin  have  been  brought  about  by  any  man  existing,  save 
Nikias.  Even  when  the  people  committed  the 'aggravated  imprud- 
ence of  sending  out  the  second  expedition,  Demosthenes  doubtless 
assured  them  that  he  would  speedily  either  take  Syracuse  or  bring 
ba(.*k  bcjlh  armaments,  with  a  fair  allowance  for  the  losses  inseparable 


358 


REVIEW— 477^105  B.C. 


from  failure;  and  so  he  would  have  done,  if  the  obstinacy  of  Nikias 
liid  permitted.  In  measurini?  therefore  the  extent  of  misjudirment 
lairly  iinputahle  to  the  Athenians  for  this  ruinous  undertaking,  we 
musi  always  rc'collcet,  that  tirst  the  failure  of  the  sieire,  next  the  ruin 
of  the  armament,  did  not  arise  from  intrinsic  (lilliculties  in  the  case 
but  from  tlie  personal  defects  of  the  commander. 

After  the  Syracusan  disaster,  there  is  no  lonirer  any  question  about 
adluMing  to,  or  deiiarlinir  fiom  the  Peiiklean  policy,  Athens  is  like 
Palroklus  in  the  Illiad,  after  Apollo  has  stunned  him  by  a  blow  on 
the  back  and  loosened  his  armor.     Nothing  but  the  slackiiess  of  her 
enemies  allowed  her  time  for  a  partial  recovery,  so  as  to  make  in- 
creased heroism  a  substitute  for  impaired  force,  even  auainst  doubled 
and  tripled  ditliculties.     And  the  years  of  struirixle  which  she  now 
went  through  are  aniong  the  most  glorious  events  in  her  histoiv. 
These  years  present  many  ndsfortunes,  but  no  serious  mi>judirmenV; 
not  to  mention  ou^-  peculiarly  Ixjnorable  moment,  after  the  overthrow 
of  the  Four  Hundred.     I  have  in  the  two  ])re(eding  chapters  exam- 
ined into  the  bhune  imputed  to  the  Athenians  for  not  accepting  the 
ovi  rtures  of  i)eace  after  the  battle  of  Kyzikus,  and  for  dismi'ssing 
Aikibiades  after  the  battle  of  Notium.     On  both  points  their  conduct 
has  been  shown  to  be  justifiable.     And  after  all.  they  were  on  the 
point  of  partially  recovering  themselves  in  407  B.C.,  when  the  unex- 
]M'cled  event  of  Cyrus  set  the  seal  to  their  destiny. 

The  bloodshed  after  the  reeapture  of  Milviene  and  Skione,  and 
still  more  that  which  succeeded  tlie  captm-e  of  Melos,  aredis>;r{iceful 
to  the  humanity  of  Athens,  and  stand  in  pohiied  contrast  with  the 
treatment  of  Samos  when  reconquered  by  Perikles.  But  they  did 
not  contribute  sensibly  to  break  down  her  power;  thouuh  beimr 
recollected  with  aversion  after  other  incidents  were  forgoiTen,  they 
are  alhuled  to  in  later  times  as  if  they  had  caused  the  fall  of  the 
empire. 

1  have  thought  it  important  to  recall,  in  this  short  summarv,  the 
leadinir  events  of  the  seventy  years  i)reeeding  400  B.C.,  m  order  that 
Jt  may  be  understood  to  what  degree  Athens  was  politically  or  })ru- 
dentially  to  blame  for  the  great  downfall  which  she  then  underwent. 
Her  downfall  had  one  great  cause— we  may  almost  say,  one  sinde 
cause— the  Sicilian  expedition.  The  empire  of  Athens  both  was,  and 
appeared  to  be.  in  exuberant  strength  when  that  expedition  was  sent 
lorilj;^strength  more  than  sufficient  to  bear  up  ngainst  ail  moderate 
faults  or  moderate  misfortunes,  such  as  no  government  ever  long 
escapes.  But  the  catastrophe  of  Svracuse  was  something  over})as- 
smg  iu  terrific  calamity  all  Grecian  experience  and  all  power  of  fore- 
sight. It  W!is  like  the  Russian  cam])aiiru  of  1812  to  the  Emf)eror 
iNapoleon;  though  by  no  means  imputable,  in  an  equal  degree,  to 
vice  in  the  original  project.  No  Grecian  i>ower  could  bear  up'against 
such  a  death-wound;  and  the  i)roionged  strugule  of  Athens,  after  it, 
is  not  the  least  wonderful  part  of  the  whole  war. 


ATHENIAN  EMPIRE. 


Si^O 


Nothing  in  the  political  history  of  Greece  is  so  remarkable  as  tlic 
Atheniau  empire;  taking  it  as  it  stood  in  its  coinpleteness,  from  about 
400-13  B.C.  (the  date  of  the  Syraeu.-an  catastrophe),  or  still  more 
from  460-24  B.C.  (the  date  when  Brasidas  made  his  coiKjuests  iu 
Tlirace).  After  the  Syracusau  catastrophe,  the  conditions  of  the 
empire  were  altogether  changed;  it  was  irretrievably  broken  up, 
though  Athens  still  continued  an  energetic  struggle  to  retain  some  of 
the  fragments.  But  if  we  view  it  as  it  had  stood  before  that  event, 
during  the  period  of  its  integrity,  it  is  a  siglit  marvellous  to  conieui- 
plate,  and  its  working  must  be  pronounced,  iu  my  judgment,  to 
have  been  highly  beneficial  to  the  Grecian  world.  No  Grecian  sttite 
except  Athens  could  have  sulliced  to  organize  such  a  system,  or  to 
hold,  in  partial,  though  regulated,  continuous  and  specific  commun- 
ion, so  many  little  states,  eacli  animated  with  that  force  of  political 
repulsion  instinctive  iu  the  Greeinn  mind.  This  was  a  mighty  task, 
worthy  of  Athens,. and  to  which  no  state  except  Atiiens  was  compe- 
tent. We  have  already  s(!en  in  part,  imd  we  shall  see  still  further, 
how  little  qualilied  Sparta  was  to  perform  it:  and  we  shall  have 
occasion  hereafter  to  notice  a  like  fruitless  essay  ou  the  part  of 
Thebes. 

As  in  regard  to  the  democracy  of  Athens  generally,  so  in  regard  to 
her  empire — it  has  been  customary  with  historians  to  take  noiice  of 
little  except  the  bad  side.  But  juy  conviction  is,  and  I  have  shovva 
grounds  for  it  in  Chap,  xlvii.  that  the  empire  of  Athens  was  not 
harsh  and  oppressive,  as  it  is  commonly  depicted.  Under  the  cir- 
cumstances of  her  dominion — at  a  time  when  the  vvhole  transit  and 
commerce  of  the  ^Egeau  was  under  one  maritime  system,  which 
excluded  all  irregular  force — when  Persian  ships  of  war  wore  kept 
out  of  the  waters,  and  Persian  tribute-oilicers  au  ay  from  the  seaboard 
— when  the  disputes  inevitable  among  so  many  little  conununities 
could  be  peaceably  redressed  by  the  mutual  right  of  application  to 
the  tribunals  at  Athens — and  when  t'lese  tribunals  were  also  such  as 
to  present  to  sufferers  a  refuge  against  wrongs  done  even  by  indi\id- 
nal  citizens  of  Athens  herself  (to  use  the  expression  of  tiie  oligarchi- 
cal Phrynichus)— the  condition  of  the  maritime  Greeks  was  materinll/ 
better  than  it  had  been  before,  or  Dian  it  will  be  seen  to  becoino 
allerward.  Her  empire,  if  it  did  not  inspire  attachment,  cc^ita'iil/ 
provoked  no  antipathy,  among  thebiilkof  the  citizens  of  the  subjee^ 
communiti(;s,  as  shown  by  the  p;u-ly  character  of  the  n.'volts  ;:ga!!;st 
her.  If  in  her  imperial  "^chanicter  she  exacted  obedience,  she  a!s  > 
fulfilled  duties  and  insured  protection — to  a  degree  imcotupaniblv 
greater  than  was  ever  realized  by  Sparta.  And  even  if  slic  luid  heeii 
ever  so  much  disposed  to  cramp  the  free  play  of  mind  and  purpose 
ainong  her  sul)je(,ls— a  disposition  which  is  no  way  proved— the  very 
circumstances  of  her  own  democracy,  with  its  open  antithesis  of 
political  parties,  universal  liberty  of  speech,  and  manifold  individuid 
energy,  would  do  much  to  prevent  the  accomplisliment  of  sucli  au 


360 


REVIEW— 477-405  B.C. 


end,  nnd  would  act  as  a  stimulus  to  the  dependent  communities  even 
witljout  her  own  intention.  .   -,     ,      ^ 

Wiiiiout  bcini^  insensible  either  to  the  f:;ults  or  to  the  misdeeds  of 
imperial  Athens^,  I  believe  tliat  her  empire  was  a  great  comparative 
benelit,   and  its  extinction  a  great  loss,  to  her  own  subjects.     But 
still  mor.^  do  I  believe  it  to  have  been  a  good,  looked  at  with  refer- 
ence to  Pan-Hellenic  interests.     Its  maintenance  furnished  the  only 
possibility  of   keepini]^  out    forei.irn   intervention,    and  leaving   the 
destinies  of  Greece  todepend  upon  native,  spontaneous,  untramnielcd 
Grecian  agencies.     The  downfall  of  tlie  Athenian  empire  is  the  sii;nai 
for  the  arms  and  corruption  of  Persia  again  to  make  tliemselves  fell, 
and  for  the  re-enslavement  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  under  lier  tribute- 
otlicers.     What  is  still  worse,  it  leaves  the  Grecian  world  in  a  stale 
incapable  of  repelling  any  energetic  foreign  aitaek,  ar.d  open  to  tlie 
overruling  march  of  •*  the  man  of  IMacedon  "  half  a  century  alter- 
ward.     For  such  was  the  natural  tendency  of  tin;  Creciiui  world  to 
political  non-integration  or  disintegration,  that  the  rise  of  the  Allie- 
nian  empire,  incol-porating  so  many  stat(>s  into  one  system,  is  to  be 
reuarded  as  a  most  extraordinary  accident.     2>otliing  but  the  genius, 
ent'rgy,  discipline,  and  demoeraey  of  Athens,  could  bave  brought  it 
aboirt;'nor  even  she,  unless  favored  andinisbed  on  by  a  very  peculiar 
train  of  antecedent  events.    Ihit  having  once  got  it,  she  might  ])erfectlv 
well  have  kept  it:  and  had  she  done  so,  the  Hellenic  world  would 
have  remained  so  orcauizc  d  as  to  be  able  to  repel  foreign  interven- 
tion either  from  Susa  or  from  Pella.     When  we  retlect  how  intnntely 
superior  was  the  Hellenic  mind  to  that  of  all  surrounding  nations 
and  races— how  conipleiely  its  creative  agency  was  stilled,  as  soon 
as  It  came  under  the  :>Ia(edonian  dictation— and  how  much  more  it 
miMit  perhaps  have  achieveil,  if  it  Inid  enjoyed  another  century  or 
haif-century  of  freedom,  under  the  stimulating  headship  of  the  most 
proirressive  and  most  intellectual  of  all  its  separate  communities— we 
shafi  look  with  double  re-ret  on  the  ruin  of  the  Athenitm  empire,  as 
acceleratinir,  without  renieily,  the  luiivinsal  ruin  of  Grecian  mdci-en- 
deuce,  poUtical  action,  and  mental  giaudeur. 


APPENDIX. 


361 


APPENDIX. 

I>f  EXPLANATION   OF  TTTE   PLAN  OF  SYr.ACUST^,  AND  THE   OPERA- 
TIONS DUKING  THE  ATHENIAN  SIEGE. 

In  the  dp'^cription  priven  of  this  memorable  event  by  Thucydirles,  there  is  a 
pov>d  deal  whi.Mi  is  only  brielly  und  iuiperfev-tly  explained.  He  certainly  has  left 
us  vaiious  diiiiculties,  in  the  solution  of  w  hich  we  cannot  advance  beyond  conjec- 
ture more  or  less  plausible;  but  there  are  some  wiiich  appear  to  me  to  admit  of 
a  more  satisfactory  solution  than  has  yet  been  offered. 

Dr.  Arnold,  in  an  appendix  annexed  to  tlie  third  vohune  of  his  Thucydides 
(p.  2Qo  seq.),  to.icether  with  two  pl.ms,  has  bestowed  much  pains  on  the  elucida- 
tion of  these  diiiiculties;  also  Colonel  Loake,  in  his  valuable  remarks  on  the 
t  )po;?raphy  of  Syracuse  (the  pei-usal  of  which,  prior  to  their  appearance  in  the 
Tran^vlctidns  of  the  lioyal  Society  of  Literature.  I  owe  to  i?is  politeness);  S  n-ra 
di  Falco,  in  the  fourth  volume  of  his  Antichiia  di  Sicilia;  and  Saverio  Cavallari 
(the  architect  employed  in  1S.)9,  in  the  ex.xininaiion  and  excavation  of  the 


tliese  comments,  I  arrive  at  conclusions  on  some  points  different  fro.ii  all  of 
them,  which  I  shall  now  proceed  shortly  to  state— keeping  closely  and  exclu- 
sively to  Timcydides  and  the  Athenian  siege,  and  not  professing  to  meddle  with 
Syracuse  as  it  stood  afterward. 

*  The  excavations  of  M.  Cavallari  (in  1839)  determined  one  point  of  some 
importance  which  was  not  before  known;  the  situation  and  direction  of  the 
western  wall  of  the  outer  cit}''  or  Achradina.  Tliis  wall  is  not  marked  on  the 
plan  of  Dr.  Arnold  nor  alluded  to  in  his  remarks;  but  it  appeal's  in  that  t»f 
Colonel  Leake  and  in  Seira  di  Falco,  as  well  as  in  Cavallari;  and  will  be  found 
noted  in  the  plan  hereunto  annexed. 

Respecting  Achradina,  Colonel  Leake  remarks  (p.  7):  "That  it  was  distinctly" 
divided  by  nature  into  an  upper  portion  to  the  noi-lh-east.  adjacent  to  the  outer 
sea— and  a  lower  in  the  opposite  direction,  adjacent  to  the  two  harbors  of  Syra- 
cuse." Now  M.  Cavallari,  in  his  Dissertation  (p.  15  sea.),  offers  strong  reason 
for  believing  that  the  wall  just  indicated  inclosed  only  the  former  of  these  two 
porli'jiiTs;  that  it  did  not  reach  from  the  outer  sea  across  to  the  Great  Harbor,  but 
turned  eastward  by  the  great  stone-quarries  of  the  Capucijies  and  Novanteris, 
leaving  the  "'lower  portion  adjacent  to  the  two  harbors,"  open  and  unfortified. 
The  inner  and  the  outer  city  (Ortygia  and  Achradina)  were  thus  at  this  time 
detaclu'd  from  each  other,  each  havi?ig  its  own  separate  fortification,  and  not 
i.i'-huled  witlun  any  common  wall.  Tliey  were  separated  from  each  otiier  by 
this  intermediate  low  ground,  which  is  even  now  full  of  tombs,  and  exhil)its  ail 
extensive  Nekropolis.  We  know  that  it  was  the  habi!:.  almost  universal, 
anu>iig  the  Greeks,  to  bury  their  dead  close  to  the  town,  but  without  the  walls: 
C'o'jnel  Leake"s  remarks  (p.  G)  tend  much  to  coniirm  the  idea  tliat  the  buiial- 
jiLioe  of  the  inner  and  out^r  city  of  Syracuse  must  originally  have  been  without 
the  walls  of  both;  though  he  seems  not  to  have  been  acquainted  with  M. 
Cavallari's  Dissertation,  and  conceives  the  original  western  wall  of  Achradina 
as  reach iiig  across  all  the  way  to  the  Great  Harbor.  As  far  as  we  can  trust  the 
Imiguage  of  Diodorus,  which  is  certainly  loose,  he  describes  the  fortifications  of 
Ortygia  and  Achradina  as  completely  "distinct,  during  the  troubles  consequent 
Jipon  the  expulsion  of  the  Gelonian   dynasty— rrjs  TT-dAtw?  KareXdfiovTo  ttju  re 

A^paSiVrji'  Kal  ttj*/  Nrj<70i''  ajx^orifibiv  ritv  roTrmv  rovruiv  exovrmv  Ihiov  Tti;^o?, 
KaAws  KaT€(TKeva<Tixivov  (xi.  73).  Here  Diodorus  seems  to  conceive  Achradina  and 
OrLygia  as  constituting  onlji  n  part  of  Syracuse;  which  v/as  certainly  true  from 
and  after  the  time  of  the  despot  Dionysius,  but  was  not  true  either  at  the 
lime  which  immediately  followed  the  Geloniau  dynasty,  or  at  the  period  of  tlxe 
Athenian  siege 


362 


APPENDIX. 


That  OrtTffia  and  Aohradina  must  orip:inally  have  joined,  and  must  have  heen 
from  tlie  first  included  in  one  common  fortification,  lias  been  assinned  without 
anv  positive  proof,  because  it  seemed  natural.  But  this  presumption  is  out- 
veighed  by  the  fact  that  the  ground  between  the  two  constitutes  the  ^eliio- 
polis,  whicli  thus  raises  a  stronger  counter-presumption  tliat  that  ground  could 
not  originally  have  been  included  wiihin  the  fortificati<>ns. 

If  the  inner  and  the  outer  city  were  originally  separate  towns  and  se|)a rate  for- 
tifications did  they  ever  become  united,  and  at  what  time?  In  my  lillh  volume 
(ch  xliii  p  t)5-8S)  I  expressed  n.ystlf  hiaccurately  on  this  subject,  being  then 
un  icquaiuted  with  the  remarks  either  of  Colonel  Leake  or  M.  Cavallari.  I  s:ud 
that  ill  the  piicification  which  succeeded  after  the  settlt>ment  of  the  troubles 
ccnseuiient  on  the  expulsion  of  the  Gelonian  dynasty,  -  we  may  assume  as  cer- 
tain that  the  separate  fortifications  of  Ortygia  and  Achradma  were  abolished 
and  tiiat  from  heiueforward  there  was  only  one  fortified  city,  until  the  time  of 
tlie  despot  Dionysius.  mort!  than  fifty  years  afterward.""  I  now  believe  that 
they  remained  separate  at  the  time  when  Nikia.s-  first  arrived  in  Sicily,  but  I 
cannot  go  along  with  M.  Cavallari  in  thinking  that  they  continued  so  peiuia- 
iicntlv.  even  throughout  and  after  the  Athenian  siege.  It  seems  Hear  to  ine 
that  during  that  siege  tliev  must  have  been  covered  by  a  common  fortification 
— tlie  new  wall  built  by  the  Syraousans  after  the  arrival  of  Nikias  in  Sieily.  lie 
feelin"-sof  the  Greeks  about 'the  propriety  of  burial  witliout  the  walls  of  the 
town  "(-ould  not  but  give  way  to  the  necessity  of  piutceting  tlieniselves  against 
a  besieging  enemy;  and  this  necessity  was  first  presented  to  theni  by  the  pros- 
pe.'t  of  a  siege  from  Athens.  Having  once  become  familiar  with  the  protection 
of  one  common  wall,  reaching  from  sea  to  harbor  all  across,  and  covering  both 
inner  and  outer  citv,  they  were  n<.t  likely  to  forego  it  allerward. 

We  mav  thus  lay  it  down  that  when  Nikias  first  threfitened  Syi-acu.se,  and 
when  the  first  battle  was  fought  near  the  Olympieion  (October  415  B.C.),  the  two 
towns  of  which  Svra<M)se  was  composed  were  still  distinct  and  separately  torti- 
fied  Assuming  Nikias  to  land  in  the  Great  Harluir,  and  to  gam  a  victory  ren- 
dering' him  master  of  the  field,  he  would  be  able  to  occupy  the  open  space 
between  thein,  to  cut  them  off  from  each  other,  and  to  bhxkade  both  withcom- 
uirativelyhltle  trouble;  either  separately  by  distinct  walls,  or  30intly  by  one 
.»lockadiMg  wall  running  across  from  sea  to  sea  westward  ot  the  wall  ot  Achra- 
dina,  but  eastward  of  the  Temenites. 

As  soon  as  Nikias  returned  to  his  winter-quarters  at  Katana.  the  S.\Tacusans 
•    1    ..•.    1 :_    ^:.,«   «»r,,-r.c.f    ti.ii;  ilono-t.r      '*  Ti'.t'v  built  fliiriiit' the 


I 


H'{)iu  carrviu}^  meir  wcvii  oj.  vinum vtnidn'^u  u«..w..-..,  ...ly  space^ -_ --_ —  - 

Wiiicli  was  tiiUS  inclo.Sed."  'ET(ix*-iov  Se  Kal  ot  2ipa*6crtoi  ev  to.  Xf^M^n  ^P^ 
T€  TM  TrdAr-i,  rhv  Temevirriv  ei'TO?  Troirj-raftei'Oi,  reixo?  irapa  nav  to  irpo?  ras  tTriTroAa? 
ipiir,  b-a>?  /LIT,  61  ekdiraovoi  evaTroreixKTToi  ioro'  (vi.  7.5).  It  appears  to  me  that 
the  wall  thus  described  beiran  probably  at  the  innermost  cleft  ot  banta  Boiiagia, 
was  carried  in  a  direction  rather  west  of  south,  to  the  outside  of  Apollo 
Temenites,  and  from  thence  down  to  the  Great  IIarl>or— so  as  to  f..-mi  an  outer 
c-overiu'.;  v.-all.  and  materially  to  increase  the  difficulties  with  whic.i  the 
bc^^ic  ers  woidd  have  to  e  .ntend.  The  commentatoi-s,  in  marking  out  where 
they  supposed  this  new  wall  to  have  ranged,  seem  to  me  to  attend  only  to  a  part 
of  the  sent  -nee  of  Thueydides,  and  not  to  the  whole;  cney  conceive  an  out- 
Liu"^  wall  carried  out  from  the  fortifications  of  the  city  just  for  the  pui-pose  of 
i'  elosin  '  tile  Temenites— but  thev  do  not  advert  to  the  other  words  ot  the  his- 
torian, that  the  new  wall  was  "  carrieti  along  tlie  entire  fronfag^  to «'0 rd  /'./)/ - 
polf'.,  for  the  special  purpose  of  rendering  an  extended  and  difhcnlt  blockade 
indiNp.Misablp  to  the  besiegers."  The  new  wall,  starting  from  the  cleft  ot  banta 
iJonagia,  would  not  actually  join  the  old  wall,  but  it  would  nevertheless  serve 
as  a  n^-w.  advanced,  and. defensible  protection  to  the  city,  securing  both  the 
inner  city  (f)rtygia)  and  the  outer  city  (Achradina)  at  once.  At  this  time, 
probably.  Svracusans  were  more  afraid  of  a  second  attack  from  the  side  ot 
the  Great  Harbor,  since  this  was  tlie  place  where  Nikias  had  made  his  recent 
disembarkation;  aiid  the  new  wall  now  constructed  was  an  important  addi- 
tional defense  from  that  side. 


APPENDIX. 


Thev  next  began  to  turn  their  attention  tx)  defense  from  the  side  of  Epipolse. 

In  this  latter  scheme,  however,  they  were  forestalled  by  the  Athenians,  who 
started  from  Katana  without  their  knowledge,  disembarked  their  troops  near 
a  niace  or  snot  called  Leon,  and  hastened  by  a  forced  march  up  to  the  summit 
nf^FninoiW  called  Euryalus-which  they  approached  from  the  plain  ot  lliapsus. 
?L  s^de  f arSest  rSn?ved  from  Syracilse  Colonel  Leake,  and  Kiepert  in  lus 
X  place  iS  on  the  seashore,  south  of  the  peninsula  of  Thapsus,  and  about 
haKay  between  that  point  and  Achradina-  immediately  under  the  sleep 
ascent  direct  from  the  sea  to  Euryalus:  and  Kiepert  draws  a  hue  straight  trom 
Leon  (so  placed)  to  the  Euryalus,  as  if  he  supposed  that^the^Athenian  army 
cKmbered  straight  up.    But  this  is  difficult  to  sui^pose:  for  Thucydides  says 

She  Atheni^  ariiiy  ran  towards  the  Euryalus  ijxf>pe.  8po^.u>,yy.  9, ):  and  it 
does  not  seem  possible  for  hoplites  to  have  run  straight  up  the  side  of  the  chit 
asit  stinds  marked  on  the  map.  I  agree  with  Dr  Ariio  d  (ad  Time,  vi  H. )  that 
the  words  of  Thucvdides  do  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  place  called  Leon 
'v^is  on  the  sea,  nor  intimate  what  distance  it  was  from  the  sea.  It  seems  more 
1  lily  that  Leon,  as  well  as  the  landing  place  of  Nikias.  was  a  place  somewhere 

or  h  of  the  peninsula  of  Thapsus,  and  that  the  Athenian  troops,  having  come 

hire  on  ship-boanl  from  Katana,  were  disembarked  before  the  fleet  reached 
t  at  peninsula.  There  probably  was  a  regular  road  or  mountain  path,  ascend- 
inf from  the  pain  of  Thapsus  and  reaching  Euryalus  from  he  northern  side  ot 
Epii.ol™-a  vbad  good  enough,  in  most  parts,  for  the  Athenians  to  pass  over  at 
a  run  This  ascent,  as  being  the  farthest  removed  from  Syracuse,  would  be  he 
most  likely  for  them  to  be  able  to  accomplish  without  the  knowledge  of  tlio 

^  The'poskion  of  the  fort  of  Labdalum.  built  by  Nikias,  has  been  differently 
marked  by  ,hflferent  authors.  Colonel  Leake  places  it  (Notes  on  byracuse  p^  i..^) 
h  gier  up  than  Mongibellisi,  between  that  point  and  Belvedere  I  incline  to 
think  timt  this  is  higher  than  the  reality.  The  words  of  Thucydides-e,r  aKpoc? 
TollKp\iJ.yo:,  r«.  'E^.TToA-ir  bpiiyu  npb,  ra  Meyapa-are  translated  by  him  on 
the  hPhest  rocks  of  Epipolaj,  looking  toward  Megara,"  but  it  appears  to  me 
thit  hey  rither  mean--on  the  extremity  of  the  cliffs  of  Epipol*,  looking 
toward  Megara.''  The  position  fitted  on  by  Colonel  Leake  seems  mc^nvenienily 
distant  from  the  main  operations  of  Nikias  lower  down  on  Epuiolae:  moreover 
if  the  fort  of  Labdalum  had  been  there  placed  it  would  have  f^ia'^^f^^^,^  .  h  ' 
from  Belvedere  down  to  Epipolae,  and  would  have  ,7»^|tructed  Gylippus  1  his 
march  bv  that  path  into  Syracuse -which  we  shall  hnd  h«'-eafte.  that  it  I  d 
not.  I  think  that  the  fort  of  Labdalum  must  have  been  on  the  e^^J?^  «t  Jle 
cliff  somewhat  eastward  of  ^longibeUi.si,  and  more  to  the  westward  than  1. 
stands  in  the  Plan  of  GoUer:  see  G611er"s  note  (ad.  vi.  9  ")  and  the  Plan  annexed 
to  his  Thucydides-and  the  remarks  of  Mr.  Stanley  and  Dr.  Arnold-in  Arnold  s 

'^''T^S'.'"1her|roL        come  next.     1.    The  site  of  Syke.     2.    What  is  the 

ThrAthenian4,  having  finished  and  garrisoned  Labdalum,  "  descended  to 
Svke,  sat  down,  mid  fortified  the  Circle  with  all  speed  '  Many  writers  con- 
sider Syke  as  a  corruption  or  local  pronunciation  of  lyche,  designating  the 
hamlet  or  suburb  joining  Achradina  at  its  north-western  extremity,  just  ar  the 
lower  extremity  of  the  northern  cliff  of  Epipolae.  Colonel  Leake  and  otheis 
place  Svke  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  slope  of  Epipolfe,  near  upon  the  southern 
cliff.  But  the  reason  which  he  gives  for  placing  Syke  near  the  southern  cliff, 
is  not  adequate.  He  founds  his  opinion  upon  a  construction  of  a  passage  of 
Timcvdi.les  (vi.  99),  which  appears  to  me  less  correct  and  coiivenient  than  that 
adopted  by  Dr.  Arnold,  with  whose  note  (m  the  passage  I  pei;fectly  concur 

I  think  there  is  no  ground  for  identifying  the  place  called  ^yke  vj'ith  the 
Svracusan  suburb  aftirward  known  as  Tyche^  tnnn  the  Temple  pf  Fortune, 
and  I  agree  with  Dr.  Arnold  (p  270)  in  placing  Syke  'on  the  m  ddle  of  the 
slope  of  Epipola3,  exactly  to  the  southward  of  Targetta  -^y,  f  p  ?;^f ^^J^-S 
southwanl  of  that  point.  So  also  M.  Firmin  Didot  places  it  in  the  Flan  prefixed 
to  the  fourth  volume  of  his  French  translation  of  Thucydides  ,j^^,.:„c 

I  also  perfectly  agree  with  Dr.  Arnold  and  M.  Firmm  Didot  in  foy^ide  mg 
that  the  expression  The  Circle  (6  KVKkoi)  means  (.-not  the  entire  wail  of  ciicum- 


364 


APPENDIX. 


vallation  projectrd  by  the  Athenians,  but)  a  separate  walled  inclosure.  to 
serve  as  a  central  point  I'l-oni  whence  the  wall  was  to  be  carried  northward 
toward  Troj?ilus,  and  southward-  first  to  the  southern  cliff  of  Enipola-,  after- 
ward to  the  Great  Harbor.  M.  Didot  defends  this  opinion  in  an  elaborate  note 
(ad  Thucyd.  vi.  98.):  Dr.  Arnold  also  pives  some  reasons  which  (in  my  judg- 
ment) are  not  so  strong  as  thej-  nn;L,dit  have  been  made.  He  considers  one  pas- 
sage of  Tnucydides  as  making  against  him,  which,  proi>erlj-  construed,  is  in  his 
favor:  and  he  therefore  proposes  a  double  sense  for  the  word  kvkAos- sonic- 
times  meaning  "the  entire  circuinvallation"— sometimes  **  the  central  walled 
inclosure  separately."  I  think  that  6  kvkAo?  alu'oys  has  the  latter  meaning, 
and  that  the  double  sense  supi>osed  by  Dr.  Arnold  is  not  to  be  found  ni 
Thucydides. 

The  next  doubt  is  about  the  first  counter-wall  constructed  by  the  Syracusans 
to  cut  and  obstruct  the  intended  line  of  blockade.  Citdler,  M.  Didot.  and  Mr. 
Dunbar  suppose  this  counter-wall  (tyKdpaioi>  Tei\os)  to  have  l)een  carried  across 
Epipolse,  north  of  the  Athenian  Circle  or  kvk\o^.  On  the  other  hand.  Colonel 
Leake  (p.  56),  Dr.  Arnold,  and  Dr.  Thrihvall,  sui)po^e  it  to  have  been  carried 
south  of  the  Athenian  Circle,  but  along  the  platform  of  Xeapolis  undeiEpipola', 
and  not  at  all  on  Epipolte  itself.  See  Dr.  Arnolds  remarks,  p.  2',\\  2'il:  aaid  the 
Plans  of  UoUer.  an«i  M.  Didot.  and  Colonel  Leake. 

The  first  of  these  suppositions  is  wholly  inadmissible.  If  it  Avere  adopted  the 
comiter-wall  would  have  been  carried  exactly  across  the  spot  where  tlie 
Athenians  were  then  actually  working,  and  a'battle  must  inmiediately  have 
ensued,  which  was  what  the  Syiacusans  did  not  desire.  The  great  reason 
which  seems  to  have  iiiduced  G(  Her  and  others  to  ado])t  this  sui)i)osition  is  a 
theorj-  about  the  third  or  last  counter-Avall  ifyKaptriov  rtixo?)  constructed  by  the 
Syracusans.  and  its  supposed  juncture  with  the  tirst.  1  shall  hereafter'show 
that  this  last-mentioned  theory  is  erroneous,  when  I  come  to  explain  the  third 
or  last  counter-wall. 

The  second  supposition,  whereby  this  first  counter-wall  is  represented  to  have 
been  carried  along  the  i  latform  of  Neapolis,  has  not  the  like  force  of  positive 
argument  against  it.  Yet  it  appeai-s  tome  less  probable  than  that  a\  hich  1  have 
given  in  the  text,  and  in  whicli  I  describe  this  coiuiter-wall  as  having  stretched 
I'/ttrard  along  the  shipr  of  Epipolw.  south  of  the  Athenian  Circle,  from  a  point 
of  the  city-wall  beneath,  to  the  brink  or  crest  of  the  southern  cliff  above. 

Kesjieciing  the  nature  and  purpose  of  a  counter-wall  built  by  besieged  par- 
ties such  as  I  he  Syracusans — there  is  one  point  which  the  expo.Mtors  are  apt  to 
forget.  To  answer  the  puipose  contemplated  by  the  besieged,  such  a  coiuiter- 
walimust  not  only  traveise  the  enemy's  inteniled  line  of  blockade,  but  it  must 
have  somethiJig  for  l)Oth  its  extremities  to  rest  upon.  Of  coiu'se  it  starts  from 
the  city-wall,  therefore  o»<' of  its  extremities  is  perfectly  well  supported:  but 
imless  the  of/jer  or /«/ f/ztr  cutremiti/  I'c  suppoitcd  also.'the  besiegers  will  be 
able  to  turn  it.  and  get  behind  it,  without  taking  the  trouble  to  atack  it  in  front. 
The  besiegers  are  naturally  the  strongest  in  the  field— othenvise  they  would  not 
be  engaged  in  constructing  a  wall  of  circum vallation.  What  advantage  would 
the  besieged  gain,  therefore,  by  carrying  out  a  counter- wall  across  the  besieg- 
ing line  of  blockade — if  the  farther  e.xtreinity  of  their  counter-wall  rested  upon 
mere  open  space,  so  that  the  besiegers  would  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  march 
along  its  front  and  get  round  behind  it? 

That  the  counter-wall  now  built  by  the  Syracusans  was  not  to  be  thus  turned, 
is  sufficiently  evident;  otherwise  the  Athenians  would  n(Ji  have  taken  the  risk 
and  trouble  of  storming  it  in  fr»»nt.  It  must  therefore  have  had  something  for 
its  farther  extremity  to  rest  upon.  Now  in  the  course  which  I  suppose  it  to 
have  taken,  this  is  provided  for.  The  precipitous  southern  cliff  formed  its 
farther  extremity,  and  prevented  the  Athenians  from  turning  it,  so  that  they 
Were  compelled  to  attack  it  in  front,  wherein  they  were  able  and  fortunate 
enough  to  succeed.  What  still  further  confirms  my  view  that  the  steep 
southern  cliff  formed  the  tlank  support  of  this  first  counter-wall,  is—  that  the 
Athenians,  immediately  after  iheic  victory,  take  possession  of  the  southern 
cliff  and  fortify  it,  so  as  ti>  prevent  it  from  ever  again  serving  the  Syracusans 
for  the  like  purpose:  vi.  101,  1.  T^  6i  varepaia  avb  rot;  kvkAov  iTfi\i^ov  toi' 
np-qfjLv'ov   TO*'    vnep   jov    eAovs,  ctc. 


APPENDIX. 


365 


, <.  xy,^  o,ir.r»n«ition  of  Dr  Amold  and  others,  that  this  counter- 

Now  if  we  adopt  *«  f"PP°of  ^?ea?olls^lpon  ^^  are  we  to  suppose  that  its 
wall  ran  alonp:  the  P'''"  I  ™  ,„i,nt  u'S^  there  to  prevent  the  Atlien  ans  from 
fartlier  .«t'-S'"'i*„;f i^J\  °i  a,''''iV  t  h^d  been  P^^^^  for  them  to  turn  it, 
tnmmK.t  and  getting  b^md  a     It  .t  naa      ^     I^^^  supposition  which  I  am 

*J^c;^^!.1e"rfrno4r^r;ans«^^^ 

.„-We''fuVhr|&tr^||£^^^^^^^ 

f,"^A^hprii^ns  f mn    the  cliff  upon  the  Syracusan  counter-wal    running  along 

r£1S''hrSXpt2J!£lb  uTtoar^^^^^^^^  thither  a/terward,  tron>  the 

Circle  (vi.  101.  1).  ,  -   w„eXnv   -rdv  ' Ke-nvaiiav—On.  100)  do  not 

'^''^   "'r.tn.nrtSthrs~neTcrunr^^  UPO^  a  ^^''1^' 

r^rrthl^  E^ffli     The^^^^^^  that  it  began  at  a  point  lower  on  the 

StSSrS^Tw^^fefert^i^ZeTdJSn-uf  ^^^^^^^^^ 

fde^-ribing  the  battle  which  ensued  when  the  Athenians  attacked  tae  pahsado 

of  theriver^ndTS^^^  have  reached  as  far  as 

"'If/^rtheir  defeat  the  Svi-acusans  made  no  farther  attempt  at  constructing 
coumer-woi^L^^^^^^^  --ent  on  with  theirdoublewaU  across  the^nars^^ 


Uiedgh  ground  of  Epipola^  was  also  execute      -    that  the  Athenian  s  alt  o^^^ 
cTrciimvaStion,  from  Ihe  Circle  (on  the  center  oi  ^^«  f fP^^f.Si;^  *^^ 
ward  down  to  the  Great  Harbor,  was  comP/.e^;-,,?"^  thoS  some  ^PJ^^JJ 
Kafhet'^a^^tX Snfit^tnd"?^n"^  Ke'lTllSllg'^lSS':,,  °tS^  .^e,«  By 

''^^eTa^?S'';!fS;h,wth^^l^-^^^^ 

to  h£  thM  ami  flnai  eonnter-'wall  alwnt  which  there  .s  muclUo  he  ^ea-vd  !,p^ 

After  he  had  regained  superionty  m  the  ?el<'r»V^'^S/r.'^[^d  after  Ik=  had 
ZJ^^X^^i^  t^S'lJS^^!;^  trre^'ceXt^trUou 


sm 


APPENDIX. 


of  a  new  counter- wall  or  e7>tap(riov  Ter^o^.  jfe  constructed  a  simple  i rail  from 
the  city  across  EpipolcB  intcrsertiiUf  the  line  of  blockade  (which  was  yet  not 
filled  up)  to  the  north  of  the  Athenian  Circle.  Kai  ficra  TaOra  eTfixi^ov  oi 
2vpcuc6<7ioi  Kai  oi  fv/m/maxoi  6ta  Tbtv  'ETrmoXiov,  anb  r^?  iroAew?  ap^oi/uevoi,  ayto  npo^ 
TO  iyKdpKTiov,  Tei^o?  an\ovv'  ojtw?  oi  'ABrfvaiot,  ijv  fir)  ivvaivro  KuiAvaai,  firfKfTi  oioi 
Te  uiatv  dTTOTeixiorai  (vii.  4).  I  agree  with  Dr  Arnold,  Colonel  Leake,  and  others, 
in  construing  npbs  t6  eyKapaioi'  here  as  itself  equivalent  to  an  adjective  or 
adverb.  Others  construe  the  passage  as  if  Ter,xo?  were  understood  a  second 
time,  and  as  if  two  walls  were  spoken  of — avu*  npbs  to  eyKaptxioy  Teix©?,  Tet;^os 
dirXovv:  thus  assuming  that  two  walls  are  indicated— one  of  them,  an  iyKapaioi' 
T€txo9  already  existing — another,  a  Teixo?  an\ovv  about  to  be  constructed  to 
meet  it.  Grammatically  speaking,  such  a  construction  is  at  least  harsh;  but 
those  who  adopt  it  are  unable  to  explain  what  wall  is  meant  by  tliis  iyKdpaiov 
Tcixo?  assumed  as  pre-existing.  Didot  and  GoUer  think  that  it  was  the  fust 
coimter-work  constructed  bjtheSyracusans:  but  there  are  two  fatal  objections 
to  this— first,  that  the  Athenians  had  de.strojed  this  cotmter-work,  after  tlieir 
victory  (vi.  100)— next  that  it  passed  to  the  south,  and  not  to  the  north,  of  the 
Athenian  Circle,  and  therefore  never  could  have  joined  the  third  counter-work 
now  projected . 

Gylippus  pursued  the  building  of  his  new  coimter-wall,  and  after  gaining  a 
victory  over  Nikias,  succeeded  in  carrying  it  across  the  Athenian  line  of 
blockade  between  the  Circle  and  Troglius:  he  employed  partly  the  very  stones 
which  the  Athenians  had  laid  down  on  that  line  for  their  own  intended  Avail 
(vii.  6,  7).  He  carried  the  new  wall  be3ond  this  Athenian  line  as  far  as  the 
northern  cliff  of  Epipolae,  which  served  as  a  flank  support,  and  pievented  his 
new  wall  from  beinjj  turned.  After  this  important  step,  the  consummation  of 
the  projected  line  ot  blockade  became  impossible,  unless  the  Athenians  could 
attack  nis  new  wall  in  front,  and  take  it  bv  storm;  for  which  their  present 
force  was  inadequate.  Even  a  victory  in  the  field  gained  by  the  Athenians 
would  now  be  insufficient  for  the  succcj^s  of  the  siege.  Compare  vii.  6,  and 
vii.  11.  ciaTc  ^17  eivai  en  irepiTCixiaai  avTOv^,  rji'  fxij  T15  to  7rapaTei\icr/oifi  tovto  ttoAAtj 
(rrparia  iire\dMv  eA]7— which  is  the  expression  of  Nikias  in  his  letter  to  the 
Athenians,  and  is  rather  more  precise  than  the  expression  of  Thucydides  him- 
self —  exeiVov?  6e  (the  Athenians)  ical  navTdnacnv  ajrecrTtpijKeVai,  ei  Koi  Kparotfv,  /u,tj 
iv  eTi  <T<f)d^  ajroreixio-tti — where  we  must  construe  icpaToiej'  as  alluding  simply  to 
a  victory  gained  in  the  field -as  distinguished  from  a  superioritj'  so  marked 
as  to  enable  the  Athenians  to  storm  the  counter-wall. 

But  the  defensive  plans  of  Gylippus  were  not  j'et  completed.  He  knew  that 
the  Athenian  army  might  be  materially  strengthened,  as  in  fact  it  afterward 
was:  and  being  just  now  re  enforced  by  twelve  Corinthian  triremes,  he  employed 
them  "  in  assisting  to  complete  the  remainder  of  his  scheme  of  fortifications  as 
far  as  the  (new)  counter-wall.''' 

Such  are  the  words  of  Thucvdides — MeTa  6e  tovto  at  re  twv  KopivGiuiv  vrje?  Kai 
' XfjiirpaKiuiTuyv  Kai  AfVKa&iutv  f(TeiT\fV(rav  ai  urroAoiTroi  SiaScKa,  XaOovaaL  ttiv  riov 
ABrffaiatv  <i>v\ajcrji/,  /cat  f  v  v  e  t  e  i  \  L<rav  rb  Komov  TOi?  2vpaKO<rtoi9  /xe'x'"' 
roO    €  y  Kap<T  i  ov    Tfi.\ov<;  (vii.  7). 

This  passage  has  greatly  perplexed  expositors.  Many  different  interpreta- 
tions of  it  have  been  proposed:  but  not.  one  of  them  seems  to  me  satisfactory. 
And  Dr.  Arnold,  after  rejecting  various  explanations  proposed  by  others,  and 
vainly  attempting  to  elucidate  it  is  a  wcy  convincing  to  his  own  mind,  pro- 
nounces it  to  be  unintelligible  a^  least,  if  not  corrupt  (Arnold,  p.  5i74.  275). 
Colonel  Leake  explains  the  passage  by  saying — "  The  Syracusan  cross- wall  was 
now  united  with  th*^  inclosure  of  Temenitis,  and  thus  largely  extesnded  the 
d'Tiensions  of  that  outwork  of  Achradina"  (Notes  on  Syracuse,  p.  67).  And  Pr. 
Arnold  (p.  275)  inclines  to  the  same  supposition.  But  in  the  first  place,  ii  is 
difficult  to  see  what  the  Syracusans  gained  by  carrying  out  an  additional  wal', 
in  the  manner  here  described,  which  gave  them  no  new  security;  besides  that 
Colonel  Ijcake  (in  his  Plan)  represents  the  third  Syracusan  counter-work  as  if  it 
rose  straight  up  the  slope  of  Epipolae,  which  is  hardly  consistent  with  the 
words  of  Thucydides,  Sia  Ttiv  'EirtTroAwf.  Moreover  Nikias  in  his  letter  written 
afterwam  to  the  Athenians  de.scribes  the  new  counter-wall,  whereby  Gylippus 
had  frustrated  the  scheme  of  blockade,  as  being  still,  even  in  October,  aiid  after 


API^ENDIX. 


367 


1-    1    ,i^„.^  tn  imr»rove  it    tt  sinqlc  or  simple  wall   (ot    Si 
all  that  Gyl5PPH^-^^^-^„rfJoO.    v^r  11)     Such  a  description  cannot  be  held 
.U-oSoMTi'caat.  '?f^^»;  J^xo^   nsirstands  delineated  in  Colonel  Leake's  Plan.     . 
to  apply  to  the  CO""t,^j[^^^^^e^,SA^^^^^  (^..Tcixccra.   TO   Aot.o.   Tot5 

It  appears  to  me  ^hat  the^^^ 

rviflTSunShTonTsteTw  the  existing  circumstances,  and  explana- 

lo'rv  of  all  ^  h'c^follow  xotTrbv-that  remainder  which  the  Syracusans 

1\)  find  ()ut  what  IS  .meant  by  TO  Aot^  others -we  have  only  to 

thus  fortified  with  tlje  help  «f  "^^^^^^J'^JJen  GyUppus  entered  Syracuse  with 
compare  the  fortifications  ^J  f^J^  ^{-^^^^^.Snths  aft"*^^^  when  Demosthenes 

ti,e  fortifications  as  they  ^^^^"fj^fl^l^  JJthens     Now  three  distinct  construe- 
?^;^r.trrm^trJS^  -  Slilni  l^tTuf  S-  period,  which  had  not  been  in 

*^f 'tStlxt^-^lI'vU.  43,  3)  on  the  higher  ground  of  Epipolae,  guarding  the 

entrance  to  EpipoUe  from  the  Eurj^'alus  ^^^.^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^ 

3.    A  cross-wall  (Traparetxca^ayu.  42,  4^^^^^^^  ^^^^-^   it  joined  the 

extremity,  and  was  earned  ^^f/^  f^^.^^t  7ovTy<apaiov  Tet>..). 
aninter-walloreyKapaLovrec^X^^^^^^  at  different  points  up 

:i.  Three  strong  eneampinents  (irpoTetxt^jj      ^  1  ^.^^  ^^       ^j^^^  ^^^ 

the  slope  of  Epipolae,  al^'^£^^  .^,^  .^^Tq  the  TtSiian  camp.  These  encamp- 
hehind  it,  speaking  with  .^eje.  e^ice  to^^»^^^  who'were  to  defend  the 

inents  were  necessary  for  ^  ^^ '^^^^,{^'"y'?r 7vo  iV  in  case  it  were  attacked  by  an 
cross-wall,  as  weil  as  to  succor  the  f^^^  ^.^^i/;.^^  .j^^gje  ,or  simple)  and  there- 
enemy  f.om  the  Euryalus     toi  the  c  os^  wa  s^  necessary  sentnes 

fore  had  no  Pf  m^^^^V^   ^-^   be  fo  md   S^         specified    by  Thucydides, 
\i\  these  three  works   will   »*^/^^"ii'^.;^„ 'V'f  t)^^  None  of  thom 

where  he  describes  the  subsequent  operaUon^^  .^.^^  ^^.  j^ 

yet  existed  ^vhen  Gylippus  en  eed&.uac^^^^^^  ^ihdafum.    Here  then  we 

thians  are  now  stated  to  ^^^ve  jointly  construc^^^^^^  instructive  mean- 

The  words  m^xp^  ^ov  ^V'^'^P^^^^  J^  Xov?  fiJ-J^^^^  ^^  ^^^^,^^  the  entrance 

iug.    First  the  Syracusans  <^onstiucted  the  upper  loru  eross-wall  or  napa- 

to^Epipohe  /•'«>^„.^,"Sm  th^^^O''^  nt^  ttf jo  ned  the  counter-wall  or^y.apcrto. 
TeivK^i^a  continuously  from  tne  ^o"'  ""'jy^  ^  ,.„e  the  Athenian  line  of  blockade. 
Teixo?  which  had  already  been  extended  ^^'^^\?;Jfg^^^^^^^  the  counter-wall 

Th'e  .aparet-xcc^a  and  the  ^V-Pf^ j-JJ-  -t   «  cros.^-xl^  . ^^  ^^^^  ^.^^ 

were  thus  made  to  foi  "\^ue  conu  iuuu->         ,  continuous  wall, 

the  former  P'-obably  met  the  latter  at  an  ang^,^^^^^^  Athenian 

beui'ininoatthefortoHthehijH^^^^^^^^  ^,,^  ,,aii  of 

line  of  blockade  on  the  »<>'  ^'^;  \f'^*,^,,:^{,;''f  J^smxeivalL  and  both  together  are 
Syracuse  itself    They  are  111  fact^ spoken  ot  as  on^^^^^^^  vii.  4274;  vii.  43, 

called  the  naparei^^a^a  and  the^r-xo.^a- w  ^^omgare  ,  ^  ,^^^^  ^^  ^^^^ 

1-5..  That  this  TrapaTc-cxtcr/xa  o/,^  .^^^^.^'^^{^'"^t  when  he  tells  us  that  the 
ground  of  EpinolH'.  thucydides  du,t  nut  y  mt^^^^^^^  nocturnal 

Athenians  under  Demosthenes,  ^f  soon  as  the>  laa  s^^^  cross-wall 

surprise  of  the  fort  ^^^^S^^.^^l P"" '^^^l^ ^en  is  S  term^n^^  of  the  cross-wall  or 

-inform  us  what  becaine  of  the  other  te^^^^^^^  ^^^^^  j  ^^  ^^  ^^^^ 

1  am  aware  that  in  Pu"\"g   '^/^.,  J^^^^^^ftu^^^^^^^    "Sert  that  while  the  words  are 
all  the  previous  commentatoi  s    but  |^7,f"^'J,\y,.„;.y Nation  of  them  which  can  be 
ino..t  literally  construed    l^ere  is  no  ^^/^^^^i^i^^^i^i*;^^'^^^        of  events, 
rendered  consistent  with  the  actual  anqsuoseque  ^^^  proposed 

Gylippus  had  earned  his  ^.^^^        J^^^r  SvrSse  was  safe,  as  long  as  the 

line  of  Athenian  ^•""'^^"VSout  re  en  otce^^^^^^^^^  if  ^  large  re-en- 

Athenian  army  <^oininued  vithoiit  re  eutorceuiem^^       ^  supposition 

forcement  came  from  ^tluMis  as  ^^as  very  in^^^^^^ 

Syracuse  was  not  safe;  s";ee  all  the^  uppei  porU^^^^^^^        unoccupied^ and  unde- 

^S^  Zr'^'&i^^y  was^tStro:;\Sri  U  for  the^  defense  of  the 


368 


APIENDIX, 


Demosthenes  v.  itli  )us  ft>rce,  «iipe  kn    in     he  Ll.1   u^.nM  h^   ^^""^    ^''  J°i"^^'' 
accumphsh  an  effective   blockade  of  the   lirtPr     ww  k,-2^       5   i  •  ^^"l'^  ^^ 

and  terniinatinj?  in  the  new  fort  at  Fi  rvniull  n=  ti.  ^pjpoIaMueetmg 

which  the  wall  tfAchL^fna  was  the  bS^^^^^    '  "^  "P'^''  ""^  '^^^  ^"^"-^^  °^' 
No  objection  can  be  made  to  the  i)lirn«i.    t,.,.^.^^;  »    v      « 

{)o.se«.ecl  that  kuowledfe  woul.l  com^y'l  cS "n  ea-iiig ''-l,r'°AfSn;"  '° 

m^m  question  the  views  of  so  many  othrr  exDosito.«;^i;  t  u'-  '^f^*^'  '^•^^'' 
unhappily,  frequent  enough  in  Thucvd  U  anK?sin^  o  t  hJ%'^''ot''^''''."'''^-^' 
parsimony  of  words  which  he  seeins  to  h«v^  tho,  !ii*    ^     ^  ?,^  ^^^^^  extreme 

objects  to  as'^-not  behS  uS^wS^  inH^^nch  Vff  vd  dJ^  n'"^^''''i  ''^''''^'  ^ 
(p.  'r,r,),  may  be  sustainedly  reference  to  i  V~  \'V'^>^''*!*'s>'<^"""o"ly  wiite.s  ' 
the  same  signification.        ^  ^^reience  to  m.  1.,  where  ai  ,.,y.v  occui-s  inexactly 


AMNESTY  AT  ATHENS. 


369 


CHAPTER  LXVI. 

FROM  THE  RESTORATION  OF  THE  DEMOCRACY  TO  THE  DEATH  OP 

ALKIBIADES. 

The  period  bitcrvening  between  the  defeat  of  ^gospotami  (Octo- 
ber 405  B  c  ),  and  tlie  re-establisbmeut  of  the  democracy  as  sanctioned 
by  the  convention  conchided  with  Paiisanias(sorae  time  in  the  suin- 
nicr  of  403  b  c  ),  presents  two  years  of  cruel  and  multifarious  suiier- 
iii'v  to  Athens.    For  seven  years  before,  indeed,  ever  since  the  catas- 
trophe at  Syracuse,  she  l»ad  been  struL^irlincr  with  hardships— con- 
tendin<^a<''ainstauomented  hostile  force  while  her  own  means  were 
cut  downln  every  Vav— crippled  at  home  by  Die  garrison  of  Dekeleia 
—stripped  to  a  o-reat  degree  botli  of  her  tribute  and  her  foreign  trade 
—and  beset  by  fhe  snares  of  her  own  oligarchs.     In  spite  of  circum- 
stances so  adverse,  she  had  maintained  tlie  light  with  a  resohition  not 
le^ssurprisin*^  than  admirable;  yet  not  without  sinking  more  and  more 
toward  impoverishment  and  exhaustion.     The  deteat  of  ^Egospo- 
tami  closed  the  war  at  once,  and  transferred  her  from  her  period  of 
stru"-'de  to  one  of  concluding  agony.     Nor  is  the  last  word  by  nny 
means  too  strong  for  the  reality.     Of  these  two  years,  the  first  por- 
tion was  marked  by  severe  pliysical  privation,  passing  by  degrees  into 
absolute  famine,  and  accompanied  by  the  intolerable  sentiment  of 
despair  and  helplessness  asiaiust  her  enemies,  after  two  generations 
of  imperial  grandeur— not 'without  a  strong  chance  of  being  finally 
consigned  to  ruin  and  individual  slavery;  while  the  last  portion  com- 
prised all   the  tyranny,  murders,  robberies,  and  expulsions  perpe- 
trated by  the  Thirty,  overthrown  only  by  heroic  efforts  of  patriotism 
on  the  part  of  the  exiles— whicli  a  fortunate  change  of  sentiment,  on 
the  part  of  Pausauias,  and  the  leading  members  of  the  Peloponnesian 
coufederacv,  ultimately  crowned  with  success. 

After  such  years  of  misery,  it  was  an  unspenknble  relief  to  the 
Athenian  population  to  regain  possession  of  Athens  and  Attica;  to 
exchange  their  domestic  tyrants  for  a  renovated  democrat ical  govern- 
ment; and  to  see  their  foreign  enemies  not  merely  evacuate  the  coun- 
try, but  even  bind  themselves  by  treaty  to  future  friendly  dealing. 
Li  respect  of  pov/cr,  indeed,  xVthens  was  but  the  shadow  ()f  her 
former  self.  Slie  had  no  empire,  no  tribute,  no  fleet,  no  fortifications 
at  Peir^us,  no  long  walls,  not  a  sin«rle  fortified  place  in  Attica  except 
the  city  itself.  Of  all  these  losses,  however,  the  Athenians  probably 
made  little  account,  at  least  at  the  first  epoch  of  their  re-establish- 
ment; so  intolerable  was  the  pressure  which  tliey  had  just  escaped 
and  so  welcome  the  restitution  of  comfort,  security,  property  and 
independence  at  home.  The  ver>'  excess  of  tyranny  committed  by 
the  Thirty  gave  a  peculiar  zest  to  the  recovery  of  the  democracy, 


370  AFTER  THE  RESTORATION  OF  THE  DEMOCRAC^Y. 


In  tlieir  bands,  tlie  oHirarchical  principle  (to  borrow  an  expression 
from  Mr.  Burke)  "bail  jModuced  in  fact  and  instantly,  tbe  ^roskst 
of  tbose  evils  witb  \vbicb  it  was  pregnant  in  its  nature;"  realizing  tbe 
]>r()niise  of  that  plain-spoken  oligarcbical  oath,  wbicb  Aristotle  nien- 
lioiis  as  baving  been  taken  in  various  oligarcliical  cities — to  contrive 
as  niucli  evil  as  ]^o-sible  to  the  people.  80  niucli  the  more  complete 
was  the  reaction  of  sentiment  towards  tbe  antecedent  democmcv, 
even  in  tbe  minds  of  tbose  wbo  bad  been  before  discontented  witb  it. 
To  all  men,  ricli  and  poor,  citizens  and  metics.  tbe  comparative  excel- 
lence of  tbe  democracy,  in  respect  of  all  tbe  essentials  of  gooii  gov- 
ernment,  was  now  mtinifcst.  Witb  tbe  exception  of  tbose  wbo  had 
identitied  themselves  witb  the  Thirty  as  partners,  partisans,  or  instru- 
ments, there  was  scarcelv  anv  one  who  did  not  feel  that  bis  life  and 
l^roperty  bad  been  far  more  secure  under  tbe  former  democracy,  and 
would  become  so  :igain  if  that  dcmocracv  were  revived. 

It  was  tbe  first  measure  of  rinasybuUis  and  bis  companions,  after 
concluding  tbe  treaty  witb  Pausanias  and  thus  re-entering  tbe  city, 
to  exciiange  solemn  oaths,  of  amnesty  for  tbe  past,  witb  tbose  against 
whom  they  bad  just  been  at  war.  Similar  oaths  of  amnesty  were 
also  excbanged  witb  tbose  in  Eleusis,  as  soon  as  that  town  came  into 
tlieir  power.  Tbe  only  persons  excepted  from  this  amnesty  were  the 
Tiiirty,  tbe  Eleven  wbo  bad  ])resided  over  the  execution  of  all  their 
atrocities,  and  tbe  Ten  who  had  governed  in  Peirreus.  Even  these 
persons  were  not  peremptorily  banished:  opportnnity  was  offered  to 
Ibem  to  come  in  and  take  their  trial  of  accountr.bility  (universal  at 
Athens  in  tbe  case  of  every  magistrate  on  quitting  ollice);  so  that  if 
acquitted,  they  would  enjoy  the  benefit  of  tbe  amnesty  as  well  as  all 
others.  We  know  that  Eratosthenes,  one  of  tbe  Thirty,  afterward 
r(.'turju'd  to  Athens;  since  there  remains  a  powerful  harangue  of 
Lysias  invoking  justice  against  him  as  having  brougbt  to  death  Pole- 
marchus  (the  brother  of  Lyshis).  Eratosthenes  was  one  of  the  minor- 
ity of  tbe  Thirty  who  sided  g(  nerally  witb  Thennnenes.  and  opposed 
to  a  considerable  degree  tbe  extreme  violences  of  Kritias — although 
personally  concerned  in  that  seizure  and  execntion  of  tbe  rich  metics 
Avhich  Theramenes  had  resisted,  and  which  was  one  of  the  grossest 
misdeeds  even  of  that  dark  periotl.  He  and  Pheidon — being  among 
the  Ten  named  to  succeed  the  Thirty  after  tbe  death  of  Kritias,  when 
the  remaining  members  of  that  deposed  Board  letired  to  Eleusis — 
1j:uI  endeavored  to  maintain  themselves  as  a  new  oligarch}',  carrying 
on  war  at  tbe  sa(ne  time  against  Eleusis  and  against  the  democrat ical 
exiles  in  Peinpus.  Failing  in  Ibis,  they  had  retired  from  the  country, 
at  tbe  time  when  tbe  exiles  returned,  and  when  the  democracy  was 
tii'^  re  established.  But  after  a  certain  interval,  tbe  intense  senti- 
ments of  tbe  moment  having  somewhat  subsided,  they  were  encour- 
aged by  their  friends  to  return,  and  came  back  to  stand  their  trial  of 
accountability.  It  was  on  that  occasion  that  Lysias  ])refe''red  his 
accusation  against  I^rutoslbenes,  the  result  of  which  we  do  not  luiow, 


DISFRANCHISING  PROPOSITION  OF  PHORMISIUS.    371 

tbou"-!!  we  see  plainly  (even  from  the  accusatory  speech)  that  tbe  lat- 
ter  bad  powerful  friends  to^tand  by  him,  and  tliMt  the  dikasts  mani- 
fested considerable  reluctance  to  condenm.  We  Icain  moreover  from 
the  same  speech,  that  such  was  tbe  detestation  of  the  Tlnrty  among 
several  of  the  states  surrounding  Attica,  as  to  cause  formal  decrees 
for  their  expulsion  or  for  prohibiting  their  coming.  Tbe  sons,  even 
of  such  among  tbe  Thirty  as  did  not  return,  w^ere  allowed  to  remain 
at  Athens,  and  enjoy  their  rights  of  citizens  unmolested;  a  modera- 
\\o\\  lare  in  Grecian  political  warfare. 

The  lirst  public  vote  of  the  Athenians,  after  tbe  conclusion  of  peace 
with  Sparta  and  tbe  return  of  tbe  exiles,  was  to  restore  the  former 
(liMnocracv  purely  and  simply,  to  choose  by  lot  the  nine  Aichons  and 
th"  Senate  of  Five  Hundred,  and  to  elect  the  generals— all  as  before. 
It  nppoars  that  this  restoration  of  the  precediiig  constitution  was  par- 
tiillv  op]H)sed  by  a  citizen  named  Phormisius,  wbo.  having  served 
wiih  Thrasybuliis  in  Peiranis,  now  moved  that  the  political  franchise 
should  for  tne  future  be  restricted  to  tbe  possessors  of  land  in  Attica. 
His  proposition  was  understood  to  be  supported  by  .the  LacedaMuon- 
ians  and  w;;s  recommended  as  calculated  to  nu'.ke  Athens  march  in 
betlc'r  harmony  with  them.  It  was  presented  as  a  compromise 
between  oligarchy  and  democracy,  excluding  both  the  poorer  free- 
meu  and  those  whose  property  lay  either  in  movables  or  in  land  out 
of  Attica;  so  that  the  aggregate  number  of  tbe  disfranchised  would 
have  been  live  thousand"  persons.  Since  Athens  now^  had  lost  her 
fleet  and  maritime  empire,  and  since  the  importance  of  Peintus  was 
much  curtailed  not  merelv  bv  these  losses,  but  by  demolition  of  its 
separate  walls  and  of  the  long  walls— Phormisius  and  others  con- 
ceived the  opportunity  favorable  for  striking  out  tbe  maritime  and 
tr:iding  multitude  from  the  roll  of  citizens.  Many  of  these  men  must 
luive  k'en. in  easy  and  even  opulent  circumstances;  but  the  bulk  of 
them  were  poor;  and  Phormisius  had  of  course  at  bis  command  tbe 
usual  arguments,  by  which  it  is  attempted  to  prove  that  poor  men 
have  no  "business  \vith  political  judgment  or  action.  But  tbe  propo- 
sition was  rejected;  the  orator  Lvsias  being  among  its  opponents,  nnd 
composing  a"spec..h  against  it  which  was  either  spoken,  or  intended 
to  l)e  spoken,  by  some  eminent  citizen  in  tbe  assembly. 

Unfortunately,  we  have  onlv  a  fragment  of  the  speech  remaining, 
wherein  tbe  proposition  is  justly  criticised  as  mischievous  and  unsea- 
sonable, depriving  Athens  of  alarge  portion  of  her  legitimate  strength, 
patriotism,  and  harmony,  and  even  of  substantial  men  competent  to 
serve  as  hoplites  or  horsemen— at  a  moment  when  she  was  barely  ris- 
ing from  absolute  prostration.  Never  certainly  was  the  fallacy  wbicli 
connects  political  depravity  or  incapacity  witb  a  poor  station,  and 
politierd  virtue  or  judgment  with  wealth— more  conspicuously 
unmasked  than  in  reference  to  the  recent  experience  of  Athens.  The 
remark  of  Tbrasybulus  was  most  true— that  a  greater  number  of 
atrocities,  both  against  person  and  against  property,  had  been  com- 


372  AFTER  THE  RESTORATION  OF  THE  DEMOCRACY. 

mitted  iu  a  few  months  by  the  Thirty,  and  abetted  bv  tlie  class  of 
Horsemen,  all  rich  men— than  the  poor  miijority  of  the  Demos  had 
sanctioned  dunn^^-  two  generations  of  democracy.  Moreover  we 
know,  on  the  authority  of  a  witness  unfriendly  to  the  deniocracv 
that  the  poor  Athenian  citizens,  who  served  on  shipboard  and  else- 
w^here,  were  exact  in  obedience  to  their  commanders;  while  ihericlicr 
citizens  who  served  as  hoplites  and  horsemen,  and  who  laid  claim 
to  hiirher  individual  estimation,  were  far  less  orderly  iu  the  nublic 
service.  '■ 

The  motion  of  Phormisius  being  rejected,  the  antecedent  democ- 
racy was  restored  without  qualitication,  toixether  with  the  ordinances 
of  Drako,  and  the  laws,  measures,  and  weights  of  Solon.     But  on 
closer  inspection;  it  was  found  that  the  latter  part  of  tlie  resolution 
Avas  incompatible  with  the  amnesty  which  had  been  just  sworn.    Ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  Solon  and  Drako.  the  perpetrators  of  enornii. 
ties  under  the  Thirty  liad  rendered  themselves  guiltv,  and  were  open 
to  trial.     Tio  escape  this  consequence,  a  second  psephism  or  decree 
Avas  passed,  on  the  proposition  of  Tisamenus,  to  review  the  laws  of 
Solon  and  Drako.  and  re-enact  them  with  such  additions  and  ameiul- 
ments  as  might  be  deemed  expedient.    Five  Hundred  ( iiizens  hiid 
just  been  chosen  by  the  peoi)le  as  Xomothetiv  or  Law-makers  at  the 
same  time  when  the  Senate  of  Five  Hundred  was  taken  bv  lot-  out 
of  these  JNomothetcT,  the  Senate  now  chose  a  select  few,  whose  dutv 
It  was  to  consider  all  propositions  for  amendment  or  addition  to  the 
laws  of  the  old  democracy,  and  post  them  up  for  public  insju'ction 
before  the  statues  of  the  Eponvmous  Heroes,  within  the  month  then 
ninning.     The  Senate,  and  the  entire  body  of  Five  Hundred  Konio- 
thelaB,  were  then  to  be  convened,  in  order  that  each  minht  pass  in 
review,  separately,  both  the  old  laws  and  the  new  propositions-  llie 
JNomothetcB  being  previously  sworn  to  decide  riiihleously.      While 
this  discussion  was  going  on,  every  i^rivate  citizen  had  liberty  to 
enter  the  senate,  and  to  tender  his  opinion  with  reasons  for  orafainst 
any  law.     All  the  laws  which  should  thus  be  approved  (tirst  by  the 
senate    afterward  by  the   Nomotheta?)  but  no  others— were  to  ho 
handed  to  the  magistrates,  and  inscribed  on  the  walls  of  the  Portico 
called  Pa?kile.  for  public  notoriety,  as  the  future  reo-ulators  of  the 
city      After  the  laws  were  promulgated  by  such  public  inscription, 
ttie  Senate  of  Areopagus  was  enjoined  to  take  care  that  they  should 
duly  observed  and  enforced  by  the  magistrates.     A  provisional  com- 
mittee  of  twenty  citizens  was  named,  to  be  irenerally  responsible  fur 
the  city  during  the  time  occupied  in  this  revision. 

As  soon  as  the  laws  bad  been  revised  and  publicly  inscribed  in  the 
Ptt'kile  pursuant  to  the  above  decree,  two  concluding  laws  were  en- 
acted which  completed  the  purpose  of  the  citizens. 

The  first  of  these  laws  forbade  the  magistrates  to  act  upon,  or  per- 
mit to  be  acted  upon,  any  law  not  among  Uiose  inscribed;  and  declared 
tliat  no  psephism,  either  of  the  senate  or  of  the  people  should  over- 


NEW  L.\?WS  MADE. 


373 


.law  Tt  renewed  also  the  old  prohibition  (dating  from  the 
rule  any  law.  It  ^j^"*^  V';,'; ;'.  .  -^.^lu  of  the  democracy),  to  enact  a 
^'•l^'^Z't^^^^^^-  -y  individiial  Athenian 

secvotly.  ,         .■.rpeoribcd   that  all  the  leijal  adjiidlea- 

Tho  second  of  the  t%vo    '.'^f,,  ['="^'  "''„,\4,i  u„der  thS  auteco.lent 

''";r?"u\vWch  i  -iri  -en  ^S  1^  Z' Tl.ir.y.     It  further  pro- 

^^^rZZ.^^I^^^^'^^^^''^^^'^  of  ThrasyUulus  a.d 
renovation  of  the  <l«">"'-;'';^f  > '  .,^„„„,,, ,  „i,  „ctq  done  prior  to  the  nom- 
.  "[,:r:^''i::areZ'E  kl  uiS'™';rh\a,l"a.nK.s  (il.  .I,e  summer  of 
luation  ot  tue  aiciion  i^  eprvin.r -m  ..-rounds  for  criminal  process 

'^^■'i::7'^^^%MT^^^  this  should  be  car- 

'''^"'JtoXct  facial  d  was  added  t()  the  oath  taken  annually  by 
riL'd  mtoeftect,  a  special udu^t^  Heliastic  d  kasts.     The 

""  fr'"wl"d"h  ml^ve si  y  o Uh  nlS  to \^.  "  vo  any  in.pcaehmout. 

;„rh,.  «h.ill  remember  them;  on  the  contrary,  1  will  give  my  \oic 
;  ;  nntu.e  e'Su,:;  laws:    whu-h  >--  }--'«>■-  tl.en.selves  as 

mmmsm 


374  AFTER  THE  RESTORATION  OF  THE  DEMOCRACY. 

lies  from  Peirsens.  and  the  TTorsomen.  -with  otlier  partisans  of  tlic 
Tliirty  in  Athens,  blended  again  together  into  one  harmonious  and 
equal  democracy. 

Eiirht  years  prior  to  these  incidents,  we  have  seen  the  oligarcliical 
conspiracy  of  the  Four  Hundred,  for  a  moment  succcvssful.  si'nd  after- 
ward overthrown;  and  we  have  had  occasion  to  notice,  in  reference 
to  tiiat  event,  the  wonderful  uosence  of  all  reactionary  violence  on 
the  part  of  the  victorious  people,  at  a  moment  of  severe  provocation 
for  the  past  and  extreme  apprehension  for  l lie  future.  We  noticed 
that  Thucydides,  no  friend  to  the  Athenian  democracy,  .'elected  pre- 
cisely that  occasion — on  which  some  manifi station  of  vindictive 
impulse  might  have  been  supposed  likely  and  naturnl—to  beslou  the 
ino3t  unqualified  eulogies  on  their  moderate  and  gentle  bearinii-.  Il;id 
the  historian  lived  to  describe  the  reign  of  the  Thirty  and  the  restora- 
tion which  followed  it,  we  cannot  doubt  that  Ids  expressions  would 
liave  been  still  warmer  and  more  emjdiatic  in  the  same  sense.  Few 
events  in  history,  either  ancient  or  modern,  are  more  astonisliiiigthaii 
the  behavior  of  the  Athenian  people,  on  lecovcring  their  denioei-.iev 
after  tiie  overthrow  of  the  Thirty:  and  when  we  view  it  in  conjune- 
lion  with  the  like  phenomenon  after  the  disposition  of  the  Four  Ilun- 
dred.  we  see  that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  arose  from  peculiar 
caprice  or  accident  of  the  moment;  both  depended  uj  on  peininiunt 
attributes  of  the  popular  character.  If  we  knew  nothhig  e!.-e  exec  pt 
the  events  of  these 'two  periods,  we  should  be  warianted  in  di.-miss- 
ing,  on  that  evidenc'  alone,  the  string  of  contemj>tuous  predicates — 

fiddy,  irascible,  jealous,  unhist,  greedy,  etc. — one  oi  other  of  which 
[r.  Mitford  so  frequently  pronounces,  and  insinuates  even  wiien  he 
does  not  pronounce  them,  respecting  the  Atlienian  peoi)le.  A  peo- 
ple whose  habitual  temper  and  morality  merited  tiiese  epithets,  could 
not  liave  acted  as  the  Atiienians  acted  botii  after  the  Four  Ifundreel 
and  after  the  Thirty.  Particular  acts  may  l)e  found  in  their  history 
which  justify  severe  censure;  but  as  to  the  permaneiu  elements  of 
cliaracter,  both  moral  and  intellectual,  no  population  in  history  has 
ever  afforded  stronger  evidence  than  the  Athenians  on  these  two 
memorable  occasions. 

If  we  follow  the  actsof  the  Thirty,  we  shall  see  that  the  Horsemen 
aTid  the  privile,ged  Three  Thousand  hoplites  in  the  city  had  made 
themselves  partisans  in  every  species  of  flagitious  crime  which  could 
possibly  be  imagined  to  exasperate  the  feelings  of  the  exiles.  The 
latter  on  returning  sawr  before  them  men  who  had  handed  in  their 
relations  to  be  put  to  death  without  trial — wiio  had  seized  upon  and 
enjoyed  their  property — who  liad  expellerl  them  all  from  tlie  city,  and 
a  large  portion  of  them  even  from  Attica — an<l  who  iiad  held  them- 
selves in  master}^  not  merely  by  the  overthrow  of  the  constitution, 
])ut  also  by  inviting  and  subsidizing  foreign  guards.  Such  atrocities, 
conceived  and  ordered  by  the  Thirty,  hail  been  executed  by  the  aid, 
and  for  the  joint  benefit  (as  Kritias  justly  remarked)  of  those  occu- 


CONDUCT   OF  THE  OLIGARCHY 


375 


tc  nf  the  citv  whom  the  exiles  found  on  returning     iSow  Thia- 
pants  of  the  (    y  ^y   ""^  ^  ^^^^.^^  exiles,  saw  their  property  a  1 

syi.uUis,  Anytu^,  an        c  ^^-^.^  ^^   ^      ^     j       (^le  few  n^onths  of  their 

''r^^n  Zu\  Zl  <Ju"do  Individual  members  or  partisans  .>f  the 
Tiot,  been  ^^^'^^^  ^;\\^7.  V^'  ^j^^m-  but  the  movable  property  could  not 
Thirty-werLMc>.oiultotntm     uiu  remained  subject  were 

^'^^  r';:r' tI"  n^  -li" \  d  l^  ^^^  r-fited  by  tlie  los^s, 
prodigious.      I  he  \\\^"  ;;  ';  I   ti,^  ^vives  and  families  of   the 

of.en  wilh  great  ^^'^  h  ^1  l^ot^   e  orat()r  Lysias-werc  now  at 

,,Ues,  as  we  ';;^T^^>;^^^,^;^,^,'^t^ sufferers  In  like  man- 
Athens,  aU  indivi  hall}  well  Knmvn  victims  of  the 

'^^''l'^\  H^^  t;d',^n  cc^^ed  without  Uial  to  prison  and  exeeu- 
;■•  "   '1^  amo  m  of  w^^^  »^ad  been  infinitelv  greater  than 

tion.     ^^^  '^"\"\7.%n,  r  HuMitre  I   and  the  provocation,  on  every 
ill  the  tune  ot  the  1\*>^"  /^' '     , /;.;^^^^^^^^^^ 
,,.onndu.^>i..nd  pnuu      v^  ,,,  ,   a  the  vie- 

mmmmssm 

,u  .Vtlu.ns  after  the  vku.iy  ot  tUo  1>^;;'P'«  «^"  |^«,  ^ ;';\  S^ 
u;is  the  .uain  oa.ise  which  revivcl  Alliens  V°'\  ^  .fm^  -1  P  ly  to 
pvession  a„,l  .lan-er.  Much  more  torci hly  ^'« '?;'"';  "-/^fP^  '^0.° 
1,0  .estomlion  after  the  Thirty,  when  '  '%P>' '^*'^^.  ?  f  o  hh  .  c  uUl 
Nvas  at  tlu..  lowest  depth  of  ahasement,  f'<  '^n  n  ,1  mlr  oti-ii  ou 
h:,ve  rescued  her.  except  such  >^<^"^V^2\^i^  ;  "u,  i'c  M  have 
the  part  of  her  MClorioii^;  Demos.  Nothing  ^"<'"  "^  |  ";  i,„|e,K'U- 
onal  led  her  to  t.ccomplish  that  part, a  'Y'"  f  7  m,:"  povver 
det.t  and  powcTfnl  single  state,  though  sho,- 1  ''  '  '  ,  ^'^';'  ''j^'^^j 
-which' will  fnrnisli  material   for   the   subscquenl  poitiou  01  our 

history. 


376  AFTER  THE  RESTORATION  OF  THE  DEMOCRACY. 


REVISION  OF  THE  LAWS. 


377 


While  we  note  the  memorable  resolution  of  the  Athenian  people  to 

forget  that  wliicli  could  not  be  remembered  without  ruin  to  the  future 

march  of  the  democracy — we  must  at  the  8ame  time  observe  that 

Mhich   tliey  took  special   piiiiis  lo  preserve  from  beiui;-  forcrottcn. 

Tliey  formally  recoi;nized  jdl  the  adjuducd  cases  and  all  the  ri<ihtsof 

property  as  existing  under  the  democi'acy  anterior  to   the  Tjjirty. 

"You  pronounced,  fellow-citizens   (says    And(  kides),  that  all  the 

judicial  verdicts  and  all  the  decisions  of  arbitrators  passed  under  the 

democracy  should    remain  valid;  in  order  that  there  might  be  no 

abolition  of  debts,  no  reversal  of  private  rights,  but  tliat  every  man 

might  have  the  means  of  enforcing  contracis  due  to  him  by  others." 

If  the  Athenian  people  had  been  aiumatcd  i)y  that  avidity  to  despoil 

the  rich,  and  that  subjection   to  the  passion  of  the  monient.  which 

Mr.  Clifford  imputes  to  them  in  so  many  chapters  of  Ins  lustoiy— 

neither  motive  nor  opportunity  was  now  wnnting  for  wlioh  sale  con- 

tiscation;  of  which  the  rich  themselves,  duiing  the  dominion  of  the 

Thirty,  had  set  abundant  example.      The  amnesty  as  to  political 

wrong,  and  the  indelible  memory  as  to  the  rights  of  proi^erty,  stand 

alike  conspicuous  as  evidences  of  the  real  character  of  the  Athenian 

Demos. 

If  we  wanted  any  further  proof  of  their  capacity  of  t.'iking  the 
largest  and  soundest  views  on  a  (htlicult  political  .-ituatio!i.  we  should 
lind  it  in  another  of  their  measures  at  this  critical  period.  The  icn 
who  had  succeeded  to  oligarchical  presidenc}' of  Athens  after  the 
deatli  of  Kritiasand  the  expulsion  of  the  Thirty,  had  borrowed  fiom 
Sparta  llie  sum  of  one  bundled  talents,  for  the  express  j.urpose  of 
making  war  on  the  exiles  in  Peineus.  After  the  peace,  it  was  neces- 
sar}'  that  such  sum  should  be  repaid,  and  some  jx*rsons  pro{K)sed  that 
recourse  sliould  be  had  to  the  property  of  those  individuals  and  lh;it 
party  who  had  borrowed  the  money.  The  apparent  equity  of  the 
ju-oimsition  was  doubtless  felt  with  peculiar  force  at  a  time  when  the 
]>ublic  trcjisiiry  was  in  the  extreme  of  poverty.  But  nevertheless 
both  tlie  democratical  leaders  and  the  people  deci<Iedly  opposed  it, 
resolving  to  recognize  the  debt  as  a  public  cliarge;  in  which  capacity 
it  was  afterward  liquidated,  after  some  delay  arising  from  an  uu- 
y'^upplied  treasury. 

All  that  was  required  from  the  Horsemen  or  Knights  who  had  been 
active  in  the  service  of  the  Thirty,  was  that  llie^'^ should  repay  the 
sums  which  had  been  advanced  to  them  by  the  latter  as  outfit.  Such 
advance  to  the  Horsenien,  subject  to  subsequent  repayment,  and  seem- 
ingly distinct  from  the  regular  military  pay — appears  to  have  bien 
customary  practice  under  i  he  previous  democracy ;  but  we  nuiy  easily 
believe  thjit  the  Thirty  had  carried  it  to  an  abusive  excess,  in  their 
anxiety  to  enlist  or  stimulate  jiarlisans — when  we  recollect  that  they 
resorted  to  means  more  nefarious  for  the  same  end.  There  were  of 
course  great  individual  dilierenccs  among  these  Knights,  fts  to  the 
degree  in  whicli  each  had  lent  himself  to  the  mis,deedsof  the  oligarchy. 


Fven  the  most  guilty  of  them  were  not  molested,  and  they  were  sent 
four  years  afterward  to  serve  with  Agesilaus  in  Asia,  at  a  time  when 
the  Lacedc^inonians  required  from  Athens  a  contmgent  ot  cavalry; 
the  Demos  being  well-pleased  to  be  able  to  ])rovide  for  them  an 
lonoVaWe  f 01  ci -n  service.  But  the  general  body  of  Knights  suftered 
so  mtie  disadvantage  from  the  recollection  of  theThirty.  that  many 
of  them  in  after-days  became  senators,  generals,  hipparchs,  ani»  occu- 
pants  of  other  considerable  posts  in  the  state.  _ 

Vlthou'di  the  decree  of  Tisamenus,  presciibmg  a  revision  of  the 

laws  without  delay,  and  directing  that  the  laws  when  so  revis(  d 

hould  be  posted  up  for  public  view,  to  form  the  sole  and  ex<-  l^>..^e 

mude  of   the   Dikasteries,  had   been  passed  immedialel}   allei  the 

return  from  Peirwus  and  the  conhnnalion  of  the  amnesty,  yet  it 

appears  that  considerable  delay  took  place  before  such  enactment 

was  carried  into  full  effect.     A  person   named  Isikomachus   being 

chai-ec'  with  the  duty,  stands  accused  of  having  pertormed  it  tardily 

as  well  as  corruptly.     He  as  well  as  Tisamenus  was  a  scribe  or  secre- 

tarv  under  which  name  was  included  a  class  of  paid  olhcers,  highly 

important  in  the  detail  of  business  at  Athens,  though  seemingly  men 

of  low  birth,  and  looked  upon  as  filling  a  subordinate  station,  open 

to  sneers  from  unfriendly  orators.     The  boards,  the  magistrates,  and 

the  piibiie  bodies  were  so  frequently  changed  at  Athens  that  the  con- 

tinuitv  of  public  business  could  only  have  been  maintained  by  paid 

secretaries  of  this  character,  who  devoted  themselves  constantly  to 

Nikoniachus  had  been  named  during  the  democracy  anterior  to  the 
Thirtv   for  the  purpose  of  preparing  a  fair  transcript,  and  ot  posting 
up  afresIi(probablv  in  clearer  characters  and  in  a  place  more  con- 
venient for  public  View)  the  old  laws  of  Solon.     AV  e  can  well  und<'r- 
standthat  the  renovated  democratical  feeling,  which  burst  out  niter 
the  expulsion  of  the  Four  Hundred  and  dictated  the  vehei^ient  pse- 
phisni  of  Demophantus,  might  naturally  also  produce  such  a  coin- 
mi^^ion  as  this,  for  which  Nikoinachus.  both  as  one  of  the  pubuc 
scribes  or  secretaries  and  as  an  able  speaker,  was  a  suitable  person. 
His  accuser  (for  whom   Lvsias  composed  his  thirtieth  oration  now 
remaining-)  denounces  him  as  havinir  not  oidy  designedly  lingered  in 
the  business,  for  the  purpose  of  prolonging  the  ])eriod  of  reir.unera- 
tiou   but  even  as  having  corruptly  tam]\ered  with  the  old  laws,  l^y 
new'  interpolations  as  well  as  bv  omissions.     How  far  such  charges 
may  have  been   merited  we   liave  no  means  of  judging,  but  even 
assumino-  Nikomachus  to  have  been  both  honest  and   diligent,  he 
would  tilid  no  small  difiiculty  in  pro]>erly  discharging   his   duty  ot 
Aiia.'-rapheus  or   "Writer-up"  of  all  the  old  laws  of  Athens,  from 
Solon  downward.     Both  the  phraseology  of  these  ohl  hiws  :ind  the 
alphabet  in  which  th(y  were  written,  were  in  many  cases  antiquatx'd 
and  obsolete-  while  there  were  doubtless  also  cases  in  which  one  law 
was  at  variance,  wholly  or  partially,  with  another.     Now  such  cou- 


378  AFTER  THE  RESTORATION  OF  THE  DEMOCRACY. 

tradictions  an.l  archaisms  would  be  likely  to  prove  offensive,  if  set 
up  in  a  fresU  place  and  with  clean  new  characters,  yet  Kikomaelius 
had  no  authoritv  to  make  the  smallest  alteration,  and  mi^i^ht  nalunilly 
therefore  be  tardy  in  a  commission  which  did  not  promise  mucli 

credit  to  him  in  its  result.  .       r    ^     ^      ^^     ,-  i 

These  remarks  tend  to  show  that  the  necessity  of  a  f  resli  collection  niid 
publication  (if  we  mav  use  that  word) of  the  laws,  had  been  felt  piicr 
to  the  time  of  the  Thirty.  But  such  a  project  could  hariily  be  reali/.( d 
without  at  the  same  time  revisinir  the  laws,  as  a  body,  removing  nil 
flan-rant  contradictions,  and  rectifving  what  might  glaringly  dis].lra^c 
the  a^'e  either  in  substance  or  in  style.  Now  the  psephism  of  Tisa- 
menus  one  of  the  first  measures  of  the  renewed  democracy  after  the 
Thirty'  both  prescribed  such  revision  and  set  in  motion  a  revising 
bodv  but  an  additional  decree  was  now  proi>oscd  and  carried  by 
Archinus  relative  to  the  alphabet  in  which  the  revised  laws  sl-.oiiM 
be  drawn' up.  The  Ionic  alphabet,  thnt  is,  tlie  full  Greek  alphabet  of 
twentv-four  letters  as  now  written  and  printed,  had  been  in  use  at 
Athens  universallv  for  a  considerable  time,  apparently  for  two 
generations;  but  from  tenacious  adherence  to  ancient  custom  the  hiws 
had  still  continued  to  be  ccmsigned  to  writing  in  the  old  Attic  alpha- 
bet of  only  sixteen  or  eiirhteeu  letters.  It  was  now  ordained  that 
this  <cantv  alphabet  should  be  discontinued,  and  that  ih<>  revised 
laws,  as  well  as  all  future  public  acts,  should  be  written  up  in  the  full 

Ionic  alphabet. 

Partly  throu<rh  this  importnnt  reform,  partly  through  the  revi>ing 
bodv  partlv  tliroudi  the  agencv  of  Nikomachus,  who  was  still  (oii- 
tinuVd  as  xVnagraplieus,  the  revision,  inscription,  and  pubiicuiion  of 
the  laws  in  their  new  alphabet  was  at  length  completed.  But  it  s(-enis 
to  have  taken  two  years  to  peiform,  or  at  least  two  years  ehq  s( d 
before  Nikomaohus  went  through  his  trial  of  accountability,  lie 
appears  to  have  made  various  new  propositions  of  hit>  own,  which 
were  amon"-  those  adopted  bv  the  Nomotheta?;  for  these  his  accuser 
attacks  him  on  the  trial  of  accountability,  as  well  as  on  the  stiil 
ffi-aver  allegation  of  havim?  corruptly  falsified  the  decisions  of  that 
l)0(ly— wririiur  up  what  they  had  not  sanctioned,  or  suppressing  thiit 
wiiich  they  had  sanctioned.  ^        ^  v  .  ,      .      ., 

The  archonship  of  Eukleides.  succeeding  immediately  to  tlic 
Anarchy  (as  the  arch'onship  of  Pythodorus,  or  the  period  of  the 
Thirtv  was  denominated),  became  thus  n  cardinal  point  or  epoch  lu 
Athenian  history.  We  cannot  doubt  that  the  laws  came  forth  out  of 
this  revision  considerably  modified,  though  unhappily  we  possess  no 
particulars  on  the  subject.  We  learn  that  tin-  judilieal  franchise  was. 
on  the  proposition  of  Aristophon.  so  far  restricted  for  th<-  future,  that 
no  person  could  be  a  citizen  by  birth  except  the  son  of  citizen  parents 
on  both  sides;  whereas  previously  it  had  been  sutbcient  if  the  father 
alone  was  a  citizen.  The  rhetor 'f.ysias.  by  station  a  metic,  liad  not 
only  sullered  great  loss,  narrowly  escaping  death  from  the  Thirty 


RESTRICTED  CITIZENSHIP. 


379 


rwho  actually  put  to  death  his  brother  Polemarchus),  but  had  con- 
H  uted  a  laVge  sum  to  assist  the  armed  efforts  ot  the  exiles  under 
'ni  -isvbuhi^^  fn  Peineus.  As  a  reward  and  compensation  tor  such 
.,  tecJdents  the  latter  proposed  that  the  franchise  ot  citizen  shouUi 
;  '1  eon f erred  upon  him;  hut  we  are  told  that  this  decree,  though 
.  ;io  > ted  by  the  people,  was  afterward  indicted  by  Archinus  as  i  legal 
;  r  onnal,  aiul  canceled.  Lysias  thus  disappointed  ot  the  citizen- 
s,;  passed  the  remainder  of  his  life  as  an  Isoteles,  or  non-freeman 
on  tiie  best  condilion.  exempt  from  the  peculiar  burdens  upon  the 

'"'such  reSof  citizenship  to  an  eminent  man  like  Lysias  who  had 

both  acted  and  suffered  in  the  cause  of  the  democracy   when  com- 

.  ed   V  th  the  decree  of  Aristophon  above  noticed,  implies  a  degree 

ui-rmented  strictness  which  we  can  only  partially  exphtin      It  w  as 
0    ue   'i'  tlie  renewal  of  her  democracy  for  vvdiich  Athens  had  now 

nrovide  She  htid  also  to  accommodate  her  legislation  and  admin- 
i  I  •  on  to  her  future  march  as  an  isolated  state  wituout  e.npne  or 
1-  4ni  dependencies.  For  this  purpose  material  changes  must  have 
letM  Required:  among  others,  we  know  that  the  Board  ot  Hel leno- 
tamiie  (ori-inallv  named  for  the  collection  and  management  ot  the 
ir  mu;  at  Delos;  but  attracting  to  themselves  gradually  more  extend- 
e  unctions,  until  they  became,  ultimately,  i.nmediately  before  the 
Thh^v  the  general  paVmasters  of  the  state)  was  discontinued,  and 
sucl  amono;  its  duties  as  d.d  not  pass  away  along  with  the  loss  ot  the 
fo?elni  .empire,  were  transferred  to  two  new  othcers-the  treasurer 
at  war,  aiu    the  manager  of  the  Theorikon,  or  religious  lesival-tund. 

Respect  in- these  tv?o  new  departments,  the  latter  ot  which  es,)e- 
ciallv  hecam^',  so  much  extended  as  to  comprise  most  ot   he  disburse-  . 
meals  of  a  peace-establishment,  I  shtill  speak  more    ully  hereatUM-; 
at  present  I  only  notice  them  as  manifestations  ot  the  large  change  lu 
Alhenian  administration  consequent  upon  the  loss  of  the  em  pi. e^ 
Taerewere  doubtless  many  other  changes  arising  irom  the   same 
cause,  though  we  do  m)t  know  them  in  detail ;  and  I  incline  to  n  uiv 
ber  among  such  the  alteration  above  noticed  respecting  the  right  ot 
citizenship.     While  the  Athenian  empire  lasted,  the  citizens  of  Athens 
were  spread  over  the  .Egean  in  every  sort  of  capacity-as  set   ers, 
merchants,  navigators,  soldiers,  etc.,  which  must  have   ended  mate^ 
ri:dlvto  encourage  intermarriages  between  them  and  the  women  of 
olheV  Grecian  insular  stales.     Indeed,  we  are  even  told  that  an  expre>s^ 
permission  of  coivwbinm.  with  Athenians  w^as  granted  to  the  inhabit- 
ants of  EubaM-a  fact  (noticed  by  Lysias)  of  some  moment  in  illu.s- 
traiiag  the  tendency  of  the  Athenian  empire  to  mul  iply  family  ties . 
between  Athens  and   the  allied  cities.     Now,  according    o  the  law 
whieli  prevailed  before  Eukleides,  the  son  of  every  such  marriago 
wa^  by  birth  an  Athenian  citizen;  an  arrangement  at  that  time  use- 
ful to  Athens,  as  strengthening  the  bonds  of  her  empire-and  emi- 
uenlly  useful  in  a  larger  point  of  view,  among  the  causes  ol  I'm- 


380  AFTER  THE  RESTORATION  OF  THE  DEMOCRACY. 


Hellenic  sympathy.  But  when  Athens  was  deprived  both  of  lier 
empire  anil  her  tleet,  and  eonrined  witiiin  the  limits  of  Atliea — there 
no  lon-jer  remai'ied  any  motive  to  eontinue  sueh  a  regulation,  so  that 
the  exclusive  eity-feeling,  instinctive  in  the  Grecian  mind,  again  be- 
came pretlominant.  Such  is  perhaps  the  explanation  of  the  new 
restrictive  law  proposed  by  Aristophon. 

Thrasybulus  and  the  gaUant  handful  of  exiles  who  had  first  seized 
Phyle,  received  n*)  larger  reward  than  1000  drachmtii  for  a  common 
sacritiee  and  votive  ollering,  together  with  wreaths  of  olive  as  a  token 
of  iiratitude  from  their  countrymen.  The  debt  which  Athens  owed 
to  Thra>yi)uius  was  indeed  such  as  could  not  be  liquidated  by  money. 
T.)  his  individual  patriotism,  in  great  degree,  we  may  ascribe  not 
oidy  the  restoration  of  the  democracy,  but  its  good  behavior  when 
restored.  How  dilleient  would  have  been  the  consequences  of  the 
restoration  and  the  conduct  of  the  people,  had  the  event  been  brouglit 
al)out  by  a  man  like  Alkibiadcs,  apj)lying  great  abilities  principally 
to  the  turtiierance  of  his  own  cupidity  and  power! 

At  tile  resioration  of  the  democracy,  however,  Alkibiadcs  wns 
already  no  more.  IShoitly  after  the  catastioplie  at  ^gospotand,  he 
liad  sought  shelter  in  the  satrapy  of  Pliarnaba/Ais,  no  longer  thinking 
hill. self  L3afe  from  Lacedtvmonian  persecution  in  his  forts  on  the 
Thr.ician  Chersonese.  He  carried  with  him  a  good  deal  of  property, 
though  lie  left  slid  more  behind  him  in  these  forts;  how  acquired, 
We  do  not  know.  But  having  crossed  ai)parently  to  Asia  liy  the  Ijos- 
pliorus,  he  was  plundered  by  the  Thracians  in  Bithynia,  and  incurred 
much  loss  before  he  could  reach  Pharnabazus  in  Phiygia.  Renewing 
the  tie  of  personal  hospitality  "which  he  liad  contracted  with  Pharna- 
bazus f<iUi"  years  before,  he  now  solicited  from  tin-  satrap  a  safe  con- 
duct up  ;o  Susa.  The  Athenian  envoys — whom  Pharnai)azus,  after 
liis  former  ]>acitication  witii  Alkibhides408  u.c.  had  engaged  to  escort 
1o  Susa.  but  had  been  compelled  by  the  mandate  of  Cyrus  to  detain 
as  prisoners — were  just  now  releasctl  from  their  three  years*  deten- 
tion, and  enabled  to  come  down  to  the  Propontis;  and  Alkibiadcs,  by 
whom  I  ids  mission  hi.d  originaliy  been  projected,  trieil  to  prevail  on 
the  satr.ip  to  perform  the  promise  which  he  had  originally  given,  but 
had  not  been  able  to  fulfill.  The  hopes  of  the  sanguine  exile,  revert- 
ing back  to  the  history  of  Themistokles,  led  him  to  anticipate  the 
same  success  at  Sus.-i  as  had  fallen  to  the  lot  of  the  latter;  nor  was  the 
design  iiipracticable,  to  one  whose  ability  was  universally  renowned, 
an<l  win*  had  already  acted  as  minister  to  Tissaphernes. 

The  court  of  Susa  was  at  tiiis  time  in  a  jH-culiar  position.  King 
Darius  Notlius.  having  recently  died,  had  been  succeeded  by  his 
eldest  st>n  Artaxerxes  Mnemon;  but  the  younger  son  Cyrus,  whom 
Darius  had  sent  for  during  his  last  illness,  tried  after  the  death  of  the 
latter  to  supplant  Artaxerxes  in  the  succession — or  at  least  was  sus- 
pected of  so  trying.  Being  seized  and  about  to  be  slain,  the  que(  n- 
molher  Pa ry satis  prevailed  upon  Artiixerxcs  to  pardon  him,  and  send 


FEELING   AGAINST  ALKIBIADES. 


381 


him  an-ain  down  to  his  satrapy  along  the  coast  of  Ionia,  where  ho 
iTn-ed  strenuously,  though  secretly,  to  acquire  the  means  ot  de- 
liboied  s"^"\\V,,,h,-^^  ^  memorable  attempt,  of  which  I  shall  speak 
'^''""Vollv  here-  f  er  '  Bu  1 1^  cheines,  though  carefully  masked,  did 
noTesca  e   he  (f  ^^  of  Alkibiadcs,  who  wished  to  make  a  merit 

not  e^capc  i"«  ^  ^  ^  ^    become  the  instrument  of  defeating 

S',.';r  iif  cS.^  .0.1  ht  suspicions  US  well  as  his  purpose  ,,, 
}r  ,i,,tn^  whom  he  tried  to  awulien  by  alarm  of  danser  to  tlie 
I,;;;";.:  inmdeVth;"  lie  might  Hms  get  hhnielf  forwarded  t,>  Susa  us 

"' Ph'm!\V'l^us  was'alreadv  jealous  and  unfriendly  in  spirit  toward 
I  vs.^«  and  1  0  Laced*,nonians  (of  which  we.shall  soon  see  pla.n 
e^i  ie  ce"and  perhaps  toward  Oyrus  also,  since  such  were  to 
h,  it  -a  relations  of  neigliboring  satraps  in  the  Persian  enipire  But 
r'^l;,:Jlnians  and  Cvrns  were, low  alU^^^^^^^^^^^ 


kiS;-  .S  1  "1  m  n  ;;;,heless  perniission  to  live  in  P lirygia. 
H  d  eveM;  ai  "ni  r^  to  hini  a  revenue.     But  the  ob.  eels  nt^w  i.ch  tlio 
cvkMvasaimTn-soonbecanie  more  or  less  fully  divulged,    o  those 
n'Ainst  w  mm  they  were  intende.l.     Ills  restless  character,  euterpnse 
ml  eioicitv   were  so  well  known  as  to  raise  exaggerated  fears  as 
w    1  ';,'  eva-erated  hopes.      Not  merely  C>M-us-bu    the  Laced.e- 
noi ins  doTdv  allied  w-ilh  Cvrus-aiid  the  Dekarelues.  wliomLx- 
rder'liad  s':t'(.p  n.  the  Asiatic  Grecian  cities  an^w  1-  heUUh,. 
Dower  only  tlirough  Lace.henioman  support— all  weie  "»<'a\\'«  "  : 
msiiect  of  seein-  Alkibiadcs  again  in  action  and  command,  anud 
II  nlnnv  misettlwle'einents.       Nor  can  we  dou'jt  that  the  exiles 
i^linrtheeDltclde    had  banished,  and  the  disaffected  citizens 
wlo  remained  at  home  under  their  government  in  --   'j^,"-— 
or  deatli.  kept  up  correspondence  witli  him   and  looked      1     i  •  s  a 
probable  liberator.     Moreover  the  Spartan  ^  '  S/^S'-*  j;;      '^'«  '^<» 
lie  same  personal  antii«thy  asamst    urn   wluc  1    l'«<| ^h ta'.y  (s™  e 
years  before)  procured  the  order  to  be  <lisiialchcd,  fiom  W'tt^'^  U> 
X   a   to  assassinate  him.     Here  arc  elements  enough,  of  .  "^    '  y' 
•wiA-ance   and  apprehension,  afloat  against  Alkibiades-witloit  be- 
li  'vb.    tlfe  story  o    Ph.tarch,  that  Krilias  and  tlie  Tlurty  sent  to  ap- 
prise Lvsand'^Jhat  the  oli.a'rchy  at  Atl-ns  could  not  stai.    so  Ion, 
as  Alkibiadcs  was  alive.     Tlie  Irut  i  is  tlnit  «l"'".ff>'  «>;^  T'''"^  >. . ; 
included  him  in  tlie  list  of  exiles,  they  l,ad  nuudi  less  to  .;!  C;  1  f  '  J 
his  assaults  or  plots,  in  Atliea,  tlian  the  Lysandnan  DcKmcnus   n 
the  cfuesof  Asia.     Moreover,  his  name  was  not  poiuilar  even  among 
the  A  K-nian  democrats,  as  will  be  shown  "'f'-'V^.^iirairi^ed  in- 
to recount  the  trial  of  Sokrate^    .  Probably  tlierefore      ^  a  l.ged  m 
tervention  ot  Kritias  and  the  Thirty,  to  procure    he   .»'><-■[   f.-'^' 
kibiades,  is  a  fiction  of  tlie  sulvsequeut  encomiasts  ot  the  lattci  M 


382  AFTER  THE  RESTORATION  OF  THE  DE.AIOCRACT. 


Athens,  in  order  to  create  for  liim  claims  to  esteem  as  a  friend  and 
fellow-sufferer  Avith  the  democracy. 

_  A  special  dispatch  (or  Skytale)  was  sent  out  by  the  Spartan  author- 
ities to  Lysander  in  Asia,  enjoining  him  to  pro'ctu'c  that  AlUibiades 
should  he  put  to  death.  Accordingly  Lysander  communicated  lliis 
order  to  Pharnahazus,  within  whose  satrapy  Alkihiades  was  residincr, 
and  requested  that  it  ndght  be  put  in  execution.  Tlie  whole  charac- 
ter of  Pharnali:izus  shows  thai  he  would  not  perpetrate  such  a  deed 
toward  a  man  with  whom  he  had  contracted  ties  of  liosjutality.  with- 
out sincere  reluctance  and  great  ])ressure  from  without;  esjiecially  as 
it  would  have  been  easy  for  him  to  connive  underhand  at  the  escape 
of  the  intended  victim.  We  may  therefore  be  sure  that  it  was  Cyrus 
who,  informed  of  the  revelations  con.temj^lated  by  Alkihiades*  en- 
forced the  requisiticm  of  Lysander;  and  that  the  joint  demand  of  the 
two  was  too  fornddable  even  to  be  evaded  nnich  less  openly  dis- 
olx'ved.  Accordingly  Pharnahazus  dispatched  his  brother  Maga-us 
and  his  uncle  Sisamithres,  with  a  band  of  armed  men.  to  assassinate 
AlUii)iadcs  in  the  Phrygian  village  where  he  was  residing.  These 
nien,  not  dating  to  force  their  way  into  his  house  surrounded  it  and 
set  it  on  lire.  Yet  Alkihiades,  haVing  tried  to  extinguish  the  tlames, 
rushed  out  upon  his  assailants  w  ith  a  dagger  in  his  right-haud,  and  a 
cloak  wrapped  round  liis  left  to  serve'as  a  shield.  None  of  tljeni 
dand  to  come  near  him;  but  they  poured  upon  liim  sliowersof  darts 
and  arrows  until  he  perished,  undefended  as  he  was  either  by  shield 
or  by  armor.  A  female  companion  with  whom  lie  lived,  Tiniandni. 
wrapped  up  his  body  in  gainients  of  her  own,  and  performed  toward 
it  all  the  last  alfectionate  solemnities. 

Such  was  the  deed  which  Cyrus  and  the  Laceda>monians  did  not 
scruple  to  enjoin,  nor  the  uncle  and  brother  of  a  Persian  satrap  to 
execute;  and  by  which  this  celebrated  Athenian  perished  hifon.'  he 
had  attained  the  age  of  fifty.  Had  he  lived  we  cannot  doubt  that  he 
would  again  have  ])layed*  some  conspicuous  ]>art,  for  neither  his 
temper  nor  his  abilities  would  have  allowed  Iiim  to  remain  in  the 
sliade,  but  whether  to  the  advantage  of  Athens  or  not  is  more  ques- 
tionable. Certain  it  is,  that  taking  his  life  throughout,  the  go( d 
whicli  he  did  to  her  bore  no  proportion  to  the  far  greater  evil.  Of 
the  disastrous  Sicilian  expedition  he  was  more  the  cause  than  any 
other  individual,  thoudi  that  enterprise  cannot  properly  be  said  to 
have  been  caused  by  any  individual:  it  emanated  rather  f n  m  a 
national  impulse.  Havimr  first,  as  a  counselor,  contributed  more 
than  any  other  mnn  to  plunge  the  Athenians  into  this  imprudent 
adventure,  he  next,  as  an  exile,  contributed  nuire  than  any  other  man 
(except  Xikias)  to  turn  tiiat  adventure  into  ruin,  and  the  consequen- 
ces of  it  into  stdl  greater  ruin.  Without  him  Gvlippus  would  n(  t 
Lave  been  sent  to  Syracuse,  Dekeleia  would  not  have  been  fortified, 
Chios  and  Miletus  would  )iot  have  revolted,  the  oligarchical  con 
spiracy  of  the  Four  Hundred  would  not  have  been  originated.     Nor 


CHARACTER  OF  ALKHUADES. 


883 


..  -u        'A  n^of  i.ic  fir^t  three  vears  of  political  action  as  Athenian 

a„d  t"e  camp    J,  i         ,  ,,^. ,,  iiviiiil  an  oileiisivu  iiaiiio 

"f  '°  hJ.'  h^  1  anil  ^  ^utic  ■.«  force  -for  a  aefensive,  he  enabled 
where  he  had  ."''"'!>  „;",',>lv  to  recover  tlieir  iiiinred  repulaliou 
the  Lacedfomoniaii..  ^"l\''-,  .'''>,  °.,':^,"t'^ Victory  of  Jlanliiici'i.  The 
""'  roV^^lih.   ;  ;i  r    c  V  ceX.0  hlVoutttiy  ana  really  glorious 

r^SrSc^j'^'criS^^^^ 

face  of  this  ne\y  obstacle     V^  "''     ,  recently  greeted  him  at  Athens, 

y'S^'^:^^'^^^'^^^  ^^^^  "-'^  ^''"^'■^■''>- ""'' 

""Xm  hll  Sevemenis  we  turn  to  his  dispositions,  his  cn.ls,  and 
his  means    here    r<  few  characters  in  Grecian  history  whopreset.t  «, 

rnsJapadotaH-eU:^-^^^^^^^^ 

^,.A  tiw.  i;nnrtqn  euvovs   down  to  the  end  ot  his  caiet  .      ine  lu.i 

S     V CO  wSn-iby  hirp^olitieai  enetnies  tirst  l-o^^  ^^^^Z 

od  ..!  poluSan""  Athens,  the  generating  seed  was  «-..  by  l>.:s^o«^ 
overweening  insolence,  and  contempt  ot  reslramt»,  legal  .isx.eii 

^"o»''the  other  liand  he  was  never  once  defeated  either  by  land  or 
«e?  in  c?m."'e  "n  al  ilitv,  in  enterprise,  in  power  o  dealmg  with 
new  met?  nd  new  situations,  he  was  never  Avanl.ng;  qualitu's, 
wl  eh  com  led  with  his  high  birth,  wealth,  and  personal  accom- 

lUl  mems  s  "fflced  to  rcndevlum  for  the  tj"- "-,,'';;:f,,n;. '^e'"  .^ 
sueeessive  Dartv  which  he  espoused— Alheuian,  bp.itan  oi   rei  '"i 

-ofe  chiSd^r  democratic'al.  But  to  ".«°'?;'  „'^.'",f^  j^"  "^^M 
inspire  any  lasting  confidence;  all  s^c'^f  ^'^'"^  ^  «^  e  nac""es  fo" 
the  whole  we  shall  find  few  men  in  whom  eminent  tapac  acs  lor 
aetion  and  command  are  so  thoroughly  marred  by  au  assemblage  of 
bad  moral  qualities  as  Alkibmdes. 


384  DRAMA-lllIETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 


1  • 


GRADUAL  ENLARGEMENT  OF  TRAGEDY.   385 


CHAPTER  LXVIL 

THE  DRAMA.— RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS.— THE  SOPHISTS. 

^  Respecting  the  politicnl  history  of  Alliens  during  the  few  years 
immetli.-ite  y  succeeding  tlie  restoration  of  the  democracy,  we  have 
iintortuately  httle  or  no  information.     But  in  the  sprin"-  of  399  u  c 

fS'T^  -^l'^'"^^  '"'^^  ^"^^^^  >'^'^^*''^  ^^^^^'  ^^^^  beo-inning  of  the  archonsiiip 
ot  Eukleides,  an  event  happened  of  paramount  interest  to  the  inlcl- 
lectual  pubhc  of  Greece  as  well  as  to  i)liilosopliy  generally— the  trial  i 
condemnation,  and  execution  of  Sokrates.  Before  I  recount  th^.t 
memorable  mcident,  it  will  be  proper  to  sav  a  few  words  on  the 
Jiterary  and  philosophical  character  of  the  agj  in  wliich  it  happened 
iliough  literature  ana  pliilosophy  are  now  becominu-  separate  depart- 
ments m  Greece,  each  exercises  a  marked  influence  on  the  other-  and 
tlie  state  of  dramatic  literature  will  be  seen  to  be  one  of  the  causes 
directly  contributing  to  the  fate  of  Sc»krates. 

During  the  century  of  the  Athenian  democracy  between  Kleisthenes 
and  Lukleides,  there  had  been  produced  a  development  of  dramatic 
genius     tragic   and  comic,  never  paralleled    before   or  afterward 
^schylus,  tlie  creator  of  the  tragic  drama,  or  at  least  the  tirst  com- 
poser who   redered  it   illustrious,    had  been   a  combatant  both  at 
J\larathon  and   Salamis:    while   Fophokles  and  Euripides,    his  two 
eminent  followers  (the  former  one  of  the  geneials  of  the  Athenian 
armament  against  Samos  in  440  B.C.)  expired  loth  of  them  onlv  a 
year  before  the  battle  of  ^gospotami^ust  in  lime  to  escape  ihe 
bitter  humiliation  and  suflering  of  that  mournful  period.     Out  of  the 
once  nurnerous  compositions  of  tliese  poets  we  possess  onlv  a  few 
yet  sufficient  to  enable  us  t(»  appreciate  in  some  deirree  the  pnmdeur 
of  Athenian  tragedy;  and  when  we  learn  that  thev  were  freouentlv 
bcaten,  even  with  IIk*  liest  of  their  dramas  now  lemaining  in  fair 
competition  for  the  i)iize  against  other  poets  whose  names  only  have 
reached  us— we  seem  warranted  in  i)iesuming  that  the  best  produc- 
tions of  these  successful  competitors,  if  not  intrinsically  liner,  could 
hardly  have  been  inferior  in  merit  to  theirs. 

The  tragic  drama  belonged  essentially  to  the  festivals  in  honor  of 
the  god  Dionysus:  being  originaliv  a  chorus  sung  in  his  honor  to 
^^hlcllwere  successively  superadckd— lirst,  an  Iambic  moiioloiiue, 
next,  a  dialogue  with  two  actors,  lasllv,  a  n  oi,]ar  plot  with  three 
actors,  and  the  chorus  itself  interwoven  into  the  scene.  Its  subiecis 
were  Irom  the  beginning,  and  ahvavs  continue  d  to  be,  iM-rsons  either 
divine  or  heroic,  above  tiie  level  of  historical  life  and  borrowed  tiom 
what  was  called  the  mythical  past.  The  PersoD  of  ^^iH-hylus  indeed, 
lorms  a  splendid  exception;  l>ut  the  two  analoiious  dramas  of  his 
contemporary,  Phryuichus— the  Pheuissae  and  the  capture  of  JVlile- 


tus— were  not  successful  enough  to  invite  subsequent  tragedians  to 
meddle  with  contemporary  events.  To  three  serious  dramas  or  a 
trilogy — at  first  connected  together  by  sequence  of  subject  more  or 
less  Toose,  but  afterward  unconnected  and  on  distinct  subjects, 
through  an  innovation  introduced  by  Sophokles,  if  not  before — the 
tragic  poet  added  a  fourth  or  satyrical  drama;  the  characters  of  which 
were  satyrs,  the  companions  of  the  god  Dionysus,  and  other  heroic 
or  mythical  persons  exhibited  in  farce.  He  thus  made  up  a  total  of 
four  dramas  or  a  tetralogy,  which  he  got  up  and  brought  forward  to 
contend  for  the  prize  at  the  festival.  The  expense  of  training  the  ^• 
chorus  and  actors  was  chiefly  furnished  by  tlie  Choregi,  wealthy 
citizens,  of  whom  one  was  named  for  each  of  the  ten  tribes,  and 
whose  honor  and  vanity  were  greatly  interested  in  obtaining  the 
prize.  At  first,  these  exhibitions  took  place  on  a  temporary  stage, 
with  nothing  but  wooden  supports  andscalTolding;  but  shortly  after 
the  year  500  r.c,  on  an  occasion  when  the  poets  ^Eschylus  and 
Pratinas  were  contending  for  the  prize,  this  stage  gave  way  during 
the  ceremony,  and  lamentable  mischief  was  the  result.  After  that 
misfortune,  a  permanent  theater  of  stone  was  provided.  To  what 
extent  the  project  was  realized  before  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  we 
do  not  accurately  know;  but  after  his  destructive  occupation  of 
Athens,  the  theater,  if  any  existed  previously,  would  have  to  be 
rebuilt  or  renovated  along  with  other  injured  portions  of  the  city. 

It  was  under  that  great  development  of  the  power  of  Athens  which 
followed  the  expulsion  of  Xerxes,  that  the  theater  with  its  appurten- 
ances attained  full  magnitude  and  elaboration,  and  attic  tragedy  its 
maxium  of  excellence.  Sophokles  gained  his  first  victory  over 
^schylus  in  468  B.C.;  the  first  exhibition  of  Euripides  was  in  454 
B.C.  The  names,  though  unhappily  the  names  alone,  of  many  other 
competitors  have  reached  us.  Philokles,  who  gained  the  prize  even 
over  the  (Edipus  Tyraimus  of  Sophokles;  Euphorion.  son  of  ^schy- 
lus,  Xenokles  and  Nikomachus,  all  known  to  have  triumphed  over 
Euripides;  Neophron,  Achajus,  Ion,  Agathon,  and  many  more.  The 
continuous  stream  of  new  tragedy,  poured  out  year  after  year,  was 
something  new  in  the  histor\'  of  the  Greek  mind.  If  we  could  sup 
pose  all  the  ten  tribes  contending  for  the  prize  every  year,  there 
would  be  ten  tetralogies  (or  sets  of  four  dramas  each,  three  tragedies, 
and  one  satyrical  farce)  at  the  Dionysiac  festival,  and  as  many  at 
the  Lenaean.  So  great  a  number  as  sixty  new  tragedies  composed 
every  year,  is  not  to  be  thought  of;  yet  we  do  not  know  what  was 
the  usual  number  of  competing  tetralogies:  it  was  at  least  three — 
since  the  first,  second,  and  third  are  specified  in  the  Didaskalies  or 
Theatrical  Records — and  probably  greater  than  three.  It  was  rare 
to  repeat  the  same  drama  a  second  time,  unless  after  considerable 
alteialions,  nor  would  it  be  creditable  to  the  liberality  of  a  Choregus 
to  flocline  the  full  cost  of  getting  up  a  new  tetralogy.  Without  prc- 
teuding  to  determine  with  numerical  accuracy  how  many  dramas 

H.  G.  III.-13 


386  DRAMA-BHETORIC  AND  DIALECTIC&-SOPIIISTS. 

,„,!  in  o»cli  vpar  the  n-cncral  fact  of  uiuxnniplcd  :iln:n- 
JZl.TS^^<^n^tuXrn!^"ni-S^c  muse  is  bo...  .u.hcmic  .nd  in- 

fouml  its  uay  to  tlic  •n'»''\ '»,"',,':  '''/i,,,;id  to  have  «<.,n  .,,.,■ 
cxcepliDSeven  the  poorest,  lo  "• "'  '^  J  -;'^;;';",,.  „,o„  minuiical 
dated  30,000  persons:  1'VV'^m   ■    .     it  V  s  m  ft  c  ent Iv  capa.i.us  to 

""Tj;;ostonied,i.lut'oo  ^^'n^;s^■id;^nn 
t;rp^!rftu'^\?.te"f..tihiico.^^^^^ 

.  to  llie  theater  was  gratuitous;  l^^»t  '^  t  t  ,  '^;^;,™  ! '„„,V,,„,„  „.s 
«s  freemen  was  found  boUt  ^^^^'^^ ' '"■  '■„, !'"  ,\  ,  ,he  {xonumal 
adopted  of  askius  u  P''^f  .^^•<;"  't'L;  ;\i  f^uT;  ,e^^  ...iMd  l,v 
...eater  -»^V^\^^^^,  ^  !    ont! aV.  t'o  a  n.l.na'g.r  vl.o  e,.,a,.;a 

„a.e  in  the  -P..'SCt..a.,on  .u,d  o  >•;;'«;- -'^  ,?,,,.,,  ,  ,  „,„ 
S;:s^thatt.|^r^.K.;.e^o..hUi.^^^ 

oboli.     But  in  order  that  tlit'P""'  ,',"'■,,,:'-,„  a.ure  to  eaeh  ( itizen 

two  oboli  w^regi^-^\7,'  f^"'  ''Vr  ceve  i  on  the  o,-,asi<.n  of 
(riel.  as  )vell  as  poor  If    hey  d  o.e  to  .     u^  ^^.,,_  ^,,^,  ,^,^,^,„^  „f 

the  festival,  A  poor  man  -was  ''';•"'.  ,jvi,i,„„t  ,ost,  en  boiii 
purchasing  his  place  ,''"<U''''"=  '  '  '  ,  m  '  In^  ■  one  day  only 
'days,  it  he  chose;  or.  it  lie  P' 'rf, «;'  ,^'  er  -n  1  "p?m i  both  the  l«o  obeli 
-or  might  even  stay  ^'^-'y  ""^  ff  ^^,;''^,^^^^^^^^^^^^^   forthebeUer  seals 

l;;.?z^!r[^r'^ciJeif^:^i^-e.ot^^^^ 

b^::,  ^rC^Vt'^Vliol^r  ftut'^Li'of  .1.  ..0  .ere  at- 

fccted  by  it.  .   .        rrK^,„.;von   or  fc^tival-pav  intiodivcd  by 

Suchwas  the  original  ^^^^^^  '  \^"  .,^,V,n.r  th  Mublic  moncv,  irrad- 

Perikles  at  Athens;  a  system  of  distnbun;x   ^^^  P"^  ''^  ']l^  xhi^nivicuX 

.ally  extended  to  otl^^j^^^^-^^^^;;^:^ 

representation,  and  n\1uc1i  in  iaui  i'""-^  'i;  ,  .  „,..„,.,,  rj.,.,^^  foreuin 
„'ving  begun  at  a  thnc  ^><-;^'^:^i't^^Z^'^{ I'^L^^nt 
trilmte-and  continumg,  «ilh   ''  .','''^'"  ,,,,.•,, i,o,il  extraneous  re- 


EFFECT  OF  THE  TRAGEDIES. 


387 


of  the  civil,  establishment.  Of  the  abusive  excess  which  they  after- 
w:ird  reaclied,  however,  I  shall  speak  hereafter:  at  present  I  deal 
^•ith  the  Tlieorikon  only  in  its  primitive  function  and  effect,  of  en- 
abling all  Athenians  iudiscrimiuately  to  witness  the  representation  of 
the  tragedies. 

We  cannot  doubt  that  the  effect  of  these  compositions  upon  the 
public  sympathies,  as  well  as  upon  the  public  judgment  and  intelli- 
gence, nuist  have  been  benelicial  and  moralizing  in  a  high  degree. 
tlK)Ugh  the  subjects  and  persons  are  legendary,  the  relations  between 
then/are  all  human  and  simple— exaUed  above  the  level  of  humanity,  ^. 
only  in  such  measure  as  to  present  a  stronger  claim  to  the  hearer's 
admiration  or  pity.  So  powerful  a  body  of  poetical  iuiUience  has 
prob  Ujly  never  been  brought  to  act  upon  the  emotions  of  any  other 
popidatlou;  and  when  we  consider  the  extraordinary  beauty  of  these 
inuuortal  compositions,  which  lirst  stamped  tragedy  as  a  separate 
departmciit  of  poetry,  and  gave  to  it  a  dignity  never  since  reached, 
we  shall  be  satisiied  that  the  tastes,  the  sentiments,  and  the  intellect- 
ual standard,  of  the  Athenian  multitude,  must  have  been  seusibly 
improved  and  exalted  by  such  lessons,  The  reception  of  such  pleas- 
ures though  the  eye  and  the  ear,  as  well  as  amid  a  sympathizing 
crowd,  was  a  fact  of  no  small  importance  in  the  mental  history  of  the 
people.  It  contributed  to  exjdt  their  imagination,  like  the  grand 
editices  and  ornaments  added  during  the  same  period  to  their  acro- 
polis. Like  them  too,  and  even  more  than  they— tragedy  w\as  the 
monopoly  of  Athens;  for  while  tragic  composers  came  thither  from 
other  parts  of  Greece  (Acha^us  from  Eretria,  and  Ion.  from  Chios,  at 
a  time  when  the  Athenian  empire  comprised  both  those  places)  to 
exhibit  their  genius— nowhere  else  were  original  tragedies  composed 
and  acted,  though  hardly  any  considerable  city  was  without  a 
theater. 

The  three  great  tragedians— ^schylus,  Sophokles,  and  Euripides 
— distimruished  above  all   their    competitors,    as  wx'll   by   contem- 
poraries" as  by  subsequent  critics,  are  interesting  to  us,  not  merely 
from  the  positive  beauties  of  each,  but  also  from   the  differences 
between  them  in  handling,  style,  and  sentiment,  and  from  the  man 
ner  in  which  these  dilferences  illustrate  the  insensible  modification  o 
the  Athenian  mind.     Though  the  subjects,  persons,  and  events  o 
tragedv  always  continued  to'be  borrowed  from  the  legendary  world 
and  were  thus  kept  above  the  level  of  contemporaneous  life— yet  th 
dramatic  manner  of  handling  them  is  sensibly  modified,  even  ii 
Sophoklc'S  as  comp;ued  with  ..Eschylus— and  still  more  in  Euripides, 
by  the  atmosphere  of  democracy,  political  and  judicial  contention, 
and  philosophy,  encompassing  anil  acting  upon  the  poet. 

In  ^]';chylus,  the  idealitv  belongs  to  the  handling  no  less  than  to 
the  subjects;  the  passions  appealed  to  are  the  masculine  and  violent, 
to  the  "exclusion  of  Aphrodite  and  her  inspirations:  the  figures  are 
vast  and  majestic,  but  exhibited  only  in  half-light  and  in  shadowy 


388  DRAMA-miETOlUC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

outline:  the  speech  is  replete  with  hold  metaphor  and  ahnipt  transi- 
tions—'*2:randi1oqucnt  even  to  a  fault"  (as  Quintilian  remarks),  and 
often  approaching  nearer  to  Oriental  vagiieness  than  to  Grecian 
perspicuity.  In  Sophokles,  there  is  evidently  a  closer  approach  to 
reality  and  common  life:  the  range  of  emotions  is  more  varied,  the 
figures  arc  more  distinctly  seen,  and  I  he  action  more  fully  and  con- 
spicuously worked  out.  Not  only  we  have  a  more  elaborate  dra- 
matic structure,  hut  a  more  expanded  dialogue,  and  a  comparative 
simplicity  of  speech  like  that  of  living  Greeks:  and  we  find  too  a 
certain  admixture  of  rhetorical  declamation,  amid  the  greatest 
poetical  beauty  which  the  Greciiin  drama  ever  attained.  But  when 
we  advance  to  Euripides,  this  rhetori(?al  element  becomes  still  more 
prominent  and  developed.  The  ultra-natural  sublimity  of  the  legen- 
dary characters  disappears:  love  and  compassion  are  invoked  to  a 
degree  which  ^Eschylus  would  have  deemed  inconsistent  with  the 
dignity  of  the  heroic  person;  moreover,  there  are  appeals  to  the 
reason,  and  argumentative  controversies,  which  that  grandiloquent 
poet  would  have  despised  as  petty  and  forensic  cavils.  And,  what 
was  worse  still,  judging  from  the  ^schylean  point  of  view,  there 
was  a  certain  novelty  "of  speculation,  an  intimation  of  doubt  on 
reigning  opinions,  and  an  air  of  scientific  refinement,  often  spoiling 
the  poetical  effect. 

Such  differences  between  these  three  great  poets  are  doubtless 
referable  to  the  working  of  Athenian  politics  and  Athenian  philo- 
sophy on  the  minds  of  the  two  latter.  In  Sophokles,  we  may  trace 
the  companion  of  Herodotus — in  Euripides,  the  hearer  of  Anaxa- 
goras,  Sokrates,  and  Prodikus;  in  both,  the  familiarity  with  that 
wide-spread  popularity  of  speech,  and  real,  serious  debate  of  politi- 
cians and  competitors  before  the  dikastery,  which  both  had  ever 
before  their  eyes,  but  which  the  genius  of  Sophokles  knew  how  to 
keep  in  due  subordination  to  his  grand  poetical  purpose. 

The  transformation  of  the  tragic  muse  from  ^scLylus  to  Euri- 
pides is  the  more  deserving  of  notice,  as  it  shows  us  how  Attic  tragedy 
served  as  the  natural  prelude  and  encouragement  to  the  rhetorical 
and  dialectical  age  which  was  approaching.  But  the  democracy, 
which  thus  insensibly  modified  the  tragic  drama,  imparted  a  new 
life  and  ampler  proportions  to  the  comic;  both  the  one  and  the  other 
being  stimulated  by  the  increasing  prosperity  and  power  of  Athens 
during  the  half  century  following  480  B.C.  Not  only  was  the  aftlu- 
ence  of  strangers  and  visitors  to  Athens  continually  augmenting,  but 
we:dihy  men  were  easily  found  to  incur  the  expense  of  training  the 
chorus'  and  actors.  •  There  was  no  manner  of  employing  wealth 
Avhich  seemed  so  approprhite  to  Grecian  feeling,  or  tended  so  much 
to  procure  influence  and  popularity  to  its  possessors,  as  that  of  con- 
tributing to  enhance  the  magnificence  of  the  national  and  religious 
festivals.  This  was  the  general  sentiment  both  among  rich  and 
among  poor;  nor  is  there  any  criticism  more  unfounded  than  that 


GROWTH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  COMEDY.    389 

wiiif'h  represents  such  an  obligation  as  hard  and  oppressive  upon 
rich  men.  Most  of  them  spent  more  than  they  were  legally  com- 
pelled to  spend  in  this  way,  from  the  desire  of  exalting  their  popu- 
lar!! v.  The  only  real  sufferers  were  the  people,  considered  as 
interested  in  a  just  administration  of  law;  since  it  was  a  practice 
w  hich  enabled  many  rich  men  to  acquire  importance  who  had  no  per- 
sonal qualities  to  deserve  it,  and  which  provided  them  with  a  stock 
of  factitious  merits  to  be  pleaded  before  the  Dikastery  as  a  set-off 
airainst  substanlitive  accusations. 

^Tlu?  full  splendor  of  the  comic  IV^use  was  considerably  later  than 
than  that  of  the  tragic.  Even  down  to  460  B.C.  (about  the  time  when 
Pciikles  and  Ephialtes  introduced  their  constitutional  reforms),  there 
was  not  a  single  comic  poet  of  eminence  at  Athens;  nor  was  there 
app-n-ently  a  single  undisputed  Athenian  comedy  before  that  date, 
which  survived  to  the  times  of  the  Alexandrine  critics.  Magnes, 
Krates,  and  Kratinus — prol)ably  nho  Chionides  and  Ekphantides — 
all  helouir  to  the  period  beginning  about  (Olympiad  80,  or)  460  B.C. ; 
that  is  the  generation  preceding  Aristophanes,  wiiose  first  composi- 
tion dates  in  427  B.C.  The  condition  and  grow^th  of  attic  comedy 
before  this  period  seems  to  have  been  unknown  even  to  Aristotle,  who 
intimates  that  the  archon  did  not  begin  to  grant  a  chorus  for  comedy, 
or  to  nund)er  it  among  the  authoritative  solemnities  of  the  festival, 
until  long  after  the  practice  had  been  established  for  tragedy.  Thus 
the  comic  chorus  in  that  early  time  consisted  of  volunteers,  without 
any  choregus  ])ublicly  assigned  to  hear  the  expense  of  teaching  them 
or  getting  up  the  piece,  so  that  there  was  little  motive  for  authors  to 
bestow  care  or  genius  in  the  preparation  of  their  song,  dance,  and 
scurrilous  monody  or  dialogue.  The  exuberant  revelry  of  the 
phallic  festiv^al  and  procession,  with  full  license  of  scolfing  at  any 
one  present,  which  the  god  Dionysus  was  supposed  to  enjoy,  and 
with  the  most  plain-spoken  gro.^sness  as  well  in  language  as  in  ideas, 
formed  the  primitive  germ,  which  under  Athenian  genius  ripened 
into  the  old  comedy.  It  resembled  in  many  respects  the  satiric 
drama  of  the  tragedians,  but  was  distinguished  from  it  by  dealing 
not  merely  with  tlie  ancient  mythical  stories  and  persons,  but  chiefly 
with  contemporary  men  and  subjects  of  common  life — dealing  with 
I  them  often,  too,  under  their  real  names,  and  with  ridicule  the  most 
direct,  poignant,  and  scornful.  We  see  clearly  how  fair  a  field 
Athens  would  offer  for  this  species  of  conqiosition,  at  a  time  when 
tho  bitterness  of  political  conteniion  ran  high — when  the  city  had 
beconi(^  a  center  for  novelties  from  every  part  of  Greece — when 
tragedians,  rhetors,  and  philosophers  were  accpiiring  celebrity  and 
incurring  odium — and  when  the  democratical  constitution  laid  open 
all  the  details  of  political  and  judicial  business,  as  well  as  all  lhe«first 
me!i  of  the  state,  not  merely  to  universal  criticism,  but  also  to 
anmeasured  libel. 
Out  of  all  the  once  abundant  compositions  of  Attic  comedy, 


390  DRAMA-RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

notliiiiix  has  readied  iis  except  eleven  plays  of  Aristophanes.  Tliat 
poll  iiiuirelf  siiiirlf's  out  Magnes,  Krates,  ami  Kratimis,  anions:  pre- 
decessors uhom  he  describes  as  lunnerous,  for  honorable  mention, 
jis  having  been  freqiicnily,  tlioiiirh  not  uniformly  successful.  Krali- 
ims  appears  to  have  be  eh  not  only  the  most  copious,  but  also  the 
most  distiniiuij;hed.  ;  uionij:  all  tho.^e  who  preceded  Aristophanes;  a 
list  compri.^ing  Hermip])us,  Telekleid(!S,  and  the  other  bitter  assail- 
ants of  Perikles.  It  was  Kratinus  wholir.^t  extended  and  systematized 
the  license  of  the  phallic  festival,  and  the  "  careless  laughter  of  the 
festive  crowd,"  into  a  drama  of  regular  structure,  with  actors  three 
in  number,  according  to  the  analogy  of  tragedy.  Standing  forward, 
aiiainst  particular  i)ersous  exhibited  or  denounced  by  their  names, 
with  a  malignity  of  jiersonal  slander  not  inferior  to  the  lamhist 
Archilochus,  and  with  an  abrupt  and  dithyrambic  style  somewhat 
resembling  vEschvlus.  Krai  inns  made  an  ei)och  in  ccmedy  as  the 
h.tter  had  made  in  traL^edv,  but  was  surpassed  by  xVrislophanes  as 
much  as  ^Eschvlus  had  becu  surpassed  by  Sophokles.  We  are  lold 
that  his  compositions  were  not  only  more  rudely  bitter  and  exleii- 
sivelv  libellous  than  those  of  Aristophanes,  but  also  destitute  of  that 
richness  of  illustraticm  and  felicity  of  exiuession  which  pervades  all 
thewitof  the  latter,  whether  good-natured  (>r  malignant.  In  Kratimis. 
loo,  comedy  first  n)ade  herself  felt  as  a  substantive  agent  and  partisan 
in  the  ]>olitical  warfare  of  Athens.  He  espoused  the  cause  of  Kinion 
airainst  Perikles,  eulogizing  the  former,  while  he  bitterly  derided 
and  vituperated  the  latter.  '  Ilermii)pus.  Telekleides.  and  most  of  the 
contemporary  comic  writers  followed  the  same  political  line  in 
assailing  tlmt  ixreat  man,  together  with  those  personally  connected 
with  hiln,  Aspasia  and  Anaxagoras;  indeed  Hermippus  was  the 
person  who  indicted  Aspasia  for  impiety  before  the  Dikastery.  Ihit 
the  testimony  of  Aristojihanes  shows  that  no  comic  writer,  of  the 
time  of  Perikles,  equalled  Kratinus  either  in  vehemence  of  libel  or 

in  popularity. 

It  is  remaVkable  that  in  440  B.C.  a  law  was  passed  forbidding  connc 
authors  to  ridicule  any  citizen  by  name  in  their  compositions;  wliidi 
prohibition,  however,  was  rescinded  after  two  years;  an  interval 
marked  by  the  rare  phenomenon  of  a  lenient  comedy  from  Kratinus. 
triuch  enactment  denotes  a  struggle  in  the  Athenian  mind,  even  at 
that  lime,  airainst  the  mischief  of  making  the  Dionysiac  festival  an 
occasion  for  unmeasured  libel  against  citizens  publicly  named  ard 
prcdtablv  themselves  present.  And  there  was  another  style  of 
comedytaken  up  by  Krates— distinct  from  the  Iambic  or  Archilochian 
vein  worked  by  Kraiinus— in  which  comic  incident  was  attached  to 
fictitious  characters  and  woven  into  a  story,  without  recourse  to  real 
iiuli,vidual  names  or  direct  personality.  This  species  of  conndy 
(analogous  lo  that  which  Epicharnuis  had  before  exhibited  at  Syra- 
c\ise)  was  continued  by  Pherekrates  as  the  successor  of  Krates. 
Though  for  a  long  timeless  popular  and  successful  than  the  poignant 


ARISTOPHANES. 


891 


food  served  up  by  Kratinus  and  others,  it  became  finally  predominant 
after  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  by  the  gradual  transition  of 
wh'it  is  called  the  Old  Comedy  into  the  Middle  and  New  Comedy. 

But  it  is  in  Aristophanes  that  the  genius  of   the   old    libellous 
comedy  appears  in  its   culminating  perfection.     At  least  we  have 
before  us  eiiou"-h  of  his  works  to  enable  us  to  appreciate  his  merits; 
thoun-h  perhaps  Eupolis,   Ameipsias,   Phrynichus,   Plato  (Comicus) 
and  Sthers   who  contended  against  him  at  ihe  festivals  with  alternate 
vietorv  and  defeat,  would  be  found  to  deserve  similar  praise,  it  wc 
nossessed  their  compositions.      Never  probably  will   the  full   and 
mish'ickled  force  of  comedy  be  so  exhibited  again.     Without  having 
Aristophanes  actually  before  us,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to 
ima"-ine  the  unmeasured  and  unsparing  license  of  attack  assumecrby 
the ''old  comedy  upon   the   gods,  the    institutions,  the    polilicnms, 
philosophers,  poets,  private  citizens  specially  named— and  even  the 
women    whose  life  was  entirely  domestic— of  Athens.     VVith  this 
universal  liberty  in  respect  of  subject,  there  is  combined  a  poignancy 
of  derision  and  satire,  a  fecundity  of  imagination  and  variety  of 
turns  and  a  richness  of  poetical  expression— such  as  cannot  be  sur- 
passed and  such  as  fully  explains  the  admiration  expressed  for  him 
by  thc'philosopher  Plato,  who  in  other  respects  must  have  regarded 
hini  with  unquestionible  disapprobation.     His  comedies  are  i)opul.>.r 
in  the  lan>-est  sense  of  the  word,  addressed  to  the  entire  body  of  male 
citizens  on  a  day  consecrated  to  festivity,  and  providing  for  tlieiu 
amusement  or  derision  with  a  sort  of  drunken  abundance,  out  of  ail 
persons  oi>  things  standing  in  any  way  prominent  before  the  public 
eye      The  earliest  comedv  of  Aristophanes  was  exhibited  m  4*^<  B.C., 
and  his  Muse  continued"  for  a  long  time  prolific,  since  two  of  the 
dramas  now  remaining  belong  to  an  epoch  eleven   years  after  the 
Tliirtv  and  the  renovation  of  the  democracy— about  392  B.C.     Alter 
that  renovation,  however  (as  I  have  before  remarked),  the  unmeas- 
ured sweep  and  libellous  personality  of  the  old  comedy  was  gradually 
discontinued:  the  comic  Chorus  was  first  cut  down,  and  afterward 
suppressed   so  as  to  usher  in  what  is  commoidy  termed  the  JVliddle 
Comedy,  without  any  Chorus  at  all.     The  "  Plutus"  of  Aristophanes 
indicates  some  approach  to  this  new  phase;  but  his  earlier  and  more 
numerous  comedies    (from    the    "  Acliarneis"    m    42.J    b  c    to   tuc 
"Fro<rs"in  405  B.C.,  only  a  few  months  before  the  fatal  battle  ot 
^Ei^ospotami)  exhibit  the  continuous,  unexhausted,  untempered,  fiow 
of  the  stream  first  open«l  by  Kratinus. 

Such  abundance  both  of  traixlc  and  comic  poetry,  each  ot  first-rate 
excellence,  formed  one  of  the  marked  features  of  Athenian  lite,  and 
heeame  a  powerful  instrument  in  popularizing  new  combinations  of 
thought  with  variety  and  elegance  of  expression.  While  the  tragic 
Muse  presented  the  still  hiirher  advantage  of  inspiring  elevated  and 
benevolent  sympatlues,  more  was  probably  lost  than  gained  by  llie 
lessons  of  the  comic  Muse— not  only  bringing  out  keenly  all  that  was 


392  DKAMA-RIIETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

really  ludicrous  or  contemptible  in  the  phenomena  of  the  day,  but 
manufacliiiiug  scornful  laughter,  quite  as  often,  ojil  of  that  which 
was  innocent 'or  even  meritorious,  as  well  as  out  of  boundless  pri- 
vate slander.  The  "  Knighls"  and  the  •'Wasiis"'of  x\ristophane.s 
however,  not  to  mention  other  plays,  are  a  standing  evidence  of  one 
good  point  in  the  Athenian  character;  that  they  bore  with  good- 
natured  indulgence  the  full  outpouring  of  ridicule  and  even  of 
calumny  interwoven  with  it,  upon  tho^e  democrat ical  jnstitutioiis 
to  which  they  were  sincerely  attached.  The  democracy  was  strong 
enough  to  tolerate  unfriendly  tongues  either  in  earnest  or  in  jest;  the 
reput7itions  of  men  who  stood  conspicuously  forward  in  }M)litics,  on 
whatever  side,  miuht  also  be  considered  as  a  fair  murk  tor  attacks, 
inasmuch  as  that  measure  of  aggressive  criticism,  which  is  tutehiry 
and  indispensable,  cannot  be  permitted,  without  the  accompjinyuig 
evil,  comparatively  much  smaller,  of  excess  and  injustice;  thoiinii 
even  here  we  may  remark  that  excess  of  bitter  personality  is  among 
the  most  conspicuous  sins  of  Athenian  literature  generally.  But  the 
warfare  of  comedy,  in  the  persons  of  Aristophnnes  and  other  c(  m- 
posers,  airainst  philosophy,  literature,  and  eloquence— in  the  name  of 
those  good  old  times  of  ignorance,  *'  when  an  Athenian  se:im:iu  knew 
nothin'g  more  than  how  to  call  for  his  barley -cake,  and  cry  Yo-ho;" 
and  the  retrograde  spirit  which  induces  them  to  exhibit  moral  tur- 
pitude as  the  natural  conseiiuence  of  the  intellectual  progress  of  the 
acre— are  circumstances  going  far  to  prove  an  unfavorable  and 
de'^rading  influence  of  Comedy  on  the  Athenian  mind. 

In  refeience  to  individual  men,  and  to  Sokrates  especially  the 
Athenians  seem  to  have  been  unfavorably  biji^sed  by  the  misapplied 
wit  anil  genius  of  Aristophanes  in  ''The  Clouds,"  aided  by  other 
Comedies  of  ^Imeipsias  and  Eupolis;  but  on  the  general  march  of 
politics,  philosophv,  or  letters,  these  composers  had  little  influence. 
Nor  were  they  ever  regarded  at  Athens  in  the  light  in  which  the\  aic 
presented  to  us  by  niodern  criticism — as  men  of  exalted  morality, 
stern  patriotism,  and  genuine  discernment  of  the  true  interests  of 
their  country— as  animated  by  large  and  steady  views  of  inq)roviiig 
their  fellow-citizens,  but  compelled,  in  consc  qvience  of  prejudice  or 
opposition,  to  disiruise  a  far-sighted  political  philosophy  under  the 
veil  of  satire— as  good  judges  of  the  most  debatable  questions,  such 
as  the  prudence  of  making^war  or  peace— and  excellent  authority  lo 
guide  us  in  appreciating Ihe  merits  or  demerits  of  their  conieui- 
poraries,  insomuch  that  the  victims  of  theirHampoons  are  habitually 
set  down  as  worthless  men.  There  cannot  be  a  greater  misconcep- 
tion of  the  old  comedy  than  to  regard  it  in  this  point  oi  view ;  yet  it  is 
astonishini;  how  many  subsequent  writers  (from  Diodorus  and  Mut- 
arch  down  to  the  present  day)  have  thought  themselves  eniitkd  tw 
deduce  their  facts  of  Grecian  history,  and  their  estimate  of  Grecian 
men,  events,  and  institutions- from  the  comedies  of  Aristophanes. 
Standing  pre-eminent  us  the  latter  docs  in  comic  genius,  his  point  oi 


AVERSION  OF  SOLON  TO  THE  DRAMA. 


393 


view  is  only  so  much  the  mare  determined  by  the  ludicrous  associa- 
tions suggested  to  his  fancy,  so  that  he  thus  departs  the  more  widely 
Iroin  the  conditions  of  a  faiihiul  witness  or  candid  critic.  He  pre- 
S'lits  himself  to  provoke  the  laugh,  mirthful  or  spiteful,  of  the  festi- 
val crowd — assembled  for  thegratiflcation  of  these  emotions,  and  not 
with  any  exj^ectation  of  serious  or  reasonable  ini})ressions.  Nor  does 
he  at  all  conceal  how  much  he  is  mortified  by  failure;  like  the  pro- 
fessional jester  or  "laughter-maker"  at  the  banquets  of  rich  Athen- 
ian citizens — the  parallel  of  Aristophanes  as  to  purpose,  however 
unworthy  of  coni'parison  in  every  other  respect. 

This  rise  and  development  of  dramatic  poetry  in  Greece — so 
abundant,  so  varied,  and  so  rich  in  genius— belongs  to  the  fifth  cen- 
tury B.C.  It  had  been  in  the  preceding  century  nothing  more  than 
an  unpretending  graft  upon  the  primitive  chorus,  and  vvas  then  even 
denounced  by  Solon  (or  in  the  dictum  ascribed  to  Solon)  as  a  vicious 
novelty,  tendin<^ — by  its  simulation  of  false  character  and  by  its 
effusion  of  sentiments  not  genuine  or  sincere — to  corrupt  the  inteizrity 
of  human  dealings:  a  charge  of  corruption,  not  unlike  that  w-liich 
Aristophanes  worked  up  a  century  afterward,  in  his  "Clouds," 
against  physics,  rhetoric  and  dialectics  in  the  person  of  Sokrates. 
But  the  properties  of  the  graft  had  overpowered  and  subordinated 
those  of  the  original  stem;  so  that  dramatic  poetry  was  now  a  distinct 
form,  subject  to  laws  of  its  own,  and  shining  with  splendor  equal,  if 
not  superior,  to  the  elegiac,  choric,  lyric,  and  epic  poetry  which  con- 
stituted the  previous  stock  of  the  Grecian  world. 

Such  transformations  in  the  poetry — or,  to  speak  more  justly,  in 
the  literature,  for  before  the  year  oOO^b.c,  the  two  expressions  were 
equivalent— of  Greece,  were  at  once  products,  marks,  and  auxilia- 
ries, in  the  expansion  of  the  national  mind.  Our  minds  have  now 
become  familiar  with  dramatic  combinations,  which  have  ceased  to 
he  peculiar  to  any  special  form  or  conditions  of  political  society. 
But  if  we  compare  the  fifth  century  B.C.  with  that  which  preceded  it, 
th<.'  recently  born  drama  will  be  seen  to  have  been  a  most  important 
and  impressive  novelty;  and  so  assuredly  it  would  have  been 
regar(le<l  by  Solon,  the  largest  mind  of  his  own  age,  if  he  could  have 
risen  again  a  century  and  a  quarter  after  his  death,  to  witness  the 
Antigone  of  Sophokles,  the  Medea  of  Euripides,  or  the  Acharneis 
ot  Aristophanes. 

Its  novelty  does  not  consist  merely  in  the  high  order  of  imairination 
and  judgment  required  for  the  construction  of  a  drama  at  once 
ivgular  and  effective.  This  indeed  is  no  small  addition  to  Grecian 
pt)etical  celebrity  as  it  stood  in  the  days  of  Solon,  Alkieus,  Sappho, 
and  fetesichorus:  but  we  must  remember  that  the  epical  structure  of 
tlie  Odyssey,  so  ancient  and  long  acquired  to  the  Hellenic  world, 
lan^lies  a  reach  of  architectonic  talent  quite  equal  to  that  exhibited 
111  the  most  symmetrical  drama  of  Sophokles.  The  great  innovation 
otthe  dramatists  consisted  in  the  rhetorical,  the  diak'ctical,  and  the 


394  DRAMA-miETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

etliieal  spirit  which  they  breathed  into  tlieir  poetry.  Of  all  this,  the 
uudeveloped  cerm  doubtless  existed  in  the  previous  epic,  lyrie,  and 
gnomic  composition;  but  .the  drama  stood  distinguished  from  nil 
tliree  by  hrinu'ing  it  out  into  ei  nspieuous  amplitude,  .-ind  makinir  it 
the  substauti^N'c  means  of  ell'eet.  Instead  of  recounting  exploits 
achieved  or  sufferings  undergone  by  tlje  heroes— instead  of  i)ouriiig 
out  his  own  single-minded  impressions  in  reference  to  some  given 
event  or  juncture— tlie  tragic  poet  produces  the  mythical  persons 
themselves  to  talk,  discuss,  accuse,  defend,  confute,  lament,  threaten, 
advise,  persuade,  or  appease— among  one  another,  but  before  the 
audience.  In  the  drama  (a  singular  misnomer)  nothing  is  actually 
done:  all  is  talk,  assuming  what  is  done,  as  passing,  or  as  having 
passed,  elsewhere.  The  dramatic  poet,  speaking  continually,  but 
each  nioment  through  a  dilTerent  character,  carries  on  tlie  puiposeof 
each  of  his  characters  by  words  calculated  to  influence  the  other 
characters  and  appropriate  to  each  successive  juncture.  Here  are 
rhetorical  exigences  from  beginning  to  end;  while  since  the  whole 
interest  of  thc'^ piece  turns  upon  some  contention  or  struggle  carried 
on  by  speech— since  debate,  consultation,  and  retort,  never  cease- 
since  every  character,  good  or  evil,  temperate  or  violent,  must  be 
supplied  with  suitable  language  to  defend  his  proceedings,  to  attack 
or  repel  opponents,  and  generally  to  make  goixl  the  relative  imjior- 
tance  assiuned  to  him— here  again  dialectical  skill  in  no  small  degree 

is  indispensable.  .      ,  .     ,  .        .  .   r       ,  •  « 

Lasily  the  strength  and  variety  of  ethical  sentiment  infused  into 

the  Grecian  trauedy,  is  among  the  most  remnrkable   characteristics 

which  distinguish  it  from  the  anterior  forms  of  poetry.     "To  do  or 

suffer  terrible  things"— is  pronounced  by  Aristotle  to  l)e  its  proper 

subject  matter;  and  the  internal  mind  and  motives  of  the  doer  or 

sufferer,  on  which  the  ethical  interest  fastens,  are  laid  op(  n  by  the 

Greek  trairedians  with  an  impressive  minuteness  which  neither  the 

epic  nor  the  Ivric  could  possibly  parallel.     Moreover  the  approi>riate 

subject-matter  of  tragedv  is  pregnant  not  only  with  ethical  sympathy. 

but  also  with' ethical  debate  and  speculation.     Characters  of  mixed 

good  and  evil— distinct  rules  of  duty,  one  conflicting  with  the  other 

—wrong  done,  and  justified  to  the  conscience  of  the  doer,  if  not  to 

that  of  Ihe  spectator,  by  previous  wrong  suffered— all  these  are  the 

favorite  themes  of  .Eschylus  and  his  two  great  successors.     Klyta'ni-.» 

iiestra  kills  her  husband' Agamemnon  on  his  return  from  Troy;  her 

d(  fense  is,   that  he  had  deserved  this  treatment  at  her  hands  lor 

having  sacriticed  his  own  and  her  daughter,  Iphigeneia.     Her  son 

Orestes  kills  her,  under  a  full  conviction  of  the  duty  of  avengiiiff  his 

father,   and  even  under  the  sanction   of   A])ollo.     The   retributive 

Kumeiiides  pursue  him  for  the  deed,  and  .Eschylus  brings  all  the 

parties  before  the  court   of   Areop.igus  with  Athene  as  president; 

where  the  case,  being  fairly  argued,  with  the  Eumenides  as  ac(;user9 

and  Apollo  as  counsel  for  the  prisoners,  ends  by  an  ec^uality  of  votes 


ETHICS  IN  THE  DRxVMA. 


395 


in  the  court:  upon  which  Athene  gives  her  casting-vote  to  absolve 
Oreste"  Again— let  anv  man  note  the  conflicting  ol)ligations  which 
Sonhokles  so  forcibly  brings  in  his  beautiful  drama  of  the  Antigone. 
Kreon  directs  that  the  bodv  of  Polyneikes,  as  a  traitor  and  recent 
invader  of  the  country,  shall  remain  unburied:  Antigone,  sister  of 
Polvneikes  denounces  such  interdict  as  impious,  and  violates  it, 
under  an  overruling  persuasion  of  fraternal  duty,  kreon  iiavmg 
ordered  her  to  be  buried  alive,  his  youthful  son  Ihemon,  her  be- 
trothed lover,  is  pkuiged  into  a  heart-rending  conflict  between  abhor- 
rence of  such  cruelty'on  the  one  side,  and  submission  to  his  father  on 
the  other  Sophokles  sets  forth  both  these  contending  rules  of  duly 
in  an  elaborate  scene  of  dialogue  between  the  lather  and  the  sou 
Here  are  two  rules  both  sacred  an<l  respectable,  but  the  one  of  which, 
canuot  be  observed  without  violating  the  order.  Since  a  choice  must 
be  made  which  of  the  two  ought  a  good  man  to  obey?  Tins  is  a 
point  wiiich  the  great  poet  is  well  pleased  to  leave  undetermir.ed. 
But  if  there  be  any  among  the  audience  in  whom  the  least  impulse 
of  intellectual  speculation  is  alive,  he  will  by  no  means  leave  it  so, 
without  some  mental  effort  to  solve  the  problem,  and  to  discover 
some  grand  and  comprehensive  principle  from  whence  all  the  moral 
rulestmianate— a  principle  such  as  may  instruct  his  conscience  in  those 
cases  generallv,  of  not  un frequent  occurrence,  wherein  two  ooliga- 
tions  conflict  with  each  other.  The  tragedian  not  only  jippeals  more 
l)owerfully  tothe  ethical  sentiment  than  poetry  had  ever  d..Mie  before, 
hut  also,  by  raising  these  grave  and  touching  questions,  addresses  a 
stimulus  and  challenge  to  the  intelleet,   spurring  it  ou  to  ethical 

speculation.  ,       .  i 

Putting  all  these  points  together,  we  see  how  much  wuler  was  tlie 
intellectual  range  of  tragedy,  and  how  considerable  is  the  mental 
progress  which  it  betokens,  as  compared  with  the  lyric  and  gnomic 
poetrv,  or  with  the  Seven  AVise  Men  and  their  authoritative  aphor- 
isms—which formed  the  glory,  and  marked  the  limit,  of  the  precetl- 
ino-  eentury.  In  ]>lace  of'unexpanded  results,  or  the  mere  communi- 
cation of  single-minded  sentiment,  we  have  even  in  ..Eschylus,  the 
earliest  of  the  great  tragedians,  u  large  latitude  of  dissent  and  debate 
—a  shifting  point  of  View— a  case  better  or  worse,  made  out  lor 
distinct  and  contending  parties-and  a  divination  of  the  future 
advent  of  sovereign  and  instructed  reason.  It  was  through  the 
intermediate  stage  of  tragedy  that  Grecian  literature  passed  into  the 
Khetoric,  Dialectics,  and  Ethical  speculation,  which  marked  the  tilth 
century  B.C. 

Other  simultaneous  causes,  arising  directly  out  of  the  business  of 
real  life,  contributed  to  the  generation  of  these  same  capacities  and 
studies.  The  fifth  century  B.C.  is  the  first  century  of  democracy,  at 
Athens,  in  Sicily,  and  elsewhere:  moreover, at  tnat  period,  beginning 
from  the  Ionic  revolt  and  the  Persian  invasion  of  Greece,  the  poht- 
ical  relation's  between  one  Grecian  city  and  another  became  more 


396  DRAMA— RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS- SOPHISTS. 


EMPEDOKLES  OF  AGllIGENTUM. 


397 


complicated,  as  well  as  more  continuous;  requiring  a  JTreater  measure 
of  talent  in  the  public  men  who  managed  them.  Without  aonm 
power  of  persuading  or  confuting— of  deleucling  himself  against  ac- 
cusation, or  in  case  of  need,  accusing  otiiers — no  man  could  possibly 
hold  an  ascendant  position.  He  had  proi)al)ly  not  less  need  of  this 
talent  for  private,  informal,  conversations  to  satisfy  his  own  polit- 
ical partisans,  than  for  addressing  the  public  assembly  formally 
convoked.  Even  as  commanding  "Im  army  or  a  fleet,  without  any 
laws  of  war  or  habits  of  professional  <liscipline,  his  power  of  keeping 
up  the  good  huniour,  coulidcnce,  and  prompt  obedience  of  his  iren, 
depended  not  a  little  on  his  conunand  of  speech.  Nor  was  it  only  to 
the  leaders  in  political  life  that  such  an  accomplishment  was  indis- 
pensable. In  all  the  democracies — and  j)r()bably  in  several  govern- 
ments which  were  not  democracies  but  oligarchies  of  an  open 
character— the  courts  of  justice  were  more  or  less  numerous,  and  the 
procedure  oral  and  public:  in  Athens  especially,  the  Dikasierics 
(whose  constitution  has  been  explained  in  a  former  chapter)  were 
both  very  numerous,  and  paid  f(ir  attendance.  Every  citizen  had  to 
^o  befo.e  them  in  person,  without  Ix^'ng  able  to  j-end  a  paid  advocate 
m  his  place,  if  he  either  required  redress  for  wrong  offered  to  him- 
self, or  was  accused  of  Avrong  oy  another.  There  was  no  man  there- 
fore who  might  not  he  cast  or  condemned,  or  fail  in  his  own  suit. 
even  with  the  right  on  his  side — unless  he  possessed  some  powers  of 
speech  to  unfold  his  case  to  the  Dikasts,  as  well  as  to  cr)nfute  the 
falsehoods,  and  disentangle  the  sophistry,  of  an  opponent.  More- 
over—to any  man  of  known  family  and  sfation,  it  would  be  a  humil- 
iation hardly  less  painful  than  the  loss  of  the  cause,  when  standing 
before  the  Dikastery  with  friends  and  enemies  around  him,  to  find 
himself  unable  to  carry  on  the  thread  of  a  tliscourse  without  halting 
or  confusion.  To  meet  such  liabilities,  from  which  no  citizen,  rich 
or  poor,  was  exempt,  a  certain  tiaining  in  speech  became  not  less 
essential  than  a  certain  training  in  arms.  Without  the  latter,  he 
coidd  not  do  his  duty  as  an  hoplite  in  the  ranks  for  the  defense  of 
his  country:  without  the  former,  he  could  not  escape  danger  to  his 
fortune  or  honor,  and  humiliation  in  the  eyes  of  his  friends,  if  called 
ht'fore  a  Dikastery:  nor  c(»uld  he  lend  assistance  to  any  of  those 
friends  who  might  1x3  placed  under  the  like  necessity. 

Here  then  were  ample  motives,  arising  out  of  practical  pnidence 
not  less  than  from  the  stimulus  of  ambilion,  to  cultivate  the  power 
of  both  continuous  harangue,  and  of  concise  argumentation,  or  inter- 
rogation and  reply:  motives  for  all,  to  acquire  a  certain  moderate 
aptitude  in  the  use  of  these  weapons— for  the  ambitious  few,  to 
devote  much  labor  and  to  shine  as  accomplished  orators. 

Such  political  and  social  motives,  it  is  to  be  remendK'red,  though 
acting  very  forcibly  at  Athens,  were  by  no  means  peculiar  to  Athens, 
but  prevaileil  more  or  less  throughout  a  large  portion  of  the  Grecian 
cities,  especially  in  Sicily,  when  dl  the  Governments  became  popu- 


larized after  the  overthrow  of  tlie  Golonian  dynasty.  And  it  was  in 
Sicilvand  Italy,  that  the  first  individuals  arose,  who  acciuired  perma- 
nent'name  both  in  Rlietoric  and  Dialectics;  Empedokles  of  Agrigen- 
tuni  in  the  former— Zeuo  of  Elea(in  Italy)  in  the  latter. 

But  these  distinguished  men  bore  a  conspicuou^s  part  in  politics, 
and  both  on  the  popular  side;  Empedokles  ag.iinstan  oligarchy,  Zeno 
a-'-ainst  a  despot.  But  both  also  were  yet  more  distinguished  as  philos- 
ophers- and  the  dialectical  impulse  in  Zeno,  if  not  the  rhetoric- 
al impulse  in  Empedokles,  came  more  from  his  philosophy 
than  from  his  politics.  Empedokles  (about  470-440  B.C.)  ap- 
pears to  have  held  intercourse  at  least,  if  not  partial  com- 
munion of  doctrine,  with  the  dispersed  philosophers  of  the  Pytha- 
gorean league;  the  violent  subversion  of  which,  at  Kroton  and  else- 
where, I  have  related  in  a  previous  chapter.  He  constructed  a  sys- 
tem of  physics  and  cosmogony,  distinguished  for  first  broaching  the 
doctrine  of  the  Four  elements,  and  set  forth  in  a  poem  composed  by 
himself:  besides  Avhich  he  seems  to  have  had  much  of  the  mj^stical 
tone  and  miraculous  pretensions  of  Pythagoras;  professing  not  only 
to  cure  pestilence  and  other  distempers,  but  to  teach  how  old  age 
might  be  averted  and  the  dead  raiseil  from  Hades- to  prophesy— and 
to  "raise  and  calm  the  winds  at  his  pleasure.  Gorgias,  his  pupil, 
deposed  that  he  had  been  present  at  the  magical  ceremonies  of  Empe- 
dokles. The  impressive  character  of  his  poem  is  sufficiently  attested 
by  the  admiration  of  Lucretius,  and  the  rhetoric  ascribed  to  him  may 
have  consisted  mtunly  in  oral  teaching  or  exposition  of  the  same  doc- 
trines. Tisias  and  Korax  of  Syracuse,  who  are  also  mentioned  as  the 
first  teachers  of  rhetoric— and  the  first  who  made  known  any  pre- 
cepts about  the  rhetorical  practice— were  his  contemporaries;  whde 
the  celebrated  Gorgias  was  his  pupil. 

The  dialectical  movement  emanated  at  the  same  time  from  the 
Eleatic  school  of  philosophers— Zeno,  and  his  contemporary  the 
Samian  Melissus  (460-40)— if  not  from  their  common  teacher  Psir- 
menides.  Melissus  also,  as  well  as  Zeno  and  Empedokles,  was  a  dis- 
tinn-uished  citizen  as  well  as  a  philosopher:  having  been  in  command 
of  the  Samian  fleet  at  the  time  of  the  revolt  from  Athens,  and  havmg 
in  that  capacity  gained  a  victory  over  the  Athenians. 

All  the  philosophers  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.,  prior  to  Sokrates 
inheriting  from  their  earliest  poetical  predecessors  the  vast  and 
unmeasured  problems  which  had  once  been  solved  by  the  supposition 
of  divine  or  superhuman  agents,  contemplated  the  world,  physical 
and  moral,  all  in  a  mass,  and  applied  their  minds  to  find  some  h.ypo- 
thesis  which  would  give  explanation  of  this  totality,  or  at  least 
appease  curiosity  by  something  wiiicli  looked  like  an  explanation. 
AVhat  were  the  elements  out  of  which  sensible  things  were  made? 
What  was  the  initial  cause  or  principle  of  those  changes  which 
appeared  to  our  senses?  What  was  change?— was  it  generation  or 
something  integrally  new  and  destruction  of  something  pre  existent— 


398  DRAMA-RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPHISTS. 

or  was  it  a  decomposition  and  rccombinntion  of  olemcnts  still  f  on- 
tinuin"-^  The  theories  of  the  various  Ionic  philosophers  and  of 
Empedokles  after  them,  admitting  one,  two,  or  four  elementar}'  sub- 
stances, with  Friendship  and  Enmity  lo  serve  as  causes  of  motion  or 
change— the  Homttomeries  of  Anaxagoras,  with  Nous  or  Intelligence 
as  the  stirring  and  regularizing  agent— the  atcmsand  void  of  Leukip- 
pus  and  Dem^okritus— all  these  were  different  hypotheses  answering 
to  a  similar  vein  of  thouirht.  All  of  them,  though  assuming  that  the 
sensible  appearances  of  things  were  delusive  and  perplexing,  never- 
theless were  borrowed  more  or  less  directly  from  some  of  these 
appearances,  which  were  employed  to  explain  and  ilhistrate  the  whole 
theorv,  and  served  to  render  it  plausible  wlicn  stated  fis  well  as  to 
defend  it  ai^-ainst  attack.  But  the  philoso])hers  of  the  Khatic  school 
— tir^t  Xenophanes.  and  after  him  Panuenidcs— t(u  k  a  distinct  path 
of  their  own.  To  find  that  which  was  real,  and  which  lay  as  it  were 
concealed  behind  or  under  the  delusive  plw  nomena  of  sense,  they 
had  recourse  only  to  mental  abstracti(ms.  Tluy  supposed  a  Substance 
or  Something  not  perceivable  bv  sense,  but  (uily  cogitable  or  conceiv- 
able by  reason;  a  One  and  All,  continuous  and  finite,  which  was  not 
onlv  real  and  self-existent,  but  was  the  only  reality— eternal,  immov- 
able and  unchausjeable,  and  the  onlv  matter  knowable.  The  phe- 
nomena  of  sense.'which  bcL-an  and  ended  one  after  the  other  (they 
thouo-ht),  were  essentially  delusive,  uncertain,  contradictory  among 
thenSelves,  and  open  to  endless  diversity  of  opinion.  Upon  these, 
.nevertheless,  they  announced  an  opinion;  adopting  two  elements- 
heat  and  cold— or  light  and  darkness.   .  ,    »  „   . 

Parmeiiides  set  forth  this  doctrine  of  the  One  and  All  in  a  poem 
of  which  but  a  few  fragments  now  remain,  so  that  we  understand 
very  imperfectly  the  positive  arguments  employed  to  recommend  it. 
The  matter  of  truth  and  knowledge,  such  as  he  alone  admitted,  Avas 
altc'-ether  removed  from  the  senses  and  divested  of  sensible  proper- 
ties ""so  as  to  be  conceived  onlv  as  an  Ens  Rationis,  and  described  and 
di'^cussed  onlv  in  the  most  aeneral  words  of  tlie  language.  The  expo- 
sition given  by  Parmenides  in  his  poem,  though  complimented  by 
Plato,  was  vehemcntlv  controverted  by  others,  who  deduced  from  it 
manv  contradictions  and  absurdities.  As  a  part  of  his  reply— and 
doubtless  the  stromrest  part— Parmenides  retorted  upon  his  adver- 
saries; an  example  followed  by  his  pupil  Zeno  with  still  greater  acute- 
ness  and  success.  Those  who  controverted  his  ontological  theory— 
that  the  real,  ultra-phenomenal,  substance,  was  One— affirmed  it  to  be 
not  One,  but  Many;  divisible,  movable,  changeable,  etc.  Zeno 
attacked  this  latter  theorv,  and  proved  that  it  led  to  contradictions 
and  absurdities  still  greater  than  those  involved  in  the  proposition  ot 
Parmenides.  He  impugned  the  testimony  of  sense,  affirming  that  it 
furnished  premises  for  conclusions  whicli  contradicted  each  otlier, 
and  that  it  was  unworthy  of  trust.  Parmenides  had  denied  that  there 
was  any  such  thing  as  real  change  either  of  place  or  color;  Zeno  mam- 


ZENO  AT  ATHENS. 


899 


tained  change  of  place  or  motion,  to  be  impossible  and  self-contiadic- 
or      prop()umling  many  logical  difffculties,  derived  from  the  mtu.ite 

vi'iimity  of  matter,  against  some  of  the  most  obvious  atflrmations 

e  S- sen  phenomena.     Melissus  appears  to  have  argued  in 

X  vein  s  inilar  to  that  of  Zeno,  though  with  much  less  acu teness; 

5.'no^istniing  indirectly  the  doctrine  of  Parmenides  by  deducing 

imnossible  inferences  from  the  contrary  hypothesis.  ,        .,    ^ 

S  l^^iblished  a  treatise  to  maintain  the  thesis  above  described, 
^.hich  he  also  upheld  by  personal  conversations  and  discussions,  in  a 
nnni^^  d  uSs  far  more  efficacious  than  his  writing;  the  oral 
aSio-  of  these  early  philosophers  being  their  really  impressive 
m  miW  His  subtle  dialectic  arguments  were  not  only  suth- 

den   to  occupy  all  the  philosophers  of  antiquity,  in  confuting  tlieni 
m(  re  or  kss^^^^  l)ut  have  even  descended  to  modern  times 

a  fire  m  t  j^t  extingJi^hed.  The  great  effect  produced  among  the 
soeculative  minds  of  Greece  by  his  writing  and  conversation,  is 
aKed  both  by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  He  visited  Athens,  8«tve  ins  ruc- 
U< m  0  some  eininent  Athenians,  for  high  pay-and  is  said  to  have 
cmve^-sed  both  with  Perikles  and  with  Sokrates  at  a  time  when  the 
i..if<.i-  vvK  verv  voun<^-  orobablv  between  4oO-4U  n.c. 
'•'h  s  ;  .ea,  .ie  coTntkutes  a  "remarkable  era  iu  Grecian  philosophy 
bo"u=.e  1  e  first  brought  out  the  extraordinary  aggressive  or  negaUve 
forec  of  the  dialectic  nietbod.  In  this  discussion  respecting  the  One 
ami  t  e  Matn-,  positive  groutids  on  either  side  jvere  a  ike  scanty; 
e  eh  party  had  o  set  forth  the  contradictions  deducible  from  the 
op,  S  hypotlK-sis,  and  Zeno  professed  to  show  that  those  of  is 
op  'ments  were  the'more  flagrant.  We  tlms  see  t"f.-''pS  ;;•'«' "'« 
inetho.ii7ed  Question  and  answer,  or  dialectic   method     emplojtd 

ro  eiicefo^r^rdmoie  and  more  in  philosophical  nqn.ries-co.nes 
out  at  tl  e  same  time  the  i.esative  tendency,  tlie  probing,  estm-  and 
s     1  ii    iniTforce-of  Grecian  spec.lation.     The  neg^U™  «de  of 

Grecian  speculation  stands  quite  ,.s  P™""»'>"*l>V'^^wi,no  Inter 
pies  as  larse  a  measure  of  the  iutellectual  force  of  llieir  pi  ilo.ophe  s, 
Til  e  posUive  side.     It  is  not  simply  to  arrive,  at  a  ^onc  usion,  st^s- 
tained  bv  a  certain  measure  of  plausible  premise— and  then  to  pro- 
chUm  iti; \m  authoritative  dogma,  silencing  OJ^'  ^^'f  »f„f '„,'^,'^; 
icctors— that  Grecian   speculation   aspires.      To  unmask  not  onij 
iosU  ve  ft  sehood,  but  even  affirmation  without  evidence,  exa-erated 
Sdc'nce  in  what  was  only  doubtful,  and  show  of  knowhjdge  witl  - 
out  the  reality-to  look  at  a  probU.m  on  all  sides,  and  set  fortl    all 
the  difficulties  attending  its  solution-to  take  account  of  dcducUons 
from  the  affirmative  evidence,  even  in  the  case  of  coueh.sions  accep  e 
a-;  true  upon  the  balance— all  this  will  be  found  pervading  the  maicli 
0         rg'reatest  thinkers.     As  a  condition  of  all  W<^^^-^P^i;^: 
phv  it  iS  not  less  essential  that  the  grounds  of  negation  sliuukl  b. 
Freely  exposed,  than  the  grounds  of  affirmation.     We  ff  '>"d    ^o 
two  going  hand  in  hand,  and  the  negative  vein  indeed  the  moie  im- 


^?3jP=i»3=fg:f*'sgp 


400  DRAMA— RTIETORK.'  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPHISTS. 

pressive  and  characteristic  of  tlie  two.  from  Zcno  downward  in  our 
history.  In  one  of  tlic  earliest  memoruiida  illustrative  of  Grecian  dia- 
lectics— the  sentences  wherein  Plato  rejiresetits  Parnieuidesand  Zeno 
as  bequeathing  their  mantle  to  the  youtliful  Sokrates.  ;uid  giviiii^^  him 
precepts  for  successfully  prost'culing  those  researches  which  his 
marked  inquisitive  impulse  promised — this  large  and  comprehensive 
point  of  view  is  emphatically  inculcated.  He  is  admonished  to  set 
before  him  both  sides  of  every  liypolhesis,  and  to  follow  out  both  the 
negative  and  the  allirmutive  chains  of  argument  with  equal  perse- 
verance and  equal  freedom  of  scrutiny;  neitlier  daunted  by  the  ad- 
verse opinions  around  him,  nor  deterred  by  sneers  against  wasting 
time  in  fruitless  talk;  since  the  mullitu<le  are  ignorant  that  without 
thus  traveling  round  all  sides  of  a  question,  no^assured  comprehen- 
sion of  the  truth  is  attainable. 

We  thus  find  ourselves,  from  the  yejir  4i)0  B.C.  downward,  in  pre- 
sence of  two  important  classes  of  men  in  Greece,  unknown  to  Solon 
or  even  to  Kleisthenes— the  Khetoridjii.s,  and  the  Dialecticians;  for 
whom  (as  has  been  shown)  the  ground  had  been  gradually  prepared 
by  the  politics,  the  poetry,  and  the  speculation,  of  the  preceding 
period. 

Both  these  two  novelties — like  the  poetry  and  other  accomplish- 
ments of  this  memorable  race— grew  npfiom  rude  indigenous  begin- 
nings, under  native  stimulus  nnl)(  rr(i^\cd  and  unassisted  from  with- 
out. The  rhetorical  teaching  was  an  aittmpl  to  assist  and  in.prcne 
men  in  the  power  of  continuous  sptech  as  addressed  to  asscmbkd 
numbers,  such  as  the  public  assembly  or  the  dikastery;  it  was  there- 
fore a  species  of  training  .-ought  for  by  n;en  of  active  pursuits  and 
ambition,  either  that  they  mitiht  succeed  in  public  life,  or  that  Ihev 
might  maintain  their  rights  and  dignity  if  called  before  the  C(  urt  ('f 
justice.  On  the  other  hand,  the  dialectic  business  Lad  no  direct 
reference  to  public  life,  to  the  judicial  pleading,  or  to  any  as-scmblcd 
large  number.  It  Avas  a  dialogue  cairicd  on  by  two  dii-j  utants,  usu- 
ally before  a  few  hearers,  to  unravel  fon:e  clscurity,  to  reduce  the 
respondent  to  silence  and  contiadiction,  to  exercise  l)olh  parties  in 
mastery  of  thcj  subject,  cr  to  sift  the  consequences  of  some  problem- 
atical assumption.  It  was  spontanc  ous  conversation  systematize d  and 
turned  into  some  predetermined  channel;  furnishing  a  stimulus  to 
thought,  and  a  means  of  improvment  not  attainable  in  any  other  man- 
ner—furnishing to  some  also  a  source  of  profit  or  display.  It  ojiened 
aline  of  serious  intellectual  pursuit  to  men  of  a  specula) ive or  inquisi- 
tive turn,  who  were  deficient  in  voice,  in  boldness,  in  continuous 
memory,  for  public  speaking;  or  who  desired  to  keep  themselves 
apart  from  the  political  and  judicial  animosities  of  the  mc  ment. 

Although  there  were  numerous  Athenians,  who  ce  lubined,  in  vari- 
ous proportions,  speculative  with  practical  study,  yet,  generally 
speaking,  the  two  veins  of  intellectual  n^ovcment— one  toward  ac- 
tive public  business,  the  other  towaid  enlarged  opinions  and  greater 


EDUCATION  AT  ATHENS. 


401 


rommand  of  specuhitive  truth,  with  its  evidences— continued  suuul- 
?reous  and  separate.     There  subsisted  betwcum   them  a  standing 
n   cmical  c()ntriversy  an,l  a  spirit  of  mutu.l  detraction      If  Plate 
Tn^t'd  the  sophist's  and  the  rhetors,  Isokrate;s   hinks  himself  not 
less  entitle.l  to  dispara-e  thos<.  who  employed  their  time  in  debating 
mon  the  unity  or  plurality  of  virtue.     Even  anion-  elifterent  teachers, 
f  he  same  intelleictual  Walk,  also,  there  prevailed  but  too  often  an 
acrimonious  feeling  of  personal  rivalry,  which  laid  them  all  so  much 
?he  more  open  to  alsault  from  the  common  enemy  of  all  mental  pro- 
.  ess-a  feeling  of  iealous  ig.iorance,  stationary  or  wistfully  retro- 
snective  of  no  mean  force  at  Athens,  as  m  every  other  socie  y,  and 
0?  c-ours'e  blended  at  Athens  with  the  indigenous  deme)cratical  senti- 
ment     This  latter  sentiment  of  antipathy  to  nevy  ideas,  and  new 
me    al  accomplishments,  has  been  nised  into  factitious  importance 
by  the  comic  genius  of  Aristophanes-whose  point  of  view  modern 
aut  en-shave  too  often  accepted;  thus  alloAymg  some  of  the  Nvorst 
fcelin-s  of  Grecian  antiquity  to  intluence  their  manner  of  conceiving 
he  fa?ts     Moreover,  they  have  rareU  made  any  allowance  tor  that 
f?ce  of  literary  and  philosphical  antipathy.  whici>  vvas  no  less  real 
aXconstant  at  Athens  than  the  political;  and  which  naade  the  d  t- 
tout  literary  classes  or  individuals  perpetually  unjust  one  toward 
anot  er     It  was  the  blessing  and  the  glory  of  Athens,  t  jat  every 
miu  could  speak  out  his  sentiments  and  his  criticisms  with  a  fre^- 
S  paralleled  in  the  ancient  world,  and  hardly  paralleled  even  in 
rmoX     in  which  a  vast  body  of  desc^ent  both  s,  and  a  ways  has 
bee.rc(3ndemned  to  absolute  silence.     But  this  known  latitude  of 
censure  ou-ht  to  have  imposed  on  modern  authors  a  pereinptory 
necessity  ofliot  accepting  implicitly  the  censure  of  any  one,  where  the 
mr'y  inculpated  has  leff  no  defense;  at  the  very  least,  of  construing 
U  e  censure  strictly,  and  allowing  for  the  point  of  view  f^^^i  which 
it  i3roce^eds       From  inattention   to   this   necessity,   almost  all    the 
thino-s  andpersemsof  Grecian  history  are  presemted  to  us  on  then-  bad 
sle    the  libels  of  Aristophanes,  the  sneers  of  Plato  and  Xenophon. 
even      e  interested  geneValities  of  a  plaintiff  or  defendant  before  the 
I)ikastery-are  received  with  little  cross-examination  as  authentic 

materials  for  history.  ,      ,  .  *•        f  ^*  «or,.i/^v  u  ia 

If  ever  there  was  need  to  invoke  this  rare  sentiment  c^f  candoi   it  is 

when  we  come  to  discuss  the  history  of  the  persons  ^^^/.^^^;,^«i;l\'^^^; 
who  now  for  the  first  time  appear  as  of  note;  the  practical  te:.'  heis 
of  Athens  and  of  Greece,  misconceived  as  well  as  misesteemed. 


The  primitive  education  at  Athens  consisted  e,f  two  branches ;  p  m- 
lastics  for  the  body-music,  for  the  mind.  The  ^^'^V^'.^"^ 
,0  be  udcred  acccrding  to  the  limited  signiticntion  which  it  now 
,u   UK.  juuj5V.11  t»v.vv.         s     w.„;.^„;,irr  owrvtliinnr  miner  am- 


nasties,  for  the  body— music,  lor  ine."w"^';  -'-  ;;  '''\r;'^:^::\^^}. 
to  be  udcred  acccrding  to  the  limited  signiticntion  which  it  now 
hears  ^  It  comprehende^l  from  the  beginning  everything^  ^^''^"^ 
iiig  to  the  province  of  the  Nine  Muses-not  merely  lejirning  the  use 
of  the  lyre  or  how  to  bear  part  in  a  chorus,  but  also  the  lieanng, 
karnhig  and  repeating  of  poetical  compositions,  as  well  as  the  prac- 


402  DRAMA— RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPHISTS. 

tice  of  exact  and  elcpniit  pioriirciatior — -wliidj  latter  aeecinplisli- 
ment,  in  a  language  like  the  Gnek.  ^vilb  long  \\()i(ls,  measured  sylla- 
l)les,  and  great  diversity  of  adtntiiation  between  one  word  and  an- 
ollier,  must  liave  l.e(  n  "far  more  diflienlt  to  aequire  than  it  is  in  jiny 
modein  European  languj:ge.  As  the  range  of  ideas  enlarged,  so  the 
Avords7;<i/.v<c  and  musical  Uaeheis  jicquired  an  expanded  meaning,  k) 
as  to  comprehend  matter  of  iustrmtion  at  once  ampler  and  more 
diversified.  During  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.  at  Athens, 
there  came  thus  to  he  f<.und,  among  the  nu:sieal  teachers,  mien  of 
the  most  distinguished  abilities ar.d  cniineiue;  m;istersof  allth.e  learn- 
ing and  accomplishments  (f  the  age,  ttadiing  what  was  known  of 
astronomy,  geography,  and  ]  lysics,  and  capable  of  holding  dialecti- 
cal discussions  with  their  j  n}>ils,  U])(  n  all  the  various  piobkms  then 
afloat  among  intellectual  men.  Of  this  charncler  were  L;  mprus, 
Agathokics,"Pythokleides,  Dan;on,  etc.  The  two  latter  were  instruc- 
tors ofPerikh's;  ;  iid  D:!mon  was  e\en  rendered  so  v.ni'.oi)ular  at 
Athens,  partly  by  his  laige  and  fiee  >pe(ulations,  partly  thr(>ugh  the 
]  olitical  enemies  of  his'gieat  prpil,  ihat  he  was  ostracized,  or  at 
least  sentenced  to  banisl.'nu  nt.  tiuh  nun  were  ccmpctent  ((mj  an- 
ions for  Anaxagoras  {.rid  ZeriO,  J  rd  ( n  ployed  in  ]ait  on  the  >anie 
studies;  the  tiei«l  of  acquiitd  knowledge  beuig  not  then  hirge  eriOUgh 
to  be  divided  into  separate,  exclusive  cempartments.  AVhile  Euri- 
]>ides  frequented  the  ct.mpany.  and  {Kqiainted  hims-elf  with  the 
opinions  of  Annxagoras — Ion  of  (  bios  (his  rival  as  a  tragic  poet.' as 
well  as  the  friend  of  Kimon)  bestowed  so  nuieh  thought  upon  physi- 
cal subjects  :.s  then  conceived,  that  he,  set  up  a  theory  of  his  own, 
propounding  the  doctrine  of  three  elements  in  nature— air,  fire,  and 
earth. 

Now  such  musical  teachers  as  Damon  and  the  others  above-men- 
tioned,  were  Sophists,  not  merely  in  tlie  natural  and  proper  Greek 
fiense  of  Ihat  word,  but,  to  a  certain  extent,  even  in  the  special  and 
restricted  meaninu:  which  Plato  afterward  thought  proper  to  confer 
upon  it.  A  Sophist,  in  tlie  genuine  sense  of  the  word,  was  a  wise 
man— a  clever  man— one  who  stood  ]irominently  before  the  public  as 
distiniruished  for  intellect  or  talent  of  some  kind.  Thus  Solon  and 
PvthaVovas  are  both  called  Sophists;  Thamyras  the  skillful  bard  is 
called  a  Sophist:  Socrates  is  so  denominated,  not  merely  by  Aristo- 
]. bancs,  but  by  .^schines:  Aristotle  himself  calls  Aristippus,  and 
Xenophon  calls  Antisthenes,  both  of  them  disciples  of  Sokrales,  by 
that  name;  Xenophon,  in  describing  a  collection  of  instructive  books, 
calls  them  "  the  writings  of  the  old  poets  and  Sophists,"  meaning  by 
the  latter  word  prose  writers  generally:  Plato  is  alluded  toasaSoi)h- 
ist,  even  bv  Isokrates:  ^Eschines  (the  discii)le  of  Sokrates,  not  the 
orator)  was\so  denominated  by  his  contemporary  Lysias:  Isokrates 
himsdf  was  harshlv  criticised  as  a  Sophist,  and  defends  both  himself 
and  his  profession:*  lastly,  Timon  (the  friend  and  admirer  of  Pyrrho, 
about  o00-2S0  b.c).  who  bitterly  satirized  all  the  phdosophers,  desig- 


THE  NAME  SOPHIST. 


403 


f..l  ihom  all  includinn;  Phito  and  Aristotle,  by  the  general  name 
''?  ^iS  in  this  1  a^e  and  compr'ehensive  sense  the  word  was 
of  Sophists.     -}^  \"\^    ''  -J      continued  to  be  so  understood  among  the 

^   veil  •  s  me  n    <     to  his  purpose  in  addressing  them. 

\  '  /w^    n^^^^^^^^  succeeding  450  iix.)  the  rhetorical  and 

,n^  ;^Ue;u;h^:^  l^ni^^o  s^md  before  the  Vnl^l^J^^}^^^ 

tat t^tshnmu^d  the  relajiou  bet«-eeu  J^"-;^!  .f ^^.P'^^,,*^.      ; 
l,i.'wo™  two  lovers  or  two  intimate  frietids   «lucl>  w,is  i"""  "■;'"J^ 

d UirnlTrobbca  of  its  cl.arm  and  '-f 'j^^f ''y' ^^^'^^He™  So    X 

-iM  1  Plito-  who  therefore  considered  the  name  bopiui,  ocmmu^ 
i  Ue^uai  M^  combined  witb  au  odious  assocrat. on  as  fMe 
cminenllv  suitable  to  tlie  leading  leaehers  for  pa}.  M'''  ''Pi.'s '  ,„ 
t"  us  he  lasting  iuflueuee,  and  the  re  terated  Pof';"".^^'"'./  ^'^• 
[.av'  siamped  it  upon  the  men  against  {^''I'^V^tn.'a  ion-  thou  i  t  s 
their  recoguiml,  legitimate,  and  peeiUnir  ''<;^,'^",'i'"'":.,'_''?"=.\vt,u-- 
cctain,  tlmlif,  in  the  middle  of  the  V';^'>V"'^^^2^JZsty^" 

nian  had  been  asked-"  Who  are  the  1>"";=;P*  ^^  P''^"LXderwa3 
-he  would  have  uamed  Sokrales  amoug  lh<-,  Uist,  foi  bokr.ilti.  was 


404  DRAMxV— RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

at  once  eminent  as  an  intellectual  teacher,  and  pcrsonallv  unpopnlnr 
—not  because  he  received  pay,  but  on  other  grounds  which  will  i)(3 
hereafter  noticed:  and  this  was  the  precise  combination  of  qualities 
winch  tlie  general  public  naturally  expressed  by  a  Sophist.     More- 
over, Plato  not  only  stole  the  name  out  of  general  circulation  in  order 
to  fasten  it  specially  upon  his  opponents  the  paid  teachers   but  jd^o 
connected  with  it  express  discreditable  attributes,  which  foimed  no 
part  of  its  primitive  and  recognized  meaning,  and  were  alto^^ellier 
distinct  from,  though  grafted  upon,  the  vairue  sentiment  of  dislike 
associated  with  it.     Aristotle,  following  the^'xample  of  his  master 
gave  to  the  word  Sojvhist  a  definition  substantially  the  same  as  that 
which  it  bears  in  the  modern  languages— "an  impostrous  pretender 
to  knowledge,  a  man  who  employs  what  he  knows  to  be  fallacy  for 
the  purpose  of  deceit  and  of  getting  money."    And  he  did  this  at  a 
time  when  he  himself,  with  his  estimable  contemporarv  Isokrates  were 
considered  at  Athens  to  come  under  the  desiirnation  of    Sophist* 
and  were  called  so  by  every  one  who  disliked  either  their  professioii 
or  their  persons. 

_  Great  thinkers  and  writers,  like  Plato  and  Aristotle  have  full 
right  to  define  and  employ  words  in  a  sense  of  their  own  provided 
they  give  due  notice.  But  it  is  essential  that  the  reader,  should  keep 
m  Diind  the  consecpiences  of  such  change,  and  not  mistake  a  word 
used  m  a  new  sense  for  a  new  fact  or  phenomenon.  The  age  with 
whioli  we  are  now  dealing  (the  last  half  of  the  fifth  century  bc  )  is 
commonly  distinguished  in  the  historv  of  philosophy  as  the  age  of 
bokrates  and  the  Sophists.  The  Sophists  are  spoken  of  as  a  new  class 
of  men,  or  sometimes  in  language  which  implies  a  new  doctrinal  sect 
or  school,  as  if  they  then  sprang  up  in  Gieece  for  the  first  time- 
ostentatious  impostors,  flattering  and  duping  the  rich  vouth  for  their 
own  personal  gain,  undermining  the  moralUv  of  Athens,  public  and 
private,  and  encouraging  their  i.upilsto  the  unscrupulous  prosecution 
ot  ambition  and  cupidity.  They  are  even  afhrmed  to  have  succeeded 
in  corrupting  the  general  morality,  so  that  Athens  had  become  miser- 
ably tlegenerated  and  vicious  in  the  latter  years  of  the  Peloponnesijui 
war,  a,s  compared  with  what  she  was  in  the  time  of  thcMiltiadesand 
Aristeides.  Sokrates,  on  the  contiaiT,  is  usually  described  as  a  holy 
man  combating  and  exposing  these  fulse  prophets— standing  up  as  the 
champion  of  morality  against  their  insidious  artifices.  Kow  though 
the  appearance  of  a  man  so  very  orio-inal  as  Sokrates  was  a  new  fact 
of  unspeakable  importance— the  appearance  of  the  Sophists  was  no 
new  fact:  what  was  new  was  the  peculiar  use  of  an  old  word;  which 
riato  took  out  of  Its  usnal  meaning,  and  fastened  upon  the  emment 
p:ud  teachers  of  the  Sokratic  age. 

The  paid  teachers,  with  whom,  under  the  name  of  The  Sophists, 
he  brings  Sokrates  into   controversy,   were  J'rotairoras  of  Abdera 
Cror.nas  of  Leontini,  Polus  of  Agrigentum.  Hippias  of  Elis,  Prodikus 
ot  Kcos,  Thn.symachus  of  Chalkedon,  Euthydemus  and  Diouyso- 


SOPHISTS  OF  THE  SOKRATIC  AGE. 


405 


WA 

1     ^ 


-,  -us  of  Olios :  to  whom  Xenophon  adds  Antiphon  of  Athens.   These 
„ien— whom  modern  writers  set  down  as  The  Sophists,  and  denounce 
as  the  moral  pestilence  of  their  age— were  not  distinguished  in  any 
marked  or  generic  w^ay  from  their  predecessors.     Their  vocation  was 
to' train  up  "youth  for  the  duties,  the  pursuits,  and  the  successes,  of 
■ictive  life,  both  private  and  public.     Others  had  done  this  before; 
but  these  teachers  brought  to  the  task  a  larger  range  of  knowledge, 
with  a  jrreater  multiplicity  of  scientific  and  other  topics— not  only 
more  impressive  powers  of  composition  and  speech,  serving  as  a  per- 
sonal example  to  the  pupil,  but  also  a  comprehension  of  the  elements 
of  crood  speaking,  so  as  to  be  able  to  give  precepts  conducive  to  tliat 
acc'omplishment— a  considerable  treasure  of  accumulated  thought  on 
moral  and  political  subjects,  calculated  to  make  their  convei-sation 
very  instructive— and  discourse  ready  prepared,  on  general  heads  or 
common  places,  for  their  pupils  to  learu  by  heart.     But  this,  though  a 
very  important  extension,  was  nothing  more  than  an  extension,  dit- 
fering  merely  in  degree— of  that  which  Damon  and  others  had  done 
before  them.     It  arose  from  the  increased  demand  which  had  grown 
up  among  the  Athenian  youth,  for  a  larger  measure  of  education  and 
other  accomplishments;  from  an  elevation  in  the  standard  of  what 
was  required  from  every  man  who  aspired  to  occupy  a  place  in  the 
eyes  of  his  fellow-citizens.    Protagoras,  Gorgias,  and  the  rest,  sup- 
plied this  demand  with  an  ability  and  success  unknown  before  their 
time:  hence  they  gained  a  distinction  such  as  none  of  their  prede- 
cessors had  attained,  v>'ere  prized  all  over  Greece,  traveled  from  city 
to  city  with   general   admiration,   and  obtained   considerable  pay. 
While  such  success,  among  men  personally  strangers  to  them,  attests 
unequivoeally  their  talent  and  personal  dignity;  of  course  it  also  laid 
them  open  to  increased  jealousy,  as  well  from  inferior  teachers,  as 
from  the  lovers  of  ignorance  generally;  such  jealousy  manifesting 
itself  (as  I  have  before  explained)  by  a  greater. readiness  to  stamp  them 
with  the  obnoxious  title  of  Sophists. 

The  hostility  of  Plato  against  these  teachers  (for  it  is  he.  and  not 
Sokrates,  who  was  peculiarly  hostile  to  them,  as  may  be  seen  bv  the 
absence  of  any  such  marked  antithesis  in  the  Memorabilia  of  Xeno-. 
phon)  may  be  explained  without  at  all  supposing  in  them  that  cor- 
ruption which  modern  WM'iters  have  been  so  ready  not  only  to  admit 
but  to  magnify.  It  arose  from  the  radical  difference  between  his 
]X)int  of  view  and  theirs.  He  was  a  great  reformer  and  theorist: 
they  undertook  to  qualify  young  men  for  doinac  themselves  credit, 
and  rendering  service  to  others,  in  active  Athenian  life.  Not  only  is 
there  room  for  the  concurrent  operation  of  both  these  veins  of  thought 
and  action,  in  eveiy  progressive  society,  but  the  intellectual  outfit  of 
the  society  can  never  be  complete  without  the  one  as  well  as  the 
other.  It' was  the  glory  of  Athens  that  both  were  there  adequately 
represented,  at  the  period  which  we  have  now  reached.  Whoever 
peruses  Plato's  immortal  work—"  The  Repul)lic  "—will  see  that  he 


406  DRxVMA— RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPH  STS. 

di'^scntcd  from  society,  hotli  dcmocTaticnl  nnd  oliirarcliical,  fa  rome 
of  the  most  fundamental  points  of  public  and  private  morajry;  anvl 
throughout  most  of  liis  dialogues  his  (|u:\nel  is  r.otless  wiih  1^,  slates- 
men,  past  as  well  as  present,  than  with  Ihc  paid  leachcrs,  cf  J^lhens. 
Besides  this  ardent  desire  for  radical  reform  of  the  state,  cp  priiu  i- 
plcs  of  his  own,  distinct  from  every  recognized  jxjliticj*^.  p^uly  or 
creed — Plato  was  also  unrivaled  as  a  speculative  genius  an  J  as  a 
dialectician;  both  which  capacities  he  put  forth,  lo  j  A.plif  /  and 
illustrate  the  ethical  theory  and  method  tiist  struck  out  ':r  fcfrkiates, 
as  well  as  to  establish  comprehensive  generalities  of  his  r>wn. 

Now  his  reforming,  as  well  as  bis  theorizing  t(  ndeji'j:iefj,  brcuglit 
him  into  polemical  controversy  with  all  the  leading  af  i/ite  by  whom 
Ihe  business  of  practical  life  at  Athens  was  carried  o'l,  la  so  far  as 
Protagoras  or  Gorgias  talked  the  language  of  theory,  'lyy  were  doubt- 
less much  inferior  to  Plato,  nor  would  their  do(t  iiusbe  likely  to 
Isold  against  his  acute  dialectics.  IJut  it  v  as  neit}- cr  their  duty,  nor 
their  engagement,  to  reform  the  state,  or  discover  and  vindicat'"  the 
best  theory  on  ethics.  They  professed  to  (}i:a]i'y  young  Athc'hins 
for  an  active  and  honorable  life,  private  as  well  .ly  public,  m  A  /("n 
(or  in  any  other  given  cit\):  they  taught  them  '".o  think,  speak  ai  d 
act,"  in  Athens;  they  of  course  accepteel,  as  tli^;  basis  e)f  their  tcaeli 
i?ig.  that  type  of  character  which  estimable  mju  exliibited,  and  whie  h 
the  j>ublic  approved,  in,  Athens — not  undert  ?(■.!.  g  to  recast  the  iA;e, 
l)ut  to  arm  it  with  ne'W  capacities  and  adorii  it  with  fresh  ace  cm)  ii.-li- 
ments.  Their  dire^ct  business  was  with  e'j'.cal  precept,  rie)t  with  ethi- 
cal theory;  all  that  was  required  e)f  thera  as  te,  the  latter,  was,  that 
their  theory  should  be  sufficiently  souiui  to  leadte)  such  j^ractical  pre- 
cepts as  were  accounted  virtuous  by  the  nie^st  estimable  se>ciety  in 
Athens.  It  ought  never  to  be  forgot-en,  that  those  who  taught  fejf 
active  life  were  bounel  by  the  ve'ry  conditions  of  their  profe  sj-ie^n  to 
adapt  themselves  to  the  place  and  the  society  as  it  ste)e)d.  "With  the 
Theorist  Plate),  not  only  the're  was  no  such  obligation,  but  the  granel- 
eurand  instructivemess  of  his  speculations  were  rcalizeel  only  by  his  de*- 
pirting  from  it.  anel  placing  iiimself  on  a  loftier  jiinnaele  ef  vision; 
while  he  himself  not  only  admits,  Init  even  exaggerates,  the  unfiliiess 
and  repugnance,  of  men  taught  in  his  ffchool,  lor  practical  life  and 
duties. 

To  understand  the  essential  diffeTcnce  between  the  practical  and 
the  theoretical  point  of  view,  we  neeel  only  h^ok  to  Ise)krates.  the  i.ui)il 
of  Gorgias,  and  himself  a  Sophist,  'J'hough  not  a  man  of  comn^anel- 
ing  abilities,  Isokrates  was  one  of  the  most  estimable  men  of  Grecian 
antiepiity.  He  taught  for  money,  ami  taught  young  men  to  "think, 
spe'ak,  and  act,"  all  with  a  view  to  an  hone)rable  life  of  active  citizen- 
ship:  not  concealing  his  marked  disparagement  of  specul.itivc  study 
anel  debate,  such  as  the  eliale)gues  e)f  Plato  anel  the*  elialectic  exercise's 
generally.  He  de'fvjnds  his  professif>n  nmcli  in  the  same  way  as  his 
master  Gorgias,  ov  Ptce.i.goras,  would  have  defended  it,  if  wc  had 


illSIHTEUPiiETATION  OF  PL.VTO'S  DIALOGUES.    407 

„„„e  us  vinaication.  from  U^^.-    I«^^^ 

Plato  arniigiis  a^  Hie  f^^'l"'.'*';-;:  ,  ,     evidence  of  Plalo,  tlicir  pro- 

„,„mccd  enen.v:  Vi'l  oven  ';''\V''*,''  ''.'^J  if..  ,i,e  oharL'es  of  eoirupt 
"as  a  wUole   ^vm  not  '''j '",X,re£  <  f  k»o«l"'««-  etc  ,-1.1011 
,„,1  im.noml  teaolung,  "»!'"'■  ,'"?Kacl.oru.  a^'alnsl  lUem.    I  km.w 
i,e  modern  historians  pour  fo. '    .  "  '^'^.^"^  i.^^^fly  dealt  with  as  these 
few  characters  iu  history  «''".'  '.^.^tv  of  iheir  name,  in  its  n.-d- 
's^  called  Sophists.     '' l'>'y, l'^:"^;'^?, '',"  „    Vh  ch  few  mo.lern  ^yrae■■s 
en.  se,.se;  a  "'"^'^'^l'"-^/'*      :.';'^, J.nselves  or  their  readers-  hoi.g.i 
take  pains  to  emancptde  '^■\''" '';';''";  .'i,^,,Uilely  inapplicable  to  Pro- 
he  K..s-'r.-<l>  or  F.-en<r!.  word  bopl  »l  »  ■„,i,.a  rather  ''  Prolessors,  or 
rn  ras^  or  Gordas,  who  ''",f;^,   '  ^';,  :  , o  exai.ilne  the  expo4.io.,s 
Vablic  Teachers."     It  .s  >•<;;''   '^"^.r  ,'„.!  others,  to  the  Plalomc 
meti\ed,  bv  learno.l  men  '''-o  !^ti>   ^^""'     ,     ,    „^,     Theictetus,  etc.. 
!l!:u;snc's  entitled  P™;^'S--^^,^-|  j  -/•  f  piltoual  cou.rover.sy  ^U 
whei-e  Plato  .'"'■'^';'"^'^;:;  ^7^.',     or  as  cuivassin-  Iheir  opinions,     ^^e 
oi.e  or  other  of  these  Sopl"'''.  «'^^;  ^  ex  o4tor  Such  remarks  as  the^e 
c  ,„tinnally  read  fron.  the  l'«    " ^  "'^^ .'i^  p^  '  ..ul  worlhlcss  Sophist" 
_••  Mark  how  Plato  piits  dow  a  t  le  ^»-    "     .,.     ,,^    \,,y^  both  games 
_,he  obvions  rett.c.ioii,  ^'^l ';;;»,  ,^;     I   ^'^    J.     And  igain-'; Th.s 
0,1  llie  chcss-boa.-d.  be.ng  ^    "^^'";  ,;;,,,^  „f  S.ikrates,  is  not  to  be  rc- 
,„■  that  argument    plr.ced   "',''',':,"'"  ,J'„„iy  takes  It  up  and  enforces 
,,,rded  as  the  real  op""""  «'  ^  nu/zlc  and  l.nmdiate  an  o.lenlauous 
il  at  this  moment,  "'«'•-;=  .^P"(:e.'.Phuo  into  an  insincere  dispu- 
iiretender  ■•— a  remark  which  conxiii^i.'  .y,„u„a'nt  when  the 

i;;,a'and  a  «'-i;l'-\-, ''-,7  nn"e  and  tot  y  ntolllity  as  an  antidote 
.    c.,mmcntalor  is  extolling  his  l''.'J,  J"        ^,,-;i  Piotago.a3. 

against  the  alleged  '■''"•7'''""  "^,^,:^\f,Si''  dialogue  to  the  inqiury. 
I'lalo  has  devoted  a  long  ami  ."''^.V'-'''  ','„,,,,,  iLat  the  dctiiiilioa 
Whiit  is  a  Sophist  ■!  and  ^^^t^^^^^lX^'um^t  inteUectually 
whii'h  he  at  last  brings  o,it  »  ''''  J?°^;'  know.     Cicero  deUnes 

speaking,  better  than  any  one  else  ^^  '  "^  j,,,  t,,e  sake  ot  osten- 
e  Sophist  to  be  one  wl'-J  .l""-^^;^,  j'^  ?,'  '^.eproach,  will  certainly 
tatioii  or  ot  gain;  which,  '',  *  " ','^f'"„  '^  ",,1  teachers,  w'-o  are  deler- 
bear  hard  upon  Hie  great  body  9'  '"  ; ,"  ,  ais,.hargc  it3  important 
m-med  to  embrace  ^f"  ^:;^^y;^i'lZ^L^'=r  of  deriving 
duties,  like  oth.a-  Pf'>l'--^^'«";^  "'-"f  ■  ^^  or  boll.-whether  they  have 
an  inci.nie  or  of  makin.g  a  figure        't^o  ^^^^^^^.^  ^.,jt   .g_ 

any  peculiar  relish  tor  H'"  °«^'    .  i''^  ^J^  lUcy  alopt  the  sneering 
iiidescribing  Protag.iras  ,f .  «  '^,';';'f,^.-p,y.  low  purposes,  tricks   o 
language  of  PbUo  ■'S'''V'^'  '!'''•  '^"r',,n.  which  lead  the  reader  to 
get  inoney  from  the  "i^l',  «l';;;   •^'    1  eicSoiviirts  peculiarly  greedy 
telieve  that  there  ^f  soni.^t    n    m    he  ^  ^^^^.^  ^^^^  ^j  ^.^ing 

exorbitant,  and  truckl  mg ;  somah.n„  u^y  o 


THRASYMACHUS. 


409 


408  DRAMA-RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPHISTS. 

and  receiving  rcmuneratio'i.  Now  not  only  tliere  is  no  proof  Hint 
any  of  them  (speaking  of  iliose  cons])iciious  in  the  profession)  \vcie 
thus  dishonest  or  exorbitant,  hut  in  tiiecase  of  Protagoras,  even  his 
enemy  Phito  furnishes  a  proof  lliat  he  was  not  so.  lii  ilie  Platonic 
dialogue  termed  Protagoras,  that  Sophist  is  irilrodueed  as  deseribinir 
tiie  manner  in  which  he  proceeded  respecting  remuneration  from  his 
l>upils:  "I  make  no  stipulation  befoiehand;  wlicn  a  pupil  parts 
4  from  me,  I  ask  from  him  such  a  sum  as  I  think  the  lime  and  the 
-.circumstances  warrant;  and  I  add,  that  if  lie  deems  the  demand  too 
peat,  he  has  only  to  make  up  his  own  mind  what  is  the  :im(  unt  of 
improvement  which  my  company  has  piocured  to  liim,  and  what 
sum  he  considers  an  e(piivalenl  for  it.  I  am  content  to  acccj)!  the 
sum  so  named  by  himself,  only  requiring  him  to  ao  into  a  temple 
and  make  oath  that  it  is  his  sincere  belief/'  It  is  nol  easv  to  imagine 
a  more  dignified  way  of  dealing  than  this,  nor  one  which  more  thor- 
oughly attests  an  honorable  reliance  on  the  inleinal  consciousness  of 
the  scholar;  on  the  grateful  sense  of  in  j^ioveir.ent  realized,  which  to 
every  teacher  constitutes  a  reward  liaidlv  infeiior  to  the  payment 
that  proceeds  from  it,  and  which  (in  the  opinion  of  Sokiatcs)  ioimed 
the  only  legitimate  leward.  bucli  is  not  the  wav  in  which  the  cor- 
rupters of  mankind  go  to  work. 

That  which  sto<,d  most  pi(  minent  in  the  teaching  of  GcorLMas  and 
the  other  8(  phists,  was,  that  ll;ey  cultivated  and  impii.ved  the 
powers  of  public  sj  caking  in  their  pupils;  one  of  the  mos^t  essential 
a(ce»mplihhments  te)  eveiy  Aibe  ni::n  of  (onsideratie)n.  For  ibis,  too, 
tley  have  been  e'enoumed  by  iJitteT,  Prandis,  and  other  learned 
v.nters  on  the  history  of  ihi]e)s(phy,  as  corrupt  anel  immoral 
"Teaching  their  pi.pils  ihetoric  (it  l:as  licen  said),  thev  only  enable 
tliem  to  secemd  unjust  de  s^igns,  to  make  the'  worse  apjiear  the  better 
reason,  and  to  delude  tlieir  hearers,  by  triek  and  artitiee,  into  false 
le'rsuasjon  j.nd  show  of  knowledge  witiie.ut  re  alitv.  Rhetoiie  (argues 
Plate)  in  the  elialogue  ealled  Ge.rpas)  is  no  art  whatever,  but  a  mere 
i!n.seientific  knack,  enslaved  to  the  eiominant  i^rejudices,  and  ne.thin"- 
belter  than  an  imposturous  parcely  on'  the  tnie  political  art."  Now% 
the.uo-h  Aristotle,  following  the  Platonic  vein,  calls  this  pe)wer  e)f 
iiiaking  tlie  worse  appear  the  better  reason,  "the  promise  of  Prota- 
goras"—the  accusation  ou«iht  never  to  be  urged  as  it  bore  spe-e'lally 
agauist  the  teachers  of  the  Se>kialic  age.  It  is  an  argument  against 
rhetorical  teaching  generally;  against  all  the  most  distinguished 
teachers  of  j)upils  tor  active  life',  tl.re/unhout  the  ancient  weirld 
frenn  Protagoras,  Gorgias.  I>okrates.  etc.,  de>wn  to  Quintilian  Not 
only  does  the  argument  bear  ceiuallv  against  all.  bui  it  was  actually 
urged  agamst  all.  Lsokrates  and  Quintilian  be)th  defend  thenjselves 
against  it;  Aristotle  was  assailed  bv  it,  and  provides  a  defense  in  the 
be^nnning  of  his  treatise  on  Rl.eloiic;  ixr  ^\as  there  eveir  any  man, 
ineleed,  agamst  whemi  it  was  pressed  with  greater  bitterness  of 
calumny    than   Sokrates— hy   Aristo]  hunes   in  his  comedy  of  the 


"  Clouds  "  as  well  as  by  other  comic  composers.     Sokratcs  complains 
of  it  in^iis  defense  before  his  judges;  charactcrizmg  such  accusa- 
Uons  in  their  true  point  of  view,  as  being  -the   stock  reproaches 
Sstall  who  pursue  phile>sop!iy."     TIu^  ^re  indeed  only  one^.  of 
?hnLifestatiok  ever  varying  in  femnthoug'i  the  same  in  spirit 
of  the  antipathy  of  ignorance  a-ainst  ebssentmg  niiiovation  or  superior 
memUracUnplishments;  which  antipathy   intellectual  men   thein- 
^elves  when  i   happens  to  make  ou  their  side  in  a  controversy,  a.  3 
but  too  ready  to  invoke.    Considering  that  we  have  here  the  "v. tcnal  4 
0     e^e^ense  as  well  as  of  attack,  suppiieel  by  Sokrates  and  Plato,  i 
miAit  have  been  expected  that  me)elerii  wnte^rs  would  have  reframe-el 
ro^n  employing  such  an  ar^niment  to  discreeht  Gorg.as  e)r  Pre)lagoras; 
the  rather.  Is  fhey  have  before  their  eyes,  in  a  I  the  countries    > 
modern  Europe,  the  profession  of  lawyers  and  advocates,  who  le-n<l 
their  powerful  eloeiue.u-e  withe)ut  distiiictioii  to  the  cause  ol   ]us  ici 
or  injustice,  and  who,  far  from  being  regarded  as  the  corrupters  of 
soeietv  are  usually  looked  upon,  for  that  very  reason  ame,iig  others, 
IS  indispensable  auxiliaries  to  a  just  admuustration  of  law. 

Thou'di  writin- was  less  the  business  of  these  boplusts  than  per- 
sonal teaching,  sen'eral  of  them  publishel  ''^f'''-;^':^y^''r^ 
and  Theode)rus  both  set  forth  written  precepts  on  the  art  of  Rhe- 
toric- pivcepts  which  have  not  descended  te>  us.  but  which  appear  te> 
have'been   narrow  and  special,  bearing  directly  upon   practice,  and 
relatin"-  chieflv  to  the  proper  component  parts  ot  an  oration.        e) 
Aristotle,  who^had  attained  that  large  and  comprehensive  view  of  the 
theorv  of  Rhetoric  which  still  remains  to  instruT^t  us  in  his  splenelid 
treati"'^e   the  views  of  Thrasvmachus  appeared  unimportant,  serving 
0  him  onlv  as  hints  and  materials.     But  their  effect  must  have  been 
verv  different  when  they  first  appeared,  anel  when  young  men  were 
first  enabled  to  analvzc  the  parts  of  an   harangue,  to  uiulerstanel  tlie 
depenelence  of  one  upon  the  other,  and  call  them  by  thenr  approprr 
ate  names;  all  illustrated,  let  us  recollect,  by  oral  exposition  on  the 
part  of  the  master,  which  was  the  most  impressive  portion  of  the 

^  Pi-oe'likus,  again,  published  one  or  me)re  treatises  i"teneled  to  e-luci- 
date  the  ambiiuities  of  worels  and  to  point  out  \»'C  jl^^^^^^^^^^,^!^"'';^:'^; 
tions  of  terms  anparentlv.  but  ne)t  really,  eepiivalent.  Foi  this  1  I.ko 
often  ridicules  liim,  rnd  the  me)dern  historians  e^f  P^V^'Tl^.iin  ?>f 
ally  think  it  right  to  aelopt  the  same  teme.  W  hether  the  exe-cut  ion  of 
the?  work  was  at  all  adequate  to  its  purpe)se,  we  ]<.ave  no  Jn^^y^^ /^^ 
iuddn-  but  assuredly  the  purpose  was  e)ne  pre-emmentlx  calc  i- 
lale.d  to  alel  Grecian  tliinkers  and  dialecticians;  fe)r  no  man  can  studv 
th'-ir  philosophv  without  seeing  how  lamentably  thev  ^^ere  lumipered 
by  en  lavem.nt^o  the  pe)pular  phraseedogy,  and  by  infei^m^st^^m^ 

on  mere  verbal  analogy.     At  a  time  when  neither    V/.'^^^^"'^'>    ^' 
oranun.r  existed,  a  teacher  who  toe)k  care  ev.;n  ]mnctdious  care   in 
fixing  the  meaning  of  important  words  of  his  discourse-must  be 


410  DRAMA— RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

considered  as  cruidimr  the  minds  of  his  lienrcrs  in  n  snhitnry  dirrrtion, 
saliitaiy,  we  nuiy  suld,  even  to  Plulo  himself,  \\i  oi-e  spt  ( uljitioiis 
would  most  rertainly  Lave  been  inipioved  by  c(Ci.sicEal  hii;ts  Inm 
sucli  a  monitor. 

Protagoras,  too.  is  said  to  liave  been  the  first  wlio  discr'minaUd, 
and  gave  names  to  the  various  modes  and  foims  of  .iddres.'—  an  annly- 
sis  well-ealeidated  to  assist  Ids  lessons  on  right  speakiiig:  lie  appesns 
also  to  have  been  the  first  who  distinginshcd  the  thne  i:en(]ers  (  f 
nouns.     We  hear  furtlier  of  a  treatise  whieh  l.e  Avrote  on  wicstlinr — 
or  most  probably  on  gymnastics  generally;  iis  wdl  as  a  eolkelic  n  (  f 
controversial  dialogues.     But  his  most  celebrattd  treatise  was  (re 
entitled  "Truth,"  seemingly  on  philosophy  generally.     Of  this  trea- 
tise we  do  not  even  know  the  general  seope  or  jinport.     In   one  ef 
his  treatises  he  ccuifessed  his  innbilit}^  to  ss^tisfy  himself  iil  rut  llie 
existence  of  the  gods,  in  these  words — "Respeetiig  tlege  di^.  1  neifler 
know  whether  Ihey  exist,  nor  what  are  their  altiibule's:  llic  urcer 
tainty  of  the  subject,  the  shortness  of  humnn   life,  anel  niany  e^iher 
causes,  debar  me  f n  m  this  kiMwUdge."     That  the  lelieving'  pi:b1ic 
of  Athens  were  f(  riously  iidiijnant  at  this  passage,  and  that  it  ("aused 
the  author   to    le  threatened  with  prosecution  and  foicrd  1o  eiiiit 
Athens — we  can  perfectly  understand:  thoiTgh  there  seen.s-no  si  llie  i- 
ent  proof  of  the  tale  that  he  was  dro•^^ned  in  his  ouiwaid  voya;  e. 
But  that  moeh'rn  historians  of  philosophy,  who  cciMcer  the  TrLan 
gods  to  be  ficti(  ns,  and  ihe  relitiion  to  le  repugnant  to  any  lea.se  li- 
able mind,  shoulel  cnjicur  in  elenouncirg  Protai'oras  en  this  gr<  rnd 
as  a  corrupt  man,  is  to  me  less  intelligible,     iXenei]>l;anes.  aiid  ]  rob- 
ably  many  other  philosophers,  had  said  the  same  thirg  beloie  him. 
Nor  is  it  easy  to  see  what  a  superior  man  an  as  to  do.  who  ce  uld  not 
adjust  his  standard  of  belief  to  such  fictie  ns — e)r  Avhat  l;e  ceuld  say, 
if  he  said  anything,  less  than  the  Avords  cited  above  fie  m  Pro1age)ra*s; 
Avhich  appear,  as  ifar  as  Ave  can  appreciate  iheni  standing  Avitliout  the 
context,  to  be  a  brie»f  mention,  in  modest  and  circumispeel  phiase,  of 
the  reason  why  he  said  nothing  about  the  gods,  in  a  treatise  where  the 
reader  would  e'xpect  to  find  much  npon  the  subject.     Certain  it  is 
that  in  the  Platonic  dialogue,  called    "Protagoras,"  that  Sophist  is 
introduced  spe\iking  about  the  gods  exactly  in  the  manner  that  any 
orlhode)x  Pagan  might  naturally  adopt. 

The  other  fragment  preser\'eel  of  Protagoras  relates  to  his  view  of 
the  cognitive  pnVess.  and  of  truth  geiu  rally.  He  tauilit  that  'iMan 
is  the  m('asur(^  of  all  things,  both  of  that  Avhich  exists,  and  of  that 
Avhich  does  not  exist:"  a  doctrine  canvasser]  and  controverte'd  by 
Plato,  Avho  represents  that  Protagoras  aftirmed  knoAvlediic  to  consist 
in  sensation,  and  considere'd  the  sensations  of  each  inelividual  man  to 
be.  to  him,  the  canon  and  measure  of  truth.  "\Vc  know  scarce  any- 
thing of  the  elucidations  or  limit;<lions  with  Avhich  Protagoras  may 
have  accompanied  his  general  pe)sition:  and  if  even  Plato7  who  had 
^ood  means  of  knowing  them,  felt  it  ungenerous  to  insult  an  orphan 


PROTAGORAS. 


411 


doctrine  whose  fatlu^r  -- .gently  cleael^r^d^  ^Mend 

^^"^^Ce  i;:^":^lKr t"S  "  S  l-ap  upon  thesame 

otcviaem-eliitoitiitm,  H  u  rcco<;mzes.    In  so 

f  ^"'r ':"  «  ;  ma  .^umd  The  iLcory,  it  vvas'cer.ainly  not 
'^"' '  ■  f  >  •,  r  h  m  sevoral  othei-s  then  afloat,  from  tbe  Elcatic  scl.ool 
'"Tnlh^  V,  i  oimhcrs  \v hUc  it  Lad  tl.e  ir.erit  of  bringing  nuo  forc- 
:iiul  otliei  P'""'"'l"'V  ,,',..,,;,,„  „.,|,,rp  „f  co<>-n  t  on— ro  ative,  not 

i„le  relief  tlie  ^■'^'<>-"  ':'"y/,'^'^!  7^^"  ;  to  """  re-enforced  and 
in.leed  to  tl.e  sensitive  f;™:^/'™  •  ;„^,„oHa  and  ratiocinative. 

^''■'ItJl'it  i::.;r  ™n  mot'SeoL""man  1^  b,  there  .onld  be 

nuainst  li.e  nioraUty  ot  P'."'''S'  ;^,  p,".,"  a,.vo  es  to  tl.e  doctrine: 
tena,.eel   in  the  '>P<='f '°"  ,   '  ^.^'^/Je  1  f    ^^^^^  on 

r!'"if  ■  JV',;:ia"nnri^  oX  a  e  bable  to  that  Sophist  it  wonl.l 
behalf  of  I  .ol.igoiaa  u-  .,  ?o,.  tn  ibe  di-itinction  between  Good  and 
give  an  exaggerated  7.'P;''';V'';" /",  A  t,,,  TriU  .  a>.d  Falsehood  is  con- 

sideied  bv  the  /',•f'"'^^  .','', ''~,.,.^„„.ti,,g  cognition,  were  much  more 
,l,,or.es  ol  Plato  and  .-^,  *'"'''  a'^Ynen  -n-eatly  snperior  in  spccu- 
sysle,.i:a,ca..dealK.n^^^^^^^^ 

tn^S'n'ot  pJo'taglll-^s'ts  wc^l  a/ others  go,.e  before  then.  w.tU 
suggestions  ,nore  partial  and  imi«.rfect  ^reserved  In  one  of 

thesis.     He  pioicssts  lo  uv  m  „^^,,tinp-  it  even  to  ex  st  and  to  be 

,l,i„g  exist   it  is  >>"k"';";f 'S;;   '^  .i™!ve,Cm,n,.n^^         it  to  others, 
knowable  by  any  one  man,  l>l''>''^^J^^l^'  ,   ^.f^,,.  „>e  easier  task  o£ 
'rUi:  modern  historians  ot  philosophy  "5^'/-  l'"-,',f'  "f  nertormin''  tlia  ■ 
,,,,,o,,nei«g  tl.e  sceptic  sm  ol  <''«  ^"P  >    ^^"^    ''  ^.^iJ'V.i  [i™^^^^ 

existence.     The^y  ^^^^^^^'^.m    hin.^  essoiitiallv  transitory,  fluctuating, 
coming  and  gouig-as  ,s'^"^^;^    "-^^^TV'/.  '^i.i'i,^^  at  best  grounds  only 

lor  etmjecture.     I  hc\  ^'^^''-'' ,,.";,,„,? a,,,, s,„„„„_ti,e  Noiimenon.  to 
to  be  the  really  existent  ^.••";«''     •^.''^,X^Xe  p  enomena,  which 


412  BR^V-MA-RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

plural.     Kow  the  thesis  of  Gorjxias  related  to  hi,s  t.Itra-phcnomeiMl 
existence,  a.ul  bore  closely  .ii.on  the  ai-unK-msof  Zcuoand  lIclT™" 
the  tlea  10  reasot.ers  of  l.L,  el.ler  ( outei.iporarics.     He  dcS  ihm 
any  such   ultra-phc-tionKual  Something,  or  Ko.m,ei,on,  exi^^ed    « 
could  bo  known,  or  could  he  described."   Of  this  tripartite  tSst^ 
hrs   negattoi.  was  neither  more  uutenable,  nor   less  untenable    In 
hat  of  those  philosophers  who  before  him  had  atgued  for  Ihc  ,(ii  m' 
ive;  on  the  two  last  points,  his  concl.isious  wcrelieither  pan  loxk-l 
,nor  ,n,i.roperly  scept.eal.  but  jH^rfectly  just-and  have  beJ.    ra^ifiV 
■  b.   the  gra<lual  abandonmetit.  .-ither  avowed  or  implied,  of  such  t  tr- 
phenuniena    researches  among  the  major  part  of  phi  os,,,  1  e r.      it 
1  ay  ta.rly  be  presumed  that  these  .loclrines  were  u  s^ed  b  ■  Gor-i.t 
for   he  purpose  of  d.verling  bis  disciples  from  studie.rwhich  he  an 

J^oUlates  afteiward  eiilorcuig  the  same  view,  discouni"iiio-  snecu  ■ 
ions  01   h,s  nature,  ami  reeommen.ling  rhetorical  c.xe, efsc  ts  prepa  ■ : 
tmuforthe  duties  of  an  active  citizen.     Xor  must  «e  fof  ^ -t'lt  t 

fdt  trn'''i";i:e^ta'i:r="' ''"'""''  •^'^^^•""'"°-  -- "--  ^^^^ 

warrant  at  all-much  more  may  the  same  remark  be  uLle  r cs,  it'  I 
the  graver  reproaches  heaped  upon  their  teaching  on  the  .^core  of 
itnmorahty  or  corruption,     it  has  been  con.mon  .nUI,  recent  Germ", 

0  lied"' Di,  tt  r'L''^'  ,V"  "T"-^'-'"^'  "T  ^''"'"  »'"'  '^''''  "P  -^  «  » 
0.  led      D  e  bopi  silk     (bopbislic)- whom  Ibev  as.sert  to  hav'e  mn<- 

acter  s^,  th^i'."h'i'''"''''  ^1  '"'""•"  '"''■'.''"-  "■'^"''^"''■■™n  "'or.d  Zr- 
attti,sothat  it  beciiue  degenerate  at  the  end  of  the  PelouonniKi-m 

A,T',!iT;'""'''  "■'"'  "''"'  "  •""'  '^™°  '"  ""-'  'i'"-  °f  iliEies  and 

^tOorl  "y;  r'^""  T'^''"*-/'^*  ^"-^^^  ^'*  ^'^^^-^  P^^«^"  tl»at  the  persons 
hi}  ea  ^opliLsts  Iiucl  some  doctrines,  principles,  or  method   both  com- 

rnnn^-r  "'" '^^  *'^"'^  clistinouishing  them  Ironi  others      Ku    sue     a 
supposition  1..  ".nlrue:  there  %v ere  no  such  common  doctrines  or  n  in 
ciplrs,  or  melliod,  belonging  to  them.     Even  the  name  by  ^  h'ich  th  y 

and  o  hers;  they  h:id  nothing  in  common  except  their  profession  a. 
paid  teachers,  quablymg  young  men  "to  tiJink,  speak  and  c  " 
(these  are  the  words  of  Lokrates.  and  better  uords  it  would  not  be 
ea.sy  to  imd)  wall  credit  to  themselves  as  citizens.  Mo  "  ver  4  h 
conimunny  ot  profession  did  not  at  that  time  implvso  much'  /.al  'v 
of  character  as  it  does  now,   when   the  path  of  teachinir  bas  betii 

iTitli!!?  Vr'^'''^\7'^^'*^^'  '"'^'^  roadSvith  measured'' dsLice 
and   sta  ed    intervals:   Protagoras   and  Gorgias  found  predeccssori 
dee.l.  but  ro  binding  precedents  to  copv;  so  that  eacli  struck  out 
more  or  less  a  roud  of  liis  own.     And  accordingly,  we  f.nd  Pla  o  in 


ATHENIAN  CHARACTER  NOT  C0RRUPTJ:D.       413 

his  dialogue  called  "Protagoras,"  wherein  Protagoras,  Prodikus,  and 
llippias  are  all  introduced — imparting  a  distinct  type  of  character  and 
distinct  method  to  each,  not  without  a  strong  admixture  of  reciprocal 
icalousy  between  them;  while  Thrasyinachus,  in  the  Republic,  and 
Eiilhydemus,  in  the  dialogue  so  called,  are  again  ])aiiited  each  with 
colors  of  bis  own,  different  from  all  the  three  above  named.  We  do 
not  know  liow  far  Gorgias  agreed  in  the  opinion  of  Protagoras— 
"  Man  is  the  measure  of  all  things;"  and  we  may  infer  even  from 
Plato  himself,  that  Protagoras  would  have  opposed  the  views 
expressed  by  Thrasymachus  in  the  first  book  of  the  Republic.  It  is 
impossible,  therefore,  to  predict  anything  concerning  doctrines, 
methods,  or  tendencies,  common  and  peculiar  to  all  the  Sophists. 
There  were  none  such;  nor  has  the  abstract  word — "  Die  Sophistik" 
—any  real  meaning,  except  such  qualities  (whatever  they  may  be)  as 
are  inseparable  from  the  profession  or  occupation  of  public  teaching. 
And  if,  at  present,  every  candid  critic  would  be  ashamed  to  cast 
wholesale  aspersions  on  the  entire  body  of  professional  teachers- 
much  more  is  such  censure  unbecoming  in  reference  to  the  ancient 
Sophists,  who  were  distinguished  from  each  other  by  stronger  indi- 
vidual peculicarities. 

If,  then,  it  were  true  that  in  the  interval  between  480  B.C.  and 
the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  a  great  moral  deterioration  had 
taken  place  in  Athens  and  in  Greece  generally,  we  should  have  to 
search  for  some  other  cause  than  the  imaginary  abstraction  called 
Sophistic.  But— and  this  is  the  second  point — the  matter  of  fact 
here  alleged  is  as  untrue,  as  the  cause  alleged  is  unreal.  Athens,  at 
the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  w^as  not  more  corrupt  than 
Athens  in  the  days  of  MiUiadesand  Aristeides.  If  we  revert  to  that 
earlier  period,  we  shall  find  that  scarcely  any  acts  of  the  Athenian 
people  have  drawn  upon  them  sharper  censure  (in  my  judgment, 
uiHiierited)  than  their  treatment  of  these  very  two  statesmen;  the 
condemnation  of  Miltiades,  and  the  ostracism  of  Aristeides.  In 
writing  my  history  of  that  time,  far  from  finding  previous  historians 
disposed  to  give  the  Athenians  credit  for  public  virtue,  I  have  been 
compelled  to  contend  against  a  body  of  adverse  criticism,  imputing 
to  them  gross  ingratitude  and  injustice.  Thus  the  contemporaries  of 
Miltiades  and  xVristeides,  when  described  as  matter  of  present  history, 
are  presented  in  anything  but  flattering  colors;  except  their  value  at 
jMarathon  and  Sahunis,  which  finds  one  unanimous  voice  of  enco- 
mium. But  when  these  same  men  have  become  numbered  among  the 
mingled  recollections  and  fancies  belonging  to  the  past— when  a  future 
generation  comes  to  be  present,  with  its  appropriate  stock  of  com- 
plaint and  denunciation — then  it  is  that  men  find  pleasure  in  dressing 
up  the  virtues  of  the  past,  as  a  count  in  the  indictment  against  their 
own  contemporaries.  Aristophlmes,  writing  during  the  Peloponnes- 
ian war,  denounced  the  Demos  of  his  day  as  generated  from  the 
virtue  of  that  Demos  which  had  surrounded  Miltiades  and  Aris- 


414  DRiUrA— RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

« 
teides:  while  Isnkratos,  writins:  as  an  old  iTjan  hotwceri  r50-40  i?.r., 
c<)iiii)l:iins  in  li'e  rnanncT  of  his  own  time,  boasting  iiow  nnuli 
better  tlie  state  of  Athens  liad  been  in  his  yoiilli :  -whieh  jieiird  of  his 
youth  fell  exactly  durinj^-  the  life  of  Aristophanes,  in  the  last  half  of 
the  Peloj)oniiesian  war. 

Such  illusions  onirht  to  impose  on  no  one  without  a  careful  com- 
parison of  facts;  and  most  assuredly  that  comparison  will  nc)t  hc;ir 
out  the  alienation  of  increased  corruption  and  degeneracy,  between 
the  age  of  jliltiades  and  the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.    Through- 
out the  whole  of  Athenian  history,  there  are  no  acts  which  attest  so 
large  a  measure  of  virtue  and  judgment  pervading  the  whole  people, 
as  the  i)r()ceedings  after  the  Four  Hundred   and  after  the  Tliiiiy. 
Nor  do  I  believe  that   the  contemporaries  of  ]\Iiltiades  would  hiwa 
been  capable  of  such  heroism;  for  that   aipdlation  isbyuonuans 
too  large  for  the  case.     I  doubt   whether  thev  would  have  been  com- 
])etent  to  the  steady  self-denial  of  retaining  a  large  sum  in  reserve 
during  the  time  of  peace,  b  -ih    prior  to  the  Pelo]K)nnesian  war  and 
after  the  peace  of  Nikias — or   of  keeping  back  the  reserve  fund  of 
1000  talents,  while  thev  were  forced  v<'ar  after  vear  to  pav  taxes  for 
the  suj)port  of  the  war — or  r)f  acting  lijion  the  i)ru(ient.  yet  painfully 
trviiiii:  policv  recommended  bv  Perikles,  so  as  to  sustain  an  aninml 
invasion  without  either  going  out  to  tight  or  purcl;asing  ))eace  by 
ignominious    concessions.     If  bad  acts  such   as  Athens  committed 
during  the  later  years  of  the  war,  for  example,  the  massacre  of  the 
]\Ielian  population,  were  not  done  equally  by  the  contemporaries  of 
Miltiades,  this  did  not  arise  from  any  superior  humanity  jr  principle 
on  their  part,  but  from  the   fact  that  they  were  not  exposed  to  the 
like  temptation,  brought  upon    them   by  the  possession  of  imperial 
])o\ver.     Tho  condemnation   of    the  six  generals  after  the  battle  of 
Arginusfp,  if  we  suppose  tiie  same  coisduct  on  their  j^art  to  have  oc- 
curred in  490  BC,  would  have  been  decreed  more  rajndly  and  more 
nnceremoniously  than  it  was  actually  decreed  in  406  B.C.     For  at 
t])at  earlier  date  there  existed  no  pse]ihism  of  Kannonus,  surrounded 
bv  prescriptive  respect — no  Graphe   Paranonion — no  such  habi<s  of 
establisiied  deference  to  a  l')ikastery  solemnly  sworn,  with  full  notice 
to  defendants  and  f\dl  time  of  defense  measured  by  the  water-gla>s 
— none  of  tho-^e  securities  which  a  long  course  of  democracy  had 
gradually  woiked  into  the  ]>ublic  morality  of  every  Athenian,  and 
which  (as  we  saw  in  a  fornier  chapter)  interposed    a  S(  rious  barrii  i 
to  the  impluse  of  the  moment,  though  ultimately  overthrown  l)y  iis 
fierceness.     A  far  less  violent  impulse  would  have  sutliced  for  the 
same  mischief  in  490  n.c,  when  no  such  btirriers  existed.     Lastly, 
if  w  want  a  measure  of  the  api>reciating  sentiment  of  the  Atheni;.u 
public,  toward  a  strict  and  decorous  morality  in  the  narrow  sense,  in 
the  middle  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  we  have  onh"  to  consider  the 
manner  in  which  they  (lealt  with  Nikias.     I  have  shown,  in  descrih- 
ing  the  Sicilian  exi)edition,  that  the  gravest  error  which  the  Athe- 


GOOD  INFLUENCE  OF  DEMOCRACY. 


415 


nians  ever  committed,  that  which  shipwrecked  both  their  armament 
at  Svracuse  and  their  power  at  home,  arose  from  the-.r  unmeasured 
esteem  for  the  respectable  and  pious  Nikias,  which  blinded  them  to 
the  grossest  defects  of  generalship  and  public  conduct.  Disastrous 
as  such  niisjudgment  w"as,  it  counts  at  least  as  a  proof  that  the  moral 
corruption,  alleged  to  have  been  operated  in  their  characters,  is  a 
mere  fiction.  Nor  let  it  be  supposed  that  the  nerve  and  resolution 
which  once  animated  the  combatants  of  Marathon  and  Salainis,  had 
disappeared  in  the  latter  years  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  On  the 
contrary,  the  energetic  and  protracted  struggle  of  Athens,  after  the 
irreparable  calamity  at  Syracuse,  forms  a  w^orthy  parallel  to  her  re- 
sistance in  the  time  of  Xerxes,  and  maintained  unabated  that  dis- 
tinctive attribute  which  Perikles  had  set  forth  as  the  main  foundation 
of  her  glory — that  of  never  giving  way  before  misfortune.  Without 
anv  disparagment  to  the  armament  at  Salamis,  we  may  remark  that 
the  patriotism  of  the  fleet  at  Samos,  which  rescued  Athens  from  the 
Four  Hundred,  w^as  efpially  devoted  and  more  intelligent;  and  that 
the  burst  of  effort,  which  sent  a  subsequent  fleet  to  victory  at  Argi- 
uus;e.  was  to  the  full  as  strenuous. 

If  then  we  survey  the  eighty-seven  years  of  Athenian  history,  be- 
tween the  battle  of  Marathon  and  the  renovation  of  the  democracy- 
after  the  Thirty,  w^e  shall  see  no  ground  for  the  assertion,  so  often 
made,  of  increased  and  increasing  inoral  and  political  corruption.  It 
is  my' belief  that  the  people  had  become  both  morally  and  politically 
better,  and  that  their  democracy  had  worked  to  their  improvement. 
The  remark  made  by  Tlmcydides,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Koikynean 
bloodshed— on  the  violent  and  reckless  political  jintipathies,  arising 
out  of  the  confluence  of  external  warfare  with  internal  party-feud— 
wherever  else  it  may  find  its  application,  has  no  bearing  upon  Athens: 
the  proceedings  after  the  Four  Hundred  and  after  the  Thirty,  prove 
the  contrary.  And  while  Athens  may  thus  be  vindicated  on  the 
moral  side,  it  is  indisputable  that  her  population  had  acquired  a  far 
larger  ranij^e  of  ideas  and  capacities  than  they  possessed  at  the  time 
of  Ihe  battle  of  Marathon.  This  indeed  is  the  very  matter  of  fact 
deplored  by  Aristophanes,  and  atlmitted  by  those  writers,  who,  while 
denouncing  the  Sophists,  connect  such  enlarged  range  of  ideas  with 
the  dissemination  of  the  pretended  sophistical  poison.  In  my  judg- 
ment, not  only  the  charge  against  the  Sophists  as  poisoners,  but  even 
the  existence.of  such  potson  in  the  Athenian  system,  deserves  nothing 
less  than  an  empathic  denial. 

Let  us  examine  again  the  names  of  these  professional  teachers, 
beginning  with  Prodikus,  one  of  the  most  renowned.  Who  is  there 
Ihtit  has  not  read  the  well-known  fable  called  "The  Choice  of  Her- 
cules," which  is  to  be  found  irx  every  book  professing  to  collect 
impressive  illustrations  of  elementary  morality?  Who  does  not  know 
that  its  express  purpose  is,  to  kindle  the  imaginations  of  youth  in 
favor  of  a  life  of  labor  for  noble  objects,  and  against  a  life  of  indui- 


41 G  DRAMA— RITETOmC  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPHISTS. 

gence?  It  was  the  favorite  theme  on  wiiich  Prodikus  lectured,  and 
on  wliich  he  obtained  tlie  largest  audience,  if  it  be  of  striking  sim- 
plicity and  effect  even  to  a  modern  reader,  how  much  more  power- 
fully must  it  have  worked  upon  the  audience  for  whose  belief  it  wns 
specially  adapted,  when  set  off  by  tl|e  oral  expansions  of  its  author! 
Xenophon  wondered  that  the  Athenian  Dikasts  dealt  with  Sokrates 
as  a  "corrupter  of  youth:  Isokrates  wondered  that  a  portion  of  the 
public  made  the  like  mistakeabout  himself:  andl  confessmy  wonder 
to  be  not  less,  that  not  only  Aristophanes,  but  even  the  mod'ern  writ- 
ers on  Grecian  philosophy, 'should  rank  Prodikus  in  the  same  unenvi- 
able catalogue.  This  is  the  only  composition  remaining  from  him— i 
indeed  the  only  composition  remaining  from  anyone  of  the  Sophists, 
excepting  the  thesis  of  Gorgias  above  noticed.  *It  serves,  not  merely 
as  a  vindication  of  Prodikus  against  such  nproach.  ])ut  also  as  a 
warning  against  implicit  confidence  in  the  sarcastic  remarks  of 
Plato— which  include  Prodikus  as  well  as  the  other  Sophists— and  in 
the  doctrmes  which  he  puts  into  the  niouthof  the  Sophists  generally, 
in  order  that  Sokrates  may  confute  them.  The  conmionest  candor 
would  teach  us,  that  if  a  polemical  writer  of  dialogue  chooses  to  put 
indefensible  doctrine  into  the  mouth  of  the  opponent,  we  ouuht  to  be 
cautious  of  condemning,  the  latter  upon  such  verv  dubious  proof. 

Welcker  and  other  modern  authors  treat  Prodikus  as  "the  most 
innocent"  of  the  Sophists,  and  except  him  from  the  sentence  which 
they  pass  upon  the  class  generally.  Let  us  see  therefore  what  Plato 
himself  says  about  the  rest  of  them,  and  first  about  Prota«roras.  Ii  it 
were  not  the  established  practice  with  readers  of  Plato  to  condemn 
Protagoras  beforehand,  and  to  put.  upon  every  passage  relatins?  to 
liim,  not  only  a  sense  as  bad  as  it  will  bear,  but  nuicirworse  than  it 
will  fairly  bear— they  would  probably  carry  awav  verv  different 
inferences  from  the  Platonic  dialogue  called  bv  that  Sophist's  name, 
and  in  which  he  is  made  to  bear  a  chief  part.  'Tiiat  dialogue  is  itself 
enough  to  prove  that  Plato  did  not  conceive  Protagoras  either  as  a 
corrupt,  or  unworthy,  or  incompetent  teacher.  The  course  of  the 
dialogue  exhibits  him  as  not  master  of  the  theory  of  ethics,  and 
unable  to  solve  various  difficulties  with  which  thartheory  is  expec- 
ted to  grapple;  moreover,  as  no  match  for  Sokrates  in 'dialectics, 
which  Plato  considered  as  the  only  efficient  method  of  philosophical 
investigation.  In  so  far  therefore  as  imperfect  acquaintance  with 
the  science  or  theory  upon  which  n^les  of  art,  or  the  precepts  bearing 
on  practice,  repose,  disqualifies  a  teacher  from  giving  instructions  in 
such  art  or  practice — to  that  extent  Protagoras  isexpcWd  as  wantini:. 
And  if  an  expert  dialecticia!),  like  Plato,  had  passed  Isokrates  or 
Quintiliau,  or  the  large  majority  of  teachers  past  or  present,  throudi 
a  similar  cross-examination  as'to  the  theory  of  their  teachinir— au 
ignorance  not  less  manifest  than  that  of  Protagoras  would  be  brought 
out.  The  antithesis  which  Plato  sets  forth,  in  so  many  of  his  diah^ 
gues,  between  precept  or  practice,  accompanied  by  full  knowledge 


PROTAGORAS. 


417 


of  the  scientific  principles  from  which  it  must  be  deduced  if  its 
rectitude  be  disputed— and  unscientific  practice,  without  any'  such 
power  of  deduction  or  defense— is  one  of  the  most  valuable  portions 


thmg  to  say  of  a  man,  that  he  does  not  know  the  theory  of  wh-it  he 
teacher,  or  of  the  way  in  which  he  teacher;    it  is  anoihcr  thinn-  to 
s;iy,  that  he  actually  teaches  that  which  scientific  tlieo!-y  would'not 
prescribe  as  the  best;  it  is  a  third  thing,  graver  tlian  botli,  to  say  that 
Ins  teaching  is  not  only  below  the  exiirences  of  science    but  even 
corrupt^and  demoralizing.  Now  of  theselhree  points,  it  is  the  firstonl  v 
which  Plato  in  his  dialogue  makes  out  against  Protagoras-  even  the 
second,  he  neither  affirms  nor  insinuates  ;^and  as  to  the  third   not  only 
he  never  glances  at  it  even  indirectly,  but  the  whole  tendency  of  the 
discourse  suggests  a  direct  contrary  conclusion.     As  if  sensible  that 
when  an  eminent  opponent  was  to  be  depicted  as  puzzled  and  irritated 
by  superior  dialectics,  it  was  but  common  fairness  to  set  forth  his 
distinctive  merits  al<^o— Plato  gives  a  fable,  and  expository  harano-ue 
from  the  mouth  of  Protagoras,  upon  the  question  whether  virtu^'e  is 
teachable.     Ihis  harangue  is,  in  my  judgment,  very  striking  and 
instructive;  and  so  it  would  have  been  probably  accounted   if  com- 
mentators had  not  read  it  with  a  pre-established  persuasion  that  what- 
ever came  from  the  lips  of  a  Sophist  must  be  either  ridiculous  or 
immoral.     It  is  the  only  part  of  Plato's  works  wherein  any  account 
IS  rendered  of  the  growth  of  that  fioating.   uncertified,  self-propan-- 
ating,  body  of  opinion,  upon  which  the  cross-examining  analysis  of 
feokrates  is  brought  to  bear-as  will  be  seen  in  thefollov?ing  chanter 
Protagoras  professes  to  teach  his  pupils  "good  counsef"  in  their 
domestic  and  family  relations,  as  well  as  how-to  speak  and  act  in  the 
most  effective  manner  for  the  weal  of  the  city.     Since  this  comes 
from   Protagoras,  the  commentators   of  Plato   pronounce  it  to  be 
miserable  morahtv:  but  it  coincides,  almost  to  the  letter,  with  that 
which  Isokrates  describes  himself  as  teaching,  .i  generation   after- 
ward, and  substantially  even  with  that  which  Xenophon  represents 
bokrates  as  teaching:  nor  is  it  easy  to  set  forth,  in  a  few  words   a 
larger  scheme  of  practical   duty.     And  if  the  measure  of  practical 
duty,  which  Protagoras  devoted  himself  to  teach,  was  thus  serious 
and  extensive   even  the  fraction  of  theory  assigned  to  him  in  his 
nurangue,  includes  some  points  better  than  that  of  Plato  himself 
^or  Flato  seems  to  have  conceived  the  Ethical  End,  to  each  indivi- 
aual,  as  comprising  nothing  more  than  his  own  permanent  happiness 
aud  moral  health;  and  in  this  very  dialogue,  he  introduces  Sokrates 
as  maintaining  virtue  to  consist  only  in  a  right  calculation  of  a  man's 
own  personal  happiness  and    misery.     But  here  we  find  Protagoras 
speaking  m  a  way  which  implies  a   larger,  and   in   my  opinion,  a 
Jii^ter  appreciation  of  the  Ethical  End,  as  including  not  onlv  refer- 
H.  G.  111.^14 


418  DRAMA-RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPHISTS. 

ence  to  a  man's  own  happiness,  but  algo  obligations  toward  the 
happiness  of  others.  Williout  at  all  airreeinir  in  the  harsli  terms  of 
censure  which  various  critics  pronounce  iijion  that  theory  wliicli 
Sokrates  is  made  to  set  fortli  in  tlie  Phitonic  Protagoras,  I  considor 
his  conception  of  the  Etliical  End  essentially  narrow  and  imperfect, 
not  capable  of  being  made  to  serve  as  basis  for  deduction  of  the  best 
ethical  precepts.  Yet  such  is  the  prejudice  with  which  tlie  history 
of  tlie  Sophists  has  l>ecn  written,  tliat  the  commentators  on  Plato 
accuse  tlie  Sophists  of  having  originated  what  lliev  ignorantly  term 
"the  base  theory  of  utility,"  here  propounded  by  Sokrates  himself; 
complimenting  the  latter  on  having  set  forth  those  larger  views 
which  in  this  dialogue  belong  only  to  Protagoras. 

So  far  as  concerns  Protagoras,  therefore,  the  evidence  of  Plato 
himself  m.-'.y  be  produced  to  show  that  he  was  not  a  corrupt  teacher, 
but  a  worthy  companion  of  Prodikus;  worthy  also  of  that  which  avc 
know  him  to  have  enjoyed — the  society  and  conversation  of  Perikles. 
Let  us  now  examine  what  Plato  says  about  a  third  Sophist — Ilippias 
of  Elis;  who  figures  both  in  the  dialogues  called  "Protagoras,"  and 
in  two  distin(;t  dialogues  known  by  the  titles  of  "Ilippias  Major  and 
ISIinor."  Hippias  is  represented  as  distinguished  for  the  wide  range 
of  his  accomplishments,  of  which  in  these  dialogues  he  ostenta- 
tiously boasts.  lie  could  teach  astronomy,  geometry,  and  arithmetic 
— which  subjects  Protagoras  censured  him  for  enforcing  too  nnich 
upon  his  pupils;  so  little  di<l  these  Sophists  agree  in  any  one  scheme 
of  doctrine  or  education.  Besides  this,  he  was  a  poet,  a  musician, 
an  expositor  of  the  poets,  and  a  lecturer  with  a  large  stock  of  com- 
posed matter — on  subjects  moral,  political,  and  even  legendary — 
treasured  up  in  a  very  retentive  memory.  He  was  a  citizen  much 
emplo5'ed  as  envoy  by  his  fellow-citizens;  to  crown  all,  his  manual 
dexterity  was  such  that  he  professed  to  have  made  with  his  own 
hands  all  the  attire  and  ornaments  which  he  wore  on  his  pervS;on.  If, 
as  is  sufficiently  probable,  he  was  a  vain  and  ostentatious  man — 
defects  not  excluding  an  useful  and  honorable  career — we  must  at 
the  same  time  iiive  him  credit  for  a  varietv  of  ac(|uisitions  such  as  to 
explain  a  certain  measure  of  vanity.  The  style  in  which  Plato 
handles  Ilippias  is  very  different  from  that  in  which  he  treats  Prota- 
goras. It  is  full  of  sneer  and  contemptuous  banter,  insomuch  that 
even  Stallbaum.  after  having  repeated  a  great  many  times  that  this 
was  a  vile  Sophist  who  deserved  no  better  treatment,  is  forced  to 
admit  that  the  petulence  is  carried  rather  too  far,  and  to  suggest  that 
the  dialogue  must  have  been  a  juvenile  work  of  Plato.  Be  this  as  it 
may  amid  so  much  unfriendly  handlinir,  not  only  we  find'  no  im- 
putation against  Hippias  of  having  preached  a  low  or  corrupt  moral- 
ity, but  Plato  inserts  that  which  furnishes  good,  though  indirect, 
proof  of  the  contrary.  For  Hippias  is  made  to  say  that  he  had 
alread}'  delivered,  and  was  about  to  deliver  agjiin,  a  lecture  composed 
by  himself  with  great  care,  v/herein  he  enlarged  upon  the  aims  and 


GORGIAS,  POLUS,  AND  KALLIKLES. 


419 


pursuits  which  a  young  man  ought  to  follow.  The  sciieme  of  his 
discourse  was,  that  after  the  capture  of  Troy,  the  youthful  Neoptole- 
mus  was  introduced  as  asking  the  advice  of  Nestor  about  his  own 
future  conduct;  in  reply  to  which,  Nestor  sets  forth  to  him  what  was 
the  plan  of  life  incumbent  on  a  young  man  of  honorable  aspirations, 
and  unfolds  to  him  the  full  details  of  regulated  and  virtuous  conduct 
by  which  it  ought  to  be  lilled  up.  The  selection  of  two  such  names, 
among  the  most  venei-ated  in  all  Grecian  legend,  as  monitor  and 
pupil,  is  a  stamp  clearly  attesting  the  vein  of  sentiment  which  aid- 
mated  the  composition.  Morality  preached  by  Nestor  for  the  edifica- 
tion of  Neoptolenms,  might  possibly  be  too  high  for  Athenian  prac- 
tice; but  most  certainly  it  would  not  err  on  the  side  of  corruption, 
selfishness,  or  over-indulgence.  We  may  fairly  presume  that  this 
discourse  composed  by  Hippias  would  not  be  unworthy,  in  spirit  and 
purpose,  to  be  placed  by  the  side  of  "  The  Choice  of  Hercules,"  nor 
its  author  by  that  of  Prodikus  as  a  moral  teacher.  , 

The  dialogue  entitled  "  Gorgias  "  in  Plato,  is  carried  on  by  Sokrates 
with  three  dilfereut  persons  one  after  the  other— Gorgias,  Polus,  and 
Kallikles.  Gorgias  (of  Leontini  in  Sioily),  as  a  rhetorical  teacher, 
acquired  greater  celebrity  than  any  man  of  his  time,  during  the  Pelo- 
pouuesian  war:  his  abundant  powers  of  illustration,  his  tlorid  orna- 
ments, his  artificial  structure  of  sentences  distributed  into  exact 
antithetical  fractions— all  spread  a  new  fashion  in  the  art  of  speak- 
ing, which  for  the  time  was  very  popular,  but  afterward  became 
discredited.  If  the  line  could  be  clearly  drawn  between  rhetors  and 
sophists,  Gorgias  ought  rather  to  be  ranked  with  the  former.  In  the 
conversation  with  Gorgias,  Sokrates  exposes  the  fallacy  and  impos- 
ture of  rhetoric  and  rhetorical  teaching,  as  cheating  an  ignorant 
audience  into  persuasion  without  knowledge,  and  as  framed  to  satisfy 
the  passing  caprice,  without  any  regard  to  the  permanent  w^elfare 
and  improvement  of  the  people.  Whatever  real  inculpation  may  be 
conveyed  in  these  arguments  against  a  rhetorical  teacher,  Gorgias 
must  bear  in  common  with  Isokrates  and  Quintilian,  and  under  the 
I  shield  of  Aristotle.  But  save  and  except  rhetorical  teaching,  no 
dissemination  of  corrupt  morality  is  ascribed  to  him  by  Plato;  who 
mdeed  treats  him  with  a  degree  of  respect  which  surprises  the 
commentators. 

The  tone  of  the  dialogue  changes  materially  when  it  passes  to 
1  olus  and  Kallikles,  the  former  of  whom  is  described  a,s  a  writer  on 
rlietoric,  and  probably  a  teacher  also.  There  is  much  insolence  in 
1  olus,  and  no  small  asperity  in  Sokrates.  Yet  the  former  maintains 
no  arguments  which  justify  the  charge  of  immorality  against  him- 
self or  his  fellow-teachers.  He  defends  the  tastes  and  sentiments 
common  to  every  man  in  Greece,  and  shared  even  by  the  most  estim- 
able Athenians— Perikles,  Nikias,  and  Aristokrates,  while  Sokrates 
prides  himself  on  standing  absolutely  alone,  and  having  no  support 
except  from  his  irresistible  dialectics,  whereby  he  is  sure  of  extorting 


420  DRAMA— RHETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPHISTS. 

relijctant  admission  fiom  his  adversary.  How  far  Sokrates  may  be 
right,  I  do  not  now  inquire:  it  is  sufficient  that  Polus,  standing  as  he 
does  amid  company  at  once  so  numerous  and  so  irreproachable,  can-' 
not  be  fairly  denounced  as  a  poisoner  ot  the  youthful  mind. 

Polus  presently  hands  over  the  dialogue  to  Kallikles,  who  is  here 
represenled,  doubtless,  as  laying  down  doctrines  openly  and  avow- 
rcdly  anti-social.  He  distingui:^lies  between  the  law  of  nature  and 
the  law  (both  written  and  unwritten,  for  the  Greek  word  substan- 
tially includes  both)  of  socitly.  According  to  the  law  of  nature 
(Kaflikles  says)  the  strong  man — tlie  better  or  more  capable  man — 
puts  forth  his  strength  to  the  full  for  his  own  advantage,  without 
limit  or  restraint;  overcomes  the  resistance  which  weaker  men  are 
able  to  offer;  and  seizes  for  himself  as  much  as  he  pleases  of  the 
matter  of  enjoyment.  He  has  no  occasion  to  restrain  any  of  his 
appetites  or  desires;  the  more  numerous  and  pressing  they  are,  so 
much  the  better  for  him — since  his  power  affords  him  the  means  of 
satiating  them  aW.  The  many,  who  have  the  misfortune  to  be  weak, 
must  be  content  with  thai  which  he  leaves  them,  and  submit  to  it  as 
best  they  can.  This  (Kallikles  says)  is  what  actually  happens  in  a 
state  of  nature;  this  is  what  is  accounted  just,  as  is  evident  by  the 
practice  of  independent  communities,  not  included  in  one  common 
political  society,  toward  each  other;  this  'isjuatice,  by  nature,  or  accord- 
ing to  the  hnv  of  nature.  But  when  men  come  into  society,  all  this 
is  reversed.  The  majority  of  individuals  know  very  well  that  they  are 
weak,  and  that  their  only  chance  of  security  or  comfort  consists  jn 
establishing  laws  to  restrain  the  stron»  man,  re-enforced  by  a  moral 
sanction  of  praise  and  blame  devoted  to  the  same  general  end.  They 
catch  him  like  a  young  lion  while  his  mind  is  yet  temler,  and 
fascinate  hira  by  talk  and  training  into  a  disposition  conformable  to 
that  measure  and  equality  which  the  law  enjoins.  Here,  then,  is 
justice  according  to  the  law  of  society;  a  factitious  system  built  up. 
by  the  many  for  their  own  protection  and  happiness,  to  the  subver- 
sion of  the  faw  of  nature,  which  arms  tlie  strong  man  with  a  right  to 
encroachment  and  license.  Let  a  fair  opportunity  occur,  and  the 
the  favorite  of  nature  will  be  seen  to  kick  off  his  harness,  tread  down 
the  laws,  break  through  the  magic  circle  of  opinion  around  him,  and 
stand  forth  again  as  lord  and  master  of  the  many;  regaining  that 
glorious  position  which  nature  has  assigned  to  him  as  his  right. 
Justice  by  nature — and  justice  by  law  and  society — are  thus,  accord- 
ing to  Kallikles,  not  only  distinct,  but  mutually  contradictory.  He 
accuses  Sokrates  of  having  jumbled  the  two  together  in  his  argument. 

It  has  been  contended  by  many  authors,  that  this  anti-sociai  reason- 
ing (true  enough,  in  so  far  as  it  states  simple  matter  of  fact  and  pro- 
bability— inmioral,  in  so  far  as  it  erects  the  power  of  the  strong 
man  into  a  right;  and  inviting  many  comments,  if  I  could  find  a 
convenient  place  for  them)  represents  the  morality  commonly  and 
publicly  tiiugUt  by  the  persons  called  Sopliists  at  Athens.    I  deny 


KALLIKLES. 


421 


this  assertion  emphatically.  Even  if  I  had  no  other  evidence  to  sus- 
tain my  denial,  except  what  ha3  been  already  extracted  from  the  un- 
friendly writings  of  Plato  himself,  respecting  Protagoras  and  Hippias 

with  what  we  know  from  Xenophon  about  Prodikus — I  should 

consider  my  case  made  out  as  vindicating  the  Sophists  generally  from 
such  an  accusation.  If  refutation  to  the  doctrine  of  Kallikles  were 
needed,  it  would  be  obtained  quite  as  efficaciously  from  Prodikus 
and  Protagoras  as  from  Sokrates  and  Plato. 

But  this  is  not  the  strongest  part  of  the  vindication. 

First,  Killikles  himself  is  not  a  Sophist,  nor  re})resented  by  Plato 
as  such.  He  is  a  young  Athenian  citizen,  of  rank  tind  station,  belong- 
ing to  the  deme  Acharnoe;  he  is  intimate  with  other  young  men  of 
condition  in  the  city,  has  recently  entered  into  active  political  life, 
and  bends  his  wiiole  soul  toward  it;  he  disparages  philosophy,  and 
speaks  with  utter  contempt  about  the  Sophists.  If  then  it  were  even 
just  (which  I  do  not  admit)  to  infer  from  opinions  put  into  the  mouth 
of  one  Sophist,  that  the  same  were  held  by  anotli;ir  or  by  all  of  them 
— it  would  not  be  the  less  unjust  to  dra\v  the  like  inference  from 
opinions  professed  by  one  who  is  not  a  Sophist,  and  who  despises 
the  whole  profession. 

Secondly,  if  any  man  will  read  attentively  the  course  of  the  dia- 
logue, he  will  see  that  the  doctrine  of  Kallikles  is  such  as  no  one 
dare  publicly  to  propound.  So  it  conceived  both  by  Killaklcs  him- 
self, and  by  Sokrates.  The  former  first  takes  up  the  conversation  by 
saving  that  his  predecesor  Polus  had  become  entangled  in  a  (,'ontra- 
diction.  because  he  had  not  courage  enough  oi)enly  to  announce  an 
unpopular  and  odious  doctrine;  but  he  (Killikles)  was  less  shame- 
faced, and  would  speak  out  boldly  that  doctrine  which  others  kept 
to  themselves  for  fear  of  shocking  the  hearers.  "Certainly  (says 
Sokrates  to  him)  your  autlacity  is  abundantly  shown  by  the  doctrine 
which  you  have  just  laid  down — ^you  set  forth  plainly  that  which 
other  people  think,  but  do  not  choose  to  utter."  Now,  opinions  of 
which  Polus,  an  insolent  young  man,  was  afraid  to  proclaim  himself 
the  champion,  must  have  been  revolting  indeed  to  the  sentiments  of 
hearers.  IIow  then  can  any  reasonable  man  believe,  that  such  opinions 
were  not  only  openly  propounded,  but  seriously  inculcated  as  truth 
upon  audiences  of  youthful  hearers,  by  the  Sophists?  We  know 
that  the  teaching  of  the  latter  was  public  in  the  highest  degree;  pub- 
licity was  pleasing  as  w^ell  as  ])rofitable  to  them ;  among  the  many 
disparaging  epithets  heaped  upon  them,  ostentation  anil  vanity  are 
two  of  the  most  conspicuous.  Whatever  they  taught,  they  taught 
publicly;  and  I  contend,  with  full  conviction,  that  had  they  even 
agreed  with  Killikles  in  this  opinion,  they  could  neither  have  been 
sufficiently  audacious,  nor  sufficiently  their  own  enemies,  to  make  it 
a  part  of  their  public  teaching;  but  would  have  acted  like  Polus, 
and  kept  the  doctrine  to  themselves. 

Thirdly,  this  latter  conclusion  will  be  rendered  doubly  certain,  when 


422  DRAMA-RIIETORIC  xVXD  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

we  consider  of  w\v?i  city  we  arc  now  spoakinf^.     Of  all  places  in  the 
world   the  democratical  Athens  is  the  last  in  which  the  doctrine  ad-^ 
vanced  bv  Killikles  could  possibly  have  been  professed  by  a  public 
teacher-  or  even  by  Killikles  himself,  in  any  public  meeting.     It  is 
unnecessary  to  remind  the  reader  how  profoundly  democratical  was 
the  sentiment  aud   tlie  morality  of  the  Athenians— how  much  they 
loved  tlieir  laws,  tlieir  constitution,  and  tla-ir  political ('<iuality—h()\v 
iealous  their  iippreh(;nsion  was  of  any  nascent  or  threatening  despot- 
ism     All  this  is  not  simplv  admitted,  but  even  exaggerated,  by  Mr. 
]\[itford    Wachsmut,  and  other  auti  democratical  writers,  who  often 
draw  from  it  materials  for  their  abundant  censures.     Now  the  very 
point  which  Sokrates  (in  this  dialoirue  called  "Gorgias")  seeks  to  es- 
tablish aiiainst  Kallikies,  against  the  Klietors,  and  against  the  Sophists 
—is  that^thuy  courted,   flattered,  and   tnickled  lo  the  sentiment  ot 
the  Athenian  people,  with  degrading  subservience:  that  they  lookec 
to  the  immediate  .gratification  simply,  and  not  to  i)ermanent  moral 
improvement  of  the  people— that  they  had  not  courage  to  address  to 
them  any  unpalatable  truths,  however  salutary,  but  wou  d  shift  and 
modify  opinions  in  every  way  so  as  to  escape  giving  olTense— that  no 
man  who  put  liimself  prominently  forward  at  Athens  had  any  chance 
of  success  unless  he  became  molded  and  assimilated,  from  the  core, 
to  the  people  and  their  tvpe  of  sentiment.     Gnmtiug  such  charges 
to  be  true   how  is  it  conceivable  that  any  Sophist,  or  any  Ithetor, 
could  venture  to  enforce  upon  an  Athenian  public  audience  the  doc- 
trine laid  down  bv  Killikles?    To  tell  such  audience—"  Your  hiws 
and  institutions  are  all  violations  of  the  law  of  nature,  contrived  to 
disappoint  the  Alkibiades  or  Napoleon  an>ong  you  of  his  naturul  right 
to  become  your  master,  and  to  deal  with  you  petty  men  as  his  slaves 
All  vour  unnatural   precautions,  and  conventional  talk,  in   favor  ot 
le^rjility  aud  equal  dealing,  will  turn  out  to  be  nothing  better  than 
pitiful  impotence,  as  soon  as  he  tinds  a  good  opportunity  of  standing 
forward  in  his  full  might  and  energy— so  as  to  put  you  into  your 
proper  places,  and  show  you  what  privileges  Nature  intends  lor  her 
favorite'"     Conceive  such  a  doctrine  propounded  by  a  lecturer  to 
assembled  Athenians!     A  doctrine  just  as  revolting  to  Njikias  as  to 
Kleon,  aud  which  even  Alkibiades  would  be  forced  to  affect  lo  dis- 
approve since  it  is  not  simply  anti-]>opular— not  simi)1y  despotic— 
but  the  drunken  extravairance  of  despotism.     The  Great  man  as  de- 
picted bv  Kallikies  stands  in  the  same  relation  to  ordinary  mortals, 
as  Jonathan  Wild  the  Great  in  the  admirable  parody  of  Fielding. 

That  Sophists,  whom  Plato  accuses  of  slavish  flattery  to  the  demo- 
cratical ear.  should  gratuitouslv  insult  it  by  the  proposition  of  sueh 
tenets  is  an  assertion  not  merelv  untrue,  but  utterly  absurd.  Even 
as  to  Sokrates  we  know  from  Xenophon  how  much  the  Athenians 
were  offend<'d  with  him.  and  how  much  it  was  urged  by  the  accusers 
on  his  trial  that  in  hiu  conversations  he  was  wont  to  cite  with  pecu- 
liar relish  the  description  (in  the  second  book  of  the  Iliad)  of  Odysseus 


k 


DOCTRINE  OF  THRASYMACIIUS. 


423 


following  the  Grecian  crowd  when  running  away  from  the  agora  to 
get  on  shipboard,  and  prevailing  upon  them  to  come  back,  by  gentle 
words  addressed  to  the  chiefs,  but  by  blows  of  his  slick,  acc(jm- 
pauied  with  conlemptuous  reprimand,"to  the  common  people.  The 
indirect  evidence  thus  afforded  that  Sokrates  countenanced  unequal 
dealing  and  ill-usage  toward  the  many,  told  much  against  him  in  the 
minds  of  the  Dikasts.  What  would  they  have  felt  then  toward  a 
Sophist  who  publicly  professed  the  political  morality  of  Kallikies  ? 
The  truth  is — not  only  was  it  impossible  that  any  such  morality,  or 
anything  of  the  same  type  even  much  diluted,  could  find  its  way  into 
the  educational  lectures  of  professors  at  Athens — but  the  fear  would 
he  in  the  opposite  direction.  If  the  Sophist  erred  in  either  way,  it 
would  be  in  that  which  Sokrates  imputes — by  making  his  lectures 
over-democratical.  Nay,  if  we  suppose  any  opportunity  to  have 
arisen  of  discussing  the  doctrine  of  Kallikies,  he  would  hardly  omit 
to  flatter  the  ears  of  the  surrounding  democrats  by  enhancing  the 
beneficent  results  of  legality  and  equal  dealing,  and  by  denouncing 
this  "natural  despot"  or  undisclosed  Napoleon,  as  one  who  musi, 
either  take  his  place  under  such  restraints,  or  find  a  place  in  some 
other  city. 

I  have  thus  shown,  even  from  Plato  himself,  that  the  doctrine 
ascribed  to  Kallikies  neither  did  enter,  nor  could  have  entered,  into 
the  lectures  of  a  Sophist  or  professed  teacher.  The  same  conclusion 
may  be  maintained  respecting  the  doctrine  of  Thrasyniachus  in  the 
first  book  of  the  "Republic."  Thrasymachus  was  a  rhetorical 
teacher,  who  had  devised  precepts  respecting  the  construction  of  an 
oration  and  the  training  of  young  men  for  public  speaking.  It  is 
most  probable  that  he  confined  himself,  like  Gorgias,  to  this  depart- 
ment, and  that  he  did  not  profess  to  give  moral  lectures,  iike  Prota- 
goras and  Prodikus.  But  granting  him  to  have* given  suca,  he  would 
not  talk  about  justice  in  the  way  In  which  Plato  makes  him  talk,  if 
he  desired  to  give  any  satisfaction  to  an  Athenian  audience.  The 
mere  brutality  and  ferocious  impudence  of  demeanor,  even  to  exag- 
geration, Avith  which  Plato  invests  him— is  in  itself  a  strong  proof 
that  the  doctrine,  ushered  in  with  such  a  preface,  was  not  that  of  a 
popular  and  acceptable  teacher,  winning  favor  in  public  audiences. 
He  defines  justice  to  be  "the  interest  of  the  superior  power;  that 
rule,  which,  in  every  society,  the  dominant  power  prescribes,  as 
being  for  its  own  advantage."  .  A  man  is  just  (he  says)  for  the  advan- 
tage of  another,  not  for  his  own ;  he  is  weak,  caniiot  help  himself, 
aud  must  sul)mit  to  that  which  the  stronger  authority,  whether  des- 
pot, oligarchy,  or  commonwealth  commands. 

The  theory  is  essentially  different  from  the  doctrine  of  Kallikies, 
as  set  forth  a  few  pages  back;  for  Thrasymachus  does  not  travel  out 
of  society  to  insist  upon  anterior  rights  dating  from  a  supposed  state 
of  nature — he  takes  societies  as  he  finds  them,  recognizing  the  actual 
governing  authority  of  each  as  the  canon  and  constituent  of  justice 


424  DRAMA-IIUETOKIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

or  iniusticc  Stallbfium  and  otlicr  writers  liavc  incautiously  treated 
the  two  theories  as  if  they  were  tiie  same;  and  with  something  even 
worse  than  want  of  caution,  while  they  pronounce  the  theory  of 
Thrisvniaehus  to  be  detestablv  immoral,  announce  it  as  having  been 
propounded  not  by  him  only,  but  by  Tlu>  iyjphu^L^-ihxx^  in  their 
usual  style,  dealing  with  the  Sophists  as  if  they  were  a  schoc  sect 
or  partnership  with  mutual  responsibility.  AUioever  has  folh;^vcd 
the  evidence  which  I  have  produced  rcspe('tiiig  Protagoras  and  1  lodi- 
kus,  will  know  how  dilferently  these  latter  handled  the  question  of 

■^^But^the  truth  is.  that  Uie  theorv  of  Thrasymachus,  though  incorrect 
nnd  defective,  is  not  so  detestable  as  these  writers  represent.     V\  hat 
m-ikes  it  seem  detestable,  is,  the  style  and  manner  in  which  he  ic 
made  to  put  it  forward,  whicli  causes  the  just  man  to  appear  petty 
and  contemptible,  while  it  surrounds  the  unjust  man  with  enviable 
attributes.     Now  this  is  precisely   the  circumstance  which  revolts 
the  common  sentiments  of  mankind,  as  it  revolts  also  the  critics  who 
read  what  is  said  by  Thrasvmachus.     The  moral  sentiments  exist  in 
men's  minds  in  complex  and  powerful  groups,  associated  with  sonic 
lar«re  words  and  emphatic  forms  of  speech.     Whether   an   ethical 
theory  satisfies  the  exi£::cnces  of  reason,  or  commands  and  answers 
to  all  the  phenomena— a  common  audience  w  ill  seldom  give  theni- 
selves  the  trouble  to  consider  with  attention,  but  wliat  they  imperi- 
ouslv  exact— and  what  is  indispensable  to  give  the  theory  any  chance 
of  success   is,  that  it  shall  exhibit  to  their  feelings  the  just  man  as 
respectable  and  diunified,  and  the  unjust  man  as  odious  and  repUiSive. 
Now  that  which  otfends  in  the  language  ascribed  to  Thrasymaclnis, 
is  not  merely  the  absence,  but  the  reversal,  of  thi.s  condition— the 
presentation *of  the  just  man  as  weak  and  silly,  nnd  of  injustice  in  all 
the  pr^^t^U^  of  triumph  and  dignity.     And  for  this  verv  i^ason  1  ven- 
ture to  infer  that  sudi  a  tleorv  was  jiever  pr<  pounded  by  Ihrasy- 
machus  to  anv  public  audience  in  the  the  form  m  which  it  appears 
in  Plato      For   Thrasvmachus  was  a    rhetor,  who   had   studied   tlie 
principles  of  his  art;  now  wc  know  that  these  common   sentiments 
of  an  audience  were  precisely  what  the  rhetors  best  understood,  and 
alwavs  strove  to  conciliate.     Even  from  the  time   of  Gorgias,  tluy 
be"-aii  the  practir^e  of  composimr  beforehand  declamations  upon  tiie 
treneral  heads  of  moralitv,  which  were  ready  to  be  introduced  into 
actual  speeches  ai?  occasion  presented  itself,  and  in  which  appeal  was 
made  to  the  moral  sentiments  foreknown  as  common,  with  more  or 
less  of  modification,  to  all  the  Grecian  assemblies.     The  real  Thrasy- 
machus,   addressing    any   audience    at  Alliens,  would  never  have 
wounded  these  sentiments,  as  tlic  Platonic  Thrasymachus  is  maoe  to 
do  in  the  "  Republic."     Least  of  all  would  he  have  done  this,  if  it  be 
true  of  him,  as  Plato  asserts  of  the  Rhetors  and  Sophists  generally, 
that  they  thought  about  nothing  but  courting  popularity,  without 
any  sincerity  of  conviction. 


OPINION  OF  THRASYMACHUS. 


425 


Though  Plato  thinks  fit  to  bring  out  the  opinion  of  Thrasymachus 
with  accessories  unnecessarily  oITensive,  and  thus  to  enhance  che 
dialectical  triumph  of  Sokrates  by  the  brutal  manners  of  the  adversary 
— he  was  well  aware  that  he  had  not  done  justice  to  the  opinion 
itself,  much  less  confuted  it.  The  proof  of  this  is,  that  in  the  second 
book  of  the  "Republic,"  after  Thrasymachus  has  disappeared,  the 
very  same  opinion  is  taken  up  by  Glaukou  and  Adeimantus,  and  set 
fortfi  by  both  oC  them  (though  they  disclaim  entertaining  it  as  their 
own),  as  suggesting  grave  doubts  and  difficulties  wiiich  they  desire  to 
hear  solved  by  Sokrates.  Those  who  read  attentively  the  discourses 
of  Glaukon  and  Adeimantus,  will  see  that  the  substantive  opinioa 
ascribed  to  Thrasymachus,  apart  from  the  brutality  with  which  he  is 
made  to  state  it,  does  not  even  countenance  the  charge  of  immoral 
teaching  agauist  him — much  less  against  the  Sophists  generally. 
Hardly  anything  in  Plato's  compositions  is  more  powerful  than  those 
discourses.  They  present  in  a  perspicuous  and  forcible  manner, 
some  of  the  most  serious  difficulties  with  which  ethical  theory  is 
required  to  grapple.  And  Plato  can  answer  them  only  in  one  way — 
by  taking  society  to  pieces,  and  reconstructing  it  in  the  form  of  his 
imaginary  republic.  The  speeches  of  Glaiikon  and  Adeimantus  form 
the  immediate  preface  to  the  striking  and  elaborate  description  which 
lie  goes  through,  of  his  new  state  of  society,  nor  do  they  receive  any 
other  answer  than  what  is  implied  in  that  description.  Plato 
indirectly  confesses  that  he  cannot  answer  them,  assuining  social 
institutions  to  continue  unreformed,  and  his  reform  is  sulticiently 
fundamental. 

X  call  particular  attention  to  this  circumstance,  without  which  we 
cannot  fairly  estimate  the  Sophists,  or  practical  teachers  of  Athens, 
face  to  face  with  tlieir  accuser-general — Plato.  He  was  a  great  and  sys- 
tematic theorist,  whose  opinions  on  ethics,  politics,  cognition,  religion, 
etc.,  were  all  wrought  into  harmony  by  his  own  mind,  and  stamped 
with  that  peculiarity  which  is  the  mark  of  an  original  intellect.  So 
splendid  an  effort  of  speculative  genius  is  among  the  marvels  of  the 
Grecian  Avorld.  His  dissent  from  all  the  societies  which  he  saw 
around  him,  not:  merely  democratical,  but  oligarchical,  and  despotic 
also,  was  of  the  deepest  and  most  ra<lical  character.  Nor  did  he  de- 
lude himself  by  the  belief,  that  any  partial  amendment  of  that  which 
he  saw  arouiuf  could  bring  about  tiie  end  which  he  desired:  he  looked 
to  nothing  short  of  a  new  genesis  of  the  man  and  the  citizen,  with 
institutions  calculated  from  the  beginning  to  w^ork  out  the  full  meas- 
ure of  perfectibility.  His  fertile  scientitic  imagination  realized  this 
idea  in  the  "Republic."  But  that  very  systematic  and  original  char- 
acter, which  lends  so  much  value  and  charm  to  the  substantive  specu- 
lations of  Plato,  counts  as  a  deduction  from  his  trustworthiness  as 
critic  or  witness,  in  reference  to  the  living  agents  whom  he  saw  at 
work  in  Athens  and  other  cities,  as  statesmen,  generals,  or  teachers. 
His  criticisms  are  dictated  by  his  own  point  of  view,  according  to 


42G  DRAMA-RIIETORIC  AND  DIALECTICS— SOPHISTS. 

"VV'liich  the  entire  poclciy  Avas  corrupt,  and  all  the  instrunionls  who 
carried  on  its  functions  were  of  tssentially  bai^e  metal.  Whoever 
-will  read  either  the  "  Goririas  "  or  the  "  Republic,"  will  see  in  how- 
sweeping  and  indiscriminate  a  manner  he  passes  his  sentence  of  con- 
demnation. Not  only  all  the  Sophists  and  all  the  Rhetors— but  all 
the  musicians  and  ditliyrambic  or  tragic  poets— all  the  statesmen,  past 
as  well  as  present,  not  excepting  even  the  great  Perikles— receive 
from  his  hands  one  common  stamp  of  dishonor.  Every  one  of-thcse 
men  is  numbered  by  Plato  among  the  numerous  category  of  tlatter- 
ers,  who  minister  to  the  immedijite  gTntification  and  to  the  desires  of 
the  people,  without  looking  to  their  permanent  improvement,  ormak- 
ini;  them  morally  better.  "Perikhs  and  Kimon  (says  Sokrates  in 
the  *  Gorgias')  are  nothing  but  servants  or  ministers  who  supply  the 
immediate  appetites  and  tastes  of  the  people;  just  as  the  baker  and 
the  confectioner  do  in  their  respective  departments,  without  know- 
ing or  caring  whether  the  food  will  do  any  r(>al  good— a  point  which 
the  physician  alone  can  determine.  As  ministers,  they  are  clever 
enouirh:  they  have  pro\  ided  the  city  amply  with  tribute,  walls,  docks, 
siiips^  and  »uch  other  follies :  but  1  (Sokfates)  am  the  only  man  in 
Athens  who  aim,  so  far  as  my  strength  permits,  at  the  true  purpose 
of  politics — the  mental  improVementof  the  people."  So  wholesale  a 
condemnation  betrays  itself  as  the  offspring,  and  the  consistent  off- 
spring, of  systematic  peculiarity  of  vision— the  prejudice  of  a  great 
and  able  mind. 

It  would  be  not  less  unjust  to  appreciate  the  Sophists  or  the  states- 
men of  Athens  from  the  point  of  view  of  Plato,  than  the  present 
teachers  and  politicians  of  England  or  France  from  that  of  Mr.  Owen 
or  Fourier.  Both  the  one  and  the  other  class  labored  for  society  as 
it  stood  at  Athens:  the  statesmen  carried  on  the  business  of  practical 
politics,  the  Sophists  trained  up  youth  for  practical  life  in  all  its  de- 
partments, as  family  men,  citizens,  and  leaders — to  obey  as  well  as 
to  command.  Rotlf  accepted  the  system  as  it  stood  without  contem- 
plating the  possibility  of  a  new  biith  of  society:  both  nnnistered  to 
certain  exigences,  held  their  anchorage  upon  certain  sentiments,  and 
bowed  to  a  certain  morality,  actually  felt  among  the  living  men 
around  them.  That  which  Plato  says  of  the  statesmen  of  Athens  is 
]>erfectU'true— that  they  were  oidy  servants  or  ministers  of  the  peo- 
ple, lie,  who  tried  the  people  aiul  the  entire  society  by  comparison 
with  an  imaginary  standard  of  his  own,  might  deem  all  these  minis- 
ters worthless  in  the  lump,  as  carrying  on  a  system  too  bad  to  be 
mended;  but  nevertheless  the  difference  between  a  competent  and  an 
incompetent  minister — between  Perikles  and  Nikias — was  of  un- 
speakable moment  to  the  security  and  happiness  of  the  Athenians. 
What  the  Sophists  on  their  part  undertook,  was,  to  educate  young 
men  so  as  to  make  them  better  qualified  for  statesmen  or  ministers; 
and  Protagoras  would  have  ihcught  it  sufficient  honor  to  himself — 
as  well  as  sufficient  benefit  to  Athens,  which  assuredly  it  would  have 


ATHENIAN  CORRUPTION. 


427 


■ 


\)QQi\ — if  he  could  have  inspired  any  young  Athenian  with  the  soul 
and  the  capacities  of  his  friend  and  companion  Perikles. 

So  far  is  Plato  from  considering  the  Sophists  as  the  corrupters  of 
Athenian  morality,  that  he  distinctly  protests  against  that  supposi- 
tion, in  a  remarkable  passage  of  the  "Republic."  It  is  (he  says)  the 
whole  people,  or  the  so(;iety,  with  its  established  morality,  intelli- 
gence, and  tone  of  sentiment,  which  is  intrinsically  viciousi  the 
teachers  of  such  a  society  nmst  be  vicious  also,  otherwise  their  teach- 
ing would  not  be  received;  and  even  if  their  private  teaching' were 
ever  so  good,  its.  effect  would  be  washed  away  except  in  some  few 
privileged  natures,  by  the  overwhelming  deluge  of  pernicious  social 
iatluences.  Nor  let  any  one  imagine  (as  modern  readers  are  but 
too  ready  to  understand  H)  that  this  poignant  censure  is  intended  for 
Athens  so  far  forth  as  a  democracy.  Plato  was  not  the  man  to 
preach  king-worship,  or  wealth-worship,  as  social  or  political  reme- 
dies: he  declares  emphatically  that  not  one  of  the  societies  then  exist- 
ing was  such  that  a  truly  philosophical  nature  could  be  engaged  in 
active  functions  under  it.  These  passages  would  be  alone  sutiicient 
to  repel  the  assertions  of  those  who  denounce  the  Sophists  as  poison- 
ers of  Athenian  morality,  on  the  alleged  authority  of  Plato. 

Nor  is  it  at  all  more  true  that  they  were  men  of  mere  w^ords,  and 
made  their  pupils  no  belter— a  charge  just  as  vehemently  pressed 
against  Socrates  as  against  the  Sophists — and  by  the  same  class  of 
enemies,  such  as  xlnytus,  Aristophanes,  Eupolis,  etc.  It  was  mainly 
from  Sophists  like  Hippias  that  the  Athenian  youth  learnt  what  they 
knew  of  geometry,  astronomy,  and  arithmetic:  but  the  range  of 
what  is  called  special  science,  possessed  even  by  the  teachers,  was  at 
that  time  very  limited;  and  the  matter  of  im^truction  communicated 
was  expressed  untler  the  general  title  of  "Words  or  Discourses," 
which  were  always  taught  by  the  Sophists,  in  connection  with 
thought  and  in  reference  to  a  practical  use.  The  capacities  of 
tliouglit,  speech  and  action — are  conceived  in  conjunction  by  Greeks 
generally,  and  by  teachers  likelsokrates  and  Quintilian  especially; 
and  when  young-  men  in  Greece,  like  the  Boeotian  Proxenus,  put 
themselves  under  training  by  Gorgias  or  any  other  Sophist— it  was 
with  a  view  of  qualifying  themselves,  not  merely  to  speak,  but  to 
act. 

Most  of  the  pupils  of  the  Sophists  (as  of  Sokrates  himself)  were 
young  men  of  wealth;  a  fact,  at  which  Plato  sneers,  and  others  copy 
him,  as  if  it  proved  that  they  cared  only  about  high  pay.  But  I  do 
not  hesitate  to  range  myself  on  the  side  of  Isokrates,  and  to  contend 
that  the  Sophist  himself  had  much  to  lose  by  corrupting  his  pupils 
(an  argument  used  by  Sokrates  in  defending  himself  before  the 
Dikastery,  and  just  as  valid  in  defense  of  Protagoras  or  Prodikus) 
and  strong  personal  interest  in  sending  them  forth  accomplished  and 
virtuous— that  the  best  taught  youth  weredecidely  the  most  free  from 
crime  and  the  most  active  toward  good— that  among  the  valuable 


428  DRAMA-RIIETOKIC  AND  DIALECTICS-SOPHISTS. 

ideas  and  fccIiDgs  m iiich  a  youn-  Athenian  liad  in  his  mind  as  well 
as  among  the  good  pursuits  whieh  he  followed,  those  which  he 
learnt  trom  (he  Sophists  counted  n(>arly  as  the  best— that  if  the  con- 
trary had  been  the  fact,  fathers  would  not  have  continued  so  to  send 
their  sons,  and  pay  their  money.  It  was  not  merely  that  these  tc  ch- 
ers  countervailed  in  part  the  temptations  to  dissipated  eniovnunt 
but  also  that  they  were  personally  unconcerned  in  the  acrinionious 
slander  and  warfare  of  party  in  his  native  eity-that  the  topics  with 


all  the  undehned  cluster  of  associations  connected  with  the  ^n-eat 
words  of  morahty-that  they  vivified  in  him  the  sentiment  ofPan- 
Ilellenicbrotherhood-and  that  in  teachinghim  the  art  of  persuasion 
they  could  not  but  make  him  feel  the  dependence  in  which  he  stood 
tovvard  those  who  were  to  be  persuaded,  together  with  the  necessity 
under  which  he  lay  of  so  conducting  himself  as  to  conciliate  their 
^ood  will. 

The  intimations  given  in  Plato,  of  the  enthusiastic  reception  which 
Protagoras    Prodikus,  and  other  Soi^hists  met  with  in  the  various 
cities— the  description  which  we  read  (in  the  dialogue  called  Prota- 
goras) of  the  impatience  of  the  youthful  Hippokrales,  on  hearing  of 
the  arrival  of  that  Sophist,  insomuch  that  he  awakens  Sokrates  be- 
fore daylight,  in  order  to  obtain  an   introduction  to  the  newcomer 
and  proht  by  his  teaching-the  readiness  of  such  rich  men  to  pay 
money,  and  devote  time  and  trouble,  for  the  purpose  of  acquirincra 
personal  supmority  apart  from  their  wealth  and  station-the  ardor 
with  which  Kallias  is  represented  as  employing  his  house  for  the 
hospi  able  entertainment,  nnd  his  fortune  for  the  Sid,  of  the  Sophists 
—a  1  this  makes  upon  my  mind  an  impression  directly  the  reverse  of 
that  ironical  and  contemptuousphraseology  with  which  it  is  set  forth 
Dy  I'lato     Such  Sophists  had  nothing  to  recommend  them  except 
superior  knowledge  and  intellectual  force,  combircd  with  an  impos- 
ing personalrty   making  itself  felt  in  their  lecture,  and  conversatkm. 
It  IS  to  this  that  the  admiration  was  shown ;  and  the  fact  that  it  was 
so  shown,  brings  to  view  the  best  attributes  of  the  Greek,  especially 
the  Athenian  mind.     It  exhibits  those  qualities  of  which  Periklc^ 
niade  emphatic  boast  in  his  celebrated  funeral  orations-conceprion 
of  public  speech  as  a  practical  thing,  not  meant  as  an  excuse  for  in 
action,  but  combined  with  energetic  action,  and  turning  it  to  good 
account  by  full  and  open  discussion  beforehand-profound  sensibility 
to  the  charm  ot  manifested  intellect,  without  enei-vating  thrnowers 
of  execution  or  endurance.     Assuredly  a  man  like  Prota-oras  arriv- 
ing in  a  city  with  all  his  train  of  admiration  laid  beforeS  mult 
have  known  very  little  of  his  own  interest  or  position,  if  he  Kfo 
preach  a  low  or  corrupt  morality.     If  it  be  true  general h^ a!  Vol 
tairehas  remarked,  that  "  any  man -who  should  cSme  to  preach  a 


SPIRIT  SHOWN  TOWARD  SOKRATES. 


429 


I 

I 


relaxed  moralily  would  be  pelted,"  much  more  would  it  be  true  of  a 
Sophir^t  like  Protagoras,  arriving  in  a  foreign  city  with  all  the  pres- 
ti'r,-  of  a  o-reat  intellectual  name,^  and  with  the  imagination  of  youths 
on  fire  to  hear  and  converse  with  him— tliat  any  similar  doctrine 
would  destroy  his  reputation  at  once.  Numbers  of  teachers^  have 
made  their  reputation  by  inculcating  overstrained  asceticism;  it  will 
be  hard  to  find  an  example  of  success  in  the  opposite  vein. 


CHAPTER  LXVIII. 

SOKRATES. 

Tii^T  the  professional  teachers  called  Sophists  in  Greece  were 
intellectual  and  moral  corrupters— and  that  much  corruption  grew 
ui)  under  their  teachins:  in  the  Athenian  mind— are  common  state- 
ment^ which  I  have  endeavored  to  show^  to  be  erroneous.     Corre- 
M)ondin<^  to  these  statements  is  another,  which  represents  Sokrates  as 
one  whole  special  merit  it  was  to  have  rescued  the  Athenian  mind 
from  such  demoralizing  influences;— a  reputation,  which  he  neither 
deserves  nor  requires.     In  "eneral  the  favorable  interpretation  of 
evidence  as  exhibited  tow^ard  Sokrates,  has  been  scarcely  less  marked 
than  the  harshness  of  presumption  against  the  Sophists.     Of  late, 
however  some  authors  have  treated  his-  history  in  an  altered  spirit, 
and  have  manifested  a  disposition  to  lower  him  down  to  that  which 
they  re<'ard  as  the  Sophistical  level.     M.  Forchhammer's  treatise— 
"  The  Athenians  and  Sokrates,  or  Lawful  Dealing  against  Revolu- 
tion"—o-oes  even  further,  and  maintains  confidently  that  Sokrates 
was  most  iustly  condemned  as  a  heretic,  a  traitor,  and  a  corrupter  of 
youth      His  book,  the  conclusions  of  whieh  I  altogether  reject,  is  a 
sort  of  retribution  to  the  Sophists,  as  extending  to  their  alleged  oppo- 
nent the  same  bitter  and  unfair  spirit  of  construction  with  that  under 
which  they  have  so  long  unjustly  suffered.     But  when  we  impartially 
consider  the  evidence,   it  will  appear  that    Sokrates  deserves  our 
admiration  and  esteem,  not  indeed  as  an  anti-Sophist,  but  as  conibm- 
ing  with  the  qualities  of  a  good  man,  a  force  of  character  and  an 
ori<^inality  of  speculation  as  well  as  of  method,  and  a  pow^r  of  intel- 
lectually working  on  others— generally  different  from  that  of  any 
professional  teaciier— without  parallel  either  among  contemporaries 

or  successors 

The  life  of  Sokrates  comprises  seventy  years,  from  469  to  399  B.C. 
His  father  Sophroniskus  beinn'  a  sculptor,  the  son  began  bj^  following 
the  same  profession  in  which  he  attained  sufficient  proficiency  to 
have  executed  various  works;  especially  a  draped  group  of  tlie 
Charites  or  Graces,  preserved  in  the  Acropolis;  and  shown  as  his 


430 


SOKRATES. 


work  down  to  the  time  of  Pausanias,     His  mother  Plifrnarctc  was  a 
midwife  and  he  had  a  brother  by  tlie  mother's  side  named  Patrokles. 
Kespectin«'his  wife  Xanthippe,  and  his  three  sons,  all  that  has  passed 
into  history  is  the  violent  temper  of  the  former,  and  the  patienee  of 
li(«r  husband  in  endurinfij  it.     The   position  and  family  of  t^okrates, 
without  beini:?  absolutely  poor,  were  humble  and  unimi)ortanl:  but 
lie  was  of  •^-euuiue  Attic  breed,  belon,dng  to  the  ancient  .uens  Daida- 
lidfE,  which  took  its  name  from  Da-dalus  the  mythical  artist  as  pro- 
genitor, ,        ,      ,       1  11 
The  personal  qualities  of  Sokrates.  on  the  other  hand,  were  marked 
and  distini^niishinn:.  not  less  in  body  than  in  mind.     His  physical  con- 
stitution  was  lieTdthv,  robust   and   enduring,  to    an   extraordiniuy 
den-ree      He  was  not  merely  strong  and  active  as  an  hoplite  on  mili- 
tar'v'  service,  but  capable  of  bearing  fatigue  or  hardship,  and  indifler- 
ent  to  heat  or  cold,  in  a  measure  which  astonished  all  his  companions. 
He  went  barefoot  in  all  seasons  of  the  year,  even  during  the  winter 
campai"-n  at  Potid«a,    under  the  severe  frosts  of  Thrace;  and  the 
same  homely  clot hinir  sufficed  to  him  for  winter  as  well  as  for  sum- 
mer    Though  his  diet  was  habitually  simple  as  well  as  abstemious, 
yet  there  were  occasions,  of  religious  festival  or  friendly  congratula- 
tion   on  which  every  Greek  considered  joviality  and  indulgence  to 
be  becoming.     On  such  occasions,  Sokrates  could  drink  more  wine 
than  any  guest  present,  yet  without  being  overcome  or  intoxicated. 
He   abstained  on  principle,  from  all   extreme  gA  mnastic   training, 
which  required,  as  necessary  condition,  extraordinary  abundance  of 
food      It  was  his  professed  purpose  to  limit,  as  much  as  possible,  the 
number  of  his  wants,  as  a  distant  approach  to  the  perfection  of  the 
ffods  who  wanted   nothing;   to  control  such  as  were  natural,  and 
prevent  the  multiplication  of  any  that  were  artificial.     His  admirable 
bodily  temperament  contributed  materially  to  facilitate  such  a  pur- 
pose and  assist  him  in  the  maintenance  of  that  self-mastery,  contented 
^eif-sufficiency,  and  independence  of  the  favor  as  well   as  of  the 
enmity  of  others— which  were  essential  to  his  plan  of  intellectual 
.life      His  friends,  who  communicate  to  us  his  great  bodily  strength 
and  endurance,  are  at  the  same  time   full  of  jests  upon   his  ugly 
physiognomy— his  flat  nose,  thick  lips,  and  prominent  eyes,  like  a 
s'ltvr  or  Silenus.     We  cannot  implicitly  trust  the  evidence  of  such 
very  admiring  witnesses,   as  to  the  philosopher's  exemption  from 
infirmities  of^'temper;  for  there  seems  good  proof  that  he  was  by 
natuial  temperament  violently  irascible— a  defect,  which  he  generally 
kept  under  severe  control,  but  which  occasionally  betrayed  him  into 
improprieties  of  language  and  demeanor.           " 

Of  those  friends,  the  best  known  to  us  are  Xenophon  and  Plato, 
thou'di  ther3  existed  in  antiquity  various  dialogues  composed,  and 
memoranda  put  together,  by  other  hearers  of  Sokrates.  respecting 
liis  conversati(»ns  aiid  teaching,  which  are  all  now  lost.  The  "Mem- 
orabilia "  of  Xenophou  profess  to  record  actual  conversations  held 


XENOPHON  AND  PLATO. 


431 


by  Sokrates,  and  arc  prepared  with  the  announced  purpose  of  vindi- 
f  aiuAini  against  the  accusations  of  Meletus  and  his  other  accusei^ 
ou  the  trial,  us  wefl  as  against  unfavorable  opinions,  seemingly  much 
chculated,  respecting  hil  character  and  purposes  AVe  thus  have  m 
ha  sort  of  partial  biog^iphy,  subject  to  such  dec  uctions  from  Us 
evidentiary  value  a.s  may  be  requisite  for  imperfection  ot  memory, 
hent^onal  decoration,  and  partiaUty      On  the  other  hand   the  pur- 

ose  of  Plato  in  the  numerous  dialogues  wherein  he  introduces 
Sou-ites  IS  not  so  clear- and  is  explained  very  differently  by  dii - 
fcrent  commentors.     Plato  was  a  great  speculative  genius  who  came 

0  f^nro".inions  of  his  own  distinct  from  those  ot  Sokrates,  and 
eniDl  iyed  the  name  of  the  latter  as  spokesman  for  tliese  opinions  m 
vTi?ous  dia^^^o^^^  How  much,  in  the  Platonic  Sokrates.  can  be 
llfcTaccip^^^^^  as  a  picture  of  the  manor  a^  a  record  of  his 

oph  o^-how  much,  on  the'  other  hand,  is  to  be  treated  as  Plf  onism 
^or  in  what  proportions  the  two  are  intermmgled-is  a  point  not  to 
Ik  decided  with  certainty  or  rigor.  The  ' '  Apo  ogy  ot  Sokrates,  the 
^Iriton,"  and  the  '!  P^don '' (m  so  f^^as  it  is  ---  P-^^|^  -[ 


ui^^t^e  e^  tem^e^^pa^f^  world,  in  the  van- 

ons  S-uefwhereyer  it  is  stated-certainly  belong  to  the  second 
(it  the  etfilSil  dialogues,  much  may  be  probably  taken  to  represent 

'll^thrir^^oSilionr;^^^^  PUto  mto  the  mouth  of  Sokrates 
•tre  I  il  tophus  much  of  uncertainty,  we  find,  to  our  great  satisfac- 
'ti.m   t  at  the  p  ctures  given  by  Plato  and  Xenophou  ot  their  com- 

0  ;  master 'u'eii^^^^^  main  accordant;  diifering  only  as  dnuvn  f roni 
t^'  s^nfor  <'hia    by  two  authors  radically  different  in  spirit  and 

kirieter  Xenophon,  the  man  of  action,  brings  out  at  ength  those 
coivtrsltions  of  Sokrates  which  had  a  bearing  on  practical  conduct 
MmlwP^e  calculated  to  correct  vice  or  infirmity  in  particular  mdi- 
vl:^:rsuchSthe  matter  whlc^h  served  luspu^^ose  a.  an^po  c. 
ci^t  at  the  same  time  that  it  suited  his  intellecauui  laste  But  he 
i^;u;i;ile!: nevertheless  very  plainly,  tUatthe  cumversationof  Soki-^ 

was  often,  indeed  usually,  of  ^r'^/'^^^'"     f     f     Vw^^s^^^^^^^^ 
emli'/ino-  tendency  not  destined  for  the  reproof  of  posilive  or  special 

Mh^^^ken  the  inquisitive  faculties  -^^.J;;-^^;^ -!-;!; 
comprehension  of  vice  and  virtue  as  rolerable  to  deteimmale  gciicr 
1   i  cip les      Now  this  latter  side  of  the  master's  phvsio-nomy,  wl  ich 
^    oi^lon  records  distinctly,  though  .without  -"JP^^^f^^;; '^J-;^^^^^^^ 
nient  acquires  almost  exclusive  prominence  m  t  ^  P^at  m  c  pictur^^ 
Plato  leaves  out  the  practical,  and  consecrates  himself  to  t he  lieon  ti^ 
cal,  Sokrates;  whom  he  divests  in  part  of  ^^^^ ^  f^^  V^. |'  P,,,^^^^ 
enroll  him  as  chief  speaker  in  certain  larger  \1  ^/^^L^  /^olhtT  but 
own     The  two  pictures  therefore  do  not  contradict  each  othti,  but 


432 


SOKRATES. 


<■ 


mutually  supply  cac-li  other's  defects,  and  adrilt  of  bcin.i?  blended 
into  om*cousi6teut  whole.  And  respeciing  the  method  ot"  Sokrates 
a  point  more  eharacteristic  than  either  his  precepts  or  his  theory— as 
well  as  respecting  the  eilect  of  that  method  on  uie  miuds  of  hearers 
—both  Xenoplion  and  Plato  are  witnesses  substaniially  in  unison- 
though  here  again,  the  latter  has  made  the  method  his  own,  worked 
it  out  on  a  scale  of  enlargement  and  perfection,  and  given  to  it  a 
permanence  which  it  could  never  have  derived  from  its  oriirinal 
;  author,  who  only  talked  and  never  wrote.  It  is  fortunate  that"  our 
two  main  witnesses  about  him,  both  ispeaking  from  personal  knowl- 
edge, agree  to  so  great  an  extent. 

Both  described  in  the  same  numner  his  private  life  and  habits;  his 
contented  poverty,  justice,  temperance  in  the  largest  sense  of'  the 
word,  and  self-sullicing  uidependence  of  character.     On  most  of 
these  points  too,  Aristophanes  and  the  other  comic  writers,  so  far  as 
their  testimony  counts  for  anything,  appear  as  conlirmatorv  witneses- 
for  they  abound  in  jests  on  liie  course  tare,  shabby  and  scanty  cloth- 
ing, bare  feet,  pale  face,  i)()or  and  joyless  life,  of  Sokrates.     Of  the  cir- 
cumstances of  his  life  we  are  almost  wholly  iirnorant.     He  served  as  an 
hoplite  atPotidiea,  at  Dehum,  and  at  Amphipolis;  with  credit  appar- 
ently in  all,  though  exaggerated  encomiums  on  the  part  of  his  friends 
provoked  an  equally  exaggerated  skepticism  on  the  i>artof  Atheuteiis 
and  others.     He  seems  never  to  have  lilicd  any  po]iti(;al  otiice  until 
the  year  (u.c.  400)  of  the  battle  of  Arginusie,  in  v.  jiich  year  he  was 
member  of  the  Senate  of  Five  Hundred,  and  one  of  the  Prvtanes  on 
that  memorable  day  when  the  proposition  of  Kallixenus  against  the 
six  generals  was  submitted  to  the  public  assembly.     His  determined 
refusal,  in  spite  of  all  personal  hazard,  to  put  an  unconstitutional 
question  to  the  vote,  has  been  already  recounted.     That  during  his 
long  life  he  strictly  obeyed  the  laws,  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  none 
of  his  numerous  enemies  ever  arraigned  him  before  a  com  t  of  jnstice: 
that  he  discharged  all  the  duties  of'an  upriirht  man  and  a  brave  as 
well  as  pious  citizen,  may  also  be  confidently  asserted.     His-  friends 
lay  especial  stress  upon  his  piety,  that  is  upon  his  exact  discharne  of 
all  the  religious  duties  considered  as  incumbent  upon  an  Athenian 

Though  the:?e  points  are  requisite  to  be  established,  in  order  that 
we  may  rightly  interpret  the  character  of  Sokrates— it  is  not  from  them 
that  he  has  derived  his  eminent  ph>ce  in  history.  Three  peculiarities 
distinguish  the  man.  1.  His  long  life  passed'in  contented  poverty 
and  in  public,  apostolic,  dialectics.  2.  His  strong  relidous  persua- 
sion—or  belief  of  acting  under  a  mission  and  siuns  fro^m  the  gods; 
especially  his  Daemon  or  Genius— the  special  rehdous  warning  of 
which  he  believed  himself  to  be  frequently  the  subject.  3.  His  <'reat 
intellectual  originahty,  both  of  subject 'and  of 'methwl,  and  his 
power  of  stirring  and  forcing  the  germ  of  inquiry  and  ratiocination 
in  others.  Though  these  three  characteristics  were  so  blended  in 
Sokrates  that  it  is  not  easy  to  consider  them  sepai'ately — yet  in  tach 


NOTOIUETY  OF  SOKRATES. 


43a 


respect,  he  stood  distinguished  from  all  Greek  philosophers  before  of 

""^It  wlui't  time  Sokrates  relinquished  his  professi/jn  as  a  statuary 
we  do  not  know;  but  it  is  certain  that  all  the  middle  and  later  part 
oHiis  life   at  least,  was  devoted  exclusively,  to  the  selt-imposed  task 
of  teaching-;  excluding  all  other  business,  public  or  private,  and  to 
dl  neXt  of  all  meaiTs  of  fortune.     We  can  hardly  avoid  speakmg 
Mm  as  a  teacher,  though  he  himself  disc  aimed  the  appellation: 
s  practice  was  to  talk  or  converse-fo  pmffZ.  or  jpr^^^,  if  we  trans- 
late t' derisory  word  by  which  the  enemies  of  plulosophy  described 
lialec  ic  cohversation.  ^Early  in  the   mornin-  he  frequented  the 
nbirc  walks,   the  gymnasia  for  bodily  training,   and  the  schools 
^t  e  J^uths  were  "Reiving  instruction.     He  was  to  be  seen  in    he 
marketVace  at  the  hour  when  it  was  most  crowded,  among  the 
W  IS  ami  tJiblcs  where  i^n^ods  were  exposed  for  sale:  his  whole  day 
w'^    s^^^^^^^^^^^  "^^nner.     He  talked  with  anyone 

youno'  or  old,  rich  or  poor,  Who  sought  to  address  him,  and  m    he 
S-  of  all  Who  chose  to  stand  by.     Not  only  he  never  either 
asked  It  received  any  reward,  but  he  made  no  distinction  of  persons 
never  withheld  his  conversation  from  any  one,  and  t a  ked  upon  the 
sune  -eneral  topics  to  all.     He  conversed  with  politicians,  Sophists 
m  ma?y  men,  artisans,  ambitious  or  studious  youths,  Kc.     He  visited 
l\\%l^^  of  intei-est  in  the  city,  male  or  female:  his  friendship  with 
A.pasia  is  well  known,  and  one  of  the  most  inter(>sting  chapters  of 
Xenophon's  Memorabilia  recounts  his  visit  to.  and  chalogue  with 
Theodote— a  beautiful  Hettera  or  female  companion .     Nothm-  could 
be  more  public,  perpetual,  and  indiscriminate  as  to  P^'^-?^^^^^;/;;|;^  ^^^ 
conversaion      But  as  it  was  engaging,  curious,  an(    instiuctive  to 
n  cS tai  Vr^ons  mad  to  atten.1  him  in  public  as. 

compan  ons  Ind  listeners.     These   men,  a  fluctuating   bodJ^  were 
commmW  known  as  his  disciples  or  scholars;  though  neither  he  nor 
Wrier"onal  friends  ever  employed  the  X^xm^  teacher  and  dim>le  Xo 
d  sSelhe  relation  betweei  them.     Many  of  them  .^^^^"^e  ;iU^^^^^^ 
by  his  reputation,  during  the  later  years  of  his  life,  from  other  Gie- 
cian  cities;  Megara,  Thebes,  Elis,  Kyrene,  etc. 
'       Now  no  other  person  in  Athens,  or  in  any  other  Grecian  city, 
appc^iTs  ever   o  have  manifested  himself  in  this  perpetual  and  indis- 
eS'mnite  manner  as  a  public  talker  for  infection.     All  t^c^^^^^ 
either  took  money  for  their  lessons,  or  at  least  gave  them  apait  from 
t£  nulttde  in  I  private  house  or  garden,  to  special  Pv^P^^with 
admissions  and  rejections  at  their  own  pleasure     By  ^^  P^^\^^^ 
mode  of  life  which  Sokrates  pursued,  not  only  his  conversation 
Cached  the  minds  of  a  much  wider  circle,  but  he  became  more  abun^ 
Stl"^^^      a  person.     White  acquiring  a  ^-^-^^^^^f^ 
finH  oVImirPTs  ind  raising  a  certain  intellectual  interest  in  others^  lie 

-was  probably  the  reason  why  he  was  selected  by  Anstoplian^s  ana 


434 


SOKRATES 


the  otiier  comic  writers,  to  be  attacked  as  a  general  representative  of 
philosophical  and  rhetorical  tcacliing;  the  more  so,  as  Ids  marked 
and  repulsive  physiognomy  admitted  so  wdl  of  beiiii,-  imitated  in  the 
mask  which  the  actor  wore.  The  audience  at  the  theater  would  more 
readily  recognize  the  peculiar  figure  which  tliey  wvw  accustomed  to 
see  every  day  in  the  market  place,  tlian  if  Prodikiis  or  Protagoras 
whom  most  of  them  did  nr^t  know  by  sight,  had  been  brought  on  the 
stage.  It  was  of  httle  importance  either  to  them  or  to  Aristophanes 
whether  bokrates  was  represented  as  teaching  what  he  did  reallv 
teach,  or  something  utterly  dilTerent.  ^ 

This  extreme  publicity  of  life  and  conversation  was  one  among  the 
characteristics  of  Sokrates,  distinguishing  him  from  all  teachers  either 
before  or  after  him.     >,ext  was.  liis  persuasi<m  of  a  special  reli"ious 
mission  restraints,  impulses,  and  communications,  sent  to  him  by  the 
gods.     Taking  the  belief  in  such  supernatural  intervention  geneiillv 
It  was  indeed  no  way  peculiar  to  Sokrates:  it  was  the  ordinary  failli 
of  the  ancient  world,  insomuch  that  the  attempts  to  resolve  phe- 
nomena into  general  laws  were  looked  upon  with  a  certain  disappro- 
bation  as  indirectly  setting  it  aside.     And  Xenophon  accordinn-Iv 
avails  him.<^.'lf  of  such  general  fact,  in  replying  to  the  indictment  for 
religious  innovation  of  which  his  master  was  found  guilty   to  affirm 
that  the  latter  pretended  to  nothing  beyond  what  was  included  in  the 
creed  of  every  pious  man.     But  this  is  not  an  exact  statement  of  the 
matter  in  debate;  for  it  slurs  over  at  least,  if  it  does  not  deny    that 
sp''<-i:ility  ot  ]ns]ur;,tion  from  the  gods,  which  those  who  talkt'd  with 
bokrates(as  we  h-arn  even  from  Xenophon)  believed  and  which  Sok 
rates  himself  believed  also.     Very  diiferent  is  his  own  representation 
as  put  forth  in  the  defense  before  the  Dikasterv.     lie  had  been  accus- 
tomed constantly  to  hear,  even  from  his  childhood,  a  divine  voice- 
mterfcring.  :it  moments  when  lie  was  about  to  act    in  the  wav  of 
restraint,  but  never  in  the  way  of  instigation.     Such  prohibitory  warn- 
ing was  wont  to  come  upon  him  very  frequently,  not  merely  on  great 
but  even  on  small  occasions,  hitercepting  what  he  was  about  to  do  or 
say.     Thejugh  later  writers  spenk  of  this  as  the  diemon  or  genius  of 
Sokrates,  he  himself  does  not  personify  it,  but  treats  it  mcTelv  as  a 
'divine  sign,  a  prophetic  or  supernatural  voice."    He  was  accus- 
tomea  not  only  to  obey  it  implicitly,  but  to  speak  of  it  publiclv  and 
familiarly  to  others,  so  that  the  fact  was  well  known  both  to  his 
friends  and  to  his  enemies.     It  had  always  forbidden  him  to  enter  on 
public  Ide:  it  forbade  him,  when  the  in<lictment  was  handno-  over 
him    to  take  any  thought  for  a  prepared  defense:  and  so  completely 
did  he  march  with  a  consciousness  of  this  bridle  in  his  mouth   that 
when  he  felt  no  check,  he  assumed  that  the  turning  which  he  wis 
about  to  take  was  the  right  one.     Though  his  persuasion  on  the  sub- 
ject  was  unquestionably  sincere,  and  his  obedience  constant— vet  he 
never  dwelt  upon  it  himself  as  anything  grand  or  awful,  or  entitling 
bim  to  peculiar  deference;  but  spoke  of  it  often  in  his  usual  strain  cf 


HIS  DAEMON  OR  GENIUS. 


435 


f  .nilin-  ul-ivfulness.  To  his  friends  generally,  it  seems  to  have  con- 
;'  ■  one^of  his  titles  to  reverence,  though  neither  Plato  nor  Xeno- 
nh  s  •  plc^s  to  talk  of  it  in  that  jesting  way  which  doubtless  they 
?^  "iS^  himself.  But  to  his  enemies  and  to  the  Athenuni  pub- 
He  1  appeared  in  the  light  of  an  offensive  heresy;  an  inipipus  inno- 
vation on  the  orthodox  Srecd,  and  a  desertion  ot  the  recognized  gods 

""^Siich  was  the  Daemon  or  Genius  of  Sokrates  as  described  by  him-  [ 
self  ad  as  conceived  in  the  genuine  Platonic  dialogues;  a  voice   , 
I  va     prohibitory,  and  bearing  exclusively  upon  his  own  personal    ■ 
ronduct     That  which  Plutarch  and  other  admirers  of  Sokrates  con-   j 
ceived  as  a  Daemon  or  intermediate  Being  between  gods  and  men, 
^nsTooked  upon  by  the  fathers  of  the  Christian  church  as  a  devil- 
hv  Le  Clerc  as  one  of  the  fallen  angels-by  some  other  modern  com- 
nentatorsas  mere  ironical  phraseology  on  the  part  of  Sokra  es  him- 
sdf     Without  presuming  to  determine  the  question  raised  in  the 
omer  hvpotheses,  I  believe  that  the  last  is  untrue,  and  that  the  con- 
vSn  of  Sokrates  on  the  point  was  quite  sincere.     A  circumstance 
little  attended  to,  but  deserving  peculiar  notice   and  stated  by  him- 
seif_is  that  the  restraining  voice  began  when  he  was  a  child,  and 
contiiued  even  down  to  the  end  of  his  life;  it  had  thus  become  an 
SiXd  persuasion,  long  before  his  philosophica    habits  began 
But  though ihis  peculiar  form  of  inspiration  belonged  ^^cliisive  y  to 
him,  there  were  also  other  ways  in  which  he  believed  himse  f  to  la.  e 
reeeived  the  special  mandates  of  the  gods,  not  simply  checking  hun 
when  he  was  about  to  take  a  wrong  turn,  but  spurring  l^m  on 
directing,  and  peremptorily  exacting  from  him,  a  positive  couise  ot 
procccdmg.     Such  distinct  mission  had  been  imposed  upon  him  by 
dreams,  b?  oracular  intimations,  and  by  every  other  means  which  the 
gods  employed  for  signifying  their  special  will. 

Of  these  intimations  from  the  oracle,  he  specifies  particularly  one, 
in  reply  to  a  question  put  at  Delphi,  by  his  intimate  friend,  and  en- 
thusia/tic  admirer,  Clu^rephon.  The  question  put  was,  whether  any 
other  man  was  wiser  than  Sokrates;  to  which  the  Pythian  priestess 
replied,  that  no  other  man  was  wiser.  Sokrates  affirms  that  he  was 
"Teatly  perplexed  on  hearing  this  declaration  from  so  infallible  an 
authoiity— being  conscious  to  himself  that  he  possessed  no  Nvisdoni 
on  any  subiect,  Vcat  or  small.  At  length,  after  much  meditation  and 
a  distressing  mental  struggle,  he  resolved  to  test  the  accuracy  of  the 
infallible  priestess,  by  taking  measure  of  the  wisdom  of  others  as 
as  compared  with  his  own.  Selecting  a  leading  politician,  accounted 
wise  both  by  others  and  by  himself,  he  proceeded  to  converse  with 
him  and  put  scrutinizing  questions;  the  answers  to  which  satistied 
him,  that  this  man's  supposed  wisdom  was  really  no  wisdom  at  ah 
Having  made  such  a  discovery,  Sokrates  next  tried  to  demoustmte 
to  the  politician  himself  how  much  he  wanted  of  bemg  wise;  but 
this  was  impossible:  the  latter  still  remained  as  fully  persuaded  ot 


436 


SOKKATES. 


HIS  NUMEROUS  ENEMIES. 


437 


his  own   wisdom   as  before.     The   result   which  I  acauiroH   (... 
bokrates)  was.  that  I  wa.  a  wiser  man  than  he     oj  ,St  he'    r 

i'^J'^lZ     ^^^^'^^^^%^^^,  that  he  fancied  he  knew  Ihem    wh  ]! 
Nas  lully  conscious  of  my  own  ignorance:  I  was  thus  wisS^h'     ]., 
nasnuich  as  I  was  exempt  from  that  capital  error.     So  farther  fo^ 
the  oracle  was  proved  to  be  right.     Sokrates  repeated  the    anc  p 
penment  successively  upon  a  great  number  of  dfffeienVDm^^^^^^ 
especially  those  in  reputation  foF  distinguished  a bS    first  unnn 

m.ss,„,,  ^posed  upou  n>e,  1  Lave  tius  csiib  L  i^J   /e  vf^du  „     : 

me  credit  fo^l  ?  U  :,'"  ,"„'^'  .^^^  ^,^J""-'  ^'^''l-^  'l-J  give 
of  others  tiirn«  "     •  u'l.  ,V„       i^  '       i    pomlsdii  wliieh  my  exposure 

J  uymg  ady,  in  crob^- questioning  you,  exposing  your  want  of  wi.doni 


nnd  virtno,  and  reproaching  you  until  the  defect  be  remedied.  My 
mksion  as  your  monitor  is  a  mark  of  the  special  favor  of  the  god  to 
voir  and  if  you  condemn  me,  it  will  be  your  loss;  for  you  will  find 
none  other  such.  Perhaps  you  will  ask  me,  Why  cannot  you  go 
awav  Sokrates,  and  live  among  us  in  peace  and  silence?  Thisistne 
Inrdest  of  all  questions  for  me  to  answer  to  your  satisfaction.  If  1 
tPJl  vou  that  silence  on  my  part  would  be  disobedience  to  the  god, 
vou  will  think  me  in  jest  and  not  believe  me.  You  will  believe  me 
still  less  if  I  tell  you  that  the  greatest  blessing  which  can  happen  to 
man  is  to  carry  on  discussions  every  day  about  virtue  and  those 
other  matters  which  you  hear  me  canvassing  when  I  cros.s-examine 
mvself  as  well  as  others— and  that  life  without  such  examination  is 
no  life  at  all.     Nevertheless  so  stands  the  fact,  incredible  as  it  may 

seem  to  you."  ,     -r»,  ^     •     *     i         i 

I  have  given  rather  ample  extracts  from  the  Platonic  Apology,  be- 
cause no  one  can  conceive  fairly  the  character  of  Sokrates  who  does 
not  enter  into  the  spirit  of  that  impressive  discourse.  ^  We  see  m  it 
plain  evidence  of  a  marked  supernatural  mission  which  he  believed 
himself  to  be  executing,  and  which  would  not  allow  him  to  rest  or 
employ  himself  in  other  ways.     The  oracular  answer  brought  by 
Chajrcphon  from  Delphi,  was  a  fact  of  far  more  importance  in  his 
history  than  the  so-called  Dfiemon,  about  which  so  much  more  has 
been  said.     That  answer,  together  with  the  dreams  and  other  divine 
mandates  concurrent  to  the  same  end,  came  upon  him  in  the  middle 
of  his  life,  when  the  intellectual  man  was  formed  and  when  he  liad 
already  acquired  a  reputation  for  wisdom  among  those  who  knew 
him.   It  supplied  a  stimulus  which  brought  into  the  most  pronounced 
action  a  pre-existing  train  of  generalizing  dialectics  and  Zenonian 
ne^-ation— an  intellectual  vein  with  which  the  religious  impulse  rarely 
comes  into  confluence.     Without  such  a  motive,  to  which  his  mind 
was  peculiarly  susceptible,  his  conversation  would  probably  have 
taken  the  same  general  turn,  but  would  assuredly  have  been  restricted 
within  much  narrower  and  more  cautious  limits.     For  nothing  could 
well  be  more  unpopular  and  obnoxious  than  the  task  which  he  under- 
took of  cross  examining,   and  convicting  of  ignorance,^  every  dis- 
tino-uished  man  whom  he  could  approach.     So  violent  indeed  was 
the^'enmity  which  he  occasionally  provoked,  that  there  w^ere  instances 
(we  are  told)  in  which  he  was  struck  or  maltreated,  and  very  fre- 
quently laughed  to  scorn.     Though  he  acquired  much-  admiration 
from  auditors,  especially  youthful  auditors— and  from  a  few  devoted 
adherents— yet  the  philosophical  motive  alone  would  not  have  suf- 
ficed to  prompt  him  to  that  systematic,  and  even  obtrusive,  cross- 
examination  which  he  adopted  as  the  business  of  his  life. 

This  then  is  the  second  peculiarity  which  distinguishes  Sokrates— 
in  addition  to  his  extreme  publicity  of  life  and  indiscriminate  conver- 
sation. He  was  not  simply  a  philosopher,  but  a  religious  missionary 
doing  the  work  of  philosophy— "  an  elenchthic  or  cross-examming 


438 


SOKRATES. 


ETHICAL  SPECULATIONS. 


439 


no  fair  conipanson  c  an  be  instituted  ^  tliUcicnt,  ihat 

the  subjeci  of  c.x.u.!^atio„  1     1  b^n^NZi;  oT.h  '  V""""  """' 
iiK  St  ugnislii'ble  wliolr    1,l,.,.,iin„  7„     .i  "^  KoMiios  as  one 

atic  philos,lpl  el's,  PySnis  •  i  «< il  7'"ri.'""?  i'f  "'',',  "'  ""'  ^^'- 
tl.emsolves  this v  ,st  •, ml  un  kflni,! ,     i  f  ^"Tfdpkles,  all  .et  before 

as  to  be  taiiffht  scparatciv  to  vonil,      w^^  del  uhcd  scicixes 

state  of  sei«,ce  ^vC  SoL.ui  i"c 'ivod  hk^  ^"i^*^  '''^^'■"  "'« 

Plato   before    e  St, -mU-nnT.  nn  expression  applied  to  him  by 

cbalo^ie  cX     ''iwe^,  dc^^^^^  ^"^^  "^  P^^'to's 

of  ardor  for  the  di'^usVon  of  .^.^^'S^*-' '"^I^P^^^^^  ^l'^^  yo""ff  nianfull 

first  davvn  of  did  et  L   ol  ^t"  V  ^  ''^  presents  itself,  even  at  the 

the  fo^erbrtn^^-^c^bo^  zi^^::r;^ct^^  =i^'^^ 


thP  attainment  of  truth.  I  constme  it  as  an  indication  respecting  the 
^  vlfm  d  of  Sokrates,  imbibing  tliis  conviction  Irom  the  ancient 
'  mSes  and  tlie  mature  and  practiced  Zeno-and  imposing  upon 
^  imHf  as  a  condition  of  assent  to  any  hypothesis  or  doctrine,  tlic 
\  ''  Sdcm^^Uin..-  forth  conscientiously  botn  the  positive  conclu- 
'  fl  aorthe  le^Sive  conclusions,  which  could  be  reduced  roiu 
however  hiborfous  such  a  process  miglit  be,  and  however  hltle 
nnreSed  by  the  multitude.  Little  as  we  know  the  circumstances 
Sol'  vent  to  form  the  remarkable  mind  of  Sokrates,  we  may  infer 
•0 111  his  dialooue  tliat  he  owes  in  part  his  powerful  negative  vein  of 
uTliS  to  "  tlie  double-tongued  and  all  objecting  Zeno  "   ^ 

To  1  mind  at  all  exigent  on  the  score  of  proot,  physical  science  as 

b,,i  led  in  that  day  was  indeed  likely  to  appear  ^^^  only  unsatis^c- 

i     but  hopeless;  and  Sokrates,  in  the  maturity  of  his  life,  deserted 

ilto-ether.     The  contradictory  hypotheses  which  he  heard,  with 

be'  m&^^^^     confusion  which  overhung  the  subject,  broVS^^t  liim 

even  to  the  conviction  that  the  gods  intended    lie  machinery  by 

'vhich   they   brought  about  astronomical  and    physical  results  to 

en  I  1  inknown,  and  that  it  was  impious,  as  well  as  useless  to  pry 

holer  secrets.     His  master  Archelaus,  though  mainly  occupied 


maintained  the  tenet,  inai  jusuee  111111111.,^.^^^       '^.-w     ^ "uV.  to^ 
luvv  or  convention,  not  by  nature.     From  bin  ,  perhaps  ^^^ki;  ^-' 
Iv  hive  been  partly  led  to  turn  his  mind  in  this  direction.     But  to 
L  diLi^^^^^^^^  and  having  in  his  bosom  a  dia  ec- 

i  al  inipulU  powerful,  unemployed,  and  ^-^-^tless,  the  nu-re  r^lit^^^^^^ 
of  Athenian   life,  even  without  Archelaus,  would  suggest  human 
lado^s  duties,  action  and  sultering,  as  the  most  ^"teres^^ing  mate- 
rials for  contemplation  and  discourse.     Sokrates  could  not  go  into 
pnblic  asseinbly,  the  Dikastery.  or  even  the  theater,  without  hear- 
ing discussions  al)out  what  was  just  or  unjust  ?io»^>r^^J^^^^ ,  ^^^^^^ 
exlx'dient  or  hurtful,  etc.,  nor  without  having  his  mind  conducted 
t:>\he  inquirv,  what  wasShe  meaning  of  these  large  ^vords  which 
opposing  disputants  often  invoked  with  equal  ^^^^^'^.^"^^^J^^^i^.^^^.^V 
AlUg  with  the  dialectic  and  generalizing  power  of  |;>^/^^^^,^' ^^^^^.^^^ 
formJd  Ills  bond  of  connection  with  such  minds  as  Plato,  tlu  •  c  ^  a- 
at  the  same  time  a  vigorous  practiced  ity,  a  large  sock  <^f  P;>^)  ,^ 
Athenian  experience,  with  which  Xenophon  chiet  y  ^^^^'^"^^ 
and  which  he  has  brought  out  in  his  "  Memorabilia.       O.  tl^^^^e  t    o 
intellectual  tendencies,  combined  with  a  strong  religious  sen  mun^^^ 
the  character  of  Sokrates  is  composed;  and  all  of  them  were  S  <^  ^^^d 
at  once,  when  he  devoted  himself  to  adinonitoiy  interrogation  on 
the  rules  and  purposes  of  human  life,  from  which  there  was  the  less 
to  divert  him,  as  he  had  neither  talents  nor  taste  for  public  ^^P^aking 
That  "the  proper  studv  of  mankind  is  man     Sokrates  ^^  a.  the 
first  to  proclaim.     He  recognized  the  security  and  happiness  of  man 


440 


SOKRATES. 


STUDY  OF  HUMAN  AFFAIRS. 


441 


\  of  study,  nnd  as  the  limiting  principle  whorcLv 
iscnbod.     Ill  the  present  sliite  to  AvLieh  ^ru-ui 


both  as  the  single  end 

it  ought  to  be  circumscnoea.     in  tne  pi^-.^cu,   sunu  lo  wiiieu  .ck-ikp 
lias  attained,  nothing  is  more  curious  than  to  look  back  at  the  nil. 
^vhicu  this  eminent  man  laid  down.     Astronomy— now   exhibit!.,! 
the  maximum  of  perfection,  with  the  largest  and  most  exact  pow.r 
of  prc'dicting   future  phenomena,  which   human    science   has  ev 
attained-was  pfonoimced  by  him  to  be  among  the  divine  mysteri 
which  It  was  impossible  to  understand,  and  madness  to  invcsti.., . 
as  Anaxgoras  Iiad  foolishly  pretended  to  do.     He  admitted  \Sm\ 
hat  there  was  advantage  m  knowing  enough  of  the  movenicnts  o 
the  heavenly  bodies  to  serve  as  an  index  to  the   change  of  sea^oj 
and  as  gimles  for  voyages,  journeys  by  land,  or  night-watches     But 
thus  much  (he  said)  might  easily  be  obtained  from  pilots  and  wat  h 
men;  while  all  beyond  was  nothing  but  waste  of  valuable  tin' 
exhausting  that  mental  ettort  which  ought  to  be  employed  in  piofi:';. 
ble  acquisitions.     He  reduce'd  geometry  to  its  literal  meaning  of  lau- 
measuring,  necessary  so  far  as  to  enable  any  one  to  proceed  conectv 
in  the  purchase,  sale,  or  division   of  land,  which  any  man  of  c(J- 
mon  attention   mi^irht  do   almost  without  a  teacher-but   silly  and 
worthless,  if  carried  beyond,  to  the  study  of  complicated  diauianis 
Respecmg  arithmetic,  he  gave  the  same  qualified  permission  of  sluciy^ 
but  as  to  gonci-al  physics,  or  the  study  of  Nature,  he  discarded  *it 
altogether:  "  Do  these  inquirers  (he  asked)  think   that  they  alivLu 
wT^/t;»''^'*  n-^^^^^^^^^^  enough,  that  they  thus  begin  to  meddle 

the  ^Mnds  and  the  rain  at  pleasure,  or  have  they  no  otlier  view  tLau 

fhP  ^j^,^/^"d,^"»^^^^  investigation.  Let  them  only  reeollect  how  nnich 
the  greatest  men,  who  have  attempted  the  investigation,  ditler  in 
their  pretended  results,  holding  opinions  extreme  and   opposite  to 

Sokr.?I?'tn'i'''f  '^''•  f  ".»^^^^^^'^^:  .Such  was  the  view  which 
solvrateb  took  of  physical  science  and  its  prospects.     It  is  the  verv 

same  scepticism  in  substance,  and  carried  further  in  d(me  tloiioli 
here  mv(^sted  with  a  religious  coloring-fur  which  Hitte?  and  oihc^s 

f^  fsll^nli^''T'''''  P'"'-^'"''  ^''^  ^^^^^"^^^  '^t  "^^^tters  as  they  stood 
m  440-30  BC.,  it  ought  not  to  be  accounted  even  j-urprising  niucii 

hen  nS^'-  ^^\\\^^"t^  "V^^of  that  day,  physifal  scfenee  ns 
then  stu  bed  may  well  be  conceived  to  have  promised  no  result-  and 

^?^n?./nol'r'V''''T^  worse  than  barren,  if  (like  b'okrates)  he  had  nii 
acute  pciception  how  much  of  human  happiness  was  forfeited  Iv 
}wTS;  T  ^^  ^^""'^^^'e  ignorance-how  much  might  begaiiud 
in  devoting  the  same  amount  of  earnest  study  to  this  latter  object. 
-  Vn?So\''"^  V  """J"^  ^•<^^i«arking,  that  the  objection  of  Sokrates- 
You  may  judge  how  unprohtable  are  these  studies,  by  observiii;? 
how  widely  the  students  differ  among  themselves  "-remains  in  hi  oh 
no.'^Tn  fT"  to  the  present  day,^  and  may  constantly  be  seen  employed 
again^it  theoretical  arguments  m  every  department. 


Snkratos  desired  to  confine  the  studies  of  his  hearers  to  human  mat- 
trrs  'IS  distinouislied  from  dicing;  the  latter  comprehending  astro- 
D-nV  and  physics.     He  looked  at  all  knowledge  from  the  pomt  of 
view  of  huniuii  i)ractiee.  which  hud  beenassigued  by  the  gods  toman 
•IS  his  m-Muer  subjec-t  for  study  and  learning,  and  with  reference  to 
thieh   llieivfore,  they  managed   all   the   current   phenomena  upon 
i)riacii)les  of  constant  and  intelligible  sequence,  so  that  everyone  wdio 
cho^e  to  learn,  iniuht  learn— wiiile  those  who  took  no  such  pains 
suffered  for  their  neglect.     Even  in  these,  however,  the  most  careful  ^, 
study  was  not  bv  itself  completely  sufficient;  for  the  gods  did  not 
comfcscend  to  silbmit  all  the  phenomena  to  constant  antecedence  and 
eoiKeouence,  ))at  reserved  to  themselves  the  caphal  turns  and  junc- 
tures for  special  sentence.     Yet  here  again,  if  a  man  had  been  dili- 
L^ent  in  learning  all  that  the  gods  permitted  to  be  -learnt— Jind  if, 
besides  he  was  assiduous  in  pious  court  to  them  and  in  soliciting 
sDcciai 'information  by  way  of  prophecy— they  would  be  gracious  to 
liim  so  far  as  to  signify  beforehand  how  they  intended  to  act  in 
n     niittiii"'  the  final  hand  and  in  settling  the  undecipherable  portions  ot 
I    the  prSblem.     The  kindness  of  the  gods  in  replying  through  their 
^''    oracles  or  sending  information  bv  sac^rificial  signs  or  prodigies,  in 
c;isesof  grave  difficulty— was,  in  the  view  of   Sokrates,  one  ot  the 
mostsi'nial  evidences  of  their  care  for  the  human  race,      lo  seek 
access  to  these  prophecies,  or  indications  of  special  divine  interven- 
tion to  come,  was  the  proper  suppleim-ntary  business  of  any  one  who 
h;ul  done  as  much  for  himself  as  could  be  done  by  patient  study. 
But  as  it  was  madness  in  a  man  to  solicit  special  informatum  ivom 
the  <'odson  matters  which  they  allc^wed  him  to  learn  by  his  own  dili- 
aen?e— so  it  was  not  less  madness  in  him  to  investigate  as  a  learner 
that  which  they  chose  to  keep  back  for  their  own  specialty  of  will. 

Such  was  the  capital  innovation  made  by  Sokrates  in  regard  to  the 
suhiect  of  Athenian  study,  bringing  down  philosophy  (to  use  the 
expression  of  Cicero)  from  the  heavens  to  the  earth;  and  such-  his 
attempt  to  draw  the  line  between  that  which  was,  and  was  not,  scien- 
titieallv  discoverable:  an  attempt,  remarkable,  inasmuch  as  it  shows 
his  conviction  that  the  scientific  and  the  religious  point  of  viewmutu^ 
ally  excluded  one  another,  so  that  where  the  latter  began  the  former 
ended"      It  was  an  innovation,  inestimable,  in  respect  to  the  new  mat- 
ter which  it  let  in;  of  little  import,  as  regards  that  which  it  professcjd 
to  exclude     For  in  point  of  fact,  physical  science,  though  partially 
di<couni"-ed   was  never  absolutely  excluded,  through  any  prevalence 
of  that  systc^matic  disapproval  which  he,  in  common  with  the  multi- 
tude of  his  day,  entertained.     If  it  became  comi>aratively  neglected, 
this  arose  rather  from  the  greater  popularity,  and  the  more  abunclant 
and  accessible  matter,  of  that  which  he  introduced.     Physical  or 
astronomical  science  was  narrow  in  amount,  known  only  to  tew;  and 
even  with  those  few  it  did  not  admit  of  being  expanded,  enlivened 
or  turned  to  much  profitable  account  in  discussion.     But  the  moral 


442 


SOKRATES. 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  ANALYSIS. 


443 


and  political  phenomena,  on  which  Sokratcs  turned  the  light  of 
speculation,  were  abundant,  varied,  familiar,  and  interest in^ir  to^evm 
Olio;  comprising  (to  translate  a  Greek  line  which  lie  was  fond  of  quot 
inir)  "  all  the  good  and  evil  which  hns  bcfnllen  you  in  your  home" 
connected  too,  not  merely  with  the  realities  of  'the  present,  but  i\ho 
with  the  literature  of  the  past,  throu^h  the  gnomic  and  other  poets 

The  motives  which  deternuned  tliis  important  innovation,  ;is  to 
subject  of  study,  exhibit  Sokrates  chieflv  as  a  religious  man  and  a 
liraclieal,  philanthropic  preceptor— the  Xeno])liontic  hero.  His  iniio- 
val ions,  not  less  important,  as  to  method  and  doctrine,  place  before 
us  the  iihilosopher  and  dialectician— the  other  side  of  hi.s  character 
or  the  Phitonic  hero;  faintly  traced  indeed,  yet  still  recognized  and 
identified,  bv  Xeno]>h()n. 

"Sokratcs  (says  the  latter)  coiitinued  incessnntlv  discussing  htmon 
alTairs  (the  sense  of  this  word  will  be  understood  "^bv  what  has  been 
said  above,  p.  226),  investigating— What  is  i^iety?  'What  is  impiely*> 
W^hat  is  the  honorable  and  the  base?  AVhat  is  the  just  and  the  unjust '> 
What  is  temperance,  or  unsound  mind?  What  is  courage  or  coward- 
ice? What  is  a  city?  Wiiat  is  the  character  tit  for  a  citizen?  What  is 
authority  over  men?  AVhat  is  the  character  befitting  the  exercise  of 
such  authority?  and  other  similar  questions.  Men  who  knew  these 
matters  he  accounted  good  and  honorable;  men  who  were  ignorant 
of  them  he  assimilated  to  slaves." 

Sokrates(says  Xenophon  again,  in  another  passage)  considered  that 
the  diah'ctie  procas,i  comlstod  in  coming  toj^ether  and  taking  common 
counsel  to  distinguish  and  distribute  things  into  Genera  oi^  Families, 
so  as  to  learn  what  each  separate4liing  reallv  was.  To  go  throuch 
this  process  carefully  was  indispensable,  as  the  only  way  of  enabling 
a  man  to  reguhite  his  own  conduct,  aiming  at  good  objects  and  avoid- 
ing bad.  To  be  so  practiced  as  to  be  able  to  do  it  readily,  was  essen- 
tial to  make  a  man  a  good  leader  or  adviser  of  others.  Every  man  wlio 
had  gone  through  the  process,  and  come  to  know  wdiat  each  thing 
w\is,  could  also  of  course  define  it  and  explain  it  to  others;  but  if  he 
did  r.ot  know,  it  Avas  no  wonder  that  he  went  wrong  himself,  and 
put  others  wrong  besides.  3Iorcover,  Aristotle  savs— "  To  SokVates 
we  may  unquestionably  assign  two  novelties- Inductive  Discourses 
— and  the  Definitions  of  general  terms." 

I  borrow  here  intentionally  from  Xenophon  in  preference  to  Plato; 
since  the  former,  tamely  describing  a  process  which  he  imperfectly 
appreciated,  identifies  it  so  much  the  more  completely  with  the  re:Il 
Sokrates— and  is  thus  a  better  witness  than  Plato,  wiiose  genius  not 
only  conceived  but  greatly  enlarged  it  for  didactic  purpo^ses  of  his 
own.  In  our  present  state  of  knowledge,  some  mental  effort  is 
required  to  see  anything  important  in  the  words  of  Xenophon;  so 
familiar  has  eveiy  student  been  rendered  with  ordinary  terms  and 
gradations  of  logic  and  classification— such  as  Genus— Definition- 
Individual  things  as  comprehended  in  a  Genusv-what  each  thino-  \s. 


and  to  what  genus  it  belongs,  etc.     But  familiar  as  these  words  have 
iiuw  become,  tliev  denote  a  mental  process,  of  which,  in  440-o0  u.c, 
few  men  besides  Sokrates  had  any  conscious  perception.     Of  course 
men  conceived  and  described  things  in  classes,  as  is  implied  in  the 
very  form  and  language,  and  in  the  Imbitual  junction  of  predicates 
with  subjects  in  common  speech.     They  explained  their,  meaning 
clearly  and  forcibly  in  particular  cases:  they  laid  down  maxims, 
ar"ued  questions,  slated  premises,  and  drew  conclusions,  on  trials  m 
the  (likasterv   or  debates  in  the  assembly:  they  had  an   abundant 
poetical  literature,  which  appealed  to  every  variety  of  emotion:  they 
^vere   be-innin*'-  to   compile   historical   narrative,    intermixed   witu 
reflection  and  cTiticisin.     But  though  all  this  was  done,  and  often 
admirablv  well  done,  it  was  wanting  in  that  analytical  consciousness 
which  would  have  enabled  any  one  to  describe,  explain,  or  vindicate 
what  he  was  doing.     The  ideas  of  men— speakers  as  well  as  hearers, 
the  productive  minds  as  well  as  the  recipient  multitude— were  asso- 
ciated too-elher  in  groups  favorable  rather  to  emotional  results,  or  to 
poetical.'rhetorical,  narrative,  and  descriptive  effect,  than  to  method- 
ical •'•eueralizatiou,  to  scientific  concei)tiou,  or  to  proof  either  induc- 
tive or  deductive.     That  reliex  act  of  attention  winch  enables  men  to 
understand,  compare,  and  rectify,  their  own  mental  process,  was 
only  just  beginning.     It  was  a  recent  novelty  on  the  part  of  the  rhe- 
torical teachers,  to^analyze  the  component  parts  of  a  public  harangue, 
aiul  to  propound  some  prece|)ts  for  making  men  tolerable  speakers. 
Protao-oras  was  just  setting  forth  various  grammatical  distinctions, 
while^Prodikus  discriminated  the   significations  of   words    nearly 
eiiiiivalent  and   liable   to   be   confounded.     All    these    proceedings 
appeared  then  so  ncnv  as  to  incur  the  ridicule  even  of  Plato:  yet  they 
were  branches  of  that  same  analytical  tendency  which  Sokrates  now 
carried  into  scientific  inquiry.     It  may  be  doubted  whether  any  one 
belore  him  ever  used  the  words  Genus  and  Species  (originally  mean- 
in"-  Family  and  Form)  in  the  philosophical  sense  now  exclusively 
appropriated  to  them.     Not  one  of  those  many  names  (called  by 
logicians  namca  of  the  second  inkmUoii),  which  imply  distinct  attention 
to\arious  parts  of  the  logical  process,  and  enable  us  to  consider  and 
criticise  it  in  detail— then  existed.     All  of  them  grew  out  of  the 
schools  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  the  subsequent  philosophers,  so  that 
we  can  thus  trace  them  in  their  beginning  to  the  common  root  and 
father,  Sokrates. 

To  comprehend  the  full  value  of  the  improvements  struck  out  by 
Sokrates,  we  have  only  to  examine  the  intellectual  paths  pursued 
bv  his  predecessors  or  contemporaries.  He  set  to  himself  distinct 
and  specific  problems— "  What  is  justice?  W'hat  is  piety,  cour- 
ai,re,  political  irovernment?  What  is  it  which  is  really  denoted 
bv  such  great  and  important  names,  benring  upon  the  conduct  or 
Imppiness  of  man?"  Now  it  has  been  already  remarked  that  Anax- 
agoras,  Empedokles,   Demokritus,  the   Pythagoreans,  all  had  still 


444 


SOKRATES. 


present  to  their  minds  those  vast  and  undivided  problems  which  ),• , 
been  transmitted  down  from  the  ohi  poets;  bendino-  their  miuds 
the  myentiou  of  some  system  which  would  exphiiu  ihem  all  at  om 
or  assist  the  ima-ination  in  conceiving  both  liow  the  Kosmos  Iim 
be«;an,  and  how  it  continued  to  move  on.     Ethics  and  phv^ics  nv, 
and  nature   were  all  blended  together;  and  the  Pythaioreans'  ul, 
explained  all  ^atul•e  by  numbers  and   numerical  relations    ailnlj,] 
the  same  explanation  to  moral  attributes— con.sidering  iustice  to  1. 
symbolized  by  a  perfect  equation,  or  by  four,  the  firs?  of  all  sqiia 
numbers.      These   t^vMy  philos(.i)hers  endeavored   to  find    out   il,e 
beginnings   the  component  elements,  the  movinir  cause  or  causes  „f 
things  in  the  mass;  but  the  logical  distribution  Into  C4enus,  Specie. 
and  individuals,  does  not  seem  to  have  suggested  itself  t6  them  or  to 
have  been  made  a  subject  of  distinct  attention  by  any  one  before 
bokrates.      To  study  Ethics,  or  human  dispositions  and  ends,  apart 
from  the  physical  world,  and  according  to  a  theory  of  their  own 
referring  to  human  good  and  happiness  as  the  sovereign  and  coninre- 
hensive  end;  to  treat  each  of  the  greut  and  familiar  words  desi-iiat. 
mg  moral  attributes    as  logical   aggregates  comprehending  nlaiiv 
judgments  in  particular  cases,  and  connoiimr  a  certain  harnTonv  w 
consistency  of  purpose  among  the  separate  judgments;  to  bring  nianv 
ot  these  latter  into  comparison,  by  a  scrutinizing  dialectical  procc-s 
so  as  to  test  the  consistency  and  compleleness  of  the  lo"-ical  a"-.Te^ 
gate  or  general  notion,  as  it  stood  in  ever>^  man's  mind-  all  &e 
w^ere  parts  of  the  same  forward  movement  which  Sokrates  oil<n- 
nated.  ° 

It  was  at  that  time  a  great  progress  to  break  down  the  unwieldv 
mass  conceived  by  former  philosoi)hers  as  science;  and  to  studV 
Ethics  apart,  with  a  retcrence.  more  or  less  distinct,  to  their  ouk 
appropriate'^  end.  ISay,  we  see  (if  we  may  trust  the  "Phied(m"of 
Plato)  that  Sokrates.  before  he  resolved  on  such  pronounced  severance 
had  tried  to  construct,  or  had  at  least  yearned  after,  an  undivided 
and  reformed  system  including  Physics  also  under  the  Ethical  end- 
•fJ^W'S"  of  optimistic  Physics,  applying  the  general  idea  "  F/./< 
iras  best  as  the  commanding  principle  f  r.^m  whence  physical  explana- 
tions were  to  We  deduced;  which  he  hoped  to  find,  hut  did  not  tind. 
in  Anaxagoras.  But  it  was  a  still  greater  advance  to  seize,  and  push 
out  in  conscious  application,  the  essential  features  of  that  lo-icul 
process,  upon  the  correct  performance  of   which  our  securitv  for 

Genera  and  individuals  as  comprehended  under  them  (we  need  not 
in^h'I^h'''  'ir'"''.^''''''j^^^'  ^'''^^^  and  Aristotle  dilTered  from 
tfX^lf'l:  ^'V"\  ^^''^  T"^^""''  conceptions  on  that  subject),  were 
min  tZ  ^'^^;'>'.'"''^"=:J/t  into  clear  consciousness  in  the  human 
mmd.  The  profusion  ot  logical  distributi..n  employed  in  some  of 
the  dia  ogues  of  Plato,  such  as  the  Sophistesand  the  Politicus.  seems 
paitiy  traceable  to  his  wish  to  familiarize  hearers  with  that  which 


DIALECTICxiL  PROCESS  OF  SOKRATES. 


445 


was  tlien  a  novelty,  as  well  as  to  enlarge  his  development,  and  diver- 
sify its  mode  of  appli(nition.  He  takes  numerous  indirect  opportuni- 
ties of  briuiring  it  out  into  broad  ligiit,  by  putting  into  the  mouths 
of  his  dialogists  answers  implying  complete  inattention  to  it,  exposed 
afterward  in  the  course  of  the  dialoizue  by  Sokrates.  What  was  now 
he-ninby  Sokrates,  and  improved  by  Plato,  was  embodied  as  part  iu 
a  c^omprehensive  system  of  formal  logic  by  the  genius  of  Aristotle; 
a  system  which  was  not  only  of  extraordinary  value  in  reference  to 
'the  processes  and  controversies  of  its  time,  but  which  also,  having 
become  insensibly  worked  into  the  minds  of  instructed  men,  has 
contributed  much  to  form  what  is  correct  in  the  habits  of  modern 
lliinkiu"-  Though  it  has  been  now  enlarged  and  recast,  by  some 
mo(lern''authors  (especially  by  Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill  in  his  admirable 
System  of  Loicic)  into  a  stru^cture  commensurate  with  the  vast  in- 
crease of  knowledge  and  extension  of  positive  method  belonging  (o 
the  present  day— we  must  recollect  that  the  distance,  between  the 
best  modern  logic  and  that  of  Aristotle,  is  hardly  so  great  as  that 
between  Aristotle  and  those  who  proceded  him  by  a  century— Empe- 
dokles,  Anaxagoras,  and  the  Pythagoreans;  and  that  the  movement 
in  advance  of  these  latter  commences  with  Sokrates. 

By  Xenophon,  1)V  Plato,  and  by  iVristotle,  the  growth  as  well  as 
the  habitual  use  of* loi]?ical  classitication  is  represented  as  concurrent 
with  and  dependent  lipon  dialectics.     In  this  methodized  discussion, 
so  much  in  harmony  with*the  marked  sociability  of  the  Greek  char- 
acter, the  quick  recurrence  of  short  question  and  answer  was  needful 
as  a  stimulus  to  the  attention,  at  a  time  when  the  habit  of  close  and 
and  accurate  retlection  on  abstract  subjects  had  been  so  little  culti- 
vated.   But  the  dialectics  of  Sokrates  had  far  greater  and  more  im-  v 
porlant  peculiarities  than  this.     We  must  always  consider  his  method 
iu  conjunction  with  the  subjects  to  which  he  applied  it.     As  those 
subjects  were  not  recondite  or  S()ecial.  but  bore  on  the  practical  life 
of  the  house,  the  market-place,  the  city,  the  Dikastery,  the  gymna- 
sium, or  the  temple,  with  which  every  one  was  familiar— so  Sokrates 
never  presented  himself  as  a  teacher,  nor  as  a  man  having  new  knowl- 
edi^e  to  communicate.     On  the   contrary,  he  disclaimed  such  pre- 
tensions, luiiformly  and  even  ostentatiously.     The  subjects  on  which 
he  talked  were  just  those  which  every  one  professed  to  know  per- 
fectly and  thoroughly,  and  on  which  every  (me  believed  himself  in  a 
condition  to  instruct  others,  rather  than  to  require  inslruction  f<>r 
himself      On  such  questions  as   these— What  is  justice?— What  is 
pii-ty?— What  is  a  democrncv?— What  is  a  law?— every  man  fancied 
thatiie  could  give  a  coniident  rpinion,  and  even  wondered  that  any 
other  person  should  feel   a  difficulty.     When  Sokrates.^  professing 
ii^niorance   put  any  such  question,  he  found  no  difficulty  in  obtaining 
an  answer.  Jiiven  \)fniand.  and  with  very  little  retlection.     The  an- 
swer purported  to  be  the  explanation  or  definition  of  a  term— famil- 
iar indeed,  but  of  wide  and  comprehensive  import— given  by  one 


44G 


SOKRATES. 


LARGE  PURPOSE  OF  SOKRATES. 


447 


who  bad  never  before  tried  to  render  to  Iiiniself  nn  aoroiint  of  ;vhit 
It  meant.     Havmir  got  tbis  answer,   Sokrates   put  fresh  que^^tin 
applyin-  it  to  sptcitic  cases,  to  which  the  responih-nt  was  com  pell  j 
to  ^ave  answers  inconsistent  witth  the  lirst;  thus  showinir  thatthp 
definitKjn  was  either  too  narrow, /)r  too  wide,  or  defective  in  som 
essenlial  condition.     Tlie  respondent  tlien  ame.Hicd  his  answer  I., 
this  was  a  prekide  to  other  questions,  which  coidd  only  be  ansWen! 
in  ways  inconsistent  witli  the  amendment;  and  the  respondent  ift,. 
many  attempts  to  discntan.ole  himself,  was  obli-ed  to  plead  o-uiliv  i 
the  inconsistencies,  with  an  acbnission  that  lie  could  make  no  Ji\k 
factory  answer  to  tlie  ori-inal  query,  which  bad  at  first  appeared  Co 
easy  and  tamihar.     Or  if  be  did  not  himself  admit  tbis.  the  hea  er 
at    east  felt  ,t  forcibly.     The  dialogue,  as  ^iven  to  us,  comm  i 
ends  with  a  result  purely  ne-ative,  proving  that  the  respondent  uw 
incompetent  to  answer  the  question  proposed  to  him,  in  a  manner 
consisten    and  satisfactory  even  to  himself.     Sokrates,  as  be  profe^^td 
from  the  beginninn:  to  have  no  positive  theory  to  support,  so  he  main- 
tains to  the  end  the  sameairof  a  learner,  who  would  be  irlad  to  solve 
the  difbculty  If  be  could,  but  regrets  to  find  himself  disappointed  of 
that  instruction  which  the  respondent  had  promised 

We  see  by  this  description  of  the  cross-examininir  path  of  this 
remarkable  man   lunv  ir.timate  was  the  bond  of  connection  between 
the  dialectic  method  and  the  logical  distribution  of  particular,  inio 
species  and  genera.     The  discussion  first  raised  by  Sokrates'turn. 
upon  the  meaning  of  some  large  generic  term:  the  Vmeries  wherebv 
le  follows  It  up,  bring  the  answer  given   into  collision  with  variou's 
particulars  which  it  ought  not  to  comprehend,  vet  does-or  will, 
otliers  which  it  ought  to  comprehend,  but  docs'not.     It  is  in  this 
manner  that  the  latent  and   undefined  cluster  of  association   which 
lijis  grown  up   around   a   familiar   term,    is  as  it  were  penetialcd 
by  a  fermenting  leaven,  forcing  it  to  expand  into  discernible  por- 
tions   and  bringing  the  appropriate  function  wliich  the  term  omdit 
to  tiiltill,  to  become  a  subject  of  distinct  consciousness      The  ircmi- 
s^encies  into  which  the  heaix^r  is   betrayed  in  bis  various  answers 
pioclaim  to  lum  the  fact  that  he  has  not  yet  acquired  anytbino-  like  ;i 
clear  and  full  conception  of  the  common   attribute  which  binds  to- 
gether the  various  particulars  embraced  under  some  term  which  is 
ever  upon  bis  Iips-or  perhaps  enable  him  to  detect  a  different  faet^ 
not  less  important,  that  there  is  no  such  common  attribute,  and  thai 
the  generalization  is  merely  nominal  and  fallacious.     In  either  ca^e 
be  IS  put  upon  the  train  of  thought  which  leads  to  a  correction  of  the 

fw  [n  if.  V  '  ^'"'^  ^'f  \^'  ^;V"  ''''•  ^^  '^''''  ^'^"^^^  ^^^^^  ^'^lls  seeimr  the 
«nr  to  ^nnv  q"-l'  ^"'^  'i'^,^^^^">^  ^"  ^^'^  ^"^-  Without  auv  predec(  s- 
sor  to  copy,  Sokrates  fell  as  it  were  instinctively  into  that  which 
Aristotle  descril>es  as  the  double  track  of  the  dialectic  process- 
bieaknig  up  the  One  into  Many  and  recombininir  the  Many  into  One. 
Ibe  former  duty,  at  once  the  first  and  the  most  essential    Sokrates 


performed  directly  by  his  analytical  string  of  questions — the  latter, 
or  synthetical  process,  was  one  whicli  he  did  not  often  directly  un- 
dertake, but  strove  so  to  arm  and  stimulate  the  bearer's  mind,  as  to 
enable  him  to  do  it  for  himself.  Tbis  One  and  Many  denote  the 
logical  distribution  of  a  multifarious  subject-matter  under  generic 
terms,  with  clear  understanding  of  the  attributes  implied  or  connoted 
by  each  terra,  so  as  to  discriminate  those  particulars  to  which  it 
really  applies.  At  a  moment  Avhen  such  logical  distribution  was  ns 
yet  novel  as  a  subject  of  consciousness,  it  could  hardly  have  been 
probed  and  laid  out  in  the  mind  by  any  less  stringent  process  than 
the  cross  examining  dialec-ticsof  Sokrates — applied  to  the  analysis  of 
some  attempts  at  definition  hastily  given  by  respondents;  that  "in- 
ductive discourse  and  search  for  (clear  general  notions  or)  definitions 
of  general  terms,"  which  Aristotle  so  justly  points  out  as  his  peculiar 
iuiiovation. 

1  have  already  adverted  to  the  persuasion  of  religious  mission  under 
which  Sokrates  acted  in  pursuing  this  system  of  conversation  and 
interrogation.  He  probably  began  it  in  a  tentative  Avay  upon  a 
modest  scale,  and  under  the  pressure  of  logical  embarrassment 
weighing  on  his  own  mind.  But  as  he  proceeded,  and  found  himself 
siiceessful  as  well  as  acquiring  reputation  among  a  certain  circle  of 
friends,  his  earnest  soul  became  more  and  more  penetrated  with 
devotion  to  that  which  he  regarded  as  a  duty.  It  was  at  this  time 
probably,  that  his  friend  ClRerei)lion  came  back  with  the  oracular 
answer  from  Delphi  (noticed  a  few  pages  alx)vc)  to  which  Sokrates 
himself  alluded  as  having  prompted  him  to  extend  the  range  of  his 
conversation,  and  to  question  a  class  of  persons  whom  he  had  not 
before  ventured  to  approach — the  noted  politicians,  poets,  and 
artisans.  He  found  them  more  confident  than  humbler  individuals 
in  their  own  wisdom,  but  quite  as  unable  to  reply  to  his  queries 
without  being  driven  to  contradictory  answers. 

Such  scrutiny  of  the  noted  men  in  Athens  is  made  to  stand  prom- 
inent in  the  "  Platonic  Apology,"  because  it  was  the  principal  cause 
of  that  unpopularit}''  Avhicli  Sokrates  at  once  laments  and  accounts 
for  before  the  Dikasts.  It  was  the  most  impressive  portion  of  his 
proceedings,  in  tlie  cn^cs  both  of  enemies  and  admirers,  as  well  as  the 
most  flattering  to  his  own  natural  temper.  Nevertheless  it  would  be 
a  mistake  to  pi'esent  this  part  of  the  general  purpose  of  Sokrates — or 
of  his  divine  mission,  if  we  adopt  his  own  language — as  if  it  were  the 
whole;  and  to  describe  him  as  one  standing  forward  merely  to 
mimask  seleet  leading  men.  politicians,  sophists,  poets,  or  others, 
who  had  acquired  unmerited  reputation,  and  were  puffed  up  with 
foolish  conceit  of  their  own  abilities,  being  in  reality  shallow  and 
incompetent.  Such  an  idea  of  Sokrates  is  at  once  inadequate 
and  erroneous.  His  conversation  (as  I  have  before  remarked)  was 
absolutely  universal  and  indiscriminate;  while  the  mental  defect 
which  he  strove  to  rectify  was  one  not  at  all  peculiar  to  leading  men. 


448 


SOKRATES. 


PLATONIC  DIALOGUES. 


449 


but  common  to  (hom  with  the  mass  of  mankind— though  seemin"-  to 

be  exag-L'iuted  iu  ihem,  partly  because  more  is  expected  from  tbr-iii 

partly  because   the  geueral  feeling  of  self-estim<ition   stands  at  a 

higiicr  level,  naturally  and  reasonably,  iu  their  bosoms,  than  iu  thovco 

of  ordmary  persons.     That  defect  was,  the  '-seeming  and  conceit  of 

knowledge  without  the  reality,"  on  human  life  with  its  duties  pur 

posas,  and  conduious— the  .knowledire    of    which    Sokrates    c'llkd 

einphatically  "human  wisdom,"  and   regarded   as  essential  to  the 

digni.y  of  a  freeman;  while  he  treated  other  branches  of  science  is 

above  the   level  of  man,  and  as  a   stretch   of  curiosity,  not  merciv 

superfluous,  but  reprehensible.     His  warfare  against  such  false  pcf- 

suasion  of  knowledge,  in  one  man  as  well  as  another,  upon  those 

subjects  (lor   \yith  hi.n,    I  repeat,  we    must  never  disconnect   the 

method  from  the  subjects)— clearly  marked  even  in   Xenophon   is 

abimdantly  and  strikmgly  illustrated  by  the  fertile  genius  of  Plato 

?^;i^^"^^^^^^J^^*^  ^}}*^  ^^u«  nussionary  scheme  which  pervaded  the  la^i 

Jialt  ot  ius  longhte:  a  scheme  far  more  comprehensive   as  well  iis 

more  generous,  than  those  anti-Sophistic  polemics  which  areassiirned 

to  hmi  by  so  many  authors  as  his  prominent  object. 

In  pursuing  the  thread  of  his  examination,  (here  was  no  topic 
upon  w-hich  hokrates  more  frequently  insisted,  than  the  contrast  be- 
tween the  state  of  men's  knowledge  on  the  genend  topics  of  nuin  mid 
society— and  that  which  artists  or  professional  men  possessed  in  their 
respective  special  crafts.     So  perpetually  did  he  reproduce  this  com- 
parison, that  his   enemies  accused  him  of  wearing  it  threadbare 
lake  a  man  of  special  vocation— a  carpenter,  a  brazier,  a  pilot  a 
musician,  a  surgeon— and   examine  him  on  tjie  state  of  his  profes- 
sional knowledge— you  will  find  him  able  to  indicate  the  persons  from 
whom,  and  the  steps  by  which  he  first  acquired  it:  he  can  describe 
to  you  his  general  aim,  with  the  particular  means  which  he  employs 
to  realize  the  aim,  as  well  as  the  reason  why  such  means  must  be 
employed  and  why  precautions  must  be  taken  to  combat  such  and 
such  particular  obstructions:  he  can  teach  his  profession  toothers-  in 
matters  relating  to  his  profession,  be  counts  as  an  authority   so  that 
no  extra-professional  person  thinks  of  contesting  the  decision  of  a 
surgeon  in  case  of  disease,  or  of  a  pilot  at  sea.     But  while  such  is 
the  tact  in  regard  to  every  special  art,  how  ^reat  is  the  contrast  in 
reference  to  the   art  of  righteous,  social,  and  useful  living,  whiel 
torms,  or  ought  to  form,  the  common  business  alike  important  to 
each  and  to  all!     On  this  subject  Sokrates  remarked  that  every  one 
lelt  perfectly  well-informed,  and  coutident  in  his  own  knowledge- 
yet  no  one  knew  from  whom,  or  Ijy  what  steps,  he  had  learnt^;  no 
one  had  ever  devoted  any  special  reflection  either  to  ends,  or  means, 
or  obstructions:  no  one  could   explain  or  give  a  consistent  account 
ot  the  notions  in  his  (mm  mind,  when  pertinent  questions  were  put 
to  him:    no  one    could   teach   another,    as   might  be   inferred  (he 
thought)  from  the  fact  that  there  were  no  professed'  teachers,  and 


that  the  sons  of  the  best  men  were  often  destitute  of  merit;  every 
one  kne\v  for  himself,  and  hiid  down  general  propositions  confidently, 
Avilhout  looking  up  to  any  other  man  as  knowing  better— yet  there 
was  no  end  of  dissension  and  dispute  on  ])articular  cases.    • 

Such  was  the  general  contrast  which  Sokrates  sought  to  impress 
upon  his  hearers'  by  a  variety  of  questions  bearing  on  it,  directly  or 
indirectly.  'One  wav  of  presenliug  it,  which  Plato  devoted  much  of 
his  "-enius  to  expand  in  dialogue,  was,  to  discuss,  Whether  virtue  bo 
leairy  teachable?  How  was  it  that  superior  men  like  Aristeides  and 
Peiikles  acquired  the  eminent  qualities  essential  for  guiding  and 
governing  Athens— since  thev  neither  learned  them  under  any  known 
inastcr,  al  they  had  studied  inusic  and  gymnastics— nor  could  insure 
the  s:ime  excelleuces  to  their  sons,  eitlier  through  their  own  agency 
or  through  that  of  any  master?  Was  it  not  rather  the  fact,  that 
virtue,  as  it  was  never  expressly  taught,  so  it  was  not  really  teach- 
able; but  was  vouchsafed  or  withheld  according  to  the  special 
volil'ion  and  grace  of  the  gods?  If  a  man  has  a  young  horse  to  be 
broken  or  trained,  he  finds  without  ditliculty  a  professed  trainer, 
thorouirhly  conversant  with  the  habits  of  the  race,  to  communicate 
to  the  aniiual  the  excellence  required;  but  whom  can  he  find  to  teach 
virtue  to  his  sons,  with  the  like  preliniinary  knoA'ledge  and  assured 
result?  Nay,  how^  can  any  one  either  teach  virtue,  or  atRrin  virtue 
to  be  teachable,  unless  he  be  prepared  to  explain  what  virtue  is,  and 
what  arc  the  points  of  analogy  and  difference  between  its  various 
branches— justice,  temperance,  fortitude,  prudence,  etc.?  In  several 
of  the  Platonic  dialogues,  the  discussion  turns  on  the  analysis  of 
these  last-mentioned  words— the  ''Laches"  and  "Protagoras"  on 
courage,  the    "  Charmides"   on   temperance,  the  "Euthyphron"  on 

holiness.  . 

By  these  and  similar  discussions  did  Sokrates,  and  Plato  amplifying 
upon  his  master,  raise  indirectly  all  the  important  questions  respect- 
in  i?  societ3^  h«man  aspirations  and  duties,  and  the  principal  moral 
quldities  which  were  accounted  virtuous  in  individual  men.  As  the 
i^cneral  terms,  on  which  his  conversation  turned,  were  among  the 
iuost  current  and  familiar  in  the  language,  so  also  the  abundant 
instances  of  detail,  whereby  he  tested  the  hearer's  rational  compre- 
hension and  consistent  application  of  such  large  terms,  were  selected 
from  the  best-known  phenomena  of  daily  life;  bringing  home  the 
inconsistency,  if  inconsistency  there  was,  in  a  manner  obvious  to 
every  one.  The  answers  imule  to  him— not  merely  by  ordinary 
citizens,  but  by  men  of  talent  and  genius,  such  as  the  poets  or  the 
rhetors,  when  called  upon  for  an  explanation  of  the  moral  terms  and 
ideas  set  forth  in  their  own  compositions— revealed  alike  that  state 
of  mind  against  which  his  crusade,  enjoined  and  consecrated  by  the 
Delphian  oracle,  was  directed— the  semblmce  and  conceit  of  knowl- 
edi^c  without  real  knowledge.  They  proclaimed  confident,  unhesita- 
ting persuasion,  on  the  greatest  and  gravest  questions  concerning 

H.  G.  111.— 15 


450 


SOKIIATES. 


IDEA  OF  ETHICAL  SCIENCE. 


451 


as  a  capacity-couCuU^V  I,  w  r  ufr'-l^  anloccdeiU  to  r,.„«,u 
rcason-a„.f  never  being'Cl  ^  e  K  w'l  ,;';i; .  ""  T""'"'  f'""' 
ciirreut  propositions  coiTcernin.r  l,,,, ,.'  "  ,if  i"""  ?''™'  "■'"'•'^  •" d 
■..ody  of  association  CfbeSnicclM.ii'Tf '""''•''  "  '""^l''« 
ticwlars,  eacli  separately  tHv"a  a  ul  w^  ^^  f,'"'"  '""""'■'•M.nr. 
,  togetlicrby  a  po^W.rf,a  seiil  n  ent  ,,  I  n  n  i  '"^  .rn^mory -k„it 
man  from  tlie  atmc-splicrrof  a  l,,,H,v  >  "'  '"*  ','■'■'"''  ''J''"!" 
Upon  this  basis  tl  e  fancLl  ^n  w  r>  ''''•',,''-''""'P'<^  ••"•""id  l.im 
vhen  iuvoke.l  at  ail!  was^'lleVr  ^in^L'^^'  •^,;j;:|;i;^  ■•-"-". 

or  apologist  of  tlic  nrc-exisiintr  «.„i;,V,'   .  ".indniaid,  e.xposiic.r 

fact:«otn>satestofvr'rific'm  on      Ev  '  "'V'"  "/'r ^' T  a fter  ll, 

in  his  own  mind,  will  out  I,  „vi^l;   "''','1,  ';"'',•'  "'"'  l'"-*^>'asi„a, 
there;  and  witnessed  them  in  o    crs"  •  i.^.r      '^     r"""  '■*^'«'''i^l'"l 

itnexamincd  common-pla^e   „u    Te;kTrr     «'"'  "^  "  -?■""'''  '"'"'"f 
at  once  of  large  meaniu-  en      ,1   ,1    n^f,',!   J^''  "l'"^. 'I'e  w..nls  w.re 

cesses,  and  surrounded  'by  a  sir  „.   ''  J' "      *.•■"'"'''"•  "'f'"'''"  1"<>- 

assertions  in  which  tliev  were^  ,  i\    r    r  "'^  «n""><'>it-tlie -(iienil 
imnosing  to  evcrr  on   -Uh  ., '^;"' '"'•.'"''  J'!'l'<'are.l  self.e^ i.li^nt  .n,,! 

ticular  <jJs,  nrj.rthoi°.^h   1  im  J^^^  T'"'"^''  '''^l^'"^'  i"  T"'' 

propositions  Ihetnselv'oio  re     el   vl  ,'h     ",'  "","'^7^  ""^  ■^'"''■1 
import   and  could  apply  ^.m  r^itnllW^:^!;,^^^'''^'^  '"- 

day   toVe-l  further 'eludd^dio'  a^Vnat'e  "of ''f.,r''r  "'" ''T^"" 
politics,  in  politiral   oconomv   nn   oil       V-     .         .'     ^"   "lonils.  in 

ality  is  sufficiently  pix'vaien     X      1^^  i^n<Avle(ige  without  tlicic- 

by  authority  and  evuiVnle   of     n^  ''"^^  propanation. 

sfon.sentiLnt\vUa^c^,  ^  :^;^^^  -stl^.^  upon 

then-  iirowlh-  the  like  pnlijtm„„t  ,  f  'he  steps  or  <oiiditi()nsof 

of  a  pWstal.liX       ..fu^^en      ,  J  lik^^^^  "'  Ibc  one-sided  „dvo<a,o 

is  familiar  with  the  la>"'  ,'  ^e   il       ilwf  f  "'""'•  ''*^'=""''''  e^'"?  ""'■' 

the  complex  facts,  i.?,;li;^s  ami  /.^I     •'  "'•'■-'■  T", ''  "'"'"''  "f 
cation— and  comneient  hr,f  ,     tendencies,  involved   n  iissi-nifi- 

sume  the      ,n°  oJfa^ioo    ofT  ■■  ^""""'■'.""."■^i™  words  and  to    "- 
analysis  or  study  ''"^^'""^  °^  l'"-g«  Propositions,  without  any  special 

tinfc"  and'^h;;?  '^''Ses'''7n"hr;  T'T'  ?"  ""'^  '-■'-""  "- 
respettin-  man  and.ocietv*  hm  n  "^  •'  '''  '"iP'''^'^'^''^>n«  not  only 
^ve.•e  of  this  same  sell^rl;.  ,.  ''pPf-nnir  the  physical  worhl, 
popular  astronomy  o  1  e^Sokp^  T  "'^^^'^'"'^■«^-  H.aracter.  The 
tivesuperficialobs^rvatons^l^h  '  h;^,r''  "^  ^ff^'e-ate  of  primi- 
amincd  from  cider  mc^  U  you   ^e  "^^e  ^'^/u -h''"'^'"''  passin^^mcx. 

J  ^^n^ti,  accq)led  with  unsuspecting  faith, 


and  consecrated  by  intense  sentiment.  Not  only  men  like  Nikias,  or 
Auylus  and  MeleUis,  but  even  h^okrates  himself  protested  against  the 
imnudence  of  xinaxagoras,  wh('n  he  degraded  the  divine  Helios  and 
Selene  into  a  sun  and  moon  of  calculable  motions  and  magnitudes. 
Ikit  now,  the  development  of  the  scientific  point  of  view,  with  the 
vast  increase  of  methodized  physical  and  mathematical  knowledge, 
has  tauixht  everyone  that  such  primitive  astronomical  and  physical 
eonvictTous  were  nothing  belter  than  "  a  fancy  of  knowledge  with- 
out the  reality."  Everyone  renounces  them  without  hesitation,  seeks 
his  eonclu?ioiis  from  the  scieiititic  teacher,  and  looks  to  the  proofs 
alone  for  his  gutu-antce.  A  man  who  has  never  bestowed  special 
study  on  astronomy  knows  that  he  is  ignorant  of  it:  to  fancy  that  he 
knows  it,  without  such  preparation,  would  be  held  an  absurdity. 
While  the  scientillc  point  of  view  has  thus  acquired  complete  pre- 
dominance in  reference  to  the  physical  world,  it  has  made  little  way 
comparatively  on  topics  regarding  man  and  society— wherein  "  fancy 
of  knowledsre  without  the  reality"  continues  to  reign,  not  without 
criticism  and  opposition,  yet  still  as  a  paramount  force.  And  if  a 
new  Sokrates  were  now  to  put  the  same  questions  in  the  market-place 
to  men  of  all  ranks  and  professions,  he  would  find  the  like  confident 
persuasion  and  unsuspecting  dogmatism  as  to  generalities— the  like 
faltering  blindness  and  contradiction,  when  tested  by  cross-examiu- 
inir  dt'tails. 

In  the  time  of  Sokrates,  this  last  comparison  was  not  open,  since 
there  did  not  exist,  in  any  department,  a  body  of  doctrine  scientific- 
ally constituted:  but  the  comparison  which  he  actually  took,  borrow- 
ed from  the  special  trades  and  profes.^ions,  brought  him  to  an  impor- 
tant result.     He  was  the  first  to   see  (and  the  idea  pervades  all  his 
speculations),  that  as  in  each  art  or  profession,  there  is  an  end  to 
he  attained— a  theory,  hiving  down  the  means  and  conditions  where- 
by it  is  attainable— amf  precepts,  deduced  from  that  theory— such 
precepts  collectively  taken  directing  and  covering  nearly  the  entire 
field  of  practice,  but  each  precept,  separately  taken,  liable  to  con- 
llict  with  others,  and  therefore  liable  to  cases  of  exception;  so  all 
this  is  not  less  true,  or  admits  not  less  of  being  realized,  respectin, 
the   u'cneral   art   of  human  living  and   society.     There  is  a  gran, 
and  all  comprehensive  end— the  security  and  happiness,  as  far  a 
practicable,  of  each  and  all  persons  in  the  society:  there  may  als; 
be  a  theory,  laying  down  those  means  and  conditions  under  whic' 
the  nearest   approach   can   be   made   to   that  end:  there  may  als 
be  precepts,  prescribing  to  every  man  the  conduct  and  character 
which  best  enables   hiin  to  become  an  auxiliary  toward  its  attain- 
ment, and   imperatively   restraining   him  from  acts  which  tend  to 
hinder  it— precepts  dethiced  from  the  theory,  each  one  of  them  sepa- 
rately taken  being  subject  to  exceptions,  but  all  of  them  taken  collect- 
ively governing   practice,  as  in  each  particular  art.     Sokrates  and 
Plato  talk  of  "the  art  of  dealing  wdth  human  beings"—"  art  of  behav- 


452 


SO  KR  AXES. 


ing  in  society"— "  that  F^cience  wliicli  lias  for  its  object  to  make  nicn 
happy,"  etc.  Tliey  draw  a  marked  disliiictioii  between  art,  or  luk-s 
of  p^ictice  deduced  from  a  theorelical  survey  of  the  subject-mailer 
and  taught  with  precognition  of  tlietnd— and  mere  artless,  irratioii;!!] 
knack  or  dexterity,  acquired  by  sinjple  copying  or  assimilation^ 
through  a  process  of  which  no  one  ctniid  render  account. 

Plato,  with  that  variety  of  indirect  alhision  which  is  his  character- 
istic, continually  constrains  the  reader  to  look  upon  human  and  social 
t  life  as  having  its  hwn  ends  and  purposes  no  le>s  than  each  separate 
l)rofession  or  craft;  and  impels  him  to  transfer  to  the  former  that  con- 
scious analysis  as  a  science,  and  intelligent  practice  as  an  art,  wliicli 
are  known  as  conditions  of  success  in  the  latter.     It  was  in  further- 
ance of  these  rati(mal  conceptions—"  Science  and  Art"— that  Sokra- 
tes  carried  on  his  crusade  against  "'  that  conceit  of  knowledge  with- 
out reality,"  which  reigned^nldisturbed  in  the  moral  world*  aromid 
liim,  and  was  only  begiiming  to  be  slightly  disturbed  even  as  to  the 
physical  world.    To  him  the  precept,  inscribed  in  the  Delphian  teniplc 
— "  Know  Thyself  "—was  the  holiest  (>f  all  texts,  which  he  constantly 
cited,  and  strenuously  enforced  upon  his  hearers;  interpreting  it  (o 
mean,  Know  what  sort  of  a  man  Ihou  art,  and  what  are  thy  capacit- 
ies, in  reference  to  human  use.    llis  manner  of  enforcing  it  was  alike 
original  and  eifective,  and  though  he  was  dexterous  in  varying  his 
toi)ics  and  queries  according  to  the  individual  person  with  whom  he 
had  to  deal,  it  was  his  first  object  to  bring  the  hearer  to  take  just 
measure  of  his  own  real  knowledge  or  rearignorance.     To  preach,  to 
exhort,  even  to  confute  particular  errors,  appeared  to  Scjkrates  use- 
less, so  long  as  the  mind  lay  wrapped  up  in  its  habitual  mist,  or 
illusion  of  wisdom;  such  mist  nnist  be  dissipated  before  any  new 
light  could  enter.    Accordingly,  the  hearer  being  lisually  forward  in 
announcing  positive  declarations  on  those  general  doctrines,  and  ex- 
planations of  those  terms,  to  which  he  was  most  attached  and'in  whi(  h 
he  had  the  most  implicit  confidence.  Sokrates  took  them  to  pieces. 
.  ixnd  showed  tiiat  they  involved  contradiction  and  inconsistency;  pro- 
fessing himself  to  be  without  any  positive  opinion,  nor  ever  advanc- 
ing any  until  the  hearer's  mind  had  undergone  the  proper  purifvin"- 
cross-examination.  '     ^ 

It  was  this  indirect  and  negative  proceeding,  which  though  only  a 
part  of  the  whole,  stood  out  as  his  most  original  and  most  conspicuous 
'■haracteristic,  and  determined  his  reputati7)n  with  a  large  nundjer  of 
persons  who  took  no  trouble  to  know  anything  else  about  him.  It 
was  an  exposure  no  less  painful  than  surprising  to  the  person  (ines- 
tioned;  producing  upon  several  of  them  an  effect  of  permanent  alien- 
ation, so  that  they  never  c;une  near  him  again,  but  reverted  to  their 
former  state  of  mi)id  without  any  permanent  change.  But  on  the 
other  hand,  the  ingenuity  and  novelty  of  the  process  was  hiahly  in- 
teresting to  hearers,  especially  youthful  hearers,  sons  of  rich 'men 
and  enjoying  leisure;  who  not  only  carried  away  with  them  a  lofty 


EFFECT  OF  SOKRATES'S  COXYERSATION.   453 

admiration  of  Sokrates,  but  were  fond  of  trying  to  copy  his  negative 
J^  imlcs  Probablv  men  like  Alkibiades  and  Kritias  frequen  ed  his 
I^v.ietvcineMvfor  this  purpose  of  acquiring  a  cpiality  ^yhlch  they 
mi-'ht  turn  t6  some  account  in  th.-ir  political  career  His  constant 
1  ibit  of  never  suffering  a  general  t;Mm  to  remain  umletermined,  but 
;; ,  via-  it  at  once  to  ptu'ticulars-the  homely  and  effective  instances 
of  which  he  made  choice-the  string  of  interrogatories  each  adv^mc- 

..  toward  a  result,  yet  a  result  not  forseen  by  any  one--the  indirect 
and  circuitous  manner  whereby  the  subject  was  turned  round  and 
a  last  anproaclied  and  laid  open  by  a  totally  diiferent  face-all  this 
coi  stitu  ed  a  sort  of  prerogative  in  Sokrates,  which  no  one  else  seems 
t    hive  approached.     Its  effect  was  enhanced  by  a  voice  and  manner 

. '  dy  pi  uisiblc  and  captivating-and  to  a  cerhiin  extent,  by  the  very 
ccJentricitv  of  his  Silenic  physiognomv.  What  is  termed  -  his 
i'onv"-or  assumption  of  the  character  of  an  ignorant  learner  asking 
information  from  one  who  knew  better  than  himself-Nvhile  it  was 
e..ential  as  an  excuse  fen-  his  practice  as  a  questioner,  contributed  also 
to  add  zest  and  novelty  to  his  conversation;  and  totally  bjinished 
from  it  both  didactic  pedantry  and  seeming  bias  as  an  advoca  e ; 
which  to  one  who  talked  so  much,  was  of  no  small  advantage.  After 
he  had  acciuired  celebrity,  this  uniform  profession  of  ignorance  in 
Me  wai  usually  construed  as  mere  affectation,  and  those  who 
merelv  heard  him  occasionally,  without  penetrating  into  his  intimacy, 
(^•ten  suspected  that  he  was  amusing  himself  with  ingenious  paradox^ 
Tinontle  Satirist,  and  Zeno  the  Epicurean,  accordingly  described 
him  as  a  bulfoon  who  turned  every  one  into  ridicule,  especially  mea 

""^Usbv  Plato  that  the  negative  and  indirect  vein  of  Sokrates  has 
beenwoVked  out  and  immortalized;  while  Xonophon,  who  S3'mpa- 
thi'/e  I  little  in  it,  complains  that  others  looked  at  his  inastei  too 
exclusively  on  this  side,  and  that  they  could  not  conceive  him  as  a 
o-uide  to  virtue,  but  only  as  a  stirring  and  propulsive  force  One  of 
ri  e  nrim-iiKil  obiects  of  his  "  Memorabilia  "  is,  to  show,  that  Sokrates, 
'  e  n  vim '  wcirke.l  upon  novices  sufficiently  with  the  negative  line 
of  questions,  altered  his  tono,  desisted  from  embarrassing  them,  and 
uldress,d  to  them  precepts  not  less  plain  and  simple  than  dnectly 
■'ful  in  nractice  I  do  not  at  all  doubt  that  this  was  often  the  fact, 
juid  that  the  various  dialo-ues  in  which  Xenoplion  presents  to  us  the 
nhilosonher  inculcating  self-control,  temperance,  piety,  duty  to  par- 
;^       n^^^^^  Sdelity  in  friendship,  diligence,  benevolence, 

e  ton  positive  -roumls-are  a  faithful  i>icture  of  one  vidua  )le  side 
of  i'lls  chancter'  and  an  essential  part  of  the  whole.  Such  direct 
admonSlorv  inlluence  vvas  common  to  Sokrates  with  Prodikus  and  the 

M  is  t'Stither  from  the  virtue  of  his  life,  nor  from  the 
goodness  of  his  precepts  (though  both  were  essential  features 
kr  his  character),  that  he  derives  his  peculiar  title  to  fame,  but 


454 


SOKRATES. 


BACONIAN  SPIRIT. 


455 


from  Ills  originality  and  prolific  efficacy  in  the  line  of  speculativP 
pi.losophy.     (n  that  originality,  the  fi.it  portion  o's  has  S'  ^t 
stUed)consistccl  m  l.is  having  boon  the  tirst  to  conceive  the  idea  of  an 
L.hical  SeietH-e  ^vlt h  its  appropriate  End,  and  ^itli  precepts  capal^^^e 
of  being  eMed  and  improved;,  but  tlie  second  ix.int,  and  not  t  le  en  t 
important,  ^vas    his  peculiar  method-and  extraordinar      )". 
exciting  scientit.c  impulse  and  capacity  in  the  minds  of  others      I 
^vasnol  by  positive  teaching  that  tins  elTect  uas  produced      Both' 
bokrates  and  Plato  thought  lliat  little  mental  iuiprovc.nent  coul     1  e 

roduml  by  expositions  directly  communicated   or  by  new  a       ten 
mat  er  lodged  in  the  memory.     It  was  necessary  that  mind  si     , 
^\ork  upon  mmd,  by  short  question  and  answer,  or  an  exiKTt  em   1  v 
i.i-nt  of  the  dialectic  process,  in  order  to  genera'te  i:l^U^J)^^^ 
powcTs:  a  process,  which  Plato,  with  his^exuberant  fancv,  ex  npa   ■ 
to  copulation  and  pregnancy,  representing  it  as  the  true  way  ad  the 
oiilv  eilctual  way   ol  propagating  the  philosoi)hic  spirit    ^ 

^^  e  sliould  greatly  misunderstand  the  negative  and  indirect  vein  of 
Sokrates,  if  we  supj)osed  that  it  ended  in  imthing  more  than  Vim nh 
negation      On  busy  or  ungifted  minds  among  lh?indiscr  i    nateZl 
ic  who  heard    urn,  it  i>rQbably  left  little  permanent  elTeet  of       v 

;  rl  '.n^r'/'L'^^J"^  °r'  ^''^'''^  ''^  adndralion  for  in.enui  v     >i- 
pyhairs  dislike  of  paradox:  on  practical  minds  like  Xennplum' 
e fleet  vs as  merged  m  that  of  the  precc ptorial  exhortation.     But  vviu  le 
the   seed   fell  uimn  an  intellect  having  the  least  i>redisposi  io      .r 
capacity  for  systematic  thougiit.  the  negation  had  o.lv  the  (  f  e 
driving  the  hearer  back  at  lirst.  giving  him  a  new  inipelus  fo    aftJ 
ward   springing   forward.     The    .^okratic   dialectics    cearim'   ^^V^^ 
rom  the  mind  its  mist  of  fancied  knowledge,  and  iavi  g  bte  ti?e 
real  igniorance,  produced  an  iminecliate  elfect  like  the*  touch  of      e 
torpedo.     The  newly-created  consciousness  of  i..n(,ran ce  wU    ,1   w' 
unexpected,  painful,  and  humiliating-a  s(  as  ,n  of  doubt  and  di^c  m- 
for,,yet  combined  with  an  internal  working  and  vearninoaf",.  ■  trut 
never  before  experienced.     Such  intellectual  (iniekc-ning,' w      Vcou  d 
nevcT  commence  unti    the  mind  liad  been  disabused  of  its  ori  .    • 
Illusion  of  false  knowledge,  was  considered  bv  ^'okrates      V    m  iv 
as  the  index  and  precursor,  but  as  the  indi*spens.-,ble  coi    i-io       'f 
fu  ureprogi-ess.     It  w^tsthe  mid.lle  point  in  the  ascendi   rnu^;  = 
sea  e;  the   lowest  point  being  ignorance  unconscious,  self "ati  h'e 
and  mistak.nu-itselt  tor  knowledge:  the  m-xt  above,  iVnio  in  ce  cr.  ' 
scious,  unmasked   ashamed  of  itself,  and  thirsting  after  knowled 'e 
as  yet  unpossessed;  while  actual  knowled-e   the   third  mm.     1  i   i  rt 
stage,  was  onlv  attainable  after  passing  through  n.eel;7is^:^ 
Inninary.     This  second  stage  was  a  sort   of  pre-nancy     ind  everv 
mmd,  either  by  uature  incapable  of  it,  or  in  which,  f  om'w        of   hi 
necessaiycoupinction,  it  ha.l  never  risen-was  birivn  foi   ^  11  Vi  • 
poses  of  original  or  self-appropriated  thought,  Soki  i  es  re^^arde  1  h  as 
his  peculiar  volition  and  skill  ^employing  another  J  >lalouic'metaphoiO 


while  he  had  himself  no  power  of  reprrduction,  to  deal  with  such 
pre^maut  and  troubled  minds  in  the  capaci-ty  of  a  midwife;  to  assist 
theni  in  that  mental  parturition  whereby  they  were  to  be  relieved,  but 
at  the  same  time  to  scrutinize  narrowly  the  offspring  which  they 
brousrlit  forth,  and  if  it  should  prove  distorted  or  unpromising,  to  cast 
it  aw^iy  with  the  rigor  of  a  Lykurgean  nurse,  whatever  might  be  the 
reluctance  of  the  mother  mind  to  part  with  its  new  born.  Plato  is 
fertile  in  illustrating  this  relation  between  the  teacher  and  the  scholar, 
operating  not  by  what  it  i)ut  into  the  latter,  but  by  what  it  evolved 
out  of  hmi;  by  creating  an  uneasy  longing  after  truth— aitling  in  the 
elaboration  necessary  for  obtaining  relief— and  testing  whether  the 
doctrine  elaborated  possessed  the  real  lineaments,  or  merely  the  delu- 
sive semblance,  of  truth. 

There  are  few  things  more  remarkable  tlwin  the  description  given 
of  the  colloquial  mau-ic  of  Sokrates  and  its  vehement  elTecis,  by  those 
who  had  themselves  heard  it  and  felt  its  force.  Its  suggestive  and 
stimulating  power  was  a  gift  so  extraordinary,  as  well  to  justify  any 
abundance  of  imagery  on  the  part  of  Plato  to  illustrate  it.  On  the 
subjects  to  which  he  applied  himself— man  and  society— his  hearers 
had  done  little  but  feel  and  atlirm:  Sokrates  undertook  to  make  them 
think,  weigh,  and  examine  themselves  and  their  own  judgments,  until 
the  latter  were  broui,dit  into  consistency  with  each  other  as  well  as 
with  a  known  and  vxiiierable  end.  The  generalizations  embodied  in 
their  judgments  had  grown  together  and  coalesced  in  a  manner  at 
once  so  intimate,  so  familiar,  yet  so  unveritied,  that  the  particulars 
implied  in  them  had  passed  out  of  notice:  so  that  Sokrates,  when  he 
recalled  these  particulars  out  of  a  forgotten  experience,  presented  to 
the  hearer  his  own  opinions  under  a  totally  new  point  of  view.  His 
conversations  (even  as  they  appear  in  the  reproiluction  of  Xeiiophon, 
which  presents  but  a  mere  skeleton  of  the  reality)  exhibit  the  main 
features  of  a  2:enuiue  inductive  meihod,  struggling  against  the  deep- 
lying,  but  uuiieeded,  errors  of  the  early  intellect  acting  by  itself  with- 
out conscious  march  or  scienlitic  guidance— of  the  uitdkcim  dhi  pcr- 
mi>i8iM—\ii)on.  which  Bacon  so  emphatically  dwells.  Amid  abund- 
ance of  imtantlm  iiegativm.  the  seientitic  value  of  which  is  dwelt  upon 
in  the  "  Novum  Organoii,"  and  negative  instances  too  so  dexterously 
chosen  as  generally  to  show  the  way  to  new  truth,  in  place  of  that 
error  which  they  set  aside— there  is  a  close  pressure  on  the  hearer's 
mind,  to  keep  it  in  the  distinct  track  of  particulars,  as  conditions  of 
every  just  and  consistent  generalization;  and  to  divert  it  irom  becoin- 
inn-  enslaved  to  unexamined  formuhe,  or  from  delivering  mere  inten- 
sity of  persuasion  under  the  authoritative  phrase  of  reason.  Instead 
of  anxiety  to  plant  in  the  hearer  a  conclusion  ready  made  and 
accepted  on  trust,  the  questioner  keeps  up  a  prolonged  suspense,  wiih 
special  emphasis  laid  upon  the  i)articulars  tending  both  atlirmatively 
and  negatively;  nor  is  his  pUrjwse  answered,  until  that  stale  of 
knowledge  and  apprehended  evidence  is  created,  out  of  which  the 


456 


SOKRATES. 


1 


GRECIAN  DIALECTICS. 


457 


conclusion  starts  as  a  livinpr  product,  -with  its  own  root  and  solf-sus- 
luining  power,  consciously  liiikci.!  with  its  premises.  If  tins  conclu- 
sion so  ircnenited  be  not  tlic  same  as  (liat  whicli  llie  questioner  him- 
self adopts,  it  will  at  least  Ite  some  other,  worthy  of  a  competent  and 
examining  mind  taking  its  own  independent  view  of  the  appropri;;te 
evideace.  Ami  amid  all  the  variety  and  divergence  of  particulars 
which  we  find  enforced  in  the  language  of  Sokrates,  the  end,  toward 
which  all  of  them  point,  is  one  and  the  same,  emphatically  signified, 
the  good  and  happiness  of  .social  man. 

It  is  not  then  to  multiply  proselytes  or  to  procure  authoritative 
assent — hut  to  create  earnest  seekers,  analytical  intellects,  fore- 
knowing and  consistent  agents,  capable  of  forming  conclusions  for 
themselves  and  of  teaching  others — as  well  as  to  force  them  into  th:  t 
path  of  inductive  generalization  whereby  alone  trustworthy  con- 
clusions can  be  formed — that  the  Sokratic  method  asiiires.  In  many 
of  the  Platonic  dialogues,  wherein  Sokrates  is  brought  forward  as 
the  principal  disputant,  we  read  a  series  of  discussions  and  argu- 
ments, distinct,  though  having  reference  to  the  same  subject — i)ut 
terminating  either  in  a  result  purely  negative,  or  without  any  detinite 
result  at  all.  The  cotnmentators  often  attempt,  but  in  my  judgment 
with  little  success,  either  by  arranging  the  dialogues  in  a  su]iposed 
sequence  or  by  various  other  hypotheses — to  as^iign  some  ])osif.ive 
doctrinal  conclusion  as  having  been  indirectly  conlemidated  by  the 
author.  But  if  Plato  Inid  nin^ed  at  any  substantive  demonstration  of 
this  sort,  we  cannot  w(  11  imaginethMt  he  would  have  left  his  purpose 
thus  in  the  dark,  visible  only  by  the  microscope  of  a  critic.  The 
didactic  value  of  these  dialogues — (hat,  wherein  the  genuine  iSokralic 
spirit  stands  most  manifest — consists,  not  in  the  positive  conclusion 
proved,  but  in  the  arg;iment:itive  process  itself,  coupled  with  the 
general  importance  of  the  subject  upon  which  evidence  negative  and 
affirmative  is  brouglit  to  bear. 

This  connects  itself  with  thr.t  whicli  I  remarked  in  the  preceding 
cha])ter,  when  mentioning  Zeno  and  the  first  manifestations  (^f 
dialectics,  respecting  the  large  sweep,  the  many-sided  argumentation, 
and  the  strength  as  well  as  forwardness  of  the  negative  arm — ia 
Grecie.n  speculative  ]^hilosophy.  Through  Sokrates,"this  amplitude 
of  dialectic  range  was  transmiUtvl  from  Zeno  first  to  Plato  and  next  , 
to  Aristotle.  It  was  a  proceeding  natural  to  men  wlio  were  r.ot 
merely  interested  in  establishitig,  or  refuting  some  given  p.-u-ticul.ir 
conclusion — but  Mho  also  (like  ex]H'rt  mathematicians  in  tiieir  own 
science)  loved,  esteemed,  an<l  sought  to  improve,  the  dialectic  ]iio- 
cess  it>elf.  with  the  means  of  verification  which  it  afforded;  al((]- 
ing.  of  Avhich  abundant  evidence  is  to  be  foun<l  in  the  Platonic  wiii- 
ings.  Such  pleasure  in  the  scientific  operation — though  not  meniy 
innocent,  but  valuable  both  as  a  stimulant  and  as  a  guarantee  again^'^t 
error,  and  though  the  corresponding  taste  among  mathemalicijins  is 
always  treated  with  the  sympathy  which  it  deserves — incurs  much 


unmerited  reprobation  from  modern  historians  of  philosophy,  under 
the  name  of  love  of  disputatioii.  caviling,  or  skeptical  subtlety. 

But  over  and  above  any  love  of  the  ])rocess,  the  subjects  to 
which  dialectics  were  applied,  from  Sokrates  downward — mnn  and 
society,  ethics,  polith-s.  metaphysics,  etc  .  were  such  as  particularly 
called  for  this  many  sided  handling.  Ou  topics  like  these,  relating 
to  sequences  of  fact  which  dei)end  upon  a  m.ultitude  of  co-opcratin<^ 
or  contlicting  causes,  it  is  im]iossil)le  to  arrive,  by  any  one  thread  of 
positive  reasoning  or  induction,  at  absolute  doctrine  which  a  man 
may  reckon  upon  finding  always  true,  whether  he  remembers  the  proof 
or  iiot;  as  is  the  case  with  mathematical,  astronomical,  or  physical 
truth.  '  The  ut  iiost  which  science  can  ascertain,  on  subjects  thus 
complicated,  is  an  aggregate,  not  of  peremptory  theorems  and  pre- 
dictions, l)ut  of  tendencies;  by  studying  the  action  of  each  separate 
cjiuse,  and  c<)nd)ining  them  together  as  w^ell  as  our  means  admit. 
The  knowledge  of  tendencies  Uius  obtained,  though  falling  much 
short  of  certahity.  is  higidy  important  for  guidance:  but  it  is  plain 
that  conclusions*of  this^nature— resulting  from  multifarious  threads 
of  evidence — true  only  on  a  balance,  and  always  liable  to  limitation — 
can  never  be  safely  detached  from  the  proofs  on  which  they  rest,  or 
taught  as  absolu'^  and  consecrated  formuhie.  They  require  to  be 
kcpl  in  perpetual  and  conscious  association  with  the  evidences, 
allirmative  and  negative,  by  the  joint  consideration  of  which  their 
truth  is  established;  nor  can  this  object  be  attained  by  any  other 
means  than  by  ever-renovated  discussion,  instituted  from  new  and 
distinct  points  of  view,  and  with  free  play  to  that  negative  arm  which 
is  indispensable  as  stimulus  not  less  than  as  control.  To  ask  for 
nothing  but  results — to  decline  the  labor  of  verification — to  be 
satisfied  with  a  ready-made  stock  of  estal)lished  positive  arguments 
as  proof — and  to  decry  the  doubter  or  negative  reasoner,  wjio  starts 
new  difficulties,  as  a  common  enemy — this  is  a  proceeding  suffici<'ntly 
C')inin(m.  in  ancient  as  well  as  in  modern  times.  But  it  is  iiever- 
thelessan  abnegation  of  the  dignity  and  even  of  the  functions  of 
speculative  philosophy.  It  is  the  direct  reverse  of  the  method  both 
of  Sokrates  and  Plato^  wiio,  as  inquirers,  felt  that,  for  the  great  sub- 
jects which  they  treated,  multiplied  threads  of  reasoning,  coupled 
with  the  constant  presence  of  the  cross-examining  Elenchus,  were 
indispensable.  Nor  is  it  less  at  variance  with  the  views  of  Aristotle 
(though  a  man  very  diffei-ent  from  either  of  them)  who  goes  round 
his  subject  on  all  sides,  states  and  considers  all  its  difficulties,  and 
insists  emphatically  on  the  necessity  of  having  all  these  difficulties 
brought  out  in  full  force,  as  the  incitement  and  guide  to  positive 
piiil()sophy,  as  well  as  the  test  of  its  sufficiency. 

Understanding  thus  the  method  of  Sokrates.  we  shall  be  at  no  loss 
to  account  for  a  certain  variance  on  his  part  (and  a  still  greater  vari- 
ance on  the  part  of  Plato,  who  expanded  the  method  in  writing  so 
much  more)  with  the  Sophists,  without  supposing  the  latter  to  be 


f  «:--'tJli..i&w.JN'  .E-Ufm 


1 


4^)8 


SOKRATES. 


corrupt  teachers.  As  they  aimed  at  qualifyiniic  yonn^  men  for  active 
life,  they  accepted  the  current  ethical  and  political  sentiment,  \villi 
its  unexamined  common-places  and  inconsistencies,  merely  seekiiiij 
to  shape  it  mto  wluit  was  accounted  a  meritorious  ch;iracter  at 
Athens-  They  were  thus  exposed,  alone:  with  others — and  nH.re  llian 
others,  in  consequence  of  their  reputation — to  the  analytical  cross- 
examination  of  Sokrates,  and  were  quite  as  little  able  to  defend 
themselves  ai::ainst  it. 

Whatever  may  liave  been  the  success  of  Protagoras  or  any  other 
among  these  Sophists,  the  nughty  originality  of  Sokrates  achieved 
results  not  only  equal  at  the  time,  but  incomparably  grander  and 
more  lasting  in  reference  to  the  future.  Out  of  his  intellectual  school 
sprang  not  merely  Plato,  liimself  a  host — hut  all  the  other  leaders  of 
Grecian  speculation  for  the  next  half-century,  and  all  those  who  con- 
tinued the  great  lim'  of  speculative  philosophy  tlowu  to  later  times. 
Eukleides  and  the  Megaric  school  of  philosophers — Arislippus  and 
the  Kyrenaic — Antisthenes  and  Diogenes,  the  first  of  those  called  the 
Cynics — all  emanated  more  or  less  directly  from  the  stimulus  ini- 
jrarted  by  Sokrates,  though  each  followed  a  different  vein  of  thought. 
Ethics  continue  to  be  what  Sokrates  had  lirst  made  them,  a  distinct 
branch  of  philosophy,  alongside  of  which  politics,  rhetoric,  logic,  and 
other  speculations  relating  to  man  and  society,  gradually  arranged 
themselves;  all  of  them  more  popular,  as  well  as  more  keenly  con- 
troverted, than  physics,  which  at  that  time  presented  comparatively 
liUle  charm,  and  still  less  of  attainable  certainty.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  individual  influence  of  Sokrates  permanently  enlarged 
the  horizon,  improved  the  method,  and  multiplied  the  "ascendant 
minds,  of  the  Grecian  speculative  world,  in  a  manner  never  since 
paralleled.  Subsequent  philosophers  may  have  had  a  more  elaborate 
doctrine,  and  a  larger  number  of  disciples  who  imbibed  their  ideas; 
but  none  of  them  applied  the  same  stinudating  method  wilh  the  same 
etlicacy — none  of  ihem  struck  out  of  other  nnnds  ihat  tire  which  sets 
light  to  oriiiinal  thought — none  of  them  either  produced  in  others  the 
I).iins  of  intellectual  |)regnancy,  or  extracted  from  others  the  fresh 
and  unborrowed  offspring  of  a  really  parturient  nund. 

Having  thus  touched  upon  Sokrates,  both  as  tirst  opener  of  the 
field  of  Ethics  to  scientltic  study — and  as  author  of  a  method,  little 
copied  and  never  paralleled  since  his  time,  for  stinudating  in  other 
men's  minds  earnest  analytical  inquiry — I  speak  last  about  his  theo- 
relical  doctrine.  Considering  the  fanciful,  far-fetched  ideas,  U{>on 
whieli  alone  the  Pythagoreans  and  oth^r  predecessors  had  shapetl 
their  theories  respecting  virtues  and  vices,  the  wonder  is  that  Sokrates, 
who  had  no  better  g\iides  to  follow,  should  have  laid  down  an  ethical 
doctrine  v.iiich  has  the  double  merit  of  l)eing  true,  as  far  as  it  goes, 
legiiimate,  and  of  comprehensive  generality ;  though  it  errs,  mainly  by 
stating  a  part  of  the  essential  conditions  of  virtue  (sometimes  also  a 
part  of  the  Ethical  End),  as  if  it  were  the  whole.     Sokrates  resolved 


DOCTRINE  Oy  SOKRATES. 


459 


all  virtue  into  knowledge  or  wisdom;  all  vice,  mto  ignorance  or 
follv  To  do  riirht  was  the  only  way  to  impart  happmess,  or  the 
least' decree  of  unhappiness  compatible  with  any  given  situation: 
now  this  was  precisely  what  everyone  wished  lor  and  aimed  at-- 
onlvthat  many  persons,  from  ignorance,  took  the  wrong  road;  and 
S  man  was  wise  enough  always  to  take  the  right  But  as  no  mrm 
WIS  wiUinolv  his  own  enemy,  so  no  man  ever  did  wrong  AviHingly; 
it 'was  becau'se  he  was  not  fully  or  correctly  informed  ot  the  conse- 
nuences  of  his  own  actions;  so  that  the  proper  remedy  to  apply  was 
enlar<'-ed  teaching  of  consequences  and  improved  judiiment.  lo 
make"' him  willing  to  ])e  taught,  the  only  condition  recpured  was  lo 
make  him  conscious  of  his  own  ignorance;  the  want  ot  which  con- 
sciousness was  the  real  cause  both  of  indocihty  and  of  vice. 

That  this  doctrine  sets  forth  one  portion  of  the  esseutnd  conditions 
of  virtue,  is  certain;  and  that  too  the  most  commanding  portion, 
since  there  can  be  no  assuredmoralconductexcept  under  the  suprem- 
acv  of  reason.     But  that  it  omits  to  notice,  what  is  not  less  essen- 
tial to  virtue,  the   proper  condition  of  the  emotions,  desires,  etc., 
taking  account  only  of  the  intellect-is  also  certain;  and  has  been 
remarked  by  Aristotle  as  well  as  by  many  others.     It  is  fruit Css,  in 
mv  iudo-ment,  to  attempt  by  any  retined  explanation,  to  make  out 
that  Sokrates  meant  bv  -  knowledge,"  something  more  than  wha    is 
directlv  implied  in  the  word.     He  had  present  to  his  miiul,  as  the 
orand  depravation  of  the  human  being,  not  so  mucji  vice  as  madness; 
that  state  in  which  a  man  does  not  know  what  he  is  doing.     Against 
the  vicicms  man,  securities,  both  public  and  private,  may  be  taken 
with  considerable  elfect;  against  the  madman  there  is  no  security 
except  perpetual  restraint.     He  is  incapable  of  any  of  the  du.ies 
incumbent  on  social  man,  nor  can  he,  even  if  he  wishes,  do  good 
either  to  himself  or  to  others.     The  sentiment  which  we  ie-1  towaid 
such  an  unhappy  being  is  indeed  something  totally  difterent  ironi 
moral  reprobation,  sucli  as  we  feel  for  the  vicious  man  ^vl;o Joes 
wronc  knowinolv.     But  Sokrates  took  measure  ot  both  wita  letei- 
ence  lo  the  pulposes  of  human  life  and  society,  and  pronounced 
that  the  latter  was  less  completely  spoiled  for  those  purposes  than 
the  former      Madness  was  i'jnorance  at  its  extreme  pitch,  accom- 
panied too  by  the  ciicumst.ance  that  the  madman  himself  was  uncon- 
scious of  his  own  ignorance,  acting  under  a  sincere  persuasion  that 
he  knew  what  he  w^as  doing.    But  short  of  this  extremity,  there  were 
many  varieties  and  iiradations  in  the  scale  of  ignorance,  which,  if 
accompanied  by  false  conceit  of  knowledge   differed  from  ma(  ne^^s 
only  indeii-rec;  and  each  of  which  dis-iualihed  a  ^^^^  ;^^»^^;;>;"^^ 
ri'dit  in  proportion  to  the  ground  which  it  covered.     Thewoistot 
all  io'norance-that  which  stood  nearest  to  madness-was  when  a  man 
was'i-norant  of  himself,  fancying  tlnit  lie_  knew  what  he  did  not 
really^know,  and  that  he  could  do    or  avoid   or  e"^^-'!!'^'  ^^j  '^^^J^.f^ 
quite  beyond  his  capacity;  when,  for  example,  intending  to  speak 


-■■•'  < -i.-»-'p'-ji.fcj 


400 


SOKU.VTES. 


the  same  truth,  he  «oinothTies  said  one  thins,  sometimes  anotlier    nr 
casting  up  the  san.e  aiitlm.etical  li-uiTs,  ,u  ule  soZnmJiTZ~Zr 
Mun.  son>etuues  a  less.     A  person  ,vh„  k mnvs  i.is    •  R.  "  or  ,,f  'r'  h 
netu-iau,  may  doubtless  write  ba.l  orthc.gr.pliv  or  <;,si  „',  h  ,orre,  L 
l.y  design-but  ean   also  perform    ii,e° operations  c.  rec  h     If     e 
chooses;  while  one  ignorant  of  writing  or  of  ariii.nutie  <-»««W  do  f 

tha^  the  latleT  T''-^  '"  ""'  T'"'  «'""'P"Plior  or  .-.rililmHid  n 

good,   but  conmius  acts  of  a  eonlrary  ehanutir-l.e    .l^i      e'r    m 

■oines  nearer  to  Ix-tng  a  just  man,  than  one  who  .ioes  iiot  kn  w  wlnt 

Jt  ^t  acts  are,  and  does  not  distinguisl,  ibein  fioin  ni.  us,    fo,   1 1 

umeh. ""'"""  '""^"'^'  '""'^^"'  J"^^"-^'  "■^■"   ''■  ''^'  desires  il  ever  "! 

The  opinion  here  maintained  illnslrales  foreihly  the  f'enern!  doe 
limine  of  Sokrales.     I  have   aheadv  observed  ,l,at^  11  c-  fund  ,m,  n  M 
Idea  wlueh  govern..d  his  trait,  of  re.-.soninir.  was.    he  utal         "f  "d 
ma.i  s  soeia   he  and  ,inly  to  a  s,,eeial  inolessio.,  or  tr-    e     \o     w  • 
js  pr,„e,p:d  y  ,n,,uired  after  in'  r,.gard  to  these  spee       u>;^     s 
profe.«sional  capacity;  without  this,  no  petsou  woul     c"e,   , hi,     nf 
employtng  fhetn    le,  their  .lispositions  be  ever  so  go  d;  w  t  .  i    go.?d 

Lon^     r.  ""''  '': '"'■"'.'^  "■••■■  P"-'"n»-<'.   <.ulc.-s  .hen.   be   po.4  ve 
giounds  for  suspecting  the  eonlrary.     Bui  why  do  we  inilij.re  <.  Jh 
l.resump.n.u?    Because  their  pecuiiiarv  inter.-st,  ^1  e  r Ti    fs.i  n 
s- 'Mni'Ji^'""."'  P'='^-<^  """;".?  conipetitors,  are  sl'ak'      u,  oi     ,     '"  ' 
sotliatwe  reckon  upon   their  best  efforls.     But  in  re'ard  to  tilit 
n  anitold  and  indefinite  series  of  acts  vvliiel,  coftstitnie   b    .nm  la 
of  social  duty,  a  man  has  no  such  special  interest  lo "  ,i  e^    d  ii     e 
ni,  nor  can  we  presume  in  bin,  tho..e  dispositions  wjiieh\     I  ir",  ^ 
h.s  doing  right,  wherever  he  knows  what  riirht  is.      1  ank  n  i      e 
oblige,   to  give  premiu.ns  for  these  disposiiio.rs,  and  to  atS   o einl 
ties  to  he  contrary,  by  means  of  prai.4  and  censure    no    ocT    he 
natural  sympathies  and  anti,>alhies  of  ordinarv  niindsw,,!  deter 
mine  so  powerfully  the  ap,,Iicatlon  of  moral  terms,  r,     ..ii"        ,,    ^y 

esciilK  '''The'  "'"   '•■"''!  "'■'■'■"''""J  "«■  ""'i'  "■''"■''  'i-^'^^o    w  n  d 
pusculK...     The   analogy  lietween   the   paid   special  dut^•    ■led  ile 

general  social  duty,  fails  in  this  panic,  lar.  Eve^n  f  Sokralc,  we  e 
corree  as  to  1  lie  former  (and  this  wonl.l  be  nowav  t.u e)  n  m.,ki,^ 
t  e  .ntellectual  conoitions  of  good  conduct  stand'for  lie  who  e-  S 
such  inference  could  safely  be  extended  to  the  latter 

t>okrates  alhrmeii  tbat-w-ell-doing''  was  the  nol.lest  pur..nit  of 
in.in.  ^\eIl-dolng•  consisted  in  doing  a  thing  well  after  Imvin' 
learnt  It  and  practiced  it,  by  the  ratiomd  and  proper  mean.  Uwf 
altogether  , iisparate  from  good  fortune,  or  sticccss'w  th  t  Va  ,  nal 
sehemeimd  preparation.  ■•The  best  man  (he  said)and  tie  S 
.■loved  by  the  gods,  is,  he  who  as  a  husbandman,  pcV,™.  wel  It  he 
duties  of  husbandry-as  a  surgeon,  those  of  medica   arl-in  pel  ticil 


POLITICAL  OPINIONS  OF  SOKRATES.  4C1 

life  his  duty  toward  the  commonwealth.'    But  the  man  who  does 
oiii K'^vell,  is  neither  useful-uor  agroeable  to  the  gods."       bis  is 
le  Sokratic  view  of  human  life;  to  look  at  it  as  an  assemblage  of 
c^lite  aul  practical  defails-to  translate  the  large  words  ot  the 
,,;       vocabu  ary  into  those  homely  purtieulavs  to  winch  at  hot.oni 
lev  efer-to  take  account  of  acts,  not  of  dispositions  apnrtfrom 
nr7in  contradiction  to  the  ordinary  flow  of  the  moral  sympathies)- 
?n  enforce  upon  all  men,  that  what  they  chiefly  required  w-as,  teach- 
n.'"ml  prac"^  CO  as  mepkralions  for  a<:t;  and  tli.it  therefore  ignorance 
e  noch  Iv  i-norance  m  slaking  itself  for  knowled-o,  was  their  capital    • 
rtiS^encv     The  religion  ot  Sokrates,  as  well  as  his  ethics,  had  refer- 
,   e  to  m-actk^'  human  en.is.     His  mind,  had  little  of  that  trans- 
e  ndeiiti    sm  wbioli  his  scholar  Plato  exldlnls  in  such  abundance. 
'^^^  P^  then  tliat  Sokrates  laid  down  a  general  ethical 

theorv  which  is  too  narrow,  and  which  states  a  part  of  the  truth  as 
i  were  he  whole.  But  as il  frequenlly  happens  ^viih  pliilosopher., 
who  make  the  like  mistake-wc  lind  that  he  did  not  confine  1  is 
kluctve  reasonings  within  the  limits  of  the  theory,  bi.t  escaped  the 
eiToneous  consequ?nces  by  a  partial  inconsistency.  For  example- 
no  mn  ever  iiisist,.d  more  emphatically  than  he  on  the  necessity  of 
e  iitro^  over  the  passions  and  appetites-of  enforcing  good  hab  ts- 
^  Ion  tie  value  of  tliat  state  of  the  sentiments  and  emotions  which 
s  0  1  a  cm^rso  t  mded  to  form.  In  Initb,  this  is  one particu  ar  cliarac- 
toistic  ci  1.  s  admonitions.  He  exhorted  men  to  limit  their  external 
w'm  s  to  be  sparing  in  indulgence,  and  to  cultivate,  even  in  preter- 
eucelo  louorfaiid  adv^incenK.nt,  tliose  pleasures  which  wouhl.su  ely 

arke  fro  n  a  performance  ot  duty,  as  well  as  from  selt-examina  ion 
and  the  consciousness  of  internal  improvement.     This  earnest  atten- 
?b     in  mcMilring  the  elements  and  conditions  of  happiness  to  the 
stite  of  the  internal  associations  as  contrasted  with  the  effect  of 
.4,-nal  eauses-as  well  as  the  pains  taken  to  make  it  m'P^r  how 
^m.eb   he  latter  depend  upon  the  former  for  their  power  of  contcr- 
1  ^  Cpiness  and  how  sWicieut  is  moderate  good  fortune  in  respec 
1   externals  provided  the  internal  man  be  properly  disciphned-is  a 
vein  0?  lou-ht  which  pervades  both  Sokrates  and  Plato,  and  which 
IZed  f ronhhem,  undW  various  i"0'H^9<-^''""tnhirZt  P  ota"or.^ 
luent  schools  of  ethical  philosophy.     It  is  P'^"  '•'^'^ //,  f, '^VSe? 
or  Prodikus,  training  rich  youth  tor  active  I'f'".^'''!'"      ""'Xell 
leaving  out  such  internal  element  of  .li^T.P-^'^f;  ^;«"lil  J^^'  '^^^'-'^ 
upon  it  less;  a  point  ot  decided  superioruy  >"  ^o'^Jft-'f;^  , .      ,,  •    , 
The  political  opinions  ot  Sokrates  were  much  akin  to  1 ,,  c  h  ca  , 
and  defcrve  especial  notice  as  having  in  par  '■•™'"l     "^^. »" '^J  tov- 
demnation  by  the  Dikastery.     lie  thought  «'«''''«/"  f ''7' "^-^.^ 
ernment  belonged  legitimate  y  to  those  ^1'".^"'^^  t^Z^^t 

GZ.rnor  w?as1oUhe^man  who  li.ld  the  -cTter  nor  the  man  elec.^ 
by  some  vulgar  persons-nor  lie  who  had  got  the  post  by  lot    uoi 


462 


SOKRATES. 


ACCUSED  BY  MELETUS. 


463 


he  w'lio  had  thrust  himself  in  by  force,  or  by  fraud — but  he  alone  who 
knew  liow  to  govern  well."  Just  as  the  pilot  governed  on  ship- 
board, the  surgeon  in  a  sick  man's  liouse,  the  trainer  in  a  pakrstra— 
everyone  else  being  eager  to  obey  these  professior.al  superiors,  nnd 
even  thanking  and  recompensing  them  for  their  directions,  sin. ply 
because  their  greater  knowleilge  was  an  admitted  f:ict.  It  was 
absurd  (Sokrates  used  to  contend)  to  choose  lublic  ( fllccrs  by  lot, 
when  no  one  would  trust  himself  on  shipboard  under  the  enre  of  a 
pilot  selected  by  hazard,  nor  would  any  one  pick  out  a  carpenter  or 
a  musician  in  like  manner. 

■  We  do  not  know  what  provisions  Sokrates  suggested  for  applying 
Ids  principle  to  practice — for  discovering  who  wjis  the  f-ltest  num  in 
point  of  knowledge — or  for  superseding  him  in  case  of  Lis  beconiirg 
untit.  or  in  case  another  titter  than  he  >hould  arise.  Tlie  annlogics 
of  the  pilot,  the  surgeon,  and  professirual  men  gmt  rally,  W(,nl(l 
naturally  conduct  liini  to  election  by  the  people,  renewable  afitr 
temporary  periods;  since  no  one  of  these  professional  persons,  wluit 
ever  may  be  his  positive  knowledge,  is  ever  trui-ted  (-r  obeyed  except 
by  the  free  choice  of  those  who  confide  in  him,  and  who  may  at  any 
time  make  choice  of  another.  But  it  does  not  ai  pear  that  l^okralcs 
followed  (mt  this  part  of  the  analogy.  His  compiinions  rem;iik(d 
to  him  that  his  first-rate  intellectual  ruler  would  be  a  des]K)t,  wl  o 
might,  if  he  pleased,  either  reiuse  to  listen  to  good  advice,  or  even 
put  to  death  those  who  gave  it.  "  He  will  not  act  thus  {replied 
Sokrates),  for  if  he  does,  lie  will  himself  be  the  greatest  loser." 

We  mav  notice  in  this  doctrine  of  Sokrates  the  ss.me  imperfection 
as  that  which  is  involved  in  the  ethical  doctiine;  a  disposition  to 
make  the  intellectual  conditions  of  political  fitness  stand  for  the 
whole.  His  negative  political  doctrine  is  not  to  be  mistaken;  lie 
approved  neither  of  democracy  nor  of  oligarchy.  As  lie  was  not 
attached,  either  by  sentimeut  or  by  conviction,  to  the  constitution  of 
Athens,  so  neither  had  lie  the  least  symjnilhy  with  oligarehic:d 
usurpers  such  as  the  Four  Hundred  aiftl  the  Thirty.  His  positive 
ideal  state,  as  far  as  we  can  divine  it.  would  have  been  something 
like  that  which  is  worked  out  in  the  "  Cyropa-dia"  of  Xcnoplion. 

In  describing  the  persevering  activity  of  b'okrates,  as  a  religions 
and  intellectual  missionary,  we  have  really  described  his  life:  for  he 
had  no  other  occupation  than  this  continual  intercourse  with  the 
Athenian  public— his  indiscriminate  conversation  and  invincible  dia- 
lectics. Discharging  faithfully  and  bravely  his  duties  as  an  hoplitc 
on  military  service,  but  keeping  aloof  froni  ofilcial  duty  in  the  Dikiis 
tery,  the  public  assembly,  or  the  Senate-house,  exce])t  in  that  one 
memorable  year  of  the  Imttle  of  Arginus;e,  he  incurred  none  of  those 
party  animosities  which  an  active  public  life  at  Athens  often  pro- 
voked. His  life  was  legally  blamelees,  nor  had  he  ever  been  brought 
up  before  the  Dikastery  until  his  one  final  trial,  when  he  was  seventy 
years  of  age.     That  he  stood  conspicuous  before  the  public  eye  in 


4oq  Bc  at  the  time  when  the  ''Clouds"  of  Aristophanes  were 
iMoU'-iit  on  the  stage-is  certain.  He  may  have  been  and  probably 
Wl".  consnicuous  even  earlier,  so  that  we  can  hardly  allow  him  less 
than  thirty  years  of  public,  notorious,  and  efiicacious  discoursing, 

down  to  his  trial  in  399  u  c.  ,    ,  v      ^  -r     •       ' 

It  was  in  that  year  that  Meletus,  seconded  by  two  auxiliaries, 
Anvtus  and  Lvkon,  presented  against  him,  and  hung  up  in  the 
nnnointed  plac6  (the  portico  before  the  oflice  of  the  second  or  King- 
\relion)  an  indictment  against  him  in  the  following  terms:  Sokra- 
L  is  -uilty  of  crime,  first,  for  not  worshiping  the  gods  whom  the 
citv  worships,  but  introducing  new  divinities  of  his  own-next,  for 
corrupting,  the  vouth.     The  penalty  due  is,  death. 

It  is  certain  Unit  neither  the  conduct  nor  the  conversation  of 
Sokrates  had  undergone  any  alteration  for  many  years  past;  since 
the  sameness  of  his  manner  of  talking  is  both  derided  by  his  enemies 
and  confessed  by  himself.  Our  first  sentiment  therefore  (apart  from 
the  question  of  guilt  or  innocence)  is  one  of  astonishnient,  that  he 
should  have  been  prosecuted,  at  seventy  years  of  age  for  persever- 
in-  in  an  occupation  which  he  had  publicly  followed  during  twenty 
five  or  thirty  vears  preceding.  Xenophon,  full  of  reverence  tor  his 
master,  takes  up  the  mutter^on  much  higher  ground  and  expresses 
himself  in  a  feeling  of  indignant  amazement  that  the  Athenians  could 
find  auvthing  to  condemn  in  a  man  every  way  so  admirable  But 
whoever  attentively  considers  th(^  picture  which  I  have  presented  of 
the  purpose,  the  working,  and  the  extreme  publicity  of  Sokrates, 
will  rather  be  inclined  to  wonder,  not  that  the  indictment  was  pre- 
sented at  last,  but  that  some  such  indictment  had  not  been  presented 
Ion-  before.  Such  certainly  is  the  impression  suggested  by  the 
lan-ua-e  of  Sokrates  himself,  in  the  "  Platonic  Apology.  He  there 
proclaims  emphatically,  that  though  his  present  accusers  were  men 
of  consideration,  it  was  neither  tJtdr  enmity,  nor  their  e  oquence 
which  he  had  now  principally  to  fear;  but  the  accumulated  force  of 
antipathy— the  numerous  and  important  personal  eneime^,  er.ch  witli 
sympathising  partisans-the  long-standing  and  uncontradicted  calum- 
nies-raised against  him  throughout  his  cross-examining  career. 

In  truth,  th?  mission  of  Sokrates,  as  he  himself  desoribes  it,  could 
not  but  prove  eminentlv  unpopular  and  obnoxious.  To  convince  a 
man  that,  of  matters  which  he  felt  confident  ot  knowing,  and  had 
never  thought  of  questioning  or  even  of  studying,  he  is  really 
profoundly  mnorant,  insomuch  that  he  cannot  reply  to  a  few  perti- 
iienl  queries  without  involving  himself  in  flagrant  contradictions-is 
aa  operation  highly  salutary,  often  necessary,  to  his  future  iniP'-ov<> 
ment;  but  an  operation  of  painful  mental  surgery,  in  which  indeed 
the  temporarv  pain  experienced  is  one  ot  the  conditions  a  most  uidn,- 
pens:ible  to  the  future  beneficial  results.  It  is  one  which  few  men 
c;ui  endure  without  hating  the  operator  at  the  tune;  although  doubt- 
less such  hatred  would  not  only  disappear,  but  be  exchanged  lor 


404 


SOKIJATES. 


CAUSES  OF   HIS  TRIAL. 


465 


esteem  aiifl  admimtion,  if  tliey  persevered  unlil  the  full  ullcrior 
cousequeiiees  of  the  operation  developed  tliemselves.  But  we  know 
(from  the  express  statement  of  X("noi)})on)  that  manv,  who  underwent 
this  tirst  pungent  thrust  of  his  diideeties,  never  eaulc  near  liini  ao-.-iin 
he  disregarded  them  as  higgards.  hut  tiieir  voiecs  did  not  thc^lcss 
count  in  the  hosiik-  ehorus.  Wliat  made  the  chorus  the  more  for- 
midable, was,  the  high  quality  and  position  of  its  leaders.  For 
Sokrates  himself  tells  us.  that  the  men  whom  he  chiefly  and  expre'^^ly 
sought  out  to  cross-examine,  were  the  men  of  celebrity  as  statesmeii 
rhetors,  poets,  or  artisans;  those  at  rice  most  sensitive  to  such 
humililiatiou.  and  most  capable  of  making  their  enmity  effective 

\\  hen  we  reflect  upon  this  great  body  of  antipathy,  so  terrible 
bota  from  nundjer  and   constituent   itdus,    we  shall  wonder  only 
that  Sokrates  could  have  gone  on  so  h-nsr  standing  in   the  m;irket- 
place  to  aggravate  it,  and  that  the  indiciment  of  Meletus  could  have 
been  so  long  postponed ;  since  it  was  ju- 1  .-is  applicable  earlier  as  later 
and  since  the  sensitive  temper  of  the  iH'oi)le,  as  to  charges  of  irre- 
ligion,  was  a  well-known  tact.     Tlie  ti  utli  is,  that  as  history  presents 
to  us  only  one  man  who  ever  devok-d  lijs  iifc  to  prosecute  this  duty 
of  an  elenchthic  or  cross-examining  missionaiy— so  there  was  but  one 
city,   in  the  ancient  world  at  least,  wlierein  he  would  have  been 
allowed  to  prosecute  it  for  twenty-five  years  with  safety  and  im- 
punity: and  that  city  was  Athens.     I  liave  in  a  previous  volume 
noted  the  respect  for  individual  dissent  of  opinion,  taste,  and  be- 
havior, among  one  another,  which  ch:uaeteri/ed  the  Athenian  poini- 
lation,  and  wliieh  Peiikles  puts  in  emphatic  relief  as  a  part  of  his 
funeral  discourse.     It  was  this  established  liberality  of  the  deinoeiati- 
cal  sentiment  at  Athens  which  so  long  protected'  the  noble  eccen- 
tricity of  Sokrates  from  being  disturbed  by  the  numerous  enemies 
wliieh  he  provoked.     At   J^-arla,  at  Thebes,  at  Argos,  Miletus,  cr 
t^yracuse,  his  blameless  life  would  have  been  insuflicient  as  a  shield 
and  his  irresistible  dialectic  po\v(  r  would  have  caused  him  to  be  only 
the  more  speedily  silenced.     Intolerance  is  the  natural  weed  of  the 
human  liosom,  though  its  growth  or  development  may  be  countd- 
aoted  by  liberalizing  causes:  of  these,  at  Athens,  the  most  powerful 
was,  the  democratical  comstitution  as  there  worked,  in  comlaiiation 
with  diffused  mtelk-etual  and  (csllietical  sensibility,  and  keen  relish 
for  discourse.     Liberty  of  speerh  was  consecrated,  in  every  nni'i's 
estimation,  among  the  first  of  privik'ges;  every  man  was  accustomed 
to  hear  opinions,  opposite  to  his  own,  consfnntlv,  expressed— and  to 
believe  that  others  had  a  right  to  their  opinions  as  well  as  himself. 
And  though  men  would  not,  as  a  general  principle,   have  extended 
such  toleration  to  reliL'-ious  subjecls— vet  the   established   habit  in 
reference  to  other  matters  greatly   influenced   their   practice,    and 
rendered  them  more  averse  to  any  positive  severity  against  avowed 
dissenters  from  the  received  reliL'-ious  belief.  '  It  is  certain  that  there 
was  at  Athens  both  a'keeuer  intellectual  stimulus,  and  greater  free- 


dom as  well  of  thought  as  of  speech  than  in  any  other  city  of  Greece. 
The  long  toleration  of  Sokrates  is  one  example  of  this  general  fact, 
while  hi^  trial  proves  lit.lle,  and  his  execution  nothing,  against  it — 
as  will  presently  appear. 

There  must  (loubtless  have  been  particular  circumstances,  of  which 
we  are  scarcely  at  all  informed,  which  induced  his  accusers  to 
prefer  their  indictment  at  the  actual  moment,  in  spite  of  the  advanced 
a^e  of  Sokrates. 

In  the  first  place,  Anytus,  one  of  the  accusers  of  Sokrates,  appears 
to  have  become  incensed  against  him  on  private  grounds.  The  son 
of  Anytus  had  manifested  interest  in  his  conversation:  and  Sokrates, 
observing  in  the  young  man  intellectual  impulse  and  promise,  en- 
deavored to  dissuade  ins  father  from  bringing  him  up  to  his  own 
trade  of  a  leather-seller.  It  was  in  this  general  way  that  a  great  pro- 
portion of  the  antipathy  against  Sokrates  was  excited,  as  he  himself 
tells  us  in  the  "  Platonic  Apology."  The  young  men  were  those  to 
whom  he  chiefly  addressed  himself,  and  who,  keenly  relishing  his 
conversation,  often  carried  home  new  ideas,  which  displeased  their 
fathers;  hence  the  general  charge  against  Sokrates  of  corrupting  the 
youth.  Now  this  circumstance  had  recently  happened  in  the  pecu- 
liar case  of  Anytus.  a  rich  tradesman,  a  leading  man  in  politics,  and 
just  now  of  peculiar  influence  in  the  city,  because  he  had  been  one 
of  the  leading  fellow-laborers  with  Thrasybulus  in  the  expulsion  of 
the  Thirty,  manifesting  an  energetic  and  meritorious  patriotism.  He 
(like  Thrasybulus  an<l  many  others)  had  sustained  great  loss  of 
property  during  the  oligarchical  dominion;  which  perhaps  made  him 
the  more  strenuous  in  requiring  that  his  son  vshould  pursue  trade  with 
assiduity,  in  order  to  restore  tlie  family  fortunes.  He  seems  more- 
over to  have  been  an  enemy  of  all  teaching  which  went  beyond  the 
narrowest  practicality;  hating  alike  Sokrates  and  the  Sophists. 

While  we  cm  thus  point  out  a  recent  occurrence,  which  had 
brought  one  of  the  most  ascendant  politicans  in  the  city  into  special 
exasi)eration  against  Sokrates— another  circumstance  which  weighed 
liiin  down  wa^.  his  past  connection  with  the  deceased  KriJias  and 
Alkibiades.  Of  these  two  men,  the  latter,  though  he  had  some  great 
admirers,  was  on  the  whole  odious;  still  more  from  his  private  inso- 
lence and  enormities  than  from  his  public  treason  as  an  exile.  But 
the  name  of  Kritias  was  detested,  and  deservedly  detested,  beyond 
that  of  any  other  man  in  Athenian  history,  as  the  chief  director  of 
the  unmeasured  spoilation  and  atrocities  committed  by  the  Thirty. 
That  Sokrates  h:ul  educated  both  Kritias  and  Alkibiades,  was  aflirined 
by  the  accusers,  and  seemimily  believed  by  the  general  public,  both 
at  the  time  and  jificrward.  That  both  of  them  had  been  among  those 
who  conversed  with  him.  when  young  men,  is  an  unquestionable 
fact;  to  what  extent,  or  down  to  what  period,  the  conversation  was 
carried,  we  cannot  distinctly  ascertain.  Xenophon  affirms  that  both 
of  them  frequented  his  society  when  young,  to  catch  from  liim  an 


466 


SO  K  RATES. 


arirnmentative  facility  wliioh  nii'jlit  he  sorvioenblc  to  their  politioal 
ambition;  tliat  Le  curbed  their  violent  and  licentious  propeiiisities  so 
long  asthe3'contiinied  to  come  to  him;  tliat  bpth  of  them  nianifesled 
a  respectful  {)])e(lience  to  him,  which  seemed  in  little  cousouance  with 
their  natural  temjK'rs;  but  that  they  soon  quitted  him,  weary  of  such 
restraint,  after  having  acquired  as  mucli  as  they  thouiiht  cor.venient 
of  his  peculiar  accom|>]jshment.  The  writings  of  Plato,  on  the  con- 
trary, impress  us  with  the  idea  that  the  association  of  both  of  thcni 
with  Sokrates  must  have  been  more  continued  and  intimate;  for  both 
of  them  are  made  to  take  great  part  in  the  Platonic  dialogues — while 
the  attachment  of  Sokrates  to  Alkibiades  is  represented  as  stronger 
than  that  which  he  ever  felt  toward  any  other  man;  a  fact  not  dilH- 
cult  to  exphun,  since  tlie  latter,  iiotwiihstanding  his  ungovernable 
dispositions,  was  distinguished  in  ids  youth  not  less  for  cajxicity  juid 
forward  imjudse,  than  for  beauty— and  since  youthful  male  beauty 
fired  the  imagination  of  Greeks,  especially  that  of  Sokrates.  more  t'u'm 
the  charms  of  women.  Fiom  year  450  j;.c.,  in  which  tlie  activity  of 
Alkibiades  as  a  political  leader  commenced,  it  seems  unlikely  that  he 
coukl  have  seen  muth  of  Sokrates — and  after  tlie  year  415  B.C.,  the 
fact  is  imp()>.<^ible;  since  in  that  year  he  became  a  permanent  e.xile, 
with  the  exception  of  three  or  four  months  in  the  year  407  i?.c.  At 
tlie  monient  of  the  trial  of  Sokrates,  therefore,  his  connection  widi 
Alkibiades  must  at  least  liave  been  a  fact  long  past  and  gone.  Re- 
specting Kritias,  we  nnike  out  less.  As  lie  was  a  kinsman  of  Plato 
(one  of  the  well-known  couqianions  of  Sokrates.  and  present  at  his 
trial),  and  himself  an  accomj)lished  and  literary  nuui,  his  association 
with  Sokrates  may  have  continued  longer;  'at  least  a  color  was 
given  for  so  asserting.  Though  the  supposition  that  any  of  the 
vices  either  of  Kritias  or  Alkibiades  were  encouraged,  or  even  tol- 
erated, by  Sokrates,  can  have  arisen  in  none  but  prejudiced  or  ill 
informed  minds — yet  it  is  certain  that  such  a  supjiosition  was  enter- 
tained; and  that  it  jilaced  him  before  the  public  in  :in  altcrt  d  position 
after  tne  enormities  of  the  Thirty.  Anytus,  incensed  with  him  already 
on  the  subject  of  his  son,  would  be  doubly  incen.sed  against  him  as 
the  reputed  tutor  of  Kritias. 

Of  Meletus,  the  primary,  though  not  the  most  important,  accuser, 
we  know  only  that  he  was  a  poet;  of  Lykon,  that  he  was  a  rnetor. 
Both  these  classes  had  iK'cn  alienated  by  the  cross-exannning  dialec- 
tics to  which  many  of  their  luiinber  had  been  exposed  by  Sokrates. 
They  were  the  last  men  to  bear  such  an  exposure;  with  paliencc;  Avhile 
their  enmity,  taken  as  a  class  rarely  imanimous,  was  truly  formidable 
when  it  bore  upon  any  single  individual. 

We  know  nothing  of  the  speeches  of  either  of  the  accusers  before 
the  Dikastery,  except  what  can  be  picked  out  fnmi  the  renjarks  iu 
Xenoplion  and  the  defense  of  Plato.  Of  the  three  counts  of  the  indict- 
ment, the  second  was  the  easiest  for  them  to  support,  on  ])lausible 
grounds.     That  Sokrates  was  a  religious  innovator,  Avould  be  con- 


GROUNDS  OF  THE  ACCUSERS. 


467 


siJercd  as  proved  by  the  peculiar  divine  sign  of  wliich  he  was  wont 
to  speak  freely  and  publicly,  and  which  visited  no  one  cxce{)t  hini- 
sc'lf.  Accordingly  in  the  "  Platonic  Defense,"  he  never  really  replies 
to  the  second  clnirge.  He  questions  Meletus  before  the  Dikastery, 
and  the  latter  is  represented  as  answering,  that  he  meant  to  accuse 
8(.krates  of  not  believing  in  the  gods  at  all;  to  which  imputed  disbe- 
lief Sokrutes  answers  with  an  emphatic  negative.  In  support  of  the 
lirst  count,  however — the  charge  of  general  disbelief  in  the  gods  recog- 
niz'.'d  l)y  tlie  city — nothing  in  his  conduct  could  be  cited;  for  he  was 
exact  in  his  legal  worship  like  other  citizens — and  even  more  than 
otlicrs,  if  Xenoplion  is  correct.  But  it\NOuld  ap])ear  that  the  old 
calumnies  of  the  xVristophanic  "Clouds"  were  revived,  and  that  the 
ciK'cl  of  that  witty  drama,  together  with  similar  elforts  of  Eupolis 
and  others,  perhaps  hardly  less  witty — was  still  enduring;  a  striking 
proof  that  these  comedians  w^re  no  impotent  libellers.  Sokrates 
manifests  greater  apprehension  of  the  eller't  of  the  ancient  impres- 
sions than  of  the  speeches  which  had  been  just  delivered  against 
hiin.  But  these  latter  speeches  w^ould  of  course  tell,  by  refreshing 
tlic  sentiments  of  the  past,  and  reviving  the  Aristophanic  picture  of 
Sokrates  as  a  speculator  on  physics  as  well  as  a  rhetorical  teacher  for 
pleading,  making  the  worse  appear  the  better  reason.  Sokrates  in  tho 
"Platoiiic  Defense''  appeals  to  the  number  of  poisons  who  had 
listened  to  his  conversation,  whether  any  of  them  had  ever  heard  him 
say  one  word  on  the  subject  of  physical  studies;  while  Xenoplion 
ffoes  further,  and  represents  him  as  having  positively  discountenanced 
them,  on  the  ground  of  impiety. 

As  there  were  three  distinct  accusers  to  spcnk  against  Sokrates,  so 
we  may  reasonably  suppose  that  they  would  concert  beforeluuid 
on  whal  topics  each  should  insist;  IVfeletus  undertaking  that  which 
related  to  religion,  while  Anytus  and  Lykon  would  dwell  on  the  politi- 
cal grounds  of  attack.  In  the  "Platonic  Apology,"  Sokrates  com- 
ments emphatically  on  the  allegations  of  Meletus,  questions  him 
publicly  before  the  Dikasts,  and  criticises  his  replies.  He  makes 
little  aflusiou  to  Anytus,  or  to  anything  except  what  is  formally  ein- 
holied  in  the  indictment;  and  treats  the  last  count,  the  charge  of 
('orni})ting  youth,  in  connection  with  the  lirst,  as  if  the  corruption 
alleged  consisted  in  irreligious  teaching.  But  Xenoplion  intimates 
dial  the  accusers,  in  enforcing  this  allegation  of  pernicious  teaching, 
went  into  other  matters  quite  distinct  from  the  religious  tenets  of 
Sokrates,  and  denounced  him  as  having  taught  them  awlessness  and 
tlisrespect.  as  well  toward  their  parents  as  toward  their  country.  We 
tiud  mention  made  in  Xenoplion  of  accusatory  grounds  similar  lo 
tlios-  in  the  "Clouds" — similar  also  to  those  which  modern  aulhor.s 
u.>iially  advance  against  the  Sophists. 

Sokrates  (said  Anytus  and  the  other  accusers)  taught  young  meu 
to  despise  the  existing  political  constitution,  by  remarking  that  the 
Atheuiau  practice  of  naming  Archons  by  lot  was  silly,  and  that  no 


468 


SOKRATES. 


KEMAKKS  OF  XENOPHON. 


469 


man  of  sense  would  ever  choose  in  this  way  a  pilot  or  a  carpenter— 
thougli  the  mischief  there  arising  from  bad  qualification  was  far  less 
than  in  the  case  of  the  Archous.  Such  teaching  (it  was  urged)  des- 
troyed in  the  niiuds  of  the  liearers  respect  for  the  laws  and'conslilu- 
tion,  and  rendered  them  violent  and  licentious.  As  examples  of  the 
way  in  wiiich  it  had  worked,  his  two  pupils  Kritias  and  Aikibiades 
might  be  cited,  botli  formed  in  his  school;  one,  the  most  violent  niul 
rapacious  of  the  Thirty  recent  oligarchs;  the  other,  a  disgrace  to  the 
democracy  by  his  outrageous  insolence  and  licentiousness;  both  of 
them  authors  of  ruinous  mischief  to  the  city. 

Moreover  the  youth  learnt  from  him  conceit  of  their  own  superior 
wisdom,  and  the  habit  of  iusultitig  their  fathers  as  well  as  of  sliijlit- 
ing  their  otiier  kinsmen.  Sokrates  told  them  (it  wns  urired)  flint 
even  their  fathers,  in  case  of  madness,  might  be  lawful! v  put  under 
restraint,  and  that  when  a  man  needed  service,  those  wliom  he  h;;(l 
to  look  to  were  not  his  kinsmen  as  sach,  but  the  persons  best  qiiali-  |l 
lied  to  render  it:  thus,  if  he  was  sick,  he  must  consult  a  surireon— if 
involve*l  in  a  lawsuit,  those  who  were  most  conversant  with  sncli  a 
situation.  Between  friends  also,  mere  good  feeling  juul  :ifteet!(.n 
was  of  little  use:  the  important  circumstjince  was,  tliat  they  should 
acquire  the  capacity  of  rendering  mutual  service  to  each  other.  No 
one  was  worthy  of  esteem  except  the  man  who  knew  what  Avas 
proper  to  be  done,  and  could  exphiin  it  to  others:  whicli  meant 
(urged  the  accuser)  that  Sokrates  was  not  only  the  wisest  of  men,  Imt 
the  only  person  capaole  of  making  his  pupil  wise;  other  advisers 
being  worthless  compared  with  him. 

He  was  in  the  habit  too  (the  accusation  proceeded)  of  citing  tiie 
worst  passages  out  of  distinguished  poets,  and  of  pervertinc:  them  to 
the  mischievous  purpose  of  spoiling  the  dispositions  of  youth;  jdaiit- 
ing  in  them  criminal  and  despotic  tendencies.  Thus  he  quoted  a 
line  of  Ilesiod— ''No  work  is  disgraceful;  but  indolence  is  disgrace- 
ful;" explaining  it  to  mean,  that  a  man  might  without  scruple  do 
any  sort  of  work,  base  or  unjust  as  it  might  be,  for  the  sake  cf 
l)rofit.  Next,  Sokrates  was  i^articularly  fond  of  quotinir  those  lines 
of  Homer  (in  the  second  book  of  tiie  Iliad)  wherein^Odysseus  is 
describ'-d  as  bringing  back  the  Greeks,  who  had  just  dispersed  from 
the  public  agora,  in  compliance  with  the  exhortation  of  Agnmeni- 
non,  and  were  hastening  to  their  ships.  Odvsseus  caresses  and 
flatters  the  chiefs,  while  he  chides  and  even  strikes  the  common  men; 
though  both  were  doing  the  same  thing  and  guilty  of  the  same 
fault— if  fault  it  was,  to  obey  what  the  connnander-in-chief  had 
liunself  suggested.  Sokrates  interpreted  this  passage  (the  accuser 
atlirmed)  as  if  Homer  praised  the  application  of  stripes  to  poor  men 
and  the  common  people. 

Nothing  could  be  easier  than  for  an  accuser  to  find  mattof  for 
inculpation  of  Sokrates,  by  partial  citations  from  his  continual  di/?- 
courses,  given  Avithout  the  context  or  explanations  which  hud  accom 


ipanied  them — by  bold  invention,  where  even  this  partial  basis  was 
I  'vimting— sometimes  also  by  taking  up  real  error,  since  no  man  who 
iseoiitinually  talking,  especially  externpore,  can  always  talk  cor- 
leellv.  Few  teachers  would  escap(;,  if  penal  sentences  were  per- 
r.iilted  to  tell  against  them,  founded  upon  evidence  such  as  this. 
Xenoplion,  in  noticing  the  imputations,  comments  upon  them  all, 
denies  some,  and  explains  others.  As  to  the  passages  out  of  Hesiod 
aad  Homer,  he  affirms  that  Sokrates  drew^  from  them  inferences  quite 
eontrary  to  those  alleged;  which  latter  seem  indeed  altogether 
unreasonable,  invented  to  call  fortli  the  deep-seated  democratical 
sentiment  of  the  Athenians,  after  the  accuser  had  laid  his  prelimi- 
iiiiry  ground  by  connectiiig  Sokrates  with  Kritias  and  Aikibiades. 
That  Sokrates  improperly  depreciated  eitlier  filial  duty,  or  the  domes- 
tie  affections, 'is  in  lik(;  manner  higldy  improbable.  We  may  much 
more  reasonably  believe  the  ass(;rtion  of  Xenophon,  who  represents 
im  to  have  exorted  the  hearer  "to  make  himscdf  as  wise,  and  as 
capable  of  rendering  servi(;e,  as  possible;  so  that,  when  he  wished  K> 
acquire  esteetn  from  father  or  brother  or  friend,  he  might  not  sit 
still  in  reliance  on  the  simple  fact  of  relationship,  but  might  earn 
such  feeling  by  doing  them  positive  good.  To  tell  a  young  man  that' 
mere  good  feeling  would  be  totally  insufficient,  unless  he  were  pre- 
pared and  compt'tent  to  carry  it  into  action— is  a  lesson  which  few 
pirents  would  wish  to  discourage.  Nor  would  any  generous  parent 
make  it  a  crime  against  the  teaching  of  Sokrates.  that  it  rendered  his 
S)n  wiser  than  himself — which  p!o')ably  it  would  do.  To  restrict  tlie 
range  of  teaching  for  a  young  man,  because  it  may  make  him  think 
himself  wiser  than  his  father— is  only  one  of  the  thousand  shapes  in 
Avhich  the  pleading  of  ignorance  against  knowledge  was  then,  and 
still  continues  occasionally  to  be,  i)resented. 

Nevertheless  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  these  attacks  of  Anytus, 
bear  upon  the  vulnerable  side  of  the  Sokratic  general  theory  of 
Ethics,  according  to  which,  virtue  was  asserted  to  depend  upon 
kiio\vle<lge.  I  have  already  remarked  that  this  is  tru(;.  hut  not  the 
vrhole  truth;  a  certain  stateOf  the  affections  and  dispositions  being 
not  less  indispensable,  as  conditions  of  virtue,  than  a  certain  slate  of 
the  intelligence.  An  enemy  therefore  had  some  pretense  for  making 
it  appear  that  Sokrates,  stating  a  part  of  the  truth  as  the  wliole, 
denied  or  degraded  all  that  remained.  But  thou<rh  this  Avould  be  a 
criticism  not  entirely  unfounded  against  his  general  theory,  it  would 
not  hold  against  his  percepts  or  practical  teaching,  as  avc  find  them 
ill  Xenophon;  for  these  (as  I  have  remarked)  reach  nuich  wider  than 
liis  general  tlieory,  and  inculcate  the  cultivation  of  habits  and  dispo- 
sitions not  less  strenuously  than  the  acquisition  of  knowledge. 

The  censures  affirmed  to  have  been  cast  by  Sokrates  against  the 
choice  of  Archons  by  lot  at  Athens,  arc  not  denied  by  Xenophon. 
The  accuser  urged  that  "by  such  censures  Soki-ates  excited  the 
young  men  to  despise  the  established  constit-utioti,  and  to  become 


470 


SOKRATES. 


DEFENSE  OF  SOKRATES. 


471 


1 

I 


? 


lawless  and  violent  in  their  conduct."    Tliis  is  just  the  same  pre- 
tense,  of  leudency  to  bring  Ihe  goverment  into   hntred   and  coii 
teinpt,  on  which  in  former  days  prosecutions  for  public  libel  aviic 
instituted  aixainst  wriu-rs  in  Enirland,   nnd  on  wliicli  they  si  ill  eon- 
tinned  to  be  abundantly  instituted  in  Fnince,  inider  the  hrst  l^rcsi- 
dent  of  the  Ki^public  (1850).     There  can  hardly  be  a  more  serious 
]M)litieal  mischief  than  such  confusion  of  tlie   disajiproving  critic 
wUh  a  conspirator,  and  such  imposition  of  silence  ujson  diss'^iiticnt 
ii.inorities.     Nor  has  there  ever  been  any  case  in  w  hich  such  an  iaijiu- 
taiion  was  more  destitute  of  color  than  that  of  Sokralcs,  who  api.eaicd 
alwtiys  to  men's  reason  and  very  little  to  their  feelings;   so  little 
indeed,  that  modern  authors  make  his  coldness  a  matter  of  chnrire 
auainst  him;  who  never  omitted  to  inculcate  rigid  observance  of  llio 
law,  and  set  the  example  of  such  observance   himself.     Wliatcvcr 
may  have  been  his  seniiments  about  democracy,  he  always  olieycd 
the  democratical  government;  nor  is  there  any  i)rctense  for  chariziiig 
him  with  participation  in  oligarchical  schemes.     It  was  the  Tliiriy, 
who  for  the  tirst  time  in  his  long  life,  interdicted  his  teaching  alto- 
gether, and  were  on   the  pointalmost  of  taking  his  life;  while  liis 
intimate  friend  Cluerephon  was  actually  in  exile  with  the  den'^oerats. 
Xenophon   lays  great  emphasis  on  iwo  points,   when  defer.diiig 
Sokrates  against  his  accusers.     First,  Sokrates  was  in  his  own  con- 
duct virtuous,    self-denying,   and   strict   in   obeditncc   to   the  law. 
Next,  he  accustomed  his  hearers  to  hear  nothing  cxctpt  apjieals  to 
theif  reason,  and  impressed  on  them  obedience  only  to  their  latioiml 
convictions.     That  such  a  man,    witli  so  great  a  weigiit  (.f  presinii]*- 
tion  in  his  favor,  sliould  be  tried  and  found  guilty  as  a  corrupter  of 
yQ^th— the  most  undefined  of  all  imaginable  charges— is  a  grave  and 
melancholy  fact  in  the  history  of  mankind.     Yet  when  we  see  uik>ii 
what  liuht  evidence  modern  authors  are  willing  to  adndt  the  same 
charire  against  the  Sophists,  we  have   no  right  to  wonder  thai  tlic 
Atlieniaiis — when  addressed,  not  through  ihat  calm  reason  to  wliicli 
Sokrates  appealed,  but  through  all  their  antipathies,  reli-ious  as  well 
as  i)f>litical.  public  as  well  as  private— were  exasi)eralcd  inlo  dealing 
with  him  as  the  type  and  pix^cursor  of  Kritias  anil  Alkibiades. 

After  all,  the  exasperation,  and  the  consequent  verdict  of  guilty, 
were  not  wholly  the  fault  of  the  Dikasts,  nor  wludly  brought  about 
by  his  accusers  and  his  numerous  ]>rivate  enemies.  No  such  verdiit 
w'oulil  have  l)ecn  given  unless  by  what  we  must  call  the  consent  and 
concurrence  of  Sokrates  himself.  This  is  one  of  the  most  important 
facts  of  the  case,  in  reference  both  to  himself  and  to  the  Alheniaiis. 

We  learn  from  his  own  .statement  in  the  "  Platonic  Defense,"  \hii\ 
the  verdict  of  Guilty  was  only  pronounced  by  a  majority  of  live  or 
six,  amid  a  body  so  numerous  as  au  Athenian  Dikastery ;— j^robably 
SoT  in  total  number,  if  a  confused  statement  in  Diogenes  LaerMiis 
can  be  trusted.  Now  any  one  who  reads  Ihat  defense,  and  considers 
it  in  conjunction  with  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  feelings 


of  the  Dikasts,  will  see  that  its  tenor  is  such  as  must  have  turned  a 
mull  greater  number  of  votes  than  six  against  him.  And  we  are 
iif.inned  by  the  distinct  testimony  of  Xenophon,  that  Sokrates 
.iM|)rn;iclied  his  trial  wiili  the  feelings  of  one  who  hardly  wished  to  be 
■c'l'iittcd.  lie  took  no  thought  wiiatever  for  the  preparation  of  his 
ilcronse:  and  when  his  friend  Herinogv.nies  remonstrated  with  him 
i,ii  the  serious  conseiiuences  of  such  an  omission,  he  replied,  first, 
that  the  just  and  blameless  life,  which  he  was  conscious  of  having 
ni<>i'd,  was  the  best  of  all  preparations  for  defense— next,  that  hav- 
i  !•'•  once  begun  to  meditate  on  what  it  would  be  proper  for  him  to 
sVv  the  divuie  sign  had  interposed  to  forbid  him  from  proceeding. 
llL'  WL'iit  on  to  say,  th:it  it  was  no  w^)nder  that  the  gods  should  deem 
i;  iK'Hcr  for  him  to  die  now,  than  to  live  longer.  lie  had  hitherto 
iIvlmI  i.i  perfect  satisfaction,  with  a  consciousness  of  progressive 
liiDi-d  improvement,  and  with  esteem,  marked  and  unabated,  from 
lli^  friends.  If  his  life  were  prolonged,  old  age  would  soon  over- 
l))\ver.hiin;  he  would  lose  in  part  his  sight,  his  hearing,  or  his  intelli- 
■vnc;  and  life  with  such  abated  efiieacy  and  digidty  would  be 
[iitoicrable  tj  him.  Whereas,  if  he  were  condemned  now,  he  should 
k'  condemned  unjustly,  which  would  be  a  great  disgrace  to  his 
judg-'s.  but  none  to  hini:  nav,  it  would  even  procure  for  him  increase 
of  NTinpathv  and  adiniralion,  and  a  more  willing  acknowledgment 
Ironi  every  one  that  he  had  b^en  both  a  just  man  and  au  improving 
p.tH'cptor. 

These  words,  si)ok'.Mi  before  his  trial,   intimate  a  state  of  beliet 
which  explains  the  tenor  oi"  the  defease  and  formed  one  essential 
condition  of  the  final  result.     They  proved  that  Sokrates  not  only 
cared  little  for  being  acquitted,  but  even  thought  thit  the  approacli- 
h\'i  trial  was  marked  out  by  the  gods  as  the  term  of  his  life,  and  that 
llK're  were  ii'*)od  reasons  why  he  should  prefer  such  a  consunuiiation 
a>  best  for  himself.     Nor  is  it  wonderful  that  he  shouhl  entertain 
til  It  opinion,  when  we  recollect  the  entire  ascendency  within  him  of 
^iioug  internal  conscience  and  intelligent  refiection,  built  upon  an 
iH-igiaidly  fearless  temperament,  and  silencing  what  Plato  calls  "  the 
child  wilhin  us,  who  trembles  b;fore  death  "—his  great  love  of  col- 
loiuial  inlluence,   and  incai>acity  of  living  without  it— his  old  age, 
now  seventy  years,  rendering  it  impossible  that  such  influence  could 
much  lonu^er  continue— ami  the  opportunity  afforded  to  him,  by  now 
itwering  above  ordinary  men  under  the  like  circumstances,  to  read 
ii!i  impressive  lesson,  as  well  as  to  leave  behind  him  a  reputation  yet 
iii)n'ex;dted  than  that  which  he  had  hitherto  acquired.     It  was  in 
tuis  frame  of  mind  that  Sokrates  came  to  his  trial,  and  undertook  his 
luipriMueditated  defense,  the  substance  of  which  we  now  read  in  the 
"Piatonie  Aooloii-v."     His  calculations,  alilvc  high-minded  and  well- 
balmced,  were  conipletelv  lealized.     Had  h,'  been  ac(iuitted  after 
such  a  defense,  it  would  have  b^'cn  not  only  a  triumpii  over  his  per- 
WQul  enemies,  bill  w  ould  have  been  a  sanction  on  the  part  of  the 


472 


SOKIIATES. 


HIS  SENTIMENT  ABOUT  DEATH. 


473 


1 


people  and  the  popnlnr  Dikastcry  to  his  teaching— which  indeed  lu 
been  enforced  by  Anytus  in  iiis'accusini!:  arguincnl,  in  refereiue  to 
jicqniltal  ireuerally,  even  bi-fore  lie  iicard  llie  defense:  whereas  hi^ 
coudcinnaliijn,  and  the  feebngs  witii  uhiih  lie  met  it,  have  iskd 
double  and  triple  luster  over  his  \\hoh'  life  and  cliaracter. 

Prefaced  by  this  exposition  of  the  feelings  of  Sokrates,  the  *' Pla- 
tonic Defense"  becomes  not  nieiely  sublime  and  imitre>sive,  but  :iKo 
the  manifestation  of  a  rational  and  consistent  i)urpose.  It  docs 
indeed  include  a  vindication  of  himself  against  two  out  of  the  three 
counts  of  the  indictment— against  the  charge  of  not  believing  in  the 
recognized  gods  of  Alliens,  and  that  of  corrupting  the  youth:  nspecl- 
ing  the  seccmd  of  th(!  three,  whereby  he  was  charged  with  rdii^iuus 
innovation,  he  says  little  or  nothing.  But  it  bears  no  resenillame 
to  the  speech  of  one  standing  on  his  trial,  with  the  written  indict- 
ment concluding  "Penally,  Death  "—hanging  up  in  ojun  court 
before  him.  On'the  C(nitrary,  it  is  an  emphaiic  lesson  to  the  lieanrs, 
embodied  in  the  frank  outpouring  of  a  fearless  and  self  contiiiiiii,' 
conscience.  It  is  undertaken,  from  the  beginning,  because  the  hiw 
commands;  with  a  faint  wish,  and  even  not  an  unciualiticd  wish— hit 
no  liope— that  it  may  succeed.  ISokrates  first  replies  to  the  standing 
antipathies  against  him  without,  arising  fnan  the  number  of  eiieihiis 
whom  his  cross-i  xaniining  Elenchus  had  aroused  agair.st  him,  and 
from  those  false  reports  which  the  Aristophanic  *'  Clouds"  had  con- 
tributed so  nnich  to  circulate.  In  accounting  for  the  rise  of  these 
antipathies,  he  impresses  upon  the  Dikasts  the  divine  niission  under 
which  he  was  acting,  not  without  considerable  doubts  whether  thcv 
will  believe  him  to  be  in  earnest;  and  gives  that  interesting  e.\p(H- 
lion  of  his  intelleelual  campaign,  against  "  the  conceit  of  kiiowlcdiT 
without  the  reality,"  of  whi(  li^I  have  ahrady  spoken.  He  then  goes 
into  the  indictment,  questions  Meletus  in  open  court,  and  dis.-ects 
Lis  answers.  Having  rebutted  the  charge  of  irreligioii.  h<'  reverts 
airain  to  the  imi)erative  mandate  of  the  gods  under  which  he  is  act- 
inif.  'to  spend  hi>  life  in  the  search  for  w  isdom  and  in  exaniining 
liiniself  as  well  as  others;"  a  mandate,  which  if  he  were  to  disobey, 
lie  would  be  then  justly  amenable  to  the  charge  of  irreligion;  and  lie 
announces  to  the  Dikasts  distinctly,  that  even  if  they  were  now  to 
acquit  him,  he  neither  could  nor  would  relax  in  the  course  which  lie 
had  been  pursuing.  He  considers  that  the  mission  imposed  upon 
Liin  is  among  the  greatest  blessings  ever  conferred  by  the  gods  upon 
Athens.  He  deprecates  those  murmurs  of  surprise  or  tlispkasure, 
which  his  discourse  evidently  called  forth  more  than  once— tlioiidj 
not  so  much  on  his  own  account,  as  on  that  of  the  Dikasts,  who  wm 
be  benefited  by  hearing  him,  and  who  will  hurt  themselves  and  their ^ 
city  much  more  than  him,  if  they  should  now  pronounce  condemiiii- 
tion.  It  was  not  on  his  own  account  that  lie  sought  to  defend  himi 
self,  but  on  account  of  the  Athenians,  lest  ihey  by  condemning  hi»j 
should  sin  against  the  gracious  blessing  of  the  god :  they  would  m 


easily  find  such  another,  if  they  should  put  him  to  death.  Though 
lii^  inission  had  sj>urred  him  on  to  indefatigable  activity  in  individual 
colloqay,  yet  the  divine  sign  had  always  forbidden  hi  in  from  taking 
active  part  in  public  proceedings.  On  the  two  exceptional  occasions 
when  he  had  stood  publicly  forward— once  under*  the  democrac3% 
once  under  the  oligarchy — he  had  shown  the  same  resolution  as  at 
pres-'iit; — not  to  be  deterred  by  any  terrors  from  that  course  which 
he  believed  to  be  just.  Young  men  were  delighted,  as  well  as 
improved,  by  listeniiiL^  to  his  cro>s-exami!iations.  In  proof  of  tli; 
charg'  that  heliad  corru'pted  them,  no  witnesses  had  been  produc'd 
—neither  any  of  themselves,  wiio  having  been  once  young  when 
they  enjoyed  his  conversation,  had  since  grown  elderly — nor  airy  of 
their  relatives;  while  he  on  his  part  could  produce  abundant  testi- 
mony to  the  improving  eifect  of  his  society,  from  the  relatives  of 
those  wdio  had  profited  by  it. 

"No  man  (says  he)  knows  what  deatli  is.  yet  men  fear  it  as  if  thev 
knew  well  that  it  was  the  greatest  of  all  evils;  which  is  just  a  case  of 
that  worst  of  all  ignorance — the  conceit:  of  knowing  what  y  ):i  do 
not-e:illy  know\  For  my  part,  this  is  the  exact  point  on  which  I 
differ  from  most  other  men,  is  there  be  any  one  thing  in  which  I  am 
wiser  than  they:  as  I  know  nothing  about  Hades,  so  I  do  not  pretend 
to  any  knowledge;  but  I  do  know  well,  that  disobedience  to  a  pierson 
belter  than  m^'self,  either  God  or  man,  is  both  an  evil  and  a  shame; 
nor  will  I  ever  embrace  evil  certain,  in  order  to  escape  evil  which 
may  for  aught  I  know  be  a  good.  Perhaps  you  may  feel  indig- 
nant at  the  res(dute  tone  of  my  defense:  you  may  Inive  expected 
that  I  should  do  as  most  others  do  in  less  dan'^iTous'trials  than  mine 
—that  I  should  W(N'p,  beg  and  entreat  for  my  life,  and  bring  forward 
my  children  and  relatives  to  do  the  same.  I  have  relatives  like  olher 
men— and  three  children;  but  not  one  of  them  shill  appear  before 
you  for  any  such  purpose.  Not  from  any  insolent  dispositions  on 
my  part,  nor  any  wnsh  to  put  a  slight  upon  you— but  because  I  hold 
such  conduct  to  be  degrading  to  tlie  reputation  which  I  enjov:  for  I 
h(i>y  a  rei)utation  for  superiority  among  you,  deserved  or  undeserved 
as  it  may  be.  It  is  a  disgrace  to  xVthens  when  esteemed  men  lower 
themselves,  as  they  do  but  too  often,  by  such  mean  and  cowardly 
supplications;  and  you  Dikasts.  instead  of  Ixdng  pro:npfcd  thereby 
'o>^pare  them,  ought  rather  to  condemn  them  the  more  for  so  dis- 
bonorin<r  the  city.  Apart  from  any  reputation  of  mi-ie,  too.  I  should 
'tea  guilty  man  if  I  sought  to  bias  you  by  supjilications.  ]\iy  duty  is 
toinstriici  and  persuade  you,  if  I  can:  but  you  have  sworn  to  follow 
voiir  convictions  in  judiring  according  to  the  laws,  not  to  make  the 
li^vs  h.'nd  to  your  partiality — and  it  is  your  duty  so  to  do.  Far  lie  it 
bom  me  to  habituate  you  to  perjury;  far  be  it  from  you  to  contract 
fiiy  jsuch  habit.  Do  not  therefore  require  of  me  proceedings  dishonora- 
'jle  in  reference  to  myself,  as  well  as  criminal  and  imoious  in  regard 
to  you;  especially  at  a  moment  when  I  am  myself  rebutting  an 


474 


SOKRATES. 


THE  SENTENCE. 


475 


tti 


u 


I 

1 

* 


accusation  of  impiety  advanced  hy  Meletns.     T  leave  to  yon  nr.dto 
the  o-od   to  decide  as  may  turn  out  best  both  for  me  and  for  you." 

No  one  who  reads  the  "Platonic  Apology  "  of  fc^okratcs  uill  ever 
wi^h  that  he  had  made  any  other  defense.     But  it  is  the  spccdi  of 
one  who  deliberately  forefi^oes  the  immediate  purpose  of  a  defense- 
persuasion  of  his  judges;  who  speaks  for  posterity,  without  rcpnl 
to  his  own  life— ''sola  postcritatis   cura.  et   abruptis  vitju   bhiiuli- 
mentis  "    The  effect  produced  upon  the  Dikasts  was  such  as  SokraKs 
anticipated   beforehand,  and   heard   afterward  without   surprise  is 
without  discomposure,  in  the  verdict  of  guilty.     His  only  sur])ii>c. 
was   at  the  extreme  smalhiess  of  the  majority  whereby  tliat  verdict 
was'pa«sed      And  this  is  the  true  matter  for  astonishment,     ^■(■v(r 
before  had  the  Athenian  Dikasts  heard  such  a  speech  addressal  to 
them      While  all  of  them  doubtless  knew  Sokrates  as  a  very  :  l)!c 
and  verv  eccentric  man,  respecting. his  purposes  and  ciiaracter  tluv 
would  differ:  some  rejiardimr  him  with  uue(iualified  hostility,  a  lew 
others  with  respectful  admiration,   and  a  still  large  number  amUi 
simple  admiration  for  ability,  without  any  decisive  sentunc  nt  citbr 
of  antipathv  or  estetni.     But  by  all  these  three  categories,  hirilly 
excepting- eVen  liis  admirers,  the  speech  would  be  bit  to  ejjnvono 
stin*--  whTch  never  misses  its  way  to  the  anirry  feelings  ot  the  .puluinl 
bosom   whether  the  judsres  in  session  be  one  or  a  few  or  many-ilie 
stinn-  of  ''affront  to  the  court."     The  Athenian  Dik:.sts  were  ahMiys 
accu'^tomed  to  be  addressed  with  deferer.cc,  often  with  subservuiicc: 
thev  now  heard   themselves  lectured  by  a  philosoi^lier  ^^llo  Mo(,(l 
before  them  like  a  fearless  and  invulnerable  su]>crior,  beyondtlidr 
power  thou'di  awaiting  their  verdict;  one  who  laid  claim  to  a  divine 
mission,  which  pro])ablv  many  of  them  believ(  d  to  be  an  imposliire 
—and  who  declared  himself  the   ins])ired  uprooter  of  '  coneeit  o 
knowled-e  without  the    reality,"  which  purpose  many  would  no 
understand,  and  some  would   not   like.      To  many,  l;i^  clenicaimr 
would  appear  to  betray  an  insolence  not  without  analogy  to  Alki- 
blades  or  Kritias,  with  whom  his  accuser  had  compared  him.    1  lin\i 
alreadv  remarked,  in  reference  to  his  trial,  that  considering  the  nnii> 
ber  of  personal  enemies  whom  he  made,  the  wonder  is,  not  tlint  Ji  , 
was  tried  at  all,  but  that  he  was 'not  tried  until  so    ate  ii\lli^  '';^; 
now  remark,  in  reference  to  the  verdict,  that,  considering  his  spn 
before  the  Dikasterv,  we  cannot  be  surprised  that  he  was  U^m 
o-uiltv  but  only  that  such  verdict  passed  by  so  small  a  majority  .U 

^That  tiie  condemnation  of  Sokrates  was  brought  on  <'i^<'-^';'^^;' '•' 
the  tone  and  tenor  of  his  defense-is  the  express  testin|ony  (|i  >.cn.- 
phon      "Other  persons  on  triaKhe  says)  defended    il'*'"^;:^    \'  ' 
such  manner  as  to  conciliate  the  favor  of  the   l)ikasts.  or  fl^dici. 
entreat  them,  contrary  to  the  laws,  and  thusobtamed  -i^l'i'!^'^'-  -.^J 
Sokrates  would  resort  to  nothing  of  this  fustomiuy  practice  ^^ 
Dikiistery  contraiy  to  the  laws.    Though  he  might  casdy  hare  bun  w 


of  hi  the  Dikafifs,  if  he  icouJd  have  done  anything  of  the  kind  even 
■hfxleraldji,  lie  pj'eferred  rather  to  adhere  to  the  laws  and  die,  than  to 
pave  his  life  by  violating  tiiem."  Now  no  one  in  Athens  except 
[Sokrates.  prol)ably.  would  have  construed  the  laws  as  requiring  the 
tone  of  oration  which  he  adopted;  nor  would  he  liimself  Jiave  so 
construed  them,  if  lie  had  been  twenty  years  younger,  with  less  of 
acquired  dignity,  and  more  years  of  possible  usefulness  open  before 
liiiu.  Without  debasing  hifnself  by  unbecoming  flattery  or  suppli- 
c:ition,  he  would  have  avoided  lecturing  them  as  a  master  and  supe- 
rior— or  ostentatiously  asserting  a  divine  mission  for  purposes  which 
they  would  hardly  understand —  or  an  independence  of  their  verdict 
Avliieh  liiey  might  construe  as  defiance.  The  rhetor  L3'sias  is  said  to 
li:ive  scut  to  him  a  composed  speech  for  his  defense  which  he  de- 
cline<l  to  use,  not  thinking  it  suitable  to  liis  dignity.  But  such  a 
man  as  fiVsias  would  hardly  compose  what  would  lower  the  dignity 
cvt'U  of  the  loftiest  client — though  he  would  look  to  the  result  also; 
nor  is  there  any  doubt  tiiat  if  Sokrates  had  pronounced  it — or  even  a 
miieli  less  able  speech,  if  inoffensive — he  would  have  been  acquitted, 
(^uiiitilian  indeed  expresses  liis  satisfaction  that  Sokrates  maintained 
that  towering  dignity  which  brought  out  the  rarest  and  most  exalted 
of  his  attributes,  but  wliieli  at  the  same  time  renounced  all  chance 
of  acquittal.  Few  persons  will  <lissenl  from  this  criticism:  but  when 
we  look  at  the  sentence,  as  we  ought  in  fairness  to  do,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  Dikasts,  justice  will  compel  us  to  admit  that  Sokrates 
delii)C'rately  brougiit  it  upon  himself. 

If  the  verdict  of  guilty  was  thus  brought  upon  Sokrates  hj  his 
own  consent  and  co-operation,  nuicli  more  may  the  same  remark  be 
made  respecting  the  capital  sentence  which  followed  it  In  xVthenian 
pro;"j(lure,  the  penalty  inflicted  was  determined  by  a  separate  vote 
of  the  Dikrists,  taken  after  the  verdict  of  guilty.  The  accuser  having 
named  the  penalty  Avhich  he  thought  suitable,  the  accused  parly  on 
I'.i^  side  named  some  lighter  penalty  upon  himself;  and  between 
thi'se  two  the  Dikasts  were  called  on  to  make  their  option— no  third 
]troiK)sitiou  being  admissible.  The  prudence  of  an  accused  party 
ulways  induced  him  to  pj'opose,  even  against  himself,  some  measure 
of  puiiislmient  which  the  Dikasts  might  be  satisfled  to  accept,  in 
l>ivlV'renee  to  the  heavier  sentence  invoked  by  hi»  antagonist. 

Now  iMeletus,  in  his  indictment  and  sj^eech  against  Sokrates,  had 
oalld  for  the  infliction  of  cai)ital  punishment.  It  was  for  Sokrates 
to  niak(?  his  own  co;inter-proposition:  and  the  veiy  small  majority, 
l>y  whieli  the  verdict  had  beeu  proi!ounc(?d,  afforded  sufficient  proof 
th.it  the  Dikasts  wei\»  noway  inclined  to  sanction  the  extreme  penalty 
:igaiust  him.  The\^  doubtless  anticipated,  according  to  the  uniform 
practice  before  the  Athenian  courts  of  justice  that  he  would  suggest 
some  lesser  penalty — fine,  i:nprisonment,  exile,  disfranchisement,  etc. 
And  had  he  done  this  purely  and  simply,  there  can  be  little  doubt 
tliutlhe  proi^osition  would  have  passed.   But  the  language  of  Sokrates, 


476 


SOKRATES. 


SATISFACTION  WITH   THE  SENTENCE. 


477 


nftcT  the  verdict,  twis  in  a  strain  yet  hidier  tlmn  before  it;  and  Ins 
resolution  to  atlherc  to  liis  own  pofnt  of  view,  disdaining  tlie  snuilli  t 
nb  itenient  or  concession,  only  the  rr.ore  emi)liati('ally  pronouiiod. 
"  What  counter-proposition  shall  I  make  to  you  (he  said)  as  a  sub>ii. 
lute  for  the -penalty  of  Meletus?  Shall  I  name  to  you  the  tieatniein 
which. I  think  I  deserve  at  your  hands?  In  that  case,  my  proposi- 
tion would  be  that  I  should  be  rewarded  with  a  subsistence  at  llie 
public  cxDensc  in  the  rivtaneuni  for  that  is  what  1  really  desene 
us  11  public  benefactor— one  who  has  neglected  all  thought  of  Lis. 
own  aifairs,  and  embraced  voluntary  poverty,  in  order  to  devute 
]iimself  to  vour  best  interests,  atid  to  admoni.^h  ycm  individually  en 
ti;e  serious  necessitv  of  mental  and  moral  improvement.  As.^uridiy 
I  c mnoi  admit  that  I  have  deserved  from  you  any  evil  wiiatevor; 
jior  would  it  be  reasonable  in  me  to  j^ropose  exile  or  imprisonnuiit. 
-vviiich  1  know  to  be  certain  and  con.siderable  evils— in  place  of  deiilli, 
Aviiichmay  perhaps  be  not  an  evil,  but  a  good.  I  might  indeed  iin-iKise 
to  you  a  peeuniaiy  tine;  for  the  payment  of  tJidt  would  be  no  evil. 
iJu'l  I  am  poor  and  liave  no  money;*  all  that  I  could  muster  niiglit 
perliaps  anKiunt  to  a  mina;  and  1  therefore  propo.'^e  to  you  a  tine  of 
one  mina,  as  punishment  on  myself.  Plato,  and  my  other  friends 
near  me,  desire  me  to  increase  this  sum  to  thirty  mime  and  tlaytn- 
gairo  to  pay  it  for  me.  A  fiU"  of  thirty  mina%  therefore,  is  tlit 
cori;iter-penal;y  which  I  submit  for  vour  judgment." 

Subsistence  in  the  Trytaneum  at  the  Public  expense,  was  one  of 
the  greatest  honorary  distinctions  which  the  citizens  of  Athens  (ver 
conferred;  an  empalhic  token  of  public  gratitude.  That  Sokrato 
tiiere;*oi-e  sliouid  |.roelaim  himself  worthy  of  such  an  honor,  and  tiiik 
of  as.H,'Ssinir  it  upon  himself  in  lieu  of  a  punishment,  before  the  veiv 
Dikasts  who  had  just  pa:  ^ed  against  him  a  verdict  of  guilty— wouM 
be  receive  <l  by  them  as  nothing  le.-s  than  a  deliberate  insult;  a  tkH- 
nnceof  judieitd  authoritv,  which  it  was  their  duty  to  prove,  to  an 
opinionated  and  b.auiihtv  citizen,  that  he  could  not  commit  with  mi- 
puiiilv.  The  ]iersons  who  heard  his  language  with  the  greatoj 
dislicss.  were  doubtless  Plato,  Krito,  and  his  other  friends  aroiiml 
him;  v.ho.  thou-h  sympathizing  with  him  fully,  knew  well  that  in; 
was  assuring  the  success  of  tlu.'  proposition  of  Meletus,  and  woiiM 
rcizi-et  that  Ik;  siiordd  thus  throw  away  his  life  by  what  they  wouM 
think  an  ill-placed  and  unnecessary  self-exaltation.  Had  he  pro  I 
po^ed,  with  li'tle  or  no  preface,  the  substitute  f/nc  of  thirty  nuiut 
with  which  tiiis  part  of  his  speech  concluded,  there  is  every  ler.^ou 
ft)r  believing  that  the  majority  of  the  Dikasts  would  have  voted  Icr 

The  sentence  of  death  passed  against  him,  by  what  majority  we  go 
not  know.    But  Sokrates  neither  altered  his  tone,  nor  manifested  ai} 
re'Tct  for  the  lamruaire  bv  which  he  had  himself  seconded  tlie  p"'  , 
pose  of  his  a(rcusiM-s. " drthe  contrary,  he  told  the  Dikasts,  in  a  si<'i  I 
address  prior  to  his  departure  for  the  prison,  that  he  was  .^alished  boui 


T\^itli  his  own  conduct  and  with  the  result.  The  divine  sign  (he  said) 
which  was  wont  to  restrain  him.  often  on  very  small  occasions,  both 
iu  deeds  and  in  words— had  never  manifested  itself  once  to  him 
throughout  the  whole  day,  neither  when  he  came  thither  at  first,  nor 
at  any  one  point  throughout  his  whole  discourse.  The  tacit  acqui- 
escence of  this  infallible  monitor  satisfied  him  not  onlv  that  he  had 
spoken  rightly,  but  that  the  sentence  passed  was  in  reafity  no  evil  to 
him;  that  to  die  now  was  the  best  thing  wiiich  could  befall  him. 
Either  death  was  tantamount  to  a  sound,  perpetual,  and  dreamless 
sleep— which  in  his  judgment  would  be  no  loss,  but  rather  a  «niiu 
compared  with  the  present  life;  or  else,  if  the  common  mythes  were 
true,  death  would  transfer  him  to  a  second  life  in  Ilade.s  where  he 
would  find  all  the  heroes  of  the  Trojan  War,  and  of  the  past  generally 
—.so  as  to  pursue  in  conjunction  with  them  the  business  of  mutual 
cross-examination,  and  debate  on  ethical  progress  and  perfection. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  sentence  really  ai)peared  to  Sokra- 
tes in  this  point  of  view,  and  to  his  friends  also,  after  the  event  had 
happened— though  doubtless  not  at  the  time  when  they  were  about 
to  lose  him.  He  took  his  line  of  defense  advisedly,  and  Avith  full 
knowledge  of  the  result.  It  supplied  him  with  the  fittest  of  all  op- 
portunities for  manifesting,  in  an  impressive  manner,  both  his  per- 
sonal ascendency  over  human  fears  and  weakness,  and  the  dio-nity  of 
Avhat  he  believed  to  be  his  divine  mission.  It  took  him  away  in  his 
full  grandeur  and  glory,  like  the  setting  of  the  tropical  sun  at  a  mo- 
ment when  senile  decay  might  be  looked  upon  as  close  at  hand  He 
calculated  that  his  defen.se  and  beariiiir  on  the  trial  would  be  the  most 
emphatic  lesson  which  he  could  po.ssibly  read  to  the  youth  of  Athens- 
more  emphatic,  probably,  than  the  sum  total  of  tho^e  les.sons  which 
Ins  remaming  life  might  suffice  to  give,  if  he  shaped  his  defense  other- 
wise.  This  anticipation  of  the  effect  of  the  concluding  scene  of  his 
ife,  setting  tiie  sea  on  all  his  prior  discourses,  manifests  it.self  in  por- 
loiLs  of  his  concluding  words  to  the  Dikasts.  wherein  he  tells  them 
tlui  they  wil  not,  by  putting  him  to  death,  rid  themselves  of  the  im- 
po   umty  of  the  cros.s-examining  Elenchus;  that  numbers  of  voun- 

0,;^'"  ''  i'''  'V -^  ^^•/'"'^'^"  ^^^''^"  ^^«'  ^^''^^'^y  ^^'^^^  within 
Sr  V  h !"-^'    'f'.7^"r^'/^^''^  ^^'^"^^^  "^^^^  proceed  to  applv:  his  .su- 

no.tf..  n^m  '  "^^\^^^^^^n^oval  would  be  the  signal  for  numerous 
t^^avvZT''^^'''^^'  '''^^'  increased  energy  that  process  of  inter- 
im,     '^  '\"'^  '^"'"  ^^  '^^^'^''  ^'^  ^^'^'^  aiivo{eA\  his  life,  and  which 

hit  I'f  iTf  ^''  ^'''''  ^'''  "^'^'^  '^"^^  "^^'-^  ^=^^'--^1  than  his  life,  /o! 
Smh"  1  '''  "'T  ?ff^^'t^'^^^^  tJ»'^"  i'i«  loftv  bearin- on  his  trial,  for 
Znf  f^P  enthusiasm  of  young  men  thus  predisposed;  and  the 
whnmi  ^  1^''?  t^,^'»"\^'>'"-P^'ns:,ted  by  the  missionary  successors 
™m  he  calculated  on  leavinu*  behind. 

run  ^i?  «''|^'"'^'7  tircumstance.ss,  Sokrates  w^ould  have  drunk  the 
^up  ot  hemlock  m  the  prison,  on  the  day  after  his  trial.    But  it  so 


478 


SOKUATES. 


SOKRATES  NOT  A  SKEPTIC. 


479 


LaniMjnca  that  tlic  dav  of  his  sentence  was  immediately  after  that  on 
^vhidi  the  sa  red  .hfp  started  on  its  yearly  cerem()ma  pilgrmiajie 
from  Athens  to  Delos,  lor  the  festival  of  Apollo.  LntU  the  return  of 
this  vessel  to  Athens,  it  was  accounted  unholy  to  put  any  person  to 


friends  and  companions  had  free  access  to  him,  passmg  nearly  all 
their  time  with  him  in  prison;  and  Krito  had  even  arranged  a  k1:c me 
for  proeurin-  his  escape,  by  a  bribe  to  the  gaoler.     This  scLchk  au s 
only  prevented  from  taking  effect  by  the  decided  rehm\\  ol  S)kii;lts 
to  become  a  party  in  any  brea.ch  of  the  law;  a  resolution,  whidM\i' 
Miould  expeitt  as  a  matter  of  course,  after  the  hne  which  he  had  tdan 
ill  his  detense.    His  davs  were  spent  in  the  prison  in  discoui .e  rcsvH i- 
in^' ethical  and  human  subiects,  which  had  lornud  the  chaim  Jiud 
ocWttion  of  his  previous  life:  it  is  to  the  last  of  these  davs  ll.at  ..;s 
conversation  with  Simmias,  Kebes,  and  Tluvdon,  on  the  m^ii-^itJilitv 
t,f  the  soul,  is  referred  in  the  Platonic  Dialogue  called  •Ihat.oi). 
Of  that  conversation  the  main  topics  and  dcKtrines  are  Platonic  riiiUr 
than  Sokratic.     But  the  picture  which  the  dialogue  presents  ol  the 
teiiiDcr  and  state  of  mind  of  t^ocrates,  during  the  last  hours  ol  liis  lile. 
is  one  of  immortal  Vcautv  and  interest,  exhibiting  his  serene  and  evin 
Playful   equanimity,  amRl  the   uncontrollable  emotions  oi   his  sur- 
rounding friends-thc  genuine  unforced  persuasion   ?oy;;;]?^f,  ^J?^^ 
his  words  and  his  acts,  of  what  he  had  pronounced  t)efoie  the  Dka 
that  the  sentence  of  death  was  no  calamity  to  him-and   he  unahatc 
nni^^itenance  of  that  earnest  interest  in  the  improvement  of  man  aiu 
^nc  e  y  tvl  cli  had  for  so  many  years  formed  both  his  paran  ount 
mo   ve'and  his  active  occupation.'  The  details  of  the  last  scene  ta 
g  vei  with  minute  fidelity,'  even  down  to  the  moment  of  Ins  di.s  1^ 
ti  n-  and  it  is  consoling  to  remark  that  the  cup  of  hemlock  (il 
m";is  employed  for  executions  by  public  order  at  Athens)  prcdia c 
Us  elfect  by^eps  far  more  exempt  from  sufleriug than  any  nMiia 
lea  rwhichwa^  likely  to  befall  him.     Those  who  have  read  Ml.at 
h  ifL^  2J^ved  aboVe  respecting  the  strong  ^e  igimis  pei^K.u^. 
o    Sokrates.  will  not  be  sun>rised  to  hear  \1^!^\  ^^^f  j^^^^^  l^^^^  ■ 
dressed  to  Krito  immediately  before  he  passed  into  a  ^tate  of  ins^^ 
bility,  were-'*  Krito.  we  owe  a  cock  to  uEsciilapius:  dischaigt  tlic 

debt. 'and  by  no  means  omit  h."^  «.o+ r.f  Pilnfil  rl i 

Thus  per  shed  the  "  p:irens  phdosophi8e"-the  first  of  Eth    'liM 
losophers;  a  man  who  oi^ened  to  Science  both  new  mat  er,  ahke  . 
plonks  and  valuablc-and  a  new  method    memorable   ^^  J::f J  ^j .. 
nrioinality  and  cthcacy.  than  for  the  pro  ounci  philosophical  ba^^^^^^^^ 
which  it  fests.    Though  Greece  produced  great  poets,  .^^^ators  spcru 
lative  philoso])hers.  historians,  etc..  yet  other  countrie.s,  haMn.L  i.._ 
inefit^of  Gniian  literature  to  begin  with,  have^nearly  equalc 
n  all  these  lines,  and  surpassed  her  in  some.     But  where  aie  ^st  t( 


look  for  a  parallel  to  Sokrates,  either  in  or  out  of  the  Grecian  world? 
The  cross-examining  Elenchus,  which  he  not  only  first  struck  out, 
but  wielded  witli  such  matchless  effect  and  to  such  noble  purposes, 
has  been  mute  ever  since  his  last  conversation  in  the  prison;  for  even 
his  great  successor  Plato  was  a  writer  and  lecturer,  not  a  colloquial 
dialectician.  No  man  has  ever  been  found  strong  enough  to  bend  his 
bow;  much  less,  sure  enough  to  use  it  as  lie  did.  His  life  remains  as 
the  only  evidence,  but  a  very  satisfactory  evidence,  how  much  can  be 
done  by  this  sort  of  intelligent  interrogation;  how  powerful  is  the  in- 
terest which  it  can  be  made  to  inspire — how  energetic  tlie  stimulus 
wiiieh  it  can  apply  in  awakening  dormant  reason  and  generating  new 
mental  power. 

It  has  been  often  customary  to  exhibit  Sokrates  as  a  moral  preacher, 
in  which  character  probably  he  has  acquired  to  himself  the  genoral 
reverence  attached  to  his  name.  TJiis  is  indeed  a  true  attribute,  but 
not  the  characteristic  or  salient  attribute,  nor  that  by  wliich  he  per- 
manently worked  on  mankind.  On  the  other  hand.  Arkesilaus,  and 
tlie  New  Academy,  a  century  and  more  atterward,  thought  that  they 
were  following  the  example  of  Sokrates  (and  Cicero  seems  to  have 
thought  so  too)  when  they  reasoned  against  everything — and  when 
tliey  laid  it  down  as  a  system,  that  against  every  alhrmative  position, 
an  equal  force  of  negative  argument  might  be  brought  up  as  counter- 
poise. Now  this  view  of  S()krates  is,  in  my  judgment,  not  merely 
partial,  but  incorrect.  He  entertained  no  such  systematic  distrust  of 
the  powers  of  the  mind  to  attain  certainty.  He  laid  dowu  a  clear 
(though  erroneous)  line  of  distinction  between  the  knowablc  and  the 
nnknowable.  About  physics,  he  was  more  than  a  skeptic — he  thouf-ht 
that  man  could  know  nothing:  tlie  gods  did  not  intend  that  man 
shoidd  acquire  any  such  information,  and  therefore  managed  Ukitters 
in  sucli  a  way  as  to  be  beyond  his  ken,  for  all  except,  tlie  simplest  phe- 
noniena  of  daily  wants:  moreover,  not  only  man  could  not  accpiire 
such  information,  but  ought  not  to  labor  after  it.  But  respecting  the 
topics  which  concern  man  and  society,  the  views  of  Sokrates  were  com- 
pletely the  reverse.  This  was  the  field  which  the  gods  had  expressly 
a.ssi(^ned,  not  merely  to  human  practice,  but  to  liunian  study  and  ac- 
quisition of  knowledge;  afield,  wherein,  with  that  view%  lliey  man- 
aged phenomena  on  principles  of  constant  and  observable  sequence, 
so  that  every  man  who  took  the  requisite  pains  might  know  tlieni. 
^'ay,  Sokrates  went  a  step  further — and  this  forward  step  is  the  Inn- 
(lainental  conviction  upon  which  all  his  missionary  impulse  hiiigc^s. 
He  thought  that  every  man  not  only  might  know  these  things,  |)ut 
ought  to  know  thein;  that  he  could  not  possibly  act  well,  unless  he 
did  know  them;  and  that  it  was  his  imperious  duiy  to  l-ain  Iheia  as 
lie  would  learn  a  profession;  otherwise  he  was  iH)thi ng  better  than  a 
slave,  unfit  to  be  trusted  as  a  free  and  accountable  being.  Sokrates 
felt  persuaded  that  no  man  could  behave  as  a  just,  temperate,  courage- 
ous, pious,  patriotic  agent — unless  he  taught  himself  to  know  cor- 


480 


SOKRATES. 


rectly  what  justice,  temperance,  conrafre.  pie\v,  and  patriotism,  etc., 
really  were.     He  was  possessed  with  lln    tr.ily  Baconian  idea,  that 
tlie  power  of  steady  moral   action  depended  vfpon.  and  was  limited 
hy,  tlie  rational  eonipiehension  of  moral  ends  and  means.    But  wheu 
he' looked  at  the  minds  around  him,  he  perceived  that  few  or  noue 
either  had  any  such  comprehension,  or  had  ever  studied  to  acquire  it 
—yet  at  the  same  time  every  man  felt  persuaded  that  he  did  possess 
itj^and  acted  contidentlv  upon  such  ])L'rsuasion.     Here  then  SokraUs 
found  that  the  tirst  outwork  for  him  to  surmount,  was,  that  univer- 
sal "  conceit  of  knowledge  without  the  reality,"  against  which  he  de- 
clares such  emphatic  war;  and  against  which,  also,  though  under  aii- 
othtr  form  of  words  and  in  reference  to  other  subjects.  Bacon  de- 
clnivs  war  not  less  emphatically,  two  thousand  years  afterward— 
"Opinio  coi)ia^  inter  causas  inopia3  est."     Sokrates  found  that  those 
notions  respecting  human  and  social  affairs,  on  which  each  man  re- 
lied and  acted,  were  nothing  but  spontaneous  products  of  the  "  intel- 
lectus  sibi  pcrmissu.s"— of  tlie  intellect  left  to  itself,  either  without 
any  iruidance,  or  with  onlv  the  blind  guidance  of  sympathies,  antipa- 
thiesT  authoritv,  or  silent 'assimilation.     They  were  products  got  to- 
gether (to  u.se  Bacon's  language)  "  from  much  faith  and  much  chance, 
and  from  the  primitive  sugii-estions  of  boyhood,"  not  merely  without 
care  or  study,  but  witiiout'even  consciousness  of  the  juocess,  and 
without  any  ^subsequent  revision.     Upon  this  basis  the  Sophists,  or 
professed  tc'aehers  for  active  Hie,  sought  to  erect  a  superstructure  of 
virtue  and  ability;  but  to  Sokrates  such  an  attempt  appeared  hopeless 
and  conlradictorv— not  less  impractic;djle  than  Bacon  in  his  time  pro- 
nounced it  to  be,^o  carrv  up  the  tree  of  science  into  majesty  and  fruit- 
bearing,  without  first  cleaiing  away  those  fundamental  vices  whieh 
lay  umiiolested  and  in  pt>isonous  influence  round  its  root.     Sokra- 
tes went  to  work  in  the  Baconian  manner  and  si)irt;  bringing  his 
cros.s-examining  process  to  bear,  as  the  tirst  condition  to  all  further 
improvement,  u]ion  the~e  rude,  self-begotten,  incoherent  generaliza- 
tions, which  parsed  in  men's   minds   for  com])etent  and  directing 
knowledire.     But  he,  not  less  than   B.icon,  performs  this  analysis, 
not  withli  view  to  finality  in  the  negative,  but  as  the  first  stage  to- 
ward an  ulterior  profit— as  the  preliminary  purification,  indispensa- 
ble to  future  positive  result.     In  the  physical  sciences,  to  which  La- 
con's  attention  was  chieflv  turned,  no  such  residt  could  be  obtained 
without  improved  experimental  re.searcli,  bringing  to  light  facts  new 
and  yet  unknown;  but  on  those  topics  which  Sokrates  discussed,  the 
elementary  data  of  the  inquiry  were  all  within  the  hearer's  experi- 
ence, requ'iring  onlv  to  be  pressed  upon  his  notice,  afiirmatively,  as 
well'asneirativelv,  toirether with  the  apprcpiiaU^  ethical  and  political 
End;  in  such  manner  as  to  stimulate  within  him  the  rational  eflort 
requisite  for  combining  them  anew  \ipon  consistent  principles. 

If  then  the  philosopliers  of  the  New  Academy  considered  Sokrates 
eilhcr  as  a  skeptic,   or  as  a  partisan  of  syslenuUic  negation,  they 


TWO  syste:viatically  negative  points.   481 

ini^interpn^tcd  his  character,  and  mistook  the  first  stage  of  his  pro- 
(.fss— that  which  Platq,  Bacon,  and  Herschel  call  the  purification  of 
tlie  intellect— for  the  ultimate  goal.  The  Elenchus,  as.Sokrates  used 
it,  was  animated  by  the  truest  spirit  of  positive  science,  and  formed 
an  indispensable  precursor  to  its  attainment. 

There  are  two  points,  and  two  points  only,  in  topics  concernino' 
maa  and  society,  with  regard  to  which  Sokrates  is  a  skeptic— or 
rather,  which  he  denies;  and  on  the  negation  of  which,  his  whole 
method  and  purpose  turn.  He  denies,  first,  tliat  men' can  know 
that  on  which  they  have  bestowx^d  no  conscious  elTort,  no  deliberate 
pains,  no  systematic  stud}',  in  learning.  He  denies,  next,  that  men 
can  practice  what  they  do  not  know;  that  they  can  be  just,  or  tem- 
perate, or  virtuous  generally,  without  knowing  what  justice  or 
temperance,  or  virtue  is.  To  imprint  upon  the  minds  of  his  hearers 
his  own  negative  conviction,  on  these  two  points— is  indeed  his  first 
ol)ject,  and  the  primary  purpose  of  his  multiform  dialectical  man- 
euvering. But  though  negative  in  his  means,  Sokrates  is  strictly 
positive  in  his  ends:  his  attack  is  undertaken  only  with  distinct  view- 
to  a  positive  result;  in  order  to  .shame  them  out  of  the  illusion  of 
kuowledge,  and  to  spur  them  on  and  arm  them  for  the  acquisition  of 
real,  a.ssured,  comprehensive,  self-explanatory,  knowledge— as  the 
condition  and  guarantee  of  virtuous  practice.  Sokrates  was  indeed 
the  reverse  of  a  skeptic:  no  man  ever  looked  upon  life  with  a  more 
positive  and  practical  eye:  no  man  ever  pursued  his  mark  with  a 
clearer  perception  of  the  road  which  he  was  travelinc:  no  man  ever 
combined,  in  like  manner,  the  absorbing  enthusiasm  of  a  missionary 
with  the  acuteness,  the  originality,  the  inventive  resource,  and  the 
generalizing  comprehension,  of  a  philosopher. 

His  method  yet  survives,  as  far  as  such  method  can  survive  in 
some  of  the  dialogues  of  Plato.  It  is  a  process  of  eternal  value  and 
of  universal  application.  That  purification  of  the  intellect,  which 
Bacon  signalized  as  indispensable  for  rational  or  scientific  progress 
the  Sokratic  Elenchus  affords  the  only  known  instrument  for  at  least 
partially  accomplishing.  However  little  that  instrument  may  have 
been  applied  since  the  death  of  its  inventor,  the  necessity  and  use  of 
It  neither  have  disappeared,  nor  ever  can  disappear.  There  are  few 
men  whose  minds  are  not  more  or  less  in  that  state  of  sham  knowl- 
edge against  which  Sokrates  made  war:  there  is  no  man  whose 
notions  have  not  been  first  got  together  by  spontaneous,  unexamined, 
uiiconscious,  uncertified  association— resting  upon  forgotten  par- 
ticiihirs,  blending  together  disparates  or  inccmsistencies,  and  leaving 
in  his  mind  old  and  familiar  phrases,  and  oracular  propo.sitions,  of 
which  he  has  never  rendered  to  himself  account:  there  is  no  man, 
v/ho,  if  he  be  destined  for  vigorous  mid  profit ahle  scientific  effort,' 
has  not  found  it  a  necessary  branch  of  self-educaiion,  to  break  upi 
disentangle,  analyze,  and  reconstruct,  these  ancient  mental  com- 
pound.s— and  who  has  not  been  driven  to  do  it  by  his  own  lame  and 
H.  G.  III.-16 


4S2 


SOKKATES 


NUMBER  OF  PERSONAL 'ENEMIES. 


483 


r 


solitary  efforts;,  since  the  paut  of  the  colloquial  Elenchus  no  longer 
staiid.s  in  the  mnrket-place  to  lend  hira  help  and  stimulus. 

To  liear  of  auv  man,  especially  of  so  illustrious  a  man,  heinsr  con- 
demned to  deatli  on  such  acrusations  as  that  of  heresy  and  allegKl 
corruption  of  vouth— inspires  at  the  present  day  a  sentiment  of 
indignant  reprobation,  the  force  oT  \vhieh  I  have  no  desire  to  enfeeble. 
The'fact  stands  eternally  recorded  as  one  amoiifr  tiie  thousand  mis- 
deeds of  intolerance,  relijrious  and  political.  But  since  amid  this 
cataloixue  each  item  has  its  own  ])articular  character,  ^^rave  or  ligl)t— 
we  are  bound  to  consider  at  wliat  point  of  the  scale  the  condom- 
nation  of  Sokrates  is  to  be  placed,  and  what  inferences  it  justifies  in 
Tei^ard  to  the  character  of  the  Athenians.  Now  if  we  examine  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  we  shall  find  them  all  extenuatinir:  and 
,  so  powerfid  indeed,  as  to  reduce  such  inferences  to  their  minimum, 
consistent  with  the  freneral  class  to  which  the  incident  belongs. 

First,  the  sentiment  now  prevalent  is  founded  upon  a  conviction 
that  such  matters  as  heresy  and  heretical  teaching  oi  youth  are  not 
proper  for  judicial  coEjnizance.     Even  in  the  modern  world,  such  a 
conviction  is  of  recent  date;  and  in  the  tifth  century   i^.c.  it  was 
unknown.     Sokrates  himself  would    not  have  agreed  in  it;  and  all 
Grecian  c:overnments,  oligarchical  and  democratical  alike  recognized 
the  opposite.     The    testimony  furnished  by  Plato  is  on  this  point 
decisive.     When  we  examine  the  two  positive  communities  which 
he  constructs,  in  the  treatises  "De  Bepublica"  and  "De  Legibus," 
we  find  that  there  is  notliiug  about  which  he  is  more  anxious,  tlian 
to  establish  an  unresisted  orthodoxy  of  doctrine,  opinion,  and  edu- 
cation.    A  dissenting  and  free-spoken  teacher,  such  as  Sokrates  was 
at  Athens,  would  not  have  been  allowed  to  pursue  his  vocation  for  a 
week,  in  the  Platonic  Republic.     Plato  would  not  indeed  condemn 
him  to  death;  but  he  would  put  him  to  silence,  and  in  case  of  need, 
send  him  away.     This  in  fact  is  the  consistent  deduction,  if  you 
assume  that  the  state  is  to  determine  what  is  orthodoxy,  and  orthodox 
teachinir— and  to  repress  what  contradicts  its  own  views.     Now  all 
the  Grecian  states,  including  Athens,  held  this  principle,  of  inter- 
ference aixainst  the  dissenting  teacher.     But  at  Athens,  though  the 
principle 'was  recognized,  yet  the  application  of  it  was  counteracted 
by  resisting  forces  which  it  did  not  find  elsewhere;  by  the  demo- 
cratical constitution  with  its  liberty  of  speech  and  love  of  speech— by 
the  more  active  spring  of  individual  intellect— and  by  the  toleration, 
greater  there  than  anywhere  else,  shown  to  each  man's  peculiarities 
of  every  sort.     In  any  other  irovernment  of  Greece,  as  well  as  in  the 
Platonic  Republic.  Sokrates  would  have  been  quickly  arrested  in  his 
career,  even  if   not  severelv  punished:   in  Athens,  he  was  allowed 
to  talk  and  teach  publiclv  'for  twenty-five  or  thirty  years,  aiul  then 
condemned   when  an   old  man.     Of  these  two  applications  of  the 
same  mischievous  principle,  assuredly  the  latter  is  at  once  the  more 
moderate  and  the  less  noxious. 


Secondly,  the  force  of  this  last  consideration,  as  an  extenuating 
circumstance  in  regard  to  the  Athenians,  is  much  increased,  when  we 
^reflect  upon  the  number  of  individual  enemies  whom  Sokrates  made 
to  himself  in  the  prosecution  of  his  cross-examining  process.  Here 
were  a  multitude  of  individuals,  including  men  personally  the  most 
eminent  and  effective  in  the  city,  prompted  by  special  antipathies, 
over  and  above  general  convictions,  to  call  into  action  the  dormant 
state-principle  of  intolerance  against  an  obnoxious  teacher.  If,  under 
such  provocation,  he  was  allowed  to  reach  the  age  of  seventy,  and 
to  talk  publicly  for  so  many  years,  before  any  real  Meletus  stood 
forward — this  attests  conspicuously  the  efficacy  of  the  restraining 
dispositions  among  the  people,  which  made  their  practical  habits 
more  liberal  than  ilieir  professed  principles. 

Thirdly,  whoever  has  read  the  account  of  the  trial  and  defense  of 
Sokrates,  will  see  that  he  himself  contributed  quite  as  much  to  the 
result  as  all  the  three  accusers  united.  Not  only  he  omitted  to  do 
all  that  might  have  been  done  without  dishonor,  to  insure  acquittal 
—but  he  held  positive  language  very  nearly  such  as  Meletus  himself 
would  have  sought  to  put  in  his  mouth.  lie  did  this  deliberately; 
having  an  exalted  opinion  both  of  himself  and  his  own  mission,  and 
accounting  the  cup  of  hemlock,  at  his  age,  to  be  no  calamity.  It  was 
only  by  such  marked  and  offensive  self-exaltation  that  he  brought  on 
the  first  vote  of  the  Dikastery,  even  then  the  narrowest  majorifty,  by 
which  he  was  found  guilty:  it  w^as  only  by  a  still  more  aggravated 
manifestation  of  the  same  kind,  even  to  the  pitch  of  something  like 
insult,  that  he  brought  on  the  second  vote,  which  pronounced  the 
capital  sentence.  Now  it  w^ould  be  uncandid  not  to  allow  for  the 
effect  of  such  a  proceeding  on  the  minds  of  the  Dikastery.  They 
were  not  at  all  disposed,  of  their  own  accord,  to  put  in  force  the 
recognized  principle  of  intolerance  against  him.  But  when  they 
found  that  the  man  who  stood  before  them  charged  with  this  offense, 
addressed  them  in  a  tone  such  as  Dikasts  had  never  heard  before  and 
could  hardly  hear  with  calmness — they  could  not  but  feel  disposed  to 
credit  ail  the  worst  inferences  which  his  accusers  had  suggested,  and 
to  regard  Sokrates  as  a  dangerous  man  both  religiously  and  politically, 
against  whom  it  was  requisite  to  uphold  the  majesty  of  the  court  and 
constitution. 

In  appreciating  this  memorable  incident,  therefore,  though  the 
mischievous  principle  of  intolerance  cannot  be  denied,  yet  all  the 
circumstances  show  that  that  principle  was  neither  irritable  nor  pre- 
dominaut  in  the  Athenian  bosom;  that  even  a  large  body  of  colla- 
teral antipathies  did  not  readily  call  it  forth  against  any  individual; 
that  the  more  liberal  and  generous  dispositions,  which  detidened  its 
malignity,  were  of  steady  elficacy,  not  easil}'-  overborne;  and  that  the 
condemnation  ought  to  count  as  one  of  the  least  gloomy  items  in  an 
essentially  gloomy  catalogue. 

Let  us  add,  that  as  Sokrates  himself  did  not  account  his  ow^n  con- 


484 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


r 


(Icmnation  and  death,  at  his  age,  to  be  any  misfortune,  but  rather  a 
favorable  dispensation  of  the  gods,  who  removed  him  just  in  time  to 
escape  that  painful  consciousness  of  intellectual  decline,  which  in- 
duced Demokril  us  to  prepare  the  p;)ison  tor  himself— so  his  friend 
Xenophon  goes  a  s\ep  further,  and  while  protesting  against  the  ver- 
dict of  i!:uilty,  extols  the  manner  of  death  as  a  subject  of  triumph; 
as  the  happiest,  most  honorable,  and  most  gnicious  way,  in  which 
the  gods  could  set  the  seal  upcm  an  useful  and  exalted  life. . 

It"  is  asserted  by  Diodorus,  and  repeated  with  exaggerations  by 
;  other  later  authors,  that  after  the  death  of  Sokrates  the  Athenians 
bitterly  repented  of  the  manner  in  which  they  had  treated  him,  and 
that  they  even  went  so  far  as  to  put  his  accusers  to  death  without 
trial.  1  know  not  upon  what  authority  this  statement  is  made,  and 
I  disbelieve  it  altogether.  From  the  time  ofXenophon's  "Memora- 
bilia," there  is  every  reason  to  presume  that  the  memory  of  Sokrates 
still  continued  to  be  unpopular  at  Athens  when  that  collection  was 
composed.  Plato,  too,  left  Athens  immediately  after  the  death  of 
his  master,  and  remained  absent  for  some  time;  indirectly,  I  think, 
this  affords  a  presumption  that  no  such  reaction  took  place  in  Athe- 
nian sentiment  as  that  which  Diodorus  alleges;  and  the  same  pre- 
sumption is  countenanced  by  the  manner  in  which  the  orator 
.iEschines  speaks  of  the  condemnation,  half  a  century  afterward.  I 
see  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  Athenian  Dikasts,  who  doubtless 
felt  themselves  justified,  and  more  than  justified,  in  condemning 
Sokrates  after  his  own  speech— retracted  that  sentiment  after  his 
decease. 


CHAPTER  LXIX. 

CYRUS  THE  YOUNGER  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND  GREEKS. 

In  my  sixty-sixth  chapter,  I  brought  down  the  history  of  Grecian 
affairs  to  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  including  a  description 
of  the  pennanent  loss  of  imperial  power,  the  severe  temporary  op- 
pression, the  enfranchisement  and  renewed  democracy,  which  marked 
the  lot  of  defeated  Athens.  The  defeat  of  that  once-powerful  city, 
accomplished  by  the  Si)artan  confederacy— with  large  pecuniary  aid 
from  the  youu ST  Persian  prince  Cyrus,  satrap  of  most  of  the  Ionian 
seaboardMeft^Sparta  mistress  for  the  time  of  the  Grecian  world. 
Lysander,  her  victorious  admiral,  employed  his  vast  tem]K)rary  power 
for  the  purpose  of  setting  up,  in  most  of  the  cities,  Dekarchies  or 
ruling  Councils  of  Ten,  composed  of  liis  own  partisans:  with  a  Lace- 
djemonian  Harmost  and  garrison  to  enforce  their  oligarchical  rule. 
Refore  I  proceed  however  to  recount,  as  well  as  they  can  be  made 
out,  the  unexpected  calamities  thus  brought  upon  the  Grecian  world, 


MARCH  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND  GREEKS.  485 

with  their  eventual  consequences— it  will  be  convenient  to  introduce 
here  the  narative  of  the  Ten  Tljousand  Greeks.  wMth  their  march  into 
the  heart  of  the  Persian  Empire  and  their  still  more  celebrated  Re- 
treat This  incident,  lying  apart  from  the  main  stream  of  Grecian 
affiirs  would  form  an  item,  strictly  speaking,  in  "Persian  history 
ntber'thau  in  Grecian.  But  its  effects  on  the  Greek  mind,  and  upon 
tiie  future  course  of  Grecian  affairs,  were  numerous  and  important; 
while  as  an  illustration  of  Hellenic  character  and  c()m|)etence,  meas- 
ured against  that  of  the  contemporary  Asiatics,  it  stands  pre-eminent 
aiidfuTl  of  instruction.  .,^,      a    e  t>  ^    ^ 

This  march  from  Sardis  up  to  the  neighborhood  of  Babylon,  con- 
ducted by  Cyrus  the  younger  and  undertaken  for  the  purj^ose  of 
placing  him  on  the  Persian  ^throne  in  the  room  of  his  elder  brother 
Artaxerxes  Mnemon— was  commenced  about  March  or  April  in  the 
year  401  B.C.     It  w^as  about  six  moatlis  afterward,  in  the  month  of 
Sei)tember  or  October  of  the  same  year,  that  the  battle  of  Kunaxa 
was  fou'dit    in  wiiich,  though  the  Greeks  were  victorious,   Cyrus 
himself  tost  his  life.     They  w^ere  then  obliged  to  comn\ence  their 
retreat  which  occupied  about  one  year,  and  ultimtitely  brought  them 
across  the  Bosporus  of  Thrace  to  Byzantium,  in  October  or  Novem- 
ber, 400  B.C.  ,      ^    .  , 
The  death  of  King  Darius  Nothus,  father  both  of  Artaxerxes  and 
Cyrus  occurred  about  the  bciiiuning  of  404  B.C.,  a  short  time  after 
tile  entire  ruin  of  the  force  of  Athens  at  ^Egospotami.     His  reign  of 
19  \-ears  with  that  of  his  father  Artaxerxes  Longimanus  which  lasted 
nearly  forty  years,  fill  up  almost  all  the  interval  from  the  death  of 
Xerxes  in  465  B.C.     The  close  of  the  reigns  both  of  Xerxes  and  of  his 
son  Artaxerxes  had  indeed  been  markf^l  by  those  phenomena  of 
conspiracy,  assassination,  fratricide,  and  family  tragedy,  so  common 
in  the  transmission  of  an  Oriental  scepter.     Xerxes  was  assassinated 
by  the  chief  officer  of  the  palace  named  Artabanus— wdio  had  re- 
ceived from  him  at  a  banquet  the  order  to  execute  his  eldest  son 
Darius   but  had  not  fullilled  it.     Artabanus,  laying  the  blame  of  the 
assassination  upon  Darius,  prevailed  upon  Artaxerxes  to  avenge  it 
by  slayin-'-  the  latter;  he  then  attemi  ted  the  life  of  Artaxerxes  himselt 
but  failed,  and  was  himself  killed,  after  cairying  on  the  government 
a  few  months.     Artaxerxes  Longimanus,  after  reigning  about  forty 
years  left  the  scepter  to  his  son  Xerxes  the  second,  who  was  slain 
after  a  few  months  by  his  brother  Sogdianus;  who  again  was  put  to 
death  after  seven  months,  by  a  third  brother  Darius  Nothus  men- 
tioned above.                                                      ■■    .  ,              ^x^    ^     a     f 
The  wars  between  the  Persian  Empire  and  Athens  as  the  head  ot 
the  confederacy  of  Delos  (477-49  B.C.),  have  been  already  related  in 
one  of  my  earlier  volumes.     But  the  internal  history  of  the  Persian 
Empire  during  these  reigns  is  scarcely  at  all  known  tons;  except 
a  formidable  revolt  of  the  satra]>  Megabyzu^  obscurely  noticed  in  the 
Fragments  of.  Ktesias.      About  414  B.C.    the  Egyptians  revolted. 


486 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


HIS  ESTEEM  FOR  THE  GREEKS. 


487 


Their  native  prince  Arayrt.Tsus  maintained  his  indcpendcnrc— 
though  probably  in  a  part  only,  and  not  the  Avhole,  of  that  coiiiilfy. 
He  was  succeeded  by  a  native  Eiryplian  dyinii-^ty  for  the  space  of 
sixty  years,  A  res'olt  of  the  Medes,  which  took  place  in  408  B.C., 
Wiis  put  down  by  Darius,  and  subsequently,  a  like  revolt  of  the 
Kadusians. 

The  peace  concluded  in  449  B.C.,  between  Athens  and  the  Persian 
Empire,  continued  Avilhout  open  violation,  uiilil  the  ruinous  catiis- 
trophe  which  belel  tlie  former  near  Syracuse  in  413  n.c.  Yet  tlirre 
liad  been  various  comnumicatious  and  envoys  from  Sj^arta  to  the 
Persian  court,  endeav(ning  to  procure  aid  fioni  the  Great  King 
duriuff  theearlv  vears  of  the  war:  coninuinications  .<«o  confused  and 
contradictory,  that  Artaxeixcs  (in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Spartans, 
in  425  B.C.,  and  carried  by  his  envoy  Artaphernes  who  was  captured 
by  the  Athenians)  complained  of  being  unable  to  understand  what 
they  meant — no  two  Sjiarlans  telling  the  same  story.  It  apjK^ars  that 
Pissuthnes,  salra])  of  Sardis,  revolted  from  the  Persian  King,  shortly 
after  this  period,  and  that  Tissajihernts  was  sent  by  the  Great  King 
to  suppress  this  revolt;  in  which  Laving  succeeded,  by  bribing  the 
Grecian  (ommander  of  the  satrap's  nicrcenaiy  troops,  lie  was  re 
warded  by  the  possession  of  the  satrnpy.  AVe  find  Tissapherncs 
Fairap  in  the  year  413  B.C..  commencing  oi)erations  jointly  Avith  tjie 
Spaitans,  for  detaching  the  Asiatic  allies  from  Athens,  after  her 
reverses  in  Sicily ;  and  employing  the  Spartans  successfully  against 
Amorges,  the  revoltetl  son  of  Pissuthnes,  who  occupied  the  strong 
maritime  town  of  lasus. 

The  increased  vigor  of  Persian  operations  against  Athens,  after 
Cyrus  the  younger  son  of  Darius  Nothus  came  down  to  the  Ionic 
coast  in  407  B.C.,  has  been  recounted  in  my  sixty-fourth  chapter; 
together  with  the  complete  prostration  of  Athenian  power,  accom- 
plished during  the  ensuing  three  years.  Residing  at  Sardis  and 
placed  in  active  co-operation  with  Greeks,  this  ambitious  and  ener- 
getic young  prince  soon  became  penetrated  with  their  superior 
military  and  political  efficiency,  as  compared  with  the  native  Asia- 
tics. For  the  abilities  and  character  of  Lysander,  the  Peloponnesian 
admiral,  he  contracted  so  much  admiration,  th.-it,  when  summoned 
to  court  during  the  last  illness  of  his  father  Darius  in  405  B.C.,  he 
even  confided  to  that  oflficer  the  whole  of  his  tribute  and  treasure, 
to  be  administered  in  furthenmce  of  the  war;  which  during  his 
absence  was  brought  to  a  victorious  close. 

Cyrus,  born  after  the  accession  of  his  father  to  the  throne,  was  not 
more  than  eighteen  years  of  age  when  first  sent  down  to  Sardis  (in  407 
B.C.)  as  satrap  of  Ly<iia,  Phrygia,  and  Kapixidokia,  and  as  commander 
of  that  Persian  military  division  which  mustered  at  the  plain  of  Kas- 
tolus;  a  command  not  including  the  Ionic  Greeks  on  the  seaboard, 
who  were  under  the  satrapy  of  Tissapherncs.  We  caimot  place 
much  confidence  in  the  account  which  Xenophou  gives  of  his  educa- 


tion; that  he  had  been  brought  up  with  his  brother  and  many  noble 
Persian  youths  in  the  royal  palace— under  the  strictest  discipline  and 
restraint,  enforcing    modest  hai)its,    with   the   reciprocal   duties  of 
obedience  and   command,    upon  all  of  them,    and  upon  him  with 
jx'ciiliar  success.     It  is  contradicted   by  all  tlie  realities  which  we 
read  about  the   Persian  court,  and  is  a'patch  of  Grecian  rather  than 
of  Oriental  sentiment,  better  suited  to  the  romance  of  the  Cyropcdia 
than  to  the  Anabasis.     But  in  the  Persian  accomplishments  of  horse- 
manship, mastery  of  the  bow  and  of  the  javelin,  bravery  in  the  field, 
daring  as  well  as  endurance  in  hunting  wild  beasts,  and  power  of 
drinking  much  wine  without  being  intoxicated — Cyrus  stood    pre- 
eminent: and  especially  so  when  compared  with  his  chha*  brother 
Artaxerxes,  who  was  at  least  unwarlike,  if  not  lazy  and  timid.     And 
although  the  peculiar  virtue  of  the  Hellenic  citizen — competence  for 
alternate  command  and  obedience— formed  no  part  of  the  character 
of  Cyrus,  yet  it  appears  that  Hellenic  affairs  and  ideas  became  early 
impressed  upon  his  mind:  insomuch  that  on  first  coming  down  to 
Sardis  as  satrap,  he  brought  down  with  him  strong  interest  for  the 
Peloponnesian  cause,  and  strenuous  antipathy  to  that  ancient  enemy 
by  whom  the  Persian  arms  had  been  so  signally  humbled  and  re- 
pressed.    How  zealously  he  co-operated   with   Lysander  and   the 
Peloponnesians  in  putting  down  Athens,   has  been  shown  in  my 
preceding  chapters. 

An  energetic  and  ambitions  youth  like  Cyrus,  having  once  learnt 
from  personal  experience  to  appreciate  the  Greeks,  was  not  slow  in 
divining  the  value  of  such  auxiUaries  as  instruments  of  power  to 
himself.  To  co-operate  effectively  in  the  war,  it  was  necessary  that 
he  should  act  to  a  certain  extent  upon  Grecian  ideas,  and  conciliate 
the  good- will  of  the  Ionic  Greeks;  so  that  he  came  to  combine  the 
imperious  and  unsparing  despotism  of  a  Persian  prince,  with  some- 
thing of  the  regularity  and  system  belonging  to  a  Grecian  adminis- 
trator. Though  younger  than  Artaxerxes,  he  seems  to  have 
calculated  from  the  first  upon  succeeding  to  the  Persian  crown  at 
the  death  of  his  father.  So  undetermined  was  the  law  of  succession 
in  the  Persian  royal  family,  and  so  constant  the  dispute  and  fratricide 
on  each  vacancy  of  the  throne,  that  such  ambitious  schemes  would 
appear  feasiljle  to  a  young  man  of  much  less  ardor  than  Cyrus. 
Moreover  he  was  the  favorite  son  of  QuL'en  Parysatis,  who  areatly 
preferred  him  to  his  elder  brother  Arttixerxes.  lie  was  born  after 
the  accession  of  Darius  to  the  throne,  while  Artaxerxes  had  been 
born  prior  to  that  event.  And  as  this  latter  consideration  had  been 
employed  seventy  years  earlier  by  Queen  Atossa  in  determining  hei 
luisl)aud  Darius  son  of  Hystaspes  to  declare  (even  during  his  life- 
time) her  son  Xerxes  as  his  intended  successor,  to  the  exclusion  of 
an  elder  son  by  a  different  wife  and  born  before  Darius's  accession— 
so  Cyrus  perhaps  anticipated  the  like  effective  preference  to  bimselt 
from  the  solicitations  of  Parysatis.     Probably  his  hopes  were  farther 


jBMiwiiJBinlLViiMiiftj 


488 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


inflamed  by  the  fact  that  he  bore  the  name  of  the  great  founder  of 
he  monarchy,  whose  memory  every  Persian  reverenced.     How  com- 
p  etdHc  reckoned  on  becomin-  king  is  shown  by  u  cruel  act  per- 
formed about  the  early  part  of  405  r..c.     It  was  requnvd  as  a  pari  ot 
Persian  etiquette  that  every  man  who  came  into  the  presence  of  tie 
kin-  should  immerse  his  hands  in  certain  pockets  or  large  sleeves 
which  rendered  them  for  the  moment  inapplicable  to  active  use;  bu 
such  deference  was  shown  to  no  one  except  the  king.      Iwotirst 
cousins  of  Cvrus-sons  of  Ilieramenes  (seemingly  one  of  the  satraps 
or^d  "h  Persian  dignitaries  in  Asia  Minor)  by  a  sister  of  Danus- 
•inneared  in  his  prSence  without  thus  conceabng  thc;ir  hands;  upon 
wS  Cyrus  ordered  them  both  to  be  put  to  death.     Tht-^father  and 
mother  preferred  bitter  complaints  of  this  atrocity  to  Darius,  who 
^'as  induced  to  send  f(.r  Cyrus  to  visit  him  in  Media  on  the  ground, 
not  at  all  fictitious,  that  his  own  health  was  rapidly  dcchnmg. 

Tf  Cvrus  expected  to  succeed  to  the  crown,  it  was  imp(U-lant  that 
he  should  be  on  the  spot  when  his  father  died.     He  acccmlingl v  went 
111)  from  Sardis  to  Media,  along  with  his  body-guard  of  300  Guck. 
under  the  Arcadian  Xenias,  who  were  so  highly  iTmuueraled  lor  this 
distant  march  that  the  rate  of  pay  was  long  celebrated      He  also  took 
with  him  Tissaphernes  as  an  ostensible  friend,  though  there  sceniMo 
have  been  a  real  enmitv  between  them.     Not  long  after  his  arrival  Da- 
rius died,  but  withoiit'complying  with  the  request  of  Parysatis  that  he 
should  declare  in  favor  of  Cyrus  as  his  successor.  Accoidii.gly  Ar  a^ 
xerxes,  being  proclaimed  king,  went  to  Pasargadse,  the  religious  capital 
of  the  Persians,  to  perform  the  customary  solemnities.      1  hus  disap- 
pointed  Cyrus  was  further  accused  by  Tissaphernes  of  conspiring 
the  death  of  his  brother,  who-caused  him  to  be  seized,  and  was  eyuu 
on  the  point  of  puttini:  him  to  death,  when  the  all-powerful  inter- 
cession of  Parvsatis  saVc-d  his  life.    He  was  sent  down  to    us  fonne 
s-itrapv  at  Safdis,  whither  he  returned  with  unsupportable  feelings 
of  aiUer  and  wound(^d  pride,  and  with   a  determined  resolution  to 
leave  nothimr  untried  for  the  purpose  of  dethroning  Ins  brother. 
This  statement,    giVen  to  us  by  Xenophon,  represents  doubtless  the 
story  of  Cyrus  and  his   friends,  current  among  the  Cyreian  aim). 
But  if  we  look  at  the  j^robabilities  of  the  case,  we  shal   be  led  to  sii.- 
p,.ct  that  the  charge  of  Tissaphernes  may  well  have  been  tme  and 
the  conspiracy  of  the  disappointed  Cyrus  against  his  brother,  a  lealil} 

'"The  ml'e^nf  when  Cvnis  returned  to  Sardis  was  highly  favorable 
to  his  plans  and  preparations.  The  long  war  had  just  been  conchukd 
bv  the  capture  of  Athens  and  the  extinction  of  her  power.  Man} 
Greeks,  after  having  ucciuired  military  tastes  and  habits  were  no^^ 
thrown  out  of  employment;  many  otlu-rs  were  driven  into  exile  > 
the  establishment  of  the  Lysandrian  Dekarchies  throughout  a  c 
cities  at  once.  Hence  competent  recniits,  for  a  well-paid  service  like 
thVt  of  Cyrus  were  now  unusually  abundant.     Having  already  a  cei- 


KLEARCHUS  AND  OTHERS  IN  HIS  SERVICE.      489 

tain  number  of  Greek  mercenaries  distributed  throughout  the  various 
garrisons  in  his  satrapy,  he  directed   the  officers  in   command   to 
streu<'-then   their  garrisons   by   as   many   additional   Peloponnesian 
soldiers    as  they    could    obtain.      His    pretext  was— first,  defense 
a"-ainst  Tissapherness.  with  whom,  since  the  denunciation  by  the  lat- 
ter, he  was  at  open  war— next,  protection  of  the  Ionic  cities  on  the 
seaboard,  who  had  been  hitherto  comprised  under  the  government  of 
Tissaphernes,  but  hail  now  revolted  of  their  own  accord,  since  the 
enmity  of  Cyrus  against  him  had  been  declared.     Miletus  alone  had 
been  pr<^vented  from  executing   this  resolution;  for  Tissaphernes, 
re-enforcing  his  garrison  in  that  place,  had  adopted  violent  measures 
of  repression,  killing  or  banishing  several  of  the  leading  men,    Cyrus, 
receiving  these  exiled  Milesians  with  every  demonstration  of  sym- 
pathy, immediately  got  together  both  an  army  and  a  fleet,  under  the 
Egyptian  Tamos,  to  besiege  Miletus  by  land  and  sea.     He   at  the 
same  time  transmitted  to  court  the  regular  tribute  due  from  these 
maritime  cities,  and  attempted,  through  the  interest  of  his  mother 
Parysatis,  to  procure  that  they  should  be  transferred  from  Tissa- 
phernes to  himself.     Hence  the  Great  King  was  deluded  into  tlie 
belief  that  the  new  levies  of  Cyrus  were  only  intended  for  private 
war  between  him  and  Tissaphernes;  an  event  not  uncommon  between 
two  neitrhboring  satraps.     Nor  was  it  displeasing  to  the  court  that  a 
suspected  prince  should  be  thus  occupied  at  a  distance. 

Besides  the  army  thus  collected  round  Miletus,  Cyrus  found  means 
to  keep  other  troops  within  his  call,  though  at  a  distance  and  unsus- 
pected. A  Laceda3monian  olficcr  named  Klearchus,  of  considerable 
military  ability  and  experience,  presented  himself  as  an  exile  at  Sar- 
dis. He  appears  to  have  been  banished  (as  far  as  w^e  can  judge 
amid  contradictory  statements)  for  gross  abuse  of  authority,  and 
extreme  tyrannv,  as  Lacedaemonian  harmost  at  Byzantium,  and  even 
for  having  tried  to  maintain  himself  in  that  place  after  the  Ephors 
had  formally  dismissed  him.  The  known  efficiency,  and  restless  war- 
like appetite  of  Klearchus,  procured  for  him  the  confidence  of  Cyrus, 
who  gave  him  the  lar«re  sum  of  10,000  darics  (about  £7,600),  which 
he  employed  in  levying  an  army  of  mercenary  G'C  ks  for  the  dtf 'n=^e 
of  the  Grecian  cities  in  the  Chersonese  against  the  Thracian  tribes  in 
their  neighborhood;  thus  maintaining  the  troops  until  they  were 
required  by  Cyrus.  Again,  Aristippus  and  Menon— Thessalians  of 
the  ffreat  family  of  the  Aleuada?  at  Larissa,  who  had  maintained  their 
tie  of  personal  hospitality  with  the  Persian  royal  family  ever  since 
the  time  of  Xerxes,  and  w^ere  now  in  connection  whh  Cyrus,  received 
from  him  funds  to  maintain  a  force  of  2,000  mercenaries  for  their 
political  ])urposes  in  Thessalv,  subject  to  his  call  whenever  he  should 
require  them.  Other  Gi-eeks,  too,  who  had  probably  contracted 
similar  ties  of  hospitality  with  Cyrus  by  service  during  the  late  war 
— Proxenus,  a  Boeotian;  Agiasaiid  Sophfcnelus,  Arcadians;  Sokratcs, 
an   xVchseon,  etc.,  were  empowered   by  him   to   collect   mercenary 


490 


CYRUS  AXD  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


XENOPIION. 


491 


.? 


soldiers.  Ilis  pretended  objects  were,  partly  the  siege  of  Miletus; 
partly  an  ostensible  expedition  against  the  Pisidians,  warlike  nud 
predatory  mountaineers  who  did  much  mischief  from  their  fastnesses 
in  the  south-east  of  Asia  Minor. 

Besides  these  unavowed  Grecian  levies,  Cyrus  sent  envoys  to  the 
Lacediemoiiians  to  invoke  their  aid,  in  requital  for  the  strenuous 
manner  in  which  he  had  seconded  their  operations  against  Atlicns — 
and  received  a  favorable  answer.  He  further  got  together  a  consid- 
erable native  force,  taking  great  pains  to  conciliate  friends  as  well  as 
to  inspire  conlidence.  "  lie  was  straightforward  and  just,  like  a 
candidate  for  command  " — to  use  the  expression  of  IIerod<;tus  respect- 
ing the  Median  Deiokes;  nuiintaining  order  and  security  throughout 
his  satrapy,  and  punishing  evil-doers  in  great  numbers,  with  the 
utmost  extremity  of  rigor;  of  which  the  public  roads  exhibited 
abundant  living  testimony,  in  the  persons  of  mutilated  men,  deprived 
of  their  hands,  feet,  or  eyesight.  But  he  was  also  exact  in  requiting 
faithful  service,  both  civil  and  military.  He  not  only  made  various 
expeditions  against  the  hostile  Mysians  and  Pisidians.  but  was  for- 
ward in  exposing  his  own  person,  and  munificent,  rewaiding  the 
zeal  of  all  soldiers  who  distinguished  themselves.  He  attached  men 
to  his  person  both  by  a  winning  demeanor  and  by  seasonable  gifts.  As 
it  was  the  uniform  custom  (and  it  is  still  the  custom  in  the  East)  for 
every  one  who  approached  Cyrus  to  come  with  a  present  in  his  hand, 
so  he  usually  gave  away  again  these  j^resents  as  marks  of  distinction 
to  others.  Ilence  he  not  only  acquired  the  attachment  of  all  in  his 
own  service,  but  also  of  those  Persians  whom  Artaxerxes  sent  down 
on  various  pretenses  for  the  i)urpose  of  observing  his  motions.  Of 
these  emissaries  from  Susa.  some  were  even  sent  to  obstruct  and 
enfeeble  him.  It  was  under  such  orders  that  a  Persian  named 
Orontes,  governor  of  Sardis,  acted,  in  levying  open  war  against 
Cyrus;  wiio  twice  subdued  i»im,  and  twice  pardoned  him,  on  solenui 
assurance  of  fidelity  for  the  future.  In  all  agreements,  even  with 
avowed  enemies,  Cyrus  kept  faith  exactly;  so  that  his  word  was 
trusted  by  every  one. 

Of  such  virtues  (rare  in  an  Oriental  ruler,  either  ancient  or  modern) 
— and  of  such  secret  preparations — Cyrus  sought  to  reap  the  fiuils 
at  the  beginning  of  401  b.c.  Xenias,  his  general  at  home,  brought 
touether  all  the  i«:arrisons,  leavinii:  a  bare  sufficiencv  for  defense  of 
the  towns.  Klearchus,  ^lenon.  and  the  other  Greek  generals  were 
recalled,  and  the  siege  of  Miletus  was  relinquished;  so  that  there  wns 
concentrated  at  Sardis  a  body  of  7,700  Grecian  lioplifes.  with  500 
light-armed.  Others  afterward  joined  on  the  march,  and  there  was, 
besides,  a  native  ;irmy  of  about  100.000  men.  With  such  menus 
Cyrus  set  forth  {]\Iarch  or  April  401  B.C.)  from  Sardis.  Plis  real  pur- 
pose was  kept  secret:  his  ostensible  pui-pose,  as  ]iroclaimed  and 
understood  by  every  one  except  himself  and  Klearchus,  was  to  con- 
quer and  root  out  the  Pisidian  mountaineers.    A  joint  Lacedtcmoniau 


and  Persian  fleet,  under  the  Lacedamonian  admiral  Samius,  at  tlie 
s;unc  time  coasted  round  the  south  of  Asia  IMinor,  in  prcler  to  lend 
co-operation  from  the  seaside.  This  Lticediemonian  co-operation 
pa.'^scd  for  a  private  levy  effected  by  Cyrus  himself;  for  the  ephors 
would  not  formally  avow  lio.stility  against  the  Great  King. 

The  body  of  Greeks,  immortalized  under  the  name  "of  the  Tea 
Thousand,  who  were  thus  preparing  to  plunge  into  so  many  unex- 
pected perils — though  embarking  on  a  foreign  mercenary  service, 
were  by  no  means  outcasts,  or  even  men  of  extreme  poverty.  They 
were  for  the  most  part  persons  of  established  position,  and  not  a  few 
even  opulent.     Half  of  them  were  Arcadians  or  Archreans. 

Such  was  the  reputation  of  Cyrus  for  honorable  and  munificent 
dealing,  that  many  young  men  of  good  family  had  run  away  from 
their  fathers  and  mothers;  others  of  mature  age  had  been  tempted  to 
leave  their  wives  and  children;  and  there  were  even  some  who  had 
embarked  their  own  money  in  advance  of  outfit  for  other  poorer 
men,  as  well  as  for  themselves.  All  calculated  on  a  year's  campaign 
in  Pisidia;  wiiich  might  perhaps  be  hard,  but  would  certainly  be 
be  lucrative,  and  would  enable  them  to  return  with  a  well-furnished 
purse.  So  the  Greek  conmianders  at  Sardis  all  confidently  assured 
them;  extolling,  with  the  emphasis  and  eloquence  suitable  to  recruit- 
ing officers,  both  the  libendity  of  Cyrus  and  the  abundant  promise 
for  all  men  of  enterprise. 

Among  others,  the  Boeotian  Proxenus  wrote  to  his  friend  Xenophon, 
at  Athens,  pressing  hira  strongly  to  come  to  Sardis,  and  offering  to 
present  him  to  Cyrus,  whom  he  (Proxenus)  "  considered  as  a  better 
friend  to  him  than  his  own  country:"  a  striking  evidence  of  the 
manner  in  which  such  a  foreign  mercenary  service  overlaid  Grecian 
patriotism,  which  we  shall  recognize  more  and  more  as  we  advance 
forward.  This  able  and  accomplished  Athenian — entitled  to  respect- 
ful gratitude,  not  indeed  from  Athens  his  country,  but  from  the 
Cyreian  army  and  the  intellectual  world  generally — was  one  of  the 
class  of  Knights,  or  Horsemen,  and  is  said  to  have  served  in  that 
capacity  at  the  battle  of  Delium.  Of  his  previous  life  we  know 
little  or  nothing,  except  that  he  was  an  attached  friend  and  diligent 
hearer  of  Sokrates;  the  memorials  of  whose  conversations  we  chiefly 
derive  from  his  pen,  as  we  also  derive  the  narnitive  of  the  Cyreian 
march.  In  my  last  preceding  chapter  on  Sokrates,  I  have  made 
ample  use  of  the  Memorai)ilia  of  Xenophon;  and  I  am  now"  about  to 
draw  from  his  Anabasis  (a  model  of  perspicuous  and  interesting 
narrative)  the  account  of  the  adventures  of  the  Cyreian  army,  which 
we  are  fortuntite  in  knowing  from  so  authentic  a  source. 

On  receiving  the  invitation  from  Proxenus,  Xenophon  felt  much 
inclined  to  comply.  To  a  member  of  that  class  of  Knights,  which 
three  years  before  had  been  the  mainstay  of  the  atrocities  of  the 
Thirty  (how  far  he  was  personally  concerned,  we  cannot  say),  it  is 
probable  that  residence  in  Athens  was  in  those  times  not  peculiarly 


492 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


DISTRESSED  FOR  MONEY. 


493 


agreeable.  IIo  nsked  the  opinion  of  Sokrates;  -wlio,  fipimliensive 
lest  yerviee  under  Cyrus,  the  hiUler  enemy  of  Alliens,  miglit  exitose 
liim  to  unpop'uiarity  witli  his  eountrynjen,  reeonimeiRled  an  aijjjjica- 
tiou  to  the  Di'lphian  oraelc.  Thitlier  Xenophon  went:  but  in  Initli 
lie  had  already  made  up  liis  mind  beforeiiand.  bo  that  instead  of 
asking,  "  whetlR-r  lie  ought  to  go  or  refuse," — he  simjily  put  tl;e 
question,  "  To  which  of  the  Gtxls  must  I  sacrifice,  in  oiiler  to  obhiin 
safety  and  success  in  a  jouuney  which  I  am  now  meditating  ?"  Tlie 
reply  of  the  oracle — indicating  Zeus  Basileus  as  the  God  to  whom 
sacrifice  was  proper — was  brought  back  by  Xenophon;  upon  which 
Sokrates,  though  displeased  that  the  question  had  not  been  fairly  put 
as  to  the  whole  project,  nevertheless  advised,  since  an  answer  had 
now  been  given,  that  it  should  be  literally  obeyed.  Accordingly 
Xenophon,  having  offered  the  sacrifices  prescribed,  took  his  dejKu'- 
ture  first  to  Ephesus  and  thence  to  Sardis,  where  he  found  the  army 
about  to  set  forth.  Proxenus  presented  him  to  Cyrus,  who  entreated 
him  earnestly  to  take  service,  promising  to  dismiss  him  as  soon  as 
the  campaign  against  the  Pisidiaus  should  be  finished.  He  was  thus 
induced  to  stay,  yet  only  as  volunteer  or  friend  of  Proxenus,  without 
accepting  any  special  post  in  the  army,  either  as  officer  or  soldier. 
There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  his  service  under  Cyrus  had  actu- 
ally the  effect  apprehended  by  Sokrates,  of  rendering  liim  unpopular 
at  Athens,  For  though  he  was  afterward  banished,  this  sentence 
v.-as  not  passed  against  him  until  after  the  battle  of  Koroneia  in 
894  B.C.,  where  he  was  in  arms  as  a  conspicuous  officer  under  Ag(si- 
laus,  against  his  ow^n  countrymen  and  their  Theban  allies — nor  need 
we  look  farther  back  for  the  grounds  of  the  sentence. 

Though  Artaxerxes,  entertaining  general  suspicions  of  his  brotlid's 
ambitious  views,  had  sent  down  various  persons  to  watch  him,  yet 
Cyrus  had  contrived  to  gain  or  neutralize  these  spies,  and  had  masked 
his  preparations  so  skillfully,  that  no  intimation  was  conveyed  to  b^ui-a 
until  the  march  was  about  to  commence.  It  was  only  then  that  Ti-^sa- 
phernes,  seeing  the  siege  of  Miletus  relinquished,  and  the  vast  Uvaq 
mustering  at  Sardis,  divined  that  something  more  was  meant  thaa 
the  mere  conquest  of  Pisidian  freebooters,  and  went  up  in  person  to 
warn  the  King,  who  began  his  preparations  forthwith.  That  which 
Tissaphernes  had  divined  was  yet  a  secret  to  every  man  in  the  army, 
to  Proxenus  as  well  as  the  rest — when  Cyrus,  having  confided  the 
provisional  management  of  his  satrapy  to  some  Persian  kinsmen,  and 
to  his  admiral  the  Egyptian  Tamos,  commenced  liis  march  in  a 
south-easterly  direction  from  Sardis,  through  Lydia  and  Phrygia. 
Three  days'  march,  a  distance  stated  at  22  parasangs,  brought  him  to 
the  Manmder:  one  additional  march  of  eight  parasangs  after  crossing 
that  river,  forwardeti  him  to  Kolossa,  a  flourishing  city  in  Phrygia, 
where  Menon  overtook  him  with  a  re-enforcement  of  1000  hoplites, 
and  500  peltasts — Dolopes,  ^Enianes,  and  Olynthians.  He  tlun 
marched  three  days  onward  to  Kelseiux',  another  Phiygian  city, 


-n-reat  and  flourishing,"  with  a  citadel  very  strong  both  ])y  nature 
•^  .?rt  IkM-e  he  haUed  no  less  than  thirty  days,  in  order  to  await 
r^;  va/o  k  Uim.,  with  his  divison  of  1000  hoplites,  800  Thra- 
c  n^'^'-t,'  and  200  Ivretan  bowmen :  at  the  same  tune  Soph^ne^^^^^ 
nnived  with  1000  further  hoplites,  and  Sosias  with  300.  1  his  total 
of  Greeks  was  reviewed  l,y  Cyrus  in  one  united  body  at.  Keleenae: 

'T^^K^i'^  JiS^ad  been  directed  straight  toward 
Pallia  near  the  borders  of  which  territory  that  city  is  situated.  So 
r^;  erefore,  the  fiction  with  which  he  started  was  kept  up.  But 
on  ic^^  V  iWvehrni^,  he  turned  his  march  away  from  Pisidia  in  adirec^ 
^on  nca-ry  northward;  first  in  two  days,  ten  parasangs  to  the  town  of 
P?dt.r  1  ext  in  two  davs  farther,  twelve  parasangs,  to  Keramon-Agora, 
^ieastct^'intl7e  district  adjoining  Mysia.  At  Pelt..,  in  a  halt  of  three 
ivs  the  Arcadian  general  Xenias  celebrated  the  great  festival  of  his 
country  the  Lyka.i^  with  its  usual  games  and  matches,  in  the  pres 
ence  of  Cyrus.  From  Keramon  Agora  Cyrus  mai^ched  in  three  days 
the  unus^^al  distance  of  thirty  parasangs  to  a  city  called  Kays^ru- 
Pp.lion  (the  plain  of  Kavstrus),  where  he  halted  for  five  days.  Here 
h's   epose  ^^^  by  the  murmurs  of  the  Greek  so  diers,  who 

ad  r(?c!dved  no  pay  for  tlu'ce  months  (Xenophon  had  before  told  us 
tint  hey  were  mostly  men  who  had  some  means  of  their  own),  and 
wh  >  now  flocked  round  his  tent  to  press  for  their  arrears.  So  im- 
Xiveri  ed  was  Cyrus  by  previous  disbursements-perhaps  a  so  by 
5  ons  of  tribute  for  the  purpose  of  popularizing  himself-that  he 
was  uttcHv  without  money,  and  was  obliged  to  put  them  off  again 
^^S^l  And  his  march  might  well  have  ended  here,  had  he 
DO  been  rescued  from  embarrassment  bv  the  arriva  of  Epyaxa,  wife 
of  the  KilHdan  prince  Syennesis,  who  b'rought^to  him  a  large  sum  of 
mnnev  and  e^  liim  ^  ^•ive  the  Greek  soldiers  four  months'  pay 

Ton^e.     As  to  the  Asiatic  soldiers,  it  is  probable  that  they  received 
little  bcvouil  tlicir  maintenance.  . 

Two  en^uin-  days  of  march,  still  through  Phrysia,  brought  the 
I  wo  6"^"'".-.  "''J  _  ...,„  „„„„  ,„  Tv,in>iim      Knih  dav's  march  is 


^^Zm^^^ny^n^^^""^'^^-  His  Asiatic  troops  «^re  first 
m!de  to  Inarch  "u  order  l>efore  hitn,  cavalry  and  infantry  m  their 
^'nar.to  dTvisions;  after  which  he  himself  in  a  chariot,  and  Epyaxa 
■  'I  h!;,;,,.,  XT.  a  sort  of  carriage  or  litter  covered  with  an  awning 

Vtch  rn  1  o?  In  t  i  ple^siiret  passed  all  along  the  front  of  the 
Greek  nc  d  a  vn  up  separately.  The  hoplites  were  marshaled  four 
deep  aU  in  their  best  trim;  brazen  helmets,  purple  tunics  greaves  or 

Snts  and  the  shields  rubbed  bright,  just  taken  out  of  the  wrai> 
™.tsn  which  thev  were  carried  during  a  mere  march.  Klcarehus 
?^mn  "iiTled  on  the  left,  and  Menon  on  the  ri.gl.t;  the  other  gencr.als 
S  distributed  in  the  center.     Having  completed  his  review  along 


494 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


tlje  whole  lino,  aiu]  taken  a  station  ^\\\h  the  Kilikinn  priiirrss  at  a 
certain  distance  in  front  of  it,  Cyrus  sent  liis  iiitcr}»iclcr  to  t)ie  gene- 
rals and  desired  that  he  might  see  thcni  charLie.  Accordingly  the 
orders  were  given,  the  spears  were  pretended,  the  trumpi  ts  sounded, 
and  the  whole  Greek  force  moved  forward  in  battle  arrav  with  the 
usual  shouts.  As  they  advanced,  the  pace  became  accelerated,  and 
tliey  made^straight  against  the  victualling  portion  of  the  Asiatic  en- 
campment. Such  Avas  the  terror  occasioned  by  the  sight,  that  all  the 
Asiatics  fled  fonhwith,  abandoning  their  i>ropertv— Epvaxa  herself 
amonir  the  lirst,  quitting  her  palanquin.  Though  she  liad  among  her 
personal  guards  some  Greeks  from  Aspendus.  Vhe  had  never  bifore 
seen  a  Grecian  army,  and  was  amazed  as  well  as  terrified;  much  to 
the  satisfaction  of  Cyrus,  who  saw  in  the  scene  an  augury  of  Lis  own 
coming  success. 

Three  days  of  farther  march  (called  twenty  parasangs  in  all)  hrouoht 
tlie  army  to  Ikoniuni  (now  Konieh),  the  extreme  city  of  Phrygia, 
where  Cyrus  halted  three  days.  He  then  marched 'for  five '(fays 
(thirty  parasangs)  tUrough  Lykaonia;  which  country,  as  beinir  out  of 
Ids  own  satrapy,  and  even  hostile,  he  allowed  the  Greeks  to  plunder. 
Lykaonia  being  immediately  on  the  borders  of  Pisidia.  its  inhabitants 
were  probably  reckoned  as  Pisidians,  since  thev  were  of  the  like  pre- 
dator}^ character:  so  that  Cyrus  would  be  partlaliv  realizing  the  i)re- 
tended  purpose  of  his  expedition.  He  thus  too  npproached  near  to 
Mount  Taurus,  which  separated  him  from  Kilikia;  and  he  here  sent 
the  Kilikian  princess,  together  with  ^Icnon  and  his  division,  over  the 
mountain,  by  a  pass  shorter  and  more  direct,  but  secminirly  little  fre- 
quented, and  too  difficult  for  the  whole  army;  in  order"  that  they 
might;  thus  get  straight  into  Jvilikia,  in  the  rear  of  Syenncsis,  who 
was  occupying  the  regular  pass  more  to  the  northward.  Intending 
to  enter  with  his  main  body  through  this  latter  pass,  Cyrus  first  pro- 
ceeded through  Kappadokia  (four  days'  march,  twenty-five  parasanirs) 
to  Dana,  or  Tyaua,  a  flourishing  city'of  Kappadokia,  where  he  halttd 
three  days,  and  where  he  put  to  death  two  Persian  officers,  on  a 
clijirge  of  conspiring  against  him. 

This  regular  pass  over  Taurus,  the  celebrated  Tauri-PvlcT  or  Kili- 
kian Gates,  was  occupied  by  Syenncsis.  Thomrh  a  road  fit  for 
vehicles,  it  was  yet  8.(500  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea.  steep,  bor- 
dered by  high  ground  on  each  side,  and  crossed  bv  a  wall  w  ith  iites, 
so  that  it  could  not  be  forced  if  ever  so  moderately  defended."  But 
the  Kilikian  prince,  alarmed  at  the  news  tliat  i\[enon  had  alrendy 
crossed  the  mountains  by  the  less  frequented  pass  to  his  rear,  and  that 
the  fleet  of  Cyrus  was  sailing  along  the  coast,  evacuated  his  own  im- 
pregnable position,  and  fell  back  to  Tarsus;  from  whence  lie  airain 
retired,  acompanied  by  most  of  the  iidiabitants,  to  an  inaccessible  fast- 
ness on  the  mountains.  Accordingly  Cyrus,  ascending  without 
opposition  the  great  pass  thus  abandoned^  reached  Tarsiis  after  a 
march  of  four  days,  there  rejoining  Menou  and  Epyaxa.    Two  lochi. 


SYENNESIS  OF  KILUvIA. 


495 


or  companies,  of  the  division  of  Menon,  having  dispersed  on  their 
mirch  for  pillage,  had  been  cut  off  by  the  natives;  for  which    he 
m-ia  bodvof  Greeks  now  took  their  revenge,  plundering  both  the 
P  r^ud  the  palace  of  Syennesis.     That  prince,  though  invited  by 
C  Tu  to  cmne  back  to  Tarsus,  at  first  refused,  but  w.is  at  length  pre- 
vffl  upon  by  the  persuasions  of  his  wife,  to  return  under  a  safe 
Jo  diic       He  was  induced  to  contract  an  alliance,  to  exchange  pres- 
ents   4  ii  Cyrus,  and  to  give  him  a  large  sum  of  money  towa.'-c   his 
exuedi  io.i^  together  with  a  contingent  of  troops:  in  re  urn  lor  whcl 
iriaH" Upi  laled  that  Kilikia  should  be  no  farther  plundered,  and  that 
.    slives  fiken  awav  might  be  recovered  wherever  they  were  found, 
'^"it   e^ns  eViden^   though  Xenophon  does  not  directly  tell  us  so 
that  the  resistance  of  Syennesis  (this  was  a  standing  name  or  title  of 
e  1  eredaary  princes  of  Kilikia.  under  the  Persian  crown)  was  a  mere 
e  nt   ^h^^  t  the  visit  of  Epyaxa  with  a  supply  ot  money  to  Cyrus,  and 
h    idm  ssion  of  Munoi/and  his  division  over  Mount  Taurus,  were 
•u  Alters  in  collision  with  him;  and  that,  thinking  Cyrus  would 
h:  suecessful.  he  was  dispos^nl  to  support  his  cause,  yet  careful  at  the 
s^une  Unit  to  give  himself  the  air  of  having  been  overpowered,  in 
p.i*p  Artaxerxes  should  prove  victorious. 

U  Hrs  W;  -r,  it  appeared  as  if  the  inm-d.  ot  Cyrus  was  dcs mod 
toflni..  at  Tarsus  wlii'e  he  was  obliged  to  re.nam  twenty  days. 
The  rinv  ha,l  alreiMly  passed  by  Pisidia.  the  ostensible  l""pose  f 
11  e  evi.,iiti,.ii  tor  whieh  the  Greeitiii  troops  had  been  cu^i^v^:  not 
,„e  ot  them,  either  oflieer  or  soldier,  ^'f  l«'«"''S/"'>,;  '"'fif" '''.^  '^ 
trirv  exeept  K'learehus,  who  was  m  the  seeret.  But  all  uow  saw 
r  t  thev  h  Id  iK-en  inipose<l  upon.  an<l  fo.i.ul  out  that  they  were  to 
be  eoud.etc'l  a-ainst  the  I'ersiat.  kin.c.  liesidos  the  resentuieut  at 
Ll  dc  ision  thev  shrunk  troin  the  risk  altogether;  not  from  any 
fear  o  Persia^  armies,  but  from  the  terrors  of  a  inarch  of  three  months 
inward  fniu  the  coast,  and  the  impossibility  ot  return,  which  had  so 
p"wl'r  lily  affected  the  Spartan  Idi.!;  Kleomenes,  a  century  before; 
most  of  them  beinir  (as  I  liave  before  remarked)  men  of  decent  jjositioii 
and  famih^u  their  respective  cities.  Accordingly  they  proclaimed 
?Mr  determinatioi.  to  advance  no  further,  as  they  had  uot  been  eu-  ^ 
(rncrod  to  flfht  a'^•linst  the  Great  King.  i 

^lmon.^tle  Grecian  officers,  each  (Klearchus,  Proxenus  Menon  ? 
\,mU  IS  etc  )  commanded  ids  own  separate  division,  without  any 
».,  walV^imo  except  (Jyrus  himself.  Each  ot  them  probably  sympa- 
Uitred  more  o,.  less  in  the  reseiUnient  as  well  as  ii.  the  repugnance  of 
e  soldiers  But  Klearchus,  an  exile  and  a  inercenary  bv  !>f"fess'on 
was  doubtless  prepared  tor  this  mutiny,  and  had  assured  C\rus  that 
UmWie  overcome.  That  such  a  u.an  as  Klearchus  could  be  tol.T- 
atdi  a  commander  ot  free  and  non-professional  -  .l;'-;  -  -  £-f. 
of  the..-reatsuscei)lil)ilitv  of  the  Greek  hoplites  for  mililaij  dl^u- 
p  iue  Fo  t  loui  he  had  great  military  merits,  being  brave,  resolute, 
and  full  of  resoin-ee  in  the  hour  ot  danger,  provident  for  the  subsist- 


496 


CYKUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


KLEARCHUS. 


497 


ence  of  bis  soldiers,  and  unshrinking  against  fatigue  and  liardsliip— 
yet  his*look  and  manner  were  Imrsli.  his  punishments  were  perpetual 
as  well  as  cruel,  and  he  neither  tried  nor  eared  to  conciliate  his  sol- 
diers; who  acc(»rdiii:;iy  stayed  with  hini,  and  were  remarkable  fur  ex- 
actness of  discipline,  so  long  as  political  orders  recjuired  them — but 
preferred  service  under  other  commanders,  when  they  could  obtain 
it.  Finding  his  orilers  to  march  forward  disobeyed,  Klearchus  pro- 
ceeded at  once  in  his  usual  manner  to  enforce  and  punish.  But  lie 
found  resistance  universal;  he  himself,  with  the  cattle  who  carried 
his  baggage,  was  pelted  when  he  began  to  move  forward,  and  nar- 
rowly escaped  with  his  life.  Thus  disappointed  in  his  attempt  at 
coercion,  he  was  compelled  to  convene  the  soldiers  in  a  regular  assem- 
bly, anil  to  essay  persuasion. 

On  tirst  appearing  before  the  assembled  soldiers,  this  harsh  and 
imperious  otticcr  stood  for  a  long  time  silent,  and  even  weeping;  a  re- 
markable point  in  Grecian  manners — and  exceedingly  impressive  to 
the  soldiers,  who  looked  on  him  with  surprise  and  in  silence.  At 
length  he  addre^ed  them — "Be  not  astonished,  soldiers  to  see  me 
deeply  mortified.  Cyrus  has  been  my  friend  and  benefactor.  It  was 
he  who  sheltered  me  as  an  exile,  and  gave  me  10,000  darics,  which  I  ex- 
pended not  on  my  own  profit  or  pleasure,  but  upon  you,  and  m  defense 
of  Grecian  interests  in  the  Chersonese  against  Thracian  depredators. 
"When  Cyrus  invited  me,  I  came  to  liim  along  with  you,  in  order  to 
make  him  the  best  return  in  my  power  for  his  past  kinilness.  But 
now,  since  you  will  no  longer  march  along  with  me,  I  am  under  the 
necessity  either  of  renouncing  j'ou  or  ofbreaking  faith  with  him. 
AVhether  I  am  doing  right  or  not,  I  cannot  say :  but  1  shall  stand  by  you 
and  share  your  fate.  No  one  shall  say  of  nie  that,  having  conductal 
Greek  troops  into  a  foreign  land,  I  betrayed  the  Greeks  and  chtse 
the  foreigner.  You  are  to  me  country,  friends,  allies:  while  you 
are  with  me,  I  can  help  a  friend,  and  repel  an  enemy.  Understand 
me  well:  I  shall  go  wherever  you  go,  and  partake  your  fortune." 

This  speech,  and  the  distinct  declaration  of  Klearchus,  that  he 
would  not  march  forward  against  the  King,  was  heard  by  the  soldiers 
with. much  delight;  in  which  those  of  the  other  Greek  divisions  sym- 
pathized, especially  as  nime  of  the  other  Greek  cijininanders  had'yet 
announced  a  similar  resolution.  So  strong  was  this  feeling  among 
the  soldiers  of  Xenias  and  Pasion,  that  2,000  of  them  left  their  com- 
manders, coming  over  forthwith,  with  arms  and  baggage,  to  the  en- 
campment of  Klearchus. 

Meanwhile  Cyrus  himself,  dismayed  at  the  resistance  encountered, 
sent  to  desire  an  interview  with  Klearchus.  But  the  latter,  knowing 
well  the  gjime  that  he  was  playing,  refused  to  obey  the  summons. 
He  however  at  the  same  time  dispatched  a  secret  message  to  encour- 
age Cyrus  with  the  assurance  that  everything  would  come  right  at 
last — and  to  desire  further  that  fresh  invitations  might  be  sent,  in 
order  that  he  (Klearchus)  might  answer  by  fresh  refusals.     He  then 


ao-ain  convened  in  a«?sembly  both  his  own  soldiers  and  those  who  had 
recently  deserted  Xenias  to  join  him.  "  Soldiers  (said  he),  we  must 
recollect  that  we  have  now  broken  with  Cyrus.  We  are  no  longer 
jiis  soldiers,  nor  he  our  paynuister:  moreover,  I  know  that  he  thinks 
that  we  have  wronged  him — so  that  I  am  both  ashamed  and  afraid  to 
<T0  near  him.  He  is  a  good  friend— but  a  formidable  enemy;  and 
has  a  powx^rful  force  of  his  own,  wdiich  all  of  you  see  near  at  hand. 
Tills  is  no  time  for  us  to  slumber.  We  must  take  careful  counsel 
whether  to  stay  or  go;  and  if  we  go,  how  to  get  away  in  safety,  as 
well  as  to  obtain  provisions.  I  shall  be  glad  to  hear  what  any  man 
has  to  suggest." 

Instead  of  the  peremptory  tone  halntual  with  Klearchus,  the  troops 
found  themselves  now,  for'the  first  time,  not  merely  released  from 
his  command,  but  deprived  of  his  advice.  Some  soldiers  address- 
ed the  assembly,  proposing  various  measures  suitable  to  tlie  emerg- 
ency: but  their  propositions  were  opposed  by  other  speakers,  who, 
privately  instigated  by  Klearchus  himself,  set  forth  the  difficulties 
either  of  staying  or  de|)arting.  One  among  these  secret  partisans  of 
the  commander  even  affected  to  take  the  opposite  side,  and  to  be  im- 
patient for  immediate  departure.  ''If  Klearchus  does  not  chose  to 
conduct  us  back  (said  this  speaker),  let  us  immediitely  elect  other 
generals,  buy  provisions,  get  ready  to  dei^art,  and  then  send  to  ask 
Cyrus  for  merchant-vessels— or  at  any  rate  for  guides  in  our  retiint 
inarch  by  land.  If  he  refuses  both  these  requests,  we  must  put  our- 
selves in  marching  order,  to  fight  our  way  Imck;  sending  forward  a. 
detachment  without  delay  to'occupy  the  passes."  Klearchus  here 
interposed  to  say,  that  as  for  liimself.  it  was  impossible  for  him  to» 
continue  in  commmd;  but  he  would  faithfully  obey  any  f>ther  com- 
mander who  might  be  elected.  He  was  followed  by  nnother speaker,, 
who  demonstrated  the  absurdity  of  going  and  askmgO^-njs  either  for 
a  guide  or  for  ships  at  the  very  moment  when  they  were  frustnvting 
his  projects.  How  could  he  be  expected  to  assist  !hem  in  getting 
away?  Who  could  trust  either  his  ships  or  his  guides?  On  the 
other  hand,  to  depart  v/ithout  his  knowledge  oreoncuiTcnce  was  im- 
possible. The  proper  course  would  Ix?  to  send  a  deputation  to  hiniv 
'  consisting  of  others  along  with  Klearchus.  to  ask  what  it  was  he 
'  really  wanted;  which  no  one  yet  knew.  His  answer  to  the  question 
should  l3e  reported  to  the  meeting,  in  order  that  they  might  take  their 
resolution  accordingly. 

To  this  proposition  the  soldiers  acceded;  for  it  was  hut  too  plain 
that  retreat  was  no  easy  matter.  The  deputation  went  to  put  the 
question  to  Cyrus;  who  replied  that  his  real  purpose  was  to  attack 
his  enemy  Abrokomas,  who  was  on  the  river  Euphrates,  twelve  days*^ 
march  onw^ard.  If  he  found  Abrokomas  there,  he  would  punish 
him  as  he  deserved.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Abrokomas  had  fled^ 
they  might  again  consult  what  step  wms  fit  to  be  taken. 
The  soldiers,  on  hearing  this,  suspected  it  to  be  a  deception,  but 


498 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


DESERTION  OF  XENIAS  AND  PASION. 


499 


nevertheless  acquiesced,  not  knowing  what  else  to  do.  They  re- 
quired  only  an  increase  of  pay.  Not  a  word  was  said  about  the 
Great  Kiuif,  or  the  expedition  alrainst  him.  Cyrus  -ranted  increased 
pay  of  titty  per  cent  upon  tlie  previous  rate.  Instead  of  one  daric 
per  month  to  each  soldier,  he  agreed  to  give  a  daric  and  a  half. 

Tiiis  remarkable  scene  at  Tarsus  illustrates  the  character  of  the 
Greek  citizen-soldier.  What  is  chiefly  to  be  noted  is,  the  a]>ixal 
made  to  their  reason  and  judgment— the  habit,  established  more  or 
less  throuirhout  solarL^ea  portion  of  the  Grecian  world,  and  atfainiii!,' 
its  maximum  at  Athens,  of  heariiiir  l)oth  sides  and  deciding  after- 
ward The  soldiers  are  indiiinant,  justly  and  naturally,  at  the  fraud 
practiced  upon  them.  But  instead  of  surrendering  themselves  to 
this  impulse  arising  out  of  the  past,  they  are  brought  to  look  at  the 
actualities  of  the  present,  and  take  measure  of  what  is  best  to  be  done 
for  the  future.  To  return  back  from  the  place  where  they  stood. 
a«'ainst  the  wish  of  Cvrus,  was  an  enterprise  so  full  of  difficulty  and 
dan«'-er  that  the  decision  to  which  they  came  was  recommended  by 
the  best  considerations  of  reason.  To  go  on  was  the  less  dangerous 
course  of  the  two,  besides  its  chances  of  unmeasured  reward. 

As  the  remaining  Greek  officers  and  soldiers  followed  the  example 
of  Klearclius  and^his  division,  the  wliole  army  marched  forward 
from  Tarsus,  and  reached  Issus,  the  cxtremf  city  of  Kdikia,  m  live 
(lavs' march— crossing  the  rivers  Sams  and  Pyranms.  At  Issus  a 
tlo'uri^hiu"-  and  comniereial  port  in  the  angle  (^f  the  Gulf  so  called 
Cvrus  was  i<.ine(l  bv  his  fleet  of  CO  triemes— :r>  Laceda-monian  and 
2o  Persim  triremes:  bringing  a  re-enforcement  of  TOOhoplites,  under 
the  conmiand  of  the  LacedfeVnonian  Cheirisophus,  said  to  have  been 
dispatched  by  the  Spartan  epliors.  He  also  received  a  further  re-en- 
forcement of  AOO  Grecian  soldiers;  making  the  total  of  Greeks  m  Ins 
army  14,0<)(),  from  which  are  to  be  deducted  the  100  soldiers  ot  31e- 
non's  division,  slain  in  Kilikia. 

The  arrival  of  this  last  body  of  400  men  was  a  fact  of  some  mipor- 
tance  Thev  had  hitherto  been  in  the  service  of  Abrokomas  (the  1  er- 
sian  crenerar  commanding  a  vast  force,  said  to  be  JJOO.OOO  men  tor 
the  king,  in  Phenicia  and  Syria),  from  whom  they  now  deserted  o 
Cvrus  Such  desertion  was  at  once  the  proof  of  their  reluctance  to 
fi.Viit  ao-ainst  the  L-reat  body  of  their  countrymen  marching  upward, 
and  of" the  general  discouragement  reigning  amid  the  kings  arim. 
So  crreat  indeed  was  that  discouragement,  that  Abrokomas  now  neii 
from  the  Syrian  coast  into  the  interior:  abandoning  three  defensible 
po-itions  in  succession— 1,  the  Gates  of  Kilikia  and  Syria:  2,  the  p:iss 
of  Beilan  over  Mount  Amanus:  3,  the  passage  of  the  Euphrates,  i  c 
appears  to  have  been  alarmed  by  the  easy  passage  of  Cyrus  tro 
Kappadokia  into  Kilikia.  and  still  more,  probably,  by  the  evident 
collusion  of  Svennesis  with  the  invader.  .t,.„iiv 

Cyrus  had  expected  to  find  the  Gates  ot  Kilikia  and  Syria  stoutly 


defended,  and  had  provided  for  this  emergency  by  bringing  up  his 
licet  to  Issus,  in  order  that  he  might  bo  able  to  transport  a  division 
ItV  sea  to  the  rear  of  the  dc;fenders.  The  pass  was  at  one  day's  marcli 
from  Issus.  It  was  a  narrow  road  for  the  length  of  near  half  a  mile, 
liotweeu  the  sea  on  one  side  and  the  steep  clitfs  terminating  Mount 
Amanus  on  the  other.  The  two  entrauw;es,  on  the  side  of  Kilikia  as 
well  as  on  that  of  Syria,  were  both  closed  by  walls  and  gates :  midway 
Ix'tvvecn  the  two  the  river  Kersus  broke  out  from  the  mountains  and 
flowed  into  the  sea.  No  army  could  force  this  pass  against  defend- 
ers; but  the  possession  of  the  fleet  doubtless  enabled  an  assailant  to 
turn  it.  Cyrus  was  overjoyed  to  find  it  undefended.  And  here  we 
cannot  but  notice  the  superior  ability  and  forethought  of  Cyrus,  as 
compared  with  the  other  Persians  opposed  to  him.  He  had  looked 
at  this  as  well  as  at  the  other  difliculties  of  his  march,  beforehand, 
and  had  provided  the  means  of  meeting  them ;  whereas,  on  the  King's 
side,  all  the  numerous  means  and  opportunities  of  defense  are  succes- 
sively abandoned:  the  Persians  have  no  confidence  except  in  vast 
numbers— or  vrhen  numbers  fail,  in  treachery. 

Five  parasangs,  or  one  day's  march  from  this  pass,  Cyrus  reached 
tk"  Phenician  maritime  town  of  Myriandrus;  a  place  of  great  com- 
merce, with  its  harbor  full  of  merchantmen.  While  he  rested  here 
seven  days,  his  two  generals  Xenias  and  Pasion  deserted  him;  pri- 
vately engaging  a  merchant-vessel  to  carry  them  away  with  their 
property.  They  could  not  lirook  the  wrong  which  Cyrus  had  done 
tliein  in  permitting  Klearchus  to  retain  under  his  command  those 
soldiers  who  had  deserted  them  at  Tarsus,  at  the  time  when  the  lat- 
ter played  off  his  deceitful  maneuver.  Perhaps  the  men  who  had 
tliiis  deserted  may  have  been  unwilling  to  return  to  their  original 
commanders,  after  having  taken  so  offensive  a  step.  And  this  may 
partly  account  for  the  policy  of  Cyrus  in  sanctioning  what  Xenias 
and  Pasion  could  not  but  feel  as  a  great  wrong,  in  which  a  large 
portion  of  the  army  sympathized.  Tlie  general  belief  among  the 
soldiers  was,  that  Cyrus  would  immediately  dispatch  some  triremes 
to  overtake  and  bring  back  the  fugitives.  But  instead  of  this,  he 
summoned  the  remaining  generals,  and  after  communicating  to  them 
lief:iet  that  Xenias  and  Pasion  Avere  gone,  added — "  I  have  plenty 
f*f  triremes  to  overtake  their  merchantman  if  I  chose,  and  to  bring 

lem  bark.  Ihit  I  will  do  no  such  thing.  No  one  shall  say  of  me, 
'lilt  I  make  use  of  a  man  while  he  is  with  me — and  afterward  seize, 
fi'l).  or  ill-use  him,  when  he  wishes  to  depart.  Nay,  1  have  their 
^vives  and  children  under  guard  as  hostages,  at  Tralles:  but  even 
tliese  shall  be  given  up  to  them,  in  consideration  of  their  good  be- 
liiivior  down  to  the  present  day.  Let  them  go,  if  they  choose,  with 
tlie  full  knowledge  that  they  behave  worse  toward  me  than  I  toward 
tliem."  This  behavior,  alike  judicious  and  conciliating,  was  univer- 
sally admired,  and  produced  the  best  possiijle  effect  upon  the  spirits 


500 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


ABROKOMxVS. 


501 


of  the  army;  iinpartiug  a  confidence  in  Cyrus  which  did  mucli  to 
oulNvcigli  the  prevailing  discouragement,  in  the  unknown  niunh 
upon  which  they  were  entering. 

At  Myrianch'us  Cyrus  finally  quitted  the  sea,  sending  back  his 
fleet,  and  striking  with  his  land  force  eastward  into  the  interior.  For 
this  purpose  it  was  necessary  first  to  cross  Mount  Amanns,  by  tlie 
pass  of  Beilan,  an  eminently  dillicult  road,  which  he  was  fortunate 
enough  to  find  open,  though  Abrokomas  might  easily  have  defendd 
it,  if  he  had  chosen.  Four  days'  march  brought  tlie  army  to  the 
Chains  (perhaps  the  river  of  Aleppo),  full  of  fish  held  sacred  by  the 
neighboring  inhabitants;  five  more  days,  to  the  sources  of  the  river 
Daradax,  with  the  palace  and  jKirk  of  the  Syrian  satrap  Belcsys, 
three  days  further,  to  Thapsakus  on  the  Euphiates.  This  was  a 
great  and  flourishing  town,  a  center  of  commerce  enriched  by  the 
important  ford  or  transit  of  the  river  Euphrates  close  to  it,  in  lati- 
tude about  55^  40'  N.  The  river,  when  the  Cyreians  arrived,  was 
four  stadia,  or  somewhat  less  than  half  an  English  mile,  in  breadth. 

Cyrus  remained  at  Thapsakus  five  days.  He  was  now  compelled 
formally  to  make  known  to  his  soldiers  the  real  object  of  the  march 
hitherto,  in  name  at  least,  disguised.  He  accordingly  sent  for  the 
Greek  generals,  and  desired  them  to  communicate  publicly  the  fact, 
that  he  was  on  the  advance  to  Babylon  against  his  brother— which  to 
themselves,  probably,  had  been  for  some  time  well  know  n.  Among 
the  soldiers,  however,  the  first  announcement  excited  loud  murmurs, 
accompanied  by  accusation  against  the  generals,  of  having  betrayed 
them,  in  privity  with  Cyrus.  But  this  outburst  was  very  dilToreiit  to 
the  strenuous.repugnance  which  they  had  before  manifested  at  Tardus- 
Evidently  they  susiiected,  and  had  almost  made  up  their  minds  to, 
the  real  truth;  so  that  their  complaint  was  soon  converted  into  a  de- 
mand for  a  donation  to  each  man,  as  soon  as  they  should  reach  15a- 
bylon;  as  much  as  that  which  Cyrus  had  given  to  his  Grecian  dctaeli- 
ment  ongoing  up  thither  before.  Cyrus  willingly  promised  them  live 
minae.per  head  (about  £19.  5.^.),  equal  to  more  than  a  year's  pay,  at  the 
rate  recently  stipulated  of  a  daric  and  a  half  per  month.  He  engaged 
to  give  them,  besides,  the  full  rate  of  pay  until  they  should  have  beeii 
sent  back  to  the  Ionian  const.  Such  ample  offers  satisfied  the  Greeks 
and  served  to  counterbalance  at  least,  if  not  to  efface,  the  terrors  of 
that  unknown  region  which  they  were  about  to  tread. 

But  before  the  general  body  o*f  Greek  soldiers  had  pronounced  tlicir 
formal  acquiescence,  Menon  with  his  separate  division  was  already  m 
the  water,  crossing.  For  3Ienon  liad  insti <^ated  his  men  to  decide  sepa- 
rately for  themselves,  and  to  execute  their  decision,  before  the  others 
had  given  any  answer.  "By  acting  thus  (said  lie)  you  will  confer 
special  obligation  on  Cyrus,  and  earn  corresponding  reward.  If  the 
others  follow  you  across,  he  will  suppose  that  they  do  so  because  you 
have  set  the  example.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  others  should  refuse. 
we  shall  all  be  obliged  to  retreat:  but  he  will  never  forget  that  you, 


.rnarately  taken,  have  done  all  that  you  could  for  Inm.      Such  breach 
ofSm  union,  ind  avidity  for  separate  gain,  at  a  tune  when  it  vitally 
concerned  all  the  Greek  soldiers  to  act  in  harmony  with  each  other, 
wa.  a  stni  s'Htable  to  thfi  selfish  and  treacherous  character  of  Menon 
Hei^iiiel  his  point,  however,  completely:  for  Cyr«s,  on  learnin- that 
"e  Greek  troops  had  actually  crossed,  dispatched  Glus  the  inter- 
eter  o  expres   to  them  his  warmest  thanks,  and  to  assiire  them  tha 
e  vo  lid  niver  forget  the  obligation;  while  at  the  same  time,  he  se.  t 
mSnd  lar<re  piesentsto  Menon  separately.     He  passed  with  his 
whole  army  immediately  afterward;  no  man  being  wet  above  the 

^  What  had  become  of  Abrokomas  and  his  army,  and  why  did  he  not 
de  end  this  passa-e,  where  Cyrus  might  so  easily  have  been  arrested? 
We  Lc  old  ihat^he  had  been  there  a  little  before,  and  that  he  had 
LughtU  sufticient  to  burn  all  the  vessels,  at  Thapsakus,  in  tire  be- 
liof  that  the  invaders  could  not  cross  the  river  on  foot.  And  Xeno- 
phon  fnf^^^^^^^^  the  Thapsakenes  atflrmed  the  Euphrates  to  have 

been  never  before  fordable-always  passed  by  means  of  boats;  inso- 
much  that  they  treated  the  actual  low  state  of  the  water  as  a  pro vj- 
dcutial  interposition  of  the  gods  in  favor  of  Cyrus  the  r  vcr 
made  way  for  him  to  come  and  take  the  scepter."  When  we  ^"d  that 
A  h  okomas  came  too  late  afterward  for  the  batt  e  of  f^"-^^^;:;^^^^^! 
be  led  to  suspect  that  he  too,  like  Syennesis  in  Kilikia,  was  playing  a 
double  game  between  the  two  royal  brothers  and  tha  he  was  content 
with  destroying  those  vessels  which  formed  the  ordinary  means  of 
co_ication  between  the  banks,  without  t^aking  any  me.xns  to  u^^ 
quire  whether  the  passage  was  practicable  without  them.  ^  The  asser- 
tion of  the  Thapsakenel,  in  so  far  as  it  was  not  a  ^^^'!^V'^^%fJ]'- 
tery  to  Cyrus,  could  hardly  have  had  any  other  f?^"^^^^,^'^.^^;:^^,  .^'^^ 
fact,  that  they  had  never  seen  the  river  crossed  on  foot  (whether  piac- 
ticable  or  not),  so  long  as  there  were  regular  ferry-boats 

After  crossing  the  Euphrates  Cyrus  proceeded  for  mne  d^yf  jnarch 
southward  along  its  left  bank,  until  lie  came  to  ^^s  affluent  the  river 
Araxes  or  Chaboras,  which  divided  Syria  from  ^^^^'^-^ Jj^,  ^J,^f 
numerous  and  well-supplied  villages  there  f  "^^^,^^' ^^«,^^PP  f V  "pu 
self  with  a  large  stock  of  provisions,  to  confront  the  desolate  march 
lirough  Arabhi  on  which  they  were  about  to  ent^er,  fo  -wu  g  t  e 
baaks^f  the  Euphrates  still  farther  smithward.  It  was  now  that  he 
entered  on  what  may  be  called  the  ^esert-an  endless  lea^^^^^^^  or 
succession  of  undulations  "like  the  se^  without  any  cul  vat  on 
even  any  tree-  nothinix  but  wormwood  and  various  aromatic  shiubs. 
llere'oo  the  astonished  Greeks  saw,  for  t^c  first  time  wild  asses  an- 
telopes, ostriches,  bustards,  some  of  which  afforded  ^P^rt,  and  occa- 
sionally food,  to  the  horsemen  who  amused  themselves  by  chasing 
them;  though  the  wild  ass  was  swifter  ban  any  horse,  and  the  os- 
trich altogether  unapproachable.  Five  days  march  b^^S^^  f  ^^^^1^ 
Korsote,  I  town  which  had  been  abandoned  by  Us  inhabitants-prob- 


502 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


ENTRY  INTO  BABY'LONIA. 


503 


nI.'I?,„'r.7T '■"■  ''^•'"'•'"'1.",'?  P'-ovision-dcalcrs  bol,i,„l,  ns  I,m,1  I,cf„r,.  ],,„ 
p  neilat  larsiis,  in  Kiiikhi;  since  the  army  li,»|  im-icisi,!  i      rl  "^ 
1.1...S  fort  ,e  <mwanl  nm.cl,.    All  tlmtll.evc.    1    o    a  n  ^t  m  ,  i  "'^ 
and  was  in,,.c.<l  insu/Hcienf.  for  the  Irying-journ'^  "vl'i  h  •     ,     1 
-lH..m     For  thuleeu  succ'ssive days,  an.rni^cycompu,;   ,',;.,"' 
iMl  they  nmrch  alon?  the  IHt  hank  of  the  Eupln-ates'  ^i-  it «  t  f ' 
ons,  and  evenwuhout  herhn-e  except  in  some  fe  v  pi  u^.,     T 
tlourwas  exlnuisted.  so  that  ihe  soldiers  liverfor  lomc  dav.  •  h n' 
jrothcr  upon  meat,  while  many  ba.-ea"c-animals  neri«     d  fo   i,; 
Jloreo^er  the  g,„„nd  was  oftJ.n  heSvy  am  difflc  If   fu  f  „f  1     r"'''i 
valleys,  requiring  the  personal  efforts  of  e^^■  y  «    n  to  ,,1     i    ' 'J 
and  wagons  at  particular  junctures-  efforts    in  wWifi'B     -" 
oourtiers  of  Cyrus,  under  hi^  exprcS  orde   %ook  z    iou  '  ^aHToll' 
t,^J"f """,";'•■""'  ""='"■  "'•"••"""'ted  attir;.     AfliT  t lese'^Uii'rt  1" 
.^d"  c  r'i't'ot'^of 'b  .^.vT'''^'*  ^^■'"'  r^'  "'<=  «="'-"ce  of  the  cul  • 

ludmi'llc^'^  "^  "''"'"""'  P'^^-'-f"'  ^PPHek^especi'd.y  :^':S^u,t'S 

ammr-^"fhe  rl""T"'',1 '"'"  I'"''"'""  Charmande  that  a  dispute  occurred 
among  the  Greeks  themselves,  menacing  to  the  safely  of  all      I     -np 
already  memioned  that  Klearchus,  Menon,  Proxe  us^  a   d    ich  o     he 
Greek  chiels  enjoyed  aseparate  comman,  over  Ids  own  d  vH  n  s  h 
1  e  .f^X  "  "'«f"l^^''!or  e.„.trol  of  Cyrus  hin.self     8,",  e  of  the    d 
hers  of  MtMmu  becoming  involved  in  a  quarrel  will,  thoTc^oflCea^d^^^ 

sold  ers  tfinve  mi  "hnVJ:"?  '"" ,--''".  P-iO-'-eed  one^l  M  .W^ 
soiuicrs  10  luve  misbehaved,  and  caused  li m  to  be  Hon-o-cd      The 

a  d,  Ze',?^  /'"  iT  "',"'  P""'^''"l  ^'^^'^"'^d  the  proeeedhig  t  such 

rive?  o  ids  ovn   'eLT'a  le'd'T,  "'""/  ''J'^y  f™'"  "'«  "aifks  of 

enc:n!prnt:^re"„*ou"-l!^'^^^^Vt«^^^^^ 

S'T-'-  "'Iff  ""  '""'^'"•'  "'  '"■"•  «''il«  otrer    Emoted  and  he^a 

danCr  t^drown  dWhion'"'^"^'^''';'-  f^''  T"""''^  "nl.urt Trorn  t^his 

arml'and  P  t°rm  dv  ""inrtut'onrer^'HeV''-'  'fl^T  '"  'f'^" 
the  liead  of  l.5«  TUrZi  \    '"  ^^"'e  orde  .     He  lumself  advanced  at 

attitude  a/ain^^  mZ  -  T •'•''''  '""u'^  ^'^  ^^'"'^^  liorsemen,  in  bostile 
Menon  him./lf^^  i  ^'T'''''  ^^'^o  on  tl)eir  side  ran  to  arms,  Avitli 

fense      A  sSht    ohZ  ^^'''''^  themselves  in  order  of  de- 

order  and  b  fol'hpH  h  i"''^''^'^^^  "^'^  ^''^"-'>t  on  irreparable  dis- 
^^  h  a  ?omn.^^^  T  ^T'^^^'i^-  coming  up  at  the  moment 

twe  t  tho Tu  ^^-  f-  ''^P'^^^^!'  PJ^^n^ed  Jiimself  in  military  array  be- 
f  om  fu  Uie  ^^s^K  'tI  T^"''  '^i^  ^"^''^''^*^^  Klearclu,^  to  desist 
recent  in     It  ;^dni^^^^  ""V^  ^'f  '^^"'^^-     ^"^^'^"♦'^nt  that  his 

h   he  des^^^^^^^  ^''T  ^'T-  ^^""^^^  ''^^"^^  ^«  t,-eated  so  bVht- 

ij ,  ne  desired  Proxenus  to  retire.     His  wrath  was  not  appeased,  until 


rvrus  himself,  apprised  of  the  gravity  of  the  danger,  came  galloping 
un'vit    his  personal  attendants  and  his  two  javelins  m  hand.        K  c- 
Kis  Proxenus,  and  nil  you  Greeks  (said  he),  you  know  not  wlmt 
on  ire  loinix.     Be  assu.inl  that  if  you  now  come  to  blows,  i   will  be 
he  horn  o   my  destrueiiou-and  of  your  own  also,  shortly  after  me. 
VovTio^'  fo?ce  be  ruino.1,  all  these  natives  whom  you  see  around 
l  1    e^on  e  more  hostile  to  us  even  than  the  men  now  serving  with 
1  r"    On  hearing  this  (says  Xenophon),  Klearchus  came  to  his 
.^  Tnri  tho  trooDS  dispersed  without  any  encounter.  , 

''\  ter  mS^^  territory  called' Babylonia  began      Tne 

l.ilt  tl  nk    -  tire  E  iphnUe.,  over  which  the  army  had  hitherto  been 
in;'   soon  ceased   and   low  alluvial  plains  commenced.     1  races 
wSfow  discovered,  the  lirst  throughout  their  long  march,  of  an 
tile  force  moving  in  their  front,  ravaging  the  country  and  burning 
t^h^^^^.     It  was  here  that  Cyrus  detected  the   reason  o    a  Pe- 
iiu  n oblc^^^^^^^     named  Orontes,  whom  he  extimined  in  his  tent,  in  the 
^l^^^nous  Persians   possessing  his  intimate  conndence,  as 
i;X.ll  of  Klearchus  with  a  guafd  of  3,000  hophtes.     Orontes  was 
ovimined    found  guilty,  and  privately  put  to  death.  ,    ,      , 

Ser    three    days'   march,    estimated    by   Xenophon    at    twelve 
ivirwimrrc vrus  was  induced    by  the  evidences  before  hnn,  or  by 
^•;  olt;  of  deserters,  to  believe  that  tlu.  oppo^ng  army  w.i.  clj^e 
U  1  :u  d   and   that  a   battle   was  impending.      Accordingly,  m    the 
id  lie  of  the  night,  he  mustered  his  whole  army,  Greeks  as  wel    as 
b    bariais;  butlhe  enemy    did  not  appear   as  l^^d  been  expec  a^^^^ 
iTmimbers  were  counted  at  this  spot,  and  it  was  lound  that  tl  e.o 
■,(f  Greeks  10, 100  hoplites.  and  2,500  peltasts;  of  he  barbarian 
iVsilic  force  o     C^riis,  100,000  men  wilh  20  S(.'yll}ed   chariots. 
Thjt nlbelrof  the  Greeks  had,  been  somewhat  I^J-Hiifj^-^^^C^Ilf 
the  luirch   from  sickness,  desertion,  or  other  causes.      Ihe  lei  oitsol 
t  nil.  di^ribed  the  army  of  Art^xxerxes  at  l-^^^'^^O  men,  beside^ 
the  GOOO  horse-<rmirds  commanded  by  Artagerses,  and  200  scxthcd 
t.':;',  under  The  command  of  Abrokomas,  Tissaphernes,  am     wo 
others.      It  was  ascertained  afterward,  however,  that  the  ^^^^f   ^^ 
Abn)komas  had  not  yet  joined,  and  later  accounts  represented  the 
munerical  estimation  as  too  great  by  one-fourth.  „^r.nr'^U 

In  expectation  of  an  action,  Cvms  here  convened  the  generms 
aloM-  with  the  lochages  (or  captains)  of  the  Greeks;  as  ^^^l\to  con- 
sult about  suitable  arrangements,  as  to  s^^»^^^l'\^^./.^^^'>^;,^^;fl,  ,  " 
cause.  Few  points  in  this  narrative  are  more  striking  than  the  Un^ 
giKigc  addressed  by  the  Persian  prince  to  the  Greeks,  on  this  as  well 

as  on  other  occasions.  i-  tt  ii  ^  <i.nt  T  i^nvo 

"It  is  not  from  want  of  native  forces,  men  of  Helhis  that  I  ha\e 
brought  you  hither,  but  because  I  account  you  better  and  braver  than 
auy  number  of  natives.  Prove  yourselves  now  worthy  of  the  lie  - 
d.,m  which  vou  enjoy;  that  freedom  for  which  I  envy  }o  ;  and 
^vUich  I  would  choose,  be  assured,  in  preference  to  all  m}  poises- 


504 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


PRESE^"T  OF  CYRUS  TO  SILANUS. 


605 


sions  a  thousand  times  multiplied.  Learn  now  frohi  me,  wiio  know 
it  well,  all  that  y<ju  will  have  to  encounter — vast  numbers  and  plciuv 
of  noise;  but  if  you  despise  these,  1  am  ashamed  to  tell  you  Avha 
worthless  stuff  you  will  lind  in  our  native  men.  Behave  well— like 
brave  meu,  and  trust  me  for  sending  you  back  in  such  condition  ;;<; 
to  make  your  friends  at  home  envy  you:  though  I  hope  to  prevail ou 
man}^  of  you  to  prefer  my  service  to  your  own  homes." 

"Some  of  us  are  remarking,  Cyrus  (said  a  Snmian  exile  named 
Gaulites),  that  you  are  full  of  promises  at  this  hour  of  danL^-r,  liut 
will  forget  them,  or  perhaps  will  be  unable  to  perform  them.  \\\m\ 

danger  is  over As   to  ability  (replied  Cyrus),  my  father's 

empire  reaches  northward  to  the  region  of  intolerable  cold,  south- 
ward to  that  of  intolerable  heat.  AH  in  the  middle  is  now  appor- 
tioned in  satrapies  among  my  brother's  friends;  all,  if  we  are 
victorious,  will  come  to  be  distributed  among  mine.  I  have  no  fear 
of  not  having  enough  to  give  away,  but  rather  of  not  liavini; 
friends  enough  to  receive  it  from  me.  To  each  of  you  Greeks, 
moreover,  I  shall  present  a  wreath  of  gold." 

Declarations  like  these,  repeated  by  Cyrus  to  many  of  the  Greek 
soldiers,  and  circulated  amonir  the  remainder,  filled  all  of  them  with 
confidence  and  enthusiasm  in  his  cause.  Such  uas  tlie  sense  of  force 
and  superiority  inspired,  that  Klearchus  asked  him — "  Do  you  really 
think,  Cyrus,  that  your  brother  will  fight  you?"  "Yes*  by  Zeus 
(was  tlieVeply):  assuredly,  if  he  be  the  son  of  Darius  and  Parysatis, 
and  my  brother,  I  shall  not  win  this  prize  without  a  battle."  All  the 
Greeks  were  earnest  with  him  at  the  same  time  not  to  expose  his  own 
l)erson,  but  to  take  post  in  the  rear  of  their  body,  We  shall  pres 
ently  see  how  this  advice  v.'as  followed. 

The  declarations  here  reported,  as  well  as  the  expressions  employed 
before  during  the  dispute  between  Klearchus  and  the  soldiers  of 
Menon  near  Charmancle — being,  as  they  are,  genuine  and  authentic, 
and  not  dramatic  composition  such  as  tliose  of  ^Eschylus  in  the 
Persaj,  nor  hi.-toric  amplification  like  the  speeches  ascribed  to 
Xerxes  in  Herodotus — are  among  the  most  valuable  evidences  res- 
pecting the  Hellenic  character  generally.  It  is  not  merely  the 
superior  courage  and  nulitary  discipline  of  the  Greeks  which  Cyrus 
attests,  compared  with  the  cowardice  of  Asiatics — but  also  their 
fidelity  and  sense  of  obligation,  which  he  contrasts  with  the  time- 
serving treachery  of  the  latter;  connecting  these  superior  qualities 
with  the  political  freedom  which  they  enjoy.  To  hear  this  young 
prince  expressing  such  strong  admiration  and  envy  for  Grecian 
freedom,  and  such  ardent  personal  preference  for  it  above  all  the 
splendor  of  his  own  position — was  doubtless  the  most  flattering  of 
all  compliments  Mhich  he  could  pay  to  the  listening  citizen-soldiers. 
That  a  young  Persian  prince  should  be  capable  of  conceiving  such 
a  sentiment,  is  no  slight  proof  of  his  mental  elevation  above  th* 
level   both  of  Lis  fanr.ly  and  of  Lis  nation.     The  natural  Persiuu 


•  •  n   k  Pxores^ed   by   the    conversation    between    Xerxes    and 
opuuon  IS  ^^P7r..i.tM«      To    Xerxes    the    couceptum    of   iree- 

^^'"^^  "nd  oF  SV  ^-s^ct^g  courage,  planted  by  a  pub-      . 
P,ti7AUislHp-an(l  oroi   ei^v   ^  ^^^_^^._^^  ^^^^  ^^^^^^j     j.^.j^^^g. 

]icdiscMplulepatrl()Uca.s^vcllascq^^^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^^  ^^^^^. 

me:ius  ot  tut  wnip.  lii^  ^^^  t,^  onior  into  the  feel  ng  of  personal 
,„,„,(1  by  pe.-s,mal  ob^''",^,  ^'J  .  r„uul  h^  •  based  ns  U  ^vai  on  the 
'''^''rMlw'S  r; h^^  ven.;S'  .e  "ivL  and  that  thoro  was  no  man 
i.,iiinctiontli.Utlt\  ■•'"7".'^"  ,,,j.|„_tliat  the  law  was  their 

"'r  ''?;V,"r'^n'f ;  'a'\n  .mZ?ng .  I  edience  to  it  they  were  workius 
cinly  mastei,  anil  iii.u  "in  »>'i  '  =  (htii«  knew  where  to  touch  the 
f„,- no  ou<;  else  but  for  lbom<elves      Cy  u  s  kn  .u  %u^^^ 

sentiment  of  Ilellenu.  honor  so   ;  ''''Ij '']^'';^"^^' ji;^',"doiiiaiis.  and 

cvuent.  Jbe  (l.i\  ^  m.   tl    c UUM  i  .   Aiiilirakiolic  pro- 

£■' il^^u:  ai^d  ;  S.:n ',^1  him  wm  Marios    or  ten  At.ic 

„,  ^i  .Hn.rii  id  assured  him,  ou  the  eleventli  day  precedinfr. 
';^  i^ere  Sb  oacUoi^  in  ten' .lays  from  that  time:  "i;"" -''l^  ' 
t  lat  ^''^^^  7*^  "'7 .  ..  T.  ,r  nronluicy  comes  true,  I  wdl  give  you 
&S"    J?   bTotllVZl  'not'  figl^t  at  all.  if  he  does  not  fight 

''t'snite  of 'the' strong  opinion  which  he  had  expressed  in  reply  to 
Kl  "  re  us  C V  us  now  re^llly  began  to  conceive  that  no  battle  would 
I !     zirdJd  by  his  enemie^;  especially  as  in  the  -"-«  "^  ^'-{^^j* 
ilivs  nvirdi   he  came  to  a  broad  and  deep  trench  (M  teet  bioatl  ana 
sreet  deep)  appoachiiig  so  near  to  the  Euphrates  as  to  leave  an 
hi    V  d  of  oil  V  20  feet  fSr  passage.     This  trench  ha<l  been  dug  by 
;  5  r  of  Arl"  xerx..sacross  tleplain.  for  a  length  said  to  be  of  twelve 
;,angsal,out  forty-two  Knglish  miles,  if  the  P«.™-^^"Sb'' «f:""«^ 
;.  il.ir,  "stadia),  so  as  to  touch  at  its  other  exlrem.^-  what  v.asc^lU,d 
li„.  Wall  of  Media.     It  ha,i  been  dug  as  a  special  m^ff lie  of  defense 
a^uinstthe  appn.aeliing  invaders.     Yet  we  l'«"'-.^^"' „';"''"f''^"^ 
the  invaders  themselves  found  with  eqnal  ^''''''-'^.''t  not  a  man 
^vasou  tlie  spot  to  defend  it:  so  that  .tlie  whole  f.y'^l''^"  ,f,\7>  ^^^^ 
lii".-ice  nassed  without  resistance  through  the  narrow  breadth  ot  M 

fe-Tlfis  "the  first  notice  of  a^y^d'^^TIlXmiln  burning 
rend  the  invasion— except  the  precaution  of  Abiokomas  m  burning 
K Cts  a"  Thapsakus.  \;yrus  had  been  allowed  to  traverse  all  this 


506 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


BATTLE  OF  KUNAXA. 


507 


immense  space,  and  to  pass  tlirougli  so  mimy  defensible  positions, 
without  having  yet  struck  a  blow.  And  now  Art axerxcs,  after 
having  cut  a  prodigious  extent  of  trench  at  the  cost  of  so  much  lal)or 
— provided  a  vahiable  means  of  resistance,  especially  against  Grecian 
heavy-armed  soldiers — and  occupied  it  sieniingly  imtil  the  vcrv  last 
moment — throws  it  up  from  some  unaccountable  panic,  and  sutfcrs 
a  wliole  army  to  pass  unopposed  tlirougli  this  very  narrow  gut. 
Having  surmounted  unexpectedly  so  formidable  an  o];staclo,  Cyrus 
as  well  as  the  Greeks  imagined  that  Artaxerxes  would  never  think  of 
lighting  in  the  ojien  plain.  All  l)egan  to  relax  in  that  careful  array 
which  had  been  observed  since  the  midnight  review,  insomuch  that 
Cyrus  iiimself  proceeded  in  his  chariot  instead  of  on  horseback,  while 
many  of  the  Greek  i^oldiers  lodged  their  arms  on  the  wagons  or  beasts 
of  burden. 

On  the  next  day  but  one  after  passing  the  undefended  trench,  they 
wxre  surprised,  at  a  spot  called  Kunaxa,  just  Avhen  they  were  about 
to  halt  for  the  midday  meal  and  repose,  h^-  the  sudden  intimation  that 
the  King's  army  was  approaching  in  order  of  battle  on  the  opcu 
plain.  Instantly  Cyrus  hastened  to  mount  on  horseback,  to  arm 
himself,  and  to  put  his  forces  in  order,  while  the  Greeks,  on  their 
side,  halted  and  formed  their  line  with  all  possible  speed.  They  were 
on  the  right  witigof  the  army,  adjoining  the  river  Euj^hrates;  Arianis, 
with  the  Asiatic  forces  being  on  the  left,  and  Cyrus  himself,  sur- 
rounded by  a  body  guard  of  600  well  armed  Persian  horsemen,  in  the 
center.  Among  the  Greeks,  Klearchus  commanded  the  right  divi- 
sion of  hoplites,  witli  the  Paplilagonian  horsemen  and  the  Grecian 
peltasts  on  the  extreme  right,  close  to  the  river;  Proxenus  with  his 
division  stood  next;  ]Menon  commanded  on  the  left.  All  the  Persian 
horsemen  around  Cyrus  had  breastplates,  lielmets,  short  Grecian 
swords,  and  two  javelins  in  their  right  hands:  the  horses  also  were 
defended  by  facings  both  over  the  breast  and  head.  Cyrus  himself, 
armed  generally  like  the  rest,  stood  distinguished  by  having  an 
upright  tiara  instead  of  the  helmet.  Though  the  first  news  had  come 
uiK>n  them  by  surprise,  the  Cyreians  had  ample  time  to  put  them- 
selves in  Cinnplete  order;  for  the  enemy  did  not  appear  until  the 
afternoon  was  advanced.  First,  was  seen  dust,  like  a  white  cloud- 
next,  an  undefined  dark  spot,  gradually  nearing  until  the  armor 
iK'gan  to  shine,  and  the  component  divisions  of  troops,  arranged  iu 
dense  masses,  became  discernible.  Tissaphernes  was  on  the  left, 
opposite  to  the  Greeks,  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  horsemen,  with 
white  cuirasses:  on  bis  right  stood  the  Persian  bowmen,  with  their 
gerrha,  or  wicker  shields,  spiked  so  as  to  be  fastened  in  the  ground 
while  arrows  were  shot  from  behind  them:  next,  the  Egyptian  infan- 
try with  long  wooden  shields  covering  the  whole  body'and  legs.  In 
front  of  all,  was  a  row  of  chariots  with  scythes  attached  to  the 
wheels,  destined  to  begin  the  charge  against  the  Grecian  phalanx. 
As  the  Greeks  were  completing  liieir  array,  Cyrus  rode  to  the 


front  and  desired  Klearchus  to  make  his  attack  with  the  Greeks  upon 

he  center  of  the  enemy;  since  it  was  there  that  the  King  in  person 

^■m\Tbo  posted,  and  if  that  were  once  beaten,  the  victory  was 

el     But  such  was  the  superiority  of  Artaxerxes  in  number  that 

t    center  extended  beyond  the  left  of  Cyrus.     Accordingly  Klear- 

u'  afraid  of  withdrawing  his  right  from  tlie  river,  lest  he  should 

taken  both  in  tia.dv  and  rear,  chose  to  keep  his  position  on  the 

H     ancl  merely  replied  to  Cyrus  that  he  would  manage  everything 

t  a    h^  'K'st.     I  have  before  remarked  how. often  the  tear  of  being 

Hcked  on  the  unshielded  side  and  on  the  rear,  led  the  Greek  soldier 

iu  movements  inconsistent  with  military  expediency ;  and  itwiU  be 

n  presently,  that  Klearchus,  blindly  obeying  this  habitual  rule  of 
reeuution,  was  induced  here  to  commit  the  capital  mistake  of  keep- 

.•  on  the  right  Hank,  contrary  to  the  more  judicious  direction  o 
•vrus  The  latter  continued  for  a  short  time  ridmg  slowly  in  fiont 
of  the'lines,  looking  alternately  at  the  two  armies,  when  Xenophon- 
one  of  the  small  total  of  Grecian  horsemen,  and  attached  to  the  divi- 
"oii  of  Proxenus-rode  forth  from  the  line  to  accost  him,  asking  if 
k  h=u  any  orders  to  give.  Cyrus  desired  him  to  proclaim  to  every 
me  that  the  sacrifices  were  favorable.  Hearing  a  murmur  going 
throu-h  the  Grecitui  ranks,  he  inquired  from  Xenophon  what  it  was; 
and  received  for  answer,  that  the  watchword  was  now  being  passed 
al  u Jv  for  the  second  time.  He  asked,  with  some  surprise  who  gave 
rwat'hwc)rdv  and  what  it  was?  Xc.iophon  rep  bed  hat  it  was 
"Zeus  the  Preserver,  and  Victory."  "I  accept  it,"  replied  Cyrus 
"let  that  be  the  word:"  and  immedititely  rode  away  to  his  own  post 
iu  the  center  among  the  Asiatics.  ,     .  ,       , 

The  vast  host  of  Artaxerxes.  advancing  steadily  and  without  noise, 
^vre  now  within  less  than  half  a  mile  of  the  Cyreians,  ^vlieu  the 
Greek  troops  raised  the  paean,  or  usual  war-cry,  and  began  to  move 
forward.     As  they  advanced,  the  shout  became  more  vehement,  the 
pace  accelerated,  and  at  last  the  whole  body  got  into  a  ^u^.     This 
miirht  have  proved  unfortunate,  had  then  opponents  ^!f^,«j^^^Xe" 
ciaiihoplitei;  but  the  Persians  did  not  stand  to  await  the  charge 
Thev  turned  and  fled,  when  the  assaihuits  were  yet  l^^rd^y  witln 
bow-shot.     Sueh  was  their  panic,  tlmt  even  the  drivers  of  j  le  scyt  e^ 
chariots  in  front,  deserting  their  teams,  ran  away  '^^^"S^y/^V  nftnn«' 
while  the  horses,  left  to  themselves,  rushed  apart   in  all  d";  ctiou^' 
some  turnino;  round  to  follow  the  fugit^ives,  others  coming  against  the 
advancing  Greeks,  who  made  open  order  to  let  them  pass,      lie    cu 
division  of  the  King's  army  was  thus  routed  without  a  ^^l^w    a  ml 
secmin-lv  without  a  man  killed  on  either  side;  o:ie  Greek  onl>  beiu- 
wounded  bv  an  arrow,  and  another  by  not  getting  out  of  the  way  ot 
one  of  the^hariots.     Tissaphernes  alone-who,  ^^ith  the  body  ot 
horse  immediately  around  him,  was  at  the  extreme  Persian  lett  close 
to  the  river— formed   an  exception  to   this  universal    flight.     Ue 
ciiap-ed  and  penetrated  through  the  Grecian  peltasts  who  stood  oppo- 


508 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


CYRUS  IS  SLAIN. 


509 


site  to  him  between  the  hoplites  and  the  river.  These  peltasts,  com- 
manded by  Epistlienes  of  Amphipolis,  opened  tlK*ir  ranks  to  let  liim 
pass,  darting  at  the  meti  as  they  rode  by,  yet  without  losing  any  one 
themselves.  Tissaphernes  thus- got  into  the  rear  of  the  Greeks,  who 
continued  on  their  side  to  pursue  the  flying  Persians  before  them. 

Matters  proceeded  ditferently  in  the  other  parts  of  the  field.  Arta- 
xerxes,  though  in  the  center  of  his  own  amiy,  yet  from  his  superior 
numbers  outtlanked  AriauLs,  who  commanded  the  extreme  left  of  the 
Cyreians,  Finding  no.  one  directly  oi)posed  to  him,  he  began  to 
wheel  round  his  right  wing,  to  encompass  his  enemies;  not  noticing 
the  tlight  of  his  left  division.  Cyrus,  on  the  other  hand,  when  he 
saw  tlie  easy  victory  of  the  Greeks  on  their  side,  was  overjoyed;  ami 
received  from  everyone  around  him  salutations,  as  if  he wei'e already 
king.  NeVertheles.s,  he  had  self-ccmimand  enough  not  yet  to  lusli 
forward  as  if  the  victory  was  already  gained,  but  renuunetl  unmoved, 
with  his  regiment  of  six  hundred  horse  round  him,  watching  the 
movements  of  Artaxerxes.  As  soon  as  he  saw  the  latter  wheeling 
round  his  right  division  to  get  upon  the  rear  of  the  Cyreians,  he  has- 
tened to  check  this  movement  by  an  impetuous  charge  upon  the  ecn- 
ter,  where  Artaxerxes  was  in  person,  surrounded  by  the  1  (dy  iiiir.rd 
of  6,000  horse  under  Artagerses.  So  vigorous  was  the  ntijuk  of 
Cyrus,  that  with  his  600  horse,  lie  broke  and  di.<^^ersed  this  l(dy 
guard,  killing  Artagerses  with  his  own  hand.  His  own  000  \h'\<q 
rushed  forward  in  pursuit  of  the  fugitives,  leaving  Cyrus  hin;>elf 
nearh^Uone,  with  only  the  select  few  called  his  "Table  C"(*m]):ini('ns" 
around  him.  It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  he  first  snw  his 
brother  Artaxerxes,  whose  person  had  been  exposed  to  view  by  the 
flight  of  the  body  guards.  The  sight  filled  him  witli  s\.ch  a  paroxysm 
of  raije  and  iealous  ambition,  that  he  lost  all  thouaht  of  saletv  or 
pnidcnce — cried  out,  "  I  see  the  man  " — and  rushed  forward  with  his 
mere  handful  of  comjianions  to  attack  Artaxerxes.  in  spite  of  the 
numerous  host  behind  Idni,  Cyrus  made  directly  at  his  brother, 
darting  his  javelin  with  so  true  an  aim  as  to  strike  him  in  the  breast, 
f and  wound  him  through  the  cuirass;  though  the  wound  (afterward 
jicured  by  the  Greek  surgeon  Ktesitis)  could  not  have  bt  en  very  severe, 
since  Artaxerxes  did  not  quit  the  field,  but,  on  the  cor.trary,  engaged 
in  personal  combat,  he  and  those  around  him,  agairst  the  haniilul  of 
assailants.  So  uneMpial  a  combat  did  nof'last  long.  Cyrus,  being 
severely  wounded  under  the  eye  by  the  javelin  of  a  Karian  soldier, 
was  cr.st  from  his  horse  and  slain.  The  small  number  of  faithful 
companions  around  him  all  perished  in  his  defen>e:  Artasyras,  ^vho 
stood  first  among  them  in  his  confidence  and  attachment,  seeing  him 
mortally  wounded  and  fallen,  cast  himself  down  \]\Hm  liim.  clasped 
him  in  liis  arms,  and  in  this  position  either  slew  himself,  or  was  slain 
by  order  of  the  King. 

The  head  and  the  right  hand  of  the  deceased  prince  were  immedi- 
ately cut  oil  by  orderof  Artaxerxes,  and  doubtless  exhibited  cou- 


,  .  -.^  Tinct  waq  a  Droclamatioii  to  every  one  that  the 
.nicuously  to  view.  ^'"^T.^^  ^^,^,'^  ^  ^^s  understood  by  Amicus, 
i^tire  contest  was  at  an  e^^^^^^  ^^^^^,^^  ,^^^  ^M 

vlmlo-etherwitl  aU  the  Asiatic  tioo^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^^_ 

:,Id  fled  back  to  the^unp  ^^^ot  cv  -  the^^^  ^  y      ^^^^  ^^^ 

selves,  when  the  ^^^^fj''";.^^^^^^  previous  nidit.  The  troops  _ot 
,l,,r  back  to  the  rest  g  place  ^^ J  P;  ^^^  ^^  j^,,,,!,,,  it  without  resis- 
Artaxerxes  got  nUo  ^^^f^^^f/^V ^.^f  f,.  f  u.to  their  power.  It  included 
tance.  Even  the  harem  «J  ^^^m^  U^  ^^"^.^^^^  ^J-.^y^  ,,^a  education- 
■  tw()  Grecian  women-of  free  cmiu  i^^ouo-ht  to  him  by  force 

ne  from  Phokea,    l^.ldT      The  "  two,  the  Phokean, 

from  their  parents  to  ^^\^^\^-^,,^;'LV beauty  and  accomplished  intel- 
namedMilto,  ^^^f  ^^g^!^^^^^'^ .  ^-  ti    ^^^^^^^^  barem  of  Arta- 

Ugence,  was  rm.de  V^^^^J^^J^^^'means  to  save  herself, 
xerxes;  the  other,  a  J^^^^^,^  /;    .     '  j  sought  shelter  among  some 
though  without  her  JJI^f  [,  ^"'    ^  f^n  gu^^^^  of  the  Grecian  baggage. 
Greeks  who  were  le     m  ^^  ^^,^'V,''^4'^^'issailants  with    considerable    • 
These  Greeks  repelled     he    ^^^ '  ^  f^^    ']f ' ;    ^..^.^  ^s  the  persons  of 

'^^"V  ITX  n VoriheUe  ^  bS  thelsi:^^  camp  Sf  the  Cy- 
all  who  fied  to  them  *«^.,^''^'  f  ;^^/^,,,...,-,tina^  those  reserved  wagcms 
reianswascompetely  pdlaged  no   exc^^l^^^  ^^.^  ^^^^^^ 

of  provisions  wiichCyi^s   -  ^P^^^-^^^^  of  a  supply, 

auxiliaries  might  be  ^^^^'^^^^ //"*\'.:- .^-.^.r  the  Cyreian  camp,  he  was 
While  Artaxerxes  was  ^  ^  s  .ti  ppm     ^^/^j  ^rse.  who  had  charged 
joined  by  Tissaphernes  and  ^^^^^V^^^^^^^^'    ^J  ,  ,.er.     At  this  lime 

ihrough  between  the  ^^'^^^'i^^  _.  V,,n  tldrty  sta'ua  or  3^  miles,  betweea 
Iherewasaclistanceo    no  es.stlmnthu^^^^^^  ^^^^  ,^^^^^ 

him  and  Klearchus  with  the  Gici^um  ^^^  f ,,.itives.     Apprised, 

advanced  fjl^-^^-  ^ -\^P;^^-^|  .?,*  t  oopf  1  arbee^  victorious'  L  the 
after  some  time,  that  tl  t  ^^^^- ^^'?    ^^.  camp-but  not  yet  knowing 

f  r\rorcvrus-K^  ^^'^^^^'  ^yi  '^t 

the  enemy's  forces  lUso  f'*'"™' l^-     "«  ;i';:f  JJ^^'^^k  post  with  Lis 
surrounded  by  superior  """'l"''^;,""''    Ar 'ixorxos  a.  Jn  marshaled 
rear  upon  the  river.     I"  t"'^,i;",  '     ,'^:  ^ut  n^  Gre'ks,  antidpatin>j 
liis  troops  in  front,  as  if    o  attack  h  m .  '    '    ''f,,^n,„,,v;s,  and  forced 
liis  movemenl,  were  first  ,n  making  ''  «/"'  .".^'^''AXl^en  I  lan  iK'fore. 
,l,e  Persians  to  take  fliaht  <^;^;';"  '  "  fj/,*^' ^^^  !^'  „-l"le  i>.  hopes  of 
Klcurchus.  thus  reheved  from  all  «"  "'f;';  '  ,^'",  g'^,,,,ip,  „i,i,.l.  «as 
hc.t>rins  news  of  Cyrus.     He  «'''■'  'fJ'^^'l^'rX.  '^on.pellod  to 
f«„nd°tripped  of  all  ft"™''-  ^"  '^  '   ^'^^^  V^m  also  hacl  had  no 
pass  the  night  without  supin-r.  «hile  "  "f  J J^^,'''      ,  ..ymnienced.     U 
ilinnor,  from  the  early  hour  .-.  "V,"  ,        'v    ear  i    through   Prokles 

and  dismay. 


510 


CYRUS  AND  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


DISMAY   OF  THE  GREEKS. 


511 


^  Thus  terminated  tlie  battle  of  Kiinaxn,  and  along  with  it  the  in 
tions  hopes  as  well  as  the  life  of  this  3onn.ir  piinee.     His  ehar  't,ril 
and  proeeediiiirs  sug.irpst  instnielive  leninrks.     Both  in  the  com]    ' 
of  this  expedition,  and  in  the  two  or  tliree  rears  of  adminiqration 
Asia  3Iiuor  which  preceded  it,  he  displayed  qualities  such  as  are ' 
seen   m  Cyrus  called  the  Great,   nor  in   any  other  inem])er  of  i 
Persian   regal    faniily,    nor   indeed   in    any  \;ther    Persian    ^em 
throughout  the  history  of  the  monarchy.    *We  obserye  a  lar^e  -v 
long-sighted  combination— a   power   of   foresediiir  dilh'culties    'um 
providing  means  beforehand  for  oyercominir  tlu^n— a  dexterity  in  i 
meeting  variable  exigences,  and  dealinir  with  dilTcrent  parties  Groeh 
or  Asiatics,  officers  or  soldiers— a  conviction  of  the  necessity    not 
nieivly.  of  purcliasing  men's  service  by  lavish  presents,  but  of  accniir- 
m^  their  contidence  by  staightforward  dialing  and  systematic  4od 
fait  1— a  power  of  repressing  displeasure  wheir policy  commanded  as 
at  the  desertion  of  Xenias  and  Pasion  and  tiie  first  conspiracies' of 
Orontes;  although  usually  the  punishments  which  he  inflicted  were 
lull  ot  Oriental  barbarity.     How  rare  were  the  merits  and  accon]i)li<li- 
ments  of  C}tus,  as  a  Persian,  \yill  be  best  felt  when  we  contrast  this 
portrait  by  Xenophon,  with  the  description  of  the  Persian  satiapshy 
Isokrates.     1  hat  many  persons  deserted  from  Artaxerxes  to  Cynic- 
none  except  Orontes.  from  Cyrus  to  Artaxerxes-has  been  remarked 
by  Xenophon.     Isot  merely  throughout  the  march,  but  even  as  to 
the  manner  of  fighting  at    Kunaxa,   the   judameut  of  Cyrus  was 
sounder  than  that  of  Klearchus.     The  two  matters  of  supreme  im 
])ortance  to  the  Greeks,  were,  to  take  care  of  the  person  of  CyriF 
and  to  strike  straight  at  that  of  Artaxerxes  with  the  central  diyi^ioii 
around  hmi.     Now  it  was  the  fault  of  Klearchus,  and  not  of  Cynk> 
that  both  these  matters  were  omitied;  and  that  the  Greeks  oajiiui 
only  a  victory  comparatiyely  insignif.cant  on  the  riirht.     Yet  in  sjiile 
of  such  mistake,  not  his  own,  it  ai)pears  that  Cvrus^'would  have  been 
victorious,  had  he  been  able  to  repress  that  passionate  burst  of  anti- 
pathy which  drove  him  like  a  madman  against  his  brother.     The 
same  insatiable  ambition,   and  jealous  fierceness  when   j)ower  wiis 
concerned,  which  had  before  led  him  to  put  to  death  two  first  c<  umhs. 
because  they  f  mitted  in  his  presence  an  act  of  deference  nev(  r  j^.iid 
excej)t  to  the  King  in  person— this  same  impulse,  exasperated  bv  ihe 
actual  sigiit  of  his  rival  brother,  and  by  that  standinc;  force  of  fr.iter- 
nal   antipathy  so  frequent  in  regal  families,    blinded  him  fcr  ihe 
moment  to  all  rational  calculation. 

We  may  however  remark  that  Hellas,  as  a  whole,  had  no  cauR'  to 
reiiret  the  fall  of  Cyrus  at  Kunaxa.  Had  he  dethroned  liis  brollur 
and  become  king,  the  Persian  empire  would  have  acquired  uiuld-  his 
hand  such  a  degree  of  streiii^th  as  miirht  probably  have  enabled  liini 
to  forestall  the  work  afterward  performed  by  the  Macedonian  kin-s, 
and  to  make  the  Greeks  in  Europe  as  well  as  those  in  Asia  ins 
dependents.     He  would  have  employed  Grecian  military  organi:zation 


.croinst  Grecian  independence,  as  Philip  and  Alexander  did  after  him. 

1     o.uTAVouldhave  enabled  him  to  hire  an  overwhelming  force 

f  Gr  rian   officers  and  soldiers,  who  would  (to  use  the  expressum  of 

Proxc^^^^^^^^^   recorded  by  Xenophon)  have  thought  him  a  better  friend 

o  he     than  their  own  country.     It  would  have  enabled  him  also  to 

J^;av«  of  dissension  and  venality  in  the  interior  of  each 

tcir  city  Sndthus  to  weaken  their  means  of  defense  while  he 

mn    lie^^^^^^  liis  own  means  of  attack.     This  was  a  policy  which 

;-;^    the  Persian  kings,  from  Darius  son  of  Hvstaspes  dovvn  to 

us  Codomannus,  had  ability  or  perseverance  enough  to  follow 

one  of  them  knew  either  the  true  value  of  Grecian  ms  ru- 

.  its  or  how  to  employ  them  with  effect.     The  whole  conduct  of 

-v    ''  iQ  reference  to  this  memorable  expedition  manifests  a  superior 

hi     i-'^ence,  competent  to  use  the  resourceswhich  victory  would  ha  e 

i  1  his  hands-and   ambition   likely  to   use  tli('m   again  e 

Gieeks  in  avenging  the  humiliations  of  Marathon,  balamis,  and  the 

peace  of  Kallias. 


CHAPTER  LXX. 

RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND  GREEKS. 

The  first  triumphant  feeling  of  the  Greek  troops  at  Kunaxa  was 
exeimm'^ed,  as  soon  as  they  learnt  the  death  of  Cyrus,  for  dismay  and 
or  0  v"  accompanied  by  miavailino  repentance  for  tl^^^  venture  into 
Xcl7he  and  Ivlearchus  had  seduced  them.  Probably  Klearchiis 
himself  too  repented,  and  with  good  reason,  of  having  ^l^^P^'^^^'  '  '^ 
his  manner  of'  fighting  the  battle,  so  little  J^'f^^^^'''\^^^ 
recrard  either  to  the  injunctions  or  to  the  satety  of  ^.>,7^-  ^^.f,^^!^^;^' 
less  he  still  miiutained  the  tone  of  a  victor  in  the  held,  <}"<\'-^|l^Y,^ 
pressions  of  giief  for  the  fate  of  the  young  i3rince  aesircHl  I  roklc^ 
andGlus  to  %  turn  to  Arhcus,  with  the  reply,  ^^^^^J^'?;;^],^^ 
their  side  were  conquerors  without  any  enemy  remaining;  tli.it  cy 
were  about  to  march  onward  against  Artaxerxes;  ami  that  i/.  Ai^f^^^ 
voukl  o  n  tlKMU,  thev  would  place  him  on  the  throne  which  liad 
been  iinended  foi'  Cynis.  While  this  reply  was  conveyed  to  Ari^u^^ 
by  his  particuhu-  friend  Menon  along  with  the  messengers  t  e  G lecks 
procurid  a  m.Ml  as  well  as  they  could,  having  "^^  ^>^-^f^^'^5  ,^^\^  ^-f 
some  of  the  b:i--age  animals;  and  by  k^"d»V-^i^  ^  ?.l?  rM  een 
ireat,  from  the  aiTOws.  the  wooden  Egyptian  shields  which  had  been 
thrown  awav  on  the  field,  and  the  baggage  carts.     ^  .^..^  ^„ 

Before  anv  answer  could  be  received  from   Ari.^BUS    ^^^^^^^^  ap- 
peared comin-  from  Artaxerxes;    among  ^liem  being  Phalins^^ 
Greek  from  Zakynthus,  and  the  G^^^^k  s^""S^^iJl,  ^^^^^^"^^'^^^    ^i"'; 
who  was  in  the  device  of  the  Persian  king.     Phalmus,  an  ofticcr  of 


512 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


THE  GREEKS  REJOIN  ARI.EUS. 


513 


some  military  experience  and  in  the  confidence  of  Tissapliemcs 
addressed  liiniself  to  tlie  Greek  commanders;  requiring  tiieni  on  the 
part  of  the  King,  since  he  was  now  victor  and  had  slain  Cynis.  to 
surrender  their  arms  and  appeal  to  his  mercy.  To  this  suninions 
l)aintul  in  the  extreme  to  a  Grecian  ear,  Klearchus  replied  thai  it 
was  not  the  practice  for  victorious  men  to  lay  down  their  arms. 
Being  then  calleil  away  to  examine  the  sacrifice  which  was  going  on, 
lie  left  the  interview  to  the  other  otticers,  who  met  the  summons  of 
Phalinus  by  an  emphatic  negative.  "If  the  King  thinks  himself 
strong  enough  to  iusk  for  our  arms  unconditionally,  let  him  come  and 
try  to  seize  Uiem."  '*  The  King  (rejoined  Phalinus)  thinks  that  vou 
are  in  his  power,  being  in  the  midst  of  his  territory,  hemmed  in  by 
impassable  rivers,  and  encompassed  by  his  innumerable  subjects."— 
**  Our  arms  and  our  valor  are  all  that  remains  to  us  (replied  a  jouiig 
Athenian);  we  shall  not  be  fools  enough  to  hand  over  to  you  our 
only  remaining  treasure,  but  shall  employ  them  still  to  have  a  tight 
lor //</«/•  treasure."  Rut  though  .several  spoke  in  this  resolute  tone, 
there  were  not  wanting  others  disposed  to  encourage  a  negotiation; 
saying  that  they  had  been  faithful  to  Cyrus  as  long  as  he  lived,  and 
Avould  now  be  faithful  to  Artaxerxes,  if  he  wanted  their  services  in 
Egypt  or  anywhere  else.  In  the  midst  of  this  parley  Klearchus 
returned,  and  was  requested  by  Phalinus  to  return  a  final  answer  on 
behalf  of  all.  He  at  first  asked  the  advice  of  Phalinus  himself; 
appealing  to  the  common  feeling  of  Hellenic  patriotism,  and  antici- 
l)aling,  with  very  little  judgment,  that  the  latter  would  encourage 
liie  Greeks  in  liolding  out.  ""If  (replied  Phalinu.s)  I  saw  one  chance 
out  of  ten  thousand  in  your  favor,  in  the  event  of  a  contest  with  the 
King,  I  should  advise  you  to  refuse  the  surrender  of  your  arms. 
But  as  there  is  no  chance  of  safety  for  you  against  the  King's  con- 
sent, I  reconunend  you  to  look  out  for  safety  in  the  only  quarter 
where  it  presents  it.self."  Sensible  of  the  mistake  which  he  had  made 
in  jisking  the  question,  Klearchus  rejoined — "That  is  your  opinion: 
now  report  our  answer.  We  think  we  shall  be  better  friends  to  the 
King,  if  we  are  to  be  his  friends — or  moreelfective  enemies,  if  we  are 
to  be  his  enemies — with  our  arms,  than  without  them."  Phalinuo, 
in  retiring,  .said  that  the  King  proclaimed  a  truce  so  long  as  they 
remained  in  their  present  position — but  war,  if  they  moved,  either 
onward  or  backward.  And  to  this  Klearchus  acceded,  without 
declaring  which  he  intended  to  do.  , 

Shortly  after  the  departure  of  Phalinus,  the  envoys  dispatched  to 
Aria'us  returned;  communicating  his  reply  that  the  Persian  grandees 
would  never  lolei'ate  any  pretensions  on*  his  part  to  the  crown,  and 
that  he  intended  to  depart  early  the  next  morning  on  his  return;  if 
the  Greeks  wished  to  ac(omj)any  him,  they  must  join  him  during 
the  night.  In  the  evening,  Klearchus,  convening  the  generals  and 
the  lochages(or  captains  of  lochi),  acquainted  them  that  the  morning- 
sacrifice  had  been  of  a  nature  to  forbid  them  marching  against  the 


Trin^__a  prohibition,  of  which  he  now  understood  the  reason   from 
Irivm*- since  learnt  that  the  King  was  on  the  other  side  of  the  Tigns, 
r  d  therefore  out  of  their  reach-but  that  it  was  favorable  for  repni- 
in.r  Ari:eus,     He  gave  directions  accordingly  for  a  night-raarc  i  back 
•don*'-  the  Euphrates,  to  the  station  where  they  had  passed  the  last 
;  .rhi  but  one  prior  to  the  battle.     The  other  Grecian  generals  with 
mil  aiiv  formal  choice  of  Klearchus  as  chief,  tacitly  acquiesced  in  his 
order/ from  a  sense  of  his  superior  decision  and  experience,  m  an 
cmer-ency  when  no  one  knew  what  to  propose.     1  ne  night. march 
was  Successfully  accomplished;  so  that  they  joined  Ana^us  at  the 
mvcedino-  station  about  midnight;  not  without  the  alarming  svmp- 
tom    however,  that  Miltokythes  the  Thracian  deserted  to  the  King 
•It  the  head  of  340  of  his  countrymen,  partly  horse,  partly  loot 
'  The  first  proceeding  of  the  Grecian  generals  was  to  exchange 
solemn  oaths  of  reciprocal  fidelity  and  fraternity  with  Arireus.     Ac- 
cording to  an  ancient  and  impressive  practice,  a  bull,  a  wolt,  a  boar, 
and  a  ram,  were  tUl  slain,  and  their  blood  allowed  to  run  into  the 
hollow  of  a  .shield;  in  which  the  Greek  generals  dipped  a  sword,  and 
iriceus  with  his  chief  companions,  a  spear.     The  latter,  besides  the 
promise  of  alliance,  engaged  also  to  guide  the  Greeks  in  good  faith 
down  to  the  Asiatic  coast.     Klearchus  immediately  began  to  ask 
^vhat  route  he  proposeil  to  take;  whether  t<)  return  by  that  a  oug 
which  they  had  come  up,  or  by  any  other.     To  this  Aria^us  replied. 
that  the  road  along  which  they  had  marchad  was  impracticable  for 
retreat,  for  the  utter  want  of  provisions  through  seventeen  days  of 
desert-  biit  that  he  intended  to  chose  another  road,  which  though 
lon-cr  w^ould  be  sufficiently  productive  to  furnish  them  with  provi- 
sions '  There  was,  however,  a  necessity  (he  added),  that  the  first  two 
or  three  days'  marches  should  be  of  extreme  length,  m  order  that 
thevmi-ht  get  out  of  the  reach  of  the  Kings  forces,  who  would 
would  Inirdly  be  able  to  overtake  them  afterward  with  any  consid- 
erable numbers.  ,    ^  _  ,  ^^  f„^„, 
Thev  had  now  come  93  days  march  from  Ephesus,  or  90  from 
Sardis.    The  distance  from  Sardis  to  Kunaxa  is,  according  to  Colonel 
Chesnev,   about   1205  geographical   miles,    or  1464  English   miles. 
There  had  been  at  least  9G  days  of  rest,  enjoyed  at  various  places,  so 
that  the  total  of  time  elapsed  must  have  at  least  been  189  days,  or  a 
little  more  than  half  a  year:  but  it  was  probablv  greater,  since  some 
intervals  of  rest  are  not  .specified  in  number  of  days. 

How  to  retrace  their  steps,  was  now  the  prob  em,  apparently 
insoluble.  As  to  the  military  force  of  Persia  in  the  Held,  indeed 
not  merely  the  easy  victory  at  Kunaxa.  but  still  more  the  undisputed 
march  throughout  so  long  a  space,  hfi  them  no  serious  apprehen- 
sions. In  spite  of  this  great  extent,  population,  and  riches,  they  had 
been  allowed  to  pass  through  the  most  ditficult  and  defensible  coun- 
try, and  to  ford  the  broad  Euphrates,  without  a  blow:  nay  the  King 
\\L\  shrunk  from  defending  the  long  trench  which  he  had  speciady 

H.  G.  III.~17 


514 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEX  THOUSAND. 


MARCH  OVER  THE  CANALS. 


515 


caused  to  he  dug  for  the  proterlion  of  Baln'lonia.  But  the  difficulties 
^•hich  stood  7)ot\veen  them  and  their  homes  were  of  a  \QYy  different 
character.  How  were  they  to  find  their  way  back,  or  obtain  provi- 
8ions,  in  defiance  of  a  numerous  liostile  cavahy,  which,  not  without 
elHciency  even  in  a  pitched  battle,  would  ])e  most  formidable  in 
opposing  their  retreat?  The  line  of  their  upward  march  had  all  been 
planned,  with  supi)lies  furnished,  by  Cyrus:— yet  even  under  such 
advantages,  supplies  had  been  on  tlic  point  of  failing,  in  one  part  of 
the  march.  They  were  now,  for  the  first  time,  called  upon  to  think 
and  provide  for  themselves;  without  knowledge  of  either  roads  or 
distances — without  trustworthy  guides — without  any  one  to  furnish 
or  even  to  indicate  supplies— and  with  a  territory  all  hostile,  tra- 
versed by  rivers,  which  they  liad  no  means  of  crossing.  Klearchus 
himself  knew  nothing  of  the  country,  nor  of  any  other  river  except 
the  Euphrates;  nor  does  he  indeed'  in  his  heart  seem  to  have  con- 
ceived retreat  as  practicable  without  the  consent  of  the  King.  The 
reader  who  casts  his  eye  on  a  map  of  Asia,  and  imairines  tlie  situa- 
tion of  this  Greek  division  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Eiiphrates,  near 
the  parallel  of  latitude  33^  30' — will  hardly  be  surprised  at  anv  meas- 
ure of  despair,  on  the  part  either  of  general  or  soldiers.  And  we 
may  add  that  Klearchus  had  not  even  the  advantage  of  such  a  map, 
or  probablv  of  any  map  at  all,  to  enable  him  to  slnipe  his  course. 

In  this  dilemma,  tlie  first  and  most  natural  impulse  was  to  consult 
Ariieus;  who  (as  has  been  already  stated)  pronounced;  with  good 
reason,  that  return  by  the  same  road  was  impracticable;  and  pro- 
mised to  conduct  them  home  by  another  road— longer  indeed,  }et 
better  supplied.  At  daybreak  on  the  ensuing  morning,  they  began 
their  march  in  an  easterly  direction,  anticipating  that  before  night 
they  should  reach  some  villages  of  the  Babylonian  territory,  as"  in 
fact  they  did;  yet  not  before  they  had  been  a'larmed  in  the  afternoon 
by  the  supposed  approach  of  some  of  the  enemy  s  horse,  and  by 
evidences  that  the  enemy  were  not  far  olf,  which  induced  them  to 
slacken  their  march  for  the  purpose  of  more  cautious  array.  Hence 
they  did  not  reach  the  first  village  before  dark;  these  too* had  been' 
pillaged  by  the  enemy  while  retreating  before  them,  so  that  only  the 
first-comers  under  Klearchus  could  obtain  accommodation,  while  the 
succeeding  troops,  coming  up  in  the  dark,  pitched  as  they  could 
without  any  order.  The  whole  camp  was  a  scene  of  clamor,  dis- 
pute, and  even  alarm,  throughout  the  night.  No  provisions  could 
])e  obtained.  Early  the  next  morning  Klearchus  ordered  them  under 
arms;  and  desiring  to  expose  the  groundless  nature  of  the  alarn», 
caused  the  herald  to  proclaim,  that  whoever  would  denounce  the 
person  who  had  let  the  ass  into  the  camp  on  the  preceding  night, 
should  be  rewarded  with  a  talent  of  silver. 

What  was  the  pioject  of  route  entertained  by  Ariicus.  we  cannot 
ascertain;  since  it  was  not  further  ptu-sued.  For  the  effect  of  the  un- 
expected arrival  of  the  Greeks  us  if  to  attack  the  enemy— and  even 


the  clamor  and  shouting  of  the  camp  during  the  night— so  intimi- 
dated the  Persian  commanders,  that  they  sent  heralds  the  next  morn- 
iuo-  to  treat  about  a  truce.  The  contrast  between  this  message,  and 
the  haughty  summons  of  the  preceding  day  to  lay  down  their  arms, 
was  sensibly  felt  by  the  Grecian  officers,  and  taught  them  that  the 
proper  way  of  dealing  with  the  Persians  was  by  a  bold  and  aggressive 
demeanor.  When  Klearchus  was  apprised  of  the  arrival  of  the 
heralds,  he  desired  them  at  first  to  wait  at  the  outposts  until  he  was 
at  leisure:  then,  having  put  his  troops  in  the  best  possible  order,  with 
a  phalanx  compact  on  every  side  to  the  eye,  and  the  unarmed  persons 
out  of  sight,  he  desired  the  heralds  to  be  admitted.  He  marched  out 
to  meet  them  with  the  most  showy  and  best  armed  soldiers  imme- 
diately around  him,  and  when  they  informed  him  that  they  had  come 
from  the  King  with  instructions  to  propose  a  truce,  and  to  report  on 
what  condition  the  Greeks  would  agree  to  it,  Klearchus  replied 
abruptly—"  Well  then— go  and  tell  the  King,  that  our  first  business 
must  be  to  fight;  for  we  have  nothing  to  eat,  nor  will  any  man  pre- 
sume to  talk  to  Greeks  about  a  truce,  without  first  providing  dinner 
for  them."  With  this  reply  the  heralds  rode  off,  but  returned  very 
speedily;  thus  making  it  plain  that  the  King,  or  the  commanding 
officer,  was  near  at  hand.  They  brought  word  that  the  King  thought 
their  answer  reasonable,  and  had  sent  guides  to  conduct  them  to  a 
place  where  they  would  obtain  provisions,  if  the  truce  should  be  con- 
cluded. 

After  an  affected  delay  and  hesitation,  in  order  to  impose  upon  the 
Persians,  Klearchus  concluded  the  truce,  and  desired  that  the  guides 
would  conduct  the  army  to  those  quarters  where  provisions  could  be 
had.  He  was  most  circumspect  in  maintaining  exact  order  during 
the  march,  himself  taking  charge  of  the  rear  guard.  The  guides  led 
them  over  many  ditches  and  chaimels,  full  of  water,  and  cut  for  the 
purpose  of  irrigation ;  some  so  deep  and  broad  that  they  could  not 
be  crossed  without  bridges.  The  army  had  to  put  together  bridges 
for  the  occasion,  from  palm-trees  either  already  fallen,  or  expressly 
cut  down.  This  was  a  troublesome  business,  which  Klearchus  him- 
self superintended  with  peculiar  strictness.  He  carried  his  spear  in 
the  left  hand,  his  stick  in  the  right;  employing  the  latter  to  chastise 
any  soldier  who  seemed  remiss— and  even  plunging  into  the  mud  and 
lendini?  his  own  hands  in  aid  wherever  it  was  necessary.  As  it  was  not 
th.*  usual  season  of  irrigation  for  crops  he  suspected  that  the  canals  had 
been  filled  on  this  occasion  expressly  to  intimidate  the  Greeks,  by 
impressiug  them  with  the  difficulties  of  their  prospective  march;  and 
he  was  anxious  to  demonstrate  to  the  Persians  that  these  difliculties 
were  no  more  than  Grecian  energy  could  easily  surmount. 

At  length  thev  reached  certain  villages  indicated  by  their  guides  for 
quarters  and  provision;  and  here  for  the  first  time  they  had  a  sample 
of  that  unparalleled  abundance  of  the  Babylonian  territory,  which 
Herodotus  is  afraid  to  describe  with  numerical  precision.     Large 


516 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


MOTIVES  OF  THE  PERSIANS. 


517 


quantities  of  corn,— dates  not  onl}'  in  great  numbers,  but  of  such 
beauty,  freshness,  siz<\  and  flavor,  as  no  Greek  bad  ever  seen  or 
tasted,  insomucli  tliat  fruit  like  what  was  imported  into  Greece  was 
disregarded  and  left  for  the  slaves— wine  and  vinegar,  both  also  mado 
from  the  date-palm;  tiiese  are  the  luxuries  which  Xcnophon  is  elo- 
quent in  describing,  after  his  recent  period  of  scanty  fare  and  anxious 
fa})prehensiou;  not  without  also  noticing  the  headaches  which  such 
^  new  and  luscious  food,  in  unlimited  quantity,  brought  upon  himself 
4  unci  others. 

After  three  days  passed  in  these  restorative  quarters,  they  were 
visited  by  Tissapherues,  accoujpanied  by  four  Persian  grandees  and 
a  suite  of   slaves.      The  satrap  beg;m  to  open  a  negotiation  with 
Klearchus  and  the  other  generals.     Speaking  throuch  an  interpreter 
he  stated  to  them  that  the  vicinity  of  his  satrapy  to  Greece  impressed 
him  with  a  strong  interest  in  favor  of  the  Cyreian  Greeks,  and  made 
Lim  anxious  to  rescue  them  out  of  their  present  desperate  situation; 
that  he  had  solicited  the  King's  permission  to  save  them,  as  a  personal 
recompense  to  himself  for  having  been  the  first  to  forewarn  him  of 
the  schemes  of  Cyrus,  and  for  having  been  the  only  Persian  who  had 
not  fled  before  the  Greeks  at  Kunaxa ;  that  the  Kintr  had  promised  to 
consider  this  point,  and  had  sent  him  in  the    meantime  to  ask  the 
Greeks  what  their  purpose  w^as  in  coming  up  to  attack  him;  and  that 
he  trusted  that  the  Greeks  would  give  him  a  conciliatory  answer  to 
carry  back,  in  order  that  he  might  have  less  difficulty  in  realizing 
what  he  desired  for  their  benefit.     To  this  Klearchus,  after  first 
deliberating  apart  with  the  other  officers,  replied,  that  the  army  had 
come  together,  and  had  even  commenced  their  march,  without  any 
purpose  of  hostility  to  the  King;  that  Cyrus  had  broudit  them  up 
the  country  under  false  pretenses,  but  that  they  had  been  ashamed  to 
desert  him  in  the  midst  of  danger,  since  he  had  always  treated  them 
generously;  that  since  Cyrus  was  now  dead,  they  had  no  purpose  of 
hostility  against  the  King  but  were  anxious  to  return  home;  that 
they  were  prepared  to  repel  hostility  from  all  quarters,  but  would  be 
not  less  prompt  in  requiting  favor  or  assistance.     With  this  answer 
Tissjiphernes  departed,  and  returned  on  the  next  day  but  one,  inform- 
ing them  that  he  had  obtained  the  King's  permission  to  save  the 
Grecian  army— though  not  without  great  opposition,  since  many 
Persian   counselors    contended    that  it  was    unworthy  the   King's 
dignity,  to  suffer  those  who  assailed  him  to  escape.     "I  am  now 
ready  (said  he)  to  conclude  a  covenant  and  exchanc^e  oaths  with  you; 
engaging  to  conduct  you  safely  back  into  Greece, "with  the  country 
friendly,  and  with  a  regular  market  for  you  to  purchase  provisions. 
You  must  stipulate  on  your  part  always  to  pay  for  your  provisions, 
and  to  do  no  damage  to  the  country:  if  I  do  not  furnish  you  with 
provisions  to  buy,  you  are  then  at  liberty  to  take  them  where  you 
can  find    them."       Well  were  th-    Greeks  content   to  enter  into 
such  a  covenant,  which  was  sworn,  with  hand  sgiven  upon  it. 


,j.KIeard.us,  the  other  .genej.lsnn<U.eo>^^^^^  sule^_. 

Zi  by  '^'-'^''':^?%;'^,t';^^lXLm  go  back  to  the 
|-S''nX%";^vSnTand"vetur°n  to  reconduct  the  Greek,  home. 
goi„?  hhnself  to  his  own  «Urapy^^^^^  only  indireelly, 

°TUc  st^'temeuts  of  Kte^ias  th       n  Kno  %  Relieving 

,„a  not  to  he  received  w.thot  «mo^^  ^  j= 

«r  f iriSsi  Hs;;  tsS  s,!ks 

form.Ml  of  his  ^^^f ^l^-:^^^^\f7,n;'rin  t  e  Persian  army  and  for  the 
tares  all  those,  who,  though  ^^^^  !"S ^  V^^^.f;;-  '^  cl^ath  of  Cyrus 
defense  of  Artaxerxes  had  a  5^  par   cip^^^^^  .,^^ 

_an.l  that  she  ^^^^wed  favo^^^^^^^^^^^ 
Greeks.     It  may  seem  P^^^jf^^^;  f  ^  "^'.'^^^^  retreat,  without 

been  exerted  to  P^'^^^^  ^'T^.^  \',  1  je  b^  ^''  ^'^^  ^^^^ 

anticip:iting  the  use  ft^^^,\:i\   ,"'^^^^  one  point  of  view  the 

appe^ir)  of  the  present  convention.     A    liu  <        P        ^      p^^  ti^g 

v(MV  Circumstance  wiucii  icik.iv-'v.vx  x  u:^,,      tiipv  were  in  the 

G;«ks  dangerpus_to  hun  l"  the.r  nc  ual  po  .t.o^^^  „_ 

heart  of  the  Persian  t™pire,   vithin  se\ti,  y  nmos  .  ^ 

country  not  only  teeming  with  ^'i  '^'Y,'    n  uUiplicrt"  of  canals,  as 
.Me ;  especially  «S^|'"t 'Mit^W^^^  ^'"^'' 

Herodotus  observed  respcctin.'  V  v.nAnhon  was  afterward  preparing 
Siivto  his  Grecian  soldiers-what  ^euophon  wa.  alter  ,.^._I^  ^j^, 

to-say  to  theni  at  ^^'P^ o"      .^^"^;°^,,  ,v'h  m  he  afterward  oon- 

afflr.ned  to  the  ""'''^PW  r^*'    ;'"  Sei  the^  sat  down  they  were 
ducted  away  from  Syracu«;-tli.  t  w  leie  ei  "kj  j^ 

sufficiently  numerous  and  ^^T"""^?™"^^  y",,^  a^d  would  perhaps 
A  body  of  such  troops  might  ^^  'P'^f '■\,'''''', '„^  ,e  Persian  voke, 
oneourige.  the  B^''j.V"">'^°  P'iP"^f  ™  ^"oAouft.ufe  which"  they 
and  to  exonerate  themselves  f™"/''";^  P";  ,,='"  ^visei-s  of  Artaxerxes 
now  paid  to  the  satrap.  For  ^^^'^'''^  J^J^^]!,''JXXcro^  t\w  Titms  out 
tliauSit  it  advantageous  to  convey  '"'^  Sin^  thi  her.  This  was 
of  Babylonia,  beyond  all  P^!^*'^''''?  .^^  J^  "  ^  don      .Vnd  it  was  the 

Se=  l!r  rSX  rugf  m^o  Ivance  eonside. 

ably  farther  into  ^'^.i^^'^Ij^^^^f  ,  i™"  on  both  sides,  at  the  time 
Such  was  the  slate  ot  tears  ana  ii^  1 1  ,    ,;      ^^    convention, 

when  Tissaphernes  left  the  Gi^f '  ''^  ^f  '^^  ';™;^     '^^^^^^  f.-om 

For  twenty  days  did  thoy  ;};"'\.    V^^'^j;^ !  -.^  'Sr  Aria^us  being 
'^tS^nrXr^ullh  piX^ge^^and  unexplained  delay  be- 


618 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


alar:^i  of  the  gitx. 


519 


came,  after  a  few  days,  the  source  of  iiiucli  uneasiness  to  the  Greeks; 
the  more  so,  as  Ariaeus  received  during  this  interval  several  visits 
from  his  Persian  kinsmen,  and  friendly'  messages  from  the  King, 
promising  amnesty  for  his  recent  services  under  Cyrus.  Of  these 
messages  the  effects  were  painfully  felt,  in  manifest  coldness  of  de- 
meanor on  the  part  of  his  Persian  tn^ops  toward  the  Greeks.  Im- 
patient and  suspicious,  the  Greek  soldiers  impressed  upon  Kkarclms 
tiieir  fears,  that  the  King  had  concluded  the  recent  convention  only 
to  arrest  their  movements,  until  he  should  have  assembled  a  larger 
army  and  blocked  up  more  effectually  the  roads  against  their  return. 
To  this  Klearchus  replied—"  I  am  aware  of  all  that  you  say.  Yet 
if  we  now  strike  our  tents,  it  will  be  a  breach  of  the  convention,  and 
a  declaration  of  war.  No  one  will  furnish  us  with  provisions:  we 
shall  have  no  guides:  Aria?us  will  desert  us  forthwith,  so  that  ue 
shall  have  his  troops  as  enemies  instead  of  friends.  Whether  there 
be  any  other  river  for  us  to  cross,  I  know  not;  but  we  know  that 
the  Euphrates  itself  can  never  be  crossed,  if  there  be  an  enemy  to 
resist  us.  Nor  have  we  any  cavalry — while  cavalry  is  the  best  and 
most  numerous  force  of  our  enemies.  If  the  King,  having  all  these 
advantaires,  really  wishes  to  destroy  us,  I  do  not  know  why  he  should 
falsely  exchange  all  these  oaths  and  solenmities,  and  thus  make  his 
own  word  worthless  in  the  eyes  both  of  Greeks  and  Barbarians." 

Such  words  from  Klearchus  are  remarkable,  as  they  testify  liis 
own  complete  despair  of  the  situation — certainly  a  very  natural  de- 
gpair— except  by  amicable  dealing  with  the  Persians;  and  also  his 
ignorance  of  geography  and  the  country  to  be  traversed.  This  feel- 
ing helps  to  explain  his  imprudent  confidence  afterward  in  Tissa- 
phernes. 

That  satrap  however,  after  twenty  days,  at  last  came  back,  with 
bis  army  prepared  to  return  to  Ionia— with  the  King's  daughter 
whom  he  had  just  received  in  marriage, — and  with  another  grandee 
named  Orontas.  Tissaphernes  took  the  conduct  of  the  march,  pro- 
viding supplies  for  the  Greek  troops  to  purchase;  while  Aria*us  and 
and  his  division  now  separated  themselves  altogether  from  the 
Greeks,  and  l)ecame  intermingled  with  the  other  Persians.  Klearchus 
and  the  Greeks  followed  them,  at  the  distance  of  about  three  nules 
in  the  rear,  with  a  separate  guide  for  themselves;  not  without 
jealousy  and  mistrust,  sometimes  shown  in  individual  coiitlic'?. 
while  collecting  wood  or  forage,  between  them  and  the  Persians  of 
AriaBus.  After  three  days'  march  (that  is,  apparently  three  days, 
calculated  from  the  moment  when  they  began  their  retreat  with 
Ariaeus)  they  came  to  the  Wall  of  Media,  and  passed  through  it,  pro- 
secuting their  march  onward  through  the  country  on  its  other  or 
interior  side.  It  was  of  bricks  cemented  with  bitumen,  100  feet  high, 
and  20  feet  broad;  it  was  said  to  extend  a  length  of  20  parasangs 
(or  alK)ut  70  miles,  if  we  reckon  the  parasang  at  30  stadia),  and  to 
be  not  far  distant  from  Babylon.     Two  days  of  farther  march,  com- 


During  these 


putcd  at  eight  parasangs,  brought  them  to  the  Tigris.     Durii 

uvo  days  tliey  crossed  two  great  ship-canals,  one  of  them  over  a 

n  miauont  brid-e,  the  other  over  a  temporary  bridge  laid  on  seven 

W.     Canals  of  such  magnitude  must  probably  have   been  two 

onon'n-  the  four  stated  by  Xenophon  to  be  drawn  from    he  river 

S  each  of  them  a  parasang  distant  from  the  other     They  were 

1^'feet  broad,  and  deep  enough  even  for  heavy  vessels;    hey  were 

liTtributed  by  mc.ms  of  numerous  smaller  channels  and  c  itches  f.>r 

he  irrigation  of  the  soil;  and  they  were  said  to  fall  into  the  Eu- 

Viirates%r  rather  perhaps  they  terminated  in  one  mam  larger  canal 

directly  from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Tigris,  each  of  then,  joining 

W.  larger  canal  at  a  different  point  of  its  course.    Withm  less  than 

U  mires  of  th>.  Tigris  was  a  large  and  populous  city  named  Sit- 

ke  near  which  the  Greeks  pitched  their  camp,  on  the  verge  of  a 

btautiful  park  or  thick  grove  full  of  all  kinds  o    trees;  wlule  the 

Persians  all  crossed  the  Tigris,  at  the  neighboring  bri.lge. 

As  Proxenus  and  Xenophon  were  here  walking  in  front  of  the 
camp  after  supper,  a  man  was  brought  up  who  had  asked  for  the 
ormer  at  the  advanced  posts.     This  man  said  that  he  came  with  iii- 
strictions  from  Arianis.'    He  advised   the   Greeks  to  be   on   their 
cuard    as  there  were  troops  concealed  in  the  adjoining  grove,  for 
tlie  purpose  of  attacking  them  durin-  the  ni-ht-and  ^Iso  to  send 
and  occupy  the  bridge  over  the  Tigris,  since  Tissaphernes  intended 
L  break  it  down,  in  order  that  the  Greeks  might  be  caught  without 
possibility  of  escape  between  the  river  and  the  canal.     On  discuss- 
Uthis  information  with  Klearchus,  who  was  much  alarmed  by  it, 
a  voun-  Greek  present  remarked  that  the  two  matters  stated  by  the 
informant  contradicted  each  other;  for  that  if  Tissaphernes  intended 
to  attack  the  Gi^eks  during  the  night,  he  would  not  break  down  the 
bridge,  so  as  both  to  prevent  his  own  troops  on  the  other  side  froiii 
crossing  to  aid,  an:l  to  deprive  those  on  this  side  of  all  retreat  if  they 
were  bSaten-while,  if  the  Greeks  were  beaten,  there  was  no  escape 
open  to  them,  whether  the  bridge  continued  or  not.     This  remark 
induced  Klearchus  to   ask  the  messenger,  what  was  the  extent  of 
ground  between  the  Tigris  and  the  canal.     1  he  messenger  replied 
that  it  was  a  great  extent  of  country,  comprising  many  large  cities 
and  villages.     Retiecting  on  this  communicaticm,  the  Greek  officers 
came  to  tlie  conclusion  that  the  message  was  a  stratagem  on  the  part 
of  Tissaphernes  to  frighten  them  and  accelerate  their  passage  across 
the  Ti<ms-    under    the    apprehension    that    they  might  conceive 
the  ph'ui  of  seizing  or  breaking  the  bridge  and  occupying  a  per- 
manent position  in  the  spot  where  they  were;  w luch  was  an  island, 
fortified  on  one  side  by  the  Tigris,-on  the  other  snles    by  inter- 
secting canals  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris,     buch  an  island 
was  a  defensible  position,  having  a  most  productive  territory  with 
numerous  cultivators,  so  as  to  furnish  shelter  and  means  ot  hostility 
for  all  the  Kii^g's  enemies;  Tissaphernes  calculated  that  the  message 


520 


RETKEAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


HALT  OF  THREE  DAYS. 


521 


now  delivered  would  induce  the  Greeks  to  become  alarmed  with 
their  actual  position,  and  to  cross  the  Tigris  with  as  little  delay  as 
possible.  At  least  this  was  the  interpretation  which  the  Greek 
officers  put  upon  his  proceeding::  an  interpretation  highly  plausible, 
since,  in  order  to  reach  the  bridge  over  the  Tigris,  he  had  been 
obliged  to  conduct  the  Greek  troops  into  a  position  sufficiently 
tempting  for  them  to  hold — and  since  he  knew  that  his  own  pur. 
poses  were  purely  treacherous.  But  the  Greeks,  officers  as  well  js 
soldiers,  were  animated  only  by  the  wish  of  reaching  home.  Tiicy 
trusted,  though  not  withou't  misgivings,  in  the  promise  of  Tissa- 
phernes  to  conduct  them ;  and  never  for  a  moment  thought  of  taking 
permanent  post  on  this  fertile  island.  They  did  not  however  neg- 
lect the  precaution  of  sending  a  guard  during  the  night  to  the  bridge 
over  the  Tigris,  which  no  enemy  came  to  assail.  On  the  next  morn- 
ing they  passed  over  it  iu  a  botly,  in  cautious  and  mistrustful  array, 
and  found  themselves  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Tigris— not  only 
without  attack,  but  without  sight  of  a  single  Persian,  except  Glus 
the  interpreter  and  a  few  others  watching  their  motions. 

After  having  crossed  by  a  bridge  laid  upon  thirty-seven  pontoons, 
the  Greeks  continued  their  march  to  the  northward  upon  the  eastern 
side  of  tlie  Tigris,  for  four  days  to  the  river  Pliyskus;  said  to  be 
twentv  parasangs.     The  Pliyskus  was  100  feet  wide,  wiih  a  bridge, 
and  the  large  city  of  Opis  near  it.     Here,  at  the  fiontier  of  Assyria 
and  Media,  the  road  from  the  eastern  regions  to  Babylon  joined  the 
road  northerly  on  which  the  Greeks  were  "marching.     An  illegitimate 
brother  of  Artaxerxcs  was  seen   at  the  head  of  a  numerous  force, 
which  he  was  conducting  from  Susa  and  Ekl)atana  as  a  re-enforce- 
ment to  tlie  royal  army.     This  great  host  halted  to  see  the  Greeks 
pass  by;  and  Klearchus  ordered  the  march  in  column  of  two  abreast, 
employing  himself  actively  to  maintain  an  excellent  an-ay,  and  halt- 
ing more  than  once.     The  army  tlius  occupied  so  long  a  time  iu 
passing  by  the  Persian  host  that  their  numbers  appeared  greater  than 
the  reality,  even  to  themselves;  while  the  effect  upon  the  Persian 
spectators'   was  verv   imposing.      Here   Assyria  ended   and   Media 
beiran.     They  marched,  still  in  a  northerly  direction,  for  six  days 
through  a  portion  of  Media  ahnost  unpeopled,  until  they  came  to 
some  flourishing  villages  which  formed  a  portion  of  the  domain  of 
Queen  Parysatis;  probably  these  villages,   forming  so  marked  au 
exception  to  the  desert  chaVacter  of  the  remaining  march,  were  situ- 
ated on  the  Lesser  Zab,  which  flows  into   the  Tigris,   and  winch 
Xenophon  must  have  crossed,  though  he  makes  no  mention  of  it. 
According  to  the  order  of  march  stipulated  between  the  Greeks  and 
Tissaphernes,  the  latter  only  provided  a  supply  of  piovisions  for  the 
former  to  purchase;  but  on  tiie  present  halt,  he  allowed  the  Greeks 
to  plunder  the  villages,  which  were  rich  ;ind  full  of  all  sorts  of  sub- 
sistence—yet without  carrying  off  the  slaves.   The  wish  of  the  satrap 
to  put  au  insult  on  Cyrus,'^as  his  personal  enemy,  through  Parysatis, 


thus  proved  a  sentence  of  ruin  to  these  unhappy  villagers   Five  more 
Kiarch,  called  twenty  pa-su^gs,  broug^it  them  to  U^ 


■% 


mm  whence  they  received  supplies  of  provisions,  brought  across  by 
bv  the  inhabitants  upon  rafts  supported  by  mliated  skins. 
V)     the  banks  of  the  Great  Zab  they  halted  three  days-days  of 
«e  i^^)us  and  tra-ical  moment.     Having  been  under  fee  ings  of  mis- 
is    ever  since  the  convention  with  Tissaphernes,  they  had  followed 
th  ou«-hout  the  whole  march,  with  separate  guides  of  their  own,  in 
e  rear  of  his  army,  always  maintaining  their  encampment  apart 
Darin-  their  halt  on  the  Zab,  so  many  various  manifestations  occurred 
foacrgl-avate  the  mistrust,  that  hostilities  seemed  on  the  point  of 
breaking  out  betwa-en  the  two  camps.     To  obviate  this  danger  Klear- 
chus demanded  an  interview  with  Tissaphernes.  represented  to  him 
r  t  reatening  attitude  of  affairs,  and  insisted  on  the  necessity  of 
comin-  to  a  clear  understanding.     He  impressed  upon  the  satrap 
that  over  and  above  the  solemn  oaths  which  had  been  interchanged 
lie  Greeks  on  their  side  could  have  no  conceivable  motive  to  quarrel 
with  him:  that  tliev  had  everything  to  hope  from  his  friendship  and 
eve  vthing  to  fear.'even  to  the  loss  of  all  chance  of  safe  return,  from 
his  hostility ;  that  Tissaphernes  also  could  gain  nothing  by  destroying 
I  in   but  would  And  them,  if  he  chose,  the  best  and  most  faithful 
instruments  for  his  own  aggrandizement  and  for  conquering  the 
Mvsians  and  Pisidians-as Cyrus  haa  experienced  while  he  was  alive 
Klearchus  concluded  his  protest  by  requesting  to  be  informed,  T^hat 
malicious  reporter  had  been  flUing  the  mind  of-  Tissaphernes  with 
causeless  suspicions  against  the  Greeks. .  .  „ 

"Klearchus  (replied  the  satrap),  I  rejoice  to  hear  such  excellent 
sen^^e  from  your  lips.  You  remark  truly,  that  if  you  were  to  meditate 
evil  against  me,  it  would  recoil  upon  yourselves.  I  sha  1  prove  to  you, 
in  mvturn,  that  you  have  no  cause  to  mistrust  either  the  King  or 
me  ■'If  we  had  wished  to  destroy  you,  nothing  would  be  easier. 
We  have  superabundant  forces  for  the  purpose:  there  are  wide 
plains  in  which  vou  would  be  starved-besides  mountains  and  rivers 
wliidi  vou  would  be  unable  to  pass,  without  our  help.  Having  t  uis 
the  means  of  destroving  vou  in  our  hands,  and  having  nevertheless 
bound  ourselves  bv  solemn  oaths  to  save  you,  we  shall  not  be  tools 
and  knaves  enough  to  attempt  it  now,  when  \ye  should  draw  upon 
ourselves  the  iust  indignation  of  the  gods.  It  is  my  peculiar  affec- 
tion for  my  neighbors ^the  Greeks-and  my  wish  to  attach  to  my  own 

person,  by  ties  of  gratitude,  the  Greed.  ^.«^4^^'%«/,^>™Ykn^w 
have  made  me  eager  to  conduct  you  to  Icniia  in  stifety.  For  I  know 
that  when  you  are  in  my  service,  though  t]ie  ^Ong  is  the  only  man 
who  can  wear  his  tiara  erect  npon  Ins  head,  I  shall  be  able  to  wear 
mine  erect  upon  my  heart,  iu  full  pride  and  confidence. 


522 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


FATAL  IMPRUDENCE  OF   KLEARCHUS. 


523 


So  powerful  was  tl^e  impression  made  upon  Klearchus  by  these 
assurances,  tliat  he  exclaimed—"  Surely  those  informers  deserve  the 
severest  punishment,  who  try  to  put  us  at  enmity,  when  we  are  siicu 
good  friends  to  each  other,  and  have  so  much  reason  to  he  so." 
*' Yes  (replied  Tissaphernes),  they  deserve  nothing  less:  and  if  you, 
"vvith  the  other  irenends  and  lochages,  will  come  into  my  tent  to-mor- 
row, I  will  tell  you  who  the  caluminators  are."  *'  To  be  sure  I  will 
(rejoined  Klearchus),  and  bring  the  olher  generals  with  me.  I  shall 
tell  you  at  the  same  time  who  are  the  parties  that  seek  to  prejudice 
us  against  you."  The  conversation  then  ended,  the  satrap  detaining 
Klearchus  *to  dinner,  and  treating  him  in  the  most  hospitable  and 
contidential  manner. 

On  the  next  morning,  Klearchus  communicated  what  had  passed 
to  the  Greeks,  insisting  on  the  necessity  tliat  all  the  generals  should 
go  to  Tissaphernes  pursuant  to  his  invitation;  in  order  to  re-establish 
that  confidence  which  unworthy  calumniators  had  shaken,  juul  to 
punish  such  of  the  calumniators  as  might  he  Greeks.  So  emphati- 
cally did  he  pledge  himself  for  the  good  faith  and  Pliilllellenic  dis- 
positions of  the  satrap,  that  he  overruled  the  opposition  of  many 
among  the  soldiers;  who,  still  continuing  to  entertain  their  former 
suspicions,  remonstrated,  especially  against  the  extreme  imprudence 
of  putting  all  the  generals  at  once  into  ihe  power  of  Tissjiphcrnes. 
The  urgent;^'  of  Klearchus  prevailed.  Himself  with  four  other  gen- 
erals— Proxenus,  Menon,  Agias,  and  Sokrates — and  twenty  lochnges 
or  captains — went  to  visit  tiie  satrap  in  his  tent;  about  200  of  tlie 
soldiers  going  along  with  tlum,  to  make  purchases  for  their  own 
account  in  the  Persian  camp-market. 

On  reaching  the  quarters  of  Tissaphernes — distant  nearly  three 
miles  from  the  Grecian  camp,  according  to  habit — the  five  generals 
were  admitted  into  the  interior,  while  the  lochages  remained  at  the 
entrance.  A  purple  flag,  hoisted  from  the  top  of  the  tent,  betraved 
too  late  the  purpose  for  which  they  had  been  invited  to  come.  The 
lochages,  with  the  Grecian  soldiers  who  had  accompanied  them, 
were  surprised  and  cut  down,  while  the  generals  in  the  interior  were 
detained,  put  in  chains,  and  carried  up  as  prisoners  to  the  Persian 
court.  Here  Klearchus,  Proxenus,  Agias,  and  Sokrates.  were  he- 
headed,  after  a  short  imprisonment.  Queen  Parysatis.  indeed,  from 
affection  to  Cyrus,  not  only  furnished  many  comforts  to  Klearchus 
in  the  prison  (by  the  handsof  her  surgeon  Ktesias),  but  used  all  her 
influence  with  her  son  Artaxerxes  to  save  his  life,  though  her  efforts 
were  counteracted,  on  this  occasion,  by  the  superior  influence  of 
Queen  Stateira  his  wife".  The  rivalry  between  these  two  royal 
women,  doubtless  arising  out  of  many  other  circumstances  besides 
the  death  of  Klearchus,  became  soon  afterward  so  furious,  that 
Parvsatis  caused  Stateira  to  be  poisoned. 

Menon  was  not  put  to  death  along  with  the  other  generals.  He 
appears  to  have  taken  credit  at  the  Persian  court  for  the  treason  of 


pntrappin^  his  colleagues  into  the  hands  of  Tissaphernes.  But  hi3 
life  was  onlv  prolonged  to  perish  a  year  afterward  in  disgrace  and 
•ture— probablv  by  the  requisition  of  Parysatis,  who  thus  avenged 
the  death  of  Klearchus.  The  queen-mother  had  always  power 
cnou"-li  to  perpetrate  cruelties,  though  not  always  to  avert  them. 
She  liad  already  brought  to  a  miserable  end  every  one,  even  faithful 
defenders  of  Artaxerxes,  concerned  in  the  death  of  her  son  Cyrus. 

Thouirh  Menon  thought  it  convenient,  when  brought  up  to  Baby- 
lon to  boast  of  having  been  the  instrument  through  whom  the  gen- 
enis  were  entrapped  into  the  fatal  tent,  this  boast  is  not  to  be  treated 
a^' matter  of  fact.  For  not  only  does  Xenophon  explain  the  catas- 
trophe differently,  but  in  the  delineation  which  he  gives  of  Menon 
dark  and  odious  as  it  is  in  the  extreme,  he  does  not  advance  any  such 
imputations;  indirectly,  indeed,  he  sets  it  aside. 

Uufortunatelv  for  the  reputation  of  Klearchus,  no  such  reasonable 
excuse  can  be  offered  for  his  credulity,  which  brought  himself  as  well 
as  his  colleaijues  to  so  melancholy  an  end,  and   his  whole  army  to 
the  brink  of  ruin.    It  appears  that  the  general  sentiment  of  the  Gre- 
cian army,  taking  just  measure  of  the  character  of  Tissaphernes,  was 
dispo«^ed  to  greater  circumspection  in  dealing  with  him.     Lpon  that 
*;vstem  Klearchus  himself  had  hitherto  acted;  and  the  necessity  of  it 
mi<Tht  have  been  especial Iv  present  to  his  mind,  since  he  had  served 
witii  the  Lacedfemonian  flt'ct  at  Miletus  in  411  B.C.,  and  had  there- 
fore had  fuller  experience  than  other  men  in  the  army,  of  the  satrap  s 
real  character.     On  a  sudden  he  now  turns  round,  on  the  faith  ot  a 
few  verbal  declarations,  puts  all  the  military  chiefs  into  the  most; 
defenseless  posture  and  the  most  obvious  peril,  such  as  hardly  the 
<;trou<^est  o-rounds  for  confidence  could  have  justified.     Though  the 
remark  of  Machiavel  is  justified  by  large  experience— that  from  the 
short-si >ditedness  of  men  and  their  obedience  to  present  impulse,  the 
mo^t  notorious  deceiver  will  ahvays  find  new  persons  to  trust  him— 
still  such  misjud"-ment  on  the  part  of  an  officer  of  age  and  experience 
is  difficult  to  explain.     Polyseuus  intimates  that  beautiful  women 
exhibited  by  the  satrap  at  his  first  banquet  to  Klearchus  alone,  served 
as  a  lure  to  attract  him  with  all  his  colleagues  to  the  second;  while 
Xenophon  imputes  the  error  to  continuance  of  a  jealous  rivalry  with 
Menon.    The  latter,  it  appears,  having  always  been  intimate  with 
Arireus  had  been  thus  brought  into  previous  communication  with 
Tissaphernes  bv  whom  he  had  been  well  received,  and  by  whom  he 
^'as  also  encouraged  to  lay  plans  for  detaching  the  whole  Grecian 
armv  from  Klearchus,  so  as  to  bring  it  all  under  his  (Menon  s)  com- 
mand, into  the  service  of  the  satrap.     Such  at  least  was  the  suspicion 
of  Klearchus;  who,  jealous  in  the  extreme  of  his  own  military  au- 
thoritv  tried  to  defeat  the  scheme  by  bidding  still  higher  himself  for 
the  favor  of  Tissaphernes.     Imagining  that  Menon  w^as  the  unknown 
calumnLator  who  prejudiced  the  satrap  against  him,  he  hoped  to  pre- 
vail  on  the  satrap  to  disclose  his  name  and  dismiss  him.     buch  jeal- 


524 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  TIIOUSxVND. 


ousy  seems  to  have  robbed  Klcarchus  of  his  customary  prudence. 
VVe  must  also  allow  for  another  impression  deeply  tixtd  in  hi.>  mind, 
that  the  salvation  of  the  army  was  hopeless  without  the  coubcnl  of 
Tissaphernes,  and  therefore,  since  the  latter  had  conducted  them  lims 
far  in  safety,  when  he  might  have  destroyed  them  before,  thai  Lis 
designs  at  the  bottom  could  not  be  hostile. 

Notwithstanding  these  two  great  mistakes— one  on  the  present 
occasion,  one  previously,  at  the  battle  of  Kunaxa,  in  keeping  the 
Greeks  on  the  right  contrary  to  the  oider  of  Cyrus— both  conmiiiied 
by  Klearchus,  the  loss  of  that  officer  was  doubtless  a  great  nii,-for- 
tune  to  the  army;  while,  on  the  contrary,  the  removal  of  Menon  was 
a  signal  benetit — perhaps  a  condition  of  ultimate  safety.  A  man  so 
treacherous  and  unprincipled  as  Xenophou  depicts  3Ienon,  would 
probably  have  ended  by  really  committing  toward  the  army  that 
treason,  for  w  hich  he  falsely  took  credit  at  the  Persian  court  in 
reference  to  the  seizure  of  the  generals. 

The  impression  entertained  by  Klcarchus,  respecting  the  hopeless 
position  of  the  Greeks  in  the  heart  of  the  Persian  territory  after  the 
death  of  Cyrus,  was  perfectly  natural  in  a  military  man  who  could 
appreciate  all  the  means  of  attack  and  obstruction  which  the  enemy 
luid  it  in  their  power  to  employ.  Nothing  is  so  unaccountable  in 
this  expedition  as  the  manner  in  which  such  means  were  thrown 
a^vay — the  spectacle  of  Persian  impotence.  First,  the  whole  line  of 
upward  march,  including  the  passage  of  the  Euphrates,  left  unde- 
fended: next,  the  long  trench  dug  across  the  frontier  of  Babylonia, 
with  only  a  passage  of  twenty  feet  wide  left  near  the  Euphrates, 
abandoned  without  a  guard ;  lastly,  the  line  of  the  Wall  of  Media  and 
the  canals  which  offered  such  favorable  positions  for  keeping  the 
Greeks  out  of  the  cultivated  territoiy  of  Babylonia,  neglected  in  like 
manner,  and  a  convention  concluded,  whereby  the  Persians  engaged 
to  escort  the  invaders  safe  to  the  Ionian  coast,  beginning  by  condr.ct- 
'  ing  them  throu£rh  the  heart  of  Babylonia,  amid  canals  affording 
inexpugnable  defenses  if  the  Greeks  hiul  chosen  to  take  up  a  position 
among  them.  The  plan  of  Tissaphernes,  as  far  as  we  can  under- 
stand it,  seems  to  have  been  to  draw  the  Greeks  to  some  considerable 
distance  from  the  heart  of  the  Persian  empire,  and  then  to  open  his 
schemes  of  treasonable  hostility,  which  the  imprudence  of  Klearchus 
enabled  to  do,  on  the  banks  of  the  Great  Zab,  with  chances  of  succcbS 
such  as  he  could  hardly  have  contemplated.  We  have  here  a  fresh 
example  of  the  wonderful  impotence  of  the  Persians.  We  should 
have  expected  that  after  having  cmnmitted  so  flagrant  an  act  of  ]ier- 
fidy,  Tissaphernes  would  at  least  have  tried  to  turn  it  to  account; 
that  he  would  have  poured  with  all  his  forces  and  all  his  vigor  on  the 
Grecian  camp,  at  the  moment  when  it  was  unprepared,  disorganized, 
and  without  commanders.  Instead  of  which,  when  the  generals 
(with  those  w^ho  accompanied  them  to  the  Persian  camp)  had  been 
seized  or  slain,  no  attack  whatever  was  made  except  by  small  detach- 


PERSIAN  SUMMONS  TO  SURRENDER.  525 

.     .f  VovKVAn  cavalrv  upon  individual  Greek  stragglers  in  the 
T^  "on^Tf  meconp^^^  the  generals,  an  Arcad  an  named 

l^^ik  rclms  ran  woun  ed  into  the  Grecian  camp,  where  the  soldiers 
^tlmddn'  from  afar  at  the  horsemen  scouring  the  plain,  without 

Sm  h-^aetus  wul  an  adequate  guarcircame  to  the  ITout,  "ccompamed 

lilflaj.)  Mo,.g%o tlm!  siie  they  formerly  belonged  to  h:s  slave 

'^•ThP  stcn  here  taken  seems  to  testify  a  belief  on  the  part  of  these 
T>     -^n    ?h  ,t  the  irenerals  beini;  now  in  their  power,  tlie  Grecian 

^■^,SxS.on  which  breathed  n.-thing  but  indignant  reproach;  bo 
fh.ft  beS re  ired  and  left  tlie  Greelcs  to  their  own.  reflections.      . 

W  L  theh  cami  thus  remained  unmolested,  every  man  withm 
it  Ii^  a  p  T  to  Ze  mo.t  agoni.iiig  apprehensions  K-^^^PP^^^j^^ 
i„>pondiig  iid  i-vitable   tlKiugh  no  one  e-^tc^^n  .hat  p.cc.se 

Ztl^X'' hoi^nd  Vtad-:^' tt^hol^^ 
Zke^'up  by  impassable  ">0""'f '"\ '^"j/S  ^^t' ^^f  |^  ?^^^^^ 

'whom  he  was  never  ^^S'^^^^'n^'^rlPsnondencv  which  weighed  down 

Amid  the    many  causes  oi    desponaency   wmcu  >  ^p...^^..^^. 

tt.^Tnrlorn  armv   there  was  none  more  serious  than  the  fact  that  not 

Ukef;\«  voCtr  mt  ;j;X.sions.  at  a  moment  when  the  post  prom- 


526 


RETREAT  OF   THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


ADDRESS  OF  XENOPHON. 


527 


ised  notLin.c:  but  the  maximnm  of  difficulty  as  well  as  of  linznid 
A  new,  self-kindled  light— aud  self-originated  stimulus— Mas  required 
to  vivify  the  embers  of  suspended  hope  and  action,  i^  a  mass  para- 
lyzed for  the  moment,  but  every  way  capable  of  (ffon.  And  llio 
inspiration  now  fell,  happily  for  the  army,  upon  one  in  whom  a  full 
measure  of  soldierly  strength  and  courage  was  combined  with  the 
education  of  an  Athenian,  a  democrat,  and  a  philosopher. 

It  is  in  true  Homeric  vein,  and  in  something  like  Homeric  lan- 
guage, that  Xenophon  (to  whom  we  owe  the  whole  narrative  of  the 
expedition)  describes  his  dream,  or  the  intervention  of  Oneirus,  sent 
by  Zeus,  from  wliich  this  renovating  impiKse  took  its  rise.     Lyin"- 
mournful  and  restless  like  his  comrades,  he  caught  a  short  repose"^ 
when  he  dreamt  that  he  heard  thunder,  and  saw  the  burninjr  thun- 
der-bolt fall  upon    his    paternal   house,   which  became  forthwith 
encircled  by  flames.     Awaking,  full  of  terror,  he  instantly  spran"- 
up.  upon  which  the  dream  began  to  fit  on  and  blend  itself  with  his 
waking  thoughts,  and  with  the  cruel  realities  of  his  position.     His 
pious  and  excited   fancy  generated  a  series  of  shadowy  analogies. 
The  dream  was  sent  by  Zeus  the  Kin^,  since  it  was  from  him  that 
thunder  and   lightning  proceeded.     In   one  respect,  the   siun  was 
auspicious,  that  a  great  light  had  appeared  to  him  from  ZeufTin  the 
midst  of  peril  and  suffering.     But  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  ahirm- 
ing,  that  the  house  had  appeared  to  be   completely   encircled  by 
flames,  preventing  all  egress,  because  this  seemed  to  indicate  that  he 
w^ould  remain  confined  where  he   was  in  the  Persian   dominions 
without  being  able  to  overcome  the  difficulties  wliich  hedged  him  in! 
Yet  doubtful  as  the  promise  was,  it  was  still  the  messiPge  of  Zeus 
addressed  to  himself,  serving  as  a  stimulus  to  him  to  break  through 
the  common  stupor  and  take  the  initiative  movement.     "Why  am  I 
lying  here  ?    Night  is  advancing;  at  daybreak  the  enemy  will  be 
upon  us,  and  we  shall  be  put  to  death  wilh  tortures.     Not  a  man  is 
stirring  to  take  measures  of  defense.     Why  do  I  wait  for  any  man 
older  than  myself,  or  for  any  man  of  a  different  city  to  begin?" 
«     With  these  reflections,  interesting  in  themselves  and  given  with 
Homeric  vivacity,  he  instantly  went  to  convene  the  lochagi  or  cap- 
tains who  had  served  under  lus  late  friend  Proxenus.     He  impressed 
upon  them  emphatically  the  necessity  of  standing  forward  to  put  the 
army  in  a  posture  of  defense.     "  I  cannot  sleep,  gentlemen ;  neither, 
I  presume,  can  you,  under  our  present   perils.     The  enemy  will  be 
upon   lis  at  daybreak,  prepared  to  kill  us  all  with  tortures,  as  his 
worst  enemies.     For  my  part,  I  rejoice  that  his  flagitious  perjury 
has  put  an  end  to  a  truce  by  which  we  were  the  great  losers:  a  truce, 
under  which  we,  mindful  of  our  oaths,  have  passed  through  all  the 
rich  possessions  of  the  King,  without  touching  anything  except  what 
we  could  purchase  with  our  own  scanty  means.     Now,  we  have  our 
hands  free;  all  of  these  rich  spoils  stand  between   us  and   him,  as 
prizes  for  the  better  man.     The  gods,  who  preside  over  the  match 


will  assuredly  be  on  the  side  of  us,  who  Jiave  kept  our  oatns  in  spite 
of  strong  temptations,  against  these  perjurers.  Moreover,  our  bodies 
nre  more  enduring,  and  our  spirit  more  gallant  than  theirs  They 
are  easier  to  wouSd,  and  easier  to  kill  than  we  are,  under  the  same 
fivor  of  the  gods  as  we  experienced  at  Kunaxa 

"  Probably  others  also  are  feeling  just  as  we  feel.  But  let  us  not 
-r  lit  for  any  one  else  to  come  as  monitors  to  us;  let  us  take  tje  lead 
m\  communicate  the  stimulus  of  honor  to  others.  Do  you  show 
Yourselves  now  the  best  among  the  lochages-more  worthy  of  Ix  uig 
Incrals  than  the  generals  themselves.  Begin  at  once  and  I  desire 
ml V  to  follow  you.  But  if  you  order  me  into  the  front  rank,  I  shall 
obey  without  pleading  my  youth  as  an  excuse,  accounting  myself  to 
])e  of  complete  maturity,  when  the  purpose  is  to  save  myself  from 

•  »» 
^"aH  the  captains  who  heard  Xenophon  cordially  concurred  in  his 
su-gestion,  and  desired  him  to  take  the  lead  m  executing  it  One 
au)?ain  alone-Apollonides,  speaking  in  the  Boeotian  aialect---pro- 
tested  against  it  as  insane;  enlarging  upon  their  desperate  position, 
and  insisting  upon  submission  to  the  King  as  the  only  chance  of  safety. 
'  Iow'5  (rtTplied  Xenophon).  Have  you  forgotten  the  courteous 
treatment  which  we  received  from  the  Persians  in  Babylonia  when 
we  replied  to  their  demand  for  the  surrender  of  our  arms  by  show- 
in-  a  bold  front?  Do  not  you  see  the  niiserable  fate  which  has 
b  li\Un  Klearchus,  when  he  trusted  himselt  unarmed  in  their  hands, 
ill  reliance  on  their  oaths?  And  yet  you  scout  our  exhortations  to 
r.-lstance,  again  advising  us  to  go  and  plead  for  indulgence  !  My 
frieiuh  such  a  Greek  as  this  man,  disgraces  not  only  his  own  city, 
hut  all'  Greece  besides.  Let  us  banish  him  from  our  counsels 
cishier  him,  and  make  a  slave  of  him  to  carry  baggage.  -  Nay 
(observed  Agasias  of  Stymphalus),  the  man  has  nothing  to  do  with 
Greeciv.  I  inyself  have  seen  his  ears  bored,  like  a  true  Lydian. 
Apollonides  was  degraded  accordingly.  , 

Xenophon  with  the  rest  then  distributed  themselves  m  order  to 
brill-  together  the  chief  remaining  officers  in  the  army  who  were 
presently  convened,  to  the  number  of  about  one  hundred.  The 
senior  captain  of  the  earlier  body  next  desired  Xenophon  orei)eat  ^^ 
this  larger  body  the  topics  upon  which  he  had  just  before  been  ms  st- 
iug.  Xenophon  obeyed,  enlarging  yet  more  emphatically  on  the 
situation,  perilous,  yet  not  without  hope-on  the  proper  m^as^^^  to 
be  taken-and  especially  on  the  necessity  that  ^^^ey,  he  chiet  officei s 
remaining,  should  put  themselves  forward  prominently,  fiist  tix  upon 
eHeetive  commanders,  then  afterward  submit  the  names  o  be  con- 
firmed by  the  army,  accompanied  with  suitable  exhortations  an  I 
encouragement.  His  speech  was  applauded  and  we  corned  es^ec.- 
ally  by  the  Lacedaimoniau  general  Cheirisophus  y^^'^^:^.^^^ 
Cvrus  with  a  body  of  700  hoplites  at  Issus  in  Kilikia.  Ci  e  r  sophus 
ufged  the  captains  to^retire  forvvith,  and  agree   upon  their  com- 


528 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEX  THOUSAND. 


SPEECH  OF  XENOPHON. 


629 


i, 


manders  instead  of  the  four  who  had  been  seized;  after  wLicli  the 
herald  must  be  summoned,  and  the  entire  bodv  of  soldiers  convened 
without  delay.  Arcordinirly  Timasion  of  Dardaiius  was  clio^eu 
instead  of  Kiearchus;  Xantliikles  in  pJace  of  Sokrates-  Kleauor 
in  place  ot-  Agias;  Philesius  in  place  of  Menon;  and  Xenoplior 
instead  of  Proxenus.  The  captains,  who  had  served  under  (ach  of  th' 
departed  generals,  separately  chose  a  succe.ssor  to  the  captain  thiB 
promoted.  It  is  to  be  recollected  that  the  live  now  chosen  were  not 
the  only  generals  in  the  camp;  thus  for  example,  Chcirisophus  hd 
the  commaml  of  his  own  separate  division,  and  there  may  have  been 
one  or  two  others  similarly  placed.  But  it  was  now  necessary  for  ill 
the  geiHirals  to  form  a  Board  and  act  in  concert 

At  daybreak  the  new-constituted  Board  of  Generals  placed  prom 
outposts  in  advance,  and  then  convened  the  army  in  aeneial  a^scn- 
bly,  in  order  that  the  new  appointments  might  be  submitted  and  coi- 
Vnt  -  .^s  s^^^n/s  this  had  been  done,  probably  on  tjie  proposition 
of  Cheirisophus  (who  had  been  in  command  before)  that  iienerd 
addressed  a  tew  words  of  exhortation  ard  encourrccmcnt  to  the  sol- 
diers He  was  followed  by  Kleanor.  who  delivtrtd,  with  the  like 
brevity,  an  earnest  protest  against  the  perfidy  of  Ti.-saphcrnes  niul 
Ariffus  Both  of  them  left  to  Xenopbcn  the  task,  alike  imrorlan: 
and  arduous  at  this  moment  of  despondency,  of  settirg  loith  the 
case  at  length— working  up  the  feelinos  of  the  soldieis  tcf  tl  j,t  pilch 
of  resolution  which  the  emergency  uquired-ard  rbove  HI  extin- 
guishing all  those  inclinations  to  acquiesce  in  new  tnr.d  eirus  pio- 
posals  from  the  enemy,  which  the  perils  of  the  situation  wculd  le 
likely  to  suggest. 

Xenophon^had  equipped  himself  in  his  finest  military  crsli  n.e  at 
this  his  hrst    official  appearance  before  the  aim  v.  when  lie  uahs 
seemed  to  tremble  between  life  and  death.     Taking  up  the  t  icttst  of 
Kleanor  against  the  treachery  of  the  Persirns,  he  insisted  il  at   miv 
attempt  to  enter  into  convention  or  trust  wilh  such  liais,  \^(lld  Ic 
litter  rum— but  that  if  energetic  resolution  were  taken  to  ele.il  wiih 
them  only  at  the  point   of  the  sword,  and  punish   iheir  niKieuls, 
there  was  good  hope  of  the  favor  of  the  gods  and  of  ulliniMe  iics- 
ervation.     As   pronounced  this  last  woid,  one  of  the  fcldiers  iua' 
him   happened    to   sneeze.      Immediatelv  the  whole  fiin.y  aieiid 
ehouted  with  one  accord  the  accuste^med  mvccalion  to  Zei  s  the  lie- 
Fcrver;  and  Xenophon,  taking  up  the  accident,  cc  nlinued— "  eii.ee, 
gentlemen,  this  omen  frcm  Zeus  the  Preserver  has  apreaied  at  ihe 
uistant  when  we  were  talking  about  preservation,  let  us  lieie  vow  lo 
oiler  the  preserving  sacrifice  to  that  god,  and  at  the  sr.me  time  lo 
eacritice  to  the  remaining  gods.as  well  as  we  can,  in  the  fiist  friendly 
country  which  we  may  reach.     Let  every  man,  who  agrees  wilh  n.e 
hold  up  us  hanel  "     All  held  up  their  hands:  all  then  joined  in  the 
vow,  and  shouted  the  psean. 
This  accident,  so  dexterously  turned  to  profit  by  the  ihetorical 


1  -11    f  Vpnnnhon   was  eminently  beneficial  in  raising  the  army  out 

(,t  tlie  atpic&»iu  ^r^r^r..?}      T?pn(^atino-  h  s  assurances  that  the 

''!ts"we  rori!!;.1   lle^'oa-l.o?tile  trtUeir   perjured   enemy,   he 
^   „n«l   o  their  merao,y  the  irreat  invasions  ot  Greece  bv  Darius  and 
'v'  !',    how  tlic  V  iTt  liosts  of  Persia  had  been  disgracefully  repelled 
Th    ^rii^hld   Uv^^.^^^  on  the  field  of  Kunaxa  worthy  of 

^1  f  i^f-,tl,ers    ind  thev  wouhl  for  the  future  be  yet  bolder,  kuow- 
?''f  \w  that  baule  o1  wh-vt  stuff  the  Persians  were  made      As  f..r 

^rm':rSetcl''^^l^aflrtlZn^^ren^^ 
w  of  los  n  "  tlieir  seats-ineapable  of  prevailing  against  infantry 
Ann  on  the  "r ound-and  only  better  able  lo  run  away  Now  that 
?les°  rap  refuse,  to  furnish  them  with  provisiotis  to  buy  hey J.i 
!i,  «  de  were  releaseil  froiu  their  covenant,  and  would  take  pro- 
V  on  wi  lOUt  b  nW  Then  as  to  the  rivers;  those  were  .ndee.1 
^  ffic, It  to  be  crossed  in  tl.e  middle  of  their  course;  but  the  army 
tlnk  march  up  to  heir  sources,  and  could  then  pass  them  with.jut 
ivoiiw  martii  up  lu  i"-.  ,   .,     ri    pj^^,  m\-i\H  renounce  the  idea 

:n:Sfa  'Id":  ablEied  tiel'vefpe^aneStly  in  ,  he  King's  o.^. 
cmmtrv  defvin-  all  his  force,  like  the  Mysians  and  I  isidians.  It 
S  Xe'nwln  "f  we  plant  ourselves  here  at  our  eas.  m  a  rich  coun- 
rv  «MihThe"e  tall  suitely,  and  beautiful  Median  and  Persian  women 
f,Voucompani^ns-we  shall  be  only  too  ready,  like  the  Lotophag 
iTlnZ .?  o  r  wav  home  We  ought  first  to  go  back  I  < <  Greece  and  tell 
1  countn'  nln\hn  rcnfain  poor,  it  is  their  own  fault,  when 

Trrai'l^VI  settlements 'in  this  country  awaiting  a     w^^ 

'»^^c::n';l^'e^;^rl?;^:Ttll^I^ 

ftrictes^eces4tv      Above  all  things,  let  us  maintam  order  disci- 
p  ue   and  obedSice  to  commandei.,  upon  ^v'-jeb  our  en^ii^  hope  of 

bi.:ir^:pu!:;^hr:r.fu;xrdSnS^ 

^Si^'ofTS^^^^^^^^ 

tl,.     n,P  for  a-tion      If  any  man,  however  oliscure  has  anything 
"?o  sug^it  let  him  co^e  forward  and  state  it;  for  we  have  all 


530 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


DIFFICULTIES  OF  XENOPHON. 


531 


monian,  should  lead  the  van:  wliilc  Klcanor,  ard  iLe  other  senior 
oflicers,  would  command  on  each  flank — ard  hiniM  If  with  Tiniasion, 
as  ihe  two  youngest  of  the  generals,  would  lead  ll.e  rearguard. 

This  proposition  was  at  once  adopted,  rnd  the  r.fsenihly  biokevip; 
proceeding  forthwitii  to  destroy,  or  distiibute  j  n  ( ng  one  anollier, 
every  man's  supeifluous  baggage — and  then  to  lake  their  nioiiiing 
meal  previous  to  the  march. 

The  scene  just  described  is  interesting  and  illustrative  in  m.orethnn 
one  point  of  view.  It  exhibits  that  su^ccptibility  to  the  infiiieLce  of 
persuasive  discourse  which  f(  m.ed  so  marked  a  feature  in  the  Gie- 
cian  character — a  resurrection  of  the  collective  body  out  of  the  dij  lli 
of  despair,  under  the  exhortaticn  of  one  who  had  no  estab]i>L((l  as- 
cendency, nor  anything  to  recommend  him,  except  his  intelligence, 
his  oratorical  power,  and  his  community  of  interest  with  tbcmK'lves. 
Next,  it  manifests,  still  more  strikingly,  the  superiority  of  Aihenitiu 
training  as  compared  with  that  of  other  paits  of  Greece.  Cheiri.<-o- 
phus  had  not  only  been  before  in  effiee  as  one  cf  the  generals,  lut 
was  also  a  native  of  Sparta,  who^e  Kiprema<y  and  name  was  at  that 
moment  all-powerful :  Kleanor  had  been  befoie,  not  indeed  a  general, 
but  a  lochage,  or  one  in  the  second  rank  of  officers :— he  was  an 
elderly  man— and  lie  was  an  Arcadian,  wliile  more  than  the  numeri- 
cal half  of  the  aimy  eonsisted  of  Aicadians  and  Achseans.  Either  of 
these  two,  therefore,  and  various  ethers  bendes,  enjoyed  a  sort  of  pre- 
rogative, or  established  starting-f  oint,  for  taking  the  initiative  in  refer- 
ence to  tlie  dis])irite<l }  rmy.  3;ut  Xcnophon  wi.s  ( cmj  aratively  a  young 
man,  with  little  military  experience:— he  was  not  an  tfhcer  at  all, 
either  in  the  first  or  second  grade,  but  eimply  a  volunteer,  companion 
of  Proxenijs; — he  was  moreover  a  native  of  Athens,  a  city  at  that  time 
unp>opular  among  the  great  body  of  Greeks,  and  ei^pecially  of  Pelo- 
ponnesians,  with  whom  lier  recent  long  war  brd  been  cairied  on. 
Not  only  therefore  he  had  no  advantages  ccn  paied  with  others,  but 
he  was  under  positive  disadvantages.  He  had  nothing  to  start  with 
except  his  personal  eiualities  and  previous  training;  in  .^pite  of  which 
we  find  him  not  merely  the  prime'  mover,  but  also  the  ascendant  per- 
son for  whom  the  others  make  way.  In  him  are  exemplified  those 
peculiarities  of  Athens,  attested  not  less  by  tie  deni:nciation  of  her 
enemies  than  by  the  panegvric  of  her  own  citizens — spontaneous  and 
forward  impulse,  as  well  in  conception  as  in  execution — confidence 
under  circumstances  which  made  others  despair — persuasive  discourse 
and  publicity  of  discussion,  made  subservient  to  practical  business, 
so  as  at  once  to  appeal  to  the  intelligence,  and  stimulate  the  active 
zeal,  of  the  multituele.  Such  peculiarities  stood  out  more  remjirkably 
from  being  contrasted  with  the  opposite  (qualities  in  Spartans— mis- 
trust in  conception,  slackncss'in  execution,  secrecy  in  counsel,  silent 
and  passive  obedience.  Though  Spartans  and  Athenians  formed  the 
tw^o  extremities  of  the  scale,  other  Greeks  stood  nearer  on  tiiis  point 
to  the  former  than  to  the  latter.  * 


..      r.r.  ^r^  that  encoura-ino-  autumn  which  followed  immediately 

^^'  'Kr<  re^t  AthS  cTat^stJophc  before  Syracuse,  the  inertia  of 

ll^'li     'nfcrnoTbe  s   rred  into  Vigorous  action  without  the  vehem- 

^^'"^"f  the  It^enL  Alkibiades-much  more  was  it  necessary  under 

pnce  of  ^"^/^i"""."';,^^^^^^  ^vhich  now  overclouded  the  unothcered 

'''  ^^-^P'frml^  tS  rAtheuirn  b^^^^^^^^  should  be  found  as  the  source 
Grecmn  arm}%  that  an  Aint  probably,  except  an 

of  ne^y  hfe  and    mp^l^^^  oi  obeyed  the  pi^mplings  to  stand  forward 
Athenmn.  either    '^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  i.ere  was  eve?y  motive  to  decline 

as  a  volunteer  ^^^^^^•^^^^^'eUity  to  impel  him.     But  if  by  chance 
rcsponsibihty,  and  ^^^  special  my  i  forward,  he  would 

a  Spartan  or  ^l^  ^;;^^1^^^^,^  ,^ !  i.^^^^^^^^  enable  him  to  work  on 

have  been  desti tu  e  *>    P^^^/^^'^^^^^i^'  ;;^^  familiarity  with  the 

the  minds  of  others— ot  that  n^xi»i"iy  ,                   enforcing 

temper  and  mpvemen  .  I^^^^'^"    .f  ^^^^^^^^^^^  Zvds,  which  Athc^- 

each  of  them  is  \^";f  !""*//;  f^w  words  of  introduction,  consign 
Sfe?;;' f  woSfuTth^^^^^^^^  of  tUe  anny  to  the  proper 
'''how  well  he  performed  this  may  be  seen  by  his  ^Pff  to  the  army 

Pe  ik  es^nor  Xenoplion  would  have  employed  at  •'°y.«ther  moment^ 

aSnf>"was  compelled  to  set  before  ^^^^K  asf^X'  demo 
democmey  of  Athens;  and  whieh  the  Sophists  ^«  J^'  4\,'''^^/'„rst 
mtical  iustitutioas-both  of  them  so  hardly  ^'eP^^^'f  "^  Xartlte 
crities-hclped  and  encom-a-ed  him  to.««l'"/t ,,?'J'trinite  S  ™^^ 
accomplishment,  the  cx<;lusive  possession  °f/^''l^^' "  Ts  „?  Prox- 
stant  jealousy  on  the  part  of  Booo  lan  o*«"t '^^.^nrnor^n  of  t^ 
enus,  elevatecl  Xenoph;.n  into  the  most  ascendant  person  oi  ine 


532 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


SUFFERINGS  OF  THE  GREEKS 


533 


Cyreian  army,  from  the  present  moment  until  the  time  when  itbrokp 
iil>— as  will  be  seen  in  the  subsequent  history. 

I  tiiink  it  the  more  necessary  to  notice  this  fact— that  tlie  accomnli.i, 
meuts  whereby  Xenophon  leaped  on  a  sudden  into  such  extraoidinirv 
ascendency,  and  rendered  such  eminent  service  to  his  army  w.mp 
accomplishments  belonging  in  an  especial  manner  to  the  Athenian 
democracy  and  education— because  Xenophon  himself  has  throu-h 
out  his  wntuigs  treated  Athens  not  merely  without  the  atlachmem 
of  a  citizen,  but  with  feelings  more  like  the  positive  antipathy  of  an 
exile.  His  sympathies  are  all  in  favor  of  the  perpetual  drill  the 
mechanical  obedience,  the  secret  government  proceedings  the'uar 
row  and  prescribed  range  of  ideas,  the  silent  and  deferential  de- 
meanor,  the  methodical,  though  tardy,  action— of  Sparta.  Whatever 
may  be  the  justice  of  his  prelerence,  certain  it  is,  that  the  dualities 
whereby  he  was  himself  enabled  to  contribute  so  much  both  to  the 
.  rescue  of  the  Cyreian  army,  and  to  his  own  reputation— were  Athenian 
far  more  than  Spartan. 

While  the  Grecian  army,  after  sanctioning  the  propositions  of 
Xenophon  were  taking  their  morning  meal  before  they  commenced 
their  march,  Mithridales,  one  of  the  Persians  previously  attached' to 
Cyrus,  appeared  with  a  few  horsemen  on  a  mission  of  pretended 
Iriendship.  But  it  was  soon  found  out  that  his  purposes  WTre  treacli- 
erous,  and  that  he  came  merely  to  seduce  individual  soldiers  to 
desertion— with  a  few  of  whom  he  succeeded.  Accordingly  the 
resolution  was  taken  to  admit  no  more  heralds  or  envoys. 

Disembarra.^s(d  of  superfluous  baggage,  and  refreshed,  the  army 
now  crossed  the  Great  Zab  River,  and  pursued  their  march  on  the 
other  side   haying  their  baggage  and  attendants  in  the  center,  and 
Uieinsophus  leading  the  van  with  a  select  body  of  300  hoplites.    As 
no  mention  is  made  of  a  bridge,  we  are  to  presume  that  they  forded 
the  river— which  furnishes  a  ford  (according  to  Mr.  Ainsworth)  still 
commonly  used,  at  a  place  between  thirty  and  forty  miles  from  its 
iunction  with  the  Tigris.     When  they  had  not  a  little  way  forward, 
Mithndates  again  appeared  with  a  few  hundred  cavalry  and  bowmen. 
He  approached  them  like  a  friend ;  but  as  soon  as  he  w  as  near  enoiiirb, 
suddenly  began  to  hara.ss  the  rear  with  a  shower  of  missiles     What 
surprises  us  most  is,  that  the  Persians,  with   their  verv  numerous 
force,  made  no  attempt  to  hinder  them  from  crossinc:  so  very  con- 
siderable a  river;  for  Xenophon  estimates  the  Zab  at  400  feet  broad, 
—and  this  seems  below  the  statement  of    modern  travelers,  who 
inform  us  that  it  contains  not  much  less  water  than  the  Tiuris;  and 
though  usually  deeper  and  narrower,  cannot  be  nuich  narrower  at 
any  fordable  i^lace.     It  is  to  be  recollected  that  the  Persians,  habit- 
ually marching  in  advance  of  the  Greeks,  must  have  reached  the 
nyer  first  and  were  therefore  in  possession  of  the  crossing,  wh.ether 
Dridge  or  ford.     Though  on  the  watch  for  every  opportunity  of  i)cr- 
ndy,  rissaphernes  did  not  dare  to  resist  the  Greeks,  even  in  the  most 


advantageous  posUion^^d^^^^^^^^^^ 

to  harass  ll.e  rear;  ;^1'>*=    '''krooks   few  in  number,  were  at  the  same 

bowmen  and  ^'"{^''■■^i^f '.'^,"1^;';';^'^,    and  when  Xenophon  employed 

time  inf >='■'<""]« '•'<'t';f",H  npulsts   to  charge  and  repel  thera.he  not 
his  rear-guavd,  lioplites  and  I'eltasts   to  ci">g^         ^^^^  irettin!;l)aclc 

only  coul.l  never  overtake  any  2^;«- ''^~tWn^^^^^^ 

to  rejoin  his  own  "'^»» ''»'1> •  ,^J,''",^f ,"i/t  "eU'n  behind  him  with 

man  could  discharge  Ins  ^[;"^,^"'^;  ^,' J^f.iffi'afterward  still  more 

effect;  a  'i'^f^^f^'^-^'^'^^.l^'^'^^^^^^  present  day  parallel 

signal  y, and  wh.ch  the  Pers  an  hm,eme 

with  their  carbines.  1 '"p  ^^*^ '."'^  ",,„„!;  „f  ^-wilrv      Even  the  smal 

";.™r';nt'r\uth4du™"<JriCdeia^^^^^^^ 

detachment  "*,  jl'V^;^'!^^^?  than  two  miles,  reaching  the  villages 

1  r  rvCit'^^^^^^^^^^ 

•■Tlmnk  Heaven"  (said  Xon.m  on  ^^.^  ^^ 

phus  reproached  him  f°;/,'^.P'"f/,;;™tVeach)-''  Thank  Heaven,  that 

^'''''■■=r^Ie   Sncked  L  wUhT  malTdetacl!;;:ent  only  and  not  with 

our  enemie»  a«ac'^,«''  "i,,™'! '        ^.^^^^  us  a  valuable  lesson  without 
their  great  numbeis     They  lijucve  ^^^  ^^^^^ 

their  way  a  ™X'»e  'i>  hc"U  to  P^^  '  >  ^  -.^^^  proceedings),  but 
fended  (according  to  the  "■^'^al  stupiui  y  o      M-,,i,r,iiates  reappeared 

->'-  «'l ''^ll  f^oroMo  10  s"  nn  and"s  Confid^i'it  from 
in  pursuit  with  a  t3()a\  oi  *'^' ';.'""  ,\  h^hnd  nromised  with  a  body 
h/achievement  o  t,^  Srfetifto  he  htn^dsTf  «^  satrap  BuJ 
of  that  force,  to  deliver  tne  w  eeiis  mi"  attack 

the  latter  were  now  l'--""  I'-'^^P^J^ftortltwi  Hhe  tor  eSen,  slingers, 
them,  the  t™™Pe'  ^?""f ,''-:™  '"^.c  Pct  sustained  by  the 

and  darters  issued  forth  *"  ^  '^'f  .,f t'^,J^^el mr-'e  that  the  Persians 
hoplites  in  the  rear.   .^^"  effec  ive  w,  s  t^«^ ''^Vj'^' ^     number;  while 

fled  in  dismay;,  ""'"f '^•^^1'^'  3,'l'f;. .  ".?nrof  ttiem  were  slain,  and 
the  ravine  so  ™Pe'l«^V''«''T«,'f  A,'  ek  3rs  of  their  own  accord 
eighteen  prisoners  made.  T''«X,^t .  ,?rike  terror  into  the  enemy, 
mutilated  the  dead  bodies,  m  order  to  ^J'  ^^  *? '^["^  if';™  ,,  ^^ar  the 
At  the  end  of  the  day's  march  "''^>[^.f™l  lofty  bck  walls  of 
deserted  city  of  Larissa,  '^e  vmt   mass    e   aml^  lotty         ^.^^^,_,^j^,,,_ 

which  (25  feet  In  thickness,  100  feet  "i^'' ^j'™?  ,  ^^^^^  ^  gtone 
enee)  attested  its  .fo;™''',,f  ^'j;^?".  ftel  high  tlfe  summit  of  which 
pyramid,  100  f«?' -J:^';f*  '' ^Z  'ot^he  „eiX  villages.  Another 
dl^rrK  ^e  — ■  ^^^^       Tigris  brSught  the  army  to  a  second 


534 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


FORCED  MARCH  OF  THE  PERSIANS. 


535 


deserted  city  called  Mespila,  nearly  opposite  to  Ibe  modern  eitv  of 
jMosul.  Althougli  these  two  cities,  which  seemed  to  have  formed  the 
continuHtiou  of  (or  the  substitute  for)  tlie  once  coIofsjiI  Nineveii  or 
Nmus  were  completely  destrted— yet  the  country  around  them  was 
so  well  furnished  with  villa-es  and  populaticu,  that  the  Greeks  not 
only  obtained  provisions,  but  also  strings  for  the  makini?  of  new  bows 
and  lead  for  bullets  to  be  used  by  the  slingers. 

,,  ^"1"'"?  the  next  day's  march,  in  a  course  generally  parallel  witli 
the  Tigris,  and  ascending  the  stream,  Tissaphernes,  cominir  up  aloii- 
with  some  other  giandees,  and  with  a  numerous  army,  enveloped  ili'e 
Greeks  both  m  flanks  and  rear.  In  spite  of  his  advantage  of  nundx-iN 
he  did  not  venture  upon  any  actual  charue.  but  kept  up  a  lire  of 
arrows,  darts,  and  stones.  -He  was  however  so  well  answered  bv  the 
newly-trained  archers  and  slingers  of  the  Greeks,  that  on  the  whole 
they  had  the  advantage,  in  spite  of  the  superior  size  of  the  Perviau 
bows,  many  of  which  were  taken  and  elfectivelv  employed  on  the 
Grecian  side.    Having  passed  the  night  in  a  well-stockc  d  villaoe  thev 
halted  there  the  next  day  in  order  to  stock  themselves  wilh^'provit 
lons,  and  then  pursued  their  march  for  four  successive  days  along  a 
level  country,  until  on  the  fifth  day  they  reaclu d  Iiilly  ground  with 
the  prospect  of  still  higher  liills  beyond.     All  this  march  was  made 
under  unremitting  annoyance  from  the  enemy,  insomuch  that  tliou^-^h 
the  order  of  the<3reeks  was  never  broken,  a  considerable  number  of 
their  men  were  wounded.     Exi^erience  taught  them  that  it  was  in- 
conveiiunt  for  the  whole  araiy  to  march  in  one  inflexible,  undivided 
hollow  square;  and  they  accoidiniily  constituted  six  lochi  or  re^n- 
ments  of  100  men  each,  sulxlivided  into  companies  of  50  and  enom- 
oties  or  smaller  companies  of  25,  each  with  a  special  ofhcer  (ccn- 
fonnably  to  the  Spartan  practice)  to  move  separately  on  each  tiank 
and  either  to  fall  back,  or  fall  in,  as  might  suit  the  fluctuations  of  the 
central  mass,  arising  from  the  impediments  in  the  road  or  menaces 
of  the  enemy.     On  reaching  the  hills,  in  sidit  of  an  elevated  citadel 
or  palace,  with  several  villages  around  it,  the  Greeks  anticipated  some 
remission  of  the  Persian  attack.     But  after  liaving  passed  over  one 
hill,  they  were  proceeding  to  ascend  the  second,  when  they  found 
themselves  assailed  with   unwonted  vigor  by  the  Persian  cavalry 
from  the  summit  of  it,  whose  leaders  were  seen  flosrging  on  the  men 
to  the  attack.     This  charge  was  so  efficacious,  that"  Uie  Gieek  li*dit 
troops  were  driven  in  with  loss,  and  forced  to  take  shelter  within  The 
ranks  of  the  hoplites.     After  a  march  both  slow  and  full  of  sulTering 
they  could  only  reach  their  night-quarters  by  sending  a  detachment 
to  get  iwssession   of  some  ground  above  the  Persians,  who  thus 
became  afraid  of  a  double  attack. 

The  villages  which  they  now  reached  (supposed  by  Mr  Ainsworth 
to  have  been  in  the  fertile  country  under  the  modern  town  called 
Zakhu),  were  unusually  ricii  in  provisions;  magazines  of  flour  barley-, 
and  wmejiaving  been  collected  there  for  the  Persian  satrap     They 


1  •^A.r  t«  m-rlnr  to  tend  the  numerous 
reposed  here  three  d^n  J"  f  y„-  ^  ^Z  moslcompetont  persons 
wouudcd,  for  wlio»e  •'e'^"-^^'"^"'*;'^'''"',-,  .,  fourth dav  they  resumed 
^erc  singled  out  to  aet  "« ?">■« 7"^-  j.*;^  "'gut  experience' had  now 
thrir  mareli,  descending  nlo  "  «  P';'"';  f*  i,',  march  under  the 
satisned  them  that  U  --^XnWhen.e"  appeared  and  began  to 
attacic  of  cavalry,  f''  "\''' }\^"fl ' , %  ,a"-e  and  when  thus  in  station, 
,,ar..ss  thorn  '  ^-j,^ ''^'"^^/^^J'^ff^^J  n  ifdvanced  the  Persian  assail- 
easily  repelled  him.  /^^,';^^/"'^.""  i^^ys  iu  the  habit  of  taking  up 
aats  began  to  retire;  for  they  ^«'';  ;'.**y;„  „,iies  from  the  Grecian 

their  night-post  at  a  J'^"i"f  f  „"?  """i'  ^I,*^  l^"]  attack  in  their  camp, 
position;  being  very  appreiei^ive  of  nc^ctmna^  ^.^^^^  ^^. 

when  their  horses  were  tied  bv  »  «  i^;' '  "  ,  Q^eks  resumed  their 
bridle.  As  soon  as  t'''^^>''':''.^;^'^fi'^;i,7the  night,  that  the  Per- 
^r'd'^'nro^e^lLr'he;^ Xr'on  the  next^day  or  the  day 

'"S:;  t..e  ensuing  day.  l-wever  tjie  Pe.i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^      -de^a  f^orced 

march  by  ni,ght,  were  f  ^'  "-^^  ""l^^i^J^ipi  o^^^^^  ground  overhanging 
occnpalion  ot  a  spur  ot  hig     and  PJ^-^'P^'"    ,J'j„  aesceud  into  the 

immediately  the  road  ^^;  '""''y  ^^.,^^ed  hcTt  once  saw  that  descent 
uhiin.     When  Cheirisoplius  appioac  lui, 'le  a  He  therefore 

Ls  impracticable  in  the  face  of  «■'«"«'»>  '  ;^j''diired  him  to  bring 
halted,  sent  for  Xenoplmn  mm  ^^«  "^^>;„;'"'^,';^,'^  .ougli  he  obeyed 
forwanl  the  pellasts  to  l''«;'^";,„  °  'i.t'  ° ',«  to  the  t°o..t,  .lid  not 
the  summons  in  person  and  g''"oPJ- '  ']!,,„[,,«  rear,  because  he  saw 
think  it  prudent  to  move  the  P*^^,  ^''^  ^fX  am-  ]mt  coming  up; 
Tissaphernes.  with  another  P'.''''"".fi,Xaen  l^reat- 

80  that  the  Grecian  army  was  a    o  ce  mpule^  .  .^.^^^^  ^^  j,^^ 

ened  liy  the  enemy  <:l<>«"f/'P""^,'',"'\H  assailed.     But  Xenophon 
high  gn.un.l  in  front  could  >l°' ''^f,'*'^^i\\\^,'^t^^^^^  was  an  acces- 

observed,  that  on  the  ''■S';^, 'f,;']  ^^^'/^^^ «  ence  a  descent  might  be 
siblc  mountain  summit  vet  bigliu   ' '   "'.       position.     Pointing  out 
made  for  a  tiank  ^V":''='^,>;P°''.^i,faVnTL  only  means  of  dislodg- 
this  summit  to  Cheirisophus,  ''^ -^^  ™  "^ J  ,\,°„i,,ouUl  immediately 
Ing  the  troops  in  front.  l'«  "■^'^'^^, '"' °'^t,S^        it   and  offere,!  to 
kSten  with  a  iletachiueut  to  "''''i«  P."*'^ '",  .(avin-  with  tlio  army. 
Cheirisophus  the  «  ^If^.^^^^^^J  ...f^^S^'.^W^u'then  (said  Xeno- 
'■  Choose  for  yourself,    said  ^^'»<^   '"°P'  "''• . ,,     j^^  "     Accordingly, 
phon),  I  will  go;  since  I  am   I'';  ,7'  S^^"[„*f^a""^;„,,  center  of  the 
at  the  head  of  a  select  detachment  fom  »'«; J'""  'J  ,^         u^e  steep 
army,  he   immediately  ^onu-'enccd  hi,   flank  « 
ascent  to  this  highest  summit.    *^  ^o"". '^.'r  i  opi^i"-  to  get  to  the 
pose,  they  also  d^'tf '^J    '^t'^';,'^  Lms  vv-  rc^s  "n^  n^^  at  the 

summit  first;  and  the  tvyo  ''<^!f,f  "f"J^,„"  ,  ..jYorts  to  get  before  the 

^!!^^^:^!!^^^^        ^^^  -"^ 

armies  respectively. 


536 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


KAHDUCIIIAN  MOUNTAINS. 


537 


As  Xer.ophon  was  riding  by  the  side  of  his  soldiers,  cheering  Uiein 
on  and  reminding  them  tlmt  their  chance  of  seeing  their  country  and 
their  families  all  depended  upon  success  in  the  effort  before  them  a 
Sikyonian  hoplite  in  the  ranks,  named  Soteridas,  said  to  him—"  You 
and  I  are  not  on  an  equal  footing,  Xenophon.     You  are  on  horseback 
I  am  painfully   struggling  up  on  foot,  with  my  shield  to  carry. " 
Stung  with  this  taunt,  Xenophon  sprang  from   his  horse,  pushed 
h>oteridas  out  of  his  place  in  the  ranks,  tcu^k  his  shield  as  well  as  his 
place,    and   began   to   march   forward   afoot   along   with    the  rest 
Though  thus  weigfjed  down  at  once  by  the  shield  belonging  to  an 
hopliie,  and  by  the  heavy  cuirass  of  a  horseman  (who  carried  no 
shield),  he  nevertheless  put  forth  all  his  strength  to  advance  under 
such  double  incumbrance,  and  to  continue  his  incitement  to  the  rest. 
But  the  soldiers  around  him  were  so  indignant  at  the  proceeding  of 
Soteridas.  that   they  reproached  and   even   struck   him,   until  they 
compelled  him  to  resume  his  shield  as  well  as  his  place  in  the  ranks. 
Xenophon  then  remounted  and  ascended  the  hill  on  horseback  as 
far  as   the  ground   permitted;  but  was  obliged  again  to  dismount 
presently,  in  consequence  of  the  steepness  of"^ the  uppermost  portion. 
Such  energetic  efforts  enabled  him  and  his  detachment  to  reach  the 
summit  first.     As  soon  as  the  enemy  saw  this,  they  desisted  from 
their  ascent,    and  dispersed  in  all  directions;  leaving  the  forward 
march  open  to  the  main  Grecian  armv,  which  Cheirisophus  accord- 
ingly conducted  safely  down  to  the  jdain.     Here  he  was  rejoined  bv 
Xenophon  on  descending  from  the  summit.     All  found  themselves 
in  comfortable   quarters,   amid  several  well-stocked  villages  on  the 
banks  of  the  Tigris.     They  acquired  moreover  an  additional  booty  of 
large  droves  of  cattle,  intercepted  when  on  the  point  of  being  trans- 
ported across  the  river;  wiiere  a  considerable  body  of  horse  were  seen 
assembled  m  the  opposite  bank. 

Though  here  disturbed  only  by  some  desultory  attacks  on  the  part 
of  the  Persians,  who  burnt  several  of  the  viUages  which  lay  in  their 
forward  line  of  march,  the  Greeks  became  seriously  embarrassed 
whither  to  direct  their  steps;  for  on  their  left  flank  was  the  Tisrris, 
so  deep  that  their  speais  found  no  bottom— and  on  their  light, 
mountains  of  exceeding  height.  As  the  generals  and  the  lochages 
Avere  taking  counsel,  a  Rhodian  soldier  came  to  them  w i'h  a  ])ropo- 
sition  for  transporting  the  whole  army  across  to  the  other  bank  of 
the  river  by  means  of  inflated  skins,  which  could  be  furnished  in 
alamdance  by  the  animals  in  their  possession.  Rut  this  ingenious 
scheme,  in  itself  feasible,  was  put  out  of  the  question  bv  the  view  of 
the  Persian  cavalry  on  the  opposite  bank;  and  as  the  villaixesin  their 
front  had  been  burnt,  the  army  had  no  choice  except  to  return  back 
one  day's  march  to  those  in  which  they  had  before  halted.  Here  the 
generals  agam  deliberated,  questioning  all  their  prison'^rs  as  to  the 
different  beaiings  of  the  country.  The  road  from  the  south  was  that 
in  which  they  had  ahead v  marched  from  Pitbvlon  and  Media:  that 


*    <i,owP^twird  jroino-  to  Lydia  and  Ionia,  w^as  barred  to  them  by 

I  .  tmS^^^^^^^      eastward  (they  were  informed)  was  the  way 

fS  northward,  lay  the  rugged  and  inhospitable 

nnt-dns   o      lie  K  u-duchians-fiei-ce   freemen  who  despised  the 

r^n    Kin<^   and  de^ed  all  his  efforts  to  conquer  them;  having  once 

V  ;  \!tt   .;  Porsian  invadino"  army  of  120,000  men.     On  the  otlier 

^M ''%--  n.;  M.ld-t  lowe^^^^^^^^        the  rich  Persian  satrapy  of  Armenia, 

^^.;;^i^b  "'  ^hra^es  ^nd  the  Tigris  could  be^  Classed  near 

ei  Turces  and  from  whence  (hey  could  choose  their  further  course 

lv'?ow'ird  Greec'      Like  Mvsia,  Pisidia,  and  other  mountainous 

easil>  t«^^\\^;,\,Y^^^^^^^^  free  territory  surrounded  on  all  sides  by 

^Zn^^^i^G.:J^ns,  wh/reigned  only  in  the  cities  and 

''Oetenlibdng  to  fight  their  way  across  these  difficult  mountains 
into    Vrmcnia   but  refraining  from  any  public  announcement,  for 
f    r  th  A  th     msse.  should  be  occupied  beforehand-the  generals 
^l^  ^X   h   hi  ordor  that  the^  might  be  ready  for  brc^ikmg 
m  at  1  moment's  notice.     They  then  began  their  march  a  little  after 
mid,  i  l^   ^^   that  soon  after'  daybreak  they  reached  the   first  of 
me   ife  •  iuehian    inountain-p  i.ses,  which   they   found   undefended 
(^^heid'olm     with  his  front  division  and  all  the  light  troops,  made 
ha^te  S  a^^^^^        the  pa.s,  and  having  got  over  the  first  mountain, 
de  ec^lded  on  the  otlfer  side  to  som.  villages  in  the  valley  or  nooks 
bene  It      while  Xenophon,  with  the  heavy-armed  and  the  bagi^age 
fo  lowed  at  a  slower  pace-not  reaching  the  villages  until  dr.rk,  as 
he  road  wis  both  steep  and  narrow.     The  Karducliians,  taken  com- 
p  eteU  by    un'rise,  abandoned  the  villages  as  the  Greeks  approaclied 
ami  took  refu-e  on  the  mountains,  leaving  to  the  intruders  plenty  of 
Twsc^;     comfortable  houses,  and  especially  abundance  of  copper 
proNi-^ons  coimo  ^^^  ^^^  ^^^  damage,  trying  to 

['^i     the  muives   o  aS'le  colloquy.     But  none  of  the  latter  would 
i.vite  tiie  "a  ivcs  necessity  drove  the  Greeks  to  take  what 

waTiu": s  a  y  0^^^^^^^^^^  3-t  when  X-ophon  and  tl^ 

rear    ir^^r^^^^^     coming  in  at  night,  that  some  few  Ivarduchians  first 

U^  th^^,  by  surmise  and  with  -^-^^^:i^^^J 
ti.oi,-  niimlii-rs  had  been  ffreater  serious  miscliiet  mi;;M  na\e  cnsutu. 

Mmv  fi-^  w«e  clS-overe.1  burnins  o„  the  mo,in1ains-a.i  earne  t 
of  ivlw-u  ce  d.  r  n"  tlie  next  day;  which  satisfied  the  Greek  jreneva  s 

at   hey  must  liSlTle"  the  am,/,  in  '^f'^l^^'^^^^^^e 
"""  "  h^  %',\':f thrC^vc : ri"  \?bur^df  t.t"ba|grge 


538 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  TIIOUSxYND. 


THE  KARDUCHIANS  DEFEATED. 


539 


advnnce  from  the  i.arrownc^s  of  the  rond  find  the  hnrns^ing  attnck  of 
the  Kanhichians,  who  were  now  ass(  mhlul  in  considerable  numbers. 
Tlieir  attaek  was  ren:wed  with  do\d)le  vi^^or  on  the  ensuinfr  d;iy, 
when  the  Greeks  were  foreed,  from  want  of  provisions,  to  haslen 
fonvard  their  march,  thougli  in  the  midst  of  a  terrible  snow-storm. 
Both  Cheirisophus  in  the  front  and  Xcncphoi)  in  the  rear  were  hard 
pressed  by  the  Karduchian  slingers  and  Itowmcn,  the  hitter,  men  of 
consummate  skill,  having  bows  three  eulnts  in  length,  and  arrows  of 
more  than  two  cubits,  so  strong  that  the  Greeks,  when  they  took 
them,  could  dart  them  as  javelins.  These  arehers,  amid  the  rugged 
ground  and  narrow  paths,  approaelied  so  near  and  drew  the  ])ow 
with  such  surprising  force,  resting  one  extnmiiy  of  it  on  the  ground, 
that  several  Gieek  warriors  were  mortally  w«'unded  even  throudi 
both  shield  and  corslet  into  the  reins,  and  ihrouch  the  brazen  lielniet 
into  their  heads:  among  tlum  especially,  two  distinguished  men,  a 
Lacedaemonian  named  Kleonymus  and  an  Arcadian  named  Basias. 
The  rear  division,  more  roui:hly  handled  than  the  rest,  was  obliged 
continually  to  halt  to  repel  the  enemy,  under  all  the  diflRculties  of  the 
ground,  w  hich  made  it  scarcely  possible  to  act  against  nimble  moun- 
taineers. On  one  occasion,  however,  a  body  of  these  latter  were 
entrapped  into  an  ainbush,  driven  back  with  loss,  and  (what  was 
still  more  fortunate)  two  of  their  number  were  made  prisoners. 

Thus  impeded,  Xenophrm  sent  frequent  messages  entreating  Cheiri- 
sophus to  slacken  the  march  of  the  van  division;  but  instead  of 
ol)eying,  Cheirisophus  only  hastened  the  faster,  urging  Xenophon  to 
follow  him.  The  march  of  the  army  became  little  better  than  a  rout, 
so  that  the  reai  division  reached  the  halting-place  in  extreme  confu- 
sion; upon  which  Xenophon  proceeded  to  remonstrate  with  Cheiri- 
sophus for  prematurely  hurrying  forwju'd  and  neglecting  his  com- 
rades beh.nd.  But  the  ether — pointing  out  to  his  attention  the  hill 
l)efore  them,  and  the  steep  path  ascending  it,  forming  their  future 
line  of  march,  which  was  beset  with  numerous  Karduchians — de- 
fended himself  by  saying  that  he  had  hastened  forward  in  hopes  of 
being  able  to  reach  this  pass  before  the  enemy,  in  which  attempt, 
however,  he  had  not  succeeded. 

To  advance  further  on  this  road  appeared  hopeless;  yet  the  guides 
declared  that  no  other  could  be  taken.  Xenophon  then  bethouglit 
liim  of  the  two  prisoners  whom  he  had  just  captured,  and  proposed 
that  these  two  should  be  questioned  also.  They  were  accordingly 
interrogated  apart;  and  the  tirst  of  them — having  persisted  in  deny- 
ing, notwithstanding  all  menaces,  that  there  was  any  road  exe(pt 
that  before  them — was  put  to  death  under  the  eyes  of  the  second 
prisoner.  This  latter,  on  being  then  questioned,  gave  more  com- 
fortable intelligence,  saying  that  he  knew  of  a  different  road,  more 
circuitous,  but  easier  and  practicable  even  for  beasts  of  burden, 
whereby  the  pass  before  them  and  the  occupying  enemy  might  he 
turned;  but  that  there  Wiis  one  particular  high  position  commanding 


the  road  which  it  was  necessary  to  master  l)eforehand  by  surprise 
«s  the  Karduchians  were  already  on  guard  there.  Two  thousand 
riveks  having  the  guide  bound  along  with  them,  were  accordmgiy 
(li.Ditc'hed  late  in  the  afternoon,  to  surprise  this  post  by  a  night 
in-mh  while  Xenophon,  in  order  to  distract  the  attention  of  the 
K-irdu'ehians  in  front,  nuide  a  feint  of  advancing  as  if  about  to  force 
the  direct  pass.  As  soon  as  he  was  seen  crossing  the  ravine  which 
led  to  this  mountain,  the  Karduchians  on  the  top  immediately  began 
to  roll  down  vast  masses  of  rock,  which  bounded  and  dashed  down  . 
IhL'  roadway  in  such  a  manner  as  to  render  it  unapproachable.  1  hey 
continued  to  do  this  all  night,  and  the  Greeks  heard  the  noise  of  the 
descending  masses  long  after  they  had  returned  to  their  camp  tor 

sapper  and  rest,  ,      .,        •       -,. 

Meanwhile  the  detachment  of  2,000.  marching  by  the  circuitous 
roid  and  reaching  in  the  night  the  elevated  position  (though  there 
was  linother  above  yet  more  commanding)  held  by  the  Karduchians 
surprised  and  dispersed  them,  passiug  the  night  by  their  hres.  At 
daybreak,  and  under  favor  of  a  mist,  they  stole  silently  toward  the 
position  occupied  by  the  other  Karduchians  in  front  of  the  main 
Grecian  army  On  coming  near  thev  suddenly  sounded  their  truin- 
nets  shouted  aloud,  and  commenced'  the  attack,  which  proved  coin- 
nk'tely  successful.  The  defenders,  taken  unprepared,  fled  with 
little  resistance,  and  scarcely  any  loss,  from  their  activity  and  know- 
kd"-e  of  the  country;  while  Cheirisoi)hus  and  the  mam  Grecian  force, 
ou 'hearing  the  trumpet  which  had  been  previously  concerted  as  the 
si.rnal  rushed  f.)rward  and  stormed  the  height  in  front,  some  along 
tlfe  regular  path,  others  climbing  up  as  they  could  and  pulling  each 
otiier  up  by  means  of  their  spears.  The  two  bodies  of  Greeks  thus 
joined  each  other  on  the  summit,  so  that  the  road  became  open  for 

further  advance.  ,  ,     .  ^.        . 

Xenophon,  however,  with  the  rear-guard,  marched  on  the  cir- 
cuitous road  taken  by  the  2,000,  as  the  most  practicable  for  the  bag- 
gao-e  animals,  whom  he  placed  in  the  center  of  his  division  the  whole 
army  covering  a  great  length  of  ground,  since  the  road  w'as  very 
narrow  During  this  interval  the  dispersed  Karduchians  had  ralliea 
and  re-occupied  two  or  three  high  peaks,  commanding  the  road— from 
whence  it  was  necesssary  to  drive  them.  Xenophon's  troops  stormed 
successively  these  three  positions,  the  Karduchians  not  daring  to 
affront  close  combat,  yet  making  destructive  use  of  their  missiles. 
A  Grecian  guard  was  left  on  the  hindermosl  of  the  three  peaks, 
until  all  the  biggage  train  should  have  passed  by.  But  the  Kardu- 
cliians  bv  a  sudden  and  well-timed  movement,  contrived  to  surprise 
this  giiard  slew  two  out  of  the  three  leaders,  with  several  soldiers, 
and  forced  the  rest  to  jump  down  the  crags  as  they  could,  in  order 
to  join  their  comrades  in  the  road.  Encouraged  by  such  success  the 
assailants  pressed  nearer  to  the  man-hing  army,  occupying  a  crag  over 
against  that  lofty  summit  on  which  Xenophon  was  posted.    As  it 


540 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEX  THOUSAND. 


THE  GRECIANS  ENTER  ARMENIA. 


541 


was  within  speaking  distance,  he  endeavored  to  open  a  negotiation 
with  them  in  order  to  get  back  the  dead  bodies  of  the  slain.  To  this 
the  Karducliians  at  tii*st  acceded,  ou  condition  that  their  vilhiges 
should  not  be  burnt;  but  tiniling  their  numbers  every  moment  In- 
creasing, ihey  resumed  the  offensive.  When  Xejiophon  with  the 
army  had  begun  his  descent  from  the  last  summit,  Ihey  hurried  on- 
ward in  crowds  to  occupy  it,  beginning  again  to  roll  down  masses  of 
rock  and  renew  their  tire  of  missiles  upon  the  Greeks.  Xenophou 
himself  was  here  in  some  danger,  having  l)een  deserted  by  his  shield- 
bearer;  but  he  was  rescued  by  an  Arcadian  hoplite  named  Eurylo  . 
chus,  who  rau  to  give  him  the  benetit  of  his  own  shield  as  a  protec- 
tion for  both  in  the  retreat. 

After  a  march  tlius  painful  and  perilous,  the  rear  division  atk'ngtli 
found  themselves  in  safety  among  their  comrades,  in  villages  with 
"well-stoclvcd  houses  and  abundance  of  corn  and  wine.  So  eager, 
however,  were  Xenoplion  and  Cheirisophus  to  obtain  the  bodies  of 
tlie  slain  for  burial,  that  they  consented  to  purchase  them  by  surren- 
dering the  guide,  and  to  march  onward  without  any  guide:  a  heavy 
sacrifice  iu  this  unknown  country,  attesting  their  great  anxiety  about 
the  burial. 

For  three  more  days  did  they  struggle  and  fight  their  way  through 
the  narrow  and  rugged  paths  of  the  Karduchian  mountains,  beset 
throughout  by  these  formidable  bowmen  and  slingers;  whom  they 
had  to  dislodsre  at  cverv  diflieult  turn,  and  against  whom  their  own 
Kretau  bowmen  wei'e  found  inferior  indeed,  but  still  highly  useful. 
Their  seven  days'  march  through  this  country,  with  its  free  ai;d  war- 
like inhabitants,  were  days  of  the  utmost  fatigue,  suffering,  and 
peril;  far  more  intolerable  than  anything  which  they  had  experienced 
from  Tissaphemes  and  the  Persians.  Right  glad  were  they  once 
more  to  see  a  plain,  and  to  find  themselves  near  the  banks  of  the 
river  Kentrites,  which  divided  these  mountains  from  the  hillocks  and 
plains  of  Armenia,  enjoying  comfortable  quarters  in  villages,  with 
the  satisfaction  of  talking  over  past  miseries. 

•  Such  were  the  apprehensions  of  Karduchian  invasion,  that  the 
jk  Armenian  side  of  the  Kentrites,  for  a  breadth  of  15  miles,  was  unpeo- 
pled and  destitute  of  villages.  But  the  approach  of  the  Greeks  hav- 
ing becoming  known  to  Tirii)azus,  satrap  of  Armenia,  the  banks  of 
the  river  were  lined  with  his  cavalry  and  infantry  to  oppose  their  pas- 
sage; a  precaution,  which  if  Tissaphernes  had  taken  at  the  great  Zab 
at  the  moment  when  he  j^ertidiously  seized  Klearchus  and  his  col- 
leagues, the  Greeks  would  hardly  have  reached  the  northern  bank  of 
that  river.  In  the  face  of  such  obstacles,  the  Greeks  nevertheless 
attempted  the  passage  of  the  Kentrites.  seeing  a  regular  road  on  the 
other  side.  But  the  river  was  200  feet  in  breadth  (onlv  half  the 
breadth  of  the  Zab),  above  their  breasts  in  (iei)th.  extremely  rapifl, 
and  witli  a  bottom  full  of  slippery  stones;  insomuch  that  they  could 
not  hold  their  shields  in  the  proper  positiou,  from  the  force  of  the 


,„am-  while  if  they  lifted  the  shields  above  their  heads,  they  ueie 
'J^fed  defenseless  to  the  arrows  of  the  satrap's  troops  After  vari- 
exposedaeieuse  impracticable,   and   they  were 

":'?•    ?mVp,umethefr  encampment  on  l^he  left  bank.    To  their  great 
'  tf  they  sfw  he  Karduchians  assembUttg  on  the  hills  in  their  rear. 
"       .  t  fp^r  sUiivtion   during  this  day  and  night,  appeared  nearly 
ttrVte     I       'e rght  Xenopln.n  ha-.i  a  dream-the  first  which  he 
Kid  us  s  nee  his  dream  on  the  lerritic  night  after  the  seizure  of 
nt .  enerals-but  on  this  occasion,  of  augury  more  unequivocally 
fnf     He  dreimed  that  he  was  bound  in  cliains,  but  that  his  chains 
rf sudden  drmned  off  spontaneously;  on  the  faith  of  whtcl.  ho 
?,  d  Che  risophus  at  daybreak  that  he  had  good  hopes  of  preservation; 
„^  ,v^.en  the  -enerali  offered  sacrifice,  tlie  victims  were  at  once 
Irable      As  tfe  army  wen,,  taking  their  morning  mea,  two  voung 
Greeks  ran  to  Xenophonwitl.  the  auspicious  news  that  they  had  acci- 
totillv  found  another  ford  near  half  a  mile  up  the  river  where  the 
Se  was  not  even  up  to  their  middle,  and  where  the  rocks  came  so 
clo  eon  the  right  b:ink  that  the  enemies  horse  could  offer  no  oppo- 
E,      Vennnhon   startino-  from  his  meal  in  delight,  immediately 
Ed  iSfto'tS  gods  Who  Had  reveled  .^^oUi  tbe  <ir-,vi  to 
liim^elf  iu  the  night,  and  the  unexpected  ford  afteiw.ud  to  lliese 
vo  ths    two  reveiaUous  which  he  ascribed  to  the  Siime  gods 
^  P  0  entW  they  marched  in  their  usual  order    Cheinsophus  cora- 
mu  din"  the  van  and  Xenophon  the  rear,  along  the  river  to  the  newly 
^covered  ford-  the  enem/marching  parallel  with  them  on  theoppo- 
fi^  bink      Havin-  reached  the  ford,  halted,  and  grounded  arms. 
C  eir  ophus  Si  wreath  on  his  head,  look  off  hisc  othes,  and  then 
re  meffi  arms,  orderin..^  all  the  rest  to  resume  their  arms  also 
F-  rUKaVus  company  of  100  men)  was  then  arranged  in  column  or 
^■'IfiewiU?  Cheirisophus  himself  in  the  center.    Meanwh.lethe 
moihets  were  offering  sacrifice  to  the  river.     i<o  soon  as  the  signs 
v^e  p  onouneed  to  b%  favorable,  all  tl.e  soldiei-s  «l'">''f    he  p^an 
amlal  the  women  joined  in  chorus  with  then;  feminine  jell      Cheiii- 
'^^1         en   at  the^iea.l  of  -he  army,  entered  the  river  a,^  began    o 
im\  it;  while  Xenophon.  with  a  large  portion  of  the    ear  divi^on 
made  a  feint  of  hastening  back  to  the  origmal    "f.''..  f  '^^^«.  ^"^5 
about  to  attempt  the  passage  there.     Tins  '^'f  ?<=''^'^, '    ,.'";''°''°^"i; 
the  enemy's  horse;  who  became  afraid  of  being  aU«cked  on  bo  h 
siilcs    "nlloncd  off   to  guard  the  passage  at  the  other  po  nt    and 
wLa  no  serio^  resisnmce  .,.  Ch'firisoplius.  .  As  so<n.  a«  the  hi U^v 
b  ul  reaehcl  the  other  side,  an.l  out  his  division  into  "  de  •    J  '  :X'-^^ 
up  to  attack  the  Armenian  infantry,  who  were  on  t  "^  h>^>  h^'°ljj  "^ 
lill-  wav  above-  but  this  infantry,  deserte<l  by  its  cavaliy.disptrseU 
wLnt^iw^l^in/hs  approach.  •  The  handful  of  Grecian  cavalry. 
at"'dieVt"  the  division  of  Cheirisophus.  pursuedand  took  some  valu- 

"'Lloon  as  Xenophon  saw  his  colleague  successfully  established  on 


542 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


DISTRESSING  MARCHES. 


543 


the  opposite  bank,  he  brought  l)nrk  his  cletachment  to  the  ford  over 
which  the  bagirage  and  attenriiints  were  still  passing,  and  proceeded 
to  take  precautions  against  the  Karduchians  on  his  own  side  who 
■were  assembling  in  the  rear.  He  found  some  difficulty  in  keeping 
his  rear  division  together,  for  many  of  them,  in  spite  of  orders,  quit- 
ted their  ranks,  and  went  to  look  after  their  mistresses  or  their  ba?- 
gage  in  the  crossing  of  the  water.  The  peltasls  and  bowmen,  who 
had  gone  over  with  Cheirisophus,  but  whom  that  general  now  no 
longer  needed,  were  directed  to  hold  themselves  prepared  on  both 
flanks  of  the  army  crossing,  and  to  advance  a  little  way  into  the 
water,  in  the  attitude  of  men  just  about  to  recross.  When  'Xeuoplioii 
was  k'ft  with  only  the  diminished  rear  guard,  the  rest  having  got 
over,  the  Karduchians  rushed  upon  liim,  and  began  to  shoot  and 
sling.  But  on  a  sudden,  the  Grecian  hoplitcs  charged  with  their 
accustomed  pa?an.  upon  Avliicli  the  Karduchiatis  took  to  flight— luiv- 
ing  no  arms  for  close  combat  on  the  plain.  The  trumpet  now  being 
heard  to  sound,  they  ran  away  so  much  the  faster;  while  this  was  the 
signal,  according  to  orders  before  given  b}-  Xenophon,  for  the  Greeks 
to  suspend  their  charge,  to  turn  back,  and  to  cross  the  river  as  speed- 
il}'  as  possible.  By  favor  of  this  able  maneuver,  the  passage  wa8 
accomplished  by  the  whole  arm}^  with  little  or  no  loss,  about  mid- 
day. 

^riiey  now  found  themselves  in  Armenia:  a  country  of  even,  undii- 
hiting  surface,  but  verv  high  above  the  level  of  the  sea.  and  extremelv 
cold  at  the  season  when  they  entered  it — December.  Though  the 
strip  of  land  bordering  on  Karduchia  furnished  no  supplies,  one  long 
march  brought  them  to  a  village,  containing  abunelance  of  provisions, 
together  with  a  residence  of  the  satrap  Tiribazus;  after  which,  in  two 
further  marches  they  reached  the  river  Teleboas,  with  many  villages 
on  its  banks.  Here  Tiribazus  himself,  appearing  with  a  division  of 
cavalry,  sent  forward  his  interpreter  to  request  a  conference  with  the 
headers;  which  l)einir  held,  it  was  agi'oed  tliat  the  Greeks  should  pro- 
ceed unmolested  through  his  territoiy,  taking  such  supplies  as  they 
re^quired,  but  should  neither  burn  nor  eiamage  the  villages.  They 
accordingly  advanced  onward  for  three  days,  computed  at  fifteen 
parasangs,  or  three  pretty  full  days'  march;  without  any  hostility 
from  the  satrap,  though  he  was  hovering  within  less  than  two  miles 
of  them.  They  then  found  themselves  amid  several  villages,  wheic- 
in  were  regal  or  satrapical  residences,  with  a  plentiful  stock  of  bread. 
meat,  wine,  and  all  sorts  of  vegetables.  Here,  during  their  nightly 
bivouac,  they  were  overtaken  by  so  heavy  a  fall  of  snow,  that  the 
generals  on  the  next  day  distiibiited  the  troops  into  separate  quarters 
among  the  villages.  No  enemy  appeared  near,  while  the  snow  seemed 
to  forbid  any  rapid  surprise.  Yet  at  night,  the  scouts  reported  that 
many  fires  were  discernible,  together  with  traces  of  military  move- 
ments around;  insomuch  that  the  generals  thought  it  ]irudent  to  put 
themselves  on  their  guard,  and  again  collected  the  army  into  one 


Wxronic  Here  in  the  night  they  were  overwhelmed  by  a  second  fall 
Kow  still  heavier  than  the  preceding;  sufllcient  to  cover  over  the 
'lee  imr'  men  and  their  arms,  and  to  benumb  tue  cattle  The  men 
Sev'r  lay  warm  under  the  snow  and  were  unwillmg  to  rise,  until 
xZonhon  himself  set  the  example  of  rising,  and  employing  himself 
w  I  1  s  arms  in  cutting  wood  and  kindling  a  hre.  Others  fol- 
bwe    1  is  example,  and  great  comfort  was  found  m  rubbing  them- 

e  m  with  pork  fat,  oil  of  almonds  or  of  sesame,  or  turpentine. 
Ihvincr  sent  otit  a  clever  scout  named  Demokrates,  who  captured  a 
ni  vcVisoner,  they  learned  that  Tiribazus  was  laying  plans  to  inter- 

;Xhem  in  a  lofty  mountain  pass  M^^^^  cm  in  tueir  route; 

unon^^diich  they  immediately  «et  forth,  and  by  two  days  of  forced 
m  n-eh  suVprisino-  in  their  way  the  camp)  of  Tiribazus,  got  over  the 

i^c  itl^^ss  in  sSfety.  Three'days  of  aeUlitional  march  brought  them 
?o  the  Euphrates  riVer-that  is,  to  its  eastern  bmnch,  now  called 
Mnrid  Thev  found  a  ford  and  crossed  it,  without  having  the  water 
higherthan  tiie  navel;  and  they  were  informed  that  its  sources  were 

""^TheirV^ur  days  of  march,  next  on  the  other  side  of  the  Euphrates 
were  toilsome  aiid  distressing  in  the  extreme;  throivgh  a  plain  covered 
with  deep  snow  (in  some  places  six  teet  deep),  and  at  tur.es  in  the 
ace  of  a  north  wind  so  intolerably  chdlmg  and  piercing,  that  at 
len-th  one  of  the  prophets  urged  the  necessity  of  offering  sacritices 
to  Boreas;  upon  which  (says  Xenophon),  the  severity  ot  the  wind 
abated  conspicuously,  to  the  evident  consciousness  of  all      ^1  any  of 
the  slaves  and  beasts  of  burden,  and  a  few  even  of  the  soldiers  perish- 
ed- some  had  their  feet  frost-bitten,  others  because  l)linded  b>  the 
snow  others  again  were  exhausted  by  hunger,     beveral  of   hese  un- 
happv  men  we?e  unavoidably  left  behind ;  others  lay  down  to  perish, 
nearK  warm  spring  which  had  melted  the  snow  around,  froiu  extrem- 
ity of  fatigue  and  sheer  wretchedness,  though  the  enemy  were  close 
upon  the  rear.     It  was  in  vain  that  Xenophon,  who  commanded  the 
rear--uai-d,  employed  his  earnest  exhortations  prayers,  and  threats 
to  in'duce  them  to  move  forward.      The  sufferers    nnserab  e  and 
motionless,  answered  only  by  entreating  him  to  kill  theni  at  once 
So  crreatly  was  the  army  disorganized  by  wivtchedness,  that  we  hear 
of  one  c^se  in  which  a  soldier,  ordered  to  carry  a  disabled  comnicle 
disobeyed  the  order,  and  was  about  to  bury  him  alive.     Xenophon 
made  a  sally,  with  loud  shouts  and  cUUter  of  spear  with  shield,  m 
which  even  the  exhausted  men  joineel-against  the  pursuing  enemy- 
He  was  fortunate  enough  to  frighten  them  away  aiid  drive  them    o 
take  shelter  in  a  neighboring  wood.     He  then  le  t  the  sufferers  lymg 
down  with  assurance  that  relief  should  be  sent  to  them  on  the  next 
dav-and  went  forward;  seeing  all  along  the  line  of  march  the  ex- 
hausted  soldiers  lying  on  the  snow,  without  even  the  protection  of  a 
^vatch.     He  and  his  rear-guard  as  well  as  the  rest  were  obliged  thus 
to  pass  the  night  without  either  food  or  fire,  distributing  scouts  m 


544 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


AFTER  A   WEEK'S  REST. 


545 


1 


the  best  way  that  the  case  admitted.  Meanwhile  Cheirisophus  with 
the  van  division  had  got  into  a  village,  which  they  reached  so  unex- 
pectedly, that  they  found  tiie  women  fetching  water  from  afountnin 
outside  the  wall,  and  the  head-man  of  the  village  in  his  house  wiiii- 
in.  This  division  here  obtained  rest  and  refreshment,  and  at  day- 
break some  of  their  soldiers  were  sent  to  look  alter  the  rear.  It  was 
with  delight  that  Xenophon  siiw  them  approach,  and  sent  them  back 
to  bring  up  in  their  arms,  into  the  neighboring  village,  those  exhaust- 
ed soldiers  who  hud  been  left  behind. 

Repose  was  now  indispensable  after  the  recent  sufferings.  There 
were  several  villages  ne;ir  at  hand,  and  the  generals,  thinking  it  no 
longer  dangerous  to  divitle  the  army,  cjwartered  the  different  divisions 
among  them  according  to  lot.  PoU  Urates  an  Athenian,  one  oC  the 
captains  in  the  division  of  Xenophon,  requested  his  pernnssion  to  ao 
at  once  and  take  possession  of  the  \illage  assigned  to  him,  before  aiiy 
of  the  inhabitants  could  escajx?.  Accordingly,  running  at  speed  with 
a  few  of  the  swiftest  soldiers,  he  came  upon  the  village  so  suddenly 
as  to  seize  the  head-man  with  his  nt  wly-niarried  daugirter,  and  several 
young  hoises  intended  as  a  tribute  lor  the  King.  "  This  village,  as 
well  as  the  rest,  was  found  to  consist  of  houses  excavated  in  the 
ground  ({IS  the  Armenian  villages  are  at  the  present  day),  spacious 
within,  but  with  a  narrow  mouth  like  a  well,  entered  by'a  doeend- 
iug  ladder.  A  separate  entrance  was  dug  for  conveniently  admitting 
the  cattle.  All  of  them  were  found  amply  stocked  with  live  cattle 
of  every  kind,  wintered  upon  hay;  as  well  as  with  wheat,  barky, 
vegetables,  and  a  sort  of  barley- wine  or  beer  in  tubs,  with  the  giaiiis 
of  barley  on  the  surface.  Reeds  or  straws  without  any  joint  in  them, 
were  lying  near,  through  which  they  sucked  the  liquid:  Xeuoi)li(tn 
did  his  utmost  to  conciliate  the  head-man  (who  sjjoke  Persian,  and 
with  whom  he  communicated  througli  the  Peiso  Giecian  inleri)reter 
of  the  army),  promising  him  that  not  one  of  his  relations  should  be 
maltreated,  and  that  he  should  be  fully  remunerated  if  he  would 
conduct  the  army  safely  out  of  the  country,  into  that  of  the  Chaly- 
bes  which  he  descrilxjd  as  being  adjacent.  Py  such  treatment  the 
head-man  was  won  over,  pi'omised  his  aid,  anel  even  revealed  to  the 
Greeks  the  subterranean,  cellar^  wherein  the  wine  was  deposited; 
while  Xenophon,  though  he  kept  him  constantly  under  watch,  and 
placed  his  youthful  son  as  a  hostage  under  the  care  of  Epistheues,  yet 
continued  to  treat  him  with  studied  attention  and  kindness.  For 
seven  days  did  the  fatigued  soldiers  remain  in  these  comfortable  quar- 
ters, refreshing  themselves  and  regaining  strength.  They  were 
waited  upon  by  the  native  youths,  with  whom  they  communicated 
by  means  of  signs.  The  uncommon  happiness  which  all  of  them 
enjoyed  after  their  recent  sullerings.  stands  depicted  in  the  lively 
details  given  by  Xenophon;  who  left  here  his  own  exhausted  horse, 
and  took  young  horses  in  exchange,  for  himself  and  the  other 
officers. 


After  this  week  of  repose,  the  army  resumed  its  march  through 
the  snow.  The  head-man,  whose  house  they  had  replenished  as  well 
as  they  could,  accompanied  Cherisophus  in  the  van  as  guide,  but  was 
not  put  in  chains  or  under  guard :  his  son  remained  as  an  hostage  with 
Episthenes,  but  his  other  relations  M'ere  left  unmolested  at  home.  As 
they  marched  for  three  days,  without  reaching  a  village,  Cheiroso- 
phus  began  to  suspect  his  fidelity,  and  even  became  so  out  of  humor, 
though  the  man  affirmed  that  there  were  no  villages  in  the  track,  as 
to  beat  him — yet  without  the  precaution  of  putting  him  afterward 
in  fetters.  The  next  night,  accordingly,  this  head-man  made  his 
escape;  much  to  the  displeasure  of  Xenophon,  who  severely  reproach- 
ed Cheirisophus  first  for  his  ^ harshness,  and  next  for  his  neglect. 
This  was  the  only  point  of  difference  between  the  two  (says  Xeno- 
phon) during  the  whole  march ;  a  fact  very  honorable  to  both,  con- 
sidering the  numberless  difficulties  against  which  they  had  to  con- 
tend. Episthenes  retained  the  head-man's  youthful  son,  carried  him 
home  in  safety,  and  became  much  attached  to  him. 

Condemned  thus  to  march  without  a  guide,  they  could  do  no  better 
than  nmrch  up  the  course  of  the  river;  and  thus,  from  the  villages 
which  had  proved  so  cheering  and  restorative,  they^  proceeded  seven 
days'  march  all  through  snow,  up  the  river  Pliasis;  a  river  not  verifi- 
able, but  certainly^  not  the  same  as  is  commonly  known  under  that 
name  by  Grecian  geographers:  it  was  100  feet  in  breadth.  Two 
more  days'  march  brought  them  from  this  river  to  the  foot  of  a  range 
of  mountains;  near  a  pass  occupied  by  an  armed  body  of  Chalybes, 
Taoehi,  and  Phasiani. 

Observing  the  enemy  in  possession  of  this  lofty  ground,  Cheiriso- 
phns  halted  until  all  the  army  came  up;  in  order  that  the  generals 
might  take  counsel.  Here  Kleanor  began  by  advising  that  they 
should  storm  the  pass  with  no  greater  delay  than  was  necessary  to 
refresh  the  soldiers.  But  Xenophon  suggested  that  it  was  far  better 
to  avoid  the  loss  of  life  which  must  thus  be  incurred,  and  to  amuse 
the  enemy  by  feigned  attack,  while  a  detachment  should  be  sent  by 
stealth  at  night  to  ascend  the  mountain  at  another  point  and  turn  the 
position."  "  Howevei*  (continued  he,  turning  to  Cheirisophus),  steal- 
ing a  march  upon  the  enemy  is  more  ^^our  trade  than  mine.  For  I 
understand  that  you  the  full  citizens  and  peers  at  Sparta,  practice 
stealing  from  your  boyhood  upward;  and  that  it  is  held  noway  base, 
hut  even  honorable,  to  steal  such  things  that  the  law  does  not  distinct- 
ly forbid.  And  to  the  end  that  you  may  steal  with  the  greatest  effect, 
and  take  pains  to  do  it  in  secret,  the  custom  is,  to  flog  you  if  you  are 
found  out.  Here  then,  you  have  an  excellent  opportunity  of  dis- 
playing your  training.  Take  good  care  that  we  be  not  found  out  in 
stealing  an  occupation  of  the  mountain  now  Ixjfore  us;  for  if  we  ai'e 
found  out,  we  shall  be  well  beaten." 

"Why,  as  for  that  (replied  Cheirisophus),  you  Athenians  also,  as 
I  learn,  are  capital  hands  at  stealing  tlii3  public  money — and  that  too 

H.  G.  HI.— 18 


546     RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

in  '^Pitc  of  prodi'jinns  peril  to  the  thief;  nay,  your  incst  poi^  crful 
hum!  ^tcal  most  of  all— at  least  if  it  be  the  most  powei-ful  men  among 
vou  who  are  raised-  to  ofiieial  command.  So  that  this  i8  a  time  for 
voa  toe\lnt)it  i/oht  trainini^,  as  well  as  for  me  to  exhibit  mine. 

\Vc  h'lvc  here  an  interehanire  of  raillery  between  the  two  Grrcinn 
ollicers  whieii  is  not  an  nnintcrestin.ir  f(  ature  in  the  history  of  Uie 
expedition.     The  remark  of  Cheirisophus,  especially,  ilhistrntes  ll.at 
which  I  noted  in  u  former  chapter  as  Hue  both  of  Sparta  and  Alliens 
—the  readinesw  to  take  brilx's.  so  general  in  individnals  elotlud  wilh 
ortlcial  power:  and  the  readiness,  in   official  Alhemaiis,  to  eomnnt 
such  perulation,  in  spite  of  serious  risk  of  punishment.     Now  tins 
chmee  ot   punishment  proceeded  altoirether   from   those  aeeiisiii^ 
orators  commonly  called  dema-oirues.  and  from  the  popular  judi- 
cature whom   theV  addressed.     The   joint  workin/r  ot  both  erently 
nb'ited  th<«  evil,  yet  was  incompetent  to  suppress  it.     But  aeeorf  iiiir 
to\he  pictures  cumraonly  drawn  of  Athens,  we  are  instrueKd  to 
believe  that    the  crvinc:  public  evil  was— too   .srreat   a   license  of 
accusation,   and  to  >  much  judicial  trial.     Assuredly  such  was  not 
the  conception  of  Cheirisophus;  nor  shall  we  hml  it  borne  out  hy 
any  fair  appreciation  of  the  general  evidence.     A\  hen  the  peeulatieii 
of  official  persons  was  thus  notorious  in  spite  of  serious  risks,  what 
w^ould  it  have  become  if  the  door  had  t)een  barred  to  accusmfr  (icma- 
n-o<nies  and  if  the  numerous  popular  Dikasts  had  been  exehMTiLTd 
for  a  select  few  judges  of  the  same  stamp  and  class  as  the  oflieial 

"^Enfordm- his  proposition.  Xenophon  now  informed  his  colleairnes 
that  he  had  just  captured  a  few  guides,  by  laying  an  ambush  for 
certain  native  plunderers  who  beset  the  rear;  and  that  these  guides 
acquainted  him  that   the   mountain  was  not  inneeessible,  but  pas- 
tSbvUtB  and  oxen.     He  further  offered  himself  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  marching  detachment.     But  this  being  overruled  hy 
Cheirisophus,  some  of  the  best  among  the  captams.  Aristonymus, 
Aristeas.    an<l    Nikomachus,    volunteered    their   services   .•'i'<\  ^vere 
accepted      After  refreshim?  the  soldiers,  the   generals  marched  witii 
the  main  army  near  to  the  foot  of  the  pass,  and  there  took  "P  tiieir 
niirht-station.  making  demonstrations  of  a  purpose  to  storm  i    t  e 
next  mornin-      But  as  soon  as  it  was  dark,  Aristonymus  and  1  s 
detachment  started,  and  ascending  the  mountain  at  another  r;Oii  t 
obtained  without   resistance   a  high    position   on   the  fl«^"k  ot    ne 
enemy   who  soon  however  saw  them  and  oispatched  a  torce  to  keep 
iruard  on  that  side.     At  daybreak  those  two  detachments  came  to  a 
conflict  on  the  heights,  in  which  the  Greeks  were  completely  victo- 
rious- while  Cheirisophus  was  marching  up  the  pass  to  attacK  ine 
main  body.     His  light  troops,  encouraged  l)y  seeing  t^f  victtm  oi 
their  comrades,  hastened  on  to  the  charge  faster  than  their  liopliies 
could  follow.     But  the  enemy  was  so  dispirited  by  seeing  ^''^'n^^^^.^^ 
turned   that  they  fled  with  litlie  or  no  resiblaiice.     Ihougii  oni)  a 


MARCH  THROUGH  THE  TAOCHI  COUNTRY.   547 

few  were  slain,  many  throw  away  their  light  shields  of  wicker  or 
wood-work,  ^vhich  became  the  prey  of  the  conquerors. 

Tims  misters  of  the  pass,  the  Greeks  descended  to  the  level  ground 
on  the  other  side,  where  they  found  themselves  in  some  villages 
v.]  stocked  with  provisions  and  comforts;  the  first  in  the  country 
nV  the  Taochi      pibid)ly  they  halted  here  some  days;  for  they  had 
«(U  no  vilhmes,  either  for  rest  or  for  refreshment  during  the  lasln.ne 
clvs'marehr since  leaving  those  Arnien.au  villages  m  which  they 
eul  nassed  k  week  so  eminently  restorative,  and  which  apparently  - 
ad  furnisluid  them  with  a  stock  of  provisions  for  the  onward  jour- 
nev     Such  halt  gave  lime  to  the  Taochi  to  carry  up  their  f amdies 
S  prov'isimis  into   inaccessible   strongholds    so   that  the  Greeks 
?ound  no  supplies,  during  tive  days'  march  througli  the  territory. 
Their  provisions  were  completely  exhausted,  when  they  arrived  be- 
fore one  of  these  strongholds,  a  rock  on  which  were  seen    he  fami- 
esand  the  cattle  of  the  Taochi;  without  houses  or  fortification, 
but  nearly  surrounded  by  a  river,  so  as  to    eave  only  one  narrow 
ascent!  rendered  unapproachable  by  vast  rocks  which  the  defenders 
hurled  or  rolled  from  the  summit.     By  an  ingenious  combinat  on  of 
b  ivery  and  stratagem,  in  which  some  of  the  captains  much  dis- 
iu^ruished  themselves,  the  Greeks  overcame  this  dilhculty,  and  took 
the^'hei^'ht      The  scene  which  then  ensued  was  awful       llie   lao- 
chiati  women  seized  their  children,  flung  them  over  the  precipice, 
and  then  cast  themselves  headlong  also,  followed  by  the  men.     Al- 
most every  soul  tlius  perished,  very  few  surviving  to  become  pris- 
oners     An  Arcadian  captain  named  J^neas,  seeing  one  ot  them  m 
a  tine  dress  about  to  precipitate  himself  with  the  rest,  seized  hini 
'with  a  view  to  prevent   it.     But   the  man   in   return  gra-sped  him 
liimly   drairged  him  to  the  edge  of  the  rock,  and  leaped  down  to 
the  destruclion  of  both.     Though  scarcely  any  prisoners  were  taken, 
however,  tlie  Greeks  obtained  abundance  of  oxen,  asses,  and  sheep, 
which  fully  supplied  their  wants.  ^,    ,  ,  ,-  -.  *i 

Thev  now  entered  into  the  territory  of  the  Clialyl3es,  which  they 
were  seven  davs  in  passing  through.  These  were  the  bravest  war- 
riors whom  they  had  seen  in  Asia.  Their  equipment  was  a  spear 
of  tifte.'u  cubits  long,  with  only  one  end  pointed-a  helmet,  greaves 
stuffed  corselet,  with  a  kilt  or  dependent  flaps-a  short  sword  which 
they  employed  to  cut  oif  the  head  of  a  slain  enemy  displaying  the 
heiui  iu  si^rfit  of  their  surviving  enemies  with  triumphant  dance  and 
son-  They  carried  no  shield;  perhaps  because  the  excessive 
leunh  of  the  spear  required  the  constant  employment  of  both  hands 
-y"et  they  did  not  shrink  from  meeting  the  Greeks  occasionally  m 
regular,  stand-up  fight.  As  they  had  carried  off  all  /I'eir  provisions 
into  hill  forts,  the  Greeks  could  obtain  no  supp  les,  but  J  ^ed  all  the 
time  upon  the  cattle  which  they  had  acquired  froiu  the  Taoc  i 
After  seven  days  of  march  and  combat-t be  CUalybes  perpetua  ly 
attacking  their  rear-they  reached  the  river  Harpasus^  (400  feet 


548 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


broad),  wliere  they  passed  into  the  territory  of  the  Skythini.  It 
rather  seems  that  the  territory  of  the  Chalybes  was  mountninous; 
that  of  the  Skythini  was  level,  and  contained  villages,  wherein  tliLy 
remained  three  days,  refreshing  themselves,  and  stocking  themselves 
with  provisions. 

Four  days  of  additional  march  brought  them  to  a  sight,  the  like 
f  of  which  they  had  not  seen  since  Opis  and  Sittake  on  the  Tigris  in 
Babylonia — a  large  and  flourishing  city  called  Gymnins;  an  earnest 
of  the  neighborhood  of  the  sea,  of  commerce,  and  of  civilization. 
The  chief  of  this  city  received  them  in  a  friendly  manner,  and 
furnished  them  with  a  guide,  who  engaged  to  conduct  them,  after 
live  days'  march,  to  a  hill  from  whence  they  would  have  a  view  of 
the  sea.  This  was  bv  no  means  their  nearest  wav  to  the  sea,  for  the 
chief  of  Gymnias  wished  to  send  them  through  the  territory'  of  some 
neighbors  to  whom  he  was  hostile;  which  territory,  as  soon  as  they 
reached  it,  the  guide  desired  them  to  burn  and  destroy.  However, 
the  promise  was  kept,  and  on  the  fifth  day,  marching  still  apparently 
through  the  territory  of  the  Skythini,  they  reached  the  summit  of  a 
mountain  called  Theches,  from  whence  the  Euxine  Sea  was  visible. 

An  animated  shout  from  the  soldiers  who  formed  the  vanguard 
testified  the  impressive  effect  of  this  long-deferred  spectacle,  assur- 
ing, a.s  it  seemed  to  do  their  safety  and  their  return  home.  To 
Xenophon  and  to  the  rear-guard — engaged  in  repelling  the  attack  of 
natives  who  had  come  forward  to  revenge  the  plunder  of  their  terri- 
tory— the  shout  was  unintelligible.  They  at  first  imagined  that  the 
natives  had  commenced  an  attack  in  front  as  well  as  in  the  rear,  and 
that  the  van-guard  was  engaged  in  battle.  But  every  moment  the 
shout  became  louder,  as  fresh  men  came  to  the  summit  and  gave 
vent  to  their  feelings;  so  that  Xenophon  became  anxious,  and  gal- 
loped up  to  the  van  with  his  handful  of  cavalry  to  see  what  had 
happened.  As  he  approached,  the  voice  of  the  overjoyed  crowd 
was  heard  distinctly  crying  out  Thalatta,  ThaJatia  (The  sea,  the  sea), 
and  congratulating  each  other  in  ecstasy.  The  main  body,  the  rear- 
guard, the  baggage-soldiers  driving  up  their  hor-^es  and  cattle  before 
them,  became  all  excited  by  the  sound,  and  hurried  up  breathless  to 
the  summit.  The  whole  army,  officers  and  soldiers,  were  thus  as- 
sembled, manifesting  their  joyous  emotions  by  tears,  embraces,  and 
outpourings  of  enthusiastic  sympathy.  With  spontaneous  impulse 
they  heaped  up  stones  to  decorate  the  spot  by  a  monument  and  com- 
memorative trophy;  putting  on  the  stones  such  homely  offerings  as 
their  means  afforded — sticks,  hides,  and  a  few  of  the  wicker  shields 
just  taken  from  the  natives.  To  the  guide,  who  had  performed  his 
engagement  of  bringing  them  in  five  days  within  sight  of  the  sea, 
their  gratitude  was  unbounded.  They  presented  him  with  a  horse, 
a  silver  bowl,  a  Persian  costume,  and  ten  darics  in  money;  besides 
several  of  the  soldiers'  rings,  which  he  especially  asked  for.  Thus 
loaded  with  presents,  he  left  them,  having  first  shown  them  a  village 


PASSAGE  THROUGH  THE  MAKRONES.     549 

wherein  they  could  find  quarters-as  well  as  the  road  which  they 
^j^S^tTthrovu^yhe^^^^^  ^,  ,,,  ,,,,. 

In  arms  on  the  -f^^-^^l^'f^^^^ J^^^  t.provide  the 

''■^"is'T  crVs  n^  mi  e  ^  Makrones^ere  shouting  and 
means  ot  crossing.  'i"<-  „„i,„„.  :,,  the  Grecum  svnn\'  came  to 
encoumgiog  each  other  aloud,  ?:  P^"^\V^  /  i^^guaM,  and^  that   he 

Makrones,  an,l  to  assure  "'^      »'«'  /^^  t^VlmA  a  market  to 
harm,  de^jring  "Othju^g  mo^e  th^n  .^  f re^^^^^^^^  ^^^  , 

"  The'arm%ow  reached  the  borders  of  the  Kolchians,  ^vho  .^•ero 

«..?  thorn  r.ivv  if  in  any  w^ay  we  can  do  so.  ,    .       •     i 

EtMvTthese  formidaWe  compauies  of  hoplites,  each  m  .«.ngle 
file  now  bc-aito  ascend  the  hill;  the  peltasts  and  hmvmeu  bein? 
fv,r't1v  .Ust^ilm  ed  among  them,  partly  placed  on  the  flanks.     Che i- 

unaware  of  its  P<''^'''>ff^R™P^'ic'ued  with  wine;  those  who  ate  much, 
'^.eTr^lzedrhCmUviXuvUing  an^ 


550 


RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


like  madmen  in  a  state  of  delirium.  From  this  terrible  distemper 
some  recovered  on  the  ensuiii!?  daj;  others  two  or  lliree  days  after- 
ward.    It  does  not  appear  that  any  one  actually  died. 

Two  more  day's  march  brought  them  to  the  sea,  at  the  Greek  mari- 
time city  of  Trapezus  or  Tnbizond,  founded  by  the  inhabitMiits  of 
Sinope  on  the  coast  of  tlie  Kolciiiaii  territory.  Here  the  Trapezuu- 
tines  received  tliem  with  kindness  and  hospitality,  scndinir  thtin 
presents  of  bullocks,  barley -meal,  and  wine.  Taking  up  their  (junr  , 
ters  in  some  Kolcliian  villaires  near  the  town,  they  now  enjoyed,  for 
the  first  time  since  leaving  Tarsus,  a  safe  and  undisturbed  repose 
durinir  thirty  days,  and  were  ena])l('d  to  recover  in  some  degree  from 
the  severe  hardships  which  they  had  undergone.  While  the  Trape- 
zuntines  brought  produce  for  'sale  .into  the  camp,  the  Greeks  ]n'o- 
vided  the  means  of  ])urchasing  it  by  predatory  incursions  against  the 
Kolchians  on  the  hills.  Those  Kolchians  who  dwelt  under  the  hills 
and  on  the  plain  were  in  a  state  of  semi  dependence  upon  Trapezus; 
so  that  the  Trapezuntines  mediated  on  their  behalf  and  prevailed 
upon  the  Greeks  to  leave  them  unmolested,  on  condition  of  a  con- 
tribution of  bullocks. 

These  bullocks  enabled  the  Greeks  to  discharge  the  vow^  wliichthey 
had  made,  on  the  proposition  of  Xenophon,  to  Zeus  the  Preserver, 
during  that  moment  of  dismay  and  desijair  which  succeeded  inune- 
diately  on  the  massacre  of  their  generals  by  Tissaiihernes.  To  Zeus 
the  Preserver,  to  Herakles  the  Conductor,  and  to  vari(ms  other  gods, 
thev  offered  an  abundant  sacrifice  on  their  mountain  camp  overhang- 
ing the  sea,  and  after  the  festival  ensuing,  the  skins  of  the  victims 
were  given  as  prizes  to  competitors  in  running,  wrestling,  boxing, 
and  tlTe  pankration.  The  superintendence  of  such  festival  games, 
so  fully  {\ccordant  with  Grecian  usage  and  highly  interesting  to  the 
army,  was  committed  to  a  Spartan  named  Drakontius;  a  man  whose 
dest'inv  recalls  that  of  Patroklus  and  other  Homeric  heroes— for  he 
had  been  exiled  as  a  boy,  having  unintentionally  killed  another  hoy 
with  a  short  sword.  Various  departures  from  Grecian  custom  how- 
ever were  admitted.  The  matches  took  place  on  the  steep  and  stony 
hill-side  overhaniring  the  sea,  instead  of  on  a  sn>oolh  idain;  and  the 
numerous  hard  falls  of  tlie  competitors  afforded  increased  interest  to 
the  bv-standers.  The  captive  non-Hellenic  boys  were  admitted  to 
run  for  the  prize,  since  otherwise  a  ])oy-race  could  not  have  been 
obtained.  Lastly,  the  animation  of  the  scene,  as  well  as  the  ardor  of 
the  competitors,*was  much  enhanced  by  the  number  of  their  mis- 
tresses present. 


^cVPPENDIX. 


651 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  LXX.  \ 

^xT  TTXT?  rvna-R AVHY   OF  THE  RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND, 
^^JtE^RtSeY  QUITTED  THE  TIURIS,  AND  ENTERED  THE  IvARDU- 
CHIAN  MOUNTAINS. 

Tt  wnnld  be  iniustice  to  this  gallant  and  long-suffering  body  of  men  not  to 
...  i.pnt  the  rea'fer  w  th  a  map  ?xliilnting  the  full  length  of  their  stupendous 
P  3h  TTd  to  the  moment  when  the  Greeks  enter  Karduchia,  the  Ime  of  march 
I!,'^v  hP  inlicated  upo^^^^^^^^  which,  though  not  identifying  special  haltmg- 

SSes  or  locates  m^^^^^^^       certain  that  we  cannot  be  far  wrong  on  the  whole 
&  Ster  that  moment,  the  evidence  gradually  disappears,  and  we  are  left  >wth 
^^SLT^^o?eihan^i^no^yledse  of  the  terminus,  the  general  course,  and  a  tew 

march  through  K^rducS  but  tL  most  iuTportant  point  which  he  has  es  ab- 
Sd  here  sfen^  to  b^         identity  of  the  river  Kentrites  with  the  Buhtan-Clmi 
an  el^e'^x  aSnt  of  the  Tigris-distinguishing  it;f  rom  the  nvet;  o    f'ths  on  the 
r^..A  *u^  i.;x7«r  TvVinhiir  on  the  south-east,  with  both  ot  wnicii  it  nau  ueeu. 
Ilr^viouslfconfounded^^^  Buhtan-Chai  falls  into  the  Tigris  at  a  vil- 

FJ^H  called  Til  and -co^^^^  at  the  present  day  a  natural  barrier  between 

SdNtan  and  IrmenS"   p.  10t>).    In  this  identification  of  the  Kentrites  with 
t^ie  B^^San  cSat  ?rofessor\        agrees  iZug  <ler  Zehn  Tausend  p.  f^ 

Tf  the  Greeks  crossed  the  Kentrites  near  its  continence  with  the  ligris,tiiey 
would  march  up  it^rlght  bank  in  one  day  to  a  situation  near  the  modern  to  vn 
Xrt^Mrliusworth  thinks),  though  Xenophon  tf  e^XirlwS'Jf^xf  dlys  of 
Tiitii«  which  nevertheless  thev  must  have  passed.  Their  two  next  aa>s  ot 
SSSi  j^^sum  n^a  di^^^^^^^^^^  neariy  north,  would  carry  them  (as  Xenophon 
Ses 'if  rS)  blvoml  the  sources  of  the  Tigris;  that  is,  -beyond  the  head- 
water^ of  the  eastern  tributaries  to  the  Tigris  Teleboas-"of  no 

^r ^.^uttetui^ir  i?"ri)  Thfr'l  I  fpSxr  "suffidrnrrl^s?^^^^^  id e'nti?.? 
t^;r^ rive?  w  U  SaraUif  o/*Blkck  Rfv^.  ^  through  the  yaUey  or 

r>Hin  of  Mush  into  the  Murad  or  Eastern  Euphrates  (AinsAorth,  p.  1.2,  Ritter 
F  H?,mde  nart  X  s  37  P  BH2^     Though  Kinneir  (Journey  through  Asia  Minor 
md  Kurdis?ai    fsiS.  p.  ?84),  Rennell  (Illustrations  of  the  Expedition  of  C^'-us, 
^  on-^UIi  Rpi'l  rSvStem  of  Geography,  iv.  p.  140)  identify  it  with  the  Ak-bu  or 
R^^'y5ush-\hU  S^inlf^^^^^^  ••iri"'{;^t^"'"  tributary  to  the 

^^^s<^^^c^  ^^KT^iSilt^aiai^s  i:;l;^:^;;ind  Armema  give  t.  h^ 
o,Si^^;;X  J;?|est  autl^f  ^^ollows  M.^u^oi;ai  ^^fgi^^^^^^^^; 

kSiSs  no\%itaMt!^-onflSencr.  ^^^  considerably  higher  up 

near  the  tmvn  ofsert  or  S^  From  hence  he  supposes  that  they  marched 
nea  lyt>SeasUn  t^^^^^  modern  road  troui  Sert  to  Bit  Js,  thus  getting  round  t^^^^^ 
hf-ifi  ornpi-  the  head  of  the  river  called  Biths-Su,  which  is  one  oi  ine  easietu 
amueSL  to  the  T Igrts  (  tirst  into  the  Buhtiin-Chai),  and  which  Xenophon 

fook  S.r  the  Tf-ris  tself  Th^  then  marched  farther,  in  a  line  not  far  distant 
f?mVthe  Lake  of  Van  over  the^sa.idle  which  separates  that  lake  from  the  lofty 
mrntafn  \li-Dagh  T^is  saddle  is  the  watei-shed  which  f  P^>:;Jf^,.\^^^  ^^j^" 
S  to  the  T  gr£  f rom  those  to  the  Eastern  Euphrat.es,  of  which  lattei  the  Tele- 
boas  or  Kara-Su  is  one  (Koch  Zug  d^r  Zehn  Tausend  p  83-^)^ 

After  the  river  Teleboas,  there  seems  no  one  point  ^^^^^^^^.^f'^^  ™ 
be  identified  with  anything  approaching  to  certamtj.    Nor  have  we  any  means 


552 


APPENDIX. 


even  of  rletermininp  tho  pcnoral  lino  of  route,  apart  from  specific  places,  which 
they  followed  from  the  river  T«leboas  to  Trebizond. 

Their  first  object  was  to  reach  and  cross  the  Eastern  Euphrates.  They  would, 
of  coui-se,  cross  at  the  nearest  point  where  they  could  find  a  ford.  But  how 
low  down  its  course  does  the  river  continue  to  be  fordable,  in  midwinter,  with 
snow  on  the  ground?  Here  Professor  Koch  differs  from  Mr.  Ainsworth  and 
Colonel  Chesney,  He  affirms  that  the  river  would  be  fordable  a  little  above  its 
confluence  with  the  Tscharbahur.  about  latitude  :39«  3'.  According  to  Mr.  Ains- 
worth, it  would  not  be  fordable  below  the  confluence  with  the  river  of  Khaniis 
(Khinnis).  Koch's  authority,  as  the  most  recent  and  systematic  investigator  of 
these  regions,  seems  preferable,  especially  as  it  puts  the  Greeks  nearly  in  the 
road  now  traveled  over  from  Mush  to  Erzerum,  which  is  said  to  be  the  only 
pass  over  the  mountains  open  throughout  all  the  winter,  passing  by  Khinnis 
and  Koili:  see  Ritter,  Erdkunde.  x.  p.  3^7.  Xenophon  mentions  a  warm  spring, 
which  the  army  passed  by  during  the  third  or  fourth  day  after  crossing  the 
Euphrates  (Anab.  iv.  5,  15).  Professor  Koch  believes  himself  to  have  identified 
this  warm  spring— the  only  one,  as  he  states  (p.  90-9:3),  south  of  the  range  (»f 
mountnins  called  the  Bingol-dagh— in  the  district  called  Wardo,  near  the  vil- 
lage of  Bashkan.  ,     ,  „         ^  ,  , 

To  lay  down  with  any  certainty  the  line  which  the  Greeks  followed  from  the 
Euphrates  to  Trebizond,  appears  altogether  impossible.  I  cannot  admit  the 
hypothesis  of  Mr.  Ainsworth,  who  conducts  the  army  across  the  Araxes  to  its 
northern  bank,  carries  them  up  northward  to  the  latitude  of  Tifiis  in  Georgia, 
then  brings  them  back  again  across  the  Han^a-Chai  la  northern  atlluent  of  the 
Araxes,  which  he  identifies  with  the  Ilarpasus  mentioned  by  Xenophon)  and 
the  Araxes  itself,  to  Gymnias,  which  he  places  near  the  site  of  Erzerum.  Pro- 
fessor Koch  (p.  104— lOS).  who  dissents  vith  good  reason  from  Mr.  Auisworth, 
proposes  (though  with  hesitation  and  uncertainty)  a  line  of  his  own.  which 
appears  to  me  open  greatlv  to  the  s;>me  objection  as  that  of  Mr.  Ainsworth.  It 
ranit'S  the  Greeks  too  much  to  the  northward  of  Erzerum,  more  out  of  their 
line  of  march  from  the  place  where  they  crossed  the  Eastern  Euphrates,  than 
can  be  justified  by  any  probability.  The  Greeks  knew  well  that,  in  order  to  get 
home,  they  must  take  a  westerly  direction  (see  Anab.  iii.  5.  15). 

Their  great  and  constant  purpose  would  be  to  make  way  to  the  westward,  as 
soon  as  thev  had  crossed  the  Euphrates:  and  the  road  from  that  river,  passing 
near  the  sitle  of  Erzerum,  to  Trebizond  would  thus  coincide,  in  the  main,  with 
their  spontaneous  tendency.  They  had  no  motive  to  go  noithward  ot  Erzerum, 
nor  ought  we  to  suppo.se  it  without  some  proof,  I  trace  upon  my  map  a  line  c>f 
march  much  less  circuitous,  not  meaning  it  to  be  understood  as  the  real  road 
which  the  araiy  can  be  proved  to  have  taken,  but  simply  because  it  seems  a 
pos.sible  line,  and  because  it  serves  as  a  sort  of  approximation  to  complete  the 
i-eaders  idea  of  the  entire  ground  traveled  over  by  the  Ten  Thousand. 

Koch  hardly  makes  sufficient  account  of  the  overwhelming  hardships  with 
which  the  Greeks  had  to  contend,  when  he  states  (p.  9ti)  that  if  they  had  taken 
a  line  as  straight  or  nearly  as  straight  as  was  practicable,  they  might  have 
marched  from  the  Euphrates  to  Trebizond  in  sixteen  or  twenty  days,  even 
allowing  for  the  bad  time  of  the  year.  Considering  that  it  was  midwinter,  m 
that  very  high  and  cold  country,  with  deep  snow  throughout;  that  thej;  had 
absolut*»ly  no  advantages  or  assistance  of  any  kind:  that  their  sick  and  dis- 
abled men,  together  with  their  arms,  were  to  be  cairied  by  the  stronger:  that 
there  were  a  great  many  women  accom{)anying  them:  that  they  had  beasts  to 
drive  along,  carrying  bacrgage  and  plunder— the  prophet  Silanus,  for  example, 
having  preserved  his  S.tRR)  darics  in  coin  from  the  field  of  Kunaxa  until  his 
return;  that  there  was  much  resistance  from  the  Chalybes  and  Taochi;  that 
they  had  to  take  provisions  where  provisions  were  discoverable;  that  even  a 
small  stream  must  have  impeded  them,  and  probably  driven  thi  m  out  of  their 
coui-setofind  a  ford— considering  the  intolerable  accumulation  of  these  and 
other  hardships,  we  need  not  wonder  at  any  degree  of  slowness  in  their  prog- 
gress.  It  rarely  happens  that  modem  travelers  go  over  these  regions  in  nml- 
winter:  but  we  may  see  what  traveling  is  at  that  season  by  the  dreadlui 
description  which  Mr.  Baillie  Eraser  gives  of  his  journey  from  Tauris  to  Eize- 
rum  in  the  month  of  March  (Travels  in  Koordhistan,  Letter  XV.).    Mr.  lumior 


APPENDIX. 


553 


/rn  .la  «  VLqv  "Tlie  winters  are  so  severe  that  all  communication 
Kie'n' B^bui?  a^\he  cVZnll^.^  villages  is  cut  off  for  four  months  m  tho 
^farS^c^nsequence  of  the  dep^  distance-the  air-line- 

^  Now  if  we  measure  ^^.^^^^^l^J'^^J.^J.^^^^  Greeks  to  have  crossed 

from  Trebizond  to  the  Pl^^i^^^.f^^^S^^V^^^^^^^^^  The  number  of  day's 

the  Eastern  Euphrates-we  shall  fit^  it  l.O^ngnsnu^  include  the  five 

j()urney-marches  which  Xenophon  ineim^^^^^^  even  ^  properly 

days  of  march  undertaken  from  GymmasUYia^^  j^ore 

speaking,  were  ^i'-e^.^ed  agamst  the;«^°^>f «  each  ^tihZe  M  days,  therefore, 
than  for  the  promotion  of  their  ^f^!J[iiin'"ar  progress.  This  surely  is  not  an 
they  must  have  made  3.14  miles  ^t  recuiineHi  pit  g  disadvantages  of  their 
unreasonably  slow  F?^''^f  ,^„^,«;iPP^|.^at  1^^^^^^^  from  tie  straight- 

situation;  nor  does  it  ""PlL^^J^^ch  ^lifnlelf  (K  s  Introducti  p.  4)  suggests 
^t^s  S^'rfs?men?s't^h1c^  must^hale  cLcurred  on  the  march,  but  which 

^'?lirr?v"e?^^^htV^^^^ 

Tchoruk-Su,  as  Colonel  Chesney  ar^dPro^^^^^^^^^  identified., 
difficult  to  assign  any  other  river  witti  ™^4^"^.y^ich  Xenophon  calls  Gymnias 

I  cannot  but  think  it  P/o^able  that  the  city  wm^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^^^ 
(Diodorus,  xiv.  29  calls  It  Gymnasia)  ^^-^^  «^f„^\^,o^^^^                                               • 

Gumisch-Khana(HamiltonK  Gumush^Ka^  ^          ^^^  .  ^^ 

neir).    "  Gumis(3h-Khana  (sa>  s  J^.  Hainilton,  i^^^  ancient  and  con- 

xi.  p.  168;  ch.  xiv.  p.  m)  \s  f  lebmted  as  the  s^^^^^      i^^e  ^^^^.^  ^^^  ^^ 

fa^rJ^nf a^iTiS^oil^^^^^^^^^  ^-m  Trebizond  to  Erze- 

^Xw  here  is  r^or^y^^^.^^^^^^ 

the  existence  of  the  silver-minesfunislies  a  ^  y     ^  flourishing, 

ZS^^^tT^f^r^n^:rS[^rt?^'^i^T^^^  Chalybes,  the 

Skythini,  the  Makrones,  etc.         ,^.,  _,„.  -^  ^u^  ^nd  of  the  third  day  after  quit- 

tremely  difficult  J^f^  A^^^^,^"i;„V>orta^^  in  this  discussion) that  it  lies  m  the 
Khana,  tells  us  (what  is  of  s«;^%""K^/i^^  Minor,  vol.  ii.  P.  3^)- 

winter-road  from  Erzerum  tj>Tre.Hzo^^^^  Ss^erbv  Gumtsch-Khana,  and  takes 
"The  winter-road,  which  is  the  XtWotR?rs  cross  over  the  mountain  at  vari- 
the  longer  portion  of  the  vallej  :  aU  the  ^^he^s  cross  o^er^^^^^^^  ^^ 

in  Asia  Minor,  vol  u.  p.  389).  rvf^f.\r<;i  marched  in  any  direct  road  from 

Now  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  the  p^t.t  ^i^  W  davs'  march  which  thev 
Gymnias  to  Trebizond.  On  the  ^o"^f  ;:V«  oonducted  by  a  guide  sent  from 
undertook  immediately  from  G5'mnms  ^^  as  conduc^^^^^^  hostile  to  Gymnias,  in 
that  town,  who  la   them  «ver  the^  tem^nes  ^f  People  iiostue    ^^  ^^^^^^^ 

=?i^X^i'ai!:lt1S^^'^  hS^^^^  ^^-  -  ^^^  '^^ 

of  the  sacred  mountain  Theche.        ^  expected.    But  unfortu- 

Theche  was  a  summit  ^^-^P^/JJ;,  Vhe  mrtirular  ^  on  which  the  inter- 

nately  it  seems  impossible  to  verify  tne  imtieuiar  s"}""'/.     ^^li  presumes  it 
esting  scene  described  ^,^/j»«P|;!;;!J.^«f^oi^^^  h-^^^^r,  according  to 

^X  '^  SSSml^t^t^'ii^^S^    b^nvilli'allS  W  other  geographers 


554 


APPENDIX. 


identify  it  with  the  ridpre  called  Tekieh-Baprh  to  the  east  of  Giimisch-Khniia: 
nearer  to  the  sea  than  that  place.  This  mountain,  I  think  would  suit  pretty 
veil  f<^r  the  narrative  in  resp.M-t  of  position:  but  Koch  and  other  modern  trav- 
elers affirm  that  it  is  neither  higrh  enough,  nor  near  enough  to  the^ea,  to  permit 
an-  such  view  as  that  ^^hich  Xenophon  relates.  It  stands  on  Kieperts  map 
at  'a  distance  of  full  ^^  English  mih-s  from  the  sea  the  view  of  whirl.,  moivovtr. 
seems  intercepted  l.v  the  still  higher  mountain-chain  now  called  Kolath-Iagl, 
a  p.)rtion  of  the  ancient  Paiyaderes.  which  runs  along  parallel  to  the  coast.  It 
is  to  be  recollected  that,  in  th.-  first  half  of  February,  the  time  of  Xenophon  s 
visit,  the  highest  peaks  would  certainlj-  be  all  covered  with  snow,  and  therefore 
verv  diflicult  to  ascend.  ,  ,  .   .        „  j  i- 

There  is  a  striking  view  obtained  of  the  sea  from  the  mountain  called  Kara- 
kaban.  This  mountain,  more  than  4.000  feet  high,  Hes  rather  abox-e  twenty  ; 
miles  from  the  sea.  to  the  south  of  Trebizond.  and  immediately  north  of  the 
"tin'higher  chain  of  Kolath-Dagh.  From  the  Kolath-Drgh  chain,  whidi  runs 
east  and  west,  there  strike  out  three  or  four  parallel  ndges  to  the  northward 
formed  of  primitive  slate,  and  cut  down  pret  if)itously  so  as  to  leave  deep  and 
narrow  valleys  between.  On  leaving  Trebizond.  the  traveler  ascends  the  hill 
immediately  above  the  town,  and  then  descends  into  the  va  ley  on  the  other 
Bide  His  road  to  Karakaban  lies  partly  ah  ng  the  valley,  partly  along  the  crest 
of  one  of  the  four  ridges  just  mentioned.  But  throughout  all  »?i«  ro^^^^^e  sea 
is  never  seen:  being  hidden  bv  the  hills  inmediately  above  Trebizond  He  does 
not  ag>nn  see  the  sea  until  he'reaches  Kainkaban  which  is  s"flp"t'"tlv  ^^^^^^^^^^^ 
enable  him  to  see  over  those  hills.  The  grides  :as  I  am  informed  by  Dr.  Holland, 
who  twice  went  over  the  spot)  point  out  with  great  animation  this  view  of  the 
sea  as  particularly  deserving  of  notice.  It  is  enjoyed  for  a  short  space  while 
the  road  winds  round  the  mountain,  and  then  again  lost.  j       •       ^ 

Here  is  a  view  of  the  sea  at  once  distant,  sudden,  impressive,  and  enjoyed 
from  an  eminence  not  too  high  to  be  accessible  to  the  CyreJan  army.  In  so  far 
it  would  be  suitable  to  the  description  of  Xenophon.  J^et  again  it  appears  that 
a  person  coming  to  this  point  from  the  land  side  (as  Xenophon  of  course  did), 
would  find  it  in  his  descending  route  not  in  his  ascending:  aj^^'  this  can  hardlj 
be  reconciled  with  the  description  which  we  read  m  the  Greek  histoi  lan  More- 
over the  subsequent  marchVs  which  Xenophon  mentions  after  quoting  the 
mountain  summit  Theche.  can  hardly  be  reconciled  with  the  supposition  that 
Uwas  the  srme  as  what  is  now  called  Karakaban.  It  is  indeed  quite  possible 
(as  Mr  Hamilton  suggests)  that  Theche  may  have  been  a  peak  apart  from  an\ 
road  and  that  the  guide  mav  have  conducted  the  so  diers  tfiither  for  the 
Spress  purpose  of  s^howing  the  sea.  guiding  them  back  again  into  the  road 
afterward  This  increases  the  difficulty  of  identifying  the  spot.  However,  the 
who  e  ??gion  is  as  vet  very  imperfectly  known,  and  perhaps  it  is  not  unpos- 
5bie  that  there  maV  be  some  particular  locality  even  on  Tekieh-Dagh  whence 
through  an  accidental  gap  in  the  intervening  mouutams,  the  sea  might  become 
visible. 


GREEK  CITIES   ON  THE  EUXINE.  555 


CHAPTER  LXXI. 

rKOCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND  GREEKS,  FROM  THE  TDfE 
TH.\T  THEY  REACHED  TIIAFEZUS,  TO  THEIR  JUNCTION  WITH  THE 
LACEDAEMONIAN  ARMY  IN   ASIA  MINOR. 

AVE  now  commence  a  third  act  in  the  history  of  this  memorable 
body  of  men  After  having  followed  them  from  Sardis  to  Kunaxa 
as  mercenaries  to  procure  tiie  throne  for  Cyrus— then  from  Kunaxa 
to  Trapezus  as  men  anxious  only  for  escape,  and  purchasing  tlieir 
safety  by  marvelous  bravery,  endurance,  and  organization— vve  shall 
now  track  their  proceedings  among  the  Greek  colonies  on  the  Euxine 
and  at  the  Bosporus  of  Thrace,  succeeded  by  their  struggles  against 
the  meanness  of  the  Thracian  prince  Seuthes,  as  well  as  against  the 
treachery  and  arbitrary  harshness  of  the  Lacedaemonian  commanders 
Anaxibius  and  Aristarchus.  ^^     r       a 

Trapezus,  uow  Trebizond,  where  the  army  had  recently  found 
repose  was  a  colony  from  Sinope,  as  were  also  Kerasus  and  Ivotyora 
farther  westward;  each  of  them  receiving  a  harmost  or  goyeinor 
from  the  mother-city,  and  paying  to  her  an  annual  trdmte.  All  these 
three  cities  were  planted  on  a  narrow  strip  of  land  dividmg  the  i.ux- 
ine  from  the  elevated  mountain  range  which  so  closely  borders  on 
its  southern  coast.  At  Sinope  itself,  the  land  stretches  out  into  a 
defensible  peninsula,  with  a  secure  harbor,  and  a  large  breadtli  ot 
adiacent  fertile  soil.  So  tempting  a  site  invited  the  Milesians  even 
before  the  year  600  B.C.,  to  plant  a  colony  there,  and  enai)led  bmope 
to  attain  niuch  prosperity  and  power.  Farther  westward,  not  more 
than  a  long  day's  iourney  for  a  rowing  vessel  from  Byzantium  was 
situated  the  Megarian  colony  of  Herakleia,  in  the  territory  of  the 

Mariandyni.  ,         ..      r^  ^  u 

The  native  tenants  of  this  line  of  coast,  upon  whom  the  Greek 
settlers  intruded  themselves  (reckoning  from  the  westward),  were  the 
Biihynian  Thracians,  the  Mariandyni,  the  Paphlagonians,  the  lib- 
areni,  Chalybes,  Mosyna3ki,  Drihi3,  and  Kolchians  Here  as  else- 
where, these  ntitives  found  the  Greek  seaports  useful,  in  giving  a 
now  value  to  inland  produce,  and  in  furnishing  the  great  men  witli 
ornaments  and  luxuries  to  which  they  would  otherwise  have  had  no 
access  The  citizens  of  Herakleia  had  reduced  into  dependence  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  neigh])oring  Mariandyni,  and  held  tlieni 
ill  a  relation  resembling  that  of  the  natives  of  Esthonia  and  Livonia 
to  the  German  colonies  in  the  Baltic.  Some  of  the  Kolclnan  villages 
were  also  subject  in  the  same  manner  to  the  Trepezuntines;  and 
Sinope  doubtless  possessed  a  similar  inland  dominion  of  greater  or 
less  extent.  But  the  principal  wealth  of  this  important  city  arose 
from  her  navy  and  maritime  commerce;  from  the  rich  tunny  tisliery 


I  ! 


556        PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN   THOUSAND. 

attached  to  her  promontor}-;  from  the  olives  in  her  ininu'diatc 
neighborhood,  which  was  u  cuhivation  not  iudigeuous,  but  only 
naturalized  by  the  Greeks  on  the  seaboard;  from  the  varied  produce 
of  the  interior,  comprising  abimdant  herds  of  cattle,  mines  of  silvr, 
iron,  and  copper,  in  the  neighboring  mountains,  wood  for  sliip- 
buildinir,  as  well  as  for  house-furniture,  and  native  slaves.  The  (ase 
was  siniilar  with  the  three  colonies  of  Siuope,  more  to  the  eastward 
— Kotyora,  Kerasus,  andTrapezus;  except  that  the  mountains  whicli 
border  on  the  Euxine,  gradually  approaching  nearer  and  nearer  to 
the  shore,  left  to  each  of  them  a  more  confined  strip  of  cultivable 
land.  For  these  cities  the  time  had  not  yet  arrived,  to  be  conquered 
and  absorbed  by  tlie  inland  monarchies  around  them,  as  Miletus  and 
the  cities  on  the  western  coast  of  Asia  Minor  hnd  been.  The  Papli- 
Iftgonians  were  at  this  time  the  only  indigenous  people  in  those 
regions  who  formed  a  considerable  aggregated  force,  under  a  prince 
named  Korvlas;  a  prince  tributary  to  Persia,  yet  half  independent— 
since  he  had  disobeyed  the  summons  of  Artaxerxes  to  come  up  and 
help  in  repellini]:  Cyrus — and  now  on  terms  of  established  alliance 
with  Sinope,  thougli  not  without  secret  designs,  wl;ich  he  wanted 
only  force  to  execute,  against  that  city.  The  other  native  tribes 
to  the  eastward  were  mountaineers  l)Otli  ruder  and  more  divided; 
warlike  on  their  own  heights,  but  little  capable  of  any  aggressive 
combinations. 

Though  we  are  told  that  Periklcs  had  once  dispatched  a  detnch- 
ment  of  Athenian  colonists  to  Sinope,  and  liad  expelled  from  thence 
the  despot  Timesilaus— yet  neither  that  city  nor  any  of  her  neigh- 
bors appear  to  have  taken  part  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  either  for 
or  against  Athens;  nor  were  they  among  the  number  of  tributaries 
to  Persia.  They  doubtless  were  acquainted  with  the  upward  march 
of  Cvnis,  who  had  disturbed  all  Asia;  and  probably  were  not  igno- 
rant of  the  perils  and  critical  state  of  his  Grecian  army.  But  it  was 
with  a  feeling  of  mingled  surprise,  admiration,  and  alarm,  that  they 
saw  that  army  descend  from  the  mountainous  region,  hitherto  only 
recognized  as  the  abode  of  Kolchians,  Makrones,  and  other  analogous 
tribes,  among  whom  was  perched  the  mining  city  of  Gymnias. 

Even  after  all  the  losses  and  extreme  sufferings  of  the  retreat  the 
Greeks  still  numbered,  when  mustered  at  Kerasus,  8.600  hoplites, 
with  peltasts  or  targeteers,  bowmen,  slingers,  etc.,  making  a  total  of 
above  10,000  military  persons.  Such  a  force  had  never  before  been 
seen  in  the  Euxine.  Considering  both  the  numbers  and  the  now- 
acquired  discipline  and  self-confidence  of  the  Cyreians,  even  Siuope 
herself  could  have  raised  no  force  capable  of  meeting  them  in  the 
field.  Yet  they  did  not  belong  to  any  city,  nor  receive  orders  from 
any  established  government.  They*^  were  like  those  mercenary 
armies  which  marched  about  in  Italy  during  the  fourteenth  century, 
under  the  generals  called  Condottieri,  taking  service  sometimes  with 
one  city,   sometimes  with  another.     No  one  could  predict  what 


PLANS  OF  THE  ARMY. 


557 


♦i.o^r  micrbt  conceive  or  in  what  manner  they  might  deal 
1;rthe  St  bU  hed  cmnmunitks  on  the  shores  of  the  Eu^ne  If 
''  ..crino  r  such  an  army  had  suddenly  appeared  m  Sicv.y,  a 
we  unagme  tlK  t  ^^^'\  f".  /expedition  against  Syracuse,  it  would 
^■•^'^' V'"n  n-onbW  Katana  in  their  war 

^''7n  rslr^u  f  ^f  t^^  inlS)^  of  Trapezus  had  wished  to 

aixtunst  feyi.icuse.     ii   l.ic  .„  Tr^^j.,,ias  the  Paphlagoman 

tiuow  off  the  dominion  oSmope-o^^^^^^  formidLble  auxili- 

^^''r^:^^^^^^    MoveoJer  there  were  various  tempting^ 
•aries  to  ^c^"^/7.'' ^'^^^^^  new  colony,  which,  with  so  numer- 

^''XCu'oTo-^^^^^^  Fot>ably  have  over- 

T  ^rl  S  none  heAelf  There  was  no  restraining  cause  to  reckon 
topped  ^'"^P^.  ;*^''^  .  :.^  Hellenic  sympathies  and  education  of  he 
Z^^^^r^^  was  of  nc?t  iLs  importance,  the  fact  that 
Cyreian  '^"^^'f '._,._„  ^^1,^(3^.3  by  permanent  profession,  such  as 

t^l,  rpJhPini  reoeived  with  vehement  acdamalions.  and  warmly  les- 
nond' d  to  WaU-Cheiriiphus  offered,  if  the  army  chose  to  empower 

^:.Kt:^,>r' Hlf SSr,r^^  a.d  he 


THE  ARMY  LEAVES  TRAPi^ZUS. 


559 


5:,S       PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

imlividual  soldiers,  nor  small  fompanies,  miif't  be  allowed  (o  go  out 
ut  pleasure,  without  giving  notiee  to  the  generals;  moreover,  the 
camp  must  be  kept  under  constant  guard  Jind  seouts,  in  the  event  of 
t;urprise  from  a  retaliating  enemy.  It  was  prudent  also  to  take  the 
best  measures  in  their  poVer  for  procuring  vessels;  since,  after  all, 
Cheirisophus  might  possibly  fail  in  bringing  an  adequate  number. 
They  ought  to  borrow  a  few  sliips  of  war  from  the  Trapezuntines, 
and'detahi  all  the  merchant  ships  which  they  saw;  unshipping  the 
rudders,  placing  the  cargoes  under  guard,  and  maintaining  the  crews 
durinir  all  the  time  that  the  ships  might  be  required  for  transport  of 
the  army.  Many  such  merchant  vosels  were  often  sailing  by;  so 
that  they  would  thus  acquire  the  means  of  transport,  even  though 
Cheirisophus  should  bring  few  or  none  frcm  Byzantium.  Lastlv, 
Xenophon  proposed  to  require  the  Grecian  cities  to  rei)air  and  put  in 
order  the  road  along  the  coast,  for  a  hmd-march;  since,  perhaps,  with 
all  their  efforts,  it  would  be  found  impossible  to  get  together  a  suffi- 
cient stoek  of  transports. 

All  the  propositions  of  Xenoph.on  were  readily  adopted  by  the  army, 
except  the  last.  But  the  mere  m(  nlion  of  a  renewed  land-march  ex- 
cited such  universal  murmurs  of  lepugnance,  that  he  did  not  venture 
to  iMit  that  question  to  the  vote.  He  took  upon  himself  however  to 
send  messaces  to  the  Grecian  cities,  on  Ids  own  responsibility;  urg- 
in*'-  them  to>epair  the  roads,  in  order  that  the  departure  of  the  army 
mfght  be  facilitated.  And  he  found  the  cities  ready  enough  to  carry 
his"wishes  i|ito  effect,  as  far  as  Kotyora. 

The  wisdom  of  these  precautionary  suggestions  of  Xenophon  soon 
appeared;  for  Cheirisophus  not  only  failed-  in  his  object,  but  was 
compelled  to  stay  away  for  a  considerable  lime.  A  pentekonter  (or 
armetl  ship  with  lifty  oars)  was  borrowed  from  the  Trapezuntines, 
and  committed  to  the  ciiarge  of  a  Laceda'monian  Perioekus,  named 
Dexippus,  for  the  ])urpose  of  detaining  the  merchant  vessels  passing 
bv.  This  man  bavins?  violated  his  tnist,  and  employed  the  ship  to 
m:ike  his  owmi  escape  out  of  the  Euxine,  a  second  was  obtained  and 
iconfided  to  an  Athenian,  Polykrates;  who  brought  in  successively 
several  merchant  vessels.  These  the  Greeks  did  not  plunder,  but 
secured  the  cariroes  under  adequate  guard,  and  only  reserved  the  ves- 
sels for  transports.  It  became  however  gradually  more  and  more 
difficult  to  supply  the  camp  with  provisions.  Though  the  army  was 
distributed  into  suitable  detachments  for  plundering  the  Kolehiau 
villaires  on  the  hills  J^ixl  seizing  cattle  and  prisoners  for  sale,  yet  these 
expeditions  did  not  alwavs  succeed;  indeed  on  one  occasion,  two 
Grecian  lochi  or  companies  got  entangled  in  such  difficult  ground, 
that  they  were  destroyed  to  a  man.  The  Kolchians  united  on  the 
hills  in  increased  and  menacing  numbers,  insomuch  that  a  larger 
guard  became  necessary  for  the  camp;  while  the  Trapezuntines— 
tired  of  tlie  protracted  stay  of  the  army,  as  well  as  desirous  of  exenipt- 
mg  from  pillage  the  natives  in  their  own  immediate  neighborhood— 


ronducted  the  detachments  only  to  vdlagcs  alike  remote  and  difficult 
'?'aceeL  It  was  in  this  manner  that  a  large  force  under  Xenophon 
ll  nTsefrattacked  the  lofty  and  rugged  stronghold  of  the  Drihe-  he 
t  w'lri^ite  nation  of  mountaineers  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Eux  ne      e^^^^  and  troublesome  lo  Trapezus  by  their  incursions. 

V-te  •;  Ufficult  march  and  attack,  which  Xenophon  describes  in 
•forP.n"  detail  and  wherein  the  Greeks  encountered  no  small 
"Sorn^n^^^-^vy  returned  in  the  end  completely  sue- 

/.n^«fnl  and  with  a  plentiful  booty.  ./-,,•• 

A  t  en^'  h  after  Ion-  awaiting  in  vain  tiie  reappearance  of  Clie.nso- 
i,f:     nrre  mhi '  sc  "rdty  and  weariness  determined  tliem  to  leave 
Cez^s     rs1,ffident  nnmber  of  vessels  had  been  collected  to  serve 
?o;  le  ntnspo  rt  of  the  women,  of  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  of     e 
|l"a-e      All  tliese  were  accordingly  placed  on  board  under  the 
"■nl?M,Vl  of  Phihsius  and  Sopluunetus,  the  two  oldest  generals; 
Srr  reLS^ armrmarclled  by  land,  along  a  road  which  had 
Uen  lust  made  L^ood  nnd.T  the  representations  of  Xenophon      Iii 
i^Z.  ■'.Invs  tl  cv  reached  Kerasus,  another  marilimc  colony  of  the 
S  ^neaTs       in  the  te    it^ry  called  Kolehian;  there  they  halted  tea 
d«f  n  u4e  ed  and  n.  mbered  the  army,  and  divided  the  money  ac- 
n  red  b^   he  sXo    their  prisoners.   'Eight  thousand  six  hundred 
'     r   . .   ,„■   nf  .  lo Hi  Brobably  sreatcr  than  eleven  thousand,  were 
r\'n,     r,rr!a«dtu    '    b^^des   a^  and  various  light  troops. 

'1  rin''  1  e  ;  t  at'KerSus,  tU.  declining  discipline  "f  t>-  -W 
be!  me  manifest  as  they  approached  home  ^^'^^l^^,^^^ 
„.-iim.<l  ori'Miiatins  now,  as  afterward,  m  the  intii"ues  01  irtauiei 
"us  fflcer' A  captain  nanx^d  Klearetus  l^rsuadcJlus  company  to 
h.mnt  the  nlunder  of  a  Kolehiau  village  near  Kerasus.  « licli  Iwd 
nX  a  We  dly  market  to  the  Greeks,  and  which  ''f  t«l/';«"™ 
on  ll:  fnilhof  pea'eeful  relatio.,s  lie  i..te>jded  .^  -^c^off  sepa. 
r.tclv  with   the   booty    n   one   of   the  vessels;   but  Ins  aiiaciv  wa» 

I,       M-iitrles  of  Kerasus  were  iu  great  danger,  and  only  escaped 

:,V;;aZr f  ";;;^Ker.^s^  nmiatcT  without  m-iuiry  or-  punishtueut, 
'■'iet'l'^irKe^^ramf  Ko  Jorarihere  was  not  then  (nor  is  there  t,ow) 


560        PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

• 
"vray  through  it  as  enemies,  with  the  aid  of  one  section  of  these  people 
themselves;  which  alliance  was  procured  f(>r  tiiem  by  llic  Tnipczuu- 
tine  Timesitheus,  wlio  was  proxeuus  of  the  Mosyno'lvi  and  understood 
their  language.  The  Greeks  took  the  mountain  fastnesses  of  this  peo- 
ple, and  plundered  the  wooden  turrets  which  formed  their  abodes. 
Of  their  peculiar  fashions  Xenophon  gives  an  interesting  description, 
which  I  have  not  space  to  copy.  The  territory  of  the  Tibareni  was 
more  easy  and  accessible.  This  people  met  the  Greeks  with  pres- 
ents, and  tendered  a  friendly  passage.  But  the  generals  at  first  de- 
clined the  presents,  preferring  to  treat  them  as  enemies  and  plunder 
them ;  which  in  fact  they  would  have  done,  had  they  not  been  deterred 
by  inauspicious  sacrifices. 

Near  Kotyora,  which  was  situated  on  the  coast  of  the  Tibareni,  yet 
on  tiie  borders  of  Paphlagonia,  they  remained  forty -five  days,  still 
awaiting  the  appearance  of  Cheirisophus  with  the  transports  to  carry 
them  away  by  sea.  The  Sinopian  Harmost  or  governor  did  not  pu- 
mit  them  to  be  welcomed  in  so  friendly  a  manner  as  at  Trapezu?. 
No  market  was  provided  for  them,  nor  were  their  sick  admittei 
within  the  walls.  But  the  fortifications  of  the  town  were  not  so  con 
structcd  as  to  resist  a  Greek  force,  the  like  of  which  had  never  be- 
fore been  seen  in  those  regions.  The  Greek  generals  found  a  weak 
point,  made  their  way  in,  and  took  possession  of  a  few  houses  for  the 
accommodation  of  their  sick;  keeping  a  guard  at  the  gate  to  secure 
free  egress,  but  doing  no  further  violence  to  the  citizens.  They  ob- 
tained their  victuals  partly  from  the  Kotyorite  villages,  partly  from 
the  neighboring  territory  of  Paphlagonia,  until  at  length  envoys  ar- 
rived from  Siuope  to  remonstrate  against  their  proceedings. 

These  envoys  presented  themselves  before  the  assembled  soldiers  in 
the  camp,  when  Hekatonymus,  the  chief  and  the  most  eloquent  amoiii,' 
them,  began  by  complimenting  the  army  upon  their  gallant  exploits 
and  retreat.  He  then  complained  of  the  injury  which  Kotyora,  and 
Sinope  as  the  mother-city  of  Kotyora,  had  suffered  at  their  Iiands,  in 
violation  of  common  Hellenic  kinship.  It  such  proceedings  were  con- 
tinued, he  intimated  that  Sinope  would  be  compelled  in  her  own  de- 
fense to  seek  alliance  with  the  Paphlagonian  prince  Korylas,  or  any 
other  barbaric  auxiliary  who  would  lend  them  aid  against  the  Greeks. 
Xenophon  replied  that  if  the  Kotyorites  had  stistained  any  damage,  it 
was  owing  to  their  own  ill-will  and  to  the  Sinopian  Harmost  in  the 
place;  that  the  generals  were  under  the  necessity  of  procuring  subsis- 
tence for  the  soldiers,  with  house-room  for  the  sick,  and  that  they 
had  taken  nothing  more;  that  the  sick  men  were  lying  within  the 
town,  but  at  their  own  cost,  while  the  other  soldiers  were  all  en- 
camped without;  that  they  had  maintained  cordial  friendship  with  the 
Trapezuntines,  and  requited  all  their  good  ofiices;  that  they  sought 
no  enemies  except  through  necessity,  being  anxious  only  again  to 
reach  Greece;  and  that  as  for  the  threat  respecting  Korylas,  they 
knew  well  enough  that  that  prince  was  eager  to  become  master  of  the 


SUCCESS  OF  THE  REPLY. 


561 


weiUhy  city  of  Sinope,  and  would  speedily  at  empt  some  such  enter- 
Tise  it- he  could  obtain  the  Cyreian  army  as  his  auxiliaries. 
^  This  judicious  reply  shamed  the  colleagues  of  Hekatonymus  so 
tnuch  that  they  went  the  length  of  protesting  agamst  what  he  had 
r^^^H  and  of  altirmino-  that  they  had  come  with  propositions  of  sym- 
'  ti  ^  nnd  f r?end?l  i D  to  the  army,  as  well  as  witli  promises  to  give 
S^m^a  hip^ ta^^^^^^^^^  Sir^ipe,  if  they  should  visit  that  town 

o^Uie^r  wTy  home.     Presents  were  at  once  sent  to    he  arm v  by  the 
?iiLhi t  mts  of  Kotvora  and  a  good  understanding  established. 
wHn  iiUe7ch^^^^^^        good-will  with  the  powerful  city  of  Sinope 

was^nun^pea'^^^^^^ 

rlition  to  their  power  of  reaching  home.     If  they  contmuea  ineir 
march  bv    and    it  was  only  through  Sinopian  guidan^  and  medi- 
Suon  that  they  could  obtain  or  forci  a  passage  through  Paphlagonia; 
w  li^e  fofa  voy^^^  by  sea,  there  was  no  chance  of  procuring  a  suffi- 
dent  number  of  vessds  except  from  Sinope,  since  no  news Jiad  .^^^en 
ricehed  of  Cheirisophus.     On  the  other  hand,  that  city  had  also  a 
sfroT/inreres^  in  facilitating  their  transit  homeward,  and  thus  remoy- 
bg  ?orm  dable  neighbors,  for  whose  ulterior  P^^^P9^^f  ^^^f,^^^^^^^^^ 
iio%uarantee     After  some  preliminary  conversation  with  the  bino- 
S'm^envoysthf  generals  convoked  the  army  in  assembly,  and  en- 
Ueued  Hekotonymus  and  his  companions  to  advise  them  as  to  the 
be'st  mode  o?  pro'ceeding  westward. to  .the  Bosporus     Hekaton^^^^^^^^ 
after  aDolo«nzing  for  the  menacing  insinuations  ot  his  former  speecn 
and  protesting  that  he  had  no  other  object  in  view  excep  to  poin  out 
I  s7est  anieasiest  plan  of  route  for  the  army    -gan  to  unfold  the 
insuoerable  difficulties  of  a  march  through  Paphlagonia.     Ihe  very 
entrance  into  the  country  must  be  achieved. through  a  narrow  aper- 
?u  eTn  the  mountains,  which  it  was  impossible  to  force  if  occupied 
bvtle  enemy.   Even  assuming  this  difficulty  to  be  surmounted,  there 
7ere  spacious  plains  to  be  passed  over,  wherein  the  Paphlagonian 
horse,  the  most  numerous  and  bravest  in  Asia,  would  be  found  almost 
irresikible.    There  were  also  three  or  four  great  ";«;«;  ^^^J^^^^^^^f^ 
army  would  be  unable  to  pas&-the  Thermodon  and  the  Ir  s,  each 
300  feet  in  breadth-the  Halys,  two  stadia  or  nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
mile  in  breadth-the  Parthenius.  also  very  considerable      Such  an 
array  of  obstacles  (he  affirmed)  rendered  the  project  of  maiching 
through  Paphlagonia  impracticable;  ^^^^reas  the  voyage  by  sea  from 
Kotyora  to  Sinope.  and  from  Sinope  to  Herakleia,  was  easy ;  and  the 
transit  from  the  latter  place  either  by  sea  to  Byzantium,  or  by  land 

across  Thrace,  yet  easier.  ,        .  ^  ^  ♦t.o«  cnf 

Difficulties  like  these,  apparently  quite  real,  were  more  ^an  suf- 
ficient  to  determine  the  vote  of  the  army,  already  sick  of  marcking 
and  fighting,  in  favor  of  the  sea  voyage;  though  there  were  not  want- 
ing suspicions  of  the  sincerity  of  Hekatonymus.  But  Xenophon  m 
communicating  to  tiie  latter  the  decision  of  the  army,  ^f  j^^tly  ap^ 
prised  him  thSt  they  would  on  no  account  permit  themselves  to  be 


5G2        PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

divided;  that  tliey  would  eitlier  depart  or  remain  aU  in  a  body;  and 
tlitit  vessels  must  be  provided  sufficient  for  the  triinsi)ort  of  all.  Ikka 
tonvmus  desired  them  to  send  envoys  to  their  own  to  Sinopc  to  nmb 
tlie^necessary  arrangements.  Tliree  envoys  were  accordingly  scut- 
Ariston,  an  Athenian,  Kallimaclius,  an  Arcadian,  and  Samolas,  an 
Achaan;  the  Atlieniun,  probably,  as  possessing  the  talent  of  speaking 
in  the  Slnopian  senate  or  assembly. 

Di^riug  the  absence  of  the  envoys,  the  army  stdl  contmued  near 
Kotyora"  with  a  market  provided'  by  the  town,  and  with  traders 
from  Sin  ope  and  Herakleia  in  the  camp.  Such  soldiers  as  had  no 
money  wherewith  to  purciiase,  subsisted  by  pillaging  the  neigh- 
boring frontier  of  Paphlagonia.  But  they  were  receiving  no  pay; 
every*man  wjis  living  on  his  own  resources;  and  instead  of  carrying 
back  a  handsome  purse  to  Greece,  as  each  soldier  had  hoped  when 
lie  first  took  service  under  Cyriis,  there  seemed  every  prospect  of 
their  returninj^  poorer  than  when  they  left  home.  Moreover,  the 
army  was  now  moving  onward  without  any  definite  purpose,  with 
increasing  dissatisfaction  and  decreasing  discipline;  insomuch  that 
Xenophon  foresaw  the  difficulties  which  would  beset  the  responsible 
conmianders  when  they  should  come  within  the  stricter  restraints 
and  oblisz^itions  of  the  Grecian  world. 

It  w^as^these  considerations  which  helped  to  suggest  to  him  the  idea 
of  emplovin^^  the  armv  on  sohk;  entcri)rise  of  conquest  and  coloniza- 
tion in  theEuxine  itself;  an  idea  highly  flattering  to  his  pers()iial 
ambition,  especially  as  the  army  was  of  unrivaled  efficiency  against 
an  enumv,  and  no  such  second  force  could  ever  be  got  together  in 
those  distant  regions.  His  patriotism  as  a  Greek  was  inflamed  with 
tlie  thou'dits  of  procuring  for  Hellas  a  new  autonomous  city, 
occupied  bv  a  considerable  Hellenic  population,  possessing  a  spacious 
territory  and  exercising  dominion  over  many  indigenous  neighbors. 
He  seems  to  have  thought  first  of  attacking  and  conquering  some 
established  non-Hellenic^city;  an  act  which  his  ideas  of  internationa 
morality  diil  not  forbid,  in  a  case  where  he  had  contracted  no  specia 
convention  with  the  inliabitants— though  he  (as  well  as  Cheirisoplnis) 
strenuously  protested  aijainst  doing  wrong  to  any  innocent  llelleiiic 
community.  He  contemplated  the  employment  of  the  entire  tone  in 
capturin*--  Phasis  or  some  other  native  city;  after  which,  when  the 
establishment  was  once  safely  effected,  those  soldiers  who  i^rettnea 
goin^'-  home  to  remaining  as  settlers,  might  do  so  without  injl'^''";*''/^ 
those  who  stayed,  and  probably  with  their  own  purses  fiH^'**  y> 
plunder  and  conquest  in  the  neighborhood.  To  settle  as  one  ol  tne 
richest  proprietors  and  chiefs— perhaps  even  the  recongized  (hUisi, 
like  Aixnon  at  Amphipolis— of  a  new  Hellenic  city  such  as  eouia 
haidlv^fail  to  become  rich,  powerful,  and  important— was  a  tempting 
prospect  for  one  who  had  now  acquired  the  habits  of  cominaiui. 
Moreover  the  sequel  will  prove,  how  correctly. Xenophon  appreciated 


SACRIFICE  OF  XENOPHON. 


5C3 


the  discomfort  of  leading  the  army  back  to  Greece  without  pay  and 

ll'^lls^tf;:;^:^^^^  and  the   advice   of  his  master 

^^  V  tcs  in  -rave  and  doubtful  cases  where  the  most  careful  reflec- 
non  was  at  fault,  to  recur  to  the  inspired  authority  of  an  oracle  or  a: 
1  e    and  to  offer  sacrifice,  in  full  confidence  that  the  gods  would 
»^^        communicate  a  special  revelation  to  such  persons  as 
Tv    ivored      Accordingly  Xenophon,  previous  to  any  ccnnmumca, 
mi  ^"c  soldiers  respecting  his  new  project,  was  anxious  to 
vtMin  t  ewiU  of  the  n-ods  by  a  special  sacrifice;  for  which  he 
•  "S  tl  e  P^^^^^^        of  the  Aml^akio^Silanus,  the  chief  prophet  in 
rarmy      This  prophet  (as  I  have  already  mentioned),  before    he 
b   t  e  of^unaxa,  had  assured  Cyrus  tliat  Arlaxerxes  womd  not  fight 
^f  en  lays-an  I  the  prophecy  came  to  pass;  which  nnule  such  an 
Ire^^^^^^^^  thtit  he  rewarded  him  with  the  prodigious  pres- 

nt  of  3  000  (larics  or  ten  Attic  talents.     While  others  were  re turn- 
wnoor  Sihmus   havino; contrived  to  preserve  this  sum  throughout 
S^haSp^of  the  j?treat,  was  extnm^ly  rich   am^ 
inlnstun  homowth  his  treasure  in  safety      He  licaruwuu  stion 
mi 'nance  the  project  of  remt.inhig  in  the  Euxme,  and  deternunexi 
mtSei   bviiitk-ac.     As  far as'concernc.l the  sacrifices   indeed 
.11^    he  offered  apart  with  Xenophon.  he  was  obliged  to  admit  that 

tt  idtauLis  of' the  victims  wei^  f"^-?™"'"' ^,™:;P''""ButTa 
loin"  too  familiar  with  the  process  to  be  imposed  upon.  But  he  at 
S  Jiime  time  tried  to  creati  alarm  by  declaring  that  a  n.ce  mspec- 
ti„n  rlisclrised  evidence  of  treacherous  snares  laid  for  Xenophon, 
rtilliat^er  indications  he  himself  began  to  realize  by  spreading 
roDors  anion  "the  army  that  the  Athenian  general  was  layiii. 
dZkstine  plJns  for  keeping  them  away  from  Greece  without  their 

""TirZ^Srely  and  insidiously  divulged,  the  scheme  found 
.on  0  supporters  but  a  far  larger  number  of  opponents;  especially 
™in.'  hose  omcers  who  were  iealous  of  the  ascendency  o  Xcno- 
r  °  Thna>^on  and  Thorax  employed  it  as  a  means  of  alarming 
It  ierakleo.ic  and  Sinopian  traders  in  the  camp;  t[^'>"S  "'^^"/^^^^^  ^ 
iuilc<s  they  provided  not  merely  transports,  but  also  pay  to  to 
sokUers,  .Xenophon  would  find  mear.s  to  detain  tl'C  "™  Y  '"  ';« 
Euxine  and  w^uld  employ  tln_.  lyansports  %yl,en  •'"■>' •'■^^,^^;°''','^^ 
the  lionieward  voyage,  but  for  his  own  projects  "f  «^q  ;f'"«";t  hr<^e 
ii(-ws  snread  so  much  terror  both  at  Siiiope  and  Herakleia,  tli.it  largo 
ff:;;;'  money  were  made  from  bothcities  toTima^ion,  onconc^ion 
that  he  would  insure  the  departure  of  the  army  as  soon  "^  »''<;  f  ^^^^ 
should  be  assembled  at  Kotyora.  Aeconlingly.  l''f^«  «"^f^^^j^°'V 
v.ning  an  assembly  of  tlie  soldiers,  protested  ''S'""*^^ .»'  f„,'^  'P  f  ^I. 

Xeuophon  in  thus  P-l'-"??  ■-•-■'  P^  "1  d  by  Thorix.C 
lie  debate  or  decision.      And   limasion,  steouueu  uj 


or 
or 


564        PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

only  strenuously  urged  the  army  to  return,  but  went  so  far  as  to 
promise  to  them,  on  the  faith  of* the  assurances  from  Herakleia  and 
JSinope,  future  pay  on  a  liberal  scale,  to  commence  from  the  firsi  new 
moon  after  their  departure;  together  with  a  hospitable  reception  in 
his  native  city  of  Dardanus  on  the  Hellespont,  from  whence  they 
could  make  incursions  on  the  rich  neighboring  satrapy  of  Pharnu- 
bazus. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  these  attacks  were  repeated  from  more 
than  one  quarter — until  the  Aclueans  Philesius  and  Lykon  had  loiidlv 
accused  Xeuophonof  underhand  maneuvering  to  cheat  the  army  into 
remaining  against  their  will — that  the  latter  rose  to  repel  the  imputa- 
tion; saying,  that  all  that  he  had  done  was,  to  consult  the  gods 
whether  it  would  be  better  to  lay  his  project  before  the  amiy  or  to 
keep  it  in  his  own  bosom.  The  encouraging  answer  of  the  gods,  as 
conveyed  through  the  victims  and  testified  even  by  Silanus  himself, 
proved  that  the  scheme  was  not  ill-conceived;  nevertheless  (he 
remarked)  Silanus  had  begun  to  lay  snares  for  him,  realizing  by  liis 
,own  proceedings  a  collateral  indication  wiiich  he  had  announced  to 
be  visible  in  the  victims.  "If  (added  Xenophon)  you  had  continued 
as  destitute  and  unprovided,  as  you  were  just  now — I  should  still 
have  looked  out  for  a  resource  in  the  capture  of  some  city  which 
w^ould  have  enabled  such  of  you  as  chose,  to  return  at  once;  while 
the  rest  stay  behind  to  enrich  themselves.  But  now  there  is  no 
longer  any  necessity;  since  Ilerakleia  and  Sinope  are  sending  trans- 
ports, and  Timasion  promises  pay  to  you  from  the  next  new  moon. 
Nothing  can  be  better:  you  will  go  back  safel}'  to  Greece,  and  will 
receive  pay  for  going  thither.  I  desist  at  once  from  my  scheme,  and 
call  upon  all  who  were  favorable  to  it  to  desist  also.  Only  let  us  all 
keep  together  until  we  are  on  safe  ground;  and  let  the  man,  who 
lags  behind  or  runs  off,  be  condemned  as  a  wrong-doer." 

Xenophon  immediately  put  this  question  to  the  vote,  and  every 
hand  was  held  up  in  its  favor.  There  was  no  man  more  disconcerted 
with  the  vote  than  the  prophet  Silanus,  who  loudly  exclaimed  against 
the  injustice  of  detaining  any  one  desirous  to  depart.  But  tiie 
soldiers  put  him  down  with  vehement  disapprobation,  threatening 
that  they  would  assuredly  punish  him  if  they  caught  him  ninning 
off.  His  intrigue  agjiinst  Xenophon  thus  recoiled  upon  himself,  for 
the  moment.  But  shortly  afterward,  when  the  army  reached  Hera- 
kleia,  he  took  his  opportunity  for  clandestine  flight,  and  found  Lis 
way  back  to  Greece  with  the  3,000  darics. 

If  Silanus  gained  little  by  his  maneuver,  Timasion  and  his  partners 
gained  still  less.  For  so  soon  as  it  become  known  that  the  army  had 
taken  a  formal  resolution  to  go  back  to  Greece,  and  that  Xenophon  him- 
self had  made  the  proposition,  the  Siuopians  and  the  Herakleots  felt  at 
their  ease.  They  sent  the  transport  vessels,  but  withheld  the  money 
which  they  had  promised  to  Timasion  and  Thorax.  Hence  tlit^e 
officers  were  exposed  to  dishonor  and  peril;  for  having  po.^ilivtly 


INTRIGUES  AGAINST   XENOPHON. 


565 


engaged  to  find  pay  ^^;.  ^'^^y^^^^^l^^ 

their  word.      ^^  ,f  ^,^  ''^u^^  th"   1  ad  altered  their  views,  and  that 
Xenophonandtold  him  that  U^^^^  newly-arrived  transports  in 

''ZX^^^^^  to^Gr't' Wainslthe  town  and  territory 
'fph-   i"" It  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  Euxine.     Xenophon  replied 
Ifiey  mi^ht  con^^^^       the  soldiers  and  make  the  Proposition   i 
fv Sc-  but  that  he  would  have  nothing  to  say  to  it.     To  make 
theyciio.>c,  o^^'.V;;'''  ,  i     .    f^^  which  they  had  so  much  in- 

the  very  P^9Pf VE^^^^,,^*^^'^'';^^^  some  preparation; 

vei^diedagamstXenopho^^^^^^^  ^^.^  ^^^^^^  ^^„^ 

so  that  each  of  ^I'^^^^^^^^^S^f^  hem      Durino-  this  interval,  the  soldiery 
get  the  scheme  ^^^f^ested  by  th^^^^  .  discontent  and 

^'Satn  Tw^^^^^^^  of  the  absent  Cheiriso- 

S  r^-^^^  ?lS  S^f  t^ 

?'tr%h:reTv7sTonXig  so  p^^^  this  glaring  falsehood, 

S^^sl^^u^^ 

l:f  iXS;"uTviorcc"ts"rhcVl.a^  before  doL  against  t..e 

"t1rkn«wi™%anaer  ,>f   such  spontaneous   and  informal 

Wt U  '^°""'"fc  ,'    imnnrtmce  of  the  hab  tual  solemnities  of  con- 

''"""ifoS  a^ran'-emXtS^    eitl.er  discussion  or  legitimate 

JSrwould  tTe  I'etr  o^ofme  and  death  between  him  and 
*"'snM!ors°S'i.c1  I  understand  that  there  are  some  men  here 
cahSJnVmc^  asif  I  --J— fof^i'ir^rH  i^m"L^wS 

^TtiXmls  Zr^TV^^  %ly  Ji^  rn^^tr  tfreacS 
S^^rhrSt^^o  we:S-ino  [KbLiTterriS.  he  must 


566       PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

CO  cnstward.  Can  any  one  hope  to  deceive  you  on  tliis  point,  and 
persuade  you  that  tlie  sun  rises  on  tJm  side,  and  sets  on  Ihut?  (uu 
any  one  cheat  you  into  goinu:  on  shipboani  with  a  wind  wliich  hlows 
vou  away  from  Greece  ?  Suj^pose  even  that  I  put  yon  aboaid  \\\m\ 
there  is  no  wind  at  all.  How  am  I  to  force  you  to  sail  with  mr- 
airainst  your  own  consent — I  being  only  in  one  ship,  you  in  a  liuiMlied 
or  more  ?  Imagine  however  that  I  could  even  succeed  in  deluding 
you  to  Phasis.  When  we  land  there,  you  will  know  at  once  that  Me 
are  not  in  Greece;  and  what  fate  can  I  then  expect— a  detected  im- 
poster  in  the  midst  of  ten  thousand  men  with  .arms  in  their  hands? 
Tsj^o — these  stories  all  proceed  from  foolish  men,  who  are  jealous,  of 
my  influence  with  you,  jealous  too,  without  reason — for  I  luillKr 
liinder  tlum  from  outstripping  me  in  your  favor,  if  they  can  reiidcr 
you  greater  service — nor  yon  from  electing  them  commanders,  if 
you  think  tit.  Enough  of  this  now;  I  challenge  any  one  to  couie 
forward  and  say  how  it  is  possible  either  to  cheat,  or  to  be  cheated, 
in  the  manner  laid  to  my  charge." 

Having  thus  grappkd'direetly  with  the  calumnies  of  his  enemies, 
and  dissipated  them  in  such  manner  as  doubtless  to  create  a  reiiCtiou 
in  hisown  favor.  Xenophon  made  use  of  tiie  opportunity  to  denoinice 
the  growing  disorders  in  the  army;  which  he  depicted  as  such,  that 
if  no  corrective  were  applied,  dis^grace  and  contempt  must  fall  upon 
all.  As  he  paused  after  this  general  remonstrance,  the  soldiers  loudly 
called  upon  him  to  go  into  imriieulars;  upon  wliich  he  proceeded  to 
recall,  with  lucid  and  impressive  simplicity,  the  outrages  which  had 
been  committed  at  and  near  Kerasus— the 'unauthorized  and  unpro- 
voked attack  made  by  Klearetus  and  his  company  on  a  neighborinij 
village  which  was  in'friendly  commerce  with  the  army — the  nun-der 
of  the  three  elders  of  the  village,  who  had  come  as  heralds  to  com-" 
plain  to  the  generals  about  such  wrong— the  mutinous  attack  made 
by  disorderly  soldiers  even  ivpon  the  magistrates  of  Kerasus,  at  the 
very  moment  when  they  were  remonstrating  with  the  generals  on 
what  had  occurred ;  exposing  these  magistrates  to  the  utmost  peril, 
and  putting  the  generals  themselves  in  ignominy.  "If  such  are  to 
be  our  proceedings  (continued  Xenophon),  look  you  well  into  what 
condition  the  army  will  :all.  You,  the  aggregate  body,  will  no 
longer  be  the  sovereigti  authority  to  make  war  or  peace  with  wlioni 
you  please;  each  individual  among  you  will  conduct  the  army  against 
any  point  which  he  may  choose.  And  even  if  men  should  come  to 
you  as  envoys,  either  for  peace  or  for  other  pui'poses,  they  may  he 
slain  by  any  single  enemy;  so  that  you  will  be  debarred  from  all 
public  communications  whatever.  Next,  those  whom  your  universal 
suffrage  shall  have  chosen  commanders,  will  have  no  authority; 
while  any  self-elected  genefal  who  chooses  to  give  the  word,  Cast, 
Cast  {ie.  darts  or  stones),  may  put  to  death  without  trial  either  oflieer 
or  soldier  as  it  suits  him;  that  is,  if  he  finds  you  ready  to  ol>ey  him, 
as  it  happened  near  Kerasus.     Look  now  what  these  self-elected 


VOTE  OF  THE  ARMY. 


567 


^  r.  f^,.  ^'Aii  The  ma^-istrate  of  Kerasus,  if  he  was 
''^ff'Mmv  of  "n,  "  tZr.1  you,  h-S  been  euabled  to  escape  .ntU 
r«illy  ^"'''ff'^,,."'' "fu  "  ceut,  he  I  as  been. obliged  to  nm  away  from 
iinpanity;  il  1  e  was  '"""''':"•.,•„,  ,,,.,,,i,  willioul  prelense  or  trial, 
voa,  as  theouly  '"-rf'^  '  ..  ^T  a^  lu  vTbr.,u-l  t  matters  to  sueh 
•TlK.sc  wl.o  stoaed  the  '  «  fl' J  .^  e    no   enter  l&  town  of  Kerasus 

..pass,  that  you  alone,  ='''^',X^;V'ree  a„l  tl"'t  ^'^  «"°"»'  *=''<•'" 
iu'  ..alety,  .uiless  in  C''"i"'a"^  "S  '[i?,'JJ^\'  ,3  .^„(i  those  who  were 
send  in  a  herald  to  take  m^- o    '  dead  (kkare,  is ^u^  ^^  ^^ 

slaia  in  the  attack  ou     e  1^^.  ;^'^^,f  ^ffd^  ^Tise  were  an.xious  to  give 

bury  the  bodies  ^^^  |^^-        ,    .j^.        ^^^^  a-ainst  the  recent  disorders 

Coutuiuuig  in  this  ^"n^i^^^      P^';^^.^    -^       •     impressing  hisown 

and  oiurage..,  Xenophon  ^^^^';^^^^^the    soldieS.     They 

sentiment,    heartily   and  '^^X?  f  Ihe  mu  iny  at  Kerasus  should 

p,,.ed  a  vote  that  !^^ -Jj^^^    <^u  It^  of  "mih^  outrages  in  future, 
he  punished;  that  it  an>  one  v\ as    u  ^  ^     lochages 

he  should  be  put  upon  his  .^  ''^^^^  l^^^^,^^^^^^^^^^  to  death;  .uid 

s;arshou^it^.d";^£^^^J|M^  s 

r^ir^Si^^^'^^^Httt  i^::uce  of  Xenophon  and 

llie  prophets  <»  P''"fy  "^'/'^'L,,  specimen  of  the  political  morality 
'  '"'  l^ir^''  f::    7,^0  ec^    wobl?  lumuduleeper  and  moroprc- 
ijaiversal  tl.ron-h  .  t  the  <,,cciu  wo  „-,is<,.llaneous  aggregate, 

I  .>minant  among  lis  bettci  sections,    i  Ycnonlion  insists  oil 

au,l temporary  society,  now  '"'f  «"•'' ^,  >'  >«  ;^  fcS  lie  sovereiuu 
,1,0  universal  suffrage  of  the  «'l'"'«  ^'  ;\.;  '  f,"^  .v^i^^the  decision  of 
authority  for  the  guidance  ^^  «^^^y;'i;'';';";caT  '  i'ng  a  title  to  pre- 
Ihe  majority,  fairly  andformally  co     etc     •«  ca'O ',  i^^^^_ 

viil  over  everv  d  ssenlient  minority;   "  "  ^uierais  cii  ^       Tliis  is 

enlv  condition  eitliei  toi  P;"V°"'"=', „.,„,;,.'  ,vi,h  the  llellen  c  com- 
i„a  spensable  to  keep  up.tlieii  syni  ,itl  1  s  with  tnc  n     ^  _ 

lanniVies,  and  t'^'  V-''^''-'^ ,?  ;.:fvcTtl  •  1  e  ki  e^^^^^^^^^  touch  the 
..omplete  success  o  his  speech  P"^^';^^^';^^,  i,„,i,i,l,.al  insub- 
nsjjht  chord  or  Uiei  idu  rluu.,.     ^        ,     ,      .^^'mv  collectivelv  went 

meuted— cerlaiuly  noway  diminished. 


P> 


568       PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

Tlie  circumstances  which  immediately  followed  were  indeed  well 
calculated  to  augment  it.  For  it  was  resolved,  on  the  proposition  of 
Xenophon  liimself,  that  the  generals  themselves  should  be  trieil 
before  the  newly -constituted  tribunal  of  the  lochages  or  captains,  in 
case  any  one  had  complaint  to  make  against  them  for  past  mailers; 
agreeably  to  the  Athenian  habit  of  subjecting  every  magistrate  to  a 
trial  of  accountability  on  laying  down  his  office.  In  the  course  of 
this  investigation,  Philesius  and  Xanthikles  were  fined  twenty  niiuff. 
to  make  good  an  assignable  deficiency  of  that  amount,  in  the  cargoes 
of  those  merchantmen  which  had  been  detained  at  Trapezus  for  the 
transport  of  the  army:  Sophsenetus,  who  had  the  general  superin- 
tendence of  this  property,  but  had  been  negligent  in  that  duty,  was 
fined  ten  minai.  Next,  the  name  of  Xenophon  was  put  up,  when 
various  persons  stood  forward  to  accuse  him  of  having  beaten  and 
ill-used  them.  As  commander  of  the  rear-guard,  his  duty  was  by  far 
the  severest  and  most  difficult,  especially  during  the  intense  cold  and 
deep  snow;  since  the  sick  and.  wounded,  as  well  as  the  laggards  and 
plunderers,  all  fell  under  his  inspection.  One  man  especially  \\ as 
loud  in  complaints  against  him,  and  Xenophon  questioned  him,  as 
to  the  details  of  his  case,  before  the  assembled  aimy.  It  turned  out 
that  he  had  given  him  blows,  because  the  man,  having  been  intrusted 
with  the  task  of  carrying  a  sick  soldier,  was  about  to  evade  the  duty 
by  burying  the  dying  man  alive.  This  interesting  debate  (given  in 
the  Anabasis  at  length)  ended  by  a  full  approbation  on  tlie  part  of 
the  army  of  Xenophon's  conduct,  accompanied  with  regret  that  he ! 
had  not  handled  the  man  yet  more  severely. 

The  statements  of  Xenophon  himself  give  us  a  vivid  idea  of  the' 
internal  discipline  of  the  army,  even  as  managed  by  a  discreet  and 
well-tempered  officer.  "I  acknowledge  (said  he  to  the  soldiers)  to  liave 
struck  many  men  for  disorderly  conduct;  men  who  were  content  to  owe 
their  preservation  to  your  orderly  march  and  constant  fighting,  while 
they  themselves  ran  about  to  plunder  and  enrich  themselves  at  your 
cost.  Had  we  all  acted  as  they  did,  we  should  have  perished  to  a  man. 
Sometimes  too  I  struck  men  who  were  lagging  behind  with  cold  and 
fatigue,  or  were  slopping  tlie  way  so  as  to  hinder  others  from  getting 
forward:  I  struck  them  with  my  fist,  in  order  to  save  them  from  the 
spear  of  the  enemy.  You  yourselves  stood  by,  and  saw  me:  you 
had  arms  in  your  hands,  yet  none  of  you  interfered  to  prevent  me. 
I  did  it  for  their  good  as  well  as  for  yours,  not  fic<m  any  of  insolence 
of  disposition;  for  it  was  a  time  when  we  were  all  alike  suffering  from 
cold,  hanger,  and  fatigue;  whereas  I  now  live  comparatively  well, 
drink  more  wine  and  pass  easy  days — and  yet  I  strike  no  one.  You 
will  fiFid  that  the  men  who  failed  most  in  those  times  of  hardship,  are 
now  the  most  outrageous  offenders  in  the  army.  There  is  Boiskus, 
the  Thessalian  pugilist,  who  pretended  sickness  during  the  march,  in 
order  to  evade  the  burden  of  carrying  his  shield — and  now,  as  1  iim 
informed,  he  has  stripped  several  citizens  of  Kotyora  of  their  cIoIIrs. 


COMPLETE  TRIUMPH  OF  XENOPHON. 


569 


Tf  (he  concluded)  the  blows  which  I  have  occasionally  given,  m  cases 
i  Sy  are  now  brought  in  evidence-I  call  upon  those  aniong 
v!)U  S^  t^  ^'^^^'"  ^  ^'''''''  ''^^^'^^  ""'^  protection,  to  stand  up 

^^^.^^^[n'mvid^lrresponded  to  this  appeal   insomuch  that  Xeno- 
hon  was  1^   merely  acquitted,  but  stood  higher  than  before  in  the 
^  ^  <m  of  the  a  mv      We  learn  from  his  defense  that  for  a  com- 
;:i'n.  "officer  to^^^^^^       a  soldier  with  his  fist,  if  wanting  in  duty 
vanot'considered  improper;  at  least  under  such  circumstances  as 
,0  c  of  the  retreat.     But  what  deserves  notice  sti  1   more,   is  the 
tr  i<)rdin  ?V  influence  which  Xenophon's  powers  ot  speaking  gave 
.in  over   he  minds  of  the  army.     He  stood  distinguished  from  the 
iX    ~ls,  Lacedaemonian.  Arcadian,  Ach^an,  etc    by  having 
^    newer  of  working  on  the  minds  of  the  soldiers  collectively;  and 
i^^eeXt  he  had  tlfe  good  sense,  as  well  as  the  spirit,  not  to  shrmk 
mm  ?e  lino-  them  unolSisant  truths.     In  spite  of  such  f rankness-or 
Xer  parilv  by  means  of  such  f rankness-his  ascendency  as  com- 
m  nder  not  onlv  remained  unabated,  as  compared  with  that  o    the 
S  s  but  vvent  on  increasing.     For  whatever  may  be  said  about 
Zn-^nevy  of  orators  as  a  means  of  influence  over  the  people^ 
itwm  be  found  that  though  particular  points  may  be  g^^ined  m 
livav    vet  wherever  the  influence  of  an  orator  has  been  steady 
^  on^'cm  Ihuied  (like  that  of  Perikles  or  Demosthenes)  it  is  owing 
ntnu.  the  fact  tint  he  has  an  opinion  of  his  own,  and  is  not  willing 
ZTcomnod^^   himself  constantly  to   the  prepossessions  of  his 
'eurerr  Without  the  oratory  of  Xenophon,  there  would  have  existed 
rencdne  forkin<llingor  sustaining  th^, erisu^c.nnmmus  of    en  thou- 
"mdCyreims  assembled  at  Kotyora,  or  for  keeping  up  the  moral 
oVuv  ot  the  a"--re<-at.e  over  the  individual  members  and  frac- 
^        the  o  lier^  d^^^^^      could  doubtless  speak  well  enough  to 
;ss  short  encouragements,  or  give  simple  explanations,  to  the 
S  rs-  wUh()ut  this  faculty,  no  man  was  fit  for  military  command 
over  Greeks      But  the  oratory  of  Xenophon  was  something  of  a 
h  'her  or  lor'    Whoever  will  study  the  discourse  pronounced  by  h  m 

i^<^;^  will  perceive  a  dexterity  in  ^-l?"!^ -^^j.-^^;^";;;  ^^ 
tn,ips— -1  discriminating  use  sometimes  of  the  plainest  and  mosi 
£  appeal     ometiinel  of  indirect  insinuation  or  circuitous  tra^si- 

in     to  work  round  the  min<ls  of  ^^^^^^rT'l^^Tr^et^^ 
fundamental  political  convictions  whu^i   lay  deep   in   the  ^^^cwii 

vnied  lepetition     sueu  intelligent  Athenian,  but  would 

education  and  the  pracuce  ui  au  lut      .,  pnp-«Tv  and  iudff- 


570       PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

points  we  may  be  sure  that  other  officers  were  more  nearly  lijs 

equals.  ,        .,    j  i 

The  important  publir  proceedings  above  dcscnbed  not  only  restored 
the  intluenceuf  Xenophon,  but  also  clcMrcd  ofT  a  .creat  amount  of  lt;i(l 
feelins:,  and  sensil)Iy  abated  the  bad  habits,  which  liad  powii  np  in 
the  army.  A  scene  which  speedily  followed  was  not  without  elTtct 
in  promntin<;  cheerful  and  amicable  sympalhics.  The  rjiphhiaonian 
])rin(:e  Kor\his,  weary  of  the  desulloiy  warfare  carried  on  betutin 
the  Greeks  and  the  border  inhal)itants/sent  envoys  lo  the  Greek  camp 
'  with  ]ir('sents  of  horses  and  tine  robes,  and  with  e.xjjressions  of  a  wi^h 
to  conclude  peace.  The  Greek  generals  acc(  pled  the  i)resents,  jiud 
promised  to  sul)mit  the  proposition  to  the  tumy.  But  tirst,  they  cu- 
tertained  the  envoys  at  a  banquet,  providinir  at  the  same  time  giimes 
and  dances.  Nvith  other  recreations  .miusinir  not  only  to  them  hut  also 
to  the  soldiers  irenerallv.  The  various  dances,  warlike  and  panto- 
mimic, of  Tliracians,  Mvsians,  ^Enianes,  Magnetes,  etc.,  are  descrilxd 
by  Xenoplion  in  a  lively  and  interesting  mnnner.  They  were  fol- 
lowed on  the  next  d.iy  by  an  amicable  couveulion  concluded  bet^Yl■ln 
the  army  and  the  l^a'phlagcmians. 

Not  long  afterward,  a  number  of  transports,  sufficient  for  the  whole 
army,  having  been  assembled  from  Ilcraklcia  and  Sinope— all  tie 
soldiers  were  convevcd  bv  sea  to  the  hitter  place,  passing  by  the 
mouth  of  the  rivers, 'Thcrmodon,  Iris,  and  llalys,  which  they  would 
have  found  impracticable  to  cross  in  a  land-march  through  Paphla- 
giMiia.  Havimr  reached  Sinope  after  a  day  and  a  night  of  sailing 
with  a  fair  wind,  they  were  hospitably  received,  and  lodged  in  the 
neighboring  seaport  of  Armene,  where  the  Sinopir.ns  sent  to  them  a 
large  present  of  barley-meal  and  wme,  and  where  they  remained  fur 

five  da  vs.  .  .       ,  ,  , 

It  was  here  that  thev  were  joined  by  Chcu'isophus.  whose  absence 
had  been  so  unexpeetedlv  prolonged.  But  he  came  with  only  a  sin- 
gle trireme,  bringing  nothing  except  a  message  from  Anaxibius,  the 
LacedjemoniiHi  admiral  in  the  Bosporus;  \\  ho  complimented  the 
armv  and  promis-d  that  thev  should  be  taken  into  im- as  soon  as 
thev  were  out  of  the  Euxine.  "The  soldiers,  severely  disappointed  on 
seeing  him  arrive  thus  emptv-handed.  became  the  more  strongly  bent 
on  striking  some  blow  to  till  their  own  purses  before  they  reached 
Greece.  JVelins-  that  it  was  necessary  to  the  success  of  any  such 
project  that  it  sTiould  be  prepared  not  only  skillfully,  but  secretly, 
thev  resolved  to  elect  a  single  general  in  place  of  tiiat  board  of  six  (or 
perhaps  more)  who  were  still  in  function.  Such  was  now  tlie  ascen- 
dency of  Xenoplion,  that  the  gener:d  sentiment  of  the  army  at  once 
turned  toward.him;  and  the  lochages  or  captains,  communicating  to 
him  what  Avas  in  contemplation,  intim:>.ted  to  him  tlieir  own  anxious 
hopes  that  he  would  not  decline  the  offer.  Tempted  by  so  tlattenng 
a  proposition, -he  hesitated  at  first  what  answer  he  should  give.  But 
at  length  the  uncertainty  of  being  able  to  satisfy  the  exigences  of  the 


THE  ARMY  GO  TO  HERAKLEIA. 


571 


^rmy  and  the  fear  of  thus  compromising  the  reputation  which  he 
1,1(1  already  realized,  outweiglied  the  opposite  inducements.  As  m 
oiher  cases  of  doubt,  so  in  this— he  offered  sacrifice  to  Zeus  Basileus; 
•iiid  the  answer  returned  bv  the  victims  was  such  as  to  determine  him 
t,)  refusal.  Aecordinglv,  Vhen  tlie  army  assembled,  with  predeter 
raination  to  choose  a  sinuie  chief,  and  proceeded  to  nominate  him— 
hi'  respectfully  and  thankfully  declin(>d,  on  the  ground  that  Cliein- 
sophus  was  a  Lacediemonian,  and  that  he  himself  was  not;  addmg 
thit  he  should  cheerfully  serve  under  any  one  whom  they  might 
Dime  His  excuse  however  was  repudiated;  especially  by  tlu^  lo- 
cliiTes  Several  of  these  latter  were  Arcadians;  and  one  of  them, 
\.'r.i^iii"s  cried  out,  with  full  sympathy  of  the  soldiers,  that,  if  that 
pmieiple  were  admitted,  he  as  an  Arcadian  ought  to  resign  his  com- 
nimd  Findiu"'-  that  his  former  reason  was  not  approved,  Xenoplion 
acquainted  the  army  that  he  had  sacrificed  to  know  whether  he  oug;ht 
to  accept  the  command,  and  that  the  gods  had  peremptorily  forbid- 
den him  to  do  so.  ,  i       ^    *     i   *i 

Cheirisophus  was  then  elected  sole  commander,  and  undertook  tiie 
duty  savin>^  that  he  woidd  have  willingly  served  under  Xenophon, 
if  the  latter liad  accepted  the  olfice,  but  that  it  was  a  good  thing  for 
Xenophon  himself  to  have  declined— since  Dexippus  had  alrejidy 
poisoned  the  mind  of  Anaxibius  against  him,  though  he  (Cheiriso- 
phus) had  emphatically  contradicted  the  calumnies. 

On  the  next  dav,  the  armv  sailed  forward,  under  the  command  of 
Cheirosophus,  tollerakleia;"  near  wliich  town  they  were  hospitably 
entertained,  and  srratified  with  a  present  of  meal,  wme,  and  bullocks 
even  n-reater  than  they  had  received  at  Sinope.     It  now  appeared 
that  >fenophon  had  acted  wiselv  in  decUning  the  sole  command;  and 
also  that  Cheirisophus,  though  elected  commander,  yet  having  been 
very  long  absent,  was  not  really  of  so  much  importance  in  the  eyes 
of  the  soldiers  as  Xenophon.     In  the  camp  near  Herakleia,  the  sol- 
diers becaine  impatient  that  their  irenerals  (for  the  habit  of  looking 
upon  Xenophon  as  one  of  them  still  continued)  took  no  measures  to 
procure  monev  for  them.     The  Achaan  Lykon  proposed  tlmt  they 
should  extort  a  contribution  of  no  less  than  3,000  slaters  of  Kyzikus 
(about  60,000  Attic  drachmas,  or  10  talents  =  £2,300)  from  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Herakleia:  another  man  immediately  outbid  this  proposition, 
and  i)roposed  that  thev  should  require  10,000  staters— a  full  month's 
pay  for  the  army.     It'was  moved  that  Cheirisophus  and  Xenophon 
should  go  to  the  Herakleots  as  envoys  with  this  demand.     But  both 
of  ihem  indi  Miantlv  refused  to  be  concerned  in  so  unjust  an  extor- 
tion, from  a  Grecian  city  which  had  just  re.eivf'd  the  armv  kindly 
aiul  sent  handsome  presents.    Accordingly  Lykon  with  two  Arcadian 
olliceis  undertook  the  mission,  and  intimated  the  demand,  not  with- 
out threats  in  case  of  non-compliance,  to  the  Herakleots.     Ihe  latter 
replied  that  they  woidd  take  it  into  consideration.     But  they  waited 
oulv  for  the  departure  of  the  envoys,  and  then  immediately  closed 


572       PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


HALT  AT  KALPE. 


573 


brought   iu 


their  oullyin. 


their  gates,  manned   their  walls,   and 
property. 

The  project  being  thus  baffled,  Lykonand  the  rest  turned  their  tlis- 1 
pletisure  upon  Cheirisophus  and  Xenophou,  whom  they  accused  of  I 
having  occasioned  its  miscarriage.     And  they  now  began  to  exclaim 
that  it  was  disgraceful  to  the  Arcadians  and  Achaeans,  who  foimtd 
more  than  one  numerical  half  of  the  army  and  endured  all  the  loil- 
toobey  as  well  as  to  enrich  generals  from  other  Hellenic  cities;  espe- 
cially  a  single  Athenian  who  furnished  no  contingent  to  the  aiuiy, 
Here  again  it  is  remarkable  that  the  personal  importance  of  Xciiu- 
phon  caused  him  to  be  still  regarded  as  a  general,  though  the  sole 
command  had  been  vested  by  formal  vote  in  Cheirisophus.    So  vehe- 
ment was  the  dissatisfaction,  that  all  the  Arcadian  and  Achtean  sol- 
diers in  the  army,  more  than  4,500  hoplites  in  numbei\  renounced  the  | 
authority  of  Cheirisophus,  formed  themselves  into  a  distinct  divisioD, 
and  chose  ten  commanders  from  out  of  their  own  numbers.    Tlie| 
whole  army  thus  became  divided  into  three  portions — first  the  Area- 1 
dians  and  Acha'ans:  secondly,  1400  hoplites  and  700  Thracian  pel- 
tasts,  who  adhered  to  Cheirisophus:  lastly,  1700  hoplites,  300  peltasts, 
and  40  horsemen  (all  the  horsemen  in  the  army),  attaching  themselves  j 
toXenophon;  who  however  was  taking  measures  to  sail  away  indi- 
vidually from  Hernkleia   and  quit  the  army  altogether,  wlii*ch  be 
would  have  done  had  he  not  been  restrained  by  unfavorable  sacri- 
fices. 

The  Arcadian  division,  departing  first,  in  vessels  from  Herakleia, 
landed  at  the  harbor  of  Kalpe;  an  untenanted  promontory  of  the 
Bithynian  or  Asiatic  Thrace,  midway  between  Herakleia  and  Byzan- 
tium. From  thence  they  marched  at  once  into  the  interior  of 
Bithynia,  with  the  view  of  surprising  the  villages,  and  acquiring 
plunder.  But  through  rashness  and  bad  management,  they  first 
sustained  several  partial  losses,  and  ultimately  became  surromuled 
upon  an  eminence,  by  a  large  muster  of  the  indigenous  Bithyiiiaus 
from  all  the  territory  around.  They^  w  ere  only  rescued  from  destruc- 
tion by  the  unexpected  appearance  of  Xenophon  with  his  division; 
[who  had  left  Herakleia  somewhat  later,  but  heard  by  accident,  during 
their  march,  of  the  danger  of  their  comrades.  The  whole  army  thus 
became  re-assembled  at  Kalpe,  where  the  Arcadians  and  Aclueaus, 
disgusted  at  the  ill -success  of  tlieir  separate  expedition,  again  estab- 
lished the  old  union  and  the  old  generals.  They  cho.se  Neon  in  place 
of  Cheirisophus,  who — afflicted  by  the  humiliation  put  upon  him,  iu 
having  been  first  named  sole  commander  and  next  depo.-ed  within  a 
week — had  fallen  tiick  of  a  fever  and  died.  The  elder  Arcadian  cap- 
tains further  moved  a  resolution,  that  if  anyone  henceforward  should 
propose  to  separate  the  army  into  fractions,  he  should  be  put  to 
death. 

The  locality  of  Kalpe  was  well-suited  for   the   foundation  of  a 
colony,  which  Xenophou  evidently  would  have  been  glad  to  bring 


about  though  he  took  no  direct  measures  tendmg  toward  it;  wlule 
S(  iers  were  so  bent  on  returning  to  Greece,  and  so  jealous  lest 
I'uoXa  shou  entrap  them  into  remaining  that  they  almost 
dmnned  the  encampment.  It  so  happened  that  they  were  detained 
leie  for  some  days  without  being  able  to  march  forth  even  in  quest 
o  D?ovisions  because  the  sacrifices  were  not  favorable.  Xem^phou 
Refused  o  lead  them  out,  against  the  warning  of  the  sacnfices-- 
a  liouVt^ie  army  suspected  him  of  a  deliberate  maneuver  for  the  pur- 
nose  of  detention:  Neon  however,  less  scrupulous,  led  out  a  body 
nf  2  000  ineu  who  chose  to  follow  him,  under  severe  distress  for  want 
ffnrovisS^^^  surprised  by  the  native  Bithynians.  with 

U  e^aUrof  some  troops  of  the  Persian  satrap  Pharnabazus,  he  was 
defeated  with  the  loss  of  no  less  than  500  men;  a  misfortune  which 
XeSon  regards  as  t*ie  natural  retribution  for  contempt  of  the 
Sdal  warning.     The  dangerous  position  of  Neon  with  the  re- 
Sder  oF  he  dftachment  was  rapidly  made  known  at  the  camp; 
SS^fwh^ch  Xenophon,  unharnessing  a  wagon-bullock  as  the  only 
rilnear  at  haJd.  immediately  offered  f^'f^^l-.^.l"^^^^^^^^^ 
^ion  the  victim  was  at  once  favorable;  so  that  he  led  out  without 
del  V    ieT.rea"er  part  of  the  force,  to  the  rescue  of  the  exposed  de- 
hc  iment  "which  was  brouglit  back  in  safety  to  the  camp.     So  bold 
lidThe  enemy  become,  that  in  the  night  the  camp  ^yas  attacked. 
The  Greeks  weV  obliged  on  the  next  day  to  retreat  into  stronger 
J  oumi  surrSing  themselves  with  a  ditch  and  palisade.     Fortun- 
a  elv  a  vessel  arrived  from  Herakleia,  bringing  to  the  camp  at  Kalpe 
f  .upiV^Tbarley-meal.  cattle,  and  wine;  which  restored  the  spirits 
of  the  irrnv   enablino-  them  to  go  forth  on  the  ensuing  morning,  and 
t  me  the 'a"        against^he  Bithynians    ancl  the  troops  of  . 
Ph  rnabazus  "^These  troops  were  completely  defeated  and  dispersed 
so  that  thrGreeks  returneluo  ^  at  Kalpe  in  the  evenmg, 

both  safe  and  masters  of  the  country.  «^,:,,ol  nf  K-lpnn 

At  Kalpe  they  remained  some  time,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Klean- 
de  from  Byzantium,  who  was  said  to  be  about  to  brin<v  vessels  for 
Uieir  transport.  They  were  now  abundantly  provided  with  supplies, 
>t  merely  from  the  undisturbed  plunder  of  the  neighboring  villages 
b  ^so  from  the  visits  of  traders  who  came  with  cargoes.  Imleed 
tl le  i  npress^n-that  they  were  preparing,  at  the  instance  of  XenOj 
p  o  1  to  foi  nd  a  new  city  at  Kalpe-became  so  strong,  that  several 
oxhe  neiVl  boring  native^iUages  sent  envoys  to  ask  on  what  terms 
alliance  would  beVanted  to  tliem.    At  length  Kleander  came,  but 

"^eZlerwar^ced^monian  harmost  or  Fovernor  of  By^i. 
tium      His  appearance  opens  to  us  a  nevv  phase  in  the  eventful  h  s- 

loJ    of  this  gaflant  army!  as  well  as  an  i««^^\^^.:"^^|,^f,j;f,,,f„^^ed 
aivcian  world  under  the  Lacedfemonian  empire.    He  came  attenaea 

InMhe  Lamtmonian  Dexippus.  who  ^-^^X^ad     her^'S 
army  until   their   arrival   at  Trapezus,   and  who  had  there    beeu 


574        PROCEEDINGS  (JF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


OFFENSE  TO  KLEANDER. 


575 


entrusted  ■vvilh  ;ui  iirmcd  vessel  for  the  purpose  of  dctainiiii^trauspovls 
lo  convey  the  troops  lioine,  ))ul  liad  abused  the  coiilideuce  reposed  in 
liini,  by  runniiiu:  away  uith  the  ship  to  IJ3zaiitiuiu. 

It  so  haj)pened  lliat  at  tiie  monieut  when  Kleander  arrived,  the 
Avhole  army  was  out  on  a  inaraudinii;  excursion.  Orders  had  been 
ahvady  ]ii-onudu:aled.  that  wiiaU'ver  was  ea{)tui-ed  by  every  one  wlicu 
llie  wliole  army  was  out,  should  be  -brought  in  and  desalt  witli  us 
public  property;  though  on  days  when  the  army  was  collectively  at 
rest,  any  soldier  might  go  out  indivitlually  and  take  to  hiinself  uliat- 
cver  he  could  ])ilhige.  On  the  day  when  Kleander  arrived,  and 
found  the  whole  army  out,  some  soldiers  were  just  coming  back  with 
a  lot  of  sheep  whicli  they  bail  seized.  By  right,  the  sheep  oughl  to 
liave  been  handed  into  the  i)ublic  store.  But  these  soldiers,  desirous 
to  appropriate  them  wrongfully,  addressed^themselves  to  Dexijipus, 
and  promised  him  a  portion  if  he  would  enable  them  to  retain  the 
rest.  Accordingly  the  latter  interfered,  drove  away  those  who 
claimed  the  sheep  as  public  property,  and  denounced  them  as  thieves 
to  Kleander;  who  desired  him  to  bring  them  before  him.  Dexijipus 
arrested  one  of  them,  a  soldier  belonging  to  the  lochus  or  company 
of  one  of  the  best  friends  of  Xenophon — the  Arcadian  Agasias.  The 
latter  took  the' man  under  his  protection;  while  the  soldiers  aiouud, 
incensed  not  less  at  the  i)ast  than  at  the  present  conduct  of  Dexip- 
pus,  broke  out  into  violent  manifestations,  called  him  a  traitor,  and 
pelted  him  with  stones.  Such  was  their  w  rath  that  not  Dexippus 
alone,  but  the  crew  of  the  triremes  also,  and  even  Kleander  himself, 
lied,  in  alarm;  in  spite  of  tiie  intervention  of  Xenophon  and  the  other 
generals,  who  on  the  one  hand  expLuned  to  Kleander,  that  it  was  an 
established  army-order  whicli  these  soldiers  were  seeking  to  enforce 
— and  on  the  other  hand  controlled  the  mutineers.  But  the  Lace- 
d.emimian  harmost  was  so  incensed  as  well  by  his  own  fright  as  by  the 
calumnies  of  Dexippus,  that  he  threatened  to  sail  away  at  once'  and 
jiroelaim  the  Cyreian  army  (;nemies  to  Sparta,  so  that  every  Hellenic 
city  should  be  interdicted  from  giving  them  reception.  It  was  in 
vain  that  the  generals,  well-knowing  the  formidable  consequences  of 
such  an  interdict,  entreated  him  to  relent.  He  would  consent  only 
on  condition  that  the  soldiers  who  had  begun  to  throw  stones,  as  well 
as  Agasias  the  interfering  officer,  shouki  be  delivered  up  to  him. 
This  latter  demand  was  especially  insisted  upon  by  Dexippus,  who, 
liating  Xenophon,  had  already  tried  to  prejudice  Anaxibius  against 
him,  and  believed  that  Agasias  had  acted  by  his  order. 

T\n\  situation  now  became  extremely  critical;  since  the  soldiers 
would  not  easily  be  brought  to  surrender  their  comrades — who  had  a 
perfectly  righteous  cause,  though  they  had  supported  it  by  undue 
violence— to  the  vengeance  of  a  traitor  like  Dexippus.  "\Vhen  the 
army  was  convened  in  assembly,  several  of  them  went  so  far  as  to 
treat  the  menace  of  Kleander  with  contempt.  But  Xenoplion  took 
puius  lo  set  them  right  upon  this  point.     *'  Soldiers  (said  he),  it  will 


be  no  slight  misfortune  if  Kleander  shall  depart  as  he  threatens  to 
do,  in  his  present  temper  toward  us.  We  are  here  close  upon  the 
eities  of  Greece:  now  the  Lacedaemonians  are  the  imperial  ^ower  in 
Greece,  and  not  merely  their  authorized  officers,  but  even  each  one 
of  their  individual  citizens,  can  accomplish  what  he  pleases  in  the 
various  cities.  If  then  Kleander  begins  by  shutting  us  out  from 
liyzaniium,  and  next  enjoins  the  Lacedaemonian  harmost  in  the  other 
cities  to  do  the  same,  proclaiming  us  lawless  and  disobedient  lo 
Sparta — if,  besides,  the  same  representation  should  be  conveyed  to 
the  Lacediemonian  admiral  of  the  fleet,  Anaxibius — wx' shall  be  hard 
pressed  either  to  remain  or  to  sail  away:  for  the  Laced.Traonians  are 
at  present  masters  both  on  land  at  sea.  AVe  must  not,  for  the  sake 
of  any  one  or  two  men,  suffer  the  whole  army  to  be  excluded  from 
Greece.  We  must  obey  whatever  the  Lacedaemonians  command, 
eS|»ecially  as  our  cities,  to  which  we  r(^s]M"ctively  belong,  now  obey 
them.  As  to  what  concerns  myself,  I  understand  that  Dexippus  has 
toUl  Kleander  that  Agasias  would  nevev  have  taken  such  a  step  ex- 
cept by  my  orders.  Now.  if  Agaisias  himself  states  this,  I  am  ready 
to  exonerate  both  him  and  all  of  you.  and  to  give  myself  up  to  any 
exlremity  of  punishment.  I  maintain  too,  that  any  other  man  whom 
Kleander  arraiirns  ought  in  like  manner  to  giv(^  himself  up  for  tri:;l, 
ill  order  that  you  coJlectivelv  may  be  discharged  from  the  imputa- 
tion. It  will  be  hard  indeed,'  if  just  as  we  are  reaching  Greece,  we 
should  not  oidv  be  debarred  from  the  praise  and  honor  which  we 
anticipated,  but  should  be  degraded  even  below  the  level  of  others, 
and  shut  out  from  the  Grecian  cities." 

After  this  speech  from  the  philo  Luconian  Xenophon— so  signifi- 
cant a  testimony  of  the  unmeasured  ascendency  and  interference  of 
the  Lacedcemonians  throughout  Greece— Agasias  rose,  jmd  pro- 
claimed, that  what  he  had  done  was  neither  under  the  orders,  nor 
with  the  privity,  of  Xenophon;  that  he  had  acted  on  a  personal 
impulse  of  wrath,  at  seeing  his  own  honest  and  innocent  solcier 
drago-ed  away  bv  the  traitor  Dexippus:  but  that  he  now  willingly 
irave  himself  upas  a  victim,  to  avert  from  the  army  the  displeasure 
of  the  Laced  emonians.  This  generous  self-sacritice  which  at  the 
moment  promised  nothing  less  than  a  fatal  result  to  Agasias,  was 
accepted  by  the  army  :  and  the  generals  conducted  both  him  and  the 
soldier  whom  he  had  rescued,  as  prisoners  to  Kleander.  Presenting 
himself  as  the  responsible  partv,  Agasias  at  the  same  time  explained 
to  Kleander  the  infamous  behavior  of  Dexippus  to  the  army,  and 
said  that  toward  no  one  else  would  he  have  acted  in  the  same  man- 
ner, while  thcT^oldier  whom  he  had  rescued,  and  who  was  given  up 
at  the  same  time,  also  affirmed  that  he  had  interfered  merely  to  pre- 
vent Dexippus  and  some  others  from  overruling,  for  their  own 
individual  benefit,  a  proclaimed  order  of  the  entire  army.  Kleander 
having  observed  that  if  Dexippus  had  done  what  was  affirmed,  he 
would  be  the  la:it  to  defend  him,  but  that  no  one  ought  to  have  been 


576        PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

stoned  without  trial— desired  that  tlie  persons  surrendered  might  l)c 
left  for  his  consideration,  and  at  the  same  time  retracted  his  expres- 
sions of  displeasure  as  regarded  all  the  others. 

The  generals  then  retired,  leaving  Kleander  in  possession  of  the 
prisoners,  and  on  the  point  of  takmg  his  dinner.  But  they  retired 
-with  mournful  feelings,  and  Xenophon  presently  convened  the  army 
to  propose  that  a  general  deputation  should  be  sent  to  Kleander  lo 
implore  his  lenity  toward  their  two  comrades.  This  being  cordially 
adopted,  Xenophon,  at  the  head  of  a  deputation  comprising  Drakon- 
tius  the  Spartan  as  well  as  thi;  chief  officers,  addressed  an  earnest 
appeal  to  Kleander,  representing  that  his  honor  had  been  satisticd 
with  the  unconditional  surrender  of  the  two  persons  required ;  that 
the  army,  deeply  concerned  for  two  meritorious  comrades,  entreated 
him  now  to  show  mercy  and  spare  their  lives;  that  they  promised 
him  in  return  the  most  implicit  obedience,  and  entreated  him  to  take 
the  command  of  them,  in  order  that  he  might  have  personal  cogni- 
zance of  their  exact  discipline,  and  compare  their  worth  with  that  of 
Dexippus.  Kleander  was  not  merely  soothed,  but  completely  won 
over,  by  this  address:  and  said  in  reply  that  the  conduct  of  the 
generals  Ix^lied  altogether  the  representations  made  to  lum  (doubtless 
by  Dexippus),  that  they  were  seeking  to  alienate  the  army  from  the 
Lacedaemonians.  He  not  only  restored  the  two  men  in  his  power, 
but  also  accepted  the  command  of  the  army,  and  promised  to  con- 
duct them  back  into  Greece. 

The  prospocts  of  the  army  appeared  thus  gicatly  improved ;  the 
more  so,  as  Kleander,  on  entering  upon  his  new  functions  as  com- 
mander, foimd  the  soldiers  so  cheerful  and  orderly,  that  he  was 
hiirhly  gratitied,  and  exchanged  personal  tokens  of  friendship  and 
hospilality  with  Xenophon.  "But  when  sacriticescame  to  be  offered, 
for  beginning  the  march  homeward,  the  signs  were  so  unpropilious, 
for  tliree  successive  days,  that  Kleander  could  not  bring  himself  to 
brave  such  auguries  at  the  outset  of  his  career.  Accordingly,  he  told 
the  ffenerals,  that  the  gods  plainly  forbade  him,  and  reserved  it  for 
tlicm,  to  conduct  the  aVmy  into  Greece;  that  he  should  therefore  sail 
back  to  Byzantium,  and  would  receive  the  army  in  the  best  way  he 
could,  when  they  reached  the  Bosporus.  After  an  interchange 
of  presents  with  the  soldiers,  he  then  departed  with  his  two  triremes. 

The  favorable  sentiment  now  established  in  the  bosom  of  Kleander 
will  be  found  very  serviceable  hereafter  to  the  Cyreians  at  Byzan- 
tium; but  they  had  cause  for  deeply  regretting  the  unpxopitious 
sacrifices  which  had  deterred  him  from  assuming  the  actual  com- 
mand at  Kalpe.  In  the  request  preferred  to  him  by  them  that  he 
would  march  as  their  commander  to  the  Bospoms,  we  may  recog- 
nize a  scheme,  and  a  very  well-contrived  scheme,  of  Xenophon;  who 
had  before  desired  to  leave  the  army  at  Herakleia,  and  who  saw 
plainly  that  the  difficulties  of  a  commander,  unless  he  were  a  Lace- 
diemonian  of  station  and  influence,  would  increase  with  every  step 


MARCH  TO   CHALKEDON. 


577 


of  their  approach  to  Greece.  Had  Kleander  accepted  the  command, 
the  soldiers  would  have  been  better  treated,  while  Xenophon  himself 
might  either  have  remained  as  his  adviser,  or  might  have  gone  home. 
llVrprobably  would  have  chosen  the  latter  course. 

Under  the  command  of  their  own  officers,  the  Cyreians  now 
iiKUThed  from  Kalpe  across  Bithyuia  to  Chrysopolis  (in  the  territory 
of  Chalkedon  on  the  Asiatic  ed'^e  of  the  Bosporus,  mimediately 
opposite  to  Bvzantium,  as  Scutari  now  is  to  Constantinople),  where 
they  remained  seven  davs,  turning  into  money  the  slaves  and  plunder 
which  they  had  collected.  Unhappily  for  them,  the  Lacediemonnm 
admiral  Anaxibius  was  now  at  Byzantium,  so  tliat  their  friend 
Kleander  was  under  his  superior  command.  And  Pharnabazus,  the 
Persian  satrap  of  the  north-western  regions  of  Asia  Minor,  becoming 
much  alarmed  lest  they  should  invade  his  satrapy,  dispatched  a  i)ri- 
vate  message  to  Anaxibius;  whom  he  prevailed  upon,  by  promise  of 
lar^e  presents,  to  transport  the  army  forthwith  across  to  the  Euro- 
pean side  of  the  Bosporus.  Accordingly,  Anaxibius,  sending  for 
the  o-enerals  and  the  lochages  across  to  Byzantium,  invited  the  army 
tocniss,  and  gave  them  his  assurance  that  as  soon  as  the  soldiers 
should  be  in  Europe,  he  would  provide  pay  for  them.  The  other 
oflieers  told  him  that  they  would  return  with  this  message  and  take 
the  sense  of  the  armv;  but  Xenophon  on  his  own  account  said  that 
he  should  not  return;  that  he  should  now  retire  from  the  army,  and 
sail  away  from  Byzantium.  It  was  only  on  the  pressing  instance  of 
Anaxibius  that  he  was  induced  to  go  back  to  Chrysopolis  and  con 
duet  the  army  across;  on  the  understanding  that  he  should  depart 
innnediatelv  afterward.  .      .       ^  . 

Here  at  Byzantium,  he  received  his  first  communication  from  the 
Tliracian  prince  Seuthes;  wiio  sent  Medosades  to  offer  him  a  reward 
if  he  would  bring  the  army  across.  Xenophon  replied  that  the  army 
wiMild  cross;  thaUio  reward  from  Seuthes  was  needful  to  bring  about 
that  movement;  but  that  he  himself  was  about  to  depart,  leaving 
the  command  in  other  hands.  Iti  point  of  fact,  the  whole  army 
crossed  with  little  delay,  landed  in  Europe,  and  found  themselves 
within  the  walls  of  Byzanthim.  Xenophon,  who  had  come  along 
with  them  paid  a  visit  shortlv  afterward  to  his  friend  the  harmost 
Kleander  and  took  leave  of  him  as  about  to  depart  inunediately. 
But  Kleander  told  him  that  he  must  not  think  of  deptuMing  until  the 
army  was  out  of  the  city,  and  that  lie  w^ould  be  held  responsible  if 
thev  stayed  In  truth  Kleander  was  very  uneasy  so  long  as  the 
soldiers  were  within  the  walls,  and  was  aware  that  it  might  be  no 
easy  matter  to  induce  them  to  go  oway.  For  Anaxibius  had  prac- 
tieed  a  gross  fraud  in  promising  them  pay.  which  he  had  neither 
the  ability  nor  the  inclination  to  provide.  Without  handing  to  them 
either  pay  or  even  means  of  purchasing  supplies,  he  issued  orders 
that  they  must  go  forth  with  arms  and  baggage,  and  muster  outside 
of  the  gates,  there  to  be  numbered  for  an  immediate  march ;  any  one 

H.  G.  ni.-19 


o78       PUCK'EEDLXGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

• 
who  stnved  l)d»in(l  h'Au2:  lu'ld  as  pcinsliiil.k'.  This  proclaiiwiliori 
w  :is  aliki-  uncxiurfctl  aiul  olTensive  to  the  sohlicrs,  ^lio  fell  that  Ihiy 
liail  hcen  dihulrd,  ami  Avtne  very  baikwanl  in  olii'ying.  lloiic'c 
Kleandcr,  whih-  urircut  with  Xciioplion  to  d«lVr  his  'Icparliiiv  milil 
he  had  con(lucU'<l  the  army  outsidr  of  the  walls,  added-  "  Go  forlh 
as  if  you  were  ahoiit  to  luareh  aloii<^  with  tliem;  when  yon  are  once 
outside,  you  may  depart  as  soon  as  you  please."  X<i)<)phon  rej>li( d 
thai  this  matter  must  be  settled  with  Anaxihius,  to  whom  aeeord- 
imily  both  of  them  ivent,  and  who  repeated  the  same  dire(  tjoiis.  in  a 
mruiner  vet  more  peremptory.  Though  it  was  plain  to  Xeiioplioa 
that  he  was  here  makinu' hiniself  a  sort  of  instrument  to  the  fraud 
whieh  Anaxibius  had  praetieed  upon  the  army,  yet  he  had  no  ehoiee 
but  toobey.  Aecordingly,  he  as  well  as  the  other  "generals  put  them- 
selves at  the  liead  of  the  troops,  wlio.  followed,  ho\\ever  relnetanlly, 
aiut  arrived  ni(»st  of  them  outside  of  the  gales.  Kteonikus  (u  Lace- 
diemonian  olticer  of  eonsideration.  uotieed  more  than  once  in  my 
lasLpreeedinii'  volume)  eouunanding  at  the  ^rate,  .stood  close  to  it  in 
person;  in  order  that  when  all  the  Cyreians  liad  gone  forlh,  he  might 
immediatelv  shut  it  and  fasten  it  with  the  bar. 

Antixibius  knew  well  wliat  he  was  doing.  He  fully  anticipated 
that  the  ccmmiunication  of  the  final  orders  Avoidd  occasion  an  out- 
break among  the  Cvreians.  and  was  anxiousto  defer  it  until  they  were 
outside.  bIu.  when  there  remained  only  the  rearmost  com])anics 
still  in  the  inside  and  on  their  march,  all  the  rest  having  got  out— lie 
thought  the  danger  was  over,  and  summoned  to  him  the  generals 
and  captains,  all  of  whom  were  probably  near  the  g:ites  supeiiutctid- 
ing  the  march  tluough.  It  seems  tha't  Xcnophim,  having  given 
notice  that  lie  intended  tn  depart,  did  not  answer  to  this  summons 
as  one  of  the  generals,  but  rcnudned  outside  among  the  soldiers. 
"Take  what  supplies  you  want  (said  Anaxibius)  from  the  neighbor- 
iniz:  Thracian  villaces,  which  are  well  furbished  with  wheat,  barley, 
and  other  necessaries.  After  thus  providing  yourselves,  march  for- 
ward to  the  Chersonesus,  and  there  Kyniskus  will  give  you  pay." 

This  was  the  first  distinct  intimation  given  by  Anaxibius  that  lie 
did  not  intend  to  perfonn  his  promise  of  finding  pay  for  soldiers. 
Who  Kvniskus  was  we  do  not  know,  nor  was  he  probably  known  to 
the  Cvreians;  but  the  march  here  enjoined  was  at  least  150  EngU^h 
miles,"  and  might  be  much  longer.  The  route  was  not  indicated, 
and  the  geneiVis  had  to  inquire  from  Anaxibius  wlicther  they  were 
to  ffo  hv  what  was  calk  d  the  Holy  Mountain  (that  is,  by  the  shorter 
line:  skirting  the  northern  c(^,ast  of  the  Propontis),  or  by  a  more 
inland  and  civcuitious  road  through  Thrace;— also  whether  they 
were  to  regard  the  Thracian  prince,  Peutlies,  as  a  friend  or  an 
en(;mv. 

In.slead  of  the  pay  which  had  been  formally  promised  to  them  by 
Anaxibius  if  they  would  cross  over  from  Asia  to  Byz:intium.  the 
Cyreians  thus  found  themselves  sent  away  empty  handed  to  a  long 


MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY 


579 


march— through   another  barbarous  country,  with  chance-supplies 
to  be  ravished  only  by  their  own  efforts,— and  at  the  end  of  it  a  lot 
niikuown  and  uncertain;  while,  had  they  remained  in  Asia,   they 
would  liave  had  at  auv  rate  the  rich  satrapy  of  Pharnabazus  Avithm 
their  reach      To  perfidy  of  dealing  was  uow  added  a  brutal  eject- 
meat  from  Byzantium,  without  even  the  commonest  manifestations 
of  li().*I>itality;  contrasting  pointedly  with  the  treatment  w-hicli  the 
army  had  recently  experienced  at  Trapezus,  Sinope,  and  Herakleia; 
where  they  had  been  welcomed  not  only  by  complimeuts  on  their  - 
nast  achievements,  but  also  by  an  ample  present  of  flour,  meat:,  and 
wine      Such  behavior  could  not  fail  to  provoke  the  most  violent 
indignation  in  the  bosoms  of  the  soldiery;  and  Anaxibius  had  there- 
fore delayed  criviug  the  order  until  the  last  soldiera  were  marching 
out  thinking  that  the  army  would  hear  nothing  of  until  the  generals 
came  out  of  gates  to  inform  them;  so  that  the  gates  would  be  closed, 
and  the  walls  manned  to  resist  any  assault  from  without.     But  ins 
calculations  were  not  realized.     Either  one  of  the  soldiers  passing  by 
heard  him  give  the  order,  or  one  of  the  captains  forming  his  audience 
«;tole  aw^ay  from  the  rest,  and  hastened  forward  to  acquaint  his  com- 
rades on  the  outside.     The  bulk  of  the  army,  already  irritated  by 
the  inhospitahh^  way  in  which   they  had  been  thrust  out  needed 
uothia*'-  further  to  inflame  them  inio  spontaneous  mutiny  and  aggres- 
sion    Viiile  the  generals  within  (who  either  took  the  communica- 
tion more  patiently,  or  at  least,  looking  further  forward  felt  that  any 
attempt  to  resent  or  resist  tiie  iil-usage  of  the  Spartan  admiral  would 
only  make  their  position  worse)  were  discussing  with  Anaxibius  the 
details  of  the  mirch  just  enjoined— the  soldiers  without,  bursting 
into  spontaneous  movement,  with  a  simultaneous  and  fiery  impulse, 
made  a  rush  back  to  get  possession  of  the  gate.     But  Eteonikus 
seein*'-  their  moveraeut,  closed  it  without  a  moment's  delay,   and 
fastened  the  bar.     The  soldiers  on  reaching  the  gate  and  finding  it 
barred    clamored   loudly  to  get  it   opened,  threatened  to  break  it 
down  '  and  even  began  to   knock  vio'.eiitly  against  it.     Some  ran 
down'  to  the  sea-coast,  and   made  their  way  into  the  city  round  the 
line  of  stones  at  the  base  of  the  city  wall,  which  protected  it  against 
the  sea-  while  the  rearmost  soldiers  who  had  not  yet  marched  out, 


seeinsr  what  was 


passing. 


and  fearful  of 


being 


cut  off  from  their 


comrades,  assaulted  the  gate  from  the  inside,  severed  the  ta^tenings 
with  axes,  and  threw  it  wide  open  to  the  army.  All  the  soldiers 
then  rushed  up.  and  were  soon  again  in  Byzantium. 

Nothino'  could  exceed  the  terror  of  the  Lacedtemonians  as  well  as 
of  tiie  native  Byzantines,  when  they  saw  the  excited  Cyreians  again 
within  the  walls.  The  town  seemed  already  taken  and  on  the  point 
of  beiii"-  plundered.  Neither  Anaxibius  nor  Eteonikus  took  the 
smallest" means  of  resistance,  nor  stayed  to  brave  the  approach  of  the 
soldiers  whose  wrath  they  were  fully  conscious  of  having  deserved. 
Both  fled  to  the  citadel— the  former  first  running  to  the  sea-shore, 


580        PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

* 

and  iumpiug  into  a  fisliing-boat  to  go  thitlier  by  sea.  He  even  thought 
the  citadel  not  tenuhle  Avilh  its  existing  garrison,  and  sent  over  lo 
Chalkedon  for  a  re-enforcenu-nt.  Still  niuie  territied  were  the  citi- 
zens of  the  town.  Every  man  in  the  market-place  instantly  tied; 
some  to  their  houses,  otliers  lo  the  mcrciiaiit  vessels  in  the  harbor, 
othei-s  to  the  triremes  or  ships  of  war,  which  they  hauled  down  to 
the  water,  and  thus  put  to  sea.  ,     .     ,     , 

To  the  diiceptiou  and  harshness  of  the  Spartan  admiral,  there  \yas 
thus  added  a  want  of  precaution  in  the  manner  of  execution,  which 
threatened  "to  prove  the  utter  ruin  of  Byzantmm.     For  it  was  but 
too  probaWe  that  the  Cvreian  soldiers,  under  the  keen  sense  of  recent 
injury   would    satiate   their  revenge,  and   reind)urse  themselves  lor 
the  want  of  hospitalitv   toward  them,   without  distinguishing  the 
Lacediemonian  garrison  from  the  Byzantine  citizens;  and  that  too 
from  mere  impulse,  not  merely  without  orders,  but  in  spite  of  pro- 
hibitions, from  their  generals.     Such  was  the  aspect  of  the  case, 
when  they  became  airain  assembled  in  a  mass  wiihin  the  gates;  and 
such  would  probably  have  been  the  reality,  had  Xenophon  executed 
his  design  of  retirins?  earlier,  so  as  to  leave  the  other  generals  actuig 
without  him.     Being  on  the  outside  along  with  the  soldiers,  Xeno- 
phon felt  at  once,  as  soon  as  he  saw  the  gates  forced  open  and  the 
army  a^ain  within   the   town,  the  territic  emergency   which  was 
impendin*^:  first,  the  sack  of  Byzantium— next,  horror  and  antipathy, 
throughout  all   Greece,    toward   the   C'yreian   offices  and   soldiers 
indiscriminately— lastly,  unsparing  retribution  mllicted  upon  all  by 
the  power  of  Sparta.    'Overwhelmed  with  these  jinxieties,  he  rushed 
into  the  town  along  with  the  multitude,  using  every  eflort  to  pacity 
them  and  bring  them  into  order.     They  on  their  parts,  delighted  to 
see  him  alone  with  them,  and  conscious  of  their  own  force,  were 
ea^er  to  excite  him  to  the  same  pitch  as  tliemselves,  and  to  pre- 
vail on  him  to  second  and  methodize  their  present  triumph.     "  Now 
is  your  time,  Xenophon  (they  exclaimed),  to  make  yourself  a  man. 
You  have  here  a  city— you  have  triremes— you  have  money— >;oii 
have  plenty  of  soldiers.     Now  then,  if  you  choose,  vou  can  enrich 
us-  and  we  in  return  can  make  vou  powerful."— "lou  speak  well 
(replied  he);  I  shall  do  as  vou  propose;  but  if  you  want  to  a^'com- 
plish  anvthing,  you  must  fall  into  military  array  forthwith.       lie 
knew  that  this  was  the  first  condition  of  returning  to  anything  like 
tranquillity;    and   by  great   fortune,  the  space  called  the  Thiakion 
immediately  adjoininiz;  the  gate  inside,  was  level,  open,  and  clear  ot 
lio:i>es;   presenting  an  excellent  place  of  arms  or  locality  for  a 
review.'    The  whole  army,  partlv  from  their  long  military  jiractice, 
parllv  under  the  impression  that  Xenophon  was   really  about  to 
second  their  wishes  and   direct  some   aggressive  operation— threw 
themselves  almost  of  their  ow^n  accord  into  regular  array  on  the 
Thrakion;  the  hoplites,  eight  deep,  the  pclta-^ts  on  each  Hank.     It 
was  in  this  position  that  Xenophon  addressed  them  as  follows: 


SPEECH  OF  XENOPHON. 


581 


-Soldiers  I  am  not  surprised  that  yon  are  incensed  and  that  you 
think  vom-selves  scandalously  cheated  and  ill-used.  But  if  we  give 
wav  to  our  wra  h-if  we  punish  these  Laceda^nonians  now  betore 
rfo  thei^-Treaohe^  and  plunder  this  innocent  city-retiect  what 
"  -1  L  tbP  eoi  sequence  We  shall  stand  proclaimed  forthwith  as 
:;'i^st  ^"^!^SmoniLs  and  .their  .dlies  and  wh:it  son  of  ^ 
wn  that  will  be  those  who  have  witnessed  and  who  s  ill  lecollect 
:^  u'  n^lL  of  history  may  ea^ly  fancy.   „  Y^,t!f  "nir'tlee     an 

.lo  the  war  a-'ainst  Sparta  with  a  powerful  army  and  U^^^t  an 
^Juut^^^v^ii  and  numerous  tributary  cit.es  in  Asia  as  well  as 
'il  ,'^,  non^^^^^^^  this  verv  Byzantium  in  which  we  now  stand 
wr  •  ve  le^  ^vanquished  in^he'way  that  all  ot  you  know.  And 
what  thcTn  wUl  be  the  fate  of  us  soldiers,  when  we  shall  have  as  united 
^  en  ie  SpT  I  with  all  her  old  allies  and  Athens  ^^"^^^^^T^^^  ;^- 
nhernes  and  the  barbaric  forces  on  the  coast-and  most  of  all,  the 
^G  !'rki  i^vl  mn  we  marched  up  to  dethrone  and  slay,  if  we  were 

)i:\     r  «1irmaii  fool  eiKMKdi  to  think  that  we  have  a  chance  of 

f  11.  MX  -ind  friends  who  are  in  the  cities  which  will  take  aims 
^M  us-ai  d  will  take  arms  justly,  if  we,  who  abstained  from 
a,.,aiuhL  u^    ;.^  ,_.,,•„  ^u,.    even  when  we  were  in  force  sufficient, 

:^^e;:^ihd;^r;:ow;^iund:r .  nrst ^~;^^:^^ 

S^UaSUnlhe^^^^^ 

dvorwle^thus  obedient,  to  obtain  your  just  rights;  but  if  you 
sli    ikl'fai    n  this   rather  submit  to  injustice  than  cut  yourselves  off 
lof  he  G^eci  n  ^  Send  to  inform  Anaxibius  that  we  have 

e  ite re  the  city,  not  with  a  view  to  commit  any  violence,  but  m  the 
^po  f  osS.  of  obtaining  from  him  the  advantages  which  he 
Zniied  us  H  we  fail,  we  shall  at  least  prove  to  hini  that  we  quit 
the  cUy/  not  under  his  fraudulent  maneuvers,  but  under  our  own 
sense  of' the  duty  of  obedience."  . 

This  speech  completely  arrested  the  impetuous  impulse  of  the 
ariiw  brou-ht  them  to  a  true  sense  of  their  situation,  ana  mduced 
the  n  to  adopt  the  proposition  of  Xenoplion.  They  remained  un- 
moved  in  he  r  position  on  the  Thrakion,  while  three  of  the  captains 
weie  Lilt  t()  communicate  with  Anaxibius.  While  they  were  thus 
waitino-  a  Theban  named  Kreratadas  approached,  who  had  once 
comin?Aded  in  Byzantium  under  the  Laceda^nonians  durmg  the  pre- 
vious war  He  had  now  become  a  sort  of  professional  Condottiero 
or  -enerai  looking  out  for  an  army  to  command  Avherever  he  could 
fuidone,  and  offering  his  services  to  any  citv  which  would  engage 
him  He  addressed  the  assembled  Cyreians.  and  offered,  if  they 
would  accept  him  for  their  general,  to  conduct  them  against  the  Delta 
of  Thrace  (the  space  included  between  the  northwest  corner  ot  the 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


EFFECT  OF  THE  SPEECH. 


583 


V 


T>    r^^nti^  aii.l  the  smitli-west  corner  of  the  Eiixinc).  winch  he  asserted 
Pr«^ponti>a  d  tllesomu^^^^  opportunity  of  phuuler;  lie 

to  IK^  a  rich  ^c";^^;7^;;;;[^,     ;./;;  ^vith  ample  suhsistcnc-c   durln-     . 
further  VJ-^'f^^^^^^^^^^  '  c turned    bearing  the  reply  of 

1:'.:^^^^^dt<^^^^^  ^^--^^^y'  Prondsii,^,  that  not 
Anaxibms,  TNiioinc  viu  .  ^    j^.  (^^)]^,(.(iience,  but 

CHdy  thearrnvs^Kudd  M^^  to  the  authorities  at 

that  he  ^vol  Id         ,\3\Vl  is  ou  n  prnver  to  promote  their  comfort. 
^r^rVidlu^l^n^    u      e^  aW  t:^ln.  then,  iluo  pay,  that  delusion 

liliiiiiiiS 

wMnmmmm 

fresh  from  all  the  glovv  of  tluir  '<='»"•/>':  <;^.',i,,"\,,,,xilm,s: 
crously  entvappoa  ov«  from  As,a  ..x  ^7.  -.'i^.'J  '„'  ^vLnuium  h.<l 
and  althoud.  it  may  be  said  ''"■  J  ;\\ '''''''„  ,1,.  ho<<(  is  comnunily 
I,.,  concern  ..ither  in  'l'«5'"'^,"'  '  V^;'  ^fi^^^j'on  .,^oen  .arrison  a,»l 
taken,  in  militmy  operat.ons, '"!,;','  ^■^^7„,eir  hands,  «i.h  c„n- 
citizens  m  *>"  P'^'^''''''''. I" V™,t  r  f  t  dr  exploits  in  Asia,  the  Cyreiaiis 
scionsness  of  force  arisnu'  ™t  {'.  '  J  onnortunitv  l.olh  of  aven-in- 
were  at.the  sa.ne  time  "f »'"?''  .;'',S;"'n-,he  process  of  exe- 
a  .ross  recent  ininry  «>"  .':;;™'  f ,','  ^  '^milu  "f  that  ™sh  whereby 
onlion;  to  which  Y'^  ""\;';'  ,,  ,be  fnrThcr  fact  that  without  the 
they  had  "'''J'"''''  .•'.^^''^^'^VxZV^^^^^^^^  I'''"!.  .."inviting  scr- 

entesthevbad  nothing  \"."P,y„'V..  ',p^^p,i  by  an  (.verpowenns 
vice  in  Thr:i<e.  With  ^"  '''  '^^ "  ^•^'^>4" ,'ere  t  a  a  relirii.S  freneral, 
impulse  of  this  nature.  ^^; '»' '   "f  ^^.j'^  ,rwork  upon  .heir  minds  .s 

%::t:^7^^^^"^^  -^^^^^  '-^'-d,  OC  unquestionable 


reality  and  prodigious  magnitude,  yet  belonging  all  to  a  distant  future, 
aiid  t'licrcfore  of  little  comparative  force,  except  when  set  forth  in 
lna'niitiei.1  characters  by  the  orator.      How  powerfully  he  worked 
upoa  the  minds  of  his  liearers,  so  as  to  draw  forth  these  far- removed 
dano-ers  from  the  cloud  of  present  sentiment  by  which  they  were 
overlaid— how  skillfully  he  employed  in  illustration  the  example  of 
his  own  native  city— will  be  seen  by  all  who  study  his  speech.    Never 
(lid  his  Athenian  accom.plishments— his  talent  for  giving  words  to 
important  thoughts— his  promptitude  in  seizing  a  present  situation  and 
luaiiao-in"-  the  sentiments  of  an  impetuous  multitude— appear  to  greater 
advaiaage  than  when  he  was  thus  suddenly  called  forth  to  meet  a  ter- 
rible emergency.    His  pre-established  reputation  and  the  habit  of  obey- 
iu"-  his  orders  were  doubtless  essen'  ial  conditions  of  success.    But  none 
of^his  colleagues  in  command  would  have  been  able  to  accomplish 
the  like  memorable  change  on  the  minds  of  the  soldiers,  or  to  procure 
obedience  for  any  simple  authoritative  restrdnt;  nay,  it  is  probable 
that  if  Xenophon  had  not  been  at  hand  the  other  generals  would  have 
foUowetl  th';  passionate  movement,  even  though  they  had  been  re- 
luctant—from  simple  inability  to  repress  it.     Again— whatever  might 
have  been  the  accomplishments  of  Xenophon,  it  is  certain  that  even 
Jw  would  not  have  been  able  to  work  upon  the  minds  of  these  excited 
soldiers  had  tliev  not  been  Greeks  and  citizens  as  well  as  soldiers- 
bred  in  Hellenic  V»^P'^thies  and  accustomed  to  Hellenic  order,  with 
authority  operating  in  part  through  voice  and  persuasion,  and  not 
through  the  Persian  whip  and  instruments  of  torture.     'I  he  memora- 
ble discouse  on  theThrakion  at  Byzantium  illustrates  the  working  of 
that  persuasive  agency  which  formed  one  of  the  permanent  foixcs 
and  conspicuous  charms  of  Hellenism.     It  teaches  us  that  if  the  ora- 
tor could  sometimes  accuse  innocent  defendants  and  pervert  well-dis- 
posed assemblies— a  part  of  the  case  wliich  historians  of  Greece  often 
present  as  if  it  were  the  whole— he  could  also,  and  that  in  the  most 
trying  emergencies,  combat  the  strongest  force  of  present  passion, 
and  bring  into  vivid  presence  the  half-obscured  lineaments  of  long- 
siuihted  reason  and  duty. 

After  conductimr  the  army  out  of  the  city,  Xenophon  sent,  through 
Kleander,  a  message  to  Anaxibius,  requesting  that  he  himself  might 
be  allowed  to  come  in  asrain  singly,  in  order  to  take  his  departure  by 
sea.  His  request  was  granted,  though  not  without  much  dithculty; 
upon  which  he  took  leave  of  the  army  under  the  strongest  expres- 
sions of  affection  and  gratitude  on  their  part,  and  went  into  Byzan- 
tium along  with  Kleander;  while  on  the  next  day  Ktpratadas  cam  i 
to  assume  the  command  according  to  agreement,  bringing  with  liini 
a  prophet,  and  beasts  to  be  offered  in  sacrifice.  There  followed  in 
his  train  twenty  men  carrying  sacks  of  barley-meal,  twenty  more 
with  jars  of  wine,  three  bejiring  olives,  and  one  man  with  a  bundle 
of  garlic  and  onions.  All  these  provisions  being  laid  down.  Kcerata- 
das  proceeded  to  offer  sacrifice,  as  a  preliminary  to  the  distribution 


584       PllOCKEDlNGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

of  them  anion-  the  soldiers.  On  the  first  day,  the  sacrifices  being 
unfavorable,  ifo  distribution  took  place;  on  the  second  day,  Ivcrata- 
das  was  standing  with  the  wrealh  on  his  head  at  the  al  ar,  and  willi 
the  victims  beside  him,  about  to  renew  his  sueritiee-yhenl  imasioa 
•nid  the  other  ofiicers  interfered,  desired  him  to  abstain,  and  disnm- 
'scd  him  from  the  command.  Perliaps  the  first  unfavorable  sac.  iti- 
ce<  may  have  partly  impelled  tliein  to  this  proceeding.  But  the  nuini 
reason  was,  the  scanty  store,  inadequate  even  to  one  day  ssubsisUne. 
for  the  army,  broui^ht  by  Kanatadas-aud  the  obvious  insufiiciency 

^'  On  thetleparturc  of  Kceratadas,  the  army  marched  to  take  up  ils 
ouarters  in  some  Thraciau  villages  not  far  from  liy/antmm,  uiukr 
iU  former  otlicers;  who  however  could  not  agree  as  to  their  tutuie 
order  of  march.  Kleanor  and  Phryniskus,  who  hvA  received  pre- 
sent^ from  Seuthes,  ur-ed  the  expediency  of  accepting  ihe  service  of 
that  Thracian  prince:  Neon  insisted  on  going  to  the  Chersonese  to  he 
under  the  Lacedamonian  ofiicers  in  that  peninsula  (as  Anaxibiushad 
Tu-oiected);  in  the  idea  that  he,  as  a  Laceda-nionian,  wor.ld  there  oh- 
t  in  the  command  of  the  whole  army;  while  T.masion.  with  the  view 
of  re-establishing  himself  in  his  native  city  of  Dardanus,  proposed 
returninir  to  the  Asiatic  side  of  the  strait. 

Thou-di  this  last  plan  met  ^vith  decided  favor  among  tlie  ami},  it 
con   1    S   1  e  executed  without  vessels.     These  Timasion  had  little  or 
no  me  uis  of  procuring;  so  that  considerable  delay  took  place,  during 
"iiich  the  soldiers,  receiving  no  pay,  fell  into  much  distress.     Many 
of  them  were  even  compelled  to  sell  their  arms  m  order  to  get  sub- 
sistence-while others  not  permission  to  settle  in  some  of  the  neigh- 
bo  imMow  ns  on  condition  of  being  disarnu'd.    The  whole  army  was 
tluis.V'n  duall  '  meltinu^  away,  much  to  the  satisfaction  of  Anaxilmis, 
^^^val  anxious  to  see  the^purposes  of  Pharnabazus  accomplish^^^^ 
r>v  decrees,  it  would  probably  have  been  disso  ved  al  oge  hei,  had 
not  a  Shan '^e  of  interest  on  the  part  of  Anaxibius  induced  h.m  to 
pro:   0  e   ts'eoi-anization.    He  sailed  from  Dyztmtium  to  the  Asiatic 
coa^^^  to  acquaint  Pharnabazus  that  the  Cyreians  could  no  longe 
ca   se  uneasiness,  and  to  require  his  own  pron.ised  reward.     It^ seems 
l^^oveMhat  X;.nophon  h?mself  departed  from  By ^ntmm  by  di 
same  opportunity.     When  they  reached  Kyzikus,  the}  met  the  Lact 
niln  Arist-.rchus;    who  was  coming  out  ^>^,  ^^^-l^^^^^^^^^^ 
harmost  of  Bvzantium.  to  supersede  Kleander,  and  ^^llO  ac:qu^»\\^ 
A  axihius  that  Polus  was  on  lh(3  point  of  arriving  to  supersede  In 
as  admiral.     Anxious  to  meet  Pharnabazus  and  make  f  re  of    ;^ 
bride,  Anaxibius  impressed  his  parting  injunction  upon  An.^Uirdms 
to  sell  for  slaves  all  the  Cyreians  whom  he  might  find  at  B}zantii m 
on  h     arrival,  and  then  pursued  his  voyage  along  the  southern  coast 
of  the  Propontis  to  Parium.     But  Pharnabazus,  having  abyadv  re- 
ceived intimation  of  the  change  of  admirals,  knew  that  t^;;  fnc;nash  P 
of  Anaxibius  was  no  longer  of  any  value,  and  took  uo  fuither  hccu 


PHAHNABAZUS   DEFRAUDS  ANAXIBIUS. 


585 


of  him;  while  he  at  the  same  time  sent  to  Byzantium  to  make  the 
Uke  compact  with  Aristarchus  against  the  Cyreian  Army. 

Anaxibius  was  stung  to  the  quick  at  this  combination  of  disappoint- 
ment and  insult  on  the  part  of  the  satrap.  To  avenge  it,  he  resolved 
to  employ  those  very  soldiers  wiiom  he  had  first  corruptly  and  fraudu- 
lently brought  across  to  Europe,  cast  out  from  Byzantium,  and  lastly 
ordered  to  "be  sold  into  slavery,  so  far  as  any  might  yet  be  found  in 
that  town.  He  now  resolvecf  to  bring  them  back  into  Asia  for  the 
purpose  of  acting  against  Pijarnabnzus.  Accordingly  he  addressed 
himself  to  Xenoplioii,  and  ordered  him  without  a  moment's  delay  to 
rejoin  the  army,  for  the  purpose  of  keening  it  together,  of  recalling 
the  soldiers  who  had  dsjparted.  and  transporting  the  whole  body 
across  into  Asia.  He  provided  him  with  an  armed  vessel  of  thirty 
oars  to  cross  over  from  Parium  to  Perinthus,  sending  over  a  peremp- 
tory order  to  the  Perintidans  to  furnish  him  with  horses  in  order  that 
he  might  reach  the  army  with  the  greatest  speed.  Perhaps  it  would 
not  have  been  safe  for  Xenophon  to  disobey  this  order,  uniler  any 
circumstances.  But  the  idea  of  acting  with  the  army  in  Asia  against 
Pharnabazus,  untler  Lacedtenionian  stinction,  w\as  probably  very  ac- 
ceptable to  him.  He  hastened  across  to  the  army,  who  welcomed 
his  return  with  joy.  and  gladly  embraced  the  ])roposal  of  crossing  to 
Asia,  which  was*  a  great  improvement  upon  their  forlorn  and  destitute 
condition.  He  accordingly  conducted  them  to  Perinthus,  and  en- 
camped under  the  walls  of  the  town;  refusing,  in  his  way  through 
Selynibria,  a  second  proposition  from  Seuthes  to  engage  the  services 
of  the  army. 

While  Xenophon  w^as  exerting  himself  to  procure  transports  for 
the  passage  cf  the  army  at  Perinthus,  Aristarchus  the  new  harmost 
arrived  there  with  two  triremes  from  Byzantium.  It  seems  that 
not  only  Byzantium,  but  also  both  Perinthus  and  Selymbria,  were 
comprised  in  his  government  as  harmost.  On  first  reaching  By- 
zantium to  supersede  Kleander,  he  found  there  no  less  than  400 
of  the  Cyreians,  chiefly  sick  and  wounded,  whom  Kleander,  in 
spite  of  the  ill-will  of  Anaxibius,  had  not  only  refused  to  sell  into 
shivery,  but  had  billeted  upon  the  citizens,  and  tended  with  so- 
licitude; so  much  did  his  good  feeling  toward  Xenophon  and 
toward  the  araiy  now  come  into  play.  We  read  with  indignation 
that  Aristarchus,  immediately  on  reaching  Byzantium  to  supersede 
him.  was  not  even  contented  with  sending  these  400  men  out  of  the 
town;  but  seized  them— Greeks,  citizens,  and  soldiers  as  they  were 
—and  sold  them  all  into  slavery.  Apprised  of  the  movements  of 
Xenophon  with  the  army,  he  now  came  to  Perinthus  to  prevent  their 
transit  into  Asia;  laying  an  embargo  on  the  transports  in  the  harbor, 
and  presenting  himself  "personally  before  the  assembled  army  to  pro- 
hibit the  soldiers  from  crossing.  When  Xenophon  informed  him 
that  Anaxibius  had  given  them  orders  to  cross,  and  had  sent  him 
expressly  to  conduct   them— Aristarchus  replied,  "Anaxibius  is  no 


5S(j 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


POSITION  OF  SEUTHES. 


587 


lon^'-er  in  functions  as  adminil,  and  I  am  liarmost  m  this  town.  If  I 
catHi  anv  of  you  at  sea,  1  will  sink  you."  On  tiie  next  day,  lie  sent 
to  invite^tlie  -eueral^  and  the  captaius  (k)ciiages)  to  a  coufereiicc 
williin  the  walls.  Thev  were  just  about  to  enter  the  gates,  when 
Xenunhon,  who  was  ainong  them  received  a  private  warning,  tlial  it 
he  went  in  Aristarclius  would  seize  him,  and  either  put  him  to  deuUi 
or  '^end  him  prisoner  to  Phurnabazus.  Accordingly  Xenophon  sent 
forward  the  others,  and  remained  himself  with  the  army,  alleging  the 
oblio-atiou  of  sacriticing.  The  ])eliavior  of  Aristarchus— who  when 
he  ^a\v  the  others  without  Xenophon,  sent  them  away,  and  (lesiiul 
that  thev  would  all  come  again  in  the  afternoon— confirmed  tlie.iu>ti(e 
of  his  suspicions,  as  to  the  imminent  danger  from  which  he  had  been 
preserved  by  this  accidental  warning.  It  need  hardly  be  added  thai 
Xenophon  disregarded  the  second  invitation  no  less  than  the  hist; 
moreover  a  third  invitation,  which  Aristarchus  afteiward  sent,  was 
disregarded  by  all.  ,.       *     i 

AVe  have  here  a  Laceditmonian  harmost,  not  scrupling  to  lay  a 
snare  of  treachery  as  flagrant  as  that  which  Tissaphernes  had  prac- 
ticed on  the  banks  of  the  Zab  to  entrap  Klearchus  and  his  colleagues 
—and  that  too  against  a  Greek,  and  an  oflicer  of  the  highest  station 
and  merit,  who  had  just  saved  Byzantium  from  pillage,  and  was  now 
aetuallv  in  execution  of  orders  received  from  the  Laceda-monian 
admiral  Anaxibius.  Assuredly,  had  the  accidenttd  warning  beeu 
withheld  Xenophon  would  not  have  escaped  falling  into  this  snare; 
nor  could  we  reasonably  have  charged  him  with  impriidence-so 
fullv  was  he  entitled  to  count  upon  straightforward  conduct  under 
the  circumstances.  But  th.'  same  cannot  be  s;ad  of  Klearchus,  who 
manifested  lamentable  credulity, -nefarious  as  was  the  fraud  to  which 

^\t  the  Vecond  interview  with  the  other  officers,  Aristarchus,  while 
he  forbade  the  armv  to  cross  the  water,  directed  them  to  force  their 
wav  bv  land  thnmdi  the  Thracians  who  occupied   the  Holy  Moun- 
tain, and  thus  to  arrive  at  the  Chersonese,  where  (he  said)  they  should 
receive  pay.     Neon  the  Lacediemonian,  with  about  800  hopliteswho 
adhered  to  his  separate  command,  advocated  this  plan  as  the  best.       o 
beseta'^ain^t  it,  however,  there  wasthe  proposition  of  t^euthestotaUe 
the  armv  into  pay,  which  Xenophcm  was  inclined  to  prefer,  unea^^y  ai 
the  thoughts  of  being  cooped  up  in   the  narrow   peninsula  of  the 
Chersonese  under  the  ab.solute  command  of  the  Lacedamionian  liar- 
most   with'n-reat  uncertainty  both  as  to  pay  and  as   to  provisions. 
^Moreover  it\vas  imperiously  necessary  for  these  disappointed  troops 
to  make  some  immediate  movement,  for  they  had  been  brought  to 
the  <-ates  of  Perlnthus  in  hopes  of  passing  immediately  on  shipboarcl; 
it  was  midwinter— they  were  encamped  in  the  open  held,  under  the 
severe  cold  of  Thrace— they  had  neither  assured  supplies,  nor  even 
monev  to  purchase,  if  a  market  had  been  near.     Xenophon,  who  had 
brouo^ht  them  to  the  neighborhood  of  Perinthus,  was  now  again 


responsible  for  extricating  them  from  this  untenable  situation,  and 
he-'-an  to  offer  sacrifices,  according  to  his  wont,  to  ascertain  whether 
the""-ods  would  encourage  him  to  recommend  a  covenant  with  Seu- 
the."  The  sacrifices  wctc  so  favorable  that  he  himself,  together  with 
a  eoiifideiitial  officer  from  each  of  the  generals,  went  by  night  and 
paid  a  visit  to  Seuthes  for  the  purpose  of  understanding  distinctly 

his  olfers  and  purposes.  ,   ,  ,  .i 

MtEsades,  the  father  of  Seuthes,  had  been  been  apparently  •  a 
dependent  prince  under  the  great  monarchy  of  the  Odrysian  Thraci- 
ans so  formidable  in  the  early  years  of  the  Peloponnesian  w\ar.  But 
intc'stine  commotions  had  robbed  him  of  his  principality  over  three 
Thracian  tribes  which  it  was  now  the  ambition  of  Seuthes  to  recover, 
by  the  aid  of  the  Cyreian  army.  He  offered  to  each  soldier  one 
slater  of  Kvzikus  (about  20  Attic  drachmas,  or  nearly  the  same  as 
that  which  they  originally  received  from  Cyrus)  as  pay  per  month; 
twice  as  much  to  each  lochage  or  captain— four  times  as  niuch  to 
each  of  the  generals.  In  case  they  should  incur  the  enmity  of  the 
Lacedemonians  by  joining  him,  he  guaranteed  to  them  all  the  right 
of  settlement  and  fraternal  protection  in  his  territory,  loeach  ot 
the  o-enerals,  over  and  above  pay,  he  engaged  to  assign  a  fort  on  the 
sea-?oast,  with  a  lot  of  land  around  it,  and  oxen  for  cultivation.  And 
to  Xenophon  in  particular,  he  offered  the  possession  of  Bisanthe,  his 
best  point  on  the  coast.  "  I  will  also  (he  added,  addressing  Xeno- 
phon) 'live  you  my  daughter  in  marriage:  and  if  you  have  any 
dano-hter  I  will  buy  her  from  you  in  marriage,  according  to  the  cus- 
tonrof  Thrace."  Seuthes  further  engaged  never  on  any  occasion  to 
lead  them  more  than  seven  days'  journey  from  the  sea,  at  farthest. 

These  offers  were  as  liberal  as  the  army  could  possibly  expect,  and 
Xeno»hon  himself,  mistrusting  the  Lacedoemonians  as  well  as  mis^ 
trusted  by  them,  seems  to  liiive  looked  forward  to  the  acquisition  of 
a  Thracian  coast-fortress  and  territory  (such  as  Miltiades,  Alkibiades 
and  other  Athenian  leaders  had  obtained  before  him)  as  a  valuable 
refuse  in  case  of  need.  But  even  if  the  promise  had  been  less 
favorable,  the  Cyreians  had  no  alternative,  for  they  had  not  even 
present  supplies,  still  less  any  means  of  subsistence  throughout  the 
winter  while  departure  by  sea  was  rendered  impossible  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians. On  the  next  day  Seuthes  was  introduced  by  Xenophon 
and  the  other  generals  to  the  army,  who  accepted  his  offers  and  con- 
cluded the  bargain.  ,  .  •.  .  p 

They  remained  for  two  months  in  his  service,  engaged  m  warfare 
an-ainst  various  Thracian  tribes,  whom  they  enabled  him  to  conciuer 
and  despoil,  so  that  at  the  end  of  that  period,  he  was  in  possession 
of  an  extensive  dominion,  a  large  native  force,  and  a  considerable  tri- 
bute Thou'^h  the  suffering  from  cold  w^as  extreme,  during  these 
two  months^  of  full  winter  and  amid  the  snowy  mountains  of 
Thrace  the  army  were  nevertheless  enabled  by  their  expeditions 
alon"-  with  Seuthes  to  procure  plentiful  subeisteuce,  which  they 


^iSS        TKOCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

could  hardly  liave  done  in  any  oilier  manner.  But  tlie  pay  uliicli  lie 
had  offered  was  never  liquidated;  at  least  in  requittal  of  their  two 
months  of  service,  tliev  received  pay  only  for  twenty  days  and  i\  link' 
more.  And  Xenophon  himself,  far  from  obtaining  fullillnienl  of 
those  splenilid  promises  which  Seuthes  had  made  to  him  personally, 
seems  not  even  to  have  received  his  pay  as  one  of  the  generals.  For 
him,  the  result  was  singularly  unhappy,  since  he  forfeited  the  good- 
will'of  Seuthes  bv  importunate  demand  and  complaint  for  the  pur- 
pose of  obtaining  the  pay  due  to  the  soldiers;  while  they  on  their 
side,  imputing  to  his  connivance  the  non-fulfillment  of  the  promise, 
became  thus  in  part  alienated  from  him.  IVluch  of  this  mischief  was 
brouirht  about  bv  the  treacherous  intrigues  and  calumny  of  a  corrupt 
Greek  from  MaVoneia,  named  Herakleides,  who  acted  as  minister 
and  treasurer  to  Seuthes.  .         .         ,      ^ 

Want  of  space  comi)els  me  to  omit  the  narrative  given  by  Xeno- 
phon, both  of  the  relations  of  the  army  with  Seuthes,  and  of  the 
warfare  earned  ou  against  the  hostile  Thracian  tribes— interesting  as 
it  is  from  the  juxtaposition  of  Greek  and  Thracian  manners.  It 
seems  to  have  been  composed  by  Xenophon  under  feelings  of  acute 
personal  disappointment,  and  probably  in  refutation  of  calumnies 
against  himself  as  if  he  had  wronged  the  army.  Hence  we  may  trace 
in  it  a  tone  of  exaggerated  querulousness  and  complaint  that  the 
the  soldiers  were  ungrateful  to  him.  It  is  true  that  a  portion  of  the 
armv,  under  the  belief  that  he  had  been  richly  rewarded  by  Seuthes, 
Avhiie  they  had  not  obtained  their  stipulated  pay,  expressed  virulent 
sentiments  and  falsehoods  against  him.  Until  such  suspicions  were 
refuted,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  army  were  alienated;  but  they  were 
perfectly  willing  to  hear  both  sides— and  Xenophon  triumphantly 
disproved  the  accusation.  That  in  the  end,  tlieir  feelings  toward 
liim  were  those  of  esteem  and  favor,  stands  confessed  in  his  own 
words,  proving  that  the  ingratitude  of  which  he  complains  was  the 
feeling  of  some  indeed,  biit  not  of  all. 

It  is  hard  to  sav,  however,  what  w  ould  have  been  the  fate  of  this 
gallant  armv,  when  Seuthes,  having  obtained  from  their  arms  in  two 
montli.s  all  that  he  desired,  had  become  only  anxious  to  send  them 
off  without  pav— had  thev  not  been  extricated  by  a  change  of  interest 
and  poliov  on  the  part  of'all-iiowerful  Sparta.  The  Laceditmonians 
had  just  declared  war  against  Tissaphernes  and  Pharnabazus,  send- 
ing Thimbron  into  Asia  to  commence  militaiy  operations.  They 
then  became  extremelv  anxious  to  transport  the  Cyreians  across  to 
Asia,  wiiich  their  harinost  Aristarchus  had  hitherto  prohibited,  and 
to  take  them  into  permanent  pay;  for  which  purpose  two  Laceda;- 
mouians,  Charminus  and  Polynikus,  were  commissioned  by  Thim- 
bron to  offer  to  the  armv  the  same  pay  as  had  been  promised,  though 
not  paid,  by  Seuthes,  and  as  had  been  originally  paid  by  Cyrus. 
Seuthes  and  Herakleides,  eager  to  hasten  the  departure  of  the  soldiers, 
endeavored  to  take  credit  with  the  Lacedaemonians  for  assisting  their 


XENOPHON  AND  ARMY  CROSS  TO  ASIA. 


580 


Tnvf.illv  did  the  army  accept  this  offer,  though  complaining 
Sy  o'  ?he"  .ml  pvactlcea  upol.  thorn  ^  *^™"-. -'"^l;  ^X' 
•  .  ',  till,  inst-iiipo  ot  Xenophon,  vainly  pressed  the  Ihiacum 
""„\nv,ln4slc  even  sent  Xenophon  to  demand  the  ariear  of 
Cfn  tl  e  iamc  of  thcl  acedicmoAians,  ^■hieh  afforded  to  the 
^A^Ln^an'm  opportunity  ot  adininisterinsa  severe  lecture  to  Soathes. 

LLr^Zih  1,.  eross  into  Asia,  Xenophon  was  desirous  of 
S<^r.ck^o''X  hen'  in  t  was  persuaded  to  rLaiu  with  them  until 
fuc^.nctim^^h  Thimbron.     He  was  at  this  time  so  POor,  having 

searoe  V  eaou. 'h  to  pay  for  I'i*  journey  home,  that  he  was  obliged  to 
scarci  I)  <  no  1    ■  1.0      1  j  ^  j  ,;   ,o„n  where  tlie  army  landed. 

Il   .' he    ound  E'Sides^a  Phliasian  prophet  with  wMiom  he  l^d 
been  wont  to  hold  intercourse  ami  offer  saenflce  at  Atl.ens.     T  Is 
,nm   havinn-  asked  Xenoplion  how  mueli  he  had  acquired  in  the 
ex  e'dmon   could  uot  believe  him  when  he  aflBrmed  his  poverty.    Bu 
Xntev  proceeded  to  offer  sacrifice  together,  from  some  animals 
se nt  bv  tl  e  Lampsakenes  as  a  present  to  Xenophon,  Eukleides  had 
no  soone    inspected  the  entrails  of  the  victims,  tlian  he  to  d  Xciio- 
phou  t  .?a  ho  fully  credited  the  statement.     "  I  see  (he  said)  that  evea 
ff  money  shall  hi  ever  on  its  way  to  come  to  you,  you  yourself  wi 
,V  ,   1  indrance  to  it   oven  if  there  lic  no  other   here   Xenophon 
cquieS  :Tus  Vemehios  (.lie  Gracious)  is  the  real  bar.     Have 
vou  ever  sacrificed  to  him.  with  entire  burnt-offenngs,  as  we  used  to 
irtoo-ehCT  at  Athens?"     ' '  Never  (replied  Xenoplion)  throughou 
the  Xlc  march."     "Do  so  now,  then  (said  Euk  e.des)  and  it  will 
■for  your  advantage."    The  next  day,  on  reao  h.ng  Ophryniurn 
Xenophon  obeyed  the  injunction;  sacrificing   little  pigs  entire  to 
•   Z  us  Meilichios,  as  was  the  custom  at  Athens  during  tliopubhc 
festival  called  Diasia.    Ami  on  tlie  very  same  day  ho  felt  the  bene- 
ficial effects  of  tlie  proceedins;  for  Biton  and  another  envoy  came 
from   the  Lacedsemonians  with  an  advance    of  pay   to  the  army, 
and  with  dispositions  so  favorable  to  himself,  that  they  brought  bnck 
for  him  his  hor.se,  which  he  had   just  sold  at  Lampsakus  for  fifty 
darics     This  was  equivaUiiit  to  giving  him  more  than  one  vear  s  pay 
ill  hand  (the  nav  which  he  would  have  received  as  general  being  four 
da   c   per  mS.   or  four  times  that  of  the  soldier)  at  a  time  when 
he  was  known  to  be  on  the  point  of  depavture,  and  therefore  would 
not  "ay  to  earn  it.     The  shortcomings  of  Seuthes  were  now  made  tip 
with  immen.se  interest,  so  that  Xenophon  became  better  off  than  any 


CAPTURE  OF  ASIDATES. 


591 


500       PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

man  in  tlie  army;  tboiiirh  ho  liimsrlf  slurs  over  the  magnitude  of  flie 
present,  by  icpresfuliug  it  us  a  delicate  compliment  to  restore  tohini 
a  favorite  horse. 

Thus  gratefully  and  instantaneously  did  Zeus  tlie  Gracious  respond 
to  llie  8;icrifice  Avhich  Xenophon,  after  a  long  omission,  liad  been 
admonished  by  Eukleides  to  offer.  And  doubtless  Xenophon  ^vils 
more  thnn  ever  eonfinned  in  the  belief,  whicli  manifests  itself 
throuirhout  all  his  writings,  that  sacrifice  not  only  indicates,  by  the 
interior  aspect  of  the  immolated  victims,  tlie  tenor  of  coming  events 
—but  also,  according  as  it  is  rendered  to  tlie  right  god  and  at  the 
riiiht  season,  determines  his  Avill,  and  therefore  the  course  of  events, 
f()r  dispensations  favorable  or  unfavorable. 

But  the  favors  of  Zeus  the  Gracious,  tliough  begun,  were  not  yet 
ended.  Xenophon  conducted  the  army  through  the  Troad,  and 
across  Mount  Ida,  to  Antandrus;  from  thence  along  tlie  coast  of 
Lydia,  throuiih  the  plain  of  Tliebc  and  the  town  of  Adramyttinm. 
leaving  Atarneus  on  the  right  hand,  to  Pergamus  in  Mysia;  a  hill 
town  overhanging  the  river  and  jdain  of  Kaikus.  This  district  was 
occupied  by  the  descendants  of  the  Eretrian  Gongylus,  who  liaving 
been  banished  from  embracing  the  cause  of  the  Persians  when  Xerxes 
invaded  Greece,  had  been  rewarded  (like  the  Spartan  king  Demara- 
tus)  with  this  sort  of  principality  under  tlie  Persian  empire.  His 
descendant,  another  Gongylus,  now  occupied  Pergamus,  with  his 
wife  Hellas  and  his  sous  *Gorgion  and  Gongylus.  Xenophon  was 
here  received  with  great  hospitality.  Hellas  acquainted  him,  that  a 
powerful  Persian,  named  Asidates,  was  now  dwelling,  with  his  wife, 
familv.  and  propertv,  in  a  tower  not  far  off  on  the  plain;  and  that  a 
sudden  night  march',  with  3(K)  men,  would  suffice  for  the  capture  of 
this  valuable  bootv,  to  which  her  own  cousin  should  guide  him. 
AccordiuLjly,  having  sacrificed  and  ascertained  that  the  victims  were 
favorable? Xenophon  communicated  his  plan  after  the  evening  meal 
to  those  captains  who  had  been  most  attached  to  him  throughout  the 
expedition,  wishing  to  make  them  partners  in  the  profit.  As  soon  as 
'it  became  known,  many  volunteers,  to  the  number  of  COO,  pressed  to 
be  allowed  to  join.  But  the  captains  repelled  them  declining  to  take 
more  than  300,  in  order  that  the  booty  might  afford  an  ampler  divi- 
dend to  each  partner.  j  ,  .    j  ,     i 

Bcannin"-  their  march  in  the  evening.  Xenophon  and  his  detach- 
ment of  m)  reached  about  midnight  the  tower  of  Asidates.  It  was 
laro-e  lof  y,  thickly  built,  and  contained  a  considerable  garrison.  It 
served  for  protection  to  his  cattle  and  cultivating  slaves  around,  like 
a  baronial  castle  in  the  Middle  Ages;  but  the  assailants  neglected  this 
oMtlvino-  plunder,  iu  order  to  be  more  sure  of  taking  the  castle  itselt. 
It>^  walls  however  were  found  much  stronger  than  was  expected;  and 
althoii^di  a  breach  was  made  by  force  about  dayl)ieak,  yet  so 
vi<rr,rous  was  the  defense  of  the  garrison,  that  no  entrance  could  be 
cff'cctcd      Signals  and  shouts  of  every  kind  were  made  by  Asidates 


to  nroeurc  aid  from  the  Persian  forces  in  then(;ighborhood;  numbers 
if  wl?om  som  be^^au  to  arrive,  so  that  Xenophon  and  his  company 
IreobTiged  to  retreat.     And  their  retreat  was  at  as    onlyaccom- 
nlUhc^l  'ifter  severe  suffering  and  wounds  to  nearly  halt   of  them 
!  h  'fhP  lifl  of  Gon-ylus  with  his  forces  Ironi  Pergamus,  and  of 

t:i!^^^^^'^^^  ^^^"^  ^^=^^^"""^'  a  little  further 

''^Sr\iis  first  enterprise  thus  miscarried,  Xenophon  soon  laid 
,,,^^h!  a  second,  employing  Uie  whole  --f^  ?-'  ^r^--  ^  ^^ 
•    .    \  M.iti.s:   nri^oner   to   Pcirirainus,  \\itl»    his   wiie.  cniicutu, 
„,„.,„g  |-    f .-^   1  .';" "7,  j"  ^^^         Thus  (says  he,  auxious  above 

"m'^Umu '^     or  The  m'd    '  o  '  «u^ificial  prophecy)  lUc   "  previous 
;,M-Uu"f(l.oe  wi.U'      Im.l   promised    fMV.rably    helovc    the    l,rs 

^vhiclfto^'her  with  the  booty  brought  iu,  made  up  a  prod.g.ous 

""iu  m'lan!' uie'aWision.  a  ircncral  tribute  of  sympathy  and  admira- 

.in,? w  ,  D-  ill    o  Xeuopl.on.  in  wliieh  all  the  anny-geuerals.  cap- 

loii  ^^■'«  P''^.    '  :!^1:„ ',,  i|„,  l.aeedieuiouitius  besides-unannnously 

t:uus,  aad  '^l' '«  "r^"^'^^^^  he  was  allowed  to  select  tor 

hiTelTl L  Jieke^t  U  0    1 .  rses.  u.ules.  oxea.  aud  other  items  of 
lun^elf  the  P'^^}''^  ''"f ,      K,.„.,m(.    possessor  of  a  share   valu;ib!e 

'"•"y  V  |"Zrieh  him    t  once   iu"dditU.n  to  the  tifly  daric.  which  ho 

-IJ^S^easou^comp^uot.^ 

S;iTsthiehhe''had  before  put  forth-.hat  neither  had  he  any 

:L;.n  to  -mp^i;.  of  the  in^^^^^^^^  „„a  the  Oy- 

As  .soon  as   >'"";'"  o'-".")^^   Y  nophou  took  his  leave  of  them. 

;''^';l'!r,^d?;;«iu.^:  e'':mp;;^;t''E;;^us  that  portion  wiaci.  ha.i 

llavuis  ",l"*|  ,'',.'"  .,,  „„„enil   of  the  tithe  set  apart  by  the  army  at 
S^'^f  ,S^.^^ingt;\;^ns.     He  must  l-;-ted^l.re.au.r 


'■■} 


592        PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 

second  visit  to  Asia,  we  ure  left  to  conjecture.  I  incline  to  believe 
that  he  did  not  remain  many  months  at  home,  but  that  he  went  out 
again  in  the  next  spring  to  rejoin  the  Cyreians  in  Asia— became 
airain  their  commander— and  served  for  two  years  under  the  Spartan 
general  Derkvllidas  before  the  arrival  of  Agesdnus.  ISuch  military 
service  would'  doubtless  be  very  much  to  his  ta>te;  while  a  residence 
at  Athens  then  subject  and  quiescent,  would  ])robably  be  distasteful 
to  him;  *i)Oth  from  the  habits  of  command  whieh  he  had  contracted 
diirimr'the  previous  two  years,  and  from  feelings  arising  out  of  the 
death  of  Sokrates.  After  a  certain  interval  of  repose,  he  would  be 
disposed  to  enter  again  upon  the  war  against  his  old  enemy  Tissa- 
phernes;  and  his  service  went  on  when  Agesilaus  arrived  to  take  Ihc 
command. 

But  during  the  two  years  after  this  latter  event,  Athens  became  a 
party  to  the  war  against  Sparta,  and  entered  into  conjunction  w  ith 
the  king  of  Persia  as  well  as  with  the  Thebans  and  others;  while 
Xenophon,  continuing  his  service  as  coninumder  of  the  Cyreians,  and 
accompanying  Agesilaus  from  Asia  back  into  Greece,  became  engaged 
against  the  Athenian  troops  and  their  Ra?otian  allies  at  the  blootiy 
battle  of  Koroneia.  Under  these  circumstances,  we  cannot  wonder 
that  the  Atiienians  passed  sentence  of  bnnishment  ngninst  him;  not 
because  he  had  originally  taken  part  in  aid  of  Cyrus  ngainst  Arta- 
xerxes — nor  because  his  political  sentiments  were  unfriendly  to 
democracy,  as  has  been  sometimes  erroneously  jitHrmed— but  Ik  cause 
he  was  now  openly  in  arms,  and  in  conspicuous  command,  against 
his  own  country.  Having  thus  become  an  exile,  Xenophon  was 
allowed  by  the  Lacedaemonians  to  settle  at  Skillus,  one  of  the  villages 
of  Triphylia,  near  Olympiain  Peloponnesus,  which  they  had  recently 
emancipated  from  the  Eleians.  At  one  of  the  ensuing  Olympic 
festivals,  Megabyzus,  the  superintendent  of  the  temple  of  Arl(misat 
Ephesus,  came  over  as  a  spectator;  bringing  with  him  the  money 
which  Xenophon  had  dedicated  therein  to  the  Ephesian  Artemis. 
This  money  Xenophon  invested  in  the  purchase  of  lands  at  Skillus, 
to  be  consecrated  in  permanence  to  the  goddess;  having  previously 
considted  her  by  sacritice  to  ascertain  her  approval  of  the  site  con- 
templated, which  site  was  recommended  to  him  by  its  resemblance 
in  certain  points  to  that  of  the  Ephesian  temple.  Thus,  there 
was  near  each  of  them  a  river  called  by  the  same  name  Selinus, 
Ijaving  in  it  fish  and  a  shelly  bottom.  Xenophon  constructed  a 
chapel,  an  altar,  and  a  statue  of  the  goddess  made  of  cypress-wood; 
all  exact  copies,  on  a  reduced  scale,  of  the  temi)le  and  golden  statue 
at  Ephesus.  A  column  placed  near  them  was  inscribed  with  the 
following  words — "This  spot  is  sacred  to  Artemis.  Whoever 
jxjssesses  the  property  and  gathers  its  fruits,  must  sacrifice  to  her  the 
tithe  every  year,  and  keep  the  chapel  in  repair  out  of  the  remainder. 
Should  any  one  omit  this  duty,  the  goddess  herself  will  take  the 
omissioii  in  hand." 


ANNUAL  SACRIFICE  BY   XENOPHON. 


593 


Immediately  near  the  chapel  was  an  orchard  of  every  description 
of  fniit-trees 'while  the  estate  around  comprised  an  extensive  range 
of  meadow,  Woodland,  and  mountain— with  the  still  loftier  mouri- 
I'liii  called  Phohx^.  adjoining.     There  was  thus  abundant  pasture  tor 
horses,  oxen,    sheep,    etc^uid  excellent  hunting-ground  nexir    for 
deer  and  other  game;  advantages  not  to  be  found  near  the  Artemi- 
.ion  at  Ephesus.     Residing  hard  by  on  his  own  property   allotted  to 
him  bv  the  Lacedaemonians,  Xenoplum  superintended  this  estate  as 
stewanl  for  the  goddess;  looking  perhai)S  to  the  sanctity  of  her  name 
for  Drote^nionfrom  the  disturbance  by  the  Eleians,  who  viewed  with 
'X  ie-dous  eve  the  Lacedemonian  settlers  at  Skillus,   and  protested 
a^hist  the  peace  and  convention  promoted  by  Athens  after  ihe  battle 
of  Leuktra,  because  it  recognized  that  place,  along  with  thetovvnships 
of  Triphvlia.  as  autonomous.     Every  year  he  made  a  splendid  sacri- 
fice fron'i  the  tithe  of  all  the  fruits  of  the  property;  to  which  solem- 
nity not  only  all   the   Skilluntines,    but  also  all   the  ueighboring 
villa"-es    were   invited.      Booths  were   erected  for  the   visitor    to 
whom  the  goddess  furnished  (this  is  the  language  of  Xenophon)  aa 
aniDle  dinner  of  barley-meal,  wheaten  loaves,  meat,  ganie,  and  sweet- 
meats- the  game  being  provided  by  a  general  hunt,  which  the  sons  of 
Xenophon  conducted,  and  in  which  all  the  neighbors  took  part  if 
thoy  chose      The  produce  of  the  estate,  saving  this  tithe  and  subject 
to  the  obli<.-atiou  of  keeping  the  holy  building  in  rc{>air,  was  enjoyed 
by  Xenophon  himself.     He  had  a  keen  relish  for  both  hunting  and 
horsemanship,  ami  was  among  the  first  authors,  so  far  as  we  know 
who  ever  made  these  pursuits,  with  the  management  of  horses  and 
dogs,  the  subject  of  rational  study  and  description 

Such  was  the  use  to  which  Xenophon  applied  the  tithe  voted  by 
thearmvatKerasus  to  the  Ephesian  Artemis;  the  other  tithe,  voted  at 
the  sania  time  to  Apollo,  he  dedicated  at  Delphi  in  the  treasure- 
chamber  of  the  Athenians,  inscribing  upon  the  olTering  his  own 
name  and  that  of  Proxenus.  His  residence  being  only  at  a  di^^tance 
of  twenty  stadia  from  the  great  temple  of  Olympia,  he  was  enabled 


in  his  own  mind;  while  he  had  also  leisure  for  he  composition  of  his 
various  works.  The  interesting  description  wdiich  he  himself  gives 
of  his  residence  at  Skillus  implies  a  state  of  things  not  present  and 
continuing,  but  past  and  gone;  other  testirnonies  too,  though  con- 
fused and'contradictory,  seem  to  show  that  the  Laceda3monian  settle- 
bent  at  Skillus  lasted  no  longer  than  the  power  ot  Lacedaemon  was 
adequate  to  maintain  it.  During  the  mis  fortunes  which  bete  tha 
city^  after  the  battle  of  Leuktra  (371  b.c),  X^"^P^;^i|' J^  ^^/"/^ 
family  and  his  fellow-settlers,  was  expe  led  by  the  Eleians  and  is 
then  iaid  to  have  found  shelter  at  Corinth.  But  as  Athens  soou 
came  to  be  not  only  at  peace,  but  in  intimate  alliance,  with  fepaita— 


I  594       PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND. 


I 


m 


tl^e  sentence  of  banishment  against  Xenophon  v>'r.s  revoked ;  so  thut 
the  hitter  part  of  his  life  was  again  passed  in  the  ( nooymeut  ol  his 
l.irthri-ht  as  an  Athenian  citizen  and  Knight.  ^Uvo  of  his  sons, 
Gi-vHus  and  Diodorus.  fouirht  among  the  Ather.ian  horsemen  at  the 
cavalry  combat  vvhieh  preeeeded  the  battle  of  ^b  niineia,  ^Yhere  the 
formef  was  slain,  after  manifesting  distinguished  bravery;  while  Ins 
.r,:,nd<on  Xenophon  became  in  tlie  next  generation  the  sulpeet  ol  u 
pl.^nding  before   the  Athenian  Dikaslery,  composed  by  the  orator 

^  OiTbiin-ino-  this  accomplished  and  eminent  h-ader  to  the  close  of 
that  ardnmis  retreat  which  he  had  conducted  with  so  much  honor  I 
have  thouirht  it  necessarv  to  anticipate  a  little  oir  the  iuture  m  <m  er 
to  take  a^lance  at  his  subsequent  destiny,     lo  his  exde  (in  tins 
H.iiit  of  view  not  less  useful  than  that  of  Thucydides)  we  probably 
owe  many  of  those  compositions  fn)m  which  so  much  of  our  kiiowl- 
edo-e  of  Grecian  r.ffairs  is  derived.   But  to  tlie  contemporary  worhl,  the 
retmit   which  Xenoj^hon  so  successfully  conducted,  atlorded  a  lar 
more   impressive  lesson   than  any  of  his  literary  compositicms.     It 
tau-ht  ill  the  most  striking  manner  the  impotence  of  the  Fersiau 
land-force,  manifested  not  less  in  the  generals  than  in  the  soldiers. 
It  Droved  that   the  Persian   leaders  were  unht   lor  any  systematic 
operations    even  under  the  greatest   possible  advantages,  against  a 
<.inall  number  of  disciplined  warriors  resolutely  bent  on  resistance; 
n  at  tiiev  were  too  stupid  and  reckless  even  to  obslruct  the  passage 
of  rivers,  or  destroy  riads.  or  to  cut  off  supplies.     It  more  than  con- 
hrmed  ll  e  contemptuous  language  applied  to  themby  C  vrus  hiinse  f 
before  the  battle  of  Kunaxa;  when  he  proclaimed  that  he  envied  the 
Greeks  their  freed.mi,  and  that  he  was  ashamed  of  the  worthlessness 
of  his  own  countrymen.     Against  such  perfect  wejikness  f^^^^^^;- 
iranization,  nothing  prevented  the  success  ol  the  Greeks  along  ^Mh 
C'v^ils    except  his  Own  paroxysm  of  fraternal  antipathy.     And  an  e 
slmll  perceive  herenft.'r  the  military  and  political    eaders  ot  Greece- 
A-cilaus,  Jason  of  Phenv,  and  others  down  to  Philip  and  Alexande 
—tirmlv  pei-suaded  that  with  a  tolerably  numerous  and  well-appointa 
Grecian  force,  combined  with  exemption  from  Grecian  enemies,  tlu} 
could  succeed  in  overthrowing  or  dismembering  the  Persian  einpirc. 
This  conviction,  so  important  in   the  subsequt'nt  i>i«^ory  ot  Gicca. 
takes  its   date  from  the  retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand.     ^\  e  si.  I 
indeed  find  Persia  exercising  an  important  influence,  lor  two  gen- 
erations   to   come-and   at   the  peace   of    Antalkidas  an  .infl^}^;"^^ 
stron.^er  thap  ever-over  the  destinies  of  Greece.     B^^^ f  f ,:;;}    J^ 
seen  to  arise  from  the  treason  of  Sparta,  the  chief  of  the  Hdlei  ?t 
world   who  abandons  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  and  even  arms  herself  amI 
the  name  and  tiie  force  of  Persia,  for  the  pairposesof  aggrandizemeut 
and  dominion  to  herself.     Persia  is  strong  1  y  being  enabled  to  em- 
nlov  Hellenic  stremrth  airainst  the  Hellenic  cause;  by  lending  moiu>> 
or  a  fleet  to  one  side  of  the  Grecian  intestine  parties,  and  thus  becoiu- 


SEQUBL  OF  GRECIAN  AFFAIRS  RESUMED.       595 

5n.  arHflcially  strengthened  against  both.  But  the  Xenophontic 
rlibas  s  betniys  her  real  weakness  against  any  vigorous  attack; 
^  •  Vi^  .t  tlu  same  time  exemplifies  the  discipline,  the  endurance, 
S^power  o   se  f  acli  i^L^^^^^^  the  susceptibility  of  influence 

I  .m  sneech  an    discussion,  the  combination  of  the  reflecting  obed  - 
re  of  citizens^  mechanical  regularity  of  soldiers-wluch 

0  fer  sud  imnT)  t  1  distinction  on  the  Hellenic  cliaracter.  The 
fn  no^aflce  of  this  expedition  and  retreat,  as  an  illustration  of  the 
n£ic  qualities  and^xcellence,  will  justify  the  large  space  which 
has  been  devoted  to  it  in  this  history. 


CHAPTER  LXXII. 

GREECE  UNDER  THE  LACED^MONLVN  EMPIRE. 

The  three  preceding  Chapters  have  been  devoted  exclusively  to 
the  narrith'c  of  the  Ex'pedition  and  Retreat  immortalized  by  Xeno- 
nioroccupyin-  the  two  years  intervening  between  about  April  401 
frmd  Time  399  b  c  That  event,  replete  as  it  is  with  interest  and 
pfeCnt  w  th  hi^^^^^  conscquences,^stands  apart  from  the  general 

scmience  of  Grecian  af^airs-which  sequence  I  now  resume. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  as  soon  as  Xenophon  with  his  Ten 
Tlcu^tnd  warriors  descended  from  .^^^/^f  3;  i-jtains  b^^^^^^^^^^^ 
\vmouvx  and  the  Euxiiic  to  the  hospitable  shelter  of  Irapezus,  ana 
k  " m  to  ii  tS  plans  for  returning  to  Central  Greece-they  found 
?1  fm  ekes  wi  ll  i^the  Lacedemonian  empire,,  unable  to  advance  a 
t^w^^^^  consulting  Lacedaemonian  dictation  and  obliged  when 
herrciic  cd  the  Bosporus,  to  endure  without  redress  tbe  harsh  and 
t  e'fche  01^^^  of  the  Spartan  officers  Anaxibius  and  Aristarchus 

Of  that  empire   the   first   origin   has  been  '^^l.^^^i^^^y  ^^Vlobe  non 
ben-,  n  with  the  decisive  victory  of  .Egospotami  m  the  Hellespont 
^e^'Lnbir  or  October  405  B.c.)fwhere  ^1-^  Laced^monmn^^^^^^^^^^ 
without  the  loss  of  a  man,  got  possession  of   lie  ^^^/^^^^.^^^f  ^^^^^^^^ 
and  1  1-ir-e  portion  of  their  crews— with  the  exception  ot  eight  or 
^.  llren^JUth  which  the  Athenian  admiral  Konon  d^ecUnl  ^s 

escape  to  Eua-.^oras  at  Cyprus.        l^^^^,l^^'^«,,P^V^epdPmoni  ns    io 
thus  annihilatetl      Nothing    remained   for  the   Laced«raonians    to 

!l!^er  ex';^  ^1^  city  itself  and  P---;  ^  -^^^-^^-^^^l^^J:^ 
happen  and  actually  brought  to  pass  m  April  404  b.c,  when  J.jsan 
'rSrel  Athens  in  triuniph,  dismantlc^l  Peireus,  and  demolished 
a  Ug^^H-^!n  of  the  Lon^  W^dls  With  the  e-<T)U^. of  At^i^ 
lierscTf— whose  citizens  deferred  the  moment  ot  subjection  by  a 
1;  :^!  thouyii  miavaiUng,  struggle  against  the  ^-^ws  of  ^mni^ 
and  of  Samos-no  other  Grecian  city  offered  any  resistance  to  L^saii 


596 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


KNIGHTS  OR  HORSEMEN. 


597 


dcr  after  the  battle  of  ^Egospotami ;  which  in  fact  not  only  took 
away  from  Athens  her  whole  naval  force,  but  transferred  ii  all 
over  to  him,  and  rendered  him  admiral  of  a  larger  Grecian  fleet  thau 
had  ever  been  seen  together  since  the  battle  of  Salamis. 

I  have  recounted,  in  my  sixty-fifth  chapter,  the  sixteen  montlis  of 
bitter  suffering  undergone  by  Athens  immediately  after  her  siirrcn 
der.    The  loss  of  her  fieetand  power  was  aggravated  b}'  an  extremity 
of  internal   oppression.     Her  oligarchical   party  and  her  t'xiles,  re- 
turning  after  having  served  with  the  enemy   against  lier,  extorted 
from  the   public  assembly,   under  the    dictation  of  Lysander   who 
attended  it  in  person,  the  appointment   of  an  omnipotent  Council 
of  Thirty,  for  the  ostensible   purpose   of  framing  a  new  conslitu 
tion.     These   Thirty   rulers — among   whom    Kritias  was   the  nlo^ 
violent,  and  Theramenes  (seemingl}-)  the  most  moderate,  or  at  ka> 
the    soonest  satiated — perpetrated    cruelty    and  spoliation   on   tin 
largest  scale,  being  protected  against  all  resistance  by  a  Laceda 
monian  harmost  and  garris(jn  established  in  the  acropolis.    Beside 
numbers  of  citizens  put  to  death,  so  many  others  were  driven  iiiti 
exile  with   the  loss  of  their   propert}',  that  Thebes  and  the  neigh 
boring  cities  became  crowded  with  them.     After  about  eight  months 
of  unopposed  tyranny,  the  Thirt}'  found  themselves  for  the  first  tinit 
attacked  by  Thrasybulus  at  the  head  of  a  small  party  of  these  exile- 
coming  out  of  Ba'otia.     His  braverv  and  irood  conduct — coml)inc( 
with  the  enormities  of  the  Thirty,  which  became  continually  niop 
nefarious,  and  to  which  even  numerous  oligarchical  citizens,  as  wel 
as  Theramenes  himself,  successively  became  victims — enabled  hiii 
soon  to  strengthen  himself,  to  seize  the  Peiraus  and  to  carry  on  ; 
civil  war  which  ultimately  put  down  the  tyrants. 

These  latter  were  obliged  to  invoke  the  aid  of  a  new  Laccda^moniai 
force.  And  had  that  force  still  continued  at  the  disposal  of  Lysan 
der,  all  resistance  on  the  part  of  Athens  would  have  been  unavailing 
But  fortunately  for  the  Athenians,  the  last  few^  months  had  wrought 
material  change  in  the  dispositions  both  of  the  allies  of  Sparta  and 
of  many  among  her  leading  men.  The  allies,  especially  Thebes  and 
Corinth,  not  only  relented  in  their  hatred  and  fear  of  Athens,  nov 
that  she  had  lost  her  power — but  even  sympathized  with  her  suffering 
exiles,  and  became  disgusted  with  the  self-willed  encroachments  of 
Sparta;  while  the  Spartan  king  Pausanias,  together  with  some  of  the 
Ephors,  were  also  jealous  of  the  arbitrary  and  oppressive  conduct  of 
Lysander,  Instead  of  conducting  the  Laccda-monian  force  to 
uphold  at  all  price  the  Lysandrian  oligarchy,  Pausanias  appeared 
rather  as  an  equitable  mediator  to  terminate  the  civil  war.  He 
refused  to  concur  in  any  measure  for  obstructing  the  natural  ten- 
dency toward  a  revival  of  the  democracy.  It  was  in  this  man- 
ner that  Athens,  rescued  from  that  sanguinary  and  rapacious  regime 
which  has  passed  into  history  under  the  name  of  the  Thirty  Tyrants, 
was  enabled  to  re-appear  as  a  humble  and  dependent  member  of  the 


Spartan  alliance— with  nothing  but  the  recollection  of  her  former 
power  vet  with  her  democracy  again  in  vigorous  and  tutelary  action 
for  internal  government.  The  just  and  gentle  bearmg  of  her  demo- 
cratical  citizens,  and  the  absence  of  reactionary  antipathies,  after 
such  cruel  ill-treatment— are  among  the  most  honorable  features  in 

her  history.  ,.        ,  ,    ^  t  i  -ji 

The  reader  will  find  in  preceding  chapters,  what  I  can  only  rapidly 
dance  at  here,  the  details  of  that  system  of  bloodshed,  spoliation, 
extinction  of  free  speech  and  even  of  intellectual  teaching,  efforts  to 
implicate  innocent  citizens  as  agents  in  judicial  assassination,  etc.— 
which  stained  the  year  of  Anarchy  (as  it  was  termed  in  Athenian 
annals)  immediately  following  the  surrender  of  the  city.  These 
details  depend  on  evidence  perfectly  satisfactory;  for  they  are  con- 
veyed to  us  chiefly  by  Xcnophon,  whose  sympathies  are  decidedly 
oli"-archical  From  him  too  we  obtain  another  fact,  not  less  preg- 
nant with  instruction;  that  the  Knights  or  Horsemen,  the  body  of 
riclte^t  proprietors  at  Athens,  were  the  mainstay  of  the  Thirty  from 
first  to  last,  notwithstanding  all  tlic  enormities  of  their  career.      ^ 

We  learn  from  these  dark,  but  well-attested  detads,  to  appreciate 
the  auspices  under  which  that  period  of  history  called  the  Lacediie- 
monian   Empire  was  inaugurated.     Such  phenomena  were  by  no 
means  confined  within  the  walls  of  Athens.     On  the  contrary,  the 
year  of  Anarchy  (using   that  term   in  the  sense  in  which  it  was 
employed  by  the  Athenians)  arising  out  of  the  same  combination  of 
causes  and  a'^ents,  was  common  to  a  very  large  proportion  of  the 
cities  throughout  Greece.     The  Lacedajmonian  admiral  Lysander, 
durinn-  his  fil-st  year  of  naval  command,  had  organized  in  most  of  the 
•dlied'cities  factious  combinations  of  some  of  the  principal  citizens, 
corresponding  with,  himself  personally.     By  their  efforts  in  their 
respective  cities,  he  was  enabled  to  prosecute  the  war  vigorously; 
and  he  repaid  them,  partly  by  seconding  as  much  as  he  could  their 
iniustices  in  their  respective  cities— partly  by  promising  to  strcngtlien 
their  hands  still  further,  as  soon  as  victory  should  be  made  sure.    This 
policy  while  it  served  as  a  stimulus  against  the  common  enemy,  con- 
tributed still  more  directly  to  agsrrandize  Lysander  himself;  creating 
for  him  an  ascendency  of  his  own,  and  imposing  upon  him  personal 
obligations  toward  adherents,  apart  from  what  was  required  by  the 

interests  of  Sparta.  ,    ,     .  •       -,  in 

The  victory  of  ^gospotami,  complete  and  decisive  beyond  all 
expectations  either  of  friend  or  foe,  enabled  him  to  discharge  these 
obligations  with  interest.  All  Greece  at  once  made  submission  to 
the  Laceda>monians,  excerpt  Athens  and  Samos-and  these  tw^o  only 
held  out  a  few  months.  It  was  now  the  first  business  of  the  victori- 
ous commander  to  remunerate  his  adherents,  and  to  take  permanent 
security  for  Spartan  dominion  as  well  as  for  his  own.  In  the  greater 
number  of  cities,  he  established  an  oligarchy  of  Ten  citizens,  or  a 
Dekarchy  composed  of  his  own  partisans;  while  he  at  the  same  time 


598 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


LYSANDRIAN  DEKARCHIES. 


599 


planted  in  each  a  Laoecl.Tmoni;m  liarmost  or  governor,  with  a  i^ani- 
son,  to  uphold  the  new  ohgarcliy.  The  Dekarchyof  Ten  Lvsandrijiu 
partisans,  witli  the  Lacedaemonian  hannost  to  sustain  them,  bceaim.' 
the  general  sclieme  of  Hellenic  government  throughout  the  ^Egeaii. 
from  Euba^a  to  the  Thracian  coast  towns,  and  from  ^liletus  to  l^yzaii- 
tium.  Lysander  sailed  round  in  person  with  his  victorious  fleet  to 
Byzantium  and  C'halkedon,  to  the  cities  of  Lesbos,  to  Thasos,  and 
other  places;  while  he  sent  Eteonikus  to  Thrace  for  the  purpose  of 
thus  recasting  the  irovernments  evervwhere.  Not  merelv  those  cities 
which  had  hitherto  been  on  the  Athenian  side,  but  also  those  which 
had  acted  as  allies  of  Sparta,  were  subjected  to  the  same  intestine 
revolution  and  the  same  foreign  constraint.  Everywhere  the  new 
Lysandrian  Dekarchy  superseded  the  previous  governments,  whether 
oligarchical  or  democratical. 

At  Thasus,  as  well  as  in  other  places,  this  revolution  was  not  ac- 
complished without  much  bloodshed  as  well  as  treacherous  stratagem; 
nor  did  Lysander  himself  scruple  to  enforce,  personally  anil  by  his 
own  presence,  the  execution  and  expulsion  of  suspected  citizens.  In 
many  places,  however,  simple  terrorism  probal)ly  sufliced.  The  new 
Lysandrian  Ten  overawed  resistance  and  procured  recognition  of 
their  usurpation,  by  the  mepace  of  inviting  the  victorious  admiral 
with  his  fleet  of  200  sail,  and  by  the  simple  arrival  of  the  Lacede- 
monian harmost.  Not  only  was  each  town  obliged  to  provide  a 
fortitied  citadel  and  maintenance  forjhis  governor  with  his  garrison, 
but  a  scheme  of  tribute,  amounting  to  1000  talents  annually,  was 
imposed  for  the  future,  and  assessed  ratably  upon  each  city  by 
Lysander. 

In  what  spirit  these  new  Dekarchics  would  govern,  consisting  as 
they  did  of  picked  oligarchical  partisans  distinguished  for  audacity 
and  ambition — who,  to  all  the  unscrupulous  lust  of  power  which 
characterized  Lysander  himself,  added  a  thirst  for  personal  gain, 
from  which  he  was  exempt,  and  were  now  about  to  reimburse  them- 
selves for  services  already  rendered  to  him — the  general  analogy  of 
Grecian  history  would  sufficiently  teach  us,  though  we  are  without 
special  details.  But  in  reference  to  this  point  we  have  not  merely 
general  analogy  to  guide  us;  we  have  further  the  parallel  case  of  the 
Thirty  at  Athens,  tlie  particulars  of  whose  rule  are  well  known  and 
have  already  been  alluded  to.  These  Thirty,  with  the  exception  of 
the  difference  of  number,  were  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  Lysan- 
drian Dekarchy;  created  by  the  same  originating  foroe,  placed  under 
the  like  circumstances,  and  animated  by  the  like  spirit  and  interests. 
Every  sul)ject  town  would  produce  its  Kritias  and  Theramenes,  and 
its  body  of  wealthy  citizens  like  the  Knights  or  Horsemen  at  Athens 
to  abet  their  oppressions,  under  Laceda^nonian  patronage  and  the 
coverinir  g'lard  of  the  Lac(*da'monian  harmost.  Moreover,  Kritias, 
with  all  his  vices,  was  likely  to  be  better  rather  than  worse,  as  coni- 
parcd  with  his  oligarchical  parallel  in  any  other  less  cultivateil  city. 


r.4>  ir.ttor«  fliid  r>hilo«ophy,  accustomed  to  the  conver- 
He  was  a  ^;;^..^^^^^^^,^^iE;2ioil'  of  ethical  and  social  ques- 
sation  ot  S>'"''^^'-^';V  ,",  'l'     .,f  the  Kni<-hts  or  horsemen  at  Athens. 

l''"f-  ,]Slv'tlL"l^  l^n  1  at  ^5^^^  and  had  been  exposed 
Indoubtedly  the}  iuxa  /  *;Y'  •  •  j,  ^.y^^^.^s  than  the  correspondmg 
,,  ,,oiH.  li»f '^^^l'^"^?  \";  ,  "^n^^i^^i^  a^  had  no  shame  in 

dass  elsewhere.  If  thin  \^\;,  |!^;-^i^rou-lu)ut  all  their  enormities, 
serving  as  accomphces  to  t  le  ^^^/^^  ^^^^'^f^i^.^  .^ould  furnish  a  body 
,ve  need  not  fear  to  P^'^^^"'  \^.  ^\^  ^^ fj  ^.^  ?'^a)x  leader  at  least  as  san- 
of  wealthy  men  yet  more  \\";^^'^^1^  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^  kritias.     As  at  Athens, 

gainary,  rapacnou^  and    uU  o^a  UM^  ^^  ^^^^^^  ^^,,,,,. 

,0  elsewhere;  the  Dekaichs  )^^"  \  ':^;,^^;"  ^^  A  ^^^  ,vicked  men;"  they 

ons  political  OPP---  ;^^f^^^  ^  !^:     ^  ,nanner  with  men  of  known 
W()uld  next  proceed  t(,dea  11  tic  ^^^^^^^^^  oppression. 

prol.itv  and  courage  likely  to  t^^vc  ^^  /^^^       -^     ^f  remonstrances 

Vueir' career  of  blood  ^^ould  co  lum^^^^^^^ 

from  more  moderate  P^P^V    ^^'"^"^  t  >^^^  !\ 

,nenes-until  tliev  contrived  ^nc  ;;!;  ^^^^Xh^;;„Up.Uhies  and 

zens,  which  would  '';y^^'\^\\Z,l^^^^^^  of  such  victims 

their  rapacity  by  victims  s  U  i^«^^  .^^^^^^^^of  pure  s^poliation.     They 

being  w.'althy  men   ^^^^^<  ^^^*;\/^^J  ^  ^.^^^^  their  own 

would  next  dispatch  by  torce  ^y?^^'^^^'.^^^  ceremony  than  ac- 

nnmber,  like  Theramenes;  \>'f^^y;i^J:^  lthen«  where  we  may 

eomp:uHed  the  l\^n>etration  o    ih^  u   m  ^^^^  ^^^^^^_ 

trace  the  eifect  of  those  puuc  a   ^^^^  ^^.;  ^^^/'-     {^^       yet  still  not  for- 

have  sutlicient   invention   to  ^^"^^loy    he  pica         iv^^^^^^^^^^ 

cisoly  the  same  Pl'«»«'»''»:',  ''"^.^P'^^^.'tJ^.ly^^^^^^^^^^  "•  .^■.^^'"l"''' 

Alliens.  But  we  are,  »V^'^^''^f."'f  ,^  ,  f  lir  s'uniile  from  whenee  to 
the  history  ot  the  Athe.uaii  Thirty  a.  a  f.u  j.  mpl>^ '  ,,^^,.. 

derive  our  idea  of  "'»«;  I^^t;  .f/,  'cU  eaol.  i^^  own  peeuliar 
spread  the  Gveeiaa  world,  "^''l'"'-^^,.'':^'''.,''^,  gome  even  more 
Lvch:  some  were  ess  ,ty 7°"  f ' ^  .''f  ^f  ,t''?Uy  And  in  point 
tyrannical,  re-ard  being  1«"1  to  V^  1,  U,n,.„  h.^ror  of  these  Dekar- 
of  fact,  Isokrates,  who  speaks  2^'!'' /  "  j-"!^  i^,,"'  'i^ey  had  in  common 

l.'^t"^fl^d^rrur=vS  rtr^gS'-ul^on^hoys  a.d  wo.en. 


Goo 


THE  LACED/EMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


SPARTAN  HAR^IOSTS. 


601 


Nothing  of  this  kind  is  ascribed  to  Kritias  and  his  companions;  and 
it  is  a  considerable  proof  of  the  rest  rain  ins:  force  of  Athenian  iiiau 
ner^,  that  men  who  inflicted  so  much  evil  in  gratification  of  other 
violent  impulses,  should  have  stopped  short  heret.  The  Decemvirs 
named  by  Lysauder,  like  the  Decemvir  Appius  Claudius  at  Rome, 
would  tlud  tliemselves  armed  with  power  to  satiate  their  lusts  as  well 
as  their  antipathies,  and  would  not  be  more  likely  to  set  bounds  to 
the  former  than  to  the  latter.  Lysander,  in  all  the  overweening  in- 
solence of  victory,  while  rewarding  his  most  devoted  partisans  with 
an  exaltation  comprising  every  sort  of  license  and  tyranny,  .'■laiiietl 
the  dependent  cities  with  countless  murders,  perpetrated  on  privaie 
as  well  as  ou  public  grounds.  No  individual  Greek  had  ever  befuie 
wielded  so  prodigious  a  power  of  enriching  friends  or  destroying 
enemies  in  this  universal  reorganization  of  Greece;  nor  was  there  ever 
any  power  more  deplorably  abused. 

It  was  thus  that  the  Laceda^uonian  empiie  imposed  upon  each 
of  the  subject  cities  a  double  opiuession;  the  native  Decemvirs, 
and  the  foreign  Harmost;  each  abetting  the  other,  and  forming 
together  an  aggravated  pressure  upon  the  citizens,  from  whicii 
scarce  any  escape  was  left.  The  Thirty  at  Athens  paid  the  greatest 
possible  court  to  the  harmost  Kallibius,  and  put  to  death  individ- 
ual Athenians  olrensive  to  him,  in  order  to  purchase  his  co-opera- 
tion in  their  own  violences.  The  few  details  which  we  possess 
respecting  these  harmosts(who  continued  throughout  the  insular  and 
maritime  cities  for  about  ten  years,  imtil  the  battle  of  Knidus,  or  as 
long  as  the  maritime  empire  of  Sparta  lasted — but  in  various  conti- 
nental dependencies  considerably  longer,  that  is,  until  the  defeat  of 
Leuktra,  in  371  B.C.)  are  all  for  the  most  part  discreditable.  We  have 
seen  in  the  last  chapter  the  description  given  even  by  the  philo- 
Laconian  Xenophcn,  of  the  harsh  and  treacherous  manner  in  which 
they  acted  toward  the  returning  C^yreian  soldiers,  combined  with 
their  corrupt  subservience  to  Pharnabazus.  \Ve  learn  fiom  him  that 
it  depended  upon  the  fiat  of  a  Lacedaemonian  haimost  whether  these 
soUliers  shoulel  be  proclaimed  enemies  and  excluded  forever  fremi 
their  native  cities;  and  Kleander,  the  harmost  of  Bvznntium,  who  at 
first  threateneei  them  with  this  treatment,  was  only  induced  by  the 
most  unlimited  submission,  combined  with  very  delicate  manage- 
ment, to  withdraw  his  menace.  The  ciiiel  proceedings  of  Anaxibius 
and  Aristarchus,  who  went  so  far  as  to  sell  400  of  these  soldiers  into 
.•slavery,  has  been  recounted  a  few  pages  above.  Nothing  can  be 
more  arbitrary  or  reckless  than  their  proceedings.  If  they  could 
beliave  thus  toward  a  body  of  Greek  soldiers  full  of  actiuired  glory, 
effective  either  as  friends  or  as  enemies,  and  having  generals  capable 
of  prosecuting  their  collective  interests  and  making  their  complaints 
heard — wnat  protection  would  a  private  citizen  of  any  subject  city, 
Byzantium  or  Perinthus,  be  iikely  to  enjoy  against  their  oppression? 

The  stor}'  of  Arivtodemiis.  iLe  Larmost  of  Oreus  in  Eulaa,  evinces 


that  no  justice  could  be  obtained  against  any  of  then-  enor  mties  from 
h'  Epl  ors  at  Sparta.  That  harmost,  among  many  other  acts  of 
mfal  V  olence    seized  a  beautiful  youth,  son  of  a  free  citizen  at 

r  us  o  onhe  palastra-carried  htm  otf-and  afl^er  vainly  endeav- 
in  (''overcome  his  resistance,  put  him  to  death.  1  he  father  ot  the 
x^m  1  went  to  Sparta,  made  known  the  atrocities,  anei  appealed  to 
?l^  ™  )  s  and  Senate  for  redress.  But  a  deaf  ear  was  turned  to  hii 
n  m  la  ts  and  in  ansruish  of  mind  he  slew  himself.  Indeed,  we 
k      V     hat'  these  Spartan  authorities  would  grant  no  redress,  not 

edy  against  harmosts,  but  even  against  private  Spartan  citizens 
who  had"i)een  o-„ilty  of  gross  crime  out  of  their  own  coun  ry.     A 
C  im     ea    Leuktra,  name.l  Skedasus,  preferred  c^omplaint    hat 
uxwrimrtans    on  their  wav  from  Delphi,  after  having  bc^en   lios- 

t  d)?ren  e^^^  in  his  house,   had  tirst  violated,  and  afterward 

i  k'd  his  two  dauditers;  but  even  for  so  flagitious  an  outrage  as 

i  no  redress  could  be  obtained.  Deaibtless,  when  a  po^yerful 
f  eio^  allv,  like  the  Persian  satrap  Pharnabazus,  ccunplained  to  t^^e 
Enhors  of 'the  conduct  of  a  Lacedaemonian  harmost  or  adminil  his 
rem  It  ns  w.>uld  receive  attention;  and  Ave  learn  that^heEphors 
were  ths  induced  not  merelv  to  recall  Lysander  from  the  Hellespont, 

mt'o  pit  to  death  another  officer,  Thorax,  for  corrupt  appropriation 
r^  n  01  c^'  But  for  a  private  citizen  in  any  subject  city,  the  superin- 
b  nd  1-  auth(>rit  V  of  Sparta  woulel  be  not  merely  remote  but  elea  anei 

110^^^^^^^^  Fo  as  to  alTord  him  no  protection  whatever,  and  to  leave 
n  a  t  oge  tier  at  the  mercv  of  the  harmost.  It  seems  too  that  the 
ri"  S^^^^^^^^  training,  and  peculiarity  of  habits,  rendered  individ- 
u'd  Laced  enionians  onforei-n  service  more  self-wil  ed,  more  inca- 
m ble  of  ^  ring  into  the  customs  or  feelings  of  others,  and  more 
liable  ?o  cul'enenvte  when  set  free  from  the  strict  watch  of  home- 

''^!.kln:;^U^^;Se?S^  together-tlie  Dekarchies,  the  Har- 

most    and  the  overwhelming  dictatorship  of  Lvsandci--and  constru- 
0-"  oVbe  •  narts  of  the  Grecian  world  by  the  analogy  of  A  hens  uneler 

he  ™rt^^-^4^^^^^       be  warranted  in  aflirming  that  the  first  years  of 

e  S    irtan  Empire    which  followed  upon  the  victoiy  of  ^gos- 

potan     we™ rs  of  all-pervading  tyranny,  and  multifarious  mtes- 

[ine  Sda  nity^^  --^s  Greece  had  never  before  endured.     Tlie  hard- 

. /m<,  nf  war  severe  in  many  wavs,  were  now  at  an  end,  but  they 

mi  replaced  bv  a  sl^te  of\uffering  not  the  less  dilficult  to  bear 
be'ause^it  was  called  peace.  And  what  made  ^jf^^^^^^ 
intolerable  was  that  it  was  a  bitter  disappointment  aiel  a  ll<^gr<mt 
vioMon  of  promises  proclaimed,  repeatedly  and  explicitly,  by  the 

Lacedfiemonians  themselves.  ♦;„.„.  onrV.pr  thqn  the 

For  more  than  thirty  years  precedmg-from  times  ealier  ^J^^  th^ 

commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian  '^'^^\-'}l'JZ'^^^^ 

fessed  to  interfere  only  for  the  purpose  S>V;,y''f  ^\n  ^uf-Ul  (^^  of 

putting  down  the  usurped  ascendency  of  Athens.     All  the  dilics  oi 


m2 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


CHANGE  IN  THE  SPARTAN  LANGUAGE. 


G03 


1 

1 


S]>arHlitul  been  invited  into  strenuous  action— all  tliose  of  Alliens 
li'id  been  un'-ed  to  revolt— under  tlie  soul  stirring  ery  of  "Freedom 
to  Greece  "''The  earliest  ineilenients  addr(>sid  bv  tbe  Corinthians 
to  Sparta  in  483  B.C.,  immediately  alter  the  Koikyrsean  disimtc, 
called  upon  her  to  stand  forward  in  fultiliment  ot  her  recognized 
fimction  as  -  Liberator  of  Greece,"  and  dem-unced  her  as  guiltv  of 
connivance  witli  Athens  if  she  held  back.  Alliens  was  branded  as 
the  -'despot  city;"  which  had  alreadv  absorbed  the  independence  of 
many  Greeks,  and  menaced  that  of  all  the  rest.  The  last  foinial 
requisition  borne  bv  the  Lacedaemonian  emoys  to  Athens  in  the  win- 
ter immediatelv  preceding  the  war,  ran  thus— '' If  you  desire  the 
continuance  of Vcace  with  Sparta,  restore  to  the  Greeks  their  auton- 
omv  "  WliLUi  Archidamus,  kinu"  of  Sj^arta.  aiijiroached  at  the  head 
of  his  armv  to  besieire  Plata-a,  the  Plata-ans  laid  chum  to  autonomy 
n'^  havin«- i>een  solemnlv  guaranteed  to  them  by  King  Pausanias  afhr 
the  o-reaf  victory  near  their  town.  Upon  which  Archidamus  replied 
—''Your  demand  is  just:  we  arc  prepared  to  confirm  younmUnwmy 
—but  we  call  upon  vou  to  aid  us  in  semiring  the  like  for  those  olher 
Greeks  who  have  been  enslaved  by  Athens.  This  is  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  our  <neat  present  effort."  And  the  iianner  of  general  enfran- 
chisement which  the  Lacedemonians  thus  held  up  at  the  outset  of 
the  war,  enlisted  in  their  cause  encouraging  sympathy  and  good 
wishes  tiirouirhout  Greece.  .    ,         .     .- 

But  the  mo>t  striking  illustration  by  far.  of  tlie  seductive  promises 

hekl  out  by  the   Laceda'inonians,  was  afforded   by  the  conduct  of 

Brisidas  in'Thrace,  when  he  first  came  into  the  neiiihl>orbood  of  the 

Athenian  allies  during  the  eightli  year  of  the  war  (424  B.C.)      In  his 

memorable  discinirse  addressed  to  the  public  assin.bly  at  Akantlius. 

he  takes  the  -greatest  pains  to  satisfy  them  that  he  c;  me  only  for  the 

purpose  of  reali/.inu^  the  promise  of  enfranchi^cment  proclaimed  by 

the  Lacedaemonians  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.     Having  expected, 

when  actin'*-  in  such  a  cause,  nothing  less  than  a  hearty  welcome,  he 

is  astonishc^l  to  find  their  gates  closed  against  liim      "I  am  come 

(Slid  he)  not  to  injure,  but  to  liberate  tiic  Greeks:  after  bin;  ing  the 

Lacedtcmonian  auth.>rities  by  tiie  most  solemn  oaths,  that  all  whoni 

I  miv  brin'^  over  shall  be  dealt  with  as  aut(>nomous  allies.     VV  e  do 

not  wish  to'obtain  vou  as  allies  either  by  force  or  fraud,  but  to  act 

as  your  allies  at   a  time  when  you  are  enslaved  by  tlie  Athenians. 

You  ou-^ht  not  to  suspect  my  purposcjs,  in  the  face  of  these  solemn 

assurances-  least  of  all  ouirht  any  man  to  hold  back  through  appic- 

liension  of  private  enmities,  and  through  fear  lest  I  should  put  the 

city  into  the  hands  of  a  few  chosen  partisans.     I  am  not  come  to 

identify  myself  with  local  faction:  I  am  not  the  man  to  offer  you  :in 

unreal  liberty  by  breaking  down  your  established   consiituti(m,  for 

the  purpose  of  enslavinsl:  ('ither  the  Many  to  the  Few,  or  the  Few  to 

the   Many.      That  would    be   more   intolerable   even    than   iorvvjn 

dominion:  and  wc  Lacediemonians  should  incur   nothing   but   re- 


proach, instead  of  reaping  thanks  and  honor  for  our  trouble.  We 
should  dravY  upon  ourselves  those  very  censures.  ui)on  the  strength 
of  which  w^e  are  trying  to  put  down  Athens;  ;uid  that,  too,  in  aggra- 
vated measure,  worse  than  those  who  have  never  made  honorable 
]>rofession3;  since  to  men  in  high  position,  specious  trick  is  more 
disicraceful  than  open  violence.— If  (continued  Brasidas)  in  spite  of 
iiiy'assurances,  you  still  wdlhhold  from  me  your  co-operation,  I  shall 
tliink  myself  authorized  to  constrain  you  by  force.  We  should  not 
be  warranted  in  forcing  freedom  on  any  unwilling  jMirties,  except 
with  a  view  to  some  common  good.  But  as  we  seek  not  empire  for 
ourselves — as  we  struggle  only  to  put  down  the  empire  of  others— as 
we  oifer  juitonoiny  to  each  and  all— so  we  should  do  wrong  to  the 
majority  if  we  allowed  you  to  ])ersist  in  your  opposition." 

Like  the  allied  sovereigns  of  Europe  in  1818,  who,  requiring  the 
most  strenuous  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  people  to  contend  against 
the  Emperor  Napoleon,  promised  free  constitutions,  yet  granted 
nothing  after  the  victory  had  been  assured— the  Lacedaimonians  thus 
held  out  the  most  einphatic  and  repeated  assurances  of  general 
autonomy  in  order  to  enlist  allies  against  Athens;  disavowing,  even 
ostentatiously,  any  aim  at  empire  for  themselves.  It  is  true,  that 
after  the  irrefit  catastrophe  before  Syracuse,  wdien  the  ruin  of  Athens 
appeared  imminent,  and  when  the  alliance  with  the  Persian  satraps 
aiiainst  her  was  first  brought  to  pass,  the  Lacediemonians  began  to 
think  more  of  empire,  and  less  of  Grecian  freedom;  which,  indeed, 
so  far  as  concerned  the  Greeks  on  the  continent  of  Asia,  was  surren- 
dered to  Persia.  Nevertheless,  the  old  watchword  still  continued. 
It  was  still  curivnMy  believed,  though  less  studiously  professed,  that 
the  destruction  of  the  Athenian  empire  was  aimed  at  as  a  means  to 
the  liberation  of  Greece. 

The  victory  of  ^Egospotami  with  its  consequences  cruelly  unde- 
ceived every  one.  The  language  of  Brasidns,  sanctioned  by  the 
solemn  oaths  of  the  Laecilaiaioiiian  Epliors,  in  424  B.C.— and  the 
proeeediuii-  of  the  Lacedieinonian  Lysander  in  405-404  B.C.,  the  com- 
mencing hour  of  Spiirtan  omnipofeiice— stand  in  such  literal  and 
flanTanfcontradictiou,  that  we  might  almost  imagine  the  former  to 
have  foreseen  the  possibility  of  such  a  successor,  and  to  have  tried  to 
disirrace  and  disarm  him  beforehand.  The  Dekarchies  of  Lysander 
realized  that  precise  aseendency  of  a  few  chosen  partisans  which 
Brasidas  repudiates  as  an  abomination  w^jrse  than  foreign  dominion; 
while  the  harmosts  and  garrison,  installed  in  the  dependent  cities 
alon;^  with  the  native  Decemvirs,  planted  the  second  variety  of  mis- 
chief as  wtill  as  the  first,  each  agirravating  the  other.  Had  the  noble- 
minded  Kallikratidas  gained  a  victory  at  Arginusie.  and  lived  to 
elo^e  the  war,  he  would  probably  have  tried,  with  more  or  less  of 
.siifcess,  to  make  some  approach  to  the  promises  of  Brasidas.  But  it 
v/  IS  the  double  misfortune  of  Greece,  first  that  the  closing  victory 
was  gained  by  such  an  admiral  as  Lysander,  the  most  unscrupulous 


604 


THE  LACED^^rOXIAN  EMPIRE. 


POWER  OF  SPARTA. 


605 


of  all  power  seekers,  partly  for  his  country,  and  still  more  for  him- 
self— next,  that  the  victory  Wiis  so  decisive,  sudden,  and  imposing, 
as  to  leave  no  enemy  standing,  or  in  a  position  to  insist  upon  tcniis. 
The  fiat  of  Lysander,  acting  in  the  name  of  ISpurlM,  became  omnipo- 
tent, not   merely   over  enemies,  hut  over  allies;    and  to  a  certain 
degree  even  over  the  Spartan  autiiorities  themselves.     There  was  m 
present  necessity  for  conciliating  allies— still  less  for  acting  up  to 
former  eniiagenients;  so  that  nothing  reninined  to  opi)ose  tlie  naliir- 
ally  ambitious  inspinilions  of  the  Spartan  Eidiors,  who  allowed  the 
adniiral  to  carry  out  the  details  in  his  own  way.     But  former  a.^sur- 
ances,  though  Sparta  was  in  a  condition  to  disregard  them,  were  not 
forirutteu  by  others;  and   the  recollection  of  them  imparted   addi- 
tional bitterness  to  the  oppressions  of  the  Decemvirs  and  llarmosis. 
In  perfect  consistency  with  her  misrule  tliroughout  Eastern  Greece, 
too,  Sparta  identitied  herself  with  the  energetic  tyranny  of  Diony- 
sius  at  Syracuse,  assisting  both  to  erect  and  to  uphold  it;  a  contradic- 
tion to  her  former  maxims  of  action  which  would  have  astounded 
the  historian  Herodotus. 

The  empire  of  Sparta,  thus  constituted  at  the  end  of  405  RC, 
maintained  itself  in  full  grandeur  for  somewhat  above  ti-n  years, 
until  tiie  naval  battle  of  Knidus  in  o94  B.C.  That  defeat  destroycel 
Ler  fleet  and  nuiritime  ascendency,  yet  left  her  in  undiminished 
power  on  land,  which  she  still  maintained  until  her  defeat  by  the 
Thebans  at  Leuktra  in  o71  B.C.  Throughout  all  this  time,  it  was  licr 
established  system  to  keep  up  Spartan  harmosts  and  gavrisons  in  the 
dependent  cities  on  the  continent  as  well  as  in  the  islands.  Even 
the  Chians,  who  had  been  her  most  active  allies  during  the  last  eight 
years  of  the  war,  weie  compelled  to  subndt  to  this  hardship;  besides 
having  all  their  fleet  taken  away  from  them.  BuX  the  native* Dckar- 
chies,  though  at  first  established  by  Lysander  univeii^ally  ihrouiihout 
the  maritinie  dependencies,  did  not  last  as  a  system  so  long  as  the 
Ilarmosts.  Composed  as  they  were  to  a  great  degree  of  the  personal 
nominees  and  confederates  of  Lysandei-,  they  suffered  in  part  by  the 
.reactionary  jealousy  which  in  time  made  itself  felt  against  his  ovcr- 
1  weening  ascendency.  After  continuing  for  some  tinjc  they  lost  the 
countenance  of  the  Spartan  Ephors,  who  proclaimed  permission  to 
the  cities  (we  do  not  precisely  know  when)  to  resume  their  pre- 
existing governments.  Some  of  the  Dekarehies  thus  became  dis- 
solved, or  modified  in  various  ways,  but  several  probably  still  con- 
tinued to  subsist,  it  they  had  force  enough  to  maintain  tiiemselves; 
for  it  does  not  a]>pear  that  the  Ephors  ever  systematically  put  them 
down  as  Lysander  had  systematically  set  them  up. 

The  government  of  the  Thirty  at  Athens  w  ould  never  have  been 
overthrow  n,  if  the  oppressed  Athenians  hail  been  obliged  to  rely  on 
a  tutelary  iuterfereni  e  of  the  Spartan  Ephors  to  help  them  in  over- 
throwing it.  I  have  already  shown  that  this  nefarious  oligarchy 
came  to  its  end  by  the  unassisted  efforts  of  Thrasybulus  and  the 


Athenian  democrats  themselves.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  arro- 
gance and  selfishness  of  Sparta  and  of  Lysander  had  alienated  the 
thebans  Corinthians,  Megarians,  and  other  neighbormg  allies,  and 
iuauced'them  to  sympathize  with  the  Athenian  exiles  against  the 
atrocities  of  the  Thirty— but  those  neighbors  never  rendered  any 
Do^itive  or  serious  aid.  The  inordinate  personal  ambition  of  Lysan- 
der had  al<o  offended  King  Pausaiiias  and  the  Spartan  Ephors,  so 
fintthev  toa,  became  indifferent  to  the  Thirty,  who  were  his  crea- 
'  tares  'But  this  merely  deprived  the  Thirty  of  that  foreign  sui)port 
whicii  Lysander,  had  ho  still  continued  in  the  ascendent,  would  have 
extended  to  them  in  full  measure.  It  was  not  the  i)ositive  cause  of 
their  downfall.  Tliat  crisis  was  brought  about  altogether  by  the 
ener-T  of  Thrtisybulus  an  1  his  companions,  who  manifested  such 
force  and  determination  as  couhl  not  have  l)een  put  down  without  an 
extraordinary  display  of  Spirtan  military  power;  a  display  not 
entirely  safe  when  the  svmpathies  of  the  chief  allies  were  with  the 
other  side— and  at  any  rate  adverse  to  the  inclinations  of  1  ausanias. 

As  it  was  with  the  Thirtv  at  Athens,  so  it  probably  w-as  also  with 
the  Dektu-chies  in  the  dependent  cities.  The  Spartan  Ephors  took 
no  steps  to  put  them  down;  but  where  the  resistance  of  the  citizens 
was  strenuous  enough  to  overthrow  them,  no  Spartan  intervention 
cime  to  prop  them  up;  and  the  llarmost  perhaps  received  orders  not 
to  consider  his  authority  as  iudissolubly  linked  with  theirs.  1  he 
native  forces  of  each  dep^'udent  city  being  thus  left  to  find  ther  own 
level  the  Decemvirs,  once  installed,  would  doubtless  maintain  them- 
^elvc's  in  a  great  number;  while  in  other  cases  they  would  be_  over- 
thrown—o?  perhaps  would  contrive  to  perpetuate  then-  dominion  by 
compromise  and  alliance  with  other  oligarchical  sections.  This  con- 
fused and  unsettled  state  of  the  Dekarehies— some  stdl  existing, 
others  half-existing,  others  again  defunct— prevailed  in  B96  B.C., 
when  Lysander  accompanied  Agesilaus  into  Asia,  in  the  lull  hope 
that  he  should  have  infiuenc;;  enough  to  reoganize  them  all.  \\  e 
must  recollect  that  no  other  dependent  city  would  possess  the  same 
means  of  ofTering  energetic    resistance  to  its  local    Decemvirs,  as 

Vtheus  offered  to  the  Tliirtv;  and  that  the  insular  Grecian  cities 
were  not  only  feeble  individually,  but  naturally  helpless  against  the 

lords  of  the  sea.  ,    .  , 

Such  then  was  the  result  throughout  Greece  when  that  long  war, 
which  had  been  undertaken  in  the  name  of  universal  autonomy  was 
tenninated  by  the  battle  of  ^gospotami.  In  jdace  of  imperial 
Athens  was  substituted,  not  the  promised  autonomy,  but  yet  more 
imperial  Sparta.  An  awful  ]>Uture  is  given  by  the  Philo-Laconian 
Xenophon,  in  399  B.C.,  of  the  ascendency  exercised  throughout  all 
the  Grecian  cities,  not  merely  by  the  Ephors  and  the  public  officers, 
but  even  by  the  private  citizens,  of  Sparta.  "The  Lacedaemonians 
(says  he  in  addressing  the  Cyreinn  army)  are  now  the  presidents  ot 
Greece-  and  even  any  single  private  LacedcCmonian  can  accomplish 


CG6 


THE  LACED/EMONIAN   E3IPIKE. 


SPARTA'S  ABUSE  OF  POWER. 


607 


Avlmt  lie  plea«;es."  "All  the  cities  (be  says  in  another  place)  then 
obeyed  whatever  order  theymiglit  receive  from  :i  Laceda-nioniun  citi- 
zen." Kot  merly  was  the  general  ascendency  thus  oninipreseut  ami 
irresistible,  but  it  was  enforced  with  a  stringency  of  detail,  and  dark- 
ened by  a  thousand  accompaniments  of  tyranny  and  individual  abuse, 
such  as  had  never  been  known  under  the  much  decried  empire  of 
Athens. 

AVe  have  more  than  one  picture  of  the  Athenian  empire  in  speeches 
made  by  hostile  orators  who  had  every  mo'.ive  to  work  up  the 
strongest  antipathies  in  the  bosoms  of  their  audience  against  it.  "We 
have  tlie  addresses  of  the  Corinthian  envoys  at  Sparta  when  stimu- 
lating the  Spartan  allies  to  the  Peloj)onnesiau  War — that  of  the 
envoys  from  Mitylene  delivered  at  Olympia  to  the  Spartan  confeder- 
ates, when  the  city  had  revolted  from  Athene  and  stood  in  pressing 
need  of  support — the  discourse  of  Brasidas  in  the  public  assembly  at 
Akanthus — and  more  than  one  speech  also  from  Plermokratcs, 
impressing  upon  his  Sicilian  counirymen  hatred  as  well  as  fear  of 
Athens.  Whoever  reads  these  discourses,  will  see  that  they  dwell 
almost  exclusively  on  the  great  political  wrong  iidierent  in  the  very 
fact  of  her  empire,  robbing  so  many  Grecian  communities  of  tiieir 
legitimate  autonomy,  over  and  above  the  tril)ute  imposed.  That 
ATIicus  had  thus  already  enslaved  many  citi(  s,  and  was  only  watch- 
ing for  opportunities  to  enslave  many  more,  is  the  theme  upon  which 
they  expatiate.  But  of  practical  grievances — of  cruelly,  oppressiou. 
spoliation,  multiplied  exiles,  etc.,  of  high-handed  wrorig  committed 
by  individual  Athenians — not  one  wo.d  is  spoken.  Had  there  been 
the  smallest  pretext  for  introducing  such  inflammatory  topics,  how 
much  more  impressive  would  have  been  the  appeal  of  Brasidas  to 
the  sympathies  of  the  Akanthians!  How  vehement  would  have  been 
the  dt-nunciations  of  the  Mityleiiaan  envoys,  in  place  of  thetiuueand 
almost  apologetic  language  whicli  we  now  read  in  Thucyuidc.*'! 
Athens  extinguished  the  autonomy  of  her  subject  allies,  and  i>un- 
ished  vevolters  with  severity,  sometimes  even  wnth  cruelty.  But  a;^ 
to  other  points  of  wrong,  tiie  silence  of  accusers,  such  as  those  just 
noticed,  counts  as  a  powerful  exculpation. 

Tlie  case  is  altered  w  hen  we  come  to  the  period  succeeding  the  bat- 
tle of  .Egospotami.  Here  indeed  also,  we  tiiid  the  Spartan  empire 
complained  of  (as  the  Athenian  empire  had  been  before),  in  contrast 
with  that  state  of  autonomy  to  which  each  city  laid  claim,  and  which 
Sparta  not  merely  ]>romiscd  to  insure,  but  set  forth  as  her  only 
gromul  for  war.  Yet  this  is  not  the  prominent  grievance — other 
topics  stand  more  emphatically  forward.  The  Decemvirs  and  the 
Harmosts  (some  of  the  latter  being  Helots),  the  standing  instruments 
of  Spartan  empire,  are  felt  as  more  sorely  painful  than  the  empire 
itself;  as  the  language  held  by  Brasidas  at  Akanthus  admits  iheni  to 
])('  beforehand.  At  the  time  when  Athois  was  a  subject  city  undtr 
Sparta,  governed  by  the  Lysandrian  Thirty  and  by  the  Lacedaino- 


uiau  harmost  in  the  acropolis,  the  sense  of  indignity  arising  from  the 
lad  of  subjertion  was  absorbed  in  the  still  more  terribh;  suffering 
arising  from  the  enormities  of  those  individual  rulers  whom  the 
imperTal  state  had  set  up.  Now  Athens  set  up  no  local  rulers— no 
native  Ten  or  native  Thirty — no  resident  Athenian  harmosts  or  garri- 
sons. This  was  of  itself  an  unspeakable  exemption,  when  compared 
with  the  condition  of  cities  subject,  not  only  to  the  Spartan  em})ire, 
l)ut  also  under  that  empire  to  native  Decemvirs  like  Kritias,  and 
Spartan  harmosts  like  Aristarchus  or  Aristodemus.  A  city  subject  to 
Alliens  had  to  bear  definite  burdens  enfoi'ced  by  its  ow^i  government, 
which  vsas  liable  in  case  of  default  or  delinquency  to  be  tried  Ijefore 
the  popular  Athenian  DiUastery.  But  this  same  Dikastery  (as  I  have 
shown  in  a  former  volume,  and  as  is  distinctly  stated  by  Thucydides) 
was  the  harbor  of  refuge  to  each  subject  city;  not  less  against  indi- 
vidual Athenian  wrong-doers  than  against  miscoMduct  from  other 
cities.  Those  who  coinplained  of  the  hardship  suffered  by  a  subject 
citv,  from  the  obligation  of  bfinging  causes  to  be  tried  in  the  Dikas- 
tery of  Athens— even  if  we  take  the  case  as  they  state  it,  and  over- 
look the  unfairness  of  omitting  those  numerous  instances  wherein 
the  city  was  thus  enabled  (o  avert  or  redress  wrong  done  to  its  own 
citizens— would  have  complained  both  more  loudly  and  Avilh  greater 
justice  of  an  ever-present  Athenian  harmost;  especially  if  there  were 
co-existent  a  native  government  of  Ten  oligarchs,  exchanging  w  ith 
him  guilty  counivancos,  like  the  partnership  of  the  Thirty  at  Athens 
with  the  LacedaMuonian  harmost  Kallibuis. 

In  no  one  point  can  it  be  shown  that  the  substitution  of  Spartan 
empire  in  place  of  Athenian  w^as  a  gain,  either  for  the  subject  cities 
or  for  Greece  generally ;  while  in  many  points,  it  was  a  great  and 
serious  aggravation  of  suifering.  Ami  this  abuse  of  power  is  the 
more  deeply  to  be  regretted,  as  Sparta  enjoyed  after  the  battle  of 
iEgospotami  a  precious  opportunity — such  as  Athens  Jjad  nevci-  had, 
and  such  as  never  again  recurred— of  reorganizing  the  Grecian  world 
ou  wise  principles,  andwdth  a  view  to  Pan  Hellenic  stability  and  har- 
mony. It  is  not  her  greatest  sin  to  have  refused  to  grant  universal 
autonomy.  She  had  indeed  promised  it;  but  we  might  pardon  a 
departiu'C  from  specitic  performance,  had  she  exchanged  the  boon  for 
cue  far  greater,  which  it  was  within  her  reasonable  power,  at  the  end 
of  405  B.C.,  to  confer.  That  universal  tow^n  autonomy,  toward  which 
the  Grecian  instinct  tended,  though  immeasurably  better  than  uni- 
versal subjection,  Avas  yet  accompained  by  much  internal  discord, 
and  by  the  still  more  foVmidable  evil  of  hefplessness  against  any  effi- 
cient foreign  enemy.  To  insure  to  the  Hellenic  w^orld external  safety 
as  well  as  internal  concord,  it  was  not  a  new  empire  whicli  was 
wanted,  but  a  new  political  combination  on  equitable  and  compre- 
hensive principles;  divesting  each  town  of  a  portion  of  its  autonomy, 
and  creating  a  common  authority,  responsible  to  all,  for  certain  deti- 
aitc  controiliug  purposes.     If  ever  a  tolerable  federative  system  would 


608 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


ARROGANCE  OF  LYSANDER. 


609 


have  been  prartic:i)>lc  in  Greece,  it  was  after  the  battle  of  ./E.i^ospo- 
tami.  The  Athenian  empire — whieli,  with  all  its  defects,  I  believe  to 
have  been  much  better  for  the  subject  cities  than  universal  autonomy 
would  have  been — luul  already  removed  many  ditticulties.  and  shown 
that  combined  and  systematic  action  of  the  maritime  Grecian  world 
w  as  no  impossibility.  Sparta  nudit  now  Iiave  substituted  herself  for 
Athens,  not  as  heir  to  the  imperial  i>ower,  but  as  president  and  exe- 
cutive a^rcnt  of  a  new  Confederacy  of  Delos — reviving  the  equal, 
comprehensive,  and  liberal  principles  on  which  that  confederacy  h;id 
first  l^een  organized. 

It  is  true  that  sixty  years  before,  the  constituent  members  of  the 
original  synod  at  Delos  had  shown  themselves  insensible  to  its  value. 
As  soon  as  the  pressing  alarm  from  Persia  had  passed  over,  somehiul 
discontinued  seuding" deputies,  others  had  disobeyed  requisitions, 
othei-s  again  had  bought  olT  their  obligations,  and  forfeited  their 
rights  as  autonomous  and  voting  members,  by  ]H'Cuniary  bargain 
with  Athens;  who  being  obliged  by  the  duties  of  Iier  presidency  to 
enforce  obedience  to  the  Synod  against  all  reluctant  members,  made 
successively  many  enemic'S,  and  was  gradually  converted,  almost 
without  her  own  seeking,  from  I'resident  into  Kmperor,  as  the  only 
means  of  obviating  the  total  dissolution  of  the  Confederacy. 

But  though  such  untoward  circumstances  had  happcnc  d  before,  it 
does  not  follow  that  they  would  now  have  liappened  again,  assuming 
the  same  experiment  to  "have  been  retried  by  S)iarta,  with  manifest 
t^incerity  of  purpose  and  tolerable  wisdom.  The  Grecian  world, 
especially  the  maritime  portion  of  it,  had  passed  through  trials  not 
less  painful  than  instmctive,  during  this  important  interval.  Nor 
does  it  seem  rash  to  suppose,  that  the^bulk  of  its  members  might  now 
liave  been  disjiosed  to  pei-foim  steady  confederate  duties,  at  the  call 
and  under  the  presidency  of  Sparta,  had  she  really  attempted  to 
reoriranize  a  liberal  confederacy,  treating  every  city  as  autonomous 
and  equal,  except  in  so  far  as  each  was  bound  to  obey  the  resolutions  of 
the  ireneral  synod.  However  impracticable  such  a  scheme  may 
appear,  we  must  recollect  that  even  Utopian  schemes  have  their 
transient  moments,  if  not  of  certain  success,  at  least  of  conmiencement 
not  merely  possible  but  promising.  And  my  belief  is,  that  had  Kal- 
likratidas.  with  his  ardent  Pan-Hrdlenic  sentiment  and  force  of  moral 
resolution,  been  the  final  victor  over  inqu'rial  Athens,  he  would  not 
Iiave  let  the  moment  of  pride  and  omnipotence  pass  over  without 
essaving  some  noble  ]U'oject  like  that  sketched  above. 

It' is  "to  be  remembered  that  Athens  had  never  had  the  power  of 
organizing  any  such  generous  Pan-Hellenic  combinaiion.  She  had 
become  depopularized  in  the  legitimate  execution  of  her  trust,  as 
president  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos,  against  refractory  members. 
She  had  been  obliged  to  choose  betwx-en  breaking  up  the  Confed- 
eracy, and  keeping  it  together  under  the  strong  compression  of  an 
imperial  chief.     But  Sparta  had  not  yet  become  depopularized.    She 


now  stood  without  competitor  as  leader  of  the  Grecian  world,  and 
might  at  that  moment  have  n-asonably  hoped  to  carry  the  members 
of  ft  along  with  her  to  any  libt^ral  and  Pan-Hellenic  organization,  had 
slie  attempted  it  with  proper  earnestness.  Untortunately  she  took 
the  opposite  course,  under  the  intbunu-e  of  Lysander;  foundini^a  new 
empire  far  more  oppres.iive  and  odious  ihan  that  of  Athens,  with  few 
of  the  advantages,  and  none  of  the  excuses,  attached  to  the  latter. 
As  siie  soon  became  even  more  unpopular  than  Athens,  her  moment 
of  high  tide,  for  beneficent  Pan-Hellenic  combination,  passed  away 
aijo-lnever  to  return. 

Ibiving  thus  brought  all  the  maritime  Greeks  under  her  empire, 
with  a  tribute  of  more  than  1000  talents  imposed  upon  them— and 
continuing  to  be  chief  of  her  landeil  alliance  in  Central  Greece, 
which  now  includcil  Athens  as  a  simple  unit— Sparta  was  the  all- 
peivading  imperial  power  in  Gi'eece.  Her  new  empire  was  organ- 
ized hy  the  victorious  Lysander;  but  with  so  much  arrogance,  and  so 
much  personal  ambition  to  govern  all  Greece  by  means  of  nominees 
of  his  own.  Decemvirs  and  Harmosts — that  he  raised  numerous  rivals 
and  enemies,  as  w^ell  at  Sj)arta  itself  as  elsewhere.  The  jealousy 
ealertained  by  King  Pausanias,  die  otfL'iuled  feelings  of  Thebes  and 
Corinth,  and  the  manner  in  wdiich  these  uew^  phenomena  brought 
about  (in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  Lysander)  the  admission  of  Athens 
as  a  revived  democracy  into  the  Lacedaemonian  confederacy — has 
been  al  ready  r  el  at  ed . 

In  the  early  months  of  403  B c,  Lysander  was  partly  at  home, 
partly  in  Attica,  exerting  himself  to  sustain  the  falling  oligarchy  of 
Athens  against  the  increasing  force  of  Thrasybulus  and  the  Athenian 
exiles  in  Peiraius.     In  this  purpose  he  was  directly  thwarted  by  the 
opposing  views  of  King  Pausanias,  -mwX  three  out  of  the  live  E]>hors. 
But  though  the  f^phors  thus  checked  Lysander  in  regard  to  Athens, 
they  softened  the  humiliation  by  sending  him  abroad  to  a  fresh  com- 
mand on  the  Asiatic  coast  and  the  Hellespont;  a  step  whirh  had  the 
farther  advantage  of  putting  asunder  two  su(di  marked  rivals  as  he 
and  Pausanias  had  now  become.     That  which  Lysander  had  tried  in 
vain  to  do  at  Athens,  he  w^as  doubtless  b(>tter  able  to  do  in  Asia, 
where  he  had  neither  Pausanias  nor  ilie  E|ihors  ahni'T  with  him.    He 
could  lend  eff(!Ctive  aid  to  the  Dekarchies   and  Harmosts  in    the 
Asiatic  cities,  against  any  internal  opposition  with  which  they  m\i\\i 
be  threatened.      Bitter  were  the  comolain is  which  reached  Snarta. 
both  against  him  and  against  his  rulinir  partisans.      At  len2-th  the 
Ephors  were  prevailed  upon  to  disavow  th(^  Dekarchies.  and  to  oro- 
elaini  that  they  would  not  hinder  the  cities  from  resuming  their 
former  governments  at  I'lleasure. 

But  all  the  crying  oppressions  set  forth  in  the  complaints  of  the 

maritime  cities  would  have  been  insufficient  to  procure  the  recall  of 

Lysander  from  his  command  in  the  Hellespont,  had  not  Pharnabazus 

joined  his  remonstrances  to  the  rest.      These  last  representations  so 

H.  G.  IIL— 20 


610 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


TISSAPHERNES  RETURNS  TO  ASIA  MINOR.       611 


strengthened  the  enemies  of  Lysander  at  Spartn,  thnt  a  peremptory 
order  was  sent  to  recall  liim.  "Constrained  to  obey,  lie  came  Lack  to 
Sparta,  but  the  comparative  disgrace,  and  the  loss  of  that  boundless 
power  which  he  had  enjoyed  on  his  ermma?;d.  w.ns  so  insnpportahle 
to  him,  that  he  obtained  permission  to  go  on  a  pilgrimage  to  ihett  niple 
of  Zeus  Ammou  in  Libya,  under  the  ])l('a  lliat  he  had  a  vow  to  dis- 
charge. He  appears  also  to  have  visiud  tbe  temples  of  Dcii.lii  nnd 
Dodona,  with  secret  ambitious  projects  wliich  will  bementioritd  pres- 
ently. This  politic  withdrawal  softened  the  jealousy  Pgainst  hiiii, 
so  that  we  shall  find  Iiim,  after  a  year  or  two,  re-eslablish(d  in  gitnt 
influence  and  ascendency.  He  was  f-cnt  as  Sj^arlan  envoy,  at  ^^l)^lt 
precise  moment  we  do  not  know,  to  Syiacuse,  wliere  he  Kiit  couule- 
nance  and  aid  to  the  recently  established  de^poli^m  of  Dioitysius. 

The  position  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  a'ong  ihe  coast  of  loiiia,  yEoHs, 
and  the  Hellespont,  became  very  peculiar  after  tl  e  tiiuraph  of  Sjmrta 
at  ^gospotami.  I  have  already  recounte  d  how,  inmcdiately  after 
the  great  Athenian  Catastrophe  before  {^yiacusc.  llie  I'tisian  kingliiid 
renewed  his  grasp  upon  those  cities,  from  vhidi  the  viiiorous  hand 
of  Athens  had  kept  him  excluded  for  nioie  than  fifty  vears:  Ikav 
Sparta,  bidding  for  his  aid.  Iiad  eonsenled  by  three  foinial  (e)nven- 
tions  to  surrender  them  to  him,  \\hile  her  e  e  n  mi.-sieiner  Lie  has  even 
reproved  the  Milesians  for  their  aversion  to  lhi>li;igain:  he>\v  Athdis 
also,  in  the  days  of  her  weakness,  cempe  ting  for  the  same  advi'ntai:*', 
had  expressed  her  willingness  to  pay  the  same  price  for  it.  Alter 
the  battle  of  ^Egospotami,  this  convention  v.:s  eariied  inle)  (lT((t; 
tliough  seemingly  not  without  disputes  leMweeii  the  .^alra.p  I'har- 
iiabazus  on  one  side,  and  Lysaneler  and  DcikyU'das  en  ilie  e)ilier. 
The  latter  was  Lacediemonian  liarmost  at  .\ly  elos.  ^^hieh  1e)^\ll, 
so  important  as  a  station  on  the  IleJlespe-nt,  tiie  Laeeeian.e  iii:  iis 
seem  still  to  have  retained.  But  Pliarnabazus  and  his  n:be)idiiia;es 
acquired  more  complete  command  of  the  Helkspe>ntine  AEe)Iis  jiid  of 
the  Troad  than  ever  they  had  enjoyed  before,  both  ale)ng  the  toa>t 
and  in  the  interior. 

Another  element,  however,  soon  became  operative.  The  condiiioii 
of  the  Greek  cities  on  the  coast  of  leinia.  theujih  ;  cre)rding  to  P(  r- 
sian  regulations  they  belonged  to  the  .^^atrapy  of  Tiss{ii)hernes,  was 
now  materially  determined. — first,  by  the  competing  claims  of  Cyrus, 
who  wished  to  take  them  away  from  him.  and  ttieel  to  get  sueh 
transfer  orelered  at  court — next,  by  the  aspiralioi.s  of  that  youag 
]^rince  to  the  Persian  throne.  As  Cyrus  rested  liis  liope  of  success 
0!i  Gr'cian  co-operation,  it  was  highly  important  to  liim  te)  lemhr 
liimst^lf  popular  among  the-  Greeks,  e'speci.dly  on  his  own  side  of  tiic 
^EsT'^an.  Partlvhis  ')wn  maniH^-talions  of  I'ust  and  rone  iliate)rv  teni- 
per,  partly  the  bad  name  ami  known  periiely  of  Tissajiherne'S,  in- 
duced the  Grecian  cities  with  one  accord  to  revolt  from  the  latter. 
All  threw  themselves  into  the  arms  of  Cyrus,  except  ]\Iih*tus,  where 
Tissapherncs  interposed  in  lime,  slew   the  leaders  of  the  intended 


revolt,  and  banished  many  of  their  partisans.  Cyrus,  receiving  the 
exiles  with  distinguished  favor,  levied  an  army  to  besiege  Miletus 
aud  procure  their  restoration;  while  he  at  the  same  time  threw 
strong  Grecian  garrisons  into  the  other  cities  to  protect  them  against 

attack.  . 

This  local  quarrel  was,  however,  soon  merged  m  the  more  compre- 
hensive dispute  respecting  the  Persian  succession.  Both  parties 
were  f()un<l  on  the  field  of  Kunaxa;  Cyrus  with  the  Greek  sejldiers 
aud  Milesian  exiles  on  one  side— Tissaphernes  on  the  other.  How 
that  attempt,  upon  which  so  much  hinged  in  the  future  history 
bo!h  of  Asia  Minor  and  of  Greece,  terminated— I  have  already 
recounted.  Probably  the  impression  brought  back  by  the  Lacedai- 
nioniin  fleet  which  left  Cyrus  ou  the  coast  of  Syria,  after  he  had 
surmounted  the  most  eliiflcult  country  withtmt  any  resistance, 
was  hiiilily  fave)ral)le  to  his  success.  So  much  the  more  painful 
would  bc!  'the  disappointment  among  the  Ionian  Greeks  when  the 
news  of  his  death  was  afte-rward  brought:  so  much  the  greater  their 
alarm,  when  Tissaphernes,  having  relinquished  the  pursuit  of  the 
Ten  Thousand  Greeks  at  the  moment  when  they  entered  the  moun- 
tains of  Karduchia,  came  down  as  victor  to  the  seaboard;  more 
powerful  than  ever— rewarded  by  the  Great  King,  for  the  services 
which  he  had  rendered  auainst  Cyrus,  with  all  the  territory  which 
had  been  governed  by  the  latter,  as  well  as  with  the  title  of  com- 
mander-in-chief over  all  the  neighboring  satraps— aud  prepared^not 
only  to  reconquer,  but  to  punish,  the  revolted  maritime  cities.  He 
began  by  attaekirg  Kyme;  ravaging  the  territory,  with  great  loss  to 
the  eiiizens,  and  exacting  from  them  a  still  larger  contribution,  whea 
the  approach  of  winter  rendered  it  inconvenient  to  besiege  their  city. 

In  such  state  of  apprehension,  these  cities  sent  to  Sparta,  as  the 
great  imperial  power  of  Grc^ece,  to  entreat  her  protection  against  the 
air^ravated  slavery  irai)ending  over  them.  The  Lacedaemonians  had 
nothing  farther  to  exp;.'Ct  from  the  King  of  Persia,  with  whewi  they 
had  already  broken  the  peace  by  lending  aid  to  Cyrus.  Moreover 
the  fame  of  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  who  w^ere  now^  coming  home 
along  the  Euxine  te)ward  Byzantium,  had  become  diffused  through- 
out Gree'ce,  inspiring  signal  contempt  for  Persian  military  efficiency, 
and  hopes  of  enrichment  by  war  against  the  Asiatic  satraps.  Ac- 
eordingiy,  the  Spartan  Ephors  were  induced  to  comply  with  the 
]K'titio"i  of  their  Asiatic  countrymen,  and  to  send  over  to  AsiaThim- 
brou  at  the  head  of  a  considerable  force:  2,000  Neodame)eles  (or 
Helots  who  had  been  enfranchised),  and  4,000  Peloponnesian  heavy- 
armed,  accompanied  by  300  Athenian  horsemen,  out  of  the  number 
of  those  who  had  been  adherents  of  the  Thirty,  four  years  before; 
an  aid  granted  by  Athens  at  the  special  request  of  Thimbron.  Ar- 
riviuix  in  Asia  dliring  the  winter  of  400-899  B.C.,  Thimbron  was 
re-enforced  in  the  spring  of  399  B.C.  by  the  Cyreian  army,  who  were 
brought  across  from  Tnrace  as  described  in  my  last  chapter,  and 


612 


THE  LACEDEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


MANIA  IN  EOLIS. 


613 


taken  into  Lacedaemonian  pay.  Willi  this  large  force  he  became 
more  tlii'u  a  match  for  the  satraps,  even  on  the  plains  \vher(:  they 
eoiikl  employ  their  numerous  cavalry.  The  petty  Grecian  priuces 
of  Pergamus  and  Teuthrauia,  holding  that  territory  by  ancient  grants 
from  Xerxes  to  their  ancestors,  joined  iheir  troops  to  his,  contribul- 
iug  much  to  enrich  Xenophon  at  the-  moment  of  his  departure  iiom 
the  Cyreians.  Yet  Thimbron  achieved  nothing  worthy  of  so  large 
an  arnjy.  He  not  only  miscarried  in  the  siege  of  Larissa,  but  was 
even  unable  to  maintain  order  among  his  ov.n  soldiers,  -vvlio  pilhiged 
indiscriminately  both  Irieuds  and  foes  Such  loud  complaints  "svere 
transmitted  to  Sparta  of  his  irregularities  and  inefficiency,  that  the 
Ephors  first  sent  him  an  order  to  maich  into  Karia  where  Ti.ssa- 
phernes  resided — antl  next,  betore  that  order  was  exec  uied,  dispatched 
Derkyllidas  to  supersede  him;  Kcniinglyin  tlu  an  inter  399-o08  u.c. 
Thimbron  on  returning  to  bparia  was  fined  and  banished. 

It  was  highly  probable  that  the  Cyreiau  soldieis,  though  excellent 
in  the  field,  yet  having  been  disapp(  inted  of  reward  lor  the  pio- 
digious  tedls  which  ihey  had  gone  tLjc-iigh  in  their  long  march.  ai:d 
having  been  kept  on  short  allowance  in  Uiiace,  as  well  as  (heated 
by  Seuthes — were  greedy,  v.ixiupulous,  and  haul  to  be  restrained, 
in  the  matter  of  pillage';  c>p(cia]ly  r.s  Xenophon,  their  n.o^t  influ- 
ential general,  had  now  left  them.  *  1  htir  condi:et  greatly  improved 
under  "Derkyllielas.  And  though  sueh  inipiov'n:ent  was  doubtless 
owing  partly  to  the  supeiiority  of  the  latter  owr  Thimbron,  yet  it 
seems  also  partly  ascriballe  to'tbe  liiel  that  Xirc]l.on,  alter  a  few 
months  of  residence  at  Athens,  jucempanied  h.m  to  Asia,  Mid 
resumed  the  commanel  of  his  old  cemiades. 

Derkyllidas  was  a  man  of  so  DiUeh  lesource  ard  cunning,  as  to 
have  acejidred  the  surname  of  Sisjphus.  He  had  ^^  ned  tlirei  gheut 
all  the  concluding  years  of  the  war,  and  had  been  Haimost  at  ^\ly- 
dus  during  the  naval  command  of  Lysander,  who  coi.eiemned  h  ni, 
on  the  complaint  of  Pharnal  jszus,  to  the  disgiace  of  ]  i.blic  expoM.ie 
with  his  shield  on  his 'arm:  this  was  (1  prtsume)  a  disguice,  liee.'tiise 
an  officer  of  rank  always  had  his  shield  carried  for  him  by  an  alteiid- 
anl,  except  in  the  actual  encounter  of  Ir.ttle.  Having  i.tAer  foigiAcn 
1  liarnahazus  for  thus  dishonoring  him,  Lerkyllidjis  ne^w  took  {.cImih- 
tfige  of  a  misunderstanding  between  the  satiap  ;;nd  Tiss{i]'heines.  to 
nnke  a  truce  with  tlie  latter,  and  ccnduct  his  aimy,  8,(  (0  i-tieii.;., 
into  the  territoiy  ef  the  Icimer.  The  n.(  untaincus  regien  of  l(;i 
generally  kne)\vu  as  ihe  Ticjid — inhabited  by  a  population  cf  ,5  cii< 
Greeks  (who  had  pi.c  vinlly  Helhniztd  the  irditiene/us  inhrdiit.nts), 
anel  therefore  known  as  tl  V  ^Polis  of  Uitnnal  {;yus — was  laid  epen  \o 
him  by  a  recent  event,  in  [oiiant  in  itself  as  well  as  instructive  to 
read. 

The  entire  Persian  empire  was  parcedcd  into  fo  n  any  satrapies, 
each  satrap  being  bound  to  ser.d  a  fixed  jniountof  :  i  r.ual  trilute, 
and  to  hold  a  certain  amount  of  military  force  uady,  lor  the  court 


at  Susa.  Provided  he  was  punctual  in  fulfilling  these  obligations, 
little  inquiry  was  made  as  to  his  other  proceedings,  unless  in  the  rare 
case  of  his  maltreating  some  ia dividual  Persian  of  high  rank.  In 
hke  m.uujer,  it  appears,  each  satrapv  was  divided  into  sub-satrapies 
or  districts;  each  of  these  held  i)V  a  deputy,  wdio  paid  to  the  satrap 
a  fixed  tribute  and  maintained  for  him  a  certain  mihtary  force— 
iiavli)"--  libertv  to  govern  in  other  respects  as  he  pleased.  Besides  tlie 
tribute  however,'  presents  of  undefined  amount  were  of  constant 
occurrence,  be)th  from  the  satrap  to  the  king,  and  from  the  deputy 
to  the  satrap.  Nevertheless,  euouili  was  extorted  from  the  people 
(we  need  hardly  add),  to  leave  an  ample  profit  both  to  the  one  and  to 

the  other.  .  -,  ^      -n,         r  4. 

This  re"-ion,  called  ^Eolis.  had  been  intrusted  by  Pharnabazus  to 
a  native  e)f  Dardanus  named  Zenis,  who,  after  lK)lding  the  post  for 
some  time  antl  givino-  full  satisfaction,   died  of   illness,   leaving  a 
^vidow  with  a  son  and  dauuhter  still  minors.     The  satrap  was  on  the 
point  of  iriving  the  district   to  another  person,  wiien   Mania,  the 
widow  of  Zenis,  herself  a  native  of  Dardanus,  preferred  her  petition 
to  be  allowed  to  sueicee'd  her  husi)aud.     Visiting  Pharnabazus  with 
monev  in  hand,  sufficient  not  only  to  satisfy  himself,  but  also  to  gain 
over  his  mistresses  and  his  ministers— she  said  to  him— "JSIy  husband 
was  faithful  to  vou,  and  paid  his  tribute  so  regularly  as  to  obtain 
vour  thanks.     If"^  I  serve  vou  no  worse  than  he,  why  should  you 
iiaine  any  other  deputy?  'if  I  fail  in  giving  you  satisfaction,  you 
can  alwa'ys  remove  me,  and  give  the  place  to  another."^    Pharna- 
bazus granted  her  petition,  and  had  no  ewise  to  re'pent  it.     IVIania 
was  regular  in  her  pavment  of  tribute— frequent  in  bringing  him 
]nvsents— and  si)lendid,  beyond  any  of  his  other  deputies,  in  her 
manner  of  receiving  him  whenever  he  visited  the  district. 

Her  chief  residemce  was  at  Skepsis,  Gorgis.  and  Kebren— inland 
towns,  strong  both  by  position  and  by  fortification,  amid  the  moun- 
tainous region  once  belonging  to  the  Teukri  Gergithes.    It  was  here, 
too,  that  she  kept  her  treasures,  which,  ]>artly  left  by  her  husband, 
partly  accumulated  by  herself,  had  giadually  reached  an  enormous 
sum.'    But  her  district  also  reached  down  te)  the  coast,  comprising, 
among  other  towns,  the  classie-al  name  of  Ilium,  and  probablv  her 
own    native    city,    the    neighboring    Dardanus.      She    maintained, 
besides,  a  large  military  force  of  Grecian  mercenaries  in  regular  pay 
:uid  excellent  condition,  which  she  emidoyed  both  as  garrison  for 
e.u'h  of  her  de'pendent  towns,  and  as  means  for  conquest  in  the  neigh- 
borhood.     She  had    thus   reduced  the  maritime  towns  of  Larissa, 
Hainaxbus,  and  Kolome,  in   the  southern  part  of  the  Troad;  com- 
manding her  troops  in  person,  sitting  in  her  chaiie)t  to  witness  the 
attack,  and  rewarding  every  one  who'elistingnished  himself.     More- 
over, when  Pharnabazus  undertook  an  expedition  against  the  pre- 
date:>ry  Mysians  or  Pisidians,  she  accompanieel  him,  and  her  military 
force'formed  so  much  the  best  imrt  of  his  army,  that  he  paiel  her  the 


^^-i't'A.S^t.-tr 


614 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


TREATMENT  OF  MEIDIAS. 


615 


highest  compliments,  nrd  {-r  nu'timcs  condcFCcndcd  to  nsk  her  advice. 
So,  "vvhen  Xerxes  invjuicd  Gu^ce,  Artciinbiii,  Cjiiedi  ot  HnlikMiiuu^i-iis, 
Dot  oniy  liinii>hcd  ^liijs  an.c-iig  the  lot-iij  j  oiiitid  in  his  fleet,  {md 
ioiight  bravely  <it  Baliimis,  bul  j.l^o,  vLen  he  (hose  to  eall  a  ecuiuil, 
etood  alone  in  d.-iiing  lo  give  him  fonnd  opini(  ns  contrary  to  his  o"\vn 
lejtniiiL's — 0]>ini()ns  which,  1(  rn.iialejj'  for  the  Grecian  world,  lie 
c<  iild  bring  himself  only  to  tohu.te.  Lot  to  follow. 

Under  an  energetic  woman  like  Mania,  thus  victorious  and  well 

riovided,  iEolis  was  the  n.cst  defensible  yart  of  tlie  satrapy  of 
harnabazus,  and  might  piobally  have  d<fi(d  Dtrkyllidas.  had  not 
a  domestic  traitor  ]>ut  an  end  to  her  life.  Iltr  s(  n-in-law.  JNIddias,  a 
Greek  of  ^kcpsis,  with  whom  she  lived  (n  t(ims  of  inl mate  cod- 
tcitnee — "though  she  was  scrupulously  mistrustlul  of  evinone  else, 
as  it  is  proper  for  a  despot  to  be" — was  so  inflamed  by  his  (^\ll 
J  nibition  and  ])y  the  suggestions  of  evil  counselors,  who  told  him  it 
was  a  shame  that  a  woman  should  thus  be  ruler  while  he  was  imh  ;i 
private  man,  tliat  Ijc  strangled  her  in  lier  (han.ber.  Following  up  his 
mfarious  scheme,  he  also  assassinated  lier  son,  a  beautiful  youth  of 
seventeen.  He  succtedcd  in  getting  possession  of  the  three  strongest 
places  in  the  district — Kebren,  Skepsis.  and  Geigis,  together  wiili 
the  accumidated  triasure  of  Mania.  But  the  cemm.anders  in  ilie 
otlu  r  towns  refused  obedience  to  his  summons.  \ mil  thty  shoiiid 
K  ceive  orders  from  riiarnabazus.  To  that  satrap  ]\ledias  in^taniiy 
sent  envoys,  bearing  am]>le  piesents,  with  a  petition  that  tliesatup 
would  grant  to  him  ihe  district  winch  had  been  enjoyed  by  Mania. 
Pharnabaziis.  r*  j  i dijiting  the  iiresents,  sent  an  indignant  rcj^iy  lo 
Meidias — "  Kee]»  iluni  until  I  come  to  seize  them,  and  to  seize  \tu 
also  along  Aviih  them.  I  w  ould  not  consent  to  live  if  I  were  not  lo 
avenge  the  death  of  ^Fania." 

At  that  critical  moment,  prior  to  the  coming  of  the  saliap.  Dcilvl- 
lidas  presented  himself  with  his  amiy,  and  found  ^olis  ;i  iri(  .-t 
def(  useless.  The  three  recent  conquests  of  Mania — Lari^^a.  IImi.jix- 
ilus,  and  Kolome— surrendered  to  him  as  soon  as  he  appeared;  while 
the  garrisons  of  Ilium  and  some  other  ];laces,  who  had  taken  special 
senMce  umler  Mania,  and  found  themselves  worse  oil  now  that  lh(  y 
had  lost  her,  accepted  his  invitation  to  renounce  Persian  dc]K'ndeii( c, 
declare  themselves  allies  of  hparta,  and  hold  their  cities  lor  liini. 
He  thus  became  master  of  ujost  part  of  the  district,  with  the  excip 
lion  of  Kebren,  Sepsis,  and  Gorgis,  which  he  was  anxious  to  secure 
before  the  arrival  of  Pharnaba/us.  On  arriving  before  Kebren,  Juan 
ever,  in  spite  of  this  necessity  for  hasie,  he  remained  ii  active  lor 
four  dnys.  be^-ause  tlje  sacrifices  were  un)>ropitious;  while  a  ra.'-ii 
subordinate  oflicei.  hazarding  an  unwtirranted  attack  during  thisinkr- 
val,  w.-i-^  repulsed  and  woimded.  The  sacrifices  at  length  became 
favorable,  and  Derkyllidas  was  rewarded  for  his  patience!  The  gar- 
rison, affected  by  the  example  of  those  at  Ilium  and  the  other  towns, 
disobeyeel  their  commander,  who  tried  to  earn  the  satrap's  favor  by 


holding  out  and  assuring  to  him  this  very  strong  place.  Sending 
out  heralds  to  proclaim  that  they  would  go  with  Greeks  and  not 
with  Persians,  they  admitted  the  LacedcCnionians  at  once  within  the 
gates.  Having  thus  fortunately  captiucHl,  anel  duly  secured,  this 
important  tow^u,  Derkyllidas  marched  against  Skepsis  and  Gergis, 
the  former  of  which  was  held  by  Meidias  himself;  who.  dreading 
the  arrival  of  Pharnabazus,  and"  mistrusting  the  citizens  within, 
thought  it  best  tcJ  open  negotiations  with  Derkyllidas.  He  sent  to 
solicft  a  conference,  demanding  hostages  for  his  .safety.  When  he 
came  forth  from  the  towm,  and  demanded  from  the  Lacedicmoniaii 
commander  on  what  terms  alliance  would  be  granted  to  him,  the 
latter  replied:  "  On  condition  that  the  citizens  shall  be  left  free  and 
autonomous,"  at  the  same  time  marching  on,  without  waiting  either 
for  acquiescence  or  refusal,  straight  up  to  the  gates  of  the  town. 
3Ieidias,  taken  by  suri)rise,  in  the  power  of  the  assailants,  and  aw^are 
that  the  citizens  were  unfriendly  to  him,  Avas  obliged  to  give  orders 
tliat  the  gate  should  be  oi)ened,  so  that  Derkyllidas  found  himself 
by  this  rapid  maneuver  iu  possession  of  the  strongest  place  in  the 
district  without  either  loss  or  eleiay,  to  the  great  delight  of  the  Skep- 
siaus  tliemselves. 

Derkyllidas,  having  ascended  the  acropolis  of  Skepsis  to  offer  a 
sacritice  of  thtmks  to  Athene,  the  great  patron  goddess  of  Ilium  and 
most  of  the  Teukrian  towns— caused  the  garrison  of  ^Leidias  to 
evacuate  the  town  forthwith,  and  consigned  it  to  tlie  citizens  them- 
selves, exhorting  them  to  conduct  their  political  affairs  as  became 
Greeks  and  freemen.  This  proceeding,  which  reminds  us  of  B.a- 
sidas  in  contrast  with  Lysander,  -svas  not  less  politic  than  g<'nerous; 
since  Derkyllidas  could  h.irdly  hope  to  hold  an  inland  town  in  the 
midst  of  the  Persian  satrapy  except  by  the  attachment  of  the  citi- 
Zv'ns  themselves.  He  then  marched  away  to  Gergis,  still  conducting 
along  with  him  Meidias,  who  urgently  entreated  to  be  allowed  to 
retain  that  town,  the  last  of  his  remaining  fortresses.  Without  giv- 
ing any  decided  answer,  Derkyllidas  took  him  by  his  side,  and 
marched  with  him  at  the  head  of  his  army,  arrayed  only  in  double 
tile,  so  as  to  carry  the  appearance  of  peace,  to  the  foot  of  the  lofty 
towers  of  Gergis.  The  garrison  on  the  walls,  seeing  ]\leidias  along 
with  him,  allowed  him  to  approach  without  discharging  a  single  mis- 
sile. '*Now,  Meidias  (saiel  'he),  order  the  gates  to  be  opened,  and 
show  me  the  w^ay  in,  to  the  temple  of  Athene,  in  emler  that  I  mr.y 
there  offer  sacritie-e."  Again  Meidias  was  forced,  from  fear  of  being 
at  once  seized  as  a  prisoner,  to  give  the  order;  and  the  liaceda-mo- 
nian  forces  found  themselves  in  possession  of  the  town.  Derkyllidns, 
distributing  his  troops  rounvl  the  walls,  in  order  to  make  sure  of  his 
conquest,  ascended  to  the  acropolis  to  offer  his  intended  sacriliee; 
aftei  wiiich  he  proceeded  to  dictate  the  fate  of  INIeidias,  whom  he 
divested  of  his  character  of  prince  and  of  his  military  force— incor- 
porating the  latter  in  the  Lacedajmonian  army.     He  then  called  upon 


616 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  E3IPIRE. 


COMMAND  OF  DERKYLLIDAS. 


617 


Meidias  to  specify  all  bis  paternal  property,  and  restored  to  him  the 
wiiole  of  wliat  he  c-lainied  -ds  such,  though  tiie  bystanders  protested 
aiiuinst  the  statement  dven  in  as  a  tlagrant  exaggeration.  But  he  laid 
hands  on  all  the  properly,  and  all  tliLi  treasures  ot  Mania— and  caused 
her  house,  ^vhieh  Meidias  liad  taken  for  himself,  to  be  put  luida* 
seal— as  hiwful  prey;  since  Mania  had  belonged  to  Phaniabazus, 
aiiainst  whom  the  Lacediemonlans  \vere  making  war.  On  coming 
out,  after  examining  and  yeiilying  the  contents  of  the  house,  he  said 
to  his  olticers,  "Now,  my  friends,  we  have  here  already  worked  out 
pay  for  the  whole  army,  8,000  men,  for  near  a  year.  Whatever  we 
acquire  besides,  shall  come  to  you  also."  He  well  knew  the  favor- 
able effect  which  this  intelligence  would  produce  \\\Hm  the  temper, 
as  well  as  upon  the  discipline,  of  the  army— especially  upon  the 
Cyreians,  who  had  tasted  the  discomfort  of  irregular  pay  and  p(;V- 

ert  v. 

'"'And  where  am  I  to  live?"  asked  Meidias,  who  found  himself 
turned  out  of  the  house  of  Mania.  "In  your  rightful  i^lace  of  abode, 
to  be  sure  (repHed  Derkyllidas);  in  yom*  native  town  bkepsis,  and  in 
your  paternal  house."  AVnat  became  of  the  assassin  afterward,  wc 
do  not  hear.  But  it  is  satisfactory  to  lind  that  he  did  not  reap  the 
anticipated  reward  of  his  crime;  the  fruits  of  which  were  an  impor- 
tant advantage  to  Derkyllidas  and  bis  army,  and  a  still  more  impor- 
tant  blessing  to  the  Greek  cities  which  had  been  governed  by  .Mama 
— enfranchisement  and  autonomy. 

This  rapid,  easy,  and  skillfully-managed  exploit— the  capture  of 
nine  towns  in  vvzht  davs— is  all  which  Xenoplxm  mentions  as 
achieved  by  DerkvTlidas  during  the  summer.  Having  acquired  pay 
for  so  many  months.  per!;aps  the  soldiers  may  have  been  disposed  to 
rest  until  it  was  spent.  I>ut  as  winter  approached,  it  became  neces- 
sary to  tind  winter-quarters,  without  incurring  the  reproach  which 
had  fallen  upon  Thimbroii  of  consuming  the  substance  of  allies. 
Fearimr,  however,  that  if  he  changed  his  position,  Phaniabazus 
would  employ  thi3  numerous  Persian  cavalry  to  harass  the  Grecian 
cities,  he  tendered  a  truce,  which  the  latter  willingly  accepted.  For 
the  occupation  of  ^olis  by  the  Laceda'monian  genend  was  a  sort  of 
watch-post  (like  Dekeleia  to  Athens),  exposing  the  whole  of  Phrygia 
near  the  Propontis  (in  w  hich  was  Daskylium,  the  residence  of  Phar- 
nal)azus)  to  constant  attack.  Derkyllidas  accordingly  only  marched 
throuirh  Phrvgia,  to  take  up  his  winter  quarters  in  Bithynia,  tlie 
north-western  corner  of  Asia  Elinor,  Vtween  the  Propontis  and  th(! 
Euxine;  the  same  territory  through  which  Xenophon  and  the  Ten 
Thousand  had  marche<l,  on  their  road  from  Kalpe  to  Chalkedcm.  11' 
procured  abundant  provisions  and  booty,  slaves  as  well  as  cattle,  by 
plundering  the  Bithynian  villages;  not  without  occasional  losses  ou 
Lis  own  side,  by  the  carelessness  of  marauding  parties. 

One  of  these  losses  was  of  considerable  magnitude.     Derkyllidas 
had  obtained  from  Scathes  in  Eui-opeau  Thrace  (the  same  prince  of 


whom  Xenophon  had  had  so  much  reason  to  complain)  a  re-enforce- 
ment of  800  cavalry  and  200  peltasts — Odrysian  Thracians.  These 
Ovlrysians  estal)lished  themselves  in  a  se|)arate  camp,  nearly  two 
miles  and  a  half  from  Derkyllidas,  which  they  surrounded  with  a 
pilisadj  about  man's  height.  Being  inilefatigable  i)lunderers,  they 
prevailed  upon  Derkyllidas  to  send  them  a  guard  of  200  hoplites,  for 
the  p  u'i)ose  of  guarding  their  separate  camj)  with  the  booty  accmnu- 
];iled  within  it.  Presently  the  camp  became  richly  stocked,  espe- 
cially with  Bithynian  captives.  The  hostile  Bithynians,  however, 
watching  their  opportunity  when  the  Odrysiaus  were  out  marauding, 
suddenly  attacked  at  daybreak  the  200  Grecian  hoplites  in  the  camp. 
Slnoting  at  them  over  the  ])alisade  with  darts  and  arrows,  they  killed 
and  wounded  some,  while  the  Greeks  with  their  spears  were  utterly 
helpless,  and  could  only  reach  their  enemies  by  pulling  up  the  pali- 
sade and  charging  out  upon  them.  But  the  light-armed  as.sailants, 
easily  evading  the  charge  of  warriors  with  shield  and  spear,  turned 
round  upon  them  when  they  began  to  retire,  and  slew  several  before 
they  could  get  back.  In  each  successive  sally,  the  same  phenomena 
reeurivd,  until  at  length  all  the  Greeks  were  overpowered  and  slain, 
except  tifteenof  th(;m,  who  charged  through  the  Bithynians  in  the  tirst 
sally,  and  marched  onward  to  join  Derkyllidas,  instead  of  returning 
witii  their  coinrades  to  the  ])alisade.  Derkyllidas  lost  no  time  in 
sending  a  re-enforcement;  which,  however,  came  too  late,  and  found 
oalv  the  naked  bodies  of  the  slain.  The  victorious  Bithynians  carried 
asvay  all  then*  own  captives. 

At  the  beginning  of  sjiring,  the  Spartan  general  returned  to  Lamp- 
sakus,  where  he  found  Arakus  and  two  other  Spartans  just  arrived 
out  as  commissioners  sent  by  the  Eph()rs.  Arakus  came  with 
instructions  to  prolong  the  command  of  Derkyllidas  for  anotiier 
year;  as  well  as  to  communicate  the  satisfaction  of  the  Ephors  with 
the  Cyreian  army,  in  consequence  of  the  great  improvement  in  their 
conduct,  compaied  wiQi  the  year  of  Thimbron.  He  accordingly 
a>s  'mbled  thr'  soldiers,  and  addressed  them  in  a  mingled  strainOf 
praise  and  admonition;  expressing  his  hope  that  they  would  continue 
the  forbearance  which  they  had  now  begun  to  practice  towju'd  all 
Asi  itic  allies.  The  commander  of  the  Cyreians  (probably  Xenophon 
hiniself),  in  his  re]dy,  availed  himself  of  the  occasion  to  pay  a  com- 
p'lmcnt  to  Derkyllidas.  "  We  (said  he)  are  the  same  men  now  as 
we  were  in  the  previous  year;  but  we  are  under  a  different  general: 
you  need  not  look  farther  for  the  explanation."  Without  denying 
the  superiority  of  Derkyllidas  over  his  i)i-edeeessor,  we  may  remark 
that  the  abundant  wealth  of  Mania,  thrown  into  his  hands  by  acci 
(L'Ut  (though  he  showed  great  ability  in  turning  the  accident  to 
aeeouut),  was  an  auxiliary  circumstance,  not  less  unexpected  than 
Weighty,  for  insuring  the  good  behavior  of  the  soldiers. 

It  was  among  the  furtlier  instructions  of  Arakus  to  visit  all  the 
principal  Asiatic  Greeks,  and  report  their  condition  at  Sparta;  and 


'1 


618 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


DERKYLLIDAS  CAPTURES  ATARNEUS. 


619 


Dcrkyllidas  was  pleased  to  see  tliem  entering  on  this  survey  at  a 
moment  when  they  wouki  find  the  cities  in  undisturbed  peaee  and 
tranquillity.  So  loni^  as  the  truce  continued  b')th  with  Ti^sapl)erne3 
and  Pharnabazus,  these  cities  were  secure  from  a.^gressiou  and  paid 
no  tribute;  the  lanii-iorce  of  Derkyllidas  all'ording  to  tliem  a  pro- 
tection analogous  to  that  which  had  been  conferred  by  Athens  ar.d 
lier  powerful  lleet,  during  tlie  interval  between  the  formation  of  the 
Confederacy  of  Delos  and  Wm  xVtiienian  catastrophe  at  Syracuse.  At 
the  same  time,  during  the  truce,  the  army  had  neither  occupation  nor 
subsistence.  To  keep  it  together  and  near  at  h;md,  yet  without  liv- 
ing at  the  cost  of  friends,  was  the  problem. 

It  was  accordingly  with  great  satisfaction  that  Derkyllidas  noticed 
an  intimation  accidentally  dropped  by  Ard.ius.  Some  envoys  (the 
latter  said)  were  now  at  Sparta  from  the  Thracian  Chersouesus  (the 
long  tongue  of  land  bordering  westward  on  the  Hellespont),  soliciting 
aid  against  their  marauding  Tliracian  neighbors.  Tliat  fertile 
j)eninsula,  first  Helleni/.ed  a  century  and  a  lialf  before  by  the  Athe- 
nian Milliades,  had  l)een  a  favorite  resort  for  Athenian  citizens, 
many  of  whom  had  acquired  property  there  during  the  naval  })ower 
of  Athens.  The  battle  of  .Egospotanu  dispossessetl  and  drove  home 
these  lu'oprietors,  at  tlie  same  time  depriving  the  peninsula  of  its 
protection  against  the  Thracians.  It  now  contained  eleven  distinet 
cities,  of  which  Sestos  was  the  most  iiuportant;  and  its  inhabittuits 
combined  to  send  envoys  to  Sparta,  entreating  the  Ei>hors  to  dispatch 
a  force  for  the  purpose  of  building  awall  across  the  isthmus  from 
Kanlia  to  Paktye;  in  recompense  for  which  (they  said)  there  was 
fertile  land  enough  open  to  as  many  settlers  as  chose  to  come,  with 
coast  and  harbors  for  export  close  at  hand.  3Iiltiades,  on  first  going 
out  to  the  Chersonese,  had  secured  it  by  constructing  a  cross  wall  on 
the  same  spot,  which  had  since  bee  ome  neglected  during  the  period 
of  Persian  supremacy;  Perikles  lujd  afterward  sent  fresh  colonists, 
and  caused  the  wall  to  be  repaired.  But  it  seems  to  have  been 
unnecessary  while  the  Atlienian  empire  was  in  full  vigor — since  the 
Tiu-aeian  princes  liad  been  generally  either  conciliated,  or  ke])t  off. 
by  Athens,  even  without  any  such  bulwark.  Informed  that  the 
r"qu(;st  of  tin;  Chersonesites  had  been  favorai)ly  listened  to  at  Sparta, 
Derkyllidas  res(dved  to  execute  their  project  witli  his  own  army. 
Having  prolonged  his  truce  with  Pharnabazus,  he  crossed  the  Helles- 
pont into  Europr',  and  employed  his  army  during  the  whole  sununer 
in  constructing  this  cross  wall,  about  4|  miles  in  length.  The  work 
was  distributed  in  portions  to  ditfcrent  sections  of  tlie  army,  compe- 
titi(»n  b'ing  excited  by  rewards  for  the  most  rapid  and  workmanlike 
execution;  while  the" Chersonesites  were  glad  to  provide  pay  and 
subsistence  for  the  army,  during  an  operation  which  provided 
security  for  all  the  eleven  cities,  and  gave  additional  value  to  their 
lands  and  harbors.  Numerous  settlers  seem  to  have  now  come  in, 
under  Lacediumouian  auspices — who  were  again  disturbed,  wholly 


or  partially,  when  the  Laccdtemonian  maritime  empire  was  broken 
up  a  few  years  afterward. 

On  returning  to  Asia  in  the  autumn,  after  tlie  completion  of  this 
work  wdnch  had  kept  his  army  iisefully  employed  and  amply  pro- 
vided during  six  months,  Derkyllidas  undertook  tlie  siege  of  Atar- 
m'us,  a  strong  post  (on  the  continental  coast  eastward  of  Miiyleue) 
oecupied  by  some  Ciiiau  exiles,  whom  the  Lacedamonian  atlmiial 
Kratesippidas  had  lent  corrupt  aid  in  ex[)ellin'^  from  their  native 
island  a  few  years  before.  These  men,  living  by  predatory  expedi- 
tions against  Chios  and  Ionia,  were  so  well  sui>plied  with  provisions 
that  it  cost  Derkvllidas  a  blockade  of  eight  months  before  he  could 
reduce  it.  He  placed  in  it  a  strong  garrison  well  su])plied,  that  it 
inidit  serve  him  as  a  retreat  in  case  of  need— under  an  Acluean 
named  Drako.  whose  name  rem.ained  long  teriibie  Iroiu  his  ravages 
on  the  neighboring  plain  of  Mysia. 

Deikyllidas  next  proceeded  to  Ephesus,  where  ordeis  ])resently 
readied  him  from  the  Ei)hors,  directing  him  to  march  into  Karia  and 
attack  Tissaphernes.  The  temporary  truce  which  had  liitherto 
provisionally  kept  olt  Persian  soldiers  and  tribute-gatherers  froni  tlic 
Asiatic  Greeks,  was  now  renounced  by.  mutual  consent.  These 
Greeks  had  sent  euvovs  to  Sparta,  assuring  tlie  Ephors  that  Tissa- 
phernes would  be  con'strained  to  renounce  formally  the  sovereign 
ris2;hts  of  Persia,  and  grant  to  them  full  autonomy,  if  his  residence  in 
Karia  were  vigorously  attacked.  Accordingly  Derkyllidas  marclied 
southward  across  the  Mfca.nder  into  Karia,  while  the  Lacedaemonian 
tleet  under  Pharax  co-operated  along  the  shore.  At  the  same  time, 
Tissaphernes  on  his  side  had  received  re-enforcements  from  Susa, 
touelher  with  tlie  appointment  of  generalissimo  over  all  the  Persian 
force  in  Asia  Elinor;  upon  which  Piiarnabazus  (who  had  gone  up  to 
court  in  the  interval  to  concert  more  vigorous  means  of  i)rosecuting 
the  war,  but  had  now  returned)  joined  him  in  Karia,  prepared  to 
eoniinence  vigorous  operations  for  the  expulsion  of  Derkyllidas  and 
his  army.  Having  properly  garrisoned  the  strong  ]>laces,  the  two 
satraps  crossed  the  .Nheander,  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  Grecian 
and  Karian  force,  with  numerous  Persian  cavalry,  to  attack  the 
Ionian  cities.  As  soon  as  he  heard  this  news,  Derkyllidas  came  back 
with  his  army  from  Karia  to  cover  the  towns  menaced.  Having 
reerossed  the  Mfcander,  he  was  marcliing  with  his  army  in  di-order, 
not  suspecting  the  enemy  to  be  near,  when  on  a  sudden  he  came  upon 
their  scouts,  planted  on  some  sepulchral  monuments  in  the  road. 
He,  too,  sent  some  scouts  up  to  the  neighboring  monuments  and 
towers,  who  apprised  him  that  the  two  satraps,  with  their  joint  force 
in  good  order,  were  planted  here  to  intercei)t  him.  He  immediat(!ly 
pi ve  orders  for  his  hoplites  to  form  in  battle  array  of  eight  dovp, 
with  the  peltasts,  and  his  handful  of  horsemen  on  each  Hank,  l^ut 
such  was  the  alarm  caused  among  his  troops  by  this  surprise,  that 
none  could  be  relied  upon  except  the  Cyreians  and  the  Pcloponne- 


620 


THE  LACEDEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


SPARTAN  ENERGY. 


621 


sians.  Of  the  insular  and  Ionian  hoplitcs,  from  Pricne  and  otlicr 
cities,  some  actually  hid  their  arms  in  the  thick  standiii;::  corn,  :iiul 
fied;  others,  wIjo  took  their  places  in  the  line,  manifested  dispositions 
which  left  little  hope  tliat  tliev  would  stand  a  cliai\u::e;  so  thnt  llici 
Persians  had  the  opportunity  of  lighting  a  battle  not  merely  \viih 
superiority  of  uumt)er,  but  also  with  advantnge  of  position  ;uid 
circumstances.  Pharnabazus  was  anxit)us  to  attack  without  delay. 
But  Tissapherues,  who  recoilected  wt-il  the  valor  of  the  Cyi'jiaii 
troops,  and  concluded  that  all  the  remtuning  Greeks  Aveie  like  thcni, 
forbade  it;  sending  forward  herakls  to  demand  a  conierence.  As 
they  approaclied,  Derkyllidas,  surrountling  himself  with  a  body- 
guard of  the  tiuest  and  the  best  equi[>|ted  S(  Idiers,  advanced  to  the 
front  of  the  line  to  meet  them  saying  that  Ik;  for  his  part  was  pre- 
pared to  tight — but  since  a  conference  was  demiiiuled.  lie  Iwtd  no 
objection  to  grant  it,  j)rovidcd  hostages  were  exchangid.  This 
having  been  assented  to,  and  a  place  named  for  conference  on  the 
ensuing  day,  both  armies  were  sinudtaneoiisly  withdiawn;  the 
Persians  to  Tralles.  the  Greeks  to  Leukophrys,*  celebrated  for  its 
temple  of  Artemis  JA'ukophryne. 

This  backwardness  on  ihe  part  of  Tissaphernes,  even  at  a  time 
when  he  was  encouraged  by  a  brother  satrap  braver  than  himself, 
occasioned  to  the  Persians  the  loss  of  a  very  promising  moment,  iind 
resv'ued  the  Grecian  army  out  of  a  position  of  much  ]>eril.  It  helps 
to  explain  to  us  the  escape  of  the  Cyreians,  and  the  manner  in  whidi 
they  were  allowed  to  cross  rivers  and  pass  over  the  most  dillieult 
ground  without  any  serious  opposition,  while  at  the  same  tiir.c;  it 
tended  tocontirm  in  the  Greek  mind  the  same  impressions  of  Persian 
iml)ecility  as  that  escape  so  forcibly  suggest(  d. 

The  conference,  as  might  be  exiM'cted.  emled  in  nothing.  Der- 
kyllidas required  on  behalf  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  complete  autonomy 
— exemption  from  Persian  interference  and  tribute;  while  the  two 
satraps  on  their  side  insisted  that  the  J.aceda'monian  army  should  be 
withdrawn  from  Asia,  and  the  Laceda-monian  harmosts  from  all  the 
Greco- Asiatic  cities.  An  armistice  was  concluded,  to  allow  time  for 
reference  to  the  authorities  at  home;  thus  replacing  matteis  in  the 
condition  in  which  they  had  been  at  the  beginning  of  the  year. 

Shortly  after  the  conclusion  of  this  truce,  Agesilaus,  king  of 
Sparta  arrived  with  a  large  force,  and  the  war  in  all  respects  beg;ui 
to  assume  larger  proportions — of  which  more  in  the  nextcha]Uer. 

But  it  was  not  in  Asia  alone  that  Spsirta  engaged  in  war.  The 
prostration  of  the  Athenian  power  had  removed  that  common  bond 
of  hatred  and  alarm  which  attached  the  allies  to  her  headship: 
while  her  subsequent  conduct  had  given  positive  offense,  nnd  had 
even  excited  against  herself  the  same  fear  of  unmeasured  inqierial 
ambition  which  had  before  run  so  powerfully  against  Athens. 
She  had  appropriated  to  herself  nearly  the  whole" of  the  Athe- 
nian maritime   empire,   with  a  tribute   scarcely   inferior,  if  at  all 


inferior,  iii  amount.  How  far  the  total  of  1000  talents  was  actually 
re'alizf'd  during  each  successive  year,  we  are  not  in  a  condition  to 
say;  but  such  was  the  assessment'imposed  and  the  scheme  laid  down 
iiy  Sparta  .for  her  maritime  dependencies— enforced  too  by  omnipres- 
ent instruments  of  rapacity  and  oppression,  decemvirs  and  harmosts, 
such  as  Athens  had  never  paralleled.  When  we  add  to  this  great 
maritime  empire  the  prodigious  ascendency  on  land  which  Sparta 
had  enjoyed  before,  we  shall  find  a  total  of  material  power  far  supe- 
rior to  that  which  Athens  had  enjoyed,  even  in  her  day  of  greatest 
exaltation,  prior  to  the  truce  of  41o  B.C. 

This  was  not  all.  From  the  general  dullness  of  character  pervad- 
iuu-  Spartan  citizens,  the  full  resources  of  the  state  were  liardly  ever 
pul  forth.  Her  habitual  shortcomings  at  the  moment  of  action  are 
keenly  criticised  by  her  own  friends,  in  contrast  with  the  ardor  and 
forwaVdness  wdiich  animated  her  enemies.  But  at  and  after  the  bat- 
tle of  ^Egospotami,  the  entire  management  of  Spartan  foreign  affairs 
was  founll  in  the  hands  of  Lysander;  a  man  not  only  exempt  from 
the  inertia  usual  in  his  countrynu'n,  but  of  the  most  unwearied  activ- 
ity and  grasping  amlnlion,  as  well  for  his  country  as  for  himself. 
Under  his  direction  the  immense  advantages  which  Sparta  enjoycnl 
from  her  new-  position  wan-e  at  once  systematized  and  turned  to  the 
fullest  account.  Now  there  was  enough  in  the  new  ascendency  of 
Spiu'ta.  had  it  been  ever  so  modestly  handled,  to  spread  apprehension 
through  the  Grecian  world.  But  apprehension  became  redoubled, 
wheult  was  seen  that  her  ascendency  was  organized  and  likely  to  be 
worked  bv  her  most  aggressive  leader  for  the  i)iu-poses  of  an  insatiable 
and)ition.*^  Fortunatelv  for  the  Grecian  world,  indeed,  the  power  of 
Sparta  did  not  long  continue  to  be  thus  absolutely  wielded  by  Lysan- 
der, whose  arrogance  and  overweening  position  nused  enemies 
against  him  at  home.  Yet  the  llrst  impressions  received  by  the  allies 
respecting  Spartan  empire,  were  derived  from  his  proceedings  and 
his  plans  of  dominion,  manifested  with  ostentatious  insolence;  and 
such  impressions  continued,  even  after  the  influence  of  Lysander 
himself  had  been  much  abated  by  the  counter-working  rivalry  of 
Pausanias  and  others. 

While  Sparta  separatelv  had  thus  gained  so  much  by  the  close  of 
the  war,  not  one  of  her  allies  had  received  the  smallest  remuneration 
or  compensation,  except  such  as  might  be  considered  to  be  involved 
in  the  destruction  of  a  formidable  enemy.  Even  the  pecuniary  result 
or  residue  which  Lvsander  had  brought  home  with  him  (470  talents 
remaining  out  of  tlie  advances  made  by  Cyrus),  together  with  the 
bootv  acquired  at  Dekeleia,  was  all  detained  by  the  LacedaMuonians 
theniselves.  Thebes  and  Corinth  indeed  presented  demands,  in 
which  the  other  allies  did  not  (probably  durst  not)  join,  to  be  allowed 
to  share.  Bnt  thougli  all  the  efforts  and  sufferings  of  the  war  had 
fallen  upon  these  allies  no  less  than  upon  Sparta,  the  demands  were 
refused,  and  almost  resented  as  insults.     Henee  there  arose  among 


<i 


622 


THE  LACEDxEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


AGIS  INVADES  EIJS. 


623 


the  allies  not  merely  a  fear  of  tl)C  irrar-pinrr  dominion,  but  a  hatred  of 
the  monopolizing  rapacity  of  Sparta.  Of  tliis  new  feeling  an  early 
manifestation,  alilvC  glaring  and  important,  was  made  by  the  Tlie- 
bans  and  Corinthians,  when  they  refused  to  join  Pausanias  in  his 
march  against  Thrasybulus  antl  the  Athenian  exiles  in  Peincus— less 
than  a  year  after  the  surrender  of  Athens,  the  enemy  whom  tliese 
two  cities  had  hated  with  sueli  extreme  bitterness  down  to  the  veiy 
moment  of  surrender.  Even  Arcadians  and  Aeha-ans,  too,  liiibit- 
iially  obedient  as  they  were  to  Lacedienion,  ke(  nly  felt  the  different 
way  in  wl)ich  she  treated  them,  as  compared  with  the  previor.s  years 
of  war,  when  she  had  been  forced  to  keep  alive  their  zeal  agaiust  the 
common  enemy. 

The  Laeediemonians  were,  however,  strong  enough  not  merely  to 
despise  this  growing  alienation  of  their  allies,  but  even  to  t;ike  re- 
venge upon  such  of  Ihe  Peloponnesians  as  had  incurred  their  displeas- 
ure.°  Amonii-  these  stood  conspicuous  the  Eleians;  now  under  a  gov- 
ernment called  democratieal,  of  which  the  leading  man  was  Thrasy- 
^l^tus— a  man  wlio  had  lent  considerable  aid  in  404  u.c.,  to  Tiir.isy- 
bulus  and  the  Athenian  exiles  in  Peirieus.  The  Eleians  in  the  year  420 
B.C.  had  been  engaged  in  a  controver^y  with  Sparta— had  employed 
their  privileges  as  administrators  of  the  Olympic  festival  to  exclude  lier 
from  attendance  on  that  occasion— and  had  subsecpiently  been  in  arms 
airainst  her  along  with  Argos  and  :\Iantineia.  To  these  grounds  of 
qTiarrel,  now  of  rather  ancient  date,  had  been  added  afterward,  a 
refusal'to  furnish  aid  in  the  war  against  Athens  since  the  resumption 
of  hostilities  in  414  B.C.,  and  a  recent  exclusion  of  King  Agis,  who 
liad  come  in  person  to  otter  sacrifice  and  consult  the  oiacl(>  of  Zens 
Olympius;  such  exclusion  being  grounded  on  the  fact  that  h.e  was 
about  to  pray  for  victory  in  the  w^ar  then  pending  against  Atliens. 
contrary  to  the  ancient  canon  of  the  Olympic  tem])le,  which  admitted 
no  sacrifice  or  considtation  respecting  hostilities  of  Greek  against 
Greek.  These  were  considered  by  Sparta  as  affronts,  and  the  season 
was  now  favorable  for  resenting  them,  as  well  as  for  chastising  and 
humbling  Elis.  Accordingly,  Sparta  sent  an  eml)assy,  requiring  the 
Eleians  to  make  good  the  unpaid  arrears  of  the  quota  assessed  upon 
them  for  the  cost  of  the  war  against  Athens;  and  further— to  relin- 
quish their  authoritv  over  their  dependent  townships  or  Periceki, 
leaving  the  latter  autonomous.  Of  these  dependencies  there  v.ere 
several,  no  one  very  considerable  individually,  in  the  n  gion  called 
Triphylia,  south  of  the  river  Aiplieus,  and  north  of  the  Meda.  One 
of  them  vvas  Lepreum,  the  autonomy  of  which  the  Lacedjemonians 
liad  vindicated  against  Elis  in  4'?0  B.C.,  though  during  the  subsequent 
period  it  had  again  become  subject. 

Tlie  Eleians  refused  compliaiicr  with  the  demand  thus  sent,  alleg- 
ing that  their  dependent  cities  were  held  by  the  right  of  coiKiUcst. 
They  even  retorted  uiK)n  the  Lacedirmonians  the  charge  of  enslaving 
Greeks;  upon  which  Agis  marched  with  an  army  to  invade  their  ter- 


ritory, entering  it  from  the  north  side  where  it  joined  Achaia. 
Hardly  had  he  crossed  the  frontier  river  Larissus  and  begun  his  rav- 
a.'es  when  an  earthquake  occurred.  Such  an  event,  usually  con- 
sfrucd  in  Greece  as  a  divine  warning,  acted  on  tliis  occasion  so 
stron<dy  on  the  religious  susceptibilities  of  Agis,  that  he  not  only 
withdrew  from  the  Eleian  territory,  but  disbanded  his  army.  His 
retreat  "-ave  so  much  additional  courage  to  the  Eleians,  that  they  sent 
envoys  and  tried  to  establish  alliances  among  those  cities  wiiich  they 
knew  to  be  alienated  from  Sparta.  Not  even  Thebes  and  Corinth, 
liowever,  could  be  induced  to  assist  them;  nor  did  they  obtain  any 
o'her  aid  except  1000  men  from  ^Etolia. 

In  the  next  summer  Agis  undertook  a  second  expedition,  aecom- 
puiied  on  this  occasion  by  all  the  allies  of  Sparta;  even  by  the 
Athenians,  now  em-olled  upon  the  list.  Thebes  and  Corinth  alone 
.stood  aloof.  On  this  occasion  he  approached  from  the  opposite  or 
southern  side,  that  of  the  territory  once  called  Messenia:  passing 
throu'di  Anion,  and  crossing  the  river  Xeda.  He  marched  tlirough 
Triphvlia  to  the  river  Alnheus,  which  he  crossed,  and  then  proceeded 
to  Olympia,  where  he  consummated  the  sacrifice  from  which  the 
Eleians  had  before  excluded  him.  In  his  march  he  was  joined  by 
the  inhabitants  of  Lepreum,  Makistus,  and  other  dependent  towns, 
which  now  threw^  olf  their  subjection  to  Elis.  Thus  re-enforced,  Agis 
proceeded  onward  toward  the  city  of  Elis,  through  a  productive 
country  under  flourishing  agriculture,  enriched  by  the  crowds  and 
sacrifices  at  the  neighboring'Olympic!  temple,  and  for  a  long  period 
nnass:iiled.  After  attacking,  not  very  vigorously,  the  half-fortified 
citv— and  being  repelled  bv  the  ^tolian  auxiliaries— he  marched  on- 
ward to  the  liarbor  called  Ivyllene,  still  plundering  the  territory.  So 
ample  was  the  stock  of  slaves,  cattle,  and  rural  wealth  generally, 
that  his  troops  not  onlv  acquired  riches  for  themselves  by  plunder, 
hut  were  also  joined  by  many  Arcadian  and  Achaean  volunteers,  who 
crowded  in  to' partake  of  the  golden  harvest. 

The  opposition  or  wealthy  oligarchical  party  in  Elis  availed  them- 
selves of  this  juncture  to  take  arms  against  the  government;  hoping 
to  get  possession  of  the  city,  and  to  maintain  themselves  in  powder  by 
tlK^aid  of  Sparta.  Xenias  their  leader,  a  man  of  immense  weallh, 
witii  several  of  his  adherents,  rushed  out  armed,  and  assailed  the 
government-house,  in  which  it  appears  that  Thrasydosus  and  his  col- 
leagues had  been  banqueting.  They  slew  several  persons,  and 
anion"-  them  one,  whom,  from  great  personal  resemblance,  they  mis- 
took for  Thrasydaeus.  The  latter  was,  however,  at  that  moment 
intoxicated,  and  asleep  in  a  separate  chamber.  They  then  assembled 
m  arms  in  the  market  place,  believing  themselves  to  be  masters  ot 
the  city;  while  the  people,  under  the  like  impression  that  Thrasyd- 
aMis  was  -dead,  were  too  much  dismayed  to  offer  resistance.  But 
presently  il  became  known  that  he  \vas  yet  alive;  the  people  crowded 
to  the  government-house  "  like  a  swarm  of  bees,"  and  arrayed  them- 


624 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  EMPIRE. 


TRIUMPHANT  POSITION  OF  SPARTA. 


625 


selves  for  bis  protection  as  well  as  under  liis  guidance.  Leadino- 
tiieni  forth  at  once  to  battle,  he  completely  deleattd  the  oligarchical 
insurgents,  and  forced  them  to  tlee  for  protection  to  theLaccdaj- 
iiioniau  army. 

Agis  ])resently  evacuated  the  Eleian  territory,  yet  not  Avithoiit 
planting  a  Lacedfemonian  harmust  and  a  garrison,  together  uiih 
Xeiiias  and  the  oligarchical  exiles,  at  Epitalium,  a  little  way  soutii 
of  the  river  Alpheus.  Occupying  this  fort  (analogous  to  Dekeleia  in 
Attica),  they  spread  ravage  and  ruin  all  around  throughout  the 
autumn  and  winter,  to  such  a  degree,  that  in  the  earty  sprinsr, 
Thrasydicus  and  the  Ek-ian  government  were  compelled  to  send  to 
Sparta  and  solicit  peace.  They  consented  to  raze  the  imperfect  forti- 
fications of  their  city,  so  as  to  leave  it  (piile  open.  They  further 
surrendered  their  harbor  of  Kyllene  with  their  ships  of  war,  jmd 
relinquished  all  authority  over  ihe  Trij)!  ylinn  tov.nships,  as  well  as 
over  Lasiou,  which  was  claimed  as  an  Aicadian  town.  Though  they 
pressed  strenuously  their  claim  to  jjieserve  the  town  of  Epeium  (be- 
tween the  Arcadhm  town  of  lleviea  and  the  Triphylian  town  of 
Makistus),  on  the  plea  that  th.ey  had  bought  it  from  its  previous  in- 
habitants at  the  ])rice  of  thirty  talents  jKiid  down— the  LacedaMuo- 
nians,  pronouncing  this  to  be  aconipul^ory  bargain  imposed  np(.n 
weaker  parties  by  force,  refused  to  recognize  it.  The  town  was 
taken  away  from  them,  seemingly  without  any  reimbursement  of  the 
purchase-money  either  in  j.art  or  in  whole.'  On  these  terms  the 
Eleians  were  admitted  to  peace,  ar.d  enrolled  again  among  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Lacedtemonian  confe(ieracy. 

The  time  of  the  Olynipie  fe>lival  seelns  to  have  been  now  approach- 
ing, and  the  Eleians  were  ]irobal.ly  the  more  anxious  to  obtain  peace 
from  Sparta,  as  they  feared  to  be  dei)rived  of  their  ])rivilege  as  super-' 
intendents.  The  Pisatans— inlnibilants  (;f  the  district  immediately 
round  Olympia— availed  themselves  of  the  Spartan  invasion  of  Elis 
to  petition  for  restoration  of  their  original  privilege,  as  adminisliators 
of  the  temple  of  Zeus  at  Olymjjia  with  its  great  "periodical  solemnity 
—by  the  dispossession  of  the  Eleians  as  usurpers  of  that  piivileue. 
Put  tl;eir  request  met  with  no  success.  It  was  true,  indeed,  tiiat 
such  right  liad  belonged  to  the  Pisalans.  in  earlv  davs,  before  the 
(Jlympic  festival  had  acquired  its  actual  Pan-Hellenic  importance  ar.d 
grandeur;  and  that  the  Eleians  had  only  appropriated  it  to  them- 
selves after  conquering  the  territory  of  Vila.  But  taking  the  festivnl 
as  it  then  stood,  the  Pisatans.  mereVillaiiei-s  without  anv  considerable 
city,  were  incompetent  to  do  justice  to  it,  and  would  have  lowered 
its  dignity  in  the  eyes  of  all  Greece. 

Accordingly,  the*  Lacediemonians.  on  this  ground,  dismissed  the 
claimants,  and  left  the  superintendence  of  the  01ymi)ic  games  still  in 
the  hands  of  the  Eleijins. 

This  triumphant  dictation  of  terms  to  Elis  placed  the  Laceda3- 
mouiuns  iu  a  condition  of  overruling  ascendency  throughout  Pelo- 


ponnesus, such  as  they  had  never  attained  before.  To  complete 
iheir  victory,  they  rooted  out  all  the  remnants  of  their  ancient 
enemies  the  Messenians,  so.e.e  of  whom  had  been  plan  led  by  the 
•Vtlienians  at  Naupaktus,  others  in  the  island  of  Kephallenia.  All 
oi  this  persecuted  race  were  now  expelled,  in  tiie  hour  of  Lacedae- 
monian omnipotence,  from  the  neighborhood  of  Peloponnesus,  .and 
forced  to  take  shelter,  some  in  Sicily,  others  at  Kyrene  We  shall 
in  a  future  chapter  have  to  commemorate  the  turn  of  fortune  in  their 
favor. 


CHAPTER  LXXIII. 

AGESILAUS  KING  OF  SPARTA.— THE   COllTNTIIIAN  WAR. 

The  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  with  the  victorious  organi- 
zation of  the  Lacedemonian  empire  by  Lysauder,  has  already  beea 
described  as  a  period  carrying  with  it  increased  suffering  to  those 
towns  which  had  formerly  belonged  to  the  Athenian  empire  as  com- 
mi'-d  with  what  they  had  endured  under  Athens  — and  iiarder 
dep'endence,  unaccompanied  by  any  species  of  advantage,  even  to 
those  Peh)ponnesians  and  inland  cities  which  had  always  beeii 
dependent  allies  of  Sparta.  To  complete  the  melancholy  picture  of 
the  Grecian  world  during  these  years,  we  may  add  (what  will  be 
hereafter  more  fully  detailed)  that  calamities  of  a  still  more  dei)lor- 
nble  character  overtook  the  Sicilian  Greeks:  first,  from  the  mva.ion 
of  the  Cartha-inians,  who  sacked  Himera,  Selinus,  Agrigentum,  G.'la, 
and  Kamarina— next  from  the  overruling  despotism  of  Dionysius  at 

Syracuse.  .  ,    ,    .  .  -.•  •  *     ♦ 

Sparta  alone  had  been  the  trainer;  and  that  to  a  prodigious  extent, 
both  in  revenue  and  power.  It  is  from  this  time,  and  from  the  pro- 
ceedino-s  of  Lysander,  that  various  ancient  authors  dated  the  com- 
mencement of  her  dejreneracy,  which  they  ascribe  mainly  b)  her 
departure  from  the  institutions  of  Lvkurgus  by  admitting  gold  and 
silver  money.  These  metals  had  before  been  strictly  prohibited;  no 
money  beiiig  tolerated  except  heavy  pieces  of  iron,  not  portable 
except  to  a  very  trifling  amount.  That  such  was  the  ancient  insti- 
tution of  Sparta,  under  which  any  Spartan  having  in  his  possessnm 
<'-old  and  silver  money,  was  liable,  if  detected,  to  punishment,  appears 
certain  How  far  the  retrulation  mav  have  been  m  practice  evaded, 
we  have  no  means  of  determining.  Some  of  the  Ephors  stij^nuously 
ouposed  the  admission  of  the  large  sum  brought  home  by  Lysander 
as  remnant  of  what  he  had  received  from  C^yrus  toward  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war  They  contended  that  the  aduiission  of  so  much 
o-old  and  silver  into  the  public  treasury  was  a  flagrant  transgression 
of  the  Lykurgean  ordinances.     But  their  resistance  was  unavailing, 


626 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


CHANGE  IN  SPARTAN  HABITS. 


627 


and  the  new  acquisitions  were  roceivcd;  tliouc:li  it  still  continued  to 
be  a  peual  offense  (and  was  even  nuule  a  eapilal  offense,  if  we  May 
trust  Plutarch)  for  any  individual  to  be  found  willi  gold  and  silver 
in  his  possession.  To  mforce  sucli  a  ])roliibiti(jn,  Iiowevcr,  evjii  if 
practit;able  be  fore,  ceased  to  be  practicable  80  soon  as  tlicse  nielals 
were  recognized  and  tolerated  iu  the  possession,  and  for  the  pur- 
poses, of  the  government. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  introduction  of  a  large  sum  of 
coined  gold  and  silver  into  Sparta  "was  in  itself  a  striking  and  impor- 
tant phenomenon,  when  viewed  in  conjunction  with  the  peculiar 
customs  and  discipline  of  the  slate.  It  was  likely  to  raise  strong 
antipathies  in  the  bosom  of  an  old-fashioned  S))artan,  and  i)rol)al»ly 
King  Archidanuis,  had  he  been  alive,  would  have  taken  part  wiiii 
the  opposing  Ephors.  But  Plutarch  and  others  have  criticised  it  too 
luuch  as  a  phenomenon  by  itself;  whcieas  it  was  really  one  charac- 
teristic mark  and  portion  of  a  new  assemblage  of  circuinstances,  into 
which  Sparta  had  been  gradually  arriving  during  the  last  years  of  the 
war,  and  which  were  brought  into  the  most  eii'ective  action  by  the 
decisive  success  at  il]gospotami.  The  institutions  of  LykuVgus, 
though  excluding  all  Si>artjui  citizens,  by  an  unremitting  drill  and 
public  mess,  from  trade  and  industry,  from  ostentation,  and  from 
luxury — did  not  by  any  means  extinguish  in  their  bosoms  the  love  of 
money:  while  they  had  a  positive  tendency  to  exaggerate,  rather 
than  to  abate,  the  love  of  ])ower.  The  Spartan  kings  Eeotychides 
nnd  Pieistoanax  had  Ix  th  been  guilty  of  receiving  bribes;  Tisi;aph(>rncs 
liad  found  means  (during  the  twentieth  year  of  the  Pelojonnesian 
war)  to  corrupt  not  merely  the  Spartan  admiral  Astyochus,  but  also 
nearly  all  the  captains  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  except  the  Syra- 
cusan  Hermokrates;  Gylij^pus.  as  well  as  his  father  Kleandrides,  had 
degraded  himself  by  the  like  fraud;  and  Anaxibius  at  Byzantium 
was  not  at  all  purer.  Lysandcr,  enslaved  only  by  his  app(  tite  for 
dominion,  and  lumself  a  remarkable  instance  of  sui>eriority  to  pecu- 
niary corruption,  was  thus  not  the  first  to  engraft  that  vice  on  the 
minds  of  his  countrymen.  But  though  he  found  it  already  diffused 
among  them,  he  did  much  to  impart  to  it  a  still  more  deeded  pre- 
dominance, by  the  immense  increase  of  opportunities,  and  enlariidl 
booty  for  peculation,  which  his  newly  organized  Spartan  empire  fur- 
nished. Not  merely  did  he  bring  homo  a  large  residue  in  gold  and 
silver,  but  there  was  a  much  larger  annual  tribute  imposed  by  him 
on  the  dependent  cities,  combined  with  numerous  appointments  of 
harmosts  to  govern  the  cities.  Such  appointments  pi-esented  abun- 
dant illicit  profits,  easy  to  acquire,  and  even  diflicult  to  avoid,  since 
the  decemvirs  in  each  city  were  eager  thus  to  purchase  forbearance 
(TV  connivance  for  their  own  misdeeds.  So  many  ncnv  sources  of  cor- 
ruption were  sufficient  to  operate  most  unfavorably  on  the  Spartan 
character,  if  not  by  implanting  any  fresh  vices,  at  least  by  stimulat- 
ing all  its  inherent  bad  tendencies. 


•  To  understand  the  material  change  thus  wrought  in  it,  we  have 
mly  to  contrast  the  speeches  of  King  Archidiuaus  and  of  the  Corin- 
ihians,  made  in  482  B.C.  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloi)()nnesian  war 
—with  the  stiite  of  facts  at  the^eud  of  the  war,  during  tlie  eleven 
rears  iK'tween  the  victory  of  ^gospotami  and  the  defeat  of  Knidus 
i0")-394  B.C.).  At  the  former" of  the  two  epochs,  Sparta  had  no 
riiiutary  subjects,  nor  any  funds  in  her  treasury,  while  her  citizens 
wre  very  reluctant  to  pay  imposts:  about  334  B.C..  thirty-seven  years 
iiiLT  her  defeat  at  Leuktra  and  her  loss  of  Messenia,  Aristotle  remarks 
iiL'  like  fact,  which  had  then  again  become  true;  but  during  the  con- 
iiiuance  of  her  empire,  between  405  and  394  B.C.,  she  possessed  a 
i;ir.ie  public  revenue,  derived  from  the  tribute  of  the  dciiendent 
.ilu's.  In  432  B.C.,  Sparta  is  not  merely  cautious  but  backward; 
;  <peeiallv  averse  to  any  action  at  a  distance  from  home;  in  404  B.C., 
:trv  the  close  of  the  war,  she  becomes  aggressive,  intermeddling, 
lud  ready  for  dealing  with  enemies  or  making  acquisitions  remote  as 
\\\ll  as  near.  In  432  B.C.,  her  unsocial  and  exclusive  manners  against 
li  •  rest  of  Greece,  with  her  constant  ex!)ulsion  of  other  Greeks  from 
iK'i- own  city,  stand  prominent  among  her  attributes;  while  at  the 
n  1  of  the  war,  her  foreign  relations  had  acquired  such  great  devel- 
ipmeut  as  to  become  the  principal  matter  of  attention  for  her  leading 
■iiizeus  as  well  as  for  h'er  magistrates;  so  that  the  inilux  of  strriugcrs 
into  Sparta,  and  the  efllux  of '  Spartans  into  otlier  parts  of  Greece, 
Kcame  constant  and  inevitable.  Hence  the  strictness  of  tlie  Lykur- 
:Q[\n  discipline  gave  Avay  on  many  points,  and  the  principal  Spartans 
'sp'.'cially  strugi:led  by"^  various  shifts  to  evade  its  ol)ligatioiis.  It 
was  to  these  leading  men  that  the  great  i)rizes  fell,  enabling  them  to 
lurieh  themselves  at  the  expense  either  of  foreign  subjects  or  of  the 
jtuljlic  treasury,  and  tending  more  and  more  to  aggravate  that  inequal- 
ity of  wealth'ainoug  the  Spartans  which  Aristotle  so  emphatically 
notices  in  his  time;  since  the  smaller  citizens  had  no  similar  oppor- 
i unities  opened  to  them,  nor  any  industry  of  their  own,  to  guard 
ilicir  properties  against  gradual  subdivision  and  absorption,  and  to 
ivcep  them  in  a  permanent  state  of  ability  to  furnish  that  contribution 
10  the  mess-table,  for  themselves  and  their  sons,  which  formed  the 
?  ,n-()utidwork  of  Spartan  political  franchise.  Moieover,  the  spectacle 
■fsueli  newly-opened  lucrative  prizes — accessible  only  to  that  par- 
licular  secttion  of  inffuential  Spartan  families  who  gradually  became 
known  apart  from  the  rest  under  the  title  of  the  ecpials  or  peers— 
imhiit(.red  the  discontent  of  the  energetic  citizens  beneath  that  privi- 
k',ij;ed  position,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  menace  the  tranqudlity  of  the 
^tate— as  will  presently  be  seen.  That  sameness  of  life,  habils, 
ittainments,  aptitudes,  enjoyments,  fatigues,  and  restraints,  which 
the  Lykurgean  regulations  had  so  long  enforced,  and  still  continued 
'')  prescribe— divesting  wealth  of  its  |>rincipal  advantages,  and  thus 
keeping  up  the  sentiment  of  personal  equality  among  the  poorer  citi- 
Jious— became  more  and   more  eluded    by  the  richer,  thi'ough  the 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


POWER  OF  LYSANDER. 


629 


f 


venality  as  Avoll  as  the  example  of  Ephors  and  Senators;  while  for 
those  who  had  no  means  of  corruption,  it  continued  nnrehixod, 
except  in  so  far  as  many  of  tliem  fell  into  a  still  more  degraded  con- 
dition by  the  loss  of  tiieir  citizenship. 

It  is  not  merely  Isokrates  who  attests  the  corruption  wroiiglit  in 
the  charaeter  of  tlie  Spartans  by  tlie  possession  (^f  that  forcitrn  empire 
wiiich  followed  the  victory  of  ^Egospotami — but  also  their  earncsi 
panegyrist  Xenophon.  After  havmg  warmly  extolled  the  hnvs  of 
Lykurgus  or  tlie  Spartan  institutions,  he  is  constrained  to  admit  th;U 
hfs  euTogies,  though  merited  by  the  past,  have  become  lamentably 
inapplicable  to  that  present  whicli  he  himself  witnessed.  "Formerly 
(says  he)  the  Lacediemonians  used  to  prefer  their  own  society  and 
moderate  way  of  life  at  h'.me,  to  apj^^intments  as  harmosls  in  for 
eign  towns,  witli  all  the  flattery  and  all  the  corrui^tion  atteiuliui; 
them.  Formerly,  they  were  afraid  to  be  seen  with  gold  in  tiieir  p^s 
session;  now,  there  are  some  who  make  even  an  ostentatious  display 
of  it.  Formerly,  they  enforced  tiieir  (Xenclasy  or)  expulsion  of 
strangers,  and  for])ad(^  foreign  travel,  in  order  that  their  citi/.(i:> 
might  not  be  tilled  with  relaxed  habits  of  life  from  conlaet  with  for 
cigners;  but  now,  those  who  stand  first  in  point  of  influence  amoiii; 
them,  study  above  all  things  to  be  in  perpetual  employment  as  har 
mosts  abroad.  There  was  a  time  when  they  took  i>aiiis  to  be  worthy 
of  headship;  but  now  they  strive  much  rather  to  get  and  keep  the 
command  than  to  be  properly  qualified  for  it.  Accordingly  the 
Greeks  used  in  former  days  to  come  and  solicit,  that  tlie  Spartaii> 
would  act  as  their  leaders  atrainst  wrong-doers;  but  now  tliev  ar( 
exhorting  each  other  to  concert  measures  for  ^shutting  out  Si)arla 
from  renewed  empire.  Nor  can  w^e  wonder  that  the  Spartans  have 
fallen  into  this  discredit,  when  thevhave  manifestlv  renounced  ohedi 
ence  both  to  the  Delphian  god  and  to  the  institutions  of  Lykurgus. 

This  criticism  (written  at  some  period  between  894-71  ij.c.)  from 
the  strenucms  eulogist  of  Sparta  is  highly  instructive.  We  know  fntni 
other  evideiures  how  badly  the  Spartan  empire  worked  for  the  subject 
cities;  we  here  learn  liow  badly  it  worked  for  the  character  oi.  the 
Spartans  themselves,  and  for  those  internal  institutions  which  even 
an  enemy  of  Sparta,  who  detested  her  foreign  policy,  still  felt  con- 
strained to  admire.  All  the  vices,  here  insisted  upon  by  Xenophon. 
arise  from  various  incidents  connected  with  lier  empire.  The  mod- 
erate, home-keeping,  old-fashioned,  backwar<l  disposition — of  which 
the  Corinthians  complain,  but  for  which  King  Archidamus  takes 
credit,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  War — is  found  ex- 
changed, at  the  close  of  the  war,  for  a  spirit  of  aggression  and  con- 
quest, for  ambition  public  as  well  as  private,  and  for  emancipation  of 
the  great  men  from  the  subduing  ecjuality  of  discipline  enacted  by 
Lykurgus. 

Agis  the  son  of  Archidamus  (42(>-399  t,.c.\  and  Pausanias  son  of 
Pleistouuax  (408-39-4  B.C.),  were  the  two  kings  of  Sparta  at  the  end 


of  the  w\'ir.    But  Lysandcr,  the  admiral  or  commander  of  the  fleet, 
was  for  the  time  greater  than  either  of  the  two  kings,  who  had  the 
ri-ht  of  commanding  only  the  troops  on  land.     I  have  already  men- 
tioned how  his  overweening  dictation  and  insolence  offended  not  only 
Pausanias  but  also  several  of  the  Ephors  and  leading  men  at  Sparta, 
as\vell  as'Pharnabazus  the  Persian  satrap;  thus  indiiectly  bringing 
^bout  the  emancipation  of  Athens  from  the  Thirty,  the  partial  dis- 
coiirao-ement  of  the  Dekarchies  throughout  Greece,  and  tne  recall  of 
Lv>ander  himself  from  his  command.     It  was  not  without  reluctance 
tint  the  conqueror  of  Athens  submitted  to  descend  again  to  a  iiriviite 
stuion      Amid  the  crowd  of  flatterers  who  heatped  incense  on  hmi 
at  the  moment  of  his  omnipotence,  there  were  not  wanting  those  who 
'.u.r.rested  that  he  was  much  more  worthy  to  reign  than  eit^ier  Agis  or 
Pau'sanias:  that  the  kings  ought  to  be  taken,  not  fron  the  first-born  of 
the  linean-e  of  Eurvj^thenes  and  Prokles.  but  by  selection  out  of  all 
the  Herakleids,  of  whom  Lysandcr  himself  w^as  one ;  and  that  the  per- 
son elected  ouiiht  to  be  not  merely  a  descendant  of  Ilerakles,  but  a 
worthy  parallel  of  Ilerakles  himself.     AVHiile  pagans  ^yere  sung  to  the 
honor  of  Lvsander  at  Samos-while  Chcerilus  and  Aniilochus  corn- 
nosed  noem^sin  his  praise-while  Antimachus  (a  poet  higlily  esteemed 
by  Plato)  entered  into  a  formal  competition  of  recited  epic  verses 
called  Lmindria,  and  was  supivassed  by  Nikerat us— there  was  an- 
other warm  admirer,  a  rhetor  or  sophist  of  Halikarnassus    named 
Kleon   who  wrote  a  discourse  proving  that  Lysandcr  had  well  earned 
the  re<^al  dignity— that  personal  excellence  ought  to  prevail  over  leg- 
itiniat?  descent-and  that  the  crown  ought  to  be  laid  open  to  election 
from  the  most  worthy  among  the  Herakleids.     Considering  that  rhe- 
toric wjis  neither  employed  nor  esteemed  at  Sparta,  we  cjiunot  reason- 
ably believe  that  Lysandcr  really  ordered  the  composition  of  this 
discourse  as  an  instrument  of  execution  for  projects  preconceived  by 
himself   in  the  same  manner  as  an  Athenian  prosecutor  or  detcmdant 
before  the  Dikastery  used  to  arm  himself  with  a  speech  from  Lyshis 
or  Demosthenes.     Kleon  would  make  hiscourt  professionally  through 
such  a  prose  composition,  whether  the  project  were  first  recommend- 
ed by  liimself,  or  currently  discussed  among  a  circle  of  admirers; 
whil6  Lysandcr  would  probably  requite  the  compliment  by  a  reward 
not  less  munificent  than  that  which  he  gave  to  the  indifferent  poet 
Aniilochus.     And  the  composition  would  be  put  into  the  form  of  an 
haran-ue  from  the  admiral  to  his  countrymen   without  aiiy  definite 
purpose  that  it  should  be  ever  so  delivered      Such  l^vpothe^is  of  a 
speaker  and  an  audience  was  frequent  with  the  rhetors  in  the  i^  rat- 
ings, as  we  may  see  in  Isokrates-especially  m  his  sixth  discouise, 

called  Archidamus.  . -  ^ti.oT-a 

Either  from  his  own  ambition,  or  from  the  snggestionsof  others, 
Lysandcr  came  now  to  conceive  the  idea  of  breaking  the  succession 
of  the  two  renal  families,  and  opening  for  himself  a  door  to  reach Ihe 
crowa     His  projects  have  been  characterized  as  revolutionary;  but 


630 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


INTRIGUES  OF  LYSANDER. 


631 


there  Peems  notliing  in  tlicm  which  fairly  merits  the  appellation  in 
the  sense  which  that  word  now  bears,  if  we  consider  accuratelv  wlmt 
the  Spartan  kings  were  in  the  year  400  B.C.     In  tin's  view  tlie  as^oc'- 
ations  connected  with  the  title  of  king,  are  to  a  modern  reader  mis. 
leading.     The  Spartan  kings  were  not  kings  at  all,  in  any  modoni 
sense  of  the  term;  not  only  they  were  not  absolute,  bnt  they  were  not 
even  constitutional  kings.     They  were  not  soven-itins,  nor  was  any 
Spartan  their  subject;  every  Spartan  was  the  member  of  a  free  Greeiaii 
conmiunity.    Tbe  Spartan  king  did  not  govern;  nor  did  he  reign  in 
the  sense  of  having  government  carried  on  in  his  name  and  bv'hi.s 
delegates.     The  government  of  Sparta  was  carried  on  by  the  Epiiors 
whh  frequent  consultation  of  the  senate,  and  occasional,  tlx  uuh  rare 
appeals,  to  the  public  assembly  of  citizens.    The  Spartankin^-  was  mt 
legally  inviolable.     He  might  be,  and  occasionally  was,  ^anested 
tried,  and  punished  for  misbehavior  in  the  di?eUar£re  of  his  func- 
tions.    He  was  a  self-acting  person,  a  great  ofhcer  of  stale;  en  jovin<r 
certam  defini I e  privileges,  and  exercising  certain  military  and  judVial 
functions,  which  passed  as  an  virinnsiftif^  bv  beredilary  transinisslon 
in  his  family;  but  subject  to  the  control  of  the  Epliors^  as  to  the  way 
in  which  lie  performed  these  duties.     Thus,  for  example,  it  was  his 
privilege  to  command  the  army  when  sent  on  foreign  service;  yet  a 
law  was  made,  requiring  him  *to  take  dejnities  alon'g  with  liini'asa 
council  of  war  without  whom  nothing  was  to  be  doiio.     The  Ephors 
recalled  Agesilaus  when  they  thought  tit;  and    they  brouaht  Pau- 
sanias  to  trial  and  punishment,  for  alleged  misconduct  in  "his  ceni- 
mand.     The  only  way  in  which  the  Spartan  kings  formed  pari  of  the 
sovereign  power  in  the  state,  or  shared  in  the  exeiciseof  L'-oveinnient 
properly  so  called,  was  that  they  had  vntese.rojfirfo  \n  thcVenate,  and 
could  vote  there  by  proxy  when  they  were  not  present.    In  ancient 
times,  very  imperfectly  known,  the  Spartan  kinirs  seem  really  to  have 
been  sovereigns;  the  government  having  then  been  reallv  carried  on 
by  them  or  by  their  orders.     But  in  the  year  400  k.c,  Aais  and  Pau- 
sanias  had  become  nothing  more  than  u:reat  and  diunified  heredi'.irv 
othcers  of  state,  still  bearing  the  old  title  of  their  ancestors.    To  tlin>\V 
open  these  hereditary  functions  to  all  the  members  of  the  Ilerakleid 
Gens,  by  election  from  their  number,  might  ])e  a  change  better  or 
worse:  it  was  a  startling  novelty  (just  as  itwould  liave  been  lo  {.re- 
pose, that  any  of  the  various  priesthoods,  which  were  liercdifary  in 
particular  families,  should  be  made  elective),  because  of  the  extreme 
attachment  of  the  Spartans  to  old  and  sanctified  customs;  but  it  can- 
not properly  be  styled  revolutionarv.     The  Ephors,  the  Senate,  and 
tlfe  public  assembly,  might  have  made  such  a  chaiiLe  in  full  leiinl 
form,  without  any  appeal  to  violence;  the  kin:rs  miirht  vote  a<jainsi 
it,  but  they  would  have  been  outvoted.     And  if  the  chauL-e  had  been 
made,  tlie  Spartan  government  would  have  remained,  in  form  as  well 
asm  principle,  just  what  it  was  before;  althonjrh  the  Eurysthencid 
and  Prokleid  families  would  have  lost  their  privilcn-es     It  is  not 


nionnt  here  to  deny  that  the  Spartan  kings  were  men  of  great  impor- 
"  nee  in  the  state,  esiiecialiy  when  (like  Agesilaus)  they  combined  with 
'■u'  otlicial  station  a  marked  personal  e.iergy.  But  it  is  not  the  less 
'me  that  the  associations,  connecied  with  the  tule  ot  kniij  m  ihc 
inodern  mind,  do  not  properly  apply  to  them. 

To  carry  his  point  at  Sparta,  Lysander  was  we  1  aware  that  agen- 
cies of  an  unusual  character  must  be  employc;d.     Qaitting  Spaila 
■,.m  after  his  recall,  he  visited  the  oracles  of  Delphi,  Dodona,  and 
Z.U3  Animon  in  Libya,  in  order  to  procui-e,  by  persuasion  or  cor  r  up - 
ion  injunctions  to  tlie  Sparians  countenancing  his  pro3ects     So  gieat 
.'the  general  effect  of  oracular  injunctions  on  the  Spartan  miml, 
M  Kleomenes  had  thus  obtained  the  deposition  of  King  Demaratus. 
_-n.d  ihe  exiled  Pleistoanax,  his  own  return;  bribery  having  been  in 
iH.di  cases  the  moving  impulse,    But  Lysander  was  not  equally  foi-- 
un  te.     No.ie  of  th?se  oracles  could  be  induced   by  any  oilers    to 

n  ure  upon  so  grave  a  sentence  as  that  of  repealing  the  establishe( 
,\v  of  succession  lo  the  Spartan  thr(,ne.     It  is  even  said  that  the 
V  lests  of  Ammon,  not  content  with  refusmg  his  oilers,  came  over  to 
S-Kiria  to  denounce  bis  proceeding;  upon  which  accusation  Lysander 
\v  IS  nut  on  his  trail,  but  acquitted.  .      ,  t  .,  •  i        * 

The  statement  that  he  was  thus  tried  and  acquitted,  I  think  untrue 
Bat  his  schemes  thus  far  miscarried-and  he  was  compelled  to  resort 
..another  stratairem,  yet  still  appealing  to  the  religious  susceptibi  i- 
tics  of  his  countrvmen.     There  had  been  born  some  time  betoie     n 
one  of  the  cides  6f  the  Euxine,  ayouthnamed  S.lenus,  ^vl^ose  mo    e^ 
aliirmed  that  he  was  the  son  of  Apollo;  au  assertion  whicl    found 
(tensive  credence,  notwithstanding  various  diiticulties  raised  by  the 
sk.MX ics.     While  making  known  at  Sparta  this  new  birth  ot  a  son  to 
t;,.  -od,  the  partisans  of  Lysander  also  spread  abroad  the  news  that 
there  existed  sacred  manuscripts  and  inspired  records  ot  great  anti- 
quity hidden  and  yet  unread,  in  the  custody  of  the  Delphian  pries  s; 
lot'to  be  touched  or  consulted  until  some  genuine  son  of  Apollo 
should  come  forward  to  claim  them.     W it h  the  ^'Hinivance  of  some- 
ainon-  the  priests,  certain  oracles  were  labricatcd  agreeable  to  the 
vi.'?vs"of  Lysander!     The  plan  was  concerted  that  Silenus  should  pre- 
s.nt  himself  at  Delphi,  tender  the  proofs  of  his  divine  Pf  e"^;^^^'.;^"f 
then  claim  the  inspection  of  these  hidden  records;  which  the  p    es  s 
alter  an  apparently  rigid  scrutiny,  were  prepared  to  g''^"^  .  ^^^^""^ 
would  then  read  them  aloud  in  the  presence  ot  all  ^^^^^f  P^'^j.'''^^^[^;f  ^.^ 
one  would  be  found  among  them,  recommending  to  the  Spartans  to 
choose  th  'ir  kings  out  of  all  the  best  citizens.  Gnpn„« 

So  nearly  did  tins  project  approach  to  consummation,  tliat  Silenus 
actually  presented  himself  at  Delphi,  and  put  m  his  claim  ^^t  one 
of  the  confederates  either  failed  in  his  courage,  or  ^^■o>e  ^own  at 
the  critical  moment;  so  that  the  hidden  records  stil  ^*eniained  hidden. 
Yet  thou-h  Lvsand  -r  was  thus  compelled  to  abandon  his  plan  noth- 
ing was  made  public  about  it  until  alter  his  death.     It  might  prob- 


632 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


AGESILAUS. 


633 


ably  have  suocce(le(l,-hnd  he  found  temple-confederates  of  propr 
courage  and  cunuing — when  we  consider  llie  jirofcund  and  habitu; 
deference  of  the  Spartans  to  Delplu;  upon  the  sanction  of  wliit;. 
oracle  the  Lvkurgean  institutions  themselves  were  nuunlyunderstr-od 
to  rest.  And  an  occasion  presently  arose,  on  which  the  propond 
change  migiit  have  been  tried  with  uiuisual  facility  and  lierlinciKc; 
though  Lysander  himself,  having  once  miscarried,  renounced  his 
enterprise,  and  employed  his  intlueuce,  which  continued  unabated,  in 
giving  the  scepter  to  another  instead  of  acquiring  it  for  himself— like 
Mucian  in  reference  to  the  Emperor  Vespasian. 

It  was  apparently  about  a  year  after  the  catupnigns  in  Elis.  that 
King  Agis,  now  an  old  man,  was  taken  ill  at  llera-a  in  Arcadia.  ;ind 
carried  l)ack  to  Sparta,  wjjcre  he  shortly  afterward  expired.  His 
wife  Timjca  liad  given  birth  to  a  son  named  Leotychides,  now  a 
j'outh  about  lif teen  years  of  age.  But  the  legitimacy  of  this  youtii 
had  always  been  suspected  by  Agis,  who  h:id  pronounced,  wlicn  ilie 
birth  of  thccliild  was  first  inade  known  to  him,  that  it  could  not  lie 
liis.  lie  had  been  frightened  out  of  his  wife's  bed  by  the  shock  of 
an  earthquake,  which  was  construed  as  a  warning  from  Poseidon, 
and  was  held  to  be  a  prohibition  of  intercourse  for  a  cert.-iin  time; 
during  which  interval  Leotychides  was  born.  This  was  one  siorv: 
another  wa.s,  that  the  young  prir.ce  was  the  son  of  Alkibiadcs.  boin 
during  the  absence  of  Agis  in  his  C(  mmand  at  Dekcleia.  On  llie 
other  hand,  it  was  alleged  that  Agis,  though  originally  doubtful  of 
the  legitimacy  of  Leotychides,  Iiad  aiterward  retracted  his  sitspicioiis, 
and  fully  recogiuzcd  him:  especijdly.  and  with  pecidiar  solcniuiiy, 
during  his  last  iilness.  As  in  the  case  of  Demaratus  about  a  c(  iitiiiT 
earlier — advantage  was  taken  of  these  doubts  by  Agcsilaus.  the 
younger  brother  of  Anis,  powerfully  seconded  by  Lysander,  to 
exclude  Leotychides,  and  occupy  the  fhroiic  himself. 

Agesilaus  was  the  son  of  King  Archidnmus,  not  by  Lampito  the 
mother  of  Agis,  but  by  a  secoiul  wife  named  Eupolia.  He  was  now 
at  the  mature  age  of  forty,  and  having  been  brought  up  without  any 
prospect  of  becoming  king — at  least  until  veryiecent  times — lind 
passed  through  the  unmitigated  rigor  of  Spartan  dj'ill  and  trainini;-. 
He  was  distinguished  for  all  Spartan  viitues:  exemplary  filtedience  to 
authority,  in  the  perfornumce  of  his  trying  exercises,  nnlitary  as  well 
as  civil — emulation,  in  trying  to  surpass  every  competitor — extraor- 
dinary courage,  energy,  as  w^ell  as  facility  in  enduring  hardship- 
simplicity  and  friigaiity  in  all  his  per.sonal  habits — extreme  sensil;'l- 
ity  to  the  opinion  of  his  fellow-citizens.  Toward  his  personal 
friends  or  adherents,  he  was  remarkable  for  fervor  of  attachment, 
even  for  unscrupulous  partisanship,  with  a  readiness  to  use  all  his 
intluence  in  screening  their  injustices  or  shortcomiiigs;  while  he  was 
comparatively  placable  and  generous  in  dealing  with  rivals  at  home, 
notwithstanding  his  eagerness  to"l)e  tirst  in  every  sort  of  comiietition. 
His  manners  were  cheerful  and  popular,  and  his  physiognomy  pleas- 


in"-;  though  in  stature  he  was  not  only  small  but  mean,  and  though  he 
labored  under  the  additional  defect  of  lameness  on  one  leg,  which 
accounts  for  his  constant  refu.sal  to  suffer  his  statue  to  be  taken. 
He  was  indifferent  to  money,  and  exempt  from  excess  of  selfish  feel- 
iQ<^  except  in  his  passion  for  superiority  and  power. 

iu  spite  of  his  rank  as  brother  of  Agis,  Agesilaus  had  never  yet 
been  tried  iu  any  military  command,  though  he  had  probably 
served  in  the  army  either  at  Dekcleia  or  in  Asia.  ^Much  of  his  char- 
acter therefore  lay  as  yet,  undisclosed.  And  his  popularity  may  i^r- 
haps  have  been  the  greater  at  the  moment  when  the  throne  became 
vacant,  inasmuch  as7  having  never  been  put  in  a  ]>osiiion  to  excite 
jealousy,  he  stood  distinguished  oidy  for  accomplishments,  eiforls, 
endurances,  and  punctual  obedience,  wherein  even  the  poorest  citi- 
zens were  his  competitors  on  equal  terms.  Nay,  so  com]>lete  was 
the  self-constraint,  and  the  habit  of  smothering  emotions,  generated 
by  a  Spartan  trainin^^  that  even  the  cunning  Lysander  himself  did 
not  at  this  time  know  him.  He  and  Agesilaus  had  been  early  and 
intimate  friend^,  both  having  been  ])laced  as  boys  in  the  same  herd  or 
troop  for  the  purposes  of  discipline:  a  strong  illustration  of  the  equal- 
izing character  of  this  diseipllue;  since  we  know  that  Lysander  was 
of  poor  parents  and  condition.  He  made  the  mistake  of  supposing 
Airesilaus  to  be  of  a  disposition  particularly  gentle  and  manageable; 
and  this  was  his  main  inducement  for  espousing  the  pretensions  of 
the  latter  to  the  throne,  after  the  decease  of  Agis.  Lysander  reek 
oned,  if  by  his  means  Agesilaus  became  king,  on  a  great  increase  of 
his  own  intluence,  and  especially  on  a  renewa'd  mission  to  Asia,  if 
not  as  ostensil)le  ireneral,  at  least  as  real  chief  under  the  titular  head- 
ship of  the  new  king. 

AccordinLTly,  when  the  imposing  solemnities  which  always  marked 
the  funeral  ol"  a'king  of  Sparta  were  terminated,  and  the  day  arrived 
for  installation  of  a  new  king,  Agesilaus.  under  the  pronqMings  of 
Lysander.  stood  forward  to  contest  tlie  Ic^gitimacy  and  the  title  of 
Leotyehicies.  and  to  claim  the  scepter  for  himself— a  true  Herakleid, 
brother  of  the  late  king  Agis.  In  the  debate,  whicli  probably  took' 
place  not  merely  before  the  Ephors  and  the  senate  but  before  the 
asscmliled  citizc'ns  besides— Lvsander  warmly  seconded  his  preten- 
sions. Of  this  debate  unfortunately  we  are  not  permitted  to  know 
much.  AVe  cannot  doubt  that  the  mature  age  and  excellent  reputa- 
tion of  Agesilaus  would  coimt  as  a  great  reconuncndation,  when  set 
acjainst  an  untried  youth;  and  this  was  ju-obably  the  real  ]>obit  (since 
tlu!  relatl(m>;hin  of  both  was  so  near)  upoii  which  decision  turned; 
for  the  IcLdtiniaev  of  Leotvehideswas  ])ositiveiy  asseverated  by  his 
mother  Tim;ea,  and  we  do  iiot  find  that  the  question  of  paternity  was 
referred  to  the  Delphian  oracle,  as  in  the  case  of  Demaratn^. 

There  was.  however,  erne  circumstance  which  stood  much  in  tb.e 
way  of  Airesilaus— his  personal  deformity.  A  lame  king  of  Sparta 
hiidnevcr^yet  been  known.     And  if  wc  turn  back  more  than  a  ecu- 


634 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR 


AGESILAUS  KING. 


635 


tury  to  the  occurrenre  of  a  similar  deformity  in  one  of  \hv  R.ittijid 
princes  at  Kyrene,  we  see  the  Kyrenians  takinu'  it  fo  deeply  lo  heart, 
th  It  they  sent  to  ask  advice  from  Delphi,  and  to  invite  the  iSIaiiiindjii 
reformer  Demonax.  Over  and  a]K)ve  this  sentiment  of  r(  ptipiuiiirc 
too,  the  gods  had  specially  forewarned  Sparta  to  hcwaie  of  ''a  Ir.ni 
reiucn."  Diopeithes,  a  prophet  and  relig'ions  adviser  of  hii:h  lepina 
tion.  advocated  tlie  canse  of  Leotvcliides.  He  itroihiced  an  aiieidi; 
oracle,  telling  Sparta,  that  ''with  all  her  pride  s!  e  mnst  not  si.ffer.i 
lame  reign  to  impair  her  stable  footing;  for  if  she  did  so.  nnexaii;|ik(! 
suffering  and  ruinous  wars  would  long  beset  her."  This  propluHV 
had  already  been  once  inveiked,  about  eii2:htv  years  earlier,  but  wit! 
a  very  different  interpretation.  To  Grecian  kaders,  like  Tlitniis 
tokles  or  Lysander,  it  was  an  accomplishment  of  no  small  value  1( 
be  able  to  elude  inconvenient  texts  or  intractable  religious  feelings,  by 
expository  ingenuity.  And  Lysander  here  raised  his  voice  (as  Tlu 
mistokles  had  done  on  the  momentous  occasion  before  the  baltieoi 
Salamis),  to  com!)at  the  professional  expositors;  contending  lljil  by 
**a  lame  reign,"  the  god  meant,  not  a  bodily  defect  in  the  king— 
whicli  miirlit  not  even  be  conirenital.  but  miirht  aiise  from  sc^hk 
positive  hurt — but  the  reign  of  any  king  who  was  not  a  gc  nuini 
descendant  of  Ilernkles. 

The  influence  of  Lysander,  combined  doubtless  with  a  pnpoiuler 
ance  of  sentiment  abfadv  teneliug  toward  Aeresilaus.  caiued  t.hi 
effort  of  interpretative  subtlety  to  be  welcomed  as  convincing,  tuul 
led  to  the  nonnnation  of  the  lame  candidate  asking.  Tliere  wiis, 
liowever,  a  considerable  minority  lo  whom  this  decir  ion  a]ii'e;ne(l  a 
sin  airainst  the  gods  and  a  mockerv  of  the  oracle.  And  Ihouiib  ihc 
murnuirs  of  such  dissentients  were  kept  down  by  the  abdity  and  suc- 
cess of  Agesilaus  during  the  first  years  of  his  reiirn.  vc  t  when,  in  bis 
ten  last  years,  calamity  and  humiliation  were  poured  thickly  upon 
this  proud  cit}-,  the  public  sentiment  came  decidedly  round  to  ibeir 
view.  3[any  a  pious  Spartan  then  exclained,  with  f(  clings  of  liiiier 
repentance,  that  the  divine  word  never  failed  to  come  true  at  last, 
and  that  Sparta  was  justly  punished  i'6r  having  willfully  shut  her  eyes 
to  the  distinct  and  merciful  warning  vouchsafed  to  her,  about  tlic 
mischiefs  of  a  "lame  reign." 

Besides  the  crown.  Agesilaus  at  the  same  time  acquired  the  birgc 
property  left  by  the  late  King  Agis;  an  acquisition  which  enabled 
him  to  display  his  generosity  by  transferring  half  of  it  at  once  to  bis 
maternal  relatives — for  the  most  ]xirt  poor  perstms.  The  pcpubnily 
acquire<l  by  tliis  step  was  still  farther  incre;.s<'d  by  his  mniuier  of 
conducting  himself  toward  the  Ephors  and  Senate.  B'tween  tlie^fi 
magistrates  and  the  kings  there  was  generally  a  bad  understanding. 
Tlie  kings,  not  having  lost  the  tradition  of  the  plenary  power  once 
enjoyed  by  their  ancestors,  displayed  as  much  haughty  reserve  ;is 
they  dared,  toward  an  authority  now  beco!ue  essentially  superior  to 
their  own.     But  Agesilaus — not  less  from  his  own  pre-eslablislied 


bal)its,  than  from  anxiety  to  make  up  for  the  defects  of  his  title^ 
•ulopted  a  line  of  conduct  studiously  opposite.  He  not  only  took 
pjuns  to  avoid  collision  with  the  Ephors,  but  showed  marked  defer- 
ence both  '.<)  their  orelers  and  to  their  persons.  He  rose  from  his  seat 
wbenever  they  appeared;  he  conciliated  both  Ephors  and  senators  by 
tnaely  presents.  By  such  judicious  proceeding,  as  well  as  by  his 
exact  observance  of'the  laws  and  customs,  he  was  himself  the  great- 
est iiainer.  Combined  with  that  ability  and  energy  in  which  he  was 
never  deficient,  it  insured  to  him  more  real  power  than  had  ever 
fallen  to  tiie  lot  of  any  king  of  Sparta;  power,  not  merely  over  the 
inilitary  operations  abroad  which  usually  fell  to  the  kings — but  also 
over  tlie  i)ol icy  of  the  state  at  home.  On  the  increase  and  matnte 
nance  of  that  real  power  his  chief  thoughts  were  concentrated;  new 
dispositions  generated  by  kingship,  which  had  never  shown  them- 
st'lves  ill  him  Ijefore.  Despising,  like  Lysand'M',  both  money,  luxury, 
aiul  all  tfi(!  outward  show  of  power — he  exhibited,  as  a  king,  an  ultra- 
Spartan  simplicity,  carried  almost  to  affectation,  in  diet,  clothing, 
a:ul  general  habits.  But  like  Lysander  also,  he  delighted  in  the 
exercise  of  dominion  through  the  medium  of  knots  or  factions  of 
(Itvoted  partisans,  whom  lie  rarely  scrupled  to  uphold  in  all  their 
career  of  injustice  and  oppression.  Though  an  amiable  man,  with 
11)  disposition  to  tyranny  and  still  less  to  plunder,  for  his  own 
l)enetit — Agesilaus  thus  made  himself  the  willing  instrument  of  both, 
for  the  beiietit  of  his  various  coadjutors  and  friends,  whose  power 
and  consequence  he  identilied  with  his  own. 

At  the  moment  when  Agesilaus  became  king,  Sparta  was  at  the 
luaxinuim  of  her  power,  holding  nearly  all  the  Grecian  towns  as  sub- 
ject allies,  with  or  without  tribute.  She  was  engaged  in  the  task  (as 
ins  alreacly  been  mentioned)  of  protect iug  the  Asiatic  Greeks  against 
the  Pcrsiaii  satraps  in  their  neighborhood.  And  the  most  interesting 
p  )rtion  of  the  life  of  Agesilaus  consists  in  the  earnestness  with  which 
lie  espoused,  and  the  vigor  and  ability  with  which  he  conducted  this 
great  Paiihellenic  duty.  It  will  be  seen  that  success  in  his  very 
pi«)ini>ing  career  was  intercepted  by  his  bad  factious  subservience 
to  partisans,  at  home  and  abroad — by  his  unmeasured  thirst  for 
Spartan  omnipotence — and  his  indifference  or  aversion  to  any  gener 
oas  s(;]ieme  of  combination  with  the  cities  dependent  on  Sparta. 

His  attention,  however,  was  first  called  to  a  dangerous  internal 
co:ispiracy  with  wlilch  Sparta  was  threatened.  The  "lame  reign"  ^• 
was  as  yet  less  than  twelve  months  old,  when  Agesilaus,  being 
eiigaged  in  sacrificing  at  one  of  the  established  state  solemnities,  was 
apprisL'd  by  the  olliciati ng  prophet  that  the  victims  exhibited  menac- 
ing sympt;oms,  portending  a  conspiracy  of  the  most  formidable 
character.  A  second  sacrifice  gave  yet  worse  promise;  and  on  the 
third  the  terrifieil  i)iophet  exclaimed,  "Agesilaus,  the  revelation 
bofore  us  imports  that  we  are  actually  in  the  midst  of  our  enemies." 
They  still  continued  to  sacrifice,  but  victims  were  now  offered  to  the 


636 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


CONSPIRACA'  DISCLOSED. 


637 


avcrtina:  anrl  preserving  gods,  with  prnyers  that  these  latter,  by 
tutelary  iuteri)()siti()M,  wcmhl  keep  olf  the  impendiug  peril.  At 
length,"^  after  much  repetition  and  great  ditticulty,  favorable  victiniv 
were  obtained ;  the  meaning  of  which  was  soon  made  clear.  Five 
days  afterward  an  informer  came  before  the  Epliors,  commmdcati:::^ 
the  secret  that  a  dangerous  conspiracy  was  preparing,  organized  by  a 
citizen  named  Kina(h)n. 

Tile  conspirator  thus  named  was  a  Spartan  citizen,  but  not  one  of 
that  select  number  called  the  Equals  or  the  Peers.  It  has  already 
been  mentioned  tiiat  inetiualities  had  been  gradually  growing  up 
among  (ivialitied  citizens  of  Sparta,  tending  tacitly  to  set  apart  a  ccr- 
t-ain  number  of  them  under  the  name  of  The  Peers,  and  all  the  rest 
under  the  correlative  name  of  The  Inferiors.  Besides  this,  since  tlic 
(jualitication  of  every  family  lasted  only  so  long  as  the  citizen  could 
luiiii-;h  a  given  contribution  for  himself  and  his  sons  to  the  public 
mess-table'  ;'.nd  since  inilustrv  of  everv  kind  was  inconsistent  wiili 
iiie  riiiid  personal  drilling  inijwsed  upon  all  of  them — the  natural 
consequence  was  that  in  each  generation  a  certain  nimiber  of  citizens 
became  disfranchised  and  dropixd  off.  But  tliese  disfraueliistd 
men  did  m^l  become  Periceki  or  Helots.  They  were  still  citizens, 
whose  qualitieation,  though  in  abeyance,  might  be  at  any  time 
renewed  by  the  numiticence  of  a  rich  man;  so  that  they  too,  aloiiir 
with  the  lesser  citizens,  were  known  under  the  denomination  of  Tlie 
luferioi-s. 

It  was  to  this  class  that  Kinadon  belonired.  He  was  a  vonnir  man 
of  remarkable  strength  an(i  courage,  who  had  discharged  with  honor 
his  duties  in  the  Lykurgean  discipline,  and  had  imbibed  from  it  tliai 
sense  of  person.-d  equality,  and  that  contenq.t  of  privilege,  Avhich  its 
theory  as  well  as  its  practice  suggested.  Notwithstanding  all  exact- 
ness of  duty  performed,  he  found  that  the  constitution,  as  pnietically 
worked,  ext  luded  him  fiom  the  honors  and  distinctions  of  the  state; 
leserving  them  for  the  select  citizens  known  under  the  name  of  Peers. 
And  this  exclusion  had  beccme  more  marked  and  galling  since  the 
formation  of  the  Spartan  (inpire  after  the  victory  of  ^gospctauii: 
whereby  the  niimber  of  lucrative  posts  (harmosties  and  others)  all 
monopolized  by  the  Peers,  had  been  so  much  multiplied.  Debaried 
from  the  great  jiolitieal  prizes.  Kinadon  was  still  employed  by  the 
Ephors,  in  consequence  of  his  high  spirit  and  military  sullieieccy,  in 
thai  ste.nding  force  which  they  kept  for  maintaining  order  at  honu'. 
He  had  been  the  agent  oi(h'red  on  several  of  those  arbitrary  seizun  s 
wiiich  they  never  scrupled  to  employ  toward  persons  whom  tliey 
regarded  as  dangerous.  But  this  was  no  satisfaction  to  his  riiiiid; 
nay,  probably,  by  bringing  him  into  close  contact  with  the  men  in 
authority,  it  contributed  to  lessen  his  respect  for  them.  He  desired 
"  to  be  inferior  to  no  man  in  Sparta" — and  his  consjiiracy  was  under- 
taken to  realize  this  object  by  jjieaking  up  the  constitution. 

It  has  already  been  mentioned  that  amid  the  general  insecurity 


which  pervaded  the  political  society  of  Laconia,  the  Ephors  main- 
tained a  secret  police  and  system  of  espionage  which  reached  its 
height  of  unscrupulous  elli  ieiiey  under  tiie  title  of  the  Krypteia. 
Such  precautions  were  now  more  than  ever  requisite;  for  the  changes 
in  the  practical  working  of  Spartan  politics  tended  to  multiply^  the 
imniber  of  malcontents,  and  to  throw  the  Inferiors  as  well  as  the 
Pcriojki  and  the  Neodaniodes  (manumitted  Helots),  into  one  common 
antipathy  with  the  Helot  ,  against  the  exclusive  partnership  of  the 
Peers.  Informers  were  thus  sure  of  encouragement  and  reward,  and 
the  man  who  now  came  to  the  Ephors  either  was  really  an  intimate 
friend  of  Kinadon,  or  had  professed  himself  such  in  order  to  elicit 
the  secret.  "Kinadon  (said  he  to  the  Ei)hors)  brought  me  to  the 
extremity  of  the  market-place,  and  bade  me  count  how  many  Spar- 
tans there  were  therein.  I  reckoned  up  about  forty,  besides  the  king, 
the  Ephors,  and  the  Senators.  Upon  my  asking  him  why  he  desired 
me  to  count  them,  he  replied — Because  these  are  the  men,  and  the 
only  men,  whom  you  have  to  look  upon  as  enemies;  all  others  in  the 
market-place,  more  than  4,000  in  number,  are  friends  and  comrades. 
Kinadon  also  pointed  out  to  me  the  one  or  two  Spartans  whom  wo 
met  in  tlie  roads,  or  who  were  lords  in  the  country  districts,  as  our 
only  enemies;  every  one  else  around  them  being  friendly  to  our  pur- 
pose." "  How  many  did  he  tell  you  were  the  accomplices  actually 
privy  to  the  scheme?" — asked  the  Ephors.  "  Only  a  few  (was  liie 
reply);  but  those  thoroughly  trustworthy:  these  confidants  them- 
selves, however,  said  that  all  around  them  were  accomplices — 
Inferiors,  Periueki,  Neodaniodes,  and  Helots,  all  alike;  for  when- 
ever any  one  among  these  classes  talked  about  a  Spartan,  he  could 
not  disguise  his  intense  antipathy — he  talked  as  if  he  could  eat  tlie 
Spartans  raw." 

"  But  how  (continued  the  Ephors)  did  Kinadon  reckon  upon  get- 
ting arms?"  "His  language  was  (replied  the  witness) — We  of  the 
standing  force  have  our  own  arms  all  ready;  and  here  are  plenty  of 
knives,  swords,  sjnts,  hatchets,  axes,  and  scythes — on  sale  in  this 
market-place,  to  suit  an  insurgent  multitude:  l)esides,  ever}' man  who 
tills  the  earth,  or  cuts  wood  and  stone,  has  tools  by  him  which  will 
serve  as  weapons  in  case  of  need;  especially  in  a  struggle  with 
enemies  themselves  unarmed."  On  being  asked  what  was  the 
moment  fixed  for  execution — the  witness  could  not  tell;  he  had  been 
niistructed  only  to  remain  on  the  si)()t,  and  be  ready. 

It  does  not  appear  that  this  man  knew  the  name  of  any  person 
concerned,  except  Kinadon  himself.  So  deeply  were  the  Ephors 
alarmed,  that  they  refrained  from  any  formal  convocation  even  of 
what  was  called  the  Lesser  Assemblv — including  the  Senate,  of  which 
the  kings  were  members  ex-ollicio,  and  perhaps  a  few  other  principal 
persons  besides.  But  the  members  of  this  assembly  were  privately 
brought  together  to  deliberate  on  the  emergency;  Agesilaus  probably 
among  them.     To  arrest  Kinadon  at  once  in  Spartu  appeared  impru- 


638 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


ASIATIC  PROCEEDINGS. 


6^0 


dent;  since  his  accomplices,  of  niimher  as  yet  unknown,  "would  ])( 
thus  admonished  either  to  break  out  in  insurrection,  or  at  least  ti 
m:ike  tlieir  escape.  But  an  elaborate  stratafrem  Avas  laid  for  nrrcst 
inn  Iiim  out  ol  Sparta,  without  the  knowledge  of  his  aceoniplicev. 
Tlie  E})lior?,  calling  him  before  them,  professed  to  confide  to  liin 
(as  they  had  done  occasionally  before)  a  mission  to  go  to  Anion  (; 
Laconian  town  on  the  frontier  toward  Arcadia  and  Triphylia)  ain 
there  to  seize  some  parties  designated  by  name  in  a  formal  SkytaL 
or  warrant;  including  some  of  the  Aulonite  Perio^ki — some  Helots— 
and  oiu'  other  jierson  by  name,  a  woman  of  peculiar  beauty  residfir 
at  the  place,  whose  intluence  was  understood  to  spread  disaflVctici, 
among  all  the  Lacedaemonians  who  came  tliitlier,  old  as  wdl  i> 
young.  When  Kinadon  inquired  what  force  he  was  to  take  will 
him  on  (he  mission,  the  Epliors,  to  obviate  all  suspicion  that  Hk  . 
were  ])icking  out  com])ani()ns  with  views  hostile  to  him,  desired  liii; 
to  go  to  the  Hipi^agretes  (or  ccmmiander  of  oOO  youthful  guards  calki; 
Horsemen,  tliough  they  were  not  really  mounted)  and  ask  for  tli( 
first  six  or  seven  men  of  the  guard  who  might  liappen  to  be  in  thi 
way.  But  they  (the  Ephors)  had  already  held  secret  comnuniicatioi 
■with  the  Hippagretes,  and  liad  informed  him  both  whom  they  wIsIkc 
to  be  sent,  and  what  the  peisons  sent  were  to  do.  They  then  di< 
patched  Kinadon  on  Iiis  pretended  mission,  t(dling  him  that  tlicy 
should  place  at  his  disjiosal  three  carts,  in  order  that  he  might  more 
easily  bring  home  the  prisoners. 

Kinadon  bciian  his  journey  to  Anion,  without  the  smallest  sus- 
picion of  the  plot  laid  for  him  by  Ej^hors;  who,  to  make  their  pur- 
pose sure,  sent  an  additional  body  of  the  guards  after  him,  to  quell 
any  resistance  which  might  possibly  arise.  But  their  stratagem  suc- 
ceeded as  completely  as  they  could  desire.  He  was  seized  on  the 
road,  by  those  who  accompanied  him  ostensibly  for  his  pretended 
mission.  These  men  interrogate*!  him,  put  him  to  the  torture,  and 
lieard  from  l)is  lips  tlie  names  of  his  accomplices;  the  list  of  wliom 
thev  wrote  down,  and  forwarded  bv  one  of  the  guards  to  Sparfa. 
The  Ephors,  on  receiving  it,  immediately  arrested  the  ]\irties  j  rin- 
cipally  concerned,  especially  the  prophet  Tisanjenus;  and  examined 
them  along  with  Kinadon,  as  soon  as  he  was  brought  in  prisoner. 
They  asked  th:*  latter,  among  other  questions,  what  was  his  purixisc 
insetting  on  foot  the  conspiracy;  to  which  he  replied — "  I  wanted 
to  be  inferior  to  no  man  at  Sparta."  His  punishment  was  not  lontr 
deferred.  Having  been  manacled  with  a  clog  round  his  neek  to 
which  his  hands  were  miide  fast — he  was  in  this  condition  coiuhuicd 
roiuid  the  city,  with  men  .scourging  and  pricking  him  during  the 
]>rogi'oss.  His  accomplices  were  treated  in  like  manner,  and  at 
length  all  of  th<^m  were  put  to  death. 

Sueh  is  the  curious  nurrative,  given  by  Xenophon,  of  this  unsuc- 
cessful conspiracy.  He  probably  derived  his  information  from 
Agesilaus  himself;   since  we  cannot  easily  explain  how  he  could 


have  otherwise  learnt  so  much  about  the  most  secret  maneuvers  of 
the  Ephors,  in  a  government  proverbial  for  constant  secrecy,  like 
that  of  Sparta.  The  narrative  opens  to  us  a  glimpse,  though  sadly 
transient  and  imperfect,  of  the  internal  dangers  of  the  Spartan  gov- 
ernment. We  were  aware,  from  eailier  evidences,  of  great  discontent 
prevailing  among  the  Helots,  and  to  a  certain  extent  among  the 
Periwki.  But  the  incident  here  desci-ibed  presents  to  us  the  first 
manifestation  of  a  body  of  malcontents  among  the  Spartans  them- 
selves; malcontents  formidable  both  from  energy  and  position,  like 
Kinadon  and  the  prophet  Tisamenus.  Of  the  state  of  disaffected 
feelin!?  in  the  provincial  townships  of  Laconia,  an  impressive  proof 
is  afforded  by  the  case  of  that  beautiful  woman  who  was  alleged  to 
be  so  active  in  political  proselytism  at  Anion;  not  less  than  i)y  the 
passionate  expressions  of  hatred  revealed  in  the  deposition  of  the 
informer  himself.  Though  little  is  known  about  the  details,  yet  it 
seems  that  the  tendency  of  affairs  at  Sparta  was  to  concentrate  both 
power  and  jnoperty  in  the  hands  of  an  oligarchy  ever  narrowing 
among  the  citizens;  thus  aggravating  the  dangers  at  home,  even  at 
the  time  when  the  power  of  the  state  was  greatest  abroad,  and  pre- 
paring the  way  for  that  irreparable  humiliation  which  began  with  tlie 
defeat  of  Leuktra. 

It  can  hardl}'  be  doubted  that  much  more  widespread  discontent 
came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Ephors  than  that  which  is  specially 
indicated  in  Xenophon.  And  such  discovery  may  probably  have 
been  one  of  the  motives  (as  had  happened  in  424  u.c.  on  occasion  of 
the  expedition  of  I3rasidas  into  Thrace)  whicli  helped  to  bring  about 
the  Asiatic  expedition  of  Agesilaus,  as  an  outlet  for  brave  malcon- 
tents on  distant  and  lucrative  military  service. 

Derkyllidas  liad  now  been  carrying  on  war  in  Asia  Minor  for  near 
three  years,  against  Tissaphernes  and  Pharnabazus,  with  so  much 
erticieucy  and  success,  as  both  to  protect  the  Asiatic  Greeks  on  the 
coast,  and  to  intercept  all  the  revenues  which  those  satraps  either 
transmitted  to  court  or  enjoyed  themselves.  Pharnabazus  had 
already  gone  up  to  Susa  (during  his  truce  with  Derkyllidas  in  397 
B.C.),  and  besides  obtaining  a  re-enforcement  which  acted  under  liim- 
self  and  Tissaphernes  in  896  B.C.  against  Derkyllidas  in  Ly^dia,  had 
laid  schemes  for  renewing  the  maritime  war  agahist  Sparta. 

It  is  now  that  we  hear  again  mentioned  the  name  of  Konon,  who 
having  saved  himself  with  nine  triremes  from  the  defeat  of  ^Egospo- 
tanii,  had  remained  for  the  last  seven  years  under  the  protection  of 
Evagoras,  prince  of  Salamis  in  Cyprus.  Konon,  having  married  at 
Salamis,  and  having  a  son  born  to  him  there,  indulged  but  faint  hopes 
of  ever  returning  to  his  native  city,  when,  fortunately  for  him  as  well 
as  for  Athens,  the  Persians  again  became  eager  for  an  etiicient 
admiral  and  fleet  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Mitu)r.  Through  representa- 
tions from  Pliarnabazus,  as  well  as  from  Evagoras  in  Cyprus — and 
through  correspondence  of   the  latter  with    tiie  Greek  physician 


640 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


LARGE  PLANS  OF  AGESILAUS. 


641 


Ktesias,  who  wished  to  become  personally  einploj^ed  in  the  negotia« 
tion,  and  who  seems  to  liave  had  considciable  influence  witli  Queen 
Pary satis — orders  were  obtained,  and  funds  provided,  to  equip  in 
Plienicia  and  Kiliiiia  a  numerous  fleet,  under  tlie  command  of  Ivouon. 
While  ihat  otflcer  beirau  to  sliow  liimself,  and  to  act  with  such  trirenii's 
as  he  found  in  readiness  (about  forty  in  number)  along  the  southern 
coast  of  Asia  Minor  from  Kilikia  to  Kaunus — further  preparations 
were  vigorously  prosecuted  in  the  Phenician  ports,  in  order  to  make 
up  the  fleet  to  300  sail. 

It  was  by  a  sort  of  accident  that  news  of  such  equipment  renclicd 
Sparta — in  an  age  of  the  world  when  diplomatic  residents  were  as 
yet  unknown,  A  Syracusan  merchant  named  Herodas,  having 
visited  the  Phenician  ports  for  trading  purposes,  brought  bnck  to 
Sparta  intelligence  of  the  preparations  wliich  he  had  seen,  sutticient 
to  excite  mucii  uneasiness.  The  Spartans  were  tnking  counsel  among 
them.solves,  and  communicating  with  their  neighi)oring  allies,  when 
Agesilaus,  at  the  instance  of  Lysander.  stood  forward  as  a  volunteer 
to  solicit  the  command  of  a  land-force  tor  the  purpose  of  attacking 
the  Persians  in  Asia.  He  pr()[)o.'<ed  to  l;d\e  with  him  only  thirty  fall 
Spartan  citizens  or  Peers,  as  a  sort  of  B(  ard  or  Council  of  (Jllicers; 
2.000  Neodamodes  or  enfranchised  Helots,  whom  the  Ephors  were 
probably  glad  to  send  away,  and  wlio  would  be  selected  from  the 
bravest  and  most  formidable;  and  6,000  hopliles  from  the  land-:illies. 
to  whom  the  prospect  of  a  rich  service  against  Asiatic  enemies  would 
be  tempting.  Of  these  thirty  Sprntans  Lysander  intended  to  he 
leader,  and"  thus  reckoning  on  liis  pre-e.^tablislied  influence  over 
Agesilaus,  to  exercise  the  real  con  m;.nd  himself  without  the  name. 
He  had  no  serious  fear  of  the  Perf-ian  arms,  either  by  land  or  sea. 
He  looked  upon  the  announcement  of  the  Phenician  fleet  to  be  ;ui 
empty  threat,  as  it  had  sooltcii  proved  in  the  mouth  of  Tissaphernes 
during  the  late  war;  while  the  Cyreian  expedition  had  inspired  him 
further  with  ardent  hopes  of  another  successful  Anabnsis,  or  con- 
quering invasion  of  Persia  from  the  sea-coast  inward.  But  he  hj.d 
still  more  at  heart  to  employ  his  newly-acquiied  jiscendency  in  re- 
establishing everj'where  the  Dtknrchies,  which  had  excited  such 
intolerable  hatred  and  exercised  so  much  oppression,  that  even  the 
Ephors  had  refused  to  lend  jjositive  aid  in  upholding  them,  so  tlint 
they  had  been  in  several  places  broken  up  or  modifled.  If  theanihi- 
tion  of  Agesilaus  was  comparatively  kss  stained  by  per.'^onjd  and 
factious  antipathies,  and  more  Pan-Hellenic  in  its  aim,  thnn  that  of 
Lysander — it  was  at  the  same  time  yet  more  unmeasured  in  resp(  et 
to  victory  over  the  Great  King,  whom  he  dreamed  of  dethroning,  or 
at  least  of  expelling  from  Asia  Minor  and  the  coast.  So  powerful 
was  the  influence  exercised  by  the  Cyreian  expedition  over  the 
schemes  and  imagination  of  energetic  Greeks;  so  sudden  was  the 
outburst  of  ambition  in  the  mind  of  Agesilaus,  for  which  no  one 
before  had  given  him  cicdit. 


Though  this  plan  was  laid  by  two  of  the  ablest  men  in  Greece,  it 
turned  out  to  be  rash  and  imi)rovident,  so  far  as  the  stability  of  the 
LacedaMuonian  empire  was  concerned.  That  empire  ought  to  have 
been  made  sure  by  sea,  where  its  real  danger  lay,  before  attempts 
were  made  to  extend  it  by  new  inland  acquisitions.  And  except  for 
purposes  of  conquest,  there  was  no  need  of  further  re-enforcements 
in  Asia  Minor;  since  Derkyllidas  was  already  there  with  a  force  com- 
petent to  make  head  against  the  satraps.  Nevertheless  the  Laceda?- 
monians  embraced  the  plan  eagerly;  the  more  so,  as  envoys  wen^ 
sent  from  many  of  the  subject  cities,  by  the  partisans  of  Lysande.^ 
and  in  concert  with  him,  to  enttcat  that  Agesilaus  might  be  placed  at 
the  head  of  the  expedition,  with  as  large  a  force  as  he  required. 

No  difficulty  probably  was  found  in  levying  the  pro]K)£ed  number 
of  men  from  the  allies,  since  there  was  gre^at  promise  of  plunder  for 
the  soldiers  in  Asia.  But  the  altered  position  of  Sparta  with  respect 
to  her  most  powerful  allies  was  betrayed  by  the  refusal  of  Thebes, 
Corinth,  and  Athens,  to  take  any  part  in  the  expedition.  The  refusal 
of  Corinth,  indeed,  was  excused  professedly  on  the  ground  of  a 
recent  inauspicious  conflagration  of  one  of  the  temples  in  the  city; 
Jind  that  of  Athens,  on  the  plea  of  weakness  and  exhaustion  not  yet 
repaired.  Cut  the  latter,  at  least,  had  already  begun  to  conceive 
some  hope  from  the  projects  of  Konon. 

The  mere  fact  that  a  king  of  Spai-ta  was  about  to  take  the  com- 
mand and  pass  into  Asia,  lent  peculiar  importance  to  the  enterprise. 
The  Spartan  kings,  in  their  function  of  leaders  of  Greece,  conceived 
themselves  to  have  inherited  the  scepter  of  Agamemnon  and  Orestes; 
and  Agesilaus,  especially,  assindlated  his  expedition  to  a  new  Trojari 
war— an  effort  of  united  Greece,  for  the  ]>urpose  of  taking  vengeance 
on  the  common  Asiatic  enemy  of  the  Hellenic  name.-  The  sacrifices 
having  been  found  favorable,  Agesilaus  took  measures  for  the  transit 
of  the  troops  from  various  ports  to  Ephesus.  But  he  himself,  with 
one  division,  touched  in  his  way  at  Gernestus,  the  southern  point  of 
Euha3a;  wishing  to  cross  from  thence  and  sacrifice  at  Aulis,  the  port 
of  Ba'otia  where  Agamemnon  had  offered  his  memorable  sacrifice 
nnmediately  previous  to  departure  for  Troy.  It  appears  that  he  both 
went  to  the  spot,  and  began  the  sacrifice,  without  asking  pernu'ssion 
from  the  Thebans;  moreover  he  was  accompanied  by  his  own 
prophet,  who  conducted  the  solemnities  in  a  manner  not  consistent 
with  the  habitual  practice  of  tlie  temple  or  chapel  of  Artemis  at  Aulis. 
On  both  these  grounds,  the  Thebans,  resenting  the  proceeding  as 
iin  insult,  sent  a  body  of  armed  men.  and  compelled  him  to  desist 
from  the  sacrifice.  Not  taking  part  themselves  in  the  expedition, 
Uiey  probably  considered  that  the  Spartan  king  was  presumptuous  in 
assuming  to  himself  the  Pan-Hellenic  character  of  a  second  Agamem- 
Jion;  and  they  thus  inflicted  a  Immiliation  which  Agesilaus  never 
forgave. 

Agesilaus  seems  to  have  reached  Asia  about  the  time  when  Der- 
H.  G.  III.— 21 


i^ 


.    k  'TiHE  ejORJNTIIIAJJf  WAR 


.  kyllitla*  bad  recently  conclnded  his  In^Jt  armhctice  wifch"Tf?K;]>liornrs 

"am!  Pliarhubazus ;  an  armistice  iitteydtd  to  hliow  timfc  for  nuitujil 

coinHruuication  both  with  Sparta  and  tbe  PersiuD  court.     0«  Wwr 

asked  by  the  satrap   what  was  his  purpose  in   <f)Tninflr, -Aircitihiiis 

m(;rdy  renewed  tJbe  demand  whjuh  liad  before  btx-ft  imide  ly  I)er 

,  kyllldas— of  autonomy  for  the  Asiatic  Greeks.     Tisaaphernef;  rej^li.d 

by  proposing  a  continuation  of  the  same  nrhiisticc,  muii  he  cou!,! 

ccmimnnicale  with  tbe  Persian  eourl— iuiding  that  he  iH:f]-Rd  to  k* 

ejnpowcred  to  grant  the  demand.     A  fresh  arjpiistice  ^as  aecord- 

;  in;;ly  sworn  to  on  both  sides,  for  tiiree  nionfliS;  DerkvHidas  (^vim 

.  with  his  army  came  now  under  the^bommand  6i  A eMlauji)  nnd  Hn- 

ippTdas  being  sent  to  the  satrap  to  receive  his  oath,  «nS  tftke  oatlis 

to  hbu  in  return.  ;...  --v     ;  ..;u  ii-^  viii:.  it,:;.. 

While   tlie  ai1«y  was  thus  coudemned  to  te<niforhTy  JTiaefiMi  nt 

Ephesus,  the  conduct  and  position  of  Lysnndf  r  hegfln  to  r-xcite  i.itol. 

erable  jealousy  in  the  sui)erior  officers;  and  most  of  nil  'M  A\L(^{h\m. 

Bo  .great  and  e&tabjished  was  tltc  reputation  of  L^.<}*ndei^\viu)<«e 

stftiue  liad  betn  erected  .at  Ephesus  itsejf  in  fiae  t«nipk  of  Arieniis  us 

"well  as  in  many  other  cities— ih;^t  all  the  Asiuiii'  Greeks  Jooked  upon 

him  as  the  real' chief  of  the  ejcpinlijion. :  That  ire  ^-JJjouid  U«T<aI  (hief, 

'under  tbe  n9ininal  command  .of  anotlier,  Wai  notlirn^  more  lb;in 

wbat  hadliappened  before,  ii^  tlie.yt^ir  wiR-rein  he  LTrlSed.-tlie  «ire'>t 

victory  of  izEj^^osj^otami—tbo  Lacedjemoniaus  hatihir  tltt'n  also' sent 

Jiim  QUt  in  th<?  oslcnsihle  capacity  of  secretary  to  the'a(!miriil  ArMkus. 

Jn  order  to  save  the  inviolability  of  thvir  o.wii  nile  that  the  s«nif  mini 

'should. not  serve  twice  as  admiral.     It  wns  thnniirh  the  insniraticn 

of  Lysander,  and  witli  a  view  to  his  presence,  that  the  d<c<'nivi;s 

and  other  partisans  in  tlie  subject  e-ilie.s  hid  sent  to  Spju'tn  to  pcii- 

tion  for.Ngesilaus;  a  prince  as  yet  untried  and  unkrxnvn.     SoiIi:,t 

Lysander— takinc:  credit,  with  tnith,  for  huvinij  insured  to  AirisiliMis 

first  the  crown,  next  this  im]x»rtant,iippointmeut— juiended  for  liini- 

selF.  and  was  expected  by  othei-s  to- exercise  a  fre«h  turn  of  eoni- 

mand,  and  to  renovate  in  every  town  the  discontlited  or  efifeehk-*! 

Dekarchies.     Numbers  of  his  partis.ing  came  to  Eplx^ih^?  to  ureel  his 

arrival,  and  a  crowd  of  petifi^)nei>;  were  seen  followinti  his  stcjvs 

everywhere;  while  Agesiluus  iiimself  ap}X'ared  compaTUtivclv  ncu- 

Icctod.     Moreover,  Lysander  i-e.su mctl  id  1  th.it  iiiwhtjc*  of  niaiuicr 

which  he  had  contracted  durin.u-  his  former  comTnaixls,  and  wliicli 

on  this  occasion  gave  the  urentor  olft'usc-,,  siiire  the  miiimer  of  xVge^i- 

hiusw-j^s  boUi  courteous  and-  sinipie  in  a-peculiar  dogir-e. 

■  ;'nie.  tliirty  Spart^ju  counselors,,  over  whoirrLvsmder  had  bern 

named  jo.. prx'^ide,  liud.lno-  them^ttlve>  neither  consulted  by  him,  nor 

?oliciiea by  others,  wore  deeply .dissa'd'stiod.    Tluir  complabifs heljiid 

to  encoin-age  Agesihius,  who  was  still  more  keenly  wounded  in  liis 

pwn  persouiij  di.Sjnity,  to  put  forth  a  resolute  and  imi)erious  streniith 

6f  Wdl,  such  as  he  had  not  l)ofore  been  known  to  possess.     He  sur- 

cesaively  rejected  every   petition  preferretl   to  Ijim  by  or  througli 


LYSANDB^R  SENT  TO  TITE  HELLESPONT.        #19 

Lysander:  a  systematic  purpose,  whicli,  though  rt0ver  formally  an- 
nounced, was  presently  discerned  by  the  petitioners,  by  the  Thii-ty, 
and  by  Lys  uider  hiniHcdf.  The  latjter  thus  found  himself  not  merely 
disa])i)oiti'ed  in  all  his  calculations,  but  humnialed  to  excess,  though 
without  any  tangible  ground  of  complaint.  He  wa?  forced  to  warn 
his  partisans  that  his  intervention  was  an  injury  and  not  a  benefit  to 
theai;  that  thev  must  desist  from  obsequious  attention  to  him,  and 
nuist  a<ldre.ss  themselves  directly  to  Agesilaus.  With  that  prince  he 
also  remonstrifp'd  on  hjs  own  account—''  Truly,  Agesilnns,  you  know 
liow  to  dcgi-udv  yonr  friends.''— "  Ay,  to  be  sure  (was  the  reply), 
those  among  them  who  want  to  appear  greater  tlian  I  am;  but  such 
as  SL'ck  to  uphold  nie,  I  shoulcl  Ix?  ashi:med  if  I  did  not  know  how  tcf 
rc'piiy  with  due  honor." — Lysander  was  constrained  to  adinit  the  force? 
of  this  replv  and  to  request,  as  the  only  ineaus  of  escape  from  pres- 
ent and  i);dpable  humiUatiOu,  that  he  might  be  sent  on  some  mission. 
anaiL;  engaging  to  serve  faithfully  in  whatever  duty  he.migl?t  be 
employed.  ■     '  ■  ^- 

This  proposition,  doubtless  even  more  agreeable  to  Agesilaus  than, 
to  him^elf.  being  readily  assented  to,  he  was  dispatched  on  a  mission 
to  the  Hellespont.  P^aithful  to  his  engagement  of  forgetting  past 
offenses  aiid  serving  with'  zciil.  He  found  means  to  gabi  oVer  a;  Pef-' 
sian  grandee  uamedSpithridates,  who  had  rece'rved  some  offl^hse  f  rom 
Pharnabazus.  Spithritiht^es  revolted  openly,  taj-rying  a  rt^inicnt  of 
200  horse  to  join  Agesilaus ;  who  w^a^  thus  enAbfed  to  inforiii  iumself 
fullv  about  the  satrapy  df  Pharnabazus;  coniprisii>g  the  territory 
called  Phrygia  in  the  nei^hbo,rho(>d  of  the  Pro.|ijon^is  and  the  Heiles-^ 
pout,  '■      \"    ■■'    '"'''      ■'    '  .  '  '    ' 

The  army  under  Tissapheru.es  had  been  already  powerfulat  the' 
moment  when  his  tinudity  induced  hlpi  toconcli^d^  the  first  Armis- 
tice with  D«;rkyllidas.  But  addiii^niil  re-cnfoTcements,  received  si ncd 
the  conelusion'^of  the  Seconal  and  mojie' rcctUlt  anjiistice,  bad  rajsed, 
him  to  such  an  excess  of  C()nihl('rit^..'fhat  even  iMore  the  stipulated 
three  months  had  expired,  he 'sent'to'fniist  oh  thp.'fm 
lire  of  Agesilaus  fioni  Asia,  and"t6'*^!roclalm"t\'d,r"fortbwith^  if  siicli 
(lepirture  were  delayed.  While- .this'  tnes.«a'ge,  ahepiUpanfed  by, for-' 
iiiidahle  reports  of  the  satrap's  fort^c,  filh^d  the  arm^  at  EpUesus  with 
mini^k'd  alarm  and  indignation,  'Agesilaus' nLCOepted  the  challenge 
with  cheerful  readiness;  sending- -WM'd'  back |  tjiat  be  thanked  tli\) 
satrap  for  perjuring  himself  in  so  ffagrant!  a  inanner;  as  tq  set.tbo> 
Kods  against  him  and  insure  their  faroj-,  to  'the  &reek'  'sfcle^.  '  Orders 
were  forthwith  given,  and  contingetits  $ummdc6d  frqnl  the  Asiatic, 
Greeks,  for  a  forward  movement  'sodthward,  to  •ch)ss'^the'lf!ffiand(T^ 

aud  attack  Tissaphernes  in  Karia,  wiier6  he  usUa1h'l;e^iae4.  ,..Th^ 
cities  on  the  route  were  rcquirec'  to  provide  fnn^azlnei,  so  that  Tistj. 
saphernc'3,  fully  aiiiieii^ating  attack  in  this  (^irpctto?i:'  tM^^ 
fantry  to  cross  into  Karia,  for  the  purpose  b^  acting  dii  tW  dcfcti-: 
sive;^  while  he  kept  hi.i  numerous  cavalr/iii' the  plitpfa^f  the' Mseaii- 


644 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


HUMANITY  OF  AGESILAUS. 


645 


der,  with  a  view  to  overwhelm  Agesilaus,  who  had  no  calva^>^  in  liis 
march  over  that  level  territory  toward  the  Kariau  hills  aud  rugged 

ground. 

But  the  Lacedaemonian  king,  having  put  the  enemy  on  this  false 
scent,  suddenly  turned  his  march  northward  toward  Plirygia  and 
the  satrapy  of 'Pharnabsizus.  Tissanlurnes  took  no  pains  to  aid  liis 
brother  satrap,  who  on  his  side  liad  made  few  preparations  for  de- 
fense. Accordingly  Agesilaus.  findhig  little  or  no  resistance,  took 
many  towns  and" villages,  and  collected  abundance  of  provisions. 
])hindcr,  and  slaves.  'Profiting  by  the  guidance  of  the  revolted 
Spithridates,  and  marcliing  as  "little  as  possible  over  the  plains,  he 
carried  on  lucrative  and  unopposed  incursions  as  far  as  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Daskylium,  the  residence  of  the  satrap  himself  near  the 
Propontis.  Near  the  satrapic  residence,  however,  his  small  body  of 
cavalry,  ascending  an  eminence,  came  suddenly  up(»n  an  equal  de- 
tachment of  Pershm  cavalry,  under  Rliathines  and  Baga'us;  who 
attacked  them  vigorously,  and  drove  them  back  with  some  loss,  until 
they  were  protected  byAgesilaus  himsilf  coming  up  with  the  hop- 
lites.  The  effect  of  such  a  dice  k  (and  there  were  probably  others  of 
the  same  kind,  though  Xenophon  do(  s  not  s])ecify  them)  on  the  spirits 
of  the  ai-my  was  discouraging.  On  the  next  morning,  the  sacrifices 
being  found  unfavorable  ior  farther  advance,  Agesilaus  gave  orders 
for  retreating  toward  the  sea.  He  reached  Ephesus  about  the  close 
of  autumn;  resolved  to  eniploy  the  winter  in  organizing  a  more 
powerful  cavalr}',  which  experience  proved  to  be  indispensable. 

This  autunund  march  through  Phrygia  was  more  lucrative  thnn 
glorious.  Yet  it  enables  Xenophon  to  bring  to  view  different  merits 
of  his  hero  Agesilaus;  in  doing  which  he  exhibits  to  us  ancient  war- 
fare and  AsiaUc  habits  on  a  very  painful  side.  In  common  both  with 
Kallikratidas  and  Lysander,  though  not  with  the  ordinary  Spartan 
conunanders,  Agesilaus  was  indifferent  to  the  acquisition  of  money 
for  himself.  But  he  was  not  the  less  anxious  to  enrich  his  friends, 
and  would  sometimes  connive  at  unwarrantable  modes  of  acquisili(»n 
for  their  benefit.  Deserters  often  came  in  to  give  information  of  rich 
juizes  or  valuable  prisoners;  which  advantages,  if  he  had  chosen,  he 
midit  have  appropriated  to  himself.  But  he  made  it  a  practice  to 
throw  both  the  booty  and  the  honor  in  the  way  of  some  favorite 
officer;  just  as  we  have  seen  (in  a  former  chapter),  that  Xenophon 
iiiniself  was  allowed  by  the  army  to  capture  Asidates  and  enjoy  a 
large  portion  of  his  ransom.  Again, when  the  army  in  the  course  of 
its  inarch  was  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  sea,  and  appeared 
to  be  advancing  farther  ipland.  the  authorized  auctioneers,  whose 
province  it  was  to  sell  the  booty,  found  the  buyers  extremely  slack 
It  was  difficult  to  keep  or  carry  what  was  bought,  and  opportunity 
for  resale  did  not  seem  at  hand.  Agesilaus.  while  he  instructed  the 
auctioneers  to  sell  upon  credit,  without  insisting  on  ready  money— at 
the  same  time  gave  private  hints  to  a  few  friends  that  he  was  very 


\ 


chorllv  about  to  return  to  the  sea.  The  friends  thus  warned,  bid- 
; liner  for  the  plunder  on  credit  and  purchasing  at  low  prices,  were 
speedily  enabled  to  dispose  of  it  again  at  a  seaport,  with  large 

'''^We 'are  not  surprised  to  hear  that  such  lucrative  gracesj)rocured 
for  V-'-esllaus  many  warm  admirers;  though  the  eulogies  of  Xenophon 
oQ-iirto  have  been  confined  to  another  i)()mt  in  his  conduct,  now  to 
iK-Mientioned.     Agesilaus,  while  securing  for  his  army  the  plunder 
oFthe  countrv  over  which  he  carried  his  victorious  arms,  took  great 
niitis  to  prevent  both  cruelty  and  destruction  of  property.     When 
•uiv  town  surrendered  to  him  on  terms,  his  exactions  were  neither 
miaous  nor  ffro-^sly  humiliating.     Amid  all  the  plunder  realized,  too 
the  most  valuable  portion  was  the  adult  natives  of  both  sexes,  hunted 
doun  and  brought  in  by  the  predatory  light  troops  of  the  army,  to  be 
.old  as  slaves.     Agesihlus  was  vigilant  in  protecting  these  poor  vic^ 
tinis  from  lU-usage;  inculcating  upon  his  soldiers  the  duty,      not  of 
nuui^iiin-  them  like  wrong-doers,  but  simply  of  keeping  them  under 
Ir.iard  as  me!i."     It  was  the  practice  of  the  poorer  part  of  the  native 
uonulation  often  to  sell  their  little  children  for  exportation  to  travel- 
in.'  .lave-merchauts,  from  inability  to  maintam  them.      1  he  children 
thiis  purchased,  if  thev  promised  to  be  handsome,  were  often  muti- 
lated and  fetched  large  prices  aseunuchs,  to  supply  the  large  dc^iand 
for  the  harems  aud  reliirious  worship  of  many  Asiatic  towns.     But  in 
their  haste  to  get  out  of  the  way  of  a  plundering  army   these  slave- 
merchants  were  forced  often  to  leave  by  the  way-side  the  little  children 
whom  they  had  purchased,  exposed  to  the  wolves,  the  dogs,  or  starv- 
ation     In  this  wretched  condition  they  were  found  by  xVgesilaus 
ou  his  march.     His  humane -disposition  prompted  him  to  see  them 
carried  to  a  place  of  safety,  where  he  gave  them  in  chai-ge  of  those 
o' I  natives  whom  age  and  feebleness  had  caused  to  be  left  behind  as 
uot  worth  carry inir  off.     By  such  active  kindness,  rare  indeed  in  a 
Grecian  general,  toward  the  conciuered.  he  earned  the  gratitude  ot 
the  captives,  and  the  sympathies  of  everyone  around. 

This  interesfimr  anecdote,  imparting  a  glimpse  of  the  ancient 
world  in  reference  to  details  which  Grecian  historians  rarely  conde- 
scend to  unveil,  demonstrates  the  compassionate  disposition  of  Ages- 
ilaus We  find  iu  conjunction  with  it  another  anecdote,  dlustratmg 
the  Spartan  side  of  his  character.  The  prisoners  who  had  hecn  cap- 
tured during  the  expedition  were  brouiiht  to  Ephesus,  and  sold  during 
Uie  winttM-  as  slaves  for  the  profit  of  the  army.  Asesilaus-being 
then  busily  employed  in  trainina-  his  trooi)s  to  mditary  elhciency, 
especially  "for  the  cavalry  service  during  the  ensuing  campaign-- 
thou'ditU  advisable  to  impress  them  with  contempt  for  the  bodily 
oanaciry  and  prowess  of  the  natives.  He  therefore  du-ected  the 
heralds  who  conducted  the  auction  to  put  the  prisonei-s  up  to  sale  in 
a  state  of  perfect  nudity.  To  haye  the  body  thus  exposed  vvas  a  thing 
never  done,  and  even  held  disgraceful,  by  the  native  Asiatics;  while 


646 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


AGE5IL.W3  J2ENEWS  THE  WAR. 


647 


among  the  Greeks,  tlie  practice  was  universal  for  purposes  of  exercist 
—  or  at  least  had  bcronie  universal  durinijr  the  last  two  or  three  ceu 
tnries— for  we  are  told  that  orii^inaily  tue  Asiatic  feeling  on  thispoirt 
had  prevailed  tl:rou.iilioiit  Greece.  It  was  one  of  the  obvious  difTt'i- 
ences  between  Grecian  and  Asiatic  customs— that  in  the  former  ])olli 
tiie  exercises  of  the  palte^tra,  as  well  as  the  matchers  in  the  solemn 
pimes,  required  competitors  of  everv  rank  to  contend  naked  Aia-s- 
i.aus  iiimself  stripped  thus  hal)ituallv;  Alexander,  i>rince  of  .Mari'- 
don,  had  done  so  when  lie  ran  at  the  Olvmpic  stadium— aNo  tic 
combatants  out  of  the  great  familv  of  the  Diai^-orids  of  Pdiodes  avIk'h 
they  gained  their  victories  in  the  Olvmpic  pankratium— and  :ill 
tho<(.'  (jther  noble  pugilists,  wrestlers,  and  runners,  descended  from 
gods  and  heroes,  upou  whom  Pmdar  pours  forth  his  comi>limeutarv 
odes. 

On  this  occasion  at  Ephesus,  Agesilaus  gave  special  orders  to  pu; 
up  the  Asiatic  prisf)ners  to  auction  naked;  not  at  all  by  wavof  in^uli 
but  in  order  to  exhibit  to  the  eye  of  the  Greek  soldier  who  contem- 
plated them,  how  much  he  gained  by  his  own   bodily  traininii"  am! 
frequent  exposure— and  how  inferior  was  the  condition  of  men  "whose 
iKKlies  never  felt  the  sun  or  wind.     They  disj)laved  a  white  skin, 
l)lunjp  and  soft  liujbs,   weak  and  undevelojK'd  muscles,   like  ineii 
accustomed  to  be  borne  in  carriages  instead  of  walking  or  running- 
from  whence  we  indirectly  learn  that  manv  of  tiienrwere  men  In 
wealthy  circumstances.     And  the  purpose 'of  Agesilaus  was  com- 
pletely answered;  since  his  soldiers,  wiien  thev  witnessed  such  evi- 
dences of  bodily  incompetence,  thought  that  "'the  enemies  against 
whom  they  had  to  contend  were  not  more  formidable  than  women." 
tSiich  a  method  of  illustrating  the  dilfereuce  between  good  and  had 
}>hy>ical  training  would   hardly  have  occurred  U)  anyone  except  u 
tSpartan,  biought  uj)  under  the  Lykurgean  rules. 
^    While  Agesilaus  thus  brought  liome  to  the  visi(m  of  his  soldiers  the 
melliciency  of  untrained  bodies,  he  kept  them  throuuiiout  the  winter 
under  h.iid  work  and  drill,  as  well  in  the  pahestra'as  in  arms.    A 
force  of  cavalry  was  still  wanting.     To  procure  it,  he  enrolled  all  the 
lichest  Greeks  in  the  various  Asiatic  towns,  as  conscripts  to  serve  on 
horseback;  giving  each  of  them  leave  to  exempt  himself,  however. 
by  providing  a  competent  substitute  arul  equipment— man,  horse,  and 
arms.     Before  the  connnencement  of  spriiiir.  an  adequate  force  of 
cavalry  was  thus  assend)led  at  Ephesus,  and  put  into  tolerable  exer- 
cise.    Throughout  the  whole  winter,  that  cit  v  became  a  place  of  arms. 
consecrated  to  drillinir  and  gymnastic  exercises.     On  parade  as  well 
as  in  the  palaestra,  Agesihms' himself  was  foremost  in  setting  the  ex- 
ample of  obedience  and  hard  work.     Prizes  were  given  to' the  dili- 
gent and   improving,  among  hojdites.   horsemen,  and  liirht  troops; 
while  the  armorers,  braziers,  leather-cutters,  etc.,  all  the  various  arti- 
sans whose  trade  lay  in   muniments. of  war,  were  in  the  fullest  em- 
ployment.    *at  was  a  sight  full  of  encouragement  (says  Xenophon, 


wli6  i^vas  doubttel^s  present  and  took  part  in  it),  to  see  Agesilaus  and 
the  soldiers  leaving  the  gymnasium,  all  with  wreaths  on  their  heads; 
wd  marching  to  the  teiuple  of  Artemis  to  dedicate  their  wreaths  to 

the  iioddess."  •,      .     i  •       .,v 

Before  Agesilaus  was  in  condition  to  begin  his  military  operations 
for  the  spring,  the  first  year  of  his  command  had  passed  over.    Thirty 
fresh  counseloivi  reached  Ephesus  from  Sparta,  superseding  the  first 
thirtv  under  Lysander,  who  all  went  home  forthwith.     The  army 
WIS  now  not  only  more  numerous,  but  belter  trained,  and  more  sys- 
teinatically  arranged,  than  in  the  preceding  campaign.     Agesilaus 
distributed  the  various  divisions  under  the  command  of  dilterent 
members  of  the  new  Thirty;  the  cavalry  being  assigned  to  Xenokles, 
the  Neodamole  hoplites  to  Skythes,  the  Cyreiaus  to  Herippidas,  the 
\siatic  contingents  to  Migdou.     113  then  gave  out  that  he  should 
march  straight  against  Sardis.     Nevertheless  Tissaphernes,  who  was 
in  that  place,  construing  this  proclaimition  as  a  feint,  and  believing 
that  the  real  march  would  be  tlirectcd  against  Karia,  disposed  his 
cavalry  in  the  plain  of  the  :Sbeander  as  he  had  done  in  the  preceding 
c'impai<m-  while  his  infantry  were  sent  still  farther  southward  within 
the  Kanan  frontier.     On  this  occasion,  however,  Agesilaus  marched 
as  he  had  announced,  in  the  direction  of  Sardis.     For  three  days  he 
plundered  the  country  without  seeing  an  enemy;  nor  was  it  until  the 
fourth  day  that  the  cavalry  of  Tissaphernes  could  be  summoned  back 
to  oppose  him;  the  infantry  beinir  even  yet  at  a  distance.    On  rea'  li- 
in"-  the  banks  of  the  river  Paktolus,  the  Persian  cavalry  found  Vag 
G?eek  light  troops  dispersed  for  tlij  purpose  of  plunder,  attacked 
them  by^urprise,  and  drove  them  in  with  considerable  loss.    Pre  ;- 
eutiy  however  Agesilaus  himself  came  up,  and  ordc'red  his  eavalry 
to  charge   anxious  to  bring  on  a  battle  before  the  Persian  infantry 
could  arrive  in  the  field.     In  eificiency,  it  appears,  the  Persian  cavalry 
was  a  full  match  for  his  cavalry,  and  in  number  apparently  superior 
But  when  he  brought  up  his  infantry,  and  caused  his  peltasls  and 
youn»-er  hoplites  to  join  the  cavalry  in  a  vigorous  attack— victory 
so;)n  declared  on  his  side.    The  Persians  were  put  to  fiight  and  many 
of  them  drowned  in  the  Paktolus.     Their  camp  too  Avas  taken,  wi'di 
a  valuable  booty;  including  several  camels,  which  Agesdaus  after- 
•  ward  took  with"  him  into  Greece.     This  success  insured  to  lum  t:;e 
imopposed  mastery  of  all  the  territory  round  Sardis.     He  earned  his 
rava-es  to  the  very  gates  of  that  city,  plundering  the  gardens  and 
ornamented  ground,'  proclaiming  liberty  to  those  withm,  and.dely- 
insi'  Tissaphernes  to  come  out  and  figlit. 

The  career  of  that  timid  and  treacherous  satrap  nov/  apiu-oaclicd 
its  close  The  Persians  in  or  near  Sardis  loudly  complainel  of  hi:n 
as  leaving  them  undefended,  from  cowardice  and  anxiety  for  his  own 
residence  in  Karia;  wdiilc  the  court  of  Susa  was  now  aware  tnat  lae 
powerful  re-enforcement  which  had  l)een  scut  to  him  last  year,  in- 
leaded  to  drive  Agesilaus  out  of  Asia,  had  been  made  to  achieve  ab- 


648 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


RHODES  REVOLTS. 


649 


solutcly  notliiner.  To  these  pounds  of  just  dissatisfaction  was  added 
a  court-intriirue;  to  wldcli,  and  to  the  {igency  of  a  person  yet  more 
worthless  and  eruel  than  himself,  Tissaphernes  fell  a  victim.  The 
Queen  Motlier  Parysalis  had  never  forgiven  him  for  having  heen  one 
of  the  principal  agents  in  tiie  defeat  and  death  of  her  son  Cyrus. 
Her  intluenee  being  now  re  estahlished  over  the  mind  of  ArtaxeVxis, 
she  took  advantage  of  the  existing  discredit  of  the  satrap  lo  g(t  an 
ortler  sent  down  for  his  deposition  and  death.  Tithransles.  llie 
bearer  of  this  order,  seized  him  by  stratagem  at  Kolo.'^sjc  in  Phrygia, 
while  he  was  in  the  bath,  and  caused  him  to  be  beheaded. 

The  mission  of  Tithraustes  to  Asia  Minor  was  accompanied  hy  in- 
creased elTorts  on  the  part  of  Persia  for  prosecuting  the  war  against 
Sparta  with  vigor,  by  sea  as  well  as  by  land;  and  also  for  fomenting 
the  anti-Spartan  movement  which  burst  o'jt  into  hostilities  this  yi  jir 
in  Greece.  At  first,  however,  immediately  alter  the  death  of  Tissa- 
phernes, Tithraustes  endeavored  to  open  negotiations  with  Agesihms; 
who  was  in  military  possession  of  the  country  round  k^ardis,  while 
that  city  it.>^elf  appears  to  have  been  occupied  by  Aria  us — jirobjilily 
the  same  Persian  who  had  formerly  been  general  under  Cyrus,  ;md 
who  had  now  again  revolted  from  Artaxerxes.  Tithraustes  took 
credit  to  the  justice  of  the  king  for  having  pujushed  the  late  satrap; 
out  of  Avhose  perfidy  (he  aflirn:ed)  the  w:ir  had  ari>en.  He  then  sinn- 
nioned  Agesilaus,  in  tin;  king's  name,  to  evacuate  Asia,  leaving  die 
Asiatic  Greeks  to  pay  their  originaj  tribute  to  Persia,  but  to  enjoy 
complete  autonomy,  subject  to  that'one  condition.  Had  this  propo- 
sition been  accepted  and  executed,  it  would  have  secured  these 
Greeks  against  Persian  occupation  or  governors;  a  mudi  milder  fiite 
for  them  than  that  to  wlii(h  the  Lacedanionians  lusd  consented  in 
their  conventions  with  Tissaphernes  sixteen  years  I  efore,  v.ud  analo- 
gous to  the  position  in  which  the  Chalkidiaus  of  Thrace  had  hern 
placed  with  regard  to  Athens,  under  the  i)eace  of  Nikias;  subject  lo 
a  fixed  tribute,  yet  autonomous — with  no  other  obligation  or  inlcr- 
ference.  Agesilaus  replied  that  he  had  no  power  lo  entertain  such  a 
proposition  without  the  authorities  at  home,  whom  he  accordin.L^ly 
sent  to  consult.  But  in  tiie  interim  he  was  prevailed  uiion.  by  Ti- 
thraustes to  conclude  an  armistice  for  six  months,  and  to  move  out  of 
his  satrapy  into  that  of  Piiarnabazus;  receiving  a  contribution  of 
tliirty  talents  toward  the  temporary  maintenance  of  the  army.  Thtn' 
satraps  generally  acted  more  like  independent  or  even  hostile  prin<e^, 
than  co-operating  colleagues;  one  of  the  many  causes  of  the  wc:;k- 
ness  of  the  Persian  emi>ire. 

When  Airesilaus  had  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Kyme,  on  his 
march  northward  to  the  Hellespontine  Phrygia,  he  received  a  disp:;t(h 
from  home,  placing  the  Spartan  naval  force  in  the  Asuitic  seas  under 
his  command,  iiswell  as  the  land-force,  and  empowering  him  to  name 
whomsoever  lie  chose  as  acting  admiral.  For  the  first  time  since  the 
battle  of  ^gospotiimi,  the  maritime  empire  of  Sparta  was  beginning 


to  he  threatened,  and  increased  efforts  on  her  part  were  becoming 
requisite.  Piiarnabazus,  going  up  in  person  to  the  court  of  Arta- 
Mi'.xes,  had  by  pressing  representations  obtained  a  large  subsidy  for 
littinj;  out  a  fleet  in  Cyprus  and  Phenieia,  to  act  under  the  Atheniau 
a  hniral  Konon  against  tbe  LacedaMuonians.  That  officer — with  a  fleet 
of  forty  triremes,  before  the  equipment  of  the  remainder  was  yet 
complete — had  advanced  along  the  southern  coast  of  Asia  Minor  to 
Kauaiis,  at  the  soutli-westeru  corner  of  the  peidnsula,  on  the  frontier 
of  Ivaria  and  Lykia.  In  this  port  he  was  beseiged  by  the  Laceda*nio- 
iiiin  fleet  of  1'20  triremes  under  Pharax.  But  a  Persian  re-enforee- 
nient  strengtliened  the  fl^et  of  Konon  to  eighty  sail,  and  put  the  place 
out  of  danger;  so  that  Pharax,  de>isling  from  the  siege,  retired  to 
Rhodes. 

The  neighborhood  of  Konon,  however,  who  was  now  with  his 
il'^et  of  eighty  sail  near  the  Chersonesus  of  Knidus,  emboldened  the 
Rhodiaus  to  revolt  from  Sparta.  It  was  at  llhodes  that  the  general 
detestation  of  the  LacecUiimonian  empire,  disgraced  in  so  many  dif- 
ferent cities  by  t!ie  local  Dekarchies  and  by  the  Spartan  harmosts, 
lirst  manifested  itself.  And  such  was  the  ardor  of  the  Rhodiau 
population,  that  their  revolt  took  place  while  the  fleet  of  Pharax  was 
(in  part  at  least)  actually  in  the  harbor,  and  tiiey  drove  him  out  of  it. 
Konon,  whose  secret  encouragements  had  helped  to  excite  this  insur- 
rection, presently  sailed  to  Rhodes  with  his  fleet,  and  made  the 
inland  his  main  station.  It  threw  into  his  hands  an  unexpected 
advantage;  for  a  numerous  fleet  of  vessels  arrived  there  shortly  after- 
ward, sent  by  Nephereus,  the  native  king  of  Egypt  (which  was  in 
revolt  against  the  Persians),  with  marine  stores  and  grain  to  the  aid 
of  the  Lacedteinonians.  Not  having  been  apprised  of  the  recent 
revolt,  these  vessels  entered  the  harbor  of  Rhodes  as  if  it  were  still  a 
li!ieed;emonian  island ;  and  their  cargoes  were  thus  appropriated  by 
Konon  and  the  Rhodiaus. 

In  recounting  the  various  revolts  of  the  dependencies  of  Athens 
which  took  place  during  the  Peloponnesian  war,  I  had  occasion  to 
point  out  more  than  once  that  all  of  them  took  place  not  merely  in 
llic  absence  of  any  Athenian  force,  but  even  at  the  instigation  (in 
ii.ost  cases)  of  a  present  hostile  force — by  the  contrivance  of  a  local 
party — and  without  privity  or  previous  consent  of  the  bulk  of  the 
citizens.  Tlie  present  revolt  of  Rhodes,  forming  a  remarkable  con- 
ti;ist  on  all  these  points,  occasioned  the  utmost  surprise  and  indignation 
iiniong  the  Lacedaemonians.  They  saw  themselves  about  to  enter 
upon  a  renewed  maritime  war,  without  that  aid  which  they  had 
leckoned  on  receiving  from  Egypt,  and  with  aggravated  uncertainty 
iu  respect  to  their  dependencies  and  tribute.  It  was  under  this  pros- 
pective anxiety  that  they  took  the  step  of  nominating  Agesilaus  to 
ilie  command  of  the  fleet  as  well  as  of-  the  army,  in  order  to  insure 
unity  of  operations;  though  a  distinction  of  function,  wdiich  they 
l^ad  hitherto  set  great  value  upon  maintaining,  was  thus  broken 


650 


TIIE.;qC^mTIIIA^  WK^- 


COMPARISON  OF  SENTIMENT. 


651 


clown — am?  HK>Ui2:4»  iko  two  eomHVtndl  Iwul  wvef  bcoil  iroiti^  in  any 
kiiKi  befvre  Agesilau.s.     PhurHX,  the  previous  adniu-»L  was  recalli'd. 

But  the  violciiit  displeasure  of  the  Laf^dfemouiaji^  against  the 
revolted  lihrxliuns  was  slill  b  etter  attested  by  «uothf  r  ])rocceding. 
Anions  all  the  .areiit  families  at  Khodes.  none  were  more  distin- 
guished Ukiu  the  Diagorid*.  Its  menvberi*  wene  not  onlyjreuerals 
and  hi.^h  politieal  functioHuries  lu  then-  Dative  island,  but  had 
jittainedeven  P;»iiheUfni(;  celebrity  by  nn  unp:iraUeledserLe$.of  victo- 
ries at  the  Olympic  and  otlRT  great  solemnitnus.  DorienK.  a  memkr 
of  this  fajuily,  had  ijaiucd  the  vicfory  in  the  pnnUratiou  at  01yiii}uti 
on  three  siie*cesj<ivea()lemnities.  He  had  olrtaiued  seven  prizes  in 
the  Nemeitu,  and  ei^ht  in  tlM3  Isthmian  g;nnes.  He  l-ad  cnrricd  off 
the  prize  at  one  Pythiiin  solemnity  without  a  contest — no  one  daring 
to  stand  Hp  against  bin)  in  the  fealfirt  8triHj;g:le  of  tite  pankration. 
As  a  Uiiodiau,  wJiile  lihodes  was  a  subject -aily  of  Athenis  durinir  ik 
Peloi)onnesian  war,  lie  had  been  sp  pronounced  in  his  Httachmenl  to 
Sparta  as  to  draw  on  hlmself-a  i>enteu<;^'  of  l«uiii«hment;  upon  whicli 
he  had  retired  to  Thurii  and  had  been  active  in  hostility  to  Atiieiis 
after  the  Syracusan  catastrophe.  Serving  aijainsl  her  in  j^hips  lilted 
owt  at  his  own  cost,  he  had  i>een  captured  in  407  u.c.  by  the  Athe- 
nians and  hrdught  in  as  prisoner  to  Athens.  Ky  the  received  pnurtice 
of  war  in  that '(ky,  his  life  was  forfeited:  and  over  and  al»ove  such 
l^ractiee,  tlie  nomo  of  Dorieus  was  peculiai}y  odious  to  the  Athenians. 
But  when  tlvev,^a>v^  licfove  the  public  assembly  a  captive  enciny.  of 
lieroic  Hneajife'^a,s  >yeU  qs  of  unrivaled  athletic  majerty  iind  renown, 
tlK'ir  previo\is  hatred  wjls  so  overj>owered  by:  sympathy  and  admira- 
tion, tlvit  th<?y  iib<^^^t^d,him  by  public  vote^  and  dismieeed  him 
Tihi'onditi^nally.  ;    .>.:    ^i..'....:     '  .'  • 

This  interesting  anecdote,  which  lm$.  already  beOn  nj^nAed  in  my 
sistv-foniih.chMpterj  i*  here  ixgn'm  noticed  a.s  a  contrast  to  the  treat- 
ment wiiich  the  "same  Dorieus  now  underwent  from  tlie  Lacetla'mo- 
niaus.  'W^vit  he  had  been  dmn^  since,  we  do  not  know;  Ijut  at  the 
ti;ne  wheivlVnodes  now  revolted  from  Sparta,  he  \yafx  not  only  absent 
from  the  ii^land.  but  actually  in  or  net} r  Peloponnesus.  Such,  how- 
ever was  the  wrath  ^f  t.hc  J^cedffimoniags.asfiun^tlihc^iajsgene 
licit  Dorieus  >^- as  jseijzed  i>y  their,  order,  broujcht  t<)  ttptirta,  and  there 
condeiuned  apd  cxequtcHl  It  scc'me  hai-dly. possible. tliat  he  ciiu  have 
j'.ad  any  personal  concern  in  the  revolt.  Had  BUcli  begn.llie  fact,  he 
^vould  "iaave.  been  in  the  ishind— or  would  at;  least  have  taken  care 
not  to  be  within  tiie  Teach  of  the  Laqedtejino.pians  whcR  the  revolt 
happened,  Perluij^?.  l)oweyer,  otJier  niemberj^of  the  X%goridaj,  bis 
fiunilv,  on<?o  so  much  attiielMMi  to  Si^orta,  may  have  taken  ptift  in  it; 
for  we  kr^ow,  bv  the  example  of  Uic  Thirty  at  Athens,  that  the 
Lysandrinn  Dekavfhies and  Spartan  hfirHpostsma<lethemfielves  qmte 
as.  formidable  to  Qliui-kvchical  as  to  democrat ical  polifi<,'ana,  and  it  is 
very  coiK^ei v^b\e  l.ljuit .  the  DiagorMffi  .ijiaj  have  b^fipw^,  ^^  j^hiiO' 
La<X)ul»uiu.tJ^eij.pol>tica.  .ja'iji.:  ,.^^iu  ej^.^^v  iaor;^  :>u  oJ-*-^iiJi-:  i^'.- 


This  extreme  difference  in  the  treatment  of  the  same  man  by  Atliens 
and  by  Sparta  raises  instructive  rctlections.     It  exhibits  the  difference 
h)th between  Athenian  and  Spartan  sentiment,  and  between  the  senli- 
nu-nt  of  a  multitude  and  thatof  a  few.     Tiie  grand  and  sacred  person- 
■ility  of  the  Hienmike  Dorieus,  when  exhibited   to  the  senses  ol  the 
Athenian  multitude— the  spectacle  of  a  man  in  chauis  before  them, 
who  had  been  proclaimed  victor  ;ukI  crowned  on  so  many  solenui  oc- 
casions before  the  largest  assemblages  of  Greeks  ever  brought  together 
-produced  an  overwhelming  effect  upon  ther  emotions ;  sullicuMit  not 
onlvto  efface  a  slAmi  pre-established  antipathy  founded  on  active  p  i^t 
ho>'tility,  but  to  countervail  a  just  cause  of  revenge,  spcakuig  mi  he 
lan"iia*'-e  of  that  day.     But  the  same  appearance  produced  no  effect 
at  all  on  the  Spartan   Ephors  and    Senate;  not   sumcient  even   lo 
hinder  them  from  putting  Dorieus  to  death,  though   he  luid  given 
thi'iu  no  cause  for  antipathy  or  revenge,  simply  as  a  sort  ot  retribu- 
tiou  for  the  revolt  of  the  island.      Now  this  difference  depended 
partly  upon  the  difference  between  the  sentiment  of  Athenians  and 
bpartans   but  partly  also  upon  the  difference  between  the  sentiment 
of  a  multitude  and  that  of  a  few.     Had  Dorieus  been  brougut  before 
a  *^elect  judicial  tribunal  at  Athens,  instead  of  before  the  Atheman 
public  assembly— or  had  the  case  been  discussed  before  the  assembly 
In  his  absence— he  would  have  been  probably  condemned,  couform- 
uhlv  to  usa'-e,  under  the  circumstances;  but  the  vehement  emotion 
worked  by'^his  presence  upon   the  multitudinous  spectators  of  th<3 
;t>^cmbly,  rendered  such  a  course  intolerable  to  them.     It  has  been 
(oMunon  with  historians  of  Athens  to  dwell  upon  the  passions  ot 
the  public  assemblv  as  if  it  were  susceptible  of  excitement  only  in  an 
an"-rv  or  vindictive  direction;  whereas  the  truth  is,  and  the  exampic 
before  us  illustrates,  that  they  were  open-minded  in  one  direction  as 
well  as  in  another,  anil  that  the  present  emotion,  whatever  it  mig.it 
he  merciful  or  svmpatlietic  as  w(dl  as  resentful,  was  intensified  bv 
the  mere  fact  of  nuiltitude.     xViid  thus,  where  the  established  rule  ot 
procedure  happened  to  be  cruel,  there  was  some  chance  of  moving 
an  Atheni  m  assembly  to  mitigate  it  in  a  par  icular  case,  though  the 
Sprrtan  Ephors  or  Senate  would  be  inexorable  in  carrying  it  out— it 
iiidee  I  they  did  not,  as  seems  probable  in  the  case  of  Dorieus,  actu- 
allv  go  beyond  it  in  rigor.  .......  .     ^ 

While  Kouon  and  the  Khodians  were  thus  raising  hostilities  against 
Sparta  by  sea,  Au'csilaus,  on  receiving  at  Kyme  the  news  of  his 
iioiiiiutition  to  the'double  command,  immediately  dispatcheil  orders 
to  the  dependent  maritime  cities  and  islands,  re(piiriug  the  construc- 
tion and  equipment  of  new  triremes.  Such  was  the  influence  of 
Sparta,  and  so  much  did  the  local  governments  rest  upon  its  coii- 
tiiuiance,  that  these  requisitions  were  zealously  obeyeil.  Many  lerKl- 
iug  men  incurred  considerable  expense,  from  desire  to  acquire  his 
favor;  so  that  a  fleet  of  I'^O  new  triremes  was  ready  by  the  ensuing 
year.    Agesilaus,  naming  his  brother-in-law  Peisander  to  act  as 


650 


THE  qOitlNTmA^  W41R. 


COMPARISON  OF  SENTIMENT. 


651 


(l^^v^-n — and  tWuiz:**  tiio  t^o  eommnnd;?  \ii\d  uttvef  bc»ert  unitpd  in  any 
kiiui  befvi-e  A*§t'silaiisi.     Pliurux,  the  previous  adaiiriiL  was  recalled. 

But  the  vi«>k'iit  displeasure  of  the  LacwlteuKmiajis  a^^aiiLst  the 
revolted  RhrHlians  ^^as  st.ill  b  ttteraltestecl  by  «uotht'r  i)rocce(lirig. 
Annviig  all  the  grc-jit  families  at  Rhodes,  none  were  more  dislin- 
guished  tlwui  the  DiagoricVde.  Its  lueiubirs  were  not  only  ireuerals 
and  hi.ffh  political  functiowarics  iu  their  pative  island,  but  had 
attained  even  PaQhelWnicceleijrity  by  an  unparaUeled  series  of  victo- 
ries at  the  Olympic  aud  otlR-r  great  solemnit^ius.  Doiiens:.  a  mcinlKT 
of  this  foiuiiy,  had  gained  the  victory  in  the  panUrr.tiou  at  Olymiua 
on  three  suc'cesiiive  solt-Minities.  He  had  olrtaiued  seven  prizes  in 
the  Neineitu,  and  ei_g:ht  in  tin?  Isthminu  g;;mes.  He  had  carried  off 
the  i)rize  at  one  Pythi;in  solemnity  without  a  contest — no  one  daring 
to  stand  up  against  hin>  iu  the  fealfid  Ktni-j^le  of  the  pankration. 
As  a  Uliodiau,  wliile  Rhodes  \v;^s  a  subject -ally  of  Athene  (hu'inir  llie 
Peloi)onuesian  war,  he  had  been  sp  pronounced  in  his  atfaohnient  to 
Sparta  as  to  draw  on  himself. a senUii<;e  of  l«uiiijhiiient;  upon  which 
he  had  retired  to  Thurii  and  had  been  active  in  hostiliiy  to  Athens 
after  the  i^yraeusan  catastrophe.  Servinfr  aijainsl  her  in  ships  tilted 
oHt  at  his  tntn  cost,  he  had  l)een  captured  in  407  li.f".  by  the  Atlit^- 
uians  and  Iwdught  in  as  pri:?oner  to  Athfua.  Ky  tho  received  i)nu.'tice 
of  war  in  that  day,  his  life  was  forfeited:  ami  over  aud  al»r7ve  nuch 
l^ractiee,  the  nom^^of  Doiieuswas  peculiarly  odious  to  the  Athenians. 
Rut  when  tl»ev,^a>v'  iH^fove  th<?  public  assembly  a  cupllve  enemy,  of 
lieroic  rinea}^^e''a,«^  ?yeU  ^s  oj  uiuival^d  athletic  majt^ty  and  ix'nown, 
tlH'ir  previoiis  hatre<i  was  so  ovrr}><>wt:red  by  syiupafhy  and  admira- 
tion, tViJit,  tb<?y  lilM,'jrm^d,liim  by  pubtic  vot(^,.  aud  di^jnis^ed  him 
uiK'onditipnally.  ;.  .      _ 

This  inierestinf^  anecdote,  which  has.  already  beOn  mhUed  in  my 
siMv-fouiili.chapier^  i*  W^  i\gi}\n  i>oticed  a.s  a  contraH  to  the  treai- 
luent  winch  the  "same  Dorieus  now  underwent  flou)  the  Laced*nio- 
riaus.  ^VW\\  he  hftd  V)een  doin^  since,  we  do  not  kiK>w;  )mt  at  the 
time  wheiv  Rhodes  now  revolted  from  Sparta,  he  was.  not  only  almnt 
from  the.  island,  but  actually  in  or  near  Peloponnesus.  Such,  how- 
ever wa.=!  the  wrath  9f  liie^yaced^pioniaQs  iu:j£dn$tRliodiJftJ>|renerally 
lint  Dorieiis^asf^i^ed  by  their. order,  brouj:;ht  \<i  SiKirta,  and  there 
condeniaied  apd  cxoquto^l.  It  seems  haixlly  possible. that  he  can  have 
Jiad  any  persouai concern  jji  the  revolt.  Had  sucli  been  the  fnct,  he 
wouUi  Jiave  been  in  the  islaoid— or  would  a-t  least  have  taken  care 
not  to  be  within  tJie  reach  of  the  L^iqecUmionians  whc|i  the  revolt 
liappentdj  JPerluipf.  howeycF,  atiijer  membtir^;Of  Ih?  PHtgorid^J,  ^^ 
faudlv,  once  so  much  attiK?iied  to  Sixirta,  may  have  taken  inxtl  in  it; 
for  we  know,  bv  the  example  of  the  Tlurty  at  Athpns,  that  the 
LysandriMu  Dekavchies and  Spartan  ImrRnostsiuade themK'lves  quite 
as  formidable  to  Qliiiarchical  as  to  demoeratieai  poliii<.'aOf!.  and  if^s 
very  cotw>eiv^ble  lluit ,  the  DiagorAdffi  .may  have  b^eonaj?  i^^e  P^"^^' 
Lacoiiiau  iu.  the  If.  politics,  ,jiiii:ii:  i^w^jj  cia^v  Hyjz^  ^^  tw^juj;-  -- 


This  extreme  difference  in  the  treatment  of  the  same  man  by  Atliens 
find  by  Sparta  raises  instructive  reflections.  It  exhibits  the  difference 
b)lh between  Athenian  and  Spartan  sentiment,  and  between  the  senti- 
ment of  a  multitude  and  thatof  a  few.  The  jj^rand  and  sacred  person- 
nlitv  of  the  Hierouike  Dorieus,  when  exhibited  to  the  senses  of  the 
Athenian  multitude— the  spectacle  of  a  man  in  chains  before  them, 
wiio  had  been  proclaimed  victor  and  crowned  on  so  many  solenui  oc- 
casions before  the  largest  assemblages  of  Greeks  ever  brought  together 
—produced  an  overwhelming elfec^t  upon  ther  emotions ;  ^ulticicnt  not 
onlvto  efface  a  stA)n2  pre-established  antiiiathy  founded  oji  aelive  p  ist 
hostility,  but  to  countervail  a  just  cause  of  revenge,  speaking  in  ihe 
hueniage  of  that  day.  But  the  same  appearance  produced  no  etfect 
at  all  on  the  Sp-utau  Ephors  and  Senate;  not  sumdent  even  lo 
hinder  them  from  putting  Dorieus  to  death,  though  he  had  given 
tiiciu  no  cause  for  antipathv  or  revenge,  simply  as  a  sort  of  retnbu- 
tiou  for  the  revolt  of  the  "island.  Now  this  difference  depended 
partly  upon  the  difference  between  the  sentiment  of  Athenians  and 
Spartans,  but  partly  also  upon  the  difference  l>etween  the  sentiment 
of  a  multitude  and  that  of  a  few.  Had  Dorieus  been  brought  before 
a  select  judicial  tribunal  at  Athens,  instead  of  before  the  Athenian 
pnldic  assembly— or  had  the  case  been  discussed  before  the  assembly 
in  his  absence— he  wM)uld  have  been  probably  condemned,  conform- 
al)ly  to  usage,  under  the  circumstances;  but  the  vehement  emotion 
worked  by'^his  ]U'esenco  upon  the  nudtitudinous  spectators  of  the 
assembly,  rendered  such  a  course  intolerable  to  them.  It  has  been 
common  with  historians  of  Athens  to  dwell  upon  the  passions  of 
the  public  asscuiblv  as  if  it  were  susceptible  of  excitement  only  \u  an 
angry  or  vindictive  direction;  whereas  the  truth  is,  and  the  exaiuple 
before  us  illustrates,  that  they  were  open  minded  in  one  direction  ns 
\vell  as  in  another,  and  that  the  present  emotion,  whatever  it  nught 
he,  merciful  or  sympathetic  as  well  as  resentful,  was  intensified  by 
the  mere  fact  of  \nultitude.  And  thus,  where  the  established  rule  of 
procedure  happened  to  be  cruel,  there  was  some  chance  of  moving 
an  Atheni  m  assembly  to  nutigate  it  in  a  par  icular  case,  though  the 
Spr.rtan  Ephors  or  Semite  would  be  inexorable  in  carrying  it  out— it 
iiidfiC  I  they  <lid  not,  as  seems  probable  iu  the  case  of  Dorieus,  actu- 
aliv  go  be^yond  it  in  rigor. 

While  Ivonon  and  the  Rhodians  were  thus  raising  hostilities  against 
Sparta  by  sea,  Agesilaus,  on  receiving  at  Kyme  the  news  of  his 
nomination  to  the'double  command,  immediately  dispatched  orders 
to  the  dependent  maritime  cities  and  islands,  recpiiriug  the  construc- 
tion and  equipment  of  new  triremes.  Such  was  the  influence  of 
Sparta,  and  so  much  did  the  local  governments  rest  upon  its  con- 
tinuance, that  these  requisitions  were  zealously  obeyed.  Mnny  lead- 
ing men  incurred  considerable  expense,  from  desire  to  acquire  his 
favor;  so  that  a  fleet  of  I'^O  new  triremes  was  ready  by  the  ensuing 
year.    Agesilaus,  naming  his  brother-in-law  Peisander  to  act  as 


652 


THE  CORINTHIAN  WAR. 


PHARNABAZUS  SURPRISED. 


653 


admiral,  sent  him  to  superintend  the  preparations;  a  brave  \o\m^ 
man,  but  destitute  botli  of  skill  and  experience.  " 

Meanwhile  he  himself  pursued  his  march  (about  the  bednnino-  of 
autumn)  toward  the  satrapy  of  Pharnabazus— Phrvgia  south  mid 
southeast  of  the  Propontis.  Under  the  active  guidance  of  Ms  I'lcw 
auxiliary  Spithridates,  he  phnuiend  the  countrv,  cnpturin"-  mmmc 
towns  and  reducing  others  to  capitulate;  with  considerable  iuivan- 
tage  to  his  soldiers.  Pharnabazus,  Imviug  no  sutlicient  armv  to 
liazard  a  battle  in  defense  of  his  satrapv,  concentrated  all'his  force 
near  his  own  residence  at  Daskylium.  offerimr  no*opposition  to  the 
march  of  Agesilaus:  wlio  was  induced  bv  Spithridates  to  traverse 
Phrygia  and  enter  Paphlagonia.  in  hopes  of  conchidincr  nn  alliance 
ivuh  the  Paphlagonian  prince  Ot^s.  'J'hat  prince,  in  nominal  (lrp<ii- 
dence  on  Persia,  could  muster  the  best  cavalrv  in  the  IVrsian  (  mpire 
But  he  had  recently  refused  to  obey  an  inviiaUou  f n  m  the  coiirt  at 
Susa,  and  he  now  not  only  welcomed  the  appearance  of  Aee^lau's 
but  concluded  an  alliance  with  him,  strcnutheninir  him  'with  an 
auxiliary  body  cf  cavalry  and  peltasts.  Anxious  to"  requite  Spith- 
ridates tor  his  services,  and  vehtmently  attached  to  his  son  the 
beautiful  youth  Megabates— Agesilaus  persuaded  Otys  to  niarrv 
the  daughter  of  Spithridates.  He  even  caused  her  to'lu;  convcvcd 
by  sea  in  a  Lacediemoniau  trireme— probably  from  Abvdos"  to 
Si  nope.  "       ' 

Re-enforced  by  the  Paphlagonian  auxiliaries,  Aiicsiiaus  prosecuted 
the  war  with  augmented  vigor  against  tlie  satraiiv  of  PJiarnahazus 
He  now  approached  the  neighborliood  of  Daskviliim  tlie  re'-iddue 
ot  the  satrap  himself,  inherited  from  his  father  Pharnakcs  wlio  had 
been  satrap  before  him.  This  was  a  well-supplied  countrv  full  ef 
rich  villages,  embellished  with  parks  and  gardens  for  the  'satrap's 
liunting  and  gratification:  the  sporting  tastes  of  Xenophon  lead  him 
also  to  remark  that  there  were  plenty  of  birds  for  the  fowler  with 
rivers  full  of  fish.  In  this  agreeable  region  Agesilaus  pasnd  the 
winter.  His  soldiers,  abundantly  supplied  with  provisions  became 
so  careless,  and  stiapgled  with  so  much  contempt  of  their  (luniv 
that  Pharnabazus,  with  a  body  of  400  cavalrv  and  two  scvlhed 
chariots,  found  an  opportunitv  of  attacking  700  of  them  bv  Hiijrisc- 
driving  them  back  witli  considerable  loss,  until  Agesilaus  came  up  to 
protect  them  with  the  hoplites. 

This  partial  misfortune  liowever,  was  speedily  avcn^-cd  Fearful 
of  being  surrounded  and  capture d,  Pharnabazus  refrained  fnm 
occupying  any  fixed  position.  He  hovered  about  the  country  canv 
ing  his  valuable  I'roperty  along  with  him,  and  keeping  his  phue  of 
encampment  as  secret  as  lie  could.  The  watchful  Spithridates, 
nevertheless,  having  obtained  information  that  he  was  (  ncamped  for 
the  night  in  the  village  of  Kane,  about  18  miles  distant.  Herippidas 
(oneot  the  thirty  Spartans)  undert<ok  a  nlLhimarch  with  a  detach- 
ment to  surprise  him.     Two    thou.-and  Grecian   hoplites    the  iiko 


number  of  light-armed  peltasts,  and  Spithridates  w^ith  the  Paphla- 
gonian horse,  were  appointed  to  accompany  him.     Though  many  of 
these  soldiers  took  advantage  of  the  darkness  to  evade  attendance, 
the  enterprise  proved  completely  successful.     The  camp  of  Pharna- 
bazus was  surprised  at  break  of  day;  his  Mysian  advanced  guards 
were  put  to  the  sword,  and  he  himself,  with  all  his  troops,  was  com- 
pelled to  take  tliirht  with  scarcely  any  resistance.    All  his  stores,  plate, 
and  personal  furniture,  together  with  a  large  baggage-train  and  abun- 
dance of  prisoners,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors.    As  the  Paphla- 
ffonians  under  Spithridates  formed   the  cavalry  of  the  victorious 
detachment,  they  naturally  took  more  spoil  and  more  prisoners  than 
the  infantry.     They  were  proceeding  to  carry  off  their  acquisitions, 
when  Ilerippidas  interfered  and  took  everything  away  from  them; 
placing  the  entire  spoil  of  every  description  under  the  charge  of 
Grecian  officers,  to  be  sold  by  formal  auction  in  a  Grecian  city;  after 
which  the  proceeds  were  to  be   distributed  or  applied  by  public 
authority.     The  orders  of  Ilerippidas  were  conformable  to  the  regu- 
lar and  systematic  proceeding  of  Grecian  officers;  but  Spithridates 
and  the  Paphlagonians  w^ere  probably  justified  by  Asiatic  practice  in 
appropriatimr  that  which  they  had  themselves  captured.     Moreover, 
the  order,  disagreeable  in  itself,   was  enforced  against  them  with 
Laced(emoniau  "harshness  of  manner,  unaccompanied  by  imy  guar- 
autv  that  they  would  be  allowed,  even  at  last,  a  fair  share  of  the  pro- 
ceeds.    Resenting  the  conduct  of  Ilerippidas  as  combining  injury 
with  insult,  they  deserted  in  the  night,  and  fled  to  Sardis.  Avhere  the 
Persian  xVria^us  was  in  actual  revolt  against  the  court  of  Susa.     This 
was  a  serious  loss,  and  still  more  serious  chagrin,  to  Agesilaus.     He 
was  not  only  depriv(;d  of  valuable  auxiliary  cavalry,  and  of  an  cnter- 
prisinc: Asiatic  informant;  but  the  report  would  be  spread  that  he 
defrauded  his  Asiatic  allies  of  their  legitimate  plunder,  and  others 
would  thus  deterred  from  joining  him.     His  personal  sorrow  too 
was  aggravated  by  the  departure  of  the  youth  Megabazus,   who 
accompanied  his  father  Spithridates  to  Sardis. 

It  was  toward  the  close  of  this  winter  that  a  personal  conference 
took  place  betw^een  Agesilaus  and  Pharnabazus,  managed  by  the 
intervention  of  a  Greek^of  Kyzikus  named  Apollophanes;  who  was 
connected  by  ties  of  ho.spitality  with  both,  and  served  to  each  as 
guaranty  for  the  good  faith  of  the  other.  We  have  from  Xeno- 
phon,  himself  probably  present,  an  interesting  detail  of  this  inter- 
view.' Agesilaus  accompanied  by  his  thirty  Spartan  counselors, 
being  the  first  to  arrive  at  the  place  of  appointment,  all  of  them  sat 
down  upon  the  grass  to  wait.  Presently  came  Pharnabazus,  with 
splendid  clothing  and  retinue.  His  attendants  were  beginning  to 
spread  fine  carpets  for  him,  when  the  satrap,  observing  how  the 
Spartans  were  seated,  felt  ashamed  of  such  a  luxury  for  himself,  ajid 
sat  down  on  the  grass  bv  the  side  of  Agesilaus.  Having  exchanged 
salutes,  they  next  shook  hands;  after  which  Pharnabazus,  who  as 


P54 


THE  CQRIIVfUUN  WAa. 


CUAHACTEH  t)F  AOESlLAfS. 


im 


the  altkrof  tlie  t>vo  ImiMier-n  llio^vsttq  1«fi(fer  hh  right-haTnl;  wns 
nUo  the  Hist  to  ojxjM  th(;  cxj/JrV-titeyU©!).  "AliHliW  Uc-  sj>oke  ciittk 
-vvclt  enough  to  di.sin'nse  witli  th0  irfccjisily.of  tie  ialcipielt^f,  wo  ;iie 
pot  ,uifomi(?d.  "Agrsilim,^  (,sfUl  he),  Ivfm  Oxe  fmticl  anti  ally  of 
you  LiicrdaDmouiaRs -vvliHe  you -wcrent  wari\Hh  AUitBfe:  1  furnished 
you  -witii  money  to  .slivngllie»  yo>ir  tleiH;  mimI  louglit  \YJ4h  you 
Tiiysclf  ashore  on  hor.sfhju  k,  cl/asinjf  youi;  -rmijuei^  into  llie  n-n. 
You  cannot  charge  nwj  willi  tv^-  ^mviuar  jiayccii  yt  u  ffllsc,  like 
Tissaphci'c<'!3,  cither  hy  woid  or  Uop<l.  Yet  after  Ibks  Ixliavior,  I  jriu 
iiow  reduced  hy  you  to  such  a  CQudhiop,  thiit  I  hn\^*  not  a  tlUuier  in 
piy  own  territory,  except  hy  pickin.ir  up  your  WaviuitH,  like  the 
Leasts  of  the  tiekh  I  see  the  liBe  rewAiences.  parkv,  i.-rd  huiiliiv. 
grounds,  boKjucathed  to  me  by  my  fatlier,  w4»ich  dqi  mtii}  the  cliiinni  of 
my  life,  cut  up  or  burnt  do\v  u  by  you.  Ls  tlds  llie  ouiuluicl  of  men 
mindful  of  f.n  ors  received,  and  tuger  to  jrequile  Fhtni V  Piav yutswer 
me  this  qiiestiou;  for  perhaps  I  have  yet  to  h^mm  wliat*  is  holy 
and  j[ust." 

The  thirty  Spartan  couaselors  were  (xn-ered  with  sliame  by  tLis 
emphatic  appeak  They  bH  lield  their  pwjce;  while  Ai:c^iiaus,  after  a 
lon^  pause',  at  k^Hjjrth  replied—"  You  4U>e  aware,  P);aru;d«iz.ais,  that  in 
Grecian  cities,  individu^da  beconie  private  friends  and  guests  of  each 
other.  ^  Such  guest*;,  if  tlie  <il\w^  to  whtch  they  belouL'  go  to  war; 
fight  with  each  other,  4Uid  sojuetimesiby  accideait  even  kill  each  other) 
each  in  behalf  of  hi&  respective  city.  So  theii  it  is  that  we,  heinn*  at 
Ava4-  with  ywir  king,  arc  ct)mpolled  to  hotl-d  all  his  doiiija ions  as  eiie- 
my'«  lamb  But  in  regard  Xq  you.  we  w  mild  pay  any  price  to  become 
your  friends.  I  do  not  invite  you  to«c<;ipt  us  as. maslei-s,  in  place  of 
your  present  master ;  I  a.sk  you  to  become  mn  ally,  and  to  enjoy  your 
own  property  as  a  freeman— bowing  before  no  man  and  aeknowledg- 
lug  IK)  master.  Now  freedom  is  in  itself  a  possenvioij  of  the  hidiekt 
vahiG.  But  this  is  not  all.  We  do  not  call  upon  yn«  to  bo  a  free- 
tnau,  and  yet  poor.  We  offer  you  our  aliinnce,  to  Jicquii-e  fresh  ter- 
ritory, not  for  the  king,  but  for  yourself ;  by  rtH.l;uciug  those  who  are 
R(nv  your  fejlow -slaves  to  become  your  siib;jeCts.  Kow  tell  me— if 
you  thus  continue  a  freeman  and  become  ri'clx,  what  can  you  want 
farther  to  make  yon  a  thoroughly  pioi^perous  man?" 

"I  will  8p<.ak  frankly  to  you  in  reply  (saitl  PkirnabaKiisX  If  the 
king  5hull  ,«K^ud  any  other  general,  and  put  me  under  him,  I  shall 
willingly  become  your  friend  and  all  v.  But  if  he  impdpes  tlie  duty 
of  command  on  me,  so  strong  is  the  point  of  honor,  that  I  shall,  con* 
tinue  to  make  war  upon  you  to  the  beat  of  my  power.  Expect  nothing 
else." 

,  A.g«'silaus,  struck  with  this  nh^wor,  took  liis  band  and  sMid— 
"Would  that  with  such  high-mindt>d  senliments  yon  r'>w//f  ])ecomo 
our  fiiend!  At  any  rate,  let  me  assure  you  of  tlos-^that  I^ill  rmme- 
diutely  quit  your  territory;  and  for  the  future,  even  ahould  the  war 


continae;'  1  will  fespeiit- both  you  and  airyour^im)i3erfy,-^s  lorig  as  I. 
rin  tunv my  ann?  ag'ainsi:  any  other  Persians.       ';-  ...^...v    .-,„  ^'.li 

Here  the  ooii  Versfttion  closed ;  Pliafnabuzus  moiTftted  his  hofse,  ari^ 
nnVe  awrty.     His  «oh  by  Panipita,-howevei-at  that  tune  stil  a  haiiji; 
^neyodth-lingei^dbehitnl,  ran  up  to  Agt'Sdails,  and  exclaimed--^ 
!IS  s  luiakej^umyguesi.'*    -1  accept  it  with  all  my  heart 

wa' tl^  ftn^wer:  ->  Remember  me  by  this"-rejoiiied  the  youn- 
Fo^Tai^-mil1in*.^^o  tlie  hands  of  Agesliaus  the  line  javelin,  which 
L'  cii^^^ied      Tl3.  Intt^rimnit^liately  t^^  off  the  ornanl^tal  trap- 

Ur/mm  the  horse  of  his  secrt>tary  Idteus,  and  gave  them  as  a; 
IvtmMi  present,  upon  which  the  young  man  i-ode  away  with  them,  and 

''^rll^^lf  ftoudnug  interest  and  emphasis  in  this  interview  a3 
d.sc  n^d  by  Xenophmi,  who  here ,  breathes  f^-^^^^;;^ 
chronicle  sometldug  of  the  romantic  spin    f^f^^^^f  ^J.^Rf^^;^^^^^^ 
T)led"x?s  exchanged  between  Agesilaus  and  the  son  of  l  liarnabazus 
wertMiot  for.*o^       bv  either,    ^he  latter-being  m  after-days  imoov- 
^.^hXind  driven  into  exile  ^y  ^^s  brother,  dun^^^^^ 
Pharnabizus  in  Eirypt-was  compelled  to  take  refuge  m  trieece 

vt re  A^esilaus  pSfvided  him  with  protection  and  aJiome,  and  even 
wen  so  far  as  to  employ  influence  in  favor  of  an  Athcman^youth,  to 
wh^  hos^-^PlL-nabazus  was  attached.^    This  Athcmi^  youtl^; 

adTut4wntlH3agb>a.ld'&ike  of  the  boy- rimik-rS  i;i  the  Olympic 
stadiuuv  nev^rtlR'l^ss  AgeMlaus,  by' strCmVou^  personal  interference, 
"kit  the  1-eluctanee  or  the  Efeian  judges,  and  previvd^d  upon 
^.im  to  adn.it  him  as  a  Competitor  with  the  Ojher  l^ov^^The  st^^ 
liid  by  Xenol>h(m  upon  this  favor  illustrates  the  tone  ot  Greciaii  s.eu- 
^n  allows  L  the  variety  of  objects  vvliich  pc^?ornd  ascem  - 
•  com-imssi.'  ■  Disinterested  in  reguiti  to  himself,  Agtsi- 
.uTmvs  both  in  pi'omotiiig  the,  eiicroachments  and 
istiees  e^+"  his  fiMends.    Tlid  unfair' privilege  w^hicU 

ho  procured  f of  thisyouth,  t?ie)ngh !*^^,f ' *!;^^  i» l^^j''^^^^^ 
f-iil  to- (!.ttend  a  crowd-of'specttitbrs' familiar  with  the  e^t^bhslle^.t, 
conditions  of  the  stadiumi^ine!  to  expose  the  judges  to  sevejjcensiim 
Quittipcr  tb^^^at-rnpv  of  l>harnfil)a'zus--which  was  nowpiettj  v.tll 
exln^Ud;  Whiles  t1  J  armistice  ct^iic^ded 

exnired— AgeMMus  took  iip  lri<^^CJ^tnp  near  the  temple  of  Artemis,  at 
^^i^l^1>lnn  6r  ^iW  (m  aieregibn  e^l^^^J^  ^nown  aj, 
J^olis)  ntw  tfhe  gulf  6f  E!*.en<     He  here  employed  himself  m  bring 
S^  to  Metier  an  iiicrettf.^<l  number  of  troops  with  a  view.to  penetra  ^ 
firther  into  the  inwrlof  of  AMh  Minor  during  the  summer     llece  it 

^ha^^l^tlXemised  the  belief  -^^^^.'^yXo^^^^ 
his  sunerioi' strengHh;  s^  that  he  received  propositions  from  v  i io,i|, 
distrk^tffin  the  iriteri<.F,  Inviting  Ins  presence  and  expressing  anxictg 
to  ttm^w  off  the  Persian  yoke.  He  sought  aTso  to,  compose.  the>  di^-* 
^loSfn^^Ismie^-fiMl  had  am«.^.t  :W  U^i^s>^*».;J>Slv|.t, 


em 


THE  COlilNTiUAN  WAR. 


BATTLE  OT  KNIDUS. 


657 


clues  in  the  Greco- Asiatic  cities,  avoiding  as  much  as  possible  sliarn 
inflictions  of  death  or  exile.  How  much  he  achieved  in  this  direc. 
tion,  we  cannot  tell— nor  ciin  it  have  been  possible,  indeed,  to  achieve 
much,  without  dismissing  the  Spartan  harmosts  and  lessening  the 
political  power  of  his  own  i)artisans;  neither  of  which  he  did. 

His  plans  were  now  all  laid  for  penetrating  farther  than  ever  into 
the  interior,  and  for  permraent  conquest,  if  possible,  of  the  western 
portion  of  Persian  Asia.  What  he  would  have  permanently  aeconi- 
plished  toward  this  scheme,  cannot  be  determined;  for  his  ao-o-res- 
siye  inarch  was  suspeudeil  by  a  summons  home,  the  reason  of  whieh 
will  appear  in  the  next  chapter. 

Meanwhile  Pharnabazus  had  been  called  from  his  satrapy  to  "-oand 
take  the  command  of  the  Persian  fleet  in  Kilikia  and  the  south  of 
Asia  Minor,  in  conjunction  wilh  Konon.     Since  the  revolt  of  Rhodes 
from  the  Lacedaemomans  (in  the  summer  of  the  precedin^r  year  ^95 
B.C.),  that  active  Athenian   had   jichieved   nothing.     The  burst  of 
activity,  produced  by  the  first  visit  of  Pharnabazus  at  the  Persian 
court,  had  been  paralyzed  by  the  jealousies  of  the  Persian  command- 
ers  reluctant  to  serve  under  a  Greek— l.y  peculation  of  otficers  who 
embezzled  the  pay  destined  for  the  troops— by  mutiny  in  the  fleet 
from  absence  of  pay— and   by  the  many  delays  arising  while  the 
satraps,  unwilling  to  spend  their  own  revenues  in  the  war,  waited  for 
orders  and  remittances  from  ( ourt.     Hence  Konon  had  been  unable 
to  make  any  efficient  use  of  his  fleet,  during  those  months  when  the 
I^acedaemonian  fleet  was  increased  to  nearly  double  its  former  num- 
ber.    At  length  he  resolved— seeminglv  at  the  instigation  of  his  coun- 
trymen at  home  as  well  as  of  Euagoras  prince  of  halamis  in  C'\  prus 
and  through  the  encouragement  of  Ktesias,  one  of  the  GrecianpliVNi- 
cians  resident  at  the  Persian  court— on  going  himself  into  theintei'ior 
to  communicate  personally  wilh  Artaxerxes.     Landing  on  the  Kilik- 
lan  coast,  he  crossed  by  laud  to  Thapsacus  on  the  Euphrates  (as  the 
Cyreian  arm v  had  marched),  from  whence  he  sailed  down  the  river 
m  a  boat  to  Babylon.     It  appears  that  he  did  not  see  Artaxerxes. 
liom  repugnance  to  that  ceremony  of  prostration  which  was  requind 
iroiji  all  who  approached  the  royal  person.     But  his  messai-es,  trans- 
mi  ted  through  Ktesias  and  others— with  his  confident  engagement  to 
put  down  the  maritime  empire  of  Sparta  and  counteract  the  projeets 
or  Agesilaus  it  the  Persian  forces  and  money  were  put  into  efticient 
action-produced  a  powerful  effect  on  the  mind  of  the  monarch;  who 
<.r)ubtlesswas  not  merely  alarmed  at  the  formidable  position  of  Agesi- 
Jaus  m  Asia  Minor,  but  also  hated  the  Laceda'monians  as  main  airenls 
111  the  aggressive  enterprise  of  Cyrus.     Artaxerxes  not  onlv  approved 
his  views,  but  made  to  him  a  large  grant  of  money,  and  fraiismitted 
peremptory  orders  to  the  coast  that  his  oflicers  should  be  active  in 
prosecuting  the  maritime  war. 

«nl^^''^^  ^''^^  ""!  '-^'^1  ^'''l''^^^  moment,  Konon  was  permitted  to  name 
any  Persian  whom  he  chose,  as  admiral  jointly  with  himself.    It  was 


hv  his  choice  that  Pharnabazus  was  xialled  from  his  satrapy,  and 
ordered  to  act  jointly  as  commander  of  the  fleet.  This  satrap,  the 
bravest  and  most  straightforward  among  all  the  Persian  grandees,  and 
inst  now  smarting  with  resentment  at  the  devastation  of  his  satrapy 
by  \<^esilaus,  co-operated  heartily  with  Konon.  A  powerful  fleet, 
pir  Iv  Phenician.  partly  Athenian  or  Grecian,  was  soon  equipped, 
superior  in  number  even  to  the  newly-organized  Lacedaemonian  fleet 
under  Peisander.  Euagoras,  prince  of  Salamis  in  Cyprus,  not  only 
provided  many  triremes,  but  served  himself  personally  on  board. 

It  was  about  the  month  of  July,  394  B.C.,  that  Pharnabazus  and 
KoMon  brou'^ht  their  united  fleet  to  the  south-western  corner  of  Asia 
Minor-  first  probably  to  the  friendly  island  of  Rhodes,  next  off  Lory- 
ma  and  the  mountain  called   Dorion  on  the  peninsula  of  Knidus. 
Peisander,  with  the  fleet  of  Sparta  and  her  allies,  sailed  out  from 
Knidus  to  meet  them,  and  both  parties  prepared  for  a  battle.     The 
numbers  of  the  Lacedaemonians  are  reported  by  Diodorus  eighty-tive 
triremes-  those  of  Konon  and-  Pharnabazus  at  above  ninety.     But 
Xenophon   wilhout  particularizing  the  number  on  either  side,  seems 
to  intimate  the  disparity  as  far  crreater;  stating  that  the  entire  fleet  of 
Peisander  w^as  considerably  inferior  even  to  the  Grecian  division 
under  Konon,  without  reckoning  the  Phenician  ships  under  Pharna- 
bazus.    In  spite  of  such  inferiority,  Peisander  did  not  shrmU  from 
the  encounter.     Though  a  yountr  man  without  military  skill,  he  pos- 
sessed a  full  measure  of  Spartaircourage  and  pride;  moreover— since 
the  Spartan  maritime  empire  was  only  maintained  by  the  assumed 
superiority  of  his  fleet— had  he  confessed  himself  too  weak  to  fight, 
his  enemies  would  have  gone  unopposed  round  the  islands  to  excite 
revolt.    Accordingly  he  sailed  forth  from  the  harbor  of  Knidus.    But 
when  the  two  fleets  were  ranged  opposite  to  each  other,  and  the  battle 
was  about  to  commence— so  inanifest  and  alarming  was  the  superior- 
ity of  the  Athenians  and  Persians,  that  his  Asiatic  allies  on  the  left 
division,  noway  hearty  in  the  cause,  fled  almost  without  striking  a 
l)low.     Under  such  discouraging  circumstances,  he  nevertheless  led 
his  fleet  into  action  with  the  greatest  valor.     But  his  trirenu'  w%as 
overwhelmed  by  numbers,  broken  in  various  places  by  the  beaks  of 
.the  enemy's  ships,  and  forced  back  upon  the  land,  together  with  a 
large  portion  of  his  fleet.     Many  of  the  crews  jumped  out  and  got  to 
land,  abandoning  their  triremes  to  the  conquerors.     Peisander  too 
might  have  escaped  in  the  same  way;  but  disdaining  either  to  sur- 
vive his  defeat  or  to  quit  his  ship,  fell  gallantly  fighting  aboard.    The 
victory  of  Konon  and  Phainabazus  was  complete.     More  than  half 
of  the  Spartan  ships  w\as  either  captured  or  destroyed,  though  the 
neighborhood  of  the  land  enabled  a  large  proportion  of  the  crews  to 
e^oape  to  Knidus,  so  that  no  irreat  number  of  prisoners  were  taken. 
Among  the  allies  of  Sparta,  the  chief  loss  of  course  fell  upon  those 
who  were  most  attached  to  her  cause;  the  disaffected  or  lukewarm 
were  those  who  escaped  by  flight  at  the  beginning. 


1658 


AFTEll'^UE  BATTLE  OF  ItNIDUS. 


HOSTILITY  AGAINST  SPARTA. 


659 


11     i 


?  Such  \cUr  thb  m«in<^rAl>Je  tiininph  of  tvonon  nt  Kinilns;  ifte  rover:; 
«al  of  that  of -X]^'san<ler  ut  ^s>:()sjM)tanu  (')(?v<'rt  yvAVf><  before.  Its  im- 
portant effects  wtlt  be  rbcountfd  in  the  eoimiig' chajiter."  ^•'" 


■•».. 


CHAPTER  LXXiy. 


«    :u;,»r- 


.!   s: 


'-'*.    ^^'        aCta^J 


•jLiA- 


Aj:' 


Jj-lROM  THij  HAttl^  of  ifyforl*^  f  o  Jirfe"  T?EBtn.i5n^o  bP  tnt  long 

WALIj*  of  ATHENS. 

HAvrNOln  irry  hi^t  chapter  earned  the  series  of  Asiatic  events  dtwu 
to  the  kittle  <>f  Kuithi??,  in  the  In^ipiinhig  of  Aii^st,  b.c.  804".  at 
Xvhich  period  witr  was  nlix'aily  raging  on  tlie  othersraeof  the  ^^ienn 
5n  Greece  Propei— I  now  take  np  tli^'  thread  of  events  from  a  perioci 
Somewhat  earlier,  1o  j^h'ow  how  thid  Itwl-ineutioued  war,  comniqnjjy 
called  the  Corinthfan  War.  ^      ■^-     *'" ""'  '  '       ^  ■■'■.■■.    ^ 


ln'g-dti 


.V. 


-  At  the  aeces-iion  of  As:ej?ilftiw  to  the  throne,  in  398  B.c./thp  power 
of  Sparta  throuirhont  all'Greece  from  Laconia  to  Thessalv,was  f'reater 
than  it  had  ever  been,  and  greater  than  any  Grecian  state  Iind  evet 
efijoye<l  before.  The  burden  (rf  the  long  war  agaiub^t  Athens  .she  had 
borne  in  far  le^s  prop6*»-t  ion  than  In^r  allies;  iisirniis  she  had  re.',  poo 
exclusively  for  lKMS(lf.  *^  TIkh?'  pre  varied  conseaucntly*  nniong  her 
allies  a  general  ditieontent,  \thi,eh  Thebes  ?is  wHl  a<?,  Corinth  mani- 
fested by  refnsiiig  *t<J  t:ike  part  in  the  reeent  expeditions;  either  of 
Pausanias  agfdust  Thrasybuhis  arnl  the  Athenian  cxtU's  in  Pciraus— 
©r  of  Agis  again.st  tli<f  ^k'ians— or  of  Agesilaiis  against  the  Persian^ 
in  Asia  3lh>or.  The  Elt'ians  were  f  oinp7etely  Inimbled  by  tliu  iriv^'- 
sinns  of  Agifi.  Al^rthe  other  cities  in  Peloponnesus,  froni*  anprehcnr 
Hon.  ffoi.i  nTiefent  halKt,  and  from  l/eipg  governed  by  obgarclde^ 
who  leaned  on  S^^arta  for  support,  were  olx'tlient  to  her  anLhoriTy— 
%vith  the  smgle  ex'reptlort  6f  Arg()i^.^vhich  rejnained,. as  before,  neutral 
a!id  qulf^,  though  in  scntinvpht  nnfriendlv.  Athens  was: a  .<5imple  unit 
in  the  caraloguf  of  Spainan  all1(s.  furaishing  ^hr  contingent,  like  IIk? 
re>J|.  to  hL'  cortT mended  by  ll>c  xcnairus-^ — or  o.ffiCtT  sent  from  Sparta 
for  the  Mp^eial  fitirpoMe  of  comma nfb'nir  snel\  foreign  contjngenis, 
•  In  the  noi'lhern  regions  of  Greece,  the  ail  Vance  of  Ppartfiii  power  is 
3t?t  nu^re  i-einarkAbie.  J.ooking  1  »ack  tp  the  year  410  B  c.  (about  two 
years  ufff^r  th^  peace  of  Ki-kias\  Sparta  hnd  liceh  so  iihable  to  protect 
hov  coloAy  of  Herakleia,  in  Trachis  on  the  Mnlinc  Gulf,  n(^u-  the 
strait  of  TlieVmopylnp,  fliat  the  Boeotians  were  obliiri,'d  to  send  agar- 
tison  thither,  in  order  to  prevf^nt^  it  from  falbncr  into  the  Uiuids  of 
Atljens.  TheV  even  went  so  fnf.as  to"  dismiss  1he  LacCd^^m'^inJiH 
harmost.  In  thf  winter  of  40M0^  b.c.  ,  another  dl^iisf er  Iioij  hdpr 
pened  ai  lrerak)^if>,-->n  wld(*h  tbe  LacetJfetrvoniHn  hnrniOFrf  ^^t>*;.siain' 
But  about  399  B.Cv^'we  find  Sim4*^a  cd-frdsing-.mi  )[}iYCT>tetf6U'fe&^^^ 


cncv  at   Hcrakleia,  and   even   making   that    p  ace  a  central   post 

?or   keeping    down    the    people   in    tiie    neighborhood   ot    Mount 

ffita  and  a  portion  of   Thessaly.     Herippulas  the  L^vcechemonian 

r^  sent  thitherto  repress  some  factious  movenienls,  with  a  foico 

^;m.^en     o  enable   him   to  overawe   the  pub.ic  ^^^^'^^y;,'^;^''^ 

tic  obnoxious  party  in  the  place,  and  to  put  them  to  death,  oOO  in 

n  mil  csou  side  ot"  the  gates.      Carrying  his  arms   farther  against 

U^e  ffit  ea"  ^  the  ne.ghborhood,  who  had  been  lon^ 

.    N^r  mce  with  the  Laconian  colonists  at  llerakleia   he  expelled 

,.m  f      1  the  r  abodes,  and  forced  them  to  migrate  with  their  wives 

ui   el  l(b-en  int.)  Thessaly.  -Hence  the  Lacedannomans  were  enabled 

urexled  their  influence  into  jmrts  of  Thessaly,  ana  to  place  aha  ^ 

m  ^  w  ai  a  Vrrison  in  Pharsalus,  resting  upon  llerakleia  as  a  bis  s 

-'vhich  ihu;  became  a  position  of  extraordinary  imporlance  ioi  then 

dominion  over  the  northern  regions. 

Vi   1  the  real  power  of  Sparta  thus  greatly  augmented  on  hud   m 
a:l  li  ion  to  her  last  empire  at  sea,  bringing  its  ample  mhnyi   ub- 
tc-aid  among  cities  who  had  not  merely  long  recognized  liei  as 
culer    but  had    never  recognized    any  one   el.e-ii  requa^a   an 
in  snl  slimulus  to  raise  any  formidable  hoslde  combination  against 
;  tw  thstanding  a  laiie  spread  of  disatfection  and  anlipa  Iin . 
Tim  si  nu  us  came  fmm  Pclsia,  from  whose  tre.i.sures  the  means  h.u 
b  cMi  be  Ore  furnished  to  Sparta  herself  for.  subduing  Athens      lie 
nL^  that  a  formidable  navy  was  fitting  out  m  ^^  ;f:?;5^!^,;y^^f  ^ 
bromoted  the  expedition  of  Agesilaus  m  the  spring  of  39Gb.o.,  \v.ts 
CbUess  circulated  and  heard  with  -^t^sfactimi  a.nong  tlie^(^^^^ 
cities  unfriendly  to  Sparta;  and  the  refusal  of  Ihebcs   Coiuith,  ami 
Aihiis  to  take  service  under  that  prhice-aggravated  m  the  case  of 
Ui%e  nu  s  bva  positive  olfense  given  to  him  on  the  occasion  of  his 
sac-fer Aulis-was  enough  to  warn  Sparta  of  the  dangerous  sen- 
uSand  tendencies  by  Nvincli  she  was  s..rrounded  near  home 
■  It  w'  s  upon  these  tendencies  that  the  positive  ^^^^^^ftions  and 
mom  ses  of  Persia  were  brought  to  bear,  in  the  course  of  the  follow - 
u'  y^  a  Id  not  merely  ..oniises,  but  pecuniary  supplies,  with  news 
ofrevved  naval  warfare  Uireatening  the  insular  dominion  of  Sparta 
Ti'Wi^'Ss     he  new  satrap  .ho   had  put  to  death  .md   succeeded 
f  SS^      had   no  sooner   concluded   the  armistice   mentioned 
alK^e    ana  %-e^^^^^^        upon  A-esilaus  to  remove  his  army  into  the 
«  of  pC^^^^^^  l^e  employed  active  measures  fc^  kincb 

Ub'I^u  a<'-ainst  Sparta  in  Grec>ce,  in  order  to  create  a  necessity  for 
UtM-i  il'^  Agesilaus  out  of  Asia.  He  sent  a  Rhodian  named  1  imok- 
rate^  into  G^^^^^^  as  envoy  to  the  cities  most  untnendly  to  be 
iilceaSll^mil^^ith  a  sun/of  fifty  talents;  cU-eting  hmi  to  employ 
tiUm<ini.vmffainin<'  over  t  ic  failing  men  ui  llie»e  cilifs,  .iiid  to 
cSi~Xmn  our.s  of  alliance  an.^aid  wiU.  Persia,  for  common 
holuUva'S  Sparta.  The  island  of  Rliodes.  havms  just  revol  cd 
hC  tkp  SmrUmVminion,  had  admitted  Konon  with  the  Persian 


660 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


THE  BCEOTLVN  WAR. 


661 


I     ' 


fleet  (as  I  have  mentioned  in  the  last  chapter),  so  tliat  probably  the 
Khodian  envoy  was  on  a  mission  to  lllhraustes  on  behalf  of  his 
countrymen.  He  was  an  appropriate  envoy  on  this  occasion,  as  hav- 
ing an  animated  interest  in  raising  up  new  enemies  to  Si)arta.  and 
as  being  hearty  in  stirring  up  among  the  Thebans  and  Corintiijjius 
the  same  spirit  which  had  led  to  the  revolt  of  Rhodes.  Tiie  elTeci 
which  that  revolt  produced  in  alarming  and  exasperatiuL'"  the  Spar- 
tans, has  been  already  noticed;  and  we  may  fairlv  presume  thai  its 
effect  on  the  other  side,  in  encouraging  their  Grecian  enemies,  was 
considerable.  Timokrales  visited  Thebes,  Corinth,  awd  Argos,  dis- 
tributing his  funds.  He  concluded  engagements,  on  behalf  oi'  the 
satrap,  with  various  leading  men  in  each,  putting  them  into  C()ni- 
munication  with  each  other:  Ismenias,  Androideidas,  and  others  iu 
Thebes— Timolaus  and  Polyanthes  at  Corinth— Kvlon  and  others  at 
Argos.  It  appears  tliat  he  did  not  visit  Athens; 'at  least  Xenoplion 
expressly  says  that  none  of  his  money  went  there.  The  working  of 
this  mission— coupled,  we  must  recoiled,  with  the  lencwed  naval 
warfare  on  the  coast  of  Asia,  and  the  promise  of  a  Pcisian  Hett 
against  that  of  Sj^arta— was  soon  felt  in  the  more  pronounced  mani- 
festation of  anti-Laconian  sentiments  in  tlicse  various  cities,  and  in 
the  commencement  of  attempts  to  establish  alliance  between  them. 

With  that  Laconian  bias  which  pervades  his  Hcllenica.  Xenophoii 
represents  the  coming  w;ir  against  Sparta  as  if  it  had  been  brought 
about  mainly  by  these  bribes  from  Persia  to  the  leading  men  in  these 
various  cities.    I  have  statul  on  more  than  one  occasion,  that  the 
average  public  morality  of  Grecian  individual  politicians,  in  Sparta, 
Athens,  and  other  cities,  was  not    such  as  to  exclude  personal  cor- 
ruption; tliat  it  required  a  morality  higher  than  the  averajie,  when 
such  temptation  was  resisted — and*  a  morality  considerably  higher 
than  the  average,  if  it  were  systematically  resist(  d.  and  for  along 
.  life,  as  by  Perikles  and  Nikias.     There  would  be  nothing  therefore 
surprising,  if  Ismenias  and  the  rest  had  received  bribes' under  the 
circumstances  here  mentioned.     But  it  appears  hiiihly  improbable 
that  the  money  given  by  Timokrates  could  have  been  a  bribe;  that 
is,  given  privately  and  for  the  sepjnate  use  of  these  leaders.     It  was 
furnished  for  the  promotion  of  a  certain  public  object,  which  could 
not  be  accomplished  without  heavy  disbursements;  if  was  analoirous 
to  that  sum  of  thirty  talents  which  (as   Xenoi^hon  himself  tells"  us) 
Tithraustes  had  jii3t  given  to  Agesilaus,  as  an  inducement  to  carry 
away  his  army  into  the  satrapy  of  Pharnabazus  (not  as  a  present  for  the 
private  purse  of  the  Spartan  king,  but  as  a  contribution  to  the  wants 
of  the  army),  or  to  that  which  the  satrap  Tiribazus  gave  to  Antalkidas 
afterward,  also  for  pu])lic  objects.     Xenophon  affirms,  that  Ismenias 
and  the  rest,  having  received  tiiese  presents  from  Timokrates,  accused 
the   Lacedjiemonlans,    and  rendered    them    odious— each  in  his  re- 
spective city.  But  it  is  certain,  from  his  own  showing,  that  tJie  hatred 
toward  them  existed  in  these  cities,  before  the  anival  of  Timokrates. 


In  Ar^ros   such  hatred  was  of  old  standing;  in  Corinth  and  Thebes, 
though  kindled  only  since  the  close  of  the  war,  it  was  not  the  less 
nronouuced.      Moreover  Xenophon  himself    informs  us,   that   the 
Athenians,  though  they  received  none  of  the  money,  were  qintc  as 
ready  for  war  as  the  other  cities.     If  we  therefore  admit  his  state- 
ment as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  Timokrates  gave  private  presents  to 
various  leading  politicians,  which  is  by  no  means  improbable— we 
must  dissent  from  the  explanatory  use  which  he  makes  ot  tins  tact, 
by  setting  it  out  prominently  as  the  cause  of  the  war.     ^^  hat  these 
leidincr  men  would  lind  it  difficult  to  raise,  was,  not  hatred  ot  hparta, 
l.ut  coutidence  and  courage  to  brave  the  power  of  Sparta      And  lor 
this  purpose  the  mission  of  Timokrates  would  be  a  valuable  aid,  by 
conveying  assurances  of  Persian  co-operation  and  support  against 
Soarla      He  must  have  been  produced  pu1)licly  either  before  the 
people!  the  Senate,  or  at  least  the  great  body  of  the  anti-Laconian 
party  in  each  city.     And  the  money  which  he  brought  with  hira 
thoiiffh  a  portion  of  it  may  have  gone  in  private  presents,  would 
serve  to  this  party  as  the  best  wammt  for  the  sincerity  ot  the  satrap. 
Whatever  negotiations  may  have  been  in  progress  between  tiie 
cities  visited   by  Timokrates,   no   union  had   been   brought  about 
between  them  when  the  war,  kindled  by  an  accident,  broke  out  as  a 
"Boeotian  War,"  between  Thebes  and  Sparta  separately.    Between 
the  Opuntian  Lokriaiis  and  the  Phokians,  north  of  B<rolia,  there  was 
a  strip  of  disputed  borderland;  respecting  which  the  Phokians   iin- 
nutinn-  wrongful  encroachments  to  the  Lokrians,  invaded  their  terri- 
tory °The  Lokrians,  allied  with  Thebes,  entreated  her  protection; 
upon  which  a  body  of  Ba^otians  invaded  Phokis;  while  the  Phokians 
on  their  side  threw  themselves  upon  Laced.Tmon,  invoking  her  aid 
a-ainst    Xliebes.      "The    Laceckcmonians    (says    Xenophon)^   were 
dt'li-hted  to  get  a  pretense  for  making  war  against  the  Theoans— 
hivin"-  becn^long  angry  with  them  on  several  dilTerent  grounds. 
Tlicv1hou<'-ht  that  the"  present  was  an  excellent  tunc  for  marching 
a-ainst  thc'm,  and  putting  down  their  insolence;  since  Agesilaus  w^as 
in  full  success  in  Asia,  and  there  was  no  <^thcr  war  to  embarrass  tlumi 
in   Greece  "     The  various  grounds  on  which  the  Lacedflemonians 
rested  their  displeasure  against  Thebes,  -begin  from  a  time  immedi- 
ately succeeding  the  close  of  the  war  against  Athens,  and  the  senti- 
ment was  now  both  established  and  vehement.     It  Avas  they  who  now 
began  the  Boeotian  war;  not  the  Thebans,  nor  the  bribes  brought  by 

Timokrates.  ,     ,    j  i    r        •     *-„^t^^ 

The  energetic  and  ambitious  T.ysander,  who  had  before  instigated 
the  expedition  of  Agesilaus  across  the  ^gean  and  who  had  long 
hated  the  Thebans— was  among  the  foremost  advisers  of  the  expedi- 
tion now  decreed  by  the  Ephors  against  Thebes,  as  well  as  the  chief 
commander  appointed  to  carry  it  into  execiuion.  He  was  dispatched 
with  a  small  force  to  act  on  the  north  of  Bcpotia.  He  wa^  directed 
to  start  from  Ilerakleia,  the  center  of  Lacedaemonian  influence  m 


662 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


Hf 


those  regions— to  mnster  the  ITornkleots,  togctlier  -uitii  the  various 
dependent  popuUitious  ill  the  neighborb.ood  of  (Kta.  (Kta'ans,  iMalinns, 
^^i^nianes,  etc. — to  march  toward  Boeotia,  taking  up  the  Phokians  in 
Ills  way — and  to  attack  Ilaliartus.  Under  the  walls  of  tliis  town 
King  Pausanias  engaged  to  meet  him  on  a  given  day,  Mitli  tlie 
native  LacedaMnonian  force  and  the  Peloponncsinn  allies.  For  this 
]»urpose,  having  obtained  favorable  border  sacriliees,  he  miuehcd 
forth  to  Tegea,  and  there  employed  himself  in  collecting  tlie  ailitd 
contingents  from  Peloponnesus.  But  the  allies  generally  were  tjudy 
and  reluctant  in  the  cause;  while  the  ('(^rinthians  withheld  all  con- 
C'irrenee  and  supiwrt —though  neither  did  they  make  any  manifesta- 
tion in  favor  of  Thebes. 

Finding  themsclvt-s  thus  exposed  to  a  forr.iidtible  attack  on  two 
sides,  from  Sparta  at  the  height  of  her  power,  and  f rf  ni  a  Spar'.m 
officer  of  known  ability — being  mcM-eover  at  the  same  time  without  a 
single  ally — the  Thebans  resolved  to  entreat  succor  from  Athens.  A 
Theban  embassy  to  Athens  for  any  pur]i('se,  and  especially  for  this 
purpose,  was  itself  among  the  strongest  n:arks  of  the  I'c volution 
which  had  taken  place  in  Grecian  politics.  The  antipathy  between 
the  two  cities  had  been  so  long  and  virulent,  that  the  Thebans,  r.t  th(; 
close  of  the  war,  had  endeavored  to  iRtiuce  ISparta  to  root  out  the 
Athenian  population.  Their  conduct  subse(juent]y  had  l>een  favora- 
ble and  sympalhizing  toward  Thrasybulus  in  his  struggle  against  the 
Thirty,  and  tiiat  leader  had  testified  his  gratitude  l)y  (ledicatinir 
statues  in  the  Theban  Ilerakieion.  But  it  was  by  no  means  clear 
that  Athens  would  feel  herself  called  upon,  either  by  policv  or  ity 
sentiment,  to  assist  them  in  the  present  cnieig(  ncy ;  at  a  moment 
when  she  had  no  Long  Walls,  no  fortifications  at  Peiraus,  no  t>liips, 
nor  any  protection  against  the  Spartan  maritime  power. 

It  was  not  until  Pausaiuas  and  Lysander  were  l;oth  actually 
engaged  in  mustering  their  forces,  that  the  Thelans  sent  to  juldress 
the  Athenian  assendjly.  The  s])eech  of  the  Theban  envoy  sets  forth 
strikingly  the  case  against  Sparta  as  it  then  stood.  Disc'laimim:  all 
concurrence  with  thali  former  Theban  deputy,  who,  without  any 
instructions,  had  taken  on  himself  to  propose,  in  the  f^partan  assem- 
bly of  allies,  extreme  severity  toward  t]\c  conquered  Athenians — he 
reminded  the  Athenians  that  Tbel»es  had  by  unanimous  voice  (lerlined 
obeying  the  summons  of  the  Spartans,  to  aid  in  the  march  against 
Thrasybulus  and  the  PeirnDus;  and  that  this  was  the  fiist  cause  of  the 
anger  of  the  S])artans  against  her.  On  that  ground,  lh(  n,  he  a]  peak  d 
to  the  gratitude  of  democratical  Athens  against  the  Laeedfemonians. 
But  he  likewise  invf)ked  against  tiiem,  with  yet  greater  confidence. 
\hv  aid  of  oligarchical  Athens — or  of  those  who  at  that  time  h.-sd 
stood  opposed  to  Thrasybulus  and  the  Peirapus;  for  it  was  Sparta 
who,  after  having  first  set  up  the  oligarchy  at  Athens,  had  afterward 
refused  to  sustain  it,  and  left  its  partisans  to  the  generosity  of  their 
democratical  opponents,  by  whom  alone  they  were  saved  harmless 


A4:  .«,yr<5P  Mhcngnvafe  e>ka:cr,  if  pt^eibk  (so  he  presunied),  to  Tc^guia, 
?^  ^?^?  cmTiin^  ut^ii  'i«  e«tcri.>n8e  he  aeudered  th^  cordml  aul  of. 
her  o^fe  c'^l'^'\,  ^^\i"  '  ,hued  out  that  it  was  by  no  means  an  im-.- 

Thebes  a.^  an  ally.  .  ^^^  f  ^  'V,  ,  .^,'\V'  '  ^versal  hatred  whicii  Sparta, 
pvacticabte  cnterpn^v;  luoKH.g   o^^^  ^^^.^^^  ^       ^ 

f^TS^eS:^  The^lleSa^  llw.by  expcrknce  tlu.t. 
tlian  of  pn-)r  ^»|^"  \^%  ,  /  .     .  ^i^  would,  now  show  that  she 

Thcl)es  eou  d  be  ^^^^^^.^^l^^"^ n^^  Aeniuns  would  inter: 
cudd  be  yet  nio-  e  «^^.'X^^",ow  about  to Ught,  not  for^ 
t.re  to  rescue  hei      M^^^^^^^^^^^  prcservution  and  dignity: 

Syracusans  ovAsiatc.   I    t      1^^  (concluded  the  Thebaiv 

;:i^^;^fS^h"w:;t^^^  -  ^  ^^^^'^ 

bem^tiUoyouUmukiBtocuM^^  the  ai^honship  of  EuklcKh-s 

niin<irilv,  wmen  mi.^i**' ^^^'^  "'^^ '''^**  t?  .^  4|.,i  /.n»Tini-i'heusive- 

1  !•       *  .„,]  u,,.  wi-^t- and  u-enei'Oiis  torbearauco  w  itU  \\hiui  it  u.ii 
tiition—anu  the  wi»t>  iMui  ■7'';;'"^*;      trwturlno-  recoUec'LiMU— were? 

enlarged  ud  l»;^^iVf  V,  *^-  restored  hinnoi'V  between  deinocrat^  and 


664 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


LYSANDER  IS  SLAIN. 


665 


I*     I 


P 


communicated  it  to  tlie  Thobnn  envoys.  He  told  them  that  Athens 
knew  well  the  risk  which  she  was  incurring  wliile  Peira?u8was  uncle- 
fended;  but  that  nevertlieless  she  was  prepared  to  show  lier  grati- 
tude by  giving  more  in  requital  than  slie  had  received;  for  she  was 
prepared  to  give  the  Thebans  positive  aid.  in  case  they  were  attacked 
— while  the  Thebans  had  done  nothing  more  for  Ae/lhan  to  refuse  to 
join  in  an  aggressive  march  against  her. 

Without  such  assurance  of  succor  from  Atliens,  it  is  highly  prob- 
ably that  the  Thebans  might  have  been  afraid  to  fnce.  siiigle-lmnded, 
Lysiinder  and  the  full  force  of  Sparta.  But  they  now  ])reparcd  for 
a  strenuous  defense.  The  first  approach  of  Ly.">andcr  wiih  his  ainiy 
of  Herakleots,  Phokians,  and  others,  fioni  the  north,  was  truly 
menacing;  the  mjre  so,  as  Orchonienus,  the  second  city  next  \o 
Thebes  in  the  Bceotian  confederacy,  broke  <  ff  its  allegiance  and 
joined  him.  The  supremacy  of  Thebes  over  the  cili(S  c('n.i)osing 
the  Bcrotiun  confederacy  aj^pcars  to  have  been  olten  hnnh  and  op- 
pressive, though  probably  not  equally  cppressi\e  teward  all,  and 
certainly  not  equally  oelious  to  all.  To  Tlattea.  on  the  extie  me  south 
of  Boeutia,  it  had  1  e^en  long  intolerable,  ar.d  the  unhappy  fate  of  that 
little  toNvn  has  sadelened  many  pages  of  my  preceding  volun.es.  To 
Orchomenus,  on  the  extren.e  north,  it  was  also  utipalatable — partly 
because  that  town  stood  next  in  pow'cr  and  impe»rtai!ce  to  Thebes— 
partly  because  it  had  an  imposing  legendary  antiquity,  and  claimed 
to  have  been  once  lie  ascendent  city  receiving  tribute  Irem  Thehes. 
The  Orchomeuians  now  joined  Lysander,  threw  open  to  him  the  way 
into  Bope^lia,  and  cemducted  him  with  his  aimy,  afier  liist  ravj.ging 
the  fields  of  Lebaeleia,  into  the  district  be  leiDsrinir  te)  llaliartus. 

Before  Lysander  cjuitte'el  Sj  aria,  the  j  Ian  of  oi)eratieins  concerted 
between  him  and  Pausanias,  wj;s  that  the^y  should  meet  on  a  given 
day  in  the  territory  of  Ilaliaitus.  Ar.el  in  execution  of  this  i)lan 
Pausanias  had  alre::dy  aelvanccd  with  his  Pe  lope)nnesian  ainiy  as  far 
rs  Plattea  in  Berotia.  Whether  the  eiay  fixed  between  them  had 
yet  arriveel,  when  Lysander  reached  Hali;:rlus.  we  cannot  determine 
with  certainty.  In  the  impeifection  of  the  Grecian  calendar,  a  mis- 
take on  this  point  would  be  very  coneeivabU — as  had  happened  be- 
tween the  Athenian  generals  Hippokrates  and  Demosthenes  in  those 
measures  which  preceded  the  battle  ot  Delium  in  4:24  B.C.  But  the 
engagement  must  have  been  taken  by  both  parties,  .*-ubject  to  obstruc- 
tions in  the  way— since  each  ■vnouUI  have  to  march  through  a  hostile 
country  to  reach  the  place  of  meeting.  The  words  of  Xencphon, 
liowever,  rather  indie-ate  that  the  day  fixed  had  not  yet  arrived; 
nevertheless  Lysander  resolve  d  at  e  nee  to  act  against  Haliartus.  with- 
out waiting  for  Pausnnias.  There  weie  as  yet  only  a  few  Thebans 
in  the  town,  and  he  probably  had  geird  reason  for  judging  that  he 
would  succeed  better  by  rapid  measures,  I  ef ore  any  more  Thebans 
could  arrive,  than  by  delaying  until  the  e;ther  S]^arlan  ainiy  sjiould 
join  him;  not  to  ment'on  anxi<*ty  that  the  eonque.st  should  belong  to 


himself  exclusively,  and  confidence  arising  from  his  previous  success 
at  Orchomenus.  Accordingly  he  addressed  an  invitation  to  ths 
Haliartians  to  follow  the  example  of  the  Oi-ehomcnians,  to  revolt 
from  Thebes,  and  to  stand  upon  their  autonomy  under  Lacedicmo- 
nian  protection.  Perhaps  there  may  have  been  a  party  in  the  town 
disposed  to  comply.  But  the  majority,  encouraged  too  by  the  Tlie- 
bans  within,  refused  the  proposition ;  up;)a  which  Lystuuler  marchei 
up  to  the  walls  and  assaulted  the  town.  He  was  here  engaged.  clos3 
by  the  gates,  in  examining  where  he  could  best  effect  an  entrance, 
when  a  fresh  division  of  Thebans,  apprised  of  his  procjeedings,  was 
seen  approaching  from  Thebes,  at  their  fastest  pace— cavalry  as  well 
as  hoplites.  They  were  probably  seen  from  the  watch-towers  in  tho 
city  earlier  than  they  became  visible  to  the  assailants  without;  so 
that  the  Haliartians,  encouraged  by  the  siglit,  threw  open  their  gates, 
and  made  a  sudden  sally.  Lysander,  seiiiningly  taken  by  surprise, 
wa^  himself  slain  among  the  first,  with  his  prophet  by  his  side,  by  a 
llaliartian  hoplite  named  Xeochorus.  His  troops  stood  some  time, 
against  both  the  Hali  utians  from  the  town,  and  tlie  fresh  Thebans 
wiio  now  came  up.  But  they  were-  at  length  driven  back  with  con- 
siderable loss,  andcomj)elled  to  retreat  to  rugged  and  difilcult  grounil 
at  some  distance  in  their  rear.  Here  however  they  made  good  their 
])osition,  repelling  their  assailants  with  the  loss  of  more  than  200 
hoplites. 

The  success  here  gained,  though  highly  valuable  as  an  encourage- 
ment to  the  Thebans,  would  have  been  co'unterb  danced  by  the  speeely 
arrival  of  Pausaidas,  had  not  Lysander  him>(3lf  bjen  among  the  slain. 
But  the  death  of  so  eminent  a  man  w^as  an  irreparable  K^ss  to  Sparta. 
His  army,  composed  of  heterogeneous  masses,  both  collected  and 
held  together  by  his  personal  ascendency,  lost  confident,  and  dis- 
pensed In  the  ensuing  night.  When  Pausanias  arrived  soon  after- 
ward, he  found  no  second  army  to  join  with  him.  Yet  his  own 
force  was  more  than  sulficient  to  impress  terror  on  the  Thebitis,  had 
not  Thrasvl)ulus,  faithful  to  the  recent  promise,  arrived  with  an  im- 
posing body  of  Athenian  hoplites,  together  with  cavalry  under  Ortho- 
bulus— and  imparted  fresh  courage  as  well  as  adequate  strength  to 
the  Theban  cause. 

Pausanias  had  first  to  consider  what  steps  he  would  take  to  recover 
the  bodies  of  the  slain— that  of  Lvsander  amono-  them:  whether  he 
would  fight  a  battle  and  thus  take  his  chance  of  becominii-  ma^tor  of 
the  field— or  send  the  usnal  i^etition  for  burial-truce,  which  always 
implied  confession  of  inferiorit  v.  On  submiiting  the  point  lo  a  coun- 
cil of  olficers  and  Spartan  eldeVs.  their  decision  as  well  ns  his  own 
was  against  fighting;  not  however  without  an  indignant  protest  from 
some  of  the  Spartan  elders.  He  considered  that  the  whole  original 
plan  of  operations  was  broken  up,  since  not  only  the  great  name  and 
genius  of  Lysander  had  perished,  but  his  whole  army  had  sponta- 
neously disbanded;  that  the  Peloponncsian  allies  were  generally  lukc- 


6^ 


AFTER  TOE  BATTLE  OF^KXIDUS. 


PAUSANIUS  CONDEMNED. 


667 


n    ) 


'■-warm  and  r^Ttiefn^t,  t^oi  ^6  t)c  coimkd  lipon'  fpf  pticr^^^^^^  brVovTor 
ill  case  of  pres^siiiii;  dhn-^er-  tliiithc  bHdIittIc  or'B9.  f|ivm/v,  ivliik'  tijc 
^hcbin  cavaliy  \Vas  irjnitrnus  aiid  c^ccclUiit ;  Ifi&tly.'fliJit  xhv  dcjul 
"body  of  Lysander  hlni.«olf  lay  ?0  ('■l(Sse  tolhc  wji^ls  6f  itnliaiitis,  ilmt 
oVeii  if  tlic  Lamlitirionians  Verc  victorK)!]?;  il:t'5'.(0u)<j  U<^^  (Jinyit 
off  Avithout  ^criouK \ \o^i  from  the  aiir.cd.  (fcfi^ ejc!( Vs  in "t liciV  iow(Ts:. 
■Such  were  the  reasons  x\'bjc1a  dct<rminicd  Paii^njiinfi  f,r.(V  tli^  ii.;jij6r 
part  of  the  eouncU  to  send  nrd  solicit  a  fnife'.  Bid  fjie  Tlic'bjms 
rcfnscd  to  irrant  it  exCtpt  on  coiidiiion  Ihat  they  should  itinicdintcly 
evacuate  Ba^otia.  '  Thmi^K  pucli  a  iTCj[idsiiiofi  waf^  coniiiiry  1o  ihu 
rceeived  prjictice  of  Gfce^e,  \vhich  iiTirr>??d  chi  the  viclor  ihe  duly  of 
grhtitinf^the  burial-trtiti'e  um.t>hriifionri11y,  whenever  it  w:is.iskcd,  snd 
inferiority  thiis  ptd)]iely  coideis5-ed — nc'verllidess  such  an. 'is  ihe  reluc- 
tant temper  of  the  artnr,  llmt  Tliey  lienrd  not  merely  witli  ;;c(iiiics- 
•eence,  but  with  "joy,  tlie  proposition  of  (■epartin<r.  Ihe  h(  dits  avcvo 
duly  buricd^hat  of  Ly^nuder  in  the  territory  of  raroj  e,  innudi- 
atelyacro^^s  the  Ph{ki;;u  hordrr,  hutv.ot  for  from  ITnlinitus.  .\i.d  no 
sooner  were  these  sokninities  completed,  tlian  ihe  I  nc(  Ta  n  oiiisin 
army  was  Ird  buck  to  Ptloponncsus;  tlicir  dejection  fomiij  ii-  a 
mournful  contrast  to  ll;e  triun. pliant  ir.soler-ce  of  ihe  Tl.eh:.ns,  vlo 
watched  their  march  find  resliaincd  ti  cm,  not  witl(ut  occ  signal 
blows,  from  strniriiliniz:  out  of  the  load  into  the  cultivated  ti(  Ids. 

The  death  of  Lysander  produced  the  nu)st  ]>i(vr<\nd  ^orrow  i\  d 
resentment  at  Spnrla.  On  returning  ihiiher  Piius-  nias  found  him- 
self the  subject  of  such  viruh  nt  accusation,  that  he  il  ovlIi!  it  ])iu- 
dent  to  make  his  escape,  and  take  sanctuary  in  the  t<  n  pie  of  Aiheiie 
Alea,  at  Tegea.  Pic  was  impeached  aid  jut  on  tiirl,  during  his 
absence,  on  two  counts;  tirst,  for  havirg  hem  hdiind  ihc  tinic 
covenanted,  in  meeting  Lysander  at  ll.MJiartus;  next,  for  liaving 
submitted  to  ask  a  truce  fnmithe  Thelans,  instead  of  ti<;hiing  hatlle, 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  bodies  of  the  slain. 

As  far  as  there  is  evidence  to  form  a  jud^-ment,  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  Pausanias  was  guilty  upon  either  ol  the  two  counts.  The 
first  is  a  question  of  fact;'  and'  it  seems  quite  as  likely  that  Lysander 
was  befcTc  his  time,  as  that  Pausanias  was  behind  his  lime,  in  arriv- 
ing rt  Plaliartus.  Besides,  Lysander,  aiTiving  there  first,  woi;ld 
have  been  quite  safe,  had  he  not  resolved  to  attack  without  delay; 
in  which  the  chances  of  war  turned  out  against  liim.  though  llie 
resolution  in  itself  may  have  been  well  conceived.  Next,  as  to  :he 
truce  solicited  for  burying  the  dead  bodies — it  does  not  appear  that 
Pausanias  could  witlT  any  prudence  have  braved  the  chances  of  a 
battle.  The  facts  of  the'case — even  as  summe'ei  up  ly  X(  rophon, 
who  always  exaggerates  everything  in  favor  of  the  Ppartans— lead 
us  to  this  conclusion.  A  few  of  the  Spartan  e-lders  would  doubtless 
prefer  perishing  e)n  the  fidd  of  battle,  to  the  humiliation  of  sending 
the'  herald  to  ask  fe)r  a  truce.  But  the  mischief  of  fighting  a  ])attlc 
under  the  influence  of  such  a  point  of  honor,  to  the  exclusion  of  a 


rational  estimate  of  consequences,  will  be  seen  when  we  come  to  the 
Ivittle  of  Leuktra,  where  Kleombre)tus  son  of  Pausanias  was  thus 
Dinued  inro  an  imprudence  (at  least  this  is  alleged  as  one  ot  the  mo- 
five^)  10  which  his  own  life  and  the  dominion  of  Sparta  became  for- 
feit     Moreover  the  armv  of  Pausanias,  comprising  very  few  Spar- 
•uis  consistedchiefly  of^dlies  who  had  no  heart  in  the  cause,  anei 
who  were  glad  to  be  required  by  the  Thebans  to  elepart.     It  he  had 
fVMi-ht  a  battle  and  lost  it,  the  detriment  to  Sparta  would  have  been 
nos't  serious  in  every  way;  whereas,  if  he  had  gameel  a  victory   no 
•esull  would  have  followed  except  the  acquisition  of  the  bodies  tor 
burial-  since  the  execution  of  the  e^riginal  plan  had  become  imprac- 
ticable' through  the  dispersion  of  the  'army  of  Lysander. 

Thon-h  a  careful  examination  of  the  tae'ts  leads  us  (anei  seems 
•dso  to  have  led  Xenophon)  to  the  e'onclusiou  that  Pausanias  was 
iiinocenl  he  was  nevertheless  found  guilty  in  his  absence  He  was 
,1  -reat  p.irt  borne  down  by  the  grief  felt  at  Sparta  tor  the  loss  of 
Lv^ander  with  wiiom  he  had  been  before  in  political  riva  ry,  anel 
for  whose  death  he  was  made  responsible.  Moreover  the  old  accu- 
sation was  now  revived  against  hini-for  which  he  had  been  tried, 
and  b  uvly  acquited,  eiglit  years  before-of  having  tolerated  the?  re- 
estahlisliment  of  the  Athenian  eiemocracy  at  a  tune  when  he  might 
have  put  it  down.  Without  doubt  this  argument  t()ld  prodigiously 
a-ainst  hlni  at  the  present  juncture,  when  the  Athenians  had  3ust  . 
now  forthe  first  time  since  the  surrender  of  their  city  renoune-ed 
their  suhjeclioa  to  Sparta  and  sent  an  army  to  assist  the  1  hebans  ui 
tiieir  eieCense  So  violent  was  the  sentiment  against  Pausanias  tliat 
he  was  condemned  to  death  in  his  absence,  anel  passed  the  remainde^r 
of  his  life  as  an  exile  in  sanctuary  at  Tegea.  His  son  Agesipolis 
was  invested  with  the  scpter  in  his  place.  +     •„  i,  „.^ 

A  brief  remark  will  not  be  here  misplaced.  On  no  topic  ha\e 
Grecian  historians  heen  more  profuse  in  their  reproaches  than  upeni 
the  violence  an  1  injustice  of  democracy,  at  Athens  anel  else^where,  in 
condemning  unsuccessful,  but  innocent  generals.  Out  of  the  many 
ca.es  in  whrch  this  reproach  is  advanced,  there  are  very  few  wherein 
it  h-as  been  maele  good.  But  even  if  we  grant  it  to  be  valid  against 
Athens  and  her  democracy,  the  fate  of  Pausanias  will  show  us  that 
the  Ephorsand  Senate  of  anti-democratical  Sparta  were  capable  of 
the  m.e  unjust  misjudgnumt.  Hardly  a  single  instance  C)f  A  he^niau 
con^iemnation  occurs,  which  we  can  so  clearly  prove  to  be  uudc- 
siT'i'ed   as  tills  of  a  Spartan  king.  ,     r,       ,        i    j 

T.V':.  nVfmm  tl.e  'bmisl.ed  king  to  I.r.andcr--tl;e  Spartan,  md 
indeed  v.Uid  re:isons  for  d.^ploring  tl.c  f.U  ot  the  UUter  He  ha 
Di-ocured  for  tliem  their  ijioate^t  and  most  decisive  vicl ones  and 
e  ti 'lie  was  comin-  wlicii  lliev  needed  his  services  to  procure  theiu 
more  f..  he  kft  b.lii.nl  lii.n  no  man  of  equal  warlilce  resource, 
■  mnm.'  and  power  of  oo.nma.nl.  Hut  if  he  possessed  those  alni- 
ties  whTch  powerfully  helped  Sparta  to  triumph  over  her  enemies,  lie 


668 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


EFFECTS  OF  LYSxVNDER'S  DEATH. 


669 


1     ' 


at  the  same  time  did  more  than  any  man  to  bring  her  empire  into 
dishonor  and  to  render  its  tenure  precarious.      His  decemvual  gov- 
eruments  or   Dekarchies,  diffused  through    the   subject  cities,  and 
each  sustained  by  a  Laceda-monian  harmost    and    garrison,  were  jig 
gravalious  of  local  tyranny  such  as  the  Grecian  world  had  never  be- 
fore undergone.     And  though  the  Spartan  authorities  presently  saw- 
that  he  was  abusing  the  imperial  name  of  the   city  for  unmeasured 
pergonal  a-^-irrandi/enu  nt  of  his  own,    and  partially  withdrew  their 
countenance  from  his  Dekarchies— yet  the  general  character  of  their 
empire  still  continued  to  retain  the   impress  of  partisanship  and  sub- 
iu«»aiion  which  he  had  originally  stamped  upon  it.     lnst(i.d  of  thr.t 
auTonomv  which  Sparta  had  so   repeatedly  promised,  it  became  sub 
iection  e-very  way  end)ittered.      Sucli   an  empire  was  pretty  sure  to 
be  short-lived:  but  the   loss  to   Fpnita   hci self,  wlun  her  empire  fell 
away   is  not  the  only  fault  w  hieh  the  hi.-torian  of  Greece  has  to  im- 
i.ule  io  Lvsander,     His  far  deeper  sin  consists  in  Lis  having  thrown 
awav  an  opportunity— such  as  never  o(curied  eitlier  before  or  aller- 
^^.„(l_for  organizing  S(  me  peimanent,  licnorable,  self-mainta:ning, 
ran-hellenlc  Tombination   under  the  l.iadship  of   SjaitJi.     Ibis  is 
(is  1  have   before   remarked)  what  a  man   like  Kiillikuitidas  would 
Lave  attempted,  if  not  with  far-sighted  wiKkm,  at  hast  with  gener- 
ous i^inceiity,  and  bv  an  appeal  to  the  best  Acins  cf  political  senti- 
ment in  the  chief  city  as  well  as  in  the  >uboidinfiles.     It  is  possible 
'that  with  the  best  intentions  even  he  might   have  failed;  so  strong 
was  the  centrifuiial  instinct  in  the  Giecian  politi(al  mind.     But  what 
we- have  to  reproach   in  Lysanctr   is,   that  he  never  tried;  that  he 
jibused  the  critical  moment  of  cue  for  the  pui-pose  of  infusmg  new 
poison  into  the  system;  that  he  not  only  sa(rif.eed  the  inten Ms  cu 
Giecce  to  the  narrow  ir:;ius  of   Sparta,    but   even   the   interests  of 
Sparta  to  the  still  narrower  nionopoiy  of  dcminicn  in  his  own  bards. 
Tlnit  his  measures  worked    miM-bievously  not  merely  for  Gietce, 
lait  for  Sparta  herself,  aggravating  all  her  bad  tendencies— has  Utn 
aireadv  remarked  in  the^preceding  pages.       _  .      -,     ,  v      i 

Tha't  Lvsander.  with  unbounited  oi>portunities  of  gam,  both  Imcl 
and  died*  ])oor.  exhibits  the  honorable  side  of  bis  character,  let 
hi-  personal  indifference  to  money  seems  only  to  have  kit  the  greater 
soMce  in  his  bosom  for  that  thirst  of  power  wliich  made  him  un- 
scnipuloas  in  satiating  the  rapacity,  as  w  ell  as  in  upholding  the  op- 
pnssions.  of  coadjutors  like  the  Thirty  at  Athens  and  tie  Di(<mvns 
in  other  cities.  In  spite  of  his  great  success  and  ability  in  ckncg 
the  Peloponnesian  war.  we  shall  agree  with  Pausaniiis  that  he  was 
more  mischievous  than  profitable  even  to  Sparta— even  if  we  bkc 
no  thou^l»t  of  Greece  <rener;illv.  What  would  have  been  the  eflect 
produced  by  his  projcM-ts  in  regard  to  the  regal  succession,  had  he 
l>e*en  able  to  bring  them  to  bear,  we  have  no  means  of  mesisiiring. 
We  are  told  that  the  discourse  composed  and  addressed  io  1  im  by 
the  Halikarnassiuu  rhetor  Klcou,  was  found  alter  his  ceuih  t.mong 


his  papers  by  Agesilaus;  who  first  iearnt  from  it  with  astonishment 
and  alarm  the  point  to  which  the  ambition  of  Lvsander  had  tended, 
and  was  desirous  of  exposing  his  real  characteV  by  making  the  dis- 
course public — but  was  deterred  by  the  dissuasive  counsel  of  the 
Eplior  Lakratidas.  But  this  story  (attested  by  Ephorus)  looks  more 
like  an  anecdote  of  the  rhetorical  schools  than  like  a  reality.  Agesi- 
laus was  not  the  man  to  set  much  value  on  sophists  or  their  com- 
]>ositious,  nor  is  it  easy  to  believe  that  he  remained  so  long  igno- 
rant of  those  projects  \vhicli  Lysauder  had  once  entertained  but  sub- 
secpicntly  droppcjtl.  Moreover  the  probability  is,  that  Kleou  himself 
would  make  the  discourse  public  as  a  sample  of  his  own  talents, 
even  in  the  lifeliine  of  Lysander;  not  only  without  shame,  but  as 
representing  the  feelings  of  a  considerable  sectiou  of  readers  through 
out  the  Grecian  world. 

Most  important  were  the  consequences  which  ensued  from  the 
death  of  Lysander  and  the  retreat  of  Pausanias  out  of  Bceotia.  Fresh 
hope  and  spirits  were  infused  into  all  the  enemi^^  of  Sptirta.  An 
alliance  was  immediately  concluded  against  her  by  Thebes,  Athens. 
Corinth,  and  Argos.  Deputie-;  from  these  four  cities  were  appointed 
to  meet  at  Corinth,  and  to  take  active  measures  for  inviiing  the  co- 
operation of  fresh  allies;  so  that 'the  war  wiiieh  had  begun  as  a 
Beotian  war,  now  acquired  the  larg^'r  denomination  of  a  Coriiithiau 
war,  under  which  it  lasted  until  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.  The  alli- 
ance was  immediately  stren'^thened  by  the  junction  of  the  Eubopans 
—the  Akarnaniaus — the  Ozolian  Lokrians — Ambrakia  and  Leukas 
(hoth  particularly  attached  to  Corinth)  —  and  the  Chalkidians  of 
Thrace. 

We  now  enter  upon  the  period  when,  for  the  first  time,  Thebes 
begins  to  step  out  of  the  rank  of  secondary  powers,  and  gradually 
raises  herself  iuto  a  primary  and  ascemlent  city  in  Grecian  politie'S. 
Throughout  the  Peloponnesiau  War.  the  Thebans  had  shown  them- 
selves excellent  soldiers  both  on  horseback  and  on  foot,  as  auxiliaries 
to  Sparta.  But  now  the  city  begins  to  have  a  poli(;y  of  its  own,  and 
individual  citizens  of  ability  become  conspicuous.  While  waiting 
for  Pelopidas  and  Epaminondas,  with  whom  we  shall  pie-ently 
become  acquainted,  we  have  at  the  present  moment  Ismenias;  a 
f  wealthy  Theban,  a  sympathizer  with  Thrasybulus  and  the  Athenian 
'  exiles  eight  years  before,  and  one  of  tin;  great  organizers  of  tlie  pres- 
ent anti-Spartan  movement;  a  man,  too,  honored  by  his  political 
( iiemies,  when  they  put  him  to  death  fourteen  years  ahervvard,  with 
the  title  of  "a  great  wicked  man" — the  same  combination  of  epithets 
which  Clarendon  applies  to  Oliver  Cromwell. 

It  was  Ismenias.  who,  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  Bipotinns  and 
Argeians,  undertook  an  expedition  to  put  down  the  Spartan  infltience 
in  the  regions  north  of  Bo^otia.  At  Pharsidus  in  Thessaly,  the  Lace- 
diemonians  had  a  harmost  and  garrison;  at  Phene,  Lyko)ihron  the 
despot  was  their  ally;  while  Larissa,  with  Medius  the  despot,  was 


670 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


V.J  i 


>*^ch:  m'  ¥f3rfW.A.i?S?  ■^' • 


tTA 


'671 


11    » 


ij 


their  principal  enemy.  By  the  aid  of  the  Bcrotians.  Mcdins  was  new 
enabled  lo  captm-e  Pharsiiiiis;  Larissa,  with  Kiannon  and  Skotnsa, 
was  received  into  tlie  Theluin  alliance,  and  Ismenias  (obtained  also  the 
more  important  advantage  of  expelling  the  Lactdantoniaiis  from 
Ilerakleia.  Some  maleonteuts,  left  after  the  violent  inleritnDce  of 
the  Spartan  Herii)piclas  two  years  before,  opened  the  iralcs  of  Ibnik- 
leia  by  niirlit  to  the  Ha?otians  and  Argeians.  The  L:i(Cf'a.nK)iiians 
in  the  town  wore  put  to  the  sword,  but  the  other  Peloponncsian  col- 
onists were  permitted  to  retire  in  safety;  while  tiie  old  Tracliinitiu 
inhabitants,  whom  the  Lacedaemonians  had  expeWed  to  make,ro( m 
for  their  new  settlers — together  with  the  O'laans,  whom  they  lu.d 
driven  out  of  the  districts  in  the  neighborhf  od — were  now  called 
back  to  repossess  their  original  homes.  The  loss  of  Hirakhia  was  a 
serious  blow  to  the  Spartans  in  tho^e  region.- — ])rottcting  Eiibd'a  in 
its  recent  revolt  from  them,  and  en;  liling  Ismenias  to  draw  into  his 
alliance  the  neighboring  Malians,  ^nianes,  and  Athanianes — tribes 
fcitn  telling  along  the  valley  of  the  Sp^rcheius  westward  to  the  vicinity 
of  Pindus.  Assembling  additional  troops  from  these  districts  (which, 
only  a  few  months  before,  had  supplied  an  army  to  I>ysander).  Isnie- 
liias  marched  against  the  Phokians,  among  whom  the  Spartan  Lakis- 
thenes  had  bien  leit  as  harmost  in  command.  After  a  severe  battle, 
this  otlic<T,  with  his  Phokians,  was  defeated  near  the  Lokrian 
town  of  Naryx;  and  Ismenias  came  back  victorious  to  the  synod  at 
Corinth. 

Bv  such  important  advantages,  accomplished  during  the  winter  of 
39.")-394  B.C..  the  prospects  of  Grecian  afiairs  as  they  stood  in  tlu* 
ensuing  spring  became  materially  altered.  The  allies  asscir.blcd  at 
Corinth  full  of  hope,  and  resolved  to  levy  a  large  coiubined  force  to 
act  against  Sj)tu-ta;  who.  on  her  side,  seemed  to  be  threatened  with 
the  loss  of  all  her  extra-Peloponnesian  land-empire.  Accordingly, 
the  Ephors  determined  to  recall  Avithout  delay  Agesilaus  with  his 
armv  from  Asia,  and  sent  Epikydidas  with  orders  to  that  elfect.  Liit 
even  before  this  re-enforcement  could  arrive,  they  thought  it  expedient 
to  muster  their  full  Peloponiu-sian  force  and  to  act  wiih  vigor  against 
the  allies  at  Corinth,  who  were  now  assembling  in  considerable  nuni- 
l)ers.  Aristodemus— guardian  of  the  youthful  King  Agesipolis,  son 
of  Pausanias.  and  himself  of  the  Eurystheneid  race— marclud  at  the 
Ijead  of  a  body  of  6,000  Lacedanionian  hoplites:  the  Spartan  xenagi 
0>r  officers  sent  on  ]nn-posc  to  conduct  the  contingents  from  the  oi:]- 
lyin<^-  allies),  suceessivelv  brouirht  m  3.0<X)  hoplites  from  Elis,  Tri- 
phvfia.  Akroreia,  and  'Lasion  — 1500  from  Sikyon  — 3,C00  from 
Epidaurus,  Trazen,  llerniione.  and  lialieis.  Kone  were  ^cnt  from 
Phlius.  on  the  plea  (true  or  false)  Jhat  in  that  city  t]»e  moment  w:;S 
on-  of  solemnilv  and  holy  truce."  There  weii  also  hoplites  fr(;m 
TcL'ea,  Mantineia.  and  the*Aclia?an  town?,  but  their  number  is  not 
given;  so  tliat  we  do  not  know  the  fidl  muster-roll  on  the  Laceda- 
monian  side.    The  cavalry,  600  in  number,  were  all  Lacedaemonian; 


dUTerent  rural  districts  of  Triphyiia.  ■\  '.;.''.'         ..    , 

"  'Tife  fellicd  foWj^'of-'ihe  enemy  washU'eadVi^nnstei-ecrheiai-  Cormlli: 
■COOO  Athenian ^oplit,6fs-^7,ef0b  AtireJl»n-^3.00p  Bbeothn,  those  from 
:  (!>V'i}w)rft6mis  ^in^  absent— 3. WD  O6rintliiun-^3,000:from  tlie  differ- 
■  tirtt 'toxVns  of  EiitMfea;  making  24.000  in  'all  The^total  6f  cavalty  w;t;5 
'1.150-'c(^ipb^e*Paf  800  I^olian,  tJOO  Atlieiiiitfl,  100  Ifrrtn  Oiialkis  rii 
EnbcBiV  atid  50  from  th6 "  I^kriuhk.  Tlii?  iiglir-tfOops  also\vet\} 
numevoii^  ^  p^wtTy  •  C«^-i.^^'^^V'i^H  .dhiwir  pfobtibly  ^fi^?;;]i;:^the  ser^ 
•  i^oiYidatidn  SVliiph  Hilled  t^fifelds-^.pi^^^  it"^ 

Aitarniinifins..  •;  *    '  .  '        r  ',       .,«„.■',  ^    ■'■■'[■  \<j- ..    .i 
■'  T!ii3  ftillcd  T^ViHct^;  holtlih^.fi;  coiwicil  of  wHr  to  jm-abt^e  t%iv  plans, 
'Carrie  to  a  rt.'soVtioii  tha«  tt(e  hopni^s  %6tdd  ;uc>t  be  xli-kwu  up  ili 


^ah.r  beco^ning  formidable  oply  bytli^  attlueutsylium  itix^c^^v^ 
"Pfopoi^iioii  to  t^e  length  of  its'ebut-fe::.'..  The  A:i^clt,,m  :of  this  adyico 
••'W  rom\ii^ablc:^'btit1fe  bbld^iess^Vft^T^t  "lote  rctn:irkal)ie.  w.iea 
Vicwed'rticoiniinction -with  the  (Established  feeling  of  awe  toward 
SpimV  ''It-was  fidopteli  by'We  orehferal  council  of  the  allies;  but, 
unfortiinately,  the  time  fot  executing  it  had  already  passed;  for  the 
Lacedrettio-nians  were  aiFix'ady  in  march  and  had  crossed  then-  own 
bdrdef' '  Thev  toOlt  the  line  of  road  by  Tegea  and  Mantineia  (wliosc 
troof)^  jdincci  the  march),  and  advanced  as  far  as  Sikyon  where, 
probably,  all  the  xVrcadiau  and  Achaean  contingents  w^ere  ordereil  to 

rendezvous 

The  troops  of  the  confederacy  had  advanced  as  far  as  Xemea  when 
thev  learned  that  the  Lacedtemonian  army  was  at  Sikyon;  bat  they 
then  altered  their  plan,  and  confined  themselves  to  the  defensive. 
The  Laeediemonians  on  their  side  crossed  over  the  mountainous  post 
c  illed  Epi^'ikia,  under  considerable  annoyance  from  the  enemv  s  light 
tro..ns  who  poured  missiles  upon  them  from  tlie  high  gi-ouiul.  l>ut 
when  they  had  reached  the  level  country,  on  the  other  side,  along  the 
shore  of  the  Saronie  Gulf,  where  they  probably  received  the  contiu- 
o-e-Us  from  Epidaurus,  Tr.pzen,  Hermione,  and  Halieis— the  whole 
annv  thus  re-enforced  marched  forward  without  resistance,  burning 
and  r? va-ing  the  cultivated  lauds.  The  confederates  retreated  before 
them  and  at  length  took  up  a  position  close  to  Corinth,  amid  some 
rou^li  •'■rouud  with  a  ravine  in  their  front.     The  Lacedsemonians 


672 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


AGESILAUS. 


673 


;l 


I 


$ 


advanced  forward  until  tliej'  were  little  more  than  a  mile  distant  from 
til  is  position,  and  there  encamped. 

After  an  interval  seemiiiijjly  of  a  few  days,  the  Boeotians,  on  the  day 
when  their  turn  came  to  occupy  the  right  wing  and  to  take  the  lead, 
gave  the  signal  for  battle.  'The  Lacedaemohians,  prevented  by  tlie 
wooded  ground  from  seeing  clearly,  were  only  made  aware  of  llic 
coming  attack  by  hearing  the  hostile  pa-an.  Taking  order  of  bat  He 
immedhitely,  they  advanced  forward  to  meet  the  assailants,  ayIkii 
within  a  furlong  of  their  line.  In  each  army,  the  right  division  took 
the  lead— slanting  to  the  right,  or  keeping  the  left  shoulder  forward, 
according  to  the  tendency  hal)itual  with  Grecian  hoplites,  throiiLili  . 
an.xiety  to  keep  the  right  or  unshieUled  side  from  being  exposed "lo^ 
the  enemy,  and  at  the  same  time  to  be  protected  by  tlie  shield  of 
a  right-hand  neighbor.  The  Lacedaemonians  in  the  one  army,  and 
the  Thebtms  in  the  other,  each  inclined  themselves,  and  caused  their 
respective  armies  to  incline  also,  in  a  direction  slanting  to  the  right, 
80  that  the  Lacedamonians  on  their  side  considerablv  outHanked'tlie 
Athenians  on  'the  opposite  left.  Out  of  the  ten  tribes  of  Athenian 
hoplites,  it  was  only  the  six  on  the  extreme  left  who  came  into  conflict 
with  the  Lacedamonians;  while  the  remaining  four  contended  with 
the  Tegeans  who  stood  next  to  the  Lacedamonians  on  their  own  line. 
But  the  six  extreme  Athenian  tribes  were  completely  beaten,  and 
severely  handled,  being  taken  in  flank  as  well  as  in  front  by  the  Lnce- 
dfemouians.  On  the  other  hand,  the  remaining  four  Athenian  tribes 
vanquished  and  drove  before  them  the  Tegeans:  and  generally,  along 
all  the  rest  of  the  line,  the  Thebans,  Argeians.  and  Corinthians  w(  re 
victorious— except  where  the  troops  of  the  Achaan  Pellene  stood 
opposed  to  those  of  the  raM)tian  Thespian,  where  the  battle  was  equjd 
and  the  loss  severe  on  both  sides.  The  victorious  confederates,  heAV- 
cyer,  were  so  ardent  and  incautious  in  pursuit,  as  to  advance  a  con- 
siderable distance  and  return  with  disordered  ranks;  while  the  Lace- 
daemonians, who  were  habitually  seif-restraininL^  in  tliis  particular, 
kept  their  order  perfectly,  attacking  the  Thebans,  Argeians,  aid 
Corinthians  to  great  advantage  when  returning  to  their  camp.  Sev- 
eral of  the  Athenian  fugitives  obtained  shelter  within  the  walls 
of  Corinth,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  philo-Laconian  Corinth- 
ians, who  insisted  upon  shutting  the  gates  against  them,  and  opening 
negotiations  with  Sparta.  The  Lacechemonians,  liowever,  came  so 
near,  that  it  was  at  last  thought  impossible  to  keep  the  gates  ope  n 
longer.  Many  of  the  remaining  confc derates  were,  therefore,  obliied 
to  be  satisfied  with  the  protection  of  their  ancient  camp,  w hich  .seeins. 
however,  to  have  been  situated  in  such  defensible  ground  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  did  not  molest  them  in  it. 

So  far  JUS  the  Lacedtemonians  separately  were  concerned,  the  battle 
of  Corinth  was  an  important  victory,  gained  (as  they  afhrmed)  with 
tlie  loss  (3f  only  eight  men,  and  inflicting  heavy  loss  upon  the  Athe- 
uiaus  in  the  battle,  as  w  ell  as  upon  the  remaining  confederates  in  their 


return  from  pursuit.  Though  the  Athenian  hoplites  suHered  thus 
severely,  yet  Tlirasybulus  their  commander,  who  kept  the  field  until 
the  last,  with  strenuous  efforts  to  rally  them,  was  not  satisfied  with 
their  behavior.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  all  the  allies  of  Sparta  were 
worsted,  and  a  considerable  number  of  them  slain.  According  to 
Diodorus,  the  total  loss  on  the  Lacedannonian  side  was  1100;  on  the 
side  of  the  confederates,  2,800.  On  the  whole,  the  victory  of  the 
Lacedaemonians  was  not  sufficiently  decisive  to  lead  to  important 
results,  though  it  completely  secured  their  ascendency  within  Pelo- 
ponnesus. We  observe  here,  as  w^e  shall  have  occasion  to  observe 
elsewhere,  that  the  Peloponnesian  allies  do  not  fight  heartily  in  the 
cause  of  Sparta.  They  seem  bound  to  her  more  by  fear  than  by 
alfection. 

The  battle  of  Corinth  took  place  about  July,  304  b.c,  seemingly 
about  the  same  time  as  the  naval  battle  near  Knidus  (or  perhaps  a 
little  earlier),  and  while  Agesilaus  was  on  his  home  ward  march  after 
being  recalled  from  Asia.  Had  the  Lacedemonians  been  able  to 
defer  the  battle  until  Agesilaus  had  come  up  so  as  to  threaten  Boeotia 
on  the  northern  side,  their  campaign  would  probably  have  been  much 
more  successful.  As  it  is.  their  defeated  allies  doubtless  went  home 
in  disgust  from  the  field  of  Corinth,  so  that  the  confederates  were 
now  enabled  to  turn  their  whole  attention  to  Agesilaus. 

That  iirince  had-  received  in  Asia  his  summons  of  recall  from  the 
Ephors  with  profound  vexation  and  disappointment,  yet  at  the  same 
tini'  with  patriotic  submission.  He  had  augmeuteel  his  army,  and 
was  contemplating  more  extensive  schemes  of  operations  against  the 
Persian  satrapies  in  Asia  Elinor.  He  had  established  such  a  reputa- 
tion for  military  force  and  skill,  that  numerous  messages  reacheel  him 
from  different  inland  districts,  expressing  their  anxiety  to  be  emanci- 
pated from  Persian  dominion,  and  inviting  him  to  come  to  their  aid. 
Ills  ascendency  was  also  established  over  the  Grecian  cities  on  the 
coast,  whom  he  still  kept  under  the  government* of  partisan  oligar- 
chies and  Spartan  harmosts — yet  seemingly  with  greater  practical 
moderation,  and  less  license  of  oppression,  than  had  marked  the  con- 
duet  of  these  men  when  they  coulcl  count  upon  so  unprincipled  a  chief 
as  Lysander.  He  w^as  thus  just  now^  not  only  at  a  high  pitch  of 
actual  glory  and  ascendency,  but  nourishing  yet  brighter  hopes  of 
farther  conquests  for  the  future.  And  what  filled  up  the  measure  of 
his  aspirations — all  these  conejuests  were  to  be  made  at  the  expense, 
not  of  Greeks,  but  of  the  Persian.  He  was  treading  in  the  footsteps 
of  Agamemnon,  as  Pan-Hellenic  leader  against  a  Pan-Hellenic  enemy. 

All  these  glorious  dreams  were  dissip:Ued  by  Epikydidas,  with  his 
sad  message,  and  peremptory  summons,  from  the  JEphors.  In  the 
•  chagrin  and  disappointment  of  Agesilaus  we  can  sincerely  sympa- 
thize; but  the  panegyric  which  Xenophon  and  others  pronounce 
upon  him  for  his  ready  obc^dience  is  altogether  unreasonable.  There 
Was  no  merit  in  renouncing  his  projects  of  conquest  at  the  bidding  of 

H.  G.  in.  23 


<( 


674 


Al^TEr.  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


theEpliors:  l?ccausc,  if  anv  scrions  misfortune  had  befallen  Spjirta 
at  home,  none  of  tiiose  projects  could  have  been  executed.  Nor  is  it 
out  of  place  to  remark,  that  even  if  Agesilaus  had  not  been  recalled, 
the  extinction  of  the  Lacedjrmonian  naval  sujieriority  by  the  defeat 
of  Knidus  avouUI  have  rend(Ted  all  Jarixo  plans  of  inland  concpiest 
impracticable.  On  reccivini?  his  orders  of  recall,  he  convened  an 
a<=semblv  both  of  his  allies  and  of  his  army,  to  make  known  the  pain- 
ful necessity  of  his  departure;  which  was  heard  with  open  and  sin- 
cere manifestations  of  sorrow.  He  assured  them  that  as  soon  as  lie 
had  dissipated  the  clouds  which  hunir  over  Sparta  at  liome,  he  should 
come  back  to  Asia  without  dclav,  and  resume  his  efforts  agains  llie 
Persian  satraps;  in  the  interim  he  left  Euxenus,  Avith  a  force  of  4  '00 
men,  for  their  protection.  Such  was  the  sympathy  excited  hy  Lis 
communication,  combined  with  esteem  for  his  character,  that  the 
cities  passed  a  ireneral  vote  to  furnish  him  with  contingents  of  troops 
for  his  march  to  Sparta.  But  this  first  burst  of  zeal  abated,  when 
thev  came  to  reflect,  that  it  was  a  service  against  Greeks:  not  merely 
impopular  in  itself,  but  presenting  a  certainty  of  hard  fiLihting  with 
little  plunder.  Acresilaus  tried  every  means  to  keep  up  tlieir  spirits, 
bv  proclaimimr  prizes  both  to  the  civic  soldiers  and  to  the  merce- 
naries, to  be  distributed  at  Sestos  in  the  Chersonesus,  as  soon  as  tliev 
siiouki  have  crossed  into  Europe:  prizes  for  the  best  equipment,  and 
best-disciplined  soldiers  in  everv  different  arm.  By  these  means  he 
prevailed  upon  the  bravest  and  most  efT(  ctive  soldiers  in  his  army  to 
imdertake  the  march  along  with  iiim:  among  them  many  of  the 
Cyreians,  with  Xenophon  himself  at  their  head. 

Thomjh  Airesilaus,  in  leaving  Greec(,',  had  prided  liimself  on  hoist- 
in^  the  flan- ()f  Air:imemnon,  he  was  now^  destined  against  his  will  to 
tn'^ad  in  the  footsteps  of  the  Persian  Xerxes  in  his  march  from  the 
Thracian  Chersonese  throuirh  Thrace,  Macedonia,  and  Thessaly.  to 
Thermopvht  and  Bcvotia.  ""Never  since  the  time  of  Xerxes  had  any 
armv  un(h'rtak(Mi  this  march;  Avhich  now  bore  an  Oriental  impress, 
froni  the  fact  that  Airesilaus  brought  with  him  some  camels,  taken 
in  the  battle  of  Sardis.  Overawina'  or  defeating  the  various  Tliraeian 
tribes  he  reached  Amphipolis  on  the  Strvmon,  wliere  he  was  met  hv 
Derkvliidas,  who  had  come  fresh  from  the  battle  of  Corinth  and 
informed  him  of  the  victon'.  Full  as  his  heart  was  of  Pan-ITellenic 
projects  a'^ainst  Persia,  he'bnrst  into  exclamations  of  renret  on  hear- 
inijof  the  deaths  of  so  manv  Greeks  in  battle,  who  could  have  suf- 
ficed if  united,  to  emancipate  Asia  Minor.  Sending  Derkyllulas 
forward  to  Asia  to  make  known  the  victory  to  the  Grecian  cities  in 
Ids  alliance,  he  pursued  his  march  through  ]VIacedonia  and  Th(  ssaly. 
In  the  latter  country,  Ltirissa,  Krannon.  and  other  cifh-s  in  alliame 
with  Tiiebes.  nnsed'  opposition  to  bar  his  passage.  But  in  the  dis- 
united condition  of  this  country,  no  systematic  resistance  could  he 
orijanized  acrainst  him.  Nothing  more  appeared  than  detarhed 
boelies  of  cavalry,  whom  he  beat'  and  dispersed,  with  the  death  ot 


^     NEWS  OF  THE  NAVAL  DEFEAT  AT  KNIDUS.     675 

Polycharmus  their  leader.  As  the  Thessalian  cavalry  how^evcr  was 
the  best  in  Greece,  Agesilaus  took  great  pride  in  having  defeated 
them  with  cavalry  disciplined  by  himself  in  Asia;  backed  however, 
it  must  be  observed,  by  skdlful  and  effective  support  from  his  hop- 
litcs.  After  having  passed  the  Achtean  mountains  or  the  line  of 
jnonnt  Olhrys,  he  marched  the  rest  of  the  way  without  opposition, 
through  the  strait  of  Thermoi)yla3  to  the  frontier  of  Phokis  and 

Bieotia. 

lu  this  latter  part  of  his  march,  Agesilaus  was  met  by  the  Ephor  - 
Diphridas  in  person,  wlio  urged  him  to  hasten  his  march  as  much  as 
possible  and  attack  the  Beeotiaus.  He  w  as  further  joined  by  two 
Lacedjjemouian  regiments  from  Corinth,  and  by  fifty  young  Spartan 
volunteers  as  a  body-guard,  w  ho  crossed  by  sea  from  Sikyou.  He 
was  re-einforced  also^by  the  Phokians  and  the  Orchomeuians— in 
addition  to  the  Peloponnesian  troops  who  had  accompanied  him  to 
Asia,  the  Asiatic  hoplites,  the  Cyreians,  the  peltasts,  and  the  cavalry, 
whom  he  had  brouixht  with  him  from  the  Hellespont,  and  some  fresh 
troops  collected  in  tlie  march.  His  army  was  thus  in  imposing  force 
when  lie  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Chieroueia  on  tlie  Boeotian 
border.  It  was  here  that  they  were  alarmed  by  an  eclipse  of  the 
sun,  on  Aug.  14,  394  B.C.;  a  fatal  presage,  the  meaning  of  wdiichwas 
soon  interpreted  for  them  by  the  arrival  of  a  messenger  bearing  news 
of  the  ntival  defeat  of  Knidus,  with  the  death  of  Peisander,  brother- 
in-law  of  Agesilaus.  Deeply  w^as  the  latter  affected  with  this  irrep- 
arable blow.  He  foresaw  that,  when  known,  it  would  spread 
dismay  and  dejection  among  his  soldiers,  most  of  whom  would  remain 
attached  to  him  only  so  loiig  as  they  believed  the  cause  of  Sparta  to 
he  ascendant  and  profitable.  Accordingly,  he  resolved,  being  now 
within  a  day's  march  of  liis  enemies,  to  hasten  on  a  battle  without 
making  known  the  bad  uew^s.  Proclaiming  that  intelligence  had 
been  received  of  a  sea-fight  having  taken  place,  in  which  the  Lacedae- 
monians hiul  been  victorious,  though  Peisamler  himself  was  slain— 
he  offered  a  sacriflce  of  thtmksgiving  and  sent  round  presents  of  con- 
gratulation; which  produced  an  encour;iging  effect,  and  made  the 
skirmishers  especially  both  forward  and  victorious. 

To  his  enemies,  now  assembled  in  force  on  the  plain  of  Koroneia, 
the  real  issue  of  the  battle  of  Knidus  w^as  doubtless  made  known, 
spreading  hop(;  and  cheerfulness  through  their  ranks;  though  %ve 
are  not  informed  what  interpretation  they  put  upon  the  solar  eclipse. 
The  army  was  composed  of  nearly  the  same  contingents  as  those  who 
had  recently  fought  at  Corinth,  except  that  we  hear  of  the  .Enianes 
in  place  of  the  Malians;  but  probably  each  contingent  w^as  less  numer- 
ous, since  there  was  still  a  necessity  for  occupying  and  defending  the 
camp  near  Corinth.  Among  the  Athenian  hoplites,  who  had  just 
been  so  roughly  handled  in  the  preceding  battle,  and  who  were  now 
drafted  off  by  lot  to  march  into  Bwotia,  against  both  a  general  and 
an  army  of  high  reputation— there  prevailed  much  apprehension  and 


676 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


I 


some  reluctance;  as  we  learn  from  one  of  them,  Mantitheus,  wlio 
stood  forward  to  volunteer  his  services,  and  who  afterward  makes 
just  boast  of  it  before  an  Atiieuiau  dikastery.  The  Thcbans  and 
Boeotians  were  probably  in  full  force,  and  more  numerous  than  at 
Corinth,  since  it  was  their  own  country  whicli  was  to  be  defended. 
The  camp  was  established  in  the  territory  of  Koroneia,  not  far  from 
the  <;reat  temple  of  Itonian  Athene,  where  the  Pamba-otia,  or  general 
Boeotian  assemblies,  were  held,  and  where  there  also  stood  the 
trophy  erected  for  the  great  victory  over  Tolmides  and  the  Athenians, 
about  fifty  years  before.  Between  the  two  armies  there  was  no  great 
difference  of  numbers,  except  as  to  the  peltasts,  who  were  more  numer- 
ous in  the  army  of  Agesilaus,  though  they  do  not  seem  to  have  taken 
much  part  in  the  battle. 

Havini;  marched  from  Charoneia,  Agesilaus  approached  the  plain 
of  Koroneia  from  the  river   Kephissus,''while  the  Thcbans  met  him 
from  the  direction  of  Mount  lielikon.     He  occupied  the  riglit  wing 
of  his  army,  the  Orchomeuians   being  on  the  left,  and  the  Cyreians, 
with  the  Asiatic  allies,  in  the  center.     In  the  opposite  line,  the  The- 
bans  were  on  the  right,  and  the  Argeians  on  the  left.     Both  armies 
approached  slowly  and  in   silence  until  they  were  separated  only  by 
an  interval  of  a  furlong,  at  which  m(  ment  the  1  hebans  on  the  right 
began  the  war-shout,  and    accelerated  their  march  to  a  run:  the  rest 
of  the  line  following  their   example.     AYhui  they  got  within  half  a 
furlong  of  the  Laceda?monians,  the  caiter  division  of  theh!tl(r  under 
the  command  of  Heripoidas  (comprising  the  Cyreians,  with  Xeiiophon 
himself,  and  the  Asiatic  allies)  started   forwaul  on  their  side,  and 
advanced  at  a  run  to  meet  thtm;  Kcmingly  ^ceiting  beyond  tlieir  ovn 
line,  and  coming  first  to  cross  spears  with  the  enemy's  center.     After 
a  sharp  struggle,  the  division  of  Heiippidas  was  here  victorious,  and 
drove  back  its  opponents.      Agesilaus  c  n  Lis  right  was  yet  n^.ore  vic- 
torious, for  the  Argeians    opjiosed  to  him  fed  without  even  crossing 
spears.     Tliese  fuLntivcs  f(  und  safely  on  the  high  giov.nd  of  Alount 
lielikon.     But  on^the  other  hand,  the  Thel  ans  en  their  own  right, 
completely  beat  back  the  Orehcmeuinns,  and  pur^uul  ihem  so  far  as 
te)  get  to  the  baggage  in  the  rear  of  the  army.     Agesilaus,  w  hile  his 
frieads  around Vere  coigratulating  him  as  conqueu.r,  inn.ediately 
wheeled  round  to  coniplete  his  victory  by  attacking  the  The  I  ans; 
who  on  their  side  also  faced  about,  and  j  repared  to  fght  their  way, 
in  close  and  eleep  order,  to  rejoin  their  cemiades  on  Ileliken.  Though 
Affesilaus  might  have  let  thcDi  pass,  and  assailed  them  in  the  itar 
with  o-rcater  safetv  and  equal  effect,  he  preferred  the  n.oie  l:e>ne>iable 
victofv  of  a  conflict  face  to  face.     Such  is  the  coloring  w  hie  h  his 
panenyrist    Xenophon    puts    upon    his    maneuver.      Yet   we    may 
remark  that  if  he  had  let  the  Thebans  pass,  he  could  not  lave  pur- 
sued them  far,  seeing  that  their  e)wn  eemrades  were  at  hand  to  sus- 
tain the>m— and  alsothat  h.avingneveryet  iouohi  against  thcTliebans, 
he  had  probably  no  adeepiate  appreciation  of  their  piowets. 


COMBAT  BETWEEN  THEBANS  AND  SPxVRTANS.     677 

• 

The  crash  which  now  took  place  was  something  terrifio  beyond  all 
Grecian  military  experience,  leaving  an  indelible  iuipression  upon 
Xenophon,  who  was  personally  engaged  in  it.  The  hoplites  on  both 
sides  came  to  the  fiercest  and  closest  bodily  straggle,  pushing  shields 
against  each  other,  with  all  the  weight  of  the  incumbent  mass  behind 
impelling  forward  the  foremost  ranks— especially  in  the  deep  order 
of  the  Thebans.  The  shiehls  of  the  foremost  combatants  were  thus 
stove  in,  their  spears  broken,  and  each  man  was  engaged  in  such  close 
embrace  with  his  enemy,  that  the  dagger  was  the  only  weapon  which 
he  could  use.  There  was  no  systematic  shout,  such  as  usually 
marked  the  charge  of  a  Grecian  army ;  the  silence  was  only  broken 
by  a  medley  of  furious  exclamations  and  murmurs.  Agesilaus  him- 
self, who  was  among  the  front  ranks,  .and  whose  size  and  strength 
were  by  no  means  on  a  level  with  his  personal  courage,  had  his  be)dy 
covered  with  wounds  from  different  weapons— w^as  trodden  down — 
and  only  escaped  by  the  devoted  courage  of  those  fifty  Spartan  vol- 
unteers who  formed  his  body-guard.  Partly  from  his  wounds, 
partly  from  the  irresistible  courage  and  stronger  pressure  of  the  The- 
bans, the  Spartans  were  at  length  compelled  to  give  way,  so  far  as 
to  afford  a  free  passage  to  the  former,  who  were  thus  enablexl  to 
march  onward  and  rejoin  their  comraeles;  not  without  sustaining 
some  loss  by  attacks  on  their  rear. 

Agesilaus  thus  remained  master  of  the  fielel  of  battle,  having 
gained  a  victory  over  his  opponents  taken  collectively.     But  so  far  as 
concerns  the  Thebans  separately,  he  had  not  only  gained  no  victory, 
but  had  failed  in  his  purpose  e)f  stopping  their  progress,  and  had  had 
the  worst  of  the  combat.     His  w^ounds  having  been  dressed,  he  was 
brouLcht  back  on  men's  shoulders  to  give  his  final  orders,  and  was 
thenlnformed  that  a  detachment  of  80  Theban  hoplites,  left  behind 
by  the  rest,  had  taken  refuge  in  the  temple  of  Itonian  Athene  as  sup- 
pliants.    From  generosity  mingled  with  respect  to  the  sanctity  of  the 
spot,  he  commanded  that  they  should  be  dismissed  unhurt,  and  then 
proceeded  to  give  directions  for  the>  night  watch,  as  it  was  already 
late.     The  field  of  battle  presented  a  terrible  spectacle:  Spartan  and 
Theban  dead  lying  intermingled,  sonK3  yet  grasping  their  naked.dag- 
gers,  others  pierced  with  th^e  elaggers  of  their  enemies;  around,  on 
the  blood  stained  ground,  were  seen  broken  spears,  smashed  shields, 
swords  and  dairgers  scattered  apart  from  their  owners.     He  directed 
the  Spartan  and  Theban  dead  to  be  collected  in  separate  heaps,  and 
placed  in  safe  custodv  for  the  night,  in  the  interior  of  his  phalanx: 
the  troops  then  took  their  supper,  and  rested  for  the  night.     On  the 
next  morninir,  Gylis  the  Polemare-h  was   ordered  to  draw  up  the 
army  in  batlile-array,  to  erect  a  trophy,  and  to  e)ffer  sacrifices  of 
cheerfulness  and  thanksiriving,  with  the  pipers  solemnly  playing, 
according  to  Spartan  fashion.     Agesilaus  was  anxious  to  make  these 
demonstrations  of  victory  as  ostentatious  as  possible,  because  he  really 
doubted  whether  he  had  gained  a  victory.     It  was  very  possible  that 


% 


678 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


REVERSES  OF  SPARTA. 


C79 


the  T]iel)ans  mi-ht  feel  ccrfcUnce  er.ordi  to  rcmw  llic  ntt^c•^^  niul 
irv  to  recover  the  field  of  battle,  ^^'nh  their  o^^•ll  dead  i:rou  it;  >vhi(-h 
W-ilaiis  had,  for  that  lea.on,  caiued  to  hecolkeUd  m  a  separate 
be'l'p  and  plack  .vithin  the  Laccdamcnian  ines  lie  Avas  ho^^■ever, 
.o      reliev^^  cloubt   by  a  herald  coming   rem  the  Ihehans  to 

CO  ci  he  custoinarv  truce  for  the  burial  of  their  dead;  the  inuler- 
;od  confession  of  defeat.  The  r(qv;e.t  ^vas  m.iiHdia  e ly  panted; 
ea  n^Hv  paid  the  last  solenuiities  to  its  o^n  dc  ad,  and  the  Spartan 
f  nx'  X  as  then  Avithdra^Mi  ficni  Ba^otia.  Xenc^-hon  (:( es  not  slate 
tiie  loss  on  either  side,  but  Diodorus  oives  it  at  COO  on  the  nde  of  the 
confecieiati  s,  350  on  tliat  of  the  Lacedanionians. 

IW^  as  he  was  Lv  his  wounds  for  in.in(diate  action,  ^gesi- 

laus  c  Id  hint.elf  to  be  earned  to  Delphi,  w  here  the  Py  hian  games 
vm^a  1 1  1  uicnnent  going  on.  He  here  offer,  d  to  Aj  cl  o  he  .he 
of  the  booty  acquired  during  his  two  years' CMUinipn  m  Asui  a  ithe 
cmal  to  100  talents.  Meanwliile  the  poleman  h  Ga hs  corducted  .e 
m^v  first  into  Phokis,  next  on  a  prulatoiy  excursion  into  the 
i  okrian  tc.  ritorv.  where  the  nimble  attack  of  the  Lokrian  light  troops 
aniid  1  a  lv  irn.und.  inflicted  upon  his  troops  a  severe  check  and 
c  s  h  m  ln«  lif^'-  ^fier  this  the  contingents  in  th.e  aimy  w^-re  dis- 
mT-<d  to  their  nspective  bomes.  :,nd  Agesilaus  1  m.self  wh(n 
U>kTMblv  recovered,  ailed  with  the  Pcloponnesiars  1  (  mew  aid  Irem 
in;  cross  tlu.  C'orinthian  Gull.  He  was  received  at  ^P^  a^'^l^ 
t^cKd^^n.rva\nm  of  esteem  and  gratitude,  vslneb  was  still  farlhe 

^^I^llle^ne-^  by  his  exemplary  -''n^li^^y.^"^  .^^f,  [I  l^^^^;^^^^ 
the  nublic  discipline;  an  exaclne^s  ne.t  dlmlln^^ed  e nhei  h}  on.L, 
Mbsennr  e^n  m^^^^^^^  of  uneemtrolled  ascenel.  ney.  lion,  this  time 
W^^^^^  c'ffe.etive  leaelerof  Spartan  i.e.licy,  cn.ienmg  an 

[  thu  nee  mX  th^  hadeve>r  fallen  to  the  lot  e,f  any  kii.g  beiore. 
I  i  Ve  t'^  if  aVc  i^^^^e.lis,  be)th  voung  and  of  feeble  charaeter,  was 
Ion  over'bv  his  judicious  and   conciliatory  behavior,  into  the  most 

"1^hr^';!^';^t;i:;had  thus  been  fought  in  tl- space  cvf  little  moi. 
than  Tmonth  (Julv  anel  Auirust)-those  of  Corinlh,  Knidus,  an. 
KomneirU  e  first  and  third  on  land,  the  second  at  .ea,  as  descril  (.1 
in  Xlist  (^  apter.  In  each  of  the  two  land-battles  the  I^ae-ee  an  o^ 
Lm^lad  ^  'leel  a  viote>ry:  they  remained  maste^rs  ^^^  ^^^^^^^^^ 
^•eiv  soiiciu.l  bvthe  ene'mv  to  grant  the  burial-tn.cc.  But  ifwc 
rnnnirewht  results  these  vietorie-s  had  proeluced,  the  answer  must 
K  l^Ui  U^rel^totally  barren.  The  position  of  Sparta  in  Gi.eee 
nl  Mo-oin^t  their  enemie's  had  underirone'  no  improvencnt.  In  tl.c 
ffnttlfof  Cor  nth      e^  l^^ui  ineleed  nuaiitested   signal  superi- 

or ti^  and  a  re  much  honor.  B.it  at  the  fie;ld  e)f  Koremeia,  lie 
honor  o  the  e^iav  was  rather  e>n  the  si.le  of  the  Thebans,  :f^ohvo\^ 
t?r,iu.h  the  me)st  strenuous  oppositiem.  and  earned  the-ir  point  of 

h  i.T;  their  allies.     Anel  the>  pu.pe.se  of  f ^-T'^';'VT'^'TniteL  of 
E  Zr  Diphridas)  to  invade  BaM)tia,  completely  failed.     Instead  ot 


Ldvancing,  he  withdrew  back  from  Koroneia,  and  returned  to  Pelo- 
ponnesus^ across  the  Gulf  from  Delphi;  which  he  might  have  deme 
iust  ;is  well  withe)ut  fighting  this  muielerous  and  hardly  contested 
battle.  Even  the  narrative  of  Xcne)p!ion,  deeply  cole)red  as  it  is  both 
l)V  his  sympathies  and  his  antipathies,  indicates  to  us  that  the  pre- 
dominant impression  carried  off  by  every  one  from  the  field  of  Ke)ro- 
neia  was  that  of  the  tremendous  force  and  obstinae^y  of  the  Thebaa 
hoplites— a  foretaste  of  what  w^as  to  come  at  Leuktra! 

If  tlie  two  land  victories  of  Sparta  were  barren  of  results,  the  case 
was  far  otherwise  wutli  her  naval  de;feat  at  Knidus.  That  defeat 
was  preirnant  with  conscjuences  following  in  rapid  succession,  and 
of  the  most  disastrous  character.  As  with  Athens  at  ^gospottinii— 
the  loss  of  her  fleet,  serious  as  that  was,  serveel  only  as  the  signal  for 
countless  following  losses.  Pharnabazus  and  Konon,  with  their  vie*- 
lorious  fleet,  sailed  from  island  to  island,  and  from  one  contincntrd 
seaport  to  another,  in  the  .E^eau,  to  expel  the  Lacedaemonian  har- 
niosts,  and  terminate  the  enipi.-e  of  Sparta.  So  universal  was  the 
odium  which  it  had  inspired,  that  the  task  was  founel  easy  beyond 
expectation.  Conscious  of  their  unpopularity,  the  harmosts  in  almost 
all  the  towns,  on  both  sides  e)f  the  He ilespont,  deserted  their  posts 
and  fled,  on  the  me.-e  news  e)f  the  battle  of  Knidus.  EvcryAvhere 
Pharnabazus  and  Konon  found  themselves  received  as  liberators, 
and  welcomed  with  presents  of  hospitality.  They  pledged  themselves 
not  to  introeluce  any  fe)reign  force  or  governor,  nor  to  fortify  any 
separate  e'itadel,  but  to  guarantee  to  each  city  its  own  genuine  auton- 
omy. This  p  .licy  was'adopted  by  Pharnabazu'^  at  the  urgent  repre- 
sentation of  Kone^n,  who  warned  "him  that  if  he  manife'sted  any  de- 
siirn  of  reducing  the  cities  to  subjection,  he  would  find  them  all  M3 
enemies;  that  eae;h  of  them  severally  would  cost  him  a  long  siege; 
and  tliat  a  ombination  would  ultimately  bo  formeel  against  liim. 
Such  liberal  and  judicious  ieleas,  when  seen  to  be  sincerely  acted 
upon,  pre^dueeel  a  strong  fueling  of  friendship  and  even  of  g.-atitude, 
so  that" the  Lacedaemonian  maritime  empire  was  disse)lved  without  a 
blow,  by  the  almost  spontaneous  movements  of  the  cities  themselves. 
Thougli  the  victorious  fleet  presented  itself  in  many  different  places, 
it  was  nowhere  calleel  upon  to  put  dowm  resistance,  or  to  undertake 
a  single  siege.  Kos,  Nisyra,  Teos,  Chios,  Erythrae,  J  phesus,  Mity- 
lene,"Samos,  all  declared^themselves  independent,  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  new  conquero.-s.  Pharnabazus  presently  disembarked  at 
Ephesus  and  inarched  by  land  northward  to  his  own  satrapy;  leav- 
ing a  fleet  of  forty  triremes  under  the  commanel  of  Ke)non. 

To  this  general  burst  of  anli-Spartan  feeling,  Abydos,-on  the  Asi- 
atic siele  of  the  Hellespont,  formeel  the  solitary  exception.  That 
town,  steady  in  hostility  to  Athens,  hael  been  the  great  military  sta- 
tion of  Sparta  for  her  northern  Asiatic  warfare,  during  the  last 
twenty  years.  It  was  in  the  satrapy  of  Pharnabazus,  and  had  been 
made  the  chief  place  of  arms  by  Dt-rkyllielas  and  Agesilaus,  for  their 


6g0  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF   KNIDUS. 

i.  :„->f  ti,.it  cnfrnn  iq  wcU  as  foi*  tliG  commniid  of  tlic  strait. 

\^ia    to  communicate  the  victory  to  the  allial  <^"l^V,.    tiVrn  im 

at  "^'Y       ;^^w  ;  f  t  ,o    Vbvdencs— ^vas  uow   tl.e  means  ol   saving  a 
apprelicusions  ot  tne  AO}atnth     n>.i>  uw  Cr^.,v1^      Durinn-  the 

striit  to  make  sure  also  of  the  strong  V^^^f^^Z^^  '^^,^^ 
T^o.,n  ci.lp  in  the  Thiac  an  Chersonese.  In  that  itiine  pLiun^uuv 
?he  e       a  beeu  n>any  n<.v  settlers,  vvl.o  luul  come  in  «"<  acqmml 

'xfr^  i'n1n™"ou'    B?  ^^^<^ ^^'^^^  "lep-d-t  <>"  Sparta 

niaa«  aireadv-  considerable,  vas  so  aggravated  by  ^isapr.-  ntm  't 
"    en  le  found  that  he  could  not  yet  expel  then,  Irom  1»«_«  ''  ;,; 

^^t  horesolved  to  act  again.st  tho.n  -''1;:,^"  For'uEn  rp  o^ 
to  Strike  a  blow  at  them  near  their  own  home,     i^  or  Uii^  P^^po.^  i 
transimued  orders  to  Kouon  to  prepare  a  commanding  naval  foice 


KONON  WITH  THE  FLEET. 


681 


for  the  ensuing  spring,  and  in  the  mean  time  to  keep  both  Abydos 
and  Sestos  under  blockade. 

As  soon  as  springe  arrived,  Pharnabnzus  embarked  on  board  a 
powerful  fleet  equipped  by  Konon;  directing  his  course  to  Melos,  to 
various  islands  among  the  Cyclades,  and  lastly  to  the  coast  of  Pelo- 
ponnesus. Thc}^  here  spent  some  time  on  the  coast  of  Laconia  and 
Me-ssenia,  disembarking  at  several  points  to  ravage  the  country. 
They  next  landed  on  the  island  of  Kythera,  which  they  captured, 
grantinG:  safe  retirement  to  the  LacedoEmonian  garrison,  and  leaving 
in  the  island  a  garrison  under  the  Athenian  Nikophemus.  Quitting 
then  the  harborless,  dangerous,  and  ill-i)rovided  coast  of  Laconia, 
they  sailed  up  the  Saronic  Gulf  to  the  L'^thmus  of  Corinth.  Here 
they  found  the  confederates— Corinthian,  Bffiotian,  Athenian,  etc. — 
carrying  on  w^ar,  with  Corinth  as  their  central  post,  against  the  Lace- 
daemonians at  Sikyon.  The  line  across  the  isthmus  from  Lecha^um 
to  Kenchrea3  (I he  two  ports  of  Corinth)  was  now  made  good  by  a 
defensive  system  of  operations,  so  as  to  conline  the  LacedasmoniaDS 
within  Peloponnesus;  just  as  Athens,  prior  to  her  great  losses  in  44G 
B.C.,  while  possessing  both  Megara  and  Peg?e,  had  been  able  to  main- 
tain the  inland  road  midway  between  them,  where  it  crosses  the 
hidi  and  diflicult  crest  of  Mount  Geraneia,  thus  occupying  the  only 
three  roads  by  which  a  Lacedaemonian  army  could  march  from  the 
Isthmus  of  Corinth  into  Attica  or  Bcrotia.  "^Pharnabazus  communi- 
cated in  the  most  friendly  manner  with  the  allies,  assured  them  of 
his  strenuous  support  against  Sparta,  and  left  with  them  a  consider- 
r,ble  sum  of  money. 

The  appearance  of  a  Persian  satrap  with  a  Persian  fleet,  as  master 
of  the  Peloponnesian  sea  and  the  Saronic  Gulf,  was  a  phenomenon 
astounding  to  Grecian  eyes.  And  if  it  was  not  equally  offensive  to 
Grecian  sentiment,  this  was  in  itself  a  melancholy  proof  of  the 
degree  to  which  Pan-Hellenic  patriotism  had  been  stilled  by  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian war  and  the  Spartan  empire.  No  Persian  tiara  had  been 
seen  near  the  Saronic  Gulf  since  the  battle  of  Salainis;  nor  could 
anythinii:  short  of  the  intense  personal  wrath  of  Pharnabazus  against 
the  Lace<liTemonnians,  and  his  desire  to  revenge  upon  tliem  the  dam- 
age inflicted  by  Dei;kyHidas  and  Agesilaus,  have  brought  him  now  as 
far  away  fromhis  own  satrapy.  It  was  this  wrathful  feeling  of  which 
Konon 'took  advantage  to  procure  from  him  a  still  more  important 
boom. 

Since  404  B.C.,  a  space  of  eleven  j^ears,  Athens  had  continued 
without  any  walls  round  her  seaport  toVn  Peirwus,  and  withoat  any 
Long  Walls  to  connect  her  city  with  Peira?us.  To  this  state  she  had 
been  condemned  by  the  sentence  of  her  enemies,  in  the  full  knowl- 
edge that  she  could  have  little  trade— few  ships  either  armed  or  mer- 
caiitile— poor  defense  even  against  pirates,  and  no  defense  at  all 
against  airgression  from  the  mistress  of  the  sea.  Konon  now  en- 
treated Pharnabazus,  who  was  about  to  go  home,  to  leave  the  fleet 


6G2 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  KNIDUS. 


LONG  WALLS  OF  ATHENS. 


683 


under  his  command,  and  to  permit  him  to  use  it  in  rehuildm?  the 
forlificptions  of  IV'ira'Us  as  well  as  the  Lone:  N\  alls  of  Athens. 
AVhile  he  en'ra^cd  to  maintain  the  flc<t  hy  contrihiitums  from  the 
inlands  he  assured  the  satrap  that  no  blow  could  he  intlicted  upon 
Si>arta  so  destructive  or  so  mortifying,  as  the  renovation  of  Athins 
and  Peinr-.H  with  their  comidete  and  connected  lortihcations. 
Sparta  would  thus  be  deprived  of  the  most  imixuMant  harvest  whieh 
8hc  had  reaped  from  the  Ion.?  struggle  of  the  Pcloponnesian  A^  ar. 
ludi'mantas  he  now  was  airainst  the  Lacedaemonians,  1  harnabaziis 
svmpathized  cordially  with ^these  plans,  and  on  departing  not  only 
kit  the  tleet  under  the  conmiand  of  Konon,  but  also  furnished  hnii 
with  a  considerable  sum  of  money  toward  the  expense  of  the  lortiti- 

'  Konon  betook  himself  to   the   work   energetically   and  without 
delav.     He  had  quitted  Athens  in  407  n.c,  tis  one  ot  the  jomt  adnur- 
als  nominated  after  the  disgrace  of  Alkibiades.     He  Innl  parted  with 
his  countrvmeu  tinall-  at  the  catastrophe  of  .Lgospotami  m  40.)  bc 
preserving  the  miserable  fraction  of  eight  or  nine  ships  out  of  that 
noble  fleet  which  otherwise  would  have  passed  entire  mto  the  hands 
of  Lysan.ler.     Ho  now  returned,  in  393  d.c.  as  a  second  1  heims- 
tokles,   the  deliverer  of  his  country,   and    the  restorer  of  her    ost 
streu«nh  and  independence.     All  hands  were  set  to  ^vork;  carpenters 
and  masons  bein-  hired  with  the  funds  furnished  by  Iharnabazus, 
to  complete  the  foititicaticms  as  quickly  as  possible.      I  he  baotiaus 
ctnd  other  neighbors  lent  their  aid  zealously  as  volunteers— the  sanie 
who  eleven  years  before  had  danced  to  the  sound  <;f  Joyful  music 
wlien  the'former  walls  were  demolished;  so  c(;mpletely  had  tiie  tcel- 
in«-s  of  Greece  altered  since  that  period.     By  such  hearty  co-opera- 
atu^n   the  work  was  finished  during  the  course  of  the  present  sum- 
mer and  autumn  without  any  opposition;  and  Athens  enjoyed  again 
her  fortified  Peira-us  and  harbor,  with  a  pair  of  L(>i.<  VValls,  s  raiglit 
and  parallel,  joining  it  securely  to  the  city.     The  third  <n-  l}f^^^ 
Wall  (a  sin'de  wall  stretching  from  Athens  to  Phalerum),  which  had 
existed  down  to  the  capture  of  the  city  by  Lysander,  was  not  re- 
stored- nor  was  it  indeed  bv  an v  means  necessary  to  the  securitv 
either  of  the  citv  or  of  the  poft.     Having  thus  given  renewed  lite  and 
securitv  to  Peineus,  Konon  commemorated  his  great  naval  victoi\ 
l)v  a  ijolden  wreath  in  the  acropolis,  as  we41  as  by  the  erection  ot  a 
temple  in  Peineus  to  the  honor  of  the  Knidian  Aphrodite,  who  was 
worshiped  at  Knidus  with  peculiar  devotion  by  the  local  popula- 
tion     He  further  celebrated  the  completion  of  the  walls  by  a  sp  eiulii 
sacrifice  and  festival  banquet.     And  the  Athenian  people  not  only 
inscribed  on  a  pillar  a  public  vote  gratefully  recording  the  exploiis 
of  Konon,  but  also  erected  a  statue  to  his  honor.  v  +  ^  ,.f 

The  importance  of  this  event  in  reference  to  the  future  history  oi 
Athens  was  unspeakable.  Though  it  did  not  restore  to  her  either 
her  former  navy,  or  her  former  empire,  it  reconstituted  her  as  a 


city  not  only  self-determining  but  even  partially  ascendant.  It 
re-aniinated  her,  if  not  into  the  Athens  of  Perikles,  at  least  into 
that  of  Isokrates  and  Demosthenes:  it  impaited  to  her  a  second  fill 
of  strength,  dignity,  and  commercial  iin};oitaiice,  during  the  half 
century  destined  to  elapse  before  she  was  finally  overwhelmed  by 
the  superior  military  force  of  Macedoii.  Those  who  recollect  the 
extraordinary  stratagem  whereby  Theini^tokles  had  contrived  (eighty- 
live  years  before)  to  accomplish  the  fortification  of  Athens,  in  spite 
of  the  base  but  formidable  jealousy  of  Spaita  and  her  Peloponneshm 
allies,  will  be  aware  how  much  the  consummation  of  the  Themis- 
toklean  project  had  depended  upon  accident.  Now,  also,  Konon  in 
his  restoration  was  favored  by  unusual  combinations  such  as  no  one 
could  have  predicted.  That  Pharuabazus  should  conceive  the  idea 
of  coming  over  himself  to  Peloponnesus  with  a  fieet  of  the  largest 
force,  was  a  most  unexpected  contingency.  He  was  influenced 
neither  by  attachment  to  Athens,  nor  seemingly  by  considerations  of 
policy,  though  the  proceeding  was  one  really  conducive  to  the  inter- 
ests of  Persian  power — but  simply  by  his  own  violent  personal  wrath 
against  the  Laccdtemonians.  And  this  wrath  would  probably  have 
been  satisfied,  if,  after  the  battle  of  Knidus,  he  could  have  cleared 
his  own  satrapy  of  them  completely.  It  was  his  vehement  impa- 
tience, when  he  found  him-elf  unable  to  expel  his  old  enemy  Der- 
kyllidas  from  the  important  position  of  Abydos,  which  chiefly 
spurred  him  on  to  take  revenge  on  Sparta  in  her  own  waters. 
Nothing  less  than  the  satrap's  personal  presence  would  have  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  Konon  either  a  sufficient  naval  force,  or  sufficient 
funds,  for  the  erection  of  the  new  walls,  and  the  defiance  of  all  im- 
pediment from  Sparta.  So  strangely  did  events  thus  run,  that  the 
energy,  by  which  Derkyllidas  preserved  Al)ydos,  brought  upon 
Sparta,  indirectly,  the  greater  mischief  of  the  new  Kononian  walls. 
It  would  have  been  better  for  Sparta  that  Pharnabazus  should  at 
once  have  recovered  Abydos  as  well  as  the  rest  of  his  satrapy ;  in 
which  case  he  would  have  had  no  wrongs  remaining  unavenged  to 
incense  him,  and  would  have  kept  on  hfs  own  side  of  the  ^^ean; 
feeding  Konon  with  a  modest  squadron  suflflcient  to  keep  the  Lacc- 
d.emonian  navy  from  again  becoming  formidable  on  the  Asiatic  side, 
but  leaving  the  walls  of  Peira^us  (if  we  may  borrow  an  expression  of 
Plato)  *'  to  continue  asleep  in  the  bosom  of  the  earth." 

But  the  presence  of  Konon  with  his  powerful  fleet  was  not  the 
only  condition  indispensable  to  the  accomplishment  of  this  work. 
It  was  requisite,  further,  that  the  interposition  of  Sparta  should  bc 
kept  oflf  not  merely  by  sea,  but  by  land— and  that,  too,  during  all  the 
number  of  months  that  the  walls  were  in  progress.  Now  the  barrier 
against  her  on  laud  was  constituted  by  the  fact  that  the  confed- 
erate force  held  the  cross  line  within  the  isthmus  from  Lecha?um  to 
Kenchreae,  with  Corinth  as  a  center.  But  they  were  unable  to  main- 
tain this  line  even  through  the  ensuing  year— during  which  Sparta, 


M 


684 


AFTER  KEBULLDIXG  THE  WALLS. 


LAND  WARFARE. 


685 


aided  by  dissensions  at  Corinth,  broke  throu<2:h  it,  as  -svill  appear  in 
the  next  chapter.  Had  she  been  jible  to  break  through  it  wliile  the 
forlifieations  of  Athens  were  yet  incomplete,  she  wouhl  have  deemed 
no  effort  too  great  to  effect  an  entrance  into  Attica  and  iuterrui)t  ihe 
work,  in  which  she  might  very  probably  have  succeeded.  Here, 
then,  was  tiie  second  condition,  which  was  realized  during  the 
summer  and  autumn  of  393  n.c,  but  which  did  not  continue  to  be 
realized  longer.  So  fortunate  was  it  for  Athens  that  the  two  condi- 
tions were  fulfilled  both  together  during  this  particular  year! 


CHAPTER  LXXV. 

FROM    THE    REBUILDING   OF    TIIE    LO^G   WALLS    OF   ATHEKS  TO   THE 

PEACE   OF    ANTALKIDAS. 

Tee  presence  of  Pharnabazus  and  Konon,  with  their  commanding 
force,  in  the  Saronic  Gulf,  and  the  liberality  with  which  the  former 
furnished  pecuniary  aid  to  the  latter  for  rebuilding  the  full  fortifica- 
tions of  Athens,  as  well  as  to  the  C<irinthian5  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  war,  seem  to  have  given  preponderance  to  the  confederates  over 
Sparta  for  that  year.  The  plans  of  Koncm  were  extensive.  He  was 
the  first  to  organize,  for  the  defense  of  Corinth,  a  mercenary  force, 
which  was  afterward  improved  and  conducted  with  greater  elliciency 
by  Iphikrates;  and  after  he  had  finished  the  fortifications  of  Peira?us 
with  the  Long  Walls  he  employed  himself  in  showing  his  force  among 
the  islands  for  the  purpose  of  laying  the  foundations  of  renewed 
maritime  power  for  Athens. .  We  even  hear  that  he  caused  an  Athe- 
nian envoy  to  be  dispatched  to  Dionysius  at  Syracuse,  with  the  view 
of  detaching  that  despot  from  SparUi,  and  bringing  him  into  connec- 
tion with  Athens.  Evagoras,  despot  of  Salaniis  in  Cyprus,  the  steady 
friend  of  Konon,  was  a  party  to  this  proposition,  which  he  sought  to 
strengthen  by  offering  to  Dionysius  his  sister  in  marriage.  Theie 
was  a  basis  of  sympathy  between  them  arising  from  the  fact  that 
Evagoras  was  at  variance  with  with  the  Phenicians  both  in  Phenicia 
and  Cyprus,  while  Dionysius  was  in  active  hostilities  with  the  Car- 
thaginians (their  kinsmen  and  colonists)  in  Sicily.  Nevertheless  the 
proposition  met  with  little  or  no  success.  We  find  Dionysius  after- 
ward still  continuing  to  act  as  an  ally  of  Sparta. 

Profiting  by  the  aid  received  from  Pharnabazus,  the  Corinthians 
strengthened  their  fleet  at  Lecha'um  (their  harbor  in  the  Corinthian 
Gulf)  so  considerably  as  to  become  masters  of  the  gulf,  and  to  occupy 
Rhium,  one  of  the  two  opposite  capes  which  bound  its  narrow 
entrance.  To  oppose  them,  the  Lacedirmonians  <m  their  side  were 
driven  to  greater  maritime  effort.     More  than  one  naval  action  seems 


to  have  taken  place  in  those  waters  where  the  prowess  and  skill  of 
the  Athenian  admiral  Phormion  had  been  so  signally  displayed  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  At  length  the  Lacedae- 
inonhu?  admiral  Herippidas,  who  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the 
fleet  after  his  predecessor,  Polemarchus,  had  been  slain  in  battle, 
compelled  the  Corinthians  to  abandon  Rhium,  and  gradually  recovered 
his  ascendency  in  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  which  his  successor,  Teleutias, 
brother  of  Agcsilaus,  still  further  completed. 

While  these  transactions  were  going  on  (seemingly  during  the  last . 
half  of  393  B.C.  and  the  full  year  of  392  B.C.),  so  as  to  put  an  end  to 
the  temporary  naval  preponderance  of  the  Corinthians,  the  latter 
were  at  the  same  time  bearing  the  brunt  of  a  desultory,  but  continued 
land-warfare  against  the  garrison  of  Lacedaemonians  and  Pelopon- 
nesians  established  at  Sikyon.  Both  Corinth  and  Lechaeum  were 
partly  defended  by  the  presence  of  the  confederate  troops,  Ba'olians, 
Argelans,  Athenians,  or  mercenaries  paid  by  xVthens.  But  this  did 
nofprotect  the  Corinthians  against  suffering  great  damage,  in  their 
lands  and  outlying  properties,  from  the  inciu'sions  of  the  enemy. 

The  plain   between   Corinth  and   Sikyon— fertile  and   extensive 
(speaking  by  comparison  with  Peloponnesus  generally),  and  consti- 
tuting a  large  part  of  the  landed  property  of  both  cities,  was  rendered 
uncultivable  during  393  and  392  B.C. ;  so  that  the  Corinthian  pro- 
prietors were  obliircd  to  withdraw  their  servants  and  cattle  to  Peiraeum 
(a  portion  of  the^Corinthian  territory  without  the  isthmus  properly 
so  called,  north-east  of  the  Akrokorinthus,  in  a  line-  between  that 
eminence  and  the  Megarian  har])or  of  Pegfe).     Here  the  Sikyonian 
assailants  could  not  reach  them,  because  of  the  Long  AValls  of  Corinth, 
which  connected  that  city  by  a  continuous  fortification  of  12  stadia 
(somewhat  less  than  a  mile  and  a  half)  with  its  harbor  of  Lechaeum. 
Nevertheless  the  loss  to  tlje  proprietors  of  the  deserted  plain  was  still 
so  great  that  two  successive  seasons  of  it  were  quite  enough  to  inspire 
them  with  a  strong  aversion  to  the  war;  the  more  so,  as  the  damage 
fell  exclusively  upon  them— their  allies  in  Bceotia,  Athens,  and  Argos 
having  as  yet  suffered  nothing.  Constant  military  service  for  defense, 
with  the  conversion  of  the  city  into  a  sort  of  besieged  post,  aggra- 
vated their  discomfort.    There  was  another  circumstance  also  doubt- 
less not  without  influence.    The  consequences  of  the  battle  of  Knidus 
had  been,  first,  to  put  down  the  maritime  empire  of  Sparta,  and  thus 
to  diminish  the  fear  which  she  inspired  to  the  Corinthians;  next,  to 
rebuild  the  fortifications,  and  renovate  the  shipping,  commercial  as 
well  as  warlike,  or  Athens— a  revival  wa^ll  calculated  to  bring  back 
a  portion  of  that  anti- Athenian  jealousy  and  apprehension  which  the 
Corinthians  had  felt  so  strongly  a  few  years  before.     Perhaps  some 
of  the  trade  of  Corinth  may  have  been  actually  driven  away  by  the 
disturbance  of  the  war,  to  the  renewed  fortifications  and  greater 
security  of  Peiraeus. 
Fostered  by  tliis  pressure  of  circumstances,  the  discontented  philo- 


PASIMELUS. 


687 


686 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


Laconinn  or  peace -pjutv  wiiicli  Ind  nlways  existed  at  Coiiiitb, 
presently  acquired  sufficient  J^trenglll,  and  manifested  itself  \vith 
Futtlcient  publicity,  to  eive  much  jilaim  lo  ilie  government.  The 
Corinthian  rroveinmeut  had  always  hcen,  and  still  wj;s,  oligj.rchienl. 
In  what  manner  the  administrators  or  the  council  Avcre  renewed,  (t 
hoAv  Ions:  individuals  continued  in  office,  indeed,  we  do  not  kr.ow. 
But  of  dt  mocracy,  with  its  legnl  p(  pular  assemblies,  open  discussions, 
and  authoritative  resolves,  there  wjis  nothing.  Now  the  oiigardiienl 
persons  actually  in  power  were  vdiemenlly  jinti-Laconinn,  corisistinii; 
of  men  who  had  partaken  of  the  Persian  funds  and  conti  act(  d  nlli- 
ance  with  Persia,  besides  c(  mprominng  themselves  iirevcc;.bly  (like 
Timolaus)  by  the  most  bitter  mjinifestntions  of  hostile  sentiment 
toward  Sparta.  These  men  found  themselves  m.enaced  by  a  power- 
ful opposition-part V,  which  had  no  constitutional  means  for  n:;»king 
its  sentiments  pi eilcminjint,  iind  for  accon.plishirg  penceably  either 
a  chanire  of  r.dminiMrators  or  a  chjinge  of  public  policy.  It  was  only 
by  an  appeal  to  arms  and  violence  that  such  a  ci^nsummation  could 
be  brouirht  about;  a  fact  notorious  to  both  parties— so  that  the  oli- 
garchical administrators,  in«  rmed  of  the  meetings  and  conversations 
goinc:  on,  knew  well  that  they  had  to  expect  nothing  less  than  the 
breakinn;  out  of  a  conspiracy.  That  such  anticipjilicns  were  well- 
founded,  we  crather  even  from  tlie  partial  recital  of  Xenophon;  who 
states  that  Pa^simelus,  the  philo-Laccniian  kr.dcr,  was  on  his  guard 
and  in  preparation— and  counts  it  to  him  as  a  virtue  that  shortly 
afterward  he  opened  the  gates  to  the  Laceda-monians. 

Anticipating  such  conspiracy,  the  govei nnunt  resolved  to  prevent 
it  by  a  rouj)  (Vetat.  Thev  threw  themselves  upon  the  assistance  of 
their  allies,  invited  in  a  body  of  Argeians,  and  made  their  blow  the 
more  sure  by  striking  it  on  the  last  day  of  the  festival  called  Eukleia, 
when  it  was  least  expected.  Their  proceeding,  though  dictated  by  pre- 
caution, was  execuled  with  the  extreme  of  brutal  ferocity  aggravated 
by  sacrik'2;e;  in  a  manner  very  dilTcrent  from  the  deep-laid  artillees 
recently  practiced  by  the  Spartan  Ephors  when  they  were  in  like 
manner  afraid  of  the* conspiracy  at  Kinadon— and  more  like  the  oli- 
irarchical  conspirators  of  Kc^'kyra  (in  the  third  year  of  ihe  Pelopon- 
iiesian  AVar)  when  thev  broke  iiito  the  assembled  Senate,  and  massa- 
cred Peithias  with  sixty  others  in  the  Senate-house.  AVhile  the  choice 
performers  at  Corinth  were  contending  for  the  prize  in  the  theater, 
with  jud2:es  formally  named  to  decide— and  while  the  market  place 
around  was  crowded  with  festive  spectators— a  number  of  armed  men 
were  introduced,  probably  Argeians,  with  leaders  designating  the 
victims  whom  they  were  to  sTrike.  Some  of  these  select  victims 
were  ma^.^acred  in  the  market-place,  others  in  the  theater,  and  one 
even  while  sitting  as  a  judge  in  the  theater.  Others  again  tied  in 
terror,  to  embrace  the  altars  or  statues  in  the  market-placf — which 
sanctuary  nevertheless  did  not  save  their  lives.  Nor  was  such  sacri- 
lege arrested— repugnant  as  it  was  to  the  feelings  of  the  assembled 


spectators  and  to  Grecian  feelings  generally— until  120  persons  had 
perished.  But  the  persons  slain  were  chiefly  elderly  men;  lor  the 
youu<^er  portion  of  the  philo-Laconian  party,  suspecting  some  mis- 
chief^had  declined  attending  the  fcsiival,  and  kept  themselves  sepa- 
ntely  assembled  under  their  leader  Pasimelus,  in  the  gymnasuini 
;uiil  cypress-grove  called  Kraniuin,  just  without  the  city-gates.  We 
tind  too  that  they  w^ere  not  only  assembled,  but  actually  in  arms. 
For  the  moment  that  they  heard  the  clamor  in  the  market-place  and 
learned  from  f^ome  fugitives  what  was  going  on,  they  rushed  up  at 
once  to  the  Akrokorinthus  (or  eminence  and  acropolis  overhangni'^ 
the  city)  and  got  possession  of  the  citadel;  which  they  mauitamed 
witb  such  force  and  courage,  that  the  Argeians,  and  the  Corinthians 
who  took  part  with  the  oovernment,  were  repulsed  in  the  attempt  lo 
di^lo  Ige  them.  This  ci^-cumstance,  indirectly  revealed  in  the  one- 
sided narrative  of  Xenophon,  lets  us  into  the  real  state  ot  the  cily, 
and  affords  good  i!:round  for  believing  that  Pasimelus  and  his  trieiids 
were  prepared  beforehand  for  an  armed  outbreak,  but  waited  to 
execute  it  until  the  festival  was  over— a  scruple  which  the  govern- 
ment in  their  eagerness  to  forestall  the  plot,  disregarded;  einploying 
tiie  hands  and  weapons  of  Argeians  who  were  comparatively  unim- 
pressed bv  solemnities  peculiar  to  (Jorinth. 

'JUiou'^h  Pasimelus  and  his  friends  were  masters  of  the  citadel  and 
had  rep'rdsed  the  assault  of  their  enemies,  yet  the  Yvvv\ii<^oai>detat 
had  been  completely  successful  in  overawing  their  parly  in  the  city, 
and  deijriving  them  of  all  means  of  conimunicating  with  the  Lace- 
(1  iMUonians  at  Sikyon.  Feeling  unable  to  maintain  themselves,  they 
wer(!  besides  frigh'tened  by  menacing  omens,  when  they  came  to  oiler 
sacrifice  in  order  that  they  might  learn  whether  the  gods  encouraged 
them  to  lio-lit  or  not.  The  victims  were  found  so  alarming,  as  to 
drive  them  to  evacuate  the  post  and  prepare  for  voluntary  exi  e. 
Many  of  tliem  (according  to  Diodorus  500)  actually  went  into  exile; 
while  others  and  among  them  Pasimelus  himself,  were  restrained  b\^ 
the  entreaties  of  their  friends  and  relatives,  combined  with  solemn 
assurances  of  peace  and  security  from  the  government;  who  now 
probably  felt  themselves  victorious,  and  were  anxious  to  mitigate  the 
antipathies  which  their  recent  vh)lence  had  inspired.  These  pacilic 
assurances  were  faithfully  kept,  and  no  further  mischief  was  done  to 

any  citizen.  .  „      .        ,   , 

But  the  political  condition  of  Corinth  w\as  materially  altered  by  an 
extreme  intimacy  of  alliance  and  communion  now  formed  witli 
Ar-os;  perhaps  combined  with  reciprocal  rights  of  intermarriage, 
and  of  mirchase  and  sale.  The  boundary  pillars  or  hedges  which 
separated  the  two  territories  were  pulled  up,  and  the  city  waseiuitled 
ArnoH  instead  of  Gorintli  (says  Xenophon).  Such  was  probably  t  ne 
invidious  phrase  in  which  the  opposition  party  described  the  very 
close  political  union  now  formed  between  the  two  cities;  upheld  by  a 
strong  Argeian  force  in  the  city  and  acropolis,  together  with  some 


688 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


CAPTURE  OF  KROMMYON  AND  SIDUS. 


GS^ 


Hi 


Athenian  mercenaries  under  Ipbikrates,  and  some  Ba}oliaus  as  a  irar- 
risou  in  tlie  port  of  Lecli*um.  Most  probably  the  governnu!nt 
remained  still  Corintliiau,  and  still  oligarchical,  as  before.  But  it 
now  rested  upon  Argeiau  aid,  and  was  therefore  dependent  chiefly 
upon  Argos,  though  partly  also  upon  the  other  two  allies. 

To  Pasimelus  and  his  friends  such  a  state  of  thiugs  was  intolerable. 
Though  personally  they  had  no  ill-usage  to  complain  of,  vet  the  com- 
plete predominance  of  their  political  enemies  was  quite 'sufliclent  to 
excite  their  most  vehement  antipathies.  They  entered  into  secret 
correspondence  with  Praxilas,  the  Lacediemouian  commander  tit 
Sikyon,  engaging  to  betray  to  him  one  of  the  gates  in  the  western 
Long  Wall  between  Corinth  and  Lechtieum.  The  scheme  being  con- 
certed, Pasimelus  and  his  partisiuis  got  themselves  placed,  panly  bv 
Cfuitrivance  and  partly  by  accident,  on  the  night-watch  at  this  irate; 
an  imprudence,  which  shows  that  the  governinent  not  only  did"  not 
maltreat  them,  but  even  admitted  them  to  trust.  At  the  moment 
fixed,  Praxilas— presenting  himself  with  a  Lacedsemoniiui  muru  or 
regiment,  a  Sikyonian  force,  and  the  Corinthian  exiles— found  the 
treacherous  sentinels  prepared  to  open  the  gates.  Having  first  sent; 
in  a  trusty  soldier  to  satisfy  him  that  there  was  no  deceit,  he  then 
conducted  all  his  force  within  the  gates,  into  the  mid-space  between 
the  t\yo  Long  AValls.  So  broad  was  this  space,  and  so  inadequate 
did  his  numbers  apj^ear  to  maintain  it.  that  he  took  the  precaulion  of 
digging  a  cross-ditch  with  a  palisade  to  defend  himself  on  the  side 
toward  the  city;  which  he  was  enabled  to  do  undisturbed,  since  the 
enemy  (we  are  not  told  why)  did  not  attack  him  all  the  next  dav. 
On  the  ensuing  dav,  however,  Argeians,  Corinthians,  and  AthenLiii 
mercenaries  under  Ipbikrates,  all  came  down  from  the  city  in  full 
force;  the  latter  stood  on  tlie  light  of  the  line,  along^the  eastern  waiU 
opposed  to  the  Corinthian  exiles  on  the  Laceda-mouian  left;  while 
the  Lacedaemonians  themselves  were  on  their  own  right,  opposed  to 
the  Corinthians  from  the  city;  and  the  Argeians,  opposed  to  the 
Sikyonians,  in  the  center. 

It  was  here  that  the  battle  began;  the  Argeians,  bold  from  superior 
numbers,  attacked  and  broke  the  Sikyonians,  tearing  up  the  j)alisa(le, 
and  pursuing  them  down  to  the  sea  with  nmch  slaughter;  upon 
which  Pasimachus  the  Lacedtemonian  commander  of  cavalry  coming 
to  their  aid,  caused  his  small  body  of  horsemen  to  dismount  and  tie 
their  horses  to  trees,  and  then  armed  them  with  shields  taken  from 
the  Sikyonians,  inscribed  on  the  outside  with  the  letter  Sigma  {2). 
AVith  these  he  approached  on  foot  to  attack  the  Argeians,  who  mis- 
taking them  for  Sikyonians,  rushed  to  the  charge  with  alacrity;  upon 
which  Pasimachus  exclaimed— "By  the  two^Grods,  Argeians,  these 
Sigmas  which  you  see  here  will  deceive  you:"  he  then  closed  with 
Ihem  resolutely,  but  his  numbers  were  so  inferior  that  he  was  soon 
overpowered  and  slain.  3Ieanwhile  the  Corinthian  exiles  on  the  left 
had  driven  back  Ipbikrates  with  his  mercenaries  (doubtless  chiefly 


licrht  troops)  and  pursued  them  even  to  the  city  gates;  while  the 
Lacedemonians,  easily  repelling  the  Corinthians  opposed  to  them, 
c'lme  out  of  their  palisade  and  planted  themselves  with  their  faces 
toward  the  eastern  wall,  but  at  a  little  distance  from  it,  to  intercept 
the  Argeians  on  their  return.  The  latter  were  forced  to  run  back  as 
thev  could  huddling  close  along  the  eastern  wall,  with  their  right  or 
unshielded  side  exposed  as  they  passed  to  the  spears  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians. Before  they  could  get  to  the  walls  of  Cormth,  they  were 
met  and  rou«rbly  handled  by  the  victorious  Corinthian  exiles.  And 
even  when  they  came  to  the  walls,  those  within,  unwilling  to  throw 
onen  the  gates  for  fear  of  admitting  the  enemy,  contented  themselves 
with  handing  down  ladders,  over  which  the  defeated  Argeians 
clambered  with  distress  and  difficulty.  Altogether,  their  loss  m  this 
disastrous  retreat  was  frightful.  Their  dead  (says  Xenophon)  lay 
piled  up  like  heaps  of  stones  or  wood  w  .,    r  i 

This  victory  of  Praxitas  and  the  LacedcTmonians,  thought  it  did 
not  vet  make 'them  masters  of  Lechanim,  was  nevertheless  of  con- 
siderable importance.     Shortly  afterward   they  received  reinforce- 
ments which  enabled  them  to  turn  it  to  still  better  account.     The 
first  measure  of  Praxitas  was  to  pull  down  a  considerable  breadth  ot 
the  two  walls,  leaving  a  breach  which  opened  free  passage  for  any 
Lacedamonian  army  from  Sikyon  to  reach  and  pass  the  isthmus 
He  then  marche»l  bis  troops  through  the  breach,  forward  on  the  road 
to  Mcnira  capturing  the  two  Corinthian  dependencies  of  Krommyon 
and  Sidus'on  the  Saronic  Gulf,  in  which  he  placed  garrisons      Re- 
turning back  by  the  road  south  of  Corinth,  he  occupuHl  Epieikia  on 
the  frontier  of  Epidaurus,  as  a  protection  to  the  territory  of  the  latter 
a'minst  incursions  from  Corinth— and  then  disl)anded  Ins  army. 
°A  desultory  warfare  was  carried  on  during  the  ensuing  winter  and 
spring  between  the  opposite  garrisons  in  Corinth  and  Sikyon.     It 
was  now  that  the  Athenian  Ipbikrates,  in  the  former  place,  began  to 
distincruish  himself  at  the  head  of  his  mercenary  peltasls,  whom, 
after  fheir  first  organization  by  Konon.  he  had  trained  to  effective 
tactics  under  the  strictest  discipline,  and  whose  movements  he  con- 
ducted  with   consummate  skill.     His   genius   introduced  improve- 
•*   ments  both  in  their  armor  and  in  thcMr  clothing.     He  lengthened  by 
'    one-half   both   the  light   javelin  and  the  short   sword,  which   the 
Thracian  peltasts  habitually  carried;  he  devised  a  species  of  leggmgs, 
known  afterward  by  the  name  of  Iphikratides;  and  he  thus  com- 
bined  belter  than  had  ever  been  done  before,  rapid  motion— power 
of  acting  in  difficult  ground  and  open  order— effective  attack  either 
by  missUes  or  hand  to  hand-and  dexterous  retreat  in  case  of  need. 
As  yet  he  was  but  a  young  officer,  in  the  beginning  of  his  military 
career     We  must  therefore  presume  that  these  improvements  were 
chiefly  of  later  date,  the  suggestions  of  his  pefsonal  experience;  but 
even  now%  the  f^uccesses  of  his  light  troops  were  remarkable.  Attadun  ir 
Phlius  he  entrapped  the  Phliasians  into  an  ambuscade,  and  inflicted 


1 


690 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


ALARM  OF  ATHENS  AND  THEBES. 


691 


on  tlicm  a  defeat  so  destructive,  that  they  were  oblined  to  invoke  the 
aid  of  a  Lacedemonian  garrison  for  the  protection  of  their  city.  He 
eaintd  a  victorv  near  Sikvon,  and  carried  his  incursions  over  all 
Arcadia  to  the  very  irates  of  the  cities;  daniaginii-  the  Arcadian  hop- 
lites  so  severely  that"  they  became  afraid  to  meet  him  in  the  field. 
His  own  i>eltasts  however,  though  full  of  confidence  against  these 
Peloponne'^inn  hoplites.  still  retained  their  awe  and  their  reluctance 
tofi-'ht  a-aiiist  Lacedicmonians;  who  on  their  side  despised  them, 
but '""despised  tlieir  own  allies  still  more.  "Our  friends  fear  these 
peltasts  as  children  fear  hol)i2:oblin8' — said  the  Lacedaemonians  sar- 
castically, endeavoring  to  set  the  example  of  courage  by  ostentatious 
demonstrations  of  their  own  round  the  walls  of  Corinth.         ^ 

The  breach  made  in  the  Lonu:  Walls  of  Corinth  by  Praxitas  Iiad 
laid  open  the  road  for  a  Peloponnesian  army  to  march  either  into 
Attic'i  or  Beeotia.  Fortunately  for  the  Athenians,  they  had  already 
comi>leted  the  rebuilding  of  their  own  Long  Walls;  but  they  were  so 
miK  h  alarmed  bv  the  new  danger,  that  they  inarched  with  their  full 
force  and  with  inasons  and  carpenters  accompanying,  to  Corinth. 
Here 'with  that  celeritv  of  work  for  which  they  were  distinguished,  they 

in  a  few  (Tays  re-established  completely  the  western  ^vall,  the  more 
inuKa-taiit  ofthetwo,  since  it  formed  the  barrier  against  the  incur- 
sions of  the  Lacedanionians  from  Sikyon.  They  had  then  a  secure 
position  an<l  could  finish  the  eastern  wall  at  their  leisure,  which  they 
accordingly  did  jmd  then  retired,  leaving  it  to  the  confederate  troops 
in  Corinth  to  defend.  .  , 

Tins  advanta-e.  however,  a  very  material  one,  was  again  over- 
thrown by  the  expedition  of  the  Laced<emoiiian  king  Agesilaus  dur- 
ing- the  saine  sunuuer.     At  the  head  of  a  full  Laceda-monian  and  Pelo- 

pcmnesian  force,  he  first  marched  into  the  ^^^"'.^^^P'^^,  ;tn^'' F.vll.'^ 
there  spent  som.^  time  in  ravaging  all  the  cultivated  plain.  Fiom 
hence  he  passed  over  the  mountain-road  by  Tenea  into  the  \^^^  <^ 
Corinth,  to  the  foot  of  the  newly-repaired  Lcmg  }\  alK  He  e  hib 
brother  Telcutian,  who  had  recently  superseded  Henppidas  as  admiral 
in  theCorinthias,  Gulf,  came  to  co-operate  with  him  m  a  joint  attack 
bv  sea  and  land  on  the  new  AValls  and  on  Leclueum.  The  presence 
of  this  naval  force  rendered  the  Long  Walls  difiicult  to  maintain, 
since  "troops  could  be  disembarked  in  the  interval  between  them, 
where  the  Sikvonians  in  the  ].revious  battle  had  been  beaten  and  pur- 
sued down  to  "the  sea.  Agesihius  and  Teleutias  were  strong  enough 
to  defeat  the  joint  force  of  the  four  conft  derated  armies,  and  to  mas- 
ter not  only  the  Long  Walls,  but  also  the  port  of  Lecha'um,  with  it. 
docks  and  the  ships  within  them,  thus  breaking  up  the  naval  powei 
of  Corinth  in  the  Kriss.-ean  Gulf.  Leclneum  now  became  a  per- 
manent post  of  hostility  aiiainst  Corinth,  occupied  by  a  Lacedfe- 
monian  garrison  andoccasi^mally  by  the  C(n-inthian  exi  es,  ^vhile  any 
second  rebuildinir  of  the  Corinthian  Long  \\^dls  by  the  Athenians 
l)ccaine  impossible.     After  this  important  .^access,  Agesilaus  returned 


to  Snarta      Neither  he  nor  his  Lacedaemonian  hoi^lites,  especiiilly  the 
A  ,Fl[.p  uis  were  ever  willimrly  absent  from  the  lestival  ot  the  Hya- 
kin?lb    nor'mdL  iliwclisdain  to  take  his  station  in  the  chorus 
umler  the  orders  of  the  choric  conductor,  for  the  piean  m  honor  of 

'Vwas  thus  that  the  Long  Walls,  though  rebuilt  by  the  Athenians 
^n  throrecedin- year,  wer?  again  permanently  overihrown,  and  the 
•  ,1  f or  L^em^^^^       urmk.«  to  march  beyond  the  Isthmus  once  . 
tor  LuiccicLin  u  Athenians  and  the  Bo3otians 

Irm      atXr  new  sSss,  U>.t  ..oth  appear  to  have  — e  desir- 

'■1  ?j  T  irSoniau  "a'rison)  as  autouoinous  aud  disconnocted 
F  i  U  R,;^ot  m  c  Sc-ra  ion;  while  the  Athenian  envoy  sseeni  to 
Hve  teen  fav<  r^ly  rece^^^^^^  -^  Spartti,  and  to  have  found  the  Laee- 

S;^,  S'  d™po  Jl  to  make  peace  on  l-^'P;, f ''"f J'J^^'^X  a  e.t 
l^ul  been  oronosed  daring  tile  late  discussions  w  th   liriba/.us  (neie 
„f,l  tn  1       u  ticedV  rec^-ni/.in«  the  newly-built  Athenian  Walls, 
orin.'  L  ui  ot  Imteosrand  Skyros  to  Athens,  and  K-'-^^'te^-f 

nrooosuSns      Tl  ^Argeians  and  Corinthians,  however,  strenuously 
Sp^rd  r-thoughts  of  peace,  urging  "^e  Athemans  to  c^^^^ 
war;  hesides  which,  it  appears  that  many  f}''f/\"  P'''f  °' "'"^^^^^ 
that  large  restitution  ought  to  have  "^C""  l"f;  «  "^  -V'^HnCifeS^^^^ 
forfeited  at  the  end  of  the  late  war,  and  ''f>V^?,w  iTmds     Sese 
nn.'ht  to  have  been  given  back  as  well  as  the  tluee  inlands,     y'^"''',,^ 
t,T  other    'rounds    the  Athenian  people  refused   to  sanction  tlie 
ctinmei^da  i'm  of  their  envoys;  though  Andokides,  one  of  those 
e.mlys    in  a   discourse    still  extant,  earnestly  advised    that  they 

^''tLc  iSeuIg  tfJufc^ntinued,  Corinth,  though  defended  by  a  con- 
siderab  e  CO  .f,Mferatc  force,  incl.uVmg  Athenian  hoplites  under    Od- 

ia,  nd  peltasls  under  Iphikrates,  became  """*  .j-'-'f  ^^^,^^^^^,,"^1 
,ilepo.ls  at  Lech^eura  as  well  as  at  5^™I>""J;;».  ™'  s  ho  "eveV 
its  own  exiles  as  tlie  most  active  ot   all  enemies      biill,  iiowtvti, 

iLe  reinaUied  the  pniinsula  and  the  fonifi,=atioa  of  Pei.^um  as  an 

:is;UsM.{fc.^^^^^^^ 

:,Xft  o^SS  hrtl^e  cente  of  t^at  ixminsi^t  wluch^sep^^^^^^^ 

s^i     ToimbB  (now  Psath..  Bay),  on  its  nortli-east.     Across  this  latxer 

baVcmi^  111  -inmunicated  e.  sily,  '"-"g'Vr'rf^Tn  tootia'    The 
fled  port  of  (Enoe,  with  Kreusis  the  port  of  Tliespi*  in  Ba-otia.     1  Ue 


692 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


CAPTURE  OF  PEIRJiiUM. 


693 


Corinthian  exiles  now  prevailed  upon  Agcsilaus  to  repeat  his  iuvasiop 
of  the  territory,  partly  in  order  tiiat  the/  might  deprive  the  eity  of 
the  benefits  which  it  derived  from  Peirteum— partly  in  order 'that 
they  might  also  appropriate  to  themselves  the  honor  of  celehratiilo- 
the  Isthmian  games,  which  were  just  approaehin!r.  The  Spartan 
Kmg  accordingly  marched  forth,  at  the  head  of -a  force  composed  of 
Lacedii3monians  and  of  the  Peloponnesian  allies,  first  to  Lechseum 
and  thence  to  the  Isthmus,  specially  so  called;  that  is,  the  sacrt-d 
precmct  of  Poseidon  near  Schcrnus  on  the  Saronic  Gulf,  at  the  nar- 
rowest breadth  of  the  Isthmus,  where  the  biennial  Isthmian  festival 
was  celebrated. 

It  was  the  month  of  April  or  beginning  of  May,  and  the  festival 
had  actually  begun,  under  the  presidency  of  the  Corinthians  from 
the  city  who  were  in  alliance  with  Argos;  a  body  of  Argeians  beinf' 
present  as  guards.  But  on  tl^',  approach  of  Agesilaus,  they  imme*^ 
(iiately  retired  t(.  the  city  by  the  road  to  Kenchrea,  leaving  their 
sacrifices  half-finished.  Not  thiukinir  fit  to  disturb  their  retreat 
Agesilaus  proceeded  first  to  offer  sacrifice  himself,  nnd  then  took  a 
position  close  at  hand,  in  the  sacred  ground  of  Pcseidon  while  the 
Corinthian  exiles  went  through  the  solemnities  in  due  form,  and  dis- 
tributed the  parsley-wreaths  to  the  victors.  After  remaining  three 
days,  Agesdaus  inarched  away  to  attack  Peira^um.  He  had  no 
sooner  departed  than  the  Corinthians  from  the  city  came  forth  cele- 
brated the  festival,  and  distributt'd  the  wreaths,  a  second  time.' 

Peirseum  was  occupied  by  so  numerous  a  guard,  comprising  Iphik- 
rates  and  his  peltasts,  that  Agesilaus,  instead  of  directly  attacking 
It,  resorting  to  the  stratagem  of  making  a  sudden  retrograde  march 
duectly  toward  Corinth.  Probably  many  of  the  citizens  were  at 
that  moment  absent  for  the  second  celebration  of  the  festival;  so 
that  those  remaining  within,  on  hearing  of  the  approach  of  Ac;csi- 
laus,  apprehended  a  plot  to  betray  the  city  to  liim,  and  send  in  ha.-te 
to  Peirjeum  to  summon  back  Iphikrates  with  his  peltasts.  Having 
learnt  that  these  troops  had  passed  bv  in  the  night,  Agesilaus  fortll- 
Vvith  again  turned  Jiis  course,  and  marched  back  to  Pciifeum  which 
he  Inmself  approached  by  the  ordinary  road,  coasting  round  along 
the  Bay  of  Lechasura.  near  the  Thcrma.  or  warm  springs  which  are 
still  discernible;  while  he  sent  a  mora  or  division  of  troops  to  get 
round  the  place  by  a  mountain-road  more  in  the  interior,  ascending 
some  woody  heights  commanding  the  town,  and  crowned  by  a  tem- 
ple of  Poseidon.  The  movement  was  quite  effectual.  The  garrison 
and  inhabitants  of  Peineum,  seeing  that  the  place  had  become  inde- 
fensible, abandoned  it  on  the  next  dav  with  all  their  cattle  and  pro- 
perty, to  tak(>  refuge  in  the  Ilera'um,  or  sacred  giound  of  Here 
Akrsea,  near  the  western  cape  of  the  peninsula.  While  Agesilaus 
marched  thither  toward  the  coast  in  pursuit  of  them,  the^tioojis 
descending  from  the  heights  attacked  and  captured  O^noe— the 
Corinthian  town  of  that  name  shuated  near  the  Alkyonian  bay  over 


an-ainst  Kreusis  in  Boeotia.  A  large  booty  here  fell  into  their  hands, 
which  was  still  farther  augmented  by  the  speedy  surrender  of  all  in 
th(^  llerajum  to  Agesilaus,' without  conditions.  Called  upon  to  deter- 
mine the  fate  of  the  prisoners,  among  whom  were  included  men, 
women,  and  children— freemen  and  slaves— with  cattle  and  other 
property— Agesilaus  ordered  that  all  those  who  had  taken  part  in  the 
massacre  at  Corinth  in  the  market-place  should  be  handed  over  to 
the  vengeance  of  the  exiles;  and  that  all  the  rest  should  be  sold  as 
slaves.  ^Though  he  did  not  here  inflict  any  harder  measure  than  was 
usual  in  Grecian  welfare,  the  reader  who  reflects  that  this  sentence, 
pronounced  by  one  on  the  whole  more  generous  than  most  contem- 
porary commanders,  condemned  numbers  of  free  Corinthian  men 
and  women  to  a  life  of  degradation,  if  not  of  misery— will  under- 
stand by  contrast  the  encomiums  with  which  in  another  volume  I 
set  forth  the  magnanimity  of  Kallikratidas  after  the  capture  of  Me- 
thvmna;  when  he  refused,  in  spite  of  the  importunity  of  his  allies,  to 
sell  either  the  Methymna3an  or  the  Athenian  captives— and  when  he 
proclaimed  the  exalted  principle,  that  no  free  Greek  should  be  sold 
into  slavery  by  any  permission  of  his. 

As  the  Lacedjemonians  had  been  before  masters  of  Lechaeum, 
Krommyon,  and  Sidus,  this  last  success  shut  up  Corinth  on  its  other 
side,  and  cut  off  its  communication  with  Boeotia.  The  city  not 
being  in  condition  to  hold  out  much  longer,  the  exiles  already  began 
to  hiy  their  plans  for  surprising  it  by  aid  of  friends  within.  So  tri- 
umphant was  the  position  of  Agesilaus,  that  his  enemies  were  all  in 
alarm,' and  the  Thebans,  as  well  as  others,  sent  fresh  envoys  to  him 
to  solicit  peace.  His  antipathy  toward  the  Thebans  was  so  vehe- 
ment, that  it  was  a  great  personal  satisfaction  to  him  to  see  them 
thus  humiliated.  He  even  treatCvi  their  envoys  with  marked  con- 
tempt, affecting  not  to  notice  them  when  they  stood  close  by,  though 
Pharax,  the  proxenus  of  Thebes  at  Sparta,  was  preparing  to  intro- 
duce them. 

Absorbed  in  this  overweening  pride,  and  exultation  over  con- 
quered enemies,  Agesilaus  was  sitting  in  a  round  pavilion  on  the 
banks  of  the  lake  adjoining  the  Heneum- with  his  eyes  fixed  on  the 
long  train  of  captives  brought  out  under  the  guard  of  armed  Lace- 
daemonian hoplites,  themselves  the  object  of  admiration  to  a  crowd 
of  spectators— when  news  arrived,  as  if  under  the  special  inter- 
vention of  retributive  Nemesis,  which  changed  unexpectedly  the 
prospect  of  affairs.  A  horseman  was  seen  galloping  up,  his  horse 
foaming  with  sweat.  To  the  many  inquiries  addressed,  he  returned 
no  answer,  nor  did  he  stop  until  he  sprang  from  his  horse  at  the  teet 
of  Ao-e^ilaits;  to  whom,  with  sorrowful  tone  and  features,  he  miuie 
his  communication.  Immediately  Agesilaus  started  up  seized  his 
spear  and  desired  the  herald  to  summon  his  principal  ofticers.  On 
their  coming  near,  he  directed  them,  together  with  the  guards  around 
to  accompany  him  without  a  moment's  delay;  leaving  orders  with 


694 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


FEW  OF  THE  MORA  ESCAPE. 


695 


the  general  body  of  the  troops  to  follow  as  soon  as  thev  should  have 
snatched  some  rapid  refreshment.  He  then  immediately  put  himself 
in  march;  but  he  had  not  gone  far  when  three  fresh  horsemen  met 
and  informed  him,  that  the  task  which  he  was  hastening  to  perlonu 
had  already  been  accomi)lished.  Upon  this  he  ordered  a  halt,  and 
returned  to  the  Heraeum;  where  on  the  ensuing  day,  to  countervail 
the  bad  news,  he  sold  all  his  captives  by  auction. 

This  bad  news— the  ani\al  of  which  has  been  so  graphically-  de- 
scribed by  Xenoi>hon,  himself  probably  among  the  bystanders  and 
companions  of  Agesilaus— was  nothing  less  than  the  defeat  and  de- 
struction  of  a  Lacedicmonian  mora  or  military  division  bv  the  lidit 
troops  under  Iphikrates.  As  it  was  an  understood  privilege  of  die 
Amyklsean  hoplites  in  the  Lacedaemonian  army  always  to  go  home, 
even  when  on  actual  service,  to  the  festival  of  the  Hvakintliia| 
Agesilaus  had  left  all  of  them  at  Lecha'um.  The  festival  day  heinij 
now  at  hand,  they  set  off  to  return.  Rut  the  road  from  Leclueum  to 
Sikyou  lay  immediately  under  the  walls  of  CV)rinth,  so  that  their 
march  was  not  safe  without  an  escort.  Accordingly  the  i.olemarch 
commanding  at  LechcTum.  leaving  that  place  for  tlie  time  under 
watch  by  the  Peloponnesian  allies',  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
Laced;rmonian  mora  \\\\\c\\  formed  the  habitual  garrison,  consistinij 
of  600  hoplites.  and  of  a  mom  of  cavalry  (number'unknown)— to  pro- 
tect the  Amyklncans  until  they  were  out  of  danger  from  the  enemy 
at  Corinth.  Having  passed  by  Corinth,  and  reached  a  jioint  within 
about  three  miles  of  the  friendly  town  of  Sikyon,  he  thought  the 
dtinger  over,  and  turned  back  with  his  mora  of  Implites  to  Leclueum; 
still,  however,  leaving  the  officer  of  cavalry  with  orders  to  accom- 
pany the  Amyklagans  as  much  farther  as  Uiey  might  choose,  and 
afterward  to  follow  him  on  the  return  march. 

Though  the  Amykhvans  (probably  not  veiy  numerous)  were  pre- 
sumed to  be  in  danger  of  attack  from  Corinth  in  their  march,  and 
though  the  force  in  that  town  was  known  to  be  considerable,  it  never 
occurred  to  the  Lacedaemonian  jiolemarch  that  there  was  any  simihu- 
danger  for  his  own  7Jiora  of  600  hoplites;  so  contemptuous  was  liis 
estimate  of  the  peltasts,  and  so  strong  was  the  apprehension  which 
these  peltasts  were  known  to  entertain  of  the  Lacedtemonians.  But 
Iphikrates,  who  had  let  the  whole  body  march  bv  undisturbed,  when 
he  now  saw  from  the  walls  of  Corinth  the  600  hoplites  returning 
separately,  without  either  cavalry  or  light  troops,  conceived  the  idea 
— perhaps  in  the  existing  state  of  men's  nduds,  no  one  else  would 
have  conceived  it— of  attacking  them  with  his  peltasts  as  thev  re 
passed  near  the  town.  Kallias,  the  general  of  the  Athenian  hoplites 
in  Corinth,  warmly  seconding  the  project,  marched  out  Lis  troops, 
and  arrayed  them  in  battle  order  not  far  from  the  gjites;  while 
Iphikrates  with  his  peltasts  began  his  attack  upon  the  Laccd;ernoni:m 
mora  in  flanks  and  rear.  Approaching  within  missile  distance,  he 
poured  upon  them  a  shower  of  darts  and  arrows,  which  killed  or 


mounded  several,  esp^^y  -  [I^^  ^^^^^0^^^  ^^ 

ilie  assa  lants.  ana  f^^"^";^';'^,  j^^^t,  ^.ven  tlie  youngest  soldiers, 

^  carried  torvvardoLechaum^^  ^^^  ^^^^.^,  ^.,^^^j^,^. 

cucunibered  by  iheii  l'^'^^>  ^^^^^^^^^  1,^^.^^.^  ^,^.,i,.  And  when,  after 
enemies,  ^1- --e  -une^        cccdc  Ix loi.  U ^^  ^^^^.^  ^^^^^^^  .^^ 

an  unavadiug  pm^^uU,  ^'^f  ;"==.,  ^,iu,.  ^,.  ten  of  them  were  slam 
ranks,  the  attack  was  [^''^^;^^'^:  ^^^  ''  ^Uirpolemarch  give  orders  to 
before  they  could  ge  baclv.  ;^S;^^^^f  ^j  ^^..^^^  Uieir  attack,  forcing 
march  forward;    again  ,^»  .^  , ^  ^/^^^^^^^^ 

Uim  to  halt ;  again  he  ordered  ^'^^^'^^'^  former  occasion  it  had 
between  18  and  33  years ot  :^e  !  »^;^^  ^^\  ,^j  ^^,;,,^  Uiem  otf.  But 
been  those  between  18  and  '^)   "  ;;,  ^^^^^^^^^^^^  nothing,  and 

the  result  was  just  the  same:  .^^  ^  l^  ^,  ^^H^^^;^^^;^^  ^.^.t   forward 

only  suifered    increased     oss  of   tl  a    ^|^  ^^^^   .        Whenever  tl»e 

soldiers,  when  they  tried  f /;^\'  "  i^^^,;.  X,,  ^tS  e  circumstances 
toHhemoniansatU^iupWd    OU.U    n^ 

were  ^^^^'^^^^^^^'J^^Zn^ ^^  contident  and  vigorous.    . 
the  peltasts  became  <-^^^;„'". ' "i  in  the  distressed  mora,  by  tliC  coming 
Some  relief  was  now  l^tf^jxle^il  to  the  d  s  tcssu^^^^^^      the\mykkeans. 

up  of  their  cavalry,  ^'^^^^^^^^X'^^u^^ ^  nisiilt  might 
Had  this  cavidry  beei   w.  h^cu   aUhe^^^^^  ^  ^^^^  ^^^^. 

have  been  ddf(.'ren  ;  ^'^'  ;,^^' '^' ^[  ^^^^^ r  the  LacedaMuoman  horse- 
mated  assaults  ot    he  peltasts.     ^^  this  orcasion  ven- 
men  were  at  no  time  very  good,  "^^        j'^  >  J^^^  ,,';\.%,u,..e 
tare  to  push  their  pursuit  to  a  gn'a^r  i.  nge  than ^ 

could  keep  up  with  tnem.  At  k  ig  ,  ''  .[^^.^^^^^^^j^trived  to  get  his 
wounded,  and  great  distress  to  all,  \]]^}]''};^^^^^^^^^^^^  ,,,ne  from  the 

detaeliment  as  far  as  ^l^ ^''^^l"^"^^.  r^uin  He  J^^^^^^^^^  Iphikrates 
sea  and  about  two  miles  from  L^^^'  ""^'^  ,f^^  ."^^  ^  u^s  also  was 
still  continued  .to  {---,-- ,^^^j^  ^^^Jl  to  hand,  when 
marching  up  with  his  ^'1M>  >  ^ ;- ^  ^^    \^-^^^^^^  i,^  strength, 

the  Lacedannonians,  enfeebled  in  "^'^l^^^^^.,^^  enemy,  broke 

and  too  much  dispirited  for  ^^^^^^''^^^^^^J.^u^l^^ln.^ 
and  fled  in  all  directions.     S^"^Vn,r  w    1^1^^^^^^^  the  rest  ran 

pl.ce  a  few  of  them  reached   a^ongjitlU^^^^^  ^^.^ 

toward  the  sea  at  the  nearest  poll   ,a^^^^^  ^^^^^.^  ,^, 

fri(MKls  were  rowin-  in  ^'''^'^^  l]^''].^^^^^^^^  toward 

rescue  tbem,  threw  thein.elv^uUo  the ^^  .^  ^^^^ 

this  new  succor.     But  the  active  ptiia  ^    ^      tion  of  the  unfor- 

rir^r  out'  ^rit^luir'nSl  of  cS)fa  very  s.u.U  p.-opo.ioa 

had  started  off  express  ^^^^^^^^^^^^    >  fiom  L^  ^^^^^.^..^^ 


G96 


AFTER  REBUILDING   THE  WALLS 


SUCCESSKS  OF  IPHIKRATES. 


697 


the  field  m  time  to  contend  for  the  possession  of  the  bodies  nn,i  ,n 
escape  the  sliame  of  soliciting  the  burial  truce.  Rut  the  three  h.  -.p 
men  who  met  him  afterward,  arrested  his  course  by  informing  im 
that  the  bodies  had  already  been  buried,  under  truce  asked  ami  b 
tamed;  which  authorized  Iphikrates  to  erect  his  well-earned  iro,  hy 
on  the  spot  where  he  had  first  made  the  attack  ^  ^ 

Such  a  destruction  of  an  entire  division  of  Laced.Tmonian  hoplites 
by  light  troops  who  stood  in  awe  of  them  and  whom  they  dJvn.,,\ 
was  an  incident,  not  indeed  of  great  political  importance   but Vt,  k 
mg  m  respect  of  military  effect  and  impression   upon  tk  Grec  •  n 
mmd      Nothing  at  all  like  it  had  occurred  since  the  memorable  C 
tiire  of  Sphaktena,  tiiirty-tive  years  before:  a  disaster  less  con  si  it r 
able  in  one  respect   that  the  number  of  hoi)liies  beaten  was  iiJvnor 
by  one-tlnrd-but  far  more  important  in  another  respect   that  half 
fw    W'n"  ^'^;^  surrendered  as  prisoners;  whereas  in  Ihe  battle  n^ 
Corinth,  though  the  whole  mora  (except  a  few  fuoitives)  peri.l  c 
does  not  seem  that  a  single  prisoner  was  taken.^  l>on  the  Coin 
thians,  B(Botians,  and  other  enemies  of  Sparta,  the  event  operate    as 
a  joyous  encouragement,   reviving  them  out  of  all  their  prev  o 
lespondency.     Even  by  the  allies  of  Sparta,  jenlous  of  her  sun  i lo 
^y   and    bound  to  her  by   fear  more   than  by  attachment,   t  ^'s 
welcomed  with  Ill-suppressed  satisfaction.     But  upon  the  aimv   , 
Agesilaus  (and  doubtless  upon  the   Lacedamonians  at  he  me)  it  fell 
hke  a  sudden   thunderbolt,  causing  the  strongest  manifestati(  n.  of 
sorrow  and  sympathy.     To  these  Inanifestations  there  w',s  onlv  om- 

nnfi!  {""V  '^  /^^^''''''  ^^'^^^l'^''-^'  o^-  ^^ons  of  the  slain  ^^arriors;•  who 
not  on  >  showed  no  sorrow,  but  strutted  about  publicly  with  (Lecr- 
lul  and  triumphant  countenances,  like  victorious  AthletVs.  We  shall 
Tina  the  like  phenomenon  at  Sparta  a  few  years  subsequently  alicr 
the  far  more  terrible  defeat  at  Leuktra;  the  lelatives  of  ?he  slam  w  re 

^uir^f  -^  ^t'^^'T^^'^'^  ""^  ^^'"^  survivors,  downcast  and  moriified;  a 
fact  strikingly  characteristic  of  the  intense  mental  effect  of  ihc 
bpartan  training  and  of  the  peculiar  associations  which  it  generated. 
Sivinf '  7^^^^^^^"^^  howMerrible  was  the  contemi)t  which  awaited  a 
bp.ir  an  who  survived  defeat,  when  we  find  fathers  pc;sitively  lejoic- 
mg  that  their  sons  had  escaped  such  tr(  atment  by  death  " 
the  Th  ?i\r^  Agcsilaus  requited  for  his  supercilious  insult  toward 
th^TpuWn'T^;i  ^^?'^"  ^'"^  "^  ^'''^  consented  to  see  them,  alKr 
not  T^l!  ^^''^^  ^\'''  ^^"'  '^"^^^  completely  altered.  They  said 
not  a  Mord  about  peace,  but  merely  asked  permission  topass  thron-h 

our'rrn  rr -V  '^-^  'Y''  ^^"".^O-men  in  Corinth.  "  f  understand 
uZl  nfT  ^f-'^  Agesilaus,  smiling)_you  want  to  witness  ihe  tri- 
m^^  d  rwm  t  'T^''  ^">^^  '^'"  '''^''f  '^  ''  ^'^^^h.  CVme  along  with 
JS!^  t  ''^  ^^''''^'  >'''''•       Accordingly,  on  the  next  day   he  Siused 

LatSof^orr^Vf^"^^'^;'^^^  ''''''-'''''^  ^'^-^  nimvup^lothev^r? 
Km  '  ? .  ^f '°^^'-^^^'fy'»g  those  within  to  come  out  and  fight.  The 
laud.^  had  been  so  ravaged,  that  there  remained  little  to  desfioy.    Eut 


wherever  there  were  any  fruit-trees  yet  standing,  the  Lacedgemomaris 
now  cut  them  down.  Iphikrates  was  tpo  prudent  to  compromise  his 
recent  advantage  by  hazarding  a  second  battle;  so  tliat^Agesilaus  had 
only  the  satisfaction  of  showing  that  he  was  master  of  the  held  and 
ilicu  retired  to  encamp  at  Leclueum;  from  whence  he  sent  back  the 
Theban  envoys  by  sea  to  Kreusis.  Having  then  left  a  fresh  mora  or 
division  at  Lechaum,  in  place  of  that  which  had  been  defeated,  he 
marched  back  to  Sparta.  But  the  circumstances  ot  the  march  be- 
traved  his  real  feelings,  thinly  disguised  by  the  recent  bravado  of 
raarchin<-  up  to  the  nates  of  Corinth.  He  feared  to  expose  his  Lace- 
diximonian  troops  even  to  the  view  of  those  allies  through  whose  ter- 
ritory he  was  to  pass;  so  well  was  he  aware  that  the  latter  (especia  ly 
the  Mantineians)  would  manifest  their  satisfaction  at  the  recent  de- 
frit  \ccordin«»-ly  he  commenced  his  day's  march  before  dawn,  and 
did  not  halt  foiMhe  ni-ht  till  after  dark;  at  Mantineia  he  not  only 
did  not  halt  at  all,  but  passed  by,  outside  of  the  walls,  before  day 
liid  broken  There  cannot  be  a  more  convincing  pro()t  ot  the  real 
dispositions  of  the  allies  toward  Sparta,  and  of  the  sentunent  ot  com- 
Dulsion  which  dictated  their  continued  adherence;  a  tact  which  we 
shall  see  abundantly  illustrated  as  we  advance  in  the  stream  of  the 

' Tluf retirement  of  A<'-esilaus  was  the  signal  for  renew^ed  enterprise 
on  the  part  of  Iphikrafes;  who  retook  Sidus  and  Krommycm,  which 
had  been  irarrisoncd  by  Praxitas— as  well  as  Peiiieum  aiul  (Lnoe. 
which  had  i)een  left  under  occupation  by  Agesihius.     Corinth  was 
thus  cleared  of  enemies  on  its  eastern  and  north-eastern  sides.     And 
thou-h  the  Lacedajmonians  still  carried  on  a  desultory  warfare  from 
Leehleura,  vet  such  was  the  terror  impressed  by  the    ate  destruction 
of  their  moVa,  that  the  Corinthian  exiles  at  Sikyon  did  not  venture  to 
march  by  land  from  that  place  to  Leclueum,  under  the  walls  of 
Corinth-but  communicated  with  Lechaium  only  by  sea.     In  truth 
we  hear  of  no  further  serious  military  operations  undertaken  by 
Sparta  anainst  Corinth,  before  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.     And  the 
place  became  so  secure,  that  the  Corinthian  leaders  and  their  Ar-eian 
allies  were  glad  to  dispense  with  the  presence  of  Iphikrates^^    14iat 
otlieer  had  gained  so  much  glory  by  his  recent  successes,  which  the 
Athenian  omtors  even  in  the  next  generation  never  ceased  to  extol, 
that  his  temper,   naturally  haughty,   became  domineering;  and  he 
tried  to   procure,  either  for  Athens  or  for  himself,  the  '"^'^tery  of 
(•orinth--putting  to  death  some  of  the  philo-Argeian  leaders.     We 
know  these  circumstances  only  by  brief  and  meager  allusion;  but 
they  caused  the  Athenians  to  recall  Iphikrateg  with  a  large  portion 
of  his  peltasts,  and  to  send  Chabrias  to  Corinth  in  his  place 

It  was  either  in  the  ensuimr  summer-or  perhaps  immediately  after- 
ward during  the  same  summer,  390  B.(^-that  Agesilaus  undertook 
an  expedition  into  Akarnania,  at  the  instance  or  the  Achseans,  who 
threatened  if  this  were  not  done,  to  forsake  the  Lacedsemonian  alli- 


698 


AFTEU  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


AGESIPOLIS  CONSULTS  THE  ORACLES. 


699 


ance.  Tliey  had  acquired  possession  of  tlic  iEtoliau  district  of  Kuh- 
don,  had  brought  tlie  neigliboring  vilhigcrs  imo  a  city  ic^ideiHc,  {uid 
jrarrisoned  it  as  a  depeudence  of  the  Aclur;in  ( onfcdtiac y.  But  die 
Akarnanians—allies  of  Alliens  as  wvW  as  'Ihchcs,  and  aided  by  tm 
Athenian  squaciron  at  G^niada^— attacked  tin  m  there,  y.iobnbly  ;U  the 
invitation  of  a  portion  of  tlie  inliabilants,  and  pressed  thim  K)  h;ird, 
that  thev  emphjycd  the  most  urgent  instances  to  obtain  aid  irem 
Sparta.  ' Aixesiluis  crossed  the  Gulf  at  Rhii:n»  with  a  considerable 
force  of  Sj^artans  and  allies,  and  the  full  muster  of  the  Achaaiis. 
On  his  arrival,  the  Akarnanians  all  took  refiige  in  their  cities,  Kiid- 
inir  their  cattle  up  into  the  interior  highlands,  to  the  borders  of  a 
remote  lake.  Agesilaus,  having  sent  to  Slratus  to  rcquiie  thtm  not 
merely  to  forbear  hostilities  against  the  Achaans,  but  lo  relinquish 
their  alliance  with  Athens  ancTThebcs,  and  to  biccme  allies  of  ^paita 
—found  his  demands  resisted,  and  ]ieg:;n  to  lay  waste  the  country. 
Two  or  three  days  of  operations  designedly  slack,  were  eini»k)ytd  to 
lull  the  Akarnanians  into  security;  after  >vhi(h,  by  a  rapid  forced 
march  Auesilaus  suddenly  surprised  the  lenu  le  spot  in  which  Uuir 
cattle  murshives  had  been  deposited  for  sale  ty.  He  spent  a  diiy  here 
to  sell  this  bootv;  merchants  i)r(>bal)ly  iiccom}  Jinviughis  army.  But 
he  had  considerable  dilliculty  in  liis  return  ujarch,  from  the  narrow 
paths  and  hidi  mountains  through  which  h.e  hnd  to  thread  his  way. 
By  a  series  ^)f  brave  and  well  combined  Ijill-movements— wliieh 
probably  reminded  Xenophon  of  his  own  operations  against  the  Kar- 
duchiaus  in  the  retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand— he  defeated  and  dis- 
persed the  Akarnanians.  though  not  without  suffering  considerably 
from  the  excellence  of  their  light  troops.  Yet  he  was  not  succes.sful 
in  his  attack  upon  anv  one  of  their  cities,  nor  would  he  consent  to 
prolonij  the  war  until  seed-time,  notwithstanding  taiiust  solicitation 
from  the  Acha'ans.  whom  he  ])acitied  by  engaging  to  leturn  the  next 
pprin^--  He  was  indeed  in  a  dithcult  and  dangerous  country,  had  not 
iii^  rc-treat  been  facilitated  bv  the  compliance  of  the  ^:tolians;  who 
cak-ulated  (thom-h  vainly)  on  obtaining  from  him  the  recovery  of 
Naupaktus,  then  held  (as  well  as  Kalydon)  1  y  the  Acha-ans.  Partial 
as  the  success  of  this  exoedition  had  been,  however,  it  inflicted  suf- 
ficient damasre  on  the  Akarnanians  to  accomi)lish  its  purpose.  Ou 
•  learning  that  it  was  about  to  be  repeated  in  the  ensuing  sprmg,  they 
sent  envoys  to  Sparta  to  solicit  peace;  consenting  to  abstain  Irc.m 
hostilities 'against  the  Achaians,  and  to  enroll  themselves  as  members 
of  the  Lacediiemonian  confederacy. 

It  was  in  this  same  year  that  the  Spartan  authorities  resolvecl  on 
an  expedition  against  Arsjos,  of  which  Agesi polls,  the  other  kiii.ir; 
took  the  command.  Havmg  found  the  border  sacrifices  favorable, 
and  crossed  the  frontier,  he  sent  forward  his  army  to  Phlius,  wlure 
the  Peloponnesian  allies  were  ordered  to  assemble;  but  he  himselt 
first  turned  aside  lo  Olymnia,  to  consult  the  oracle  of  Zeus. 

It  had  been  the  practice  of  the  Argeians,  seemingly  ou  more  than 


one  previous  occasion,  when  an  invading  Lacedaemonian  army  was 
approaching  their  territory,  to  meet  them  by  a  soh'uin  message,  inti- 
mating that  it  was  the  time  of  some  festival  (the  Kaineian  or  other) 
lidd  sacred  by  both  parties,  and  warning  them  not  to  violate  the 
frontier  durimr  the  holy  truce.     This  w^;is  in  point  of  fact  nothing 
hotter  than  a  fruud;  for  the  notice  was  sent,  not  at  the  moment  when 
tiic  Karneian  festival  (or  other,  as  the  case  might  be)  ought  to  come 
on  according  to  the  due  course  of  seasons,  but  at  any  time  when  it 
mi-dit  serve^the  purpose  of  arresting  aLacedamonian  invasion.     But 
tliouudi  the  du})licitv  of  the  Argeians  was  thus  manifest,  so  stnmg 
wore'^the  pious  scruVles  of  the  Sparlan  king,  that  he  could  hardly 
make  up  his  mind  to  disregard  the  warning.     Moreover,  in  the  exist- 
in.r  confusion  of  the  calendar,  there  was  always  room  for  some  uncer- 
tafaty  as  to  the  question,  which  was  the  true  Karneian  moon;  no 
Dorian  state  having  anv  right  to  fix  it  imperatively  for  the  others,  as 
thuEleians  lixed  the  Olympic  truce,  and  the  Corinthians  the  Isthmian. 
It  was  with  a  view  to  satisfy  his  conscience  on  this  subject  that 
Airesipolis  now  went  to  Olympia,  and  put  the  cpiestion  to  the  oracle 
of  Zeus;  whether  he  miuht'with  a  safe  religious  conscience  refuse  to 
accept  the  holv  truce,  if  the  Argeians  should  now  tender  it.     The 
oracle,  hai)iluaily  dexterous  in  meeting  a  si)eciflc  question  with  a 
L'oneral  reply,  informed  him  that  he  might  with  a  safe  conscience 
decline  a  truce  demanded  wrongfully  and  for  underhand  purposes. 
This  was  accej)ted  by  zVgesipolis  as  a  satisfactory  allirmative.     Never- 
tlicless,  to  make  assurance  doubly  sure,  he  went  directly  forward  to 
Delphi  to  put  the  same  question  to  Ai)ollo.     As  it  Avould  have  been 
truly  embarrassing,  however,  if  the  two  holy  replies  had  turned  out 
such  as  to  contradic;t  each  other,  he  availeil  hims(df  of  the  pra'judi- 
ciinn  whic'h  he  had  alieady  received  at  Olympia,  and  submilled  the 
(lucstiou  to  Apollo  at  Delplii  in  this  form—  'Is  thine  opinion  on  the 
que^ion  of  the  holy  truce  the  same  as  that  of  thy  father  (Zeus)?" 
"  Most  decidedly  the  same, "  replied  the  god.     Such  double  warranty, 
tliough  the  appeal  was  so  drawn  up  as  sc;arcely  to  leave  to  Apollo 
freedom  of  speech,  enabled  Agesi  polls  to  return  with  full  confidence 
to  Plilius.  where  his  army  was  already  mustered:   and   to   march 
immediately  into  the  Arg(;ian  territory  by  the  road  of  Nemea.     Being 
met  on  the  ^frontier  by  two  heralds  with  wreaths  and  in  solemn  attire, 
who  warned  him  that' it  was  a  season  of  holy  truce,  he  informed  them 
that  the  gods  authorized  his  disobedience  to  their  summons,  and 
marched  on  into  the  Arueian  plain. 

It  hapi>ened  that  on'the  first  evening  after  he  had  crossed  the 
border,  the  supper  and  the  consequent  libation  having  been  just  con- 
cluded, an  earthquake  occurred;  or,  to  translate  the  Greek  phrase, 
"the  god  (Poseidon)  shook."  To  all  Greeks,  and  to  Lacedamonians 
especially,  this  was  a  sol(;mn  event,  and  the  personal  companions  of 
Ai^esipoHs  immediately  began  to  sing  the  paan  in  honor  of  Poseidc^n; 
the  general  impression  among  the  soldiers  being  that  he  would  give 


700 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE   WALLS. 


HOSTILITY  OF  SPARTA. 


701 


orders  for  quitting  the  territory  immediately,  as  Agis  had  acted  in 
the  inv;\sion  of  El  is  a  few  years  before.  Perhaps  Agesipohs  would 
have  done  the  same  here,  construing  the  eartluiuake  as  a  warning 
that  he  had  done  wrong  in  neglecting  the  summons  of  the  heralds- 
had  he  not  been  fortilied  by  the  recent  oracles.  He  now  replied  that 
if  the  earthquake  had  occurred  before  he  crossed  the  frontier,  la 
should  have  considered  it  as  a  prohibition;  but  as  it  cnme  after  liis 
crossiiiir  he  looked  upon  it  as  an  encouragement  to  go  forward. 

So  fully  had  the  Argeians  counted  on  the  success  of  their  warning 
transmitted  by  the  heralds,  that  they  had  made  little  preparation  for 
defense.  Their  dismay  and  confusion  were  very  great:  their  prop- 
erty was  still  outlying,  uot  yet  removed  into  seciu-e  places,  so  that 
Airesipolis  foiuul  much  both  to  destroy  and  to  appropriate.  He 
carried  his  ravages  even  to  the  gates  of  the  city,  piquing  himself  on 
advancing  a  little  farther  than  Agesilaus  had  gone  in  his  invasion  two 
years  before.  He  was  at  last  driven  to  retreat  by  the  terror  of  a  flash 
of  lightning  in  his  camp,  which  killed  several  persons.  And  a  proj- 
ect  which  he  had  formed  of  erecting  a  permanent  fort  on  the  Argeian 
frontier,  was  abandoned  in  consequence  of  unfavorable  sacritices. 

Besides  these  transactions  in  and  near  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  the 
•war  between  Sparta  and  her  enennes  was  prosecuted  during  the  saDie 
years  both  in  the  islands  and  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minoi ;  though  our 
information  is  so  imperfect  that  we  can  scarcely  trace  the  thread  of 
events.  The  defeat  near  Knidus  (3U4  B.C.)— the  triumphant  mari- 
time force  of  Pharnabazus  and  Konon  at  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth  in 
the  ensuing  year  (393  B.C.)— the  restoration  of  the  Athenian  Long 
Walls  and  fortified  port— and  the  activity  of  Konon  with  the  flert 
among  the  islands — so  alarmed  the  Spartans  with  the  id{  a  of  a  si  cond 
Athenian  maritime  empire  that  they  nuide  every  effort  to  detach  the 
Persian  force  from  the  side  of  their  enennes. 

The  Spartan  Antalkidas.  a  dexterous,  winning,  and  artfid  man, 
not  unlike  Lysander,  was  sent  as  envoy  to  Tiril)azus  (392  B.C.);  whom 
we  now  find' as  satrap  of  Ionia  in  the  room  of  'I'ilhiaustes,  after  hav- 
,ing  been  satrap  of  Armenia  during  the  retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand. 
[As  Tiribazus  was  newly  arrived  in  Asia  Minor,  he  had  not  acquirid 
that  personal  enmitv  against  the  Spartans,  which  the  active  hostilities 
of  Derkvllidasand  Agesilaus  had  "insj)ired  to  Pharnabazus  and  other 
Persians*.  ;\Ioreover "jealousy  between  neighboring  satraps  was  an 
ordinary  feeling,  which  Anlalkiilas  now  hoped  to  turn  to  the  advan- 
tage of  Sparta."  To  counteract  his  projects  envoys  were  also  sent  to 
Tiribazus,  by  the  confederate  enendes  of  Spart.i— Athens,  Thebes, 
Corinth,  and  Argos:  and  Konon,  as  the  envoy  of  Athens,  was  incau- 
tiously dispatched  among  the  number.  On  the  part  of  Sparta, 
Antalkidas  offered,  first,  to  abandon  to  the  King  of  Persia  all  the 
Greeks  on  the  continent  of  Asia;  next,  as  to  all  the  other  Greeks, 
insular  as  well  as  continental,  he  required  nothing  more  than  absolute 
autonomy  for  each  separate  city,  great  and  small.    The  Persum  King 


(he  said)  could  neither  desire  anything  more  for  liimself,  nor  have 
.nv  motive  for  continuing  the  war  against  Sparta,  when  he  should 
once  be  placed  in  pos.session  of  all  the  towns  on  the  Asiatic  coast  and 
when  he  should  find  both  Sparta  and  Athens  rendered  incapable  of 
rnnovino-  him  through  the  autonomy  and  disunion  of  the  Hellenic 
world      But  to  neither  of  the  two  propositions  of  Antalkidas  ^voul( 
Athens  Thebes,  or  Argos.  accede.     As  to  the  first,  they  repudiated 
the  disgrace  of  thus  formally  abandoning  the  Asiatic  Greeks;  as    o 
he  secSnd  proposition,  guaranteeing  autonomy  to  every  distmct  city 
0  Greece   they  would  admit  it  only  under  special  reserves  which  it 
d  d  not  suit  tl/e  purpose  of  Antalkidas  to  grant      In  truth  the  propo- 
rtion went  to  break  up  (and  was  framed  with  that  view)  both  the 
Cotian  confederacy  under  the  presidency  of  Thebes,  and  the  union 
Mvveen  Argos  and   Corinth;  while  it  also  deprived  Athens  of  the 
chance  of  recovering  Lemnos,  Imbros,  and  Skyros-islands  which 
had  been  possessed  and  recolonized  by  her  since  the  first  commence- 
ment of  the  confederacy  of  Delos;  indeed  the  two  former,  even  from 
the  time  of  Miltiades  the  conqueror  of  Marathon 

Here  commences  a  new  era  in  the  policy  of  Sparta.  That  she 
should  abneo-ate  all  pretension  to  maritime  empire,  is  no  way  dilticuit 
to  undeS^^^  that  it  had  already  been  irrevocably  overthrown 

bv  the  defeat  of  Knidus.  Nor  can  we  wonder  that  she  should 
abandon  the  Greeks  on  the  Asiatic  continent  to  Persian  sway;  since 
tl  h  was  nothing  more  than  she  had  already  consented  o  do  m  her 
conventions  wiUi  Tissaphernes  and  Cyrus  durin-  the  latter  years  of 
Jhe  Peloponnesian  War-and  consented,  let  us  add,  not  under  any  of 
that  strino-eut  necessity  which  at  the  same  time  pressed  upon  Athens, 
but  simply  with  a  view  to  the  maximum  of  victory  over  an  enemy 
a  leadVeufeebled.  The  events  which  followed  the  close  of  that  war 
ecoum^^^^^  "^^^^ed  induced  her  to  alter  her 

I  tmidnation,  and  again  to  espouse  their  cause.     But  the  real  novelty 
now  first  exhibited  u!  her  policy  is  the  full  development  of  wha^^ 
before  existed  in  manifest  tendency— hostility  against  all  the  paitial 
land-confederacies  of  Greece,  disguised  under  the  Pl^^^f^^^^^^J^^f^jJ 
of  universal  autonomy  for  every  town,  great  or  small.     Hoxv   this 
autonomy  was  const.-.ed  and  carried  into  act   we  shall  f  e  h^mnfte^^^ 
at  present  we  have  only  to  note  the  first  proclamation  of  it  by  Antal- 
kidas in  the  name  of  Sparta.  .         ,i  •        f^r.^  *>,« 
On  this  occasion,  indeed,  his  mission  came  to  nothing,  ^^omjhe 
peremptory  opposition  of  Athens  and  the  others.     But  he  ^'^'^J^^^^^^^^ 
Kite  enou'di  to  srain  theapprohalion  and  confidence  of  lirdjazus;  who 
saw  so  cl?arly  how  much  both  propositions  tended  to  P^'^^f^tejli^ 
interests  and  power  of  Persia,  that  he  resolved  to  go  "P^"  f  ^^^^i,!^ 
court    and   i/revail   on  Artaxerxes  to   act   in   concert   ^Mth  hpai  ... 

ZiVh  iiotSg  to  support  Antalkidas  ^jV' Mbe'S^^^^^^^^ 
o-ave  him  money  to  re  enforce  the  Sp.artan  fleet.   He  at  the  same  time 
?;^dered   to   Sparta  the  far   more  signal  service  of  arresting  and 


702 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


detainini^  Konon,  prctendiup:  tliat  the  latter  was  acting  contrary  to 
tlie  interests  of  the  kini:.  This  arrest  was  a  i^ross  act  of  pertidy, 
^ince  Konon  not  only  commanded  respect  in  his  ciiaracter  of  envoy 
— but  had  been  acting  willi  the  full  contidence,  and  jihnost  under  the 
oiders,  of  Pharnabazus.  But  the  removal  of  an  othcer  of  so  much 
ability — the  only  man  who  possessed  the  conlidence  of  Pharnabazus 
— was  the  most  fatal  of  all  inipediments  to  the  naval  renovation  of 
Athens.  It  was  fortunate  that  Konon  had  had  time  to  rebuild  the  Lou!^ 
AV'alis,  before  Ids  means  of  action  were  thus  abrui)tiy  intercepted. 
IJespecling-  his  subsequent  fate,  there  exist  contradictory  stories. 
According  to  one.  he  was  put  to  death  by  the  Persians  in  prison; 
accor  ling  to  another,  he  found  means  to  es(ape  and  again  took 
refuge  with  Evagoras  in  Cyprus,  in  whieli  island  he  afterward  died 
of  sickness.  The  latter  story  appears  undoubtedly  to  be  the  true  one. 
But  it  is  certain  that  he  never  afterward  had  the  means  of  perform- 
ing any  public  service,  and  that  his  career  was  cut  short  by  this 
treacherous  detention,  just  ;it  the  moment  when  its  promise  was  the 
most  splendid  for  his  country. 

Tiribazus,  on  going  up  to  the  Persian  court,  seems  to  have  been 
detained  tliere  for  the  purpose  of  concerting  measures  against  Evag- 
oras, prince  of  ►Salands  in  Cyprus,  whose  revolt  from  Persia  was  on 
the  point  of  breaking  out.  But  the  Persian  court  could  not  yet  be 
j)revailed  u])on  to  show  any  countenance  to  the  pro])o.sitions  of 
{Sparta  or  of  Antalkidas.  On  the  contrary,  Struthas.  who  was  sent 
d<nvn  to  Ionia  as  temporary  substitute  for  Tiribazus,  full  of  anxiety 
to  avenge  the  ravages  of  Agesilaus,  acted  with  vigorous  hostility 
against  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  manifested  friendly  dispositions 
toward  Alliens. 

Tiiind)ron  (of  whom  we  have  before  heard  as  first  taking  the  coin- 
man<l  of  the  (yyreian  army  in  Asia  Minor,  after  their  return  from 
''J'hrace)  received  orders  again  to  act  as  head  of  the  Lacedaino- 
idan  forces  in  Asia  against  Slruthas.  The  new  commander,  with  iin 
army  estimated  by  Diodorus  at  .S.OOO  men,  marched  from  Ephesus 
into  the  interior,  and  began  his  devastation  of  the  territory  deixndeiit 
on  I\'rshi,  But  his  previous  command,  though  he  was  persoimlly 
amiable,  had  l)een  irregular  and  disorderly,  and  it  was  soon  ob^(  rved 
that  the  same  defects  were  now  yet  more  prominent,  aggravated  by 
too  liberal  indulgence  in  convivial  plensures.  Aware  of  his  rash,  con- 
temptuous, and  improvitlent  mo<le  of  attack.  Struthas  laid  a  snare 
for  him  by  sending  a  detachment  of  cavnlry  to  menace  the  camp, 
just  when  Thind>ron  had  conduded  his  morning  meal  in  company 
with  the  tlute-player  Thersander — the  latter  not  merely  an  excellent 
nuisieian.  but  j)ossessed  of  a  full  measure  of  Spartan  courage. 
Starting  from  his  tent  at  the  news,  Thimbron  with  Theisandei", 
waited  only  to  collect  the  few  troojvs  immediately  at  hand,  without 
even  leaving  any  orders  for  the  remainder,  and  li::sfened  to  lepel  11h^ 
assailants;  who  gave  way   easily,  and  seduced   him   into  a  pursuit. 


DIPIIRIDAS  SENT  TO  SUCCEED  THIMBRON.      703 

Presently  Struthas  himself,  appearing  with  a  numerous  and  well- 
array  cd  body  of  cavalry,  charged  with  vigor  the  disorderly  detacli- 
nK'Ut  of  Tliind)ron.  Both  that  general  and  Thersander,  bravely 
lighting,  fell  among  the  first;  while  the  army,  deprived  of  their  coni- 
n°inder,  as  well  as  ill-prepared  for  a  battle,  made  but  an  ineffective 
resistance.  They  were  broken,  warndy  pursued,  and  the  greater 
number  slain.  \  few  v.dio  contrived  to  escape  the  active  Persian 
cavalrv,  found  shelter  in  the  neighboring  cities. 

This  victory  of  Struthas,  gained  by  the  Persian  cavalry,  displays 
a  degree  of  vigor  and  ability  which,  fortunately  for  the  Greeks,  was 
rarefy -seen  in  Persian  opeiations.  Our  scanty  information  does  not 
enable  us  to  trace  its  conscipiences.  We  find  Diphridas  sent  out  soon 
after  by  the  Lacedamonians,  along  with  the  adndral  Ekdikus,  as  suc- 
cessor of  Thimbron,  to  bring  together  the  remnant  of  the  defeated 
army,  and  to  protect  those  cities  which  had  contributed  to  form  it. 
Dipiu-idas— a  man  with  all  the  popular  qualities  of  his  predecessor, 
but  a  better  and  more  careful  otficer — is  said  to  have  succeeded  to 
some  extent  in  this  difficult  mission.  Being  fortunate  enough  to 
take  captive  the  son-in-law  of  Slruthas  with  his  wife  (as  Xenophon 
had  captured  Asidates),  he  obtained  a  sutficiently  large  ransom  to 
enable  him  to  pay  his  troops  for  some  time.  But  it  is  evident  that 
his  achievements  Were  not(-()iisideral)le.  and  that  the  Ionian  Greeks 
on  the  continent  are  now^  left  to  make  good  their  position,  as  they 
can,  against  the  satrap  at  Sard  is. 

The  forces  of  Sparta  were  much  required  at  Rhodes:  which  island 
(as  has  been  mentioned  already)  had  revolted  from  Sparta  about  five 
years  before  (a  few  months  anterior  to  the  battle  of  Knidus),  dis- 
possessed the  Lysandrian  oligtu-chy,  and  established  a  democratical 
government.  But  since  that  period,  an  opposition-party  in  the 
island  had  gradually  risen  up,  ac(iuired  strength,  and  come  into  cor- 
respondence with  the  oligarchical  exiles;  who  on  their  side  warmly 
solicited  aid  from  Sparta,  representing  that  Rhodes  would  otherwise 
become  thoroughly  dependent  on  Athens.  Accordingly  the  Lacedae- 
monians sent  eight  triremes  across  the  iEgean  under  the  command  of 
Ekdikus;  the  first  of  their  ships  of  war  which  had  crossed  since  the 
defeat  of  Knidus.  Though  the  Perso-Athenian  naval  force  in  the 
^Egean  had  been  either  dismissed  or  paralyzed  since  the  seizure  of 
Konou,  yet  the  Rho  liau  government  possessed  a  fleet  of  about 
twenty  trirenuis,  besides  considerable  force  of  other  kinds;  so  that 
Ekdikus  cotdd  not  even  land  on  the  island,  but  was  compelled  to 
halt  at  Knidus.  Fortunately,  Teleutias  the  LacedcCmonian  was  now 
in  the  Corinthian  gulf  with  a  fleet  of  twelve  triremes,  which  were  no 
longer  required  there;  since  Agesilaus  and  he  had  captured  Leelueum 
a  few  mouths  before,  and  tlestroyed  the  maritime  force  of  the  Corin- 
thians in  those  waters.  He  was  now^  directed  to  sail  with  his  squad- 
ron out  of  the  Corinthian  gulf  across  to  Asia,  to  supersede  Ekdikus, 
and  take  the  command  of  the  whole  fleet  for  operations  off  Rhodes. 


704 


AFTEIl  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


VICTORY  OF  THRASYBULUS. 


705 


On  passing  by  Samos,  lie  persuaded  the  inhabitants  to  embrace  the 
cause  of  Sparta,  an^l  to  furnish  him  willi  a  few  ships;  after  whieh  he 
went  onward  to  Knidus,  where,  superseding  Ekdikus,  he  found  him- 
self at  the  liead  of  twenty-seven  triremes.  In  liis  way  from  Kni(his 
to  Rhodes,  he  accidentally  fell  in  with  the  Athenian  admiral  PJiilok- 
rates,  conducting  ten  triremes  to  Cyprus  to  the  aid  of  Evagoras  in 
his  struggle  against  the  Persians,  lie  was  fortifnate  enough  to  carry 
them  a.s  prisoners  into  Knidus,  where  he  sold  the  whole  booty,  and 
then  proceeded  with  his  tleet,  thus  augmented  to  thirty-seven  sail,  to 
Rhodes.  Here  he  established  a  fortified  post,  enabling  the  oligar- 
chical party  to  carry  on  an  active  civil  war.  But  he  was  defeated  in 
battle — his  enemies  being  decidedly  the  stronger  force  in  the  island, 
and  masters  of  all  the  cities. 

The  alliance  wiih  Evagoras  of  Cyprus,  in  his  contention  .against 
Artaxerxes,  was  at  this  moment  an  unfortunate  and  perplexing  cir- 
cumstance for  Athens,  since  she  was  relying  upon  Persian  aid  against 
Sparta, and  since  Sparta  was  bidding  against  her  for  it.  But  the  alliance 
'was  one  winch  she  could  not  lightly  throw  off.  For  Evagoras  had  not 
only  harbored  Konon  with  the  remnant  of  the  Athenian  tleet  after  the 
disaster  of  ^gospotami,  but  had  earned  a  grant  of  citizenshij)  and 
the  honor  of  a  statue  at  Athens,  as  a  strenuous  auxiliary  in  procuring 
that  Persian  aid  which  gained  the  battle  of  Knidus,  and  as  a  personal 
combatant  in  that  battle,  before  the  commencement  of  his  dissension 
with  Artaxerxes.  It  would  have  been  every  way  advantagec^us  to 
Athens  at  this  moment  to  decline  assisting  Evagoras.  since  (not  to 
mention  the  probability  of  offending  the  Persian  court)  she  had. more 
than  enough  to  employ  all  her  maritime  force  nearer  home  and  for 
purposes  more  essential  to  herself.  Yet  in  spite  of  these  ver}' serious 
considerations  of  prudence,  the  paramount  feelings  of  prior  obliga- 
tion and  gratitude,  enforced  by  intluential  citizens  who  had  formed 
connections  in  Cj'prus,  determined  the  Athenians  to  identify  them- 
selves with  his  gallant  struggles  (of  which  I  shall  speak  more  fully 
presently).  So  little  was  fickleness,  or  instability,  or  the  easy  obli- 
vion of  past  feelings,  a  part  of  their  real  nature — though  historians 
have  commonly  deiumnced  it  as  among  their  prominent  qualities. 

The  ca})ture  of  their  squadron  under  Philokrates,  however,  and 
the  consequent  increase  of  the  Laceda?monian  naval  force  at  Rhodes, 
compelled  the  Athenians  to  postpone  further  aid  to  Evagoras,  and  to 
arm  fort v  triremes  under  Thrasvbulus  for  the  Asiatic  coast;  noincon- 
siderable  effort,  when  we  recollect  that  four  years  before,  there  was 
scarcely  a  single  trireme  in  Peir*us.  and  not  even  a  wall  of  defense 
around*  the  place.  Thouuh  sent  immediatelv  for  the  assistance  of 
Rhodes,  Thrasybulus  judged  it  expedient  to  go  first  to  the  Hellespont; 
probably  from  extreme  want  of  money  to  pay  his  n»en.  Derkyllidas 
was  still  in  occupation  of  Abydos,  yel  there  was  no  Lacedaemonian 
fleet  in  the  strait:  so  that  Thrasybulus  was  enabled  to  extend  the  alli- 
ances of  Athens  both  on  the  European  and  the  Asiatic  side— the  latter 


being  under  the  friendly  satrap  Pharuabazus.  Reconciling  the  two 
Thnician  princes,  Seuthes  and  Amadokus,  whom  he  found  at  war, 
lie  brought  both  of  them  into  amicable  relations  with  Athens,  and 
then  moved  forward  to  Byzantium.  That  city  was  already  in  alli- 
ance with  Athens;  but  on  the  arrival  of  Thrasybulus,  the  alliance  was 
still  further  cemented  by  the  change  of  its  government  into  a  democ- 
racy. Having  established  friendship  vrith  the  opposite  city  of  Chal- 
kedon,  and  being  thus  master  of  the  Bosporus,  he  sold  the  tithe  of 
the  commercial  ships  sailing  out  of  the  Euxine;  leaving  doubtless  an 
adequate  force  to  exact  it.  This  was  a  striking  evidence  of  revived 
Athenian  maritime  power,  Mhich  seems  also  to  have  been  now 
extended  more  or  less  to  Samothrace,  Thasus,  and  the  coast  of 
Thrace. 

From  Byzantium  Thrasybulus  sailed  to  Mitylene,  which  was 
already  in  friendship  with  Athens;  though  Methymna  and  the  other 
cities  in  the  island  were  still  maintained  by  a  force  under  the  Lace- 
daemonian harmost  Therimachvis,  With  the  aid  of  the  Mitylenaeans, 
and  of  the  exiles  from  other  Lesbian  cities,  Thrasybulus  marched  to 
the  borders  of  Methymna,  where  he  was  met  by  Therimachus;  who 
had  also  brought  together  his  utmost  force,  but  was  now  completely 
defeated  and  slain.  The  Athenians  thus  became  masters  of  Antissa 
and  Eresus,  where  they  were  enabled  to  levy  a  valuable  contribution, 
as  well  as  to  plunder  the  refractory  territory  of  Methymna.  Never- 
theless Thrasybulus,  in  spite  of  farther  help  from  Chios  and  Mity- 
lene, still  thought  himself  not  in  a  situation  to  go  to  Rhodes  with 
advantage.  Perhaps  he  was  not  sure  of  pay  in  advance,  and  the 
presence  of  unpaid  troops  in  an  exhausted  island  might  be  a  doubt- 
ful benefit.  Accordingly,  he  sailed  from  Lesbos  along  the  western 
and  southern  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  levying  contributions  at  Halikar- 
uassus  and  other  places,  until  he  came  to  Aspendus  in  Pamphylia; 
where  he  also  obtained  money  and  was  about  to  depart  with  it,  when 
some  misdeeds  committed  by  his  soldiei-s  so  exasperated  the  inhabi- 
tants that  they  attacked  him  by  night  unprepared  in  his  tent,  and 
slew  him. 

Thus  perished  the  citizen  to  whom,  more  than  to  anj'^  one  else, 
Athens  owed  not  only  her  renovattsd  democracy,  but  its  wise,  gener- 
ous, and  harmonious  working,  after  renovation.  Even  the  philo- 
Laeonian  and  oligarchical  Xenophon  bestows  upon  him  a  marked 
and  unaffected  eulogy.  His  devoted  patriotism  in  commencing  and 
prosecuting  the  struggle  against  the  Thirty,  at  a  time  when  they  not 
only  were  at  the  height  of  their  power,  but  had  plausible  grouiid  for 
calculating  on  the  full  auxiliary  strength  of  Sparta,  deserves  high 
admiration.  But  the  feature  which  stands  yet  more  eminent  in  his 
character — a  feature  infinitely  rare  in  the  Grecian  character  generally 
—is,  that  the  energy  of  a  successful  leader  was  combined  with  com- 
plete absence  both  of  vindictive  antipathies  for  the  past  and  of  overl>ear- 
iiig  ambition  for  himself.     Content  to  live  himself  as  a  simple  citizen 

H.  G.  III.  23 


706 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


STRATAGEM  OF  IPHIKRATES. 


707 


under  the  restored  democracy,  he  taught  his  coiintrymrn  to  forgive 
an  oliijarchical  party  from  wlioin  they  liad  sulYcrcd  atrocionsAvionLs, 
and  ijet  the  example  himself  of  acquiescing  in  the  loss  of  his  own 
large  property.  Tlie  generosity  of  such  a  proceeding  ouglit  not  to 
count  for  lees,  because  it  Avas  at  the  same  time  dictated  by  the  hiuh- 
est  political  prudence.  We  lind,  in  an  oration  of  Lysias  agriist 
Ergokles  (a  citizen  who  served  in  tlie  Athenian  tlect  on  this  last  cxpo- 
dilion),  in  whicli  tlie  hitter  is  accused  of  gross  pecidation — in>inua- 
tions  against  Thrasybulus,  of  liaving  countenanced  the  deliiKiiK  iicv, 
though  coupled  with  praise  of  his  general  character.  Even  the  words 
as  they  now  stand  are  so  vague  as  to  carry  little  evidence;  but  ulun 
we  reflect  that  the  oration  was  spoken  after  the  ilealh  of  Tlir:i>y- 
bulus,  tliey  are  entitled  to  no  weight  at  all. 

The  Athenians  sent  Agyrrhius  to  succeed  Tlirasybuhis.  After  the 
death  of  tlie  latter,  we  may  conchide  that  the  fleet  went  to  Rhodes, 
its  original  destination — though  Xenophon  does  not  expressly  say  so; 
the  rather  as  neither  Teleutias  nor  any  suhscqcf  iit  LacedaMiioniiin 
commander  appears  to  have  become  nuister  of  the  island,  in  j-pite  of 
tiie  considerable  force  which  they  had  there  assenibled.  The  Lnce- 
duDmonians,  however,  on  their  side,  beinir  also  much  in  want  of 
money,  Teleutias  was  obliged  (in  the  same  mannei-  as  the  Ailieniniis) 
lo  move  from  island  to  island,  levying  contiibulions  as  he  could. 

When  the  news  of  tlie  successful  i)rocei(lings  of  Tlrasy  hnlus  ;it 
Byzantium  and  the  Hellespont,  again  cstablisliing  atoll  forthe  pn  tit 
of  Athens,  reached  Sparta,  it  excited  >o  mucli  anxiety,  Iliat  Ai!:ixi- 
bius,  having  great  intluence  with  the  Ei>hors  of  the  time,  pre^aiud 
on  them  to  send  liim  out  as  harmost  lo  Ahydos,  in  tlie  room  of  Der- 
kyllidas,  who  had  now  been  in  that  post"  for  several  yt  ars.  IIaviii2; 
been  the  officer  originally  employeil  to  jM-c^cure  the  revolt  of  the  ])li;(e 
from  Athens  (in  4li  B.C.),  Derkyllidas  had  >ince  rendeixd  service  not 
less  essential  in  preserving  it  to  Spnrta,  during  the  exter.sive  dtscr 
tion  which  followed  the  l)attle  of  Knidus.  Hut  it  was  supposed,  tluit 
he  ought  to  have  checked  the  aggressive  plans  of  Thrasybulus;  niorr- 
over  Anaxibius  promised,  if  a  small  force  were  intrusted  to  him,  lo 
put  down  eflfectually  the  newly-revived  Athenian  influence.  He  amis 
presumed  to  know  well  those  regions,  in  which  he  hfid  once  alre;;t;y 
been  admiral,  at  the  moment  when  Xenoi)h()n  and  the  Cy n  inn  anriv 
flrst  returned;  the  harshness,  treachery,  vnd  conuption,  whidi  lie 
displayed  in  his  dealing  witii  that  gallant  body  of  men.  have  ht(  n 
already  recounted  in  a  former  chapter.  AVitli  three  triremes,  artl 
funds  for  the  pay  of  1000  mercenary  ti-oops,  An:ixi])ius  accoidingly 
Avent  to  Abydos.  He  began  his  operaiions  with  eonsiderable  vigoi'.hotli 
against  Athens  and  against  Pharnaba/us.  While  Ik^  armed  a  lainl- 
force,  which  he  employed  in  making  incursions  on  the  ncighhoriuir 
cities  in  the  territory  of  that  satrap— he  at  the  same  lime  re-enfcrc((l 
his  little  squadron  by  three  triremes  out  of  the  liarbor  of  Abydos,  so 
that  he  became  strong  enough  to  seize  the  merchant-vessels  passing 


along  the  Hellespont  to  Athens  or  to  her  allies.  The  force  which 
Thrasybulus  had  left  at  Byzantium  to  secure  the  strait-revenues,  was 
lluis  inadequate  to  its  object  without  farther  addition. 

Fortunately,  Iphikrates  was  at  this  moment  disengaged  at  Athens, 
having  recently  returned  from  Corinth  with  his  body  of  peltasts,  for 
■whom  doubtless  employment  was  wanted.  He  was  accordingly  sent 
with  1200  peltasts  and  eight  triremes,  to  combat  Anaxibius  in  the 
Hellespont:  which  now^  became  again  the  scene  of  conflict,  as  it  had 
been  in  the  latter  years  of  the  Peloponnesian  War;  the  Athenians 
from  the  European  side,  the  Lacedaemonians  from  the  Asiatic.  At 
first  the  waifare  consisted  of  desultory,  privateering,  and  money- 
levviiiii:  excursions  on  both  sides.  But  at  length,  the  Avatchful  iienius 
of  Iphikrates  discovered  opportunity  for  a  successful  stratagem. 
Anaxibius.  having  just  drawn  the  town  v:)f  Antandrusinto  hisalliance, 
had  marched  thither  for  the  purpose  of  leaving  a  garrison  in  it,  with 
his  Laceduimonian  and  mercenary  forces,  as  well  as  200  hoplites  from 
Aliydos  itself.  His  way  lay  across  the  mountainous  region  of  Ida, 
southward  to  the  coast  of  tlie  Gulf  of  Adramytlium.  Accordingly 
Iphikrates,  foreseeing  that  he  Avould  speedily  return,  crossed  over  iii 
the  night  from  the  Chersonese,  and  planted  himself  in  ambush  on 
the  line  of  return  march,  at  a  point  wiiere  it  traversed  the  desert  and 
mountainous  extremities  of  the  Abydene  territory^  near  the  gold 
mines  of  Kremaste.  The  triremes  Avhich  carried  him  across  were 
ordered  to  sail  up  the  strait  on  the  next  day,  in  order  that  Anaxibius 
might  be  apprised  of  i*,  and  might  suppose  Iphikrates  to  be  employed 
on  his  ordiinuy  money-levying  excursion. 

The  stratagem  was  completely  successful.  Anaxibius  returned  on 
the  next  day,  without  the  least  suspicion  of  any  enemy  at  hand, 
m  uvhing  in  careless  order  and  with  long-stretched  files,  as  well  from 
the  narrowness  of  the  mountain  path  as  from  the  circumstance  that 
he  was  in  the  friendly  territory  of  Abydos.  Not  expecting  to  fight, 
lie  had  unfortunately  either  omitted  the  morning  sacrifice,  or  taken 
no  pains  to  ascertain  that  the  victims  were  favorable;  so  Xenophon 
informs  us,  with  that  constant  regard  to  the  divine  judgments  and 
divine  warnings  which  pervades  both  the  Hellenica  and  the  Anabasis. 
Iphikrates  having  suffered  the  Abydenes  who  w^ere  in  the  van  to 
pass,  suddenly  sprang  from  his  ambush,  to  assault  Anaxibius  with 
tlie  Laceda'monhms  and  the  mercenaries,  as  they  descended  the 
mountain  pass  into  the  ])lain  of  Kremaste.  His  appearance  struck  , 
terror  and  confusion  into  the  Avhoh*  army;  unprepared  in  its  dis-* 
orderly  arrav  for  steadfast  resistance — even  if  the  minds  of  the  soldiers 
had  been  ever  so  well  strung — against  well-trained  peltasts,  wlio  were 
sure  to  prevail  over  hoplites  not  in  steady  rank.  To  Anaxibius  himself, 
the  truth  stood  plain  at  once.  Defeat  was  inevhable,  and  th.ere 
remained  no  other  resource  for  him  except  to  die  like  a  brave  man. 
Accordingly,  desiring  his  shield-bearer  to  hand  to  him  his  shield,  he 
suid  to  those  around  him— "  Friends,  my  honor  commands  me  Iodic 


708 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS 


IIIERAX  PROCEEDS  TO  RHODES. 


709 


here-  but  do  you  hasten  away  and  save  yourselves  before  the  enemy 
clie  wUh  us  "     Such  order  was  hardly  required  to  determine  his 
p^fc-'tricken   troops,  who  tied  with  one  accord   toward   Abydc.; 
wh  e  Anaxibius  himself  awaited  liruilytiie  approach  of  the  enemy, 
and  fell  gallantly  fighiing  on  the  spot,     ^o  le.s  than  twelve  Sparh.n 
harn  osts^  those \vho  had  been  expelled  from  their  various  govern- 
ments by  the  defeat  of  Knidus.  and  who  had  remained  ever  since  under 
Deri  yi  idas  at  Abydos.  stood  with  the  lilie  courage  and  shared    us 
file      Such  disdain  of  life  hardly  surprises  us  in  conspicuous  bpart:.n 
c  tizens   to  whom  preservation  by  tlight  was  "no  true  preservation 
Un  the  anguage  of  Xenophon),  but  simply  prolongation  of  life  under 
intolerable^dislrace  at  home.     But  what  deserves  greater  remark  s. 
hat   he  youth^o  whom  Anaxibius  was  tenderly  attached  and  who 
was  his  constant  companion,  could  not  endure  to  leave  him,  slayed 
fic^htin-  by  his  side,  and  perished  by   the  same  honorable  deaih. 
SS  siTols  was  the  mutual  devotion  which  this  relation  between  per- 
sons of  tie  male  sex  inspired  in  the  ancient  Greek  ^^-^'J^]^ 
exccDtious   no  one  else  made  any  attempt  to  stand.     AH  tied   and 
t^^e'pursi'ied  by  Iphikrates  as  fa?  as  the  gates  of  Abydos  with    he 
slaughter  of  50  out  of  the  200  Abydene  hophtes,  and  200  of  the 

'' Thif  wel^^'anned  and  successful  exploit,  wliile  it  added  to  the 
reputation  of  Iphikrates.  rendered  the  Athenians  again  "^^sters  of 
the  Bosporus  and  the  llellespcnt.  insuring  both  the  levy  of  the  dnc. 
and  the^ransit  of  their  trading-vessels.  But  while  the  At^;^'^;|;  '^^ 
were  thus  carryina-  on  naval  war  at  Rhodes  and  the  Hellespont,  the> 
beo-an  to  experience  annoyance  nearer  home  from  .-Lgina. 

That  island  (witidn  sight  as  the  eyesore  of  Peuuus  as  Perikles  was 
wont  to  call  it)  had  been  occupied  tifty  years  before  by  a  \^^V^^f\l 
eminently  hostile  to  Athens,  afterward  c<;nquered  and  expe  led  hv 
her-at  last  again  captured  in  the  new  abode  which  hey  hadob  ained 
inLaconia-.4d  put^o  death  by  her  order  During  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  War,  ^gina  had  been  tenanted  by  Athenian  ci  izens  as  o  i  - 
settlers  or  klerudis;  all  of  whom  had  been  driven  in  alter  the  ba 
of  .Egospotami.  The  island  was  then  restored  by  Lysamlt-r  to  t  e 
remnant  of  the  former  population-as  many  of  them  at  least  as  ht 

^"^These  new  ^-inetans,  though  doubtless  animated  by  associations 
hicrhly  unfavorable  to  Athens,  had  nevertheless  remained  not  only  at 
peace'  but  also  in  reciprocal  commerce,  ^vith  her,  until  a  consuto  jk' 
time  after  the  battle  of  Kniilus  and  the  rehuildmg  of  her  Long  \N  'M\>. 
And  so  they  wouhl  have  continued,  of  their  own  accord— since  i  lie) 
could  gain  but  little,  and  were  likely  to  h,se  all  the  security  ot  the 
traffic,  by  her  hostility-had  they  not  been  forced  to  commence  tt 
war  by  Eteonikus,  the  Laceda?monian  harmost  m  the  island;  ont 
amidst  many  examples  of  the  manner  in  which  the  smaller  Grecum 
states  were  dragged  into  war,  without  any  motive  ot  their  own,  U} 


the  ambition  of  the  cn-oater— by  Sparta  as  well  as  by  Athens.  With 
concurrence  of  the  Ephors,  Eteonikus  authorized  and  encouraged  all 
E-'inetans  to  tit  out  privateers  fen-  depredation  on  Attica;  which 
r'^ression  the  Athenians  resented,  after  suffering  considerable  incou- 
veuience  by  sending  a  force  of  ten  triremes  to  block  up  .Eginafrom 
the  sea  with  a  body  of  hoplites  under  Pamphilus  to  construct  and 
oecup3'-'a  permanent  fort  in  the  island.  This  squadron,  however, 
was  soon  driven  off  (though  Pamiihilus  strll  continued  to  occupy  the 
fort)  by  Teleutias,  who  came  to  .Egina  on  heriring  of  the  blockade; 
hiving  been  eno-a.^'ed,  with  the  fleet  which  he  commanded  at  Rhodes, 
ia  an  expedition  alnong  the  Cyclades  for  the  purpose  of  levying  con- 
tributions He  seems  to  have  been  now  at  the  term  of  his  year  of 
eomin and  and  while  he  was  at  ^gina,  his  successor  Hierax  arrived 
from  Sparta  on  his  wav  to  Rhodes  to  supersede  him.  The  fleet  was  i 
accordino-ly  handed  over  to  Hierax  at  .Egina,  while  Teleutias  went 
directly  home  to  Sparta.  So  ixMuarkable  was  his  popularity  among 
the  seamen,  that  numbers  of  them  accompanied  him  down  to  the 
water-edn-e,  testifying  their  regret  and  attachment  by  crowning  him 
with  wreatiis  or  pressing  his  hand.  Some,  who  came  down  too  late, 
when  he  was  already  under  weigh,  cast  their  wreaths  on  the  sea, 
utterin*'-  prayers  for  his  health  and  happiness. 

Hierax  while  carrying  back  to  Rhodes  the  remaining  fleet  which 
Teleutias' had  brou^ditfrom  that  island,  left  his  subordinate  Gorgopas 
as  harmost  at  yE^-ina  with  twelve  triremes;  a  force  which  protected 
the  island  completely,  and  caused  the  fortified  post  occupied  by  the 
Athenians  under  Pamphilus  to  be  itself  blocked  up,  insomuch  that 
after  an  interval  of  four  months,  a  special  decree  was  passed  at 
Athens  to  send  a  numerous  squadron  and  fetch  away  the  garrison. 
As  the  iEainetan  privateers,  aided  by  the  squadron  of  Gorgopas  now 
recommenced  their  annoyances  against  Attica,  thirteen  Athenian 
triremes  were  put  in  equipment  under  Eunomus  as  a  guard-squadron 
a"-ainst  .^"-ina.  But  Gorgopas  and  his  squadron  were  now  for  the 
time  withdrawn,  to  escort  Antalkidas,  the  new  Lacedsemonian  ad- 
miral sent  to  Asia  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  again  negotiating  with 
Tiribazus  On  returning  back,  after  landing  Antalkidas  at  Ephesus, 
Gor.ropas  fell  in  with  Eunomus,  whose  pursuit  however  he  escaped, 
lancfiiP'-  at  .En-ina  just  before  sunset.  The  Athenian  admiral,  after 
watchiTi"  for  a  short  time  unlil  he  saw  the  Lacedaemonian  seamen 
out  of  tiieir  vessels  and  ashore,  departed  as  it  grew  dark  to  Attica, 
eirrvin'^  a  li'dit  to  prevent  his  ships  from  parting  company.  But 
Gorgopas  causing  his  men  to  take  a  hasty  meal,  immediatelv  re- 
endiarked  and  pursued;  keepinu"  on  the  track  by  means  of  the  light, 
and  taking  care  not  to  betray  himself  either  by  the  noise  of  oars  or 
hv  the  chant  of  the  Keleustes.  Eunomus  had  no  suspicion  of  the 
accompanying  enemy.  Just  after  he  had  touched  land  near  Cape 
Zoster  in  \ttica.  when  his  men  were  in  the  act  of  disembarking,  Gor- 
gopas gave  signal  bv  trumpet  to  attack.     After  a  short  action  by 


710 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


TELEUTIAS  SURPRISES  PEIR^US. 


711 


moonlight,  four  of  the  Atlienian  squadron  were  captured,  and  carried 
off  to  .Egina;  willi  the  remainder,  Eunonius  escaped  to  Peir«us. 

This  victory,  rendering  both  Gorgopas  and  tlie  ^ginetans  confi- 
dent, laid  them  open  to  a  stratagem  skillfully  planned  by  llje  Athe- 
nian Chabrias.  Tliat  oflicer,  who  seems  to  have  been  dismissed  f nun 
Corinth  as  Iphikrates  had  been  before  him,  was  now  about  to  eon- 
duet  a  force  of  ten  triremes  ;ind  800  pellasts  to  the  aid  of  Evagoras; 
to  whom  the  Athenians  were  thus  paying  their  debt  of  gratitude, 
though  they  could  ill  sjjare  any  of  their  forces  from  home.  Chabrins. 
passing  over  from  Peirteus  at  night,  landed  w  ithout  being  perceived 
in  u  desert  place  of  the  coast  of  ^Egina,  and  planted  himself  in 
ambush  with  his  peltasts  at  some  little  distance  inland  of  the  Hera- 
kleion  or  temple  of  Ilerakles,  amid  hollow  ground  suitable  for 
concealment.  He  had  before  made  arrangement  with  anoUicr 
squadron  and  a  bo«ly  of  hoplites  under  Demtjenetus.  who  arrived  at 
daybreak  and  landed  in  ^Egina  at  a  point  called  Tripyrgia,  ab(»ut 
two  miles  distant  from  the  lierakleiou,  but  further  removed  fnmi  the 
city.  As  soon  as  their  arrival  became  known,  Gorgopas  hastened 
out  of  the  city  to  n  pel  them  with  all  the  troops  he  could  collect, 
^ginetans  as  well  as  marines  out  of  the  ships  of  war,  and  eight 
Spartans  who  happened  to  be  liis  companions  in  the  island.  In  their 
march  from  the  city  to  attack  the  newcomers  they  had  to  pass  near 
the  llerakleion,  and  therefore  near  the  troops  in  ambubh,  who,  as 
soon  as  Gorgopas  and  those  about  him  had  gone  by,  rose  up  suddenly 
{'.nd  attacked  them  in  the  rear.  The  stratagem  succeeded  not  less 
completely  than  that  of  Iphikrates  i\t  Abydos  against  Anaxibius. 
Gorgopas  and  the  Spartans  near  him  weie  slain,  the  rest  were 
defeated  and  compelled  to  llee  with  considerable  loss  back  to  tie 
city. 

After  this  brilliant  success,  C'habrias  pursued  his  voyage  to  Cyprus, 
and  matters  appeared  so  secure  on  the  side  of  ^Egina,  that  Denui;- 
netus  also  was  sent  to  the  irellcs])ont  to  re-enforce  Iphikrates.  For 
some  time,  indeed,  the  Lacedtumonian  ships  at  ^Egina  did  nothing. 
Eteonikus,  who  was  sent  as  successor  to  Gorgopas,  could  neither  per- 
suade nor  constrain  the  seamen  to  go  aboard,  since  he  had  no  funds, 
while  their  pay  wits  in  arrears;  .so  that  Athens  with  her  coast  and  her 
trading-vessels  remained  altogether  unmolested.  Ai  length  the  Lace- 
diemouians  were  obliged  to  send  aaain  to  ^Egina  Teleutias,  the  most 
popidar  and  best-beloved  of  all  their  commanilers,  whom  the  seamen 
welcomed  with  tlie  utmost  delight.  A(hlressing  them  under  the 
influence  of  this  first  impression,  immediately  after  he  liad  ofl'ered 
sacrifice,  he  told  them  plainly  that  he  brought  w  ith  him  no  money, 
but  that  he  had  come  to  put  them  in  the  way  of  procuring  it;  that  he 
should  himself  touch  nothing  until  they  were  amply  ])rovided,  and 
should  recjuire  of  them  to  bear  no  more  hardship  or  fatigue  than  he 
went  through  himself;  that  the  power  an<l  prosperity  of  Sparta  hnd 
all  beeu  purchased  by  willingly  braving  danger  as  web  as  toil  in  the 


cause  of  duty;  that  it  became  valiant  men  to  seek  their  pay,  not  by 
crino-ing  to  any  one,  but  by  their  own  swords  at  the  cost  of  enemies. 
And°he  engaged  to  find  them  the  means  of  doing  this,  provided  they 
would  now  again  manifest  the  excellent  qualities  which  he  knew 
them  by  experience  to  possess.  .      ,  .      .  , 

This  address  completely  won  over  the  seamen,  who  received  it  with 
shouts  of  applause;  desiring  Teleutias  to  give  his  orders  forthwith, 
and  promising  ready  obedience.  "  Well."  said  he,  "now  go  and  get 
vour  suppers,  as  vou  were  intending  to  do;  and  then  come  immedi- 
ately on  ship-board,  bringing  with  you  provisions  for  one  day. 
Advance  me  thus  much  out  of  your  own  means  that  we  may,  by  the 
will  of  the  gods,  make  an  opportune  voyage." 

In  spite  of  the  eminent  popularity  of  Teleutias,  the  men  would 
probablv  have  refused  to  go  on  board  had  he  told  them  l>eforehand 
his  intentifm  of  sailing  with  his  twelve  triremes  straight  into  the 
harbor  of  Peincus.  At  first  sight  the  enterprise  seemed  insane,  for 
there  were  triremes  in  it  more  than  sufficient  to  overwhelm  him. 
But  he  calculated  on  finding  them  all  unprepared,  with  seamen  as 
well  as  ofticers  in  tiieir  lodgings  ashore,  so  that  he  could  not  only 
strike  terror  and  do  damaixe,  but  even  realize  half  an  hour's  plunder 
before  preparations  could  be  made  to  resist  him.  Such  was  the 
securitv  which  now  reigned  there,  especially  since  the  death  of  Gor- 
gopas,'that  no  one  dreamt  of  an  attack.  The  harbor  was  open,  as  it 
"had  been  fortv  years  before,  when  Brasidas  (in  the  third  year  of  the 
Peloponnesiau  War)  attempted  the  like  enterprise  from  the  port  of 
Me-T-ara.  Even  then,  at  the  maximum  of  the  Athenian  naval  power, 
it  w^as  an  enterprise  possible,  simply  because  every  one  considered  it 
to  be  impossible;  ami  it  only  failed  because  the  assailants  became 
terrified  and  fiinched  in  the  execution. 

A  little  after  dark  Teleutias  quitted  the  harbor  of  .^gina  without 
'  telling  any  one  whither  he  was  going.  Rowing  .eisurely,  and  allow- 
ino-  his  men  alternate  repose  on  their  oars,  he  found  himself  before 
morning  within  half  a  mile  of  Peirteus,  where  he  waited  until  day 
was  just  dawning,  and  then  led  his  squadron  straight  into  the  har- 
bor. Everything  turned  out  as  he  expected;  there  was  not  the  least 
idea  of  being  attacked,  nor  the  letist  preparation  for  defense.  Isot  a 
sin"-le  trireme  w^as  manned  or  in  fighting  condition,  but  several  were 
moored  without  their  crews,  together  with  merchant- vessels,  loaded 
as  well  as  emptv.  Teleutias  directed  the  captains  of  his  squadron  to 
drive  against  the  triremes  and  damage  them;  but  by  no  means  to 
damage  the  beaks  of  their  own  ships  by  trying  to  disable  the  mer- 
chant'^ships.  Even  at  that  early  hour  many  Athenians  were  aijroad 
and  the  arrival  ot  the  unexpected  assailants  struck  every  one  w  itli 
surprise  and  consternation.  Loud  and  vague  cries  transmitted  the 
news  through  all  Peira3us,  and:  from  Peirteus  up  to  Athens,  where;  it 
was  believed  that  their  harbor  was  actually  taken.  Every  man  hav- 
iiiir  run  home  for  his  arms,  the  whole  force  of  the  city  rushed  impetu- 


713 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


ously  down  thither  with  one  accord,  hoplites  as  well  as  horsemen. 
But  before  succors  could  arrive,  Teleutias  had  full  time  to  do  consid- 
erable  mischief.  His  seamen  boarded  the  larger  merchaut-sliips, 
seizing  both  the  meu  and  the  portable  goods  which  they  found 
a')oard.  Some  even  jumped  ashore  on  the  quay  (called  the  Deigina), 
laid  hands  on  the  tradesmen,  ship-masters,  and  pilots,  whom  they 
saw  near,  and  carried  them  away  captive.  Various  smaller  vessels 
with  their  entire  cargoes  were  also  towed  away,  and  even  tliree  or 
four  triremes.  With  all  these  Teleutias  sailed  sjifely  out  of  Peinens, 
sending  some  of  his  squadron  to  escort  the  prizes  to  ^gina,  while  lie 
himself  with  the  remainder  sailed  southward  aloug  the  coast.  As  he 
Was  seen  to  come  out  of  Peiraus,  his  triremes  were  mistaken  for 
Atheiiiaa  and  excited  no  alarm,  so  that  he  thus  captured  several 
fishini^-boats  and  passage-boats  coming  with  passengers  from  the 
islands  to  Athens— together  with  some  merchantmen  carrying  corn 
and  other  u;oods  at  Sunium.     All  were  carried  safely  into  .Egina. 

The  enterprise  of  Teleutias,  thus  admirably  coucerted  and  exe- 
cuted without  the  loss  of  a  man,  procured  for  him  a  plentiful  booty, 
of  which  probably  not  the  least  valuable  portion  consisted  in  the  men 
seized  as  captives.  When  sold  at  ^Egina  it  yielded  so  large  a  return 
that  he  was  enabled  to  pay  down  at  once  a  month's  pay  to  his  sea- 
men, who  became  more  attached  to  him  than  ever,  and  kept  the 
triremes  in  animated  and  sictive  service  under  his  orders.  Admon- 
ished by  painful  experience,  indeed,  the  Athenians  were  now  doubt- 
less careful  both  in  guarding  and  in  closing  Peira^is,  as  they  had 
become  forty  years  before  after  the  unsuccessful  attack  of  Prasidas. 
But  in  spite  of  the  utmost  vigilance  they  suffered  an  extent  of  damage 
from  the  indefatigable  Teleutias,  and  from  the  oEginetan  privateers, 
quite  sutllcient  to  make  them  weary  of  the  war. 

We  cannot  doubt  indeed  that  the  prosecution  of  the  war  must  have 
been  a  heavy  financial  burden  upon  the  Athenians,  from  395  B.C. 
downward  to  387  B.C.  How  they  made  good  the  cost,  without  any 
contributory  allies,  or  any  foreign  support,  except  what  Konon  ob- 
tained during  one  year  from  Pharnabt.zus— we  are  not  informed. 
On  the  revival  of  the  democracy  in  403  B.C.  the  poverty  of  the  city, 
both  public  and  private,  had  been  very  great  owing  to  the  long  previ- 
ous war,  ending  with  the  loss  of  all  Athenian  property  abroad.  At 
a  iieriod  about"  three  years  afterward,  it  seems  that  the  Alhei.iaus 
were  in  arrears,  not  merely  for  the  tribute-money  which  th(  y  then 
owed  to  Sparta  as  her  suljject  allies,  but  alto  for  debts  due  to  the 
B(volians  on  account  of  damage  done;  that  they  were  too  poor  to 
perform  in  full  the  religious  sacrifices  prescribed  for  the  year,  and 
Avere  obligf^d  to  omit  some  even  of  the  more  ancient;  that  the  docks 
as  well  a.s' the  walls  were  in  sad  want  of  repair.  Even  the  pay  to 
those  citizens  who  attended  the  public  assemblies  and  sat  as  Dikasts 
in  the  dikasteries— pay  essential  to  the  working  of  the  democracy— 
was  restored  only  by  degrees;  begiuniug  first  at  one  obolus,  and  not 


DIRECT  PROPERTY  TAXES. 


713 


restored  to  three  oboli,  at  which  it  had  stood  before  the  capture, 
until  after  an  interval  of  some  years.  It  was  at  this  time  too  that 
the  Theoric  Board,  or  Paymasters  for  the  general  expenses  of  public 
worship  and  sacrifice,  was  first  established;  and  when  we  read  how 
much  the  Athenians  were  embarrassed  for  the  means  of  celebratin<»- 
the  prescribed  sacrifices,  there  was  probably  great  necessity  for  the 
formation  of  some  such  ofilce.  The  disbursements  connected  with 
this  object  had  been  administered,  before  403  B.C.,  not  by  any  special 
Board,  but  by  the  Hellenotamiae,  or  treasurers  of  the  tribute  collected 
from  the  allies,  who  were  not  renewed  after  403  b.c,  as  the  Athenian 
(iiiinre  had  ceased  to  exist.  A  portion  of  the  money  disbursed  by 
the  Theoric  Board  for  the  religious  festivals,  was  employed  in  the 
distribution  of  two  oboli  per  head,  called  the  diobely,  to  all  present 
citizens,  and  actually  received  by  all— not  merely  by  the  poor,  but  by 
IKM-sons  in  easy  circumstances  also.  This  distribution  was  made  at 
several  festivals,  having  originally  begun  at  the  Dionysia,  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  the  citizens  to  obtain  placed  at  the  theatrical 
representations  in  honor  of  Dionysus;  but  we  do  not  know  either  the 
number  of  festivals,  or  the  amount  of  the  total  sum.  It  was,  in 
principle,  a  natui-al  corollary  of  the  religious  idea  connected  with 
the  festival ;  not  simply  because  the  comfort  and  recreation  of  each 
citizen,  individually  taken,  was  promoted  by  his  being  able  to  attend 
ijie  festival — but  because  the  collective  effect  of  the  ceremony,  in 
honoring  and  propitiating  the  god,  was  believed  to  depend  in  part 
upon  a  multitudinous  attendance  and  lively  manifestations.  Gradu- 
jilly,  however,  this  distribution  of  Theoric  or  festival  money  came  to 
bo  ])uslied  to  an  abusive  and  mischievious  excess,  which  was  brouirht 
before  our  notice  forty  years  afterward,  during  the  political  career 
of  Demosthenes.  Until  that  time,  we  have  no  materials  for  speaking 
of  it;  and  what  I  here  notice  is  simply  the  first  creation  of  the 
Theoric  Board. 

The  means  of  Athens  for  prosecuting  the  war,  and  for  paying  her 
troops  sent  as  well  to  Boeotia  as  to  Corinth,  must  have  been  den'ved 
mainly  from  direct  assessments  on  property,  called  eisphone.  And 
some  such  assessments  we  find  alluded  to  generally  as  having  taken 
phiee  during  these  years;  though  we  know  no  details  either  as  to  fre- 
quency or  amount.  But  the  restitution  of  the  Long  Walls  and  of  the 
fortifications  of  Peiraeus  by  Konon,  was  an  assistance  not  less  valuable 
to  the  finances  of  Athens  than  to  her  political  power.  That  excel- 
k'ut  harbor,  commodious  as  a  mercantile  center,  and  now  again  safe 
for  the  residence  of  metics  and  the  importations  of  merchants,  became 
i^peedily  a  scene  of  animated  conunerce,  as  we  have  seen  it  when  sur- 
prised by  Teleutias.  The  number  of  metics,  or  free  resident  non- 
citizens,  became  also  again  large,  as  it  had  been  before  the  time  of 
lier  reverses,  and  including  a  number  of  miscellaneous  non-Hellenic 
persons,  f rom  Lydia,  Phrygia,  and  Syria.  Both  the  port-duties,  and 
tlhj  value  of  fixed  property  at  Athens,  was  thus  augmented  so  as  in 


714  AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 

^^'I'^ll.t'pri^^Jel^s.'wer^^ri^u^y  felt,  aud  coulnbuted  to  dispone 

"'l,;"^"ildk.sp"r'^,  tboir  prospects  were  not  only  on  the dccnue 
hnt  1  d  btcome  seriou.lv  nunuch.g.  After  goinjr  Iron.  Jtgma  o 
E  k«  s  i  the  prJee  ling -veur,  and  lending  Lack  GorgopayvUl.  .ho 
iJi^i^e  a"  Ji mlron,  AnHdkidas  had  placed  .he  rema.m ier  ot  h.s lleet 
^,de°  1  is  secretary  Nik..locluis,  %vith  orders  to  proceed  to  the  llelle.- 
niidu  lis  sttc    ly       .  |^    .         n^.  hiniseU'  lauded,  and  repaned  to 

^M'l.,zn.l,vil,m  he  v^as  conducted  up  .o  the  court  of  Susa.    Here 
2  '      e"^.l?h:propc.siti<msforthepacitica.iouj,fGWe^ 
nl,.<  of  universal  autonomy,  abanaoiung  all  .he  AM.itic  Ijicu^j   i» 
sublect  ■  bs  .lute  y   o  the  PcTsian  king-which  he  had  tried  u.  van,  o 
cSv  tl  .ou' 'h  t^  years  before.      Though   the  Sparlans  genera  ly 
^„    ^nfin   VrtiwrxC!   An.alkidas  behaved  with  so  much  de.v 
U^^ln-t to  g  i.; thi^o  ^IfaVor  personally. .while  all  the  i-.fl-"-  " 
T  Sr  zu<;  was  employed  to  second  his  political  views.   A  lenglli  the) 
Juice^^edbi  prevailing  upon  the  lii.ig  formally  to  adopt  Ihe  peace 
nnd  to  moc  aim  war  aSainst  any  Greeks  who  should  retuse   oaec   Ic 
to  it  "mpoweriu?  .lie  Sparlans'to  enforce  it  everywhere  as  h.s  a  1  es 
an    unZhis  «u;ction.'   In  order  to  ■•«>"«v^. '^^j ^^."Jf",    t '."'i^^ 
i^r,.vtnl  ..  crivit  imnedinieiit  lo  this  measure,  llie  Kin^r  ^^as  luiiiiti  in 
S    ^d  to  fnite   be  satrap  Pharnabazus  up  to  court  and  to  hcnjor  |nn 
^-  libs    lau-hter  in  niarriaire;  leaving  tbe  satrapy  of  I>«^^>Ji    \^ 
nn  ei    Le   tanp(,rarv   administration   of  Ariobarzanes,   a   p«-sonal 
fdend  ad  c."  Antalkidas.   Thus  armed  against^all  contingencies 
lucaaami    lu  returned  from  Siisa  to  the  coast  of  A^iii 

Antalkidas  and  T^'J^^f  "'J^^"'^"^^  beariim-  tbe  formal  diploma 

r  tes-  who  Willi  tliir.v-two  sail,  were  occupying  the  tuiopeai    ^i  ic 
of   he  H  1  esp  It.     ife  immediately  repaired  to  Abydos  by  land  a 

K  ktn  eai-ly'^oppor.uni.y  of  stealing  out  by  "jf    J"^  '  ^^Z 
the  strait  toward  the  Proponli.s;  speading  t^.<^,,™    "'  ^l'^^.^     p  t 

rlp?r    V f  Ikidis  ^aif( d  down  it  again  to  meet  tbe  byracusan  an 


DISTRESS  AND  DISCOURAGEMENT. 


715 


a  match  for  his  enemies.  He  had  further  the  good  fortune  to  cap- 
tun;  a  detached  Athenian  squtidron  of  eight  triremes,  which  Tlirasy- 
hulus  (a  second  Athenian  citizen  of  tliat  name)  was  conducting  from 
Tiirace  to  join  the  main  Athenian  fleet  in  the  Hellespont.  Lastly, 
additional  re-euforcemenls  also  reached  Antalkidas  from  the  zealous 
aid  of  Tiribazus  and  Ariobarzanes,  insomuch  that  he  found  him- 
self at  the  head  of  no  less  than  eighty  triremes,  besides  a  still  grealer 
number  which  were  under  preparation  in  the  various  ports  «f  Ionia. 
Such  a  fleet,  the  greatest  which  had  been  seen  in  the  Hellespnnt 
since  the  battle  of  xEgospotami,  was  so  much  superior  to  anyliiing 
that  could  be  brought  to  meet  it,  and  indicated  so  strongly  thr  full 
force  of  Persia  operating  in  the  interests  of  Sparta— that  the  Athe- 
nians began  to  fear  a  repetition  of  the  same  calamitous  sulfeiing 
which  they  bad  already  undergone  from.Lysander.  A  portion  of 
such  hardsliip  they  at  once  began  to  taste.  Not  a  single  merchant- 
ship  reached  them*  from  the  Euxine,  all  being  seized  and  detained  by 
Antalkidas;  so  that  their  main  supply  of  impo;-ted  corn  was  thus 
cut  off.  Moreover,  in  the  present  encouraging  state  of  affairs,  the 
.'Eginetau  privateers  became  doubly  active  in  harassing  the  coasting 
trade  of  Attica;  and  this  combination,  of  actual  hardsiiip  with  pro- 
spective alarm,  created  a  paramount  anxiety  at  Athens  to  termi- 
nate the  war.  Without  Athens,  the  other  allies  would  have  no 
chance  of  success  through  their  own  forces;  while  the  Argeians 
also  hitherto  the  most  obstinate,  had  become  on  their  own  account 
desirous  of  peace,  being  afraid  of  repeated  Lace(hemoni;in  invasions 
of  their  territory.  Thai  Sparta  should  ])ress  for  a  peace,  when  the 
terms  of  it  were  suggested  by  herself,  is  not  wondertul.  Even  to 
her,  triumphant  as  her  position  now  seemed,  the  war  was  a  heavy 

burden.  .  ^      .  ,11 

Such  was  the  general  state  of  feeling  in  the  Grecian  world,  when 
Tiribazus  summoned  the  contemling  parties  into  his  presence,  prob- 
ably at  Sardis,  lo  hear  the  terms  of  the  convention  which  had  just 
come  down  from  Susa.  lie  produced  the  original  edict,  and  having 
lirst  publicly  exhibited  the  reii-al  seal,  read  aloud  as  follows:— 

"  King  Artaxerxes  thinks  it  just  that  the  cities  in  Asia,  and  the 
islands  o"f  Klazomenai  and  Cvprus,  shall  belong  to  him.  He  thinks 
it  just  also,  to  leave  all  the  other  Hellenic  cities  autonomous,  both 
small  and  sireat— except  Lemnos,  Imbros,  and  Skyros,  which  are  to 
belong  to  Athens,  as  they  did  originally.  Should  any  parties  refuse 
to  accept  this  peace,  1  will  make  war  upon  them,  along  Avith  those 
who  are  of  the  same  mind,  by  land  as  well  as  by  sea,  with  ships  and 

with  money."       .  ,     ^  i?  *u 

Instructions  were  given  to  all  the  deputies  to  report  the  therms  ot  the 
edict  to  their  respective  cities,  and-  to  meet  again  at  ^P'l^'b^  Tor 
acceptance  or  rejection.  When  the  time  of  meeting  arri-ved,  all  the 
cities  in  spite  of  their  repugnance  to  the  abandonment  of  the  Asiatic 
Greeks  and  partly  also  to  the  second  condition,  nevertheless   felt 


716 


AFTER  REBUILDING  THE  WALLS. 


PIIILO  ARGEIAN  CORINTHIANS. 


717 


themselves  overruled  by  superior  force  and  gave  a  reluctant  consent. 
On  taking  the  oaths,  however,  the  Thebans  tried  indirectly  to  make 
good  an  exception  in  their  own  case,  by  (rlainiing  to  take  the  oatli 
not  only  on  Ijelialf  of  themselves,  but  on  behalf  of  the  Bcrotian  cities 
generallv;  a  demand  which  Agesihms  in  the  name  of  Sparta  repudi- 
ated, as' virtually  canceling  that  item  in  the  paciticalion  whereby  the 
small  cities  were  pronounced  to  be  autonomous  us  well  as  flu*  great. 
When  the  Theban  deputy  replied  that  he  could  not  relinquisli  his 
claim  without  fresh  instruction  from  home,  Agesilaus  desired  iiiin 
to  go  at  once  and  consult  his  countrymen.  *'  You  may  tell  tlicni 
(said  he)  that  if  tliey  do  not  comply,  they  will  be  shut  out  from  the 
treaty.'' 

It  was  with  much  delight  tliat  Agesilaus  pronounced  this  peremp- 
tory sentence,  which  placed  Thel>es  in  so  humiliating  a  dilemma. 
Antipathy  toward  the  Thebans  was  one  of  his  strongest  si^-ntinients, 
and  he  exulted  in  the  hope  that  they  would  piM-sist  in  their  refusal; 
so  that  he  would  thus  be  enabled  to  bring  an  overwhelming  force  to 
crush  their  isolated  city.  So  eagerly  did  he  thirst  for  the  expected 
triumph,  that  immediately  on  the  departure  of  the  Theban  deputies, 
and  iK-'fore  their  answer  could  possibly  have  been  obtained,  he  pro- 
cured the  consent  of  the  ephoi-s.  offered  the  border  sacritice,  and  led 
the  Spartan  force  out  as  far  as  Tegea.  From  that  city  he  not  only 
dispatched  messengers  in  all  directions  to  hasten  the  arrival  of  the 
Perio'ki,  but  also  sent  forth  the  officers  called  xenagi  to  the  cities  of 
the  Peloponuesian  allies,  to  muster  and  bring  together  the  respective 
contingents.  But  in  spite  of  all  injunctions  to  dispatch,  liis  wishes 
were  disappointed.  Before  he  started  from  Tegea,  the  Theban  dep- 
uties returned  with  the  intimation  that  they  were  prepared  to  take 
the  oath  for  Thebes  alone,  recognizing  the  other  Boeotian  cities  as 
autonomous.  Agesilaus  and  the  Spartans  were  thus  obliged  to  be 
satistied  with  the  minor  triumph,  in  itself  veiy  serious  and  consider- 
able, of  having  degraded  Thebes  from  her  federal  headship,  and  iso- 
lated her  from  the  Bo'otian  cities. 

The  unmeasured  and  impatient  miso-Tlieban  bitterness  of  Agesi- 
laus, attested  here  by  his  friend  ;md  panegyrist,  deserves  especial 
notice;  for  it  will  be  found  to  explain  much  of  the  misconduct  of 
Sparta  and  her  officers  during  the  ensuing  years. 

There  yet  remained  one  compliance  for  Agesilaus  to  exact.  The 
Argeian  auxiliaries  were  not  yet  withdrawn  from  Corinth;  and  the 
Corinthian  government  might  probably  think  that  the  terms  of  the 
peace,  leaving  their  city  autonomous,  ixjrmitted  them  to  retain  or 
dismiss  these  auxiliaries  at  their  own  discretion.  But  it  was  not  so 
that  Agesilaus  construed  the  peace;  and  his  constmction,  right  or 
wrong,  was  backed  by  the  power  of  enforcement.  He  sent  to  inform 
both  Argeians  and  'Corinthians,  that  if  the  auxiliaries  were  not 
withdrawn,  he  would  march  his  army  forthwith  into  both  territo- 
ries.   No  resistance  could  be   offered  to  kis  peremptory  mandate. 


The  Arireians  retired  from  Corinth;  and  the  vehement  philo- Argeian 
CorinthTans— especially  those  who  had  been  concerned  in  the  massa- 
cre at  the  festival  of  the  Eukleia— retired  at  the  same  time  into  vol- 
untary exile,  thinking  themselves  no  longer  safe  in  the  town.  They 
found  a  home  partly  at  Argos,  partly  at  Athens,  where  they  were 
most  hospitably  received.  Tliose  Corinthians  who  had  before  been 
in  exile  and  who,  in  concert  with  the  Lacoda^moiuan  garrison  at 
LechWm  and  Sikvon,  had  been  engaged  in  bitter  hostility  against 
their  countrymen  in  Corinth— were  immediately  readmitted  into  the 
city  According  to  Xenophon,  their  readmission  was  pronounced 
by  t"he  spontaneous  voice  of  the  Corinthian  citizens.  But  we  shall 
be  more  correct  in  affirminn:,  that  it  was  procured  by  the  same  intim- 
idating summons  from  Agesilaus  which  had  extorted  ihc  dismissal 
of  the°Argeians.  The  restoration  of  the  exiles  from  Lechaeum  on 
the  present  occasion  was  no  more  voluntary  than  that  of  the  Athe- 
nian exiles  had  been  eighteen  years  before,  at  the  close  of  the  Pel- 
oponnesian  War— or  than  that  of  the  Phliasian  exiles  was,  two  or 
three  years  afterward. 


CHAPTER  LXXVL 

FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS  DOWN   TO    THE  SUBJUGATION   OF 

OLYNTHUS   BY   SPARTA. 


an 


The  peace  or  convention  which  bears  the  name  of  Antalkidas,  was 
an  incident  of  serious  and  mournful  import  in  Grecian  history  Its 
true  character  cannot  be  better  described  than  in  a  brief  remark  and 
reply  which  we  find  cited  in  Plutarch.  "Alas  for  Hellas  (observed 
some  one  to  Agesilaus)  when  we  see  our  Laconians  medizingl  -  ^ ay 
(replied  the  Spartan  king)  say  rather  the  Medes  (Persians)  lacojitz- 

^"  These  two  propositions  do  not  exclude  each  other.  Both  were  per- 
fectly true  The  convention  emanated  from  a  separate  partnership 
between  Spartan  and  Persian  interests.  It  was  solicited  by  the  bpar- 
tan  Antalkidas,  and  propounded  by  him  to  TiribazAis  on  the  express 
ground,  that  it  was  exactly  calculated  to  meet  the  Persian  kmgs  pur- 
poses and  wishes-as  we  learn  even  from  the  philo-Laconian  Xeno- 
phon.  While  Sparta  and  Persia  were  both  great  gainers,  no  otl  er 
Grecian  state  gained  anything,  as  the  convention  was  ongiim  y 
framed.  But  after  the  first  rejection,  Antalkidas  saw  1^<^  ^^^^  > 
of  conciliating  Athens  by  the  addition  of  a  special  article  pi oviding 
that  Lemnos,  Imbros,  and  Skyros  should  be  restored  to J^er  This 
addition  seems  to  have  been  first  made  in  the  abortive  f^f  tuitions 
which  form  the  subject  of  the  discourse  already  mentioned  pio- 
noinced  by  Andokides.    It  was  continued  afterward  and  mserted  m 


718 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


CONDUCT  OF  SPARTA. 


719 


the  final  decree  which  Antnlkulas  andTiribazus  brought  do\vn  in  tlie 
king's  name  from  Susa:  and  it  doubtless  somewhat  contributed  to 
facilitate  the  adherence  of  Athens,  though  the  united  forces  of  Spuria 
and  Persia  had  become  so  overwhelming,  that  she  couid  hardly  have 
had  the  means  of  standing  out.  even  if  the  supplementary  artich'  had 
been  omitted.  Nevertheless  this  condition  undoubtedly  did  secure  to 
Athens  a  certain  share  in  the  gain,  conjointly  with  the  far  larL'er 
shares  both  of  Sparta  and  Persia.  It  is  however  not  less  true,  that 
Athens,  as  well  as  Thebes,  assented  to  the  peace  only  under  fear  and 
compulsion.  As  to  the  other  states  of  Gieece,  they  were  interested 
merely  in  the  melancholy  capacity  of  partners  in  the  general  loss  and 
deirradation.  ,  ^  ,   , 

that  de<i:radation  stood  evidently  marked  m  the  lorm,  ongui,  and 
transmission  of  the  convention,  even  apart  .from  its  substance.  It 
was  a  fiat  issued  from  the  court  of  Susa;  as  such  it  was  ostentatiously 
proclaimed  and  "sent  down"  from  thence  to  Greece.  Its  authority 
was  derived  from  the  king's  seal,  and  its  sanction  from  his  (.'onclud- 
in;^  threat,  that  he  would"  make  war  against  a-11  recusants.  It  was 
brought  down  by  the  satrap  Tiribazus  (along  with  Antalkidas),  read 
by  hfm  aloud,  aiid  heard  with  submission  by  the  assembled  Grecian 
envoys,  after  he  had  called  tlieir  special  attention  to  tlie  regal  seal. 

Such' was  the  convention  which  Sparta,  the  ancient  president  of 
the  Grecian  world,  had  been  the  first  to  solicit  at  the  hands  of  the 
Persian  king,  and  which  she  now  not  only  set  the  example  of  sanc- 
tioning by  lier  own  spontaneous  obedience,  but  even  avouched  as 
guaranty  and  champion  against  all  opponents:  preparing  to  enforce 
it  at  the  point  of  the  sword  against  any  recu-ant  state,  whether  party 
to  it  or  not.  Such  was  the  convention  which  was  now  inscribed  on 
stone,  and  placed  as  a  permanent  record  in  tlic  temples  of  the  Grecian 
cities:  nav,  even  in  the  common  sanctuaries— the  Olympic,  Pythian, 
and  others— the  gTcat  foci  and  rallying  points  of  Pan-Hellenic  senti- 
ment. Though  called  bv  the  name  of  a  convention,  it  was  on  the  v(  ry 
face  of  it  a  peremptory  mandate  proceeding  from  the  ancient  enemy 
of  Greece,  an  acceptance  of  which  w.ls  nothing  less  than  an  act  of 
obedience.  While  to  him  it  was  a  glorious  troi)hy,  to  all  Pan  Hellenic 
patriots  It  was  the  deepest  disgrace  and  insult.  EfTacing  altogether 
the  idea  e>f  an  independent  Hellenic  world,  bound  together  and  ng- 
ulatcd  by  the  self-acting  forces  and  common  sympathies  of  its  own 
members — even  the  words  of  the  convetition  proclaimed  it  as  an  act 
of  intrusive  foreign  power,  and  erected  the  Barbarian  king  into  a 
dictatorial  settler  of  Grecian  dilTerenccs;  a  guardian  who  cared  for 
the  peace  of  Greece  more  than  the  Greeks  themselves.  And  thus, 
lookiuij  to  the  form  alone,  it  was  tantamount  to  that  .s^^mbol  of  sub 
mission— the  cession  of  earth  and  water— whieh  had  been  demanded 
a  century  iKjfore  bv  the  ancestor  of  Artaxerxes  from  the  ancestors  of 
the  Spartans  and  Athenians;  a  demand  which  both  Sparta  and  Athens 
then  not  only  repudiated,  but  resented  so  cmclly,  as  to  put  to  death 


the  heralds  by  whom  it  was  brought— stigmatizing  the  ^gmetans 
and  oliiers  as  traitors  to  Hellas  for  complying  with  it.  Yet  nothing 
more  w  ould  have  been  implied  in  such  cession  than  what  stood  em- 
bodied in  tlie  inscription  on  that  "  eolonuainfame,"  which  placed  the 
peace  of  Antalkidas  side  by  side  with  the  Pan-Hellenic  glories  and 

ornaments  at  Olympia.  w  v,     .,      •   *  v  . 

Great  must  have  been  the  change  wrought  by  the  mtermediate 
events,  when  Sparta,  the  ostensible  president  of  Greece— in  her  own 
estinitition  even  more  than  in  that  of  others— had  so  lost  all  Pan-Hel- 
lenic conscience  and  dignity,  as  to  descend  into  an  obsequious  minis- 
ter procuriniz  and  enforcing  a  Persian  mandate  for  political  objects 
of  her  own.  How  insane  would  such  an  anticipation  have  appeared 
to  .'Eschyhis,  or  the  audience  who  heard  the  Persae!  to  Herodotus  or 
Thucydidesl'  to  Perikles  and  Archidamus!  nay,  even  to  Kallikratidas 
or  Lysaniler!  it  was  the  last  consummation  of  a  series  of  previous 
political  sins,  invoking  more  and  more  the  intervention  of  Persia  to 
aid  her  against  her  Grecian  enemies. 

Her  tirst  application  to  the  Great  King  for  this  purpose  dates  from 
the  commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  is  prefaced  by  an 
apolo-y,  little  less  than  humiUating,  from  King  Archidamus;  who, 
not  unconseious  of  the  sort  of  treason  which  he  was  meditating, 
pleads  that  Sparta,  when  the  Athenians  are  conspiring  against  her, 
ou'dit  not  to  be  blamed  for  asking  from  foreigners  as  well  as  from 
Greeks  aid  for  her  own  preservation.     From  the  earliest  commence- 
ment to  the  seventh  year  of  the  war,  many  separate  and  successive 
envoys  were  dispatched  by  the  Spartans  to  Susa;  two  of  whom  were 
seized  in  Thrace,  brought  to  Athens,  and  there  put  to  death.     The 
rest  reached  tlieir  destination,  but  talked  in  so  confused  a  way,  and 
contradicted  each  other  so  much  that  the  Persian  court,  unable  to 
understand  what  the\  meant,  sent  Artaphernes  with  letters  to  Sparta 
(in  the  seventh  year' of  the  war)  complaining  of  such  stupidity,  and 
asklu"-  for  clearer  information.     Artaphernes  fell  into  the  hands  ot  an 
Athenian  squadron  at  Eion  on  the  Strymon,  and  was  conveyed  to 
Athens;  where  he  was  treated  ^itii  great  politeness,  and  sent  back 
(after  the  letters  which  he  carried  had  been  examined)  to  Ephesus. 
AVhat  is  more  important  to  note  is,  that  Athenian  envoys  \\<ive  sent 
alon"-  with  him,  with  a  view  of  bringing  Athens  into  friendly  com- 
inunTcation  with  the  Great  King;  which  was  only  prevented  by  the 
fact  that  Artaxerxes  Longimanus  just  then  died.     Here  we  see  the 
fatal  practice,  generated  by  intestine  war,  of  invoking  Persian  aid; 
begun  by  Sparta  as  an  importunate  solicitor— and  partially  imitated 
by  Athens,  though  we  do  not  know  what  her  envoys  were  instructed 
to  sav,  had  they  been  able  to  reach  Sus^. 

Nothing  more  is  heard  about  Persian  intervention  until  the  year  ot 
the  great  Athenian  disasters  before  Syracuse.  Elate  with  the  hopes 
arising  out  of  that  event,  the  Persians  required  no  solicitation,  but 
were  quite  as  eager  to  tender  interference  for  their  own  purposes,  as 


720 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


SPARTA  AT  THE  PEACE. 


721 


Sparta  was  to  invite  them  for  liers.  IIovv  ready  Sparta  was  to  pur- 
cluise  llieir  aid  l>y  the  surrender  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  aud  that  too 
witliout  any  stipulations  iu  their  favor,  has  been  recounted  in  a  pre- 
ceding chapter.  She  had  not  now  the  excuse — for  it  stands  only  as 
an  excuse  and  not  as  a  justiticalion — of  self-defense  against  aggres- 
sion from  Athens.  Avhich  Arehidamus  had  produced  at  the  beginuin"- 
of  the  war.  Even  then  it  was  only  a  colorable  excuse,  not  borne  out 
by  the  reality  of  the  case;  but  now,  the  avov,ed  as  well  as  the  real 
object  was  something  quite  different— not  to  repel,  but  to  crush 
Athens.  Yet  to  accomplish  that  object,  i.ol  even  of  pretended  safety, 
but  of  pure  ambition,  SparUv  sacrificed  iincondiiionally  the  liberty  of 
her  Asiatic  kinsmen;  a  price  which  Arehidamus  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  would  certainly  never  have  endured  the  thought  of  paying, 
notwithstanding  the  then  formidable  power  of  Athens.  Here,*  too. 
we  find  Athens  following  the  example:  and  consenting,  in  hopes  of 
procuring  Persian  aid,  to  the  like  saciilice,  lliough  the  bargain  was 
never  consummated.  It  is  true  that  she  was  then  contending  for  her 
existence.  Nevertheless,  the  facts  afford  melancholy  proof  how 
much  the  sentiment  of  Pan-Hellenic  independence  became  enfeebled 
in  both  the  leaders,  amid  the  tierce  intestine  conflict  terminated  by 
the  battle  of  ^Egospotami. 

After  that  battle,  the  bargain  between  Sparta  and  Persia  would 
doubtless  have  been  fulfilled,  and  the  Asiatic  Greeks  would  have 
passed  at  once  under  the  dominion  of  the  latter— had  not  an  entirely 
new  train  of  circumstances  arisen  out  of  the  very  peculiar  posili(  n 
and  designs  of  Cyrus,  That  young  prince  did  all  in  his  jiow  er  to 
gain  the  affections  of  the  Greeks,^is  auxiliaries  for  his  ambitious 
speculations;  in  which  sjMCulations  both  Sparta  and  the  Asiatic 
Greeks  took  part,  compromising  themselves  irrevocably  against 
Artaxerxes,  and  still  more  against  Tissaphernes.  Sparta  thus  became 
unintentionally  the  enemy  of  Persia,  and  found  herself  compelled  to 
protect  the  Asiatic  Greeks  against  her  hostility  with  which  they  were 
threatened:  a  protection  easy  for  her  to  confer,  not  merely  from  the 
unbounded  empire  which  she  then  e'^ijoyed  over  the  Grecian  world, 
but  from  the  presence  of  the  renowned  Cyreian  Ten  Thousand,  aiul 
the  contempt  for  Persian  military  strength  which  they  brought  lujuie 
from  their  retreat.  She  thus  tinds  herself  in  the  exercise  of  a  Pan- 
Hellenic  protectorate  or  presidency,  first  through  the  miuistiy  of 
Derkyllidas,  next  of  Agesilaus,  who  even  sacrifices  at  Aulis,  takes  up 
the  scepter  of  Agamemnon,  and  contemplates  large  schemes  of  aggres- 
sion agjiinst  the  Great  King.  Here,  however,  the  Persians  play 
against  her  the  same  game  which  she  had  invoked  them  to  assist  in 
playing  against  Athen.s.  Their  tltet,  which  fifle(n  years  before  she 
had  invited  for  her  own  purposes,  is  now  brought  inagainst  herself, 
and  with  far  more  effect,  since  her  empire  was  more  odious  as  well 
as  more  oppressive  than  the  Athenian.     It  is  now  Athens  and  her 


allies  who  call  in  Persian  aid,  without  any  direct  engagement,  in- 
deed, to  surrender  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  for  we  are  told  that  after  the 
battle  of  Knidus  Kouon  incurred  the  displeasure  of  the  Persians  by 
Ills  supposed  plans  for  reuniting  them  with  Athens,  and  Athenian 
aid  was  still  continued  to  Evagoras— yet  nevertheless,  indirectly  pav- 
in"-  the  way  for  that  consununation.  If  Athens  and  her  allies  here 
render  themselves  culpable  of  an  abnegation  of  Pan-Hellenic  senti- 
ment, we  may  remark,  as  befoi-e,  that  tliey  act  under  the  pressure  of 
stron'o-er  necessities  than  could  ever  be  pleaded  by  Sparta;  and  that 
they  might  employ  on  their  own  behalf,  with  much  greater  truth,  the 
excuse  of  self-preservation  preferred  by  King  Arehidamus. 

But  never  on  any  occasion  did  that  excuse  find  less  real  place  than 
in  rec^ard  to  the  mission  of  Antalkidas.     Sparta  was  at  that  time  so 
powerful   even  after  the  loss  of  her  maritime  empire,  that  the  allies 
at  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  jealous  of  each  other  and  held  together 
only  by  common  terror,  could  hardly  stand  on  the  defensive  against 
her  and  would  probably  have  been  disunited  by  reasonable  offers  on 
her' part;  nor  would  she  have  needed  even  to  recall  Agesilaus  from 
Asia      Nevertheless  the  mission  was  probably  dictated  in  great  meas- 
ure by  a  groundless  panic,  arising  from  the  sight  of  the  revived  Long 
Walls  and  refortitied  Peinijus,  and  springing  at  once  to  the  fancy, 
that  a  new  Athenian  empire,  such  as  had  existed  forty  years  before, 
was  about  to  start  into  life;  a  fancy  little  likely  to  be  realized,  since 
the  very  peculiar  circumstances  which  had  created  the  first  Athenian 
empire  were  now  totally  reversed.     Debarred  from  maritime  empire 
herself,  the  first  object  with  Sparta  was,  to  shut  out  Athens  from  the 
like;  the  next,  to  put  down  all  partial  federations  or  political  com- 
binations, and  to  enforce  universal  autonomy,  or  the  maximum  of 
political  isolation;  iu  order  that  there  might  nowhere  exist  a  power 
capable  of  resistimr  herself,  the  strongest  of  all  individual  states.    As 
a  means  to  this  end,  which  was  no  less  in  the  interest  of  Persia  than 
iu  hers,  she  outbid  all  prior  subserviences  to  the  Great  King— be- 
trayed to  him  not  only  one  entire  division  of  her  Hellenic  kinsmen, 
but  also  the  general  honor  of  the  Hellenic  name  in  the  most  fiagrant 
manner— aiul  volunteered  to  medlze  in  order  that  the  Persians  might 
■  reoay  her  by  laconizing.     To  insure  fully  the  obedience  of  all  the 
satraps   who  had  more  than  once  manifested  dissentient  views  of 
tiieir  own    Antalkidas  procured  and  brought  down  a  formal  order 
signed  and  sealed  at  Susa;  and  Sparta  undertook,  without  shame  or 
scmple,  to  enforce  the  same  order— "the  convention  sent  down  by 
the  Kino-"— upon  all  her  countrymen;  thus  converting  them  into  the 
subiectsT  and  herself  into  a  sort  of  viceroy  or  satrap,  of  Artaxerxes. 
Such  an  act  of  treason  to  the  Pan-Hellenic  cause  wa.s  far  more  ilag- 
rant  and  destructive  than  that  alleged  confederacy  with  the  Persian 
king  'for  which  the  Theban  Ismenias  was  afterward  put  to  death, 
and  that  too  by  the  Spartans  themselves.     Unhappily,  it  formed  a 


722 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS 


POINT  MADE  AGAINST  CORINTH. 


723 


precedent  for  the  fuliire,  and  was  closely  copied  afterward  liy 
Thebes:  forebodiuu:  but  too  clearly  the  short  career  which  Grecian 
political  independence  had  to  run. 

That  large  patriotic  sentiment,  which  dictated  the  mairnanimous 
answer  sent  by  the  Athenians  to  the  ofiei-s  of  Mardonius  in  47i>  n.c, 
refiisinir,  in  the  n)idst  of  ruin  present  and  prospective,  all  temptalioii 
to  betrav  the  sanctity  of  Pan-Hcllenii-  fellow.shiiJ — that  seulinienl 
which  had  been  durinir  the  two  following  generations  the  predomi- 
nant inspiration  of  Athens,  and  had  also  been  powerful,  tluuigh 
always  less  powerful,  at  h^]iaita — was  now,  in  the  former,  overlaid  by 
more  pressing  api)rehensiuns.  and  in  the  latter  completely  extin- 
iruished.  Now.  it  was  to  the  leading  states  that  Greece  had  to  look 
for  holding  up  the  great  ])anner  of  Pan-Hellenic  independence;  from 
the  smaller  states  nothing  more  could  be  required  than  that  they 
should  adhere  to  and  delend  it  when  upheld.  But  so  soon  as  bparta 
was  seen  to  solicit  and  (nforce,  and  Athens  to  accept  (even  under 
constraint),  the  proclamation  under  the  king's  hand  and  seal  bnaiglit 
down  by  Antalkidas— that  baiuier  was  no  longer  a  part  of  the  ]iublic 
embleni"s  of  Grecian  political  life.  The  grand  idea  represented  by  it 
—of  collective  self-determining  Hellenism — was  left  to  dwell  in  the 
bosoms  of  individual  patriots. 

If  we  look  at  the  convention  of  Antalkidas  apart  from  its  form  and 
warranty,  and  with  reference  to  its  substance,  we  shall  find  that 
thouirh  its  tirst  article  was  unecjuivocally  disgraceful,  its  last  was  at 
least "popnlar  as  a  promise  to  the  ear.  Universal  autonomy,  to  each 
city,  small  or  great,  was  dear  to  Grecian  political  instinct.  I  have 
already  remarked  more  than  once  that  the  exaggeiated  force  of  this 
desire  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  short  duration  of  Grecian  freedom. 
Absorbinu-  all  the  powers  of  life  to  the  separate  ])arts,  it  left  no  vital 
force  or  integritv  to  the  whole;  especially,  it  robbed  both  each  and 
all  of  the  power 'of  self-defense  against  loreign  assailants.  Though 
indispensable  up  to  a  certain  point  and  under  certain  modifications, 
yet  bevond  these  moditicaticms,  which  Grecian  political  instinct  was 
far  from  recoirnizing,  it  produced  a  great  preponderance  of  mis- 
chief. Although  therefore  this  item  of  the  convention  was  in  its 
promise  acceptable  and  popular — and  although  we  shall  find  it  herc^- 
after  invoked  as  a  protection  m  various  individual  cases  of  injustice 
—we  must  inquire  how  it  was  carried  into  execution,  before  avc  can 
l^ronounce  whether  it  was  good  or  evil,  the  jnesent  of  a  friend  or  of 
an  enemy. 

The  succeeding  pages  will  furnish  an  answer  to  this  inquiry.  The 
Lacediiemonians,  as  "  presidents  (guaranties  or  executors)  of  the 
peace,  sent  down  by  the  king,"  undertook  the  duty  of  execution;  and 
we  shall  see  that  from  the  beginning  they  meant  nothing  sincerely. 
They  did  not  even  attempt  any  sinc-ere  and  steady  complianc^  with 
the  iione.st,  though  undistinguishing.  political  instinct  of  the  Greek 
mind;  much  less  did  they  seek  to  grant  as  much  as  was  really  good, 


ond  to  withhold  the  remainder.  They  defined  autonomy  in  such  man- 
ner  and  meted  it  out  in  such  portions,  as  suited  their  own  poliiical 
utc^rests  and  purposes.    The  promise  made  by  the  cn.vcntjon  except 

so  far  as  it  enabled  them  to  increase  their  own  power  by  disniem- 

•Prmentor  party  intervention,  proved  altogether  false  andhollmN. 

For  if  we  look  back  to  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  when 

tliev  sent  to  Athens  to  require  general  autonomy  throughout  Greece, 

vc  shall  find  that  the  word  had  then  a  distinct  and  serious  import; 

'mandiiig  that  the  cities  held  in  dependence  by  Athens  should  bo 
oft  free  v?hich  freedom  Sparta  might  have  insured  tor  them  herself 
tie  close  of  the  war,  hacl  she  not  preferred  to  convert  it  into  a  far 
n  'her  empire.  But  in  387  (the  date  of  the  peace  of  Antalkidas) 
—re  were  no  large  bodies  of  subjects  to  be  emancipated,  except  the 
Hies  of  Sparta  herself,  to  whom  it  was  by  no  ^'^'  '!''^!^'^'' 
„v>lv  So  that  in  fact  what  was  promised  as  well  as  what  was 
• . ;  iz-'d   even  by  the  most  specious  item  of  this  disgracetul  conven- 

r  was  "  that  cities  should  enjoy  autonomy,  not  tor  then-  own  ccnn- 
f,rr'aiurin  their  own  wav,  but  for  LaccHhemonian  ccmvenience;  a 
L^iiiilcant  phrase  (employed  by  Perikles  in  the  ^^ebat..  prec^c^n^  he 
IVloponnesitm  war)  which  forms  a  sort  ot  running  text  fc  Giecum 
history  during  the  sixteen  years  between  the  peace  of  Antalkidas  and 

'1'i;^'^^ivady'mentioned  that  the  two  first  applications  of  the 
ncwlv-proelaimed  autonomy  made  by  the  Lacedaemonians  were  o 
extort  from  the  Corinthian  government  the  dismissal  ot  its  Aigeiai 
■lUK  iiries  and  to  compel  Thebes  to  renounce  her  ancient  pre>idencY 
;  n  e  tootian  federaticm.  The  latter  especially  was  an  obi-'ct^whicli 
thev  luu  long  had  at  hetirt;  and  by  both,  their  aseendeney  in  Greece 
V-  s  much  inSroased.  Athens  too-terrified  by  the  new  development 
o  4s  a  force,  as  well  as  partially  bribed  by  the  restoration  of  he 
n  ree  is  ids  into  an  acceptance  of  tiie  peace-u;iis  thus  robbed  of 
T  T  leban  and  Corinthia'i  allies,  and  disabled  from  opposing  the 
Spartan  projects.  But  before  we  enter  upon  these  Pi;.>.iects  it  will  be 
convenient  to  turn  for  a  short  time  to  the  proceedings  of  the  Pei- 

'''Even  before  the  death  of  Darius  Nothus  (father  of  Artaxerxes  and 
C^T us)  E^ypt  had  revolted  from  the  Persians,  under  a  native  prince 
inmec   iUiivrli^iis.     To  the  Grecian  leaders  who  ac^companied  Cyrus 
;  h^  ex^^^^^^^^^^  against  his  brother,  this  revolt  was  wel    known  to 

mve  much  incensed  the  Persians;  so  that  Klearchus.  in  the  conver- 
sation wliicl  took  place  after  the  death  of  Cyrus  about  accom.noda- 
tionntl     Vrtax^^^^         intimated  that  the  Ten  Thousand  could    end 

n  ^ffti^^^n 'reconquering  Egypt.  It  was  n<^  mere  y  tln.se 
Greeks  who  were  exposed  to  danger  by  the  death  of  Cyrus,  but  aU> 
^  e  vuio  s  Persians  and  other  subjects  who  had    ent  assistance  to 

m   a    o Whom  made  submission  and  tried  to  conciliate  Ar  axerxes 
except  Tamos,  who  had  commanded  the  fieet  oi  Cyrus  on  the  coa.t3 


724 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


GREEK  PRINCES  DISPOSSESSED. 


725 


Tioth  of  Ionia  and  of  Kilikia.  Such  was  the  alarm  of  Tamos  when 
Tissapheriics  came  down  iu  full  power  to  the  coast,  that  he  fled  willi 
his  fleet  and  treasures  to  Egypt,  to  seek  protection  from  King  Psam- 
metichus,  to  whom  he  had  rendered  valuuhle  service.  This  traitor, 
liowever,  having  so  valuahle  a  deposit  brought  to  him,  forgot  every- 
thing else  iu  his  avidity  to  make  it  sure,  and  put  to  death  Tamos  with 
all  his  children.  About  395  B.C.  we  find  Nephereus,  king  of  Egyj)!, 
lending  aid  to  the  Laceda'monian  fleet  against  Artaxerxes.  Two 
years  afterward  (302-90  B.C.).  during  the  years  numcdiatc'ly  succeed- 
ing the  victory  of  Knidus,  and  the  voyage  of  Pliariiabazus  across  the 
^Egean  to  Peloponnesus — we  hear  of  that  satrap  as  employed  with 
Abrokomns  and  Tithraustes  in  strenuous  but  unavailing  efl!orts  to 
reconquer  Egypt.  Having  thus  repulsed  the  Persians,  the  Egyptian 
king  Akoris  is  found  between  390-80  b.c  ,  sending  aid  to  Evagoras 
in  Cyprus  against  the  same  enemy.  And  iu  spite  of  further  efforts 
made  afterward  by  Artaxerxes  to  reconquer  Egypt,  the  native  kings 
in  that  country  maintained  their  independence  for  about  sixty  years 
in  all,  until  the  reign  of  his  successor  Ochus. 

But  it  was  a  Grecian  enemy — of  means  inferior,  yet  of  qualities 
much  superior,  to  any  of  these  Egyptians — who  occupied  the  chief 
attention  of  the  Persians  immediately  after  the  peace  of  Antalkidas: 
Evagoras,  despot  of  Salamis  in  Cyprus.  Respecting  that  prince  wo 
possess  a  discourse  of  the  most  glowing  and  superabundant  eulogy, 
composed  after  his  death  for  the  satisfaction  (and  probably  paid  for 
with  the  money)  of  his  son  and  successor,  JSikokles,  by  the  contem- 
porary Isokrates.  Allowing  as  we  must  do  for  exaggeration  and 
partiality,  even  the  trustworthy  features  of  the  picture  are  sufficiently 
interesting. 

Evagoras  belonged  to  a  Salaminian  stock  or  Gens  called  the  Tcu- 
krid(e,  wdnoh  nundxTcd  among  its  ancestors  the  splendid  legendary 
names  of  Teukrus,  Telamon,  and  ^akus;  taking  its  dejiarture, 
through  them,  from  the  divine  name  of  Zeus.  It  was  believed  that 
the  archer  Teukrus,  after  returning  from  the  siege  of  Troy  to  (the 
Athenian)  Salamis,  had  emigrated  under  aliarsh  order  from  his  father 
Telamon,  and  given  commencement  to  the  city  of  that  name  on  the 
eastern  coast  of  Cyprus.  As  in  Sicily,  so  in  Cyprus,  the  Greek  and 
Phenician  elements  were  found  in  near  contact,  though  in  very  dif 
ferent  proportions.  Of  the  nine  or  ten  separate  city  conununities, 
which  divided  among  them  the  whole  sea-coast,  the  inferior  towns 
being  all  dependent  upon  one  or  other  of  them — seven  pass  for  llcl- 
leinc,  the  two  most  considerable  being  Salamis  and  Soli;  three  for 
Phenician — Paphos,  Amathus,  and  Kitium.  Probably,  however, 
there  was  in  each  a  mixture  of  Greek  and  Phenician  population,  iu 
different  proportions.  Each  was  ruled  by  its  own  sei)arate  prince  or 
despot.  Greek  or  Phenician.  The  Greek  immigrations  (though  their 
exjict  date  cannot  be  assigned)  appear  to  have  been  later  in  date  than 
the  Phenician.    At  the  time  of  the  Ionic  revolt  (b.c.  496),  the  pre- 


ponderance was  on  the  side  of  Hellenism;  yet  with  considerable 
Fntermixture  of  Oriental  custom.  Hellenism  was  however  greatly 
r msl  e(l  by  the  Persian  reconquest  of  the  revolters,  aca)mplished 
tl  rou'di  the  aid  of  the  Phenicians  on  the  opposite  contmentAnjl 
Mioli  doubtless  the  victories  of  Kimon  and  the  Athenians  (4.0-.)0 
BC)  partially  revived  it.  yet  Perikles,  in  his  pacihcation  with  the 
P.M-i-ms  had  prudently  relinciuished  Cyprus  as  well  as  Egypt;  so 
Ui  t  the'  Grecian  element  in  the  former,  receiving  little  extraneous 
el^eouragement,  became  more  and  more  subordinate  to  the  Pheni- 

""' R  was  somewhere  about  this  time  that  the  rei-ning  princes  of  Sala- 
mis who  at  the  time  of  the  Ionic  revolt  had  been  (greeks  of  the 
T.ulJid  Gens  were  supplanted  and  dethroned  by  a  Phenician  exile 
w   o  Adn^^  '^"d    made   himself   despot    in   their 

nl  ce  To  nsure  his  own  scepter,  this  usurper  did  everything  in  his 
Sowe'r  to  mdtiply  and  strengthen  the  Phenician  population,  as  vvd 
as 7o  discourage  and  degrade  the  Hellenic.  ,  The  same  policy  was  not 
inlv  continued  by  his  Successor  at  Salamis,  but  seems  also  to  have 
been  inSed  ins^^^  of  the  other  towns;  insomuch  that  during 
most  part  of  the  Peloponnesiau  war,  Cyprus  became  sen^ib  y  dis- 
Senbed  The  Greeks  in  the  island  were  harshly  oppressed;  new 
GrlTvtit^^^^^  were  kept  off  ^V  tu,  niost  repulsive 

treatment,  as  well  as  by  threats  of  those  cruel  -^  !  f  J-^;^  \%^  ^^^^^ 
Yvl.ip])  were  habitually  employed  as  penalties  by  tiie  Orientals,  w  niie 
Grecian  arL  education,  music,  poetry,  and  intelligence  were  rapidly 

'"NonSaiiding  such  untoward  circumstances,  in  -Inch  tl^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
nf  the  Tcukria  Ev^i^oras  at  Salamis  was  passed,  he  manifested  at  an 
e  u  1 V  a-^^  eliergy  both  of  mind  and  body,  and  so  much  power 

of  wimiincr  popularity,  Uiat  he  became  at  once  a  marked  man  both 
a moi"  Gi-eeks  and  Phenicians.  It  was  about  this  time  that  ^m 
P  e'niciaJidespot  was  slain,  through  a  -^^^P^-^^'  formed  ^^>^^ 
or  Tvrian  named  Abdemon,  who  got  possession  of  the  sccptci.  i  ne 
usurper  m?stS  of  his  position  and  anxious  to  lay  hands  upon  all 
CO  Sm^r^^^  might  be  capable  of  doing  lum  niisch.ei 

tiid  to  seze  Evagoras;  but  the  latter  escaped  and  passed  over  to  bo 
11  Kilikir    Thou^-h  thus  to  all  appearance  a  helpless  exde.  he  found 
e^is  to  strike  a  decisive  blow,  while  the  new  usurpation,  stained  by 
rS  vidences  and  rapacity,  was  surrounded  by  ---es  .loubters 
or  neutrals   without  having  yet  established  any  firm  foo  nig.     He 
e  ossedoveVfrZ^^^  a  small  but  determined  band 

ofTout  fifty  fXwers-obtained  secret  admission  by  a  postern  gate 
of  sXm^.-and  assaulted  Abdemon  by  night  in  his  palace.  In  spite 
0  a  va^a;  superior  number  of  guards  this  -^l^:^:^^;^^^ 
with  such  extraordinary  daringand  judgment,  that  Abdemon  peri.iiea, 
and  Evagoras  became  despot  in  his  place.  ,  Evagoras 

The  splendor  of  this  exploit  was  quite  sufficient  to  seat  i^va^oras 


726 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


unopposed  on  the  throne,  amid  .1  population  alwnys  accustomed  to 
princely  governmeut;  while  anioni;,-  tlic,  Salainiiiian  Greeks  he  was 
still  larther  endeared  by  his  Teukrid  descent.  His  conduct  fully  jus- 
titied  the  expectations  entertnined.  ]S'ot  merely  did  he  refrain  froiu 
bloodshed,  or  spoliaiiou,  or  violence  for  the  gratitication  of  ]K'rs(iial 
ai^petite;  abstinences  remarkable  enough  in  any  Grecian  despot  lo 
stamp  Ids  reiun  with  letters  of  gold,  and  the  more  remarkable  in 
Kvagoras,  since  he  had  the  susceptible  temi)crament  of  a  Greek, 
though  his  great  mental  force  alwa3S  kept  it  under  due  contrcJ.  But 
he  was  also  careful  in  inquiring  into,  and  strict  in  punishing  crime,  yet 
without  those  demonstrations  of  cruel  intiiclion  by  which  an  Oriental 
prince  displayed  his  energy.  His  government  was  at  the  same  time 
hiuhly  popular  and  conciliating,  as  well  toward  the  nuiltilude  as 
toward  individuals.  Indefatigable  in  his  own  personal  supervision, 
he  examined  everything  for  himself,  sha[ied  out  his  own  line  of 
policy,  and  kept  watch  over  its  execution.  He  was  foremost  in  all 
elTort  and  in  all  danirer.  ^laintaining  uncHsturbed  securitv.  he  ur.ul- 
ually  doubled  the  wealth,  commerce,  industry,  and  military  force  of 
the  city,  while  liis  own  popularity  and  renown  went  on  increasing. 

Above  all,  it  was  his  iirst  wish  to  renovate,  l)oth  in  Salamis  and  in 
Cyprus,  that  Hellenism  winch  the  Phenician  despots  (»f  the  last  tifly 
years  had  done  so  much  to  extinguish  or  con  upt.  For  aid  in  this 
scheme,  he  seems  to  have  t\n*ned  his  thoughts  to  Athens,  with  which 
city  he  was  connected  as  a  Teukrid,  by  gentile  and  legendary  sympa- 
thies— and  which  was  then  only  just  ceasing  to  be  the  great*  naval 
power  of  the  ^Egean.  For  though  we  cannot  exactly  make  out  the 
date  at  which  Evagoras  began  to  reign,  we  may  conclude  it  to  have 
been  about  411  or  410  B.C.  It  seems  to  have  been  shortly  aft«r 
that  period  that  he  was  visited  by  Anclokides  the  Alhenian;  more- 
over he  must  have  been  a  prince  not  merely  estiiblished,  but  ]>ower- 
ful,  when  he  ventured  to  harbor  Konon  in  40.>  B.C..  after  the  battle 
of  ^Egospotami.  He  invited  to  Salamis  fresh  imndgiants  from 
Attica  and  other  parts  of  Greece,  as  the  j)rince  Philokyprus  of  Soli 
had  done  under  the  auspices  of  Solon,  a  century  and  a  half  before. 
He  took  especial  pains  to  revive  and  improve  Grecian  letters,  arts, 
teaching,  music,  and  intellectual  tendenci(  s.  His  encouragement  was 
so  successfully  administered,  that  in  a  few  3'ears.  without  constraint 
or  violence,  the  face  of  Salamis  was  changed.  The  gentleness  and 
sociability,  the  fashions  and  pursuits,  of  Hellenism,  became  ag.iiu 
predominant;  with  great  influence  of  example  over  all  the  other 
towns  of  the  island. 

Had  tiie  rise  of  Evagoras  taken  place  a  few  years  earlier,  Athens 
might  perhaps  have  availed  her.^elf  of  the  opening  to  turn  her 
ambition  eastward,  in  preference  to  that  disastrous  impulse  which 
led  her  westward  to  Sicily.  But  coming  as  he  did  only  at  that  later 
moment  when  she  was  hard  pressed  to  keep  up  even  a  defensive  war, 
he  protited  rather  by  her  weakness  than  by  her  strength.     During 


EVxVGQKAS  AT  WAR  WITH  THE  PERSIANS.      727 

1     •         r^ovo   r,f  iho  w'lv   when  the  Athenian  empire   w^as 

•  ',  fu  ,  e  iove.  lor  tillv  ycuvs  .u.dcr  Athens,  became  a  scene  of 
uliich  It  hail  '-''.1">'^ '  \"i'  V  i,,r,„,-v-levvius  Heets-mauv  oiilsettlers 
,.H,os    Jjetwee,    u       .  V  .1  m.  m^^^  e^^^^^  tl,e  Islands,  the  Cherso- 

th.  <  efeat  of  '^-^^^^  ^,  ''"\^^'f^^;.,.,.,l    o  seek  shelter  either  at  Ath.ns 

lo  "lilt,, .     10  sm.u  iJ  ,.  i  ,i,euian  triremes  saved  ont  ot  the 

'""T'.^fe  ;  it  p  d^itS  uv,taU 0  s  ot  Evagoras  wonld  present  a 
ireat  defeat,  the  protianuu.  m  ,,,,,,,,1       Vccord  nL'lv  we   earn 

1,  ,vl,or  of  ref.ige  nowliere  else  to  "^  .  "  (■  f,;,,^,'' j'u-^,^,,-,t  parts  of 
tl-'  '"""^■■•""i:ft'sal an  Is  '' Utn  Cnian'""..mu.n,  durin,  the 
^r:if SimHolTa^d  s;  «erln.  ^Meh  preeed^  as  .eU  as  fo^.wed 

cannot  determme.     A      he  /J^^^.^^*  ^    \,,f  ^j^       instrumental  in 

(lisnlaved  by  him  on  that  occasion  m  the  service  of  f  Y;^^^^^.^^^^/^^'^^ 
uisiM.i>^>i  "J  *  ,  f  ii      litter  a'T^amst  turn  aie  lo  uu 

self,  that  the  .jealousy  and  ahum  ^f^,  ^^^,/;  "^\; '^^g,.,,  .moment  when 

i:-'r-pr^;i!:ri.r^.r^:rir^^i:^«-^^^^^ 


728 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


vailing,  moreover,  upon  some  of  tlie  Kilikian  towns  to  declare  againsf 
the  Persians.  lie  receiveil  powerful  aid  from  Akoras,  the  native  aiui 
independent  king  in  Egypt,  as  well  as  from  C'habrias  and  tlie  force 
sent  out  by  the  Athenians.  Beginning  apparently  about  ^i)0  n.c, 
the  war  against  P>agoras  lasted  something  more  than  ten  years,  cost- 
ing the  Persians  great  efforts  and  an  immense  expenditure  of  money. 
Twice  did  Athens  send  a  squadron  to  his  assistance,  from  gratitu' ' 
for  his  long  protection  to  Konon  and  his  energetic  efforts  before  iu 
the  battle  of  Knidus — though  she  thereby  ran  every  risk  of  making 
the  Persians  her  enemies. 

The  satrap  Tiribazus  saw  that  so  long  as  he  had  on  his  hiuids  a  war 
in  Greece,  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  concentrate  his  force  against 
the  prince  of  Salamis  and  the  Egyptians.  Hence,  in  part,  the  extra- 
ordinary effort  made  by  the  Persians  to  dictate,  in  conjimction  with 
Sparta,  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  and  to  get  together  such  a  tleet  in 
Ionia  as  should  overawe  Athens  and  Thebes  into  submission.  It  was 
one  of  the  conditions  of  that  peace  that  Evagoras  should  be  aban- 
doned; the  whole  island  of  Cyprus  being  acknowledged  as  belonuing 
to  the  Persian  king.  Though  thus  out  off  from  Athens,  and  reduced 
to  no  other  Grecian  aid  than  such  mercenaries  as  he  could  pay,  Eva- 
goras was  still  assisted  by  Akorisof  Egypt,  and  even  by  llekalomnus 
prince  of  Karia  with  a  secret  present  of  money.  But'  the  peace  of 
Antalkidas  being  now  executed  in  Asia,  the  Persian  satraps  were 
completely  masters  of  the  Grecian  cities  on  the  Asiatic  sea-board, 
and  were  enabled  to  convey  round  to  Kilikia  and  Cyprus  not  only 
their  own  fleet  from  Ionia,  but  also  additional  contingents  from  these 
very  Grecian  cities.  A  large  portion  of  the  Persian  force  acting 
against  Cyprus  was  thus  Greek,  yet  sceminoly  acting  by  consliaiul, 
neither  well-paid  nor  well-used,  and,  therefore,  not  very  ellicient. 

The  satraps  Tiribazus  and  Orontes  commanded  the  land  force,  a 
large  portion  of  which  was  transported  across  to  Cyprus:  the  admiral 
Gaos  was  at  the  head  of  the  fleet,  which  held  its  station  at  Kitium  in 
the  south  of  the  island.  It  was  here  that  Evagoras,  having  pre- 
viously gained  a  battle  on  h.nd.  attacked  them.  "By  extraordinary 
efforts  he  had  got  together  a  tleet  of  200  triremes,  nearly  equal  in 
.number  to  theirs:  but  after  a  hard  fought  contest,  in  which  heat 
first  seemed  likely  to  be  victorious,  he  underwent  a  complete  naval 
defeat,  which  disqualified  him  from  keeping  the  sea,  and  enabled 
the  Persians  to  block  up  !^alamis  as  well  by  sea  as  by  land.  Thongh 
thus  reduced  to  his  own  single  city,  however,  Evagoras  defended 
himself  with  unshaken  resolution,  still  sustained  by  aid  from  Akoris 
in  Egypt;  while  Tyre  and  several  towns  in  Kilikia  also  continued  iu 
revolt  against  Artaxerxes;  ^o  that  the  eft"orls  of  the  Persians  were 
distracted,  and  the  war  was  not  coni  luded  until  ten  years  after  its 
commencement.  It  cost  them  on  the  whole  (if  we  may  believe 
Isokrates)  15.000  talents  in  money,  and  such  severe  losses'  in  men, 
that. Tiribazus  acceded  to  the  pioposilious  of  Evagoras  for  peace, 


ASSASSINATION  OF  EVAGORAS  AND  HIS  SON.   729 

consenting  to  leave  him  in  full  possession  of  Salamis,  under  payment 
of  a  stipulated  tribute,  "like  a  slave  to  his  master."  These  last 
words  were  required  by  the  satrap  to  be  literally  inserted  in  the  con- 
vention; but  Evagoras  peremptorally  refused  his  consent,  demand- 
ing that  the  tribute  should  be  recognized  as  paid  by  "one  king  to 
another,"  Ilather  than  concede  this  point  of  honor,  he  even  broke 
off  the  negotiation,  and  resolved  again  to  defend  himself  to  the  utter- 
most. He  was  rescued,  after  the  siege  had  been  yet  further  pro- 
longed, by  a  dispute  which  broke  out  between  the  tw^o  commanders 
of  the  Persi.m  army.  Orontes,  accusing  Tiriluizus  of  projected  trea- 
son and  rebellion  against  the  king,  in  conjunction  with  Sparta, 
caused  him  to  be  sent  for  as  prisoner  to  Susa,  and  thus  became  sole 
commander.  But  as  the  besieging  army  was  already  wearied  out  by 
the  obstinate  resistance  of  Sahimis,  he  consented  to  grant  the  capitu- 
lation, stipulating  only  for  the  tribute,  and  exchanging  the  offensive 
phrase  enforced  by  Tiribazus,  for  the  amendment  of  the  other  side. 

It  was  thus  that  Evagoras  was  relieved  from  his  besiegiiig  enemies, 
and  continued  for  the  remainder  of  his  life  as  tributary  prince  of 
Salamis  under  the  Persians.  He  was  no  further  engaged  iu  war,  nor 
was  his  general  popularity  among  the  Salanunians  dindnished  by  the 
hardships  which  they  had  gone  through  along  with  him.  His  pru- 
dence calmed  the  rankling  antipathy  of  the  great  king,  who  would 
gladly  have  found  a  pretext  for  breaking  the  treatj^  His  children 
were  numerous,  and  lived  in  harmony  as  well  with  him  as  with  each 
other.  Isokrates  sj>ecially  notices  this  fact,  standing  as  it  did  in 
marked  contrast  with  the  family  relations  of  most  of  the  Grecian 
despots,  usually  sUuned  with  jealousies,  antipathies,  and  conflict, 
often  with  actual  bloodshed.  But  he  omits  to  notice  the  incident 
whereby  Evagoras  perished;  an  incident  not  in  keeping  with  that 
superhuman  good  fortune  and  favor  from  the  Gods,  of  which  the 
panegyrical  oration  boasts  as  having  been  vouchsafed  to  the  hero 
throughout  his  life.  It  was  seemingly  not  very  long  after  the  peace, 
that  a  Salaminian  named  Nikokreon  formed  a  conspiracy  against  his 
life  and  dominion,  but  was  detected,  b}'  a  sirgular  accident,  before 
the  moment  of  execution,  and  forced  to  seek  safety  in  flight,  lie 
left  behind  him  a  youthful  daughter  in  his  harem,  under  the  care  of 
an  eunuch  (a  Greek,  born  in  Elis)  named  ThrasycliX^us;  who,  full  of 
vindictive  sympathy  in  his  master's  cause,  made  known  the  beauty 
of  the  young  lady  both  to  Evagoras  himself  and  to  Pnytagoras,  the 
most  distinguished  of  his  sons,  pariner  in  the  gallant  defense  of 
Salamis  against  the  Persians.  Both  of  them  w<'ie  tempted,  each 
unknown  to  the  other,  to  make  a  secret  assignation  for  being  con- 
ducted to  her  chamber  by  the  eunuch:  both  of  them  were  there 
assassinated  by  his  hand. 

Thus  perished  a  Greek  of  pre-eminent  vigor  and  intelligence, 
remarkably  free  from  the  vices  usual  in  Grecian  dc^spots,  and  fonn- 
iug  a  strong  contrast  in  this  respect  with  his  contemporary  Dionysius, 


«gQ  PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 

wl,o«c  militnrv  enorm'  is  so  deeply  stained  bv  crime  and  violence 
Nkokl"  he-son  ofEva^oras.  rei.L'ned  =,t  Ha  m.us  after  """.  "  "' 
S  owe  1  m  el.  resanl,  accompanied  by  munmccnt  prc;sent.,  to  ll  c 
IZnian  Isokrates;  who  compliments  bin.  as  a  paeitic  a.-.d  ^  ell- 
rii".o"edVrucc  att.ched  to  Greek  pursuits  and  arts,  c.mversaiit  by 
trona  stidv \N-itl.  Greek  rbik>soi.by,  and  alK.ve  ail,  .■opyn.g  l,.s 
fHflie.  in  that  iust  dealinL'  and  absence  of  wrony-  towa.-d  person  nr 
r'ropertv.  ^J^lich  had  so  much  pron.oled  the  comlort  as  well  as  the 

P  w'e'n^wfevertlrL  the  episode  respecting  Evnporas-interesting 
^oflesb  from  the  eminent  qnnlities  of  that  pnnee  tLan  fion,  the 
^bmn4  of  Hellenism  stru.n.^ling  with  the  Phe.ucta..  elenicnl  in 
?;  .BP;l-m  the  ceneral  consequences  of  the  perce  of  Anta  kidas  m 
Ce.U.-al  Greece.  For  the  first  time  since  the  battle  ot  >Iyka  e,  i..  ,  J 
BC  he  Persians  were  now  really  masters  of  all  the  Gie<;kson  the 
Asiat  c  coaM  The  sat.aps  lost  no  lime  in  confi.-ming  tbcir  < bm  n.- 
fon  In  a  the  cW,s  wh  el.  tltC'V  suspe.'ted.  th.y  built  clr.dels  and 
Xntel  PC  m  nent  srarrisons.     li.  son.e  eases,  their  m.struf    or  .Us- 

fe  cities   bavins  already  once  <han?ed  their  pcsttton  gre.,  1y   ., 
the   wor'e    bv  passing  froni  easy  subjection  unde.;  Athet.s  to  tl.c 
hm-h  r,  ie'of  ■l.aecda.monian  ha.mosts  and  native  <lecemv.rs-wee 
now   .'■    sferre.1  to  n.nst.Ts  vet  more  oppressive  and  mo.-e  eomple  elv 
w   ho      the  pa  e  of  Il.ll.nic  svmpalhy.     Both  in  pubbe  eMo.lam 
Tnd   in  wro,  e    oinL'  toward   individuals,  the  comn.andant  a.ul  Ins 
^Mercenaries  «%om  the  ^atrap  maintained,  were  probably  .nore  ra]..- 
rcTs  ami  cer  ainlv  m.ae  unrest.aimd,  than  even  the  hav.nosts  o 
Sw'a      Moreover'tlte  Pei-siat.  gran.lees  rc„uired  ber.t.l.lul  boys  . 
riuucl'is  for  their  service,  and  b<anliful  women  as  mm.ites  o    tlu. 
harems      Wha   was  taken  for  their  convenience  a<l..,)tled  ..(.■.;• 

recoven-  nor  redress;  and  Gre<-ian  women,  if  not  "1""'  ;!'^'"    f'    '   •  1' 
recoMiv  iioi         .     '  .,:„.;„«   ^gre  at  least  more  intelligent,  1in<I), 

rnd"U  e  h^-ls  we  m"y  "ead  in  the  history.of  that  Phoka-at,  lady, 
Z  coi'iDanion  of  Cvrt.s.  who  was  taken  captive  at  Kuna.xa.     Uou- 
o"e  e  A°ia"ic6reeks,  when  passing  into  JK^  I'^ml-Y"    O'';;';;' 
nmte  "  came  under  the  maxims  and  sentiment  of  Oriental>,  u^ix    • 
i^'  tie"  infliction  of  pain  or  torture-maxims  not  <ndv  more  ciu.l 
.hi,   Imieot  the  Greeks,  but  also  making  little  distinction    .Hweeu 
freemen  indsave^    The  dift-'ience  tetween  the  Greeks  and  Plui  - 
c  anT  n  Cvprus,  on  this  point,  has  been  just  noticed;  and  dou  111- . 
t he  d  ft-tTence  t  etween  Greeks  a..d  Persians  was  stdl  more  maik   I 
While  the  Asiatic  Greeks  were  tSms  made  over  l'.V  !■!>■"'''.;>";' " 
Pe^oSpartan  convention  of   Antalkid.as.  to  a  condi  ua.   in  ey  .v 
«   wo  se,  thev  were  at  the  same  time  trans  erred,  as  re h.c 
auxd  ar  es  to  strenjthen  the  hands  of  the  Great  l^'".?  •■'.'-'"'"f'  f 
Grceki-aL^inst  Evauoras   in   C'yprus-and   above  all.  aga  nst      c 
Sands  adjoining  the  coast  of  Asia-Chios,  bamos,  Khode»,  etc. 


POWEK  GAINED  BY  SPARTA. 


731 


Tliose  islands  were  now  exposed  to  tlie  same  hazard,  from  their  over- 
\vhchniDg  Persian  ueiglibors,  as  that  from  which  they  had  been 
rescued  near!}^  a  century  before  by  the  Confederacy  of  Delos,  and  by 
the  Atheni'in  empire  into  which  tlmt  Confederacy  was  transformed. 
xVU  liie  tulehiry  combination  that  the  genius,  the  energy,  and  the 
Pan  he'llenic  anior,  of  Athens,  liad  first  organized,  and  so  long  kept 
up — was  now  broken  up;  while  Sparta,  to  whom  its  extinction  w^as 
owing,  in  surrendering  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  liad  destroyed  the  security 
even  of  the  islanders. 

It  soon  a])peared,  liowever,  how  much  Sparta  herself  had  gained 
by  this  surrender  in  respect  to  dominion  nearer  home.  The  govern- 
ment of  Corinth — wrested  from  the  party  friendly  to  Argos,  deprived 
of  Argeian  auxiliaries,  and  now  in  the  hands  of  tlie  restored  Corinth- 
ian oxile.^  who  were  the  most  devoted  partisans  of  Sparta — looked  to 
bcr  for  support,  and  made  lier  mistress  of  the  Isthmus,  either  for 
olfensc  or  for  defense.  Slie  thus  gained  tlie  means  of  free  action 
against  Thebes,  the  enemy  upon  whom  her  attention  was  first 
directed.  Thebes  was  now  the  object  of  Spartan  antipathy,  not  less 
than  Athens  had  formerly  been;  especially  on  the  part  of  King 
Agij^ilaus.  who  had  to  avenge  the  insult  olfered  to  himself  at  the 
sacrifice  near  Auli>,  as  well  as  tlie  strenuous  resistance  on  the  field  of 
Ivoroni'ia.  He  was  at  the  zenith  of  his  political  intiuence;  so  that  his 
intense  miso-Theban  sentiment  made  Sparta,  now  becoming  aggress- 
ive on  all  sides,  doubly  aggressive  against  Thebes.  More  prudent 
Spartans,  like  Antalkidas.  warned  him  that  his  persevering  hostility 
would  ultimately  kimlle  in  the  Thebans  a  fatal  energy  of  military 
re.<i<tance  and  oVganization.  But  the  warning  was  despised  until  it 
wfis  too  fully  realized  in  the  development  of  the  great  military  genius 
of  Epamini)ndas,  and  in  the  defeat  of  Leuktra. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  in  the  solemnity  of  exchanging 
oaths  to  the  peace  of  xVnt:d kidas,  the  Thebans  had  hesitated  at  first  to 
recognize  the  autonomy  of  the  other  Bceotian  cities;  upon  which 
Agesilaus  had  manifested  a  fierce  impatience  to  exclude  them  from 
the  treaty,  and  to  attack  them  single-handed.  Their  timely  submis- 
sion balked  him  in  his  impulse;  but  it  enabled  him  to  enter  upon  a 
series  of  measures  highly  humiliating  to  the  dignity  as  well  as  to  the 
power  of  Thebes. 

All  the  Beeotian  cities  were  now  proclaimed  autonomous  under  tlie 
convention.  As  soli(.'itor,  guaranty,  and  interpreter,  of  that  conven- 
tion, Simrta  either  had,  or  professed  to  have,  the  right  of  guarding 
their  autonomy  against  dangers,  actual  or  contingent,  from  their  pre- 
vious Vorort  or  presiding  city.  For  this  purpose  she  availed  herself 
of  this  moment  of  change  to  organize  in  each  of  them  a  local  oli- 
garchy, composed  of  ])artisans  adverse  to  Thebes  as  well  as  devoted 
to  herself,  and  upheld  in  case  of  need  by  a  Spartan  harmost  and  gar- 
ri^son.  Such  an  internal  revolution  grew  almost  naturally  out  of  the 
siluutiou;  since  the  previous  leaders,  and  the  predominant  sentiment 


732 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


PLAT/EA  RESTORED. 


733 


in  mo«t  of  the  towns,  seoin  to  Iiave  »>een  faTorable  to  Boeotian  unity, 
'amUo  U.e  cou.inue.1  .rosUlency  of  Thebes  ^''^^^  'rulers  -mW  there- 
fore  linil  themselves  hampered,  iiitmudateo.  anil  di^nialiticd.  umkr 
the  new  "vslem  wh,!e  those  who  ha.l  before  been  uu  opposi  lou 
mLoHtv  wm  1,  lome  forward  with  a  bold  and  deeided  pol.ey  bke 
KriH  .i -UKl  Theramenes  at  Athens  after  the  surrender  o  the  eity  to 
^vl.  nde  T he  e  V  ,,aders  doubtless  would  rather  invite  than  repel 
the  establishme.,t  of  a  Spartan  Imrnmst  in  their  town,  as  a  seouri  y  to 
t  eins  ■  vt^  a-aiust  resistance  from  their  own  citizens  as  well  as 
arrsVatWcfe  from  Thebes,  and  as  a  n.eans  of  placmg  them  under 
?he  in r  d  condilions  of  a  Lysan.hiau  Dekarchv.  Though  most  of 
he  too  lau  cities  were  thus',  on  the  whole,  favorable  to  1  l>ebe  - 
and  llTo  'h  Sparta  thrust  upon  then,  the  b.,.,n  wluch  she  called 
auhmom  "  from  motives  of  her  own,  and  uot  from  their  sohcita- 
?i  lyet-'OiThonienus  and  Thespife,  over,  whom  the  Pr"-"^")^;"^]  «/ 
iCu's  appears  to  have  Ken  harshly  exercised,  were  adverse  lo  ut 
auo  biv  r^  ble  to  the  Spartan  alliance.  These  two  cities  v-ere  strongly 
garrisoned  by  Sparta,  and  formed  her  mam  sta  lons  m  B<ro  m. 

The  oreselice  of  such  irarrisoiis.  one  on  each  side  of  T  labes— the 

dic«t  nuance  of  the  Beeotarchs,  wi,h  the  breaking  up  ot  a  I  sym- 

b,,is^nd  proceedings  of  the  Borotian  federation-aud  the  establisl - 

™  nl  of  oii^rohies^devoted  to  Sparta  in  "i;;  «'''"  ""g;^^™:,^;';'- 

less  a  deep  wound  to  the  pri<ie  ol   the  Thebaus.     But  there  was 

iitoiher  wound  still  .lecper.'an.l  this  the  Lacedamon.ans  forthwith 

imiret'tkd  lo  inflict— the  lestovation  of  Pla!a'a.  ,    , .    , 

'''a  m      nc^oly  interest  a.ta.  hes  .,o,h  to  .he  ^o^^^^f  °^ ,^'1^:^ 

one  of  the  biislhtcst  scenes  of  Grecian  glory,-and  to  "\V'"y,'-  "™ 

fti^lful  population,  victims  of  an  cvposxl  position  combined  ^Mlh 

n      eri  -d    ee  l.'iie^s.     Espe.iallv,  we  follow  with  a  sort  of  repug- 

nee    i  e  cap  icious  turns  of  policy  which  dictated  the  Spar  an 

1,  ivicr  tow.-  rd  ti.em.     One  hundred  and  twenty  years  befoie,  the 

PI  iems  ud   brown  th.mselves  upon  S,;arta  to  ^nl'-';"!'".;'^,'?  "  } 

ti  1  against  Thebes.     The  Spartan  king  Kleomeneshad  tl'en  decliiie 

lObli^'ntion  as  too  distant,  tmd  1 re. ommended  •!'  ^    »  « "^ 

emselxTS  will.  Athens.      This  recommenda.ion    though   d.  ta   d 

■hiHy  l.v  a  wish  to  raise  contention  between  Athens  «"'!  T  ^    '^ 

was  c..mplied  wilh:   and  the  alliance,  severing  P  al»a  altoget    r 

?rom    1^  Ea.o.ia„  conf.-leracy,  turned  out  bot.i  advantageous  am 

1 ,  ,,or-.ble  to  her  until  Ih.'  l.eL'innin2  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.    At 

.Tti me      s    led  the  ,.olicv  of  iheSpartans  to  uphold  and  strengthen 

'cveT«ay    ■esupien.acyofThebesovertheBa.ot.aucit.es.  It vv^ 

.  loSer  bv  Spartan  intervention,  in.leed,  that  the  power  of  Ihehes 
w  ,s°re  establislle,!,  after  the  great  prostration  :,s  well  as  d.sgi  «e 
which  she  had  un.lergone,  as  traitor  to  Hellas  and  ■^^ealous  n  Le 
service  of  Mar.lonius.  Athens,  on  the  other  h..iul,  was  at  tl'a'  '  « 
doing  ter  best  to  break  up  the  Bieolian  federat.on,  and  to  enroll  ts 
various  cities  as  her  allies:  in  which  project,  though  doubtless  stig- 


gestetl  by  and  conducive  to  her  own  ambition,  she  was  at  that  timo 
(460-445  B.C.)  perfectly  justifiable  on  Pan-helleiiic  grounds;  seeing 
that  Thebes  as  their  former  chief  had  so  recently  enlisted  them  all  in 
the  service  of  Xerxes,  and  might  be  expected  to  do  the  same  again  if 
a  second  Persian  invasion  should  l)e  attempted.  Though  for  a  time 
successful,  Athens  was  expelled  from  Boeotla  by  the  defeat  of  Koro- 
neia;  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  the  whole  Bceo- 
tian  federation  (except  Platjea)  was  united  under  Thebes,  in  bitter 
hostility  against  her.  The  first  blow  of  the  war,  even  prior  to  any 
declaration,  was  struck  by  Thebes  in  her  abortive  nocturnal  attempt 
to  surprise  Plattea.  In  the  third  year  of  the  war.  King  Archidamus, 
at  the  head  of  the  full  Lacedaemonian  force,  laid  siege  to  the  latter 
town;  which,  after  an  heroic  defense  and  a  long  blockade,  at  length 
surrendered  under  the  extreme  pressure  of  famine;  yet  not  before 
one  half  of  its  brave  defenders  had  forced  their  way  out  over  the 
blockading  wall,  and  escaped  to  x\thens,  where  all  the  Platiean  old 
men,  women,  and  chiUlren,  had  been  safely  lodged  before  the  siege. 
By  a  cruel  act  which  stands  among  the  capital  iniquities  of  Grecian 
warfare,  the  Lacedaemonians  had  put  to  death  all  the  Platiean  cap- 
tives, two  hundred  in  number,  who  fell  into  their  hands;  the  town 
of  Plataea  had  been  razed,  and  its  w  hole  territory,  joined  to  Thebes, 
had  remained  ever  since  cultivated  on  Theban  account.  The  surviv- 
ing Plata?ans  had  been  dealt  with  kindly  and  hospitably  by  the 
Athenians.  A  qualified  right  of  citizenship  was  conceded  to  them 
at  Athens,  and  when  Skione  was  recaptured  in  420  B.C.,  that- town 
(vacant  by  the  slaughter  of  its  captive  citizens)  was  handed  over  to 
the  Plata?ans  as  a  residence.  Compelled  to  evacuate  Bkione,  they 
were  obliged,  at  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  to  return  to 
Athens,  where  the  remainder  of  them  were  residing  at  the  time  of  the 
peace  of  Antalkidas;  little  dreaming  that  tho.^e  who  had  destroyed 
their  town  and  their  fathers  forty  years  before,  would  now  turn 
round  and  restore  it. 

Such  restoration,  whatever  might  be  the  ostensible  grounds  on 
which  the  Spartans  pretended  to  rest  it,  was  not  really  undertaken 
either  to  carrv  out  the  convention  of  Antalkidas,  which  guaranteed 
only  the  autonomy  of  e,risting  towns — or  to  repair  i>revious  injustice, 
since  prior  destruction  had  been  the  deliberate  act  of  themselves, 
and  of  King  Archidamus  the  father  uf  Agesilaus — but  simply  as 
a  step  conducive  to  the  present  political  views  of  Sparta.  And 
toward  this  object  it  was  skilfully  devised.  It  weakened  the  The- 
bans,  not  only  by  wresting  from  them  what  had  been,  for  about  forty 
years,  a  part  of  their  territory  and  property;  but  also  by  e-tablishing 
upon  it  a  permanent  stronghold  in  the  occupation  of  tin  ir  iiitter  ene- 
mies, assisted  by  a  Spartan  garrison.  It  furnished  an  additional  sta- 
tion for  such  a  garrison  in  Boeotia,  with  the  full  consent  (  f  tlie  newh^- 
established  inhabitants.  And  more  than  all,  it  introduced  a  subject 
of  couteutioQ  between  Athens  and  Thebes,  calculated  to  prevent  the 


734 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


SPARTA  AND  MANTINEIA. 


735 


!  I 
- 1 


two  from  hearty  co  operation  afterward  against  Sparta.  As  the  sym- 
mthv  of  the  Plataaus  with  Athens  was  no  less  ancient  and  covdal 
tlmu  tlieir  antipathy  against  Thebes,  we  may  probably  conelndetliat 
the  restoration  of  the  town  was  an  act  acceptable  to  the  Allienians; 
at  least  at  tirst.  until  they  saw  the  use  made  of  it,  and  the  p(  siiiou 
which  Si)aita  came  to  occupy  in  reference  to  Greece  generally.  iMaiiy 
of  the  Platiuius,  during  their  residence  at  Athens,  had  internuuTKd 
with  AtlK'tdan  women,  who  now  probably  accompanied  their  hus- 
bands to  the  !•(  <tored  little  town  on  the  north  of  KithaTon,  near  the 
southern  bank  of  the  river  Asopus.  ,       ,  ,  , , 

U'ld  the  Plateaus  been  restored  to  a  real  and  honorable  autononl^^ 
suelias  thev  enjoyed  in  alliance  with  Athens  before  the  Pelop.-iine- 
*;ian  war,  wt'  should  haye  cordially  syini)athized  with  the  event.  Lut 
the  sequel  will  prove— and  their  own  subsecpient  statement  eniphalie- 
allv  sets  forth— that  they  were  a  mere  dependency  ot  Sparta,  and  an 
outpost  for  Sparlan  ojxnitions  against  Thebes.  They  were  a  part  of 
the  <mat  revolution  which  the  Spartans  now  brought  about  in  lia'o- 
tia- 'whereby  Thebes  was  de-raded  from  the  president  of  a  federation 
hito  an  isolated  autonomous  city,  while  the  other  Po^otian  cities  who 
had  been  before  members  of  the  federation,  weie  elevated  each  for 
it-elf  into  the  like  autonomy:  or  rather  (to  substitutethe  real  truth  in 
place  of  Spartan  professions)  they  became  enrolled  and  sworn  in  as 
dependent  allies  of  Sparta,  under  oligarchical  factions  devoted  Cher 
purposes  and  resting  upon  her  for  support.  That  the  1  hebans  should 
submit  to  such  a  revolution,  and  above  all,  to  the  .sight  of  1  lataa  as 
an  independent  nei-hbor  with  a  territorj'  abstracted  from  themselves 
— irovesimw  much  they  felt  their  own  weakness,  and  how  irresisti- 
ble at  this  moment  was 'the  ascendency  of  their  great  enemy,  in  i^er- 
vertin"-  to  her  own  ambition  the  ])opular  lure  of  univei^al  autonomy 
lield  out  by  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.  Though  compelled  to  acquiesce 
the  Thebans  waited  in  hopes  of  some  turn  of  fortune  which  would 
enable  them  to  reorganize  the  Bcvotian  federation;  while  their  host  if 
sentiment  toward  Sparta  was  not  the  less  bitter  for  being  suppressed 
Sparta  on  her  part  kept  constant  watch  to  prevent  the  reunion  ()t 
Ba30tia-  an  obiect  in  which  she  was  for  a  time  completely  success! ul 
nnd  wa.s  even  enabled,  beyond  her  hopes,  to  become  possessed  ot 
Thebes  itself,  through  a  party  of  traitors  withui— as  wdl  presently 

"Tn'These  measures  re-ardinc:  Boeotia,  we  recognize  the  vigorous 
hand  and  the  miso-Theban  spirit,  of  Agesilaus.  He  was  at  this  tune 
the  cr'reat  director  of  Spartan  foreign  policy,  though  opposed  by  his 
more  iu.<=^t  and  moderate  colleague  King  Agesipohs,  as  well  as  bv  a 
sec-ion  of  the  lea.lin-  Spartans;  who  reproached  Agesilaus  with  lii> 
project  of  rulin"  Greece  bv  means  of  subservient  local  despoiS  oi 
oli'-^archies  in  the  various  cities,  and  who  contended  that  the  auton- 
onrv  promised  by  thepiacr  of  Antalkidas  or.ght  to  be  left  to  develop 
itself  freely,  without  any  coercive  intervention  on  the  part  ot  bparia. 


Far  from  any  wish  thus  to  realize  the  terms  of  peace  which  they 
liad  themselves  imposed,  the  Lacedaemonians  took  advantage  of  an 
early  moment  after  becoming  free  from  tlieir  enemies  in  Bo^otia  and 
Corinth,  to  strain  their  authority  over  their  allies  beyond  its  previous 
limits.  Passing  in  review  the  conduct  of  each  during  the  late  war, 
they  resolved  to  make  an  example  of  the  city  of  ]\Iantineia.  Some 
acl-s  not  of  positive  ho.stility,  but  of  equivocal  tidelity,  were  imputed 
to  the  Mantineians.  They  w^ere  accused  of  having  been  slack  in 
performance  of  their  military  obligations,  sometimes  even  to  the 
leniz^th  of  withholding  their  contingent  altogether,  under  pretense  of 
a  swison  of  religious  truce;  of  furnishing  corn  in  time  of  war  to  the 
hostile  Argeians;  and  of  plainly  manifesting  their  disaflfected  feeling 
toward  Sparta — chagrin  at  every  success  which  she  obtained,  satis- 
faction when  she  chanced  to  experience  a  reverse.  The  Spartan 
Ephors  now  sent  an  envoy  to  Mantineia,  denouncing  all  sucli  past 
behavior,  and  peremptorily  requiring  that  the  walls  of  the  city  should 
be  demolished,  as  the  only  security  for  future  penitence  and  amend- 
ment. As  compliance  was  refused,  they  dispatched  an  army,  sum- 
moning the  allied  contingents  generally  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing 
the  sentence.  They  intrusted  the  command  to  King  Agesi])()lis, 
since  Agesilaus  excused  himself  from  the  duty,  on  the  ground  that 
the  Mantineians  had  rendered  material  service  to  his  father  Archi- 
damus  in  the  dangerous  Messenian  war  which  had  beset  Sparta  dur- 
ing the  early  part  of  his  reign. 

Having  first  attempted  to  intimidate  the  Mantineians  by  ravaging 
their  lamls,  .Agesipolis  commenced  the  work  of  blocka.de  by  digging 
a  ditch  round  the  town,  half  of  his  sokliers  being  kept  on  guarl, 
while  the  rest  worked  with  the  spade.  The  ditch  being  completed, 
he  prepared  to  erect  a  wall  of  circumvallation.  But  being  a]-)]>riscd 
that  the  preceding  harvest  had  been  so  good  as  to  leave  a  large  stock 
of  provision  in  the  town,  and  to  render  the  process  of  starving  it  out 
tedious,  bolli  for  Sparta  and  for  her  allies,  he  tried  a  more  rapid 
method  of  accomplishing  his  object.  As  the  river  Ophis,  of  consid- 
erable breadth  for  a  Grecian  stream,  passed  through  the  middle  of 
the  town,  he  dammed  up  its  ettiux  on  the  low^er  side,  thus  causing  it 
to  inundate  the  interior  of  the  city  and  tlireaten  the  stability  of  tiie 
walls,  which  seem  to  have  been  of  no  great  height,  and  built* of  sun- 
burnt bricks.  Disappointed  in  their  application  to  Athens  for  aid, 
and  unable  to  provide  extraneous  support  for  their  t(Utering  towers, 
the  Mantineiatis  were  compelled  to  solicit  a  capitulation.  But 
Agesipolis  now^  refused  to  grant  the  request,  except  on  condition 
that  not  only  the  fortifications  of  their  city,  but  tiie  city  itself  should 
be  in  lireat  part  demolished,  and  that  the  inhabitants  should  be  redis- 
tributed into  those  five  villages  which  had  been  brought  togetluM-, 
many  years  before,  to  form  the  aggregate  city  of  Maniineia.  To  this 
also 'the  Mantineians  were  obliged  to  submit,  and  the  capitulation 
was  ratitied. 


rs6 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


MISCHIEVOUS  INFLUENCE  OF  SPARTA. 


737 


Though  notliing  was  said  in  the  terms  of  it  about  the  chiefs  of  the 
Mantiueiaii  democmtical  government,  yet  these  latter,  conscious  that 
they  were  detested  both  by  their  own  oligarchical  opposition  and  by 
the  Liiceda'monians,  accounted  themselves  certain  of  l)eing  put  to 
death.  And  such  would  assuredly  have  been  their  fate  had  not 
Pausanias  (the  late  king  of  Sp.uta,  now  in  exile  at  Tegea),  whose 
good  opinion  they  had  always  enjoyed,  obtained  as  a  personal  favor 
from  his  sou  Agesipolis,  the  lives  of  the  most  obnoxious,  sixty  in 
number,  on  condition  that  they  should  depart  into  exile.  Agesipolis 
h:ul  much  difficulty  in  accomplishing  the  w  ishes  of  his  father.  His 
Lacedicmonian  soldiers  were  ranged  in  arms  on  both  sides  of  the 
gate  by  which  the  obnoxious  men  went  out;  and  Xenophon  notices 
it  as  a  signal  mark  of  Lacedemonian  discipline  that  they  c<mld  ke(  p 
their  spears  unemployed  when  disarmed  enemies  were  thus  within 
their  reach,  especially  as  the  oligarchical  Mantineians  manifested  the 
most  murderous  propensities,  and  were  exceedingly  difficult  to  con- 
trol. As  at  Peineus  before,  so  here  at  ]\Ianiineia  again,  the  liberal, 
but  unfortunate.  King  Pausanias  is  found  interfering  in  the  character 
of  mediator  to  soften  the  ferocity  of  political  antipathies. 

The  city  of  Mantineia  was  now  broken  up,  and  the  inhabitants 
were  distributed  again  into  the  five  constituent  villages.  Out  of 
four-fifths  of  the  poi)ulation.  each  man  pulU  d  down  his  house  in  the 
city  and  rebuilt  it  in  the  village  near  to  which  his  property  lay.  The 
remaining  fifth  continued  to  occui^y  Matineia  as  a  village.  Each 
village  was  placed  under  oligarchical  government  and  left  unfortified. 
Though  at  first  (says  Xenoi>hon)  the  change  proveti  troublesome  and 
odious,  yet  presently,  when  men  found  themselves  resident  upon 
their  I'andeil  properties,  and  still  ;nore,  whtn  they  felt  themselves 
delivered  from  the  vexatious  demagogues,  the  new  situation  became 
more  popidar  than  the  old.  The  Lacedaemonians  were  still  better 
satisfied.  Instead  of  one  city  of  iMnntineia,  five  distinct  Arcadian 
villaiies  now  stood  enrolled*  in  their  catalogue  of  allies.  They 
assigned  to  each  a  separate  xenagus  (Spartan  ofticer  destined  to  the 
command  of  each  allied  contingent),  and  the  military  service  of  all 
was  henceforward  performed  with  the  utmost  regularity. 

Such  was  the  dissection  or  cutting  into  parts  of  the  ancient  city 
Mantineia,  one  of  the  most  odious  acts  of  l)igh-handed  Spartan  des- 
potism. Its  true  character  is  veiled  by  the  partiality  of  the  historian, 
who  recounts  it  with  a  confident  a^^urance  that,  after  the  trouble  of 
moving  was  over,  the  population  felt  themselves  decidedly  bettered 
by  the'  chauire.  Such  an  assurance  is  only  to  be  credited  on  the 
ground  that, 'being  captives  under  the  Grecian  laws  of  war.  they 
may  have  been  thankful  to  escape  the  more  terrible  liabilities  cf 
death  or  personal  slavery,  at  the  price  of  forfeiting  their  civic  com- 
munity. That  their  feelings  toward  the  change  were  those  of  genuine 
aversion,  is  shown  by  their  subsequent  conduct  after  the  battle  of 
Leuktra.     As  soon  as  the  fear  of  Sparta  was  removed,  they  flocked 


togc'ther  wi'h  unanimous  impulse  to  reconstitute  and  refortify  their 
dismantled  city.  It  would  have  been  strange  indeed  had  the  fact 
been  otherwise,  for  attachment  to  a  civic  community  Avas  the  stron«T- 
est  political  instinct  of  the  Greek  mind.  The  citizen  of  a  town  was 
averse — often  most  unhappily  averse— to  compromise  the  separate 
and  autonomous  working  of  his  community  by  joining  in  any  larger 
political  combination,  however  equitably  franic(l  and  however  it 
might  promise  on  the  wiiole  an  increase  of  Hellenic  dignity.  But 
still  more  vehemently  did  he  shrink  from  the  idea  of  lireaking  up 
his  town  into  separate  villages,  and  exchanging  the  character  of  a 
citizen  for  that  of  a  villager,  which  was  nothing  less  than  great 
social  degradation  in  the  eyes  of  Greeks  generally,  Spartans^  not 
excepted. 

In  truth  the  sentence  executed  by  the  Spartans  against  Mantineia 
was,  in  point  of  dishonor  as  well  as  of  privation,  one  of  the  severest 
which  could  be  inflicted  on  free  Greeks.  All  the  distinctive  glory 
and  superiority  of  Hellenism — all  the  intellectual  and  artistic  mani- 
festations— all  that  there  was  of  literature  and  philosophy,  or  of 
refined  and  rational  sociality — depended  upon  the  city-life  of  the 
people.  And  the  influence  of  Sparta,  during  the  period  of  her 
empire,  was  peculiarly  mischievous  and  retrograde,  as  tending  not 
only  to  decompose  the  federations  such  as  Bceotia  into  isolated  towns, 
but  even  to  decompose  suspected  towns  such  as  Mantineia  into 
villages;  all  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  each  of  them  exclusiveh^ 
dependent  upon  herself.  Athens  during  her  period  of  empire  hacl 
exercised  no  such  disuniting  influence;  still  less  Thebes,  whom  wg 
shall  hereafter  find  coming  forward  actively  to  found  the  new  and 
^reat  cities  of  Megalopolis  and  Messene.  The  imperial  tendencies  of 
bparta  are  w^orse  than  those  of  either  Athens  or  Thebes;  including 
less  of  improving  or  Pan-Hellenic  sympathies,  and  leaning  the  most 
systematically  upon  subservient  factions  in  each  subordinate  cit}^ 
In  the  very  treatment  of  Mantineia  just  recounted,  it  is  clear  that  the 
attack  of  Sparta  was. welcomed  at  least,  if  not  originally  invited,  by 
the  oligarchical  party  of  the  place,  who  sought  to  grasp  the  power 
into  their  own  hands  and  to  massacre  their  political  opponents.  In 
the  first  object  they  completely  succc'cded,  and  their  government  prob- 
ably was  more  assured  in  the  five  villages  than  it  would  have  been  in 
the  entire  town.  In  the  second,  nothing  prevented  them  from  suc- 
ceeding except  the  accidental  intervention  of  the  exile  Pausanias;  an 
accident,  which,  alone  rescued  the  Spartan  name  from  the  additional 
disgrace  of  a  political  massacre,  over  and  above  the  lasting  odium 
incurred  by  the  act  itself — by  breaking  up  an  ancient  autonomous 
city,  which  had  shown  no  act  of  overt  enmity,  and  which  was  so 
moderate  in  its  democratical  m'lnifestations  as  to  receive  the  favor- 
able criticism  of  judges  rather  disinclined  toward  democracy  gener- 
ally. Thirty  years  before,  when  jNIantineia  had  ebnquered  certain 
neighboring  Arcadian  districts,  and  had  been  at  actual  war  with 

H.  G.  III.— 24 


738 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


MARITIME  POWER. 


739 


Smrta  to  nrc<^ri-ve  them,  tlie  victorious  Spartans  exncted  notlnng 
nu  r.  th  m  the  reauctiou  (.f  ibe  city  to  its  orijiinal  distric  ;  now  they 
arc  ' at  'tied  ^vith  nothin-  less  than  the  partition  of  the  city  into 
mifor  tied  villages,  thoimh  there  had  been  no  actual  war  preceding. 
So  much  had  Spartan  poVer,  as  well  as  Spartan  despotic  propen.ily, 
r»rooTessed  durinir  this  interval.  ■,  ^.    ^  •    t 

^  Tl  e"e  cral  laSmia^e  of  Isokrates.  Xcnophon  and  Diodonis  null- 
cues  that  this  severity  toward  Mantineia  was  only  the  most  f  rnigc  nt 
^mon-  I  <eries  of  severities,  extended  by  the  Laccciamonians  throndi 
Xir  w Imfe  confederacy,  and  operating  npon  all  such  of  its  nRmbers 
as  iave  them  ground  for  dissatisfaction  or  mistrus  .  During  the  n 
vc'S-s  after  the  surrender  of  Athens,  they  had  been  loids  of  the 
Sm  world  both  bv  laiul  and  sea,  with  a  power  never  before 

S)  nation  of'Athens,  Thebes,  Argos,  and  Corinth,  ^^^^^^^'^^l 
Pes  a  had  broken  up  their  empire  at  sea,  and  much  endangered  it 
on  md  At  length  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  enli.ting  P^'*;^^^^;; 
thUi^^do  (at  the  price  of  the  liberty  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks),  had 
enable  thm  to  dissolve  the  hostile  con.bination  against  them.  Hie 
'eneral  aut()nomy,  of  which  they  were  the  authoriz.ed  inteiTrc^er. 
me  In  not  bin-  more  than  a  separation  of  the  I  (totian  (il.es  irom 
ThebL  andofCorinth  from  Argos-beingnoway  intended  o  apply  to 

Iree  t  It  L  ced  rni^  applied  themselves  to  raise  their  as.  emU  ncy 

on  hi ud  to  the  point  where  it  had  stood  before  the  ba  tie  of  Knulns, 
and  even  to  recrain  as  much  as  possible  of  their  empire  at  .ea  To 
^^^  b  ck  a  ciominion  such  as  that  of  the  ^^y^^-^^^'l^^^'^^ 
Dekarchie^  and  to  reconstitute  a  local  oligarchy  of  their  most 
dovcied  mili^^^^^  in  each  of  those  cities  where  the  government  had 
t'cM?^m^^hat  Utod         during  the  recent  perie.d  of  war-was  their 

'^  Tl^'exilS'^ho  had  incurred  the  condemnation  of  their  fellow- 
dtiz^s  for  subserviencs  to  Sparta,  no^v  found  the  ^^-^-^^;^^^^^ 
for  soliciting  Spartan  intervention  to  procure  their  retuin.  It  \\...s 
in  th^  manner  that  a  l)ody  of  exiled  political  leaders  from  Phhus-- 
^?ho<e  <Teat  merit  it  was  that  the  city  when  under  their  government 

ad  ix'cn  zealous  in  service  to  Sparta,  but  had  now  become  lukewarm 
or  even  distiffected  in  the  hands  of  their  oppe.nents-obtained  fioni 
the  Ephors  a  mess:ige,  polite  in  form  but  authoritative  m  substances 
'uldressed  to  the  Phliasians,  requiring  that  the  exiles  should  be 
restored,  as  friends  of  Sparta  banished  without  just  cause. 

While  the  Spartan  power,  for  the  few  years  succeeding  the  peace 
of  Antalkidas,  was  thus  decidedly  in  ascending  movement  on  land, 
efforts  were  also  made  to  re-establish  it  at  sea.  ^everal  of  the 
Cyclades  and  other  smaller  islands  TNcre  again  rendered  tributarj- 
In  this  latter  sphere,  however.  Athens  Ix^canie  lier  competitor.     Since 

the  peace,  and  the  resioralion  of  Lcmnos,  Imbre)s,  and  Skyros,  com- 


bined with  the  refortilicd  Peira^us  and  its  Long  Walls — Athenian 
commerce  and  naval  power  had  been  reviving,  though  by  slow  anel 
humble  steps.  Like  the  naval  force  of  England  compared  with 
France,  the  warlike  marine  of  Athens  rested  upon  a  considerable 
commercial  marine,  which  latter  hardly  existed  at  all  in  Laconia. 
Sparta  liad  no  seamen  except  constrained  Helots  or  paid  foreigners, 
while  the  commerce  of  Peineus  both  required  and  maintained  a 
nunicrous  population  of  this  chai-acter.  The  harbor  of  Peincus  was 
convenient  in  re\spect  of  accommodation,  and  well-stocked  with  arti- 
sans— while  Laconia  had  few  artisans,  and  was  notoriously  destitute 
of  harbors.  Accordingly  in  this  maritime  competition,  Athens, 
though  but  the  siiadow  of  her  former  self,  started  at  an  advantage  as 
compared  with  Sparta,  and,  in  spile  of  the  superiority  of  the  latter 
on  land,  was  enabled  to  compete  with  her  in  acquiring  tributary 
dependencies  among  the  smaller  islands  of  the  ^gean.  To  these 
latter,  who  had  no  marine  of  their  own,  and  who  (like  Athens  her- 
self) required  habitual  suppliers  of  imported  corn,  it  was  important  to 
obtain  botU  access  to  Peira'us  and  protection  from  the  Athenian  tri- 
remes against  that  swarm  of  pirates,  who  showed  themselves  after  the 
peace  of  Antalkidas  when  there  w\asuo  predominant  maritime  state, 
besides  wliicli,  the  market  of  Peira?us  was  often  supplied  with  foreign 
corn  from  the  Crimea,  through  the  preference  shown  by  the  princes 
of  Bosi)e>rus  to  Athens,  at  a  time  when  vessels  from  other  places 
could  obtain  nO  cargo.  A  moderate  tribute  paid  to  Athens  w^ould 
secure  to  the  tributary  island  greater  advantages  than  if  paid  to  Sparta 
— with  at  least  equal  protection.  Probabiy'the  inlluence  of  Athens 
over  these  islanders  was  further  aided  by  the  fact,  that  she  adminis- 
tered the  fcstivids,  and  lent  out  tlie  funels,  of  the  holy  temple  at 
Del  OS.  We  know  by  inscriptions  remaining,  that  large  sums  were 
borrowed  at  inteiTst  from  the  temple  treasure,  not  merely  by  indi- 
vidual islanders,  but  also  by  the  island  cities  collectively — Xaxos, 
Andros,  Tenos,  Siphnos,  Seriphos.  The  Amphiktyonic  ctmncil  who 
dispensed  these  loans  (or  at  least  the  presiding  members)  were  Athe- 
^lians,  named  annually  at  Athens.  Moreover  these  islanders  ren- 
dered religious  homage  and  attendance  at  the  Delian  festivals,  and 
were  thus  brought  within  the  range  of  a  central  Athenian  intiuence, 
capable,  under  favorable  circumstances,  of  being  strengthened  anel 
rendered  even  politically  important. 

By  such  helps,  Athens  was  slowly  aeeiuiring  to  herself  a  second 
maritime  confeeleracy.  which  we  shall  presently  find  to  l)e  of  con- 
siderable moment,  tliough  never  approaching  the  grandeur  of  her 
fe)rmer  empire:  so  that  in  the  year  380  B.C.,  when  Isokrates  published 
his  Panegyrical  Discourse  (seven  years  after  the  peace  of  Antalki- 
das), tliough  her  general  powxn*  was  still  slender  compared  with  the 
overruling  might  of  Sparta,  yet  her  navy  had  alreaely  made  such 
progress,  that  he  claims  for  her  the  right  (^)f  taking  the  "command  by 
sea,  in  that  crusade  which  he  strenuously  enforces,  of  Athens  and 


740 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


Sparta  in  Imrmonious  unity  at  tlie  head  of  all  Greece,  against  the 

Asiatic  barbarians.  i?    *    *  n  •  i 

It  would  seem  that  a  few  years- after  the  peace  of  Antalkidas, 
Snarta  became  somewhat  ashamed  of  having  surrendered  the  Asiatic 
Greeks  to  Persia;  and  that  Kini:  Agesipolis  and  other  leading  hpar- 
tans  encouraired  the  scheme  of  a  tresh  Grecian  exiiedition  against 
A^ia  in  compliance  with  proi)ositions  from  some  disaltected  subjects 
of  V'rtuxerxcs.  Upon  some  Buch  project,  currently  discussed  though 
never  realized,  Isokrates  probably  built  his  Panegyrical  Oration, 
composed  in  a  lofty  strain  of  patriotic  eloquence  (380  B.C.),  to  stnnu- 
Lite  both  Sparta  and  Athens  in  the  cause,  and  calling  on  both,  us 
ioint  chiefs  of  Greece,  to  suspend  dissension  at  home  for  a  great 
Pan-Hellenic  manifestation  against  the  common  enemy  abroad.  But 
whatever  ideas  of  this  kind  the  Spartan  leaders  may  have  entertained, 
their  attention  was  Utken  otT.  about  382  B.C.,  by  movements  in  a 
more  remote  region  of  the  Grecian  world,  which  led  to  important 

consequences.  ,  .  a  -     *^ 

Since  the  year  414  B.C.  (when  the  Athenians  were  engaged  m  the 
sice  of  Syracuse),  we  have  heard  nothing  either  of  the  kings  of 
Ma'cedonia,  or  of  the  Chalkidic  Grecian  cities  in  the  peninsu  a  of 
Thrace  adjoining  Macedonia.  Down  to  that  year,  Athens  still  re- 
tained a  portion^  her  maritime  empire  in  those  regions.  J  he  l^la- 
teans  were  still  in  possession  of  Skione  (on  the  isthmus  of  1  allene, 
which  she  had  as>igned  to  them,  while  the  Athenian  admiral  Eueliou 
seconded  by  many  hired  Thracians,  and  even  by  Perdikkas  king  ot 
Macedonia,  undertook  a  fruitless  siege  to  re  conquer  Amphipo.i^'  on 
the  Strymon.  But  the  fatal  disaster  at  Syracuse  having  disabled 
Athens  from  maintaining  such  distant  interests,  they  were  lost  to  her 
alon*^  with  her  remaining  empire— perhaps  earlier;  though  w^e  do  not 
knovv  how\  At  the  same  time  during  the  last  years  of  the  Pelopon- 
iiesian  war,  the  kingdom  of  :Macc(lonia  greatly  increased  in  power; 
partly  we  may  conceive,  from  the  helpU'.-s  condition  of  Atluns— but 
still  more  from  the  abilities  and  energy  of  Archelaus,  sou  and  sue-. 

cessor  of  Perdikkas.  ,,       -,     .  .  ^f 

The  course  of  succession  among  the  :Macedonian  princes  seems  not 
to  have  been  settled,  so  that  disputes  and  bloodshed  took  place  at  the 
death  of  several  of  them.  :Moreover  there  were  distinct  tribes  ot 
Macedonians,  who,  though  i;(>rming  part,  really  or  nominally,  of  the 
dominion  of  the  Temenid  princes,  nevertheless  were  m.mediateiy 
subject  to  separate  but  subordinate  princes  of  their  own.  1  he  rc-ign 
of  Perdikkas  had  been  much  troubled  in  this  manner.  In  the  lust 
instance  he  had  stripped  his  own  brother  Alketas  of  the  crown,  who 
appears  (so  far  as  we  can  make  out)  to  have  had  the  better  right  to  it; 
next  he  had  also  expelled  his  younirer  brother  Philippusfrom  his  sub- 
ordinate principality.  To  restore  Amyntas.  the  son  ot  Philippus  Avns 
one  of  the  purposesof  the  Thrakian  prince  Sitalkes,  in  the  expedition 
undertaken  conjointly  with  Athens,  during  the  second  year  ot  the 


ARCHELAUS— EURIPIDES. 


741 


Peloponnesian  war.     On  the  death  of  Perdikkas  (about  413  b  c),  his 
eldest  or  only  legitimate  son  was  a  child  of  seven  years  old;  but  his 
natural  son  Archelaus  was  of  mature  age  and  unscrupulous  ambition. 
The   dethroned   Alketas  was  yet   alive,  and   had   now  considcrablo 
chance  of  re-establishing  himself  on  the  throne:  Archelaus,  inviting 
him  and  his  son  under  pretense  that  he  would  himself  bring  aboul 
their  re-establi&hment,  sknv  them  both  amidst  the  intoxication  of  a 
banquet.     He  next  dispatched  the  boy,   his  legitimate  brother,  by 
suffocating  him  in  a  well;  and  through  these  crimes  made  himself 
king.     His  government   howTver  was   so   energetic  and  able,  that 
Macedonia  reached  a  degree  of  military  power^such  as  none  of  his 
predecessors  had  ever  possessed.  His  troops,  military  equipments,  and 
fortified  places  were  much  increased  in  numbers;  while  he  also  cut 
straight  roads  of  communication  between  the  various  portions  of  his 
territory— a  novelty  seemingly  everywi-iere,  at  that  time.     Besides 
such  improved  organization  (w'-hich  iinfortunately  we  are  not  permit- 
ted   to   kiunv   in   detail),  Archelaus  founded  a  splendid  periodical 
Olympic  festival,  in  honor  of  the  Olympian  Zeus  and  the  Muses,  and 
maintained  correspondence  with  the  poets  and  pliilosopliersof  Athens. 
He  prevailed  upon  the  tragic  poets  Euripides  and  Auathon,  as  well 
as  the  epic  poet  Choerilus.  to  visit  him  in  M-icedonia^  where  Euripi- 
des especially  was  treated  with  distinguished  favor  and  munificence, 
remaining  there  until  his  death  in  400  or  405  B.C.     Archelaus  also  in- 
vited Sokrates,  who  declined   the  invitation— and  appears  to  liave 
shown  some  favor  to  Plato.     He  perished  in  the  same  year  as  Sok- 
rates (399  B.c  ),  by  a  violent  death;  two  Thessalian  youths,  Krateuas 
and   Hellanokratcs,  together  with  a  Macedonian  named  Dekamni- 
chus,  being  his  assassins  during  a  hunting  party.      The  two  first 
were  youths  to  whom  he  Avas  strongly  attached,  but  whose  diirnity 
he   had  wounded   by  insultinir  treatment  and  non-performance  of 
promises:  the   third  was  a  Macedonian,   wlio,  for  havinir  made  an 
offensive  remark  upon  the  bad  breath  of  Euripides,  had  been  given 
up  by  the  ordsr  of  Archelaus  to  the  poet,  in  order  that  he  miirht  be 
flogged  for  it.    Euripides  actually  caused  the  sentence  to  be  inflicted: 
btit  it  was  not  till  six  years  after  his  deatli  that  Dekamnichus,  who 
had   neither   rorgotten   nor  forgiven  the  a  front,  found  the  oppoV- 
tunity  of  taking  revenge  by  instigating  and  .aiding  the  assassins  of 
Archelaus.  '    , 

These  incidents,  recounted  on  the  nuthority  of  Aristotle,  and  re- 
lating as  well  to  the  Macedonian  king  Ai-che1a\is  as  to  the  Athenian 
citizen  and  poet  Euripides,  illustrate  the  political  contrast  bet^veen 
Macedonia  and  Athens.  The  government  of  the  former  is  one 
wholly  personal— dependent  on  the  passion^,  tastes,  appetites,  and 
capacities  of  the  king.  The  ambition  of  Archelaus  leads  both  to  his 
crimes  for  acquiring  the  throne  and  to  his  improved  or<i:anization  of 
the  military  force  of  the  state  afterw-ard;  his  admiration  for  the  poets 
and  philosopliers  of  Athens   makes  him  sympathize  warmly  with 


742 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


EuriDides  and  insures  to  the  latter  personal  satisfaction  for  an  offen- 
sive remark;  liis  appetites,  mingling  license  with  insult,  end  hydraw- 
in^^  unon  him  personal  enemies  of  a  formidable  character.   L  J'Jai,  c  ed 
Moi^shinds  marked  in  the  whole  series  of  proceedings;  the  person 
alitv  of  the  monarch  is  the  determining  element,     ^ow  at  Athens 
no  such  element  exists.     There  is,  on  the  one  hand,  no  easy  way  of 
briii^nn^  to  bear  the  ascendency  of  an  energetic  chief  to  improve  the 
milihirvorganizati(.n-as  Athens  found  to  her  cost,  when  she  was 
afterward  assailed  bv  Philip,  the  successor  after  some  mtena  .  and 
in  many  respects  the'parallel,  of  Archelaus.     But  on  the  other  hand, 
reither  the  personal  tastes  nor  the  appetites  of  any  imhvidua   Athe- 
nian count  as  active  causes  in  the  march  of  public  affairs.  Avhuh  is 
determined  bv  the  established  law  and  by  the  pronoune(d^(■ntmK■nts 
of  the  bodv  of  citizens.     However  gross  an  insult  might  have  been 
offered  to  Euripides  at  Ath-ns,  the  Dikasts  would  never  have  sen- 
tenced that  the  offender  should  be  handed  over  to  Inm  to  be  flogged. 
They  would  have  inflicted  siuh  measure  of  punishment  as  the  nature 
of  the  wrom-,  and  the  pre-existing  law,  appeared  to  them  to  require. 
Political  measures,  or  judicial  sentences,  at  Athens,  might  be  well  or 
ill  iud-ed;  but  at  any  rate,  they  were  always  dictated  by  regard  to  a 
known  law   and   to    the    public    conceptions    entertained  of  state- 
intercsts,  state-di-nity,  and  state-obligations  without  the  avowed  in- 
trusion of  any  man's  personality.     To  Euripides-who  In.d  through- 
out his  whole  life  been  the  butt  of  Aristophanes  and  other  comic 
writers,    and  who   had    been    compelled    to  hear    in   the   crowded 
theater,  taunts  far  more  galling  than  what  is  ascribed  to  D^k 'mni- 
chus-the  contrast    must   have   been   indeed   striking,  to  have  the 
offender  made  over  to  him,  and  the  whip  p  aced  at,  his  disposa  ,  by 
order  of  his   new  patron.     And   it    is  little  to  his  honor,  that  le 
should  have  availed  himself  of  tlie  privilege,  by  causing  the  punisli- 
■  ment  to  be  really  administered-a  punishment  which  he  could  nevca 
have  seen  inflicted,  during  the  flfty  years  of  his  past  life,  upon  an> 

free  Athenian  citizen.  ,       .,  r        j„,.o 

Krateuas  did  not  survive  the  deed  more  than  three  or  four  daj  s, 
after  which  Orestes,  son  of  Archelaus,  a  child   was  placed  on  Uie 
Hirone.  under  the  iruardianship  of  Aeropus.     The  latter,  how;ever, 
after  about  four  years,  made  away  with  his  ward,  and  reigned  in  ns 
stead  for  two  years,     lie  then  died  of  sickness,  and  was  succeeded 
bv  his  son  Pausanias.  who,  after  a  reign  of  only  one  year  was  assas- 
sinated and  succeeded   by  Amyntas.     This  Amy ntas(chietlvcee- 
brated  as  the  father  of  Philip  and  the  grandfather  of  Alexander  the 
Great),  though  akin  to  the  royal  family,  had  been  nothing  more  than 
an  attendant  of  Aeropus,  until  he  made  himseit  king  by  putting  to 
death  Pausanias.     He  rei-ned,  though  with    interruptions,  twent}- 
four  vears  (:393-309  B.C.).  years,  f.>r  the  most  part    of  trouble  anc 
hiMuiiialion  for  Macedonia,  and  of  occasional  exile  for  himself.     J  It 
vio-orous  military  orgtuii/.ation  introduced  by  Archelaus  appears  to 


^'  A31YXTAS  EXPELLED  F1I03I  MACEDONIA.        743 

have  declined  ;  while  the  frequent  dethronements  and  assassinations 
of  kings   begnmmg  even  with  Pordikkas,  the  father  orSS 
and  continued  down  to  Amyntas,  unhinged  the  ccntinl     utlmH  v 
and  disunited  the  various  portions  of  the   \lace(loni-n       L.   In  •  7 
naturally  tended  to  separ.ltion,  and  couLl  c^rft^h^lS  Se7b;!; 

r, Jn^  interior  regions  of  3[acedonia  were  bordered   to  the  north  - 
north-east  and  norlh-west,  by  warlike  barbarian  tribes'  Thra  i^'u  d 
I  lynan,  whose  invasions  were  not  unfrccnient  and  of  ten  f  o  •  m?,  Vh^ 

111}  nans  poured  in  upon  Amyntas  durinir  the  first  ySir  of  his  rei'n^ 
perhaps  hey  may  have  been  iiivited  by  other  princl4  7the  nteiitr' 
and  at  all  events  their  coming  would  operate  as  a  si^na    for  ml  com' 

M<pier  a  l(w  moi}llis  before  by  a.,iSiissiniil  ii.r  liis  niccloccssoi-  •in, I 
mviMg  into  iiol,  o»  the  ,)oo;,le-«us  not  ouIy^iM;a,le  to  i^el  ti.e 
bm  found  l„n,sc-lf  obliged  to  evacnate  Pella,  mid  even  o  eU  e  f  ,  1 
n!;Ov,','ll  •'''''=','''"•  I>^^l'^""".-  of  his  position,  he  m  e  ov't  i 
tbc  O lyn  laaiis  a  large  portion  of  the  nei-hboriug  tcrritorv-Lo  v  r 
Macedonia  or  the  coast,  and  cilles  rotuid  the  l^.ennaic  Gulf  (s 
tl.  cession  IS  represented  to  Lave  be...  made  at  the  moment  of  hi" 
distress  and  exiwtr.at.oi,,  we  maj-  faii-ly  suspect  that  it  was  made  for 

mi'"ht^veiP'r"'<  !'"""^'/"'  ^'^''"^'^'"  "i"!vlle..t,  of  wliki  Amvuas 
m.ght  w  ell  st.uid  in  need  at  a  mo.iient  of  so  mueli  e\i-eucv 

It  IS  upon  this  occasion  that  we  berin  to  liear  ao-iiin  of  ibp  ri,.,l 

k.d.ans  of  01v.,thus,_and  the  confede.-acy  which  th?f  g  adu.l ly  a^' ,'!: 

g    e<i  ron.Kl  their  <-ity  as  a  center.     The  co.ifede.acy  seen.s  to  Ime 

t.iken  .ts  start  lro„.  this  cession  of  An.yatas-or  rather  to  se'k 

ore  properly,  f,-om  his  abdicatio.. ;  for  the  cessio.i  of  what  he  con  1 

<.t  keep  was  of  co.nparatively  l.ttle  .noment.  .ind  we  shall  see  t  at 

he  tr.e,     o  .-esn.ne  it  as  soo.i  as  he  acqui.-ed  st,-e.,-th.     Ti  e  effect  of ' 

his  flighvvas  to  b.-eak.np  the  government  of  Lowe.-  o,  n,ariti,,m 

Mac^do,,.a,  a..d  to  leave  the  cities  therein  sit„at,;d  .lefense less  ^  ^  n  t 

the  Ill.vnaus,  or  other  invaders  f.-oni  the  interio,-.    To  these  cities  t°e 

only  chance  of  secu.-ity  was  to  throw  the.nselves  upon  the  Greik 

cit.es  on  the  coast,  a.,d  to  orgat.izo  in  eonju..clio,i  with  the  latter  t 

coasUhen^;,i"n"""""  ''T"'''  ^'""'^  ""  '"<••  G'eek^ ou  1 .1^ 
coast  the  m(,st  strenuous  and  pei-severing  (so  tliev  had  p.-oved  them- 

oHier  nowe,'i' fs ?7l'  '"f "''""'  ''■''""^'  AthensVhen  .It  the  sum  nit 
n  ,  t  Jf ,  'aT  h  •  '"  "'"  "'"■'"''-^-  ''""'  ""=  Chalkidiaus  of  Olvn- 
t ims.  These  Oly ntlinuis  .low  put  themselves  forw.ird— took  into  their 
a  ance  and  tmder  their  protection  the  s.n.dler  towns  of  mari  in  e 
Macedonia  nnmediately  near  them-a.id  soon  extended  their  0  nfed  - 
r,^' so  .IS  to  co.up,-ehe,Ml  all  tlKvhirger  tow,,s  in  this  region- Sit 
hl^^n  H  !  '•  ''"  ™°''  considerable  city  of  the  cotmt.y.  As  the? 
began  this  enterprise  at  ;i  time  when  the  Illyrians  were  masters  of  the 
country  so  as  to  drive  Amyulas  to  despair  and  liidit,  we  may  be  sue 


i 


744 


l^EACJE  OF  AISTALKiDAS. 


that  it  must  luive  cost  them  serious  efiorts,  not  witliout  great  danger 
f  thev  t'  led.  We  may  also  be  sure  that  the  cities  themselves  must 
ava)ee  xvillimr.  not  to  say  eager,  coadjutors,  just  as  the  is  anders 
and  vSitic  Grec4.s  ching  to  Athens  at  the  lirst  fonnatiou  of  the  cou^ 
ftdemev  of  Delos.  The  Olynthians  coukl  have  had  no  means  of 
conquering  even  the  less  considerable  Macedo.nan  cities,  much  less 
Pi'lla   bv  tm-ce  and  against  the  will  of  the  inhabitants. 

IIow  the  lUvrians  were  compelled  to  retire,  and  by  what  steps  the 
confederacy  w-as  got  together,  we  are  not  permitted  to  kno^v.     Our 
^^oi  (unhappily  very  brief)  comes  fron.  ^^^jr^  ^^^•\^;  ^l'^"  ^^^^s"f 
Klei-enes,  speaking  at  Sparta  about  ten  years  af  enNaid(nc.  38. 
and  cleserbing  in  a  few  words  the  confederacy  as  it  then  stood      Lit 
Xre  is  one   circumstance  which  this  witness-h.mself  hosti  e   to 
Olvntlus   -md   coming  to   solicit  Spartan   aid   against  her-attests 
SatLuv:   the   equal,  generous,  and  brotherly  principles  upon 
^ddch  the  'oivnthians  framed   their   scheme   from   the   beginning. 
Tlev  did  not'  present  themselves  as  an  imperial  city  enrolling  a 
body  of  dependent  allies,  but   i"vited  each  separate  city  to  adop 
Common  lavs  and  reciprocal  citizenship  with   Olvnthus.  with  full 
lUmv  of  intermarriau^e^  commercial  dealing,  and   am  ed  proprietoi- 
.1  in  ^  That  the  Macedonian  cities  near  the  sea  should  we  come  so 
1  b^i'al  a  proposition  as  this,  coming  from  the  most  powerfu  ot  then 
Grecian  neighbors,  cannot  at  all  surprise  us,  espc  cially  at   a   tune 
whc^n  they  ?ere  exposed  to  the  lllyrian  invaders,  and  when  Amyntas 
Md  tie    the  country.     They  had  hitherto  always  been  subject:  the  r 
cities  ha     not  (like  the  Greek  cities)  enjoyed  each  its  ONvn  separa  e 
u  onomv  with  n  its  own  walls:  the  offer  now  n^ide  to  them  b>  the 
O    itEs  -as  one  of  freedom  in  exchange  for  Ihe.r  P^^t  *Uon 
unller  the  Macedonian    kings,  combined  with  a  force  adequate  to 
irotcct  them  a-ainst  lllyrian  and   other  invrders.      Perhaps   also, 
he  e  va  ious  dlies-Anlhcmus,  Therma,  C'hala^tra,  Pella,  Alorus, 
Pvdna   etV-^^^^    have  contained,  among  the  iiuligencus  popula  .on, 
a'ceriain  prop<)i^ion  of  domiciliated  Grecian  inhabitants,  to  whom 
die  nropositiou  of  the  Olynthians  would  be  espeeiabv  acceptable. 

Wr^iy  tLs  iinderst ind  why  the  offer  of  Olvnthus  was  ghully 
wekonS.    the  Macedonian  nraritime  cities.     '^^^T -^ere  t Ik-^^ 
^vho  fraternized  as  voluntary  partners  in  the  confederacy  ^  ^ »^ ^  t  c 
O  vnthians  having  established  this  basis,  proceeded  to  enlarge  fui- 
tler  b^^^^  the  hke  liberal  propositions  to  the  Greek  cities    n 

t  eir  nei  "M)orhood.  Several  of  tin  ^e  latter  joined  voluntarily ;  othe 
were  afraid  to  refuse;  insomuch  that  the  confederacy  came  Uiiinclu  e 
a  cons  derable  number  of  Greeks-especially  Potida-a,  situated  on  e 
Llunus  of  Pallene.  and  commanding  the  road  ot  ^-J^^^^l^^^  [j  -", 
iMitween  the  cities  within  Pallene  and  the  continent.  ^/'^  .^  >"'';*' ^^ 
carried  out  with  scrupulous  sincerit-y  their  i)rotessrd  P'^/'^if^^  .^^ 
equal  and  intimate  i^artnership,  avoiding  a  1  '^^'^'f!'^'^,^^f^ 
eilc  pre-eminence  iu  favor  of  their  owu  city.     But  in  spite  of  this 


AKANTIIUS  AND  APOLLONIA. 


745 


liberal  procedure,  they  found  among  their  Grecian  neighbors  obstruc- 
tions which  they  had  not  experienced  from  the  Maceclouiau.  Each 
of  the  Grecian  cities  had  been  accustomed  to  its  own  town-autonomy 
and  separate  citizenship,  with  its  peculiar  laws  and  customs.  All  of 
them  were  attached  to  this  kind  of  distinct  political  life,  by  one  of 
the  most  tenacious  and  universal  instincts  of  the  Greek  mind;  all  of 
them  would  renounce  it  with  reluctance,  even  on  consenting  to  enter 
the  Olyuthian  confederacy,  with  its  generous  promise,  its  enlarsied 
security,  and  its  manifest  advantages;  and  there  were  even  smne 
who,  disdaining  every  prospective  consideration,  refused  to  change 
their  condition  at  all  except  at  the  point  of  the  sword. 

Among  these  last  were  Akanthus  and  xVpollonia,  the  largest  cities 
(next  to  Olynthus)  in  the  Chalkidic  peninsula,  and  therefore  the 
least  unable  to  stand  alone.  To  these  the  Olynthians  did  not  make 
application,  until  they  had  already  attracted  within  their  confederacy 
a  considerable  number  of  other  Grecian  as  well  as  3Iacedonian  cities. 
They  then  invited  Akanthus  and  Apollonia  to  come  in,  upon  the 
same  terms  of  equal  union  and  fellow-citizensliip.  The  proposition 
being  declined,  they  send  a  second  message  intimating  that,  unless  it 
W(;re  accepted  within  a  certain  tinn;,  the}^  would  enforce  it  by  com- 
pnhory  measures.  So  powerful  already  was  the  military  force  of  the 
Olynthian  confederacy,  that  Akanthus  and  Apollonia,  incompent  to 
resist  without  foreign  aid,  dispatched  envoys  to  Sparta  to  set  forth 
the  position  of  affairs  in  the  Chalkidic  peninsula,  and  to  solicit  inter- 
vention against  Olynthus. 

Tiieir  embassy  reached  Sparta  about  B.C.  383,  when  the  Spartans, 
liaving  broken  up  the  city  of  Mantineia  into  villages  and  coerced 
Philus,  were  in  the  full  swing  of  power  over  Peloponnesus — and 
when  they  had  also  dissolved  Uie  Boeotian  federation,  placing  har- 
mosts  in  Platcea  and  Thespioe  as  cheeks  upon  anv  movement  of 
Tliebt'S.  The  Akanthian  Kleigenes,  addressing  himself  to  the  assem- 
]>iy  of  Spartans  and  their  allies,  drew  an  alarminsr  picture  of  the 
recent  growth  and  prospective  tendencies  of  Olynthus,  invoking  the 
inleifcrence  of  Sparta  against  that  city.  The  Olynthian  confederacy 
(he  said)  already  comprised  many  cities,  small  and  great.  Greek  as 
well  as  Macedonian — Amyntas  having  lost  his  kingdom.  Its  mil  itary 
p<nver,  even  at  present  great,  was  gi-owing  everyday.  The  territory, 
comi»risin<jr  a  large  breadth  of  fertile  corn-land,  could  sustain  a  niimcT- 
oas  population.  Wood  for  slii})-l)uilding,  was  close  at  hand,  wjiile 
the  numerous  harlmrs  of  the  confederate  cities  insured  a  thriving 
trade  as  well  as  a  steady  revenue  from  custom  duties.  The  neigh- 
boring Thraeian  tribes  would  be  easily  kept  in  willing  dependence, 
and  would  thus  augment  the  military  force  of  Olynthus;  even  the 
gold  mines  of  Mount  Pangieus  would  speedily  come  within  her 
assured  reach.  "  All  that  I  now  tell  you  (such  was  the  substance  of 
his  spe(?ch)  is  matter  of  i)ublic  talk  among  the  Olynthian  people,  who 
are  full  of  Jiope  and  contidence.      IIow  can  j^oii  Si^artans,  who  are 


746 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


tnkiu«-  anxious  pains  to  prevent  the  union  of  the  Boeotian  cities  per- 
mit tiie  u'^^re'^ilioii  of  so  much  more  foiniidable  a  power,  both  by 
land  aud^'by^ea,  as  this  of  Olynlhus?      Envoys  have  already  bc(  n 
sent  thitlier  from  Athens   and   Thebes-and   tlie   Olynthians   Iwivc 
decreed  to  send  an  embassy  in  return,  for   contract u]g  alliance'^ wuh 
thove  cities-  hence  your  enemies  will  derive  a  large  additional  force. 
•\Ve\)f  Akanthus  and  Apollonia,  having  declined  the  proposition  to 
ioin  the  confederacy  voluntarily,  have  received  notice  that,  if  we  per- 
sist they  will  constrain  us.     Now  we  are  anxious  to  retain  our  pjiter 
n:d  laws  and  customs,  continuing  as  a  city  by  ourselves.      But  it  we 
cannrrt  obtain  aid  from  you,  we  shall  be  under  the  necessity  of  jcjiii- 
\n^r  ihem— as  several  other  cities  have  already  done,  from  not  danng 
lo'iefuse;  cities,  who  would  have  sent  envoys  along  with  us  had  they 
rot  been  afraid  of  offending  the  Olynthians.      These  cities   if  you 
iuterfere  forthwith,  and  with  a  powerful  force,  will  now  revolt  from 
the  new  confederacy.     But  if  you  postpone  your  interference,  and 
allow  time  for  the  confederacy  to  work,  their  sentiments  will  soon 
niter      Tliey  will  come  to  be  knit  together  in  attached  unity,  by  the 
(o-bur.rhership,  the  intermarriage,  and  the  reciprocity  of  landed  pos- 
K'^^ioifs  which  have  already  been  enacted  prospectively.    All  ol  theni 
will  become  convinced  that  they  have  a  common  interest  both  in 
belon»dn^'-  to,  and   in   strengthening  the  confederacy— i"st  as  the 
Arcadiaifs,  when  they  follow  you,  Spartans,  as  allies,  are  not  only 
enabled  to  preserve  their  own  property,  but  also  to  plunder  others 
If  bv  vour  delav,  the  attractive  tendencies  of  the  coutederacy  should 
come  into  real  operation,  you  will  presently  find  it  not  so  much  within 

your  power  to  dissolve."  ,    .^    -  «i       ^„^ 

This  speech  of  the  Akanthian  envoy  is  remarkable  m  more  than  one 
respect.     Coming  from  the  lips  ofan  enemy,  it  is  the  best  of  all  tes- 
timonies to  the  liberal  and  comprehensive  spirit  m  which  the  Olyn^ 
thians  were   acting.     They   are   a(  cused-not   of  injustice    nor  of 
selti^i  ambition,  nor  of  degradinir  those  around  them— but  iiterally, 
of  oro-anizing  a  new  partnership   on   principles  too  generous  and 
too  seductive;  of  gentlv  superseding,  instead   of  violently  breaking 
down    the  barriers,  between  the  various   cities,  by  reciprocal  ties  (> 
property  and  familv  among  the  citizens  of  each;  of  uniting  them  all 
into  a  new  political  a-gre^ate,  in  which  not  only  all  would  tnjov 
equal  li^'-hts,  but   all  without   exception   would    be   gainers.       llie 
advantage,  both  in  security  and  in  power,  accruing  prospectively  to 
all   is   not  only  admitted  by  the  orator,  but  stands  m   the  Iront  ot 
his  arn-ument.      ".AlaUe  haste  and  break   up   the   confederacy  (he 
impresses  upon  Sparta)  before  its  fruit  is  ripe,  so  that  the  confederates 
may  never  taste  it  nor  find  out  how  good  it  is;  for  if  they  do   you 
will  not  prevail  on  them  to  forego  it."     By  implication,  he  also  admits 
—and  he  says  nothing  tending  even  to  raise  a  doubt— that  the  cities 
which  he  represents,  Akanthus  and  Apollonia,  would   share  along 
with  the  rest  in  this  same  benefit.     But  the  Grecian  political  instinct 


SPARTA  DECLARES  AGAINST  OLYNTHUS.        747 

was  nevertheless  prcdomiiiant—"We  wish  to  preserve  our  paternal 
laws,  and  to  be  a  city  by  ourselves."  Thus  nakedly  is  the  objection 
stated;  when  the  question  was,  not  whether  Akanthus  should 'lose  its 
freedom  and  become  subject  to  an  imperial  city  like  Athens— but 
whether  it  should  become  a  free  and  equal  member  of  a  larixer  politi- 
cal aggregate,  cemented  by  every  tie  which  could  make  union  secure, 
profitable,  and  dignified.  It  is  curious  to  observe  how^  perfectly  the 
orator  is  conscious  that  this  repugnance,  though  at  the  moment  pre- 
ponderant, was  nevertheless  essentially  transitory,  and  would  Lcive 
place  to  attachment  when  (he  union  became  to  be  felt  as  a  reaTity; 
and  how  eagerly  he  appeals  to  Sparta  to  lose  no  time  in  clenching  the' 
repugn;mce,  while  it  histed.  He  appeals  to  her,  not  for  any  bene- 
ficial or  Pan-IIellenic  ol)ject,  but  in  the  interests  of  her  own  domin- 
ion, which  require  that  the  Grecian  world  should  be  as  it  were,  pul- 
verized into  minute,  self-acting,  atoms  without  cohesion— so  that  each 
city,  or  each  village,  while  protected  against  subjection  to  any  other, 
should  further  be  prevented  from  equal  political  union  or  fusion 
with  any  other;  being  thus  more  completely  helpless  and  dependent 
in  reference  to  Sparta. 

It  was  not  merely  from  Akanthus  and  Apollonia,  but  also  from 
the  dispossessed  Macedoninn  king  Amyntas,  that  envoys  reached 
Sparta  to  ask  for  aid  against  Olynthus.  It  seems  that  Amyntas, 
after  having  abandoned  the  kingdom  and  made  his  cession  to  the 
Olynthians,  had  obtained  some  aid  from  Thessaly  and  tried  to  rein- 
state himself  by  force.  In  this  scheme  he  had  failed,  being  defeated 
by  the  Olynthians.  Indeed  we  find  another  person  named  Argteus, 
mentioned  as  competitor  for  the  Macedonian  scepter,  and  possessing 
it  for  two  years. 

After  hearing  these  petitioners,  the  Lacedaemonians  first  declared 
their  own  readiness  to  comply  with  the  prayer,  and  to  put  down 
Olynthus;  next,  they  subniitted  the  same  point  to  the  vote  of  the 
assem])lcd  allies.  Among  these  latter,  there  was  no  genuine  antip- 
athy against  the  Olynthians,  such  as  that  which  had  prevailed 
against  Athens  before  the  Peloponnesian  w^ar,  in  the  synod  then  held 
at  Sparta.  But  the  powder  of  Sparta  over  her  allies  was  now  far 
greater  than  it  had  been  then.  Most  of  their  cities  were  under  oligar- 
chies, dependent  upon  her  support  for  authority  over  their  fellow- 
citizens;  moreover  the  recent  events  in  Bwotia  and  at?  Mantineia  had 
oi)erated  as  a  serious  intimidation.  Anxiety  to  keep  the  favor  of 
Sparta  was  accordingly  paramount,  so  that  most  of  the  speakers,  as 
well  as  most  of  the  votes,  declared  for  the  war,  and  a  combined  army 
of  ten  thousand  men  was  voted  to  be  raised. 

To  make  up  such  a  total,  a  proportional  contingent  was  assessed 
upon  each  confederate;  combined  with  the  proviso,  now  added  for 
the  first  time,  that  each  might  furnish  money  instead  of  men,  at  the 
rate  of  three  ^gina^an  oboli  (half  an  ^'Eginaean  drachma)  for  each 
hoplite.     A  cavalry -soldier,  to  those  cities  which  furnished  such,  was 


748 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKlDxVS. 


reckonrdas  equivalent  to  four  hoplites;  a  hoplite  as  cquiva  ent  to 
two  peltusts;  or  peeuniary  coiitribulion  on  the  same  scale.  All  cities 
n  default  were  niade  liable  to  a  forfeit  of  one  slater  (four  drachiuas) 
vvr  dav  for  every  soldier  not  sent;  the  forfeit  to  be  enforced  by 
SDarta" '  Such  licensed  substitution  of  pecuniary  payment  for  i  er- 
soual  service,  is  the  same  as  I  have  already  described  to  have  taken 
Place  uearlv  a  century  before  in  the  confederacy  ot  Delos  under  the 
presi.lency  of  Athens.  It  was  a  system  not  likely  to  be  extensively 
acted  upon  among  the  Spartan  allies,  who  were  at  once  poorer  and 
more  warlike  than  those  of  Athens.  But  m  both  casc^  it  was  favor- 
able to  the  ambition  of  the  leading  stale;  and  the  tendency  becomes 
here  manifest,  to  sanction,  by  the  formality  of  a  public  resolution, 
that  incre:ised  Lacedaemonian  ascentlency  which  had  already  grown 

"^ThV^\kaIuhian  envovs,  while  expressing  their  satisfaction  with  the 
vote  iust  passed,  intimated  that  the  muster  of  these  numerous  con- 
tingents vvould  occupy  some  time,  and  again  insisted  on  the  necessity 
of  instant  mtervenlion,  even  with  a  small  force;  before  the  Olvnlhians 
could  find  time  to  get  their  plans  aclually  in  work  or  appreciated  by 
the  surrounding  cities.  A  moderate  Laceda-monian  force  (they  saul) 
if  dispatched  forthwith,  would  not  only.keep  U.ose  who  had  rehised 
to  join  Olynthus,  steadv  to  their  refusal,  but  also  induce  others,  w^ho 
had  joined  reluctantly,'to  revolt.     Accordingly  the  Ephors  appointed 

Eudamidas  at  once,  assigning  to  him  2  000  ^^''V^^'f-^.^'^^^Zrtl^^ 
enfranchised  Helots),  Periceki.  and  Skinta  or  Arcadian  bordereis 
Such  was  the  anxiety  of  the  Akanthians  for  haste,  that  they  would 
pot    et  him  delay  even  to  get  together  the  whole  of  his  moderate 
force     He  was  put  in  march  immediately,  with  such  as  were  ready; 
while  his  brother  Pha^bidas  was  left  behind  to  collect  the  remainder 
and  follow  him.     And  it  seems  that  the  Akanthians  judged  correctly 
For  Eudamidas,  arriving  in  Thrace  after  a  rapid  ^?^^^rch    though  he 
was   unable  to   contend   against   the   Olynthians   ^°    ^he  ticld    >^ 
induced  Potidaa  to  revolt  from  them,  and  was  able  to  defend  those 
citiersuch  as  Akanthus  and  Apollonia,  which  resolutely  stood  aloof. 
Amyntas  brought  a  force  to  co-operate  with  him. 

The  delay  in   the   march   of  Phcebidas  was  productive   of  con- 
sequences no  less  momentous  than   unexpected.     The   direct    line 
S  Peloponnesus  to  Olynthus  lav  through  .th^  Thel)an  territn^; 
a  pa^^sacre   which  the   Thebans.    whatever  might    have  been  the  r 
wishes  were  not  powerful  enough  to  refuse,  though    hey  had  con- 
Tracted  an  alliance   with   Olvnthus,  and  though  proclamation  was 
made  that  no  Theban  citizens  sliould  join  the  Lacedamonian  force 
Eu  amdtis,  having  departed  at  a  moment's  notice,  passed  thro  gl 
B«o  "a  without  a  halt  in  his  way  to  Thrace      But  it  was  knmvn   ha 
his  brother  Phcebidas  was  presently  to  follow;  and  upon  this  fact 
the  philo-Laconian  party  in  Thebes  organized  a  conspiracy 

They  obtained  from  the  Ephors,  and  from  the  miso-lhebau  feelings 


LEONTIADES  AND  ISMENIAS. 


749 


of  Agesilaus,  secret  orders  to  Phcebidas,  that  he  should  co-operate  with 
them  in  any  j^arty  movement  wiiicli  they  might  find  opportunity  of 
executing;  and  when  he  halted  with  his  detachment  near  the  gymna- 
sium a  little  way  without  the  walls,  they  concerted  matters  as  well 
with  him  as  among  themselves,  Lcontiades,  Hypates,  and  Archias, 
were  the  chiefs  of  the  party  in  Thebes  favorable  to  Sparta:  a  party 
decidedly  in  minority,  yet  still  powerful,  and  at  this  moment  so 
strengthened  by  the  unbounded  ascendency  of  the  Spartan  name, 
that  Lcontiades  himself  was  one  of  the  polemarchs  of  the  city.  Of  . 
the  anti-Spartan,  or  predominant  sentiment  in  Thebes, — which 
included  most  of  the  wealthy  and  active  citizens,  those  who  came 
successively  into  office  as  hipparchs  or  generals  of  the  cavalry — the 
leaders  were  Ismeuias  and  Androkleides.  The  former  especially,  the 
foremost  as  well  as  ablest  conductor  of  the  late  war  against  Sparta, 
was  now  in  oilice  as  Polemarch,  conjointly  with  his  rival  Lcon- 
tiades. 

While  Tsmenias,  detesting  the  Spartans,  kept  aloof  from  Phcebidas, 
Lcontiades  assiduously  courted  him  and  gained  his  confidence.  On 
the  day  of  the  Thesmophoria,  a  religious  festival  celebrated  by  the 
wiomen  apart  from  the  men,  during  which  the  acropolis  or  Kadmeia 
was  consecrated  to  their  exclusive  use — Phoebidas,  affecting  to  have 
concluded  his  halt,  put  himself  in  march  to  proceed  as  if  tow\ards 
Thrace;  seemingly  rounding  the  walls  of  Thebes,  but  not  going  into 
it.  The  Senate  w'as  actually  assembled  in  the  portico  of  the  agora, 
and  the  heat  of  a  summer's  noon  had  driven  every  one  out  of  the 
streets,  wiien  Lcontiades,  stealing  away  from  the  Senate,  hastened 
on  horseback  to  overtake  Plioebidas,  caused  him  to  face  about,  and 
conducted  the  Lacedemonians  straight  up  to  the  Kadmeia;  the  gates 
of  which  as  well  as  those  of  the  town,  were  opened  to  his  order  as 
Polemarch.  There  were  not  only  no  citizens  in  the  streets,  but  none 
even  in  the  Kadmeia;  no  male  person  being  permitted  to  be  present 
at  the  feminine  Thesmophoria;  so  that  Phoebidas  and  his  army 
became  possessed  of  the  Kadmeia  without  the  smallest  opposition. 
At  the  same  time  they  became  possessed  of  an  acquisition  of  hardly 
less  importance— the  persons  of  all  the  assembled  Theban  women; 
who  served  as  hostages  for  the  quiet  submission,  however  reluctant, 
of  the  citizens  in  the  town  below.  Lcontiades  handed  to  Pha^bidas 
the  key  of  the  ga<es,  and  then  descended  into  the  town,  giving  orders 
that  no  man  should  go  up  without  his  order. 

The  assembled  senate  heard  with  consternation  the  occupation  of 
the  acropolis  by  Phoebidas.  Before  any  deliberation  could  be  taken 
among  the  senators,  Lcontiades  came  down  to  resume  his  seat.  The 
lochagesiuid  armed  citizens  of  his  party,  to  whom  he  had  previously 
given  orders,  stood  close  at  hand.  "  Senators  (said  he),  be  not  intimi- 
dated by  the  news  that  the  Spartans  are  in  the  Kadmeia;  for  they 
assure  us  that  they  have  no  hostile  purpose  against  anyone  who  does 
not  court  war  against  them.     But  I,  as  Polemarch,  am  empowered 


750 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


hv  law  to  seize  anv  one  whose  beliavior  is  manifestly  and  eapitnlly 
criminal.  Accord"ingly  I  seize  this  man  Isnienias,  08  I  lie  great 
influmer  of  war.  Come  forward,  captains  and  soldiers,  lay  liold  of 
him,  and  carry  him  off  where  your  orders  direct."  Ismeiiias  was 
accordingly  seized  and  hurried  off  as  a  prisoner  to  the  Kadmeia; 
while  the  senators,  thunderstruck  and  overawed,  offered  no  resist- 
ance.. Such  of  them  as  were  partisans  of  the  arrested  jjolemarch, 
and  many  even  of  the  more  neutral  members,  left  the  Senate  and 
went  home,  thankful  to  escape  with  their  lives.  Three  hundred  of 
tliem,  inchidimr  Androkleidas,  Pelopidas,  :Merion,  and  others,  sought 
safety  by  voluntarv  exile  to  Athens;  after  which  the  remainder  of 
the  Senate,  now  composed  of  few  or  none  except  philo-Spartan  par- 
tisans, passed  a  vote  formally  dismissing  Ismenias,  and  appointing  a 
new  polemarch  in  his  place. 

This  blow  of  high-handed  violence  against  Ismenias  forms  a  wor- 
thy counterpart  to  the  seizure  of  Theramenes  by  Kritias,  twenty-two 
years  before,  in  the  Senate  of  Athens  under  the  Thirty.  Terror- 
gtriking  in  itself,  it  was  probablv  accomi)ani(  d  by  similar  deeds  of 
force  against  others  of  the  same 'party.  The  sudden  explosion  and 
complete  success  of  the  conspirac  y,  plotted  by  the  Executive  Chief 
himself,  the  most  irresistible  of  *all  conspirators— the  presence  of 
Phwbidas  in  the  Kadmeia,  and  of  a  compliant  S(  nate  in  the  town— 
the  seizure  or  fli!j:ht  of  Ismenias  and  all  his  leading  partisans— were 
more  than  sufficient  to  crush  all  spirit  of  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
citizens;  whose  first  anxiety  probably  was,  to  extricate  their  wives 
and  daughters  from  the  custody  of  the  Lacediemonians  in  the  Kad- 
meia. Having  such  a  price  to  offer,  Leontiades  would  extort  sub- 
mission the  more  easily,  and  would  prol)a])ly  procure  a  vote  of  the 
people  ratifying  the  new  rer/ime,  the  Spartan  alliance,  and  the  con- 
tinued occupation  of  the  acropolis.  Having  accomplished  the  first 
settlement  of  his  authority,  he  proceeded  without  delay  to  Sparta,  to 
make  known  the  fact  that  "order  reigned  "  at  Thebes.  ^ 

The  news  of  the  seizure  of  the  Kadmeia  and  of  the  revolution  at 
Thebes  had  been  received  at  Sparta  with  the  greatest  surprise,  as  well 
as  with  a  mixed  feelins:  of  shame  and  satisfaction.  Everywhere 
throughout  Greece,  probably,  it  excited  a  greater  sensation  than  any 
event  since  the  battle  of  ^Egospotami.  Tried  by  the  reeognizcd  pub- 
lie  law  of  Greece,  it  was  a  flagitious  iniquity,  for  which  Sparta  had 
not  the  shadow  of  a  pretense.'  It  was  even  worse  than  the  surpriee 
of  Plata^a  bv  the  Thebans  he  fore  the  Peloponnesian  war,  which 
admitted  of  the  partial  excuse  that  war  was  at  any  rite  impending; 
whereas  in  this  case,  the  Thebans  had  neither  done  nor  threatened 
anvthiniz:  to  violate  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.  It  stood  condemned  by 
the  indi-nant  sentiment  of  all  Greece,  unwillingly, testified  even  by 
the  philo-Laconian  Xenoi)hon  himself.  But  it  was  at  the  same  time 
an  immense  accession  to  Spartan  power.  It  had  been  achieved  Avith 
pre-eminent  skill  and  success;  and  Phoebidas  might  well  chum  to 


LEONTIADES  AT   SPARTA. 


751 


have  struck  for  Sparta  the  most  important  blow  since  ^gospotami, 
relieving  her  from  one  of  her  two  really  formidable  enemies. 

Nevertheless,  far  from  receiving  thanks  at  Si)arta,  he  became  the 
object  of  wrath  and  condemnation,  both  with  {\w-  Ephors  and  the 
citizens  generally.  Every  one  was  glad  to  throw  upon  him  the 
odium  of  tlie  proceeding,  and  to  denounce  him  as  having  acted  with- 
out orders.  Even  the  Ephors,  who  had  secretly  authorized  him 
beforehand  to  co-operate  general  1}' with  the  faction  at  Thebes,  having 
doubtless  never  given  any  specific  instructions,  now  indignantly  dis- 
avowed hiin.  Agesilaus  alone  stood' forward  in  his  defense,  con- 
tending that  the  only  question  was,  whether  his  proceeding  at  Thebes 
had  been  injurious  or  beneficial  to  Sparta.  If  the  former,  he  merited- 
punishment;  if  the  latter,  it  was  always  4avvful  to  reud^'  service, 
even  uirproiiiptii  and  without  previous  orders. 

Tried  by  this  standard,  the  verdict  was  not  doubtful.  For  every 
man  at  Sparta  felt  how  advantageous  the  act  was  in  itself;  and  felt 
it  still  more,  when  Leontiades  reached  the  city,  humble  in  solicita- 
tion as  well  as  profuse  in  promise.  In  his  speech  addressed  to  the 
assembled  Ephors  and  Senate,  he  first  reminded  them  how  hostile 
Thebes  had  hitherto  been  to  them,  under  Ismenias  and  the  party 
just  put  down — and  how  constantly  they  had  been  in  jealous 
alarm,  lest  Thebes  should  reconstitute  by  force  the  Ba?otian  federa- 
tion. **  Now  (added  he)  your  fears  may  be  at  an  end:  only  take  as 
good  care  to  uphold  our  government  as  we  shall  take  to  obey  your 
orders.  For  the  future,  you  will  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  send  us  a 
short  dispatch,  to  get  every  sej-vice  which  you  require."  It  was 
resolved  by  the  Laceihiemonians,  at  the  instance  of  Agesilaus,  to  retain 
•their  garrison  now  in  the  Kadmeia,  to  uphold  Leontiades  with  his 
colleagues  in  the  government  of  Thebes,  and  to  put  Ismenias  upon 
his  trlTd.  Yet  they  at  the  same  time,  as  a  sort  of  atonement  to  the 
opinion  of  Gieece,  passed  a  vote  of  censure  on  Phtebidas,  dismissed 
liini  from  his  command,  and  even  condemned  hini  to  a  fine.  The 
fine,  however,  most  probably  was  never  exacted;  for  we  shall  see  by 
the  conduct  of  Sphodrias  afterward  that  the  displeasure  against  Phoe- 
bidas, if  at  first  genuine,  was  certainly  of  no  long  continuance. 

That  the  Laceda,Mnonians  should  at  the  same  time  condemn  PhcQbi- 
das  and  retain  the  Kadineia-r-has  been  noted  as  a  gross  contradic- 
tion. Nevertheless  we  ought  not  to  forget,  that  had  they  evacuated 
the  Kadmeia,  the  party  of  Leontiades  at  Thebes,  which  had  com- 
l)romised  itself  for  Sparta  as  well  as  for  its  own  aggrandizement, 
would  have  been  irretrievably  sacrificed.  The  like  excuse,  if  excuse 
it  be,  cannot  be  urged  iu  respect  to  their  treatment  of  Ismenias; 
whom  they  put  upou  his  trhd  at  Thebes,  before  a  court  consisting  of 
three  Lacediemonian  commissioners,  and  one  from  each  allied  city. 
He  was  accused,  probably  by  Leontiades  and  his  other  enemies,^  of 
having  entered  into  friendship  and  conspiracy  Vv'ith  the  Persian  king 
to  the  detriment  of  Greece — of  having  partaken  in  the  Persian  funds 


752 


PEACE  OF  ANTAT.KIDAS. 


TELEUTIAS  DEFEATED. 


753 


brought  into  Greece  by  Timokrates  tlie  Rliodiaii— and  of  being  the 
real  autlior  of  that  war  which  liad  disturbed  Greece  from  895  B.C. 
down  to  tlie  peace  of  Antallvi(his.  x\fter  an  unavailing  defense,  he 
was  condemned  and  executed.  Had  this  doom  hecn  inflicted  upon 
him  by  his  political  antagonists  us  a  consequence  of  tl>€ir  intestine 
victory,  it  would  have  been  too  much  in  the  analogy  of  Grecian 
party-warfare  to  call  for  any  special  remark.  But  there  is  something 
l)ecililiarly  revolting  in  the  prostitution  of  judicial  solemnity  ami  Pan- 
Hellenic  pretense,  which  the  Lacedicmonians  here  committed.  They 
could  have  no  possible  right  to  try  Ismenias  as  a  criminal  at  all;  still 
less  to  try  him  as  a  criminal  on  the  charge  of  confederacy  with  the 
Persian  king— when  they  had  themselves,  only  five  years  before, 
acletl  not  merely  as  allies,  but  even  as  instruments,  of  that  monarch, 
in  enforcing  the  jxiace  of  Autalkidas.  If  Ismenias  had  received 
money  from  one  Persian  satrap,  the  Spartan  Autalkidas  had  profited 
in  like  manner  by  another — and  for  the  like  purpose,  too,  of  carrying 
on  Grecian  war.  The  real  motive  of  the  Spartans  was  doubtless  to 
revenge  themselves  upon  this  distinguished  Theban  for  having  raised 
against  them  the  war  which  began  in  395  u.c.  But  the  mockery  of 
justice  by  which  that  revenge^was  masked,  and  the  impudence  of 
punishing  in  him  as  treason  that  same  foreign  alliance  with  which 
they  had  ostentatiously  identified  themselves,  lends  a  deeper  enor- 
mity to  the  whole  proceeding. 

Leontiades  and  his  partisans  were  thus  established  as  rulers  in 
Thebes,  with  a  Lacedaemonian  garrison  in  the  Kadmeia  to  sustain 
them  and  execute  their  orders.  •  The  once-haughty  Thebes  was 
enrolled  as  a  member  of  the  Lnceda-monian  confederacy.  Sparti^ 
was  now  enabled  to  prosecute  her  Olynthian  expedition  with  re- 
doubled vigor.  Eudamidas  and  xVmyntas,  though  they  repressed 
the  growth  of  the  Olynthian  confederacy,  had  not  been  strong 
enough  to  put  it  down;  so  that  a  larger  force  was  necessary,  and  the 
aggregate  of  ten  thousand  men,  which  had  been  previously  decreed, 
>vas  put  into  instant  requisition,  to  be  commanded  by  Teleiitias. 
brother  of  Agesilaus.  The  new  general,  a  man  of  _  very  popular 
manners,  was"  soon  on  his  march  at  the  head  of  this  large  army, 
which  comprised  many  Theban  hoplites  as  well  as  horsemen  fur- 
nished by  the  new^  rulers  in  their  unqualified  devotion  to  Sparta. 
He  sent  forward  envoys  to  Amyntas  in  Macedonia,  urging  u])on  him 
the  most  strenuous  efforts  for  the  purpose  of  recovering  the  ^Macedo- 
nian  cities  wiiich  had  joined  the  Olynthians — and  also  to  Derdas, 
prince  of  the  district  of  Upper  3Iacedonia,  called  Elimeia,  inviting 
his  co-operation  against  that  insolent  city,  which  would  speedily 
extend  her  dominion  (he  contended)  from  the  maritime  region  to  the 
interior,  unless  she  were  put  down. 

Though  the  Lacedaemonians  were  masters  everywhere  and  had 
their  hands  free — though  Teleutias  was  a  competent  ofticer  with 
powerful  forces — and    though    Derdas  joined  with  400  excellent 


Macedonian  horse — yet  the  conquest  of  Olynthus  was  foimd  nd  easy 
enterprise.  The  Olynthian  cavalry,  in  particular,  was  numerous 
and  efiicient.  Unable  as  they  were  to  make  head  against  Teleutias 
in  the  field  or  repress  his  advance,  nevertheless,  "in  a  desultory 
engagement  which  took  place  near  the  city  gates,  they  defeated  the 
Lacedaemonian  and  Theban  cavalry,  threw  even  the  infantry  into 
confusion,  and  were  on  the  point  of  gaining  a  comi)iete  victory,  had 
not  Derdas  with  his  cavalry  on  the  other  wing  made  a  diversion 
which  forced  them  to  come  back  for  the  protection  of  the  city. 
Teleutias,  remaining  master  of  the  field,  continued  to  ravage  the 
Olynthian  territory  during  the  summer,  for  which,  however,  the 
Olynthians  retaliated  by  frequent  marauding  expeditions  against  the 
cities  in  alliance  with  him. 

In  the  ensuing  spi-ing,  the  Olynthians  sustained  various  partial 
defeats,  especially  one  near  A])ollonia  from  Derdas.  They  were 
more  and  more  confined  to  their  walls;  insomuch  that  Teleutias 
became  confident  and  begnn  to  despise  them.  Under  these  disposi- 
tions on  his  part,  a  body  of  Olynthian  cavalry  showx^d  themselves  one 
morning,  passed  the  river  near  their  city,  and  advanced  in  calm  array 
toward  the  Laced^iemouian  camp.  Indignant  at  such  an  appear- 
ance of  daring,  Teleutias  directed  Tiemonidas  with  the  peltasts  to 
disperse  them;  upon  which  the  Olynthians  slowly  retreated,  while 
the  peltas's  rushed  impatiently  to  pursue  them,  t  ven  when  they 
recrossed  the  river.  No  sooner  did  the  Olynthians  see  that  half  the 
peltasts  had  crossed  it  than  they  suddenly  turned,  charged  them 
vigorously,  and  put  them  to  flight  with  the  loss  of  I  heir  commander, 
Tiemonidas,  and  a  hundred  others.  All  this  passed  in  sight  of 
Teleutias,  who  completely  lost  his  temper.  Seizing  his  arms,  he  hur- 
ried forward  to  cover  the  fugitives  with  the  hoplitc  s  around  him, 
sending  orders  to  all  his  troops,  hoplites,  peltasts,  and  horsemen,  to 
advance  also.  But  the  Olynthians,  again  retreating,  drew  him  on 
toward  the  city,  with  such  inconsiderate  forwardness,  that  many 
of  his  soldiers,  ascending  the  eminence  on  which  the  city  was  situated, 
rushed  close  up  to  the  walls.  Here,  however,  they  were  received  by 
a  shower  of  missiles  wiiich  forced  them  to  recede  in  disorder;  upon 
which  the  Olynthians  again  sallied  forth,  probably  from  more  than 
one  gate  at  once,  and  charged  them  first  with  cavalry  and  peltasts, 
next  with  hoplites.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  disturbed 
and  distressed  by  the  first,  were  unable  to  stand  against  the  compact 
charge  of  the  last;  Teleutias  himself,  fighting  in  the  foremost  ranks, 
was  slain,  and  his  death  w^'is  a  signal  for  the  fight  of  all  around. 
The  whole  besieging  force  dispersed  and  fied  in  different  directions 
— to  Akanthus.  to  Spartolus.  to  Potidjea,  to  Apollonia.  So  vigorous 
and  effective  was  the  pursuit  by  the  Olynthians,  that  the  loss  of  the 
fugitives  w^as  immense.  The  wiiole  army  was  in  fact  ruined;  for 
probably  many  of  the  allies  who  escaped  became  discouraged  and 
went  home. 


754 


PEACE.  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


GREAT  MISCHIEF  DONE  BY  SPARTA. 


755 


At  another  time,  probably,  a  victory  so  decisive,   might  have 

flen.rred    he  Lacediemonians  from  further  proce.dMigs,  and  saved 

Olvntl,  1.     But  now,  tliey  were  so  completely  mnsfrs  everJ^^hel■e 

e^se        t  they  thoud.t  o.dy  of  repairing  the  disl.or.or  by  a  still  more 

^mno      ''  demonstr,^lioi,.    ^Their  king  Agesipolis  ^^as  placed  at  the 

Zd  of  an  expe,lition  ..n  the  largest  scale;  and  Ins  name  called  forth 

'er  cooperation,  both  in  men  and  money,  from  the  allies.     I  e 

ntSied  with  thirty  Spartan  counselors,  as  Agesila.is  had  gone  to 

Asi^  teides  a  select  body  of  energetic  youth  as  volunteers,  from 

il,e  Peria-ki,  from  the  illegitin.ate  sons  of  Spartans,  and  the  stangcrs 

or  cmzeus  who  had  lost  tluir  franchise  through  poverty,  "nlrod.iml 

alfrieiHls  of  richer  Spartan  citizens  togothroughthearduousLjlai  - 

ce-n  rainin.^AnlvnlasandDelxlasalsowel■elnstlgatedtogr«.te 

K,™n  before,  so  that  Agesipolis  was  enab  ed,  »t'e>-  ;e^-';'"f ''- 
re-enforccmeiits  in  his  march  through  Macedonia,  to  present  himsUt 
^f  "re  Olynthus  with  an  overwhelming  force  and  to  confine  the 
dti/ens  within  their  walls.  He  then  completed  the  iwage  of  their 
len'it  rv  w  ch  had  been  beirim  by  Teletltias;  and  even  took  Toroi  e 
bvstom  Bu  tie  extreme^  heat'of  the  summer  weather  presently 
Sou °™ upon  him  a  fever,  which  proved  fatal  in  a  weeks  inie; 
a  though  he  had  ctuised  himself  to  be  carried  for  repose  to  the  shady 
^rove  °m  ctau-  watei-s.  near  the  temple  of  Dionysus  at  Aphyt.s. 
HTsbmh- was  immersed  in  honey  and  tnu.sported  to  Sparta,  where 
it  WIS  buried  with  the  customary  solemnities. 

P  h-1  id  s   who  snccc'ded  Agesipolis  in  thccommaiid  prosecuted 
thrwarwith'undiminished  vigor;  andtheOlynth.ans,  debarred  fro 

ei-  hmue   produce  as  welf  as  from   importation,   were  speed! 
red  ced  to  such  straits  as  to  be  compelled  to  soliei   peace     The 
were  obliged  to  break  up  their  own  federation,  and  to  e""''      f  "; 
selves  as  Sworn  member.^  of  the  Lacedamionian  confederacy,  with  i . 
olWions  of  s..rviee  to  Sparta.     The  Olynthian  union  being   hv 
Solved  th;«n,ponent  Grecian  cities  were  enrolled  severa  ly  .isalhe 
of  Sparta  while  the  maritime  cities  of  Macedonia  were  depr  ved  o^ 
the^r  neighboring  Grecian  protector,   and  passed  again  under  the 

•'Toll"!Ve'dl",^l'Sn  of  this  growing  confederacy  and  the  recon^ 
stitutiou  <,f  maritime  Macedonia,   were  signal  misfortunes  to  te 
Grecian  world      Never  were  the  arms  of  Sparta  more  misclnevously 
OT  moreTuwa.rant,d.lv  emploved.     That  a  ,,owerfnl  Grecian  con- 
federac^-     khi  d    e  formed  in  the  Chalkidic  peninsula,  m  the  bonlc 
vc.!  on  Ibere  H..llas  joine-l  the  non.H<.llonic  'ri''f-"^' "'' '^'^^v 
f,f%i.'nal  benefit  to  the  He  euic  world  generally.     It  would  l.aM. 
serv4^ra    abulwarkto  Greece  against  the  neighboring  Macedoniiii^ 
and  Tbric Hns  at  whose .■xpense  its  conquests,  if  it  made  any  would 
have    J^en  achieved.     ThiU  Olvnthus  did  not  oi.press  her  Gre.^iii. 
m  b^hbors-th  t  the  principles  of  her  confederacy  were  of  the  most 
equa     genero^,   and  sedicing    charac.cr-that  she  employed  iu> 


nrreater  coniiml.sion  lli«an  was  requisite  to  surmount  an  unreflcctino- 
instinct  of  tovvn-autononiy— and  tliat  tlie  very  towns  who  obeyed  tliis 
instinct  would  liave  become  sensible  themselves,  in  a  very  short  time, 
of  the  benefits  conferred  by  the  confederacy  on  each  and  every  one 
—these  are  facts  certified  by  the  urgency  of  the  rchictant  Akanthians, 
■when  they  entreat  Sparta  to  leave  no  interval  for  the  confederacv  to 
make  its  working  felt.  Nothing  but  the  intervention  of  Sparta  could 
have  crushed  this  liberal  and  beneficent  promise,  nothing  but  the 
iiccident,  that  during  the  three  years  from  o82  to  879  B.C.,  she  was  at 
the  maximum  of  her  power  and  had  her  hands  quite  free,  with  The- 
bes and  its  Kadmeia  under  her  garrison.  Such  prosperity  did  not 
long  continue  uabated.  Only  a  few  months  after  the  submission  of 
Olynthus,  the  Kadmeia  was  retaken  by  the  Theban  exiles,  who  raised 
so  vigorous  a  war  against  Sparta,  that  she  would  have  been  disabled 
from  me(hlliiig  with  Olynthus — as  we  shall  find  illustrated  by  the 
fact  (hereafter  to  be  recounted)  that  she  declined  interfering  in  Thes- 
saly  to  protect  the  Thessalian  cities  against  Jason  of  Pherae.  Had 
the  Olynthian  confederacy  been  left  to  its  natural  working,  it  might 
well  have  united  all  the  Hellenic  cities  around  it  in  harmonious  action, 
so  as  to  keep  the  sea-coast  in  possession  of  a  confederacy  of  free  ancl 
self-determining  communities,  confining  the  Macedonian  princes  to 
the  interior.  But  Sparta  threw  in  her  extraneous  force,  alike  irresisti- 
ble and  inauspicious,  to  defeat  these  tendencies;  and  to  frustrate  that 
salutary  change— from  fractional  autonomy  and  isolated  action  into 
integral  and  equal  autonomy  with  collective  action — which  Olynthus 
was  laboring  to  bring  about.  She  gave  the  victory  to  Amyntas,  and 
prepared  the  indispensable  basis  upon  which  his  son  Philip  afterward 
rose,  to  reduce  not  only  Olynthus,  but  Akanthus,  Apollonia,  and  the 
major  part  of  the  Grecian  world,  to  one  common  level  of  subjection. 
Many  of  those  Akanthians,  who  spurned  the  boon  of  equal  partner- 
ship and  free  conununion  with  Greeks  and  neighbors,  lived  to  dis- 
cover how  impotent  were  their  own  separate  walls  as  a  bulwark 
airainst  Macedonian  neighbors;  and  to  see  themselves  confounded  in 
that  common  servitude  which  the  imprudence  of  their  fathers  had 
entailed  upon  them.  By  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  Sparta  had  sur- 
rendered the  Asiatic  Greeks  to  Persia;  by  crushing  the  Olynthian 
confederacy,  she  virtually  surrendered  the  Thracian  Greeks  to  the 
Macedonian  princes.  Never  again  dul  the  opportunity  occm*  of 
placing  Hellenism  on  a  firm,  consolidated,  and  self-supporting  basis, 
round  the  coast  of  the  Thermaic  Gulf. 

While  the  Olynthian  expedition  was  going  on,  the  Lacedaemonians 
were  cfft-rying  on,  under  Agesllaus,  anolher  intervention  within 
Peloponnesus,  against  the  city  of  Phlius.  It  has  already  been  men- 
tioned that  certain  exiles  of  this  city  had  recently  been  recalled,  at 
the  express  cf)mmand  of  Sparta.  The  ruling  party  in  Phlius  had  at 
the  same  time  passed  a  vote  to  restore  the  confiscated  property  of 
these  exiles;  reimbursing  out  of  the  public  treasury,  to  those  who  had 


im 


PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 


SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTllUS. 


757 


purchased  it,  the  price  which  tliey  had  paid— and  reserving  all  dis- 
puted points  for  judicial  decision.  Tlie  returned  exiles  now  again 
came  to  tSpartu,  to  prefer  complaint  that  they  could  obtain  no  just 
restitution  of  their  properly;  that  the  tribunals  of  the  city  were  in  the 
hands  of  their  opponents,  many  of  them  directly  interested  as  pur- 
cliasers,  who  refused  them  the  riglit  of  appealing  to  any  extraneous 
and  impartial  authority:  and  that  there  were  even  in  tbe  city  itsdf 
many  who  thought  them  wronged.  ISuch  allegations  were  probably 
more  or  less  founded  in  trutli.  At  the  same  time,  the  api)eai  to 
Sparta,  abrogating  the  independence  of  Phlius,  so  incensed  the  ruliug 
Phliasians  that  they  passed  a  sentence  of  fine  against  all  the  appel- 
lants. The  latter  insisted  on  this  sentence  as  a  fresh  count  for 
strengthening  their  complaints  at  Sparta;  and  as  a  further  proof  of 
anti-Spartan  feeling,  as  well  as  of  high-handed  injustice,  in  the  Plilia- 
sijm  rulers.  Their  cause  was  warmly  espoused  by  Agesilaus,  who 
had  personal  relations  of  hospitality  with  some  of  the  exiles;  while 
it  appears  that  his  colleague  king  Agesipolis  was  on  good  terms  wiih 
the  ruling  party  at  Phlius— hatl  recetved  from  them  zealous  aid,  boih 
in  men  and  monev,  for  his  Olynthian  expedition— and  had  publicly 
thanked  them  for  their  devotion  to  Sparta.  The  Phliasian  govern 
ment,  emboldened  by  the  proclaimed  testimonial  of  Agesipolis.  certi- 
fying their  fidelity,  had  fancied  that  they  stood  upon  firm  ground, 
and  that  no  Spartan  coercion  would  be  enforced  against  them.  Bui 
the  marked  favor  of  Agesipolis,  now  absent  in  Thrace,  told  rather 
against  them  in  the  mind  of  Agesilaus;  pursuant  to  that  jealousy 
which  usually  prevailed  between  the  two  Spartan  kings.  In  spite  of 
much  remonstrance  at  Sparta,  from  many  who  deprecated  hostilities 
against  a  city  of  5,000  citizens,  for  tbe  profit  of  a  handful  of  exile? 
—he  not  only  seconded  the  proclamation  of  war  against  Phlius  by 
the  Ephors,  but  also  took  the  command  of  the  army. 

The  army  being  mustered,  and  the  border  sacrifices  favorable, 
Agesilaus  marched  with  his  usual  rapidity  toward  Phlius;  dismissing 
those  Phliasian  envoys,  who  met  him  on  tbe  road  and  bribed  (»r 
entreated  him  to  desist,  with  the  harsh  reply  that  the  government  liiid 
already  deceived  Sparta  once,  and  that  he  would  be  satisfied  with 
nothing  less  than  the  surrender  of  the  acropolis.  This  being  refused, 
he  marched  to  the  city,  and  blocked  it  up  by  a  wall  of  circumvalla- 
tion.  The  besieged  defended  themselves  with  resolute  bravery  and 
endurance,  under  a  citizen  named  Delphion;  who,  with  a  select  troop 
of  300,  maintained  constant  guard  at  every  point,  and  even  annoyed 
the  besiegers  by  frequent  sallies.  By  public  decree,  every  citizen 
was  put  upon  half-allowance  of  bread,  so  that  the  siege  was  pro- 
longed to  double  the  time  which  Agesilaus,  from  tbe  inforifiation  ot 
the  exiles  as  to  the  existing  stock  of  provisions,  had  supposed  to  be 
possible.  Gradually,  however,  famine  made  itself  felt;  desertions | 
from  within  increased,  among  those  who  were  favorable,  or  not  I 
decidedly  averse,  to  the  exiles;  desertions,  which  Agesilaus  took  care 


to  encourage  by  an  ample  supply  of  food,  and  by  enrollment  as  Phlia- 
sian emigrants  on  the  Spartan  side.  At  length,  after  about  a  years' 
blockade,  the  provisions  within  were  exhausted,  so  that  the  besieued 
were  forced  to  entreat  permission  from  Agesilaus  to  dispatch  envoys 
to  Sparta  and  beg  for  terms.  Agesilaus  granted  their  request.  But 
being  at  the  same  time  indignant  that.they  submitted  to  Sparta  rather 
than  to  him.  he  sent  to  ask  the  Ephors  that  the  terms  might  bo  refer- 
red to  his  dictation.  Meanwhile  he  redoubled  his  watch  over  the 
city;  in  spite  of  which,  Delphion,  with  one  of  his  most  active  sub- 
ordinates, contrived  to  escape  at  this  last  hour.  Phlius  was  now 
compelled  to  surrender  at  discretion  to  Agesilaus,  who  named  a 
Council  of  One  Hundred  (half  from  the  exiles,  half  from  those  within 
the  city)  vested  with  absolute  powers  of  life  and  death  over  all  the 
citizens,  and  authorized  to  frame  a  constitution  for  the  future  gov- 
ernment of  the  city.  Until  this  should  be  done,  he  left  a  garrison  in 
the  acropolis,  with  assured  pay  for  six  months. 

Had  Agesipolis  been  alive,  perhaps  the  Phliasians  might  have  ob- 
tained better  terms.  How  the  omnipotent  Hekatontarchy  named  by 
the  partisan  feelings  of  Agesilaus,  conducted  themselves,  we  do  not 
know.  But  the  presumptions  are  all  unfavorable,  seeing  that  their 
situation  as  well  as  their  power  was  analogous  to  that  of  the  Thirty 
at  Athens  and  the  Lysandrian  Dekarchies  elsewhere. 

The  surrender  of  Olynthus  to  Polybiades,  and  of  Phlius  to  Agesi- 
laus, seem  to  have  taken  place  nearly  at  the  same  time. 


CHAPTER  LXXVII. 

FROM  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS  BY  THE  LACEDAEMONIANS 
DOWN  TO  THE  CONGRESS  AT  SPARTA,  AND  PARTIAL  PEACE  IN 
371  B.C. 

At  the  beginning  of  379  B.C.,  the  empire  of  the  LacedcTmonlans  on 
land  had  reached  a  pitch  never  before  paralleled.  On  the  sea,  their 
fleet  was  but  moderately  powerful,  and  they  seem  to  have  held 
divided  empire  with  Athens  over  the  smaller  islands;  while  the 
larger  islands  (so  far  as  w^e  can  make  out)  were  independent  of  both. 
But  the  whole  of  inland  Greece,  both  within  and  without  Pelopon- 
nesus— except  Argos,  Attica,  and  perhaps  the  more  powerful  Thes- 
salian  cities — was  now  enrolled  in  the  confederacy  dependent  on 
Sparta.  Her  occupation  of  Thebes,  by  a  Spartan  garrison  and  an 
oligarchy  of  local  partisans,  appeared  to  place  her  empire  be3^ond  all 
chance  of  successful  attack;  while  the  victorious  close  of  the  war 
against  Olynthus  carried  everywhere  an  intimidating  sense  of  her 


753     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 


DEMONSTRATION  AGAINST  DIONYSIUS.         759 


fur-reacliing  power.  Her  allies  too — governed  as  tliey  were  in  many- 
cases  by  Spartan  liarmosts,  and  by  oligarchies  whose  power  rested  on 
Si)ai1a — were  much  more  dependent  upon  her  than  they  hud  been 
duiing  the  time  of  the  Pelojifmnesian  war. 

Such  a  position  of  alfairs  rendered  Sparta  an  object  of  the  same 
nungled  fear  an<i  hatred  (the  first  preponderant)  as  had  been  fdt 
toward  imi)erial  Athens  fifty  years  before,  wlieu  she  was  designated 
as  the  "despot  city."  And  this  sentiment  was  further  aggravated 
by  the  recent  peace  of  Antalkidas,  in  every  sense  the  work  of  Sparta; 
wliich  she  had  first  procured,  and  afterward  carrieii  into  execution. 
That  peace  was  disgraceful  enough  as  being  dictated  by  the  king  of 
Persia,  enforced  in  his  name,  and  surrendering  to  him  all  the  Asiatic 
Greeks.  But  it  became  yet  more  disgraceful  when  the  universal 
autonomy  which  it  promised  was  seen  to  be  so  executed,  as  to  mean 
nothing  better  than  subjection  to  Sparta.  Of  all  the  aits  yet  com- 
mitted by  Sparta,  not  only  in  perversion  of  the  autonomy  promised 
to  every  city,  but  in  violation  of  all  the  acknowledged  canons  of  right 
dealing  between  city  and  city — the  most  flagrant  was,  lier  recent 
seizure  and  occupation  of  the  Kadmeia  at  Thel  es.  Her  subversion 
Hn  alliance  Avith,  and  partly  for  the  benefit  of,  Aniyntas,  king  of 
Macedonia)  of  the  free  Oh  nthian  confederacv  was  hardlv  less  olfen- 
sive  to  eveiy  Greek  of  large  or  Pan-Hellenic  patriotism.  She 
appeared  as  the  confederate  of  the  Persian  king  on  one  side,  of 
Amyntas  the  ^Macedonian  on  another,  of  the  Syracu>an  despot 
Dionysius  on  a  third — as  betraying  the  independence  of  Greece  to 
the  foreigner,  and  seeking  to  put  down  everywhere  within  it,  that 
free  spirit  which  stood  in  the  way  of  her  own  harmosts  and  partisan 
oligarchies. 

Unpopular  as  Sparta  was,  however,  she  stood  out  incontestably  as 
the  head  of  Greece.  No  man  dared  to  call  in  question  her  headsliip, 
or  to  provoke  resistance  against  it.  The  tone  of  patriotic  and  free- 
spoken  Greeks  at  this  moment  is  manifested  in  two  eminent  residents 
at  Athens — Lysias  and  Isokrates.  Of  'these  two  rhetors,  the  former 
composed  an  oration  which  he  publicly  read  at  Olympia  during  the 
celebration  of  the  99tli  Olympiad,  rc.  J}84,  three  years  after  the 
peace  of  Antalkidas.  In  this  oration  (of  which  unhappily  only  a 
fragment  remains,  preserved  by  Dionysius  of  Halikarnassus),  Lysias 
raises  the  cry  of  danger  to  Greece,  partly  from  the  Persian  king, 
partly  from  the  despot  Dionysius  of  Syracuse.  He  calls  ui)on  all 
Greeks  to  lay  aside  hostility  and  jealousies  one  with  the  other,  and 
to  unite  in  making  head  against  these  two  really  formidable  enemies, 
as  their  ancestors  had  previously  done,  with  ecpial  zeal  for  putting 
down  despots  and  for  repelling  the  foreigner.  He  notes  the  number 
of  Greeks  (in  Asia)  handed  over  to  the  Persian  king,  whose  great 
wealth  wouhl  enable  him  to  hire  an  indefinite  number  of  Grecian 
soldiers,  and  whose  naval  force  was  superior  to  anything  which  the 
Greeks  could  muster ;  while  the  strongest  naval  force  in  Greece  was 


that  of  the  Syracusan  Dionysius.  Recognizing  the  Laceda?monians 
as  chiefs  of  Greece,  Lysias  expresses  his  astonishment  that  they  should 
quietly  permit  the  fire  to  extend  itself  from  one  city  to  another. 
They  ought  to  look  upon  the  misfortunes  of  those  cities  which  had 
been  destroyed,  both  bv  the  Persians  and  by  Dionysius,  as  coming 
home  to  themselves;  not  to  wait  patiently,  until  the  two  hostde 
jiowers  had  united  their  forces  to  attack  the  center  of  Greece,  which 
yet  remained  independent. 

Of  the  two  common  enemies— Art axerxes  and  Dionysius— whom 
Lvsias  thus  denounces,  the  latter  had  sent  to  this  very  Olympic 
festival  a  splendid  theorv,  or  legation  to  offer  solemn  sacrifice  m  his 
name;  together  with  several  chariots  to  contend  in  the  race,  and 
some  excellent  rliai)sodes  to  recite  poems  composed  by  himself.  The 
Syracusan  legation,  headed  by  Thearides,  brother  of  Dionysms,  were 
clothed  with  rich  vestments  and  lodged  in  a  tent  of  extraordinary 
magnificence,  decorated  with  gold  and  purple;  such  probably  as  had 
not^  been  seen  since  the  ostentatious  display  made  by  Alkibiades  ni 
the  90lh  Olvmpiad  (b.c.  420).  Wliile  instigating  the  spectators  pres- 
ent to  exert  themselves  as  Greeks  for  the  liberation  of  their  fellow- 
Greeks  enslaved  by  Dionysius,  Lysias  exhorted  them  to  begin  forth- 
with their  hostile^  demonstration  against  the  latter,  by  plundering 
the  splendid  tent  before  them,  which  insulted  the  sacred  plain  of 
Olympia  with  the  spectack;  of  wealth  extorted  from  Grecian  sufferers. 
It  appears  that  this  exhortation  was  partially,  but  only  pariially, 
acted  upon.  Some  persons  assailed  the  tent,  but  were  probably 
restrained  by  the  Eleian  superintendents  without  difficulty. 

Yet  the  incident,  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  s[)eech  of  Lysias, 
helps  us  to  understand  the  apprehensions  and  sympathies  which  agi- 
tated the  Olympic  crowd  in  B.C.  ^^84.  This  was  the  first  Olympic 
festival  after  "the  peace  of  Antalkidas;  a  festival  memorable,  not  only 
becau.'^e  it  asrain  brought  thither  Athenians,  Boeotians,  Corinthians, 
and  Aro-eians,  who  must  have  been  prevented  by  the  preceding  war 
from  coming  either  in  B.C.  388*or  in  B.C.  892— but  also  as  it  exhibited 
the  visitors  and  Theories  from  the  Asiatic  Greeks,for  the  first  tune  since 
they  had  been  handed  over  by  Sptirta  to  the  Persians— and  the  like 
also  from  those  numerous  Italians  and  Sicilian  Greeks  whom  Diony- 
sius had  enslaved.  All  these  sufferers,  especially  the  Asiatics,  would 
doubtless  be  full  of  complaints  respecting  the  hardship  ot  their  new 
lot  and  against  Sparta  as  having  betrayed  them;  complaints  whicli 
would  call  forth  genuine  sympathy  in  the  Athenians,  Thebans,  and 
all  others  who  had  submitted  reluctantly  to  the  peace  of  Antaikidas. 
There  was  thus  a  large  body  of  sentiment  prepared  to  respond  to  the 
declamations  of  Lvsias.  And  many  a  Greciiui  patriot,  who  w^ouid  be 
ashamed  to  lay  hands  on  the  Syracustui  tents  or  envoys,  wouUl  }et  yieUl 
a  mournful  assent  to  the  orator's  remark,  that  the  free  Grecian  world 
was  on  fire  at  both  sides;  that  Asiatics,  Italians,  and  Sicilians,  had 
already  passed  into  the  hands  of  Artaxerxes  and  Diouysms;  and  that, 


760     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 


THEBES  UNDER  THE  OLIGARCHY. 


761 


if  these  two  formidable  enemies  sliould  coalesce,  the  liberties  even  of 
central  Greece  woiiUI  be  in  great  danger. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  much  such  feeling  of  grief  and  shame  would 
tend  to  raise  antipathy  against  Sparta.  Lysias,  in  that  portion  of  his 
speech  which  we  possess,  disguises  his  censure  against  her  under  the 
forms  of  surprise.  But  Isokrates,  who  composed  an  analogous  dis- 
course  four  years  afterward  (which  may  perhaps  have  been  read 
at  the  next  Olympic  festival  of  B.C.  380),  speaks  out  more  plainly. 
He  denounces  the  Lacedcvmonians  as  traitors  to  the  general  security 
and  freedom  of  Greece,  and  as  secontliug  foreign  kings  as  well  as 
Grecian  despots  to  aggrandize  themselves  at  the  co.st  of  autonomous 
Grecian  cities — all  in  the  interest  of  their  own  selfish  ambition.  iNi) 
wonder  (he  says)  that  the  free  and  self-acting  Hellenic  world  was 
every  day  becoming  contracted  into  a  narrower  space,  when  the  pre- 
siding city  Sparta  assi.stcd  Artaxerxes,  Amyntas.  and  Dionysius  to 
absorb  it— and  herself  undertook  unjust  aggressions  against  Thebes, 
Olynthus,  Phlius,  and  Mantineia. 

The  preceding  citations,  from  Lysias  and  Isokrates,  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  show  the  measure  w  hicir  intelligent  contemporaries  took, 
both  of  the  state  of  Greece  and  of  the  conduct  of  Si)arta,  during  the 
eight  years  succeeding  the  peace  of  Antalkidas  (387-379  B.C.).  But 
the  philo-Laconian  Xenophon  is  still  more  emphatic  in  his  condem- 
nation of  Sparta.  Having  described  her  triumphant  and  seemingly 
unassailable  position  after  the  subjugation  of  Olynthus  and  Phlius,  lie 
proceeds  to  sav — "  I  could  produce'numerous  other  incidents,  l)oth 
in  and  out  of*Greece,  to  prove  that  the  gods  take  careful  note  of 
impious  men  and  evil-doers;  but  the  events  which  I  am  now  about 
to  relate  are  quite  sullicieut.  The  LacedaMnonians,  who  had  sworn 
to  leave  each  citv  autonomous,  having  violated  their  oaths  by  seizing 
the  citadel  of  Thebes,  were  punished  by  the  very  men  whom  they 
had  wronged— though  no  one  on  earth  had  ever  before  triumphed 
over  them.  And  tlie  Theban  faction  who  had  introduced  them  into 
the  citadel,  with  the  deliberate  purpo.se  that  their  city  should  be 
en.slaved  to  Sparta  in  order  that  tliey  might  rule  despotically  them- 
gelves — were  put  down  by  no  more  than  seven  assailants,  among  the 
exiles  whom  they  had  banished." 

^\'hat  umst  have  been  the  hatred,  and  sense  of  abused  ascendency, 
entertained  toward  Sparta  by  neutral  or  unfriendly  Greeks,  when 
Xenophon,  alike  conspicuous  for  hi^  partiality  to  her  and  for  his  dis- 
like of  Thebes,  could  employ  tliesc  decisive  words  in  ushering  in  the 
coming  jViiase  of  Spartan  humiliation,  rep re.'^en ting  it  as  a  well- 
merilcd  judgment  from  the  gods?  The  sentence  which  I  have  just 
translated  marks,  in  the  commonplace  manner  of  the  Xenoi)honetic 
Ilellenica,  the  same  moment  of  pointed  contrast  and  transition— past 
glory  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  darkened  l>y  s\ipervening  misJor- 
tune— which  is  foreshadowed  in'the  narrative *of  Tliucydides  by  the 
dialogue  between  the  Athenian  envoys  and  the  ^lelian  council;  or  in 


the  Oedipus  and  Antigone  of  Sophoklcs,  by  the  warnings  of  the 
prophet  Teiresias. 

The  government  of  Thebes  had  now  been  for  three  years  (since  the 
blow  struck  by  Pha^bidas)  in  the  hands  of  Leontiadesand  his  oligarchi- 
cal partisans,  upheld  by  the  Spartan  garrison  in  the  Kadmeia.  Respect- 
ina:  the  details  of  its  proceedings  we  have  scarce  any  information. 
We  can  only  (as  above  remarked)  judge  of  it  by  analogy  of  the  Thirty 
tyrants  at  Athens,  and  of  the  Lysandrian  Dekarchies,  to  which  it  was 
exactly  similar  in  origin,  position,  and  interests.  That  the  general 
spirit  of  it  must  have  been  cruel,  oppressive,  and  rapacious— we 
cannot  doubt;  thouujh  in  what  degree  we  have  no  means  of  knowing. 
The  appetites  of  uncontrolled  rulers,  as  well  as  those  of  a  large 
foreis^n  i^arrison,  would  insure  such  a  result:  besides  w-hich, -those 
rulers  must  have  been  in  constant  fear  of  risings  or  conspiracies  amid 
a  body  of  hiixh-spirited  citizens  who  saw  their  city  degraded,  from 
being  the  chief  of  the  Ba^otian  federation,  into  nothing  better  than  a 
captive  dependency  of  Sparta.  Such  fear  was  aggravated  by  the 
vicinity  of  a  numerous  body  of  Theban  exiles,  belonging  to  the  oppo- 
site or\inti-Si)Mrt:ui  party,  three  or  four  hundred  of  whom  had  fled 
to  Athens  at  the  first  seizure  of  their  leader  Ismenias,  and  had  been 
doubtless  joined  subsequently  by  others.  So  strongly  did  the  Theban 
rulers  apprehend  mischief  from  these  exiles,  that  they  hired  assassins 
to  take  them  off  by  private  murder  at  Athens;  and  actually  succeeded 
in  thus  killing  Androkleidas,  chief  of  the  band  and  chief  successor 
of  the  deceased  Ismenias— though  they  mhssed  their  blows  at  the  rest. 
And  we  may  be  sure  that  tliey  made  the  prison  in  Thebes  subservient 
to  nmltiplie'd  enormities  and  executions,  when  we  read  not  only  that 
150  prisoners  were  found  in  it  wlien  the  government  was  put  down, 
but  also  that  in  the  fervor  of  that  revolutionary  movement,  the  slain 
jailer  was  an  object  of  such  fierce  antipathy,  that  his  corpse  was  trod- 
den and  spit  upon  by  a  crowd  of  Theban  women.  In  Thebes,  ris  in 
other  Grecian  cities,  the  women  not  only  took  no  part  in  political 
disputes,  but  rarely  even  sfiowed  themselves  in  public;  so  that  this 
furious  demonstration  of  vindictive  sentiment  must  have  been  gener- 
ated by  the  loss  or  maltreatment  of  sons,  husbands,  and  brothers. 

The  Thebtm  exiles  found  at  Athens  not  only  secure  shelter,  but 
genuine  sympathy  with  their  complaints  against  LaTedtemouian 
injustice.  Tlie  irenerous  countenance  which  had  been  shown  by  the 
Thebans,  twenty-four  years  before,  to  Thrasybulus  and  the  other 
Athenian  refuirees.  durinsr  the  omnipotence  of  the  Thirty— was  now 
gratefully  requited  under  this  reversal  of  fortune  to  both  cities;  and 
requited* too  in  defiance  of  the  menaces  of  Sparta,  who  demanded 
that  the  exiles  should  be  expelled— as  she  had  on  the  earlier  occasion 
demanded  that  the  Athenian  refugees  should  be  dismissed  from 
Thebes.  To  protect  these  Theban  exiles,  however,  was  all  that 
Athens  could  do.  Their  restoration  was  a  task  beyond  her  power— 
and  seemingly  yet  more  beyond  their  own.    For  the  existmg  govern- 


702     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

ment  of  Tlirbes  was  firmly  seated,  and  Imd  ilie  citizens  completeh^ 
under  control.  Administered  by  a  small  faction,  Archias,  Pliilippus, 
Hvpates,  and  Leontiades  (among  whom  the  two  first  were  at  this 
moment  polemarchs,  though  the  last  was  the  most  energetic  and 
resolute) — it  was  at  the  same  time  sustained  by  the  large  L^arrison  of 
1500  LacedcTmonians  and  allies,  under  Lysjinoridas  and  two  other 
liarmosts,  in  the  Kadmeia— as  well  as  by  the  Laeedtemonian  poits  in 
the  other  Boeotian  cities  around— Orciionienus,  Thespije,  Plata-a, 
Tanaara,  etc.  Though  the  general  body  of  Theban  sentiment  in  the 
city  was  decidedly  adverse  to  the  government,  and  though  the  young 
mc'n  while  exercising  in  the  pahesFra  (gynuiastic  exercises  being  more 
strenuT>u^ly  prosecuted  at  Thebes  than  anywhere  else  except  at 
Sparta)  kept  up  by  private  comnuniication  the  ardor  of  an  earnest, 
but  compressed  piitriotism— yet  all'manifestation  or  assemblage  was 
forcibly  kept  down,  .  nd  the  commanding  posts  of  the  lower  town, 
as  well  as  the  citadel,  were  held  in  vigilant  occupation  by  the  ruling 
minority. 

For  a  certain  time,  the  Theban  exiles  at  Athens  waited  in  hopes 
of  some  rising  at  home,  or  some  positive  aid  from  the  Athenians. 
At  length,  in  the  third  winter  after  I  heir  fiight,  they  began  to  despair 
of  encouragement  fmni  either  quarter,  and  resolved  to  take  the  initi- 
ative upon  themselves.  Among  them  were  numbered  several  men 
of  the  richest  and  highest  families  at  Thebes,  proprietors  of  chariots, 
of  jockeys,  and  of^training  establishments  for  contending  at  the 
various  festivals:  Pelopidas,  Mellon,  Damokleidas,  Theopompus, 
Pherenikus,  and  others. 

Of  these  the  most  forward  in  originating  aggressive  measures, 
thouiih  almost  the  voimgest,  was  Pelopidas;  whose  daring  and  self- 
devotion,  in  an  enterprise  which  seemed  utterly  doperate,  soon  com- 
municated themselves  to  a  handful  of  his  comrades.  The  exiles, 
keepinjx  up  constant  private  oorrespondence  with  their  friends  in 
Thebes^  felt  assured  of  the  sympathy  of  the  citizens  generally,  if 
they  could  once  strike  a  blow.'  Yet  nothing  less  would  be  suftieient 
than  the  destruction  of  the  four  rulers,  Lef)ntiades  and  his  colleagues 
—nor  would  any  one  within  the  city  devote  himself  to  so  liopeless  a 
danirer.  It  tvas"^  this  conspiracy  wh'ich  Pelopidas.  Mellon,  and  five 
or  ten  other  exiles  (the  entire  band  is  differenlly  numbered,  by  some 
as  seven,  bv  others,  twelve)  undertook  to  execute.  ^lany  of  their 
friends  in  Thebes  came  in  as  auxiliaries  to  them,  who  would  not  have 
embarked  in  the  desiirn  as  primary  actors.  Of  all  auxiliaries,  the 
most  effective  and  indispensable  was  Phyllidas,  the  secretary  of  tlie^ 
polemarchs:  next  to  him.  Charon,  an  eminent  and  earnest  patriot.' 
Phyllidas,  having  Inen  dispatched  to  Athens  on  official  bu»iness. 
entered  into  secret  conference  with  the  conspirators,  concerted  with 
them  the  day  for  their  coming  to  Thebes,  and  even  engaged  to  pro- 
vide for  them  access  to  the  persons  of  the  polemarchs.  Charon  not 
only  promised  them    concealment   in  his  house,  from   their  first 


PLANS  OF  PHYLLIDAS. 


763 


coming  within  the  gates,  until  the  moment  of  striking  their  blow 
should  have  arrived — but  also,  entered  his  name  to  share  in  the 
urmed  attack.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  such  partial  encouragements, 
the  plan  still  appeared  desperate  to  many  who  wished  heartily  for 
i!s  success.  Epaminoiidas,  for  example— who  now  for  the  first  time 
coiuiis  before  us— reside'it  at  Thebes,  and  not  merely  sympathizing 
with  the  political  views  of  Pelopidas,  but  also  bound  to  him  by  inti- 
mate friendship— dissuaded  others  from  the  attempt,  and  declined 
]):u-tici paling  in  it.  He  aunouuced  distinctly  that  he  would  not 
heeonie  an  "accomplice  in  civil  bloodshed.  It  ai»pe!as  that  there 
w.'re  men  among  the  exiles  whose  violence  made  him  fear  that  they 
wjiild  not,  like  Pelopidas,  draw  the  sword  exclusively  against 
L'^oiitiades  tuid  his  colleagues,  but  would  avail  themselves  of  success 
to  perpetrate  uiune  is:n-ed  violence  against  other  political  enemies. 

The  day  for  the  enterprise  was  determined  by  Phyllidas  the  sec- 
retary, who  had  prepared  an  evening  banquet  for  Archias  and  Phil- 
ippus.  in  celebration  of  the  period'  when  they  were  going  out  of 
otfiee  as  p jleiuarchs— and  who  had  promised  on  that  occasion  to 
bring  into  tluir  company  some  women  remarkable  for  beauty,  as 
welllis  of  the  bc3st  families  in  Thebes.  In  concert  with  the  general 
body  of  Theban  exiles  at  Athens,  who  held  themselves  ready  on  the 
borders  of  Attica,  together  with  some  Athenian  sympathizers,  to 
mirch  to  Thebes  the  instant  that  they  should  receive  intimation— 
and  in  concert  also  with  two  out  of  the  ten  Stiategi  of  Athens,  who 
to  )k  on  themselves  privately  to  countenance  the  enterprise,  without 
any  public  vote— Pelopidas  and  Mellon,  and  their  five  comptuiions, 
crossed  Kithferou  from  Athens  to  Thebes.  It  was  wet  weather, 
about  December  b  c  379;  they  were  disguised  as  rustics  or  hunters, 
with  no  other  arm;  than  a  concealed  dagger;  and  they  got  within 
the  gates  of  Theb.-s  one  by  one  at  nighifall,  ju^t  when  the  latest 
fu-niing-men  were  coming  home  from  their  fields.  aII  of  them 
arrrived  safe  at  the  house  of  Charon,  the  appointed  rendezvous. 

It  was,  however,  by  mere  accident  that  they  had  not  been  turned 
l);ick,  and  the  whole  'scheme  frustrated.  For  a  Theban  named  Hip- 
posthenid-is,  fri-ndly  to  the  conspiracy^  but  faint-hearted,  who  had 
b-en  let  into  the  s^'cret  against  the  Avill  of  Phyllidas— became  so 
frightened  as  tin  ra omentT  of  execution  approached,  that  he  took 
upon  himself,  without  the  knowledge  of  the  rest,  to  dispatch  Chli- 
don,  a  faithful  slave  of  Mellon,  ordering  him  to  go  forth  on  horse- 
back from  Thebes,  to  meet  his  master  on  the  road,  and  to  desire 
tUit  he  and  his  comrades  would  go  back  to  Attica,  since  circum 
stances  ha  1  happened  to  render  the  project  for  the  moment  imprac- 
ticable Cldidon,  going  home  to  fetch  his  bridle,  but  not  finding  it 
in  its  usual  place,  asked  his  wife  where  it  was.  Tlie  woman,  at 
first  preteu  Uuij^  to  look  for  it.  at  last  confessed  that  she  had  lent  it  to 
a  aeiglibor.  Chlidon  became  so  irritated  with  this  delay,  that  he 
got  into  loud  altercation  with  his  wife,  who  on  her  part  wished  him 


764     AFTER  Tlli  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 

ill-luck  with  lii>'  journey.  He  at  last  beat  her,  until  neighbors  ran  in 
to  interpose.  His  departure  was  thus  accitlentally  frustrated,  so  that 
the  intended  message  of  counteruiuud  uever  reaehed  the  conspirators 

on  their  way.  .  ,    i     n  ^ 

In  the  house  of  Charon  they  remained  concealed  all  the  ensuing 
day  on  the  evening  of  which  the  banquet  of  Archias  and  Philip- 
pus  was  to  take  place.  Phyllidas  had  hiid  his  phin  for  introducing 
them  at  that  banquet,  at  the  moment  when  the  two  polemarchcs 
had  become  full  of  wine,  in  female  aitire,  as  being  the  women  whose 
visit  was  expected.  The  hour  had  nearly  arrived,  and  they  were 
preparing  to  play  their  parts,  when  an  uuexptcted  messenger  knocked 
at  the  door,  summoning  Charon  instantly  into  the  presence  of  the 
polemarchs.  All  within  were  thunderstruck  with  tlie  summons, 
which  seemed  to  imi)lv  that  the  plot  had  been  divulged,  perhaps 
by  the  timid  Hippostheuidas.  It  was  agreed  among  them  that  Cha- 
ron must  obey  at  once.  Nevertheless  he  himself,  even  in  the  peril- 
ous uncertainty  which  beset  him,  was  most  of  all  apprehensive  lest 
the  friends  whom  he  had  sheltered  should  suspect  him  of  treachery 
toward  themselves  and  their  cause.  Before  departing,  therefore,  he 
sent  for  his  only  son,  a  youth  of  fifteen  and  of  conspicuous  promise 
in  every  way.  'This  youth  he  placed  in  the  hands  of  Pelopidas,  as 
ahostaire  for  his  own  lidelity.  But  Pelopidas  and  the  rest,  vehe- 
mently "disclaiming  all  suspicion,  entreated  Cliavon  to  put  his  sun 
away,  out  of  the  reach  of  that  danger  in  which  all  were  now 
involved.  Charon,  however,  could  not  be  prevailed  on  to  comply, 
and  left  his  son  among  them  to  share  the  fate  of  the  rest.  He  went 
into  the  presence  of  Archias  and  Philippus;  whom  he  found  already 
half-intoxicated,  but  inioimed,  by  inlelligence  from  Athens,  that 
eome  plot,  they  knew  not  by  whom,  was  atloat.  They  had  >ent  lor 
him  to  question  him,  as  a  known  friend  of  the  exiles;  but  he  had 
little  difticuUv,  aided  by  the  collusion  of  Phyllidas,  in  blinding  the 
vai^'ue  suspicions  of  drunken  men,  anxh)us  only  to  resume  their  con- 
viviality. He  was  allowed  to  retire  and  rejoin  his  fri<  nds.  Never- 
theless soon  after  his  departure— so  many  were  the  favorable  cliances 
which  befel  these  improvident  men— a  fresh  message  was  delivered 
to  Archias  the  polemarch,  from  his  namesake  Archias  the  Athenian 
Hierophant,  giviim-  an  exact  account  of  the  names  and  scheme  of  the 
conspirators,  which  had  become  known  to  the  jihilo-Laconian  party 
at  Athens.  The  messenger  who  bore  this  dispatch  delivered  it  to 
Archias  with  an  intimation,  that  it  related  to  very  serious  matters. 
•'[Serious  matters  for  to-morrow,"  said  the  polemarch,  as  he  put  the 
dispatch,  unopened  and  unread,  under  the  pillow  of  the  couch  on 
which  he  was  reclining,  ^  . 

Keturning  to  their  carousal,  Archias  and  Philippus   impatientl) 
called  upon  Phyllidas  to  introduce  the  woiiien  according  to  his  prom- 
ise.    Upon  this  the  secretary  retired,  and  brought  the  conspirators 
clothed  in  female  attire,  into  an  adjoining  chamber;  then  going  bacK 


LEONTIADES  AND  HYPATES  SLAIN.  765 

to  the  polemarchs.  he  informed  them  that  the  women  would  not 
come  in  unless  all  the  domestics  were  first  dismissed.  An  order  was 
forthwith  given  that  these  latter  should  depart,  while  Phyllidas  took 
cu-e  that  they  should  be  well  provided  with  wine  at  the  lodging  of 
one  among  their  number.  The  polemarchs  were  thus  left  only  with 
one  or  twS  frl.mds  at  table,  half-intoxicated  as  well  as  themselves; 
anion-  them  Kabeirichus,  the  archon  of  the  year,  who  alvvays 
throughout  his  term  kept  the  conse  -rated  speiir  of  ofhce  m  actual 
posses'sion,  and  had  it  at  that  moment  close  to  his  person.  Phyllidas 
Im  conducted  the  pretended  women  into  the  banqueting-room;  iree 
of  them  attired  as"^  ladies  of  distinction,  the  four  others  follow- 
iuo.  as  femile  attendants.  Their  long  veds,  and.  aniple  folds  of 
clothing,  were  quite  sutficlont  as  disguise-e^^n  had  the  guests  at 
Uble  bSn  sober-until  they  sat  down  by  the  side  of  the  Polpmarch  ; 
and  the  instant  of  lifting  their  veils  was  the  signal  for  using  e  r 
la->-ers.  Archias  and  Philippus  were  slain  at  once  and  wi  li  lit  le 
reSance;  but  Kabeirichus  with  his  spear  tried  to  defend  iimselt 
and  thus  perished  with  the  others,  though  the  conspirators  had  not 

ori«'-inally  intended  to  take  his  life.  .  j  ^,  e  ^^^  ^ 

Having  been  thus  far  successful,  Phyllidas  conduced  three  of  he 
conspirafors-Pelopidas.  Kephisodorus,  and  Damokleidas-to  the 
house  of  Leontiades,  into  which  he  obtained  admittance  by  announc- 
ing himself  as  the  bearer  of  an  order  from  the  polemarchs.  Leon- 
trades  was  reclining  after  supper,  with  his  wife  sitting  spinning  woo 
by  his  side,  when  they  entered  his  chamber.  Being  a  brave  and 
noJerful  man,  he  stlirted  up,  seized  his  sword,  and  mortally 
wounded  Kephisodorus  in  the  throat;  a  desperate  struggle  then 
en.ued  between  him  and  Pelopidas  in  the  narmwdoonvay,  where 

here  was  no  roam  for  a  third  to  approach.  A  length,  however. 
Pelopidas  overthrew  and  killed  him,  after  which  they  ^:;;tirc^l,  en  o  - 
ino-  the  wife  with  threats  to  rem  un  silent,  and  closing  the  door  after 

l.Sm  with  peremptory  commands  that  it  should  not  be  again  opened 
They  then  went  to  the  house  of  Hypates,  whom  they  slew  while  he 
atte"npted  to  escape  over  the  roof.  .  ThohP^ 

Til'  four  great  rulers  of  the  philo-Laconian  party  in  Thebes, 
havin-  been  now  put  to  death,  Phyllidas  proceeded  with  the  con- 
si'rtSrstothe  prison.  Here  the  jailer,  a  confidentia  ^Ifnt^^^"  ^^ 
onoressions  of  tie  deceased  o:overnors,  hesitated  to  admi  him;  but 
wa    sSn  by  a  sudden   thrust  with  his  spear,  so  as  to  insure  free 

admission  to' all.     To  liberate   the  P'^^o"^'''^:  1^^^^^^  >  [  ^,,/^^ 

part  men  of  kindred  politics  with  tl?e  conspu'ators-to  f  nu^^^^  th^^^^^^ 

with  arms  taken  from  the  battle-spoils  hangm^ii;  up  in  d  e  f^^^^^^- 

i„,^  „,„.|ie')s— and  to  rano-e   t!K-m    n  battle  order  near  the  t.emple  ot 

Ar.)    o'l-were  the   S  proceedings;  after  which  they  beg^m  to 

f^ei'^me  assurance  of  safetV  and  triuSiph.    Ei^miii^^^^^^ 

.l-i<!  ■inni-i-icd  of  wl'.at  had  occuiTOil,  were  l!ie  tirst  v\lio  iippc.irea  in 

unn;  Ivuiia  ?ow  frieuas  to   sustaiu  the  cause;  while  proelamal.on 


7G6     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

was  everywhere  made  aloud,  tlirous^h  lieralds,  tliiit  tlie  despots  were 
shiin— tliat  Thel)es  was  free— and  tiiat  all  Thebaiis  who  valued  fne- 
doiu  should  muster  in  arms  in  the  market-place.  Tliere  were  at  that 
moment  in  TheU^s  juany  trumpeters  who  Iiad  eome  to  contend  for  the 
prize  at  the  approaching  festival  of  the  Ilerakleia.  Ilipposthenidas 
engaged  these  men  to  blow  the  trumpets  in  different  parts  of  the 
city,  and  tluis  everywheie  to  excite  the  citizens  to  aruis. 

Although  during  the  darkness  sur])rise  was  the  prevalent  feelino- 
find  no  one  knew  what  to  do— yet  as  soon  as  (hty  dawned,  and  the 
truth  became  kiu.w  n,  there'was  but  one  feeling  of  joy  and' patriotic 
enthusiasm  among  tiie  Uiajorily  of  the  citizens^  JJolh  horsemen  ami 
lioplites  ha.stened  in  arms  to  the  agora."  Here  for  the  lirst  time  since. 
the  seizure  of  the  Kadmeia  by  Pluebidas,  a  formal  assembly  of  the 
Theban  people  was  convened,  before  which  Pelopidas  and  his  fellow- 
conspirators  presented  themselves.  The  priests  of  the  city  crowned 
them  with  wreaths,  and  thanked  them  in  tie  m.me  of  the  local  irods; 
while  the  assend)ly  hailed  them  with  acclannitious  of  deli iiht' and 
gratitude,  nominating  witij  one  voice  I'elopidas,  3Iellon,  ancrCharon 
as  llie  lirst  renewed  Bcrotarchs.  The  revival  of  this  title,  which  had 
been  dropped  since  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  was  in  itself  an  event  of 
iio  mean  significance;  implying  not  ir.crelv  that  Thebes  had  v.akcd 
up  again  into  freed(..m.  but  that  the  Pa'ollan  confederacy  also  had 
been,  or  would  be,  restored. 

Messengers  had  been  forthwith  dispatched  bv  the  conspirators  to 
Attica  to  communicate  their  success;  upon  which  all  the  remaininir 
exiles,  with  the  two  Athenian  generals  privy  to  the  plot  and  a  bodv 
of  Athenian  volunteers,  or  corps  francs,  all  of  whom  were  readv  oii 
the  borders  awaiting  the  summons— tlocked  to  Thebes  to  complete 
the  work.     The  Spartan  generals,  on  their  side  also,  sent  to  Plaliva 
and  Thespjjv  for  aid.     During  the  whole  night,  they  had  been  dis- 
tracted and  alarmed  by  the  disturbance  in   the  city;  lights  showinir 
themselves  here  and  there  with  tiuiui)ets  soundini:  and  shouts  for  the 
recent  success.     A])prlsed   speedily   of  the  slaiighter  of  the  pole- 
marchs,  from  whom  they  had   been  accustomed   to  receive  orders, 
they  knew  not  whom  to  tru-t  or  to  consult,  while  thev  were  doubt- 
less l»e^'t    by  affrighted  fugitives  of  the  now  defeated  partv,  who 
would  hurry  up  to  the  Kadmeia  for  safetv.     Thev  reckoned ^it  fust 
on  a  diversion  in  their  favor  from  the  forces  at  Plattca  and  Thespi;e. 
But  tlie.se  fr)rces  were  not  permitted  even  to  approach  the  city-iiate; 
being  vigorously  charged,   as  soon  as   thev  c:mie   in  sight,   by  the 
newly  mustered  Th('l)an  cavalry,   and  forced  to  retreat  with*  l(»vs. 
The  Lacedemonians  in  the  citadel  were  thus  not  only  left  without 
sup.port,  but  saw  their  enemies  in  the  city  re-enforced  by  the  other 
e.xiles  and  by  the  au.xiliary  volunteers. 

Meanwhile  Pelopidas  and  the  otlier  new  Bcpotarchs  found  them- 
selves at  the  iiead  of  a  body  of  armed  citizens,  full  of  devot(  d 
patriotism  and  unanimous  in  hailing  the  recent  rev(jlution.     Tluy 


EFFECT   UPON  GREECE. 


767 


availed  themselves  of  this  first  burst  of  fervor  to  prepare  for  storm 
ing  the  Kadniela  without  delay,  knowing  the  importance  of  fore- 
stalling all  aid  from  Sparta.  And  the  citizens  were  already  rushing 
up  to  the  assault — proclamation  being  made  of  large  rewards  to  those 
who  should  first  force  their  way  in — when  the  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander sent  proposals  for  a  capitulation.  Undisturbed  egress  from 
Thebes,  witli  the  honors  of  war,  being  readily  guaranteedto  him  by 
oath,  the  Kadmeia  was  then  surrendered.  As  the  Spartans  were 
marching  out  of  the  gates,  many  Thebans  of  the  defeated  party  went 
forth  also.  But  against  these  latter  the  exasperation  of  the  victors 
was  so  ungovernable,  that  several  of  the  most  odious  were  seiz(  d  as 
they  passed,  and  put  to  death;  in  some  cases  even  their  children 
along  with  them.  And  more  of  them  would  have  been  thus  dis- 
patched had  not  the  Athenian  auxiliaries,  with  generous  anxiety, 
exerted  every  effort  to  get  them  out  of  sight  and  put  them  into 
safety.  We  are  not  told— s-nor  is  it  certain — that  these  Thebans  were 
protected  undi'r  the  capit'.dation.  Even  had  they  been  so,  however, 
the  wrathful  impulse  might  still  have  prevailed  against  them. 

Of  the  three  h;umosts  who  thus  evacuated  the  Kadmeia  without  a 
blow,  two  w^ere  put  to  death,  the  third  was  heavily  fined  and  ban- 
ished by  the  authorities  at  Sparta.  We  do  not  know  what  the 
fortifications  of  the  Kadmeia  were,  nor  how  far  it  was  provisioned. 
But  we  can  hardly  wonder  that  these  ollicers  were  considered  to 
have  dishonored  the  Lacediemonian  arms,  by  making  no  attemi)t  to 
defend  it;  when  we  recollect  that  hardly  more  than  four  or  five  days 
would  be  required  to  {)rocure  adequate  relief  from  home — and  that 
forty-three  years  afterward,  the  Macedonian  garrison  in  the  same 
place  maintained  itself  against  the  Thebans  in  the  city  for  more 
than  fourteen  da^'s,  until  the  return  of  Alexander  from  lllyria.  The 
first  messenger  who  brought  news  to  Sparta  of  the  conspiracy  and 
revolution  at  Thebes,  appears  to  have  communicated  at  the  same 
time  that  the  garrison  had  evacualctl  the  Kadmeia  and  was  in  full 
retreat,  with  a  train  of  Theban  exiles  from  the  defeated  party. 

Th^  revolution  at  Thebes  came  like  an  electric  shock  upon  the 
Grecian  world.  With  a  modern  reader,  the  assassination  of  the  four 
leaders,  in  their  houses  and  at  the  banquet,  raises  a  sentiment  of 
repugnance  which  withdraws  his  attention  from  the  other  features  of 
this  memorable  deed.  Now  an  ancient  Greek  not  onlv  had  no  siicli 
repugnance,  but  sympathized  with  the  complete  revenge  for  the 
seizure  of  the  Kadmeia  an  I  the  death  of  Ismenias;  while  he  admired, 
besides,  the  extraordinary  j-'ersoual  daring  of  Pelopidas  and  Mellon — 
the  skillful  forecast  of  the  plot,  and  the  sudden  overthrow,  by  a  force 
so  contem|)tiMly  small,  of  a  government  which  the  day  before  seemed 
unassailable.  It  deserves  note  that  we  here  see  the  richest  men  in 
Thebes  undertaking  a  risk,  single-handed  and  with  their  own  per- 
sons, which  must  have  appearecl  on  a  reasonable  estimate  little  less 
than  desperate.     From  the  Homeric  Odysseus  and  Achilles  down  to 


768     AFTER  THE  ISUBJUGATIOX  OF  ULYNTHUS. 

the  end  of  free  Hellenism,  the  rich  Greek  strips  in  the  panestrn,  and 
exposes  his  person  in  tlie  renks  as  a  soldier  like  llie  poorest  citizens- 
being  generally  superior  to  them  in  strength  and  bodily  cfHciency. 

A? the  revolution  in  Thebes  acted  foixibly  on  the  Grecian  mind 
from  the  manner  in  which  it  was  accompli^hed,  so  by  its  positive 
effects  it  altered  forthwith  the  balance  of  power  in  Greece.  Tlie 
empire  of  Sparta,  far  from  being  undisputed  and  nearly  univcrsnl 
Dver  Greece,  is  from  henceforward  only  maintained  by  more  or  less 
of  effort,  until  at  length  it  is  completely  overthrown. 

Tlie  exiles  from  Thebes,  arriving  at  Sparta,  inflamed  both  the 
Ephors,  and  the  miso-Theban  Agesilaus,  to  the  highest  pildi. 
Though  it  was  then  the  depth  of  winter,  an  expedition  was  decreed 
forth  with  agamst  Thebes,  and  the  allied  contingents  were  sunmioiui!. 
Agesilaus  declined  to  take  the  command  of  it,  on  the  ground  that  1  e 
was  above  sixty  years  of  age,  and  therefore  no  longer  liable  to  com- 
pulsory foreign  service.  But  this  (says  Xenophon)  was  not  his  red 
reason.  He  was  afraid  that  his  enemies*  at  Sparta  would  say— 
**  Here  is  Agesilaus  again  putting  us  to  expense,  in  order  that  he  m;iy 
uphold  despots  in  other  cities"— as  he  had  just  done,  and  had  been 
reproached  with  doing,  at  Phlius;  a  second  proof  that  the  reproaches 
against  Sparta  (which  I  have  cited  a  few  pages  above  fiom  Lysiasand 
Isokrates)  of  allying  herself  with  Greek  despots  as  well  as  with 
foreii::ncrs  to  put  down  Grecian  freedom,  found  an  echo  even  in 
SparV.i  herself.  Accordingly  Kleombrotus  the  other  king  of  Sparta 
took  the  conunand.  He  iiad  recently  succeeded  his  brother  Agesi- 
polis,  and  had  never  conniianded  before. 

Kleombrotus  conducted  his  army  along  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth 
through  3Iegara  to  Plattea,  cutting  to  pieces  an  outpost  of  Thebans, 
composed  chiefly  of  the  prisoners  set  free  by  the  recent  revohition, 
who  had  been  placed  for  the  defense  of  the  ^intervening  mountain 
pass.  From  Plata?a  he  Avent  forwiird  to  Thesplas  and  fro^n  thence  to 
KynoskephaljB  in  the  Theban  territory,  where  he  lay  encamped  for 
sixteen  davs;  after  which  he  retre:ited  to  Thespia\  It  appears  that 
he  did  nothing,  and  that  his  inaction  was  the  subject  of  much  won- 
der in  his  army,  who  are  said  to  have  even  doubted  whether  he»was 
really  and  earnestly  liostile  to  Thebes.  Perhaps  the  exiles,  with 
customary  exaggera'tion,  may  have  led  him  to  hope  that  they  could 
provoke  a  rising  in  Thebes,  "if  he  would  only  come  near.  At  any 
rate  the  bad  weather  must  have  been  a  serious  impediment  to  action; 
since  in  his. march  back  to  Peloponnesus  through  Kreusis  and 
^gostheme  tlie  wind  blevv  a  hurricane,  so  that  his  soldiers  could  not 
proceed  without  leaving  their  shields  and  coming  back  afterward  to 
fetch  them.  Kleombrotus  did  not  (juit  Bceotia,  however,  without 
leaving  Sphodrias  as  harmost  atThespia.',  with  one-third  of  theentiie 
army,  and  with  a  considerable  sum  of  money  to  employ  in  hiring 
mercenaries  and  acting  vigorously  against  the  Thebans. 

The  army  of  Kieombrolus,  in  its  march  from  Megara  to  Platsea, 


ALARM  AT  ATHENS. 


769 


had  passed  by  the  sku-ts  of  Attica;  causing  so  much  alarm  to  the 
Athenians,   that  they  placed  Chabrias  with  a  body  of  peUa«ts    to 
guard   their  frontier  and  the  neighboring  road  through  Eleuthenc 
into  B(Bot,a.     This  was  the  first  time  thata  Lacedaemonian  arnS 
touched  Attica  (now  no  longer  guarded  by  the  lines  of  Corinth   as  in 
Uiewar  between  394  and  389  b.c.)  sinc4  the   retirement  of  Kh^^ 
Pausanias  in  404  b.c;  furnishing  a  proof  of  the  exposure  of  th? 
country,  such  as  to  revive   in  the   Athenian  mind  all  the  terriblp 
recollections  of  Dekeleia  and  the  Peloi)onnesian  war.     It  was  durin- 
the  hrst  prevalence  of  this  alarm— and  seemingly  while  Kleom!)iotn1 
was  still  with  his  army  at  Thesphe  or  Kync^ljA.a\i,cl^!!l^nl^ 
Athenian  frontier— that  three  Lacedaemonian  envoys,  Etvmoklesand 
two  others  arrived  at  Athens  to  demand  satisfaction  for  the  part 
taken  by  the  two  Athenian  generals  and  the  Athenian  volunteers   in 
concerting  and  aiding  the  enterprise  of  Pelopidas  and  his  comrades 
So  overpowering  was  the  anxiety  in  the  public  mind  to  avoid  crivin<^ 
ottense  to  bparta,  that  these  two  generals  were  both  of  them  accused 
before    the    Dikastery.     The    first    of    them    was  condemned  and 
executed;  the   second,  profiting  by  this  warning  (since,  pui-suaiit  to 
the  psephism  of  Kannonus,  the  two  would  be  put  on  trial  separately) 
escaped,  and  a  sentence  of  banishment  was  passed  against  him    These 
two  generals  had  been  imquestionably  guilty  of  a  grave  abuse  of 
their  ofticial  functions.     They  had   brought  the  state  into  public 
hazard,  not  merely  without  consulting  the  senate  or  assemblv  but 
even  without  taking  the  sense  of  their  own  board  of  Ten      Never- 
theless the  severity  of  the  sentence  pronounced  indicates  the  alarm 
as  well  as  the  displeasure,  of  the  general  body  of  Athenians;'  while  it 
^wT^i.^-^^^  disclaimer  iu  fact,  if  not  in  form,  of  all  political  connection 
with  Thebes. 

Even  before  the  Lacedaemonian  envoys  had  quitted  Athens  how- 
ever, an  incident  alike  sudden  and  memorable,  completely  altered 
the  Athenian  temper.  The  Lacedaemonian  harmost  Sphodrias  (whom 
Kleombrotus  had  left  at  Thespias  to  prosecute  the  war  againsi  Thebes) 
being  intormed  that  Peiraeus  on  its  land-side  was  without  o-ates  or 
night-watch— since  there  w;is  no  suspicion  of  attack— conceived  the 
Idea  of  surprising  it  by  a  night-march  from  Thesnice.  and  thus  of 
mastering  at  one  stroke  the  commerce,  the  wealth,  and  the  naval 
resources  of  Athens.  Putting  his  troops  under  march  one  evening- 
after  an  early  supper,  he  calculated  on  reaching  thePeira^us  the  next 
morning  before  daylight.  But  his  reckoning  proved  erroneous 
i.  ""^^^^^  overtook  him  when  he  had  advanced  no  farther  than  the 
lariasian  plain  near  Eleusis;  from  whence,  as  it  was  useless  to  pro- 
ceed farther,  he  turned  back  and  retreated  tolMiespije;  not,  however 
without  committing  various  acts  of  plunder  against  the  neighborin«^ 
Athenian  residents.  ° 

T^"f  Pl'^n  against  Peiraeus  appears  to  have  been  not  ill-conceived. 
Had  Sphodrias  been  a  man  competent  to  organize  and  execute  move- 
H.  G.  III.— 25 


m 


770     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

mcnts  as  rapid  as  those  of  Brasidas,  tliere  is  no  reason  why  it  might 
not  have  succeeded:  in  which  case  the  whole  face  of  the  war  would 
have  been  changed,  since  tlie  Lacedfcmonians,  if  once  ninsters  of  Pei- 
neus,  both  could  and  would  have  n)aintained  the  plnce.  But  it  was 
one  of  those  injustices,  wliich  no  one  ever  commends  until  it  iins 
been  successfully  consummated — "consilium — quod  non  potest  laud- 
ari  nisi  peractum."  As  it  failed,  it  has  been  considered,  by  critics 
as  well  as  by  contemporaries,  not  merely  as  a  crime  but  ms  a  fault, 
and  its  author  Sphodrias  as  a  brave  man,  but  sinsrularly  weak  :ind 
liot-headed.  Without  admitting  the  full  extent  of  this  censure,  we 
may  see  that  his  present  aggression  grew  out  of  an  untoward  enuila- 
tion  of  the  glory  which  Phoebidas,  in  spite  of  the  j^imulated  or  irnn- 
sient  displeasure  of  his  countrymen,  had  acquired  by  seizing  the 
Kadmeia.  That  Sphodrias  received  private  instructions  from  Kleom- 
brotus  (as  Diodorus  states)  is  not  sufficiently  ]^rovtd;  while  the  sus- 
picion, intimated  by  Xenophon  as  being  abroad,  that  he  was  wrought 
upon  by  secret  emissaries  and  bribes  from  his  enemies  the  Thebans, 
for  the  purjwse  of  plunging  Athens  into  war  with  Sparta,  is  altogetlier 
improbable:  and  seems  merely  an  hypothesis  suggested  bv  the  con- 
sequences of  the  act — which  were  such,  that  if  his  enemies  had  bribed 
liim,  he  could  not  have  served  Ihem  belter. 

The  presence  of  Sphodrias  and  his  army  in  the  Thriasian  plain  was 
communicated  shortly  after  daybreak  at  Athens,  where  it  excited  no 
less  terror  than  surprise.  Every  man  instantly  put  himsdf  under 
arms  for  defense ;  but  news  soon  arrived  that  the  invader  had  iciired. 
When  thus  reassured,  the  Athenians  ]>assed  from  f(ar  to  indignation. 
The  Lacedaemonian  envoys,  who  were  lodging  at  the  house  of  Kallias 
the  proxenus  of  Sparta,  were  immediately  put  under  arrest  and  inter- 
rogated. But  all  three  affirmed  thai  they  were  not  less  .'isloiiished,  and 
not  less  exasperated,  by  the  march  of  Sphodiias  than  the  Athenians 
themselves;  adding,  by  way  of  coutirmatiou,  tiiat  had  tiiey  been 
really  privy  to  any  design  of  seizing  the  Peineus.  they  would  have 
taken  care  not  to  let  themselves  be  found  in  the  city,  and  in  their 
ordinary  lodging  at  the  house  of  the  proxenus.  where  of  course  their 
persons  would  beat  once  seized.  They  concluded  by  assuring  the 
Athenians,  that  Sphodrias  would  not  only  be  indignanily  disavowed, 
but  punished  capitally,  at  Sparta.  And  their  reply  wus  deemed  so  satis- 
factory tliat  they  were  allowed  to  depart:  while  an  Aihenian  em- 
b.assy  was  sent  to  Sparta  to  demand  the  punishment  of  the  offending 
general, 

Tiie  Ephors  immediately  summoned  Sphodrias  home  to  Sparta,  to 
take  his  trial  on  a  capital  charge.  So  much  did  he  himself  oespair 
of  his  case,  that  he  durst  not  make  his  a])pearance;  while  the  general 
im}nession  was,  both  at  Sparta  and  elsewhere,  that  he  would  cer- 
tainly be  condemned.  Nevertheless,  though  thus  absent  and  unde- 
fended, he  was  acquitted,  purely  through  private  favor  and  esteem 
for  his  general  character.     He  wus  of  the  party  of  Kleombrolus,  so 


SYPHODRIAS  ACQUITTED. 


771 


his  conden.nMfinn      Ar^,i.^.„  ..."  V  oh/^^'M"^^  ^^'"i.  and  brmg  about 


mg  man. 


;"; .      r".    '"^^l'"^^^  ^\'i»/^^^^"g'H  oeiore  the  Senate  of  Snart 
,,,i^;,,sjun,cm    conviction  and  give  his  vole  in  the  fX 

who,  a.  a  hoy,  youth,  and  man,  has  s.oo<^^un    eSl  ed  hf  nl  tl  1^^ 
honor,    i^parta  cannot  part  will  soldiers  ]kSS"T.  ,??'■'' 
ot  Agesilaus,  following  this  opinion  a,  1  cS  Sint%vi  Ji  U^^^^^^^^ 
hiconihiotus.  insured  a  favorable  verdict      Ami  it  ;=  .      '"f*'^,"f 

n'"rHr;i;r,'i,";t  ^"r-^f--  ^^"«  '-^r^'^'^^^^^^ou:^:!'!^ 

^S'Sa^v^^^^^^^^^^^^  '°  <^-''-  --o'-  ana 

Tins  remarkable  incident  (vvliieh  comes  to  ne  f,-r.m  „  „.u 
merely  philoLaconian,  but  also  peSlIy^nVLate^vm?  Ar^^^'^ 
shows  how  powerfully  the  course  of  in" tic^Lf  Sparta \^^stfS^^^^^^^^^ 
by  private  syn.palhy  and  interests-elpecially  tho  e  oHhc  twokin^ 
It  especially  illustrates  what  has  heen  staled  i n  n  fnr  L.  ^i  P" 
respecting  the  oppressions  exercised  by  the ^mr, "n  hf ™o"s  aK 
leka,la,chies   for  which  no  redress  was  attaiLblei^^t  Sparta     Here 

in  which  al,o  ins  acquittal  was  sure  to  be  followed  by  a  war  with 
Athens.  It,  under  such  circumstances,  the  Athenian  demand  for 
redress  was  overruled  by  the  favor  of  the  two  ing^w  ha"  chance 
w  as  there  of  any  justice  to  the  complaint  of  a  depemleut  citv  or  fn 
injured   mdivKlnal   against  the  ha^most?     The  S  rast    bltweeu 


oxiles.     In  so  doing,  the  Athenian  dil.st7inrrVdt,ehwV."^ 
clear  oflieial  miseondnct-and  that,  too,  in  a  case  where  thei'r'svm 
pallues  went  along  with  the  act,  though  their  fea    of  a  ™- '^ith 

K'tl.  It Tur^a-     ^"'  •!'?  "'"''  ""P°'-'''"*  oircums  ance '  o    ote 

Li       M   "'I  ""''■"  '*',  '"''^''*='"  P"^''*«  influence,  nor  kin-ly  influ 

ence.  capihle  of  overniling  the  sincere  judicial  consc  euce   of  a 

numerous  and  independent  dikastery  ^-onscitnce   ot  a,. 

The  i'es_u!t  of  the  aeqnitlal  of  Sphodrias  must  have  been  well 
known  beforehand  to  all  ]-,arlies  at  Sparta.  Even  by  the  cener 
voice  ot  Greece,  the  sentence  was  denounced  t.s  iniquitous  Bu 
the  Athenians,  who  had  so  recently  given  strenLus  t"ffeet  to  .he 
remo„slran,-es  of  Sparta  against  tliAr  own  genera  s  were  sun^v 
It  10  the  quick,  and  only  the  more  stumr.  in  co  'sequence  of  the 
c^raordinary  compliments  to  Sphodrias  on  which    he  acquittal  ws 


II 


772     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 

made  lo  turn.  They  immcaiately  contracted  hearty  alliance  uilh 
Thcbe'  and  made  vigorous  preixualions  for  war  aganist  hparta  botli 
l,v  lend  -ml  sea.  A&r  conipleting  ihe  forlitic.tions  ot  Pen-.TUs  so 
2  Vo  p  ace  H  beyond  tl/  reacli  of  any  future  attempt  they 
^,pk>d&elvest'othe  building  of  new  ^^^^  ^^^^^^^ '^  '^' 
e\  ens^on  of  their  naval  ascendency  at  the  expense  of  bpaila. 

F.  nn  Ih^s  moment,  a  new  combination  began  m  Grecian  politics. 
The  Vlh  ■   ia^^^  the  moment  favorable  to  attempt^ the  con- 

rruc'tion     t  a  new  confederacy,  analogous  to  the   Contederacy   of 
Delorformed  a  centurv  before,  the  basis  on  which  had  been  ulti^ 
nmtelyreaR'd  the  formidable  Athenian  empire,  lost  at  the  ch^se  o 
Te  Pelopm^^^^  ^var.     Toward  such  construction  there  was  so   ai 

tendency  that  Athens  had  already  a  small  body  of  maritime  allies 
while  rhe^^^^^^  like  Isokrates  (in  his  Panegyrical  Discourse,  pub hshod 
years  K^^  been  familiaii/ing  the   public  mind  with  larger 

\^.  bIu  the  enterprise  was  ->- P— ^-l^^^^  '^rvlhen - 
and  vehemence  of  nun  smarting  un.k r  recent  insult.  1  he  Atntn 
^ns  had  -ood  orouHd  to  build  upon,  since,  while  the  discontent 
a^aii^^t  the^  seen  lency  of  Sparta  was  widely  spread,  the  ate  revolu- 
tfen  n  lliebes  had  done  muVh  to  lessen  that  sentiment  of  fear  upon 
Xch  sm'h  a.cendencv  chietlv  rested.  To  Thebes  the  3uiH-i.on 
with  Ul'ens  was  pre  eminenily  welcome,  and  lier  leaders  gladlv 
Enrolled  their  ci  V  as  a  constituent  member  of  the  new  conlederacy. 
^^^eyc^heXly  acknowledged  the  presidency  of  Atliens-reservmg^ 
however  tacitl/ or  expressl?,  their  own  rights  as  presidents  ot  lie 
Cot  -irfStion,  as  soon  as  that  could  be  reconstituted,  which 
7ec(ms  i  uti  n  w  us  at  this  n.omcnt  desirable  even  for  Athens,  seeing 
[h'rtheKirn  towns  were  now  dependent  allies  of  bparta  under 

^^:the^;;^^nS"ent  envoys  round  to  the  principal  isTandsand 
rnnr  tbm'c  lies  in  the  ^-ean,  invitinu-  all  of  them  lo  an  alliance  on 
ruu'l  and     onoia^^^^^^  ^rms.     The   principles  were  in  the  mam  the 
Xe  as   li(,se  inon  which  tiic  Confederacy  of  Delos  had  been  forme 
a^aUisUhe  Persians,  almost  a  century  before.     It  was  P^opo  ed  1  .1 
^coioressof  deputies  should  meet  at  Athens   one  from  ^^c    c'tj 
tnal    asw-U  as  great,  each  with  one   vote;  that  Athens  shmild  l;o 
li Ts  1  nt   yet  each  ind  vidual  city  autonomous;  that  a  common  fund 
^ould^^aLed   with  a  commoi   naval  ^^-^r!^^}^^^^::^ 
imDO^ed  bv  this  conirress  upon  each,  and  applied  as  the  same  autl 
irmiut  prescribe,  Uie  general  purpose  being  defined  to  ^o  nmiu^ 
icnance   of  freedom  and  security  from  foreign  aggression  to  e. u 
c^'nTederate  bv  the  <-om.non  force  of  all.     Care  was  taken  to  b.n  s 
as  much    sp<Libleth(,seassociat  tribute  and  subjt'ction  wh  di 

^;    e^.i   he   ecollection  of  the  former  Athenian  en.pire  ;;m-pula 
\d  IS  there  were  many  Athenian  citizens,  who,  during  those  tiiiu.^ 
oVlipre  m^^^^^  hJn  planted  out  as  kleruchs  or   outsettlers  ni 

wiSep^udu^^^        but  had  been  deprived  of  their  properties  at 


ATHENIAN  CONFEDERACY 


773 


the  close  of  the  war,  it  was  thought  necessary  to  pass  a  formal  decree 
renouuwng  and  barring  all  revival  of  these  suspended  ri-hts  It 
was  turthor  decreed  that  henceforward  no  Athenian  shoukf  on' any 
l.retense  hold  property,  either  in  Iiouse  or  land,  in  the  territory  of 
any  one  of  the  confederates;  neithc  r  by  purchase,  nor  as  security  for 
nioney  lent,  nor  by  any  other  -lode  of  acquisition.  Any  Athe- 
nian infringing  this  law  was  renddcd  liable  to  be  informed  ao-ainst 
betore  the  synod,  who,  on  proof  of  the  fact,  were  to  deprive  hnn  of 
the  property— half  of  it  going  to  the  informer,  half  to  the  general 
purposes  of  the  confederacy.  ^ 

Such  were  the  liberal  principles  of  confederacy  now  proposed  by 
Athens— who   as  a  candidate  for  power,   was  st^raisihtforward  and 
just,  like  the  Herodotean  Deiokes— and  formally  ratified  as  well  by 
the  Athenians  as  by  the  general  voice  of  the  confederate  deputies 
assembled  withm  their  walls.     The  formal  decree  jiud  compact  of 
alhance  was  inscribed  on  a  stone  column  and  placed  by  the  side  of 
the  statue  of  Zeus  Eleutherius  or  the  Liberator;  a  symbol   of  en- 
franchisement from  Sparta  accomplished,  as  well  as  of  freedom  to 
be  maintained  against  Persia  and  otlier  enemies.     Periodical  meet- 
ings of  the  confederate  deputies  were  provided  to  be  lield  (how  often 
we  do  not  know)  at  Atliens,  and  the  synod  was  recognized  as  com- 
petent judge  of  all  persons,  even  Athenian  citizens.  char"ed  with 
treason  against   the   confederacy.     To  give   fuller  security  to  the 
confederates  generally,  it  was  provided  in  the  original  compact  that 
it  any  Atiienian  citizen  should  either  speak,  or  put  any  question  to 
tJie  vole,  m  the  Athenian  assembly,  contrary  lo  the  tenor  of  that 
document— he  should  be  tried  before  the  synod  for  treason-  and  that 
if  found  guilty,  he  might  be  condemned  by  Ihem  to  the  severest 
punishment. 

Three  Athenian  leaders  stood  prominent  as  commissioners  in  the 
first  organization  of  the  confederacy,  and  in  the  dealings  witli  those 
numerous  cities  whose  junction -was  to  be  won  by  amicable  induce- 
ment—Chnbrias.  Timolheus  son  of  Konon.  and  Kallistratus  The 
first  of  the  three  is  already  known  to  the  reader.  He  Jind  Iph'ikrates 
were  the  most  distinguished  warriors  whom  Athens  numbered  amono- 
her  ciUzens.  But  not  having  been  euuaued  in  any  war  since  the 
peace  of  Anlulkidas  in  387  B.C.,  she  had  had  no  need  of  their  ser- 
vices; hence  both  of  them  had  been  absent  from  the  city  during 
much  of  the  last  nine  years,  and  Iphikrates  seems  still  to  have  been 
absent.  At  the  time  when  that  peace  ^^•as concluded,  Iphikrates  was 
serving  in  the  Hellespont  and  Thrace,  ChMbrias  with  Evairoras  in 
Cyprus;  each  having  been  sent  thither  by  Athens  at  the  head  of  a 
body  of  mercenary  peltasts.  Instead  of  dismissing  their  troops,  and 
returning  to  Athens  as  peaceful  citizens,  it  was  not  less  acreeable  to 
the  military  tastes  of  these  generals  than  conducive  to  their  impor- 
tance and  their  profit,  to  keep  together  their  bands,  and  to  take  forei<^n 
service.     Accordingly    Chabrias  had  continued  in   service  first  la 


774     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

CvDHis  next  with  the  native  Egyptian  king  Akoris.  The  Persians, 
a^rumst'uhom  he  served,  foinul  his  lioslility  so  inconvenient,  that 
vliirnubazus  acinancUd  of  tlic  Athenians  to  rccnll  him,  on  pam  ot 
thJ  Great  Kina's  displeasure;  and  requested  at  the  same  tmie  that 
l')hikratesmifflit  be  sent  to  aid  the  Persian  satraps  in  organizmg  a 
Lieat  expcditiSn  a-ainst  Egypt.  Tlie  Athenians,  to  whom  tlie  good- 
Avill  of  Pei^ia  was  now  of  peculiar  importance,  complied  on  both 
i.oints-  recalled  Chabrias,  Avho  thus  became  disposable  for  the  Athe- 
luan  service,  and  dispatched  Iphikratesto  take  command  along  with 

Inh^krate^*  since  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.  had  employed  his  pel- 
tasts  in  the  service  of  the  kiiiiis  of  Thrac6:  first  of  Seuthes,  near  the 
*;hoies  of  the  Propontis,  whom  he  aided  in  the  recoveiy  of  certain 
iobt  dominions— next  of  Kotys,  whose  favor  he  ncquned,  and  whose 
Uauu-hter  he  presently  married.     Not  only  did  he  enjoy  great  scoi)e 
for  warlike  operations  and  plunder,  among  the  "butter-eating  Thra- 
ciaus' — but  he  also  acquired,  as  dowry,  a  large  stock  of  such  prod- 
uce as  Thracian  princes  had  at  their  disposal,  together  with  a  boon 
even  more  important— a  seaport  village  not  far  trom  the  mouth  o 
the  Hebrus.  called  Drys,  where  lie  established  a  fort i tied  post,  and 
iiot  too-ether  a  Grecian   colony  dependent   on  himself.      JNliitiades, 
Alkibiade^  and  other  eminent  Athenians  liad  done  the  same  thing 
before  him';  thoudi  Xenophon   had   refused   a   similar  prop(^sitioii 
when  made  t.)  him  bv  the  earlier  i^eullies.     li)hikrate>  thus  became 
a  ereat  man  in  Thrace,  vet  by  no  means  abandoning  his  connection 
with   Athens,  but   making   his   position   in   each  subservient  to  his 
Importance  in  the  other.     While  he  was  in   a  siiiiation  to  favor  the 
nroieetsof  Athenian  citizens  for  mercantile  and  territorial  acquisi- 
ti.>nsiuthe  Chersonese  and  other   parts  of  Thrace— he  could   also 
lend  the  aid  of  Athenian  naval  and  military  art.  not  merely  to  princes 
in  1Mir:ice,  but  to  others  even  beyond  those  limits— since  we  learn 
that  Amvntas  Idnir  of  ^Macedonia  became  so  attached  or  indebted  to 
him  as  to  adopt  him  for  his  son.     When  sent  Vy  the  Athenians  to 
Persii   at  the  request  of  Ph.r.nabazus  (about  3i8  B.C.  apparently), 
Iphikrktes  had  fair  ground  for  anticipating  thai  a  career  yet  more 
lucrative  was  openini:  before  him.  ^  .  ,   ^,    i   • 

Inhikrates  beiuL'  thus  abroad,  the  Athenians  joined  with  Chabrias. 
in  the  mission  and  mea-«ures  for  organizinir  their  new  confederacy, 
two  other  coUea-ues,  of  whom  we  now  hear  for  the  first  tim.e— 
Timotheu-^  son  of  Konon.  and  Knllistratus  the  most  celebrated  ora- 
tor of  his  time  The  abilities  of  Kallistratus were  not  military  at  ail: 
while  Timotheus  and  Ciiabrias  were  men  of  distinguished  militriry 
merit  But  in  acquirinir  new  allies  and  attraclinir  deputies  to  her 
propo^^ed  con^'ress,  Athens  st«^od  in  need  of  persuasive  appeal,  con- 
ciliatory dealiniT,  and  substantial  fairness  in  all  her  propositions,  not 
less  than  of  generalshi|>.  We  are  told  that  Timotheus,  doubtless 
popular  as  son  of  the  liberator  Konon.  from  the  recollections  of  the 


SYNOD    ASSEMBLED  AT  ATHENS. 


775 


battle  of  Knidus— was  especially  successful  in  procuring  new  adhe- 
sions; and  probably  Kallistratus,  going  round  with  him  to  the  dif- 
ferent islands,  contributed  by  his  eloquence  not  a  little  to  the  same 
result.     On  their  invilation,  many  cities  entered  as  confederates     It 
this  time  (as  in  the  earlier  confederacy  of  Delos)  all  who  joined  must 
have  been  unconstrained  members.      And  we  may  understand  the 
motives  of  their  junction,  when  we  read  the  picture  drawn  by  Isok- 
rates  (in  380  B.C.)  of  the  tyranny  of  the  Persians  on  the  Asiatic  main- 
land, threatening  to  absorb  the  neighboring  islands.     Not  only  was 
there  now  a  new  basis  of  imposing^  force,  presented  by  Athens  and 
Thebes  in  union— but  there  was  also  a  wide-spread  hatred  of  imperial 
Sparta,  aggravated  since  her  perversion  of  the  pretended  boon  of 
autonomy,  promised  by  the  peace  of  Antalkidas;  and  the  conjunc- 
tion of  these  sentiments  caused  the  Athenian  mission  of  invitation  to 
be  extremely  successful.     All  the  cities  in.  Eubcea  (except  Histitea 
at  the  north  of  the  island)— as  well  as  Chios,  Mityleue,  Byzantium! 
and  Rhodes— the  three  former  of  whom  had  cc^ntinued  favorably 
inclined  to  Athens  ever  since  the  peace  of  Antalkidas— all  entered 
into  the  confederacy.     An  Athenian  fleet  under  Chabrias,  .sailing 
among  the  Cjclades  and  the  other  islands  of  the  ^Egean,  aided  in  the 
expulsion    of   the  Lacedasmouians    harmosts,  together    with   their 
devoted  local  oligarchies,  wherever  they  still  sub.sisted;  and  all  the 
cities  thus  liberated  became  equal  members  of  the  newly-constituted 
congress  at  Athens.     After  a  certain  interval  there  came  to  be  not 
less  than  seventy  cities,  many  of  them  separately  powerful,  which 
sent  deputies  to  it;  an  aggregate  sufhcieut  to  intimhlate  Sparta,  and 
even  to  flatter  Athens  with  the  hope  of  restoration  to  something  like 
her  former  luster.  ^ 

The  first  votes  both  of  Athens  herself,  and  of  the  newly-assembled 
congress,  threatened  war  upon  the  largest  scale.  A  resolution  was 
passed  to  equip  20,000  hoplites,  500  hoi-semeu.  and  200  triremes. 
Probably  the  insular  and  Ionic  deputies  promised  each  a  certain  con- 
tribution of  money,  but  nothing  beyond.  We  do  not,  however, 
know  how  much— nor  how  far  the  engagements,  larire  or  small,  wt-re 
realized— nor  whether  Athens  was  authorized  to  enforce  execution 
against  defaulters— or  was  in  circumstances  to  act  upon  such  author- 
ity, if  granted  to  her  by  the  congress.  It  was  in  this  way  that  Athens 
had  first  rendered  herself  unpopular  in  the  confederacy  of  Df  Ins 
—by  enforcing  the  resolutions  of  the  confederate  svnod  aga-nst 
evasive  or  seceding  members.  It  was  in  this  way  tlrat'what  was  at 
first  a  voluntary  association  had  ultimately  slid  into  an  emi)ire  bv 
constraint.  Under  the  new  circumstances  of  378  n.c,  we  may  pre- 
sume that  the  confederates,  though  ardent  and  full  of  promises  o:i 
first  assembling  at  Athens,  were  even  at  the  outset  not  exact,  and 
became  afterward  still  less  exact,  in  performance;  yet  that  xVthi  ns 
was  forced  to  be  reserved  in  claiming,  or  in  exercising,  the  nglit  of 
enforcement.     To  obtain  a  vote  of  contribution  by  the  majority  of 


i.i^»  ^gSBiat^-imm4akmmmA%,hSi 


774     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

Cypnis,  next  with  the  native  Egyptian  king  Akoris.  The  Persians, 
against  wliom  he  served,  found  his  hostility  so  inconvenient,  that 
rliarnabazus  acniandtd  of  tiic  Atlicniaiis  to  recall  him,  on  pain  of 
tiie  Great  King's  di.spleasurc;  and  requested  at  tlie  same  time  that 
Ipliikrates  uiiglit  be  sent  to  aid  tlie  Persian  satraps  in  organizing  a 
great  expedition  against  Egypt.  Tlie  Athenians,  to  whom  the  good- 
will of  Persia  was  now  of  pecidiar  importance,  comjilied  on  both 
I)()inis;  recalled  Chabrias,  who  thus  became  disposable  for  the  Athe- 
nian service,  and  dispatched  Iphikratesto  take  command  along  with 
the  Persians. 

I])hikrates,  since  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.  had  employed  his  pel- 
tasis  in  the  service  of  the  kings  of  Thrac6:  first  of  Seuthes,  near  the 
shores  of  the  Propontis,  wlnmi  he  aided  in  the  recoveiy  of  certain 
h)st  dominions— next  of  Kotys,  whose  favor  he  acquired,  and  whose 
dauii-hter  he  presently  married.  Not  only  did  he  enjoy  great  scope 
for  warlike  operations  and  plunder,  among  the  "butter-eating  Thra- 
cians"— but  he  alsx)  actjuired,  as  dowry,  a  large  stock  of  such  prod- 
uce as  Thracian  princes  had  at  their  disposal,  together  with  a  boon 
even  more  important — a  seaport  village  not  far  from  the  mouth  of 
the  Hebrus,  called  Drys,  where  he  established  a  fortified  post,  and 
got  touether  a  Grecian  colony  dependent  on  himself.  Miltiades, 
Alkibiades,  and  other  eminent  Athenians  had  done  the  same  thing 
before  him;  though  Xenophon  had  refused  a  similar  proj^osiiion 
when  made  to  him  by  the  earlier  l!^eutlies.  li)hikrates  thus  became 
a  great  man  in  Thrace,  yet  by  no  means  abandoning  his  connection 
wfth  Athens,  but  making  his  position  in  each  subservient  to  his 
Importance  in  the  other.  While  he  was  in  a  situation  to  favor  tlie 
projects  of  Athenian  citizens  for  mercantile  and  territorial  acquisi- 
tions in  the  Chersonese  and  other  parts  of  Thrace— he  could  also 
lend  the  aid  of  Athenian  naval  and  military  art.  not  merely  to  princes 
in  Thrace,  but  to  others  even  beyond  those  limits— since  we  learn 
that  Amyntas  kin^:  of  ^Macedonia* became  so  attached  or  indebted  to 
him  as  to  adopt  him  fur  his  son.  When  sent  Vy  the  Athenians  to 
Persia,  at  the  request  of  Phavnabaziis  (about  378  B.C.  apparently), 
Iphikrates  had  fair  ground  for  anticipating  that  a  career  yet  more 
lucrative  was  opening  before  him. 

Iphikrates  being  tlius  abroad,  the  Athenians  joined  with  Chabrias, 
in  the  mission  and  measures  for  organizing  their  new  confederacy, 
two  otljer  colleairues,  of  whom  we  now  hear  for  the  first  time — 
Tiniotheus  son  of  Konon.  and  Kallistratus  the  most  celebrated  ora- 
tor of  his  lime.  The  abilities  of  Kallistratus  were  rot  military  at  all: 
while  Tiniotheus  and  Chabrias  were  men  of  distinguished  military 
merit.  But  in  acquiring  new  allies  and  attracting  deputies  to  her 
proposed  congress,  Athens  stood  in  need  of  persuasive  appeal,  con- 
ciliatory dealing,  and  substantial  fairness  in  all  her  propositions,  not 
less  than  of  generalship.  We  are  told  that  Tiniotheus,  doubtless 
popular  as  son  of  the  liberator  Konon,  from  the  recollections  of  the 


SYNOD    ASSEMBLED  AT  ATHENS. 


775 


battle  of  Knidus-was  especially  successful  in  procuring  new  adhe 
sions;  and  probably  Kallistratus,  going  round  with  him  toThe      f 
ferent  islands,  contributed  by  his  eloquence  not  a  little  to  thfs.ine 
[hi    t  nw"  their  invitation,  many  cities  entered  as  confederates     At 
this  time  (as  in  the  earlier  confederacy  of  Delos)  all  who  joined  mus 
h^ive  been  unconstrained  members.      And  we  may  undcrstancute 

^nt'T  ?/J^^"^^l"rl^^°'  ''^''^  ^'^  r^^^^  the  picture  drawn  by  Isok^ 
rates  (in  380  B.C.)  ot  the  tyranny  of  the  Persians  on  the  Asiatic^nnd„- 
and,  threatening  to  absorb  the  neighboring  islands.     Not  only  was 
Uiere  now  a  new  basis  of  imposing  force,  presented  bv  Athens  aiul 
Thebes  m  union-but  there  was  also  a  wide-spread  hatred  of  iniperi 
Sparta,  aggravated  since  her  perversion  of  the  pretended  bo  n  of 
autonomy,  promised  by  the  peace  of  Antalkidas;  and  the  coniuuc- 
tion  of  these  sentiments  caused  the  Athenian  mission  of  invitation  to 
be  extremely  successful.     All  the  cities  in.  Eubcea  (except  Ilistiiea 
at  the  north  of  the  island)-as  well  as  Chios,  Mityl  .ne^^' "t    m' 
and  Rhodes-  he  three  former  of  whom  had  continued  favorallly 
inclined  to  Athens  ever  since  the  peace  of  Antalkidas-all  entered 
into  the  confederacy.     An  Athenian  fleet  under  Chabrias,  sailin- 
among  the  Cyclades  and  the  other  islands  of  the  ^gean  aided  in  tli? 
expulsion    ot    tlie  Lacedaimouians    harmosts,  together    with   their 
devoted  local  oligarchies,  wherever  they  still  subsisted;  and  all  the 
cities  thus  liberated  became  equal  members  of  the  newly-constituted 
congress  at  Athens.     After  a  certain  interval  there  came  to  be  not 
less  than  seventy  cities,  many  of  them  separately  powerful    which 
sent  deputies  to  it;  an  aggregate  sufficient  to  intimidate  Sparta   and 
even  to  flatter  Athens  with  tlie  hope  of  restoration  to  somcthin-'^  lilve 
her  former  luster.  ° 

The  first  votes  both  of  Athens  herself,  and  of  the  newly-assembled 
congress  threatened  war  upon  the  largest  scale.  A  resolution  was 
passed  to  equip  20,000  hoplites,  500  horsemen,  and  200  triremes 
Probably  the  insular  and  Ionic  deputies  promised  each  a  certain  con- 
tribution of  money,  but  nothing  beyond.  We  do  not,  however 
know  how  much— nor  how  far  the  engagements,  large  or  small  were 
reahzed-uor  whether  Athens  was  authorized  to  enforce  execution 
against  defaulters— or  was  in  circumstances  to  act  upon  such  author- 
ity It  granted  to  her  by  the  congress.  It  was  in  this  way  that  Athens 
had  first  rendered  herself  unpopular  in  the  confederacy  of  Delos 
—by  enforcing  the  resolutions  of  the  confederate  svnod  a^^amst 
evasive  or  seceding  members.  It  was  in  this  way  tlrat'what  was  at 
first  a  voluntary  association  had  ultimately  slid  into  an  empire  b- 
conslraint.  Under  the  new  circumstances  of  378  B.C.,  we  may  pre"- 
sumethat  the  confederates,  though  ardent  and  full  of  promises  on 
tirst  assembling  at  Athens,  were  even  at  the  outset  not  exact  and 
became  afterward  still  less  exact,  in  performance;  yet  that  Athens 
was  forced  to  be  reserved  in  claiming,  or  in  exercising,  the  right  of 
enforcement.    To  obtain  a  vote  of  contribution  by  the  majority  of 


776     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

deputies  present,  was  only  the  first  step  in  the  process;  to  obtain 
punctual  payment,  when  the  Athenian  tlcet  was  sent  round  for  the 
purpo>c  of  coUectini:— yet  without  incurring  daniierous  unpopularity 
—was  the  second  step,  hut  by  far  the  most  doubtful  and  difiicult 

It  must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  at  this  moment,  when  the 
confederacy  was  tirst  formed,  both  Athens  and  the  other  cities  came 
together  from  a  spontaneous  injpulse  of  hearty  mutuality  and  co-op- 
eration. A  few  years  afterward,  we  shall  tind  this  changed;  Alliens 
seltish,  and  the  confederates  reluctant. 

Intiamed  as  well  by  tiieir  position  of  renovated  headship,  as  by 
fresh  animosity  against  Sparta,  the  Athenians  made  important  ellorts, 
of  their  own,  both  tinancial  and  military.  Equipping  a  tieet,  which 
for  the  time  was  superior  in  the  .^geau,  tliey  ravaged  the  hostile 
territory  of  Histi«a  in  Eubo'a,  and  annexed  to  their  confederacy  the 
islands  of  Peparethus  and  Skiathus.  They  imposed  upon  themselves 
also  a  direct  property-tax;  to  what  amount,  however,  we  do  not 
know. 

It  was  on  the  occasion  of  this  tax  that  they  introduced  a  great 
change  in  the  tinancial  arrangements  and  constitution  <)f  the  cityj  a 
chance  conlerrinir  note  upon  the  archonship  of  Nausinlkus(B.c.  878- 
377)."  The  great  body  of  substantial  Alheniau  citizens  as  well  as 
metics  were  now  classified  anew  for  purposes  of  taxation.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  even  from  the  time  of  Solon  the  citizens  of  Athens 
bad  been  distributed  into  four  classes— Pentakosiomedimni.  llippeis, 
Zeugitaj,  Thetes— distinguished  from  each  other  by  the  amount  of 
their  respective  properties.  Of  these  Sokmian  classes,  the  fourth,  or 
poorest,  paid  no  direct  taxes;  while  the  three  former  were  taxed 
accordinix  to  assessments  represcntmg  a  ceriain  proportion  of  their 
actual  propertv.  The  taxable  proi)eity  of  the  richest  (or  Pentakosio- 
medimni, including  all  at  or  above  the  minimum  income  of  500 
medimni  of  corn  per  annum)  was  entered  in  the  tax-book  at  a  sum 
equal  to  twelve  times  their  income;  that  of  the  Hippeis  (comprising 
all  who  possessed  between  300  and  500  medimni  of  annual  income) 
at  ten  times  their  income:  that  of  the  Zeugitte  (or  possessors  of  an 
annual  income  between  200  and  300  medimni)  at  five  times  their 
income.  A  medimnus  of  corn  was  counted  as  equivalent  to  a 
drachma;  which  permitted  the  application  of  this  same  class-system 
to  movable  property  "as  well  as  to  land.  So  that,  when  an  actual 
propertv-tax  {or  e('sp/(fJi'a)  was  imposed.it  operated  as  an  equal  or 
proportional  tax.  so  far  as  regarded  all  the  members  of  the  sjune 
class;  hut  as  a  graduated  or  progressive  tax,  upon  all  the  members  of 
the  richer  class  as  compared  w  ith  those  of  the  poorer. 

The  three  Solouian  pioperty-classes  above  named  appear  to  liave 
lasted,  though  probably  not  without  modifications,  down  to  the  clo^e 
of  the  Peloponnesian  war;  and  to  have  been  in  great  part  preserved, 
after  the  renovation  of  the  democracy  in  B.C.  403,  during  the  archon- 
ship of  Eukleides.     Though  eligibility  to  the  great  office's  of  state 


CENSUS  OF  NAUSINIKUS. 


777 

'^'^^!:^n''Z  P-tmh^ry  qualifica- 

tlie  wealthier  citizens,  no^  me  e  v ^  cTs^' TX'  ?V^^'^'."«^'-^^"'"-? 
imposecb  but  also  becatise  the  ii^^l^.  nfS^rve  iSr'feTt  ""t^ 
some  olhces  was  conseauent  on  -i  m.in'o  ,  n  '^^"^--'^'^  o'  l^urdcn- 
;;.-e  .b„,  a  ,Wen  nVnZZ  o  '  p  ";  ?,  ,  "^  '""''  T,  ff'"^"^  "^ 
tUe  boloniaii  census,  in  its  m-iin  nrTnr-!r>  ?.;  „-  i  ^  '  'v-"-'foro,  tiiat 
'.ation.  was  retaine  1.  Eac  an'"  Zn-rn/'  '•''*'*■'''',''''  '""^  S™''' 
i-uriwl  in  one  of  tliree  or  ZmX  '  J^^^^^  "'"'"■  ''"''"'•'•  *'«  «»s 
each  of  tlie  classes/rfixcd      'oporfion  ,^  ""  !!^""'«»■"■    J'^or 

property  was  assumed.  aMh  wa   e  ,S  n  t^rsel  ^7^^'  ""'■"/' 
Ins  wiio  e  piopei-iv  but  for  tlie  sn  n  ,>f  V.     i ,  •  *9''«'»1<^,  not  for 

to  his  prop"?.,!-.  a<^cor;,\-n'r,J\'Lr^;"„ptt^;^^^^^^ 

ncliest  class,  the  taxable'capital 'bore   "Z^^^L  In  It         °', 
property  limn    n  tiie  les"!  rich-  i,.  tv.„\.    ^    ,  "'  '""'o  to  tiie  actual 

'l'«  third.     The  8    n  of  a      he  e    t  m^'^f"'  '  '^  fr'"' ■""''"  '^^"^  '" 
•lilferent  classes  set  oi  nosite  tf  ,.„T    ^  ''""'''''"  ''•''P'"''  '"  •■>"  'I'e 

conslit,,ted  the  a4ciri'n.s,^  of  AM-'"^   "•'"'"'  '■"  "'«  ^^''^''"'c. 
V*   niv^  «i-,,-,ii.^iiiL  Cv^nsus  or  Attica*  nnoTi   Ai-h;/-.ii  *^ii    i*      1 

every  man   possess  nj  propertv  to  the  nn.,.,Vn   !,>  o-      •'     I   "^  "^ 
.Iraeluna.)  and  upwatSs*^    Proeeemn"  upTn  th     v»l,!?."""'^  *"''  '^ 

■lasses,  and  there  mav  probalik-  have  lee"  four      R,T''  ^^"r  ""?'' 

;vas  returned  by  his  ..uardia,  s  to\Ve"^;,rc1a  ^as^^o^^Z- oTTI 

ulents:  upon  wh  oh  ids  name  was  entered  on  t'hrscheduTo  wh,  . 

taxable  capital  of  three  talents  set  an-ainst  hi m    beb^n^  om  fifn     ? 

^te?::d' at  TK^     '•i'"  *.?'""<^  oapitil'o'f"rhe':ic?nrcla''v: 
entered   at  a  fraction   less  than   one  fifth  of  their  actual  nron,  ,t^ 

(probably  enough,  one-sixth,  the  sanie  as  all  the^-s^ereli'^Sol 


I 

1 


l»Tiii>^ 


778     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

that  of  the  third,  at  a  fmction  still  smaller:  of  the  fourth  (if  there 
wa^  a  fourth)  even  smaller  tlian  the  third.  This  last  class  desoeiided 
down  to  the  minimum  of  25  miua-,  or  2500  drachma';  below  ^vhich  no 

account  was  takeu.  .  .  j     x    i    *i 

Be'^ides  the  taxable  capitals  of  the  citizens,  thus  graduated,  the 
schedule  also  included  those  of  the  metics  or  resident  aliens;  who 
were  each  enrolled  (without  any  difference  of  greater  or  smalle^ 
T)i-opertv  above  25  mina)  at  a  taxable  capital  equal  to  one-sixth  of 
hisactdal  property;  being  a  proportion  less  than  the  richest  class  of 
citizens  and  probably  equal  to  the  second  chiss  lu  order  ot  wealth. 
All  these  items  summed  up,  amounted  to  5750  or  tiOOO  talents,  form- 
in"-  the  ao-cregate  schedule  of  taxable  property;  that  is  something 
ueTir  about liOOO  talents.  A  property-tax  was  no  part  ot  the  regular 
wavs  and  menns  of  the  state.  It  was  imposed  onlvon  special  occa- 
sions- and  whenever  it  was  imposed,  it  was  assessed  upon  this  sched- 
ule—everv  man.  rich  or  poor,  being  rated  equally  according  to  his 
taxable  capital  as  there  entered.  A  property-tax  of  1  per  cent,  wou  d 
thus  prodiice  60  talents;  2  per  cent,  120  talents,  etc.  It  is  highly 
probable  that  the  exertions  of  Athens  during  the  archonship  of  Isau- 
iinikus  when  this  new  schedule  was  first  prepared,  may  have  caused 
a  property-tax  to  be  then  imposed,  but  we  do  not  know  to  what 

*'*"^\lonff  with  this  new  schedule  of  taxable  capital,  a  new  distribution 
of^he  citizens  now  took  place  into  certain  bodies  called  Symmories. 
As  far  as  we  can  make  out,  on  a  very  obscure  subject,  it  sec^ns  that 
these  Svmmories  were  twenty  in  number,  two  to  each  tribe;  that 
each  contained  sixty  citizens,  thus  making  1200  in  all;  that  these 
l'>00  were  the  wealthiest  citizens  on  the  schedule— containing,  per- 
Inp^  the  two  first  out  of  the  four  classes  enrolled.  Among  these 
l-^OO' however  the  300  wealthiest  stood  out  as  a  separate  body ;  thirty 
fmm  each  tribe.  These  300  were  the  wealthiest  men  in  the  city,  and 
were  called  "  the  leaders  or  chiefs  of  the  Symmories.  1  he  300,  and 
the  1200  corresponded,  speaking  roughly,  to  the  old  Solonian  classes 
of  Pentn'kosiomedimni  and  Hippeis:  of  which  latter  class  there  had 
aUo  been  1200,  at  the  l)eirinning  of  the  Peloponnesian  wjar.  llie 
litur'des  or  burdensome  and  costly  offices,  were  discharged  priuci- 
mllv  bv'the  Three  Hundred,  but  partly  also  by  theTwelve  Hundred 
It  would  seem  that  the  former  was  a  body  essentially  fluctuating,  and 
that  after  a  man  had  been  in  it  for  some  time,  dischaigmg  the 
burdens  belonirinii  to  it,  the  Strategi  or  Generals  suffered  him  to  be 
miiuded  with  tlie  Twelve  Hundred,  and  promoted  one  of  the  latter 
body  to  take  his  place  in  the  Three  Hundred.  As  between  man 
and'  man,  too.  the  Attic  law  always  admitted  the  process  caljed 
Aiitidosis  or  Exchange  of  Property.  Any  citizen  who  believed  him- 
self to  hive  been  overchariied  with  costly  liturgies  and  that  another 
citizen  as  rich  or  richer  than  himself,  had  not  borne  liis  fan-  share— 
mi«dit  'if  saddled  witli  a  new  liturgy,  require  the  other  to  undertake 


PURPOSE  OF  THE  SYMMORIES. 


iy>*fi 


779 


It  m  Jus  place;  and  in  case  of  refusal,  might  tender  to  him  nn 
exchange  of  properties,  under  an  engagement  that  he  would  under- 
take  the  new  charge,  if  the  property  of  the  other  were  made  over  to 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  besides  the  1200  wealthiest  citizens  who 
composed  the  Symmories,  tiiere  was  a  more  con.vidernble  nuini)er  of 
less   w^ealthy  citizens  not   included  in  them,  yet  still   liable  to  the 
property-tax:  persons  who  possessed  property,  from  the  minimum  (i 
2o  minaj,  up  to  some  maximum  that  we  do  not  know,  at  which  point 
the  Symmories  began— and  who  corresponded,  speaking  looselv   to 
the  third  class  or  Zeugihe  of  the  Soloni[iu  census.     'J'jio  two  Svni 
mories  of  each  tribe  (comprising  its  120  richest  members)  supcTiii- 
tended  the  property-register  of  each  tribe,  and  collected  the  contri- 
butions due  from  its  less  wealthy  registered  members.     Occasionallv 
when  the  state  required  immediate  payment,  the  thirty  richest  mei'i 
in  eacli  tribe  (making  up  altogether  the  300)  advanced  the  wl-ole 
sum  of  tax  chargeable  upon  the  tribe,  haviuo-  their  le-al  remedy  of 
enforcement  against  the  other  members  for  the  recoveiy  of  the  sum 
chargeable  upon  each.     The  richest  citizens  were  tiius  both  armed 
with  rights  and  charged  with  duties,  such  as  had  not  belonged  to 
them  before  the  archonship  of  Nausinikus.     By  their  interveiilioii  (it 
was  supposed)  the*  schedule  would  be  kept  nearer  to  the  trutli  as 
respects  the  assessment  on  each  individual,  while  tlie  sums  actually 
imposed  would  be  more  immediately  forthcoming,  than  if  the  state 
directly  interfered  by  officers  of  its  own.     Soon  after,  tiie  system' of 
bymmories  was  extended  to  the  trierarchy;  a  chai]n:e  which'had  not 
at   first  been  contemplated.      Each   Symmory   had    its    chiefs,    iis 
curators,   its   assessors,  acting   under  the   geul'ral    ])resideucy  of  the 
Strategi      Twenty-live  years  afterward,   We  also   find  Demosthenes 
(then  about  thirty  years  of  age)  recommending  a  s! ill  more  compre- 
hensive application  of  the  same  piinci{)le,  so  that  men,  money  ships 
and  all  the  means  and  forces  of  the  state,   mii^^lit  thus  be  parceled 
into  distinct   fractions,  and   consigned  to  distinct   Symmories   each 
with  known  duties  of  limited  extent  for  the  component  persons  to 
perform,  and  each  exposed  not  merely  to  leual  process   but  also  to 
loss  of  esteem,  in   the  event   of   non-perforinance.     It 'will   rather 
appear,  however,  that,  in  practice,  tiie  system  of  Svmmories  came  to 
be  greatly  abused,  and  to  produce  pernicious  effects  never  aniiei- 
pated. 

At  present,  however,  I  only  notice  this  new  financial  and  political 
classitication  introduced  in  378  u.c,  as  one  evidence  of  the  ardor 
with  which  Athens  embarked  in  her  projected  war  against  Sparta, 
lie  feeling  among  her  allies  the  Thebans  was  no  less  determined 
Ihe  government  of  Leontiades  and  the  Spartan  garrison  had  left 
behind  it  so  strong  an  antipathy,  that  the  large  majority  of  citizens 
embarking  heartily  in  the  revolution  acaiust  them",  lent  themselves 
to  all  the  orders  of  Pelopidas  and  his  colleagues;  who,  on  their  part 


780     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 


had  no  other  thought  but  to  repel  the  eommon  enemy.  Tlie  Tlielt;in 
government  now  beeame  pn)haI)ly(le!noeratie;>l  in  form  and  still  more 
demoeratical  iu  spirit  from  the  unanimous  ardor  pervading  the  whole 
mass.  Its  military  foree  was  put  under  the  best  training;  the  most 
fertile  portion  of  the  plain  north  of  Thel)e-:,  from  which  the  ehief  sub- 
sistence of  the  city  came,  was  surroundt'd  by  a  ditch  and  a  palisade,  to 
repel  the  expecteil  Spartan  invasion:  and  the  memorable  Saen^d  Band 
was  now  for  the  first  time  organized.  This  was  a  brigade  of  J500  liop- 
lites,  called  the  Lochus  or  reiriment  of  the  citv.  as  beimr  consecrate  to 
the  defense  of  the  Kadmeia  or  acroj)olis.  It  was  ]iut  under  constant 
arms  and  training  at  the  public  expense,  like  the  Thousand  at  Argns, 
of  whom  mention  was  made  in  my  fifty-tifth  chapter.  It  consisted  of 
youthful  citizensfrom  the  best  families,  distinguished  for  tbeir strength 
and  courage  amid  the  severe  trials  of  the  pala?strr  in  Thebes,  and  it 
was  marshaled  iu  sucbniannerlbat  each  i)air  of  neighboring  soldiers 
were  at  the  same  time  intimate  friends:  so  that  the  whole  band  were 
thus  kept  together  by  ties  which  no  dangers  could  sever.  At  first 
its  destination,  mider  Gorgidas  its  connnander  (as  we  see  ])y  thp. 
select  Three  Hundred  who  fought  in  4'-?4  r..(".  at  the  battle  of  Helium), 
was  to  serve  as  front  rank  men  for  the  general  body  of  hoplites  to 
follow.  But  from  a  circumstance  to  be  mentioned  presently,  it  came 
to  Ihj  employed  by  Pelopidas  and  Ei>aminoudas  as  a  regiment  by 
itself,  and  iu  a  char2:e  was  then  found  irresistible. 

AVe  must  remark  that  the  Thebnns  had  always  been  good  soldiers, 
both  as  hoplites  and  as  cavalry.  The  existing  en11iusias?n  therefore, 
with  the  mor(!  sustained  traitnng,  only  raised  good  soldiers  into  nuich 
better.  But  Thebes  was  now  blest  with  another  good  fortune,  such 
as  had  never  yet  befallen  her.  She  found  among  her  citizens  a 
leader  of  the  rarest  excellence.  It  is  now  for  the  first  time  that 
Epaminondas  the  son  of  Polymnis  begins  to  stand  o'ut  in  the  pid)lic 
life  of  Greece.  His  family,  poor  rather  than  rich,  was  among  the 
most  ancient  in  Thebes,  belonging  to  those  Gentes  called  Sparti, 
Avhose  heroic  progenitors  were  stiid  to  have  sprung  from  the  dragon's 
teeth  sown  by  Kadmus.  He  seems  to  have  been  lujw  of  middle  age; 
Pelopidas  was  younger,  an*!  of  a  very  rich  family ;  yet  the  relations 
between  the  two  were  those  of  equal  and  inti?nate  frieiulship,  lested 
in  a  day  of  battle  wherein  the  two  were  ranged  side  by  side  as  hop- 
lites, and  where  Epaminondas  had  saved  tlie  life  of  his  woun^led 
friend,  at  the  cost  of  several  wovmds,  and  the  greatest  possible 
danger,  to  himself. 

Epaminondas  had  discharged,  with  pimctuality,  those  military  and 
gymnastic  duties  which  were  incumbent  on  every  Theban  citizen. 
But  we  are  told  that  in  the  gymnasia  he  studied  to  acquire  the  max- 
imum of  activity  riither  than  of  strength:  the  nimble  movements  of 
a  runner  and  wr(»stler — not  the  heavy  nuiscularity,  purchased  in  part 
by  excessive  nutriment,  of  the  Bo'otian  pugilist.  He  also  learned 
music,  vocal  and  instrumental,  and  dtuicing;  }jy  which  in  those  days 


EPAMINONDAS. 


781 


was  meant,  not  simply  the  power  of  striking  the  lyre  or  blowincr  the 
flute,  but  all  that  belonged  to  the  graceful,  expressive,  and  emphatic 
management  either  of  the  voice  or'of  the  body;  rythmical  promujci- 
ation,  exercised  by  repetition  of  the  poets— and  disciplined  move- 
ments, for  taking  part  iu  a  choric  festival  with  becominu"  consonance 
amid  a  crowd  of  citizen  performers.     Of  such  gvnmastic  and  musi- 
cal training,  the  combination  of  which  constituted  an  accomplished 
Grecian  citizen,  the  former  predominated  at  Thebes,  the  hitter  at 
Athens.     Moreover,  at  Thebes,  the  musical  training  was  based  more 
upon  the  flute  (for  the  construction  of  which  excellent  reeds  srrew 
near  the  Lake  Kopai's);  at  Athens  more  upon  the  Ivre,  which  adnillted 
of  vocal  accompaniment  by  the  player.     The  Athenian  Alkihiades 
was  heard  to  remark,  when  he  threw  away  his  flute  in  disjxust.  that 
flute-playing  was  a  fit  occupation  for  the  Thebans.  since  thf^'did  not 
know  how  to  speak;  and  in  regard  to  the  countrymen  of  Pindar  gen- 
erally, the  remark  was  hardly  less  true  than  contemptuous.     On  this 
capital  point,  Epaminondas  'formed  a  splendid  exception.     Not  only 
had  he  learnt  the  lyre  as  well  as  the  flute  from  the  best  masters,  bu't 
also,  dissenting  from  his  brother  Kapheisias  and  ])is  friend  Pelopidas, 
he  manifested  from  his  earliest  years  an  ardent  intellectual  impulse 
which  would  have  been  remarkable  even  in  an  Atheidan.     He  soudit 
with  eagerness  the  conversation  of  the  philosophers  within  his  reach, 
among  w^hom  were  the  Theban  Simmias  and  the  Tarentinc  Spin- 
tharus,  both  of  them  once  companions  of  Sokrates;  so  that  the  stir- 
ring  influence   of  the   Sokratic  method  would   thus  find   its  wav, 
partially  and  at  second-hand,  to  the  bosom  of  Epaminondas.     As 
the  relations  between  Thebes  and  Athens,  ever  since  the  close  of  the 
Peloponnesiau  war,  had  become  more  and  more  friendly,  growing 
at  letigth  into  ;\lliance  and  joint  war  against  the  Spartans— we  may 
reasonably  presmne  that  he  profited  by  teachers  at  the  latter  city  as 
well  as  at  the  former.     But  the  person  to  whom  he  particularly 
devoted  himself,  and  whom  he  not  only  heard  as  a  puj^il,  but  tended 
almost  as  a  son,  during  the  close  of  an  io^ci]  life— was,  a  Tarentinc 
exile  named  Lysis;  a  member  of  the  Pythagorean  brotherhood,  who, 
from  causes  which  we  cannot  make  out.  had  sought  shelter  at  Thebes 
and  dwelt  there,  until  his  death.     With  him,  as  well  as  with  other 
phil()sophers,  Epaminondas  discussed  all  the  subjects  of  study  and 
inquiry  then  afloat.     By  perseverance  in  this  course  for  some  years, 
he    not   only  acquired    considerable   positive   instruction,  but  also 
became  pi-acticed  in  new  and  enlarged  intellectual  condanations;  and 
was,  like  Perikles,  emancipated  from  that  timorous  interpretation  of 
nature  which  rendered  so  many  Grecian  commanders  tlie  slaves  of 
signs  and  omens.     His  patience  as  a  listener,  and  his  indifference  to 
showy  talk  on  his  own  account,  were  so  remark:d)le,  that  Spintharus 
(the  father  of  Aristoxenes),  after  numerous  conversations  with  him, 
allirmed  that  he  had  never  met  with  anv  one  who  understood  more 
or  talked  less. 


782     AFTER  THE  SUBJv^GATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 


Nor  did  such  reserve  proceed  from  any  want  of  ready  powers  of 
expression.  On  tlic  contrary,  the  eloquence  of  Epaminoudas,  when 
he  entered  lipon  his  public  career,  was  sliown  to  be  not  merely  pre- 
eminent among  Thebans,  but  elTectivc  even  auainst  the  best  Athenian 
opponents.  But  his  disposition  was  essentially  modest  and  unambi- 
tious, combined  with  a  strong  intellectual  curiosity  and  a  great 
capacity;  a  rare  combination  amid  a  race  usually  erring  on  the  side 
of  forwardness  and  self-esteem.  Little  moved  by  personal  ambition, 
and  never  cultivating  popularity  by  imworthy  means,  Epaminoudas 
was  still  more  indifferent  on  the  score  of  money,  lie  remained  in 
contented  poverty  to  the  end  of  his  life,  not  leaving  enough  to  pay 
liis  funeral  expenses,  yet  repudiating  not  mere!}'  the  corrupting  propo- 
sitions of  foreigners,  l)utalso  the  solicitous  teiulersof  personal  friends; 
though  we  are  told  that,  when  once  serving  the  costly  office  of  chor- 
egus,  he  permitted  his  friend  Pelopidas  to  bear  a  portion  of  the 
expense.  As  he  thus  stood  exempt  from  two  of  tlie  besetting  infirm- 
ities which  most  frequently  misguided  eminent  Greek  statesmen,  so 
there  was  a  third  characteristic  not  less  estimable  in  his  moral  char- 
acter; the  gentleness  of  his  political  antipathies — his  repugnance  to 
liarsh  treatment  of  conquered  enemies — and  his  refusal  to  mingle  in 
intestine  bloodshed.  If  ever  there  were  men  whose  conduct  seemed 
to  justify  unmeasured  retaliation,  it  was  Leontiades  and  his  fellow- 
traitors.  They  had  opened  the  doors  of  the  Kadmeia  to  the  Spart.in 
Pha?bidas,  and  had  put  to  death  the  Theban  leader  Ismenias.  Yet 
Epaminoudas  disapproved  of  the  scheme  of  Pelopidas  and  the  other 
exiles  to  assassinate  them,  and  declined  to  take  part  in  it ;  partly 
on  prudential  grounds,  but  partly  also  on  conscientious  scruples. 
None  of  his  virtues  was  found  so  difhcult  to  imitate  ])v  liis  subse- 
quent admirers,  as  this  master^'"  over  the  resentful  and  vindictive 
passions. 

Before  Epaminoudas  could  have  full  credit  for  these  virtues,  how- 
ever, it  was  necessary  that  he  should  give  proof  of  the  extraordinary 
capacities  for  action  with  which  they  were  combined,  and  that  he 
should  achieve  something  to  earn  that  exclamation  of  praise  which 
we  shall  find  his  enemy  Agesilaus  afterward  pronouncing,  on  seeing 
him  at  the  head  of  the.  invading  Theban  army  near  Sparta-^" Oh! 
thou  man  of  great  deeds!"  In  the  year  n.c.  379,  when  the  Kadmeia 
was  emancipated,  he  was  as  yet  undistinguished  in  public  life,  and 
known  only  to  Pelopidas  with  his  other  friends;  among  whom,  too, 
his  unambitious  and  inquisitive  disposition  was  a  subject  of  complaint 
as  keeping  him  unduly  in  the  background.  But  the  unparalleled 
phenomena  of  that  year  supplied  a  sjMir  which  overruled  all  back- 
wardness, and  smothered  all  rival  inclinations.  The  Thebans,  hav- 
ing just  recovered  their  city  by  an  incredible  turn  of  fortune,  found 
themselves  exposed  single-handed  to  the  full  attack  of  Sparta  and  her 
extensive  confederacy.  Not  even  Athens  had  yet  declared  in  their 
favor,  nor  had  they  a  single  other  ally.     Under  such  circumstances, 


AGESILAUS  IN  BCEOTIA. 


783 


Thebes  could  only  be  saved  by  the  energy  of  all  her  citizens-tlie 
unamlHtious  and  plulosophical  as  well  as  the  rest.     As  the  necessities 
ot   the   case  required  such  simultaneous  devotion,   so  the  electric 
shock  of  the  recent  revolution  was  sufficient  to  awaken  enthusiasm 
VI  mmds  much  less  patriotic  than  that  of  Epaminoudas     He  wis 
among  the  first  to  join  the  victorious  exiles  in  arms,  after  the  contest 
had  been  transferred  from  the  houses  of  Archias  and  Leontiades  to 
tlie  open  market-place;  and  he  would  probablv  have  been  amono-  tlu3 
first  to  mount  the  walls  of  the  Kadmeia,  had  the  Spartan  hannost 
awaited  an  assault.     Pelopidas  being  named  Bceotarch,  his  friend 
Lpamnmudas  was  naturally  placed  among  the  eailiest  and  most  for- 
ward organizers  of  the  necessary  military  resistance  against  the  com- 
mon enemy;  in  which  employment  his  capacities  speedily  became 
manifest.  ^  Though  at  this  moment  almost  an  unknown  man   he  had 
acqmred,  in    u.c.  371,  seven   years  afterward,  so  much  reputation 
flL^^.  ^l^^'^^^^^^  ^'in^  as  general,  that  he  was  chosen  as  the  expositor 
ot   Theban  policy  at  Sparta,  and  trusted  with  the  conduct  of  the  bat- 
tle of  Leuktra,  upon  which  the  fate  of  Thebes  hinf^ed.     Hence  we 
may  fairly  conclude,  that  the  well-planned  and  succ^essful  system  of 
defense,  together  with  the  steady  advance  of  Thebes  airainst  Sparta 
durmg  the  intermediate  years,  was  felt  to  have  been  in  the  main  his 
work. 

The  turn  of  politics  at  Athens  which  followed  the  acquittal  of 
bphodrias  was  an  unspeakable  benefit  to  the  Thebans,  in  seconding 
as  well  as  encouraging  their  defense.     The  Spartans,  not  unmoved 
at  the  new  enemies  raised  up    by  their    treatment    of  Sphodrias 
thought  it  necessary  to  make  some  efforts  on  their  side     They 
organized  on  a  more  systematic  scale  the  military  force  of  their  con- 
federacy, and  even  took  some  conciliatorv  steps  with  the  view  of 
effacing  the  odium  of  their  past  misrule.     The  full  force  of  their  con- 
federaey— including,  as  a  striking  mark  of  present  Spartan  power, 
even  the  distant  Olynthians— Avas  placed  in  motion  against  Thebes  in 
the  course  of  the  summer  under  Agesilaus;  who  contrived,  by  put- 
ting in  sudden  reqifisition  a  body  of  mercenaries  acting  in  the  service 
of  the  Arcadian   town  Kleitor  against  its  neighbor  the  Arcadian 
Orchomenus.  to  make  himself  master  of   the  passes  of  Kithfpron 
before  the  Thebans  and  Athenians  could  have  notice  of  his  pnssiuf^ 
the  Lacediemonian  border.     Then  crossimr  Kithan-on  into  Ba-otia° 
he  established  his  head-quarters  at  Thesploe,  a  post  already  under 
Spartan  occupation.     From  thence  he  commenced  his  attacks  upon 
the  Theban  territory,  which  he  found  defended  partly  by  a  consider- 
able length  of  ditch  and  palisade— partly  by  the  main  foicc  of  Thebes 
assisted  by  a  division  of  mixed  Atheniang'and  mercenaries,  sent  frorn 
Athens  under  Chabrias.     Keeping  on  their  own  side  of  the  palisade 
the  Thebans  suddenly  sent  out  their  cavalry,  and  attacked  Agesilaus 
by  surprise,  occasioning  some  loss.     Such  sallies  were  frequently 
repeated,  until,  by  a  rapid  march  at  break  of  day,  lie  forced  his  way 


784     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION   OF  OLYNTIIUS. 

tlirougli  an  opening-  in  the  breastwork  into  the  inner  country   which 
he  laid  waste  nearly  to  the  city  walls.     The  Thebans  and  Athenians 
though  not  offenng  him  balllu  on  equal  terms,  nevertheless  kept  the 
field   against  him.   taking  eare  to  hold   positions  advantageous  for 
defense.     Agesilaus  on  his  side  did   not  feel  contideut  enou<T-h   to 
attack  them  against  such  odds.     Yet  on  one  occasion  he  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  do  so:  Jind  was  marching  up  to  the  charge   when  he 
was  daunted  by  the  tirm  attilude  and  excellent  array  of  the  troops  of 
Chabrias.     Tliey  had  receivetl   orders  to  await  his  approach   on  a 
high  and  advantageous  ground,  withou.  moving  until  signal  should 
be  given;  with  their  shields  resting  on  the  knee,  and  their  spears  pro- 
tended.    So  imposing  was  their  appearance  that  Agesilaus  called  off 
his  troops  without  daruig  to  complete  the  charge.     After  a  month  or 
more  of  devastations  on  the  lands  of  Thelu-s.  and  a  string  of  desultory 
sl^irmishes  in  which  he  seems  to  have  losi  rather  than  gained   Ao-e<;i- 
laus  withdrew  to  Thespiie;  the  forfiticaiions  of  which  he  strenVh- 
ened   leaving  Phabidas  wiih  a  consideiable  force  in  occupation   and 
then  leading  back  his  army  to  Peloponnesus. 

Phfcbidas -the  former  captor  of  the  Kadmeia— thus  stationed  at 
Ihespue,  carried  on  vigorous  warfare  against  Thebes;  paitly  with 
his  own  Spartan  division,   partly  with  the  Thespian  hoplites  who 
promised  him  unshrinking  sujiport.     His  incursions  soon  bnmdit  on 
reprisals  from  the  Thebans;  whoinvaded  Thcspiie,  but  were  repulsed 
by  Pha^bidas  with  the  loss  of  all  tlieir  plunder.     In  the  pursuit   how- 
ever, hurrying  incautiously  forward,  he  Avas  slain  bv  a  sudden  turn 
of  the  Theban  cavalry;  upon  which  all  his  troops  tied,  chased  bv  the 
1  hebans  to  the  very  gates  of  Thespia«.     Though  the  Spartans,  in*  con- 
sequence ot  this  misfortune,  di>pat(;lied  by  sea  another  general  and 
division  to  replace  Pha'bidas,  the  cause  of  the  Thebans  was  <neallv 
strengthened  by  their  recent  victory.     Thev  pushed  their  success  no*t 
only  against  Thespue,  but  against  the  ether  liaM>tian  cities,  still  held 
by  local  oligarchies  in  dependence  on  Sparta.     At  the  same  time 
these  oligarchies  were  threatened  by  the  growing  strength  of  their 
own  popular  or  philo-Theban  citizens,  who  crowded  in  considerable 
numbers  as  exiles  to  Thebes. 

A  second  expedition  against  Thebes,  undertaken  by  Agesilaus  in 
the  ensuing  summer  with  the  main  army  of  the  confederacv  was 
neither  more  decisive  nor  more  profitable  than  the  precedin^r 
J  hough  he  contrivecl,  by  a  well-planned  stratagem,  to  surprise  the 
iheban  palisade  and  lay  waste  the  pPain,  he  irained  no  serious  victorv 
and  even  showed,  more  clearly  than  before,1iis  reluctance  to  euna.re 
except  upon  perfectly  equal  terms.  It  became  evident  that'' the 
Inebans  were  not  only  strengthening  their  position  in  Preotia  but 
also  acquiring  practice  in  \<»arfare  and  contidence  aiiainst  the  S|)ar- 
tans;  insomuch  that  Antalkidas  and  some  other  companions  remon- 
strated with  Agesilaus,  against  carrying  on  the  Mar  so  as  only  to  «»ive 
improving  lessons  to  his  enemies  in  military  practice— and  called 


VICTORY  OF  CHABRIAS. 


785 


upon  him  to  strike  some  decisive  blow.     He  quitted  Bceotia  how 
ever,  after  the  summer's  campaign,  without  any  such  slc^     in  1  Is 
wav  he  appeased  an  intestine  conflict  which  was  about  to  break  o  ? 
m    Ihespue.     A  te. wards,  on  passing  to  Megara,  he  exper  enced  a 
stramor  hur  .  which  grievously  injured  his  sound  le^it  has  beon 
mentioned  already  that  he  was  Ltnle  of  one  leu)  a  ul     id uced  Ms 
surgeon  to  open  a  vein  in  the  limb  for  redtFrr.m?   he    nflamim   ion 
^Vhen  this  was  done,  however,  the  blood  could  not  be  stoS^^^ 
he  swooned.     Having  been  conveyed  home  to  Sparta  in^eat  s°f 
ferini^,  he  was  confined   to  his  couch  for  several  months  "ad  he 
remained  during  a  much  longer  time  unfit  for  active  comm'and 

J  he  functions  of  general  now  devolved  upon  the  other  kin -Kleom- 
brotus.  whom  the  next  spring  conducted  the  army  of  the  confedera  v 

Tl.Xn  't  ^r''''  '°^^  ^^^^'""  ^'"^  occasion,\he  AtSans  S 
Tliebans  had  occupied  the  passes  of  Kith.^ron,  so  that  he  was  unable 
even  to  enter  the  country,  and  was  obliged  to  dismiss  his  troo  s 
without  achieving  anything.  a=>  nuupi, 

His  inglorious  retreat  excited  such  murmurs  amon-  the  allies  when 
they  me   at  Sparta,  that  they  resolved  to  fit  out  a  larue  navalfo  ee 
sulhcient  both    o  intercept  the  supplies  of  imported  corn  to  AtlK-ns' 
and  to  forward  an  invading  army  by  sea  Against  Thebes   to   the 
Bffiotian  port  of  Kreusis  in  the  Krissa-an  Gulf.     The  forrn'r  obie ct 
was  attempted  first.      Toward  midsummer,  a  fleet  of  s  x       riremes 
htted  out  under   tlie  Spartan   admiral  Pollis.  was  cruisiV    n    he 
^gean;  especial  y  round  the  coast  of  Attica,  near  .Egina,  Keo    and 
A  dros.      1  he  Athenians,  who,  since   their  recently' renewed   coi 
federacy,  had  been  undisturbed  by  any  enemies  at  /ea,  found  thcM  i- 
se  ves  thus  threatened   not  merely  with  loss  of  power,  but  also  wi  L 
ossof  trade  and  even  famine;  since  their  corn-ships  from  the  Euxine 
though  safely  reaching  Genestus  (the  southern  extremity  of  Eubcea)' 
were  prevented  from  doubling  Cape  Sunium.     Feeling  severely   ids 
interruption   they  htted  out  at  Peineus  a  fleet  of  80  triremes   with 
crews  mainly  composed  of  citizens;  who,  under  the  admiral  Cha- 
brias, in  a  sharply  contested  action  near  Naxos,  com pletelv  defeated 
tlie  fleet  of  Pollis,  and  regained  for  Athens  the  mastery  bf  the  sea 
l<orty-nine  Lacedaemonian  triremes  were  disabled  or  captured   ei.rht 
with  their  entire  crews.     Moreover,  Chabrias  might  have  desirofed 
all   or  most  of  the  rest,  had  he  not  suspended  his  attack,  havinli 
eighteen  of  his  own  ships  disabled,  to  pick  up  both  the  living  men 
and  the  dead  bodfes  on  board,  as  well  as  all  Athenians  who  were 
swimming  for  their  lives.     He  did  this  (we  are  told)  from  distinct 
recollection  of  the  fierce  displeasure   of'  the    oeople    against  The 
victorious  generals  after  the  battle  of  Arginusa^'  And  we  may  thus 
see   tha    though  the  proceedings  ort  that  memorable  occasion  were 
stained  both  by  illegality  and  by  violence,  they  produced  a  salutary 
effect  upon  the  public  conduct  of  subsequent  commanders      Manv  a 
brave  Athenian  (the  crews  consisting  principally  of  citizens)  owed 


786     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 

his  life,  after  the  battle  of  Nnxos,  to  the  terrible  lesson  admiuistered 
bv  the  people  to  their  generals  in  406  B.C.,  thirty  years  before. 

'This  was  the  first  great  vietory  (in  September,  876  B.C.)  which  the 
Athenians  had  gnint'd  ai  sea  since  the  Peloponncsian  war;  and  while 
it  thus  tilled  them  with  joy  and  contideuce,  it  led  to  a  material 
enlargement  of  their  marilinie  confederacy.  The  fleet  of  Chabrias — 
of  which  a  squadioii  wns  detaclied  under  the  orders  of  Phokion,  a 
young  Athenian  now  distinguishing  himself  for  the  first  time  and 
oftenliereafter  to  be  mentioned— sailed  victorious  round  the  ^gean, 
made  prize  of  twenty  otlier  triremes  in  single  ship  brought  in 
3,000  prisoners  with  110  talents  in  money,  and  annexed  seven- 
teen new  cities  to  the  confederacy,  as  sending  deputies  to  the 
synod  and  furnishing  contributions.  The  discreet  and  conciliatory 
b'ehavior  of  Pliokiou,  especially,  obtained  mucli  favor  among  the 
islanders  and  determined  several  new  adhesions  to  Athens.  To  the 
iidiabitants  of  Abdera  in  Thrace,  Chabrias  rendered  an  inestimable 
service,  by  aiding  tliem  to  repulse  a  barbarous  horde  of  Tribalii,  who 
quitlinir  their  abode  from  famine,  had  poured  upon  the  sea-coast, 
defeating  the  Abderites  and  plundering  their  territory.  The  citizens, 
grateful  for  a  force  left  to  defend  llieir  town,  willingly  allied  them- 
selves with  Athens,  whose  confederacy  thus  extended  itself  to  the 
coast  of  Thrace. 

Having  prosperously  enlarged  their  confederacy  to  the  east  of 
Peloponnesus,  the  Atheninns  began  to  aim  at  the  acquisition  of  new 
allies  in  the  west.  The  fleet  of  60  triremes,  which  had  recently 
served  under  Chabrias,  was  sent,  under  the  command  of  Timotheus, 
the  son  of  Konon,  to  circumnavigate  Peloponnesus  and  alarm  the 
coast  of  Lacouia;  partly  at  the  instance  of  the  Thebans,  who  were 
eager  to  keep  the  navafforce  of  Sparta  occupied,  so  as  to  prevent  her 
from  convevinjx  troops  across  the  Krissa'an  Gulf  from  Coriiith  to  tlie 
Beeotian  port  of  Kreusis.  This  Periplus  of  Peloponnesus— the  first 
which  the  fleet  of  Athens  had  attempted  since  her  Immilialion  at 
JEirospotami— cou]>led  witli  the  ensuing  successes,  was  long  remem- 
bei-ed  by  the  countrymen  of  Timotheus.  His  large  force,  jusl  deal- 
inir,  and  conciliatory  professions,  won  new  and  valuable  allies.  iSot 
only  Kephallenia,  but  the  still  more  important  island  of  Korkyra, 
voluntarily  accepted  his  propositions;  and  as  he  took  care  to  avoid 
all  violence  or  interference  with  the  political  constitution,  his 
popularity  afl  around  augmented  every  day.  Alketas,  prince  of  the 
Molossi— the  Chaonnuis  with  other  Epirotic  tribes— and  the  Akarna- 
nians  on  the  coast — all  embraced  his  alliance.  While  near  Alyzia 
and  Leukas  on  this  coast,  he  was  assailed  by  the  Peloponncsian 
ships  under  Nikolochus,  rather  Taferior  in  luimber  to  his  fleet.  He 
defeated  them,  -and  being  shortly  afterwanl  re-enforced  by  other 
ti'iremes  from  Korkyra,  he  became  so  superior  in  those  waters,  that 
the  hostile  fleet  did  not  dare  to  show  itself.  Having  received  only  13 
talents  on  quitting  Athens,  we  are  told  that  he  had  great  ditliculty  in 


FINANCIAL  DIFFICULTIES  OF  ATHENS. 


787 


that  honoraMe  repug.;ance  to  the  Y^nua^^^fM^or^Z^ Z 
care  to  avoid  even  the  suspieion  of  phmder.^iuch  his  pane  VS 
sokTates  ascribes  to  him      This  was  a  featureTnhappily  rare  Lmon. 
ic  Grecian  generals  on  both  sides,  and  tending  to  become  s  ill  mr^ 
Iroi  11  the  increased  employment  of  mercenary  bands.  .  ' 

1  he  demands  uf  Tiniutheus  on  the  treasury  of  Athens  were  not 
avorably  received      Though  her  naval  position  was  now  nTore  bril 
lant  and  commanding  than  it  liad  been  since  tlie  battle  of  .Ec.ospo- 
auu-though  no  Lacedasmonian  fleet  showed  itself  to  disturb  her  in 
he  .Egean-yet  the  cost  of  the  war  began  to   be  seriously   felt 
rivateers  from  the  neighboring  island  of".Egina  annoyed  lu^  com- 
merce   requn-ing  a  perpetual  coast-guard;   while  the  contributions 
from  the  deputies  to  the  confederate  synod  were  not  sufllcicT  o  di" 
pense  with  the  necess  ty  of  a  heavy  direct  property-tax  at  home 

In  thissynod  the  Thebans,  as  nK^rnbers\)f  the  confecler^cy   were 
lepreseuted      Application  was  made  to  them  to  contribute  Lvard 

hat  the  fleet  had  been  sent  round  to  the  Ionian  Sea.     But  the  The 
bans  dec  ined  compliance,  nor  were  tliey  probably  in  any  condition 
to  furnish  pecuniary  aid.     Their  refusal  occasioned  much ^di~n^^^^ 

t  Athens,  embi  ered  by  jealousy  at  the  strides  which  they  1  ad  been 
making  during  the  last  two  years,  partly  througli  the  indirect  effect 
of  the  naval  successes  of  Athens.  At  the  end  of  the  yeai  377  b  c 
after  the  wo  successn'x^  invasions  of  Agesilaus,  the  ruin-of  two  homel 
ero|)s  had  .so  straitened  the  Thebans,  that  thev  were  forced  to  import 
corn  from  Pagas^B  in  Thessaly;  in  which  enterprise  their  ship  and 
seamen  were  at   first  captured  by  the  Lacedaemonian  harmost  a 

0^  Tv  tn",n^"^;T''  V^T^-  .    ^^''  ^^'Sligence  however  soon  led  not 
onl)  to  an  outbreak  of  their  seamen  who  had  been  taken  prisoners 
I.ut  also  to  the  revolt  of  the  town  from  Sparta,  so  that  the  com'- 
iiun  cation  of  Thebes  with  Pagasi>3  became  quite  unimpeded.     For 
he   two  succeeding  years,  there  had  been  no  Sj.artan  invasion  of 
Bcrotia;    since  in  376  B.C.,  Kleombivotus  could   not  surmount  the 
heights  of  Kithairon-while  in  375  b.c,  the  attention  of  Sparta  had 
been  occupied  by  the  naval  operations  of  Timotheus  in  the  Ionian 
bea.     During  these  two  years,  the  Thebans  had  exerted  themselves 
vigorously  against  the  neighboring  cities  of  Ba^otia,  in  most  of  which 
a  strong  party,  If  not  the  majority  of  the  population,  was  favorable 
o  them,  though  the  government  was  in  the  hands  of  the  philo  Spar- 
tan oligarchy,  seconded  by  Spjutan  harmosts  and  garrison.     We  hear 
0    one   victory  gained  by  the  Theban  cavalry  near  Plaliea,  under, 
haron;    and  of  another  near  Tanagra,  in  which  Panthoides,  the 
Lacedasmonian  liarmost  in  that  town,  was  slain. 


788     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

But  the  moPt  important  of  nil  their  successes  was  that  of  Pelopidas 
near  Tegyra.  That  coinniander,  hearing  that  the  Spartan  harmost, 
with  his  two  (nior*  or)  divisions  in  garrison  at  Orchonienus,  had 
gone  away  on  an  excursion  into  the  Lolvrian  territory,  made  a  dash 
from  Thebes  with  the  Saered  Band  and  a  few  cavalry,  to  surprise  the 
place.  It  was  tlie  season  in  which  the  waters  of  the  Lake  Kopais 
were  at  the  fullest,  so  that  he  was  obliged  to  take  a  wide  circuit  totlie 
north-west,  and  to  pass  by  Tegyra,  on  the  road  between  Orchonienus 
and  the  Opuntain  Lokris.  On  arriving  near  Orchonienus,  he  ascer- 
tained that  there  were  still  some  Lacedaemonians  in  tlie  town,  and  that 
no  surprise  could  be  effected;  upon  which  he  retniced  Ids  steps.  But 
on  reaching  Tegyra,  he  fell  in  with  the  Lacedaemonian  commanders, 
Gorgoleon  and  Tlieopompus,  returning  with  their  troops  from  the 
Lokrian  excursion.  As  his  numbers  were  inferior  to  theirs  by  half, 
they  rejoiced  in  the  encoiuiter:  while  the  troops  of  Pelopidas  were  at 
first  dismayed,  and  required  all  his  encouragement  to  work  them  up. 
But  in  the  liglit  that  ensued,  closely  and  obstinately  contested  in  a 
narrow  pass,  the  strength,  valdr,  and  comf>act  charge  of  the  Sacred 
Band  proved  irresistible.  The  two  Lacedaemonian  commanders 
were  both  slain;  their  troops  opened,  to  allowed  the  Thcbans  an 
undisturbed  retreat;  but  Pelopidas,  disdaining  this  opportunity,  per- 
sisted in  the  combat  until  all  his  enemies  dispersed  and  tied.  The 
neighborhood  of  Orchomenus  forbade  any  long  pursuit,  so  that  Pelo- 
pidas could  only  erect  his  trophy,  and  strip  the  dead,  before  return- 
ing to  Thebes. 

This  combat,  in  which  the  Lacodfcmonians  were  for  the  first  time 
be^ateu  in  fair  field  by  numbers  inferior  to  their  own,  produced  a 
strong  sensation  in  the  minds  of  both  the  contending  parties.  The 
confidence  of  the  Thebans.  as  well  as  their  exertion,  was  redoubled; 
so  that  by  the  year  374  B.C.,  they  had  cleared  BoMjtia  of  the  Laceda'- 
nionians,  as  well  as  of  the  local  oligarchies  which  sustained  them; 
persuading  or  constraining  the  cities  again  to  come  into  union  with 
Thebes,  and  reviving  the  Bo-otian  confederacy.  Haliartus,  Koronein, 
Lebadeia,  Tanagra,  Thespia\  Platjea  and  the  rest,  thus  became  again 
Boeotian;  leaving  out  Orchomenus  alone  (with  its  dependency  Cha^- 
roneia),  which  was  (m  the  borders  of  i'hokis,  and  still  continued  under 
Lacedemonian  occupation.  In  most  of  these  cities  the  party  f  i  iendly 
to  Thebes  was  numerous,  and  tJie  change,  on  the  whole,*  popular; 
though  in  some  the  prevailing  sentiment  was  such,  that  adherence 
was  only  obtained  by  intimidation.  The  change  here  made  by 
Thebes,  was,  not  to  absorb  these  cities  into  herself,  but  to  bring  them 
back  to  the  old  federative  system  of  Ba^otia;  a  policy,  which  she  had 
publicly  prochiimed  on  surprising  Platfca  in  431  B.C.  While  resum- 
ing her  own  ancient  rights  and' privileges  as  head  of  the  Boeotian 
federation,  .she  at  tlie  same  time  guaranteed  to  the  other  cities— by 
couvcntion,  probably  express,  but  certainly  implied— their  ancient 


P0LYDA3IAS  OP  PHARSALUS. 


789 


rights,  their  security,  and  their  qualified  autonomy,  as  members-  the 
system  which  had  existed  down  to  tlie'peace  of  Antalkidas 

The   position  of  the   Thebans  was   materially  improved   bv  this 
reconquest  or    reconfederation   of  Bceotia.      Becoming   masters   of 
Kreusis,  the  port  of  Thespi.T,  they  fortified  it.  and  built  some  triremes 
to  repel  any  invasion  from  Peloponnesus  by  sea  across  the  Kriss;ran 
Gulf.     Feeling  thus  secure  against  invasion,  thev  bciran  to  retaliate 
upon  their  neighbors  and  enemies  the  Phokians;  allies  of  Sparta   and 
auxiliaries  in   the  recent  attacks  on  Thebes— vef  also,  from  ancient 
tunes,  on  friendly  terms  with  Athens.      So  liard  ])ressed  were  the 
Phokians— especially  as  Jason  of  Phems  in  Thessr.lv  was  at  the  same 
time  their  bitter  enemy— that  unless  assisted,  they  would  have  been 
compelled  to  submit  to  the  Tliebans,  and  along  with  them  Orcho- 
nienus,  in(;Iiiding  the  Lacedtemonion  garrison  then  occupyin"-  it- 
while  the  treasures  of  the  Delpliian  temple  would  also  haVe  been' 
laid  open,  in  case  the  Thebans  should  think  fit  to  seize  them     Intima- 
tion being  given  by  the  Phokians  to  Sparta,  Kimr  Kleombrotns  was 
sent  to  their  aid,  by  sea  across  the  Gulf,  with  four  Laeeda>moniaii 
divisions  of  troops,  and  an  auxiliary  bodv  of  aflies.     This  re-enforce- 
ment, compelling   the   T.'iebans   to"  retiiT,  placed   both  Phokis  and 
Orchomenus   in  safety.     While   Sparta  thus  sustained  them,  even 
Athens  looked  upon  llie  PhoUian  cause  with  sympathv.     When  she 
saw  that  the  Thebans  had  passed  from  the  defensive  to  the  olTeiisive 
—partly  by  her  help,  yet  nevertheless  refuslnir  to  contribute  to  the 
cost   of  her  navy— her  ancient  jealousy  of  them   became  afrain   so 
powerful,  that  she  sent  envoys  to  Sparta  to  propose  terms  oi'  peace 
Wiiat  these  terms  were,  we  arc  not  told;  nor  does  it  appear  that  the 
Thebans  even  received  notice  of  the  proceeding.     But  .the  peace  was 
accepted  at  Sparta,  and  two  of  the  Athenian  envoys  wei-e  dispatched 
at  once  from  thence,  without  even  going  home,  to  Koikvra;  for  the 
purpose  of  notifying  the  peace  toTfmollieus,  and  ordering  him  forth- 
with to  conduct  his  fleet  b:iok  to  Athens. 

This  proposition  of  the  Athenians,  made  seeminirly  in  a  moment  of 
impetuous  dissatisfaction,  was  much  to  the  advantage  of  Sparla.  and 
served  .s(miewhatto  countervail  a  mortifying  revelation  which  had 
reached  the  Spartans  a  little  before  from  a  diJferent  quarter. 

Polydamas,  an  eminent  citizen  of  Pharsalus  in  Thessaly,  came  to 
Sparta  to  ask  for  aid.  He  had  long  been  on  terms  of  hospitality 
with  the  Lacedaemonians;  while  Pharsalus  had  not  merely  been  in 
alliance  with  them,  but  was  for  some  time  occupied  by  one  of  their 
garrisons.  In  the  usual  state  of  Thessaly,  the  great  cities  Larissa, 
Pheric,  Pharsalus,  and  others,  each  holding  some  smaller  cities  in  a 
state  of  dependent  alliance,  were  in  disagreement  with  each  other, 
often  even  in  actual  war.  It  was  rare  that  they  could  be  broudit  to 
concur  in  a  common  vote  for  the  election  of  a  su]ireme  chief  or  Tauus. 
At  his  own  city  of  Pharsalus,  Polydamas  was  now  in  the  ascendant, 


790     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATIOIT  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 

enjoying  the  confidence  of  all  the  great  family  factions  wlio  usually 
contended  for  predominance;  to  such  a  degree,  indeed,  that  he  was 
intrusted  wilk  the  custody  of  the  citadel  and  the  entire  mantigement 
of  the  revenues,  receipts  as  well  as  disbursements.  Being  a  wealthy 
man,  "hospitable  and  ostentatious  in  the  Thessaliiin  fashion,"  he 
advanced  money  from  his  own  purse  to  the  treasury  whenever  it  was 
low,  and  repaid  himself  when  public  funds  came  in. 

But  a  greater  man  than  Polydamas  had  now  arisen  in  Thessaly 
—Jason,  despot  of  Piiene;  whose  formidable  power,  threatc  ning  the 
independence  of  Pharsalus,  he  now  came  to  Sparta  to  denounce. 
Though  the  force  of  Jason  can  hardly  have  been  considerable  when 
the  Spartans  passed  through  Thessaly.  six  years  before,  in  their 
repeated  expeditions  against  Olynthus,  lie  was  now  not  only  despot 
of  Phene,  but  master  of  nearly  all  the  Thessalian  cities  (a's  L}ko- 
phron  of  Pheraj  had  partially  succeeded  in  bccomin.u  thirty  years 
before)  as  well  as  of  a  large  area  of  tributary  cin  unijacent  territory. 
The  great  instrument  of  his  dominion  was' a  standing  and  well-ap- 
pointed force  of  C,000  mercenary  troops,  from  all  parts  of  Greece. 
He  possessed  all  the  personal  qualities  requisite  for  conducting  sol- 
diers with  the  greatest  effect.  His  bodily  strength  was  gre-.t^  his 
activity  indefatiirable;  his  self-command,  both  asto  haid>hip  and  as 
to  temptation,  alike  conspicuous.  Always  personally  sharing  both 
in  the  drill  and  in  the  gymnastics  of  the'  soldiers,  and  encouraging 
military  merit  with  the  utmost  munificence,  he  had  not  only  disci- 
plined them,  but  inspired  them  with  extreme  warlike  a: dor  and 
devotion  to  his  person.  Several  of  the  neighboring  tribes,  together 
with  Alketas  prince  of  the  Molossi  in  Epiius,  had"  1  ecu  reduced  to 
the  footing  of  his  dependent  allies.  jVIoreover  he  had  ah  er.dy  defeated 
the  Pharsalians,  and  stripped  them  of  many  of  the  towns  which  had 
once  been  connected  with  them  so  that  it  only  remained  for  him  now 
to  carry  his  arms  against  their  city.  But  Jason  was  prudent  as  well 
as  daring.  Though  certain  of  success,  he  wished  to  avoid  the  odium 
of  employing  force,  and  the  danger  of  having  malcontents  for  subjects. 
He  therefore  proposed  to  Polydamas  in  a  private  interview,  that  he 
(Polydamas)  should  bring  Pharsalus  under  Jason's  dominion,  accept- 
ing for  himself  the  second  place  in  Thessaly.  under  Jason  installed 
as  Tagus  or  president.  The  whole  force  of  Thessaly  thus  united, 
•with  its  array  of  tributary  nations  around,  Avould  be  decidedly  the 
fii-st  power  in  Greece,  superior  on  land  either  to  l^parta  or  Thebes, 
and  at  sea  to  Athens.  And  as  to  tin-  Persian  king,  wiih  his  multitudes 
of  unwarlike  slaves.  Jason  regarded  him  as  an  enemy  yet  easier  to 
overthrow;  considering  what  had  been  achieved  first  by  tlie  Cyreians, 
and  afterward  by  Agesilaus. 

Such  were  the  pnjpositions,  and  such  the  ambitious  hopes,  wliieh 
the  energetic  despot  of  Pher*  had  laid  before  Polydamas ;  who  replied. 
that  he  himself  had  long  been  allied  with  Sparta,  and  that  he  could 
take  uo  resolution  hostile  to  her  interests.     "Go  to  Sparta,  then 


JASON  BECOMES  TAGUS  OF  THESSALY.         791 

(rejoined  Jason)  and  give  notice  there,  that  I  intend  to  attack  Phar- 
salus. and  that  it  is  for  them  to  afford  you  protection.  If  they  can- 
not comply  with  the  demand,  you  will  be  unraithful  to  the  interests 
of  your  eily  if  you  do  not  embrace  my  offers."  It  was  on  this  mis- 
sion that  Polydamas  was  now  come  to  Sparta,  to  announce  that  uidess 
aid  could  be  sent  to  him,  he  should  be  compelled  unwillingly  to  sever 
hiinself  frojn  her.  "  Kecoliect  (he  concluded)  that  the  enemy  agiunst 
Avhom  you  will  have  to  contend  is  formidable  in  every  way,  both  from 
])('rso!ial  qualiticsandfroni  i)Ower;  so  that  nothing  short  of  a  first-rate 
lorce  anil  commander  will  suffice.  Consider  and  tell  me  what  you 
can  do." 

The  Spartans,  having  deliberated  on  the  point,  returned  a  reply  in 
the  negative.  Already  a  large  force  had  been  sent  under  Kleombrotus 
as  essential  to  the  defense  of  Piiokis;  moreover  the  Athenians  wero 
now  the  stronger  pow^r  at  sea.  Lastly,  Jason  had  hitherto  lent  no 
active  assistance  to  Thebe-^  and  Athens — which  he  would  assur- 
edly be  provoked  to  do,  if  a  Spartan  army  came  against  liini  in 
The<saly.  Accordingly  the  Ephors  told  Polydamas  plainly,  that 
they  were  unable  to  satisfy  his  demands,  recommending  him  to  make 
the  best  terms  that  he  could  both  for  Pharsalus  and  himself.  Return- 
ing to  Thessaly,  he  resumed  his  negotiation  with  Jason,  and  prom- 
ised substantial  compliance  with  what  was  required.  But  he  entreated 
t-f)  l)e  spared  the  dishonor  of  admitting  a,  foreign  garrison  into  the 
citadel  which  hatl  been  confidentially  intrusted  to  his  care;  engaging 
at  the  same  time  to  bring  his  fellow-citizens  into,  voluntary  union 
with  Jason,  and  tendering  his  two  sons  as  hostages  for  faithfid  per- 
formance. All  this  was  actually  brought  to  pass.  The  politics  of 
the  Pharsalians  were  gently  brought  round,  so  that  Jason,  by  their 
Votes  as  well  as   the  rest,  was  unanimouslj^  elected  Tagus  of  Tlies- 

stily. 

The  dismissal  of  Polydamas  implied  a  mortifying  confession  of 
weakness  on  the  part  of  Sparta.  It  marks  too  an  important  stage  in 
til','  real  decline  of  hin'  power.  Eight  years  before,  at  the  instance  of 
the  Akanthian  envo\'s  backed  by  the 'Macedonian  Amyutas,  she  had 
s 'Ut  three  powerful  armies  in  succession  to  crush  the  liberal  and 
jHomising  confederacy  of  Olynthus,  nnd  to  re-transfer  the  Grecian 
cities  on  the  sea  coast  to  the  Macedonian  crow^i.  The  region  to 
which  her  armies  had  been  then  sent,  was  the  extreme  verge  of  Hel- 
las. The  parties  in  whose  favor  she  acted  had  scarcely  the  shadow  of 
a  claim,  as  friends  or  allies;  while  those  af/aijist  whom  she  acted,  had 
neither  done  nor  threatened  any  wrong  to  her:  moreover  the  main 
ground  on  which  her  interference  was  invoked,  was  to  hinder  the  free 
and  equal  confederation  of  Grecian  cities.  JVuir,  n  claim,  and  a  strong 
claim,  is  made  upon  her  by  Polydamas  of  Pharsalus,  an  old  friend 
and  aliy.  It  ccmies  from  a  region  mucli  less  distant;  lastly,  her  polit- 
ical interest  would  naturally  bid  her  arrest  the  menacing  increase  of 
an  aggressive  power  already  so  formidable  as  that  of  Jason.    Yet  so 


792     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTKUS. 

s(>iiously  has  the  position  of  Sparta  altered  in  the  last  eight  years 
(o82-74  B.C.)  that  she  is  now  compelled  to  decline  a  demand  which 
justice,  sympathy,  and  i)()litical  policy  alike  prompted  her  to  grant. 
t?o  unforiuuale  was  it  for  the  Olynliiiim  confederacy,  that  their  hon- 
ora'olc  and  well  combined  aspirations  fell  exactly  during  tiiose  few 
years  in  wliich  Sparta  was  at  iicr  maximum  <»f  ])ov\cr!  So  unfortun- 
ate was  such  coincidence  of  lime  not  only  tor  Olynthus,  but  for 
Greece  generally:— since  nothing  but  Spartan  intcifcrence'restored 
the  Macedoiuan  kings  to  the  sea-coast,  while  the  Olvnlhian  confeder- 
acy, had  it  been  allowed  to  expand,  mi-ht  piobabiv  have  contined 
them  to  the  interior,  and  averted  the  dealii-blow  which  came  upon 
Grecian  freedom  in  the  next  generation  from  tlicir  hands. 

The  Lacediemonians  found'scmie  compensation  for  their  reluctant 
abandonment  of  Polydamas,  in  the  pacific  propositions  from  Athens 
which  liberated  tliem  from  one  of  their  cliief  enemies.  J3ul  the  peace 
thus  concluded  was  scarcely  even  brou-ht  to  execution.  'I'imotheus 
bemg  ordered  home  from  Korkvra,  obeyed  and  set  s.dl  with  his  Heet 
lie  had  serving  along  with  him  some  exiles  from  Zakynlhus;  and  as 
he  passed  by  that  island  in  his  homeward  vovaue,  he  disembarked 
these  exiles  upon  it,  aiding  tliem  in  cslabli.4iin<r  a  fortified  ix.st 
Against  this  proceeding  ijje  Zakyni])ian  government  laid  compiaints 
at  Sparta,  where  it  was  so  deeply  resente^d,  that  redress  having- b'-(n 
in  vam  demanded  at  Alliens,  the  peace  was  at  once  broken  oil',  jmd 
Vvar  again  declared.  A  Lacedjcmonian  squadron  of  25  sail  was  dis- 
patched to  assist  the  Zakxnthians.  while  plans  were  formed  for  the 
acquisition  of  the  more  important  i>land  of  Korkvra.  1he  iieet  of 
Timotheus  having  now  been  removed  home,  a  malconient  Korkyrietm 
party  formed  a  conspiracy  to  introduce  the  Laceda'moniansas  fiiends. 
and  b!>tray  the  island  to  ihtm.  A  Lacedaemonian  tleet  of  22  triremes 
accordingly  saihd  thither,  under  color  of  a  voyage  to  Sicily,  lint 
tiie  KoikvraMU  government,  having  detected  ^he  plot,  refused  to 
receive  them,  took  precautions  for  defense,  and  sent  envoys  to  Athens 
to  entreat  assistance. 

The  Laceda'monians  now  resolved  to  attack  Korkyra  openly,  with 
the  full  naval  force  of  their  confederacy.  By  the  joint  elforts  of 
Sparta,  Corinth,  Leukas,  Ambrakia,  Elis*  Zakjnlhus,  Achaia,  Epi- 
daurus,  Troezen,  llermione,  and  Halieis— streniithenedby  pecuniary 
payments  from  other  <;onfederates,  who  preferred  commuting  their 
obligation  to  .serve  beyond  tiie  sea— a  fleet  of  sixty  Iriremes^and  a 
body  of  loOO  mercenary  hoplites,  were  assembled;  besides  some  Lace- 
dcumonians,  probably  Helots  or  Neodamodes.  At  the  same  time, 
application  was  sent  to  Dionysius  the  Syracusan  despot,  for  his  co- 
operation again.st  Korkyra,  on  the  ground  that  the  connection  of  that 
island  with  Athens  had  proved  once,  and  might  prove  again  danoer- 
ous  to  his  city.  o      >        n 

It  was  in  the  spring  of  373  r,.c.  that  this  force  proceeded  against 
Korkyra,  under  the  command  of  the  Lacedsemonian  :M nasi ppus,"^  who, 


SIEGE  OF  KORKYRA. 


793 


having  driven  in  the  Korkyra^nn  fleet  with  the  loss  of  four  triremes 
lauded  on  the  island,  gained  a  victory,  and  confined  the  iiih  ibft^nt« 
^vtthin  the  wall3>,f  th(.city.     He  next  cnrrMU^n^^c^^^Z 
adjacent  lands,  winch  were  found  in  the  highest  stale  of  culivatn 
and  full  ot  the  richest  produce;  tiHds  adminiblv  tilled-vinev-mls 
surpassing  condit.on-with  si,lendid  farm-buildinus,  W(.|l  ap,  o  nte 
vme-cellars  and  abundance  of  cattle  as  well  as  hilio,  ng-s  a'^e^   T^^^^^^ 
invading  .soldiers,  while  enriching  themselves   by  depre  lalions  on 
ca  tleand  slaves  became  so  puniperedwiththeplenlifulstod^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
that  they  retused  to  dnnk  any  wine  that  was  not  of  the  first  qua 
Such  IS  the  picture  given  by  Xeno(,hon,  an  unfriendly  witm  J  o    thi 
democratical  Korkyra,  in  respect  of  its  landed  economy,  at  th'e    i    e 
when  It  was  mvaded  by  Maasippus;  a  picture  not  les.    me.nor  lie 
ban  that  presented  by  Thucy.lides  (in  the  speech  of  Archidamus    of 
the  flourislung  agriculture  surrounding  democratical  Athens  at  the 
moment  when  the  hand  of  the  PeJoponnesian  devastator  was  first  f ek 
iiic I e  m  'to I  B.C. 

With  such  plentiful  quarters  for  his  soldiers,  Mnasippns  encamped 
o   f  of  n     "''''  !'•'  city  walls,  cutting  off  those  within  from  su,!^,  ies 

w  ith  lis  fleet.     1  he  Korkyneans  soon  began  to  be  in  want.     Yet  they 
seemed  to  have  no  chance  of  safety  except  through  aid  from  the  Alhc'- 
nians   to  whom  they  had  sent  envoys  with  pressin-  entreaties,  and 
who  had  nosv  reason  to  regret  their  hasty  consent  (in  tlie  preceding 
year)  to  summon  home  the  fleet  of  Timotheus  from  the  island     How- 
tJ^l\Vl\         ""VJ'^^  again  appointed  admiral  of  a  new  licet  to  be 
fl^?.     !  f"',  '"'V-''^  '-'  ;^'7''^"  ^^  600  peltast.s,  under  Stesikles.  was 
ected  to  be  dispatchcMl  by  the  quickest  route,  to  meet  the  imme- 
diate necessities  of  the  Korkyra^ans.  during  the  delays  unavoidable 
m  the   preparation  of  the   main  fleet   and  its  circumnavi<ration  of 
Pcoponncsus.     The  peltasts  were  conveyed  by  land  across  Thessaiy 
and  Epirus,  tothe  coast  opposite  KorkvVa;  upon  which  isJan.l  they 
weie  enabled  to  land  through  the  intervention  of  Alketas  solicited  by 
the  Athenians.     They  were  fortunate  enouuh  to  act  into  the  town'- 
where  they  not  only  brought  the  news  that  a  large  Athenian  fleet 
might  be  speedily  expected,  Init  also  contributed  much  to  the  defense 
Without  such  encouragement  and  aid,  the  Korkvra^ans  would  hardlv 
have  held  out;  for  the  famine  within  the  walls"incrcased  daily;  anil 
at  length  l)eca me  .so  severe,  that  many  of  the  citizens  deserted,  and 
numbers  of  slaves  were  thrust  out.     Mnasippns  r.fu-ed  to   receive 
them  making  public  proclamation  that  every  one  who  deserted  should 
oe  sold  into  shivery;  and  since  deserters  nevertheless  continued  !o 
come,  be  caused  them  to  be  scourired  back  to  the  citv-gates      As  for 
the  unfortunate  .slaves,  being  neither  received  by  hi^l^^lor  re-admit- 
ted within,  many  perished  outside  of  the  gates  from  sheer  hun«-er 

Sucji  spectacles  of  misery  portended  sS  visibly  the  aPi)roachin<T 
hour  of  surrender,  that  the  besieging  army  becanie  careless,  and  tli€ 


794     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 

general  insolent.  Tliough  liis  mililaiy  chest  was  well-filled,  tliroiiirh 
the  numerous  pecuniary  payments  wliich  lie  hnd  received  from  allies 
in  commutation  of  personal  service — yet  he- had  dismissed  several 
of  his  mercenaries  without  pay,  ami  had  kept  all  of  them  unpaid 
for  the  last  two  months.  His  present  temper  made  iiim  not  only 
more  harsh  toward  his  own  soldiers,  but  also  less  vigilant  in  the 
conduct  of  the  siege.  Accordinirly  the  besieged,  detecting  from  their 
wateh-towers  the  negligence  of  the  guards,  chose  a  favorable  oppor- 
tunity and  made  a  vigorous  sally.  Mnasippus,  on  seeing  his  out- 
posts driven  in,  armed  himself  and  hastened  forward  with  the  Lace- 
daemonians around  him  to  sustain  them;  giving  orders  to  the  officers 
of  the  mercenaries  to  bring  their  men  forward  also.  But  tliese  oth- 
cers  replied  that  they  couhi  not  answer  for  the  obedience  of  soldi(  rs 
without  pay;  upon  which  ]\rnasippus  was  so  incensed,  that  he  struck 
them  with  his  stick  and  with  the  shaft  of  liis  spear.  Such  an  insult 
inflamed  still  further  the  existing  discontent.  Both  officers  and  sol- 
diers came  to  the  combat  discoiiragt  d  and  heartless,  while  the  Athe- 
nian peltasts  and  the  Korkynran  h()])lites,  rushing  out  of  sevend  gates 
at  once,  pressed  their  attack  with  desperate  ener£n'.  3Inasip])us, 
after  displaying  great  personal  valor,  was  at  length  slain,  and  all  his 
troops,  being  completely  routed,  tied  back  to  the  fcMiitied  camp  in 
which  their  stores  were  preserved.  P^ven  this  too  might  have  1  ccn 
taken,  and  the  whole  armament  destroyed,  had  the  besieged  altack(d 
it  at  once.  But  they  were  astonished  at  their  own  succ(  ss.  Mistak- 
ing the  numerous  camp-followers  for  soldiers  in  reserve,  they  retired 
back  to  the  city. 

Their  victory  was  however  so  complete,  as  to  re-open  easy  com- 
munication with  the  country,  to  procure  sufficient  temporary  sup- 
plies, and  to  afford  a  certainty  of  holding  out  until  re-enforcement 
from  Athens  should  arrive.  Such  re-enforcement,  ituhed,  was 
already  on  its  way,  and  had  been  announced  as  approaching  to 
Hypermenes  (second  under  the  deceased  Mnasippus),  w  ho  had  now 
succeeded  to  the  command.  Terrified  at  the  news,  he  hastened  to 
.sail  round  from  his  station — which  he  had  occupied  with  the  fleet  to 
block  up  the  harbor — to  the  fortified  camp.  Here  he  first  put  the 
slaves,  as  well  as  the  property,  aboard  of  his  transports,  and  sent 
them  away;  remaining  himself  to  defend  the  camp  with  the  soldiers 
and  marines — but  remaining  only  a  shortt  time,  and  then  takinu- tliese- 
latter  also  aboard  the  triremes.  He  thus  comj^letely  evacuated  the 
island,  making  otf  for  Leukas.  But  sueh  had  been  the  hurry — and 
so  great  the  terror  lest  the  Athenian  fleet  should  arrive — that  much 
corn  and  wine,  many  slaves,  and  even  many  sick  and  wounded  sol- 
diers, were  left  behind.  To  the  victorious  Korkyneans.  these  acejui- 
sitions  were  not  needed  to  enhance  the  value  of  a  triuini>h  which 
rescued  them  frenn  capture,  slavery,  or  starvation. 

The  Athenian  fleet  had  not  only  been  tardy  in  arriving,  so  as  to 
incur  much  risk  of  finding  the  island  already  taken,  bul  when  it 


DISCONTENT   AT  ATHENS. 


795 


did  come,  it  was  commanded  by  Iphikrates,  Chabrias,  and  the  orator 
Ivalhstralus,   not    by   Timotheus,   whom   the   oriii:inal  vote  of   the 
people  had  nominated.     It  appears  that  Timotheus,  who  (in  April 
373  B.C.),  wiien  the  Athenians  first  learned  that  the  formidable  Lace- 
diemonian  fleet  had  begun  to  attack  Korkvra,  had  been  directed  to 
proceed  thither  forthwith  with  a  fleet  of  GO  triremes,  fwind  a  difli- 
culty  in  manning  his  ships  at  Athens,  and  therefore  undertook  a 
preliminary  cruise  to  procure  both  seamen  and  contributory  funds 
from  the  maritime  allies.     His  first  act  was  to  transport  the  GOO 
peltasts  under  Ste.sikles  to  Thessaly,  where  he  entered  into  relations 
with  Jason  of  Pherae.     He  persuaded  the  latter  to  become  the  ally  of 
Athens,  and  to  further  the  march  of  Stesikles  with  his  division  bv 
land  iivrnss  Thessaly,  over  the  passes  of  Pindus,  to  Epirus,  where 
Alketas,  who  was  at  once  the  ally  of  xVtheus  and  the  dependent  of 
Jason,  conveyed  them   by  night   across  the  strait  from  Epirus  to" 
Korkyni.     Having  thus  opened  important  connection  with  the  pow- 
erful Thessalian  despot,  and  obtained  from  him  a  very  seasonable 
service,  toL^ether  (perliaps)  with  some  seamen  from  Pagaste  to  man 
his  fleet,  Timotheus  proceeded  onward  to  the  ports  of  Macedonia, 
where  he  also  entered  into  relations  with  Amyntas,  receiving  from 
him  signal  marks  of  private  favor,  and  theuce^to  Thrace,  as  w^jll  as 
the  neighboring  islands.     His  voyage  procured  for  him  valuable  sub- 
sidies in  money  and  supplies  of  seamen,  besides  some  new  adhesions 
and  deputies  to  the  Athenian  confederacy. 

This  preliminary  cruise  of  Timotheus,  undertaken  with  the  general 
purpose  of  collecting  means  for  the  expedition  to  Korkyra,  began  in 
the  month  of  April  or  commencement  of  May,  373  B.C.     On  depart- 
ing, it  appears,  he  had  given  orders  to  such  of  the  allies  as  were 
intended  to  form  part  of  the  expedition  to  assemble  at  Kalauria  (an 
island  off  Tro'zen,  consecrated  to  Poseidon),  where  he  would  himself 
comc!  and  take  them  up  to  proceed  onward.     Pursuant  to  such  order 
several  contingents  mustered  at  this  island,  amonii:  them  the  Boeotians, 
who  sent  several  triremes;  though  in  the  preceding  year  it  had  been 
alieii-(>d  against  them  that  they  contributed  nothing  to  sustain  the 
naval  exertions  of  Athens.     But  Timotheus  stayed  out  a  long  time. 
Jieliance  was  placed  upon  him  and  upon  the  money  which  lie^was  to 
'l.ring  home  for  the  pay  of  the  fleet,  and  the  unpaid  triremes  accord- 
ingly feil  into  distress  and  disorganization  at  Kalauria,  awaiting  his 
return.     In  the  mean  time  fresh  news  reached  Athens  that  Kodvyra 
was  much   pressed,  so  that  great  indignation  was  felt  against  the 
absent  admiral,  for  employing  in  his  present  cruise  a  precious  inter- 
val esseniial  to  enable  him  to  reach  the  island  in  time.     Iphikrates 
(who  had  recently  come  back  from  ser'^ing  with  Pharnabazus,  in  an 
unavailing  attempt  to  reconquer  Egypt  for  the  Persian  king)  and  the 
orator  Kallistratus  were  especially  ioutl  in  their  accusations  against 
him.     And  as  the  very  salvation  of  Korkyra  reqidred  pressing  haste, 
the  Athenians  canceled  the  appointment  of  Timotheus,  even  during 


796     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

his  absence,  uaniing  Ipliikrates,  Kallistmtus,  and  Chabrias,  to  equip 
a  fleet  and  go  round  to  Korkyra  without  delay. 

Before  tliey  eould  get  ready,  Timotlieus  returned,  bringing  several 
new  adliesions  to  the  eoufederacv,  with  a  nourishing  account  of  gen- 
eral success.  1I(^  went  down  to  Ividauria  to  supply  the  deficiencies  of 
funds  and  make  up  for  the  embarrassments  which  his  absence  had 
occasioned,  lint  he  could  not  pay  the  Ba^otian  trierarchs  without 
borrowing  money  for  the  purpose  on  his  own  credit;  for  though  the 
sum  brought  home  from  his  voyage  was  considerable,  it  would 
apjuarthat  the  demands  ujion  him  had  been  greater  still.  At  tir>t 
an  accusation,  called  for  in  consequence  of  the  pronounced  dis- 
pleasure of  the  public,  was  entered  against  him  by  Iphikrates  and 
Kalli>lratus.  But  as  these  two  had  been  named  joint  admirals  fur 
the  expedition  to  Korkyra,  which  admitted  of  no  delay,  his  trial  was 
jioslponed  until  the  autumn — a  postponement  advantageous  to  the 
acrused,  and  d<jubtless  seconded  by  his  friends. 

31eauwhile  Iphikrates  adopted  the  most   strenuous  measures  for 
accelerating  the  equipment  of  his  flet  t.     In  the  present  temper  of  the 
]ml)lic.  Jind  in  the  known  danger  of  Korkyra,  he  was  allowed  (though 
p.  rhaps   Timotheus,    a   few    weeks   eailler,    would   not   have   been 
alloweo)  not  only  to  impress  seamen  in  the  jiori,  but  even  to  coerce 
the  irierarehs  with  severity,  and  to  employ  all  the  trinmes  reserved 
for  tiie  coast-guard   of  Attica,  as  well  as  the  two  sacied  tiireines 
called  Paralus  and   ^alamina.     lie  thus  completed  a  fleet  of  seventy 
sail,  promisiug  to  send  back  a  large  portion  of  it  directly,  if  matters 
took  a  hivoiaUle  tuin  at  Korkyra.     Ilxpecling  to  find  on  the  watch 
for  him  a  Lacedamoniau  fleet  fully  equal  to  his  own.  he  arranged 
1  is  voyage  so  as  to  (ombine  the  maximum  of  speed  with  training  to 
1ms  seamen,  and  with  }>rei)aration  lor  naval  conjbat.    The  larger  siuls 
of  an  ancient  trireme  were  habitually  taken  out  of  the  ship  previous 
to  a  l)attle,  as  being  inconvenient  abonrd.     Iphikrates  left  such  sails 
J  t  Athens,  employed  even   the  smaller  sails  sparingly,  and  kipt  his 
fcamen  constantly  at  the  oar,  Ashi<  h  grently  accelerated  his  i)rogress, 
j.t  tlic  s:ime  time  that  it  kept  the  men  in  excellent  training.     Lvery 
d:»y  he  had  to  sto]),  for  meals  and  rest,  on  an  enemy's  shore;  and 
thot  halts  were  conducted  with  such  extreme  dexttrity,  as  well  as 
I'rectsion.  that  the  least  po.-sible  tin^e  was  consumed,  not  cjiough  for 
any  local   hostile   force  to  get  together.     On  leaching  Si)liakleria, 
Iphikrates  learned  for  the  first  time  the  defeat  and  death  of  ^Inasip- 
piis.     Yet  not   fully  trusting  the  correctness  of  his  inb-iniation,  he 
still  persevered  both   in  his  celeriiy   and  his  ])recautic»ns,  until  he 
reached  Kenhallenia,  where  he  first  fully  satisfied  himsey"  that  the 
danger  of  Korkyra  was  past.     The  excellent  management  of  Iphi- 
krates throughout  this  expedition  is  spoken  of  in  terms  of  admiration 
by  Xenophon. 

Having  no  longer  any  fearof  th<^  Laceda:'monian  fleet,  the  Athenian 
commander  probably  now  sent  back  the  honjc- squadron  of  Attica 


SYRACUSAN  SQUADRON  CAPTURED.  797 

which  he  had  been  allowed  to  take  but  which  rnnLl  ni  1.,. 

as  vet  uninformed  of  tlidi-  (  i  "ht      Tnhi    i.i     l'''^?''*"'0'"=ins,  but 

ready  for  movmg  at  Ihe  first  signal      Bo  excellent  JL  iV;'    ,•     •   i-   ^ 
0.iys  Xenophon)!  that;  the  n.^nent  t^  ^!  [^^i^  ,i^>^!P  J^ 
of  a  1  the  crews  was  a  fine  thing  to  see;  theiv3  was  not     man  who      [ 
not  hasten  at  a  run  to  take  hfs  i3lace  abo-nrl  ,,     "^^'J  "^'^"  ^^"o  did 
trirem^,  after  their  voyage  .JX^  S>y?i^  "^  SSed 
to  rest  then-  men  on  one  of  the  northern  points  orKoH'v.    .  . 
they  we,^  found  by  IphikivUes  and  captur^^'^^i^  ,Uh^^  ,  V^;;;;^ 
the  admiral  Anipp„s;   one  alone  escaping,   through  the  s  re' on 
etforts  of  her  captain,  the  Rliodian  Melancrpus.     IrSi  kr  tes  ^^t         ] 
in  triumph,  towing  his  nine  prizes  into  the  harbor  of  S'yr       Th 
H  oTl.n '"f  r!^^  or  ransomed,  yielded  to  him  a  sum  o    6^  '  alen 
the  admiral  Anippus  was  retained  in  expectation  of  a  hio-hor  ransom' 
but  slew  himselt  shortly  afterward  from  mortification     "  ' 

1  hough  the  sum  thus  realized  enabled  Ipliikrates  for  the  timn  f^ 
pay  his  men,  yet  the  suicide  of  Anippus  wis  a  necnnin.l  •  ? 

ment  to  him,  and  he  soon  began  to  li^ed  money^'  T    s  e^o     h  ^^^^^ 
mduced  him  to  consent  to  the  return  of  his  oollca*!  rSstrM^^^.^ 
who-an  orator  by  profession,  and  not  on  friendlyl  „^ 
krates-had  come  out  against  his  own  consent.     Iphikrates  I  •  I  h  m 
self  singled  out  both  Kallistratus  and  Chabris  as  1  is  coll ea^^^^         u' 
was  not  indifferent  to  the  value  of  their  advice,  nor  did  ife  fear  tl  a 
en  icisms.  even  of  rivals,  on  what  they  really  saw  in  hi    p  oceX^^^^ 
But  he  had  accepted  the  command  under  hazanlous  circ  ^stances, 
ot  only  from  the  insulting  displacement  of  Timotheus  and^t^^^^^ 
provocafion  consequently  given  ti  a  powerful  party  at- die     to    le 

IZui  ^r"^-''^  V-'"  '''y^''  .^reat\loubts  w^etl^er  he  co  Id  s  c- 
eeed  in  relieving  Korkyra,  in  spite  of  the  rio-orous  coercion  which  he 
applied  to  man  his  fleet.  H.d  the  island  been  taken  and  ladlnf 
krates  failcM  ,  he  would  have  found  himself  exposed  t     severe  c 

is  a.i;     n  J    L        ;Vt  liome  might  m  that  ease  have  been  amonir 
ein  wi  h Ur  ""^-n   ""''''  ''''1^'''}^^^  ^^  1"^!  to  identifv  both  of 

of  the  latter  as  we  1  as  by  the  oratorical  talent  of  the  ff)rmer.  As  the 
result  ot  the  expedition,  however,  was  altogether  favornl)le  all  such 
anxieieswere  removed  Iphikrates  couhrwell  aflord  to  part  with 
both  his  colleagues;  and  Kallistrntus  engaged,  that  if  permitted  to 
go  home,  he  would  employ  all  his  efl^orts  to  keep  the  fleet  well-paid 
rom  the  public  treasury;  or  if  this  were  impracticable,  that  he  would 
labor  to  procure  peace.     So  terrible  are  the  difficulties  which  the 


798     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

Grecian  generals  now  experience  in  procuring  money  from  Athens 
(or  from  other  cities  in  \vhose  service  they  are  acting),  for  payment 
of  their  troops!  Ijihikrafcs  suffered  the  same  embarrassment  whicli 
Timotheus  had  experienced  the  year  before — and  Avhich  ^^  ill  be  found 
yet  more  painfully  felt  as  we  advance  forward  in  the  history.  For 
the  present  he  subsisted  his  seamen  by  finding  work  for  tliem  on  the 
farms  of  the  Korkyncans,  where  there  must  doubtless  have  been 
ample  necessity  for  repairs  after  the  devastations  of  3Inasip])us;  while 
he  crossed  over  to  Akarnauia  with  his  peltasts  and  hoplites,  and  there 
obtained  service  with  the  townships  friendly  to  Athens  against  siicii 
others  as  were  friendly  to  Sparta;  especially  against  the  warlike  in- 
habitants of  the  strong  town  called  Thyrieis. 

The  hapi)y  result  of  the  Korkyrjean  expedition,  imparting  univer- 
sal satisfaction  at  Athens,  was  not  less  beneficial  to  Timotheus  than 
to  Iphikrates.  It  was  in  November  373  B.C.,  that  the  former,  as  well 
as  his  quaestor  or  military  treasurer  Antimachus,  underwent  each  his 
trial.  Kallistratus,  having  returned  home,  pleaded  against  the  qutes- 
tor,  perhaps  against  Timotheus  also,  as  one  of  the  accusers;  though 
probably  in  a  spirit  of  greater  gentleness  and  moderation,  in  con- 
j;equeuce  of  liis  recent  joint  success  and  of  the  general  good  temper 
prevalent  in  the  city.  And  while  the  edge  of  the  accusation  against 
Timotheus  was  thus  blunted,  the  defense  was  strengthened  not  merely 
by  numerous  citizen  friends  speaking  in  his  favor  with  increaseil 
confidence,  but  also  by  the  unusual  phenomenon  of  two  })owerful 
foreign  supporters.  At  the  request  of  Timotheus,  both  Alketas  of 
Epirus,  and  Jason  of  Phera?,  came  to  Athens  a  little  before  the  trial, 
to  appear  as  witnesses  in  his  favor.  They  weie  received  and  lodged 
by  him  in  his  house  in  the  II ippodamian  Agora,  the  principal  square 
of  the  Peiraeus.  And  as  he  was  then  in  some  embarrassment  for 
want  of  money,  he  found  it  necessary  to  borrow  various  articles  of 
finery  in  order  to  do  them  honor — clothes,  bedding,  and  two  silver 
drinking-bowls — from  Pasion,  a  wealthy  banker  near  at  hand.  These 
two  important  witnesses  would  depose  to  the  zealous  service  and 
estimable  qualities  of  Timotheus;  who  had  inspired  them  with  warm 
interest,  and  had  been  the  means  of  bringing  them  into  alliance  with 
Athens;  an  alliance,  which  they  liad  sealed  at  once  by  conveying 
Steslkles  and  his  division  across  Tiiessaly  and  Epirus  to  Korkyra. 
The  minds  of  the  Dikastcpy  would  be  powerfully  affected  by  seeing 
before  them  such  a  man  as  Jason  of  Phera?,  at  that  moment  the  moNl 
powerful  individual  in  Greece;  and  we  are  not  surprised  to  leiun 
that  Timotheus  was  acquitted.  Ills  treasurer  Antimachus,  not  tried 
by  the  same  Dikastery,  and  doubtless  not  so  pow^erfully  befriended, 
w'as  less  fortunate.  He  was  condemned  to  death,  and  his  property 
confiscated;  the  Dika  t  ry  doubtless  believing,  on  what  eviifence  we 
do  not  know,  that  he  had  been  guilty  of  fraud  in  dealing  with  the 
public  money,  which  had  causeti  serious  injury  at  a  most  important 
crisis.     Under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  he  was  held  responsible 


CONDUCT  OF  TIMOTHEUS. 


799 


as  treasurer  for  the  pecuniary  department  of  the  money-levyino-  com- 
mand contided  to  Timotheus  by  the  people  ° 
r.ntl^^'u'^  military  conduct,  for  which  Timotheus  himself  would  b^ 
personally  accountable,  we  can  only  remark  that  having  been  invested 
with  the  command  for  the  special  purpose  of  relieving  the  belie.'e 
Korkyra,  he  appears  to  have  devoted  an  unreasonable  length  of  tilne 
to  his  own  selt-origmated  cruise  elsewhere;  though  such  cruise  was 
mitsel  beneficial  to  Athens;  insomuch  that  if  Korkyra  had  rell  y 
^Tl  nf "'  /^^P^^r  «  ^«^ld  have  had  good  reason  foi  imputing  the 

reputation  suffered  so  much  by  the  whole  affair,  that  in  the  ensuin- 
spring  he  was  glad  to  accept  an  invitation  of  the  Persian  satraps,  whS 
offered  him  the  command  of  tiie  Grecian  mercenaries  in  their  service 
lZ!n^  Egyptian  war;  the  same  command  from  which  Iphikrates  had 
retuea  a  little  time  before. 

That  admiral  whose  naval  force  had  been  re-enforced  by  a  lartre 
number  of  korkyriean  triremes,  wascommittingwitlio.it  opposition 
incursions  against  Akarnauia,  and  the  western  coast  of  Pelo.  onnesus- 
msomuch  that  the  expelled  Messenians,  in  their  distant  exile  at  Hes-' 
pencles  in  Libya,  began  to  conceive  hopes  of  being  restored  bv  Athens 
to  Naupaktus,  which  they  had  occupied  under  her  protection  durincr 
the  Pe  oponnesian  war.     And  while  tlie  Athenians  were  thus  master? 
at  sea  both  east  and  west  of  Peloponnesus,  Sparta  and  her  confeder- 
ates discouraged  by  the  ruinous  failure  of  their  expedition  against 
Kx)rkyra  in  the  preceding  year,  appear  to  have  remained  inactive. 
VVitii  such  mental  predispositions,  they  were  powerfully  affected  bv 
religious  alarm  arising  from  certain  frightful  earthquakes  and  inun- 
dations with  which  Peloponnesus  was  visited  during  this  vear  and 
which  were  regarded  as  marks  of  the  wrath  of  the  goil  Poseidon 
More  of  these  formidable  visitations  occurred  this  year  in  Pelopon- 
nesus than  had  ever  before  been  known;  especially  one.  the  worst  of 
all,  whereby  the  two  towns  of  Helike  and  Bura  in  Achaia  were  de- 
stroyed, together  with  a  large  portion  of  their  population.     Ten  Lace- 
demonian triremes,  which  happened  to  be  moored  on  this  shore  on 
t he  night  when  the  calamity  occurred,  were  destroyed  by  the  rush  of 
the  waters.  *^         "^  - 

Under  these  depressing  circumstances,  the  Laceda3monians  had  re- 
course to  the  same  maneuver  which  had  so  well  served  tlutiv  imrDose 
fifteen  years  before,  in  388-87  B.C.  They  sent  Antalkidas  au-ain  as 
envoy  to  I  ersia,  to  entreat  both  pecuniaiy  aid,  and  a  f ivsh  Persian 
intervention  enforcing  anew  the  peace  which  bore  his  name-  which 
peace  had  now  been  infringed  (according  to  Lacedannonian  construc- 
tion) by  the  reconstitution  of  the  Bceotian  confederacv  under  Thebes 
as  presKlent.^  And  it  appears  that  in  the  course  of^the  autumn  or 
winter  Persian  envoys  actually  did  come  to  Greece,  requiring  that 
the  belligerents  should  all  desist  from  war,  and  wind  up  their  (fissen- 
sions  on  the  principles  of  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.    The  Persian  sat- 


i 

I 


800     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

raps,  at  this  time  renewing  their  efforts  against  Egypt,  were  anxious 
for  tlie  cessaliun  of  hostilities  in  Greece,  as  a  means  of  enlarging  their 
numbers  of  Grecian  mercenaries;  of  which  troops  Timolheushad  left 
Athens  a  few  months  before  to  take  the  command. 

Apart,  however,  from  this  prospect  of  Persian  intervention,  which 
doubtless  was  not  without  effect— Athens  herself  was  becoming  more 
and  more  disposed  toward  peace.  That  common  fear  and  hatred  of 
the  Lacedaemonians,  which  had  brought  her  into  alliance  with  Thebes 
in  378  B.C.,  was  now  no  longer  predominant.  She  was  actually  at 
the  head  of  a  considerable  maritime  confederacy;  and  this  she  could 
hardlv  hope  to  increase  by  continuing  the  war,  since  the  Lacedaemo- 
nian naval  power  had  already  l)een  humbled.  Moreover  she  found 
the  expense  of  warlike  operations  very  burdensome,  nowise  defrayed 
either  by  the  contributions  of  her  alies  or  by  the  results  of  victory. 
The  orator  Kallistratus— who  had  pmmised  either  to  procure  remit- 
tances from  Athens  to  Iphikrates,  or  to  recommend  the  conclusion  of 
peace— was  obliged  to  confine  himself  to  the  latter  alternative,  and 
contributed  much  to  promote  the  pacific  dispositions  of  his  country- 
men. 

Moreover,  the  Athenians  had  become  more  and  more  alienated  from 
Thebes.  The  ancient  antipailiy,  between  these  two  neighbors,  had 
for  a  time  been  overlaid  by  com'nion  fear  of  Sparta.  But  as  soon  as 
Thebes  had  re-established  her  authoriiy  in  Bo^otia,  the  jealousies  of 
Athens  airain  began  to  arise.  In  374  b  f^.,  she  had  concluded  a  peace 
with  the  Spartans,  without  the  concurrence  of  Thebes;  which  peace 
was  broken  almost  as  soon  as  made,  by  the  Spartans  themselves,  in 
consequence  of  the  proceedings  of  Timotheus  at  Zakynthus.  The 
Phokians— against  whom,  as  having  been  active  allies  of  Sparta  in  her 
invasions  orf^'Bceotia,  Thebes  was  now  making  war— had  also  been 
ancient  friends  of  Athens,  who  sympathiz.ed  with  their  sufferings. 
Moreover  the  Thebans  on  their  side  probably  resented  the  unpaid  and 
destitute  condition  in  which  their  seamen  had  been  left  by  Timotheus 
at  Kalauria,  during  the  expedition  for  the  relief  of  Korkyra,  in  the 
preceding  year;  an  expedition,  of  which  Athens  alone  reaped  both 
the  glory  and  the  advantage.  Though  they  remained  members  of  the 
confederacy,  sending  depiuiesto  the  congress  at  Athens,  the  unfriend- 
ly spirit  on  both  sides  continued  on  the  tncrease,  and  was  further  ex- 
aspeiatcd  by  their  violent  proceeding  against  Plataea  in  the  first  half 
of  372  B.C. 

During  the  last  three  or  four  years,  Platnea,  like  the  other  towns  of 
Bceotia,  had  been  again  brought  into  the  confederacy  under  Thebes. 
Re-established  by  Sparta  after  the  peace  of  Anialkidas  as  a  so-called 
autonomous  town,  it  liad  been  gan  isoned  by  her  as  a  post  against 
ThelK's,  and  was  no  longer  able  to  maintain  a  real  autououjy  after  the 
Spartans  had  been  excluded  from  Bcrotia  iu  376  B.C.  While  other 
Boeotian  cities  were  glad  to  find  themselves  emancipated  from  their 
philo-Lacuuian  oligarchies  aud  rejoined  to  the  federation  under  The- 


DESTRUCTIO:^  OF  PLAT.EA.  gQj 

neither  was  yet  at  peace  with  Sparta  ^        '''^  ^^^^^  ^'^^^  ^^^^r,  while 

This  mtrigue,  coming  to  the  knowledi^e  of  the  Thohnnc  rinf 
mmed  them  to  strike  a  decisive  blow      Their  iirosirl.nr?'  '^^^''" 

ment,  abstracting  from      imse  ves  •    norMo^;  of  f  ^^."'^''  encroach- 

TlXi  ,L  P)"/  ^"^  '"«T«^'^^^-     Since  .he  ™uest  o  'if^^^^^^^^  t 
Iliebes;  the  Plateaus  liad  come  again,  though  reluct-mtiv  ..n,W  fh^ 
ancient  constitution  of  Bceotia,  11,  °y  were  liv? , -at  peace  iiifrTh.hic 
aclcowleclsing  her  rights  as  president  of  the  felKn  ai^d^  ^fi 

obligations.    But  though  tlu  s  at  peace-  wTth  T  ,els  tho  Pi'!?  '""^ 

off   from    the    federat,on— the  consciousness  of  siu^,   „    "'<fking 
tended  still  farther  to  keep  them  in  an^etja,  d    u    ic  on      TXl 


ingly  being  app.ehensive  of  so-;^-;,Vga;;i;^,,"F;;,rT^^^^^^^^^  thtfC 


themselves 

somewhat  ,-eiaxed:an-d  most'of'  t&m'we„ro ut  Ta,c''f ity 'to%lIi? 
far,ns  ,n  the  country,  on  the  days,  well  known  he  oiehand  w^,on 
the  public  asseinblies  in  Thebes  were  held.  Of  this  ,'elax°  ion  he 
Bceotareh  Neokles  took  ad  vantage.     He  conducted  a  Thebu  armed 

ilu  ,  '"V  ''''"^'' ,'"'''"  '"^^  ^""""^  (leseited  by  ,nost  of  its  male 
adults  aud  unable  to  ,nake  resi.lance  The  PlabTans-driersc"!  in 
llie  fields,  fiiiding  their  walls,  their  wives,  and  their  fain  lie,  a  .^ 
possession  of  the  victor-were  under  the  necessity  of  rcert  n'  the 
erms  propose,!  to  them.  They  were  allowed  to  depart  hi  saf  4y  and 
to  carry  away  all  their  moveable  property;  but  their  town  ww 
destroyed  and  its  territory  again  annexed  to^f  iXs  The  uul  appv 
fugitives  were  constrained  for  the  second  time  to  seek  i"fu-cS 
H.  G.  III. -26  ° 


802     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 

Athens,  where  they  were  ajrnin  kiudly  received  and  restored  to  the 
same  qualified  riciit  of  citizenship  as  U»ey  had  enjoyed  prior  to  the 

peace  of  Antalki^as.  .       ,      rr-,    i 

It  was  not  merely  with  Platsea,  but  also  with  Thespiae,  that  Thebes 
wasnow  meddlins:.  Mistrustini?  the  dispositions  of  the  Thespians, 
she  constrained  them  to  demolish  the  fortitientions  of  their  town;  its 
she  had  caused  to  be  done  fifty-two  years  before,  after  the  victory  of 
Delium,  on  suspicion  of  leanings  favorable  to  Athens. 

Such  proceedings  on  the  p;»rt  of  the  Thebans  in  Boootia  excited 
strong  emotion  at  Athens,  where  the  Plata-aus  not  only  appeared  as 
suppliants,  with  the  tokens  of  misery  conspicuously  disi)iayed,  br.t 
also  laid  their  case  pathetically  before  the  assembly,  and  invoked  aid 
to  regain  their  town  of  whicirthey  luul  been  just  bereft.  On  a  ques- 
tion at  once  so  touching  and  so  full  of  political  consequences,  many 
speeches  were  doubtless  composed  nnd  delivered,  one  of  which  has 
fortunately  reached  us,  composed  by  Isokrates.  and  perliaps  actually 
delivered  by  a  Plattean  speaker  before  the  public  assembly.  The 
hard  fate  of  this  interesting  little  community  is  here  impressively  set 
forth,  including  the  bitterest  reproaches,  stated  with  not  a  little  of 
rhetorical  exaggeration,  against  tl;e  nudtiplied  wrongs  done  by 
Thebes,  as  well  toward  Athens  as  tow  aid  Tlaia'a.  i\]uch  of  his 
invective  is  more  vehement  than  conclusive.  Tiius  when  the  orator 
repeatedly  claims  for  Plala?a  her  title  to  autonomous  existence,  under 
the  guarantv  of  universal  autonomv  sworn  at  the  peace  of  Antal- 
kidifs— the  Thebans  would  doubtless  reply,  that  at  the  time  of  tl»at 
peace,  Plattea  was  no  longer  in  existence,  I  ut  luul  been  extinctfor 
forty  years,  and  was  only  renovated  afteiwaid  by  iheLacedcTmonians 
for  their  own  political  purposes.  And  the  orator  intimates  plainly 
that  the  Thebans  were  noway  ashamed  of  their  proceeding,  hut  came 
to  Athens  to  justify  it,  openly  and  avowe<lly;  moi cover  st^veral  of  the 
most  distinguished  Athenian'speakers  espoused  the  same  side.  That 
the  Platfcans  had  co  operated  witli  Sparta  in  her  recent  operations  in 
Bcpotia  against  both  Athens  and  Thebes,  was  an  undeniable  fact; 
which  the  orator  himself  can  only  extenuate  by  saying  that  they 
acted  under  constraint  from  a  present  Spartan  force— but  wiiich  was 
cited  on  tlie  opposite  side  as  a  proof  of  their  jdiilo  Spartan  disposi- 
tions and  of  their  readiness  asTMin  to  join  the  common  enemy  as 
soon  as  he  presented  hims.-lf.  the  Thebans  would  accuse  Plata\a  of 
subsequent  treason  to  the  confedeiacy ;  r.nd  they  even  seemed  to  have 
contended  that  they  had  rendered  a  i^ositive  service  to  the  general 
Athenian  confederacy  of  which  thev  were  members,  by  expillingthe 
inhabitants  of  Platiea  and  disnumiliug  Thespia?:  both  towns  being 
not  merely  devoted  to  Sparta,  but  also  adjoining  Kitharon  the 
frontier  line  whereby  a  Spartan  army  would  invade  Ba^otia.  Both 
in  the  public  assembly  of  Athens,  and  in  the  general  congress  of  the 
confederates  at  that  city,  animated  discussions  were  raised  up(^n  the 
whole  subject;  discussions,  wherein,  as  it  appears,  Epaminoudas,  as 


CONGRESS  AT  SPARTA. 


803 

Athens,  sustaining  the  Tiichan  cansP  .vi  h  '^'^^'''S}^}^^'^d  speaker  ia 
enhanced  his  growing  reputation  ^  ^'^  ^bihty  which  greatly 

thf  pruS,  a;^un;:n;^i.;r;i^i;tit"""^^^  'T'^^^^^^'  ^--^^  an 

step  was  taken  to  restore  te  P  lat^^ t's  ^^  n^^^^^      '^1  ^T'  '^  '^'^^^  "'^ 
made  against  those  to  whom'hfy  c  w^^^^^^  cleclaration 

eral  result  of  the  debates  anSp  1  w  i  ""^P^^^^on-y^t  the  geu- 

la.in  sufferers  tended  decic  e  ? to  notonT  sympathy  with  the  Pla- 
the  ties  between  Atiieus  and  liefe  Ti„H^'P^^^  ^'f^^'  ^"^^  ^^os.n 
an  increased  gravitation  toward  peace  w  if  ^^^^^  '^^^^"^^^  ^'''^^  ^Y 
cated  by  the  orator  Kalli^n-.u  ,     F  ]      ^^^^^  Sparta;  strongly  advo- 

tiie  amflxinced  Pe  si^ifin   fvent  o^[^  1h?M  ^TT"^  "^^  ^^'^^Y  ^Y 
and  the  absence  of  all  prc^snective   "n'n  f  ^^'  "'"*  ^'^'^'^'  "^''^^  ^^'^'^^l 
resolution  was  at  lenot    t  Ckef  fi.J    "  ^T  '^'  ^'^"^^""ance.     The 
hy  tlie  maj(.nty  of  t  fe  confe  h^f/^    ^      }\''''?'  """^  ^^^-^^'  probably 
p^^positioL  o^eace   0  to  if  Athensito  mak'e 

iar  dis|)osi.i(>ris'^prevai]ed^^o    ird  n  aee      LT'^^  ^T']'""  ^^^^^  ^i""" 
was  given  to  the  Thebans,  .Zwei??^^^^^  ""    ^^'''  ^"^^°^'«a 

also.  If  they  chose  to  b-jcome  panic.  \]l  t  '•  ""'^  T^''^^  ^^^^ther 
the  same  time  when  the  memb  ts  oMhf  T  "^  f^^^'^"^^^^  371  b.c.  at 
were  assembled  at  Sparta  bc^h  til  n'''  ^-^'^^'edi^monian  confederacy 
those  from  the  variouJ  members  o?  to  IT'  •  "'^  ^H^""''  ^"^«:^'«'  «"^ 
there.  Among  the  AtlnSn  nvo  '  two^^^^^^^^^  confederacy,  arrived 
taiy  Daduch  or  Torehbearer  of  th7  Finn  ~^''"'^' ^^^^^"  ^^^''^'d'" 
Autokles-were  men  of  Ln'eat  fn.  il  "a"''/''''"  ceremonies)  and 
accompanicHi  by  ludli^tratur  he'S^l;'  F  onfilf  "i/^'^"  "^^" 
only  man  of  note  was  Ei)-imino,.rl i«     i  ^f\  ^^^^  ^l^cbaus,  the 

Of  the  debates  wldch  took  Zee  """"  ^^  ^^'^  Boeotarclis. 

very  impeifect  knowleb^^:^^^^^^^^^^  we  have 

versations.  no  less  inioc  i^;,f  Lw,  ^"?'''^  ^'^'^^ate  diplomatic  con- 
at  all.  XenopI  on  <■  ves  u  a  iwel  f";. '^'^'f  ''7  ^^'^  "^  knowledge 
aad  from  no  one  Ac  Th^t^^K  !u  '  '""f ^'  ""^ ^^'^  ^^''''  Athenian\ 
liere^litary  proxenu    of  S  nr  a  ft  'i'''  -''^  ^"?«"^^'cs  l^in^^elf  as 

cnnnc^ll/ j^hilo-Lac.;^ian' n  ^h- t^\fc\^^^^ 

tone,  fu  1  of  sevei-P  r.f.nv,,,.^  ^    Vi '  "^^^^^ -^^^^^^les  is  m  the  onnosMe 

spirit  of  coi,ci  iat  ?m  -ll    it/:  l;:;'  ',^  of  Autokles-is  framed  i„  i' 
ti^ejaint  i,„eros.s  of  botrp'oi'.Uedro 'ntrd  pcJ^f  ^'^°"'"=  '"''"  '"'-^S 

n.CVerdlSl.XX'p:;^e'o?  inlrikfl"  ''''Irfy- °^  ""=  <-''■ 
Ailieus  WU3  prepared  to  tie  r     .,!,,,     "^  V""  ^'''^"'  "Poii  wliic] 

.re.t.  a.d  L  L.  w!:;-;'eSi;:i's'^rt:^-/'ii;;!'K;! 


804     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

kinn-  he  dismisses  witli  indifference  llie  menace  that  Antajkidas  TNas 
on  hU  ^ay  back  from  Persia  with  nmuey  to  aid  the  Lace<  amonitins 
L  t  e  ^'  r.     It  was  not  from  fear  of  the  Persian  treasures  (he  ur^icd) 
^as  Uie  enemies  of  jK-ace  asserted-ll.at  Athens   sought  pence.     Her 
amdis  were  now  so  prosperous  both  by  sea  and    and    as  to  prove  tha 
'he  only  did  so  on  consideration  .f  the  general   evils  of  prolonged 
'v  tr  ami  on  a  prudent  abnegation  of  tliat  rash  confidence  ^^•hldl  ^^•as 
Thl'Ws  readv  to  contend  for  extreme  stakes-like  a  gamester  playing 
double  or  quits.     ^Iie  time  had  c  ome  for  both  ^parta  and  Athens 
B  w   o  deslt  from  hostilities.     The  former  had  the  slrenglh  on  land, 
?he  h  ttcr  was  predominant  at  sea;  so  tluit  each  could  guard  the  other; 
while  the  reconciliation  of  the  two  would  produce  peace  throughout 
the  Hellenic  world,  since   in   each   separate   city,   one   ol   the  Uso 
ODPOsin-  local  parties  rested  on  Athens,  the  other  on  Sparta.     Bu 
U^  was  tndispensablv  necessary  that   Sparta   should  renounce   tha 
sysTc^'  of  aggression  (already  pointedly  ^j^^^^^^^-^^^^f  ^^^.^^^^^^^^^^ 
Autokles)  on  which  she  had  acted  since  the  peace  of  Antalkidas    a 
^^tem   from  which  she  had  at  la6t  reaped  bitter  fruits,  since  her 
?niusTseizurc  of  the  Kadmeia  had  ended  by  throwing  into  the  arms 
of  the  Thebans  all  those  Bceotian  ( ities,  whose  separate  autonomy 
she  had  bent  her  whole  policy  to  insure 

Two  points  stand  out  in  this  remarkable  speech,  ^^ Inch    akes  a 
iudicious  measure  of  the  actual  position  of  ah  airs:  first,  autonomv 
o  every  city;  and  autonomy  in  the  genuine  sense,  not  construed  and 
cnforcc^d  bv' the  separate  interests  of  Sparta   as  it  had  been  at  the' 
peare  of  Antalkidas;  next,  the  distribution  of  ^^^ch  pre-eminencj  or 
headship   as  was  consistent  with  this  universal  autonomy,  bet^Ncen 
Sparta  and  Athens;   the  former  on  land,  the  latter  at  sea;  as  the 
means  of  insurin-    ranquillity  in    Greece.     That  "autonomy  per- 
^';  ed  to  Laeed.emonianl,urposes  "-which  Perikles  had  denounced 
before  the  Peloponnesian  war  as  the  condition  of  Peloponnesus,  and 
wMch  h^  been  made  the  political  canon  of  Greece  by  the  peace  of 
Inlalkidas-was  now  at  an  end.     On  the  other  hand,  At!'^?^  and 
Sparta  were  to  become  mutual  partners  and  guaranties;  dividing    he 
headship  of  Greece  by  an  ascertained  line  of  demarcation,  ye   neither 
of    thein  interfering  with    the    principle   of    universal   autonom}^ 
Thebes,  and  her  claim  to  the  presidency  of  Boeotia,  were  thus  to  be 
set  aside  by  mutual  consent. 

It  was  upon  this  basis  that  the  peace  was  concluded.  The  aima- 
n^ents  on  both  sides  were  to  be  disbanded;  the  harmosis  and  trairisons 
everywhere  withdrawn,  in  order  that  each  city  might  enjoy  lull  auton- 
omy If  any  city  should  fail  in  observance  of  these  conditions  and 
continue  in  a  career  of  force  against  any  other,  all  were  at  hberty  to 
take  arms  for  the  support  of  the  injured  party;  but  ^o  one  who 
did  not  feel  disposed,  were  bound  to  take  arms.  1  his  last  stipula- 
tion exonerated  the  Lacedaemonian  allies  from  one  of  their  most 
vexatious  chains.' 


EPAMINONDAS  AT  SPARTA. 


805 

To  the  conditions  liere  mentioned,  all  parties  ao-rppd.  «n,i  ^     .i 

nliies  aferwara  100^11^^"^,"^'" 0?!^'^;', X' wil^  "T 
(liiference  was  made  we  mi-p  nof  1,^l.  \  •/  . ,  *  ^"^  such 
Principle  of  s.ve"e„ee  ^ppiiod  "        1  'i<Xl  r^^i^  llful"  "''"  ""* 

I.e  oerge  ,c  Agesilaus  as  spokesman-he,  V>ko''Z\ll^^STAutnk^ 

•s  aud  will,  slrong  sympathy  fro..,  ma..^  of  IhfcSrDresen^' 

had  p.-ocla.med  that  uothii.g  kept  alive  the  war  except  her'^unlusi 

pietei.Mons,  and  that  uo  peace  could  bedii.-able  unless  such  Cfm, 

s,o,,s  were  put  t.side.     Accepting  the  condiiions  of  peace  astt; 

tended  that  the  presidency  of  Ba>otia  was  l.eld  by  fhebes  on  as  Cd 

the  a^sfmWv  'ha  w^^.l^i  ^^"""■\''>'  ^P"''^'     H«  -o"W  ^^.Cd 
Liie  cts>semoiy  iiiat  when  Boeotia  was  fii-st  conouered  and  <;ptflPfl  h^rit^ 

present  inhabitants,  the  other  towns  had  auK  pknted  ou    f m  n 
1  lebesas  their  chief  and  mother  city;  that  the  federTLon  of  .n 

administered  by  Ba^olarchs  chosen  by  and  from  aTw  ih  Thebl  fs 

esident.  was  coeval  witli  the  tirst  settlement  of  the  c^^lintn-  that 

lie  separate  autonomy  of  each  was  qualirted  bv  an  estab  IS  'insff 

ution.  devolving  on  the  Ba^otaiviis^and  councils  siu  n     at  T^^^^^^^ 

he  management  of  the  foreign  relations  of  ail  iointlv      All  thi.  Iv  rf 

t.f.M-.i  .•  "     ?"  coin.nis.-ion..'rs  assembled  to  determine  the 

fate  of  the  captives  after  the  suircdor  of  Plataja-  when    e  rem.i.ed 
he  con.  e:u.,at.on  of  the  Plahrans  as  guilty  of  Tn^as™,  lo  th^  ™ es 
tral  mst.lu.ions  of  Boeotia;  and  the  Spartan  comniS  ners     ,d  rec^o.'" 
.  ./.ed  the  egitmiaey  of  these  institutions  by  a  sweeping  sc, Ice  S 
death  against  the  transgressors.    Moreover/at  a  time  when  the  ascend 


g06     AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTHUS. 

envy  of  Thebes  over  the  Bopotian  cities  had  been  irreatly  impaired  by 
her  anti-Hellenic  co-operatiou  with  the  invndins:^  Persians,  the  Spar- 
tans tliemselves  had  assisted  her  with  all  their  power  to  re-establish 
it,  as  a  countervailinsr  f(^rce  against  Athens.  Epaminondas  could 
show,  that  the  presidency  of  Tiielx-s  over  the  Eopotian  cities  was  the 
k.'vst'one  of  the  federation;  a  riulit  uot  only  of  ininuniorial  antiquity, 
but  pointedly  recognized  and  strenuously  vindicated  by  the  Spartans 
themselves.  '  He  could  show  further  that  it  was  as  old,  and  as  good, 
jis  their  own  right  to  govern  the  Laconian  townships;  which  hitter 
Avas  acquired  and  held  (as  one  of  the  best  among  llieir  own  warriors 
had  boastfully  proclaimed)  by  nothing  but  Spartan  valor  and  the 
sharpness  of  the  Spartan  sword. 

An  emphatic  speech  of  this  tenor,  delivered  amid  the  deputies 
assembleil  at  Sparta,  and  arraigning  the  Spartans  not  merely  in  their 
supremacy  over  Greece,  but  ev^'n  in  their  dominion  at  honu'— was  as 
it  were  the  shadow  cast  before,  by  coming  events.  It  opened  a 
question  such  as  no  Greek  had  ever  ventured  to  raise.  It  was  a 
noveltv  startling  to  all— extravagant  probably  in  the  eyes  of  Kaliis- 
tratus  and  the  Athenians— but  to  the  Spartans  themselves,  intolerably 
poiirnant  and  insulting.  They  had  already  along  account  of  antipathy 
to  c-iear  off  with  Thebes;  their  own  wrongdoing  in  seizing  the  Kad- 
meia— their  subsequent  liumiliation  in  losing  it  and  being  unable  to 
recover  it — their  recent  short-comings  and  failun  s,  in  the  last  seven 
years  of  war  airainst  Athens  and  Thebes  jointly.  To  aggravate  this 
deep-seated  train  of  hostile  associations,  their  pride  was  now  wound- 
ed in  an  unforeseen  point,  the  tcnderest  of  all.  Agesilaus,  lull  to 
overflowing  of  the  national  sentiment,  which  in  the  mind  of  a  Spar- 
tan passed  for  the  first  of  virtues,  was  stung  to  the  quick.  Had  he 
been  an  Athenian  orator  like  Kallistratus,  his  wrath  would  have 
found  vent  in  an  animated  harangue.  But  a  king  of  Sparta  was 
anxious  onlv  to  close  these  offensive  discussions  with  scornful  abrupt- 
ness, thus  leaving  to  the  presumi)tuous  Theban  no  middle  ground 
between  humble  retraction  and  acknowledged  hostility.  Indignantly 
starting  from  his  seat^  he  said  to  Epaminc^ndas—"  Speak  plainly— 
will  yoli,  or  will  you  not,  leave  to  each  of  the  Ba-otian  cities  its 
sej^a fate  autonomy?"  To  which  the  other  replied— "Will  i/ov  leave 
each  of  the  Laconian  towns  autonomous?"  AVithout  saying  another 
word,  Airesihius  immediately  caused  the  name  of  the  Thebans  to  be 
struck  out   of  the  roll,   and  proclaimed  them    excluded   from   the 

treaty. 

Sudi  was  the  close  of  this  memorable  congress  at  Sparta  in  June 
871  B.C.  Between  the  Spartans  and  Athenians,  and  their  respective 
allies,  peace  was  sworn  But  the  Thebans  were  excluded,  and  their 
deputies  returned  home  (if  we  may  believe  Xenophon)  discouraged 
and  mournful.  Yet  such  a  man  as  Epaminondas  must  have  been 
w^ell  aware  that  neither  his  claims  nor  his  arguments  would  be 
admitted  by  Sparta.    If  therefore  he  was  disappointed  with  the  result. 


TERMS  OF  PEACE. 


807 


this  must  be  because  he  had  counted  upon   but  did  not  nht^Jn 
support  from  the  Athenians  or  others.  ^^^'^'^' 


dain.  of  Thebes  t,.;;,,,o,rri,;  .C^V^^^Z^n^^'^:^^^ 
Athens  that  the  J3ceoliaQ  federation  should  be  nuini-  .,    I         ^,  T 

^  hebes  after  the  congress  as  before  it,  were  slill  those  of  fr  e  dsh  n 
nominal  ratlier  than  sincere.  It  was  only  with  Sparta  a  ml  1  e  .l.ii^' 
hat  Thebes  was  at  war,  without  a  sing4  ally  a  taeh«l  t  hi  o°; 
the  whole,  Ka  istratus  and  his  colleagues  had  n.anase  lo  intends 
of  Athens  in  this  congress  with  great  prudence  and  success  Thev 
had  disengaged  her  from  the  alliance  with  Thebes,  which  had  Ci 
Qictated  seven  .years  before  by  common  fear  and  dislike  of  bW, 
but  which  had  no  longer  any  adequate  motive  to  counlervad  the  c  ,'  t 
of  continuing  the  war;  at  the  same  time,  tlic  disen-'a-enient  i  id  b  en 
accomplished  without  b.ad  faith.  The 'gains  of  A  henr  ,  •  ,.^he' 
last  seyen  years  ot  war  had  been  considerable.  She  had  a cq  i?ed  a 
great  na™l  power,  and  a  body  of  maritime  confederates-  deh^.r 
enemies   he  Spartans  ha,   lost  (heir  n.-ual  power  in  the  lik       opoi' 

Gr  ece- vSZ^rrTsHn  ''^^^"'''"'^'"'Je'-  of  "'^'Htime  and'insf."  r 
l^n.f  L„"    1     ^'P"'*  s'lll  <:'>"t"'i'ed  to  be  the  leading  power  on 

be  wee     the  -two  '1".h'  '""^  "  '^''  Partnership  was  now^estal.l    lied 
l,^K„^f ,       V  u     -^K  '•<'™g»izi".?  the   other   in   Iheir  respeclive 
halves  of  the  Hellenic  hegemony.     Moreover,  Alliens  had  ll  e  ,    u 
dence  to  draw  her  stake,  and  quit  the  game,  when  at  ti^^e  i,  xin mm 
of  her  .acquisi  ions   without  taking  the  lisk  of  future  .•onlin4n    e 

On  both  sides,  the  system  of  compulsory  a.,!  indefeasTble  coil- 
federacies  was  renounced;  a  renun.iation,  vihich  h:„l  a  lea  1^  i 
once  sworn  to,  sixteen  years  l)ef,>re,  at  the  pea.'e  of  An  all  i  ,s  b 
treacherously  perverted  by  Sparta  in  the  execution  Uude  tl  is','™ 
engagement,  the  allies  of  Sparta  or  Athens  ceaS"i  to  co  s  it  He  an 
organized  |x-nnanent  body  voting  bv  itsmaioritv  nasshi.'res  1  nfion" 
permanently  binding  upon  dissentients,  arn  il,g^'h'i  d  "S  s  ate  wUh 

t.iry  secessions  of  individual  members.     Thev  became  a  niei^  unce 
iiiented  aggregate  of  individuals,   each  aeliiig  for  hi.  ."f     ,"|  hiJ 
counsel   ogether.  as  long  as  they  chose,  and  o,,  operatin  ^s ',  f,,  .,.    jT 
were  in  harmony;  but  no  one  being  bound  by  kny  deci  i^   'of  lie 
oil  ers.  nor  recogm/.ing  any  right  in  Uie  others  to  omipel  him  evei    o 

Fw  w  h"/f'  "^  '"'T  '"i ''"''  ,"'"''^'""-^'  P'-'"'"**^^.  If  it  b  -came  irks,  , 
13ysuch  change,  therefore,  both  Athens  and  Sparta  were  lo-ers  in 
power;  yet  the   latter  to  a  iiiueh  greater  extiut  than  th,   fo  mJ" 
,>rSite"?.r;,™^'i,?t'  P°— her  allies  had  been  inoi4'"Zl 
We  here  see  the  exact  point  upon  which  the  requisition  addressed 


808 


AFTER  THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  OLYNTIIUS. 


bv  Sparta  to  Thel)es,  ami  the  controversy  between  Epaminondas  and 
A^-r<ihuis    really   turned.      Acjesilaus   contended   that   the  relation 
bJiwcen  Tiiebes  and  the  other  Ra'otian  cities,  was  the  stune  as  ^^^llat 
subsisted  between  Sparta  and  her  allies;    that   accordm-ly,  when 
Soarla  renounced  the  indefeasible  and  compulsory  character  of  her 
confederacv,  and  a-reed  to  deal  with  each  of  its  members  as  a  self- 
actin-  and  nidependent  unit,  she  was  entitled  to  demand  that  Thebes 
should  do  the  same  in  reference  to  the  Ba^otian  towns      Lpaminon- 
das  on  the  contrary,  denied  the  justice  of  this  paralle  .     He  main- 
tained that  the  proper  subject  of  comparison  to  be  taken,  was  tie 
relation   of    Sparta,   not   to   her  extra-Laconian   allies,   but   to  the 
Laeonian  township;  that  the  federal   union  of  the  Bo'otian  towns 
under  Thebes  was  coeval  with  the  Bwotian  settlement,  and  amonj:: 
the  most  ancient  phenomena  of  Gieecc;  that  in  reference  to  other 
states     Ba'Otia.    like   Laconia   or   Attica,    was  the   compound    and 
or«'-anizcd  whole,  of  which  each  separate  city  was  only  a  fraction; 
that  other  Greeks  had  no  more  right  to  meddle  with  the  internal 
constitution  of  tnese  fractions,  and  convert  each  of  them  into  an 
iuttMrer— than  to  insist  on  separate   independence  for  each   of     lie 
townships  of  Laconia.     Epaminondas  did  not  n.ean  to  coniend  that 
the  power  of  Thebes  over  the  Ila^otian  cities  was  as  complete  ana 
absolute  in  deirree.  as  that  of  Sparta  over  the  Laeonian  townships; 
but  merelv  that  her  presidential   power,  and  the  federal  svstem  of 
which  it  formed  a  part,  were  established,  indet(;asible,  and  beyond 
the  interference  of  any  Hellenic  convention— quite  as  much  as  the 
internal  ffovernment  of  Sparta  in  Laconia.  c      *         a 

Once  fdreadv  this  question  had  been  di>putcd  between  Sparta  and 
and  Thebt>s  at  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.  Once  already  had  it  been 
decided  by  the  superior  power  of  the  former,  extorting  submission 
from  the  latter.  The  last  sixteen  years  had  reversed  the  previous 
decision,  and  enabled  the  Tliebans  to  reconquer  those  presidential 
richts  of  which  the  former  peace  had  deprived  them.  Again  there- 
fore the  question  stood  for  decision,  with  keener  antipathy  on  both 
gidc^s— with  diminished  power  in  Sparta— but  with  increased  force, 
increased  contidence,  and  a  new  leader  whose  inestimable  worth  was 
even  vet  but  half-known-in  Thebes.  The  Athenians-friendly  with 
both  yet  allies  of  neither— suffered  the  dispute  to  l>e  fought  out  with- 
out interfering.     How  it  was  settled  will  appear  in  the  next  chapter. 


WRATH  OF  SPARTA. 


809 


CHAPTER  LXXVHL 

BATTLE   OF  LEUKTRA  AND  ITS   CONSEQUENCES. 

Immediately  after  the  cono-re^s  a*^  Rnirtn  in  t,„.^  o.^t 
subsequent  to  the  exehauge  o\   oa, ,'    a    Sn-  f^  thev  ,/,"'^>f  ",',"'r 

^j:z"z=!,jr "'« «-"^'  -usress;'?:';.rcf'Xe 

ans  were  absorbed  by  tbeir  quarrel  wilji  Tlicbes      Tb^  n^J  Ti,„? 
Jinpnlse  now  drove  tbe,.i  on  whl,  a  fury  wb  ^h  overr  J  fn?!  nt.r 
iderfi' it^  art'beT'"'"'  '^""^'  """""^^^  Asesnaur/,  d  o.be  s  eon 

ZZL^n''"    '"''''  "'"'  ••*"  entertained  boll,  by  the  Athen  •  fs 
and  by  other  Greeks;  to  a  ereat  dcn-ee  even  bi.  ti.„  tiVIi  '*^""-',  ""'^ 

To  attack  'J'liebes.  however,  an  arniv  was  winted-  ind  oo  tSnnrfo 
by  the  peace  just  sworn,  bad  renounced  evcTvtWn..irkeimCki 
ascendency  over  her  allie.s,  leaving  each  of  them^eeto  send  o^  w^l 


810 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


I 


hold  as.^istance  as  thev  chose— to  raise  an  army  Avas  no  easy  task ;  for 
the  allies,  generally 'spe-^kinc:,   heing  not  at  all  intlamefMyith  the 
Spartan  antipathy  anainst  Thebes,  desired  only  to  be  left  to  enjoy 
their  newlv-acquiW  liberty.    But  so  it  happenc  d,  thnt  at  the  moment 
Ayhen  peaee  Avas  sAvoru,  tlie  Spartan  Kin-  Kleombrotns  \yi^  actu- 
allv  at  the  head  of  an  arn.y,  of  Lacedaemonians  and  alius,  in  1  hokis, 
cn^he  north  western  frontier  of  Bceotia.     Immediately  on  hearing 
of  the  peace  Kleonibrotus  sent  home  to  ask  for  instructions  as  to  his 
future  proceedicgs.     By  the  unanimous  yoicc  of  the  Spartan  author- 
ities and  assembly,  ^x\ih  Agesilaus  as  the  most  vehement  of  all,  he 
was  directed  to  march  airainst  the  Thebans,  unless  they  should  tlmch 
at  the  last  moment  (as  they  had  done  at  the  peace  of  Antalkulas), 
and  relinquish  their  presidency  oyer  the  other  Baotian  cities      One 
citizen  alone,  named  Prothous,  interrupted  this  unanimity     He  pro- 
tested a'^ainst  the  order,  first,  as  a  violation  of  their  oaths.  avIiicU 
reiiuirc(f  them  to  disband  the  army  and  reconstitute  it  on  the  volun- 
tary principle— next,  as  imprudent  in  regard  to  the  allies,  Avho  now 
loJk.'d  upon  such  liberty  as  their  right,  and  would  never  serve  with 
cordiality  unless  it  \vere  srranted  to  them.    But  Prothous  was  treated 
with  disdain  as  a  silly  alarmist,  and  the  peremptory  order  was  dis- 
patched to  Kleombrolus;   accompanied,  probably,  by  a  re  entorce- 
inent  of  Spartans  and  Lacediemonians,  the  number  ot  whom,  in  the 
onsuiuii  battle,  seems  to  have  been  greater  than  can  reasonably  be 
imairined  to  have  been  before  serving  in  Phokis.      .^    ^   ,    ^  ^,    , 

Meanwhile  no  symptoms  of  concession  were  manifested  at  ihel:)es. 
Epaminondas.  on'his  return,  had  found  cordial  sympathy  with  the 
resolute  tone  which  he  had  adopted  both  in  defense  of  the  Boeotian 
fcleration  and  airainst  Sparta.     Though  every  one  felt  the  inagni- 
tude  of  the  danger,  it  was  still  hoped  that  the  enemy  might  be  pre- 
vented from  penetrating  out  of  Phokis  into  Ba^otia.     Epammondas 
accordin-lv  occupied  with  a  strong  force  the  narrow  pass  near  Kor- 
oneia,  lying  between  a  spur  of  jSLmnt  llelikon  on  one  side  and  the 
Lak.'  Kopais  on  the  other;  the  same  position  as  had  been  taken  by 
the  Ba^oiians.  and  forced  by  the  army  returning  from  Asia  undc^ 
Ao-esilaus.  twenty-three  years  before.     Orchomcnus  lay  northw^ard 
(that  is,  cm  the  Phokian'side)  of  this  position;  and  its  citizens   as 
well  as  its  Laceda^moninn  carrison,  now  doubtless  formed  part  ot 
the  invadin-  army  of  Kleombrotus.     That  prince,  with  a  <lep-ee  of 
ndlitary  skill  rare  in  the  Spartan  commanders,  battied  all  the  H  t-ban 
calculaVioiis.     Instead  of  marching  by  the  regular  road  from  Phokis 
into  Bccolia.  he  turned    southward   by  a  mountain   road   scarcely 
deemed  practicable,  defeated  the  Theban  division  under  Uuereas 
which  -uanled  it,  and  crossed  the  ridge  of  Helikon  to  the  Boootian 
port  of'  Kreusis  on  the  Krissfcan  gulf.     Coming  upon  this  place  by 
surprise,  he  stormed  it.  capturing  twelve  Theban  triremes  which  lay 
in  the  harbor      He  then  left  a  garrison  to  occupy  the  port,  and 
marched  without  delay  over  the  mountainous  ground  into  the  tern 


EPAMINONDAS  AND  THEBANS  AT  LEUKTRA.  811 

tory  of  Thespia;  on  the  easterly  declivity  of  Helikon;  where  lie 
encamped  on  the  high  ground,  at  a  place  of  ever-memorable  name 
called  Leuktra.  ' 

Here  was  an  important  success,  skillfully  gained;  noc  only  placiinr 
Kleombrotus  within  an  easy  march  of  Thebes,  but  also  openino- ft 
sure  communication  by  sea  with  Sparta,  through  the  port  of  Kreusvs 
and  thus  eluding  the  difficulties  of  Mount  Kith(eron.     Both  ihe  kin^^ 
and  the  Lacedaemonians  around  him  were  full  of  joy  and  couiideiici" 
while  the  Thebaus  on  their  side  were  struck  with  dismay  as  well  as 
surprise.     It  required  all  the  ability  of  Epaminondas,   and  ail  the 
daring  of  Pelopidas  to  uphold  the  resolution  of  their  countiyn.en 
and  to  explain  away  or  neutralize  the  terrific  signs  and  portent^' 
which  a  dispirited  Greek  was  sure  to  see  in  every  accident  of  the 
road.     At  length,  however,  they  succeeded  in  this,  and  the  Thebaus 
with  their  allied  Boeotians  were  marched  out  from  Thebes  to  Leuk- 
tra, where  they  were  posted  on  a  declivity  opposite  to  the  Spartan 
camp.     They  wa-re  commanded  by  the  seven  Bosotarchs,  of  whom 
Epaniinondas  was  one.     But  such  was  the  prevalent  apprehensioa 
of  joining  battle  with  the  Spartans  on  equal  terms,  that  even  when 
actually  on  the  ground,  three  of  these  Boeotarchs  refused  to  concur 
in  the  order  for  fighting,  and  proposed  to  shut  themselves  up  in 
Tliebes  for  a  siege,  sending  their  wives  and  families  away  to  Athens. 
Epaminondas  w^as  vainly  combating  their  determination,  when  the 
seyeuth  Bceotarch,  Branchy lides,  arrived  from  the  passes  of  Kithic- 
ron,  where  he  had  been  on  guard,  and  was  prevailed  upon  to  vote  in 
favor  of  the  bolder  course. 

Though  a  majority  was  thus  secured  for  fighting,  yet  the  feeling 
throughout  the  Theban  camp  was  more  that  of  brave  (i(;spair  than  of 
cheering  hope;  a  conviction  that  it  was  better  to  perish  m  the  field, 
than  to  live  in  exile  with  the  Laceda'monians  masters  of  the  Kad- 
meia.  Some  encouraging  omens,  however,  v^rere  transmitted  to  the 
camp,  from  the  temples  in  Thebes  as  well  as  from  that  of  Trophonius 
at  Lebadeia:  and  a  Spartan  exile  named  Leandrias,  serving  in  the 
Theban  ranks,  ventured  to  assure  them  that  they  were  now  on  (he 
very  spot  foredoomed  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Lacedannonian  em- 
pire. Here  stood  the  tomb  of  two  females  (daughters  of  a  Leuktrian 
named  Skedasus)  who  had  been  violated  by  two  Lacedccmonians  and 
liad  afterward  slain  themselves.  Skedasus,  after  having  in  vain 
attempted  to  obtain  justice  from  the  Spartans  lor  this  outrage,  came 
back,  imprecating  curses  on  them,  and  slew  himself  also.  The  ven- 
geance of  these  departed  sufferers  w^ould  now  be  sure  to  pour  itself 
out  on  Sparta,  when  her  army  was  in  their  own  district  and  near 
their  own  tomb.  And  the  Theban  leaders,  to  whom  the  tale  was 
full  of  opportune  encouragement,  crowned  the  tomb  with  wreaths, 
invoking  tlie  aid  of  its  inmates  against  the  common  enemy  now 
present. 

While  others  were  thus  comforted  by  the  hope  of  superhuman  aid, 


812 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


Epaminondas,  to  whom  the  order  of  the  comini^  battle  had  been  con- 
fided, took  care  that  no  human  precautions  should  be  wanting,  lli.s 
task  was  arduous,  for  not  only  were  his  troops  dispirited,  while 
those  of  the  enemy  were  confident — but  their  numbers  were  inferior, 
and  some  of  the'Bceotians  present  were  hardly  even  trusluoilhy. 
What  the  exact  numbers  were  on  either  side  we  are  not  permitted  to 
know.  Diodorus  assigns  about  6,000  n»en  to  the  Thebans;  Plutarch 
Slates  the  numbers  of  Kleoml)rotus  at  11.000.  Without  placin.ii:  laiih 
in  these  tigures,  we  see  good  reason  for  believing  that  the  Theban 
total  was  "decidedly  inferior.  For  such  inferiority  Epaminondas 
strove  to  make  up  by  skillful  tactics,  and  by  a  cond)inaiion  at  that 
time  novel  as  well  as  ingenious.  In  all  former  Grecian  I'attles,  the 
opposite  armies  had  been'  drawn  up  in  line,  and  had  fought  along 
the  whole  line;  or  at  least  such  had  been  the  intention  ot  the  gen- 
erals—and  if  it  was  not  realized,  the  cause  was  to  be  sought  in  acci- 
dents of  the  ground,  or  backwardness  or  disorder  on  the  part  of 
some  division  of  the  soldiers.  I)ep;uting  from  this  habit,  Epami- 
nondas now  arrayed  his  troo\)s  so  as  to  bring  his  own  left  to  bear  with 
irresistible  force  upon  the  Spartan  right,  and  to  keep  back  the  rest 
of  his  army  comparatively  out  of  action.  Knowing  that  Kleom- 
brotus,  with  the  tSpartans  and  all  the  oflicial  persons,  would  be  on 
the  right  of  their  own  line,  he  calculated  that,  if  successful  on  this 
point  against  the  best  troops,  he  should  find  Utile  resistance  from  the 
remainder.  Accordingly  he  placed  on  his  own  left  wing,  chosen  The- 
ban hoplites,  to  the  prodigious  depth  of  fifty  shields,  with  Pek>pidas 
and  the  Sacred  Band  in  front.  His  order  of  advance  was  disposed 
obliquely  or  in  echelon,  so  that  the  deep  column  on  the  left  should 
join  battle  first,  Avhile  the  center  and  right  kept  comparatively  back 
and  held  themselves  more  in  a  defensive  attitude. 

In  371  B.C.,  such  a  combination  was  absolutely  new,  and  betokened 
hight  military  genius.  It  is  therefore  no  disgrace  to  Kleombrotus 
that  he  was  not  prepared  for  it,  and  that  he  adhered  to  the  ordinary 
Grecian  tactics  of  joining  battle  at  once  along  the  whole  line.  But 
so  unbounded  was  the  confidence  reigning  among  the  Spartans,  that 
there  never  was  any  occasion  on  which  pecidiar  precautious  were  h  ss 
thought  of.  When,  from  their  entrenclud  camp  on  the  Leuktrian 
eminence,  they  sjiw  the  Thebans  encampe<l  on  an  opposite  eminence, 
separated  from  them  by  a  small  bread ih  of  low  ground  and  moderate 
declivities — their  only  impatience  was  to  hurry  on  the  decisive 
moment,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  escaping.  Both  the  par- 
tisans and  the  opponents  of  Kleombrotus  united  in  provoking  the 
order  for  battle,  each  in  their  own  language.  The  partisans  urged 
him,  since  he  had  never  yet  done  anything  against  the  Thebans,  to 
strike  a  decisive  blow,  arid  clear  himself  from  the  disparaging  com- 
parisons which  rumor  instituted  between  him  and  Agesilaus;  the 
opponents  gave  it  to  be  ui  dcrstood,  that  if  Kleombrotus  were  now 
backward,  llieir  suspicions  would  be  confirmed  that  he  had  leaned 


VICTORY  OF  THE  THEBANS. 


813 


in  his  heart  toward  the  Thebans.  Probably  the  king  w^as  himself 
sufficiently  eager  to  fight,  and  so  would  any  other  Spartan  general 
have  been,  under  the  same  circumstances,  before  the  battle  of  Leuk- 
tra.  But  even  had  he  been  otherwise,  the  impatience,  prevalent 
among  the  Lacedaemonian  portion  of  his  army,  left  him  no  option. 
Accordingly,  the  decided  resolution  tofiihtwas  taken.  The  last 
council  was  held,  and  the  final  orders  issued  by  Kleombrotus  after  his 
morning  meal,  where  copious  libations  of  wine  both  attested  and  in- 
creased the  confident  temper  of  every  man.  The  army  was  marched 
out  of  the  camp,  and  arrayed  on  the  lower  portion  of  the  declivity; 
Kleombrotus  with  the  Spartans  and  the  most  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
being  on  the  right,  in  an  order  of  twelve  deep.  Some  Lacedaemo- 
nians were  also  on  the  left,  but  respecting  the  order  of  the  other  parts 
of  the  line,  we  have  no  information.  The  cavalry  was  chiefly  posted 
along  the  trout. 

Meanwhile,  Epaminondas  also  marched  down  his  declivity,  in  his 
own  chosen  order  of  battle;  his  left  wing  being  both  forward,  and 
strengthened  into  very  deep  order,  for  desi)erate  attack.  His  cav- 
alry too  were  posted  in  front  of  his  line.  But  before  he  commenced 
his  march,  he  sent  away  his  baggage  and  attendants  home  to  Thebes; 
while  at  the  same  time  he  made  proclamation  that  any  of  his  Boeotian 
hoplites,  who  were  not  hearty  in  the  cause,  might  also  retire  if  they 
chose.  Of  such  permission  the  Thespians  immediately  availed  them- 
Belves;  so  many  were  there,  in  the  Theban  camp,  who  estimated  the 
chances  to  be  all  in  favor  of  Lacediiemonian  victory.  But  when  these 
men,  a  large  portion  of  them  unarmed,  v/ere  seen  retiring,  a  con- 
siderable detachment  from  the  army  of  Kleombrotus,  either  with  or 
without  orders,  ran  after  to  prevent  their  escape,  and  forced  them  to 
return  for  safety  to  the  main  Theban  arm5%  The  most  zealous  among 
the  allies  of  Sparta  present — the  Phokians,  the  Phliasians,  and  the 
Herakleots,  together  with  a  body  of  mercenaries — executed  this 
movement;  which  seems  to  have  weakened  the  Lacedjiemonians  in 
the  main  battle,  without  doing  any  mischief  to  the  Thebans. 

The  cavalry  first  engaged,  in  front  of  both  lines;  and  here  the 
superiority  of  the  Thebans  soon  became  manifest.  The  Lacedcemo- 
nian  cavalry — at  no  time  very  good,  but  at  this  moment  unusually 
bad,  composed  of  raw  and  feeble  novices,  mounted  on  liorses  pro- 
vided by  the  rich — was  soon  broken  and  driven  back  upon  the  in- 
fantry, whose  ranks  were  disturbed  by  the  fugitives.  To  re-establish 
the  battle,  Kleombrotus  gave  the  word  for  the  infantry  to  advance, 
himself  personally  leading  the  right.  The  victorious  cavalry  prob- 
ably hung  upon  the  Lacedaemonian  infantry  of  the  center  and  left, 
and.  prevented  them  from  making  much  forward  movement;  while 
Epaminondas  and  Pelopidas  with  their  left,  advanced  according  to 
their  intention  to  bear  down  Kleombrotus  and  his  right  wing.  The 
shock  here  was  terrible;  on  both  sides  victory  was  resolutely  and 
desperately  disputed,  in  a  close  hand-combat,  with  pushing  of  oppo- 


814 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTKA. 


site  sliiekls  and  opposite  masses.  But  such  was  the  overwhelming 
force  of  the  Theban  cliarge— with  the  Sacred  Baud  or  chosen  war- 
riors in  front,  composed  of  men  highly  trained  in  the  pahcstra,  and 
the  deep  column  of  fifty  shields  propelling  behind— that  even  the 
Spartans,  with  all  their  courage,  obstinacy,  and  discipline,  were  un- 
able to  stand  up  against  it.  Kleond)rotus.  himself  either  in  or  near 
the  front,  was  mortally  wounded,  apparently  early  in  the  battle;  and 
it  was  only  by  heroic  and  unexampled  ellorts,  on  the  part  of  his 
comrades  around,  that  he  was  carried  off  yet  alive,  so  as  to  preserve 
Inm  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Around  him  also 
fell  the  most  eminent  members  of  the  Spartan  official  staff;  Deinon 
the  Polemarch.  Sphodrias  with  his  son  Kleonymus,  and  several 
others.  After  an  obstinate  resistance,  and  a  fearful  slaughter,  the 
right  wing  of  tlie  Spartans  was  completely  beaten  and  driven  back 
to  their  camp  on  the  higher  ground. 

It  was  upon  this  Spartan  right  wing,  where  the  Theban  left  was 
irresistiblv  strong,  that  all  the  stress  of  the  battle  fell— as  Epami- 
mmdas  had  intended  that  it  should.  In  no  other  part  of  the  line 
does  there  appear  to  have  been  any  serious  figliting;  partly  through 
his  deliberate  scheme  of  not  pushing  forward  either  his  ceiittr  or  his 
riffhl— partly  throuudi  the  preliminary  victory  of  the  Theban  chivalry, 
which  probably  checked  in  part  the  forward  march  of  the  enemy's 
line— and  partly  also,  through  the  lukewarm  adherence,  or  even  sup- 
pressed hostility,  of  the  allies  marshaled  under  the  command  of 
Kleombrotus.  The  Phokians  and  llerakeots— zealous  in  the  cause 
from  hatred  of  Thebes— had  quitted  the  line  to  strike  a  blow  at  the 
retiring  baixijage  and  attendants;  while  the  remaining  allies,  alter 
mere  irominal  fighting  and  little  or  no  loss,  retired  to  the  camp  as  soon 
they  saw  the  Spartan  right  defeated  and  driven  back  to  it.  More- 
over, even  some  Lacedtemonians  on  the  left  wing,  probably  astounded 
by  the  lukewarmness  of  those  around  them,  and  by  the  unexpected 
calamity  on  their  own  right,  fell  back  in  the  same  manner.  The 
whole  Lacedaemonian  force,  with  the  dying  king,  was  thus  again 
assembled  and  formed  behind  the  entrenchment  on  the  higher 
ground,   where  the  victorious  Thebans  did  not  attempt  to  molest 

them.  . 

But  very  different  were  their  feelings  as  they  now  stood  arrayed  m 
the  camp,  from  that  exulting  boastfulness  with  which  they  had 
quitted  it  an  hour  or  two  before;  and  fearful  was  the  loss  when  it 
came  to  be  verified.  Of  seven  hundred  Spartans  who  had  marched 
forth  from  the  camp,  only  three  hundred  returned  to  it.  One  thous- 
and Lacedaemonians,  besides,  had  been  left  on  the  field,  even  by  the 
admission  of  Xenophon ;  probably  the  real  number  was  even  larger. 
Apart  from  this,  the  death  of  Kleombrotus  was  of  itself  an  event 
impressive  to  every  one,  the  like  of  which  had  never  occured  since 
the  fatal  day  of  Thermopylae.  But  this  was  not  all.  The  allies  who 
stood  alongside  of  them  in  arms  were  now  altered  men.     All  were 


ALTERATION  OF  FEELING. 


815 


sick  of  their  cause,  and  averse  to  further  exertion;  some  scarcely 
concealed  a  positive  satisfaction  at  the  defeat.  And  \vheu  the  sur- 
viving polemarchs,  now  commanders,  took  counsel  with  the  princi- 
pal officers  as  to  the  steps  proper  in  the  emergency,  there  were  a  few, 
but  very  few,  Spartans  who  pressed  for  renewal  of  the  battle,  and 
for  recovering  by  force  their  slain  brethren  in  the  field,  or  perishing 
in  the  attempt.  All  the  rest  felt  like  beaten  men;  so  that  the  pole- 
marchs, giving  effect  to  the  general  sentiment,  sent  a  herald  to  solicit 
the  regular  truce  for  burial  of  their  dead.  This  the  Thebans  granted, 
after  erecting  their  own  trophy.  But  Epaminondas,  aware  that  the 
Spartans  would  practice  every  stratagem  to  conceal  the  magnitude 
to  their  losses,  coupled  the  grant  with  a  condition  that  the  allies 
should  bury  their  dead  first.  It  was  found  that  the  allies  had  scarce 
any  dead  to  pick  up,  and  that  nearly  every  slain  warrior  on  the  field 
was  a  Lacedaemonian.  And  thus  the  Theban  general,  while  he 
placed  the  loss  beyond  possibility  of  concealment,  proclaimed  at  the 
same  time  such  public  evidence  of  Spartan  courage,  as  to  rescue  the 
misfortune  of  Leuktra  from  all  aggravation  on  the  score  of  dishonor. 
What  the  Theban  loss  was,  Xenophon  does  not  tell  us.  Pausanias 
states  it  at  fort3'-seven  men.  Diodorus  at  three  hundred.  The  for- 
mer number  is  preposterously  small,  and  even  the  latter  is  doubtless 
under  the  truth;  for  a  victory  in  close  fight,  over  soldiers  like  the 
Spartans,  must  have  been  dearly  purchased.  Though  the  bodies  of 
the  Spartans  w^ere  given  up  to  burial,  their  arms  were  retained;  and 
the  shields  of  the  principal  officers  were  seen  by  the  traveler  Pau- 
sanias at  Thebes  500  years  afterw^u'd. 

Twenty  days  only  had  elapsed,  from  the  time  when  Epaminondas 
quitted  Si)arta  after  Thebes  had  been  excluded  from  the  general 
peace,  to  the  day  when  he  stood  victorious  on  the  field  of  Leuktra. 
The  event  came  like  a  thunderclap  upon  every  one  in  Greece,  upon 
victors  as  wdl  as  vanquished — upon  allies  and  neutrals,  near  and 
distant,  alike.  The  general  expectation  had  been  that  Thebes  would 
be  speedily  overthrown  and  disma.iiled;  instead  of  which,  she  had 
not  only  escaped,  but  had  inflicted  a  crushing  blow  on  the  military 
majesty  of  Si)arta. 

It  is  in  vain  that  Xenophon — whose  account  of  the  battle  is  ob- 
scure, partial,  and  imprinted  with  that  chagrin  which  the  event 
occasioned  to  him — ascribes  the  defeat  to  untow'ard  accidents,  or  to 
the  rashness  and  convivial  carelessness  of  Kleombrotus;  upon  whose 
generalship  Agesilaus  and  his  party  at  Sparta  did  not  scruple  to 
cast  ungenerous  reproach,  while  others  faintly  exculpated  him  by 
saying  that  he  had  fought  contrary  to  his  better  judgment,  under 
fear  of  unpopularit}'.  Such  criticisms,  coming  from  men  wise  after 
th(i  fact,  and  consoling  themselves  for  the  public  calamity  by  cen- 
suring the  unfortunate  commander,  will  not  stand  examination. 
Kleombrotus  represented  on  this  occasion  the  feeling  universal 
among  his  countrymen.     He  was  ordered  to  march  against  Thebes 


816 


BATTLE  OF   LEUKTRA. 


NEWS  OF  THE  BATTLE  AT  SPARTA.  817 


\N'ith  the  full  belief,  entertained  by  Agesilaus  and  all  the  Spartan 
leaders,  that  her  unassisted  force  could  not  resist  him.  To  fight  the 
Thebans  on  open  ijround  was  exactly  what  he  and  every  other 
Spartan  desireii.  AViiile  his  manner  of  forcing  the  entrance  of 
B(eotia,  and  his  capture  of  Kreusis,  was  a  creditable  maneuver,  he 
seems  to  have  arranged  his  order  of  battle  in  the  manner  usual  with 
Grecian  generals  at  the  time.  There  aj^pears  no  reason  to  censure 
his  generalship,  except  in  so  far  as  he  was  unable  to  divine — what 
no  one  else  divined — the  superior  combinations  of  his  adversary, 
then  for  the  tirst  time  applied  to  practice. 

To  the  discredit  of  Xenoj^hon.  Epaminondas  is  never  named  in 
his  narrative  of  the  battle,  though  he  recognizes  in  substance  that 
the  battle  was  decided  by  the  irresistii.le  Theban  force  brought  to 
bear  upon  one  point  of  the  enemy's  jihalanx;  a  fact  wliich  l)oth 
Plutarch  and  Diodorus  expressly  refer  to  the  genius  of  the  general. 
All  the  calculations  of  Epaminondiis  turned  out  successful.  The 
bravery  of  the  Thebans,  cavalry  as  well  as  infantry,  seconded  by 
the  training  which  they  had  received  during  the  last  few  years,  was 
found  sufiicieut  to  carry  his  pl;ius  into  lull  execution.  To  this 
circumstance,  principally,  was  owing  the  great  revolution  of 
opinion  throughout  Greece  which  followed  the  battle.  Every  one 
felt  that  a  new  military  power  had  arisen,  and  that  the  Theban 
training,  under  the  generalship  of  Epaminondas,  had  proved  itself 
more  than  a  match  on  a  fair  field,  with  shield  and  spear,  and  with 
numbers  on  the  whole  inferior — for  the  ancient  Lykurgean  dis- 
cipline; which  last  had  hitheito  stood  wifliout  a  parallel  as  turning 
out  artists  and  craftsmen  in  war.  against  mere  citizens  in  the  op- 
posite ranks,  armed,  yet  without  the  like  training.  Essentially 
stationary  and  old-fashioned,  the  Lykurgean  discipline  was  now 
overborne  b}'  the  progressive  military  improvement  of  other  states, 
handled  by  a  preeminent  tactician;  a  misfortune  ]»redicted  by  the 
CoiinlhiMns  at  Sparta  sixty  years  before,  and  now  realized,  to  the 
conviction  of  all  Greece,  on  the  field  of  Leuktra. 

But  if  the  Spartan  system  was  thus  invaded  and  overpassed  in  its 
privilege  of  training  soldiers,  there  was  another  species  of  teaching 
wherein  it  neither  was  nor  could  be  overpassed — the  hard  lesson  of 
enduring  pain  and  suppressing  emotion.  Memoral)le  indeed  was 
the  manner  in  which  the  news  of  this  fatal  catastrophe  was  received 
at  Sparta.  To  prejiare  the  reader  by  an  appropriate  contrast,  we 
may  turn  to  the  manifestation  at  Athens  twenty-seven  years  before, 
when  the  trireme  called  Paralus  arrived  from  ^gospotnmi,  bearing 
tidings  of  the  capture  of  the  entire  Athenian  fleet.  "The  moan  of 
distress  (says  the  historian)  reached  all  up  the  Long  Walls  from 
Peirjeus  to  Athens,  as  each  man  communicated  the  news  to  his 
neighbor:  on  that  night,  not  a  man  slept,  from  bewailing  for  his 
lost  fellow -citizens  and  for  his  own  impending  ruin."    Kot  such  was 


the  scene  at  Sparta,  wlien  the  messenger  arrived  from  the  field  of 
Leuktra,   although  there  was  evervthing  calculated  to  render  the 
shock  violent.     For  not  only  was  the   defeat   calamitous  and  hu- 
mdiating  beyond  all  former  parallel,  but  it  came  at  a  moment  when 
every  man  reckoned  on  victory.     As  soon  as  Kleombrotus  havin<r 
forced  his  way  into  Bwotia,  saw  the  unassisted  Thebans  on  plaiS 
ground  before  him,  no  Spartan  entertained  anv  doubt  of  the  result 
Under  tliis  state  of  feeling,  a  mc^senger  arrived  with  the  astoundint^ 
revelation,  that  the  army  was  totally  defeated,  with  the  loss  of  the 
king,  of  400  Spartans,  and  more  than  1000  Lacedemonians;  and  tliat 
defeat  stood  confessed,  by  having  solicited  the  truce  for  interment 
of  the  slain.     At  the  moment  when  he  arrived,  the  festival  called 
the  GymnopoDdia  was  actually  being  celebrated  on  its  last  day;  and 
the  chorus  of  grown  men  was  going  through  its  usual  solemnity  ia 
th(^  theater.     In  spile  of  all  the  poignancy  of  the  intellig;_'nee.  the 
Ephors  would  not  perndt  the  solemnity  to  be  either  interrupted  or 
abridged.     "  Of  necessity,  I  suppose  they  were  r/rieml— hut  tln^y  went 
through  the  whole  as  if  nothing  had  happened,  only  communicatin"- 
the  names  of  the  slain  to  their  relations,  and  issuing  a  general  order 
to  the  women,  to  make  no  noise  or  wailing,  but  tx)  iJear  the  mis- 
fortune in  silence."    That  such  an  order  should  be  issued,  is  suf- 
ficiently remarkable;  that  it  should  be  issued  and  obeyed,  'is  what 
could  not  be  expected;  that  it  should  not  onlv  be  issued  and  obeved, 
but  overpassed,   is  what  no  man  could  believe  if  it  were  not^  ex- 
pressly attested  by  the  contemporary  historian.     "On  the  morrow 
(says  he)  you  might  see  those  whose  relations  had  been  slain,  walk- 
ing about  in  public  with  brigiit  and  cheerful  countenances;' but  of 
those  w^hose  relations  had  survived,  scarce  one  showed  himself;  and 
the  few  who  were  abroad,  looked  mournful  and  humbled." 

In  comparing  this  extraordinary  self-constraint  and  obedience  to 
orders,  at  Sparta,  under  the  most  trying  circumstances— with  the  sen- 
sitive and  demonstrative  temper,  a'nd^spontaneous  outburst  of  feel- 
ing, at  Athens,  so  much  more  nearly  appronchingto  the  Homeric 
type  of  Greeks— we  must  at  the  same'  time  remark,"tliat  in  reference 
to  active  and  heroic  efforts  for  the  purpose  of  repairing  past  calami- 
..'ies  and  making  head  against  preponderant  odds,  the  Athenians  w^ere 
(lecidedly  tiie  better  of  the  two.  I  have  alreadv  recounted  the  pro- 
(iigious  and  unexpected  energy  displayed  by  A'thens,  after  the  ruin- 
ous loss  of  her  tw^o  armaments  before  Syracuse,  when  no  one  expected 
that  she  could  have  held  out  for  six  months:  I  am  now  about  to 
recount  the  proceedings  of  Sparta,  after  the  calamity  at  Leuktra— a 
calamity  great  and  serious  indeed,  yet  in  positive  amount  inferior  to 
what  had  befallen  the  Athenians  at  Syrncuse.  The  reader  will  find 
that,  looking  to  the  intensity  of  active  effort  in  both  cases,  the  com- 
parison is  all  to  the  advantage  of  Athens;  excusing  at  least,  if  not 
justifying,  the  boast  of  Peiikles  in  his  memorable  funeral  harangue 


818 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


■ — that  his  countrymen,  Avitlioiit  tlic  ri2:orons  drill  of  Spartans,  were 
yet  found  noway  infci'ior  to  iSpartaus  in  daring  exertion,  when  tlie 
hour  of  actual  trial  arrived. 

It  was  the  firj^t  oljlisralion  of  the  Ephors  to  provide  for  the  safety 
of  their  defer.ted  army  in  Ilcrotia;  for  which  purpose  the,y  put  in 
march  nearly  tlie  whole  remaiiung  force  of  Sparta.  Of  the  Lace- 
daemonian >ion¥,  or  military  divisions  (seemingly  six  in  the  aggre- 
gate), two  or  three  had  been  sent  with  Kleomhrotus;  all  the  remainder 
were  novr  dispatched,  even  including  elderly  citizens  up  to  nearly 
sixty  years  of  age,  and  all  who  had  been  left  behind  in  consequence 
of  o'tlier  public  offices.  Archidamus  took  the  commnn<l  (Agesiinus 
still  contiiuiing  to  be  di?abled).  and  employed  himself  in  getting 
together  the  aid  promised  from  Tegea — from  the  villages  representing 
the  disintegTated  Mantineia — from  Corinth,  Sikyon,  Phlius,  and 
Achaia;  all  these  places  being  slill  under  the  same  oligarchies  which 
had  held  them  under  Lacedaemonian  patronnge,  and  still  adhering  to 
Si)arta.  Triremes  were  equlpi)ed  at  Corinth,  as  a  means  of  trans- 
porting the  new  arm}'  across  to  Kreusis,  and  thus  -joitnng  tiie  defeated 
troops"  at  Leuktra;  the  port  of  Kreusis.  the  recent  acquisition  of 
Kleomhrotus,  being  now  found  inestimable,  as  the  only  means  of 
access  into  Ba^otia. 

Meanwhile,  the  defeated  army  still  continued  in  its  entrenched 
camp  at  L'^uktra,  where  the  Thebans  were  at  first  in  no  hurry  to  dis- 
turb it.  Besides  that  this  was  a  very  arduous  enterprise,  even  after 
the  recent  victor}' — we  must  recollect  the  actual  feeling  of  the  The- 
bans tliemselves,'upon  whom  their  own  vktory  had  come  by  surprise 
at  a  moment  whfni  they  were  animated  more  by  despair  than  by  hope. 
They  were  do\d)tless  absorbed  in  the  intoxicating  triumph  and  exul- 
tatifin  of  the  moment,  with  the  embraces  and  felicitations  of  their 
families  in  Thebes,  rescued  from  impending  destruction  by  their 
v:dcr.  Like  the  Svracusans  after  their  last  great  victory  over  the 
Athenian  fleet  in  tlie  Great  Harbor,  they  probably  required  an  inter- 
val to  give  loose  to  their  feelings  of  ecstasy,  before  they  would 
resinue  action.  E])aminondas  and  the  other  leaders,  aware  how 
nuich  the  value  of  Theban  alliance  was  now  enhanced,  endeavored 
to  obtain  re-enforcement  from  without,  before  they  proceeded  to  fol- 
low up  the  blow.  To  Athens  they  sent  a  herald,  crowned  with 
wreaths  of  triumph,  proclaiming  their  recent  victory.  They  invited 
the  Athenians  to  employ  the  present  opportunity  for  taking  full  re- 
venge on  Sparta,  by  joining  their  hands  with  those  of  Thebes.  But 
the  sympathies  of  the  Athenians,  were  now  rather  hostile  than 
friendly  to  Thebes,  besides  that  they  had  sworn  jK'ace  with  Spavta, 
not  a  month  before.  The  senate,  'Uiio  were  assembled  in  the  acro- 
polis when  the  herald  arrived,  heard  his  news  with  evident  cha.gi'in, 
and  dismissed  him  without  even  a  word  of  courtesy;  while  the  un- 
fortunate Plata'ans,  who  were  doubtless  waiting  in  the  city  in 
expectation  of  the  victory  of  Kleombrotus,  and  of  their  own  speedy 


JASON  OF  PHER.E  ARRIVES  AT  LEUKTRA.       819 

re-establishment,  found  themselves  again  struck  down  and  doomed 
to  indefinite  exile. 

To  Jason  of  Pheras  in  Thessaly,  another  Theban  herald  was  sent 
for  the  same  purpose,   and  very  differently  n  ceived.     That  despot 
sent  back  word  that  he  would  come  fortliwilh  by  sea,  and  ordered 
triremes  to  be  equipped  for  the  purpose.     But  this  was  a  mere  decep- 
tion; for  at  the  same  time,  he  collected  the  mercenaries  and  cavalry 
immediately  near  to  him,  and  began  his  march  by  land.     So  rapid 
were  his  movements,  that  he  forestalled  all  oppos'ition— thouuh  he 
had  to  traverse  tlie  territory  of  the  Herakleots  and  Phokians^  who 
were  his  bitter  enemies— and  joined  the  Thebans  safely  in  Bcpotia. 
But  when  the  Theban  leaders  proposed  that,  he  should  attack  tljc 
Laced;emonia!i  camp  in  flank,  from  the  hiiiii  ground,   while  thev 
would  march   straight  up   the   hill  and  attack  it  in  front— Jason 
strongly  dissuaded  the  enterprise  as  too  perilous;  recomm^mding  that 
they  should  permit  the  enemy's  departure  under  capitulation.     "Be 
content  (said  he)  with  the   great  victory  wiiich   you   have  already 
gained.     Do  not  compromise  it  by  attempting  something  yet  more 
hazardous,  against  Lacedaemonians  driven  to  do-;pair  in  their  camp. 
Recollect  that  a  few  days  ago,  you  yourselves  were  in  despa!.-,  and 
that  your  recent  victory  is  the  fruit  of  that  very  feeling.     Remeinber 
that  the  gods  take  pleasure  in  bringing  about  these  sudden  clianiicsof 
fortune."     Having  by  such  represent^itions  convinced  the  Th&ins, 
he  addressed  a  friendly  message  to  the  LacedaMuonians,  remindini^' 
them  of  their  dangerous  position,  as  well  as  of  the  little  trust  to  be 
reposed  in  their  allies— and  offering  himself  as  mediator  to  negotiate 
for  their  safe  retreat.     Their  acquiescence  was  readily  given;  ^uid  at 
his  instance,  a  truce  was  agreed  to  by  both  parties,  assuring  to  the 
Lacedeenioriians  the  liberty  of  quitting* Boeotia,     In  spite  of  the  agree- 
ment,  however,  the   LacecUcmonian  commander  placed  little  faith 
either  in  the  Thebans  or  in  Jason,  appreheutling  a  fraud  for  the  pur- 
po.se  of  inducing  him  to  quit  the  camp  and  of  attacking  him  on  the 
mircli.     Accordingly,  he  issued  public;  orders  in  the  camp  for  every 
inafi  to  be  ready  for  departure  after  the  evening  meal,  and  to  march 
in  the  nigiit  to  Kithaeron,  with  a  view  of  passing  that  mountain  on 
the  next  morning.     Having  put  the  enemy  on  this  false  scent,  he 
directed  his  real  night-march  by  a  different  and  not  verv  easy  way, 
tirst  to  Kreusis,  next  to  ^gosthena  in  the  ^legarian  territory.     The 
Thebans  offered  no  opposition;  nor  is  it  at  all  i)rol)al)le  tliat  they  in- 
tended any  fraud,  considering   that  Jason  was  here  the  guaranty, 
and  that  he  at  least  had  no  motive  to  break  his  word. 

It  was  at  ^gosthena  that  the  retreating  Lacedaemonians  met 
Archidamus,  who  had  advanced  to  that  point  with  the  Laconian  forces, 
and  was  awaiting  the  junction  of  his  Peloponnesian  allies.  The  pur- 
pose of  his  march  being  now  completed,  he  advanced  no  further. 
The  armament  was  disbanded,  and  Lacedaemonians  as  well  as  allies 
returned  home. 


820 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


'I* 


In  all  communities,  the  return  of  so  many  defeated  soldiers,  liber- 
ated under  a  capitulation  by  the  enemy,  would  have  been  a  scene  of 
mourning.     But  in  Sparta  it  was  pregnant  with  grave  and  dangerous 
consequences.     So  terrible  was  the  scorn  and  ignominy  lieaped  upon 
the  Spartan  citizen  who  survived  a  defeat,  that  life  became  utterly 
intolerable  to  him.      The  mere  fact  sufficed  for  his  condemnation, 
without  any  inquiry  into  justifying  or  extenuating  circumstancj's. 
No  citizen  at  home  would  speak  to  him  or  be  seen  consorting  with 
him  in  tent,  game,  or  chorus;  no  other  family  would  intermarry  with 
his-  if  he  was  seen  walking  about  with  an  air  of  cheerfulness,  he  was 
struck  and  ill-used  by  the  passers-by,  until  he  assumed  that  visible 
humility  which  was  supposed  to  become  his  degraded  position.     Such 
rigorous  treatment  (which  we  learn  from  the  panegyrist  Xenophon) 
helps  to  explain  the  satisfaction  of  the  Spartan  father  and  mother, 
when  they  learned  that  their  son  was  among  the  slain  and  not  among 
the  survivors.     Defeat  of  Spartan  troops  had  hitherto  been  rare.    But 
in  the  case  of  the  prisoners  at  Sphakteria,  when  released  from  cap- 
tivity and  brouiiht  back  to  a  degraded  existence  at  Sparta,  some  un- 
easiness had  been  felt,  and  some  precautions  deemed  necessaiy  to 
prevent  them  from  becoming  dangerous  malcontents.     Here  was  an- 
other case  yet  more  formidable.   The  vanquished  returning  from  Leuk- 
tra  were  numerous,  while  the  severe  loss  sustained  in  the  battle  amply 
attested  their  bravery.    Aware  of  the  danger  of  enforcing  against 
them  the  established  custom,  the  Epliors  referred  the  case  to  Ages- 
ilaus-  who  proposed  that  for  that  time  and  case  the  customary  pen- 
alties'should  be  allowed  to  sleep;  but  should  be  revived  afterward  and 
come  into  force  as  before.     Such  was  the  step  accordingly  taken ;  so 
that  the  survivors  from  this  fatal  baltle-tield  were  enabled  to  mingle 
with  the  remaining  citizens  without  dishonor  or  degradation.     The 
step  was  indeed  doubly  necessary,  considering  the  small  aggregate 
number  of  fully  qualified  citizens;  which  number  always  tended  to 
decline— from  the  nature  of  the  Spartan  political  franchise  combined 
with  the  exigences  of  Spartan  training— and  could  not  bear  even  so 
great  a  diminution  as  that  of  the  four  hundred  slain  at  Leuktra. 
"  Sparta  (says  Aristotle)  could  not  stand  up  against  a  single  defeat, 
but  was  ruined  through  the  small  number  of  her  citizens." 

The  cause  here  ail  verted  to  by  Aristotle,  as  explaining  the  utter 
loss  of  ascendency  abroad,  and  the  capital  din.inulion  both  of  power 
and  of  inviolability  at  home,  which  will  now  be  found  to  come  thick 
upon  Sparta,  was  undoubtedly  real  and  important.  But  a  fact  still 
more  important  was  the  alteration  of  opinion  produced  everywhere 
in  Greece  with  regard  to  Sparta,  by  the  sudden  shock  of  the  battle  of 
Leuktra.  All  the  prestiixe  and  old  associations  connected  with  her 
lono-  established  power  vanished;  while  the  hostility  and  fears,  in- 
spired both  by  herself  and  by  her  partisans,  but  hitherto  reluctantly 
held  back  in  silence— now  burst  forth  into  open  manifestation. 
The  ascendency,  exercised  down  to  this  time  by  Sparta  north  of  the 


EXTENSIO^^  OF  TIIEBAN  POWER. 


821 


Corinthian  Gulf,  in  Phokis  and  elsewhere,  passed  aw^ay  from  her, 
and  became  divided  between  the  victorious  Thebans  and  Jason  of 
Pliera3.  _  The  Thebans,  and  the  Boeotian  con  federates 'who  were  now 
in  cordial  sympathy  with  them,  excited  to  enthusiasm  by  their  re- 
cent success,  were  eager  for  fresh  glories,  and  readily  submitted  to 
the  full  exigences  of  military  training;  while  under  a  leader  like  Epam- 
inondas,  tiieir  ardor  was  turned  to  such  good  account,  that  they 
became  better  soldiers  every  month.  The  Phokians,  unable  to  de- 
fend themselves  single-handed,  were  glad  to  come  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Tliebans — as  less  bitterly  hostile  to  tliem  than  the  Thes- 
salian  Jason — and  concluded  with  them  obligations  of  mutual  defense 
and  alliance.  The  cities  of  Euboea,  together  with  the  Lokrians  (both 
Epiknemidian  and  Opuntian),  the  Malians  and  the  town  of  Heraklea, 
followt'd  the  example.  Tiie  latter  town  was  noAV  defenseless;  for 
Jason,  in  returning  from  Ba3otia  to  Thessaly,  had  assaulied  it  and  de- 
stroyed its  fortifications;  cince  by  its  important  site  near  the  pass  of 
Thermopylae,  it  might  easily  be  held  as  a  position  to  bar  his  entrance 
into  Southern  Greece.  The  Boeotian  town  of  Orchomenus,  which 
had  held  with  the  Lacedjemonians  even  until  the  late  battle,  was  now 
quite  defenseless;  and  the  Thebans,  highly  exasperated  against  its 
iniiabitants,  were  disposed  to  destroy  the  city,  reducing  the  inhabit- 
ants to  slavery.  Severe  as  this  proposition  was,  it  would  not  have 
exceeded  the  customary  rigors  of  war:  nor  even  what  mi^lit  have 
befallen  Thebes  herself,  had  Kleombrotus  been  victorious  atLeuktra. 
But  the  strenuous  remonstrance  of  Epaminondas  prevented  it  from 
being  carried  into  execution.  Alike  distinguished  for  mild  temper 
and  for  long-sighted  views,  he  reminded  his  countrymen  that  in  their 
present  aspiring  hopes  toward  ascendency  in  Greece,  it  was  essential 
to  establish  a  character  for  moderation  of  dealing  not  inferior  to  their 
military  courage,  as  attested  by  the  recent  victory.  Accordingly,  the 
Orchomenians  were  pardoned  upon  submission,  and  re-admitiud  as 
members  of  the  Bfpotian  confederacy.  To  the  Thespians,  however, 
the  same  lenity  was  not  extended.  They  were  expelled  from  Bceotia, 
and  their  territory  annexed  to  Thebes.  It  will  be  recollected  that 
immediately  before  the  battle  of  Leuktra,  when  Epaminondas  caused 
proclamation  to  be  made  that  such  of  the  Ba^otians  as  were  disalfected 
to  the  Theban  cause  might  march  away,  the  Thespians  had  availed 
themselves  of  the  permission  and  departed.  The  fugitive  Thespians 
found  shelter  like  the  Plataeans,  at  Athens. 

While  Thebes  was  commemorating  her  recent  victory  by  the  erec- 
tion of  a  treasury-chamber,  and  the  "dedication  of  pious  offerings  at 
Delphi — wiiile  the  military  organization  of  Boeotia  was  receiving 
such  marked  improvement,  and  the  cluster  of  dependent  states 
attached  to  Thebes  was  thus  becoming  larger,  under  the  able  manage- 
ment of  Epaminondas — Jason  in  Thessaly  was  also  growing  more 
powerful  everyday.  He  was  tagus  of  all  Thessaly;  with  its  tribu- 
tary neighbors' under  complete  obedience — with  Macedonia  partially 


822 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


dependent  on  him— and  with  a  mercenary  force,  well-paid  and  trained, 
greater  than  had  ever  been  assembled  in  Greece.  By  dismantling 
Heraklea  in  'his  return  home  from  Breotia,  he  had  hud  open  the 
strait  of  thermopvhr,  so  as  to  be  sure  of  access  into  southern  Greece 
-whenever  he  choose.  His  personal  ability  and  ambition,  combined 
Avilh  his  e:reat  power,  inspired  universal  alarm:  for  no  man  kiieu' 
wldther  he  would  direct  his  arms;  whether  to  Asia,  acraiiist  the  Per- 
sian kins:,  as  he  was  fond  of  boasting— or  northward  against  the  cilies 
in  ("halkidike— or  soutliward  against  Gn  ece.  , 

The  last-mentioned  plan  seemed  the  most  probable,  at  the  begin- 
nino- of  370  B.C.,  half  a  year  after  the  battle  of  Leuktra:  for  Jason 
proclaimed  distinctly  his  intention  of  being  present  at^the  Pythian 
festival  (the  season  for  which  was  about  August  1.  870  B.C.,  ne.ir 
Delphi),  not  onlv  with  splendid  presents  and   sacrifices  to  Apollo, 
but  al^o  at  the  head  of  a  numerous  army.     Orders  had  been  given 
tiiat  his  troops  should  hold  themsehTS  ready  for  military  service- 
about  the  time  when  the  festival  was  to  be  celebrated :  and  requisitions 
had  been  sent  round,  demanding  from  all  his  tributaries  victims  fcr 
the  Pythian  sacrifice,  to  a  total  of  not  less  than  1000  bulls,  and  10,000 
sheen,  goats,  and  swine;  besides  a  prize-bull  to  take  the  lead  in  the 
procession,  for  which  a  wreath  of  gold  was   to   be  given.     Never 
before  had  such  honor  been  done  to  the  gnd\  for  tliose  who  came  to 
offer  sacrifice  were  usually  content  with  one  or  more  bcji-ts  bred  on 
the  neighborinir  plain  of  Kirrha.  We  must  r(  collect,  however,  that  this 
Pvthian  festival  of  370  n.c,  occurred  under  peculi.-tr  circumslances; 
for  the  two  previous  festivals  in  374  B.C.  and  378  B.C.  must  have  been 
comparatively  unfrequented;   in   consecim  nee   of  the  war   between 
Sparta   and  her  allies  on  one  side,  and  Athens  and  lh(  bes  on  the 
otiier- and  also  of  the  occupation  of  Phokis  'oy  Kleombrotus.    Hence 
the   festival   of  370  B.C.,    following  immediately   after   the   peace, 
appeared  to  justifv  an  extraordinary  burst  of  pious  magnificence,  to 
make  up  for  the  luixirardlv  tributes  to  the  god  during  the  two  iormer: 
while  the  hostile  dispositions  of  the  Phokians  would  be  alleged  as  an 
excuse  for  the  military  force  intended  to  accompany  Jason. 

But  there  were  other  intentions,  generally  believed  though  not  for- 
mallv  anno,meed,  which  no  Greek  could  imagine  without  uneasmes.s. 
It  was  affirmed  that  Jason  was  about  to  arrogate  to  himself  the  presi- 
dency and  celebration  of  the  festival,  which  belonged  of  right  to  the 
Amphiktyonic  assemblv.  It  was  feared,  moreover,  that  he  would 
lav  hands  on  the  rich  tfeasiiresof  the  Delphian  temple;  a  scheme  said 
to"  have  been  conceived  bv  the  Svracusan  despot  Dionysius  fifteen 
years  before,  in  conjunction  with  the  Epirot  Alketas.  who  was  now 
dependent  upon  Jason.  As  there  were  no  visible  means  of  warding 
off  this  blow,  the  Delphians  consulted  the  god  to  know  what  they 
were  to  do  if  Jason  approached  the  treasury;  upon  which  I  lie  god 
replied,  that  he  would  him.sdf  take  care  of  it— and  h^  kept  his  word. 
This  enterprising  despot,  in  the  Slower  of  his  age  and  at  the  summit 


RELIEF  TO  THEBES   BY  JASON'S  DEATH.        823 

of  his  power,  perished  most  unexpectedly  before  the  day  of  tlie  festi- 
val arrived.  He  had  been  reviewing  his  cavalry  near  Piiera;,  and 
was  sitting  ta  receive  and  answer  petitioners,  when  seven  young  men 
apj)roached,  aj>parently  in  hot  dispute  with  each  other,  and  appealing 
to  iiini  for  a  seuleinenl.  As  soon  as  ihey  got  near,  they  set  upon  h'im 
and  slew  him.  One  was  killed  on  the  spot  l)y  the  guards,  and  auollier 
also  as  he  was  mounling  on  horseback;  but  the  remaining  five  con- 
trived to  reach  hoi-ses  ready  jnepared  for  them  and  to  gallop  away 
out  of  the  reach  of  pursuit.  In  most  of  the  Grecian  cities  which  these 
fugitives  visited,  they  were  received  wiili  distinguished  honor,  as 
hiving  relieved  the  Grecian  world  from  one  who  inspired  univer>al 
alarm,  now  tiiat  Spartawas  unable  to  resist  him,  while  no  other  power 
had  as  y(?t  taken  her  place, 

Jason  was  succeeded  in  his  dignity,  but  neither  in  his  powder  nor 
abilit)'  b\'  two  brotliers — Polyphroii  and  Polydorus.  Had  he  lived 
longer,  he  would  have  inlluenced  most  seriously  the  subsequent  des- 
tinies of  Greece.  What  else  h(i  woukl  iiave  done,  we  cannot  say;  but 
he  would  have  interfered  maleriallv  with  the  (leveloi)nient  of  I'hehan 
power.  Thebes  was  a  great  gainer  by  his  death,  tiiough  perfectly 
innocent  of  it,  and  though  in  alliance  with  him  to  the  last,  insomuch 
tliat  his  widow  went  to  I'eside  there  for  security.  Epaminondas  was 
relieved  from  a  most  fo;niidable  rival,  while  the  body  of  Theban 
allies  north  of  Bceotia  became  much  more  dependent  than  they  would 
have  remained,  if  there  had  been  a  competing  power  like  that  of 
Ja3i(m  in  Thessaly.  Tae  treasures  of  the  god  were  preserved  a  few 
years  longer,  to  be  rilled  by  anolher  hand. 

While  th','se  proceedings  were  going  on  in  Northern  Greece,  during 
the  months  immediately  succeeding  the  battle  of  Leuktra,  events  not 
less  serious  and  stirring  had  occurred  in  Peloponnesus.  The  trea.ty 
sworn  at  S[)arta  twenty  days  before  tli:it  battle,  bound  the  Lacediemo- 
niaus  todisf)and  their  forces,  remove  all  their  harmosts  and  garrisons,- 
a  id  leave  every  subordinate  city  to  its  own  liberty  of  action.  As  they 
did  not  scruple  to  violate  the  treaty  by  the  orders  sent  to  Kleombro- 
tus, so  they  probably  were  not  zealous  in  executing  the  remaining 
conditions;  though  ollicers  were  named,  for  the  express  purpose  of 
going  round  to  see  that  the  evacuation  (,f  the  cities  was  really  carried 
into  effect.  But  it  i)robably  was  not  accomplished  in  twenty  days; 
nor  would  it  perhaj)s  have  been  ever  more  than  nominally  accom- 
"plislied,  if  Kleombiotus  had  been  successful  in  BtX'oiia.  But  after 
tliese  twenty  days  came  the  portentous  intelligence  of  that  prince  and 
his  army.  Tiie  invincible  arm  of  Sparta  was  broken ;  she  had  not  a  man 
to  spare  for  tlie  maintenance  of  foreign  ascendency.  Her  harmosts 
disappeared  at  once  (as  they  had  disapi"»eared  from  the  Asiatic  and 
insular  cilies  twenty-three  vears  before,  immedialelv  after  the  battle 
of  Knidiis)  and  returned  liome.  Nor  was  this  all.  The  Lacedae- 
monian ascendency  had  been  maintained  everywhere  b}^  local 
oligarchies  or  dekarcliies,  which  had  been  for  the  most  part  violent 


824 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTR.i, 


and  oppressive.  Against  these  governments,  now  deprived  of  tlicir 
foreign  support,  the  long-accinnuialcd  tlood  of  internal  discontent 
burst  with  irresistible  force,  stinnilated  probably  by  returning  exiKs. 
Their  past  misL!;overinneut  was  avenged  by  severe  sentences  ar.d 
proscription,  to  the  length  (^f  great  reactionary  injustice;  and  the 
parties  banished  by  thisanti-tSi)artan  revolution  became  so  numerous, 
as  to  harass  and  alarm  seriou^sly  the  newly-cstablishcd  governments. 
Such  were  the  commotions  which,  during  the  latter  half  of  871  li.c, 
disturbed  many  of  the  Peloponnesian  towns— Phigalcia,  Phlius, 
Corinth,  Sikyou.  Megara,  etc.,  though  with  great  local  difference 
both  of  detail  and  of  result. 

But  the  city  where  intestine  commotion  took  place  in  its  most 
violent  form  was  Argos.  We  do  wot  know  how  this  fact  \\ as  con- 
nected wilh  the  general  state  of  Grecian  ])()lilics  at  the  time;  for 
Argos  had  not  been  in  any  way  subject  to  Sparta,  nor  a  member  of 
the  Spartan  confederacy,  nor  (so  far  as  we  know)  concerned  in  the 
recent  war,  since  the  p( ace  of  Antalkidas  in  887  B.C.  The  Argeiau 
government  was  a  democracy,  and  the  popular  leaders  were  vehe- 
ment in  their  denunciations  aga.inst  the  oligarchical  opposition-party 
— who  were  men  of  wealth  and  great  family  position.  These  last, 
thus  denounced,  foiined  a  conspiracy  for  the  forcible  overthrow  of 
the  government.  But  tlie  conspiracy  w.js  discovered  prior  to  execu- 
tion, and  some  of  the  suspected  conspirators  were  interrogated  under 
the  torture  to  make  them  re'veaT  their  accemiplices;  under  which 
interrogation,  one  of  Ihem  deposed  against  thirty  conspicuous 
citizens.  The  pc(»p]e,  after  a  liasty  triaT.  put  the^e  thirty  men  to 
death,  and  conliscated  their  property,  while  others  slew  ihemselvts 
to  escape  the  same  fate.  So  furiou's  did  the  fear  and  wrath  of  the 
people  become,  exasperated  1)V  the  popular  leadeis,  that  they  con- 
tinvicd  their  executions  until  they  had  put  to  death  1200  (or  as  some 
say,  1500)  of  the  principal  (itize'ns.  At  lengtli  the  poi)ular  leadeis 
be'came  themselves  tired  and  afraid  of  what  they  had  done;  upou 
which  the  i)eopIe  were  animated  to  fury  against  them,  and  put  them 
to  death  also. 

This  gloomy  series  of  events  was  termed  the  Skytalism,  or  Cudgel- 
,ing,  from  the  instrument  (as  we  arc  told)  by  which  these  multiplied 
executions  were  consunnnated;  thoui^h  the  name  seems  more  to 
indicate  an  imjietuous  ])opuh;r  insurrecliMi  than  deliberate  execu- 
tions. We  know  the  facts  too  impt  riectly  to  be  able  to  infer  any- 
thing more  than  the  brutal  working  of  angry  political  passion  amid 
a  population  like  that  of  Argos  or  Korkyra,  where  there  was  not  (as 
at  Athens)  either  a  taste  for  speech,  or  the  habit  of  being  guided  by 
speech,  and  of  hearing  both  sides  of  every  question  fully  discussed. 
i;icero  remarks  tiiat  he  had  never  heard  of  any  Argeian  orator.  The 
acrimony  of  Demosthenes  and  ^Eschines  was  discharged  by  mutual 
eloquence  of  vituperation,  while  the  assembly  or  the  dikasiery 
afterward  decided  between  them.     AVe  arc  told  that  the  assembled 


DISCOURAGEMENT  OF  SPARTA. 


825 


Athenian  people,  when  they  lieard  the  news  of  the  Skytalism  at 
Argos,  were  so  shocked  at  it,  that  thev  caused  the  solemnity  of  puri- 
fication to  be  performed  round  the  assembly. 

Though  Sparta  thus  saw  her  c  oiitidential  partisans  disposed   ex- 
pelled, or   maltreated,    throughout  so  manv  of  the  Peloponne'^ian 
cities— and  though  as  yet  there  was  no  Thc'bau  interference  within 
the  isthmus,  either  actual  or  prospective— vet  she  was  profoundly 
discouraged,  and  incapable  of  any  effort  either  to  afford  protection 
or  to  uphold  ascendency.     One  single  defeat  had  driven  her  to  the 
necessity  of  contending  for  home  and  familv;  probably  too  the  dis- 
positions of  her  own  Peria-ki  and  Helots  in  Laconia.  were  such  as  to 
require  all  her  force  as  well  as  all  her  watchfulness.     At  any  rate 
her  empire  and  her  influence  over  the  sentiments  of  Greeks  out  of 
Laconia,  became  suddenly  extinct,  to  a  degree  which  astonishes  us, 
when  we  recollect  that  it  had  become  a  sort  of  tradition  in  the  Greek 
mind,  and  that,  only  nine  years  before,  it  had   readied   as  far  as 
Olynthus.     How^   completely  her  ascendency  had   passed   away,  is 
shown  in  a  remarkable  step  taken  by  xVtliens,  seemingly  toward^  the 
close  of  371   iJ.c,  about  four  months  after  the  battle  of  Leuktra. 
Many  of  the  Peloponnesian  cities,  though  they  had  lost  both  their 
fear  and  their  reverence  for  Sparta,  we're  still  anxious  to  continue 
members  of  a  voluntary  alliance   uneler  the  presidency  of  some  con- 
siderable city.     Of  this  feeling  the  Athenians  took  advantage,  to  send 
envoys  and  invite  them  to  enter  into  a  common  leaijue  at  Athens,  on 
the  basis  of  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  and  of  the  pea'ce  recently  sworn 
at  Sparta.     Many  of  them  obeying  the  summons,  entered  into  an 
engagement  to  the  following  effect:  "I  will  adhere  to  the  peace  sent 
down  by  the  Persian  king,  and  to  the  resolutions  of  the  Athenians 
and  the  allies  generally.     If  any  of  the  cities  wiio  have  sworn  this 
oath  shall  be  attacked,  I  will  assist  her  with  all  mv  might."     What 
cities,  or  how  many,  swore  to  this  engagement,  we" are  not  told;  we 
make  out  indirectly  that  Corinth  was  o"ne;  but  the  Eleians  refused 
it.  on  the  ground  that  tJieir  wiiht  of  sovereigntv  over  the  Marganeis, 
the   Triphylians.   and  the   Skilluntians,   was  not  recognized!^    The 
formation  of  the  league  itself,  however,  with  Athens  as  president,  is 
a  striking  fact,  as  evidence  of  the  sudden  dethnmement  of  Sparta, 
and  as  a  warning  that  she  would  henceforward  have  to  move  in  her 
own    separate   orbit,  "like    Alliens    after    the    Peloponnesian    war. 
Athens  stepp  'd  into  the  place  of  Sparla  as  president  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian confederacy,  and  guaranty  of  the  sworn  peace;  thouuh  tiie 
cities  which  entered  into  this  newcompact  were  not  lor  that  reason 
understood  to  break  with  I  heir  ancient  president. 

Another  incident  too.  apparently  occurring  about  the  present  time, 
though  we  caiuK^t  mark  its  ex-ict  date— serves  to  mark  the  altere{i 
])Osition  of  Sparta.  The  Thebans  preferred  in  the  assembly  of 
Amphiktyons  an  accusation  against  her  for  the  unlawful  capture  of 
their  citadel  the  Kadmeia  by  Phoebidyrs,  while  under  a  sworn  peace; 


826 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRxV. 


lii 


and  for  the  sanction  conferred  by  the  Spartan  authorities  on  this  act, 
in  detaining  and  occupying  the  phice.  The  Amphikiyoiiic  asscniljly 
found  the  Spartans  guilty,  and  condemned  them  to  a  line  ot  500 
talents.  As  the  tine  was  not  paid,  tlie  assembly,  after  a  certain  inter- 
val doubled  it;  but  the  second  sentence  remained  luiexecuted  as 
weil  as  the  first,  since  there  were  no  means  of  enforeenunt.  Prob- 
ably neither  those  who  preferred  the  charge,  nor  those  who  pas.-ed 
the" vote  expected  that  the  Laced;emonians  w^ould  really  submit  to 
pay  the  fine.  The  utmost  which  could  be  done,  by  way  of  ])unis!i- 
mt'iit  for  such  contumacy,  would  be  to  exclude  them  from  ilie 
Pythian  irames,  which  were  celebrated  under  the  presidency  of  the 
Aniphiktyons;  and  we  may  perhaps  presume  that  they  really  were 

thus  excluded.  .       . 

The  incident,  however,  deserves  peculiar  notice,  m  more  than  one 
point  of  yiew.     First,  as  indicating  the  lessened  dignity  of  Sparta. 
Since  the  victory  of  Leuklra  and  the  death  of  Jason,  Thebes  h:id 
become   preponderant,  especially  in    Northern    Greece,  wliere    the 
majority  of  the  nations  or  races  yoting  in  the  Amjihlktyonic  assem- 
bly were  situated.     It  is  plainly  through  the  ascendency  of  1  hebes, 
that  this  condemnatory  vote  was  passed.     Next,  as  indictitiug  the 
incipient  tendeticy,  which  we  shall  liereafter  observe   still  iuriher 
developed,  to  exteud  the  functions  of  the  Amphiktyonic  assembly 
bey(md  its' special  sphere  of  religious  solenuiities,  and  to  make  it  tlio 
instrument  of  politicjd  coercion  or  ivyeuge  in  the  linnds  of  the  pre- 
dominant state.     In  the  previ(»us  course  of  this  history,  an  entire 
century  has  passed  without  giving  occasion  to  mention  the  Amphik- 
tyonic assembly  as  tiikimr  part  in  politic  al  .ifTairs.     Neitln  r  Thu(  yd- 
ides  nor    Xenophon,   Ihouuh   their  united   histories   cover   seventy 
years  chiefly  of  Hellenic  conflict,  ever  speak  of  that  assembly.    The 
latter'   indeed,  does   not   even   notice   this   fine   imposed   upem   tl;e 
LacedcTinonians,  although  it  falls  within  the   period  of  his  hi>tory. 
We  know  the  fact  only  from  Diodorus  and  Justin;  and  unfortunately, 
merely  as  a  naked  fact,  without  any  collateral  or  iireliminary  details. 
DurinVthe  sixty  or  seventy  years  preceding  the  battle  of  Leuktni, 
Sparta'^had  always  had  her  regular  political  confederacy  and  synod 
of  allies  convened  by  herself:  her  political  ascendency  was  exercised 
over  them  to  iwmine,  by  a  method  more  direct  and  easy  than  that  of 
perverting  the  reliaioiis  authority  of  the  Amphiktyonic  a>sembly, 
even  if  s^ich  a  proceedinsr  were 'open  to  her.     But  when  Thebes, 
after  the  battle  of  Leuktra.  became  tlie  more  powerful   state   mm- 
vidually.  she  had  no  such  established  confederacy  and  synod  of  alius 
to  .sanction  her  propositions  and  to  share  or  abet  her  antij^athies.  ^  Tin; 
Amphiktyonic  asst-niblv.  meeting  nlternately  at  Delphi  and  at  Ther- 
mopylae, and  composed  of  twelve  ancient  races,  i>rinci|)ally  belonging 
to  Nortliern  Greece,  as  well  as  most  of  them  inconsiderable  in  power 
—presented  itself  as  a  convenient   instrunM-nt   for   her    purposes. 
There  was  a  certain  show  of  reason  for  considering  the  seizure  of  lin 


PROCEEDINGS  IN  xYRCADIA. 


827 


Kndmeia  by  Phoebidas  as  a  religious  offense;  since  it  was  not  only 
executed  during  the  Pythian  festival,  but  was  in  itself  a  glariuo- 
violation  ot  the  public  law  and  interpolitical  obligations  recoc:nized 
between  Grecian  cities;  which,  like  other  obligations,  were  bcdieved 
to  be  under  the  sanction  of  the  gods;  though  probably,  if  the  Athe- 
nians and  PlatcCans  had  preferreda  similar  complaint  to  the  Amphik- 
tyons  against  Thebes  for  her  equally  unjust  attempt  to  surprise 
Platcea  under  full  peace  in  the  spring  of  431  jj.c— both  Spartans  and 
Thebans  would  have  resisted  it.  In  the  present  case,  however,  the 
Thebans  had  a  ca.se  against  Sparta  suflieiently  plausible,  when  com- 
bined witii  their  overruling  ascendency,  to  carry  a  majority  iu  the 
Am})hiktyonic  assembly,  and  to  procure  the  imposition  of  this  enor- 
mous tine.  In  itself  the  sentence  produced  no  direct  effect— which 
will  explain  the  silence  of  Xenophon.  But  it  is  the  first  of  a  series 
of  procvedings,  connected  with  the  Amphiktyons,  Avhich  will  ])e 
found  hereafter  pregnant  with  serious  results  for  Grecian  stability 
and  independence. 

Among  all  the  inhabitants  of  Peloponnesus,  none  were  more 
p(»werfully  alTected,  by  the  recent  Spartan  overthrow  at  Leuktra, 
than  the  Arcadians.  Tegea,  their  most  important  city,  situated  on 
the  border  of  Laconia,  was  governed  by  an  oligarchy  wholly  in  the 
interest  of  Sparta;  Orehomenus  was  of  like  sentiment;  and  Mantineia 
had  been  broken  up  into  separate  villages  (.'ibout  fifteen  years  before) 
by  the  Lacedaemonians  themselves— an  act  of  hiuh-handed  injustice 
committed  at  the  zenith  of  their  power  after  the  peace  of  Antalkidas. 
The  remainining  Arcadian  population  v/ere  iu .  great  proportion 
villagers;  rude  men,  but  excellent  soldiers,  and  always  ready  to  fol- 
low the  Lace;hemonian  banners,  as  well  from  old  habit  and  military 
deference,  as  from  the  love  of  plunder. 

The  defeat  of  Leuktra  effaced  this  ancient  sentiment.  The  Arca- 
dians not  only  ceased  to  count  upon  victory  and  plunder  in  the  ser- 
vice of  Spaita.  but  began  to  fancy  that  their  own  military  prowess 
was  not  inferior  to  that  of  the  Spartans;  w^iile  the  disappearance  of 
the  harmosts  left  them  free  to  follow  their  own  inclinations.  It  was 
hv  the  Manlineians  that  the  movement  was  first  commenced. 
Divested  of  Grecian  city-life,  and  condemned  to  live  in  separate  vil- 
la:xes,  each  under  its  ownphilo-Spartan  oligarchj^  they  had  nourished 
a  i)rofound  animosity,  which  manifested  itself  on  the  first  opportunity 
of  deposing  these  oligarchies  ;ind  coming  ao-ain  toirether.  The" 
resolution  was  unanimously  adopted  to  re-establish  j\iautineia  with 
its  walls,  and  resume  their  political  consolidation;  while  the  leaders 
banished  by  the  Si)artans  at  their  former  intervention,  now  doubtless 
returned  to  become  foremost  in  the  work.  As  the  breaking  up  of 
Mantineia  had  been  one  of  the  most  obnoxious  acts  of  Spartan 
omnipotence,  so  there  was  now  a  strong  sympathy  in  favor  of  its 
re-establishment.  ]\Iany  Arcadians  f roin  other  quarters  came  to  lend 
auxiliary  labor.     Moreover  the  Eleiaus  sent  three  talents  as  a  cou- 


828 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


tribution  toward  the  cost.  Deeply  mortified  by  this  proceeding,  yet 
too  weak  to  prevent  it  by  foree,  the  Spartans  sent  Agesilaus  with  a 
friendly  remonstrance.  Having  been  connected  with  the  city  by 
patermll  tiesof  liospitalitv,  lie  had  declined  the  command  of  iheaimy 
of  coercion  previously  employed  against  it;  nevertheless,  on  lliis 
occasion  the  >lantiiieian  leaders  refused  to  convene  their  pub  he 
assembly  to  he:ir  his  communication,  desiring  that  he  woiikl  make 
kMOwn  his  purpose  to  them.  Accordingly,  he  intimated  that  he  had 
com'^  with  no  view  of  hindering  the  re-establi^hment  of  the  city,  but 
«;implv  to  recniest  that  tliev  would  defer  it  until  the  consent  of  Sparta 
coukrbe  formally  dven -/which  (he  promised)  should  soon  be  torth- 
comin'^  to'-^ether  with  a  handsome  subscription  to  lighten  the  cost. 
But  the  Mfuitineian  leaders  answered,  that  compliance  was  impos- 
sibl*-  «ince  a  public  ivsoUition  had  already  been  taken  to  prosecute 
the  work  forthwith.  Enraged  at  such  a  rebuff,  yet  without  power  to 
recent  it  Agesilaus  was  compelled  to  return  home.  The  Man- 
tinei  m^  persevered  and  completed  the  rebuilding  of  their  city,  on  a 
level  site,  and  in  an  elliptical  form,  surrounded  with  elaborate  walls 

and  towerr.  ,, 

The  alTront  here  offered,  probably  studiously  offered,    by   J\ian- 
linei  n  leaders  who  htid  either  been  exiles  themselves,  orsjTni)athiz(d 
withthoexiles— was  only  the  prelude  to  a  series  of  others  (presently 
to  be  recounted)  vet  more  trailing  and  intolerable.     But  it  was  doubt- 
less felt  to  the  (iiiiek  both  by  the  Ephors  and  by  Agesilaus,  as  a  pub- 
lic F-mptom  of   that  prostration  into  which  they  had  so  suddenly 
fallen      To  av>preciate  fully  such  painful  sentiment,  we  must  recol- 
kct  that  an  exaggerated  pride  and  sense  of  dignity,  individual  as 
well  as  collective,  founded  upon  military  excellence  and  earned  by 
incredible  ri"-()r  of  training— was  tlie  chief  mental  result  imbibed  by 
eveW  puiMl  of  Lvkura:us,  and  hiiherto  ratified  as  legitimate  by  the 
^reneral  testinony  of  Greece.     This  was  his  principal  recompense  for 
the  severe  fatiuue,  tiie   intense  self-suppression,  the  narrow,  mono- 
tonous ind  unlettered  routine,  wdierein  he  was  born  and  died.     As 
an  individual,  the  Spartan  citizen  was  pointed  out  by  the  finger  ot 
lu  miration  at  the  Olympic  and  other  festivals;  while  he  saw  his  city 
suMp'ieitcd  f'om  the  most  distant  regions  of  Greece,  and  obeyed 
almost  everywlK're  near  her  own  border,  as  Pan-Hellenic  presuUnt. 
On  a  suddc  n,  with  scarce  any  preparatory  series  of  events,  he  now 
felt  this  proud  prerogative  sentiment  not  only  robbed  ot  its  f()rmer 
tribute     but   stung   in  the    most    mortifying    manner.     Agesilaus. 
e^'wcially  was  the  more  open  to  such  humiliation,  since  he  was  not 
ordy  a   Spartan  to  the  core,  but  loaded  with  the  consciousness   ol 
havin^  exercised  more  intluence  than  any  king  before  him— ot  having 
succeeded  to   the    throne   at  a    moment  when   Sparta  was  at  the 
miximum  of  her  power— and  of  having  now  in  his  old  age  accom- 
panied her,  in  part  brought  her  by  his  misjudgmeuts,  into  her  pres- 
ent degradation. 


FEELING  AGAINST  AGESILAUS  AT  SPARTxV.    829 

Agesilaus  had  moreover  incurred  unpopularity  among  the  Spartans 
themselves,  whose  chagrin  took  the  form  of  religious  scruple  txnd 
uneasiness  It  has. been  already  stated  that  he  .vlis,  and  had  been 
Irom  childhood,  lame,  which  deformity  had  been  vehemeutly  insisted 
^i"  ^-  ^'onoPP'^"''."^^  (during  the  dispute  between  him  and  Leotych- 
ides  in  398  b.c.  for  the  vacant  throne)  as  disqualifviug  him  for  the 
regal  dignity,  and  as  being  the  precise  calamity  agamst  which  an 
ancient  oracle-"  Beware  of  a  Lmie  reign  "-had  given  warnin- 
Ingenious  interpretation  by  Lysander.  combined  with  superior  pcu-- 
sonal  merit  m  Agesilaus  and  suspicious  about  the  Icijitimaey  of  Leoty- 
chides,  had  caused  the  objection  to  be  then  overruled  But  there 
had  always  been  a  party,  even  during  the  palmy  days  of  Ao-e^ihui'^ 
who  thought  that  he  had  obtained  the  crown  under  no  irood  jui'^piees' 
And  when  the  humiliation  of  Sparta  arrived,  every  man's  relinio,; 
suggested  to  him  readily  the  cause  of  it—"  See  what  comes  of  haviii- 
set  at  no4ight  tlie  gracious  warning  of  the  gods,  and  put  upon  ou? 
selves  a  lame  reign!"  In  spite  of  such  untoward  impression,  how- 
ever, the  real  energy  and  bravery  of  Agesilaus,  which  had  not 
deserted  even  an  infirm  body  and  an  age  of  seventy  years  was  moiv 
than  ever  indispensable  to  his  country.  He  was  still  the  chief  leader 
ot  her  affairs,  condemned  to  the  sad  necessity  of  submittiiu'-  to 
this  Mautineian  affront,  and  much  worse  that  followed  it.  without 
tlie  least  power  of  hintlr;mcc. 

The  re-establlshnient  of  Mantineia  was  probably  completed  durin^ 
the  autumn  and  winter  of  b.c.  871-70.  Such  coJlescenee  of  vilhrnel 
into  a  town,  coupled  with  the  predominance  of  feelings  lio^til^^to 
Sparta,  appears  to  have  suggested  the  idea  of  a  laruei-  political  union 
among  all  who  bore  the  Arcadian  name.  As  yet,  no  such  union  had 
ever  existed;  the  fractions  of  the  Arcadian  name  had  nothino-  in  com- 
mon, apart  from  other  Greeks,  except  many  legendary  andl-elirrious 
sympathies,  with  a  belief  in  the  same  heroic  Imeage  and  indin-c^ious 
antiquity.  But  now  ihe  idea  and  aspiration,  espoused  with  peculiar 
ardor  by  a  leading  Mantineian  named  Lykomedes,  si)read  it-elf 
rapidly  over  the  country,  to  form  a  "  commune  Arcadum,"  or  central 
Arcadian  authority,  composed  in  cert;iin  proportions  out  of  all  the 
sections  now  autonomous- and  invested  with  peremptory  power  of 
determining  by  the  vote  of  its  majority.  Such  central  power  how- 
ever, was  not  intended  to  absorb  or  set  aside  the  separate  govern- 
ments, but  only  to  be  exercised  for  certain  definite  purposes-  in 
mamtainmg  unanimity  at  home,  together  with  concurrent  in'de- 
pendent,  action  as  to  foreign  .=;tates.  This  plan  of  a  Pan-Arctidian 
federation  was  warmly  promoted  by  the  Mantineians,  who  looked  to 
it  as  a  protection  to  themselves  in  case  the  Spartan  power  should 
revive;  as  well  as  by  the  Thebans  and  Argeians,  from  whom  aid  wa>s 
expected  in  case  of  need.  It  found  great  favor  in  most  paits  of 
Arcadia,  especially  in  the  small  districts  bordeiinn;  on  Laconia  which 
stood  most  in  need  of  union  to  protect  themselves  against  the  Spur- 


830 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


I 


t-xns— the  >Ia?nalians,  Parihasians,  Eutresians.  iEgytcs,  etc.  But  the 
jealousies  among  the  more  considerable  cities  made  some  of  them 
adverse  to  anv  scheme  emanaiing  from  ]Mantineia.  Among  iLcse 
mifiiendly  opponents  were  Ileniea,  on  the  west  of  Arcadia  bordering 
on  Elis— Orchoinenus,  conterminous  with  Mantiueia  to  the  north — 
and  Tesxea,  conterminous  to  the  south.  The  hold  of  the  Sparlans  ou 
ireatlil  hud  been  ahvavs  maintained  chiefly  through  Oxhomeiius 
and  Tegea.  The  former  was  the  place  where  they  dt  po.-ii(  d  ihdr 
liostages  taken  from  other  suspected  towns;  the  latter  was  ruled  ly 
Stasippus  and  an  oleogarchy  devoted  to  their  interests. 

Among  the  population  of  Tegea,  however,  a  large  proportion  were 
ardent  partisans  of  the  new  Pan-Arcadian  movenurit,  Mid  desirous 
of  breaking  off  their  connection  with  Sparta.  At  the  head  of  this 
])arty  wert^Proxenus  and  Kallibius,  while  Stasippus  ahd  his  friends, 
supported  by  a  senate  composed  chi(  fly  of  their  partisans,  vehemtntly 
opposed  any  alteration  of  the  existing  system.  Proxenus  and  Ins 
partisans  resolved  to  appeal  to  the  assembled  people,  whomaieord- 
inirly  tliey  convoked  in  arms:  pacific  popular  assemblies,  with  free 
diSussion.  forming  seemingly  no  part  of  the  constitution  of  the  city. 
Stasippus  and  his  friends  appeared  in  nrmed  i. umbers  also,  and  a  con- 
flict ensued,  in  which  each  party  charged  the  (ther  with  bad  faith 
and  with  strikinir  the  first  blow.  At  first  Sta:-ippus  had  the  i;dv:in- 
ta'je.  Proxenus  with  a  few  of  the  oj^posite  party  were  slain,  \\liile 
Kallibius  with  the  remainder  maintained  himself  near  the  town-wall, 
and  in  possession  of  the  gate,  on  the  side  toward  Mantiueia.  Totliat 
cilv  he  had  bei"ore  dispatched  an  express,  entreating  aid,  while  he 
opened  a  parley  with  the  opponents.  Presently  the  ]Mantinean  force 
arrived,  and  was  admitted  within  the  gates,  upon  which  Stasippus, 
seeing  that  he  could  no  lomicr  maintain  himself,  escaped  by  anoiht  r 
gate  towards  Pallantium.  Ue  took  sanctuary  with  a  few  friends  in 
a  neiixhborinic  temple  of  Artemis,  whither  he  was  pursued  by  his 
atlversaries,  who  removed  the  roof,  and  began  to  cast  the  tiles  down 
upon  them.'  The  unfortunate  men  were  obliged  to  surrender.  Fet- 
tered and  placed  on  a  cart,  they  were  carried  back  to  Tegea.  and  put 
on  their  trial  before  the  united  Tegeans  and  ]\Iantineiatis,  who  con- 
demned them  :iiid  put  them  to  death.  Eight  hundred  Tegeans,  of 
the  defeated  partv,  fled  as  exiles  to  Sparta. 

Such  was  the  ilnportant  revolution  which  now  took  place  atTegcn, 
a  struimle  of  force  on  both  sides  and  not  of  discussicm— as  wasin  the 
nrdurtTof  the  Greek  oligarchical  governments,  where  scarce  any  seri- 
ous chamrc  of  policy  in  the  state  could  be  brought  about  without 
viole::ce.  "^  It  decided  the  success  of  the  Pan-Arcadiun  movenunt, 
which  now  proceeiUd  with  redoubled  enthusiasm.  Both  ]\Iantir.eia 
and  Teii-ea  were  cordiully  united  in  its  favor;  though  Orcliomenus, 
still  strenuous  in  opposing  it,  hired  for  that  purpose,  as  well  as  for 
her  own  defense,  a  body  of  meicenaries  from  Corinth  mider  Poly- 
tropus.     A  full  assembly  of  the  Arcadian  name  was  convoked  at  a 


AGESILAUS  IN  ARCADIA. 


831 


small  town  called  Asea,  in  the  mountainous  district  west  of  Tcoea 
I  appears  to  have  been  numcrouslv  attended,  for  we  hejn-  of  on e 
p  aee  Eut.^a  (in  the  district  of  Mount  M.^nalus  and  ear  he  l^/rd^s 
of  LacoMia)  from  whence  every  single  male  adult  went  to  tl" 
assembly.  It  was  here  that  the  consummation  of  the  Pan-  \rcad Im 
stdl  slood'L'or  ^"'^^^  ''''^'^'^^^^'  ^i^-ugh  Orchomenus  and  Henia 

There  could  hardly  be  a  more  fatal  blow  to  Sparta  than  this  loss  to 
herself,  and  transfer  to  her  enemies,  of  Tegea,  the  most  powert^d  of 
her  remauung  allies.     To  assist  the  exiles"  and  avenge  Stasippus  as 
well  as  to  arrest  the  Arcadian  movement,  she  resoWcnl  on  a  march 
nto  the  country,  m  spite  of  her  present  dispirited  condilion;  while 
IIera3a  andLepreum,  but  no  other  places,  sent  contingents  to  her  aid 
From  Lhs  and  Argos,  on  the  other  liand,  re-en forcx.nents  came  to 
Mantineia  and  Tega.     Proclaiming  that   the  Mantineians  had  vio- 
lated th(3  recent  peace  by  their  entry  into  Tegea,  Agesilaus  marched 
across  the  border  against  them.      The  first  Arcadian  town  which 
he  reached  was  Eut^ea,  wiiere  he  found   that  all  the  male  adulis 
had  gone   to   the   great  Arcadian  assemblv.     Though   the  feeb'r^r 
population,  remaining  behind,  were  completely  in 'his  power   he 
lie  took  scrupulous  care  to  respect  both  person  and  property,  and 
even  ent  aid  to  rebuild  a  decayed  portion  of  the  wall.     At  Eut«a  ho 
halted  a  day  or  two,  thinking  it  prudent  to  wait  for  the  iunction  of 
the  mercenary  force  and  the  Boeotian  exiles  under  Polytropus   now 
at  Orchomenus.     Against  the  latter  place,  however,  the  Mantineians 
had  marched  under  Lykomedes,   wliile   Polvtropus,    comin*'-  forth 
trom  the  walls  to  meet  them,  had  been  defeated  with  loss  and  slain 
Hence  Agesilaus  was  compelled  to  advance  onward  with  his  own 
unassisted  forces,  through  the  territory  of  Tegea  up  to  the  neighbor- 
hood ot  Mantineia.     His  onward  march  left  the  way  from  A^ea  to 
.  le^ea  free,  upon  which  the  Arcadians  assembled  at  Asea  broke  up 
and  marched  by  night  to  Tegea;  from  whence  on  the  next  dav  thev 
proceeded  to  Mantineia,  along  the  mountain  ranire  eastward  of  the 
legeatic  plain;  so  that  the  whole  Arcadian  force  thus  became  united 
Agesilaus  on  his  side,  having  ravaged  the  fields  and  encamped 
within  little  more  than  two  miles  from-the  w^alls  of  Mantineia  was 
agreeably  surprised  by  the  junction  of  his  allies  from  Orchomenus 
who  had  eluded  by  a  night- march  the  vigilance  of  the  en^'inv      Both 
on  one  side  an<l  on  the  other,  the  forces  were  thus  concentrated 
Agesilaus  found  Iiimself  on  the  first  night,  without  intendin<^  it* 
embosomed  in  a  recess  of  the  mountains  near  3[antineia.  wdierc^thi 
Mantineians  gathered  on  the  high  ground  around  in  order  to  iWack 
him  from  above  the  next  morning.     By  a  well-niana"-fHl  -etreat   he 
extricated  himself  from  this  inconvenient  position,  and  rc£rained'th(^ 
l)lain;  Avherc  he  remained  three  days,  urepared  to  ixive  baUle  if  the 
enemy  came  forth,  in  order  that  he  min-ht^not  seem  (savs  Xeno- 
phon)  to  hasten   his  departure  through  fear."     As  the  cneiny  kept 


862 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


m 


within  their  walls,  he  marclicd  homeward  on  the  fourth  day  to  hi8 
former  camp  in  the  Teuean  territory.  The  enemy  did  not  pursue, 
and  he  tlien  pushed  on  his  march,  though  it  was  late  in  the  evening, 
to  Eutiea;  *"  wishing  (savs  Xenoplion)  to  get  his  troops  oft"  betore 
even  the  enemy's  tiivs  coidd  be  seen,  in  order  tliat  no  one  might  say 
tiiat  hi^  returnVas  a  tliglit.  He  thought  that  he  had  raised  the  spirit 
of  Spirta  out  of  the  previous  discouragement,  by  invading  Arcadia 
and  ravaging  the  country  without  any  enemy  coming  torlh  to  tight 
him."  The  army  was  tlien  brought  back  to  ?parta  i\m\  disbanded. 
It  had  now  become  a  matter  of  boast  for  Agesilaus  (according  to 
his  own  friendly  historian)  to  keep  the  field  for  three  or  four  days,  with- 
out showing  fear  of  Arcadians  and  Eleians!  So  fatally  had  bpartan 
pride  broken  down,  since  the  day  (less  than  eighteen  mouths  before) 
when  the  peremptory  order  had  been  sent  to  Klcombrotus,  to  maich 
out  of  Phokis  straight  against  Thebes! 

Nevertheless  it  was  not  from  fear  of  Ag(silai:s.  but  from  a  wise 
discretion,  that  the  Arcadians  and  Eleians  had  kept  within  the  walls 
of  Mantineia.  Epaminondas  with  the  ThcLan  aimy  was  approach- 
in'^-  to  their  aid,  and  daily  expected;  a  sum  of  ten  talents  having  been 
lent  by  the  Eleians  to  defray  the  cost,  he  lu:d  been  invited  by  them 
and  by  others  of  the  smaller  Peloponnesian  states,  who  felt  the 
necessity  of  some  external  protector  against  Sparta— and  who  even 
before  th^y  applied  to  Thelu.s  for  aid,  had  solicited  the  like  interler- 
ence  from  Athens  (probably  under  the  general  presidency  accepted 
by  \thens,  and  the  oaths  interchanged  by  her  with  various  interior 
cities  since  the  battle  of  Leuktra),  I  ut  had  cxpeiienced  a  refusal. 

Epaminondas  had  been  preparing  for  this  contingency  ever  since 
the  battle  of  Leuktra.     The  first  use  made  of  his  victory  had  been, 
to  establish  or  confirm  the  ascendency  of  Thebes  lioth  over  the  recu- 
sant Boeotian  cities  and  over  the  neighboring  Phokians  andLekrians 
etc      After  this  had  been  accomplished,  he  must  have  been  occupied 
(during  the  early  part  of  370  B.C.)  in  anxiously  watc-hing  the  move- 
inents  of  Jason  of  Pherie;  who  already  announced  his  design  of 
marchini?  with  an  imposing  force  to  Delphi  for  the  celebration  of  the 
Pvthian  games  (about  August  1).     Though  this  despot  was  the  ally 
of  Thebes,  vet  as  both  his  power,  and  his  aspirations  towaid  the 
headship  of  Greece,  were  well  known,  no  Theban  general,  even  of 
prudence  inferior  to  Epaminondas,  could  venture  m  the  face  ol  such 
liabilities  to  conduct  away  the  Theban  force  into  Peiopmuusus,  kav- 
iu"- Bceotia  uncovered,     the  assassination  of  Jason  relieved  niel)es 
from  such  apprehensions,  and  a  few  weeks  sufficed  to  show  that  his 
successors  were  far  less  formidable  in  power  as  well  as  in  ability. 
Accordin<dy,  in  the  autumn  of  370  B.C.,  Epaminondas  had  his  atten- 
tion free  ll/turn  to  Peloponnesus,  for  the  purpose  both^  ot  maintain- 
in^  the  anti-Spartan  revolution  which  had  taken  place  in  legea,  and 
of'^seconding  the  ptouounced  impulse  amoug  the  Arcadians  toward 
federative  coalitiou. 


PLANS  OF  EPAMINONDAS. 


833 


sary  to  dispossess    the   Sn-n-t-nw    nr\    ''^"^^^^  this,  itAsas  neces- 
thive  cemuries,  tlie  best  pcrlion  of  L     mh  1  I'iTvi        1    i  ,'        "'•'•'■ 

iiee  Jlessciiiuns   as  llieir  forofatluTS  had  once  been   EnTmi  ,m  ,' 
).ropo.so.   to  mvite  ba,-U  all  tbo  «a„,l,.rer.  of  life  sa  ,  o  ,^^e"         . 

b   te  iv   -hoZ      ItT'^i  '""'  \"  "';""  "1-^'  1"T  Hank  a  .loiVl,!  o 
uiutrij    iiosliu.     It  iias  bc",;ii  alrcalv   mrutoued.  tiiat   dui-ijTr  n,.. 

a"^^  r al'lS'of'ui,™'  ?''"'  i^''r''''="'-^"^"'  ""■"  --"'^".oln  t 
luu,  <il.  ivlus,  111  Ivrphallema.  and  elsewliore.  E\n,>lled  at  lli,> 
lose  of  tia  warbyilie  lriun,pl,a,U  Si.artans,  not  on  ■  fi  „  P.  I, 
ponnesus  biit  also  from  Xaiip^.ktus  an,!  Ceplial  Cnia  these  ex  les  hi 
sinee  bee,,  dispersed  ainoi,^  various  llelleldc  o,U,  lie'  at  R  e  ■  ,'  u 
r-  IL^i  ^''%T  '"  '^'"'>''  ^''  "^■•<P"'i-lo><  ill  Libva.  r  .riw 
o'u '•/    oin  "''  u     '"  "n"'^  '?  ^'-^  ';•'■••,  ""■>'  '''"'  ^^■""''""'  lims  v'  1^ 

nil  ,,  Vhe  v.4^„        l;«'a.ne  equal  or  superior  to  t!ie  Laeedienio- 

11,111  on    lie  nest  coast  of  Peloponnesus),  they  beiraii  to  iiidulo-e  Ihe 

hope  of  being  restored  lo  Kuupaktiis.     Pnibabb/^lieir  re    ,e  t  ,,    v 

•1,™    the  -'n?fr''™"  n"'  '^""''"^■^  '"  ""■•  «-^"'"''  "f  Atl.en     1  allied 
«hoie  the    liebaiis  sat  as  members.     Nothi,,!;  however  had  b<-ei 
ne  toward  it  by  the  At heniaiis-wbo  soon  became  fati.'^   wiii 
b    te  of  Te  ,[•,;■"?,"'  T"  l^'^'«^«ill'  i^parta-wben  ,I,e  mom,  i   , 

of  1  o  vvr  hrr  ete    "''v  'i'''''''  '^7'l''""''y  ^'"'l  ^<.<i<lenly.  the  balance 
o    po.vei  111  Gieece      A  chance  of  prolection  was  now  oi.ened  )o  Iho 

i  Id   f     m\  I'r.  "v""''  ■^"■"  T'"   ",'•''""''"'  "-"    '"W  Kad   ever 
n.ul  lorn  Alliens.     Epaminondas,  well-aware  of  the  los^nswell  i.s 

m.iu  la  loi.  IhaUie  should  in.tiet  „po„  Sparia  by  restori^t  the       o 

til,  II  ,11  lent  territory,  entered  into  eo^nmiinieati  ,n  with  lTi,..n   and 

caused  them  to  be  invited  to  Peloponnesus  from  all  1  ,,'ii  ili's  ■ 

atc'auluin,',"";'''' .'"■      ^^'  '""  'V'T  "^  '"'  """■'■"  """  ^-^"^'-     '      « 

a"frrv,eil       '•'"';'■■"'   '""'■"'   "'   ®i'^'''^''  "'"'  "'"liibuling  to 
agsravute  the  same  sentiment  amon.r  Tliebans  and  allii's 

m;„  1    p  i?  scheme  of  restoring  the  Mcsseniaiis.  was  combin,.d  in  the 

Aie'idi  n    ''l''V.""r-''  '"■"'"'";  '!"•  ""•■  P"""«''  consoliilaiioi  of      e 
Aicadians;   both   being  intended  as  parfs  of  one  stronc  and  selt' 
suppor  ing  organization  against  Sparta  on  her  own  bor,l,.r.°  O "  .oursc 
ie  ecu  ,1  have  accomplished  nothing  of  the  kiiul,  if  there  Lid  not 

H.  G.  III.— a' 


884 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


been  a  noworful  spontaneous  movement  toward  consolidation  among 
the  Arcadians  themselves.  But  without  his  -uidance  and  protect 
tion  the  movement  would  have  proved  abortive,  tlirough  tl-.e  force 
of  local  jealousies  within  the  country,  fomcntc^l  and  secordcd  by 
Spartan  aid  from  without.  Thou-h  the  general  vote  for  federative 
coalition  had  been  passed  with  enthusiasm,  vet  to  carry  out  smh  a 
vote  to  the  sjitisfaction  of  all,  without  quanclin-  on  points  of  detail, 
would  have  required  far  more  of  public-niiiidcd  sentiment  as  well  as 
of  iutellin-ence,  than  what  could  be  reckoned  upon  among  the  Arca- 
dian^ It  was  necessary  to  establish  a  new  city;  since  the  stand- 
ini  i^alousv  between  Mantineia  and  Tegea,  now  for  the  tirs  time 
einbarketl  in  one  common  cause,  would  never  have  peimit  cd  that 
either  should  be  preferred  as  the  center  of  the  new  consoln h.tion. 
Besides  fixing  upon  the  new  site  required,  it  was  indispensable  also 
to  choose  between  ccnitiicting  exigences,  and  to  break  up  iuicnnt 
habits  in  a  way  such  as  could  hardly  have  been  enlorced  by  iiny 
maioritv  purelv  Arcadian.  The  authority  here  deticunt  was  pie- 
ci^elv  supplied  bv  Epaininondas;  who  brought  with  him  a  victoiioiis 
armvand  a  splendid  personal  name,  combined  with  impjirtiabty  as  to 
the  local  politics  of  Arcadia,  and  single-minded  hostility  to  Spartn. 

It  was  with  a  view  to  found  these  two  new  cities,  ms  ^yelI  .-s  to 
exoel  Vo-esilaus,  that  Epaminondas  now  marched  the  Thchan  mmy 
into  Arcadia;  the  command  being  voluntarily  intrusted  to  him  by 
Pelopidasaud  the  other  B(rotarchs  present.  He  arrived  shortly  alter 
Uie  retirement  of  A^esilaus.  while  the  Arcadinns  and  >'l*'''''"^^  ;;,^!;; 
ravao-ing  the  lands  of  the  recusant  town  ot  HercTa.  As  the}  >pc(  dil> 
c-mi?bSck  to  c-reet  his  arrival,  the  aggregate  (ont(  derate  I  ody— 
r^eianrAivadians.  and  Eleians,  united  with  the  Thel.ms  and 
thPir  accomDinvin<-  allies-is  said  to  have  nmoiiutcd  to  ^O.OtO,  or 
according  to^^^^^^^  to  70.000  men.     Not  meielv  had  Epanu- 

noncks  brought  with  him  a  choice  body  of  auxilianes-Phokinns. 
Lokrans  Euba^ans,  Akarnanians,  Ilerakleots.  Malians,  and  1  lies- 
s;Uan  c^valrv  and  peltasts-but  the  ]5aH)tian  bands  themselves  were 
^o  Ir  lUant  :md  imposimr.  as  to  excite  universal  ndmiration.  Ihe 
;icto  vof  Leuktra  had  awakened  among  them  an  enthusir.sic  mih- 
tarv  ardor  turned  to  account  by  the  genius  ot  Epnminondas  nnd 
nay  to  produce  a  finished  discipline  which  even  the  unwi  hng 
Xenophon  cannot  refuse  to  acknowledge,  f  ^>^-Y^;;|;;  '^  %^^ 
of  their  assembled  force,  withm  a  day  s  march  of  Laconia,  the  Aic. 
dian>;  Ar-eians.  and  Eleians  pressed  Epnmmonda^  to  invacle  that 
countV;%^  uo  allies  could  approach  the  frontier  to  its  aid 

At  first  he  was  unwilling  to  comply,  ile  luid  not  come  4>rq'^»red  tm 
the  enterprise;  bein-  well  aware,  from  his  own  .louniev  t<>/P'^^[^ 
(when  the.  peace  conirress  was  held  there  prior  to  the  battle  ot  Leuk- 
ra),  of  the  impractieable  nature  of  the  intervening  country,  so  easy 
tot;e  defended  especitdlv  durimr  the  winter  season,  by  troops  1  ke 
the  Laceda'monians,  whom  he  believed  to  be  in  occupation  ot  all  the 


RELITCTANCE  TO  INVADE  LACONIA.  835 

S:^ei^^S^  ^~:  ^^^^^  i-tances  of  his 

that  the  passes  vvere  not  a  11  guardira    w^^^^^^^^^  ^'■^"^^^^•' 

some  of  th..  discontented  pf  keki    n  T.       •        fe  ^"^'^'^^^^"^  from 
gaged  to  revolt  ()penly    the '4^^^^^  ^^!^'^^  ^^'^^^^  eii- 

Tiiey  told  iiim  that  IIkt^ was7.^en^^^^^  ^'''T^^  "^  '^'^  ^«""try. 

i.i  ol>eyln^  the  imlitarv  req  ashbnffvLt^^^^       ^.iiroughout  Laconia 
lives  as  atonement  if  they  X  u  ]  w*  fomul^^^'''/^?^  ii^udevcd  their 
encouragements,  as  well\afbv  the  .!  m     1  •  "^"""^  ^"^''^y-    ^^  ^''^^^ 
i.i-  to  reve,jyeupon^^wtX  r^^rcu-e"^^ 
--dem,-,  Epaminondas  was  at  len^^taL^^  i^^^v^tcTS 

n  J^rpl^ls^u^lf  vi^^cSlL  responsibility,  will 

luigiit  well  censure  1dm    if  tl,!  ,    1  ^'""."^^^  '^"^^  ^"«  countrymen 

«-lves  au     uVe    -Vrcadhu;  f ornw  "Vr'?' '  '''"''^  ""^  Tl,elxms  them- 
latter  alouo  ex.K.rieutd  Lv  s^rilf  reS'nc?'' M  ""''f"-"-     '"" 

lsol,olaus  opc..u",^,  l^'au'Z'our  g     en  t'^^l°L'^K 

si()us  ivaehcd  ^«.ii..  i.i  ««.!        "^"to^j'iciu  10  ,ui,  so  tiiat  the  four  divi- 

it    a'^:"ron"tdv";T'^''V'™^ 'r  ^^•'''' S"-""l  •'- 

niarchfd  down  tlie  loft  In,'-   .f  •        ,    *^"?  ^^'■''^-    '^«  tliercfore 

liouse.  in  UU  way  as  L'^^V  „vk  ^'i''  ""''""•5  ""''  I>l">'<1erlng  the 
>.y,  d»i<ii  asAnnkUt,  between  two  and  tiaee  iuiles 


836 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


below  Sparta.  Here  lie  found  a  ford,  though  the  river  was  full  from 
the  winter  season;  and  accomplished  the  passage,  defeating  after  a 
Fcvere  contest,  a  body  of  Spartans  who  tried  to  oppose  it.  He  was 
unv  on  Uie  same  side  of  the  river  as  Sparta,  to  which  citv  l^e  s  owly 
and  cautiously  made  his  approach;  taking  care  to  keep  iislheban 
oops  alvvavs  in  the  best  battle  order,  and  protecting  them,  when 
encamped,  bv  felled  trees;  while  the  Arcadians  and  other  PHopon- 
Tu-sian  allies* dispersed  around   to   plunder  the  neighboring   houses 

'"'orc^  was'the  consternation  which  reigned  in  the  city;  destitute  of 
forlitications,  vet  hitherto  inviolate  in  fact  and  unassailable  even  in 
idea      Besides  their  own  native  force,  the  Spartans  had  no  auxiliaries 
except  those  mercenaries  from  Orchomenus  who  had  comeback  will 
A.n,iiiaus ;  nor  was  it  certain  beforehand  that  even  these  troops  would 
remain  with  them,  if  the  invasion  become  formidable.     On  the  tiist 
a^^embla-e  of  the  irresistible  army  on  their  frontier  they  had  dis- 
patched one  of  their  commanders  of  foreign  contingent s  (called  Xenagi 
o  press  the  instant  coming  of  such  Peloponnesian  allies  as  remained 
faifliful  to  them;  and  also  envoys  to  Athens,  f  treating  assisa^^^^^^^ 
from  that  citv.     Auxiliaries  were  obtained,  and  rapidly  put  under 
march   from   Pellene,  Sikvon,  Phlius.  Corinth,  Epidaurus,   Frcrzen, 
Hermione,  and  Haliei^.    But  the  ordinary  line  of  inarch  into  L^c-onia 
^vas  now  impractical)le  to  them;  the  whole  frontier  being  barred  by 
A  -,.ians  and  Arcadians.     Accordingly  they  were  obliged  to  proceed 
llr^t   to   the  Arirolic   peninsula,  and   from   thence  to  cross  bv  sea 
(embarking  probably  r.t  Helieis  on  the  south-western  coast  of  the 
peninl.ihrroPrasiaM)nthe  eastern  coast  of  Laconia);  from  whence 
thev  made  their  way  over  the  Laconian  mountains  to  Sparta.    Bung 
m  rlv  provided  with  vessels,  they  were  forced  to  cross  in  separa  e 
Jletacliments,  an<l  to  draw  lots  for  priority.      By  tfjis  cbance       e 
Phlia<ian  cor.timrent   did   not  come  over  until  the  last;  while      e 
xeia.'iis   enger  to  reach  Sparta,  left  them  behind,  and  conducted  the 
re^t  'hi'thei-    arriving  only    just    before    the  confederate  enemies 
deboucli.d  from  Scila^ia.     The  Phliasians,  on  crossing  ^o  PiasuT 
found  neither  tlieir  comrades  nor  the  xenagus,  bu   ^^'^'re  o  >  ig^ed  to 
hire  r  c^uide  to  Sparta.    Fortunately  they  arrived  there  both  sat(  1> 
and  in' lime,  eluding  the  vigilance  of  the  enemy,  who  were  then  neai 

^  T'lieXf 're-enforcements  were  no  less  seasonable  to  Sparta,  than  cred- 
itable to  the  tidelitv  of  the  allies.  For  the  bad  feeling  which  habitu- 
ally n'mivd  in  Laconia,  between  the  Spartan  citizens  on  one  side 
and  the^eriaki  and  Helots  on  the  other,  produced  in  this  hour  ol 
dan-er  its  natural  fruits  of  desertion,  alarm,  and  weakness,  ^otonly 
were  the  Periceki  and  Helots  in  standing  discontent,  but  even  among 
the  Spartan  citizens  themselves,  a  privileged  fraction  (called  leers) 
had  come  to  monopolize  i>o1itic:d  honors;  while  the  remainder- 
poorer  men,  vet  ambitious  and  active,  and  known  under  the  ordin- 


viGiLANT  Defense  of  sparta.  §37 

asahophte,  should  be  mannmitted-not  1( ss    hnn  fi  00(/^^^^^^^^        ^"^ 
in  the  r  names  to  serve      Rnt  o  hn,u    ii.  ' ^^^  Helots  gave 

of  bpaita  itsdf  as-auist  the  ajsailin-  eiieniv  was  a  task  ro(  11^,1^0^ 
tJie  energy  of  Agesilaus.  After  Laving  vainlv  rie  I  to  n  .?tho 
T  lebans  troni  crossing  the  Enrotas,  l,e  wag  forcecl  to  ab  ,n  on  Am 
kte  and  to  throw  himself  bade  iipou  the  city  of  S  '  rt?  ot  ,1^,; 
which  they  immediately  advanced.  '.More  tha  ,  one  c^^'  Sncrw^ 
on  he  point  of  breaking  out,  had  not  his  vigilance  fore  a'  ed  The 
projects.     Two  hundred  young  soldiers  of  do  btn.l  tlw  h    ,,-i 

Slhl  KsSB™•1d°^^■'''•^,^^''•°"^^^^^ 

e.iiicu  inc  Lssorium.     Those  around  him  were  ab(nit  to  attack-  tlinn. 
bu     Agesilaus,  repressing   their   zeal,  went   up  alone  to    he  baud 
ad,b-e.s.sed  them  111  language   betokening  no  suspicion  vet  warn  W 
them  that  they  had  mistaken  his  orders  ;^lieir    enS  wire  needed' 
not  at  the  Issonum,  but  in  another  part  of  the  city. '  They  ohm  1 
hrs  orders,  and  moved  to  the  spot  indicated;  upon  which  leimedi 
ately  occupied  the  Issorium  with  troops  whom  he  cou  <  tr™      In 
t  e  eiisuing  ii.ght,  he  seize,!  and  put  to  death  fifteen  of  "l  e  k  ders    f 

ih,   of  Ir^w-r''-     '^"°"""'  ^""«P"'"^y.  ^aid  to  have  been  ,,    tie 
point  of  breaking  out,  was  repressed  by  seizing  the  conspirators  in 
the  house  where  they  were  assenibledf  and  pSttino-  the ra    0     ea        ' 
untned;  the  tirst  occasion  (observes  Plutarch)  on  wific     a"y  Sin rta 
was  ever  put  to  death  untried-a  statement  which  1 1  "a  "to  be]  eve 
without  knowing   from  wiiom  he  borrowed  it  bu   wh  el    if    n,c 
proves  that  the  Spartan  kings  and  Epiiors  did  not  apply  to  Spartan 
citizens  the  same  measure  as  to  Peiiceki  and  Helots    '^^         ' 

By  such  severe  proceedings,  disjiifection  was  kept  under-  while 
the  strong  posts  of  the  city  were  effectively  occupied  and  the  wide? 


838 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


anproacbes  barricaded  by  beaps  of  stones  and  eartb.  Fbougb  de.'^ti- 
uTof'vS  Is.  Sparta  ^vas  extremely  defensible  bv  position  Li-anu- 
n  iKks  marebed  slowly  up  to  it  from  Amvkla-  Ibe  Arcadians 
an  tbers  in  bis  army  spreading  tbemselves  to  burn  and  plunder  ho 
doi  orbood.  On  tbe  third  or  fourth  day  bis  cavalry  occupied  the 
Iliipwdrome  (probablv  a  >pace  of  level  ground  near  the  river,  under 
ti  e  luU  site  of  tbe  town),  where  tbe  Spartan  cavalry,  though  inlenor 
liotb  in  number  and  in  goodness,  gained  an  advantage  over  them 
hrougb  tbe  belp  of  300  chosen  boplitcs  wbom  Agcsdausbad  p  an  e     • 

anU)U.b  bard  bv,  in  a  precinct  sacred  to  tbe  Dioskuri.      1  houg 
hi    action  was  probably  of  little  consequence,  vet  Lpaminondas  did 
not  dare  to  attempt  the  city  by  storm.     Satistied  with  having  defied 
?be  Spartans  and  manifestecl  iiis  masterv  of  the  tic'^^  ^'^^^Vul  cm" 
own  dooi-s,  be  marebed  away  southward  down  tbe  Eiirotas.    To  them 
b   their  present  depres>ion,  it  wa.s  matter  ot  consolation  and  even  ot 
bo-istin-  tbat  be  bad  not  dared  to  a>sail  them  in  their  last  sti-ongbold. 
The  agSny  of  tbeir  feelings-grief,  resentment    and  wounded  bonor- 
.vas  intolerable.     Many  wisbed  to  go  out  and  tight  at  a  1  h.aza  d :  In 
A-esilaus  resisted  them  with  the  same  lirninessas  P^nl^l";;  '^^^  ^  '<'  V^ 
it^  Vtben^    wben   tbe   Peloponnesians  lust   invaded  Attica   at   the 
bednnino-  of  tbe  Peloponne.ian  war.     Especially  the  hpartan  women 
wbo  bad^never  before  beheld  an  enemy,  are  said  to  have  manilcsted 
emotions  so  furious  and  distressing,  as  to  increase  nuicb  the  dim- 
ruUy  of  defense.     We  are  even  told  that  Antalk.das  at  Uuit   ime  one 
of  the  Ephors.  sent  bis  children  for  safety  away  fn-m  Sparta   o    ho 
inland  of   Kytbera.      Epaminondas  knew  well  bow   desperate   the 
resistance  of  the  Spartans  would  be  if  tbe.r  city  was  attacked;  while 
to  bimself,in  tbe  midst  of  a  bostile  and  impracticable  country, 

renulse  would  be  absolute  ruin.  ,        ^  tt  i 

()n  leaving  Sparta,  Epaminondas  carried  bis  march  as  ar  as  Ilelos 
and  Gvtbium  on  tbe  sea-coast;  burning  and  plunclermg  Ibe  country, 
and  trVin-  for  three  days  to  capture  Gytbiuiu,  wlueb  contained  tnc 
I  ace  UemSnian  arsenal  and  ships.  :Nbiny  of  the  Lacomaii  Periaki 
iiiS-  d  took  service  in  bis  army;  nevertheless  us  alCmpt  on 
G  h  m^^  did  not  succeed;  upon  whicb  be  tu^ned  btick,  and  retraced 
bis  steps  to  tbe  Arcadian  frontier.  It  was  the  more  necessary  for 
Hm  to  tbink  of  quitting  Laconia,  since  bis  Peloponnesian  allies  the 
\rcadia  i  and  otliers,  were  daily  stealing  borne  with  the  rich  plnn- 
der  whicb  tbey  bad  acquired,  while  bis  supplies  were  also  becouuug 

"^"Epami^iondas  bad  tbus  accomplished  far  more  tban  lie  bad  pro- 
iectid  when  quitting  Thebes;  for  the  effect  ot  the  expeditioii  o 
Grecian  opinion  was  immense.  Tbe  reputation  of  bis  army,  as  ^M'\\ 
asMiis  own,  was  prodigiously  exalted;  and  even  the  nairalive  of 
Xenopbon,  unfriendly  as  wed  as  obscure,  bears  involuntary  lesti- 
monv  botb  to  tbe  excellence  of  bis  generalship  and  to  the  goo( 
discipline  of  bis  troops.     He  made  bis  Tbebaus  keep  in  rank  and 


FOUNDATION  OF  AKCADIAN  MEGALOPOLIS. 


839 


Iiold  front  against  the  enem.y,  even  while  their  Arcadian  allies  were 
d.  i)ersmg  around  for  phmder.  Moreover,  the  insult  and  hum?  lath  u 
o  Sparta  were  sil  greater  tban  those  inflicted  by  tbe  battl  o  e  k 
ra;wli,cb  bad  indeed  shown  that  she  was  no  lono-er  invincible  in 
the  Held  but  bad  still  left  her  witb  tbe  admitted  sW-os  !k>n  of  an 
inviolable  territory  and  an  imapproa(!hable  city  ^  ^  ^ 

1  he  resistance  ot  the  Spartans  uuleed  (except  in  so  far  as  re-ards 
heir  CUV)  bad  been  far  less  than  eitlier  friends  or  enemies  expeetid 
he  belie  in  tlieir  power  was  thus  proportionally  abridged.  It  i  ovv 
emainedfor  Lpanunondas  to  complete  tbeir  humiliation  bv  cYecu 
ing  those  two  enterprises  whicb  bad  formed  the  special  purnose  of 
us  ex|)ed.tion;  the  re-establi.bment  of  Messene,  aid  the  coLolida- 
lion  ot  the  Arcadians. 

The  recent  invasion  of  Laconia,  victorious  as  well  as  lucrative 
had  inspired  the  Arcadians  with  increased  confidence  and  antinalbv 
air.iinsr  hparta,  and  increased  disposition  to  listen  to  Epaminondas 
When  that  eminent  man  proclaimed  the  necessitv  of  establishing  a 
strong  frontier  against  Sparta  on  the  side  of  Arcadia,  and  w-heu'lie 
announced  bis  intention  of  further  weakening  .Sparta  by  the  restora- 
tion ot  the  exiled  Messenians— the  general  feeling  of  the  small  Arca- 
dian communities,  already  tending  in  the  direction  of  coalescence' 
became  strong  enough  to  overl)ear  all  such  impediments  of  detail  as 
the  breaking  lip  of  ancient  abode  and  habit  involves.     HcsDectiu"- 
early  Athenian  history,  we  are  told  by  Tbucydides,  that  the  le-entf- 
ary   i  beseus,      having  become  powerfnl,   in  addition  to  his  Xn-eat 
capacity,    bad  effected  the  discontinuance  of  those  numerous  inde- 
p  ■ndent  governments  which  once  divivled  Attica,  and  bad  consoli- 
tlaleu  them  ail  into  one  common  government  at  Athens      Just  ^ucb 
was  (lie  revolution  now  operated  by  Epaminondas,  tbrouob  the'like 
combination  ot  intelligence   and   power.     A  Board   of  ^G']kists  or 
±  ounders  was  named  to  carry  out  the  resolution  taken  by  the  Area- 
dian  assemblies  at  Asea  and  Tegea,  for  tbe  establishment  of  a  Pau- 
Areadian  city  and  center.     Of  this  Board,  two  were  from  Teo-ea 
two  from  .Alantineia,    two  from  Kleitor,   two  from  the  districf  of 
JMaMialus,  two  from  that  of  the  Parrbasians.     A  convenient  site  beino- 
chosen  upon  tbe  river  Ilelisson  (whicb  flowed  througb  and  divided 
the  town  in  two),  about  twcntv  miles  west  of  Te-^ea  well-fltted  to 
block  up  the  marches  of  Sparta  in  a  uortb-wcsterlv  direction— the 
foundation  of  the  new  Great  City  (Megalopolis)  Avas  laid   bv   the 
U'..iists  jointly  Willi  Epaminondas.     Forty  distinct  Arcadian  town- 
ships, Irom  all  sides  of  this  center,  Avere  persuaded  to  loin  tbe  new 
commiinitv.     Ten  were  from  the  Mjenalii.  eight  from  the  Parrhasii, 
SIX  Irom  tlie  Eutresii;  three  great  stMi-tions  of  the  Arcadian  name, 
eacb  an  ajrgregale  ot  villages.     Four  little  townships,  occupying  a 
portion  of  the  area  intended  for  the  new  territorv   vet  bein*' Verse 
to  the  scheme,  were  constniined  to  Join;  but  iirdne  of  them   Tra- 
pezus,  the  aversion  was  so  strong.  tbuL  most  of  the  inhabitants  pre- 


840 


BATTLE  OF   LEUKTUA. 


f erred  to  emigrate  and  went  to  join  the  Trapezuntines  in  the  Euxine 
^.r  Trel)i7()nd)  who  received  them  kindly,     home  of  the  Icidn^ 
TriiizmUh  es  we^  even  shun  by  the  violent  temper  of  the  Arc..<  k. 
IrapczununLb  j  inclosed  an  area  hfty  stad.a   n 

chru2Vonee'm(^e     -^  -ilei  and  a  half);  while  an   amp  e 

V  r     tenitmv  vas  also  gathered  round  it,  extending-  northwaid     s 

Hl/st  Ntuty-Urmiks  from  the  city,  and  coP,t(  rmmons  on  the 

east  wiai  Tegia,  M^^^^  Orehomenus,  and  Kaphya-on  the  west 

with  ATps<ene   Phiiralia,  and  Hertva.  -,       .,      •  •   *  „„o 

The  other  new  citv-Messene-was  founded  under  he  ]Oint  aus- 
picls  of  tie  Tbel^uiand  their  allies,  Argeians  and  others;  1  pit  ees 
?» 'in-  especially  chosen  bv  the  Argeians  lor  that  purpose  nie;^  es- 
tni^fnSues   ihouirheaun-r  and  joyful  at  the  thought  of  regainng 

imm.o   i'e  o'>o  !H..us  Nvl.ocvor  l,Md  ll.ese  two  bovns  w:.s  n,a.UT of 
,1^  bun      1    lo.  e«a..Kar2,.Wfcrt  above  the  level  of    l'--;  «;«■''  .^:- 

n^upon  it.  summit  an  al.ua.lant  srri.,^  "^  :;'>'"  wT^l  ^tTWae 
Vnon  tbi><  suminit  tl.e  citadel  or  acropolis  of  the  new  tovN  u  ' '  ;>!'  ^^<_  '^ 
^;  wb,  if  while  the  town  itself  was  situated  lower  down  on  the  slope, 
t  mn  h  e;)Mn    ted  bv  a  eontinuons  wall  with  its  aeropolis.     Inst 
ok  n    s  crlace^  we^  offered,  by  Epan-|omlas  w ho  w,uj  vecogu,« 
•w  fFkist  or  Founder,  to  Dionvsins   and  Apdlo  l.-n  (nii  s— 1.>    i "e 
\rt,tm^  to  the  Vr-eian  Here  and  Zeus  MeuR-ius-by  the  Messen.aus, 
m  leu,    't  ho  mat  ■s  UKl  the  I  )ioskuri.     Next,  prayer  was  nu.de   o  the 
ide.  t  Heroes  and  Hen.ines  of  the  Messenian  naUon.  cspeenil  )  to 
tlwhivintible  warrior  xVristomenes,  that  they  wo.dd  now  .onie  back 
nnVa^riitken    their  residen.'O  as  inmates  in  enfra.uhised  Messene. 
U  ;r^  is  'the  "ro   nd  was  marked  o,n  and  the  imilding  was  begun 
nnderte  sound  of  Ar-eian  and  liieotian  flutes,  p  aym-thestran.sof 
P     ton    sZl  Sakadas-.     The  b..st  n,aso.,s  and  ^^^^l^f^ZZ^^t 
f^om  all  Greece  to  lay  out  the  streets  with  regularity,  as  veil  as  to 
h,rre  a  uroiier  distril.nti<m  and  constrnetion  of  the  sacred  edilices. 
in  respecHuhe  fortification.  t,>o,  Epaminondas  was  studious  ypro^ 
vS     Su eb  was  their  excelleuee  and  solidity,  that  they  ex'"'^  "-f 
matter  for  admiratiou  even  ill  the  after-days  of  lUe  t.avekr  Puu- 


AVESTERX  LACONIA. 


land  cut  olf  from  the  Sn;irran  rlnminlnn      tt      '  '      ',    ■-^^'  -i—v^  wa; 
the  direction  ^oiitli^niV   1     Ikhuo  ^      ^  il         'T'^'  '"^'^  ^"^  «^  ^^ 
3Iesseniun  Gulf),  .4  ir^  o^' "uc Uv  s^  '  Bmlt^  '''''  ''  '''' 

tiie  Periceki  of  Thuria    situated  it  w' no-    V    7""  "^  "^'P^''^  ^^^'^^ 


maritime  point  belonging  to  SpartaTrb^nr;-^^^^^^^^ 

city;  Anion  (rather  farther  norlli,  near  the  river  Nerin^  i,„i  i  ? 

^i:of^^:;'dS^re.bL'^''tr^^ 

no,.,h.ea.st  c^orner  of  the  ^lli^niar^o"  1?'  v  I'  va^r^thrbesn';;/'^? 

J^f^^sr"S^e;^;is:^2— i:;}irf^~::— 

fi.of  ti.«  \..^.r  "j^ii   icmuc.     II  A\as  m  the  ensuiii'i-  voar 

A«  n    Im-      /;'"  i'""-''  '•"' '"  l^'''*'''^  «'«  Lacedaemonian  'a rrfson  nt 
Asine,  kiMiiig  the  Spartan  polemarcli  Ocranor-  and  ,iml,?    ,    .?i      , 

the  same  time  the  otlier  Laied»,n,aiiau  i^  r  isons^n  he  so^,,l  tii  ""' 
peninsula  must  have  been  expelled  Th,  s  libe,'.  t ed  Tl  e  P  •  5^" 
of  the  region  wel<.>med  the  nc'w  Messene  as  the  t  •  r,  t  Tr  7  • ' 
Kuk-pendence.  Epaminondas,  besides  ecmh>mi:  t1  "i  Zend  ,™ 
of  Methone  and  Asme,  reconstituted  some  other  t°,wns  wS  m  er 
.hvinS'away.''""'''""  ""'  i'™^"""^'  '"^'^"  "^^'P'  ti.>fo,-,ified  1T);:;I 
In  the  sin-ing  of  4->5  B.C.,  when  Demn.sthenes  landed  at  Pvlns 
1  hueydi.les  considers  it  a  valuable  acquisition  fo  •   'tthcns  V,      1 

a  1,  m   liat  insignificant  post,  as  plunderers  of  Spartan  terriforv  a    1 

ist  gators  of  Helots  to  desertion-especially  al  their  di  lee  con 
not  be  d.stinguishe<l  from  that  of  the  Spartans  themsX's  How 
prodigiou.s  must  have  been  the  iinpre.ssioiul,roughoi,  Greec;  ^  e^ 
Epaminondas,  by  planting  the  Messenian  exile,?  ml  otters  o^  he 
strong  frontier  city  and  position  of  Ithome,  deprived  Spa  a  in  Tsh  rt 
time  of  aU  the  wide  space  between  that  moumaiu  and      .   «!;■  'e'"' 


:m7^ '  •'!fi''^^m?mww^ 


842 


BATTLE   OF   LEUKTRA. 


sea,  enfranchising  the  Periopki  and  Helots  contained  in  it!  We 
must  recollect  that  the  name  3Iessene  had  been  from  old  times 
applied  ijenerally  to  this  region,  and  that  it  \vas  never  bestowed  upon 
any  city  before  the  time  "of  Epaminondas.  When  therefore  the 
Spartans  complained  of 'Mhe  liberation  of  Messene"— "  the  loss  of 
Messene" — they  included  in  the  word,  not  simply  the  city  on  Blount 
Ith.)me,  but  all  this  territory  besides;  though  it  was  not  all  comprised 
in  the  domain  of  the  new  city. 

They  complained  yet  more  indignantly,  that  along  with  the  gen- 
uine Messenians,  now  brought  back  from  exile — a  rabble  of  their  own 
emancipated  Periceki  and  Helots  had  been  domiciled  on  their  border. 
Herein  were  included,  not  only  such  of  tliese  two  classes  as,  having 
before  dwelt  in  servitude  throughout  the  territory  westward  of 
Ithome,  now  remained  there  in  a  state  of  freedom— but  also  doubt- 
less a  number  of  others  who  deserted  from  other  parts  of  Laconia. 
For  as  we  know  that  such  desertions  had  been  not  inconsiderable, 
even  when  there  was  no  better  shelter  than  the  outlying  posts  of 
Pvlus  and  Kythera — so  we  may  be  sure  that  they  became  much  more 
numerous,  when  the  neighboring  city  of  Messene  was  founded  under 
adequate  protection,  and  when  there  was  a  chance  of  obtaining,  west- 
ward of  the  Messenian  Gulf,  free  lands  with  a  new  liome.  Moreover, 
such  Peria-ki  and  Helots  as  had  actually  joined  the  invading  army 
of  Epaminondas  in  Laconia,  would  be  forced  from  simple  insecurity 
to  quit  the  country  when  he  retired,  and  would  be  supplied  with 
fresh  residences  in  the  newly  enfranchised  territory.  All  these  men 
would  pass  at  once,  out  of  a  state  of  i>eculiarly  harsh  servitude,  into 
the  difxnity  of  free  and  equal  Ilellens,  sending  again  a  solenui  Mes- 
senian'lesralion  or  Theory  to  the  Olympic  festival,  after  an  interval 
of  moie  than  three  centuries — outdoing  their  former  masters  in  the 
mairnilude  of  their  offerings  from  the  same  soil — and  requiting  them 
for^previous  ill-usage  by  w^ords  of  detiance  and  insult,  instead  of 
that  universal  deference  and  admiration  which  a  Spartan  had  hither- 
to been  accustomed  to  look  upon  as  his  due. 

The  enfranchisement  and  re-organization  of  all  Western  Laconia, 
the  renovation  of  the  Messenian  name,  the  foundation  of  the  two 
new  cities  (Messene  and  Megalopolis)  in  inmiediatc  neighborhood 
and  sympathy — whiles  they  completed  the  degradation  of  Sparta, 
coustituled  in  all  respects  the  most  interesting  political  phenomena 
that  Greece  had  witnessed  for  many  years. 

To  the  profound  mortitication  of  the  historian— he  is  able  to  re- 
count nothing  more  than  the  bare  facts,  with  such  inferences  as  these 
facts  themselves  warrant.  Xeuo])hon,  under  whose  eyes  all  must 
have  passed,  designedly  omits  to  notice  them;  Pausanias,  whom 
we  have  to  thank  for  most  of  what  wc  know,  is  promjited  by  his 
religious  imagination  to  relate  many  divine  signs  and  warnings,  but 
little  matter  of  actual  occurrence.*  Details  are  altogether  withheld 
fruin  us.     We  know  neither  how  long  a  lime  was  occupied  in  the 


Sn.EXCE  OF  XEXOPHO>f. 


843 

sliips,  and  the  co„„ne„c,mient  of  two  ■  "?  X^f  '"""^  '"'^'"  'own- 
render  any  acco,M,t.     Yet  n,eio  isZ'ILTh""''  "?  ""^"''«  '" 
I)lienoineiia  are  eitlier  so  iiilere^fin!.-  n°  F^-     ,       '■"""  wl'ert-i"  social 
.^oeieties  already  o-staWiJl 'e!!       S.^;^   we  fl,*:^'',!'"-  /"  '^''"''>'"S 
ti"ii.-d    routine    almost  onmipotent  in  ii«  InH       "'«  ,fo'-ce  of  tn,di° 
ael.onsan.l  on  their  feelin™/'^B"l%'\''l/""''^'"-?  .'»'l'  on  men's 
one  concrete,  since  tlie  denl  wr V  1  ^f  ,1       "^  ^ood  js  preserved  in 
m<-lligence,  and  loa v  t,  h  1^;,';;=^,'' "^"'^f'^f  ^^'^'^^■>n  eons.rueli  ■" 
I5nt  the  forty  small  comn  uuUic^  whln.M  >   ""P'-'^^^a  ^i^l>i.aii..„s. 
and  the  .\[e.4nians  and  other  seUleA'X  came  f"V"'?'"""°'''' 
together  on  the  hill  of  ItUonie  wei-e  h,  a  .    te  i'       i  '        ""  "''''  ''■'"' 
of  every  kind  |,ressed  for  imnc^fatealk  action      '?;  "'"'  '^'^cy^coH 
to  afford  a  precedent,  nor  anv  resonrr,.  l^f  „,       .  /''*='''-'  ''"*  "°  fil« 
l>'ol;lems  to  .liscns.io'n  by   1  L  Xe  oh '  .r/^.^?!'?  .^"!""''  ""  ""> 
most  esteemed     AVhetliM-  tl,„  , JI !       '^"■"'"-''^'  ''ml  .ind.sment  wei-u 

n>n.t  have  l,eeu  now  a  .en,  ine'a"d  e-u-L'ir'';,"'^  ™'  '"""'^•'-'^'-  ">'  ° 
goodasohitiouasthelfffhts  ?;i.tfm  ,^  ™''''  '°  *^"'''«  out  as 
.ertain  latitn.le  for  con'S  ."^.V^.'^'ea".!  place  perndtted.  with  a 

j"a-lo  for  the  apportionmen  of  1  , "is  ™  Wls'.on''""n'''"^'';  '«^<'" 
by  purchase,  or  grant,  or-|,otli  together  for  %  "",  ""■citizens, 

oonslitutioii;  foi?  reli  dows  •  ml  .v.i,  ,r  ""^  Political  and  judicial 
•lefense,  for  nia,-kc^  }  "r  ti.e  "ec,  rUv  n  d".  '"^'•«"."".i'-'^.  for  n,ilita.-y 
o<o.  All  these  atul  tnany  o  her  s^  w"  „s  nf'""'""  °*  l^™P-''ly': 
niust  now  have  been  piw-id  ■<  for  •  nH  -f  'J '''=>-''™nt  comnmnity 
intei-estinstoknowhow  Pni,!  '-  ,  "  """'d  'lave  been  hi.o-|,ly 
^V'c  eatt  r,^.onl  mo'lZ.  t^T&^Zuur  f '"^■''  '"  "^ 
members  of  the  Hellenic  brothe,  nn,i '  f  •  ■  "''"  "'"^^'^ '""  .V"'in?est 
tin.,.,  an.l  utuler  the  a  spices  of  n^'  "f,,?"'""  "'-T  ^°"'  "'  ""=  '^'^e 
uondas,  destine.!  to  SListaTci^cl  other  H^^ 

■•epellin.  all  eotntuon  da  i^e;?  on   tl  e  a  H  f    o[  'i'™/'''''''-^'' ''°''  '" 
which,  even   two  cent urfes   nfterwnv,!  '•  ^'^■'''''''':  •'' Pni'pose, 

"lind  of  a  JWalopolitlir  ^i^trl  Ui  ?  1;  ;^i;;>,;''--^   ^o'l-aven  o,i  the 

<lian  na'me,  and  in  wlii,^;  nrX,l,i  -  i'f  ^'P'"'"" '!"-''»l"''Sof  theArca- 
••onslitnenJ  comimm  is '^^Md  fe  ri'!?/^'?" '''™  '^'"■^'^"  f™»'  H'" 
I'oriodicaliy  convoke  There  T,is  f  !  "m  "^"'"'^"VA  slionkl  be 
Tbonsat.d.-'or  the  Great  Ntlnder  T1  \'^^  T'\  ™"'''*  ""^  T"' 
called  the  Epariti,  desti "d  to  ,old'V  'r'"',  "'  .'^'•C"<'''''n  froops, 
pay  when  o,'  serWc-t  was  also  ^.^t','"  ^f''™'"-""'  ""^  receiving 
upon  eac-h  city  for  their  supZt'  and  '  P.,n  A^r ''°^'  ''""'  '"''"^ 
ably  also  otlier  officers)  was  named     Tbertrt"  ^T''"^  ^^"''*- 

I      o  uameu.     iiie  lea  Thousand,  oa  behalf 


844 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


of  all  Arcadia,  received  foreign  envoy^<— concluded  wiw.  or  \y\u(\  or 
alliance — and  tried  all  ollicers  or  other  Arcadians  hroughl  ix  loie 
them  on  accusations  of  public  misconduct.  The  great  Alhei  i;in 
orators,  Kallislralus.  Demosthenes  ^Eschines,  on  various  occasions 
pleaded  before  it.  AVhat  were  its  times  of  meeting,  we  are  unable  to 
say.  It  contributed  seriously,  for  a  certain  time,  to  sustain  a  Pan- 
Arcadian  communion  of  action  and  sentiment  which  had  never  before 
existed,  and  to  prevent,  or  soften,  those  uisseusions  whicli  had  always 
n  tendency  to  break  out  among  the  s(>parate  Arcadian  cities.  The 
patriotic  enthusiasm,  howeverrout  of  which  Megalopolis  had  lir.^t 
arisen,  gradually  became  enfeebled.  The  city  never  attained  that 
pre-eminence  of  power  whicli  its  founders  contemi-lated,  and  wjiich 
had  caused  the  city  to  be  laid  out  on  a  scale  too  large  for  the  popula- 
tion actually  inhabiting  it. 

Not  only  Vas  the  portion  of  Laconin  west  of  the  Messeiiian  Gulf 
now  rendered  independent  of  Sparla,  but  also  nuicli  of  the  territory 
which  lies  north  of  Si)arla,  between  that  city  and  Arcadia.  Thus  the 
Skirita?  (hardy  mountaineers  of  Arcadian  race,  lieretofore  dependent 
upon  Sparta,  and  constituting  a  valuable  c-ontiiigent  to  her  armies), 
with  their  territory  forming  the  northern  frontier  of  Laconia  toward 
Arcatlia,  became  from  this  time  independent  of  and  liostile  to  t^i-arta. 
The  same  is  the  case  even  with  a  place  much  nearer  to  Sparla— Sel- 
lasia,  though  this  latter  was  retaken  by  the  •Lacedamouians  lour  or 
live  vears  afterward. 

P^paminondas  remained  about  four  months  beyond  the  legal  dura- 
tion of  his  command  in  Arcadia  and  Laconia.  The  suHerings  of 
a  severe  mid-winter  were  greatly  mitigated  to  his  soldiers  by  the 
Arcadians,  who,  full  of  devoted"^  friendship,  pressed  upon  them  an 
excess  of  hospitality  which  he  could  not  pemnt  consistently  with 
th<dr  military  duties.  He  stayed  long  enough  to  settle  all  the  pre- 
liminary debates  and  ditlicullles,  and  to  i»ut1n  train  of  serious  execu- 
tion the  establishment  of  Messene  and  Megalopolis.  For  the  com- 
pletion of  a  work  thus  comprehensive,  which  changed  the  lace  and 
character  of  Peloponnesus,  much  time  was  of  course  necessary. 
Accordindv,  a  Theban  division  under  Pammenes.  was  left  to  repel 
all  obstruction  from  Sparta,  while  Tegea  also,  from  this  time  for- 
ward, for  some  years,  was  occu[»ied  as  a  post  by  a  Theban  harmosl 
and  garrison. 

^Meanwhile  the  Athenians  were  profoundly  afTected  by  these  pro- 
ceedings of  Epaminondas  in  Peloponnesus.  The  accumulation  of 
force  against  Sparta  was  so  powerful,  that  under  a  chief  like  him,  it 
seemed  sufficient  to  crush  her:  and  though  the  Athenians  were  now 
neutral  in  the  contest,  such  a  prospect  was  not  at  all  agreeable  to 
them,  involving  the  aggrandiz.cmrntof  Thebes  toa  point  inconsistent 
with  their  security.  It  was  in  the  niid.^t  of  the  successes  of  Epam- 
inondas that  envoys  came  to  Athens  from  Sparta,  Corinth,  and  Philus, 
to  entreat  her  aid.     The  message  was  one  not  merely  humiliating  to 


SPARTA  ASICS  AID  FROM  ATHEXS.  845 

'■n<.    History  .showed  abundant  ac'u  of  i,  '"  '?'«™»c-'«  lo  Ath- 

<^nhor  of  good  feeling  or  co.^e  ,  i, .  h°fe  ef  on^t,"'"^  ^""f"y'  "»'« 
da!mr,nians  toward  lier.  Wh;it  liii '  v  ., ,  f^V  'i  *''«  P="f  of  the  Lace- 
f;M-m,s|y  |,,o„.ut  forward  g  nl-  i,,  .'k  ,1°,^  *5"',"^'  ""^  "''^oy  dex- 
Pei.s,.strati,ls  from  Athens  by^s"i^,,;^tcIo  ;«  f,'^l';'-">^'^'ne>,t  6f  the 
Xer.xes  from  Greece  by  the  ii ,  t  el  'o.-N  .  f ' ,  ''.^g''.'"""^  expulsion  of 
iliaries  sent  by  AU.ens  into  laclfnjV-  '"'"»  "«'<'s-and  the  aux- 
a,zui,>.,t  the  revolted  Jlessenia.H  on  1  ,,1?,^  'i'^-  '°  ''f  ^' «'«  SP^rtans 
remmdod  the  Athenian  asse    bIv?T  ,         }   I'T'    ^"  ^^''^  lime3(he 

ca..se  by  joining  Xerxes?  an  '  hi]  b  e  ran  ;;bi ''t'n";"'*  "'*  H'"'^"'' 
•o  both.     Moreover  the rn-iirt!m7>  f„,  ? 5^  •'^'^' °*  common  liatrcd 

""'ter  Athens  in  tl/e  Con  ed™, ev^f  T?f  ^''"'■''1  5^'*  '"^™  ""'''Kd 
recomniendati(>n  from  So  m.^w!L,.  ,  i  ?V'"'  f"ll  sanction  and 
had  ia  like  matmet  C  acceo  e  I,  v  ?,'''"l''  ''''-"f  ""^  ^^"'■'^  ''y  'ad 
Hie  asscmblv,  in  the  nine  nf'^.h  V  ''"  A"'""''>is.  He  called  on 
Si,arla  in  foViei.i,!;  al"  t  „  (W    T,/;*'";?,''.  ?'°"«^-  to  concur  vvi?h 

tervened,  and  lo  alfor    to^fr^  " e    ^ u?  eHe?  ^'"•''".  'f '^  ''""^^  "' 
mon  enemv.    Tlie  Tliolvma  ,l,^,l ;  ^'"^*  agamst  the  old  com 

to.tlie  vow- said  to  h^tJ^'^^^^.^Z  ""  '^"'r'"^  ("^'''^"S 
spite  of  their  present  mp,,,oi.  "  ,'"^  ""^  repulse  of  Xerxes)  iS 

could  bebroti^tbe'irtnTw  =,.^'''?''"''''J-'f  Athens  and  Sparta 
Thebes  herself  h^^Z^^^^tlhtr^'^'  ''^='"  ^^^^ 
nesian  war.  when  Sparta  i  efused  ioc^cni^f^""  '"^'""  *•''«  P^'opon- 
tence  of  nitor  ruin.  ''"'  "*  pronouncing  the  sen- 

iaondas  and  his  army  mss  ,  i   lv^   ,  '',f '""■  '='""e"ded,  that  Epan" 

inflicting  damage  nil  Jir/^trmUltl^P^^ 

committed  a  glarino- violal ion  nfti,»„?     '"  P<^'oponnesus,  liad 

first  at  Sparlaand  after«-^r     ,f  V.^   """"'"^  '"•'"«■•  '^^^orn  in  371  nc 
omy  ,0  e'very  Gredln  dty     Tlfe  tlolf,'"'""  pf,?=  """'•^'•^^l  "'"on- 
wonting  Atnens  on  the  proud  nosto^^^  ? 'I'us-while  compli- 

"e  fate  of  Sparta  in  her  lm°  dsi^^helf  n„    f^  """  T^J '"'''1'  h^^'ng 
she  would  earn  in  Greece    fsL  ll.  '"  ,'"'"'^'1  °^  ''onor  which 

lior  ancient  rival,  fo  get'h,  /,'  tin     .|;^f  T"'''^  '"'f  f'^^^' '"  '■<^«<^ue 
■  br-ne!  IS.      In  ado,,tin|  such  po  cv-'too  sZ  ,'''"!';'"'""'.''"S  ""'^  P^"*' 
will,  he-  own  trui  interests  .sb?c^\'.KM  1,1  So r^'^'  '"'  ?  ««'''0'-d.''"ce 

^^^^i:'z^^:]T.:zt:l  'i;r  n'™"""  i  Sparta,  that 

entreat  an  amnestv  for  so  mm  n  ,  „  o  .""''a^sy  to  Athens,  and  to 
The  contrast  is  indeed  sTri"  ?  ll-ZTlloT''^"""^  ""^  P«^«- 
against  thatwhich  she  liadbeTj,,,.,!,-  .f  '""■  P''csent  language 
the  Pelopounesian  'i^,.^'''^'»-''l'«HX'Ctiug  Alliens,  before  and  through 


846 


BATTLE  OF  LEUKTRA. 


At  first,  lier  envoys  were  lioard  "svitli  doiil)tful  favor;  the  sentiment 
of  the  Athenian  assembly  bL-ini^  aiiparently  rather  against  than  for 
tliom.  "Such  lans^uage  from  the  Spartans  (murmurtd  the  assembly 
citizens)  is  inteliigible^enough  during  their  present  distress;  but  so 
long  as  they  wereia  good  circnnistauces,  we  received  notliing  but  ill- 
usage  froin  tlieni."  Nor  was  the  complaint  of  the  Spartans,  tliat  tlie 
invasion  of  Laconia  was  contrary  to  the  sworn  peace  guaranteeing 
universal  autonomy,  admitted  without  opposition.  Some  said  that 
t!ie  Lacedsenionian's  had  drawn  the  invasion  upon  themselves,  by 
tlieir  previous  inteference  with  Tegea  and  in  Arcadia;  and  that  the 
intervention  of  the  Mantiueians  at  Tegea  had  been  justifiable,  since 
Slasippus  and  the  philo-Lacouian  ])arty  in  that  city  had  been  the  first 
to  begin  unjust  violence.  On  the  other  hand,  tlie  appeal  made  by 
the  envoys  to  the  congress  of  Peloponnesian  allies  held  in  h04b.c., 
after  the  surrender  of  Athens — when  the  Theban  dtputy  had  pro- 
posed that  Athens  should  be  totally  destroyed,  while  the  Spartans 
had  strenuously  protested  against  so  cruel  a  sentence — made  a  power- 
ful impression  on  the  assembly,  and  contributed  more  than  anything 
else  to  determine  them  in  favor  of  the  proposition.  "As  Atliens  was 
then,  so  Sparta  is  now,  on  the  brink  of  ruin,  lr<  m  the  fiat  of  the  same 
enemy:  Athens  was  then  rescued  by  Sparta,  and  shall  she  now  leave 
the  rescue  unrequited?"  Such  was  the  broad  and  sinple  i^!-ue  which 
told  upon  the  feelings  of  the  ass<  mbled  Athenians,  dispoj-ing  tliem  to 
listen  with  increasing  favor  both  to  the  envoys  from  Corinth  and 
Phlius,  and  to  their  own  speakers  on  the  same  side. 

To  rescue  Sjx-irta,  indeed,  was  prudent  as  veil  as  generous.  A 
counterpoise  would  thus  be  naint'ii!  e<l  ai-ainst  the  excessive  aggian- 
dizement  of  Thebes,  which  at  this  moment  doubtless  caused  serious 
alarm  and  jealousy  to  the  Athenians.  And  thus  alter  the  first  ebulli- 
tion of  resentment  against  Sparta,  naturally  suggested  by  the  histoiy 
of  the  past,  the  philo  Spartan  view  of  the  situatien  gradually  becj!D!e 
more  and  more  predominant  in  the  assembly.  Kailistiatus  theorattr 
spoke  eloquently  in  support  of  the  LacKiamoniar.s;  while  the  adverse 
speakers  were  badly  listened  to.  as]>leading  in  favor  of  Thebes,  wherri 
no  one  wished  to  aggrandize  lurtl  er.  A  vote,  decisive  and  eniliu>i- 
astic,  w^as  passed  for  ihssisling  the  Spartans  with  the  full  foreeol  Ath- 
ens: under  the  command  e)f  Ijjhikrates,  than  residing  as  a  private 
citizen  at  Athens,  since  the  ])i"<\ce  of  the  preceding  year,  which  Li.d 
caused  him  to  be  recalled  from  Korkyra. 

As  soon  as  the  sacrifices,  offered  in  contemplation  of  this  enterprise, 
were  announced  to  be  favorable,  Iphikratcs  nnide  prrclamation  that 
the  citizens  destined  for  service  shenild  equip  themselves  and  miistei; 
in  arms  in  the  grove  of  Akademus  (outside  the  ^-ates),  there  to  irke 
their  evening  meal,  and  to  march  the  next  morning  at  daybiejik. 
Such  was  the  general  ardor,  that  many  citizens  went  forth  from  the 
gates  even  in  advance  of  Iphikrates  himself:  and  the  total  force  which 
followed  him  is  said  to  have  been  12,000  men — not  named  under  con- 


RETURN  OF  THE  THEBANS. 


847 


scription  by  the  general,  but  volunteers.     He  first  marched  to  Cor- 
inth, where  he  halted  some  days;  much  to  the  discontent  of  his  <;ol- 
diers,  who  were  unpatient  to  accomplish  their  project  of  carrvins- 
rescue  to  Sparta.     But  Iphikrates  was  well-aware  that  all  beyond 
Connth  and  Phlms  was  hostile  ground,  and  that  he  had  formidable 
enejmies  to  deal  with      After  having  established  his  position  at  Cor- 
mtii,  and  obtamed  information  regarding  theenemv,  he  marched  into 
Arcadia,  and  there  made  war  without  any  important  result      Eo-im 
inondas  and  his  army  had  quitted  Lacoiua,  while  many  of  the  Vrca- 
dians  and  Eleians,  had  gone  home  with  the  plunder  acquired-  so  th  it 
Sparta  was  for  the  time  out  of  danger.     Impelled  in  part  by  the  re 
cent  manifestation  of  Athens,  the  Theban  general  himself  soon  com- 
menced Ins  march  of  return  into  Bo^otia,  in  which  it  was  nccessarv 
tor  iiun  to  pass  the  line  of  Mount  Oneium  between  Corinlh  ard  ivcii- 
chre;r.     This  line  was  composed  of  ditlicult  ground,  and  afforded 
good  means  of  resistance  to  the  passage  of  an  army;  nevertheless 
Iphikrates,  though  he  occupied  its  two  extremities,  did  not  attcmnt 
directly  to  bar  the  passage  of  the  Thebans.     He  contented  liimself 
with  sending  out  from  Corinth  all  his  cavalry,  both  Athenian  and 
Corinthian,  to  harass  them  in  their  march.    But  Epaminondas  b(>at 
tliem  back  with  some  loss,  and  pursued  them  to  the  gates  of  Corinth 
Excited  by  the  spectacle,  the  Athenian  main  body  within  the  te)wii 
were  eager  to  march  out  and  engage  in  general  battle.     Their  ardor 
was  however  repressed  by  Iphikrates;  who,  refusing  to  go  forth   suf- 
fered the  Thebans  to  continue  their  retreat  unmolested 

On  returning  to   Thebes,  Epaminondas  with  Pelopidas  and  the 
other  Bo-otarchs,    resigned   tlie   command.     They  had   already  re- 
tained It  for  four  months  longer  than  the  expiration  of  their  term 
Although,  by  the  constitutional  law  of  Thebes,  any  general  who  re- 
tained his  functions  longer  than  the  period  fixed  bv  law  was  pn)- 
nounced  worthy  of  death,  yet  Epaminondas,  while  employed  in  his 
great  projects  for  humiliating  Sparta  and  founding  the  two  hostile 
cities  on  her  border,  had  taken  upon  himself  to  brave  this  illetralitv 
persuading  all  his  colleagues  to  concur  with  him.     On  resf<-nin<i- 
the  command,  all  of  them  had  to  undergo  that  trial  of  accountability 
which  awaited  every  retiring  magistrate,  as  a  matter  of  course— but 
-which,  in  the  present  case,  was  required  on  special  ground,  since  all 
had  commited  an  act  notoriously  punishable  as  welfas  of  ei.:n'>-erous 
precedent.       Epaminondas   undertook   the   dutv  of   defendino-  his 
CO  leagues  as  well   as  himself.     That  he  as  well  as  Pelopida?  had 
political  enemies,  likely  to  avail  themselves  of  any  fair  pretext  for 
accusing   him— is   not   to   be   doubted.     But  we   may  well   (ioul>t 
whether  on  the  present  occasion  any  of  these  enemies *^nctually  came 
l()rAvard  to  propose  that   the  penalty  leirally  incurred  should  be  in- 
tlicted;  not  merely  because  this  proposition,  in  the  face  of  a  victo- 
rious army,   returning  elate  with  their  achievements  and  proud  e)f 
their  commanders,  was  full  of  danger  to  the  mover  himself— but  al  o 


84S 


BATTLE  OF  LEIKTRA. 


for  another  reason — hecanse  Epanunondas  would  hardly  bo  im- 
prudent  enough  to  wait  for  the  case  to  be  stated  by  his  enemies. 
Knowinix  that'^thc  illegality  committed  Avas  flagrant  and  of  hazard- 
ous example— having  also  the  reputation  of  his  colleagues  as  well  as 
his  own  to  protect— he  woidd  forestall  accusation  by  coming  forward 
liimsclt  lo  explain  and  justify  the  proceeding.  He  set  forth  the 
o-loiious  results  of  the  expedition  just  finished;  the  invasion  and  de- 
vastation of  Laconia,  hitherto  unvisited  by  any  enemy— the  (online- 
ment  of  the  Spartans  within  their  w  alls— the  liberation  of  all  ">^  est- 
crn  I.aconia,  and  the  establishment  of  Messcne  as  a  city— the  con- 
stitution of  a  strong  new  ArciuHan  city,  forming,  with  Tcgea  on  on(3 
flank  and  Messene  on  the  other,  a  line  of  defense  on  the  Spartim 
frontier,  so  as  to  insure  the  permanent  depression  of  the  great  enemy 
of  Thebes— the  emancipation  of  Greece  generally,  from  Spartan 
ascendency,  now^  consummated.  ,   ,       • 

Such  justification- whether  delivered  m  reply  to  a  substantive 
accuser,  or  (which  is  more  probable)  tendered  spontaneously  ])y 
Epanunondas  himself— was  not  merely  satisfactory,  but  triumphant, 
lie  and  the  other  generals  were  acquitted  by  acclamation;  without 
even  goin*'-  Ihrouirh  the  formality  of  collecting  the  votes.  Ami  it 
appears  that  both  Epaminondas  and  Pelopidas  were  immediately  re- 
appointed among  the  Boeotarchs  of  the  year. 


K^D  OF  VOL.   IIL 


i 


COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY   LIBRARIES 

This  book  is  due  on  the  date  indicated  below,  or  at  the 
expiration  of  a  definite  period  after  the  date  of  borrowing,  as 
provided  by  the  library  rules  or  by  special  arrangement  with 
the  Librarian  in  charge. 


DATE  BORROWCO 


DATE  DUE 


T 


DATE  BORROWED 


DATE  DUE 


C28(946 , MlOO 


884 


G9i:^l 
v.? 


884 
Grote 

A  history  of  Greece. 


G9131 
V.3 


■+ 


7 


Columbia  tBnitJersiitp 

THE  LIBRARIES 


Bequest  of 

Frederic  Bancroft 
1860-1945 


HISTORY  OF  GREECE 


FROM  THE 


EAKLIRST  PERIOD  TO  THE  C\m}]  OF  THE  GENERATION 
CONTEMPORAltY  WITH  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT 


BT 


GEORGE    GROTE 


-»-♦'♦- 


IN    FOUR    VOLUMES.—VOL.    IV. 


~*-»^* 


-•■'.> 


>     I 

T  • 


V         ..    r  v      •» 


■N  E  ^     Yg  E.K-  . 


AMEEin'A'N''  t'O'CK^   EXCHANGE 

.  i'3G.l.      .       .    . 


t>ferf:awi>s3r'ai 


I 


HISTOEY  OE  GREECE 


FBOM  THE 


KAIiLIEST  PERIOD  TO  THE  n,()SE  OF  THE  GEXEliATIOIf 
CONTEMl'ORAKV  WITH  ALEXAXDEH  THE  GREAT 


BY 


GEORGE     GROTE 


->•-*- 


IN    FOUR    VOLTJMES.--VOL.    IV. 


-»-•-♦ 


•  •  •  •  •     •   •  •  /•  •  •  •    • 

•  »••»•  •••  ••    •    ••••  •• 


A M  E  R ifc-A-iq:  i'ob«;*^-^e  H  AN  GE 


V 


J- 


3/ 


^.^■ 


COI^TENTS  OF  VOLUME  IT. 


CONTINUATION     OF     HISTORICAL    GREECE. 


*  • 


•  •      * 


•  •  • 


•     •     • 


«  t 


•  •   •    «       • 
»       •       •  * 


CHAPTER  LXXIX. 

From  the  Foundation  op  Messene  and  Megalopolis  to  the  Death  op 

Pelopidas. 

PAOS 

Changes  in  Peloponnesus  since  the  battle  of  Leuktra 45 

Changes  without  Peloponnesus *? 

Aravutus  pVince  of  Macedonia „•  v  '  •. * 1« 

Ambitious  views  of  Athens  after  the  battle  of  Leuktra •  4b 

Her   aspirations  to  maritime    empire,   and    to    the    partial    recovery   of 

kleruciiies  

She  wishes  to  recover  Amphipolis— Arayutas  recognizes  her  right  to  the 

47 
48 
48 

49 
49 
50 
51 
51 

52 
53 
M 
54 

54 


place  

Atliens  and  Amphipolis ■  •  -  • ;  Vr ' " "  V ' '  • 

Death  of  Jason  and  Amyntas— state  of  Thessaly  and  Macedonia  ....  .••••;• 
Alexander  of  Pherse— he  is  opposed  by  Pelopidas— mtlueuce  of  Thebes  m 

Thessaly ••■ :.•, •  •  •  •, 

State  of  Macedonia— Alexander  son  of  Amy ntas—Eurydike— Ptolemy . .. . . . 

Assistance  rendered  by  the  Athenian  Iphikrates  to  the  family  of  Amyntas. 

iphikrates  and  Timotheus ■ • •  ■  •  •  •   •  • 

Terms  of  alliance  discussed  and  concluded  between  Athens  and  Sparta. . . . 
The  Spartan  aUied  army  defends  the  line  of  Momit  Oneium— Epaminondas 

breaks  through  it  and  marches  into  Peloponnesus 

Sikyon  joins  the  Thebans— Phlius  remains  faithful  to  Sparta 

He  enforcement  from  Syracuse  to  Peloponnesus  in  aid  of  Sparta 

Forbearance  and  mildness  of  Epaminondas ; • 

Energetic  action  and  insolence  of  the  Arcadians— Lykomedes  animates  and 

leads  them  on 

Great  intluence  of  Lykomedes -  •  •  • •   •  •   

Elis  tries  to  recover  her  supremacy  over  the  Triphyhan  towns,  which  are 

admitted  into  the  Arcadian  union,  to  the  great  offense  of  Elis 

Mission  of  Philiskus  to  Greece  by  Aiiobarzanes 

Political  importance  of  the  reconstitution  of  Messene,  which  now  becomes 

the  great  subject  of  discord.    Me.ssenian  victory  proclaimed  at  Olympia. . 

Expedition  of  Pelopidas  into  Thessaly .■■.■ •.•  •  •  ■ 

The  Tearless  Battle— victory  of  the  Spartan  Archidamus  over  the  Arcadians 
Third  expedition  of  Epaminondas  into  Peloponnesus— his  treatment  of  the 

A.r*tiM^jni  cititis         • ,,,,,•......• -..*••• .,,... 

The  Thebans  reverse  the  policy  of  Epaminondas,  on  complaint  of  the 

Arcadians  and  others.    They  do  not  re-elect  him  Boeotarch 

Disturbed  state  of  Sikyon— Euphron  makes  himself  despot— his  rapacious 

and  siinguiuary  conduct 


55 
56 

50 

57 
58 

59 

60 

60 


CONTENTS   OF    VOL.    IV 


I'AOE 

Stifferinff  of  the  Phliasians— their  steady  adherence  to  Sparta  .  •••■•••  ••;•   •    ^^ 
Assistance  rendered  to  Phlius  by  the  Athenian  Chures—surprise  of  the  fort 

Euphroa  S  expelled  from  sikyon  by  the  Arcadians  and  Thei)»ns— he  retires 

to  t  he  harbor,  wliicii  he  surrenders  to  the  Spartans . .     .■•••••■•     Lo 

Euphron  returns  to  Sikyon-he  g:oes  to  Thebes,  and  is  there  assassinated. . .    b-^ 

The  assassins  are  put  upon  their  trial  at  Thebes-tlieir  defense b-3 

Thev  are  acquitted  by  the  Tlieban  Senate ■•    •  • ■ • ^^ 

••^eiiiiment  among  the  Many  of  Sikyon  favorable  to  Euphron— honors  shown 

to  his  botly  and  memory • ;j 

The  Sikvonians  recapture  their  harbor  from  the  Spartans. t.j 

AppHcadon  of  Thebes  for  Pei-sian  countenance  to  her  headship- nussion  ot 

l\\  >pidas  and  other  envoys  to  Susa ^, 

FtU>i»idas  obtains  from  Persia  a  favorable  rescript bo 

protest  of  the  Athenians  and  Arcadians  against  the  rescript .......    o< 

Pelopidas  brings  back  the  rescript.    It  is  read  publicly  before  the  Greek 

states  convoked  at  Thebes ■  •  •■  • .•  v  •  m;-  •;•••,•••  • 

The  states  convoked  at  Thebes  refuse  to  receive  the  rescript.    The  Arcadian 

deputies  protest  against  the  headship  of  Thebes .••••••  ■  •   ■  • '   •.•  \V-  ' ' 

Tliel'hebanssend  the  rescript  to  be  received  at  Corinth;  the  Corinthians 

refuse :  fadure  of  the  Theban  object bo 

Mission  of  Pelopidas  to  Thessaly,    He  is  seized  and  detained  prisoner  by 

Alexander  of  Phera? ;;•,•••.••,•••„,/ VV^'a 

The  Thebans  dispatch  an  armv  to  rescue  Pelopidas.    The  army,  defeated 

and  retreating,  is  only  saved  by  Epaminondas.  then  a  private  man bJ 

Triumph  of  Alexander  in  Thessaly  and  discredit  of  Thebes.    Harsh  treat- 

meat  of  Pelopidas ;••• : ;•   -y'L ' 

Second  Theban  army  sent  into  Thessaly  under  Epaminondas  for  the  rescue 

Pelopidas,  who  is  at  length  released  by  Alexander  under  a  truce ■ . .  .0 

Oropus  is  taken  from  Athens  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  Thebans.    Ihe 

Athenians  recall  Chares  from  Corinth • .■;••,•,•. 

Athens  discontented  with  her  Pcloponnesian  allies;  slie  enters  into  alliance  ^ 

with  Lykomedes  and  the  Arcadians.    Death  of  Lykomedes.  •••••. ;1 

Epaminondas  is  sent  as  envov  into  Arcadia:  he  speaks  again.st  Kallistratus.  >y^ 

Pnxiect  of  the  Athenians  to  seize  Corinth :  they  are  di.^appointed ...  .  - 

The  Corinthians,  Epidauriaus,  and  others  are  anxious  to  make  peace.    Ihey  ^  ^ 

applv  to  Sparta ■ • •••• :,""'  "' 

iieiAisal  of  the  Spartans  t<i  acknowledge  the  independence  of  Messene:  they 

reproach  their  allies  with  consenting :■;_%;.:■  V   ■  [•yw-  :  ' 

Corinth,  Epidaurus,  Phlius,  etc.,  conclude  peace  with  Thebes,  but  without 

ST.arta— recognizing  the  independence  of  Messene ^^ 

(  onjolicated  relations  between  the  Urecian  states  after  this  peace. . .......  <4 

Mhc-ns  sends  a  fresh  embassy  to  the  Persian  kii-g— altered  rescript  from 

him  Dronouncing  Amphipolis  to  be  an  Athenian  p(jssession ^4 

Timotheus  sent  with  a  fleet  to  Asia— Agesilaus— revolt  of  Anobarzanes ^) 

(  onquest  of  Samos  by  Timotheus ■  •  •  •  • .  •  •■  •  • yf, 

I'artial  re-admission  to  the  Chersonese  obtained  by  1  imotheus .b 

Sixmos   and    the    Chersonese  —  new    proprietary    acquisition    for    Athens.  _ 

\rhenian  kleruchs  or  settlers  sent  thither  as  prupiieiors j^b 

Ditrculties  of  Athens  in  establishing  her  kleruchs  in  the  Chersonese <^i 

]:. .t vs  of  Thrace— Tim(»theus  supersedes  Iphikrates. •  •  •  •  •  •    •  ■  •  •  « < 

riniotheus  acts  with  success  on  the  coast  of  Macedonia  and  Chalkidike. 

He  fails  at  Amphipolis •  •  •  •  ■  - ^f 

Timotheus  acts  against  Kotys  and  near  the  Chersonese ••  •  <  •' 

.Measures  of  the  Thebans  in  Thessaly— Pelopidas  is  sent  with  an  army 

against  .MexanJer  of  Pheree • • .••••::; o^ 

Cjxuair.ondas  exhorts  the  Thebans  to  equip  a  fleet  against  Athens »U 

i  >iscu.ssion  between  him  and  Menekleidas  in  the  Theban  assembly W 

.Menekleiilas  seemingly  right  in  dissuading  naval  preparations r^--  ^^ 

Epaminondas  in  command  of  a  Theban  fleet  in  the  Hellespont  and  Bos-  ^ 

poms *•  * 


CONTENTS   OF  VOL.    IV. 


PAGE 


Archi- 


The  Arcadians 


Pelopidas  attacks  Alexander  of  Phera^-his  success  in  battle-his  rashness 

___'V|t»  |c  s  fxin  ,.».••• •• "'" ••■ ,,...••....••..••• 

p'xcessi ve  grief  of  the  Thebans  and  Thessalians  for  bis  death 

The  fiiebans  completely  subdue  Alexander  of  Pherai 

CHAPTER  LXXX- 
From  the  Death  of  Pelopidas  to  the  Battle  op  Mantixeia. 
Conspiracy  of  the  knights  of  Orchomenus  against  Thebes— destruction  of 

Orchomenus  bv  the  Thebans ,•••••,;.    " ; V  ^ ■" 

Repugnance  excited  against  the  Thebans— regret  and  displeasure  of  Epami- 

Return^of  Epaminondas  from  his  cruise— renewed  complications  in  Pe'lo- 
T^oniif^mm  ,,,,■•..•••••••••••••••••••*••■•"'■■'''''"*'*''*'''''''"'''' 

state  of  Peloponnesus— Eieians  and  Achseans  in  alliance  with  Sparta. . ... 

The  Eieians  aim  at  recovering  Triphylia-the  Spartans  at  recovering  Mes- 

WaTbetween  the  Eleia'ns  and  Arcadians;  the  latter  occupy  Olympia 

Second  invasion  of  Elis  by  the  Arcadians.    Distress  of  the  Eieians. 
damns  and  the  Spartans  invade  Arcadia 

Archidamus  establishes  a  Spartan  garrison  at  Kromnus 
gain  advantages  over  him— armistice ....... ... . ;  •   ■ 

The  Arcadians  blockade  Kromnus  and  capture  the  Spartan  garrison 

The  Arcadians  celebrate  the  Olympic  festival  along  witli  the  Iisatans- ex- 
cluding the  Eieians •. a:  :'   \\  '    \"'"'V:<^ •"■ 

The  Eieians  invade  the  festival  by  arms— conflict  on  the  plain  of  Olympia— 
bravery  of  the  Eieians 

Feelings" of  the  spectators  at  Olympia ••••.•••• ;  •  •  • 

The  Arcadians  take  the  treasures  of  Olympia  to  pay  their  mihtia 

Violent  dissensions  arising  among  the  members 
munion  in  consequence  of  this  appropiation 
Dronounces  against  it ;•—;■■, . . .  • 

Further  dissensions  in  Arcadia— invitation  sent  to  the  Thebans— peace  con- 
cluded with  Elis ;  •  •  •  r^ .' c i  • ' ' 

The  peace  generally  popular— celebrated  at  Tegea— seizure  of  many  olig- 
archical members  at  Tegea  by  the  Theban  harmost ^ 

The  Theban  harmost  releases  his  prisoners  and  makes  an  apology 

Conduct  of  the  Theban  harmost 

View  taken  by  Epaminondas . . ■  •  • 

His  view  is  more  consistent  with  the  facts  recounted  by  Xenophon  himself. 

Policy  of  Epaminondas  and  the  Thebans • ■ 

Epahiinondas  marches  with  a  Theban  army  into  Peloponnesus  to  muster  at 


83 

as 


of   the  Arcadian  com- 
The  Arcadian  assembly 


84 
84 

80 
87 

87 

88 

88 

80 
80 
90 

91 
91 


92 
9:5 
0?, 


Tegea . 


Age- 


Muster  of  the  Arcadians  and  other  enemies  of  Thebes  at  Mantmeia. 

silaus  and  the  Spartans  are  sent  for •  —  •  —  •.••.••■••   "  j" • " 

Night-march  of  Epaminondas  to  surprise  Sparta.    Agesilaus  is  informed  in 

time  to  prevent  surprise •«•■,•::  v  "i  ' ,,    i 

Epaminondas  comes  up  to  Sparta  but  finds  it  defended -  • 

He  marches  back  to  Tegea— dispatches  his  cavalry  from  thence  to  sur- 

The  surpi'ise'is  baffled  bv  the  accidentai  arrival  of  the  Atheni-.n  cavalry- 
battle  of  cavalry  nearMantineia,  in  which  the  Athenians  have  tiie  advan- 

Epaminondas  resolves  to  attack  the  enemy  near  Mantineia    ...... ..^  ......  ■ 

View  of  Xenophon— that  this  resolution  was  forced  upon  him  b>  despau  — 

Alacrity  ot  the"army  of  Epaminondas  when  the  order  for  fighting  is  given.. 
Mantinico-Tegeatic  plain-position  of  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Mantmeians 

?.Iarch  of  Epaminondas  from  Tegea v  •  • ; : 

False  impression  produce.!  upon  the  enemy  by  his  maneuvers 
led  to  suppose  that  there  wouM  be  no  immediate  battle 


94 
95 

95 

90 

9(5 

07 


Thev  are 


93 

9r/ 

99 
100 

KK) 
101 

101 


8 


CONTENTS   OF    VOL.    IV 


PAOK 

Want  of  adequate  coinmaiid  anion;?  the  allies  opposed  to  Epaminondas —  K)-^* 

Theban  order  of  battle— plans  of  the  commander 102 

Disposition  of  the  cavalry  on  both  sides 103 

Unprepared  state  of  the  Lacedaemonian  armj- 103 

Battle  of  Mantineia— complete  success  of  the  dispositions  of  Epaminondas..  1(V4 

Victory  of  the  Thebans— Epaminondas  is  mortally  wounded 104 

Extreme  discouragement  caused  by  his  death  among  the  troops  even  when 

in  full  victory  and  pursuit 1('"> 

Proof  of  the  influence  which  he  exercised  over  the  minds  of  the  soldiers. . . .  10<'» 
Victory  claimed   by  both  sides  — nevertheless   the    Lacedaemonians   are 

obliged  to  solicit  the  burial-truce 107 

Dving  moments  of  Epaminondas 107 

The  two  other  best  Theban  officers  are  slain  also  in  the  battle 107 

Who  slew  Epaminondas?    Different  persons  honored  for  it 107 

Peace  concluded— sfa^tg»o  recognized,  including  the  independence  of  Mes- 

sene— Spai-ta  alone  stands  out— the  Thebans  return  home 108 

Kesults  or  the  battle  of  Mantineia  as  appreciated  by  Xenophon— unfair  to 

the  Thebans lOS 

Character  of  Epaminondas lOU 

Disputes  among  the  inhabitants  of  Megalopolis.    The  Thebans  send  thither 

a  force  under  Pammenes,  which  maintains  the  incorporation 113 

Agesilaus  and  Archidamus 114 

State  of  Persia— revolted  satraps  and  provinces— Datames 114 

Formidable  revolt  of  the  satraps  in  Asia  Minor— it  is  suppressed  by  the 

Persian  court  through  treachery 11') 

Agesilaus  goes  as  comniander  to  Egypt— Chabrias  is  there  also 11.5 

Death  and  character  of  Agesilaus 110 

State  of  Egypt  and  Persia H*^ 

Death  of  Artaxerxes  Mnemon.    Murders  in  the  royal  family US 

Athenian  maritime  operations— Timotheus  makes  war  against  Kotys Ill* 

Ergophilus  succeeds  Timotheus  at  the  Chersonese— Kallisthenes  succeeds 

him  against  Amphipolis— war  at  sea  against  Alexander  of  Pherae 130 

Ergophilus  and  Kallisthenes  both  unsuccessful— both  tried 1^1 

Autokles  in  the  Hellespont  and  Bosporus— convoy  for  the  corn-ships  out 

of  the  Euxine 121 

Miltokythes  revolts  from  Kotys  in  Thrace— ill-success  of  the  Athenians. 121 

Menon— Timomachus— as  commanders  in  the  Chersonese.    The  Athenians 

lose  Sestos 1^* 

Kephisodotus  in  the  Chersonese.    Charidemus  crosses  thither  from  Abydos.  122 

Assa.ssination  of  Kotys 1^ 

Kersobleptes  succeeds  Kotys.      Berisades  and  Amadokus,  his  rivals— ill- 
success  of  Athens — Kephisodotus 123 

Improved  prospects  of   Athens  in  the  Chersonese— Athenodorus— Chari- 
demus    1~* 

Charidemus  is  forcetl  to  acct'pt  the  convention  of  Athenodorus— his  eva- 
sions—the Chersonese  with  Sestos  is  restored  to  Athens 125 

The  transmarine  empire  of  Athens  now  at  its  maximum.    Mischievous 

effects  of  her  conquests  made  against  Olynthus 12.> 

Maximum  of  second  Athenian  empire— accession  of  Philip  of  Macedon Ir.i6 

CHAPTER  LXXXL 

SiciiJAJi  Affairs  after  the   DESTRrmox  of  the  Athenian  Armament 

BEFORE  Syracuse. 

Syracuse  after  the  destruction  of  the  Athenian  armament 127 

Anticipation  of  the  impending  ruin  of  Athens— revolution  at  Thurii 128 

Syracusan  squadron  under  Hermokrates  goes  to  act  against  Athens  in  the 

.-Egean 128 

Disappointed   hopes  — defeat  at  Kynossema  —  second   ruinous  defeat   at 

Kyzikus 129 


CONTENTS   OF  VOL.    IV. 


9 


PAGE 

Sufferings  of  the  Syracusan  seamen— disappointment  and  displeasure  at 

Sv  racuse 130 

Banishment  of  Hermokrates  and  his  colleagues.    Sentence  communicated 

by  Hermokrates  to  the  armament.    Their  displeasure  at  it 130 

Hermokrates  had  promised  the  Syracusans  what  he  could  not  realize;  but 

his  conduct  as  commander  had  been  good 131 

Internal  state  of  Syracuse— constitution  of  Diokles 131 

Difficulty  of  deterniining  what  that  constitution  was 132 

Invasion  from  Carthage i;i3 

State  of  the  Carthaginians 133 

Extent  of  Carthaginian  empire— power  and  population— Liby-Phenicians. . .  133 
Harsh  dealing  of  Carthage  toward  her  subjects.    Colonies  sent  out  from 

Carthage 135 

3Iilitary  force  of  Carthage 1'^ 

Political  constitution  of  Carthage 136 

(Oligarchical  system  and  sentiment  at  Carthage , 1.37 

Powerful  families  at  Carthage— Mago,  Hamilkar,  Hasdrubal 138 

Quarrel  between  Egesta  and  Silenus  in  Sicily 138 

Application  of  Egesta  to  Carthage  for  aid— appHcation  granted— eagerness 

of  Hannibal 139 

Carthaginian  envoys  sent  to  Sicily— neutrality  of  Syracuse 140 

Confidence  of  the  Selinuntines— they  are  defeated  by  the  Egestaeans  and 

Carthaginians 140 

Measures  of  Selinus— promise  of  aid  from  Syracuse— large  preparations  of 

Hannibal 140 

Hannibal  crosses  over  to  Sicily  with  a  very  large  armament.    He  lays  siege 

to  Selinus 141 

Vigorous  assault  on  Selinus  —  gallant  resistance  —  the  town  is  at  length 

stormed ■• 142 

Selinus  is  sacked  and  plundered — merciless  slaughter 143 

Delay  of  the  Syracusans  and  others  in  sending  aid.    Answer  of  Hannibal  to 

their  erabass3' 143 

Hamiibal  marches  to  Himera  and  besieges  it.  Aid  from  Syracuse  under 
Diokles— sally  from  Himera  against  the  besiegers— victory  of  Hannibal. . .  144 

Syracusan  squadron — resolution  taken  to  abandon  Himera 145 

Partial  evacuation  of  Himera— resistance  still  continued:  the  town  is  at 

length  stormed  and  captured 146 

Hannibal  destroys  Himera  and  slaughters  3,000  prisoners  as  an  expiation  to 

tlie  memory  of  his  grandfather 147 

Alarm  throughout  the  Greeks  of  Sicily— Hannibal  dismisses  his  army  and 

returns  to  Carthage 148 

New  intestine  discord  in  Syracuse— Hermokrates  comes  to  Sicily 148 

i  le  levies  troops  to  effect  his  return  by  force 1^ 

He  is  obliged  to  retire— he  establishes  himself  in  the  ruins  of  Selinus  and 

acts  against  the  Carthaginians  149 

His  further  attempts  to  re-enter  Syracuse  with  the  bones  of  the  Syracusans 

slain  near  Himera.    Banishment  of  Diokles 150 

Hermokrates  tries  again  to  penetrate  into  Syracuse  with  an  armed  force. 

He  is  defeated  and  slain 151 

First  appearance  of  Dionysius  at  Syracuse 152 

Weakness  of  Syracuse  arising  otit  of  this  political  discord— party  of  Hermo- 
krates.   Danger  from  Carthage .• 152 

Fresh  invasion  of  Sicily  by  the  Caathaginians.  Immense  host  under  Hanni- 
bal and  Imilkon 153 

Great  alarm  in  Sicily— active  preparations  for  defense  at  Agrigentum 153 

Grandeur,  wealth,  and  population  of  Agrigentum 154 

The  Carlhaginijfns  attack  Agrigentum.    They  demolish  the  tombs  near  its 

walls.    Distemper  among  their  army.    Religious  terrors— sacrifice 155 

Syracusan  re-enforcement  to  Agrigentum  under  Daphnaeus,  Jlis  victorj' 
over  the  Iberians.  He  declines  to  pursue  them.  The  Agrigentine  gen- 
erals also  djecline  to  attack  them  ia  tlie  retreat 156 


10 


CONTENTS   OF    VOL.    IV 


CONTENTS   OF   VOL.    IV. 


II 


PAGE 

Daphnjeus  enters  Agrigentum.    Discontent  against  the  Agrigentine  gen- 

erals  for  having  been  backward  in  attack.    Thev  are  put  to  de^th  . ._     . .  15b 
Privations  in  both  arraies-Hamilkar  captures  the  provision-ships  of  the 

Svracusans- Agrigentum  is  evacniated     .  ...••.•. {^^ 

-Ygfi^entum  taken  and  plundered  by  tne  Carthagnuans ip» 

Terror  throughout  Si<>ily . . . . .  •  • tt'i 

Bitter  complaints  against  the  byracusan  generals. •••■:; ^^"^ 

The  HLrmokratean  party  at  Syracuse  comes  forward  to  subvert  the  govern- 

ment  and  elevate  Dionysius •   .•••:•:; :^J 

Harangue  of  Dionysius  in  the  Syracusan  assembly  against  the  generals, 

whS°are  deposed  by  vote  of  the  people,  and   Dionysms   With   others  ^^^ 

A.^^bSlsl"l  ot^Diom^^^  hitrigues  against  his  coileagues  and  frus- 

n-ates  all  their  proceedings.    He  pnx-ures  a  vote  for  restormg  the  Her-  ^^^ 

Di?nyJhis''fs^eni' with  a'  Syracusan"  re-enforcement" to'  Geia.' '  He  procures 

the  execution  or  banishment  of  the  Geloan  oligarchy •••••••..■ 

He  returns  to  Syracuse  with  an  increased  force-he  accuses  las  colleagues  ^^ 

Dionvskis  is^immed  general!  single-handed,  with  fu'li  powers. 163 

Appirent  repentance  of  the  people  after  the  vote.    Stratagem  of  Dionysms 

to  obtain  a  vote  insuring  to  him  a  body  of  paid  guards ,  •  1^4 

March  of  Dion^-sius  to  Leontini • ; •  •  ■  •  •  •.-• {j!t! 

A  vote  is  takeri  there  whereby  a  body  of  guards  is  assigned  to  him lOo 

Dionysius  establishes  himself  at  Syracuse  as  despot J ^2 

Dionysius  as  despot-the  means  whereby  he  attained  the  power lb* 

CHAPTER  LXXXn. 

Sicily  DrRi>'o  the  Despotism  of  the  Elder  Dionysius  at  SYRAcrsE. 

Imilkon  with  the  Carthaginian  army  marches  from  Agrigentum  to  attack  ^^^ 

BravI'defense"  of"  the  Geioans-Dionysius' arrives  with  an  army  to  relieve  ^^^ 

Plan  of  Dionysius'for  a  general  attack  on  the  Carthaginan  army 1«9 

He  is  defeated  and  obliged  to  retreat •  ■  •  •. ^-  v  •  iv" " '; 

He  evaluates  Gela  andliamarina-tiight  of  the  population  of  both  places, 

which  are  taken  anil  sacked  by  the  Carthaginiuns. ^i^J 

Irdienation  and  charges  of  treachery  against  Dionysius .....  i « i 

MutfnTof^^^  o^  ^o  Syracuse  and  declare  ^^^ 

Tl?e^i?\°mpn;d'S?e-theyaresurprised  and' overpowered  by  tlie  rapid  return  ^^^ 

of  Diony.sius -.'o 

Dionysius  master  of  Syracuse.  ..... .  • •  • • .V^f 

Pi-oD.  .sitions  of  peace  come  from  ImilKon.    Terms  of  peace ...............    l  #4 

S)llu5on  of  Dionysius  with  the  Carthaginians,  who  confirm  his  dommion 

over  Syracuse.    Pestilence  in  the  Cartliaginian  army • •  ■  •  •  •  •  i*4 

Near  coincidence  in  time  of  this  peace  with  the  victory  of  Lysander  at 

^.eospotami— svmpathv  of  Sparta  with  Dionysms. - •   ••••••;  ^''^ 

D^fessSi  condition  o£  the  towns  of  Southern  Sicdy,  from  Cape  Pachynus 

to  Lilybseum ji-y 

llronS  Ptatton^  aKherbuiidi«gs  er^tied  byDionVsiu.s  to  and  aboui  ^,^ 

He  assTgns  houses  in  ■6i4ygia  to  his  soldiers  and  partisans-he  d:stributes 

the  lands  of  Syracuse  anew rvia ' 177 

Exorbitant  exactio.is  of  Dionysius-discontent  at  Syracuse  .  ••.•••■••  ••••••  ^'^ 

Dionysius  marches  out  of  Syracuse  against  the  bikels-mutiny  of  the  Syra- 

cusaxx  soldiers  at  Herbesa -Dorikus  the  commander  is  slam l.a 


% 


I 


PAGE 

The  Syracusan  insurgents,  with  assistance  from  Rhegium  and  Messene, 

besiege  Dionysius  in  Ortygia  jTg 

Despair  of  Dionysius— he  applies  to  a  body  of  Campanians  in  the  Cartha- 
ginian service  for  aid 179 

He  amuses  the  assailants  with  feigned  submission— arrival  of  the  Cam- 
panians—victory  of  Dionysius jsx) 

Dionysius  strengthens  his  despotism  more  than  before — assistance  lent  to 

him  by  the  Si)artan  Aristus— Nikoteles  the  Corinthian  is  put  to  death IHI 

He   disarms   the   Syracusan   citizens  — strengthens   the   fortifications   of 

Ortygia — augments  his  mercenary  force I81 

Dionysius  conquers  Naxus,  Katana,  and  Leontini iS;* 

Great  power  of  Dionysius.    Foundation  of  Alaesa  by  Archonides ISti 

Resolution  of  Dionysius  to  make  war  upon  Carthage 18:3 

Locality  of  Syracuse— danger  to  which  the  town  had  been  exposed  in  the 

Athenian  siege 183 

Additional  fortifications  made  by  Dionysius  along  the  northern  ridge  of  the 

cliffs  of  Epipolae  up  to  the  Euryalus    iHl 

Popularity  of  the  work— efforts  made  by  all  the  Syracusans  as  well  as  by 

Dion5'sius  himself iHTy 

Preparations  of  Dionysius  for  aggressive  war  against  the  Carthaginians. '. '. '.  180 

Improvement  in  the  behavior  of  Dionysius  toward  the  Syracusans. 186 

His  conciliatory  offers  to  other  Grecian  cities  in  Sicily.     Hostile  sentiment 

of  the  Rhegines  toward  him.    Tlieir  application  to  Messene 187 

He  makes  peace  with  Messene  and  Rhegium.     He  desires  to  marry  a 
Rhegine  wife.    His  proposition  is  declined  by  the  citv.    He  is  greatly 

incensed ' 188 

He  makes  a  propositi<jn  to  marry  a  wife  from  Lokri— his  wish  is  granted— 

marries  a  Lokrian  maiden  named  Doris iS8 

Immense  warlike  equipment  of  Dionysius  at  Syracuse— arms,  engines,  etc..  189 
Naval  preparations  in  t!ie  harbor  of  Syracuse -very  great  also.    Enlarge- 
ment of  the  build  of  ships  of  war— quadriremes  aiid  (|uinqueremes 190 

General  syrapatliy  of  the  Syracusans  in  his  projects  against  Carthage ino 

He  hires  soldiers  from  all  quarters 191 

He  celebrates  his  nuptials  with  two  wives  on  the  same  day— Doris  and 

Aristomache.    Temporary  good  feeling  at  Syracuse  toward  him 191 

He  convokes  the  Syracusan  assembly  and  exhorts  them  to  war  against 

Carthage 193 

He  desires  to  an-est  the  emigration  of  those  who  were  less  afraid  of  the 

Cartliaginian  dominion  than  of  his  192 

He  g)-ants  permission  to  plunder  the  Carthaginian  residents  and  shiws  at 

Syracuse.    Alarm  at  Cai-thage— suffering  in  Africa  from  the  pestilence. .    192 
Dionysius  marches  out  from  Syracuse  with  a  prodigious  army  against  the 

Carthaginians  in  Sicily ' 193 

Insurrection  against  Carthage  among  the  Sicilian  Greeks  subject  to  her. 

Terrible  tortures  inflicted  on  the  Carthaginians 193 

Dionysius  besieges  the  Carthaginian  seaport  Motye 194 

Situation  of  Motj-e— operations  of  the  siege — vigorous  defense 194 

Dionysius  overruns  the  neighboring  dependencies  of  Carthage— doubtful 
result  of  the  siege  of  Motye— appearance  of  Imilkon  with  a  Carthaginian 

fleet—he  is  obliged  to  return 19b 

Desperate  defense  of  iMotye.    It  is  at  length  taken  by  a  nocturnal  attack. . .  196 

Plunder  of  Motye— tlie  inhabitants  either  slaughtered  or  sold  for  slaves 197 

Further  operations  of  Dionysius 197 

Arrival  of  Imilkon  with  a  Carthaginian  armament — his  successful  opera- 
tions—he retakes  Motye 198 

Dionysius  retires  to  Syracuse ^ 198 

Imilkon  captures  Messene • 199 

Revolt  of  the  Sikels  from  Dionysius.    Commencement  of  Tanromeniura 200 

Provisions  of  Dionysius  for  the  defense  of  Syracuse— he  strengthens  Leon- 
tini—he  advances  to  Katana  with  his  land  army  as  well  as  his  fleet 200 


12 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   IV. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOL.   IV. 


13 


PAGE 

Naval  battle  of  Katana— great  victorj'  of  the  Carthagiuiaii  fleet   under 

Magon aOl 

Arrival  of  Imilkon  to  join  the  fleet  of  Magon  near  Katana— fruitless  invita- 
tion to  the  Campanians  of  ^tna 302 

Dionj'sius  retreats  to  Syratuise— discontent  of  his  army 2(X3 

Imilkon  marches  close  up  to  Syracuse— the  Carthaginian  fleet  come  up  to 
occupy  the  Great  Harbor— their  imposing  entry.    Fortified  position  of 

Imilkon  near  the  Harbor •J03 

Imilkon  plunders  the  suburb  of  Achradina— blockades  Syracuse  by  sea 204 

Naval  victory  gauied  bj'  the  Syracusan  fleet  during  the  absence  of  Diony- 

sius 205 

Effect  of  this  victory  in  exalting  the  spirits  of  the  Syracusans 205 

PubUc  meeting  convened    by  Dionysius— mutinous  spirit   against   him— 

vehement  speech  by  Theodorus 206 

Sympathy  excited  by  the  speech  in  the  Syracusan  assembly 207 

The  Spartan  Pharakidas  upholds  Dionysius  —  who  finally  dismisses  the 

assembly  and  silences  the  adverse  movement 207 

Alliance  of  Sparta  with  Dionysius— suitable  to  her  general  policy  at  the 

time.    The  emancipation  of  Syracuse  depended  upon  Pharakidas 208 

Dionysius  tries  to  gain  popularity 208 

Terrific  pestilence  among  the  Carthaginian  army  before  Syracuse 209 

Dionysius  attacks  the  Carthaginian  camp.    He  deliberately  sacrifices  a 

detachment  of  his  mercenaries 309 

Success  of  Dionysius  both  by  sea  and  by  land  against  the  Carthaginian 

position... 210 

Conflagration  of  the  Carthaginian  camp— exultation  at  Syracuse 210 

Imilkon  concludes  a  secret  treaty  with  Dionysius,  to  be  allowed  to  escape 

with  the  Carthaginians,  and  abandon  his  remaining  armv 211 

Destruction  of  the  remaining  Carthaginian  anny  except  Sikels  and  Iberians  21 1 

Distress  at  Carthage— miserable  end  of  Duilkon 212 

Danger  of  Carthage— anger  and  revolt  of  her  African  subjects— at  length 
put  down 212 

CHAPTER  LXXXin, 

Sicilian  Affairs  (con /mued). — From  the  De.stritction  of  the  Carthaginlah 
Army  by  Pestilenck  before  Syracuse,  down  to  the  Death  of  Djonysius 
THE  Elder,  b.c.  394-367. 

Frequent  occurrence  of  pestilence  among  the  Carthaginians  not  extending 
to  the  Greeks  in  Sicily % 214 

Mutiny  among  the  mercenaries  of  Dionysius— Aristoteles  their  commander 
is  sent  away  to  Sparta 214 

Difficulties  of  Dionysius  arising  from  his  mercenaries— heavy  burden  of 
paying  them 215 

Dionysius  re-establishes  Messene  with  new  inhabitants 215 

Conquests  of  Dionysius  in  the  interior  of  Sicilv 216 

Alarm  at  Rhegium— Dionysius  attacks  the  Sikel  town  of  Tauromenium— 
desperate  defense  of  the  Sikels— Dionysius  is  repulsed  and  nearly  slain. ..  216 

Agrigentum  declares  against  Dionysius— re-appearance  of  the  Carthaginian 
army  imder  Magon 217 

Expedition  of  Dionysius  against  Rhegium— he  fails  in  surprising  the  town- 
he  concludes  a  truce  for  one  year 217 

JIagon  again  takes  the  field  at  Agyrium— is  repulsed  by  Dionysius— truce 
concluded 218 

Dionysius  again  attacks  Tauromenium— captures  it,  drives  out  tlie  Sikels, 
and  plants  n^w  inhabitants 218 

Plans  of  Dionysius  against  the  Greek  cities  in  Southern  Italy— great  pres- 
sure upon  these  cities  from  the  Samnites  and  Lucanians  of  the  interior. . .  218 

Alliance  contracted  among  the  Italiot  Greeks,  for  defense  both  againal  the 


I 


225 
225 


PAGK 

Lucanians  and  against  Dionysius.      Dionysius  alhes  himself   with   the 

Lucanians .- :.  "tV  "  V  -■  * '  .a' '  V  '  «"  * 

Dionysius  attacks  Rhegiuni-the  Rhegnies  save  the  Krotouiate  fleet— fleet 

of  Dionysius  ruined  by  a  storm 4--  •  •  •  •. -Vv:  vr " 

Defeat  of  the  inhabitants  of  Tiiurii  by  the  Lucanians.    Leptines  with  the 

fleet  of  Dionysius  off  Laus— his  conduct  toward  the  survivors. ...  221 

Fresh  expedition  of  Dionysius  against  the   italiot  Greeks— his  powerful  ^  ^^ 

armament— he  besieges  Knulonia /••■•,•••  Vu    •• ', ;v '  •    ^"^ 

United  army  of  the  Italiot  Greeks  advances  to  relieve  the  place— their 

advance  guard  is  defeated,  and  Heloris  the  general  slam ^ 

The  whole  army  is  defeated  and  captured  by  Dionysius '^4 

Generous  lenity  of  Dionysius  toward  the  prisoners • f^ 

Dionysius  besieges  Rhegium— he  grants  to  them  peace  on  severe  terms 22S 

He  captures  Kaulonia  and  Hipponium-iuhabitants  transported  to  Syracuse 

—territory  made  over  to  Lokri i;  •  v;,' " ' '■ S 

Artifices  of' Dionysius  to  impoverish  and  disarm  the  Rhegmes. Z^ 

He  besieges  Rhegium— desperate  defense  of  the  town  under  the  general 

Phyton.    Surrender  of  the  place  from  famine  after  a  blockade  ot  eleven 

months 

Cruel  treatment  of  Phyton  by  Dionysius  

Strong  syrapatliy  excited  by  the  fate  of  Phyton. - .,. .••••••  '*-o 

Rhegium  disiuahtled-all  the  territory  of  the  southern  Calabnan  peninsula 

united  to  Lokri ■■■■  —  • v  ■  •  v i^- • ' ' ' 

Peace  of  Antalkidas  — ascendant  position  of  Sparta  and  of  Dionysius. 
Kroton  conquered  by  Dionysius.    Splendid  robe  taken  from  the  temple  of 

TTp  j»^  ..•••... ^^  * 

Schemes  of  Dionysius  for  transmarine  colonies  and  conquests  in  Epirus  and 

Illyria ;  •^-  •  •   • J  /,  ' ' '  •'  ,•  ;  " "     i  "  i 

Dionysius  plunders  the  coast  of  Latium  and  Etruria,  and  the  rich  temple  ot 

Agylla  ■   .•: 

Immense  power  of  Dionysius— his  poetical  competitions ••••••. 

Olympic  festival  of  -iSi  b.c,  the  first  after  the  peace  of  Antalkidas.  Diony- 
sius sends  thither  a  splendid  legation— also  chariots  to  run— and  poetical 
compositions  to  be  recited  

Feeling  of  the  crowd  at  the  festival— Dikon  of  Kaulonia -  •  •  • 

Harangue  of  Lysias  at  the  festival  against  Dionysius,  in  reference  to  the 
political  state  of  the  Grecian  world,  and  the  sufferings  of  the  enslaved 

Sicilians •  •  • -. ;  •  •  • ;  •  ;, 

Hatred  of  the  past,  and  fear  of  the  future  conquests  of  Dionysius,  both  prev- 
alent  „••,"■   A 1   ■■    i"    "l 

Lysias  exhorts  his  hearers  to  destroy  the  tents  of  the  Syracusan  legation  at 
Olympia,  as  an  act  of  retribution  against  Dionysius. :/  •  v  • : 

Intense  explosion  of  antipathy  against  the  poems  of  Dionysius  recited  at 
Olympia— insults  heaped  upon  his  name  and  person ,- 

Excessive  grief,  wrath,  and  remorse,  of  Dionysius  on  hearing  of  this  mani- 
festation against  him-his  suspicions  and  cruelties 

Marked  and  singular  character  of  the  manifestation  against  Diony.sius. . . . . . 

Plato  visits  Syracuse— is  harshly  treated  by  Dionysius— acqmres  great  influ- 
ence over  Dion. .■ • 

>  New  constructions  and  improvements  by  Dionysius  at  Syracuse 

Intention  of  Dionysius  to  renew  the  war  with  Carthage •  • . 

War  with  Carthage.  Victory  of  Dionysius  over  the  Carthaginian  army  under 
Magon ; ;•.•,•,:,: .  •  / " 

Second  battle  with  the  Carthaginians  at  Kronium,  in  which  Dionysius  is  de- 
feated with  terrible  loss ■ ^■:' ,  •. \y 

He  concludes  peace  with  Carthage,  on  terms  very  unfavorable  to  himselt: 
all  the  territory  west  of  the  river  Halykus  is  surrendered  to  Carthage:  he 
covenants  to  pay  tribute  to  Carthage •  •  •  • ;••:•■,• 

Affairs  of  Soutliern  Italy:  wall  across  the  Calabnan  peninsula  projected, 
but  not  executed 

Relations  of  Dionysius  with  Central  Greece ■•  • 


239 
229 


230 

231 

231 

233 

232 

233 

2:34 
234 

235 
2:36 
237 

237 

238 

238 

2:)9 
2:39 


CONTEXTS   OF   VOL.   IV. 


15 


14 


co:nte.\t>s  of  vol.  iv 


PACB 

New  war  undertaken  by  Dionysius  aj^ainst  Carthape.  He  is  at  first  suc- 
cessful, but  is  ultimately  defeated  near  Lilybaauui  and  forced  to  return 
home 23'.) 

Dionysius  gains  the  prize  of  trapredy  at  the  Lentean  festival  at  Athens.  His 
joy  at  the  news.    He  dies  of  fever  soon  af terwai'd 240 

Character  of  Dionysius 2-li 

CHAPTER  LXXXIV. 

Sicilian  Affairs  after  the  Death  of  the  Elder  Dionysius— Dionysius  the 

Younger— AND  Dion. 

Family  left  bj'  Dionysius  at  his  death J>15 

Dion — his  connection  with  the  Dionysian  family 24(3 

Personal  character  of  Dfon 246 

Plato,  Dion,  and  tlie  Pythagorean  philosophers 2 15 

Extraordinary  influence  of  Plato  upon  Dion 247 

Dion  learns  to  hate  the  Dionysian  despotism— he  conceives  large  politick 

and  reformatory  views 248 

Alteration  of  habits  in  Dion— he  brings  Plato  into  communication  with 

Dionysius 248 

Dion  maintains  the  good  opinion  and  confidence  of  Dionj-sius,  until  the 

death  of  the  latter— his  visits  to  Peloi)onnesu8 .' 249 

Death  of  the  elder  Dionysius— divergences  of  interest  between  the  two  hues 

of  family 250 

The  vouuger  Dionj^sius  succeeds  his  father— his  character 230 

Conduct  of  Dion— he  submits  to  the  younger  Dionysius— gives  him  frank  and 

wholesome  advice 2J"  1 

Dion  acquires  great  influence  and  estimation  from  Dionysius 2.^1 

Recall  of  Philistus  from  exile 252 

Dion  tries  to  work  upon  tlie  mind  of  Dionysius,  toward  a  freer  political  gov- 
ernment and  mental  improvement 252 

His  earnest  exhortations  pro<luce  considerable  effect,  inspiring  Dionysius 

with  a  strong  desire  to  see  and  convei-se  with  Plato 253 

Invitation  sent  to  Plato,  both  by  Dion  and  Dionysius 2.54 

Hesitation  of  Plato— he  reluctantly  consents  to  visit  Syracuse 254 

Plato  visits  Syracuse— unbounded  deference  and  admiration   manifested 

toward  him  at  first  by  Dionysius.    Fear  and  hatred  felt  by  Philistus  and 

other  courtiers 2.55 

Injudicious  manner  in  which  Plato  dealt  with  Dionysius 256 

Strenuous  exhortations  addressed  by  Plato  and  Dion  to  Dionysius.  to  reform 

himself,  and  correct  his  own  deep-seated  mental  imperfections 257 

Plato  damps  the  inclination  of  Dionysius  toward  j3olitical  good 257 

If  Plato  had  tried  to  impel  Dionysius  toward  a  good  practical  use  of  his 

Bower,  Dionysius  woulcf  at  that  time  have  obeyed  him,  with  the  aid  of 
'ion 2.57 

Difficulties  which  they  would  have  encountered  in  trj'ing  to  realize  benefi- 
cent projects 258 

Intrigues  by  Philistus  and  othere  to  set  Dionysius  against  Plato  and  Dion. . .  258 
Relations  between  Dionysius  and  Dion— natural  foundation  for  jealousy  on 

the  part  of  Dionysius 2.59 

Dionysius  loses  his  inclinations  toward  political  improvements— comes  to 

hate  Dion 2.59  : 

Banishment  of  Dion  from  Syracuse  to  Italy 

Dionysius  retains  Plato  in  the  acropolis,  but  treats  him  well,  and  tries  to 

conciliate  his  esteem 

He  dismisses  Plato — then  recalls  him— second  visit  of  Plato  to  Syracuse — his 

dissatisfaction — Dionysius  refuses  U^  recall  Dion 

Dionysius  confiscates  the  property  of  Dion— mortification  of  Plato,  who  with 

difficulty  obtains  leave  to  depart  from  Syracuse 

Resolution  of  Dion  to  revenge  himself  on  Dionysius,  and  to  force  his  way 

back  to  Syracuse  bv  arms 


259 
260 
281 
268 
263 


I 


PAG  a 
Plato  reioins  Dion  in  Peloponnesus-exasperation  of  Dion-Dionysius  gives 

his  sis  e    Arete   the  wife  of  Dion,  in  marriage  to  Timokrates. .  .^. 263 

Aleins  of  iuxmaries  of  Dion-Plato-the  Academy-Alkunenos.    Dion  mus-  ^^ 

'  sS  fS.^:;:nMon^S!^ieprodigious  power  of  Dionysius: "  ■R^solutk;n  ^^^ 

Ci?J.lS^X?;;^>KainstDionVsiu^^^^  ^04 

Hevakleides  exiled  f  rom  Syracuse^he  projects  an  attack  upon  Dion>  sius,  ^^^ 

^.Stk^lf 'S^.te^u^eSBoiute-  and-  drunken  habits-lof  Dionysius ^  W  ^ 

Alfrmof  the  soldiers  of  Dion 'at  Zakynthus;  when  first  'informed  that  they  ^^ 

pS^^i^Sif  moSx^lSiol^  disquietudeof  the  s^ 

siSod  bv  the  prophet  Milt  as -fortunate  voyage  from  Zakynthus  to  Siciy  2bb 
dSu  lands  at  iterikleia-he  learnsthat  Dionysius  with  a  large  fleet  has  just 

quitted  Syracuse  for  Italy p,.!. 

Man-h  of  Dion  from  Herakleia  to  Syracuse.   . ..._...  ■■i-y-yA-:-:-^^ ofiH 

I)io>i  ero^^ses  the  river  Anapus,  and  approaches  the  gates  of  S>  i  acuse 40rt 

Misiakes  of  Timokrates,  fef t' as  governor  of  Syracuse  m  the  absence  of  ^^ 

GSai^'dsingortheSyracuVansto  welcome  and  assist  Dion. '  Timokrates 
is  obi  ged  to  evacuate  the  city,  leaving  Ortygia  and  Epipolp  gamsoned . .  2f.9 

Entn  ofDion  into  Achradina-joy  of  the  citizens-he  proclaims    iberty         200 

Dion  presents  himself  at  the  Pentapyla  in  front  ot  Ortygia-<^hallenges  tbe 
gai-rlson  of  ( )rtvgia  to  come  out  and  fight-is  chosen  general  by  the  Syra- 
cusans,  with  his  brother  Megakles ••  •  ■ " " " ';  : 

Dion  captures  Epipola^  and  Euryalus.  He  erects  a  crosswalk  from  sea  to 
sea,  to  block  up  Ortygia .• ■.:-:-^- i  Vv-^ 

Return  of  Dionysius  to  Syracuse.  He  tries  to  negotiate  with  Dion  and  the 
Svracusans— deceives  them  by  fallacious  propositions. „• "  V  "   ■•" 

Sudden  saliv  made  by  Dionysius  to  surprise  the  blockading  wall-he  is 
nearly  successful -great  bravery,  efforts,  and  danger  of  Dion-he  at 
length  repulses  the  attack  and  recovers  the  wall •.:; -V  ■• '  « • "  1" "  ■«" ' 

OrtvKia  is  again  blocked  up  by  land-efforts  of  Dionysius  with  his  fleet-ar- 
riVal  of  H?ralvleides  from  Peloponnesus  with  a  fleet  to  co-operate  against  ^^^ 

Arrival  of  Philistus  with 'ills' fleet  to 'the  aid  of  Dionysius  Battle  in  the 
Oreat  Harbor  between  the  fleet  of  Philistus  and  that  ot  the  Syracusans- 

Philistus  is  defeated  and  slain :\--^:\:-: • o-'l 

The  Dionysian  dynasty  almost  perished  with  Philistus '  •  •  •  -^.-J 

Iiitrik'UfSof  Dionysius  against  Dion  in  Syracuse. ;••;•:••.•••  •:•"•;;  " 

Relation  of  Dion  to  the  Dionj'sian  dynasty-suspicion  entertained  against 

him  by  the  Syracusaiis-his  haughty  manners.    Rivalry  ot  Herakleides  .  -.4 
Herakloides  is'  named  admiral.     Dion  causes  him  to  be  deposed,  and  theu    _ 

moves  himself  for  his  re-appointment ;  • '  li 

Intrigues  and  calumnies  raised  against  Dion  in  Syracuse,  by  the  manage-  ^^^ 

ment  of  Dionysius .•,••. ^p'uj^'^IiohAA" 

Jlistrust  of  Dion  by  the  Svracusans.  mainly  in  consequence  of  his  relation- 

•>    ship  to  the  Dionvsian  family.    Calumnies  of  Sosis.. ;<  v  ■•■■.■  ■\::^:; 

Further  propositions  of  Dionysius.     He  goes  away  from  Ortygia  to  Italy, 

leaving  bis  son  Apollokrates  in  command  of  the  garrison. ■■■   ■■  -J'O 

Increased  dissension  between  Dion  and  Herakleides-Dion  is  deposed.  »7d 

his  soldiers  deprived  of  the  pay  due  to  them— new  generals  are  named  ..  ^i( 
Dion  is  forced  to  retreat  from  Syracuse-bad  conduct  of  fj^e  new  gene*  ftls 

and  of  the  people  toward  his  soldiers-he  defends  himself,  but  lefuses  to 

emolov  any  more  force  than  was  essential  to  defense. •  'i*^ 

Dion  reaches  Leontini-the  L^^ontines  stand  by  him  against  the  Syracusans 

-arrival  of  Nypsius  with  a  re-enforcement  to  the  Dionysian  garrison  m 

Advaufagei'ained'byHeraicleidesan'd  the'Syracusans  "over  Nypsius  as  he 


10 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV 


17 


came  into  Oi-tyeria— extfavaj^ant  confldeneo  ii>  Syracuse 


PAGE 

NjT)sius  sallies 


furtli  from  OrtvKia,  masters  the  blcK-kading  wall,  and  forces  his  way  into 

>t«apohs  and  Achradina "^  gr-g 

Diuiicer  aiid  distress  of  the  Syracusiins— they  send  to  Leontiiii  to' invoke  the 


279 


aid  of  Dion 

Assembly  at  Leontini— pathetic  address  of  Dion ....  ' 279 

Emotion  of  the  soldiers  of  Dion  and  of  the  Leontines-tlieir  eaffeniess'to  eo 

to  the  aid  of  Syracuse  ^    2S0 

RelucUince  of  Herakleidos  to  let  Dion  into  Syracuse— renewed  assault  and 

increased  danger  from  Nypsius— unanimous  prayers  now  sent  to  invite 


Dion . 


280 


Emrance  of  Dion  into  Syracuse-he  draws  up  his   troops  "on "Epipolse 

I"  rightful  condition  of  the  citj- 281 

Dion  drives  back  Nypsius  and  his  troops  into  6rtvgia-he  extinguishes  tlie 

Jiames  and  preserves  Syracuse ' 2S1 

Universal  gratitude  and  admiration  on  the  pai-t  of  the  Svracusans  toward 
Dion.    Herakleides  and  Theodotes  throw  themselves  upon  his  mercv  and 

entreat  his  forgiveness 2j^2 

Dion  pardons  Herakleides— his  exposition  of  motives! . 2R'> 

Kemarkable  features  in  this  act  of  Dion 3^3 

Dion  re-establishes  the  blockade  of  Ortygia,  and  ransoms  the  captives 
taken oon 

Dion  named  general  on  land,  at  the  motion  of  Herakleides,  who  is  continued 

in  his  command  of  the  fleet 2^4 

Dangerous  intrigues  and  dissensions,  raised  by  Hei^aicleides  against  Dion' 

The  operations  against  Dionysius  are  frustrated '234 

Artempt  to  supersede  Dion  through  Ga-sylus  the  Spartan-good  conduct  of 

Ga-sylus °  285 

Surrender  of  Ortygia  by  Apollokrates  to  Dion 285 

Entry  of  Dion  into  Ortygia-restoration  of  his  wife— speedy  death  oJ!  his  "sou  386 

Conduct  of  Dion  in  the  hour  of  triumph 2815 

Suspicions  previously  entertained  respecting  Dion— tiiat  he  was  aiming  at 

the  despotism  for  himself— confirmed  by  his  present  conduct 28G 

He  retains  his  dictatorial  power,  with  the  fortress  and  garrison  of  Ortvffia 

—he  grauts  no  freedom  to  Syracuse 2S7 

Intention  of  Dion  to  con.stitute  himself  king,  with  a  LyJairgeaii  sclieme  of 

government  and  discipline 287 

Mistake  of  Dion  as  to  his  position ......!!.!!!]. 287 

Dion  takes  no  step  to  realize  any  measure  of  popular  liberty ' 288 

Opposition  raised  against  Dion  by  Heiakleides— impatience  of  the  Svracu- 
sans to  see  the  demolition  of  the  Dionysian  strongholds  and  funereal  mon- 
ument   OQO 

Dion  causes  Herakleides  to  he  pri vately  slain ...........". 289 

Increased  oppressions  of  Dion-hatred  enteitained  against  himVn  "Sj-racuse  289 
l)isquietude  and  irritability  of  Dion  on  account  of  his  unpopularity  .  290 

CA)nspiracy  of  Kallippus  against  him— artifices  and  perjury " "  2'X) 

Kalhppus  causes  Dion  to  be  assassinated 291 

life,  sentiments,  and  altered  position  of  Dion ii\il 

CHAPTER  LXXXV. 
SiciLiAx  Affairs  down  to  the  close  of  the  Expedition  op  Timoleon     b  c 

Position  and  prospects  of  Kallipus,  after  the  assassination  of  Dion ....  293 

<^*"S"      "?^  "taster  of  Syracuse  more  than  a  year.    His  misrule.    Return 

ot  Hippannus  son  of  Dionj'sius  to  Syracuse.    Expulsion  of  Kallippus 294 

Miserable  condition  of  Syracuse  and  Sicily,  as  described  by  Plato. .  T. 2d4 

Plato  s  recommendations  fruitless— state  of  Syracuse  grows  worse.    Diony- 

sius  returns  home  to  Ortygia,  expelling  Hipparinus 295  ' 

jDruiiken  habits  of  the  Dionysian  princes '  * "  ggg 


a 


PAGE 

Lokri— dependency  and  residence  of  the  younger  Dionj'sius 296 

Sulierings  of  the  Italiot  Greeks  from  the  Lueanians  and  Bruttiansof  the  in- 
terior  : 296 

Dionysius  at  Lokri— his  unpopularity  and  outrageous  misrule— cruel  retalia- 
tion of  the  Lokriaus  upon  his  female  relatives 296 

Distress  of  the  Syracusans— fresh  danger  from  Carthage.  They  invoke  the 
aid  of  Hiketas— in  concert  with  Hiketas,  they  send  to  entreat  aid  from 
Corinth 297 

Secret  alliance  of  Hiketas  with  the  Carthaginians— he  conspires  to  defeat 
the  application  to  Corinth 298 

Application  from  Syracuse  favorably  received  by  the  Corinthians— vote 
passed  to  grant  aid 298 

Difficulty  in  finding  a  Corinthian  leader— most  of  the  leading  citizens  decline 
—Timoleon  is  proposed  and  chosen 298 

Antecedent  life  and  character  of  Timoleon 298 

His  conduct  toward  his  brother  Timophanes,  whose  life  he  saves  in  battle. .  299 

Timophanes  makes  himself  despot,  and  commits  gross  oppression— Timo- 
leon with  two  companions  puts  him  to  death 290 

Beneficial  effects  of  the  act  upon  Corinth— sentiment  toward  Timoleon I](X) 

Bitter  reproach  of  Timoleon  by  his  mother 300 

Intense  mental  distress  of  Tiuicleou.  He  shuts  himself  up  and  retires  from 
public  life 301 

Ditferent  judgments  of  modern  and  ancient  minds  on  the  act  of  Timoleon— 
Comments  of  Flutarcli 301 

Timoleon  is  appointed  commander  to  Syracuse— he  accepts  the  command- 
admonition  of  Telekleides 302 

Preparations  made  by  Timoleon— his  scanty  mean.s— he  engages  some  of  the 
Phokian  mercenaries 303 

Bad  promise  of  tiie  expedition— second  message  from  Hiketas,  withdrawing 
himself  from  the  Corinthian  alliance,  and  desiring  that  no  troops  might 
be  sent  to  Sicily 303 

Timoleon  sets  out  for  Sicily  with  a  small  squadron— favorable  omens  and 
oracular  answers  from  the  gods  . . .' 303 

Timoleon  ariMves  at  Rhegium— is  prevented  from  reaching  Sicily  by  a  Car- 
thaginian lieet  of  superior  force — insidious  message  from  Hiketas 304 

Stratagem  of  Timoleon  to  get  across  to  Sicily,  in  collusion  with  the  Rhe- 

gines 304 

Public  meeting  in  Rhegium— Timoleon  and  the  Carthaginians  botli  present 
at  it— long  speeches,  during  wiiich  Timoleon  steals  away,  contriving  to 
send  his  fleet  over  to  Sicily 305 

Timoleon  at  Tauromenium  in  Sicily— formivlable  strength  of  his  enemies- 
despots  in  Sicily— despondency  at  Syracuse 306 

Success  of  Timoleon  at  Adranum.  He  surjirises  and  defeats  the  troops  of 
Hiketas.  superior  in  number. 306 

Improved  position  and  alliances  of  Timoleon— he  marches  up  to  the  walls  of 
Syracuse 307 

Position  of  Dionysius  in  Ortygia — he  resolves  to  surrender  that  fortress  to 
Timoleon,  stipulating  for  safe  conveyance  and  shelter  at  Corinth 308 

Timoleon  sends  troops  to  occupy  Ortygia,  receiving  Dionysius  into  his 
camp 308 

Timoleon  sends  news  of  his  success  to  Corinth,  with  Dionysius  himself  in  a 
trireme 309 

Great  effect  produced  at  Cormth— confidence  of  the  citizens — re-enforcement 
sent  to  Timoleon 309 

Sight  of  the  fallen  Dionysius  at  Corinth— impression  made  upon  the  Greeks 
— numerous  visitors  to  see  him.    Conversation  with  Aristoxenus 309 

Immense  advantage  derived  by  Timoleon  from  the  possession  of  Ortygia — 
numerous  stores  found  in  if .' 311 

Large  Carthaginian  armj-  under  Magon  arrives  to  aid  in  attacking  Ortygia. 
Defeated  by  Neon,  during  the  absence  of  Magon  and  Hiketas.  Neon  ac- 
quires Achradina,  and  joins  it  by  a  line  of  wall  to  Ortygia 311 


18 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   IV 


81  r 

318 
318 


Beturii  of  3Iagon  and  Hiketas  to  Syracuse— increased  difficulty  of  their  pro- 
ceedings, since  the  victory  of  Neon 3^0 

Return  of  Timoleon  to  Syracuse— fortunate  marcli  and  arrival  of  theCorin- 
uuan  re-enforcement gj2 

Messene  declares  in  favor  of  Timoleon— he  establishes  his  camp  "near  Syra-  " 
cuse ■_ ^n 

Mugon  distrusts  Hiketas  and  his  position  at  Svracuse— lie  suddeuly  witli- 

^  draws  his  army  and  fleet,  leaving  Syracuse  altogether 313 

rimoleon  masters  Epipohp  and   the  Avhole  city  of  S\Tacuse— JHiketas  is 

obliged  to  escape  to  Leontini 314 

Lixnguid  defense  made  by  the  troops  of  Hiketas '. 315 

Great  effect  produced  by  the  news  that  Timoleon  was  master  of  Syracuse'  *  Slo 
l^-traordinary  admiration  felt  toward  Timoleon— especially  for  the  distin- 
guished favor  shown  to  him  by  the  gods 315 

Timoleon  ascribes  all  his  successes  to  the  gods 310 

Temptations  to  Timoleon  in  the  hour  of  success— easypossdbiiity  of  makinjr 
himself  despot  of  Syracuse .   .  31G 

Timoleon  invites  the  Syracusans  to  demolish  the  iSionysiaii  stronghold  "iii 
Ortygia *^ 

He  erects  courts  of  justice  on  the  site! 

Desolate  condition  of  Syracuse  and  other  cities  in  Sicily."  *  Recall"  of '  exiles 

Application  on  the  part  of  Timoleon  and  the  Syracusans  to  Coiinth 
Commissioners  sent  from  Corinth  to  Svracuse— thev  revive  the  laws  and 

democracy  enacted  by  Diokles— but  with  various  changes  and  additions      810 
±'overty  at  Syracuse— necessity  for  inviting  new  colonists  .     .  3i9 

Large  body  of  new  colonists  assembled  at  Corinth  for  Sicily  ' ' "  3"0 

Influx  of  new  colonists  into  Sicily  from  all  quartei-s 320 

Relief  to  the  poverty  of  Syracuse 300 

Siiccesses  of  Tinioleon  against  Hiketas,  Leptines  and  other  despots  iii"  Sicily  321 
Hiketas  invites  the  Carthaginians  again  to  invade  Sicily.  321 

The  Carthaginians  land  in  Sicily  with  a  vast  army,  hicluding  a  iartre  pronor- 

iion  of  native  troops 321 

Timoleon  marches  from  Syracuse  against'the 'Carthaginian's— mutiny  of  "a 

portion  of  his  mercenaries  under  Thrasius  .    30-2 

Timoleon  marches  into  the  Carthaginian  province— omen  about  the  parsley  823 
He  encounters  the  Carthaginian  army  while  passing  the  Krimesus     War 

chariots  in  their  front— Timolean  orders  his  cavaliy  to  charge  323 

Strenuous  battle  between  the  infantry  of  Timolet.n  and  the  native  Cartha- 

ginian  infantry.    Terrible  storm— complete  victory  of  Timoleon  .  324 

Severe  loss  of  the  Carthaginians  in  the  batUe,  especially  of  their  native 

troops.    Immense  booty  collected  by  the  soldiers  of  Timoleon  325 
Discoiiragement  and  terror  among  the  defeated  army,  as  well  as  at  Carth- 
age itself 325 

Great  mcrease  of  glory  to  Timoleon— favor  of  the  gods  showii  to  hiin  in "t'lie 
battle 30(5 

Timoleon  returns  to  Syracuse— lie  dismisses  Thi-asius  and  the  Eaercenaries 
who  had  deserted  him— he  sends  them  out  of  Sicily— their  fate.  326 

Success  of  Timoleon  against  Hiketas  and  Mamerkus '827 

\  ictoiy  gained  by  Timoleon  over  Hiketas.  at  the  river  Damurius.       327 

Timoleon  attacks  Hiketas  at  Leontini.  Both  the  place  and  Hiketas  in  per- 
son are  surrendered  to  Timoleon  by  the  garrison.    Hiketas  and  his  famUv 

are  put  to  death 828 

Timoleon  gains  a  victory  over  Dlamerkus- he  concludes  peace  with  the 

Carthaginians 303 

Timoleon  conquers  and  takes  prisoners  Mamerkus  and  Hippoii.    Mamerkus 

IS  condemneil  by  the  Syracusan  public  assembly 309 

Timoleon  puts  down  all  the  despots  in  Sicily 3,30 

Timoleon  Jajs  down  his  power  at  Syracuse.' .330 

Gratitude  and  reward  to  him  by  the  Syracusans  ...  330 

Great  influence  of  Timoleon,  even  after  he  had  laid  down  his  power 331 


CONTEXTS  OF  VOL.   IV. 


19 


PAGE 

Immigration  of  new  Greek  settlers  into  Sicily,  to  Gela,  Agrigentum,  Kama- 

riua,  etc • 331 

Value  and  importance  of  the  moral  ascendency  enjoyed  by  Timoledh,  in 

regulating  these  new  settlements ' 332 

Numerous  difficulties  which  he  would  be  called  upou  to  adjust 333 

Residence  of  Timoleon  at  Syracuse— chapel  to  the  goddess  Automatia 333 

Arrival  of  the  bUnd  Timoleon  in  the  public  assembly  of  Syracuse,  during 

matters  of  grave  and  critical  discussion 331 

Manner  in  which  Timoleon  bore  contradiction  in  the  public  assembly— his 

earnest  anxiety  to  insure  freedom  of  sipeech  against  nimself 3^ 

Uncorrupted  moderation  and  public  spirit  of  Timoleon 835 

Xenophonic  ideal— command  over  willing  free  men— qualities,  positive  as 

well  as  negative— of  Timoleon 8J6 

Freedom  and  comfort  diffused  throughout  all  Sicily  for  twenty-four  years, 

until  the  despotism  of  Agathokles 336 

Death  and  obsequies  of  Timoleon 3:36 

Proclamation  at  his  funer  ""1 — monument  to  his  honor 337 

Contrast  of  Dion  and  Timoleon 337" 


CHAPTER  LXXXVI. 

Central  Greece  :  From  the  Accession  of  Philip  op  Macedon  to  the  Birth 

OF  Alexander.    359-50  b.c. 

Central  Greece  resumed 338 

State  of  Central  Greece  in  300-59  b.o.    Degradation  of  Sparta.: 839 

Megalopolis— Messene — their  fear  of  Sparta— no  central  action  in  Pelopon- 
nesus     - 340 

Corinth,  Sikyon.  etc 'T40 

Comparatively  good  condition  of  Athens 340 

Power  of  Thebes 841 

Extinction  of  the  free  cities  of  Boeotia  by  the  Thebans — repugnant  to  Gre- 
cian feeling 341 

Thessaly— despots  of  Pherre 342 

Alexander  of  Phera3— his  cruelties— his  assassination M2 

Tisiphonus  despot  at  Pherae — loss  of  power  in  the  Phersean  dynasty 844 

Maeedon— reign  and  death  of  Perdikkas 344 

Philip  as  a  youth  at  Thebes— ideas  there  acquired — foundation  laid  of  his 

future  military  ability 345 

Condition  of  Philip  at  the  death  of  Perdikkas 346 

Embarrassments  and  dangers  with  which  he  had  to  contend 346 

Macedonian  government .  346 

Proceedings  of  Philip  against  his  numerous  enemies.    His  success— Thra- 

cians— Athenians 347 

He  evacuates  Amphipolis.     He  defeats  the  Athenians  and  Argaeans— liis 

mild  treatment  of  Athenian  prisoners 347 

Philip  makes  peace  with  Athens— renounces  his  claim  to  Amphipolis 34S 

Victories  of  Philip  over  the  Preonians  and  Illyrians 318 

Amphipolis  evacuated  by  Philip — the  Athenians  neglect  it 349 

State  of  Euboea— the  Thebans  foment  revolt  and  attack  the  island— victori- 
ous elTorts  of  Athens 350 

Surrender  of  the  Chersonese  to  Athens 3.51 

Social  war — Chios,  Kos,  Rhodes,  and  Byzantium  revolt  from  Athens 351 

Causes  of  the  Social  War— conduct  of  the  Athenians— Synod  at  Ath<>ns 352 

Athens  acts  more  for  her  own  separate  interests,  and  less  for  that  of  her 
allies— her  armaments  on  service— badly  paid  mercenaries— their  extor- 

tions '^-^-^ 

The  four  cities  declare  themselves  independent  of  Athens— interference  of 

the  Karian  Mausolus 8.53 

Great  force  of   the  revolters— armament   dispatched  by  Athens   against 
Chios— battle  at  Chios— repulse  of  the  xVthenians,  and  death  of  ChabriaG..  353 


20 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV. 


21 


PAOB 

Further  arninmcnts  of  Athens— IpJiikrates,  Timotheus.  and  Chares-  unsuc- 
eessfiil  operations  in  the  Hellespont,  and  quarrel  between  the  generals. . .  3.54 

Iphikrate*  and  Timotheus  are  accused  by  Chares  at  Athens 355 

Iphikrates  is  acquitted,  Timotheus  is  fined  and  retires  from  Atliens 3.k3 

Arroj?ance  and  unpopularity  of  Timotheus,  attested  by  his  fi'iend  Isokrates  3.}5 

Exile  of  Timotheus — his  death  soon  afterward 356 

Iphikrates  no  more  employed— great  loss  to  Athens  in  these  two  generals. . .  35C 
Expedition  of  Chares— Athens  makes  peace  with  her  revolted  allit  s.  recog- 
nizing their  full  autonomy 857 

End  of  the  social  War— great  loss  of  power  to  Athens 357 

Renewed  action  of  Philip.    He  lays  siege  to  Amphipolis 358 

The  Amphipolitans  send  to  ask    a.ssistance  fi'om  Athens— raaneuvei*s  of 

PhiMp  to  induce  Athens  not  to  interfere 358 

The  Athenians  determine  not  to  as.sist  Amphipolis— their  motives — impor- 
tance of  this  resolution 359 

Capture  of  Amphipolis  by  Philip,  through  the  treason  of  a  paity  m  the 

town 359 

Importance  of  Amphipolis  to  Philip— disappointment  of  the  Athenians  at  his 

breach  of  promise 3G0 

Philip  amuses  the  Athenians  with  false  assurances — he  induces  them  to  re- 
ject advances  from  the  Olynthians — proposed  exchange  of  Pydna  for 

Amphipolis oGO 

Philip  acts  in  a  hostile  manner  against  Athens— he  conquers  Pydna  and  Po- 

tid;;ea— gives  Potida^a  to  the  Olj-nthians— remissness  of  the  Athenians —  'XO 
Increase  of  the  power  of  Philip— he  founds  Philipi)i,  opens  gold  mines  near 

Moimt  Panga-us,  and  derives  large  revenues  from  them 36ii 

Marriage  of  Philip  w  ith  Olympias— birth  of  Alexander  the  Great 362 

CHAPTER  LXXX\TI. 

From  the  Commencement  op  the  Sacued  War  to  that  of  the  Olynthian 

War. 

Causes  of  the  Sacred  War— the  Ampliiktyonic  assembly 363 

Political  complaint  brou::?ht  before  the  assemblv,  first  by  Thebes  against 

Sparta \ 36i 

Next,  by  Thebes  against  the  Phokians.    The  Phokians  are  condemned  and 

heavily  fined 304 

The  assembly  pass  a  vote  consecrating  the  Phokian  territorv  to  Apollo 3<35 

Resolution  of  the  Phokians  to  resist— Philomelus  their  leader 365 

Question  of  right  raised  as  to  the  presidency  of  the  temple— old  right  cf  the 

Phokians  against  that  of  the  Delphians  and  the  Amphikt3ons 366 

Active  measures  taken  by  Philomelus.   He  goes  to  Spjirta— obtains  aid  from 

king  Archidanius.     He  seizes  Delphi — defeats  the  Lokrians 366 

Philomelus  fortifies  the  temple — levies  numerous  mercenaries— tries  to  con- 
ciliate Grecian  sentiment.    The  Grecian  world  divided 367 

Philomelus  tries  to  keep  the  prophetic  agencvj^nHng- conduct  of  the  P>-thia  368 

Battles  of  Philomelus  against  the  Lokrians— his  success 369 

Exertions  of  tlie  Thebans  to  raise  a  confederacy  against  the  Phokians 369 

Danger  of  the  Phokians— they  take  part  of  the  treasures  of  the  temple,  in 

order  to  paj'  a  mercenary  force , 369 

Numerous  mercenaries  employed  by  the  Phokians — violence  and  f  erocit}'  of 

the  war — defeat  and  death  of  Philomelus 370 

Onomarchus  general  of  the  Phokians— he  renews  the  war — his  power  by 

means  of  the  mercenaries. 371 

Violent  measures  of  Onomarchus— he  employs  the  treasures  of  the  temple 

to  scatter  bribes  through  the  various  cities 371 

Succt  sses  of  Onomarchus— he  advances  as  far  as  Therniopylae — he  invades 

Boeotia— is  repulsed  by  the  The  bans '. 373 

The  Thebans  send  a  force  under  Pammenes  to  assist  Artabazus  in  Asia 

Minor r,1 


PAGE 


Tonnnest  of  Sestos  by  Chares  and  the  Athenians ;   ' : '  ■  V  "  '^' ^ 

S-ues  of  Kersobleptes  against  Athens-he  is  compelled  to  cede  to  her 
S°!S^rt?on  of  the  Chei-sonese-Athenian  settlers  sent  thither  as  well  as  to  ^^ 

^  A^thTv  and  constant  progress  of  Philip-he  conquers  Metiione-Temissness  ^^^ 

Pi^Hn  ma^-ches  "into  ThessaVy  against  the'  despots'  of  Pherae  ••••■;•  ^^'* 

Great  poweV  of  Onomarchus  axtd  the  Phokians-plans  of  Athens  and  Sparta 

the  Smrtans  contemplate  hostilities  agamst  Megalopolis. . . .  •-•••■■•  -.•   •3-4 
Fi^fappeiraSce  of  Demosthenes  as  a  public  adviser  m  the  Athenian  ^^^^ 

Pa*renSS^and  early  youtii  of  Diemosth'enes-wealth  of  his  father-dishon-  ^^^ 
Yofth  of^DemSsthtnls'-s'icicly  and'  feeble  ■constitution-want  of"  physical  ^^^ 
T^S o?l5S!<S^rg;r'a  speaker-his'uistructor.-is^u^lato-his  ^^ 
IrSat&bl^^Sr  J  of  S^henes  to  surmount'  his  natural^  d^^cts  as  a  ^^ 
vKslt^'by'Demosthenesuponactionin oratory: '  -I^i^  "^i"^^^"^;^}^^*;*"-.^^^  379 
H^"  becoraef  fi^rst. 'known'  'as ' a  logograpiier  'or ' composer  of  speeches  for  ^^ 


pSkSiiT^itleS^  and  riValry  with  bemosthenes-his  character  and 


380 


.382 


irt?l.?hVd"a?,Trl7brwJt'tS'i^y  outhe  public  ot  Athens.    Nun.ber  of 

Hil  Kknes"  ~&s  conrempt  of  the  Athenian  people-his  unperturbabil.ty  ^^ 
Ph"^kionTd'EubX'rt1Siea<lersorthepeao;;:part^^^^ 

inSf i^orphoSrsLd^irs' Su^ 

Athens  mieht  have  prevailed  over  Macedonia •  •  •  •  ^*°^ 

Change  hi  tfe  military  spirit  of  Greece  since  the  Peloponnesian  war.    De- 

clSil  of  thi  Stizen  soldiership:  increased  spread  of  mercenary  troops. 

Contrast  between  the  Periklean  and  the  Demosthemc  citizen  .   . . .... .....  ^ 

DecZe  of  ml  iTary  readiness  also  among  the  Pelopennesian  allies  of  Sparta  3b4 
MuUipliStion  of  mercenary  soldiers-its  mischievous  consequences-neces-  ^^ 

DliSiorS^'Se  SilSn  miiita.^ ^^ce'occm^d^ 

the  ereat  development  of  the  Macedonian  force •  •   •  • 000 

Ridenes?and  poverty  of  the  Macedonians-excellent  material  for  soldiers  ^ 

FiS^i^Sy  hSr^'of  Dem^sthenes-on-  ti.e  Symmories-alarm  ^^ 

Posldv^e^'^i^crmmendations  'in'  "the "  speech-mature"  tliought.and  " sagacity  ^ 

His' p?oposld  pre^mration'and  scheme  f or'extending"  the  'basis'  of"  tlie  'Syni'- 

SpTrit'of 'the  'Demosthenic'exhortations'"  "always  impressing 't:he  necessit.v  of 
personal  effort  and  sacrifice  as  conditions  of  success,^. . . ..........  •  .^.  •  •  •  •  ^^vi 

Afta^rs  of  Peloponnesus-projects  of  Sparta  against  Megalopohs-her  at- 


3S9 


390 


-he  advises  that  Athens  shall 


tempt  to  obtain  co-operation  from  Athens. 
Views  and  recommendations  of  Demosthenes 

Pll^^lSy^  Sc!S^ykopi.ron;.f  "Pl^r^"  who  calls  in  bnomarl 

Sul^elsTsVf'o^n^o'^mtJSS^^^^^^^  V^^'-'  ^ 

PhUip  ripairs  hi^  forces  and  marches  again  into  Thessaly-lus  complete  v 
tory  over  the  Phokians— Onomarchus  is  slam 


ic 


390 


392 


2: 


o 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   IV. 


Philip  ponquei-s  Phera^  and  Pa^asa? -becomes  master  of  all  Thessalv-ex^'^°^ 
IHilsion  ot  Lykophron ■  ggg 

Philip  iriva.les  Thermopyhe-the  Atheniaiis'send  a  'forcp  thither  and  arrest 
his  progresa.    ilmiv  alarm  at  this  juucture,  and  unusual  rapidity  of  move- 

IllPllt QQQ 

Phyllu.s  takes  the  coumiand  of  the  Phokians— third  spoliation  of  t lie  ttimDie 

revived  strength  of  the  Phokians— malversation  of  the  leaders  394 

War  m  Peloponnesus-the  Spartans  attack  .Megalopolis-interference  of 

Hostilities  with  indecisive  result— peace  concluded— autonomv' of  SleffaloD-  " 
ohs  again  recognized *        -i^gaiup 

Ill-success  of  the  Phokians  in  Boeotia-deathof  Phayilus,'  who  is  succeeded 

^j     i  llu-ltcKUS >••« QO*** 

The  Thebans  obtain  money  from  the  Persian  king 307 

Increased  power  and  formidable  attitude  of  Philip.    Aiarm  which  he'now 

begins  to  inspire  throughout  the  Grecian  world  oq~ 

Pluhp  acquires  a  considerable  naval  power— importance  of  the' Gulf  of  " 

I'agasfe  10  him— his  tiymg  squadrons  annoy  the  Athenian  commerce  and 

<'^a.st nqo 

Philip  carries  on  war  in  Thraee-his  intrigues  among  the  Thracian  princes?  399 

o.?t^ffl^!t"m-r''"f^.?^^''?-  alarm  at  Athens:  a  decree  is  passe/to  send 
out  a  fleet:  Philip  falls  sick:  the  tleet  is  not  sent  399 

Populanry  of  the  mercenary  general  Charidcmus-vote  in  his "  favor  pro'- 
posed  by  Aristokrates— speech  composed  by  Demosthenes  against  it  400 

Languor  of  the  Athenians-the  principal  peace-leadei-s  EubiHus.  Phokion' 
etc.  propose  nothing  energetic  against  Philip-Demosthenes  undertakes 
me  fmr^ .^ 

First  Philippic  of  Demosthenes,  a5e-5i  d.c.'.' 401 

^Vflf ^^'^^''^Ih ''''"^T"'^"^'"."^  ^^  ^^^^^^  Philippic.  '  Severecomments  on 
tne  past  apathy  ot  the  people 4qo 

fh^i^!^..'iV^^  necessity  that  citizens  sliall  serve  in  person,  and  proposes      " 

the  formation  of  an  acting  fleet  and  armament 400 

His  financial  propositions 4^^ 

Mischiefs  of  the  past  negligence  and  want  of  preparation-  ixarmdoiie  by 
tne  mercenary-  unpaid  armaments,  ser^-ing  without  citizens  403 

Dem?sthen'"'s      ^^^  ^"^^  Pihlippic-prudent  advice  and  early  warnings  of 

^'^^'%hens^'^^^^^^^^  ^^^  carriedinto  effect:' no  serious  measures  adopted 

Opponents  of  Deniosthenes  at  Athens--spe'akei-s'in"t'he  payo'f  PhiYi^^  "^^ 

about  the  Persian  king  stiil  continues 406 


CHAPTER  LXXXVIII. 
EuBoic  A>'D  Olynthian  Wars. 

^mafl  peVcf  wiTh  Ath^V?^^"^'"'-""  ^'^"^^'^"'^  ^''^'^  ^'  Philip-they 
Unfnendb-  feelings  of  Philip  toward  Olynthus-ripeni'ngVntowii'rin  'aso's'c'  407 
Fugitive  half-brothers  of  Philip  obtain  slielter  at  ( )lyntlTus  408 

iSSlnedil^cord  "'  ^^^'»**^"«-^i«  "^^'^"s  of  corruption  and  of  fomenting 

^Sfn^^5K^4^^^T^''^K,^    }^^  Olynthian  confed'erate'towns'by  Philip'/be^^ 
■Di,^?-        •^>^^^'  B.C.— terrible  phenomena 409 

waT  ^i^n''^''  ^^'"^  Olynthians  and  Chalkidians -beginning  of  the  'oiynthian 
vvar — .x)U  B.r ''  .^^ 

The  Olympians  concludf  alliance  with  "Athens!  ^ .' .' 410 

D^moShene;^''"'"''.''.'  ''"'''"!'*' ""'^^  Olynthus-earliest Olynthiac speechof 
The  second  Olynthiac  is' the  eariiest-its  tone  and  tenor,  '.'.y...  .].',[[['.['..['.  ill 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   IV 


23 


PAGE 

Disposition  to  magnify  the  practical  effect  of  the  speeches  of  Demosthenes 
—his  true  position- he  is  an  opposition  sneaker  ...••• •  -xld 

Philip  ontinues  to  press  the  Olynthian  confederacy— increasing  danger  ot 
01  ynthus— fresh  applicarious  to  Athens •■.■  v  •  v  ■  •  v  1^' I"- 

Deinosihenes  delivers  another  Olynthiac  oration— that  which  stands  hrst  m 
the  printed  order.    Its  leuor •, ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ^^"^ 

Just  cvpprecia';ion  of  the  situation  by  Demosthenes.    He  approaches  the 

question  of  the  Theorio  Fund -^^   • :  • ; ■  •  •;  V,..-;- u'l 

Assistance  sent  by  Athens  to  Olynthus.    Partial  success  against  Philip.. .. . .  41b 

Partial  and  exaggerated  confidence  at  Athens.    The  Athenians  lose  sight  ot 

the  danger  of  Olynthus.    Third  Olynthiac  of  Demosthenes 41b 

Tenor  and  substance  of  the  third  Olynthiac •   •  ■ 4  » 

Courage  of  Demosthenes  in  combating  the  prevailing  sentiment 4i» 

Revolt  of  Euboea  from  .\thens 41» 

Intrigues  of  Philip  in  Euboja •.•:;••   •••/;•  v: i;.' ' '  Viu" 

Plutarch  of  Eretria  asks  aid  from  Athens.  Aid  is  sent  to  him  under  Pho- 
kion, though  Demosthenes  dissuades  it _• .••••, "^^^ 

Treachery  of  Plutarch— danger  of  Phokion  and  the  Athenians  in  Euboea— 

victory  of  Phokion  at  Taraynai ^. •:;••••■•••  v  '  Vx 

Dionysiac  festival  at  Athens  in  March  319  b.c— Insult  offered  to  Demos- 

thenes  by  Meidias • ; ' ' L  v.,  ' "  * 

Reproaches  against  Demosthenes  for  having  been  absent  from  the  battle  ot 
Tamynse— he  goes  over  on  service  to  Euboea  as  a  hoplite— he  is  named 

senator  for  3W-18  b.c fr} 

Ho.-<tilities  in  Eubuea,  during  319-48  B.c ~  x,  • '  IL' ^  IL .•  •  *-i 

Great  efforts  of  Athens  in  hiOB.c.  for  the  support  of  Olynthus  and  the  mam- 

teiiance  of  Eubcea  at  the  same  time •  •  • ;  • ' '  •  Jv: ' 

Financial  embarrassments  of  Athens.  Motion  of  ApoUodorus  about  the 
Theoric  Fund.  The  assembly  ajipi-opriates  the  surplus  of  revenue  to  mili- 
tary purposes— ApoUodorus  is  indicted  and  fined •  -^^ 

The  diversion  of  the  Theoric  Fmid  proves  the  great  anxiety  of  the  moment 

at  Athens  "^^ 

Thn 
PI 
Final 

Sale  o^  wxv.  ^.j I' ^, ; -  ..,- 

Cost  incurred  by  Athens  in  the  Olynthian  war 4^^ 

Theoric  Fund— not  appropriated  to  war  purposes  untd  a  httle  before  tLe 

battle  of  Chajroneia ^*^ 

Views  respectii.g  the  Theoric  Fimd •••.••, •, :■.■■•::•  ^'^ 

It  was  the  general  fund  of  Athens  for  religious  festivals  and  worship— dis- 

tributions  were  one  part  of  it— character  of  the  ancient  rehgxous  festivals.  4ab 
No  other  branch  of  the  Athenian  peace-establishment  was  impoverished  or 

sacrificed  to  the  Theoric  expenditure i" '  'J  '  "C* " '  "i  ' 

The  annual  surplus  might  have  been  accumulated  as  a  war  tund— now  rar 

Athens  is  blameable  for  not  having  done  so •  •  -  ■ ...........  4^7 

Attempt  of  the  .Uhenian  pro})erty-classes  to  get  clear  of  direct  taxation  by 

taking  from  the  Theoric  Fund • .•  •  •  • •.-  •  •  • ;  •  *  ^"^ 

Conflict  of  these  two  feelings  at  Athens.  Demosthenes  tries  to  mediate  be- 
tween them— calls  for  sacrifices  from  all,  especially  personal  military  ser-  ^^ 

Appeiidixon  the' order  of  the  Olynthiac  orations  of  Demosthenes 429 

CHAPTER  LXXXIX. 

From  the  Capture  of  Olynthus  to  the  Termination  op  the  Sacred  War 

BY   Philip. 
Snfferincrs  of  the  Olynthians  and  Chalkidians-triumph  and  festival  of  Philip  432 
Effect  produe-'d  at  Athens  by  the  capture  of  01ynthu.s— especially  by  the 

number  of  Athenian  captives  takeri  in  it 4.« 

Energetic  language  of  Eubuhis  and  .JEsehines  against  Phihp *» 


2i 


CONTENTS   OF    \  OL.   IV. 


PAGE 


Increased  importance  of  ^schines 40? 

.i:schines  as  envoy  of  Athens  in  Arcadia JX 

Increasing  despondency  and  desire  for  peace  at  Athens I^-, 

Indirect  overture's  for  peace  between  Alliens  and  Philip,  eVeiVbefore  the  fall 
or  Olynthus-the  Euboeans— Plirynon,  etc  "^^wre  tne  laii 

^tJ  AthSS''^^^'^^^^^'^'^'^''^^^'^  granting  permission  to  Philip  to' send  enVoys 

Effect  produced  upon  the  minds'of  "the  Athenians  by  their 'numerous'caiJtiVe  ^^^ 
.itizens  taken  by  Phihp  at  Olvnthus •    ^*P^^^®  .„„ 

MiSi,ion  of  the  actor  Aristodeinus  from  the  Athenians  to  Philip '  on  the  sub- 
ject  of  the  captives     Favorable  dispositions  reported  from  Philip  438 

Course  of  the  bacred  W  ar-gradual  decline  and  impoverishment  of  the  Pho- 
kians.    Dissensions  among  themselves.  "icxuw 

^^I^^L'i'F^''^'^  ^"^  Phalakus  in  Phokis-Phala^kus  is  deposed-he  continues 
to  hold  Thermopylae  with  the  innrcenaries  400 

The  Thebans  invoke  the  aid  of  Philip  to  put  down  the  Phoki'ans 439 

Alarm  among  the  Phokians- ont-  of  the  Phokian  parties  invites  the  Ath^ 

mans  to  occupy  Thermopylae -Phalakus  repels  them  439 

"iaSo^'Tillrair^i^"^^"^  ^^  Athens^-uncertainty  about  Phal^kusandthe 

'ro.t^o"phit  andTo  Arb^s""'  on  Thermopyte-importance  of  that  pass 

Mytion  of  Philokrates  in  the  Athenian  assembiy— to  send  enVoys  to  Philip 

Tor  pCilCft '^    AAA 

Ten  Athenian  envoys  sent-Demosthenes  and '^schines  among  them 441 

Journey  of  the  envoys  to  Pella. *  JJA 

.Statements  of  vEschines  about  the  conduct  of  Demosthenes-arrangements 

of  the  envoys  for  speaking  before  Philip ""geraents 

Harangue  addressed  by  ^schines  to  Philip  about  Amphipoiir '  Failure  of 

Demosthenes  in  his  speech  ....  ..^o 

A n^-.wer  of  Pliilip-retum  of  the  envoys.' .;.'.  .■.';;;.■;. S? 

Review  of  .Eschines  and  his  conduct,  as  stated  by  himself 444 

Philip  offei-s  peace  on  the  terms  of  uti  possidetis-report'  "made  'by'  't'h4 

Athenian  envoys  on  their  return  ^  44K 

ProceMings  in  the  Athenian  assembly  after  *  the 'return  'of  th'e'envov^ 

mot  ions  of  Demosthenes envoys— 

Arrival  of  the  Macedonian  envoys  at  Athens^ays  fix^'  'for'di^iik's'in'g  the 


peace . 


446 


448 


Resolution  taken  by  the  synod  of  allies' at'At'hens ' 44B 

Asseinbhes  held  to  discuss  the  peace  in  presence  of  the  Slac^onian  envoy's  447 
Philokrates  moves  to  conclude  peace  and  alliance  with  Philip     He  oro- 

poses  to  exclude  the  Phokians  specially ^'  ^       aa" 

Part  taken  by  ^schines  and  Demosthenes-in  reference  to  "this 'motion 

Contradictions  between  them "xouou, 

.^schines  supported  the  motion  of  Philokrates 'a'ltogether-Demosth'e'nes 

fi' Ei'ibidus  ^       ""' ^''''^'^^  *^  ^"^  *^^  exclusion  of  the  Phokians-langilage 

^^Phmp'"'  ^'''"°^^^*^^  carri'edi'n  Vhe  'assembly,  for'  peace  'and  alliance  "with 

Assembly  to  provide  ratification  and  swearing  of  "the  "treaty 4^0 

a^id^Kereoble  Jtir  ^"^  ^^  ^^^'^'^^^  as  allies  of  Athens ?-abou't'.th'e  iPho'kians 

''\v^f"7.%o°^  ^^'^o^^ePt^s'is  admitted',  both'byi he  Athenian  assembly  and  ^ 
bj  tne  Macedonian  envoys     ^ 


449 
449 


T)  ffi.^nUv^  iTp\"i*^'l'^''P  formally  refuse  to  admit  the  Phokians 461 

Difticulty  of  Philokrates  and  .-fischines  about  the  admission     Their  f a  se 
Tif^'^'iK''?-'''^  ^^''^f  the  secret  good  intentions  of  Philip  toward  the  Phokians  451 

'  tL^p'^^r^iZu^^^L^^^^.^'""^^-^^^  ^^^^'^^^-^  -"^  ^^«^^  -•"-  --?  to  ^ 


^nL'^"L''''''^^''K7^'''^^    ^^^"^   "^   Athens " in  "abandoni'ng'the'Phokian^ 
Demost.ienea  rhd  not  protect  a,'?aii;st  it  at  the  tiiiie ^ans— 


452 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   IV. 


2;") 


PAGF, 

The  oaths  are  talten  before  Antipater,  excluding  tlie  Pl.olcians « 

ff"°!;^,h?nef  TrS'^t;e''ln"vo>°s  to  go  immrfiateiy  to  Thraee'  in'  order- to 
"SnistCT  tllf  olth  to  H.n?p-thfy  refu.e-their  delay  on  Ibe  journey  ^^^ 

PhUit  Completes  his  conquest  of-Thraceduring-theintervar  I  i ! 434 

^o"S^tL'„'sTndSr4'iS\rn|^^^^^ 

•^L^r^ll^^^^^^^'f^^^^--  ::::::::::::•■•••■■■::;■•::« 

l^>sition  of  Demosttenes^n  t^^^  Purposes,-  holdingouVdelu- 

P,?nto?pSSi  Tht'^of/te-^ot  upfconn^^^^^^^^^^^ 

pi£fic''aslembt-arAthens::suc-cessfui- address- -made  to  it  by  Chines-  ^^ 
ThtA'tt!,ifrp;^>'ifbSi-e  retees  of  -Phiiokrates  and  -^iic-hines-- "  ^^ 

carried,  decreeing  peace  and  alliance  witn  mm  loievei.     ^c  ^^^ 

litrrroVphiHpt'?l';iA,llnian''sa'^^^^^^^^^^ 

Ph^lSSs'surrend^rs-Ther-mopyia;  under- conventjon  to  Bhilip.   ««  «ilh- ^^^ 

AnS\oL'sfn?Sis -surrender -at -discreiion^ 

Tllrrll  "SSrsfnn'yr  Tl5S,j;;^  S^Sllple  -envoys  re^™  without 

A.?r^a:;ruis.t"eru?ra"AthS;?^ro«^^^^^^ 

city  in  a  good  state  of  defense .•  •..•"..•,;.••  •■■  pbVa-i«^trinmniiant 

.Eschines  and  other  Athenian  envoys  visit  Philip  in  Phokis    triumpnami  ^^ 

FS^^SS^s'iifS^lf^l^^e'Xtheinans;  after -his'cmiqiu^st 

ThSTSS^ik??IS^^mWy"eS^^ 
the  ?ffilai^Thly  are  excluded  from  the  assembly  and  Philip  is  ad-  ^^^^ 

mitted  in  their  place  •••••;••  ^/  •  i  • 400 

Ruin  and  wretchedness  of  tlie  Phokians  • .  •  •  •  •  -  •  •  •  • :  - -.IjV  •„' " 'j: "  "  L 

Irresistible  ascendency  of  Phihp.     He  is  named  by  the  Amphiktyons  pre 

sidine  celebrator  of  the  Pythian  festival  of  3ib  b  c ^  • 

Great  Change  effected  by  this  peace  in  Grecian  P/^l'ti^-f  rflati,>ns.  . .  -  408 

Demosthenis  and  .Eschines-proof  of  dishonesty  and  fiaud  m  .^bchmes,  ^^^ 

even  from  his  own  admissions •  • •  •  •     •  •  ^.;  •,;,:„;.:;•:„■  Uf  hpi- 

This  disgraceful  peace  was  brought  upon  Athens  by  the  coiiuption  of  nei  ^^ 

own  envoys •. —  --^.v  v"l t;'0 

Impeachment  and  condemnation  of  Phdokrates. . ... .  -  -^  V>;»i,Vu;"n't^mD'le  " '  470 

Miserable  death  of  all  concerned  in  the  spoliation  of  the  Delphian  temple. . .  i.u 


2G 


CONTE^'TIS   UF    VOL.   IV. 


CHAITER  XO. 

From  the  Peace  of  346  b.c,  to  the  BATxt.E  of  Ch-eroneia  and  the  Death 

OF  Philip. 

PAGE 

Position  of  Philip  after  the  oonclu.sifni  of  the  Sacred  War 471 

Sentiment  of  Demosthenes— he  recommends  acquiescence  in  the  peace  and 

acceptance  of  the  new  Amphiktyonic  dignity  of  Phihp 471 

Sentiments   of   Isokrates— his   letter   to   Piiilip— his   abnegation    of    free 

Hellenism  472 

Position  of  the  Persian  king  Ochus— his  meagjuvs   against    revolters   in 

Piienicia  and  Egypt ; 47^ 

Reconquest  of  Phe'nicia  by  Ochus— perfidy  of  the  Sidonian  prince  Tennes. . .  478 

Reconquest  of  Egypt  by  the  Persian  force  under  Mentor  and  Dapoas 474 

Power  of  Mentor  as  Pei-siau  viceroy  of  the  Asiatic  coast— he  seizes  Hermeias 

of  Atarneus .- 475 

Peace  between  Philip  and  the  Athenians  continued  without  formal  renun- 
ciation from  34G-.340  b.c 475 

Movements  and  intrigues  of  Philip  everj-where  throughout  Greece 475 

Disunion  of  the  Grecian  world— no  Grecian  cit}-  recognized  as  leader 476 

Vigilance  and  renewed  warnings  of  Demosthenes  against  Philip 476 

Mission  of  Python  to  Athens  by  Phili])— amendments  proposed  in  the  recent 

peace— fruitless  discussions  upon  them 477 

Dispute  about  Halonnesus 47y 

The  Athenians  refuse  to  accept  cession  of  Halonnesus  as  a  favor,  claiming 

restitution  of  it  as  their  right 478 

Halonnesus  taken  and  retaken— reprisals  between  Philip  and  the  Athenians  47!) 

Movements  of  the  Philippizing  factions  at  Megara— at  (.>rcu3— at  Eretria 479 

Philip  in  Thrace— disputes  about  the  Bosporus  and  Helle.-pont— Diopeithes 
commander  for  Athens  in  the  Chersonese.  Philip  takes  part  with  the 
Kardians  against  Athens.      Hostile    collisions   and   complaints   against 

Diopeithes 480 

Accusations  against  Diopeithes  at  Athens  by  the  Philippizing  orators- 
Demosthenes  defends  him— sneech  on  the  Chersonese,  and  third  Pliilippic.  4W) 
Increased  influence  of  Demosthenes  at  Athens— Atheiiian  exi)edition  s^enf 
upon  his  motion,  to  Eubcea— Oreus  and  Eretria  are  liberated,  and  KuIki^ 

is  detached  from  Phihp 481 

Mission  of  Demosthenes  to  the  Chersonese  and  Byzantium— his  impoitant 
services  in  detaching  the  Byzantines  from  Philip  and  bringing  them  into 

alliance  with  Athens 482 

Philip  commences  tne  siege  of  Perinthus— he  marches  through  the  Cher- 

sonesus— declaration  of  war  by  Athens  against  him 482 

Manifesto  of  Philip  declaring  war  against  Athens 483 

Complaints  of  Philip  against  the  Athenians- his  policy  toward  Athens— his 

lecture  on  the  ad va nrages  of  peace 484 

Open  war  between  I'hilip  and  the  Athenians.  Siege  of  Perinthus  by  Philip. 
His  numerous  engines  for  siege— great  scale  of  opeiations.  Obst'inacy  of 
the  defense.    The  town  is  relieved  by  the  Byzantines  and  by  Grecian 

mercenaries  from  the  Persian  satraps .' 484 

Philip  attacks  Byzantium— danger  of  the  place— it  is  reheved  by  the  fleets 
of  Athens.  Chios,  Rhodes,  etc.  Success  of  the  Athenian  fleet  in  the  Pro- 
pontis  under  Phokion.    I'hiiip  abandons  the  sieges  both  of  Perinthus  and 

Byzantium 485 

Votes  of  thanks  from  Byzantium  av^  the  Chersonesus  to  Athens  for  her  aid 

— honors  and  compliments  to  Demosthenes 480 

Philip  withdraws  from  Byzantium,  concludes  peace  with  the  Byzantines, 
(hians,  and  others,  and  attacks  the  Scythians.    He  is  defeated  by  the 

Tiiballi,  and  wounded,  on  his  return .   ! 480 

Important  reform  effected  by  Demosthenes  in  the  administration  of  the 
Athenian  marine 487 


COXTENTS  OF    VOL.   IT. 


27 


PAG  3 

Abuses  which  had  crept  into  the  trierarchy— unfair  apportionment  of  the 

burden— undue  exemption  which  the  rich  administrators  had  acquxred 

tor  themselves ;  •  •   • ,  ^i: "LSI 

Individual  hardship  and  bad  publlfe  consequences   occasioned   by  these 

inequalities ■  •  —  -  •  •  •  .  —   ••   ■ ;  *°' 

Opposition  offered  hv  the  rich  citizens  and  by  ^schmes  to  the  proposed 

reform  of  Demosthenes— flifficulties  whicli  he  had  to  overcome 488 

His  new  reform  distributes  the  burden  of  trierarchy  equitably 488 

Its  complete  success.    Improved  elliciency  of  the  naval  armaments  under 

j^       489 

New  Sacred  War  commences  in  Greece -489 

Kirrha  and  its  plain  near  Delphi  consecrated  to  Apollo  in  the  first  Sacred 

War  under  Solon -.•.--. u" ;  • ;  •.•  '*^'-^ 

Necessity  of  a  port  at  Kirrha.  for  the  convenience  of  visitors  to  Delphi. 

kirrha  grows  up  again,  and  comes  into  the  occupation  of  the  Lokrians  of 

Amphissa ;•  v-  .••,••.••• ; \-\  ■  ■■   ■,  '^^'^ 

R*^lations  between  the  Lokrians  of  Amphissa  and  Del])hi— they  had  stood 
forward  earnestly  in  the  former  Sacred  war  to  defend  Delphi  against  the 

Phokians ^-v: ^  v,  •  '^^ 

Amphiktyonic  meeting  at  Delphi— February  339  b.c.    ^schines  one  of  the 

legates'f  rom  Athens ••  •  "^^l 

Language  of  an  Amphissian  speaker   among   the  Amphiktyons  against 

Athens— new  dedication  of  an  old  Athenian  donative  in  the  temple 491 

Speech  of  .Eschines  in  the  Amphiktyonic  assembly .' ,  49^2 

Passion  and  tumult  excited  by  his  speech 4J.3 

Violent  resolution  adopted  by  the  Amphiktyons *4Jd 

The  Amphiktyons  with  the  Delphian  multitude  march  down  to  destroy 
Kirrha— interference  of  the  Amphissians  to  rescue  their  property.    They 

drive  off  the  Amphiktyons ., • '^^ 

Further  resolution  taken  by  the  Amphiktyons  to  hold  a  future  si)ecial  meet- 
ing and  take  measures  for  punishing  the  Lokrians 4?4 

Unjust  violence  of  the  Amphiktyons—public  mischief  done  by  ^schinc;. ...  49a 
Eft'ect  of  the  proceeding  of  ^iiischines  at  Athens.    Opposition  of  Demos- 

thenes  at  first  fruitless ' — ......  490 

Change  of  feeling  at  Athens— the  Athenians  resolve  to  take  no  part  in  the 

Amphiktyonic  proceedii)gs  against  Amphissa  49(> 

Special  meeting  of  the  Amphiktyons  at  Thermopylae  held  without  Athens. 
Vote  passed  to  levy  a  force  for  punishing  Amphissa.  Kottyphus  pres- 
ident.*    ^Jli 

The  Amphiktyons  invoke  the  intervention  of  Phihp ;  •  ■i-*^ 

Motives  which  dictated  the  vote— dependence  of  most  of  the  Amphiktyonic 

voters  upon  Philip • f-^^ 

Philip  accepts  the  command— marches  southward  through  Thermopyl;e . . . .  4;.S 
Philip  enters  Phokis— he  suddenly  occupies  and  begins  to  refprtify  Ela- 

X^»i^ 499 

He  sends  an  embassy  to  Thebes  announcing  his  intention  to  attack  Attica, 

and  asking  either  aid  or  a  free  passage  for  his  own  army 49.:» 

Unfi-iendly  relations  subsisting  between  Athens  and  Thebes.    Strong  hopes 

of  Philip  that  Thebes  would  act  in  concert  with  him  against  Athens .-9.1 

Great  alarm  at  Athens  when  the  news  arrived  that  Philip  was  fortifying 

Elateia .•  ■  *^^ 

Athenian  public  ass'embiy  held— general  anxiety  and  silence— no  one  v/ill  ^ 

speak  but  Demosthenes. . .    _■  •  •  •  •  ■  •  ^^"^ 

Advice  of  Demosthenes  to  dispatch  an  embassy  immediately  to  Thebes, 

and  to  offer  alliance  on  the  most  liberal  terms i>01 

The  advice  of  Demosthenes  is  adopted— he  is  dispatched  with  other  envoys 

to  Thebes ■•••;•.•   •.• •  •  •  •  •  ^^ 

Divided  state  of  feeling  at  Thebes— influence  of  the  Philippizing  party— 

effect  produced  by  the  Macedonian  envoys ■  •  -  ■  •   •  • ^"^ 

Efficient  and  successful  oratory  of  Demosthenes— he  persuades  the  lliebans  ^ 

to  contract  alliance  with  Athens  agahist  Philip -J^- 


28 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV 


29 


PAGK 

The  Athenian  army  marches  by  invitation  to  Thebes — cordial  co-operation 

of  the  Thebans  and  Athenians  503 

Vigorous  resohitions  taken  at  Athens — continuance  of  the  new  docks  sus- 
pended—the Theoric  Fund  is  devoted  to  military  purposes 503 

Disappointment  of  Philip — he  remains  in  Phokis  and  writes  to  his  Pelopon- 

nesiiin  ahies  to  come  and  join  him  against  Amphissa 503 

War  of  the  Athenians  and  Thebans  against  Philip  in  Phokis— they  gain 

siime  advantages  over  him— honoi-s  paid  to  Demosthenes  at  Athens 504 

The  Athenians  and  Thebans  reconstitute  tlie  Phokians  and  their  towns 504 

■\Var  against  Philip  in  Phokis— great  infiuence  of  Demosthenes — auxiliaries 

vrhioh  he  procured    505 

Increased  efforts  of  Philip  in  Phokis 505 

Successes  of  Philip— he  defeats  a  large  body  of  mercenary-  troops— he  takes 

Amphissa 5CHJ 

No  eminent  general  on  the  side  of  the  Greeks — Demosthenes  keeps  up  the 

spirits  of  the  allies,  and  holds  them  together 506 

Battle  of  Ch»roneia— complete  victory  of  Philip 507 

Macedonian  phalanx — its  long  pikes — superior  in  front  charge  to  the  Grecian 

hoplites 508 

Excellent  organization  of  the  Macedonian  array  by  Philip— different  sorts  of 

force  combined 508 

Loss  at  the  battle  of  Cha'roneia 508 

Distress  and  alarm  at  Athens  on  the  news  of  the  defeat 509 

Rj?solutions  taken  at  Athens  for  energetic  defense.    Respect  and  confidence 

shown  to  Demosthenes 509 

Effect  produced  upon  some  of  the  islanders  in  the  ^-Egean  by  the  defeat- 
conduct  of  the  Rhodians 510 

Conduct  of   Philip  after  the  victory — harshne.ss  toward  Thebes— greater 

lenity  to  Athens 510 

Conduct  of  .iEschines  — Demades  is  sent  as  envoy  to  Philip 511 

Peace  of  Demades,  concluded  between  Philip  and    the  Athenians.    The 

Athenians  are  compelled  to  recogni/.c  him  as  chief  of  the  Hellenic  world. .  511 
Remarks  of  Polybius  on  the  Demadeau  peace— means  of  resistance  still 

possessed  Vjy  Athens  512 

Honorary  votes  passed  at  Athens  to  Philip 513 

Impeaeliments  brought  against  Demosthenes   at  Athens — the   Athenians 

stand  by  him 513 

"Expedition  of  Philip  into  Peloponnesus.     He  invades  Laconia 514 

Congress  held  at  Corinth.    Philip  is  chosen  chief  of  the  Greeks  against 

Persia •• ..  514 

Mortification  to  Athenian  feelings — degraded  position  of  Athens  and  of 

Greece.    No  genuine  feeling  in  Greece  now,  toward  war  against  Persia. . .  515 

Preparations  of  Philip  for  the  invasion  of  Pei-sia 515 

Philip  repudiates  Olympias  at  tlie  instance  of  his  recently  married  wife, 

Kleopatra — resentment  of  Olympias  and  Alexander — dissension  at  court.. 
Great  festival  in  Macedonia— celebrating  the  birth  of  a  son  to  Philip  by 

Kleopatra,  and  the  marriage  of  his  daughter  with  Alexander  of  Epirus. 
Pausiinias — outrage  inflicted    upon    him — his    resentment   against   Philip, 

encouraged  by  the  partisans  of  Olympias  and  AlexaTuU-r 517 

Assassination  of  Philip  by  Pausanias,  who  is  slain  by  the  guards 518 

Accomplices  of  Pausanias 5i8 

Alexander  the  Great  is  declared  king— first  notice  given  to  him  by  the  Lyn- 

kestian  Alexander,  one  of  the  conspirators — Attains  and  Queen Kleopati'a, 

wirh  h^r  infant  son,  are  put  to  death 518 

S'vtis taction  manifested  by  Olympias  at  the  death  of  Pliilip 519 


515 


,.  516 


J9> 


CHAPTER  XCI. 

First  Period  of  the  Reign  of  Alexander  the  Great-Sieg!!:  and  Capture 

OF  Thebks. 

page 

state  of  Greece  at  Alexander's  accession— dependence  on  the  Macedonian  ^ 

-,  ^  _ ^ Orm/X 

Umvmliig  subjection  of'  the '  Greeks-intiuence' of  Grecian  intelligence  on  ^^^ 

Macedonia - • :  Ni  iV ' '  •' '. n^"" 

Ba.sis  of  Alexander  s  charact<^r— not  Hellenic •• — - 

}?(»vho(Kl  and  education  of  Alexander -^-^ 

He  receives  instruction  from  Aristotle • ; • .••••■•.•  '^'-'^ 

Early  political  action  and  maturity  of  Alexander-his  quarrels  with  his 

father.    Family  discord -•  ■  • V iVi" -i- r^ 

Uncertainty  of  Alexanders  position  during  the  last  year  ot  i  hilip o^4 

Impression'  produced  by  the  sudden  death  of  Phihp o~>> 

Accession  of  Alexander-his  energy  and  judgment. . -    .•-;■••-  ^-' 

Accomplices  of  Pausanias  are  slain  by  Alexander- Amyntas  and  others  are  ^^ 

SeJitiment  at^  Athens  on"  the  death  'of'  Philip -language  of  Demosthenes- 

inclination  to  resist  Macedonia,  but  no  overt  act o~o 

Discontent  in  Greece— but  no  positive  movement. ^-^ 

March  of  Alexander  into  Greece— submission  of  Athens. ....... .... . . . .... .  o^« 

'viexander  is  chosen  Imperator  of  the  Greeks  in  the  convention  of  Corinth— 

continued  refusal  of  concurrence  by  Sparta 5~» 

Conditions  of  the  vote  thus  passed-privileges  guaranteed  to  the  cities    .     .  o^J 
Authority  claimed  by  Alexander  uniier  the  convention— degradation  of  the 

leading  Grecian  states •  •  -•. •• •.••.., •  •  •  •  •  °"^ 

Encroachments  and  tj'ranny  of  the  Macedonian  officers  m  Greece-coin- 

plaints  of  the  orators  at  Athens •  ■  •  -. ■■ ^^ 

Violations  of  the  convention  at  sea  by  Macedonian  officers ••;••• -^'^^ 

Language  of  the  complaining  Athenians-they  insist  only  on  stnct  observ- 

ance  of  the  convention.     Boldness  of  their  language •};« 

Encouragements  held  out  by  Persia  to  the  Greeks. .. . .   o^- 

Correspondence  of  Demosthenes  witli  Persia— justifiable  and  political ;>i^ 

March  of  Alexander  into  Thrace.    He  forces  his  way  over  Mount  Hasmus. . .  5.« 

His  victory  over  the  Triballi •  •  •  •  • •  •  •  •  • : ^JJ 

He  crosses  the  Danube,  defeats  the  Get»,  and  returns  back ^;« 

Einba.ssy  of  Gauls  to  Alexander.    His  self-conceit •^*» 

Victories  of  Alexander  over  Kleitus  and  the  Illynans ^^ 

The  Thebans  declare  their  independence  against  Macedonia i>i< 

They  are  encouraged  by  Alexander's  long  absence  in  Thrace,  and  by  reports 

of  his  death i"  ;r,V '  'i '~-^u 

The  Tlieban  exiles  from  Athens  get  possession  of  Thebes ■  ■  •  •  i>-» 

They  besiege  the  IMacedonians  in  the  Kadmeia— and  entreat  aid  from  other  ^ 

Greeks.    Favorable  svmpathies  shown  toward  them,  but  no  positive  aid  .  .>5J 

enhances  of  Thebes  and"  liberation,  not  unfavorable ...._. :••.■••  "^'^*' 

Rapid  march  and  unexpected  arrival  of  Alexander  with  his  army  before 

Thebes     His  good  fortune  as  to  the  time  of  hearing  tlie  news.  ■■■■■■■_,■■■  -'^'^ 
Siege  of  Tiiebes.    Proclamation  of  Alexander.    Determination  of  the  The- 

i-\o»-»G  ■fQ  rt*mst .....*...-.-•••••••••■  •    -*- 

Capture  of  Thebes  b v  assault.    Massacre  of  the  population.     ...... . . ... .  -  -  •  51-3 

Thebes  is  razed:  theTheban  captives  sold  as  slaves:  the  terntory  distributed 

among  the  neighboring  cities - V  "  4^'  T A' '  ;•';:«  ■,;;.'^r; 

The  Kadmeia  is  occuoi-d  as  a  Macedonian  military  post.    Retribution  upon 

the  Thebans  from  Orchomenus  and  Platoca ..•  ••■•••••••;■  •  •  ^^"^ 

Sentiments  of  Alexandeu,  at  the  time  and  afterward,  respecting  the  destruc- 

tion  of  Thebes • •.;•  •  •  i Vv.' '  ; ;r  •  •• ' " " '  1' " 

Extreme  tei-ror  spread  throughout,  Greece.    Sj'mpathy  of  the  Atnemans  to- 

ward  the  Theban  exiles • '^^ 

n.  G.  111.— 2 


80 


coNT^:^'Ts  of  vol.  iv 


PAGE 

Alexander  demands  the  surrender  of  the  chief  anti-Maeedoniau  leaders  at 
Uhens     ^lemurable  debate  at  Athens.    The  .leinand  refused ...  ^o 

Embassy  of  the  Athenians  to  Alexander.  He  is  persuaded  to  arquiesct-  m 
the  refusal,  and  to  be  satistitd  with  the  banislnnent  of  Chandemus  and 
Ephialtes ■  •  •  • •;   •. ,- '^^ 

Intlueuce  of  Fhokion  in  obtaining  these  milder  terms— his  increased  asceu- 

dency  at  Athens ••.•••••.• ::c VV:;. 

Alexander  at  Corinth— obedience  of  the  Grecian  synod— interview  with  the 

philosopher  Diogenes •■- i*"  Vx>^ii.;'  ?i-^ 

Rp-congtitution  of  Orchomenus  and  Phita\i.    Return  ot  Alexander  to  Pella.  54. 
Military  operations  of  Parnienio  in  Asia  Minor  against  Memnon o4a 

CHAPTER  XCn. 

Astatic  Campaigns  of  Alexander. 

During  Alexander's  reign,  the  history  of  Greece  is  nearly  a  blank. ..........  548 

To  what  extent  the  Asiatic  projects  of  Alexander  belonged  to  Grecian  his- 

PanSeiien'ic'pretenses  set  up  by" Alexander.   The  real  feeling  of  tlie  Greeks 

was  averse  to  his  success ,;•••, v  ^ ;  "  V. 

Analogy  of  Alexanders  relation  to  the  Greeks— with  that  of  the  Emperor 

Napoleon  to  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine -h J 

Greece  an  appendage,  but  a  valuable  appendage  to  Macedonia 55U 

Extraordinary  military  endowments  and  capacity  of  Alexander. .... .... ...  ^m 

Changes  m  Grecian  warfare,  antecedent  and  contributory  to  the  militarj- 

organization  of  Macedonia  /.•••;•  v  v, \ •  "1 

Macedonian  military  condition  before  Philip.    Good  and  firm  cavalrj-  poor  ^_  ^ 

PhUip^VSarins  and  re-organizes  the  infantry.    Long  Macedonian  pike  or  ^^  ^ 

sarissa , t2Z 

Macedonian  phalanx— how  armed  and  arrayed o«>3 

•It  AN  as  originally  destined  to  contend  against  the  Grecian  hoplites  as  organ- 

ized  bv  Epaiuinondas J  •  v'* '^*ki 

Regiments  and  divisions  of  the  phalanx— heavy-armed  infantry ^^^ 

Eiglit  infantry  of  the  line— Hypaspista^,  or  Guards  •»'7-.» 

Light  troops  generally— mostly  foreigners 22'* 

Maeedonian  cavalry— its  excellence— how  regimented ^^_ 

Tlie  select  Macedonian  body-guards.    The  royal  Pages.        .........   •••••••  *^" 

Foreign  auxiliaries-G  recian  lioplites— Thes.salian  ca valry-Poeonians— Illy- 

rians.  Thracians,  etc • i~i 

Magazines,  war-office,  and  depot,  at  Pella. •  ••••••  •  •  •  • -v: "„;  Vt," iim",  ^^' 

Macedonian  aptitudes-purely  mditary-niilitary  pride  stood  to  them  mlieu  ^ 

uf  national  sentiment ^   ':"■  —  V  '  I- " '  '*' " '  ^'^^n■ 

Pleasures  of  Alexander  previous  to  his  depaitm-e  for  Asia.    Antipater  left  _ 

as  viceroy  at  Pella •  • i" '  V  • t^fi 

March  of  Alexander  to  the  Hellespont.    Passage  across  to  Asia o.ui 

Visit  of  Alexander  to  Ilium ^^ 

Aucik^gy  of  Alexander  to  the  Greek  heroes ^o" 

Review  and  total  of  the  3Iacedonian  army  m  Asia f^ 

Chief  Macedonian  officers    v:,;-\- rRi 

Greeks  in  Alexander  s  service— Euraenes  of  Kardia ;foi 

Pei-sian  forces— Mentor  and  Memnon  the  Rhodians. ^pi 

Sii'  cession  of  the  Persian  crov.n—Ochus— Darius  Codomannus oh^ 

Preparations  of  Darius  for  defense -  ■  ■ ^  J;^ 

Operations  of  Memnon  bef<  .re  Alexander  s  arrival ......  ow 

Superiority  of  the  Pereians  at  sea:  their  imprudence  m  letting  Alexander 

cross  the  Hellespont  '.mopposed •.•••••'••••■, ^ 

Persian  force  assembled  in  Phrygia,  under  Arsites  and  others. . . .  ..........  50* 

Advice  of  Memnon,  to  avoid  fikhting  on  land,  and  to  employ  the  fleet  for 

aggressive  warfare  in  Maced<  aiia  and  Greece JM 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV. 


81 


AiNltes  rei(H>ts  Memnon's  advice,  and  determines  to  fight. 


PAGE 

.  565 
.  565 


565 
566 

nm 


I&i?  rea'SL^^  SliliflaJraS'S^s  to  force  the  passage  at  once 

in  spitf  of  the  dissuasion  of  Parmenio ■ 

Disposition  ot  tlie  two  armies 

Battle  o' ''nl^''*Pel"onaidanKer  of  Aiexauder.' '  His  life  is  saved  hy  Kleitus  M8 
crmJSte%"c?on'^^?^MexaSf- Destruction  of  the  Grecian  infantry  on  the  ^ 

I  ^^  ot1lfe''pe^Sr.fs^numhers  of  tlieir  leadingmen  slain.:  •.;.:::::•.•. 508 

jSS^LXP^^'^i^'^'^'i^'-^^^  and  -severe-  treatment 'of  the  '^^ 
Unskmu\fe"fofihePersianleadeVs:-Imn,enseYm^^^^^^  produced  by  ^..^ 

TefrS'^anf sutaSon-ortheAsia.icsio'AiexanderV-S^^^^^  of  the  ^^^^ 

nf  Shes'fromlarfis  to  ti.e  coast,'    Cap Wre'  of  Ephesus :::;.::::: ^ 

gli;."a'p;^"aSfof'TSp^^^^^^^^ 


Th^  MaceSom'an  fleet  occuipies'  ihe  harbor  of  ^'^ '^^^t JJl^^^Pl^^l^^fo'^^^^^  ,,r3 
sians     Alexander  declines  naval  combat.    His  debate  with  parmenio... .  _. 

■^riil'^IL'Tef^re^Jirio  ^^^^!.  "Sexander  disbands  h,sWn  ^^^ 


fleet. 


574 
574 


March  of  \lexander  to  Halikarnassus.    Ada  queen  of  Karia  301ns  him 

Strong  earr  son  and  good  defensive  preparation  at  Hahkarnass  us  ...^  5<- 

sSe  of  Halikarnassus.    Bravery  of  the  garrison,   under  Ephialtes   the  ^^_ 

Detperate^'sally  of  Ephialtes-at  first  successful;  but  repulsed^he  himself  ^^^ 

Memnon  is  forced  to' abandon  Halikarnassus:  and  witjujraw'the'garrison  by 

Q^  retainine  onlv  the  citadel.    Alexander  enters  Halikarnassus 5m 

W  nter'camTa^n  lllxander  along  the  -ontl^-^coasi^otA.^  o'   K^el^na^  578 
Alexander  concludes  his  winter  campaign  atGordium.    Capture  or  Js^eiseucL  o. 
Appendix  on  the  length  of  the  Macedonian  sanssa  or  pike »• «' 

CHAPTER   XCm. 

Second  and  Third  Asiatic  Campaigns   of  Alexander-Battle  of  Issus- 

S1E6E  OF  Tyre. 

50,0 

Alexander  cuts  the  Gordian  knot ; kqi 

He  refuses  the  liberation  of  the  Athenian  prisoners  ...^.  ^.-^-^  ■■^■■■^  •  •  —  -^^ 
Pro-ress  of  Memnon  and  the  Persian  fleet-t)\ey  acquire  Chios  and  a  large 
paiT  of  Lesbos-they  besiege  Mitylene.    Death  of  Memnon.    Capture  of  ^^^^ 

Hopes^^ited  'in  Gre^e '  by  the  Persian'  fleet;  but "  ruined '  by  the  death  of  ^^^ 

Memnon ,' . "i  VV^ ' '  • 5S2 

Memnon's  death  an  irreparable  mischief  to  Danus.   ---■■;-,■:  ;i,«offen- 
Change  in  Darius'splan  caused  by  this  event.   He  resolves  to  take  th.otten   ^^^ 

sive  on  land.    His  immense  land  f  orce^ •  •  ■  •  ••  •  ••  •  •  •  ••  •,■;- ij^-  ]!'  ' 

Free  speech  and  sound  judgment  of  Chandemus.    He  is  put  to  deatn  ny  ^ 

Da^?us  abandoned  Memnon's'  'plan;  just  'at'  the  time'when  'he'  had'  the  best  ^^^ 

defensive  position  for  executing  them  with  efl:ect  ^ ,.^ 

Darius  recalls  the  Grecian  mercenaries  from  the  fleet _,.^. 

Criticism  of  Arrian  on  Darius'spian. - ...  •••,••::„■;;■  "-.Vi  vnrknVdokia     585 

March  of  Alexander  from  Gordium  through  Paphlagonia  and  KappadoKia.    000 


CONTENTS  OF   VOL.   lY. 


PAGE 

He  arrives  at  the  line  of  Mount  Tarsus— difti«"ulties  of  tlie  pass 585 

Conrtuct  of  Aisam«  s.  the  Persian  satrap.     Alexander  pas.ses  ]\Iount  Taunis 

without  the  l«*ast  resistance.     He  enters  Taurus 586 

Dangerous  illness  of  Alexander.    His  confidence  in  the  physician  Philippus, 

who  ciu'es  him .' RBfi 

Operations  of  Alexander  in  Kilikia 587 

3!arch  of  Alexander  out  of  Kilikia.  through  Issus,  to  ]Myj-iandrus 5b7 

March  of  Darius  from  tlie  interior  to  the  eastern  side  of  Moimt  Amanus. 
Immense  numbers  of  his  army:  great  wealth  and  ostentation  in  it:  the 

treasure  and  baggage  sent  to  Damar.kus '. 5S8 

Position  of  Darius  on  the  plain  eastward  of  Mount  Amanus.    He  throws 
open  the  mountain  passes  to  let  Alexander  come  through  and  fight  a 

pitched  battle 588 

Impatience  of  Darius  at  the  delay  of  Alexander  in  Kilikia,    He  crosses 

Moiuit  Amanus  to  attack  Alexaiiler  in  the  defdes  of  Kilikia 588 

He  arrives  in  Alexanders  rear,  and  captures  Issus 58;» 

Beturn  of  Alexander  from  Myriandrus:  his  adihess  to  his  anny o)-'*.> 

Position  of  the  Macedonian  army  south  of  the  river  Pinarus 589 

Position  of  the  Persian  araiy  north  of  the  Pinarus 500 

Battle  of  Issus 5»(> 

Alarm  and  immediate  flight  of  Darius— defeat  of  the  Persians 591 

Vigorous  and  destructive  pursuit  by  Alexander— capture  of  the  mother  and 

wife  of  Darius , .50*3 

Courteous  treatment  of  the  regal  female  prisoners  by  Alexander 593 

Complete  dispersion  of  the  Persian  army —Darius  re-crosses  the  Euphrates 

— escape  of  some  Perso-Grecian  mercenaries 5P.3 

PYodigious  effect  produced  by  the  victory  of  Issus 51)4 

Effects  produced  in  Greece  by  theJbattle  of  Issus.    Anti-Macedonian  pro- 
jects crushed 595 

Capture  of  Damaskus  by  the  Macedonians,  with  Persian  treasure  and  pris- 
oners    .505 

Capture  and  treatment  of  the  Athenian  Iphikrates.    Altered  relative  posi- 
tion of  Greeks  au<i  Macedonians 

Alexander  in  Phenicia.     Aradus,  Byblus,  and  Sidon  open  their  gates  to  him.  597 
Letter  of  Darius  soliciting  peace  and  the  restitution  of  regal  captives. 

Haughty  reply  of  Aiexaiuler 597 

Importance  of  the  voluntary  surrender  of  the  Phenician  towns  to  Alex- 
ander   597 

Alexander  appears  before  Tyre— readiness  of  the  Tyrinns  to  surrender,  yet 

not  without  a  point  reserved— he  determines  to  besitge  the  city 508 

Exorbitant  dispositions  ond  conduct  of  Alexander .509 

He  prepares  to  besiege  Tyre— situation  of  the  place .509 

Chances. of  the  Tyrians— their  resolution  not  unreasonable 600 

Alexander  constructs  a  mole  across  the  strait  between  Tyre  and  the  main- 
land.   The  project  is  defeated COO 

Surrender  of  the  princes  of  CypiTis  to  Alexander — he  gets  hold  of  tlie  main 

Phenician  and  Cyprian  fleet COl 

He  appears  before  Tyre  with  a  numerous  fleet,  and  blocks  up  the  place  by 

sea fiOl 

Capture  of  Tyre  by  storm — desperate  resistance  of  the  citizens 602 

Surviving  males,  2.000  in  number,  hanged  by  Alexander.    The  remaining 

captives  sold 60.S 

Duration  of  the  siege  for  seven  months.    Sacrifice  of  Alexander  to  Herakles  60^^ 
Second  letter  from  Darius  to  Alexander,  who  requires  unconditional  sub- 
mission  .* C03 

The  Macedonian  fleet  overpowers  the  Persian,  and  becomes  master  of  the 

^-Egean  with  the  islands . . . .' G^3 

March  of  Alexander  toward  Egypt — siege  of  Gaza 604 

His  first  assaults  fail— he  is  wounded— he  erects  an  immense  mound  round 

the  town 605 

Gaza  is  taken  by  storm,  after  a  siege  of  two  months 605 


r>(! 


yjG 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV. 


33 


PAGE 

The  garrison  are  all  slain,  except  the  governor  Batis,  who  becomes  prisoner, 

severely  wounded gos 

Wrath  of  Alexander  against  Batis,  whom  he  causes  to  be  tied  to  a  chariot, 

and  dragged  round  the  town goo 

Alexander  enters  Egypt,  and  occupies  it  without  resistance mC* 

He  determines  on  founding  Alexandria ^07 

His  visit  to  the  temple  and  oracle  of  Ammon.    The  oracle  proclaims  him  to 

be  the  son  of  Zeus C07 

Arrangements  made  by  Alexander  at  Memphis— Grecian  prisoners  brought 

from  the  ^Egean • .   609 

He  proceeds'  to  Phenicia— message  from  Athens.    Splendid  festivals.    Re- 
enforcements  sent  to  Antipater 609 

He  marches  to  the  Euphrates— crosses  it  without  opposition  atThapsakus..  609 
March  across  from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Tigris.    Alexander  fords  the  Tigris 

above  Nineveh,  without  resistance 609 

Eclipse  of  the  moon.    Alexander  approaches  near  to  the  army  of  Darius  in 

position 610 

Inaction  of  Darius  since  the  defeat  at  Issus 610 

Paralyzing  effect  upon  him  produced  by  the  captivity  of  his  mother  and 

wife 611 

Good  treatment  of  the  captive  females  by  Alexander — necessary  to  keep  up 

their  value  as  hostages 611 

Immense  army  collected  by  Darius,  in  the  plains  eastward  of  the  Tigris- 
near  Arbela 612 

He  fixes  the  spot  for  encampment  and  awaiting  the  attack  of  Alexander— in 

a  level  plain  near  Gaugamela 612 

His  equipment  and  preparation— better  arms- numerous  scythed  chariots-^ 

elephants 612 

Position  and  battle  array  of  Darius 613 

Preliminary  movements  of  Alexander — discussions  with  Parmenio  and  other 

officers.    His  careful  reconnoitering  in  person 613 

Dispositions  of  Alexander  for  the  attack— array  of  the  troops 614 

Battle  of  Arbela ]  615 

Cowardice  of  Darius— he  sets  the  example  of  flight— defeat  of  the  Persians..  615 

Combat  on  the  Persian  right  between  Mazaeus  and  Parmenio 617 

Flight  of  the  Persian  host— energetic  pursuit  by  Alexander 618 

Escape  of  Darius.    Capture  of  the  Persian  camp,  and  of  Arbela 618 

Loss  in  the  battle.    Completeness  of  the  victory.    Entire  and  irreparable 

dispersion  of  the  Persian  araiy 618 

Causes  of  the  defeat — cowai-dice  of  Darius.    Uselessness  of  his  immense 

numbers 619 

Generalship  of  Alexander 619 

Surrender  of  Babylon  and  Susa,  the  two  great  capitals  of  Persia.   Alexander 

enters  Babylon.    Immense  treasures  acquired  in  both  jolaces 620 

Alexander  acts  as  king  of  Persia,  and  nominates  satraps.    He  marches  to 

Susa.    He  remodels  the  divisions  of  his  anny 620 

Alexander  marches  into  Persia  proper— he  conquers  the  refractory  Uxii,  in 

the  intermediate  mountains 621 

Difficult  pass  called  the  Susian  Gates,  on  the  way  to  Persepolis.    Ariobar- 
zanes  the  satrap  repulses  Alexander,  who  finds"  means  to  turn  the  pass, 

and  conquer  it 621 

Alexander  enters  Persepolis 622 

Mutilated  Grecian  captives Q2Z 

Immense  wealth,  and  national  monuments  of  every  sort,  accumulated  in 

Persepolis 623 

Alexander  appropriates  and  carries  away  the  regal  treasures,  and  then 

gives  up  Pei"sepolis  to  be  plundered  and  "burnt  by  the  soldiers 623 

Alexander  rests  nis  troops  and  employs  himself  in  conquering  the  rest  of 

Persia 624 

Darius  a  fugitive  in  Media 624 


34 


CONTEXTS   OF    VOL.   IV. 


CHAPTER  XCIV. 
Military    Opetiations  and  Con(jukst.s  of  ALEXAxnKu.    aftkr  his   Wisti:k 

QUARTEKS   IM   PkRSIB,    DOWN   TO   HIS   DEATH   AT   BaBYLON. 

PAGb: 

The  first  four  Asiatic  camimijrns  of  Alexander— their  direct  bearing  and 
imi>ortance  in  reference  to  (ireeian  history 6:i5 

His  last  seven  years,  farther  eastward,  had  no  similar  heariujr  npon  iireece.  ti:^) 

Darius  at  Ekbatana— seeks  escape  toward  Baktria,  wlien  he  hears  of  Alex- 
ander  approachin,^ •  •   ............ •  -   6t(> 

Alexander  enters  Ekbatana— establishes  there  his  depot  and  base  of  opera-     ^ 

tions  ^"^^ 

Alexander  sends  home  the  Thessalian  cavalry— necessity  for  him  now  to 

pursue  a  more  desultor>'  warfare • ;   ••••.■•  V*?. 

Alexander  pursues  Darius  to  the  Caspian  Gates,  but  fails  ni  overtakmg  him  tjr< 
Conspiracy  formed  against  Darius  by  Bessus  and  otliers,  who  sei/.e  his    ^^ 

person •  ■  •   •  •  • :  ••'"■"  ^'*' 

Prodigious  efforts  of  Alexander  to  overtake  and  get  possessu»n  of  Danus. 

He  surprises  the  Persian  corps,  but  Bessus  puts  Darius  to  death 628 

Disapix)intraent  of  Alexander  when  he  missed  taking  Darius  alive 6y9 

Re^-al  funeral  bestowed  upon  Darius.     His  fate  and  c<Miduct 629 

Kepo.se  of  Alexander  and  his  arniy  at  Hekatorapylus  in  Parthia.  Com- 
mencing alteration  in  his  demeanor.    He  becomes  Asiatized  and  despoiic.  630 

Gradual  aggravation  of  these  new  habits,  from  the  present  moment b;:.0 

Alexander  conquers  the  mountains  immediately  south  of  the  Caspian.    He 

requires  the  (ireek  mercenaries  to  surrender  at  discrniion ijoO 

Envoys  from  Spaila  and  other  (ireek  cities  brought  to  him— how  treated.  tol 
March  oi  Alexander  farther  eastward— his  successes  in  Ana  and  Dnt.igiai)'^  t.31 
Proceedings   against  Philotas,  son  of  Paimeuio,  in  Drangiana.    Military 

greatness  and  consideration  of  the  family -  •  • •  ■  •  G31 

Revelation  of  an  intended  conspiracy  made  by  Kebahnus  to  Philotas  for 

the  purpose  of  being  communicated  to  Alexander.     Pliilotas  does  not 

mention    it   to   Alexander.    It  is  communicated  to  the  latter  through    ^^ 

another  channel ■  •.  : •. •  ^'^ 

Alexander  is  at  first  angrv  with  Philotas,  but  accepts  his  explanation,  and 

professes  to  pass  over  the  fact v  ,    "  • ' '  ^  J  '  V  * ' ' 

Ancient  griulge  against  PhiloUis— advantage  taken  of  the  m<.';dent  to  rum 

Yiixn        "■''-' 

Krateriis  and  others  are  jealous  of  Parmenio  and  Philotas.    Alexander  is 

persuaded  to  put  them  both  to  death  i\    i'  \<-  ' ' ' 

Arrest  of  Philotas.    Alexander  accuses  him  before  the  assembled  soldiers. 

He  is  condemned  • ■ •  •  •  •  • 'Vi ' \'t 

Philotas  is  put  to  the  torture,  and  forced  to  confess,  both  against  lumself 

and  Parmenio • •  -  -. •  •  ■  • , ]'/: 

Parmenio  is  slain  at  Ekbatana.  by  onler  and  contnvance  of  Alexander.. ....  (xjo 

Mutiny  of  the  soldiers  when  they  leain  the  assasj^mation  ot   Parmenio— 

appeased  bv  the  production  of  Alexanders  order ^;^' 

Fear  and  disgust  produced  bv  the  killing  of  Parmenio  and  Philotas >ot> 

Conquest  of  the  Paropivmisadte.  etc.  Foundution  o(  Alex.aulrm  atl  Caucasam  toO 
Alexander  crosses  the  HindcK>  Koosh.  and  comiuers  Baktna.  Bessus  is  made 

Malsa^-r^of  the  Branchidse'and 'their  families,  perpetrated  by  Alexander  in 

Sogdiana •  —  ■  •  •  ■  •   •  •  - •• ^ijA 

Alexander  at  Marakanda  and  on  the  Jaxartes. • • ^^ 

Foundation  of  Alexandria  ad  Jaxaitem.  Limit  of  march  nortliward  ••••-••  WW 
Alexander  at  Zariaspa  in  Baktria— he  causes  Besi^us  to  be  mutilated  and 

gjj^jj^  ^•'*' 

Further  subiu^atioii'  of  Baktria  and  Soprdiana.     Halt  at  Marakanda Ji-JJ) 

Banquet  at  Marakanda.    Character  and  p<Jhi* ion  < >f  Kleiius o-w 


CONTEXTS 


OF 


VOL.   IV. 


80 


PAGB 

Boasts  of  Alexander  and  his  flattertrs— repugnance  of  Macedonian  officers 

felt  but  not  expressed 640 

Scene  at  the  ban(iuet — vehement  remonstrance  of  Kleitus 641 

Furious  wrath  of  Alexander— he  mui-ders  Kleitus  641 

Intense  remorse  of  Alexander  immediately  after  the  deed 642 

Active  and  succes.sf  ul  operations  of  Alexander  in  Sogdiana 643 

Capture  of  two  inexpugnable   positions — the  Sogdian  rock — the  rock  of 

Chorienes.    Passion  of  Alexander  for  Hoxana 643 

Alexander  at  Baktra— marriage  with  Roxana.    His  demand  for  prostration 

or  worship  from  all • 644 

Public  harangue  of  Anaxarchus  during  a  banquet  exhorting  every  one  to 

render  this  worship 644 

Pubhc  reply  of  Kallisthenes  opposing  it.    Character  and  history  of  Kallis- 

chenes 614 

The  reply  of  Kallisthenes  is  favorably  heard  by  the  guests — the  proposition 

for  worship  is  dropped 645 

Coldness  and  disfavor  of  Alexander  toward  Kallisthenes 6^6 

Honoi'able  frankness  and  courage  of  Kallisthenes 646 

Kallisthenes  becomes  odious  to  Alexander 647 

Conspii-acy  of  the  royal  pages  against  Alexander's  life— it  is  divulged— they 

are  put  to  torture,  but  implicate  no  one  else;  they  are  put  to  death 647 

Kallisthenes  is  arrested  as  an  accomplice— antipathy  manifested  by  Alex- 
ander against  him  and  against  Aristotle  also 648 

Kallisthenes  is  tortured  and  hanged 649 

Alexander  reduces  the  country  between  the  Hindoo  Koosh  and  the  Indus. . .  (549 

Conquest  of  tribes  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Indus— the  Rock  of  Aornos  649 

Alexander  crosses  the  Indus— forces  the  passage  of  the  Hydaspes,  defeating 

Porus-«-generous  treatment  of  Porus  .' 6r>0 

His  further  conquests  in  the  Punjab.    Sangala  the  last  of  them 6.")1 

He  reaches  the  Hyphasis  (Sutledge),  the  farthest  of  the  river.i  of  Punjab. 

His  army  refuses  to  march  farther Go2 

Alexander  returns  to  the  Hydaspes &y^ 

He  constructs  a  fleet  and  sails  down  the  Hydaspes  and  the  Indus.    Danger- 
ous wound  of  Alexander  in  attacking  the  Malli 6.>i 

New  cities  and  posts  to  be  established  on  the  Indus— Alexander  reaches  the 

ocean — effects  of  the  first  sight  of  tides 6.54 

March  of  Alexander  by  land  westward  through  the  desert  of  Gedrosia— 

sufferings  and  losses  in  the  army 654 

Alexander  and  the  army  come  back  to  Persis.    Conduct  of  Alexander  at 

Persepolis.    Punishment  of  the  satrap  Osines 655 

He  marches  to  Susa— junction  with  the  fleet  under  Nearcims  after  it  had 

sailed  roimd  from  the  mouth  of  the  Indus 655 

Alexander  at  Susa  as  Great  King.    Subjects  of  uneasiness  to  him— the 

satraps — the  Macedonian  soldier.-; C55 

Past  conduct  of  the  satraps — several  of  them  are  punished  by  Alexander— 

alai'm  among  them  all— flight  of  Harpalus 656 

Discontent  of  the  Macedonian  soldiers  with  the  Asiatizing  intermarriages 

promoted  by  Alexander. . .   656 

Their  discontent  with  the  new  Asiatic  soldiers  levied  and  disciplined  by 

Alexander 0.57 

Interest  of  Alexander  in  the  fleet  which  sails  up  the  Tigris  to  Opis 658 

Notice  of  partial  discharge  to  the  Macedonian  soldiers— they  mutinj' — wrath 

of  Alexander — he  disbands  them  all 6.'i8 

Remorse  and  humiliation  of  the  soldiers- Alexander  is  appeased — recon- 
ciliation    65S 

Partial  disbanding — body  of  veterans  placed  under  command  of  Kraterus 

^  CO  return G59 

New  projects  of   conquests   contemplated   by  Alexander — measures  for 

enlarging  his  fleet  ...   0.59 

Visit  to  Ekbatana — death  of  Hephspstipn — violent  sorrow  of  Alexander GOO 

Alexander  exterminates  the  Kossaei  661 


36 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   IV. 


PAGE 

March  of  Alexander  to  Babylon.    Numerous  embassies  which  met  him  on  ^^ 
Alexander  at  Baby  lon-his  great  preparations  forthe  circumnavigation  and  ^^^ 

AleTaTd^r  on  th^SoardVon  the  Euphrates  and  in  'the  marshes  adjoining. 

His  Dlans  for  improving  the  navigation  and  flow  of  the  river :-\\:-  ^"^ 

Laree  re  enforcements  aTrive,  Grecian  and  Asiatic     New  array  ordered  by 

Alexander,  for  Macedonians  and  Persians  in  the  same  hies  and  com- 

panics r .......... . ., ^ 

Splendid  funeral  obsequies  of  Hephsestion •.-•.. .- ••  •  •  •  •  •  •  ""•' 

Geneml  feasting  and  intemperance  in  tlie  army.    Alexander  is  seized  with 

a  dane-erous  fever.    Details  of  his  illness t  ' '  V  • " :  •  •  •.•  •  •  ""^ 

Noh?pf  of  hisllfe.    Consternation  and  grief  in  the  army.    Last  mterview  ^^^ 

Effect  pn  Xl^ed""  on  uS  Imagination  of  contemporaries  by  the  carter  and  ^ 

Had  A^exi^e?  hvtd  he  must  have  achieved  tilings  greater  still . .........  G67 

Question^sed  by  Livj'  about  the  chances  of  Alexander  if  he  had  attacked  ^^^ 

TTnrfvaled^  exc'eilenfe  of  Alexander  as  a  miiitary  man. CG8 

Alexander  as  a  military  ruler  apart  from  military  affairs-not  deserving  of  ^ 

Al?xander  would  "have  continued  the  system  of'  Uie' Persian"  empire,  with 
no  other  improvement  except  that  of  a  strong  organization C69 

Absence  of  ^Knallty  in  Alexander-purpose  of  fusing  the  different  vane- 
ties  of  mankind  into  one  common  type  of  subjection. -  - .  •  •  ■  •  •  •  d^» 

M  stake  of  supposing  Alexander  to  be  the  ^"^•^"f.l^^f  ^^^^^^^  °^  ^'^^^  C70 
civilization.    His  ideas  compared  with  those  of  Aristotle ^j^ 

Knmher  of  new  cities  founded  in  Asia  by  Alexander ....... ... . . .....  •  •  ••.-••    «<  a 

li^^s  not  Alexander,  but  the  Diadochi  after  1^^^' ^^^o  chiefly  heUemzed  ^^^ 

How  far' Asia  was  ever  really  iielienized-the  great  fact  was  that  the  Greek 
language  became  universally  diffused ^ig 

fncretse^'Sf'^the'^^^^^^  communicatYon'  between'  Vari'ous  paris' of" 'th4    ' 

world  i'-r 

Interest  of  Alexander  in  science  and  literature ^"^ 

CHAPTER  XCV. 

Grecian  Affairs  from  the  Landing  of  Alexander  in  Asia  to  the  Close 

of  the  Lamian  War. 

Stite  of  the  Grecian  world  when  Alexander  crossed  the  Hellespont    .  .....  675 

GiSfian  spfrif  might  have  been  called  into  action  if  tne  Persians  had  played  ^^^ 

Hopis  rSd  IJi^Greece';  first  by  tlie  Persian  fleet  in  {he  JEiean,'  iiex't  by'th^    ' 

two  great  Persian  armies  on  land  .•.•■•• .•  •  • n^r, 

PubUc  acts  and  policy  at  Athens-decidedly  pacific. .  ;.^;-  •  •  •  •  •  — j^-  •„- —  -^i  ^' ' 


Phokion  and  Demades  were  leading  ministers  at  Athens-they  were  o.  ^_ 

-SS}SJf^Smt''il^-gus,though'notin'the'asc  ' 

n^veSels   still   public   men   of   importance,     financial   activity   of  ^^ 


Lvkurgus • : •  ■  •  • ■■ c-u 

Pnv:;itioTi  of  Demosthenes— his  prudent  conduct ••••••••••;••  ""^ 

im  -Ml^-VonSn  inovement  from  Sparta-King  Agis  visits   the   Persian 

admi^afs  hi  the  JEzes^n.  His  attempts  both  inlslrete  and  in  Pe  oponnesv.s  C<9 
AgisTevtes  an  a^y  in  Peloponnesus,  and  makes  open  declaration  against  ^^ 

Ag'is^kttret'  partially  successf ul,'  is  comjil'etel'y  'defeated  by  'intipiiter.*  ^d 
slain. 


C80 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV.  37 

PAGE 

Complete  submission  of  all  Greece  to  Antipater— Spartan  envoys  sent  up  to 
Alexander  in  Asia GSl 

Untoward  result  of  the  defensive  efforts  of  Greece— want  of  combination. . .  ijiil 

Position  of  parties  at  Athens  during  the  struggle  of  Agis— reaction  of  the 
Macedonizing  party  after  his  defeat 682 

Judicial  contest  between  ^schines  and  Demosthenes.  Preliminary  circum- 
stances as  to  the  proposition  of  Ktesiphon,  and  the  indictment  by 
Ji^scliines - -682 

Accusatory  harangue  of  .Eschines,  nominally  against  the  proposition  of 
Ktesiphon,  really  against  the  political  life  of  Demosthenes 683 

Appreciation  of  .^schines,  on  independent  evidence,  as  an  accuser  of 
Demosthenes 684 

Reply  of  Demosthenes— oration  De  Corona 684 

]<\ineral  oration  of  extinct  Grecian  freedom 685 

Verdict  of  the  Dikasts— triumph  of  Demosthenes— exile  of  .Eschines 686 

Causes  of  the  exile  of  ^schines— he  was  the  means  of  procuring  coronation 
for  Demosthenes 686 

Subsequent  accusation  against  Demosthenes,  in  the  affair  of  Harpalus 68< 

Flight  of  Harpalus  to  Athens— his  previous  conduct  and  relations  with 
Athens rv  w  '   ■■^   \  ^^ 

False  reports  conveyed  to  Alexander,  that  the  Athenians  had  identified 
themselves  with  Harpalus G88 

Circuuftitances  attending  the  arrival  of  Harpalus  at  Sunium— debate  in  the 
Athenian  assembly-  promises  held  out  by  Harpalus— the  Athenians  seem 
at  first  favorably  disposed  toward  him 688 

Phokion  and  Demosthenes  both  agree  in  dissuading  the  Athenians  from    ' 
taking  up  Harpalus •  •  •  •  689 

Demand  by  Antipater  for  the  surrender  of  Harpalus— the  Athenians  refuse 
to  comply,  but  they  arrest  Harpalus  and  sequestrate  his  treasure  for 
Alexander •  •  •  689 

Demosthenes  moves  the  decree  for  arrest  of  Harpalus,  who  is  arrest-ed,  but 
escapes •  •  •  • 689 

Conduct  of  Demosthenes  in  regard  to  the  treasure  of  Harpalus- deficiency 
of  the  sum  counted  and  realized,  as  compared  with  the  sum  announced 
by  Harpalus ;  •  „  ^^ 

Suspicions  about  this  money— Demosthenes  moves  that  the  Areopagus  shall 
investigate  the  matter— the  Areopagites  bring  in  a  report  against  Demos- 
thenes himself,  with  Demades  and  others,  as  guilty  of  corrupt  appropria- 
tion.   Demosthenes  is  tried  on  this  charge,  ccndemned,  and  goes  into  exile  690 

Was  Demosthenes  guilty  of  such  corrupt  appropriation?  Circumstances 
as  known  in  the  case •,  *  ^^ 

Demosthenes  could  not  have  received  money  from  Harpalus,  since  he 
opposed  him  from  first  to  last  -691 

Had  Demosthenes  the  means  of  embezzling,  after  the  money  had  passed 
out  of  the  control  of  Harpalus?    Answer  in  the  negative 693 

Accusatory  speech  of  Deinarchus  against  Demosthenes— virulent  invective 
destitute  of  facts 693 

Change  of  mind  respecting  Demosthenes,  in  the  Athenian  public,  in  a  few 
months 693 

Probable  reality  of  the  case,  respecting  the  money  of  Hari^alus,  and  the 
sentence  of  the  Areopagus 693 

Rescript  of  Alexander  to  the  Grecian  cities,  directujg  that  the  exiles  should 
be  recalled  in  each -; '  ,' '  ^'^^ 

Purpose  of  the  rescript— to  provide  partisans  for  Alexander  ifi  each  of  the 
cities.    Discontents  in  Greece 6fl.> 

Effect  produced  in  Gre<ice  by  the  death  of  Alexander 1^06 

The  Athenians  declare  themselves  champions  of  the  liberation  of  Greece,  m 
spite  of  Phokion's  opposition , 696 

The  iEtolians  and  many  other  Greeks  join  the  confederacy  for  liberation- 
activity  of  the  Athenian  Leosthenes  as  general.  Athenian  envoys  sent 
round  to  invite  co-operation  from  the  various  Greeks 696 


S8 


CONTENTti   OF   VOL.    IV 


TAG  IS 

Assistance  lent  to  the  Athenian  envoys  by  Demosthenes,  though  in  exik-. 

He  i^  recalled  to  Athens,  and  receives  an  enthusiastic  welcome  ...  G0< 
Large  Gi^cMan  confederacy  against  Anlipater-  ne ^rthe less  withoiu  bpail^ 

Bieoiia  strongly  in  trie  Macedonian  interest.    Leosthenes  \vuh  the  con- 

federate  army  maiches  into  Thessaly • ■  ■  •  •. •  •  ■  •  "*'' 

Battle  in  Thessaly-victorv  of  Leosthenes  over  Antipater,  who  is  compel. ed 

to  thiow  himself  tnto  Lamia,  and  await  succors  from  Asia-Leosthenes 

forms  the  blockade  of  Lamia:  he  is  slam. - . •  -  •  •.■•,•;-•  "•'" 

Misfortune  of  the  death  of  leo-thenes.    Antiphilus  is  named  m  his  place. 

Relaxed  efforts  of  the  Greciar  army ; .•  •   •.-•,;,•  •  •  V^v  "*"' 

Leonnatus,  with  a  Macedonian  army  from  Asia,  arrives  ^^  p^^^^^P  ■^^'^ 

defeat  and  death.    Antipater  escapes  fi-om  Lamia,  and  takes  the  com-  ^^^ 

W?r^carried  on  bv  sea  between  the  Macedonian  and  Athenian  fleets ........  TOO 

Reluctance  of  the  Greek  contingents  to  remain  on  long-continued  serMce. 

The  army  in  Thessaly  is  thinned  by  many  returning  home. .....  • . .  -  •  ■  -^ -^  •^'" 

Expected  arrival  of  Kraterus  to  re-enforce  Antipater.    Relations  betvAeen  ^^^ 

the  Macedonian  officers •  •  •  •. • •  •  • :  • ; ", ;^i:.'   ' 

State  of  the  regal  family,  and  of  the  Macedonian  generals  and  soldiery, 

after  the  death  of  Alexander ,•.••.;  •  •;  • ", Ji;' 

Philip  Aridseus  is  proclaimed  kmg:  the  satrapies  are  distributed  among  the  ^^^ 

pjldikkas  the  cSef' representative  of  central  authority,  assistf  J  lay  Eumeues  ^^^ 

List  ofVroJects"entertained"  by  Alexander  at  the  time  of  ^^^  ^^^''^^j-  j^*"  ^oi 
generals  dismiss  them  as  too  vast.    Plans  of  Leonnatus  and  Kleopatra. .       <01 

Kraterus  joins  Antipater  in  Macedonia  with  a  powerful  ariny.    l^aUle  of 
Krannon  in  Thessaly.     Ant.pater  gains  a  victory  over  the  Greeks,  though  ^^^ 
not  a  complete  one .- •  • •  ■ ;  •  •  i:." '  V   ' 

Antiphilus  tries  to  open  negotiations  with  Antipater,  ^'^^ /♦^f  ^^f^.  ^<^  %l^h 
except  with  each  city  singly.    Discouragement  among  the  Greeks.  J.aai 
city  treats  separately.     Antipater  grants  favorable  terms  to  all,  except  ^^^ 
Athenians  and  ^tolians ••••   • • i.\"l!^CJ.^L*^   * 

Antipater  and  his  army  in  Boeotia-Athens  left  alone  and  ""'^^^^^^  r^^ist^ 
Demosthenes  and  the  other  anti-Macedonian  orators  take  flight.  Embassy 
of  Phokion,  Xenokrates,  and  others  to  Antipater ;LxJ 

Severe  terms  unpo.^ed  upon  Athens  by  Antipater • ..-  •  •  ••.,:;•„• " "  XXj 

Disfrancliisement  and  deportation  of  the  1:.>,(^U0  Poorest  Athenian  citizens.      .04 

Hardship  suffered  by  the  deported  poor  of  Athens -Macedonian  garrison  ^^^ 

placed  in  Munychia • • ••  ■ ; •  '  v. o+v^ "  iA'  tv.oir 

Demosthenes,  livpeiides,  and  others,  are  condemned  to  death  m  tt^eu 
absence     Antipater  sends  officers  to  track  and  seize  the  Grecian  exiles.  ^^^ 

r^aiiS^'^nci;;^'at  kalaurial-Xrchias  with " Thracian  ' soldiers  ; 

comes  to  seize  him- he  takes  poison,  and  expires. •  • ^y" 

Miserable  condition  of  Greece-life  and  character  of  ^j;J"«f  ^enes  . .  .^. . .  -00 
Dishonorable  position  of  Phokion  at  Athens,  under  the  Macedonian  occu-  ^^^ 

patiou 

CHAPTER  XCVl. 
From  the  Lamian  War  to  the  close  of  the  History  of  Free  Hellas  and 

ilELLEMSM. 

Antipater  purges  and  remodels  the  Peloponnesian  cities.  He  attacks  the 
°Etolians!^with  a  view  of  dep-ortine  them  across  to  Asia  I  is  Hej^ce 
becomes  neces.sary  in  Asia:  he  concludes  a  pacification  with  the  ^tolians  ^09 

Intrieues  with  Perdikkas  and  with  the  princesses  at  Pella. •  ■_■■■   •  i^ 

Antigonua  detects  the  intrigues  and  reveals  them  to  Antipater  and  Kra-  ^^^ 
terns 


CONTENTS   OF   VOL.    IV. 


39 


PAGE 

Unjiropitious  turns  of  fortune  for  the  Greeks  in  reference  to  the  Lr.mian  war  711 

Antipater  and  Kraterus  in  Asia— Perdikkas  marches  to  attack  I'tolemy  in 
Kg.'^'Pt:  hut  is  killed  in  a  mutiny  of  his  own  troops.  Union  of  Antipater, 
Ptolemy,  Antigonus,  etc.  New  distribution  of  the  satrapies  made  at 
Triparadeisus 711 

War  between  Antigonus  and  Eumenes  in  Asia.  Energj^  and  ability  of 
Eumenes.    He  is  worsted  and  blocked  up  in  Nora 712 

Sickness  and  death  of  Antipater.  The  Athenian  orator  Demades  is  put  to 
death  in  Macedonia 713 

Antipater  sets  aside  hL<  son  Kassander  and  names  Polysperchon  viceroy. 
Discontent  and  oppof-ilion  of  Kassander 713 

Kassander  sets  up  for  himself,  gets  possession  of  Munycliia,  and  forms  alli- 
ance with  Ptolemv  and  Antigonus  against  Polysperchon 714 

Plans  of  Polysperchon— alliance  with  Olympias  in  Europe,  and  with  Eume- 
nes in  Asia— enfranchisement  of  the  Grecian  cities 714 

Ineffectual  attempts  of  Eumenes  to  uphold  the  imperial  dynasty  in  Asia; 
his  gallantry  and  abilitj-;  he  is  betrayed  by  his  own  soldiers  and  slain  by 
Antigonus 7^4 

Edict  issued  by  Polysperchon  at  Pella  in  the  name  of  the  imperial  dvnasty 
— su()verting  the  Antipatrian  oligarchies  in  the  Grecian  cities,  restoring 
political  exiles,  and  granting  free  constitutions  to  each 715 

Letters  and  measures  of  Polysperchon  to  enforce  the  edict.  State  of 
Athens;  exiles  returning;  complicated  political  parties;  danger  of  Pho- 


kion. 


no 


Negotiations  of  the  Athenians  with  Nikanor,  governor  of  Munychia  for 
Kassander 717 

Nikanor  seizes  Peirteus  by  surprise.  Phokion,  though  ftirewameci,  takes 
no  precautions  against  it 718 

Mischief  to  the  Athenians,  as  well  as  to  Polvsperchon,  from  Nikanor's  occu- 
pation of  Peiraeus:  culpable  negligence  and  probable  collusion  of  Phokion  718 

Arrival  of  Alexander  (son  of  Polysperchon);  his  treacherous  policy  to  the 
Athenians:  Kassander  reaches  Peira-us 719 

Intrigues  of  Phokion  with  Alexander— he  tries  to  secure  for  himself  the  pro- 
tection of  Alexander  against  the  Athenians 719 

Return  of  the  deported  exiles  to  Athens— public  vote  passed  in  the  Athenian 
assembly  against  Phokion  and  his  colleagues.  Phokion  leaves  the  city,  is 
protected  by  Alexander,  and  goes  to  meet  Polysperchon  in  Phokis 720 

Agnonides  and  others  are  sent  as  deputies  to  Polysperchon,  to  accuse  Pho- 
kion and  to  claim  the  benefit  of  the  regal  edict 720 

Agnonides  and  Phokion  are  heard  before  Polysperchon— Phokion  and  his 
colleagues  are  delivered  up  as  prisoners  to  the  Athenians 721 

Phokion  is  conveyed  as  prisoner  to  Athens,  and  brought  for  tnal  before  the 
assembly.     Motion  of  his  friends  for  exclusion  of  non-qualified  persons. . .  722 

Intense  exasperation  of  the. returned  exiles  against  Phokion— grounds  for 
that  feeling 722 

Phokion  is  condemned  to  death— vindictive  manifestation  against  him  in 
the  assembly,  f uri(^us  and  unanimous 722 

Death  of  Phokion  and  his  four  colleagues 723 

Alteration  of  the  sentiment  of  the  Athenians  toward  Phokion  not  long  after- 
ward.   Honors  shown  to  his  memory 724 

Explanation  of  this  alteration.  Kass'andei-  gets  possession  of  Athens  and 
restores  the  oligarchical  or  I'hokionic  party 724 

Life  and  character  of  Phokion 725 

War  between  Polysperchon  and  Kassander  in  Attica  and  Peloponnesus. 
Polysperchon  is  repulsed  in  the  siege  of  Megalopolis  and  also  deieated  at 
sea ';<>7 

Increased  strength  of  Kassander  in  Greece.    He  gets  possession  of  Athens..  7h 
Restoration  of  the  oligarchical  government  at  Athens,  though  in  a  miti- 


gated  form,  under  the  Phalerean  Den  etrius 

Administration  of  the  Phalerean  Demetrius  at  Athens,  in  a  moderate  spirit. 
Census  taken  of  the  Athenian  population 7; 


;» 


40 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  IV. 


PAGE 


729 


729 


730 


Kassander  in  Peloponnesus-many  cities  join  him-  the  Spartans  surround 

Feud 'in 'the''  Mac'lSimiau  "imperiai  ■filmily-Olynipias'puts  'to'death  Pliiiip 
Aridffius  and  Eiirydike-sht;  reigns  in  Macedonia:  lier  bloody  revenge 
aeainst  the  partisans  of  Antipater .- •  •  •  • •  •  •  •  •  •  ■■- 

Kassander  passes  into  3Iacedonia- defeats  Olympias,  and  becomes  master 
of  the  country-Olympias  is  besieged  in  Pydna,  captured,  and  put  to 

GreS^^power'  of  Antigonus  'in  Asia.' "  Confederacy  of  kassander,  Lysima- 

chus,  Ptolemy,  and  Seleukus  against  him .•••.■ ^ o, 

Kassander  founds  Kassandreia  and  restores  Thebes. .......   ............. ....   <oi 

Mea^res  of  Autigonus  against  Kassander-he  promises  freedom  to  the 
Grecian  cities-Rolemy  promises  the  like.    Great  power  of  Kassander  m  ^^ 

F<Sce?of  Antigonus'in'G'reece.' "  Considerable' success  agkinst  Kassander. . .  733 
Pacification  between  tl.e  belligerents.     Gi-ecian  autonomy  guaranteed  m 

name  by  all.    Ka.'^sander  puts  to  death  Koxana  and  her  child i-^d 

)lyS)erchon  espouses  the  pretensions   of   Herakles   son    of   Alexander 
against  Kassander.    He  enters  into  compact 


'>0 


Polvsnerchon  espouses  the  pretensions  of  Herakles  son  of  Alexander 
alJinst  Kassander.  He  enters  into  compact  with  Kassander,  assassmates 
the  voung  prince,  and  is  recognized  as  ruler  of  Southern  Greece  ..■-•••■•   '34 

As^diHinon  ot  Kleopatra,  last  surviving  relative  of  Alexander  the  Great,  ^ 

PtoTew'of'Eg>Trin'Greece'-a'ft^^^^^  lie  concludes  a  tinice 
with  Kassander.    Passiveness  of  the  Grecian  cit les ......... .....  ta* 


The    Athenians 


with  Kassander.    „  ,.     ,    .       •     u     ^ .. 

Sudden    arrival    of    Demetnus    Pohorketes  in  Peua^us.       ^      ,,     ^  . 

deSare  in  his  favor.    Demetrius  Phalereus  retires  to  Egjpt.    Capture  of  ^^ 

D^^iillJ^iSef  inters' Athens  in  tHi o^iph: ' "  He'  i>V;^mi^  '^f^T'ji^Ji  ' 
of  the  democracy.    Extravagant  votes  of  llattery  passed  by  the  Athenians 

toward  him.    Two  new  Athenian  tribes  created ..... .  -  •••■••.••   I.:jy. 

Alteration  of  tone  and  sentiment  in  Athens  during  the  ?«Vli.rty  years  .ob 

Contrast  of  Athens  as  proclaimed  free  by  Demetrius  Pohorketes  \^  ith  Athens  ^^^ 

Op^Uon3^'S^DexJ^Ks:nej^ew'of'bemosthene^ 

De.SiurPhalerl'ur  *in  his  khseneeV "  Honorable  com'memora-  ' 

tion  of  the  deceased  orator  Lykurgus •  •  •  • •  •  •  • 

Restrictive  law  passed  against  the  philosophers-they  all  leave  Athens. 

The  law  is  repealed  next  year,  and  the  philosopheni  return  to  Athens  ...     738 
Exploit^  of  Demetrius  Pohorketes.    His  long  siege  of  Rliodes.    Gallant  and 

successful  resistance  of  the  citizens .    •  •  •  •  • ,••;:. f^m 

His  prolonged  war  and  ultimate   uccess  in  Greece  against  J^'-^ssander^ .  .^^ . .  <40 
Return  of  Demetrius  Pohorketes  to  Athens-his  triumphant  reception- 

memorable  Ithyphallic  hymn  addressed  to  him •  •  •  • '^V- 

Helpless  condition  of  the  Athenians— proclamied  by  themselves. .       . . . . . . . .  .41 

IclXry  shov.-n  to  Demetrius  at  Athens.    He  is  initiated  m  the  Eleusiman 

mysteries,  out  of  the  regular  season  .•••••.•• V  V^V,,';  'Wlii 

March  of  Demetrius  into  Thessaly;  he  passes  into  Asia  and  joins  Anti- 

gSiiis^  great  battle  of  Ipsus,  in  which  the  four  confederates  conipletely 

defeat  Antigonus,  who  is  slain,  and  his  Asiatic  power  broken  up  and  parti-  ^ 

..  -t *  '^'^ 

ReSoration  of  the  'ka'ssandrian  'dominion  in  Greece.  Lachares  makes  him- 
self despot  at  Athens,  under  Kassander.  Demetrms  Pohorketes  retm-ns 
and  expels  Lachares.    He  garrisons  Peirffus  and  Mvuivchia. <-i.i 

Death  of  Kassander.  Bloody  feuds  among  his  family.  Demetnus  acqmres 
the  crown  of  Macedonia  ^-  "i; ' '    V  "   "• :*'  r^   '  \l.'^ 

Antigonus  Gonates  (son  of  Demetrius)  master  of  Macedonia  and  Greece. 
Permanent  footing  of  the  Antigonid  dynasty  m  Macedonia  until  the  con- 
Quest  of  that  country  by  the  Romans .•■.■■■\ i'W u  " 

Spirit  of  the  Greeks  broken-isolation  of  the  cities  from  each  other  by  ^^^ 

Antigonus ' '  * 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   IV. 


41 


PAGE 


The  Greece  of  Polybius  cannot  form  a  subject  of  history  by  itself,  but  is 
essentially  dependent  on  tureign  neighbors.  ■••:•■• .-  •  • v  r'.'^-'   ' 

Evkfjice  of  the  political  nullity  of  Atnens-public  decree  m  honor  of  Demo- 
Phares-what  acts  are  recorded  as  his  titles  to  public  gratitude i45 


CHAPTER  XCVII. 


Sicilian  and  Italian  Greeks -Agathokles. 
Constitution  estabhshed  by  Timoleon  at  Syracuse-afterward  exchanged  ^^^ 
Ita?iiS"GVelks-pressed'  upon  'by  enemies  from'  'the'interior-Archidamus 


747 


Ri'i''§f'^the^Sol?an' ki^l^glk)■m■  of  "Epirus:  through  'Macedonian  aid-Alex- 

niuler  the  Molo.ssian  king,  brother  of  Olympias •  •  • •. •  •  -.-  '*< 

ThrMolossian  Alexander  crosses  into  Italy  to  assist  the  Tarentines.    His  ^^^ 


He  levies  a  mercenary  force-his  exploits  as  general  m  Ita  y  and  bicily 
Change  of  government  at  Syracuse- Agathokles  is  recalled-his  exploits 

aeainst  the  exiles— his  dangerous  character  at  home ■•••,■  \- ; ' " 

Further  internal  changes  a%  Syracuse-recall  of  the  exdes-Agathokles  _ 

re-admitted— SAvears  amnesty  and  fidelity •  •  •. •  •  ■  •  •  ••■••■•  '^ 

Agathokles,  in  collusion  with  Hamilkar,  arms  his  pari;isans  at  Syracuse, 

and  perpetrates  a  sanguinary  massacre  of  the  citizens ;ioi 

Agathokles  is  constituted  sole  despot  of  Syracuse ;;5- 

IlTs  popular  manners,  military  energy,  and  conquests. .... ... ..... .  • .  • .-..-.   -o^ 

Progress  of  Agathokles  in  conquering  Sicily..   The  Agngentines  take  alai-m  ^^^ 

and  organize  a  defensive  alliance  against  him •••••••.••••••• \"\"''„\"^'' 

They  invite  the  Spartan  Akrotatus  to  command-his  bad  conduct   and  ^^^ 

SiciiV  the  "only  place  in'w'lii'cha'giorious  Hellenic  career  was  open 754 

pS  concluded  by  Agathokles  with  the  Agrigentines-lus  great  power  m  ^  _^ 

Ile'i^s' repu'lse'd  'from'  Agrige'ntum-tl'ie  Cartha'giiii'ans" send'  an  armament  to  ^^ 

P(Si?ion'f?The  ^cSthaginian's  'between'  'Gela  and' Agrigen'tum'-their  army  ^ 
re-enforced  from  home •  •. ■  •  •.• :  •  •  •  ■  •  in^iV  * 

Operations  of  Agathokles  against  them-his  niassacj-e  of  citizens  at  Gela. . 

Pattle  of  the  Himera,  between  Agathokles  and  the  Carthaginians  .   

Total  defeat  of  Agathokles  by  the  Carthaginians. . . ......  ■■-■■■■;■■  ■  ■  •^. 

The  Carthaginians  recover  a  large  part  of  Sicily  from  Agathokles.    His 
depressed  condition  at  Syracuse  •••••■■••••••■:■.•••:  • ;  v  ; ; ; l"^ 

He  conceives  the  plan  of  attacking  the  Carthaginians  m  Africa •••"•••  "^' 

His  energ>'  and  sagacity  in  organizing  this  expedition.    His  renewed  mas-  ^^_^ 

nriltVolft  oft  he  harbor  inspite  of '  the  blockading'  fleet.' '  'Eclipse'  of  the      . 

sun.    He  reaches  Africa  safely .......  •••;/:••-;;•.•••••:•  '^ 

He  bums  his  vessels-impressive  ceremony  for  eflfecting  this,  under  vow  to  ^_^ 

AgalhoWes'niarchesint'o  the  Carthaginian'territory-captures  Tunes-rich- 

ness  and  cultivation  of  the  countrj-  •  • •  •  •  •  •  •.•  •  •■••;••  -i^; -  •     "''' 

Consternation  at  Carthage-the  city-force  marches  out  against  him-Hanno 

and  Boinilkar  named  generals. :■••••; VV^U  o^Vi,'^';." -rivi 

Inferior  numbers  of  Agathokles-his  artifices  to  encourage  the  soldiers a)l 

Treachery  of  the  Carthaginian  general  Bomilkar- victory  of  Agathokles. ...   -bl 
Conquests  of  Agathokles  among  the  Carthaginian  dependencies  on  the  ^^^ 

Religious  terror  aiid 'distress  of  the  Carthaginians.    Human  sacrifice < o3 


/55 

7.'>6 
750 


42 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   IV. 


PAGE 

Operations  of  Agathokles  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Carthage — capture  of 
Neapohs,  Adrumetum,  Thapsus,  etc 762 

Agathokles  fortifies  Aspis  —  undertakes  operations   against   the   interior  ^ 
country— defeats  the  Carthaginians  again 763 

Proceedings  of  Hsniiikar  before  Syracuse— the  city  is  near  surrendering—  ^ 
he  is  disappointed  and  marches  away  from  it 764 

Renewed  attack  cf  Hamilkar  upon  Syracuse— he  tries  to  surprise  Euryalus,  ^ 
but  is  total] V  defeated,  made  prisoner,  and  sli-in 764 

The  Agrigentines  stand  forward  is  champions  of  Sicilian  fi-eedom  against 
Agathokles  and  the  Carthaguiians 765 

Mutiny  in  the  army  of  Agathokles  at  Times— his  great  danger  and  address  ^ 
in  extricating  himself ;  •  •  766 

Carthaginian  army  sent  to  act  in  the  interior— attacked  by  Agathokles  with 
some  success— his  camp  is  pillaged  by  the  Numidians 767 

Agathokles  invites  the  aid  of  Ophelias  from  Kyrene  767 

Antecedent  circumstances  of  Kyrene.  Division  of  coast  between  Kyrene 
and  Carthage 767 

Thimbron  with  the  Harpalian  mercenaries  is  invited  over  to  Kyrene  by 
exiles.    His  checkered  career,  on  the  whole  victorious  in  Libj'a 768 

The  Kyrenaeans  solicit  aid  from  the  Egyptian  Ptolemy,  who  sends  Ophelias 
thither.  Defeat  and  death  of  Thimbron.  Kyrenaica  annexed  to  the 
<iomiuions  of  Ptolemy  under  Ophelias  as  viceroy 769 

Position  and  hopes  of  Ophelias.  He  accepts  the  invitation  or  Agathokles. 
He  collects  colonists  fiom  Athens  and  other  Grecian  cities 770 

March  of  Ophelias  with  his  army  and  his  colonists  from  Kyrene  to  the  Car- 
thaginian territory — sufferings  endured  on  the  march 770 

Perfidy  of  Agathokles— he  kills  Ophelias-gets  possession  of  his  army— 
ruin'and  dispei'sion  of  the  colonists  771 

Terrible  sedition  at  Carthage— Bomilkar  tries  to  seize  the  supreme  power- 
he  is  overthrown  ard  slain 773 

Further  successes  of  Agathokles  in  Africa— he   captures  Utica,  Hippo —  ^^ 
Zary tus  and  Hippagreta 772 

Agathokles  goes  to  Sicily,  leaving  Archagathus  to  command  in  Africa. 
Successes  of  Archagathus  in  the  interior  country  773 

Redoubled  efforts  of  the  Carthaginians— they  gain  two  great  victories  over  ^ 
Archagathus 7^-^ 

Danger  of  Archagathus— he  is  blocked  up  by  the  Carthaginians  at  Tunes. ...  774 

Agathokles  in  Sicily.    His  career  at  first  prtsperous.    Defeat  of  the  Agri- 

.    gentines 774 

Activity  of  Agathokles  in  Sicily— Deinokrates  in  great  force  against  him —  775 

Agrigentine  army  under  Xenodokus— opposed  to  the  mercenaries  of  Aga-  ^^_ 
thokles— superiority  of  the  latter 775 

Defeat  of  Xenodokus  by  Leptines— Agathokles  passes  t.ver  into  Africa- 
bad  state  of  his  army  there— he  is  defeated  by  the  Carthaginians 770 

Nocturnal  panic  and  disoi  der  in  both  camps 776 

Desperate  condition  of  Agathokles— he  deserts  his  army  and  escapes  to 
Sicilv 776 

The  deserted  array  kill  the  two  sons  of  Agathokles,  and  then  capitulate  with 
the  Carthaginians 777 

African  expedition  of  Agathokles— boldness  of  the  first  conception— impru- 
dentlv  pushed  and  persisted  in 777 

Proceedings  of  Agatnokles  in  Sicily— his  barbarities  at  Egesta  and  Syra- 
cuse    778 

Great  mercenary  force  under  Deinokrates  in  Sicily— Agathokles  solicits  peace 
from  him,  and  is  refused— he  concludes  peace  with  Carthage 778 


Battle  of  Torgium— victor}-  of  Agathokles  over  Deinokrates. 


779 


Accommodation  and  compact  between  Agathokles  and  Deinokrates 779 

Ooerations  of  Agathokles  in  Liparas,  Italy,  and  Ki>rkyra— Kleonymus  of 

Sparta 780 

Last  projects  of  Agathokles— mutiny  of  his  grandson  Archagathus— sick- 
ness, poisoxiiDg,  and  death  of  Agathokles 780 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.    lY 


43 


Splendid  genius 
kles. . 


of  action  and  resource -nefarious  dispositions— of  Agatho- 


PAGB 


781 


HeSic\igencyinSicilycontinuesduringtheYifeofAgath^^^^ 
then  subordinate  to  preponderant  foreigners ^^ 

CHAPTER  XCV^in. 
OrTLYiNG  Hellenic  Cities.-I.  In  Gaul  and  Spain.    2.  On  the  Coast  of  the 

EUXUiE. 

r-DQ 

S:?^  pi^S?5  M^^lS^SlSJ^Nnccea:  Rhoda:  Empori^^liiecuiiar  \^ 

oiii^SSS^vmiS'SfM^ssa^  administration ...      784 

Hdlenizi^'g  influence  of  Massalia  in  the  West-Pytheas,  the  navigator  and  ^^_ 

Vffntic  Gree^ks— Peritapolis  on  the  south-west  coast ... ......  785 

^inwe-fts  envoVs  present  with  Darius  in  his  last  days-mamtams  its  inde- 
peSdenclfor  some  time  against  the  Pontic  princes-but  becomes  subject  ^^ 

The  PoSic^Skleia-oiigarchica  native  Maiiandyni  '^^ 

PoUUcal  dilSol-dllHerakleia-banishment  of  klearchus-partiai  democrac'v  ^^^ 

C^m1fnS?5>iitica^troubleVa■tHeraWleia^ 

Chamcter  and  circumstances  of  Klearchus-he  makes  himself  despot  of 

Herakleia— his  tyranny  and  cruelty ■   •   • ; ' " " " "  V  'Z'  Vi i^ca 

He  continues  despot  for  twelve  years-he  is  assassinated  at  a  festival ^88 

Sity?us  be^omes^despo^^       aggravated  cruelty-  his  military  vigor < 89 

DSotism  of  Timotheus,  just  and  mild-his  energy  and  ability . . -89 

Despot  sm  of  Dionysius-his  popular  and  vigorous  government-his  prudent 

deaUng  with  the  Macedonians,  during  the  absence  of  Alexander  m  the  ^^ 

R^urn' of  ■Alexander  to  Susa-he  *is"soiicited  by  the  Herakleotic  exiles-^an- 

eer  of  Dionysius,  averted  by  the  death  of  Alexander. •  •  •   •«« 

Prosperity  and  prudence  of  Dionysius-he  marries  Amistns-his  favor  with  ^^^ 

AmfS^Vems'^Hemkle 

K  earchus  and  Oxathres  kill  Amistris-are  killed  by  Lysimachus. -  91 

Arsinoe  Sess  of  Herakleia.    Defeat  and  death  of  Lysimachus.    Power  ^^^ 

HeraMlla^emancipated  from"  the  despots,  and  "a  popular  government  estab- 
lMied-rl?all  of  the  exiles-bold  bearing  of  the  citizens  toward  Seleukus  ^^^ 

SiUiitfon  and^lTnl'gement'  of"  Herakieia  '^s*  a  free  goyernment;^conkideV^  ^^^ 

Pr^udenTIdmSmtion"  of  Herakieia;  as  a'  free  cityVamong  ihe  powe  ;fui  ' 
princes  of  Asia  Minor-general  condition  and  influence  of  the  Greek  cities  ^^^ 

oS'cianPenSpolisonthesouth^^^^^^^^  ^94 

OlS-in  the  days  of  Herodotus  and  Ephorus-mcreased  numbers,  and  mul- 

tiplied  inroads  of  the  barbaric  hordes  •■••••••••••■•• li\ 

Olbia  in  later  davs-decline  of  security  and  production « »o 

Olhia  nilla^ed  and  abandoned— afterward  renewed ............   « ^ 

?-is;t  oFSn  thlRhetor-Hellenic  tastes  and  manners-ardent  mterest  m 

Homer 797 

Bosnorus  or  Pantikapaeum • •  ■  • jL^i 

Prmces  of  Bosporus-relations  between  Athens  and  Bosporus. ..........   . . .  <9« 

NySj^um  among  the  tributary  cities  under  the  Atheman  empire-how  it 

nassed  under  the  Bosporanic  princes • a'''*^ 

Aflfance  and  reciprocal  good  o&ces  between  the  Bosporanic  princes  Saty- 


44 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.   IV. 


•  PAGE 

rus,  Leukon,  etc.,  and  the  Athenians.    Immunities  of  trade  granted  to 

the  Athenians 798 

Political  condition  of  the  Greeks  of  Bosporus — the  princes  called  themselves 

archons— their  empire  over  barbaric  tribes 799 

Family  feuds  among  the  Bosporanic  princes — war  between  Satyrus  and 

F.umelus — death  of  Satyrus  II 799 

Civil  war  between  Prytanis  and  Eumelus— victory  of  Eumelus — he  kills  the 

wives,  children,  and  friends  of  his  brother POO 

His  reign  and  conquests — his  speedy  death 800 

Decline  of  the  Bosporanic  dynasty,  until  it  passed  into  the  hands  of  Mithri- 

dates  Eupator 801 

Monuments  left  by  the  Spartokid  princes  of  Bosporus— sepulchral  tumuli 

near  Kertch  (Pantikapaeum ) 801 

Appendix  on  Issus  and  its  neighborhood  as  connected  with  the  Battle 803 


14 


PART  IL 

CONTINUATION  OF  IIISTOIIICAL  GBEECE. 


CIIxVPTER  LXXIX. 

FIIOM  THE    FOUNDATION   OF    Mi:SSETsE    AND    MEGALOPOLIS     TO  THE 

DEATH  OF   PELOPIDAS. 

Prodigious  was  the  change  operated  throughout  the  Grecian 
world  durino-  the  eiditeeu  months  between  June  371  B.C.  (when  the 
general  pea?e,  including  all  except  Thebes  was  sworn  at  hpart^, 
twenty  days  before  the  battle  of  Leuktra),  and  the  spring  of  369  B.C., 
when  the  Thebans,  after  a  victorious  expedition  into  Peloponnesus, 
were  reconducted  home  by  Epaminondas.  - 

How  that  change  worked  in  Peloponnesus,  amounting  to  a  partial 
re-constitution  of  the  peninsula,  has  been  sketched  in  the  preceding 
chapter  Among  most  of  the  cities  and  districts  hitherto  dependent 
allies  of  Sparta,  the  local  oligarchies,  whereby  Spartan  influence  had 
been  maintained,  were  overthrown,  not  without  harsh  and  violent 
reaction.  Laconia  had  been  invaded  and  laid  waste,  while  the  bpar- 
tans  were  obliged  to  content  themselves  with  guarding  their  central 
hearth  and  their  families  from  assault.  The  western  and  best  half 
of  Laconia  had  been  wrested  from  them;  Messenc  had  been  consti- 
tuted as  a  free  city  on  their  frontier;  a  large  proportion  of  their 
Periceki  and  Helots  had  been  converted  into  independent  Gix^eks 
bitterly  hostile  to  them;  moreover  the  Arcadian  population  had  been 
emancipated  from  their  dependence,  and  organized  into  self-acting, 
icalous  nei-hbors  in  the  new  city  of  MegalopoMs,  as  well  as  m  Tegea 
and  Mantineia.  The  once  philo-Laconian  Tegea  was  now  among 
the  chief  enemies  of  Sparta;  and  the  Skirita^,  so  long  numbered  as 
the  bravest  of  the  auxiliary  troops  of  the  latter,  were  now  identified , 
in  sentiment  with  Arcadians  and  Thebans  against  her.  ^ 

Out  of  Peloponnesus,  the  change  wrought  had  also  been  consider- 
able; partly,  in  the  circumstances  of  Thessaly  and  Macedonia,  partly 
in  the  position  and  policy  of  Athens.  ^  n  t    ^ 

At  the  moment  if  the  battle  of  Leuktra-  (July  371  B.c  )  Jason 
was  tagus  of  Thessaly,  and  Amyntas  king  of  Macedonia.  ^  Amyntas 
was  dependent  on,  if  not  tributary  to,  Jason,  whose  dominion,  mili- 

45 


46 


^ou^'DATIox  of  messex 


tary  force,  and  revenue,  combined  •with  extraordinary  personal 
energy  and  ability,  rendered  Inm  decidedly  the  fin^t  potentate  in 
Greece,  "whose  aspirations  were  known  to  be  unbounded;  so  that  lie 
inspired  more  or  less  alarm  everywhere,  especially  to  weaker  neigh- 
bors like  the  jNIacedonian  prince.  Throughout  a  reign  of  twenty- 
three  years,  full  of  trouble  and  peril,  Amyntas  had  cultivated  the 
friendship  both  of  Sparta  and  Athens,  especially  the  former.  It  was 
by  Spartan  aid  only  that  he  had  been  enabled  to  prevail  over  the 
(ilynthian  confederacy,  which  would  otherwise  have  proved  an  over- 
match for  him.  At  the  time  when  Sparta  aided  him  to  crush  that 
promising  and  liberal  confederacy,  she  was  at  the  maximum  of  her 
power  (382-379  B.C.),  holding  even  Thebes  under  garrison  among  her 
subject  allies.  But  the  revolution  of  Thebes,  and  the  war  against 
Thebes  and  Athens  (from  378  B.C.,  downward)  had  sensibly  dimin- 
ished her  power  on  land;  while  the  newly  organized  naval  force  and 
maritime  confederacy  of  the  Athcuiaus  had  overthrown  her  empn-e 
at  sea.  Moreover,  the  great  power  of  Jason  in  Thessaly  had-  so 
grown  up  (combined  witli  the  resistance  of  the  Thebans)  as  to  cut  oif 
the  communication  of  Sparta  with  jNIacedonia,  and  even  to  forbid 
her  (374  B.C.)  from  assisting  her  faithful  ally,  the  Pharsalian  Poly- 
damas,  agamst  him.  To  Amyntas,  accordingly,  the  friendship  of 
Athens,  now  again  the  greatest  maritime  potentate  in  Greece,  had 
])ecome  more  important  than  that  of  Sparta.  We  know  that  he 
tried  to  conciliate  the  powerful  Athenian  generals,  Iphikrates  and 
Timotheus.  He  adopted  the  former  as  his  son;  at  what  exact  iM?riod, 
cannot  be  discovered;  but  I  have  already  stated  that  Ii)hikrates  had 
married  the  daughter  of  Kotys  king  of  Thrace,  and  had  acquired  a 
maritime  settlenicnt  called  Drys  on  the  Thracian  coast.  In  the  years 
873-372  BC,  we  tind  Timotheus  also  in  great  favor  with  Amyntas, 
testified  by  a  valuable  present  sent  to  him  at  Athens;  a  cargo  of 
timber,  the  best  produce  of  Macedotiia.  Amyntas  was  at  this  period 
on  the  best  footing  with  Athens,  sent  his  deputies  as  a  confederat(; 
to  the  regular  synod  there  assembled,  and  was  treated  with  consider- 
able favor. 

The  battle  of  Leuktra  (July  371  b.c.)  tended  to  knit  more  closely 
the  connection  between  Amyntas  and  the  Athenians,  who  were  now 
the  auxiliaries  most  likely  to  sustain  him  against  the  ascendency  of 
Jason.  It  produced  at  the  same  time  the  more  important  effect  of 
stimulating  the  ambition  of  Athens  in  everv  direction.  Not  onlv  her 
ancient  rival,  Sparta,  beaten  in  the  field  and  driven  from  one  humili- 
ation to  another,  was  disabled  from  opposing  her,  and  even  compelled 
to  solicit  her  aid — but  new  rivals,  the  Thebans,  were  suddenly  lifted 
into  an  ascendency  inspiring  her  with  r.iingled  jealousy  and  appre- 
hension. Hence  fresh  hopes  as  well  as  fresh  jealousies  conspired  to 
push  Athens  in  a  career  of  aspiration  such  as  had  never  appeared 
open  to  her  '^ince  the  disaster  of  404  B.C.  Such  enlargement  of  her 
views  w;i3  manifested  conspicuously  by  the  step  taken  two  or  three 


ASPIRATIONS    TO   MARITIME  EMPIRE.  47 

months  after  the  battle  of  Leuktra  (mentioned  in  my  preceding  chap- 
t,.,M-of  causing  the  peace,  which  had  already  been  sworn  at  Sparta 
I'm  he  ureceding  mouth  of  June,  to  be  resworn  under  the  presidency 
and  <niaranty  of  Athens,  by  cities  binding  themselves  mutually  to 
each  other  as  defensive  allies  of  Athens;  thus  silently  disenthronmg 

Sp  irta  and  taking  her  place.  n  t      n 

On  laud   however,  Athens  had  never  held,  and  could  hardly  ex- 
nect  to  hold   anything  above  tne  second  rank,  servmg  as  a  bulwark 
•vnlnst  Theban'agi^nmdizement.     At  sea  she  already  occupied  the 
fir'^t  place   at  the  head  of  an  extensive  confederacy;  and  it  was  to 
further  maritime  aggrandizement  that  her  present  chances,  as  well 
her  Pist  traditions.^pointed.     Such  is  the  new  path  upon  which  we 
no\v  find  her  entering.     At  the  first  formation  of  her  ne^y  confeder- 
acy in  378  B.C.,  she  had  distinctly  renounced  all  idea  of  resiinung 
the  lar<>-e  amount  of  possessions,  public  and  private, -which  had  been 
snitched  from  her  along  with  her  empire  at  the  close  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesianwar;  and  had  formally  proclaimed  that  no  Athenian  citizen 
should   for  the  future  possess  or  cultivate  land  out  of  Attica— a 
o-uiranty  a"-ainst  renovation  of  the  previous  kleruchies  or  out-po.s- 
s's-^ions      This  prudent    self-restraint,   which   had  contributed  so 
iii'ieh  durino-  the  last  seven  years  to  raise  her  again  into  naval  pre- 
e-ninence   is  now  gradually  throwu  aside,  under  the  tempting  cir- 
cumstances of  the  moment.*'    Henceforward,  the  Athenian  maritime 
force  becomes  employed  for  the  recovery  of  lost  possessions  as  well 
•IS  for  protection  or  enlargement  of  the  confederacy.     Tlie  prohibi- 
tion a"-ainst  kleruchies  out  of  Attica  will  soon  appear  to  be  forgotten. 
OlTeuse  is  o-iven  to  the  prominent  members  of  the  maritime  confeder- 
acy so  that  the  force  of  Athens,  misemployed  and  broken  into  frag- 
ment is  found  twelve  or  thirteen  years  afterward  unal)le  to  repel  a 
new  'aiiirressor,   who  starts  up,  alike  able  and  unexpected,   in  the 
Macedonian  prince,  Philip  son  of  Amyntas. 

Very  different  was  the  position  of  Amyntas  himself  toward  Athens, 
in  371  B.C.     He  was  an  unpretending  ally,  looking  for  her  help  in 
ease  of  need  against  Ja.son,  and  sending  his  envoy  to  the  meeting  at 
Athens  about  September  or  October  371  B.C.,  when  the  general  peace 
was  re-sworn  under  Athenian  auspices.     It  was  at  this  meeting  that 
Athens  seems  to  have  first  put  forth  her  new  maritime  pretensions. 
While  guaranteeing  to  every  Grecian  city,  great  and  small,  the  en- 
jovment  of  autonomy,  she  made  exception  of  some  cities  which  she 
claimed  as  belon<ring  to  herself.  Among  these  was  certainly  Amphip- 
olis;   probably  also   the   towns    in  the   Thrac.-ian  Cheisonesus,  and 
Potichea;  all  which  we  find  a  few  years   afterward  occupied   by 
Athenians.      How   much   of  their  lost  possessions  the   Athenians 
thought  itprudent  now  to  reclaim,  we  cannot  distinctly  make  out. 
But  we  know  that  their  aspirations  grasped  much  more  than  Amphip-- 
olis-  and  the  moment  was  probably  thought  propitious  for  making 
other  dymands  besides.     Amyntas  through  his  «nvoy,  together  with 


48 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


the  rest  of  the  assembled  envoys,  recognized  without  opposition  tho 
right  of  the  Athenians  to  Aniphipolis. 

Such  recognition  was  not  indeed  in  itself  cither  any  loss  to  Amvntas, 
or  any  gain  to  Athens;  for  Amphipolis,  tliouuh  bordering  on  his  king- 
dom, had  never  belonged  to  him,  nor  had^he  any  power  of  trans- 
ferring it.  Originally  an  Athenian  colony,  next  taken  from  Athens 
in  424-423  B.C.  by  Brasidas,  througli  the  improvidence  of  the  Alhe- 
nian  olticers  Eukles  and  Thucydides,  then  re  colonized  under  Lacccke- 
monian  auspices — it  liad  ever  since  remahied  an  independent  city 
though  Sparta  had  covenanted  to  restore  it  by  the  peace  of  Nikias 
(421  E.c),  but  had  never  performed  her  covenant.  Its  unparallchd 
situation,  near  to  both  the  bridge  and  mouth  of  the  Strymon,  in  the 
midst  of  a  fertile  territory,  within  reach  of  the  miningdistrict'of  Pan- 
gseus— rendered  it  a  tempting  prize:  and  the  right  of  Athens  to  it  was 
indisputable;  so  far  as  original  colonization  before  the  capture  by 
Brasidas,  and  formal  treaty  of  cession  by  Sparta  after  the  capture 
could  confer  a  right.  But  this  treaty,  not  fultilled  at  the  time,  was 
now  fifty  years  old.  Tlie  repugnance  of  the  Amphipolitan  popula- 
tion, which  had  originally  prevented  its  fulfillment,  was  strengthened 
by  all  the  sanction  of  a  long  prescription;  while  the  tomb  and  chapel 
of  Brasidas  their  second  founder,  consecrated  in  the  agora,  served  as 
an  imperishable  admonition  to  repel  all  pretensions  on  the  part  of 
Athens.  Such  pretensions,  whatever  might  be  the  richt,  were 
deplorably  impolitic  unless  Athens  was  prc^pared  to  back'^thim  by 
strenuous  efforts  of  men  and  money;  from  which  we  shall  find  her 
shrinking  now,  as  she  had  done  (under  the  unwise  advice  of  Nikias)  in 
431  B.C.,  and  the  years  immediately  succeedin<r.  In  fact,  the  large 
renovated  pretensions  of  Athens  both  to  Amphipolis  and  to  other 
places  on  the  Macedonian  and  Chalkidic  coast,  combined  with  her 
languor  and  inertness  in  military  action— will  be  found  henceforward 
among  the  greatest  mischiefs  to  the  general  cau.^e  of  Hellenic  inde- 
pendence, and  among  the  most  effective  helps  to  the  well-conducted 
aggressions  of  Philip  of  IVIacedon. 

Though  the  claim  of  Athens  to  the  recovery  of  a  portion  of  her  lost 
transmarine  possessions  was  thus  advanced 'and  recognized  in  the 
congress  of  autumn  371  B.C.,  she  does  not  seem  to  have  been  able  to 
take  any  immediate  steps  for  prosecuting  it.  Six  m.onths  afterward, 
the  state  of  northern  Greece  was  again  completely  altered  by  the 
death,  n-^arly  at  the  same  time,  of  Jason  in  Thessalv,  and  Amvntas  in 
Macedonia.  The  former  was  cut  off  (as  has  been"^mentioned  in  the 
preceding  chapter)  by  assassination,  while  in  the  plentitude  of  his 
vigor;  and  his  great  power  could  not  be  held  toirether  by  an  inferior 
hand.  His  two  brothers,  Polyphron  and  Polydorus,  succeeded  him 
in  the  post  of  tairus  of  Thessaly.  Polyphron,  havino;  put  to  death  his 
brother,  enjoyed  the  dignity  for  a  short  time;  after  which  he  too  was 
slain  by  a  third  brother,  Alexander  of  Pherjc;  but  not  before  he  had 
committed  gross  enormities,  by  killing  and  banishing  many  of  tie 


ALEXANDER 


49 


most  eminent  citizens  of  Larissa  and  Pharsalus;  among  them  the 
estimable  Polvdamas.  The  Larissa^an  exiles,  many  belongmg  to  the 
o-re-it  family  of  the  Alcuadie,  took  refuge  in  Macedonia,  where 
\mvntas  (having  died  in  370  B.C.)  had  been  succeeded  m  the  throne 
i>V  liis  youthful  son  Alexander.  The  latter,  being  persuaded  to  invade 
Thesssily  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  them,  succeeded  in  getting 
pos«e'^'5ion  of  Larissa  and  Kranon;  both  which  cities  he  kept  under 
own  garrisons,  in  spite  of  unavailing  resistance  from  Polyphron  and 
Alexander  of  Pherae.  . 

This  Alexander,  who  succeeded  to  Jason  s  despotism  in  Phera?, 
and  to  a  considerable  portion  of  his  military  power,  was  nevertheless 
unable  to  keep  together  the  whole  of  it,  or  to  retain  Thessaly  and  Us 
circumiacent  tributaries  in  one  united  dominion.  The  Thessalian 
cities  hostile  to  him  invited  assistance,  not  merely  from  Alexander  of 
Macedon  but  also  from  the  Thebans;  who  dispatched  Pelopidas 
iuto  the  countrv,  seemimrly  in  369  B.C.,  soon  after  the  return  ot  tlie 
annv  under  Epaminondas  from  its  victorious  progress  in  Laconia 
aiid^Arcadia.  Pelopidas  entered  Thessaly  at  the  head  of  auvarmy, 
and  took  Larissa  with  various  other  cities  into  Theban  protection; 
apparently  under  the  acquiescence  of  Alexander  of  Macedon,  Aviih 
whom  he  contracted  an  alliance.  A  large  portion  of  Thessaly  thus 
came  under  the  protection  of  Thebes,  in  hostility  to  the  dynasty  of 
Pherje  and  to  the  brutal  tyrant  Alexander  who  now  ruled  in  that 

city 

Alexander  of  Mace.lon  found  that  he  had  difticulty  enough  in 
maintaining  his  own  dominion  at  home,  without  holding  Thessalian 
towns  in  garrison.  He  was  harassed  by  intestine  dissensions,  and 
after  a  reign  of  scarcely  two  years,  was  assassinated  (368  B.C.)  by 
some  conspirators  of  Alorus  and  Pydna,  two  cities  (half  Macedonian, 
half  Hellenic)  near  the  western  coast  of  the  Thermaic  gulf.  Ptole- 
mieus  (or  Ptolemv)  of  Alorus  is  mentioned  as  leader  of  the  enterprise, 
and  Apollophanee  of  Pydna  as  one  of  the  agents.  But  besides  these 
conspirators,  there  was  also  another  enemy,  Pausanias— a  man  of  the 
royal  lineage  and  a  pretender  to  the  throne;  who,  having  been 
hitherto  in  banishment,  was  now  returning  at  the  head  of  a  consider- 
able body  of  Greeks,  supported  by  numerous  partisans  in  Macedonia 
—and  was  already  master  of  Anthemus,  Therme,  Strepsa,  and 
other  places  in  or  near  the  Thermaic  gulf.  He  was  making 
war  both  against  Ptolemy  and  against  the  remaining  family  of 
Amyntas.  Eurvdike,  the  widow  of  that  prince,  was  now  left  with 
her  two  younger  children,  Perdikkas,  a  young  man,  and  Philip,  yet 
a  youth.  She  was  in  the  same  interest  with  Ptolemy,  the  successful 
conspirator  asrainst  her  son  Alextuider,  and  there  was  even  a  tale 
which  represented  her  as  his  accomplice  in  the  deed.  Ptolemy  was 
regent,  administering  her  affairs,  and  those  of  her  minor  childreu 

against  Pausanias.  i     t^        im  j 

Deserted  by  many  of  their  most  powerful  friends,  Eurydike  and 


50 


rcUNDATlOX    OF   3IESSENE. 


IPHIKRATES   AND  TDIOTITFA-S. 


51 


i. 


Ptolemy  would  liavo  been  forced  to  yield  the  country  to  Pausanias, 
had  they  not  found  by  accident  a  foreign  auxiliary  near  at  hand. 
The  Athenian  admiral  Iphikrates,  with  a  squadron  of  modeiale  force, 
was  then  on  the  coast  cif  Macedonia.  He  had  been  sent  thiiher  by 
his  countrymen  (369  B.C.)  (soon  after  his  partial  conflict  near  Coriilh 
with  the  retreating  army  of  Epaminondas,  on  its  way  from  Pel()j)on- 
iiesus  to  Ba^otia),  for  the  purpose  of  generally  surveying  the  mari- 
time region  of  Macedonia  and  Tlirace.  opening  negotiations  with 
parties  m  the  country,  and  laying  his  plans  for  future  military  oper- 
ations. At  the  period  when  Alexander  was  slain,  and  when  Pausa- 
jiias  was  carrying  on  his  invasion,  Iphikrates  happened  to  be  on  the 
Macedonian  coast.  He  was  there  visited  by  Eurydike  with  her  two 
sous  Perdikkas  and  Philip;  the  latter  scemmgly  about  thirteen  or 
fourteen  years  of  age,  the  former  somewhat  older.  She  urgently 
implored  liim  to  assist  the  family  in  tlieir  present  emergency,  remind- 
ing him  that  Amyntas  had  not  only  throughout  his  lite  been  a  faitli- 
ful  ally  of  Athens,  but  had  also  adoi)ted  him  (Iphikrates)  as  his  son, 
and  luid  thus  constituted  him  brother  to  the  two  young  princes. 
Placing  Perdikkas  in  his  hands,  and  causing  Philip  to  emlnace  his 
knees,  she  appealed  to  his  generous  sympathies,  and  invoked  his  aid 
as  the  only  cliance  of  restoration,  or  even  of  personal  safety,  to  the 
fanuly.  Iphikrates,  moved  by  this  affecting  supplication,  declared 
in  her  favor,  acted  so  vigorously  against  Pausanias  as  to  expel  liim 
from  3Iacedonia,  and  secured  the  scepter  to  the  family  of  A^myntas; 
under  Ptolemy  of  Alorus  as  regent  for  the  time. 

This  striking  incident  is  described  by  the  orator  ^schines  in  an 
oration  delivered  many  years  afterwaid  at  Athens.  The  boy,  who 
then  clasped  the  knees'of  Iphikrates,  living  afterward  to  overthrow 
the  independence,  not  of  Athens  alone,  but  of  Greece  generally.  The 
Athenian  general  had  not  been  sent  to  meddle  in  the  disputes  of  suc- 
cession to  the  Macedonian  crown.  Nevertheless,  looking  at  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  time,  his  interference  may  really  have  pron.ised 
beneficial  consequences  to  Athens;  so  that  we  liave  no  right  to  blame 
liim  for  the  unforseen  ruin  which  it  was  afterward  found  to  occa- 
sion. 

Though  the  interference  of  Iphikrates  maintained  the  family  of 
Amvutixs,  and  established  Ptolemy  of  Alorus  as  regent,  it  did  not 
procure  to  Athens  the  possession  of  Amphipolis;  which  was  not  in 
the  power  of  the  Macedonian  kings  to  bestow.  Amphipolis  was  at 
that  time  a  free  Greek  city,  inhabited  by  a  population  in  the  main 
seemimrlv  Chaikidic,  and  in  confederacv  with  Olvnlhus,  Iphikrates 
prosecuted  his  naval  operations  on  the  coast  of  Thrace  and  Macedonia 
for  a  period  of  three  years  (808-65  B.C.).  We  make  out  very  imper- 
fectly what  he  achieved.  He  took  into  his  service  a  general  named 
Charidemus,  a  native  of  Oreus  in  Euboea;  one  of  those  Condittieri 
(to  use  an  Italian  word  familiar  in  the  fourteenth  century),  who,  liav- 
ing  a  band  of  mercenaries  under  \xU  command,  hired  himself  to  the 


best  bidder  and  to  the  most  promising  cause.  These  mercenaries 
served  under  Iphikrates  for  three  years,  until  he  was  disrnissed  by 
the  Vtheuians  from  his  command  and  superseded  by  limotheus. 
What  successes  they  enabled  him  to  obtain  for  Athens,  is  not  clear; 
t)ut  it  is  certain  that  he  did  not  succeed  in  talking  Amphipolis.  He 
sc'Mus  to  Imve  directed  one  or  two  attempts  against  the  town  by  other 
,,tilcers  which  proved  abortive;  but  he  got  possession  of  some  Am- 
phipolitau  prisoners  or  hostages,  which  opened  a  prospect  of  accom- 
plishing the  surrender  of  the  town.  .,     r  •   ^ 

It  ^eems  evident,  howevcn-,  in  spite  of  our  great  dearth  of  mforma- 
tion  that  Iphikrates  during  his  command  between  369-6o  b.c  did  not 
vuisfv  the  expectations  of  his  countrymen.  At  that  time  those  ex- 
neetations  were  large,  as  testified  by  sending  out  not  only  Iphikrates 
o  Macedonia  and  Thrace,  but  also  Timotheus  (who  had  returned 
from  his  service  with  the  Persians  in  372-71  B.C.)  to  Ionia  and  the 


tion  now  tended,  according  to  that  new  turn,  toward  more  special 
and  separate  acquisitions  for  Athens,  which  it  had  taken  since  the 
battle  of  Leuktra.  But  before  we  advert  to  the  achievements  of 
Timotheus  (366-65  B.C.)  in  these  regions,  we  must  notice  the  main 
course  of  political  conflict  in  Greece  Proper,  down  to  the  partial  paci- 
fication of  366  B.C.  ^    ,  .,  ,.     .,  .    ,         e  or-A  Pft 

Thou"-li  the  Athenians  had  sent  Iphikrates  (in  the  winter  of  3<0-b9 
H  c  )  to  rescue  Sparta  from  the  grasp  of  Epaminondas.  the  terms  ot;i 
permanent  alliance  had  not  yet  been  settled  between  them.  Envoys 
from  Sparta  and  her  allies  visited  Athens  shortly  afterward  for  that 
nuroose  All  pretensions  to  exclusive  headship  on  the  part  ot  bparta 
were  now  at  an  end.  Amid  abundant  discussion  in  the  public  assem- 
bly all  the  speakers.  Lacedtemonian  and  others  as  well  as  Athenian, 
unanimously  pronounced  that  the  headship  must  be  vested  jointly 
and  equally* in  Sparta  and  Athens;  and  the  only  point  in  debate  was, 
how  such  an  arrangement  could  be  most  suitably  carried  out.  It  was 
at  first  proposed  that  the  former  should  command  on  land,  the  latter 
at  sea;  a  distribution,  which,  on  first  hearing,  foiind  favor  both  as 
equitable  and  convenient  until  an  Athenian  named  Kephisodolus  re- 
minded his  countrymen,  that  the  Laced;i?monians  had  few  ships  of 
war.  and  those  manned  chiefly  by  Helots;  while  the  land-force  of 
Athens  consisted  of  her  horsemen  and  hoplites,  the  cjioice  citizens  of 
the  state  Vccordinjrly,  on  the  distribution  now  pointed  out,  Athe- 
nians in  great  numbers  and  of  the  best  quality,  would  be  placed 
under  Spartan  command;  while  few  Lacediemonians,  and  those  ot 
little  di<mity,  would  iro  under  Athenian  command;  which  would  be, 
not  equTait3%  but  the^everse.  Kephisodotus  pmposed  that  both  on 
land  and  at  sea,  the  command  should  alternate  between  Athens  and 
Sparta,  in  periods  of  five  days;  and  his  amendment  was  adopted,      ^ 


53 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


SIKYON  JOINS  THE  TIIEBANS. 


53 


Thoudi  siicli  amendment  had  the  merit  of  perfect  equality  between 
the  two^competitors  for  lieadship,  it  was  by  no  means  well  calculated 
for  success  in  joint  operations  against  a  general  like  Epaminondas. 
The  allies  determined  to  occupy" Corinth  as  a  main  station  and  to 
guard  the  line  of  Mount  Oncium  between  that  city  and  Kenchrra', 
so  as  to  prevent  the  Thebaus  from  a.^ain  penetrating  into  Peloponne- 
sus. It  is  one  mark  of  the  depression  in  the  fortunes  of  Sparta, 
that  this  very  station,  now  selected  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  a 
Theban  invader  from  her  frontier,  had  been  held,  during  the  war 
from  394-387  B.C..  by  the  Athenians  and  Thebans  against  herself,  to 
prevent  her  from  breaking  out  of  Peloponnesus  into  Attica  and 
Brcotia.  Never  since  the  invasion  of  Xerxes  liad  there  been  any 
necessity  for  defending  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth  against  an  extra- 
Peloponnesian  assailant.  But  now,  even  to  send  a  force  frc  m  Sparta 
to  Corinth,  recourse  nuist  have  been  liad  to  transport  by  sea.  either 
across  the  Argolic  Gulf  from  Prasiii3  to  Ilalieis,  or  round  Cape  Skyl- 
Iceumto  the  Saronic  Gulf  and  Kenchrete;  for  no  Spartan  troops  could 
march  by  land  across  Arcadia  or  Argos.  This  difliculty  however 
was  surmounted,  and  a  large  allied  force  (not  less  than  20.000  men 
according  to  Diodorus)— consisting  of  Athenians  with  auxiliary  mei'- 
cenaries  under  ChaV)rias,  Lacedfcinonians,  Pelh  nians,  Epidaurians, 
iSIeirarians,  Corinthians,  and  all  the  other  allies  still  adliering  to 
Sparta— was  established  in  defensive  position  along  the  line  of 
Oneium. 

It  was  essential  for  Thebes  to  re-open  communication  with  her 
Peloponnesian  allies.  Accordingly  Epamiiioi;das,  at  the  head  of  the 
Thebans  and  their  northern  allies,  arrived  during  the  same  summer 
in  front  of  tiiis  position,  on  his  march  into  Peloponnesus.  His  num- 
bers were  inferior  to  those  of  his  assembled  enemies,  whose  position 
prevented  him  from  joining  his  Arcadian,  Argeian,  and  Eleian  allies, 
already  assembled  in  Peloponnesus.  After  having  vainly  challenged 
the  enemy  to  come  down  and  fight  in  the  plain,  Epaminondas  laid 
his  plan  for  attacking  the  position.  Moving  from  his  camp  a  little 
before  daybreak,  so"  as  to  reach  the  enemy,  just  when  the  night- 
guards  were  retiring,  but  before  the  general  body  had  vet  risen  and 
got  under  arms— he  directed  an  assault  along  the  whole  line.  But 
his  principal  effort,  at  the  head  of  the  chosen  Theban  troops,  was 
made  against  the  Lacedemonians  and  Pellenians,  who  were  posted 
in  the  most  assailable  part  of  the  line.  So  skillfully  was  his  move- 
ment conducted,  that  he  completely  succeeded  in  surprising  them. 
The  Lacedaemonian  polemarch,  taken  unprepared,  was  driven  from 
Ills  position,  and  forced  to  retire  to  another  point  of  the  hilly  ground. 
He  presently  sent  to  solicit  a  truce  for  burying  his  dead;  agreeing  to 
abandon  the  line  of  Oneium,  which  had  now  become  indefensible. 
The  other  parts  of  the  Theban  army  made  no  impression  by  their 
attack,  nor  were  they  probably  intended  to  do  more  than  occupy 
attention,  while  Epaminondas  'himself  vigorously  assailed  the  weak 


noint  of  the  position.  Yet  Xenophon  censures  the  Lacechemonian 
polemarch  as  faint-hearted, for  having  evacuated  the  whole  Ime  as  soon 
riiis  own  position  was  forced:  allegmg,  that  he  might  easily  have 
found  another  good  position  on  one  of  the  neighboring  eminences 
\m\  mi<4it  have  summoned  re  enforcements  from  his  alhes-and  that 
the  Th?bans,  in  spite  of  their  partial  success,  were  so  embarrassed 
how  to  descend  on  the  Peloponnesian  side  of  Oneium,  that  they  were 
•ilf  disposed  to  retreat.  The  criticism  of  Xenophon  indicates  doubt- 
less an  unfavorable  judgment  pronounced  by  many  persons  in  the 
irniv  the  justice  of  which  we  are  not  in  a  condition  to  appreciate. 
But  whether  the  LacedcBinonian  commander  was  to  blame  or  not, 
Enaminondas.  bv  his  skillful  and  victorious  attack  upon  this  strong 
position,  enhanced  his  already  high  military  renown.  ^ 

Hiviu"-  ioined  his  Peloponnesian  allies,  Arcadians,  Eleians,  and 
Ar<reians^  he  was  more  than  a  match  for  the   Spartan  and  At_henian 
force  which  appears  now  to  have  conliued  itself  to  Corinth,  Lecluc- 
um   and  Kenchreie.     He  ravaged  the  territories  of  Epidaurus,  Tree 
zen'  and  Phlius;  and  obtained  possession  of  Sikyon  as  well  as  ot 
Pelicne      At  Sikyon,  a  vote  of  the  people  being  taken,  it  was  resolved 
to  desert  Sparta,  to  form  alliance  with  Thebes,  and  to  admit  a  Tlie- 
l>an  harniost  and  garrison  into  the  acropolis;  Euphron-a  citizen 
hitherto  preponderant  in  tlie  city  by  means  of  Sparta   and  devo  ed 
to  her  interest— now  altered  his  politics  and  went  along  with  the 
strono-er  tide.     We  cannot  doubt  also  that  Epaminondas  went  into 
Arcadia  to  encouraire  and  regulate  the  progress  of  his  two  great  en- 
terprises—the  foundation  of  Messene  and  Megalopolis;  nor  does  the 
silence  of  Xenophon  on   such  a   matter   amount  to  any  disproof. 
These  new  towns  having  been  commenced  less  than  a  year  be  tore, 
cannot  have  been  vet  finished,  and  may  probably  have  required  the 
re-appearance  of  his  victorious  army.     The  little  town  of  1  hlius— 
situated  south  of  Sikyon  and  west  of  Corinth-which  was  one  of  the 
most  faithful  allies  of  Sparta,  was  also  in  great  hazard  of  being  cap- 
tured by  the  Phfiasian  exiles.     When  the  Arcadians  and  Lleians  were 
marching  through  Neinea  to  join  Epaminondas  at  Oneium,  these 
exiles  entreated  them  only  to  show  themselves  near  Phlius;  with  the 
assurance  that  such  demonstration  would  suffice  to  bring  about  the 
capture  of  the  town.     The  exiles  then  stole  by  night  to  the  foot  ot 
the  town  walls  with  scaling-ladders,  and  there  lay  hid    until,  as  tlay 
began  to  break,  the  scouts  from   the  neighboring  hi  11  rikarumuu 
announced  that  the  allied  enemies  were  in  sight.     While  the  atten- 
tion of  the  citizens  within  was  thus  engaged  on  the  other  side,  the 
concealed  exiles  planted  their  ladders,  overpowered  the  few  unpre- 
pared guards,  and  srot  possession  of  the  acropolis.     Instead  ot  con- 
tenting themselves  with  this  position  until  the  allied  force  came  up 
they  strove  also  to  capture  the  town;  but  in  this  they  were  defeated 
by  the  citizens,  who,  by  desperate  efforts  of  bravery,  repulsed  both 
tlie  intruders  within  and  the  enemy  without;  thus  preserving  their 


54 


FOUXDATIOX  OF  MESSEXE. 


GREAT   INFLUEXCK  OF   LYlvOMEDES. 


f)J 


town.  The  fidelity  of  the  Phlisians  to  Sparta  entailed  upon  them 
severe  hardships  through  the  superiority  of  their  enemies  in  the  field, 
and  through  perpetual  ravage  of  their  territory  from  multiplied  hos- 
tile neighbors  (Argos,  Arcadia,  and  Sikyon)"  who  had  established 
fortified  posts  on  their  borders;  for  it  was  only  on  the  sideof  Corintii 
that  the  Phliasians  had  a  friendly  neighbor  to  afford  them  the  means 
of  purchasing  provisions. 

Amid  general  success,  the  Thebans  experienced  partial  reverses. 
Their  march  carrying  them  near  to  Corintli,  a  party  of  them  had  the 
boldness  to  rush  at  the  gates,  and  to  attempt  a  surprise  of  the  town. 
But  the  Athenian  Chabrias,  then  commanding  within  it,  disposed  his 
troops  so  skillfully,  and  made  so  good  a  resistance,  that  he  defeated 
them  with  loss  and  reduced  them  to  the  necessity  of  asking  for  the 
ordinary  truce  to  bury  their  dead,  which  were  lying  very  near  to  the 
wnlls.  This  advantage  over  the  victorious  Thebjins  somewhat  raised 
the  spirits  of  the  Spartan  allies;  who  were  still  further  encouraged 
by  the  arrival  in  Leclueum  of  a  squadron  from  Syracuse,  bringing  a 
body  of  2,000  mercenary  Gauls  and  Iberians,  with  fifty  horsemen,  as 
a  succor  from  the  despot  Dionysius.  Such  foreigners  had  never  be- 
fore been  seen  in  Peloponnesus.  Their  bravery,  and  singular  nini- 
bleness  of  movement,  gave  them  the  advantage  in  seveial  partial 
skirmishes,  and  diseoncerted  the  Thebans.  But  the  Spartans  and 
Athenians  were  not  bold  enough  to  hazard  a  general  battle,  and  the 
SyraCusan  detachment  returned  home  after  no  very  long  stay;  while 
the  Thebans  also  went  back  to  Bn^otia. 

One  proceeding  of  E];{iminordas  during  this  expedition  merits 
especial  notice.  It  was  ihe  general  practice  of  the  Thebans  to  put  to 
death  all  the  Boeotian  exiles  who  fell  into  tlieir  hands  as  prisoners, 
while  they  released  under  ransom  all  other  Gre(k  prisoners.  At  the 
capture  of  a  vilhige  named  Plieebias  in  the  Sikyonian  territory,  Epam- 
inondas  took  captiVe  a  considerable  body  of  Ba?otian  exiles.  With 
the  least  possible  delay,  he  let  them  depart  under  ransom,  professing 
to  regard  them  as  belonging  to  other  cities.  We  find  liim  always 
trying  to  mitigate  the  rigorous  dealing  then  customary  toward  politi- 
cal opponents. 

Throughout  this  campaign  of  869 B.C.,  all  the  Peloponnesian  allies 
had  acted  against  Sparta  cheerfully  under  Epaminondas  and  the 
Thebans.  But  in  the  ensuing  year  the  spirit  of  the  Arcadians  had 
been  so  raised,  by  the  formation  of  the  new  Pan-Arcadian  commu- 
nion, by  the  progress  of  Messene  and  3Iegalopolis,  and  the  conspicu- 
ous depression  of  Sparta — that  they  fancied  themselves  not  only  cap- 
able of  maintaining  their  independence  by  themselves,  but  also 
entitled  to  divide  headship  with  Thebes,  as  Athens  divided  it  with 
Sparta.  Lykomedes  the  Mantineian,  wealthy,  energetic,  and  able, 
stood  forward  as  the  exponent  of  tliis  new  aspiration,  and  as  the 
champion  of  Arcadian  dignity.  He  reminded  the  Ten  Thousand 
(the  Pan- Arcadian  synod) — that  while  aU  other  residents  in  Pelopon- 


nesus were  originally  inmiigrants,  they  alone  were  indigenous  occu- 
^•mtsof  the  peninsula;  that  they  were  the  most  numerous  section, 
!  well  as  the  bravest  and  hardiest  men,  who  bore  the  Hellenic  namo 
'^of  which  proof  was  afforded  bv  the  fact,  that  Arcadian  mcrcenarv 
v;olliers  were  preferred  to  all  others;  that  the  Lacedienionians  hud 
never  ventured  to  invade  Attica,  nor  the  Thebans  to  invade  Laconui. 
'vlthout  Arcadiau  auxiliaries.  "Let  us  follow  no  mans  lead  (he 
concluded),  but  stand  up  for  ourselves.  In  former  days,  we  built 
un  the  power  of  Sparta  by  servini;  in  her  armies;  and  now,  if 
we  submit  <juietlv  to  follow  the  Tliebans,  without  demanding  alter- 
nate headship  for  ourselves,  we  shall  presently  find  them  to  be  hpar- 

tans  under  another  name. "  ,      .         ,       ,  ^.^    i 

Such  exhortations  were  heard  with  enthusiasm  by  the  assembled 
'Vrcadians  to  whom  political  discussion  and  the  sentiment  of  collec- 
tive di<niity  was  a  novelty.     Impressed  with  admir.ition  lor  Lykoine- 
des  they  chose  as  officers  everv  man  whomherecommc^nded;  calhng 
undn  him  to  lead  them  into  active  service,  so  as  to  justifv  their  new 
uretensions     He  conducted  them  into  the  territory  of  EpKiaurus, 
now  under  invasion  by  the  Argeians;  who  were  however   in   the 
o-reatest  danger  of  being  cut  off,  having  their  retreat  intercepted  by  a 
bodv  of  troops  from  Corinth  under  Chabrias— Athenians  and  Corin- 
thians    Lykomedes  with  his  Arcadians,  fighting  his  way  through 
enemies  as  well  as  throwgli  a  ditfteult  country,  repelled  the  division 
of  Chabrias,  and  extricated  the  embarrassed  Argeians.     He  next  in- 
vaded the  territory  south  of  the  new  city  of  Messene  and  west  of  the 
]Messenian  Gulf,  part  of  which  was  still  held  by  Spartan  garrisons. 
lie  penetrated  as  far  as  Asine,  where  the  Spartan  commander,  Gera- 
n or  drew  out  his  irarrison  to  resist  them,  but  was  defeated  with  loss, 
and  slain   while  the  suburbs  of  Asine  were  destroyed.     Probably  the 
Spartan  mastery  of  the  south-western  corner  of  Peloponnesus  was 
terminated   by  this  expedition.     The  indefatigable  activity  which 
these  Arcadians  now^  displayed  under  their  new  commander,  over- 
poweriu"-  all  enemies,  and  defying  all  hardships  and  difficulties  of 
inarchin^  over  the  most  rugged  mountains,  by  night  as  well  as  by 
day  throughout  the  winter  season— excited  everywhere  astonishment 
and  alarm!  not  without  considerable  jealousy  even  on  the  part  of 
their  allies  the  Thebans.  . 

While  such  jealousy  tended  to  loosen  the  union  between  the  Arca- 
dians and  Thebes,  other  causes  tended  at  the  same  time  to  disunite 
them  from  Elis.  The  Eleians  claimed  rights  of  supremacy  over 
Lepreon  and  the  other  towns  of  Triphylia.  which  rights  they  had 
been  compelled  by  the  Spartan  arms  to  forego  thirty  years  before. 
Ever  since  that  period,  these  towns  had  ranked  as  separate  commu- 
nities each  for  itself  as  a  dependent  ally  of  Sparta.  Now  that  the 
power  of  the  latter  was  broken,  the  Eleians  aimed  at  resumption  ot 
their  lost  supremacy.  But  the  formation  of  the  new ''commune 
Arcadum"  at  Megalopolis  interposed  an  obstacle  never  before  thougm 


56 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE 


EXPEDITION  INTO  THESSxVLY. 


57 


of.  The  Tripliylian  towrs,  nffirminr!:  tlicmpclvcs  to  he  of  Arcadian 
origin,  and  setting  forth  as  their  eponymous  Ilcro  Tripliylus  son  of 
Arkas,  solicited  to  he  adniitled  as  Inlly  qiialitied  mcnihers  of  the 
incipient  Pan-Arcadian  comnnunion.  They  v^vyq  cordially  welcomed 
hy  the  general  Arcadian  hody  (with  a  dcgiee  of  sympathy  similar  to 
that  recently  shown  by  the  Germans  toward  Sleswick-Holstein).  re- 
reived  as  political  brethren,  and  guaranteed  as  independent  against 
Elis.  The  Eleians,  thus  finding  themselves  disappointed  of  the  bene- 
fits which  they  had  anticipated  from  the  humiliation  of  Sparta,  be- 
came greatly  alienated  from  the  Arcadians. 

Ariobarzanes,  the  satrap  of  Phrygia,  with  whom  the  Athenians 
liad  just  established  a  coirespondence,  now  endeavored  (perhaps  at 
their  instance)  to  mediate  for  peace  in  Greece,  sending  over  a  citizen 
of  Abydus  named  Philiskus,  furnished  with  a  large  sum  of  money. 
Choosing  Delphi  as  a  center,  Philiskus  convoked  tliithcr,  in  the  name 
of  the  Persian  king,  deputies  from  all  the  belligerent  parties,  The- 
ban,  Lacedaemonian,  Atlienian,  etc.,  to  meet  him.  Tliese  envoys 
never  consulted  the  god  as  to  the  best  means  of  attaining  peace  (says 
Xenophon),  but  merely  took  counsel  am.ong  themselves:  hence,  he 
observes,  little  progress  was  made  toward  peace;  since  the  Spartans 
peremptorily  insisted  that  jMessene  should  again  be  restored  to  them, 
while  the  Thebans  were  not  less  firm  in  resisting  the  pro]>osition. 
It  rather  seems  that  ihe  allies  of  Sparta  were  willing  to  concede  the 
]ioint,  and  even  tried,  though  in  vain,  to  overcome  her  reluctance. 
The  congress  accordingly  broke  up;  while  Philiskus,  declaring  him- 
self in  favor  of  Sparta  and  Athens,  employed  his  money  in  levying 
mercenaries  for  the  professed  purpose  of  aiding  them  in  the  war. 
"VVe  do  not  find,  however,  that  he  really  lent  them  any  aid.  It 
would  appear  that  his  mercenaries  were  intended  for  the  service  of 
the  satrap  himself,  who  was  then  organizing  his  revolt  from  Artax- 
erxes:  and  that  his  probable  purpose  in  trying  to  elose  the  war  was, 
that  he  might  procure  Grecian  soldiers  more  easily  and  abundantly. 
Though  the  threat  of  Philiskus  produced  no  immediate  result,  how- 
ever, it  so  alarmed  the  Thebans  as  to  determine  them  to  send  an  em- 
bassy up  to  the  Great  King;  the  rather,  as  they  learnt  that  the 
Lacedaemonian  Eutliykles  had  already  gone  up  to  the  Persian  court, 
to  solicit  on  behalf  of  Sparta. 

How  important  had  been  the  move  made  b\'  Epaminondas  in  re- 
constituting the  autonomous  Messenians,  was  shown,  among  other 
evidences,  by  the  recent  abortive  congress  at  Delphi.  Already  this 
formed  the  capital  article  in  Grecian  political  discussion;  an  article, 
too,  on  which  Sparia  stood  nearly  alone.  For  not  only  the  Thebans 
(whom  Xenophon  specifies  as  if  there  were  no  others  of  the  same 
sentiment),  but  all  the  allies  of  Thebes,  felt  hearty  sympathy  and 
identity  of  interest  with  the  newly-enfranchised  residents  in  Mount 
Ithome  and  in  Western  Laconia;  while  the  allies  even  of  Sparta 


,vcrc,  at  most,  only  lukewarm  agaiust  them,  it  not  positively  ineliued 

'"  v'uewXnomeaon  soon  presented  itself,  which  served  as  a  sort 
V  uttt  .1    ^.""f ,,""   ew-boru  or  newly-revived,  Messenian  coiiunu- 
"■u^'bfile    ublie  vo^e^of  Greeee.     At  the  lOSrd  Olyn.pic  ieslival 
A  J,  m    er*  3«8  B.a)-wluch  occurred  within  less  than  two  years 
*  n  i  Fn  mimHidas  laid  the  foundation-stone  of  Messene-a  Messe- 
1    SvnardDamiskus  gained  the  wreath  as  victor  m  the  toot- 
r  :^^  of  boTs      Since  the  tirst  Messenian  war,  whereby  the  nation  be- 
c  me  subicct  to  Sparta,  no  Messenian  victor  had  even  been  enrolled; 
?     ,li,   ipfnre  that  w kr    in  the   earliest  half-century   of  recorded 
rf  i-uls  seve  d  M^  sen  an  victors  are  found  on  the  register     No 
«  n    iutor  wa^  admitted  to  enter  the  lists,  except  as  a  free  Greek 
fr,,,,    ifree  comnmnitv;  accordingly  so  long  as  these  Messemaus 
[r     been  either  enslaved,  or  in  exile,  they  would  never  have  been 
ai    wed   0  contend  for  the  pri/.e  under  that  designation^    So  much 
he  strono-er  was  the  impression  produced,  when,  u  308  B.C.,  aftei  an 
terv'd  o°f  more  than  three  centuries,  Damiskus  the  Messenian  was 
•ocl    m"cM'?cto  .      No  Theory  (or   public    legation   for  sacrifice 
could      ve  come  to  Olympia  from  Sparta,  since  she  was  hen  at  war 
boh  w    1  eEis  and  ArcaJiaus;   probably  few   in.lividual  Lace- 
(Icmonia  s  were  present;  so  that  the  spectators,  composed  gener>d ly 
tGeeks  unfriendly  to  Sparia,  would  hail  the  proclamation  of  the 
new  name  a"  being  In  evi^dence  of  her  degradati.m    ■^«;«  1  as    imi 
«-mmthv  with  the  long  and  severe  oppression  of  the  Messenians 
f  fc  O  n^ic  festival-ti.e  first  after  th.  great  revolution   occasioned 
by  the  battle  of  Leuktra-was  doubtless  a  scene  of  earnest  anti-Spai- 

'' Du'J^n"This  year  303  B.C.,  the  Thebans  undertook  no  mmMo 
PdoronSesus;  the  peace-congress  at  Delphi  probably  occupied  the u 
attention   while  the  Arcadians  neither  desired  nor  needed,  their  ad. 
CtPelopida^  conducted  in  this  year  a  Theban  force  into  Thessaly 
in  orde   to  protect  Larissa  and  the  other  cities  a.gainst  A  ex=.nder  of 
Plierai  and  to  counterwork  the  ambitious  projects  ot  tl.at  despo  , 
wto  wks  solicting  re-enforcement  from  Athens.     In  Ins  fj^jh^.c^ 
lie  succee'led.     Alexander  was  compelled  to  visit  him    t  Lanssa,  and 
solicit  peace.    This  despot,   however,   alarmed   f  ."  «   <=°3^^'' 
which  came  from  all  sides  against  his  cruelty-aud  at  "•'  e  l.mguage, 
first,  admonitory,  afterward,  menacing,  of  gjl«P'J''-Vf ''?,,Tf-w h 
think  himself  h.  safety,  and  lied  home  to  Phene.     Pf'  »P',^if^,|»  ?^^ 
lished  a  defensive  union  against  him  among  the  other  Thessali.m 
citieT  and   hen  marched  onward  into  Macedonia,  where  the  regent 
P  ok'mv  not  strong  enough  to  resist,  emered  intfl  alliance  with   he 
T  ebai^s;  surreiulcdng  to' them  thirty  hostages  from  the  mos    di  - 
tin-Lished  families  in  Macedonia,  as  a  guaranty    or  his  faithful 
adherence.     Among  the  hostages  was  the  youthful  Philip  sou  of 


i)8 


FOUNDATIO.X    OP^  3IE1SSENE. 


Aimntas,  who  remained  in  this  character  at  Thebes  for  some  years 
iicder  the  care  of  Pammenes.  It  was  thus  that  Ptolemy  and  tl^^ 
family  of  Amyntas,  though  they  had  been  maintained  in  Macedon  i 
^InlVTr  ^^^^'*^'^"'  «"  ^^  Ipliiknitcs  and  the  Athenians  not  m^^^  y 
months  before,  nevertheless  now  connected  themselves  by  allian  4 
with  the  rhebans,  the  enemies  of  Athens,  ^schines  the  AtS^ 
orator  denounces  them  for  ingratitude;  but  possibirthe  surS 
force  of  the  Thebans  left  them  no  option.  Both  the  Theban  a  d 
Macedcmian  force  became  thus  enlisted  for  the  protection  of  the  free 
dom  of  Amphipohs  against  Athens.  And  Pelopidas  returned  to 
Ihebes  having  extended  tiie  ascendency  of  Thebes  not  on  y  ov  r 
tTi^r^l-^^^^^^^^  Macedonia,  assurl^d  by  the  acqidsitio^of'uie 

Such  extc'ision  of  the  Theban  power,  in  Northern  Greece  discon- 
certed the  maritime  projects  of  Athens  on  the  coast  of  Macedon  a  at 
the  same  time  thatjt  laid  the  foundation  of  an  alliance  itetwctn  her 
and  Alexander  of  Phera..  While  she  was  thus  oppos  ng  the  Thebans 
n  Thessaly  a  second  squadron  ainl  ie-enforceme.nt  afrived  a  (  o  - 
mtli  from  Syracuse,  under  Kissidas,  dispatched  by  the  de'pot 
pionysius  Among  the  synod  of  allies  assembled  at  Corinth  eba?e 
being  held  as  to  the  best  manner  of  employing  them   the  Ath'n^.^^^^ 

ihi^Sn'/rf '  T'^^i"^  '^'''  '^''^-  '^-''''^'^  ^^'  sent  to^act  in  T  Ltly  C 
1  n.  r  If  ^'"''^S"''  "^PP^"^^''  ''''''  «"^J  Pi-evaikd  to  liave  tliem  .^ 
round  to  the  southern  coast  of  Laconia  in  oider  that  tliev  mi^  It 
c.>.)perate  in  repelling  or  invading  the  Arcadians  S.  en  oiced> 
the  feicihans  and  other  mercenaries.  Archidan.us  led  out  the  Lace 
d.emonian  forces  against  Arcr.dia.  He  t(.ok  Karv.T  bv  assault  put- 
ting to  death   evciy  man  whcm  he  captured  in'the  i)lace    a nd^ho 

hr^i^fvmn  nf  ^'•'•'V^r^  tcHTitoiy  in  the  district  n^JII'aft^r 
Tiie  1  arrliasu,  until  the  joint  Arcadian  and  Arireian  forces  arrived  to 

ZeKi'hlV"^^  "'"'^^^"^  ^^  ^^°  ^-^^"^"^'^^  nearMidei 

r.%1       \\      '  'l'<^,^y'«^f'U-^aDc^ommander.gave  notice  that  he  mu'^t 
retire  as   he  period  to  which  his  orders  rc.,ched  had  exp  red      He 

iianmN  pass  the  Messenian  troops  arrested  his  advance  and  so  ham- 
pered him,  that  lie  was  forced  to  send  to  Archidamus  for  aid  The 
latter  soon  appeared,  while  the  main  bodv  of  Arcadians  and  \^ 
geians  fol  owed  r.ho;  and  Arcliidamus  resolV(  d  to  attack  tlemh  o^i . 
end  battle  ner.r  M.dea.  Imploring  his  soldiers,  in  an  en  hiit  c 
appeal,  oresciie  the  great  name  of  Sparta  from  the  disgr^c  h  o 
Inch  It  had  fallen  he  found  them  full  of  responsive  ardor  They 
rushed  u-.th  such  fierceness  to  the  charire.  that  the  Arcadi' n.  were 
thoroughly  daunted,  and  tied  with  scarcely  any  resistance      The  pur- 

sf"u  J;;:^- ^iShXf '    T^^^;^''^'  ^^^i  ^^^  ^"'^  mercenaries, Zl^;; 
slaightei  f  ighttul.     T en  thousand  men  (if  we  are  to  believe  Diodo- 

rus   were  slain,  without  tlK>  lr.^s  of  a  single  La^^^^^^^ 

ea^^  and  important  victory-or.  as  il  calue  to  be  caiied.    Mhe  tear- 


TinKI>  EXPEDITION  INTO    PELOPONNESUS.        59 

,  „  battlc"-news  was  forthwith  t^-ansmitted  by  the  herald  Demote- 
otoSmrta  So  powerful  was  the  emotion  produced  by  us  ta  e 
trU-df  ale  Spartans  who  heard  it  hurst  kito  tears;  A-es.laus.  the 
inVt(  rs  and  the  E.photM,  setting  tli3  example  ;-a  striking  proof 
how  immbled.  Ind  dikccustomed  to  the  idea  of  victory,  their  minds 
had  rec  n  iv  bec^ue!-a  striking  proof  also,  when  we  compare  it 
wth  the  indexible  self-control  which  marked  their  recep  .on  of  the 
Stious  tidings  from  Leuktra.  how  much  more  irresistible  is  iinex- 
peSedTy  than  unexpected  grief,  in  working  on  these  minds  of  iron 

^' So  offensive  had  been  the  insolence  of  the  Arcadians,  that  tlie  news 
of  their  defeat  was  not  unwelcome  even  to  their  allies  the  ^  >eban.s 
nd  Eleians.     It  ma.le  them  feel  that  they  were  not  independent  of 
Theban  aid,  and  determined  Epaminondas  again  to  show  nimself  m 
PeC  nnesus.  with  the  special  view  of  enroUin.i^  the  Achoeans  in  h>s 
nlli-mce     The  defensive  line  of  Oneium  was  still  under  occupaiion 
bv  the  Laced.pmonians  and  Athenians,  who  had  their  head-quarters 
•It  Corinth.     Yet  having  remained  unattacked  all  the  preceding  year, 
it  was  now  so  negligently  guarded,  that  Peisias,  the  general  of  xVrgos, 
in^ti-ated  by  a  private  request  of  Epammondas  was  enabled  sud- 
eny  to  seize  the  heights  above  Kenchrea?,  with  a  force  of  2,000 
men  and  seven  days'  provision.     The  Theban  commander,  hastenin.g 
],i^  march,  thus  found  the  line  of  Oneium  open  near  Kenchre.T,  and 
entered  Peloponnesus  without  resistance;  after  which  he  inoceeded 
ioined  by  his  Peloponnesian  allies,  against  the  cities  in  Achaia.    Luti 
the  battle  of  Leuktra,  these  cities  had  been  among^  the  dependent 
allies  of  Sparta,  governed  by  local  oligarchies  in  her  interest.     Since 
tlult  event  they  had  broken  off  from  her,  but  were  still  under  oligar- 
chical governments  (though  doubtless  not  the  same  men),  and  had 
remained  neutral  without^  placing  themselves  in  connection  either 
with   Arcadians  or  Thebans.      Not  being  in  a^  condition  to  resist 
so  formidable   an   invading  force,  they    opened  ^^.^^otiations  m  th 
Epaminondas.  and  solicited  to  be  enrolled  as  allies  of  Ihebes;  engag^ 
ill"-  to  follow  her  lead  whenever  summoned,  and  to  do  their  dut\  as 
members  of  her  svnod.     They  tendered  securities  which  Epaminon- 
das deemed  sufficient  for  the  fultlllment  of  their  promise      Accord- 
ino-lv  by  virtue  of  his  own  personal  ascendency,  he  agreed  to  accept 
th?m  as  they  stood,  without  requiring  either  the  banishment  of    he 
exi^tin-  rulers  or  substitution  of  democratical  forms  in  place  of  the 
oligarchical.     Such  a  proceeding  was  not  only  suitable  to  the  moder- 
atiSn  of  dealing  so  remarkable  in  Epaminondas,  but  also  calculated 
to  strengthen  the  interests  of  Thebes  in  Peloponnesus   in   1/^  Pr;fJ" 
jealous  and  unsatisfactory  temper  of  ^l\^-^^^;^^!^=^"^^^f  f^f,^^;^ 
her  on  peculiar  -rounds  Acha^ans  as  well  as  Eleians;  the  latter  be  ng 
temselves  half-alienated  from  the  Arcadians.     Epaminondas  furtl^^^^^ 

liberated  Naupaktus  and   Kalvdon,   ^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J^y  thi^fer 
^rarrisous,  and  which  he  enrolled  as  separate  allies  of  Thebes;  whither 


60 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


THEBES  AND  THE  ACU^EAN  CITIES. 


61 


he  then  returned,  without  any  other  achievements  (so  far  as  we  are 
informed)  in  Peloponnesus 

But  the  generous  calculations  of  this  eminent  man  found  little  favor 
TNith  his  countrymen.      Both  the  Arcadians,  and  the  opposition  party 
in  the  AchcTan  cities,  preferred  accusations  a-ainst  him,  allecrinir  that 
he  had  discouraged  and  humiliated  all  the  real  friends  of  ^Thebes  • 
k'aving  power  in  the  hands  of  men  who  would  join  Sparta  on  the  tirst 
opportunity      The  accusation  was  further  pressed  bv  Menekleidas,  a 
ilieban  speaker  of  ability,  strongly  adverse  to  Epaminondas.  as  well 
as  to  Pelopidas.     So  pronounced  was  the  displeasure  of  the  Thebans 
-partly   perliaps    from   reluctance   to   olfend    the  Arcadians-that 
they  not  only  reversed  the  policy  of  Epaminondas  in  Achaia,  but 
also  refrained   from  re-electing  him  as  Bceotarch  during  the  ensu- 
ing year.     They  sent  harmosts  of  their  own  to  each  of  The  AcluTau 
cities— put  down   the  existing  oligarchies— sent  the  chief  oliL^archi- 
cal  members  and  p:irtisaus  into  exile— and  established  democratical 
governments   in  each.     Hence  a  great  bodv  of  exiles  soon  became 
accumulated;  who.  watching  for  a  favorable  opportunity  and  com- 
bining their  united  forces  Jigainst  eachcitv  successivelv   were  stron^r 
enouiT  1  to   overthrow  the  newly-created  democracies,"  and  to  expd 
the  Theban  harmosts.     Thus  restored,  the  Atlia-an  oligarchs  took 
decided  and  active  part  with  Sparta;  viLWously  pressing  the  Arca- 
dians on  one  side,    while  the   Laceda-monians.  encouraged   bv  the 
recent  Tearless  Battle,  exerted  themselves  activelv  on  the  other 
^    The  town  of  Sikyon,  cUjsely  adjoining  to  Achaia,  was  at  this  time 
in  alliance  with  Thebes,  having  a  Tlieban  harmost  and  irarrison  in 
Its  acropolis.     But  its  government,  which  had  always  been  olisrarchi- 
cal   still  remained    unaltered.     The  recent  counter-revolution^in  the 
Achtean  cities,    followed    closely   by  their    junction  with   Sparta 
alarmed  the  Arcadians  and  Argeians,  lest  Sikyon  also  should  lollow 
the   example       Of  this  alarm  a  leading  Sikvonian  citizen   named 
Euphron,  took  advantage.     He  warned  them' that  if  the  olio-archv 
were  left  in  power  they  would  certainly  procure  aid  from  the  garri- 
son at  Corinth,  and  embrace  the  interests  of  Sparta.      To  prevent 
such  defection  (he  said)  it  was  indispensable  that  Sikyon  should  be 
democratized.     He  then  offered  himself,  with  their  aid,  to  accomplish 
the  revolution,  seasoning  hisoffer  with  stroni:  protestations  of  discrust 
a-gainst  the  intolerable  arrogance  and  oppression  of  Sparta-  protesta- 
tions not  unnecessary,  since  he  had  himself,  prior  to  the  battle  of 
Leuktra,  carried  on  the  government  of  his  native  city  as  local  ao-cnt 
for  her  purposes  and  interest.    The  Arcadians  and  Arteians  enterin- 
into  the  views  of  Euphron,  sent  to  Sikvon  a  large  force,  under  who'? 
presence  and  countenance  he  summoned  a -eneral   assemblv  in  the 
market-place,  proclaiined  the  oligarchy  to  be  deposed,  and  proposed 
an  equal  democracy  for  the  future.     His  proposition  being  adopted 
lie  next  invited  the  people  to  choose  generals;  and  the  persons  chosen 
were,  as  might  naturally  be  expected,  himself  with  live  partisans 


Theurior  oligarchy  had  not  been  without  a  previous  mercenary  force 
in  their  servfce,  under  the  command  of  Lysimenes;  but  these  men 
Vie  overawed  by  the  new  foreign  force  introduced.     Eui>hron  now 
n  ceeded  to  reoVgauize  them,  to  place  them  under  the  command  of 
fson  Adeas  instSad  of  Lysimenes,  and  to  increase  their  numerical 
\reu-th      Selecting  from  them  a  special  body-guard  for  his  own 
nersonal' safety,  and  being  thus  master  of  the  city  under  the  ostensi- 
e  color  of  chief  of  the  new  democracy,  he  commenced  a  career  of 
lie  most  rapacious  and  sanguinary  tyranny      He  caused  several  of 
s  colleacrues  to  be  assassinated,  and  banished  others.     He  expelled 
.  1.0  bv  wholesale  the  wealthiest  and  most  eminent  citizens,  on  sus- 
Dcionof  Laconism;  confiscating  their  properties  to  supply  himself 
with  money,  pillaging  the  public  treasure,  and  even  stripping  the 
e  iDles  of  all  thefr  rich  stock  of  consecrated  gold  and  silver  orna- 
iieuls      He  further  procured  for  himself  adherents  by  libemting 
numerous  slaves,  exalting  them  to  the  citizenship,   and  probably 
en  oiling  them  imong  his  paid  force.     The  power  which  he  thus 
acquired  became  very  great.     The  money  seized  enabled  him  not 
onlv  to  keep  in  regular  pay  his  numerous  mercenaries,  but  also  to 
bribe  the  leading  Arcadians  and  Argeians,  so  that  they  connived  at 
his  enormities;  w°hile  he  was  further  ready  and  active  in   he  field  to 
lend  them  military  support.      The  Theban  harmost  still  held  the 
acropolis  with  his  garrison,  though  Euphron  was  master  of  the  town 

^"Dudn'r^Vhe  height  of  Euphron's  power  at  Sikyon,  the  neighboring 
citv  of  Phlius  wits  severely  pressed.     The  Phliasians  had  remained 
steadily  attached  to  Sparta  throughout  all  her  misfortunes;  notwith- 
standing incessant   hostilities  from   Argos,    Arcadia,    Pellene,    and 
Sikyon,  which  destroyed  their  crops  and  inflicted  upon  them  serious 
hardships.      I  have  already  recounted   that  in  the  year  369  b.c    a 
little  before  the  line  of  Oueium  was  forced  by  Epaminondas,  the 
town  of  Phlius,  having  been  surprised  by  its  own  exiles  with  the  aid 
of  Eleians  and  Arcadians,  had   only  been  saved  by  the  desperate 
bravery  and  resistance  of  its  citizens.     In  the  ensuin^^ear,  db8  B.C., 
the  Arcreian  and  Arcadian  force  again  ravaged  the  Phliasian  plain, 
doing  ureat  damage;  yet  not  without  some  loss  to  themselves  in  their 
departure,  from  the  attack  of  the  chosen  Phliasian  hophtes  and  of 
some  Athenian  horsemen  from  Corinth.     In  the  ensuing  year,  367 
B.C.,  a  second  invasion  of  the  Phliasian  territory  was  '\"empted  by 
•Eunhron    with  his  own   mercenaries  to  the  number  ot  i,OUU— the 
arnied  force  of  Sikyon  and  Pellene-and  the  /Flieban  h^mnost  and 
garrison  from  the  acropolis  of  Sikyon.     On  arriving  near  Phlius,  the 
Sikyonians  and  Pellenians  were  posted  near  the  gate  ot     he  city 
which  looked  toward   Corinth,  in  order  to  resist  any  sally  trom 
within-  while  the  remaining  invaders  made  a  circuit  round   over  an 
elevated  line  of  ground  called  the  Trikaramun  (which  had  been  lor- 
titied  by  the  Argeians  and  was  held  by  their  garrison),  to  approach 


62 


FOUNDATION    OF  :\IESSi:XE. 


EUPHRON   RETURNS  TO  SIKYON. 


63 


aud  ravage  the  Pliliaijian  plaiu.  But  the  Phliasiaii  cavalry  and 
hoplites  so  bravely  resisted  them,  as  to  preveut  them  from  s])readiug 
over  the  plain  to  do  damage,  uutil  at  the  end  of  the  day  they 
retreated  to  rejoin  the  Sikyouians  and  Pelleniaus.  From  these  lust, 
however,  they  happened  to  he  separated  by  a  ravine  which  forced 
them  to  take  a  long  circuit ;  while  the  Phliasians,  passing  by  a 
shorter  road  close  under  their  own  walls,  were  l)eforehand  in  reach- 
ing the  Sikyonians  aud  Pellenians.  whom  they  vigorously  attacked 
and  defeated!  with  loss.  Euj)hron  with  his  mercenaries,  and  the 
Theban  division,  arrived  too  late  to  prevent  the  calamity,  which  they 
made  no  effort  to  repair. 

An  eminent  Pellenian  citizen  named  Proxenus  having  been  here 
made  prisoner,  the  Phliasians,  in  spite  of  all  their  sufferings,  released 
him  without  ransom.  This  act  of  generosity — coupled  wuth  the  loss 
sustained  by  the  Pelleuhmsin  the  recent  engagement,  as  well  as  with 
the  recent  oligarchical  counter-revolutions  which  had  disjoined  the 
other  Achaean  cities  from  Thebes— altered  the  politics  of  Pellene, 
bringing  about  a  peace  between  that  city  and  Phlius.  Such  an  acces- 
sion afforded  sensible  relief — it  might  almost  be  said,  salvation — to 
the  Phliasians,  in  the  midst  of  cruel  impoverishment;  since  even 
their  necessary  subsistence,  except  what  was  obtained  by  marauding 
excursions  from  the  enemy,  being  derived  by  purchase  from  Corinth, 
was  found  difficult  to  pay  for,  and  still  more  difficult  to  bring  home 
in  the  face  of  an  enemy.  They  were  now  enabled:  by  the  aid  of  the 
Athenian  general  Chares  and  his  mercenary  troops  from  Corinth,  to 
escort  their  families  and  their  non-mililary  population  to  Pellene, 
where  a  kindly  shelter  was  j)rovided  by  the  citizens.  The  military 
Phliasians,  while  escorting  back  a  stock  of  supplies  to  Phlius, 
broke  through  and  defeated  an  andjuscade  of  the  enemy  in  their 
way;  and  afterward,  in  c^mjunction  with  (hares,  surprised  the  fort 
of  Thyamia,  which  the  Sikyonians  were  fortifying  as  an  aggressive 
post  on  their  borders.  The  fort  becjime  not  only  a  defense  for 
Phlius,  but  a  means  of  aggression  against  the  enemy,  affording  also 
great  facility  for  the  introduction  of  provisions  from" Corinth. 

Another  cause,  both  of  these  successes  and  of  general  relief  to  the 
Phliasians,  arose  out  of  the  distracted  state  of  affairs  in  Sikyon.  So 
intolerable  had  the  tyranny  of  Eui)hron  become,  that  the  Arcadians, 
■who  had  helpcnl  to  raise  him  up,  became  disgusted,  ^ncas  of 
Stymphalus,  general  of  the  collective  Arcadian  force,  marelied  with 
a  body  of  troops  to  Sikyon,  joined  the  Theban  harniost  in  the  acrop- 
olis, and  there  summoned  the  Sikyonian  notuhlts  to  an  assembly. 
Under  his  protection,  the  intense  *^sentiment  against  Euphron  was 
freely  manifested,  and  it  was  resolved  to  recall  the  numerous  exiles, 
whom  he  had  banished  without  either  trial  or  public  sentence.  Dread- 
ing the  wrath  of  these  numerous  and  bitter  enemies,  Euphron 
thought  it  prudent  to  retire  with  his  mercenaries  to  the  harbor;  where 
he  invited  Pasimelus  the  Lacedemonian  to  come,  with  a  portion  of 


the  garrison  of  Corinth,  and  immediately  declared  himself  an  open 
partisan  of  Sparta.     The  harbor,  a  separate  town  and  fortification  at 
some  little  distance  from  the  city  (as  Lcchreum  was  from  Corinth), 
WIS  thus  held  bv  and  for  the  Spartans;  while  Sikyon  adhered  to  the 
Thebans   and  Arcadians.     In  Sikyon  itself,  however,  though  eviicu- 
•\ted  by   Euphron.  there   still   remained  violent   dissensions.      Tne 
returniu"-  exiles  were  probablv  bitter  in  reactionary  measures;  the 
liumbler''citizens  were  fearful  of  losing  their  newly-acquired  political 
privileges-  and  the  liberated  slaves,  yet  more  fearful   of  forteitmg 
that  freedom,  which  the  recent  revolution  had  conferred  upon  them. 
Hence  Euphron  still  retained  so  many  partisans,  that  having  pro- 
cured from  Athens  a  re-enforcement  of  mercenary  troops,  he  was 
ena])ledto  return  to  Sikvon,  and  again  to  establish  himself  as  master 
of  the  town  in  coujuncUon  witli  the  popular  party.     But  as  his  oppo- 
nents  the  principal  men  in  the  place,  found  shelter  along  with  the 
Theb'ui  ixarrison  in  the  acropolis,  which  he  vainly  tried  to  take  by 
as'iauit— his  possession  even  of  the  town  was  altogetlier  precarious, 
until  such  formidable  neighbors  could  be  removed.     Accordingly  he 
resolved  to  visit  Thebes,  in  hopes  of  obtaining  from  the  authorities 
an  order  for  expelling  his  opponents  and  handing  over  Sikyon   a 
second  time  to  his  rule.     On  what  grounds,  after  so  recent  a  defec- 
tion to  the  Spartans,  he  rested  his  hopes  of  success,  we  do  not  know; 
except  that  he  took  with  him  a  large  sum  of  money  for  the  purpose 
of  bribery.     His  Sikyonian  opponents,  alarmed  lest  he  should  really 
carry  his' point,  followed  him  to  Thebes,  where  their  alarm  was  still 
further  increased  by  seeing  him  in  familiar  converse  with  the  magis- 
trates.    Under  the  first  impulse  of  terror  and  despair,  they  assas- 
linated  Euphron  in  broad  daylight— on  the  Kadmeia,  and  even  before 
the  doors  of  the  Theban  Senate-house,  wherein  both  magistrates  and 

Senate  were  sittinir.  . 

For  an  act  of  violence  thus  patent,  they  were  of  course  seized 
forthwith,  and  put  upon  their  trial  before  the  Senate.  The  magis- 
trates invoked  upon  their  heads  the  extreme  penalty  of  death, 
insisting  upon  the  enormity  and  even  impudence  of  the  outrage, 
comniitled  almost  under  the  eyes  of  the  authorities— as  well  as  upon 
the  sacred  duty  of  vindicating^lot  merely  the  majesty,  but  even  the 
security,  of  the  city,  bv  exemplary  punishment  upon  offenders  who 
had  despised  its  laws'  How^  many  in  number  were  the  persons 
implicated,  we  do  not  know.  All,  exce])t  one,  denied  actual  hand- 
participation;  but  that  one  avowed  it  fiankly,  and  stood  up  to  justify 
it  before  the  Theban  Senate.  He  spoke  in  substance  nearly  as  fol- 
lows—taking up  the  languaire  of  the  accusing  magistrates:— 

"Despise  you  I  cannot,  men  of  Thebes;  for  you  are  masters  of  my 
person  and  life.  It  was  on  other  grounds  of  confidence  that  I  slew 
this  man:  first,  I  had  the  conviction  of  acting  justly;  next.  I  trusted 
in  vour  righteous  judirment.  I  knew  that  ifou  did  not  wait  for  trial 
and  sentence  to  slav  Archias  and  Hypates.  whom  you  caught  after  a 


64 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


nONORS  TO   EUPITRON. 


6JJ 


career  similar  to  that  of  Euphron— but  punished  them  at  the  earliest 
practicable  opportunity,  under  the  conviction  that  men  manifest  in 
sacrilege,  treason,  and  des])otisni,  were  already  under  sentence  of 
death  hv  all  men.  Well!  and  was  not  Euphron  too  guilty  of  all 
these  crimes  V  Did  not  he  find  the  temples  full  of  gold  and  silver 
offerings,  and  strip  them  until  thev  were  empty  ?  How  can  there  be 
a  traitor  more  palpable  than  the  inan,  who.  favoied  and  upheld  by 
Sparta,  first  betraved  her  to  you;  and  then  again,  after  havmg 
received  every  mai  k  of  confidence  from  you,  betrayed  you  to  lier— 
lianding  over  the  harbor  of  Sikyon  to  your  enemies  ?  Was  not  he  a 
despot  'without  reserve,  the  man  who  exalted  slaves,  not  only  into 
freemen,  but  into  citizens?  the  man  who  despoiled,  banished,  or 
slew,  not  criminals,  but  all  whom  he  chose,  and  most  of  all,  the 
chief  citizens  ?  And  now,  after  liaving  vjunly  attempted,  m  con* 
junction  with  your  enemies  the  Athenians,  to  expel  your  harmost  by 
force  from  Sikvon,  he  has  collected  a  great  stock  of  money,  and 
come  hither  to"  turn  it  to  account.  Had  he  assembled  arms  and 
soldiers  against  you,  you  would  have  thanked  me  for  killing  him. 
How  then  can  you  punish  me  for  giving  him  his  due,  when  he  has 
come  with  money  to  corrupt  you,  and  to  purchase  from  you  again 
the  mastery  of  Sikvon,  to  your  own  disgrace  as  well  as  mischief  ? 
Had  he  l)een  my  enemy  and  your  friend,  I  should  undoubtedly  have 
done  wrong  to  kill  him  in  your  city;  but  as  he  is  a  traitor  playing 
you  false,  how  is  he  more  my  enemy  than  yours  ?  I  shall  be  told  that 
lie  came  hither  of  his  own  accord,  confiding  in  the  laws  of  the  city 
Well!  you  would  have  thanked  me  for  killing  him  anywhere  out  of 
Thebes;  why  not  in  Thebes  also,  when  he  has  come  hither  only  for 
the  purpose  of  doing  you  new  wrong  in  addition  to  the  past  ?  AVhere 
among  Greeks  has  impunity  ever  been  assured  to  traitors,  deserters, 
or  desT>ots  ?  Recollect,  that  you  have  passed  a  vote  that  exiles  from 
any  one  of  your  allied  cities  might  be  seized  as  outlaws  in  any  other. 
Now  Euphron  is  a  condemned  exile,  who  has  ventured  to  come  back 
to  Sikyon  without  any  vote  of  the  general  body  of  allies.  How  can 
any  one  affirm  that  he  has  not  justly  incurred  death  ?  I  tell  you  in 
conclusion,  men  of  Thebes— if  you  put  me  to  death,  you  will  have 
made  yourselves  the  avengers  of  your  very  worst  enemy— if  you 
adjudge  me  to  have  done  right,  j^ou  will  manifest  yourselves  publicly 
as  just  avengers,  both  on  your  own  behalf  and  on  that  of  your  whole 
body  of  allies." 

This  impressive  discourse  induced  the  Theban  Senate  to  pronounce 
that  Euphron  had  met  with  his  due.  It  prol^ably  came  from  one  of 
the  principal  citizens  of  Sikyon,  among  whom  were  most  of  the 
enemies  as  well  as  the  victims'of  the  deceased  despot.  It  appeals,  in 
a  characteristic  manner,  to  that  portion  of  Grecian  morality  which 
bore  upon  men,  who  by  their  very  crimes  procured  for  themselves 
the  means  of  impunity;  against  whom  there  was  no  legal  force  to 
protect  others,  and  who  "were  therefore  considered  as  not  being 


f^«*» 


entitled  to  protection  themselves,  if  the  daggers  of  others  could  ever 
b"  made  to  reach  them  The  tyrannicide  appeals  to  this  seulimeu; 
^vith  confidence,  as  diffused  throughout  ail  the  free  Grecian  citif?s. 
It  found  responsive  assent  in  the  Theban  Senate,  and  would  probably 
have  found  the  like  assent,  if  set  forth  with  equal  emphasis,  in  most 
Grecian  Senates  or  assemblies  elsewhere. 

Very  different  however  was  the  sentiment  in  Sikyon.  The  body 
of  Euphron  was  carried  thither,  and  enjoyed  the  distinguished  pre- 
emineuce  of  being  buried  in  the  market-place.  There,  along  with 
liis  tomb,  a  chapel  was  erected  in  which  he  w\as  worshiped  as 
Arche'^etes,  or  Patron-hero  and  Second  Founder,  of  the  city\  He 
received  the  same  honors  as  had  been  paid  to  Biasidas  at  Amphip- 
olis  The  humbler  citizens  and  the  slaves,  uix)u  wiiom  he  had 
conferred  liberty  and  political  franchise— or  at  h^ast  the  name  of  a 
political  franchise— remembered  him  with  grateful  admiration  as 
their  benefactor,  forgetting  or  excusing  the  atrocities  which  he  had 
wreaked  upon  their  iwlitical  opponents.  Such  is  the  retributive 
Nemesis  which  always  menaces,  and  sometimes  overtakes,  an  oli- 
o-archy  who  keep  the  mass  of  the  citizens  excludt<i  from  political 
privileges.  A  situation  is  thus  created,  enabling  some  ambitious  and 
encr'-efic  citizen  to  confer  favors  and  earn  popularity  among  the 
many,  and  thus  to  acquire  power,  which,  whether  employed  or  not 
for  the  benefit  of  the  Many,  goes  along  with  their  antipathies  when 
it  humbles  or  crushes  the  previously  monopolizing  Few. 

We  may  presume  from  these  statements  that  the  government  of 
Sikyon  became  democratical.  But  the  provoking  brevity  of  Xcno- 
phon  docs  not  inform  us  of  the  subsequent  arrangements  made  with 
the  Tliebau  harmost  in  the  acropolis— nor  how  the  intestine  dissen- 
sions, between  the  democracy  in  the  town  and  the  refugees  in  the  cita- 
del, were  composed— nor  what  became  of  those  citizens  wiio  slew 
Euphron.  We.letirn  only  that  not  long  afterward,  the  harbor  of 
Sikyon,  which  Euphron  had  held  in  conjunction  with  the  Laced(e- 
mouians  and  Athenians,  w^as  left  imperfectly  defended  by  the  recall 
of  the  latter  to  Athens;  and  that  it  was  accordingly  reUiken  by  the 
forces  from  the  town,  aided  by  the  An^adians. 

It  appears  that  these  proceedings  of  Euphron  (from  his  first  procla- 
mation of  the  democracy  at  Sikyon  and  real  acquisition  of  despotism 
to  himself,  down  to  his  death  and  the  recovery  of  the  harbor)  took 
place  througliout  the  year  367  bo.  and  the  earlier  half  of  366  B.C. 
No  such  enemy,  probtibly,  would  iiave  arisen  to  embarrass  Thebts, 
unless  the  policy  recommend  -d  by  Epaminondas  in  Achaia  had  been 
reversed,  and  unless  he  himself  had  fallen  under  the  displeasure  of 
his  countrymeu.  His  inlluence  too  was  probably  impaired,  and  the 
policy  of  Thebes  affected  for  the  worse,  by  the  accidental  absence  of 
his  friend  Pelopidas,  who  was  then  on  his  mission  to  the  Persian 
court  at  Susa.  Such  a  journey  and  return,  with  the  transaction  of 
the  business  in  hand,  must  have  occupied  the  greater  part  of  the  year 

H.  G.  IV.— 3 


66 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


PERSIAN  RESCRIPT. 


67 


367  B.C.,  bein^  terminated  piobably  by  the  return  of  the  envoys  la 

t^'.o  ljp""iDninir  of  366  B.C.  ,      ,  /•  -r»i  -v 

T  el"  diu^'-  Tbebans  bad  been  alarmed  by  the  langiia-e  of  Phi  is- 
v,,,_-wbo  hud  come  over  a  lew  months  before  as  envoy  from  the 
^.trap  Ariobarzunes  and  had  threatened  to  employ  Asiatic  money  in 
t  e   nterest  of  Athens  and  Sparta  ag-ainst  Tliel3es,  though  his  threats 
seem  1  eter  to  have  been  reab.;ed-as  well  as  \)y  the  presence  ot   he 
£ic™d«inonuin  Euthykles  (after  the   faihire  of  Antalkida.    at  the 
Per    an  conn,  soliciting  aid.     Moreover  Thebes  had  now  P^^teusi.i.s 
to  the  headship  of  Greece,  at  least  as  good  as  ei  her  of  her   wo    l^a  s, 
while  since  tlie  fatal  example  set  by  Sparta  at  the  peace  calletl  hy  the 
na    e  of  Antaikidas  in  387  B.C.,  a.Kl  copied  l>y  Athens  after  the  Da. tie 
ofLeuktra  in  371  B.C.— it  had  become  a  sort  of  recognized  fu^hion 
th-it  the  leadin<-  Grecian  state  should  sue  out  its  title  from  the  tcrror- 
^S  rescript  of  the  Grc at  King,  .nd  proclaim  it.elf  «^  enfoiC|ng 
terms  which  he  had  •lictated.     On  this  ground  of  horrowcd  elevation 
Thebes  now  sought  to  i-lace  herself.     There  ^«s  in  lier  (a^e  a  r< fo- 
liar leason  which  might  partly  excuse  the  va Iv.e  ^et  uron  U  by  ht-r 
enders      It  had  been  almost  the  capital  act  of  her  roiic  y  to  cstabh.^h 
he   t^s^  new   cities,  iMegalop.Iis    ai>d   Messerel  he   vitality   am 
chance  for  duration,  of  both-especially  those  of  the  lat  er,  whie 
],ad  the  inextinguishable  hostility  of  Sparta  to  conteT.d  ^^^^ »'-^   i^'^  | 
be  materially  improved,  in  the  existing  state  ct  tl:e  Gie(k  m  nd.  if 
thev  were  recognized  as  r.utonomous  ui.der  a  Pnsnin  rescript,      lo 
attain  this  obiect,  Peh  pidas  and  Ismenias  now  prccccdci  as  tnvojs 
?oSusa    doubtless  undir  a  foimal  vote  of  the  allied  svemI,  Fim  e  the 
Arcad  an  Antiochus.  a  cekbiated  pankratia..t,  the E  enin  Aro  :h1:  mus, 
and  a  citizen  from  Amos,  jiccomi  anied  tlum.     Informed  of  the  pio- 
cmbn'     ife  Athenian?also  .cot  'iSnu.goras  and  U  on  to  Susa ;  ami  we 
read  °Tth  some  surprise  that  these  hostile  euAoys  all  went  up  thither 

"^i^'^^XTo^uTl^be  declined  to  rerform  the  usual  --mo^y  ^f 

prostration     was   favorably   leceived  by  the  Persian  couit^     Xei.o- 

[,  on_X  recounts  the  whole  proceeding  in  a  manner  unfairly  m- 

vichous  toward  the  Thebans,  forgetting  that  they  .l^'ere  now  only 

cS^  tl^e  example  of  Sparta  in  courting  Persian  «^^  -^fi^^"^^/  V^^^ 

his   application   was   greatly   furthered   by   the  recollection  of  the 

ancient^      imce  of  Thebes  >vith  Xerxes,  against  Athens  and  Sparta 

Tt  the  ime  of  the  battle  of  Platira;  and  by  the  fact  that  Tliebcs  had 

no   onl     refused  to  second,  but  had  actually  discountenanced     1  e 

exneditlm   of   Affcsilaus   anainst   Asia.     TN  e  may  peibaps  doubt. 

Xthe    this  plea  ( ounted  for  much ;  or  the  straighttorward  elcquencc 

ct  Mopidas    so  mueh  extolled  bv  Plutarch,  which  could  onlv  reach 

Pers    n^  cl^ri  throudi   an   interpreter.    But  the   main  fact  for  the 

Great  Kin.^  to  know  was,  tliat  tl  e  ThrVans  had  ^•^■^•^.-i;  ^r  the 

Leuktra;  that  they  had  subsequently  trc  dden  down  still  ^"^th  ,^^^^ 

glory  of  Sparta,  by  carrying  their  aims  over  Laconia.  and  en.ana 


natinf^  the  conquered  half  of  the  country;  that  when  they  were  no 
lon<^er  in  Peloponnesus,  their  allies  the  Arcadians  and  Argeians  had 
l,oen  «=^hainefuily  defeated  by  the  Lacedaemonians  (in  the  Tearless 
B  ittl.')  Such  boasts  on  the  part  of  Pelopidas— confirmed  as  matters 
of  fact  even  by  the  Athenian  Timagoras— would  convince  the  Per- 
sian ministers  that  it  was  their  interest  to  exercise  ascendency  over 
Greece  through  Thebes  in  preference  to  Sparta.  Accordingly  Pelop- 
idas  beini^  asked  by  the  Great  King  wh.it  sort  of  rescript  he  wished, 
obtained  "^his  own*  terms.  Messene  was  declared  autonomous  and 
independent  of  Sparta:  Amphipolis  also  was  pronounced  to  be  a  free 
and  autonomous  city:  the  Athenians  were  directed  to  order  home 
and  lav  up  their  ships  of  war  now  in  active  service,  on  pain  of  Per- 
siui  intervention  against  them,  in  case  of  disobedience.  Moreover 
Thebes  was  declared  the  head  city  of  Greece,  and  any  city  refusing 
to  follow  her  headship  was  menaced  with  instant  compulsion  by 
Persian  force.  In  reference  to  the  paints  in  dispute  between  Elisand 
Arcadia  (the  former  claiming  sovereignty  over  Tripbylia,  which 
professed  itself  Arcadian  and  had  been  admitted  into  the  Arcadian 
communion),  the  rescript  pronounced  in  favor  of  the  Eleians;  proba- 
bly at  the  instance  of  Pelopidas.  since  there  now  subsisted  much 
coldness  between  the  Thebans  and  Arcadians. 

Leon  the  Athenian  protested  against  the  Persian  rescript,  observing 
aloud  when  he  heard  it  read— ^' By  Zeus,  Atheuians,  I  think  it  is  time 
for  you  to  look  out  for  some  other  friend  than  the  Great  King."  This 
remark,  made  in  the  Kinir's  hearing  and  interpreted  to  him,  produced 
the  following  addition  to  "the  rescript : ' '  If  the  Athenians  liave  anything 
jiister  to  propose,  let  them  come  to  the  King  and  inform  him."  So 
vanue  a  modification,  however,  did  little  to  appease  the  murmui-s  of 
the  Atheuians.  On  the  return  of  their  two  envoys  to  Athens,  Leon 
accused  his  cx)lleague  Timagoras  of  having  not  only  declined  to  asso- 
ciate with  him  during  tiiejourney,  but  also  of  having  lent  himself  to 
the  purposes  of  Pdopidas,  of  be'ing  implicated  in  tre;isouable  prom- 
ises, and  receiving  large  bribes  from  the  Persian  King.  On  these 
char<res  Timagoras  was  condemned  and  executed.  The  Arcadian 
onvov  Antiochus  was  equally  indignant  at  the  rescript;  refusing 
eveu"'to  receive  such  presents  of  formal  courtesy  as  were  tendered  to 
all,  and  accepted  bv  Pelopidas  himself,  who  however  strictly  de- 
clined everything  beyond.  The  conduct  of  this  eminent  Tliebau 
thus  exhibited  a  strong  contrast  with  the  large  acquisitions  of  the 
Athenian  Timagoras.  Antiochus,  on  returning  to  Arcadia,  nin.le 
report  of  his  mission  to  the  Pan-Arcadian  synod,  called  the  Ten 
Tiiousand,  at  Megalopolis.  He  spoke  in  the  most  contemptuous 
terms  of  all  that  he  had  seen  at  the  Persian  court.  There  wer^^  (lie 
said)  plenty  of  bakers,  cooks,  wine-pourers,  porters,  etc.,  but  as  f'r 
men  competent  to  fight  against  Greeks,  though  he  looked  out  for 
them  with  care,  he  could  see  none;  and  even  the  vaunted  golden 
planetree  was  not  large  enough  to  furnish  shade  for  a  grasshopper. 


gg  FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 

On  the  other  land  the  Eleian  --^  -'"S^^.^TilUm 'S  ol 
tatkfaction,  and  the  Tl'ebaus  «  Uh  tmm  pl^^  Vhear  the  Persian 
their  allied  cities  -were  mvited  <«  J "^p^fVi^^"  ,,,<,ir  offieial  ocm- 
rescript.  It  -^as  r^^j'f J','',%Jl.f;„'';;„raUreve  seen  in  Thehes 
panion  from  Susa-the  iir.t  ^ '^  *°  PJX  1  Mtle  of  Plalan-'ftho, 
iinee  .he  times  in>">«\'-;«'-  >'  P'",'t  ^f  read  he  do.  rment  alond ;  as 
Kr^TiSM  rnro^^^h'etcasion  of  the  peace  of  Antal- 

"^Z.  though  the  Thehan  leaders  thus  c>o.1y  -pied  ^e  conduct 

of  Sparta  both   as  to   means   and   as    ^^'^'^■^"^^^J^ed    on    the 
?ounSthe    like    '•^^''^y    acquiescence    ^^^•"J'^y    ^^'^"^      ^^^^^ 

deputies  P7-°',J°,;"'^l„''Vpl ied't^hcfharcZe  .iU,  ins.ruc- 
Kmg,  and  to  Thebes.     Au   npi  j  ^^^^^,     3,,^, 

tions.  auther.zing  '•»'^™^  °  ''*^'^,  "°t.  d«j"ed  in  their  respective 
that  acc<l)tance  or  Y,?!"^^°,,'"Tvk  nudes  and  the  other  deputies 
cities.  Nor  was  this  the  * 01  St  J-Ji-  "'"'  ^  doubtless  further 
from  Arcadia  already  J'^'^f  „f  ,J.  '^,Lvov  AnUochus,  ^<nt  yet 
»Uenatedby  the  angry  '^^POJ/  «*  "''^.^["'tfi.Hieadshipof  Tliebis; 
further,  and  entered  a  g-^"''"^"' P'"^^f  f^^ve  he  d  constantly  in  that 
affirming.that  the  ^5°«<' .«"S?^\,,7,\.^°  ,ha.  n^.ht  le.     Incensed  at 

city,  but  m  'l'«  f»Vh  Inns  accu^d  lAk.nudes  of  violating. he; ar- 
fueh  language,  '''^Thebans  accu  c«  1  ^^.^  Acadian 

dinal  principle  of  the  confederacj  ,  "l""''Xc..rin'Mha.  they  would 
comra'des  forthwith  retired  "«' ^"^  .^'"^^j,;^  ,';'"pre  r  to  hive  fol- 
no  longer  sit  in  the  svnod  Tl.e  «  ''^"^j^^^frX.ed'  to  take  .he  oa.h 
lowed  his  example.  ,  ^^''-^^V  ''f;, ''l^.  '^'j  ,,'e"ynod  was  defeated, 
submitted  to  them,  the  ^P''™'lP"7, 'f/' 'i„t  ii.h  the  allies  collect- 
Having  thus  failed  '»  <^«"]->"f  J'X  Ee^Tof  applica.ioDS  indi- 
ively,  .he  Thebuns  resolved    o  ,ry  the  effiuuyo      1.       ^^^^  ^^^^.^^ 

vid..ally.  They  ««S".">'"g'>i,i^f  ^"',^'4^0^  ca  ling  upon  each  for 
rescript  in  hand  to  ^■'^''  '^^^''^/.S  ' 'Each  city  Separately  (they 
acceptance  w  th  an  oath  "*  »^'^^''°";der  peril  of  united  hos.ili.y 
though.)  would  be  afraf  <o['^f^',^«j^°^"''s„Peontident  were  they  in 
from  the  Great  Kins  and  from  T  ^^"f^-  ,,°"  ,hev  addressed  this  ap- 
the  .errors  of  .he  K>°.<f."»V"«  ^/j  'f^-Hh,  ,em  but  even  .0  several 
pc-al  not  -evely  .0  t^>e  oit-^  "'^'^'^^^f  ^^J  '  J/'Sh  .he  proposition  at 
among  their  enemies      llie!renvo>b  even  serving  as 

Corinth;  a  city,  not  on'y  a' vanance  w uu  .      ^^  ;,,„  fo^es  to 

a  center  of  operation  for  the  A'''"  l'"  ;''";,';;„^e  of  a  Thebanarmy 
guard  .he  ^'n.oiO^'^nm  and  I~  ,  ,  ,^~ed  the  proposition 
into  Peloponnesus,  liut  .lie  r^"VvV  „,p„4lves  by  any  common 
altogether,  decli.iins  formally  ^"Ji^^'^^^^^^^^^^  by 

oaths  toward  the  P^'s.an  k  .  ,?■  pj,^*  ^^/^f  f  n„t  from  all  the  cities 
the  envoys  as  they  Pa^sei  m  o  P  .^  ^'J;^-",^,^,,  .he  mission  was  com- 
'pS'il^uSerrid^^AtrSt;  wmch  Thebes  had  beenat 


MISSION  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


69 


such  pains  to  procure,  was  found  practically  inoperative  m  confirming 
or  enforcing  her  headsliip;  though  doubtless  the  mere  fact  that  it 
romorised  and  recognized  Messene,  contributed  to  strengthen  t.ie 
vifilitv   and  exalt  tlie  dignity  of  that  new-born  city 

In  ti;ereif<>.tstomake  the  Persian  rescript  avaihible  toward  the 

rocker  lition  of  their  headship  throughout  Greece,  the  lliebans  would 

[rimrallv  visit  Thessaly  and'the  northern  districts  as  well  as  PelojX)!!- 

e  us     It  appears  that  Pelopidas  and  Ismemas  tliemselves  under  ook 

h^Tmi^sion    and  that  in  tiie  execution  ot  it  they  were  seized  and  de- 

iied  as  prisoners  by  Alexander  of  Pher*.  That  despot  seems  to 
iave  con^r  to  meet  them,  under  pacitic  appearances  at  Pharsa  us 
Sy  indulged  hopes  of  prevailing  on  him  as  well  as  the  other  Ihes- 
4lians  to  accept  the  Persian  rescript;  for  we  see  by  the  example  of 
Corinth  that  they  had  tried  their  powers  of  persuasion  on  enemies  as 
wel  as  friends.  But  the  Corinthians,  while  refusing  the  application, 
had  nevertheless  respected  the  public  morality  held  sacred  even  be- 
tween enemies  in  Greece,  and  had  dismissed  the  ^^^^ys  (whether 
Pelopidas  was  among  them,  we  cannot  assert)  inviolate.  Not  so  the 
tyrant  of  Pher*.  Perceiving  that  Pelopidas  and  Ismemas  were  un- 
accompanied by  any  military  force,  he  seized  their  persons,  and  car- 
ried them  off  to  Pherae  as  prisoners.  ,  ,  .  ,  ,  «.  n    f 

Treacherous  as  this  proceeding  was,  it  proved  /^^f  ^/^y  .17^^  f,^  \^.^ 
Alexander.     Such  was  the  personal  importance  of  I  ^^  «P\^  f  f,;/,^;^^^^ 
imprisonment  struck  terror  among  the  partisans  of  1  hebes  111  I  hessaly 
and  induced  several  of  them  to  submit  to  the  despot  ot  1  he  ae;  who 
moreover  sent  to  apprise  the  Athenians  of  his  (;apture,  ^"^1   :>^«\f;;;^ 
their  aid  airainst  the  impending  vengeance  of  Thebe.      ^J^^^^  ^ 
pressed  with  the  news,  the  Athenians  looked  upon  ^^^^^^^ 
second  Jason,  likely  to  arrest  the  ^^"^^cing  ascendency  of  then  ^^^^^^^^^^ 
bor  and  rival.    They  immediately  dispatched  to  hi.,  aid   1»    t>  ti  ren  es 
and  1000  hoplites  under  Autokles;  ^^^1^«' ^\"^^ble  to  get  t  u^ugh^^  h^ 
Euripus,  when  Boeotia  and  Euba?a  were  both  hostile   o  Athens,  weie 
forced  to  circumnavigate  the  latter  island.      He  reached  Phera?  .pist 
in  time;  for  the  Thebans,  incensed  beyond  measure  at  the  seizure  cjf 
Pelopidas,  had   dispatched  without  delay   8,000  hoplites  and    600 
cavalry  to  recover  or  avenge  him.     Unfortunately  for  them  Epain- 
inondas  had  not    been   rechosen    commander  since  his  last  year  s 
proceedings  in  Achaia.     He  was  now  serving  as  an  hoplite  in  tJie 
ranks,  whfle  Kleomenes  with  other  Bffiotarchs  had  the  command.  Oi 
entering  Thessaly.  they  were  joined  by  various  alhes  in  the  country 
But  the  army  of  Alexander,  aided   by  the  Athenians,   and  placed 
under  the  command  of  Autokles,  was  found  excmlmgly  formidable 
especially  in  cavalry.     The  Thessalian  allies  of  Thebes,  acting  with 
their  habitual   treachery,  deserted  in  the  hour  of  danger;  and   to 
enterprise,  thus  difficult  and  perilous,  was  rendered  impracticable  by 
the  incompetence  of  the  Bceotarchs.     Unable  to  make  head  against 
Alexander  and  the  Athenians,  they  were  forced  to  retreat  homeward. 


70 


FOUNDATION   OF  MESSENE. 


OROPUS  TAKEN    _^^0M  ATHENS. 


71 


;,f  t^i  .ec-    «1  upon  l.in."  to  exlricale  iLcn,  frotn  tlK.inxnU.   1-pan.- 
oiicNoitec.uuii  upon  1.1...        „,„,,. i,,.|,,,i  111,,  leireat   in  consninnialc 

'au'u^rauatklof  U.";^aemy-aud  ooucluc.ed  ll.e  arn.y  .saUly  bade  to 

"^  Thu',nemor->ble  exploit,  while  it  .lis.sraced  the  unsuccessful  Bcro- 
t  J  s  XTe  e  com  e,nned  t,>  fine  an.l  .leposilion  fion.  tl>eir  olbee 
^^    i  "he  -ban  ever  the  reputation  of  Ki.aminondas  among  h.s 

5.  f„\f  AlcKiuder   for  so  illii>trio-.is  a  prisoner,  ami  Alex,  ndn ,  leai 
?ul  of  incurrinrihe  i  nplaeahle  ennuty  .,f  Thebes  was  nulueed  to 

a"edby  their  late  lU-succcss,  were  prepared  to  uudeitakc  a  second 

"'ifkir,;ih'i'hev\enrra,rce  for  the  purpose;  which  was  placed,  on 
IhisocStsion  under  the  <<min.and  of  Eiuuninondas.  1  l.e  re r.o^n 
o  In^na  e  'd  i  .1  n.anv  adluv, nis in  the <o,u,lry ;  and  h,s i.tu...  . 
ro  ess  1  an  his  n.ilitarC  skill,  waseonspi,;uous,y  "I'll^'''';';  "'  ,, 
„V and  inthnidaling  Ale..amler,  yet  wUhunt  f^-'V^'-v'-    '       '^  ;»\ 

oiuru  i^  lo  r«-.u)iL    »  '        1- lu.nunoiK  as  would  irmnt  iiolhiiig 

;;;t^\rau    pnar\ntee,c\mpt^^^ 

i;;^  ^Lsaiy ;  wLe  ^^^^^  z:^':;^tx^-{:::^  l^'a^:. 

SsIoI^tK    o  the   ame    n  Uience  in  Thessafv  which  she  had  en- 
joyed pJior  to  tie  ^i/ure  of  Pelopidas.     That  evenl  «ttU  itB  conse- 


quences  .still  remained  a  blow  to  Thebes  and  a  profit  to  Alexander; 
who  airain  became  master  of  all  or  mo.st  part  of  Thessaly,  together 
with  the  Magnetes,  the  Phthiot  Achteans,  and  other  tributary  nations 
dependent  on  Thessaly — maintaining  unimpaired  his  influence  and 
connection  at  Atiiens. 

While  the  Theban  arms  were  thus  losing  ground  in  The.ssaly,  an 
important  point  was  gained  in  their  favor  on  the  other  side  of  Bceotia. 
Oropus,  on  the  north-eastern  frontier  of  Attica  adjoining  Boeotia,  wa.s 
cai)iured  and  wrested  from  Athens  by  a  party  of  exiles  who  crosseil 
over  from  Eretria  in  Euboea,  with  the  aid  of  Themison,  despot  of  the 
last-mentioned  town.  It  had  been  more  than  once  lost  and  regained 
between  Athens  and  Thebes;  being  seemingly  in  its  origin  Bceotian. 
and  never  incorporated  as  a  Deme  or  equal  constitu(Mit  member  of 
the  Athenian  conunonwealth,  but  only  recognized  as  a  dependency 
of  Athens;  though,  as  it  was  close  on  the  frontier,  many  of  its  in- 
habitants were  also  citizens  of  Athens,  demots  of  the  neighl)oring 
Deme  Unea.  So  recently  before  as  the  period  itimicdiately  preceding 
the  battle  of  LeuKtra,  angr}'  remonstrances  had  been  exchanged  be- 
tween Athens  and  Thebes  respecting  a  portion  of  the  Oro])ian  terri- 
tory. At  that  time,  it  appears,  the  Thebans  were  forced  to  yield, 
and  their  partis.ins  in  Orojius  were  l)anished.  It  was  the^e  pirtisans 
who,  through  the  aid  of  Themison  and  the  Eretrians.  now  effected 
their  return,  so  as  to  repossess  themselves  of  Oropus,  and  doubtless 
to  banish  the  principal  citizens  friendly  to  Athens.  So  great  vrastha 
sensation  produced  aniong  the  Athenians,  that  they  not  only  marched 
with  all  thv'ir  force  to  recover  the  place,  but  also  recalled  their  genend 
Chares  with  that  mercenary  force  which  he  commanded  in  theterri- 
tcu'ies  of  Corinth  and  Phlius.  They  further  requested  aid  from  the 
Corinthians  and  their  other  allies  in  Peloponnesus.  These  allies  did 
not  obey  the  summons;  but  the  Athenian  force  alone  wrnild  have 
sufficed ' to  retake  Oropus.  had  not  the  Thebans  occupied  it  so  as  to 
place  it  beyond  their  attack.  Athens  was  obliged  to  acquiesce  in 
their  occupation  of  it;  though  under  lu'otest,  and  with  the  under- 
standing that  the  disputed  right  should  be  referred  to  impartial  arbi- 
tration. 

Tills  seizure  of  Oropus  produced  more  than  one  material  con- 
sequence. Owing  to  the  recall  of  Chares  from  Corinth,  the  liarbor 
of  Sikyou  could  no  longer  be  maintained  against  the  Sikyonians  in  the 
town  ;  who.  with  the  aid  of  the  Arcadians,  recaptured  it,  so  that  })oih 
town  and  harbor  again  came  into  the  league  of  Theb:ms  and  Arca- 
(li.uis.  Moreover,  Athens  became  discontented  with  her  Pelopon- 
nesian  allies,  for  having  neglected  her  summons  on  the  emergency 
at  Oropus,  altiiough  Athenian  troops  had  been  constantly  in  service 
for  the  protecti(m  of  Pel()]>onnesus  against  the  Thebans.  The  growth 
of  such  dispositions  at  Athens  became  knoAvn  to  the  Mantineiaii 
Lykomedes  ;  the  ablest  and  most  ambitious  leader  in  Arcadia,  who 
was  not  only  jealous  of  the  predominance  of  the  Thebans,  but  had 


72 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


APPLICATION  FOR  PEACE. 


73 


romc  to  a  fom^nl  rupture  uith  them  nt  the  synod  held  for  the  reeep- 
J^ion  of  the  Persian  rescript.     Anxious  to  disenpnge  the  Arcadians 

Cntts^^dl  as  froin  Sparta,  Ly^--^;--^;-^^!  «^ 
nf  the  discontent  of  Athens  to  open  negotiations  ^Mth  that  citj     pci 
mV  Uno-  thT  maioritv  of  the  Arcadian  Ten  Thousand  to  send  him 
^  ;  1    r^rnm^^^^^^^^^^^  There  was  difficulty  among  the  Athenians 

^'li^^x^^inlng^ds  -po^fion,  from  the  alHance^ul.i.ir^    h.^ 
..1         ^^A  CiAoito      ih  *  tlipv  were  remindcfi,  that  to  aiseng<«gc  uit 
tZ^t  lion  Th..b  ;.  "aLo  tes  in  ,l,o  .merest  of  Sparta  tlmn  o 
\    ,eiA    a.id  a  favorabV  answer  Avas  then  jriven  to  Lykon.edes.   1  lie 
h    V  to'rk  slnp    t  Peira.us  for  Lis  retnrn,  b..t  never  reacl.od  Arcad.n 
for  he  banpend  to  land  at  tl.e  i^pnl  ^vl.ere  tl.c  Arc-adian  exiles  of  Ibe 
omosite  party  "ere  assembled,  and  these  men  put  h.m  to  death  at 
Xln^'pi^e  of  his  death,  however,  Ibe  alliance  bet^veen  Aread.a 
alld  Atbens'^'i^s  still  l.ronghl  lo  pass,  though  not  ..itbout  opposi- 

*'"Ti.el»s  Tvas  dnrine  (liis  vear  engaged  in  her  .insnrressfn!  campaign 

in  T  ^Salv  (amlde-fto  alna.lv)  for  tbe  rescue  of  P^^'P'd-;-!-;'^ 

•s-ibled  bbr  fr..m  elT.'ctive  efforls  m  Peloponnesus      But  as  soon  as 

hMt  re"c.  c  ba<i  l.<en  accomplished,  Kpaminondas,  her  greatest  man 

.  :     ,er  ml    c<  rs^icuous  orator,  ^^as<lispatc•he;l  into  Arca.i.a  ,o  offer 

in  eoninnc   on  v, ith  an  envoy  from  Argos,  diplon.atic  ol^lruclioi   to 

he  propo'e    Athenian  alliance.  He  ha.l to  sp.ak  agan.sl  ^a'l'^  '•,";'; 

t  e  n  os7distin-..isbc.<l  orator  at  Athens,  who  bad  lK;en  sent  bj  his 

cmin  rvmen   o'pl.ad  Iheir  cause  amidst  the  Arcadian  Ten  Thotisand 

«nMv^o  anion '  other  anruments,  denounced  tbe  enormities  ^vli.cb 

?Hrk  ned  the  iHToic  legends  boll,  of  Thebes  an.    Argos.     ' -W^erc 

ni  iOreste'lnd  Arma-on,  iK-th  n.t.nlerers  of  their  mothers  (asked 

K    l^Ka.u^rtMives  of  A. .sos  ■'.     AV..S  not  ^^^,:^^^ 

father. "";'  "---'l',^''^ -^'^^v  w  ^  B .r'^liltralusMitsSor' 
Epaminondas,  m  hisnpiNj,  ine>  "^*''*  ,  ,,^^,  ,-.,.,]„*  i, ,,,-,,«  ,vere 
crolten  to  tell  you,  that  these  persons,  while  the\  lixed  at  home,  ^^e  e 
fnn  cei  t  or  deputed  lo  he  so.  As  soon  as  their  crimes  became 
Inmv^  Arco^  and  Thebes  banished  them;  and  then  it  was  that 
Athens  rt<^^(>d  lem  stained  with  confessed  guilt  "  This  clever 
'ton  ;o[d  much  to  the  credit  of  the  rhetorical  ^^^^^:^^^^. 
but  hi^  'speech  as  a  whole  was  not  successful.  The  Auadians  co 
ciiidcd  alliance  witfi  Athens;  yet  without  formally  renouncing  iriend- 

"^''IVsooliI^suci;  new  alliance  had  been  ratified,  it  became  impor- 
tam^o  I^ll^^^mire  a  tree  and  assured  entrau^  l^lrc^lllii^lUt 
s.i«-  -.vbile  at  the  same  time  the  lecenl  slackness  of  tbe  C  oun  lii.ms, 
n  rc"  It  t  '  s„inmo.,s  to  Oropus.  ren,l,;re.l  ''e-' n''^!'"^'  "  ,"/ 
their "tdclitv  \ecor,li...-'lv  it  was  .-esolved  in  tbe  Alhen.an  assc.i- 
blv  on  the  mot  on  of  a  ci.iV.en  named  De.notion  to  .seize  and  occupy 
Corinth  th^e  being  alreadv  some  scattered  Athenian  garn-sons.  on 
various  pointe  of  lb!  Corinthian  territory,  ready  to  be  concentrated 


1 


•md  rendered  useful  for  such  a  purpose.  A  fleet  and  land-force 
iiiider  (niares  was  made  ready  and  dispatclied.  But  on  rcachmg 
he  Corinthian  port  of  Kenchreie,  Chares  found  himsclt  sluu  out 
oven  from  admittance.  Tlie  proposition  of  Demotion,  and  the  reso- 
hition  of  the  Athenians,  had  become  known  to  the  Corinthians;  wiio 
forliiwilh  stood  upon  their  guard,  sent  soldiers  of  their  own  to  relieve 
llie  various  Athenian  outposts  on  their  territory,  and  called  upon 
these  latter  to  give  in  any  complaints  for  which  they  might  have 
oround  as  their  services  were  no  longer  needed.  Chares  prctem  ed 
fo  have  learned  that  Corinth  was  in  danger.  But  botii  he  and  the 
remaining  Athenians  were  dismissed,  though  with  every  expreSsiOQ 

of  thanks  and  politeness.  .1        t    4m    i         i   4i,« 

The  treacherous  purpose  of  Athens  was  thus  baffled,  and  the 
Corinthians  were  for  the  moment  sale.  Yet  their  position  was  pre- 
carious and  uncomfortable;  for  their  enemies,  Thebes  and  Argos,  were 
aireadv  their  masters  l)y  land,  and  Athens  had  now  been  converted 
from  an  allv  into  an  enemy.  Hence  they  resolved  to  assemble  a 
sufficient  mercenary  force  in  their  own  pay;  h^t  while  thus  pro- 
vidin"'"  Tor  military  security,  they  sent  envoys  to  I  hebes  to  open  nego- 
tiations for  peace.  Permission  was  granted  to  them  by  the  Tliebans 
to  "-o  and  consult  their  allies,  and  to  treat  for  peace  m  conjuncMon 
with  as  many  as  could  be  brought  to  share  their  views  Accord- 
ino-ly  the  Corinthians  went  to  Sparta  and  laid  their  case  before  the 
full  synod  of  allies,  convoked  for  the  occasion.  *'We  are  on  the 
PO'nt"'of  ruin  (said  the  Corinthian  envoy),  and  must  make  peace 
We  shall  reioice  to  mtike  it  in  conjunction  with  you,  it  you  will 
consent;  but  if  you  think  proper  to  persevere  in  the  war,  be  not  dis- 
pleased if  we  make  peace  without  you."  The  Epidaurians  and 
Phliasians,  reduced  to  the  like  distress,  held  the  same  language  ot 
weariness  and  impatience  for  peace.  ^  ^ 

It  had  been  ascertained  at  Thebes,  that  no  propositions  for  peace 
could  be  entertained,  which  did  not  contain  a  formal  recognition  ot 
the  independence  of  ^lessene.  To  this  the  Corinthians  and  other 
allies  of  Sparta  had  no  difficulty  in  agreeing.  But  they  vainly 
endeavored  to  prevail  upon  Sparta  herself  to  submit  to  the  same  con- 
cession The  Spartans  resolutely  refused  to  relinquish  a  teiTit(3ry 
iHherited  from  victorious  forefathers,  and  held  under  so  lonj-  a  pre- 
scription. They  repudiated  yet  more  indignantly  the  idea  ot  recog- 
niziuo-  as  free  Greeks  and  equal  neighbors,  those  who  had  so  long 
been  Their  slaves.  They  proclaimed  their  determination  of  continuing 
the  war  even  sin^'-le-handed  and  with  all  its  hazards,  to  regain  what 
they  had  lost;  and  although  they  could  not  directly  prohibit  the 
Corinthians  and  other  allies,  whose  sickness  of  the  war  had  oecome 
intolerable,  from  negotiating  a  separate  peace  for  themselves— yet 
they  gave  only  a  reluctant  consent.  xVrchidaraus  son  ot  Airesilaua 
even  reproached  the  allies  with  timorous  selfishness,  partly  in  desert- 
mg  their  benefactress  Sparta  at  her  hour  of  need,  partly  m  recom- 


74 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


TIMOTIIEUS  SENT  TO  ASIA. 


75 


mending  her  to  siihmit  to  a  sacrifice  ruinons  lo  her  honor.  The 
Spartan  prince  roniured  his  coiintrvnien,  iu  the  name  ot  all  their 
ancient  dignity,  to  spurn  the  mandates  of  Thebes;  to  shrink  neither 
from  etfort  nor  from  peril  for  the  reconquest  of  Messene,  even  if 
thev  had  to  tiixht  alone  against  all  Greece;  and  to  convert  their 
mifitary  population  into  a  permanent  camp,  sending  away  then- 
women  and  children  to  an  asylum  in  friendly  foreign  cities. 

Though  tlie  Spartans  were  not  inclined  to  adoi)t  the  desperate 
sut'-'^estions  of  Archidanuis,  yet  this  important  congress  ended  by  a 
sci^ssion  between  them  and  their  allies.  Tiie  Corinthians,  Phhasians, 
Epidaurians,  and  others,  went  to  Thebes,  and  concluded  peace; 
recognizing  the  independence  of  Messene  and  allirming  the  inde- 
pendence of  each  separate  city  within  its  own  territory,  without  either 
obliiratory  alliance,  or  headship  on  the  part  of  any  city.  Yet  when 
the  Thebans  invited  them  to  contract  an  alliance,  they  declined,  say- 
in.f  that  this  would  be  only  embarking  in  war  on  the  other  side; 
whereas  that  which  they  sighed  for  was  peace.  Peace  was  accord- 
iu^ly  sworn,  upon  the  Serins  indicated  in  the  Persian  rescript,  so 
far  as  regarded  the  general  autonomy  of  each  separate  town,  and 
specially  that  of  Messene;  but  not  including  any  sanction,  direct  w 
indirect,  of  Theban  headship.  .  .        * 

This  treaty  removed  out  of  the  war,  and  placed  m  a  position  ot 
neutralitv,  a  considerable  ninnber  of  Grecian  States;  chiefly  those 
near  the  Isthmus— Corinth,  Plilius,  Epidaurus;  probably  Tro-zenand 
Hermione,  since  we  do  not  find  them  again  mentioned  among  the 
contending  parlies.  But  it  left  the  more  powerful  states,  Thebes  and 
Ar»ros— Sparta  and  Athens— still  at  war;  as  well  as  Arcadia,  Achaia, 
and  Elis.  Tlie  relations  between  these  states  however  were  now 
somewhat  complicated:  for  Thebes  was  at  war  with  Sparta,  and  in 
alliance,  thouiih  not  altogether  hearty  alliance,  with  the  Arcadians; 
while  Athens^  was  at  war  with  Thebes,  yet  in  alliance  with  Sparta 
as  well  as  with  Arcadia.  The  Argeians  Avere  in  alliance  with 
Thebes  and  Arcadia,  and  at  war  with  Sparta;  the  Eleiaus  were  on 
unfriendly  terms,  though  not  yet  at  actual  war,  with  Arcadia— yet 
still  (it  would  appearf  in  alliance  with  Thebes.  Lastly,  the  Arca- 
dians themselves  were  losing  their  internal  co-c^peration  and  harmoiiy 
one  with  another,  which  had  only  so  recently  begun.  Two  parties 
were  forming  among  them,  imder  the  old  conflicting  auspices  <  I 
I^Iantineia  and  Tegea.  Tegea.  occupied  by  a  'Ihtban  harmost  r.i.d 
garri>on,  heid  streniiously  with  iMegaloi olis  and  ^lessene  as  well  as 
with  Theoes,  thus  tonsiiiuting  a  stiong  and  united  frontier  against 

As  the  Spartans  complained  of  their  Peloponnesinn  allies,  tor 
lir/ing  tlie  recogiiiiion  of»M(Sstiu' as  an  .aueien«ient  .suite— so  tlay 
were  no  kss  ii'CiLniKUt  with  the  Ptisi;m  king;  who,  thouali  still  call- 
iuiT  ]ji.»:<rlf  ihcir  ally,  iiad  inserted  the  same  recognition  in  the 
rescript  granted  to  PJlopidas.     The  Aiheuians  also  were  dissatisfied 


with  this  rescript.  They  had  (as  has  been  already  stated)  condemned  to 
death  Timauoras,  one  of  their  envoys  wiio  had  accompanied  Pelopidas, 
for  having  received  oribes.  They  now  availed  themselves  of  the 
opening  left  for  them  iu  the  very  words  of  the  rescript,  to  send  a 
fresh  c^nbnssy  up  to  the  Persian"^  court,  and  solicit  more  favorable 
terms.  Their  new  envoys,  communicating  the  fact  that  Tiniagoras 
had  betrayed  his  trust  and  had  been  puni^shed  for  it,^  obtaint^l  from 
the  Great  King  a  fresh  rescript,  pronouncing  xVmphipolis  to  be  an 
Atlienian  possession  instead  of  a  free  city.  Whether  that  other 
article  also  in  the  former  rescript,  which  commanded  Athens  to  call 
in  all  her  armed  ships,  was  now  revoked,  we  cannot  say;  but  it 
seems  probable. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  Athenians  sent  this  second  embassy, 
they  also  dispatched  an  armament  under  Timotheus  to  the  coast  of 
Asia  ]Minor,  vet  with  express  instructions  not  to  violate  the  jjeace 
wilh  the  Persian  king.  Agesilaus,  king  of  Sparta,  w^ent  to  the  samo 
gcene,  thouixh  without  any  public  force;  availing  himself  only  of  his 
k)ni>:-established  military  Veputatiou  to  promote  the  interests  of  his 
country  as  nesi'otiator.  Both  Spartan  and  Athenian  attention  was 
now  tuVned,  directly  and  specially,  toward  Ariobarzanes  the  satrap  of 
Phrygia;  who  (as  litis  been  already  related)  had  sent  over  to  Greece, 
two  years  before,  Philiskus  of  Abydus,  with  the  view  either  of  obtain- 
ing fi-om  the  Thebans  peace  on  terms  favorable  to  Sparta,  or  of  aid- 
inS  the  latter  against  them.  Ariobarzanes  was  then  preparing,  and 
apparently  had  since  openly  consummated,  his  revolt  from  the  Per- 
sian king,  which  Agesilaus  employed  all  his  influence  in  foment- 
ing. The  Athenians,  however,  still  wishing  to  avoid  a  distinct 
breach  Avitli  Persia,  instructed  Timotheus  to  assist  Ariobarzanes— yet 
with  a  form;d  proviso,  that  he  should  not  break  truce  with  the  Great 
King.  Tlfey  also  conferred  both  upon  Ariobarzanes  (with  his  three 
sons],  and  upon  Philiskus,  the  gift  of  Athenian  citizenship.  That 
satrap  seems  now  to  have  had  a  large  mercenary  force,  and  to  have 
been  in  possession  of  both  sides  of  the  Hellespont,  as  well  as  of 
Perinthus  on  the  Propontis;  while  Philiskus.  as  his  chief  oflic  r, 
exercised  extensive  ascendency,  disgraced  by  much  tyranny  and 
brutalitv,  over  the  Grecian  cities  in  that  region. 

Precluded  by  his  instructions  from  openly  aiding  the  revoked 
Ariobarzanes,  Timotheus  turned  his  force  against  the  island  of 
Samos;  which  was  now  held  by  Kyprothemis,  a  Grecian  chief 
with  a  military  force  in  the  service  of  Tigranes,  Persian  satrap 
on  the  opposite  mainland.  How  or  when  Tigranes  had  acquired 
it,  we  do  not  know;  but  the  Persians,  when  once  left  by  the 
peace  of  Antalkidas  in  quiet  possession  of  the  continental  Asiatic 
Greeks,  naturallv  tended  to  push  their  dominion  over  the  neigh- 
boring islands.  "  After  carrying  on  his  military  operations  in  Samos, 
with  8,000  peltasts  and  30  triremes,  for  ten  or  eleven  months, 
Timotheus  became  master  of  it.     His  success  was  the  more  grati- 


78 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


fvino-   as  he  had  found    means  to  pay  and  maintain  his  troops 
OvYiivr  the  ^vhole  time  at   the  cost  of  enc mies  ;  without  either  draw- 
iuo-  upon  the  Athenian  treasury,  or  extorting  contributions  from  allies. 
Vniirpovtant  possession  \^as  thus  acquired  for  Athens,  while  a  con- 
siderable nuiiil  er  of  Samians  of  the  opposite  pnrty  went  into  banish^ 
meut  ^^Vh  il.c  lo.s  of  llieir  pro].erties.     Since  t^timos  was  not  Jimong 
the  h'jTilimate  ].ossiSHons  ol  the  king  of  Pei>ia  this  conquest  was 
nut  understood  to  inport  war  bet^^een  him  and  Athens.     Indeed  it 
ai.pc  urs  tiuit  the  n  volt  of  Ariobarznnes  and  the  uncertain  hdelity  of 
various  neinhboiing  satraps,  shook  for  some  time  the  King  s  authority, 
and  al)-orbid  his  revenues  in  tliese  regions.     Autophradatcstljc  satrap 
^f  Lvaia— and  ^Vlausolus,  native  prince  of  Kaiia  under  Persian  su- 
p,.,.n;.,f.y_attacke(l  Ariobarzanes,  with  the  view  real  or  pretended  of 
auelliiiff  his  revolt  ;  and  laid  siege  to  Assus  and  Adrnmyttium      But 
thev  are  said  to  have  been  induced  to  desist  by  the  personal  influence 
of  Affe^ilaus.     As  the  latter  had  no  army,  nor  any  means  of  aJlure 
ment  (except  perhsips  some  money  derived   from  Ariobarzanes),  we 
may  fairly  prtsume  that  the  two  besiegers  were  not  very  earnest  m 
the  cause:     Moreover,  we  shall  find  both  of  them,  a  few  yeai^^  after- 
ward inioint  revolt  with  Ariobarzanes  himself  against  t ho  Persian 
ku^r  '   Affesilaus  obtained,  from  all  three,  pecuniary  aid  for  Sparta. 

flie  acquisition  of  Sixmos,  while  it  exalted  the  reputation  of 
Timotheus,  materially  enlarged  the  maiitime  dommion  of  Athens. 
It  seems  also  to  have  weakened  the  hold  of  the  Great  King  on  Asia 
Minor— to  have  disposed  the  n  sidents.  both  satraps  and  Grecian 
cities  to  revolt— and  thus  to  have  helped  Ariobarzanes,  who  rewarded 
both  Agesilaus  and  Timotheus.  Agesilaus  was  enabled  to  carry 
home  a  sum  of  money  to  his  embarrasK'd  countrymen;  but  limo- 
theus  declining  pecuniarv  aid,  obtained  for  Athens  the  mere  valua- 
ble boon  of  re^rdmission  to  the  Thracian  Chersonese.  Ariobarzanes 
made  over  to  him  Sestus  and  Krithote  in  that  peninsula  ;  possessions 
doubly  precious,  as  they  secured  to  the  Athenians  a  partial  mastery  ot 
the  passage  of  the  Hellespont  ;  with  a  large  circumjacent  territory 

for  occupation.  .  ^  m    ♦  f^A 

Samos  juid  the  Chersonese  were  not  simply  new  tributary  confed- 
erates a  ^^'n-esrated  to  the  Athenian  synod.  They  were,  m  large  pro- 
portiou"Sew  territories  acquired  to  Athens,  open  to  be  occupied  by 
Athenian  citizens  as  out-settlers  or  kleruchs.  Much  of  the  C  herso- 
nese  had  been  possessed  by  Athenian  citizens,  even  from  the  tune  ot 
the  first  Miltiades  and  afterward  down  to  the  destruction  of  the 
Athenian  empire  in  405  B.C.  Though  all  these  proprietors  had  bec'ii 
then  driven  home  and  expropriated,  they  had  never  lost  the  hope  ot  a 
favorable  turn  of  fortune  and  eventual  re-entry.  That  moment  had 
now  arrived.  The  formal  renunciation  of  all  private  appropriations 
of  land  out  of  Attica,  which  Athens  had  proclaimed  at  the  formation 
of  her  s<'Cond  confederacy  in  o78  B.C.,  as  a  means  of  conciliating 
maritime  allies— wa.s  lorgoLten,  now  that  she  stood  no  longer  in  fear 


ATHENS  AND  THE  CHERSONESE. 


77 


of  fiparta.  The  same  system  of  kleruchies,  w^hich  li-M  so  much  dis- 
credited her  former  empire,  w^as  again  partially  commenced.  Many 
kleruchs,  or  lot-holders,  w^ere  sent  out  to  occupy  lands  both  at  Samos 
and  In  tile  Chersonese.  These  men  were  Athenian  citizens,  who  still 
remained  citizens  of  Athens  even  in  their  foreign  domicile,  and 
whose  properties  formed  part  of  the  taxable  schedule  of  Athens.  The 
particulars  of  this  important  measure  are  unknow^n  tons.  At  Samos 
the  emigrants  must  have  been  new^  men ;  for  there  had  never  been 
any  kleruchs  there  before.  But  in  the  Chersonese,  the  old  Athenian 
proprietors,  who  had  been  expropriated  forty  years  before  (or  their 
descendants),  doubtless  now  went  back,  and  tried,  with  more  or  lessor 
success,  to  regain  ihoir  previous  lands  ;  re-enforced  by  bands  of  new 
emigrants.  And  Timotheus,  having  once  got  footing  at  Sestus  and 
Krithote,  soon  extended  his  acquisitions  to  Ela?us  and  other  places  ; 
whereby  Athens  was  emboldened  publicly  to  claim  the  whole  Cher- 
sonese, or  at  least  most  part  of  it,  as  her  own  ancient  possession— 
from  its  extreme  northern  boundary  at  a  line  drawn  across  the  isth- 
mus north  of  Kardia,  down  to  Ela?us  at  its  southern  extremity. 

This  transfer  of  lands  in  Samos  to  Athenian  proprietors,  combined 
with  the  resumption  of  the  Chersonese,  appears  to  have  excited  a 
strong  sensation  throu^di out  Greece,  as  a  revival  of  ambitious  ten- 
dencies on  the  part  of  Athens,  and  a  manifest  departure  from  those 
disinterested  professions  wiiich  she  had  set  forth  in 378  B.C.  Even  in 
the  Athenian  assembly,  a  citizen  named  Kydias,  pronounced  an  em- 
phatic protest  agaiustlhe  emigration  of  the  kleruchs  to  Samos.  How- 
ever, obnoxious  as  the  measure  was  to  criticism,  yet  having  been  pre- 
ceded by  a  conquering  siege  and  the  expulsion  of  many  native  proprie- 
tors, it  does  not  seem  to  have  involved  Athens  in  so  much  real  ditli- 
culty  as  the  resumption  of  her  old  rights  in  the  Chersonese.  Not  only 
did  she  here  come  into  conflict  with  independent  towns,  like  Kardia, 
which  resisted  her  pretensions— and  with  resident  proprietors  wiiom 
she  was  to  aid  her  citizens  in  dispossessing— but  also  with  a  new 
enemy,  Kotys,  king  of  Thrace.  That  prince,  claiming  the  CheFsonese 
as  Thracian  territory,  w^as  himself  on  the  point  of  seizing  Sestus, 
when  Agesilaus  or  Ariobarzanes  drove  him  away,  to  make  room  for 
Timotheus  and  the  Athenians. 

It  has  been  already  mentioned,  that  Kotys— the  new  Thracian  enemy, 
but  previously  the  friend  and  adopted  citizen,  of  Athens— was  father- 
in-law  of  the  "Athenian  general  Iphikratcs,  whom  he  had  enabled  to 
establish  and  people  the  town  and  settlement  called  Drys,  on  the  coast 
of  Thrace.  Iphikrates  had  been  employed  by  the  Athenians  for 
the  last  three  or  four  years  on  the  coasts  of  Macedonia  and  Chalki- 
dike,  and  especially  against  Amphipolis  ;  but  he  had  neither  taken 
the  latter  place,  nor  obtained  (so  far  as  we  know)  any  other  success; 
though  he  had  incurred  the  expense  for  three  years  of  a  mercenary 
general  named  Charidemus  with  a  body  of  troops.  How  so  unprof- 
itable a  result,  on  the  part  of  au  energetic  man  like  Iphikrates,  is  to 


78 


FOU^T)ATION  OF  MESSENE. 


TiMOTlIEUB. 


79 


be  explained— we  cannot  tell.     But  it  naturally  placed  him  before 
the  eves  of  his  countrymen  in  disadvantafreous  contest  whh  Timo- 
theus'  who  had  just  acquired  Samos  and  the  Chersonese.     An  addi- 
tional'reason  for  mistrusting  Iphikrates.  too,  was  presented  by  the 
fact  that  Atliens  was  uow^at  war  with  his  father-in  law,  Kolys. 
Hence  it  was  now  resolved  by  the  Athenians  to  recall  him,  and  ap- 
point Timotheus  to  an  extensive  command,  includin.c;  Thrace  and 
Macedonia  as  well  as  the  Chersonese.     Perhaps  party  enmities  be- 
tween the  two  Athenian  chiefs,  with  their  respective  friends,  may 
have  contributed  to  the  chancre.    As  Iphikrates  liad  been  the  accuser 
of  Timotheus  a  few  vears  before,  so  the  latter  may  have  seized  this 
opporiunitv  of  retaliating.     At  all  events  the  dismissed  general  con- 
ducted himself  in  such  a  manner  as  to  justify  the  mistrust  of  his 
couutrA-men;  taking  part  Avith  his  father-in-law  Kotys  in  the  war, 
and  actually  fightimr  against  Athens,    lie  hgd  got  into  his  possession 
some  hostages  of  Amphipolis.    surrendered   to  him   by  Ilarpalus; 
which  gave  great  hopes  of  extorting  the  surrender  of  tiie  town. 
These  hostaires  he  had  consigned  to  the  custody  of  the  mercenary 
general  Charidemus,  though  a  vote  had  been  pa^e-ed  in  tlie  Athenian 
assembly  that  they  should  be  sent  to  Athens.     As  soon  as  the  ai<- 
pointmeut  of  Iphikrates  was  canceled,  Charidenuis  forthwith  sur- 
rendered  the   hostages   to  the  Amphipolitans  thtmsclves,  thus  de- 
priving  Athens  of  a  material  advantage.     And  this  was  not  all. 
Thoudi  Charidemus  bad  been  three  years  with  his  band  m  the  ser- 
vice o"f  Athens  under  Iphikrates.  yet  when  the  new  general  Timothe- 
us wished  to  re-engage  him,  he  declined  the  proposition;  eonvcyu.g 
away  his  troops  in  Athenian  transports,  to  enter  into  the  i)ay  ot  a 
decided  enemy  of  Athens— Kotys;  and  in  conjunction  with  Ipl  i- 
krates  himself.     He  was  subsequentljr  coming  by  sea  fn  m  Kardia 
to  take  service  under  her  o'.hei  enemies.  Olynlhus  and  Am])hipolis, 
when  he  was  captured  by  the  Athenian  fleet.     Under  these  circum- 
stances, he  was  aL^iin  prevailed  on  to  serve  Athens. 

It  was  a^iinst  these  tAvo  cities,  and  the  general  coast  of  Macedrnia 
nnd  the  Chalkidlc  Thrace,  that  Timotheus  devoted  Lis  first  atien- 
>ion  postponing  for  the  moment  Kotys  and  the  Cheisonese.  In  this 
enterprise  he  ivin.d  means  to  obtain  tl:e  alliance  of  Mac(  d()nia,whi(  h 
had  been  hostile  to  his  predecessor  Iphikrates.  Ptokmy  of  Alorns, 
resrent  of  that  countiA',  who  Lad  assassinated  the  preceding  king. 
Afexandcr  son  of  Amvntas,  was  l,imKlf  aseassinattd  (3(55  B.C.) 
by  Perdikkas,  brotlier*of  Alexander.  Ferdikkas,  during  the  first 
year  or  Iwo  of  his  reign,  seems  to  have  been  friendly  and  not 
hostile  to  Athens.  He  lent  aid  to  Timotheus,  who  turned  his 
force  against  Olynthus  and  other  toAvns  both  in  the  Chalkidic 
Thrace  ^and  on  the  coast  of  Macedonia.  Probably  the  Olynthian 
confederacy  mav  have  been  again  acquiring  strength  durmg 
the  venrs  of  recent  fc^part::n  hrmiliat'.on;  so  that  Perdikkas  now- 
found  his  account  in  assif  ling  Athens  ti.  sulxlue  or  tnteebic  :t,  just 


••,=^  h'5  father  Amyntas  had  invoked  Sparta  for  the  bke  purpose. 
Timo'Ueus  with  the  assistaiic':^  of  Perdikkis,  Avas  very  successful  m 
t'r"c  parts-  making  himself  master  of  Torone,  Pofidaia,  Pydna, 
Ah'thofcc  and  various  other  places.  As  lie  mastered  many  of  the 
Oaalkidic  towns  allied  with  Olynthus,  the  means  and  adherents  still 
r't-uuedby  that  city  became  so  much  diminished,  that  Timotheus  is 
spoken  oi  loosely  as  having  conquered  it.  Here,  as  at  Samos,  he 
o')ta-'ned  his  successes  not  only  without  cost  to  Athens,  but  also  (as 
we  are  told)  without  severities  upon  the  allies,  simply  from  the 
re'^-ular  contributions  of  the  Thraciaii  confederates  of  Athens,  as- 
sisted by  the  employment  of  a  temporary  comage  of  base  metal. 
Yet  thouMi  Timotheus  was  thus  victorious  in  and  near  the  Tlier- 
m lie  Gulf  he  Avas' not  more  fortunate  than  his  predecessor  m  hia 
ntk'inpt  to  achieve  that  which  Athens  had  most  nt  heart— the  capture 
o*'  Vmphipolis;  although,  by  the  accidental  capture  of  Charidemus 
at  sea  he  was  enabled  again  to  enlist  that  chief  with  his  band, 
w lose  services  seem  to  hive  been  gratefully  appreciated  at  Athens. 
Timotheus  first  dispatched  xVlkimachus,  who  was  repulsed— thea 
Imded  himself  and  attacked  the  city.  But  the  Amphipolitans,  aided 
hv  the  neisrhhoring  Tliracians,  in  large  numbers  (and  perhaps  by  the 
Thracian  Kotys),  mule  so  strenuous  a  resistance,  that  ho  was  forced 
to  retire  Avith  loss;  and  even  to  burn  some  triremes,  which,  haA^ing 
been  carried  across  to  assail  the  city  from  tlie  wide  part  of  the  river 
Strvmon  above,  could  not  be  brought  oif  i:i  the  face  of  the  enemy.^ 

timotheus  next  turned  his  attention  to  .the  war  against  Kotys  in 
Thrace,  and  to  the  defense  of  the  newly-acquired  Athenian  posses- 
sions in  the  Chersonese,  now  menaced  by  the  appearance  of  a  new 
and  unexpected  enemy  to  Athens  in  the  eastern  Avatei-s  of  the  ^gean 

—a  Theban  fleet.  ,„     ,       ,     ,  .      i 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  in  366  B.C.,  Thebes  had  sustained 
trreat  misfortunes  in  The.ssal  v.  Pelopidas  had  been  fraudulently  seized 
and  detained  as  prisoner  by  Alexander  of  Phera^;  a  Theban  army  had 
been  sent  to  rescue  him,  but  had  been  dishonorably  repulsed,  and  had 
only  been  enabled  to  effect  its  retreat  by  the  genius  of  Epaminondas, 
thea  serving  as  a  private,  and  called  upon  by  the  soldiers  to  take  the 
command.  ''Afterward,  Epaminondas  himself  had  been  sent  at  the 
head  of  a  second  army  to  extricate  his  captive  friend,  which  he  hatl 
accomplished,  but  not  without  relinquishing  Thessaly  and  leaving 
Alexander  more  poAverful  than  CA-er.  For  a  certain  time  after  this 
defeat,  the  Thebans  remained  comparatively  humbled  and  quiet.  At 
leno-th,  the  aggravated  oppressions  of  the  tyrant  Alexander  occasioned 
such  sufferim?  and  provoked  such  missions  of  complaint  on  the  part 
of  the  ThessaUans  to  Thebes,  that  Pelopidas,  burning  with  ardor  to 
reveno-e  both  his  city  and  himself,  prevailed  on  the  Thebans  to  place 
him  St  the  head  of  a  fresh  army  for  the  purpose  of  invading  Thes- 

At  the  same  time,  probably,  the  remarkable  successes  of  the  Athe- 


80 


FOUNDATION  OF  MESSENE. 


/ 


/ 


nians  under  Timotheus.  at  Saraos  and  tlie  Chersonese,  had  ejated 
iineasinoss  throusjhout  Greece,  and  jealousy  on  tlie  part  of  th^  Thc- 
l^ans  Epuminondas  ventured  to  propose  to  his  countrymen  tlAt  they 
shouhl  ixrapple  with  Athens  on  lier  own  element,  and  compete  for  the 
headship  of  Greece  not  only  on  land  but  at  sea.  In  fact  the  rescript 
broii^-ht  down  by  Pelopidas  from  the  Persian  court  sanctioned  this 
pretension,  by  commaudini;  Athens  to  lay  up  her  ships  of  war,  on  pam 
of  incurring  the  chastisement  of  the  Great  King:  a  nnindale,  which 
she  had  so  "completely  defied  as  to  push  her  maritime  efforts  more 
enerf'-eticallv  than  before.  Epaminondas  employed  all  his  eloquence 
toinipress  upon  his  countrvmen,  that,  Sparta  being  now  humbled, 
Athens  was  their  actual  and  prominent  enemy.  He  reminded  them 
—in  language  such  as  had  been  used  by  Brasidas  in  the  early  years  of 
the  Pelol>om)esian  war,  and  by  Heimokrates  at  Syracuse— that  nu'u 
such  as  the  Thebans,  brave  and  trained  soldiers  on  land,  could  soon 
acquire  the  like  qualities  on  shipboard:  and  that  the  Athenians  then- 
selves  had  once  been  mere  landsmen,  until  the  exigencies  of  the  Per- 
sian war  forced  them  to  tnke  to  the  sea.  "  We  must  put  down  tliis 
hauffhty  rival  (he  exhorted  his  countrymen);  we  must  transfer  to  our 
own  citadel,  the  Kadmeia.  those  magnificent  Propylaea  which  adon 
the  entrance  of  the  acropolis  at  Athens."  ,     ,       .,  „     ,. 

Such  emphatic  languai^e,  as  it  long  lived  in  the  hostile  recollcctioQ 
of  \thenian  orators,  so  it  excited  at  the  moment  extreme  ardor  on 
the  part  of  the  Theban  hearers.  They  resolved  to  build  and  equip 
one  hundred  triremes,  and  to  construct  docks  with  ship-houses  fit  for 
the  constant  maintenance  of  such  a  number.  Epaminondas  himself 
was  named  commander,  to  sail  with  the  first  fleet,  as  soon  as  it  should 
be  ready  to  Hellespont  and  the  islands  near  Ionia;  while  invitations 
were  afthe  same  time  dispatched  to  Rhodes,  Chios,  and  Byzantium, 
encouraoino-  them  to  prepare  for  breaking  with  Athens.  Some  oppo- 
sition howc\'er  was  made  in  the  Theban  assembly  to  the  new^  under- 
takino--  especially  by  Menekleidas,  an  opposition  speaker,  who,  being 
f-eauent  and  severe  in  his  criticisms  upon  the  leading  men  such  as 
Pelopidas  and  Epaminondas,  has  been  handed  down  by  Nepos  and 
Plutarch  in  odious  colors.  Demagogues  like  him,  whose  power  re- 
sided in  the  public  assembly,  are  commonly  represented  as  if  they 
had  a  natural  interest  in  plunging  their  cities  into  w^ar,  in  order  that 
there  mio-ht  be  more  matter  of  accusation  against  the  leading  men. 
This  representation  is  founded  mainly  on  the  picture  which  Thucydi- 
de-^  f^ives  of  Kleou  in  the  first  half  of  the  Peloponnesian  war:  I  have 
endeavored  in  a  former  volume  to  show%  that  it  is  not  a  fair  estimate 
even  of  Kleon  separately,  much  less  of  the  demagogues  generally, 
un  warlike  men  both  in  taste  and  aptitudes.  Menekleidas  at  Thebes, 
far  from  promoting  warlike  expeditions  in  order  that  he  might  de- 
nounce the  generals  when  they  came  back,  advocated  the  prudence 
of  continued  peace,  and  accused  Epaminondas  of  involving  his  coun- 
try in  distant  and  dangerous  -schemes,  with  a  view  to  emulate  the 


POLICY  OP  EPAMINONDAS. 


81 


Hories  of  Agamemnon  by  sailing  from  Aulls  in  Bopotia,  as  comman- 
(ier  of  an  imposing  fieet  to  make  conquests  in  the  Hellespont.  "  By 
the  help  of  Thebes  (replied  Epaminondas)  I  have  already  done  more 
than  Aeamemnon.     He,  with  the  forces  of  Sparta  and  all  Greece  be- 


s 
for 


ides,  was  ten  years  in  taking  a  single  city;  while  I,  with  the  single 
orce  of  Thebes  and  at  the  single  day  of  Leuktraj  liave  crushed  the 
power  of  the  Agamemnouiah  Sparta."  While  repelling  the  charge 
of  personal  motives,  Epaminondas  contended  that  peace  would  be 
tantamount  to  an  abnegation  of  the  headship  of  Greece  ;  and  that,  if 
Thebes  wished  to  maintain  that  ascendant  station,  she  must  keep  her 
citizens  in  constant  warlike  training  and  action. 

To  err  with  Epaminondas  may  be  considered,  by  some  readers,  as 
better  than  being  rijj^ht  with  Menekleidas.  But  on  the  main  point  of 
this  debate,  Menekleidas  appears  to  have  l)een  really  right.  For  the 
general  exhortations  ascribed  to  Epaminondas  resemble  but  too  closely 
those  feverish  stimulants,  which  Alkibiades  administered  at  Athens 
to  wind  up  his  countrymen  for  the  fatal  expedition  against  Syracuse. 
If  we  should  even  grant  his  advice  to  be  wise,  in  reference  to  land- 
warfare,  w^c  must  recollect  that  he  was  here  impelling  Thebes  into  a 
new  and  untried  maritime  career,  for  which  she  had  neither  aptitude 
nor  facilities.  To  maintain  ascendency  on  haul  alone,  would  require 
all  her  force,  and  perhaps  prove  too  hard  for  her;  to  maintain  ascend- 
ency by  land  and  sea  at  once  would  be  still  more  impracticable.  By 
graspinsc  at  both,  she  would  probably  keep  neither.  Such  considera- 
tions warrant  us  in  suspecting,  that  the  project  of  stretching  across  the 
iEgean  for  ultramarine  dependencies  was  suggested  to  this  great  man 
not  so  much  by  a  sound  appreciation  of  the  permanent  interests  of 
Tliebes,  as  by  jealousy  of  Athens— especially  since  the  recent  con- 
quests of  Timotheus. 

The  project  however  was  really  executed,  and  a  large  Theban  fleet 
under  Epaminondas  crossed  the  iEgcan  in  363  B.C.  In  tlie  same 
year,  apparently,  Pelopidas  marched  into  Thessaly,  at  the  head  of 
a  Theban  land-force,  against  Alexander  of  Pliera3.  What  the  fleet 
achieved,  we  are  scarcely  permitted  to  know.  It  appears  that  Epam- 
inondas visited  Byzantium:  and  we  are  told  that  he  drove  off  the 
Athenian  guard-squadron  under  Laches,  prevailing  upon  several  of 
tlie  allies  of  Athens  to  declare  in  his  favor.  Both  he  and  Timotheus 
appciar  to  have  been  in  these  seas,  if  not  at  the  same  time,  at  least 
with  no  great  interval  of  time  between.  Both  were  solicited  by  the 
oligarchy  of  the  Pontic  Herakleia  a.^ainst  the  people;  and  both 
declined  to  furnish  aid.  Timotheus  is  said  to  have  liberated  the 
besieged  town  ofKyzikus;  by  whom  it  was  besieged,  we  do  not 
certainly  know,  but"  probably  by  the  Theban  fleet.  Epaminondas 
brought  back  his  fieet  at  the  end  of  the  year,  without  having  gained 
any  splendid  victory,  or  acquired  any  tenable  possession  for  Thebes; 
yet  not  without  weakening  Athens,  unsealing  her  hold  upon  her 
dependencies,  and  seconding  indirectly  the  liostilitie:^  carried  on  by 


82 


FOUNDATION  OF  ^lESSENIl 


DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


83 


Kotys'  iusomuch  that  tlie  Athenian  alTah's  in  the  Chersonese  and 
Tlu-uce  were  mueh  less  prosperous  in  802  ii.c.  than  they  had  hern  i.i 
304  IJ  c  Probuhlv  Epaminondas  intended  to  return  \vitii  Ins  ileet 
in  tlie  next  year  (302  li.c).  and  to  push  his  rnaritinie  enterprises  hliil 
further-  hut  we  sh:dl  lind  hini  imperatively  ealled  elsewhere,  to 
another  and  ;i  fatal  buttle-lield.  And  thus  the  first  naval  expedition 
of  Thebes  was  likewise  the  hust.  _  ,     . ,      ,     ,  i     i   •  . 

Meanwhile  his  friend  and  eollea^rue  Pclopidas  lii.d  marched  imo 
Thessalv  ai;ainst  the  despot  Alexander;  who  was  now  at  the  heid.t 
of  his  powTr,  holdinsr  in  dependenee   a   large  portion  of  Thessaly 
to^cnher  with  the  Phlhiot  Aeh;eans  and  the  jMagnetes.  and  havin:;- 
AUieus  as  his  ally.     Nevertheless,  so  levoltii^.r^li^^t^  ^^^'^^  hisernelties 
and  so  numerous  were  the  nialeontents  who  l.ad  st  nt  to  invite  aid 
from  Thebes,  that  Pelopidas  did  not  despair  of  over])owering  him. 
Nor  was  he  daunted  even  by  au  eelipse  of  the  sun,  whieh  is  said  to 
have  oecurred  just  as  he  was  commeneiniz;  his  nnmh,  nor  by  the 
gloomy  warnings  whieh  the  prophets  founded  upon  it;  though  this 
event  intimidated  maiiv  of  his  feilow-eiiizens,  so  that  his  force  was 
rendered  less  numerous  as  well  as  less  eonfideut.     Arriving  at  l^liar- 
salus,  and  strengthening  liimself  by  the  junction  of  his  Thessalum 
allies,  he  found  Alexander  approaching  to  meet  him  at  the  head  ot  a 
well-appointed  mercenary  force,  greatly  sunerior   in  number.     The 
two  chiets  contended  who  should  occupy  hist  the  hills  called  Kynos 
Kephahe.  or  the  Doii's  Heads.     Pelopidas  arrived  there  first  with  his 
cavalry,  beat  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy,  and  pursued  them  to  some 
c'istance;  but  he  thus  left  the  Iiills  cp(n  to  be  occupied  by  the  ncmer- 
«  us  infantry  of  the  tnemy.  while  his  own  infantiy.  ccndngup  later, 
were  repulsed  with  lo^s  in  their  attempt  to  carry  the  position.     1  hus 
III  promising  did  the  battle  appear,  when  Pelopidas  returned  from 
tiie  pursuit.     Ordering  his  victorious  cavalry  to  charge  the  infantry 
rn  the  hill  in  Hank,  he  immediately  dismounted,  seized  his  shield,  and 
put  himself  at  the  head  of  Ids  own  discouraged  infantry,  whom  he 
a<-ain  led  up  the  hill  to  attack  the  position.     His  pres<  nee  infi^.sed  so 
much  fresii  ardor,  tluit  Ids  troops,  in  spite  of  being  twice  reiulsid 
succeeded  in  a  third  attempt  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the  summit 
of  the  hill.     Thus  master  of  the  hiil,  Pelopidas  saw  before  him  the 
whole  army  of  the  enemy,  retiring  in  some  disoider,  though  not  vet 
beaten-  while  Alexander  in  pei.-on  was  en  the  right  wing,  exerting 
himself  to  rally  .-aid  encourace  them.     ^Vhen  Pclopidas  beheld,  as  it 
were  within  his  reach,  this  detested  enemy— whose  treacherous  arrest 
and  dungeon  he  had  himself  experienced,  and  whose  cruelties  fii.ed 
every  one's  mouth— he  was  seized  ^^  ith  a  tninsjiort  of  rage  and  mad- 
re^ss  like  Cyrus  the  younger  on  the  field  of  Kunaxa  at  the  sight  of 
Ids  brother  Artaxerxes.     AVithout  thinking  of  his  duties  as  a  general, 
or  even  looking  to  see  bv  whom  he  was  followed,  he  rushed  impetu- 
ously forward,  with  loud  cries  and  challenges  to  Alexander  to  ccr.e 
forth  and  tight.     The  latter,  declining  the  challenge  retired  amcng 


his  iriiards,  into  the  midst  of  whom  Pelopidas  plunged,  with  the  few 
who  followed  him,  an  I  there,  while  fighting  with  desperate  ])rayery, 
met  his  death.  So  rapidlv  hid  this  rash  proceeding  been  consum- 
mated that  his  armv  behind  did  not  at  first  perceive  it.  but  they 
uresen'tiv  hastened  'forward  to  rescue  or  avenge  him,  vigorously 
charged  the  troops  of  Alexander,  and  put  them  to  flight  with  severe 

^  Yet  this  victory,  though  important  to  the  Thebans,  and  still  more 
important  to  the'Thessafians,  was  to  both  of  them  robbed  of  all  its 
sensible  value  by  the  death  of  Pelopidas.  The  demonstrations  of 
irrief  throu^-hout  the  army  were  unbounded  and  universal,  the  sol- 
diers yet  warm  from  their  victory,  the  wounded  men  with  wounds 
still  untended,  flocked  around  the  corpse,  piling  up  near  to  it  as  a 
trophy  the  arms  of  the  slain  enemies.  Many,  retusmg  either  to  kin- 
dle lire  ortotoiu'h  their  evening  meal,  testified  their  affliction  by 
cuttino-'off  their  own  hair  as  well  as  the  manes  of  their  horses.^  Ihe 
Thessalian  cities  vied  with  eanh  other  in  tokens  of  affectionate 
resp  'ct  and  obtained  from  the  Thebans  permission  to  take  tn^  chiet 
sluire  in  his  funeral,  as  their  lost  guardian  and  protector.  At  1  hebes. 
the  emotion  was  no  less  strikingly  manifested.  Endeared  to  his 
countrymen  first  as  the  head  of  that  devoted  handful  of  exiles  who 
braved  every  peril  to  rescue  the  city  from  the  Lacedaemonians,  Pelop- 
idas had  been  re-elected  without  interruption  to  the  annual  office  of 
B Totarch  during  all  the  yeuvs  that  had  since  elapsed  (378-304  B.C.). 
He  had  taken  a  leading  part  in  all  their  struggles,  and  all  their  glo- 
ries; he  had  been  foremost  to  cheer  them  in  the  hour  of  despondency; 
he  had  lent  himself,  with  the  wisdom  of  a  patriot  and  the  generosity 
of  a  friend,  to  second  the  guiding  ascendency  of  Epaminondas,  and 
his  moderation  of  dealing  toward  conquered  enemies. 

All  that  Thebes  could  do  was  to  avenge  the  death  of  Pelopidas 
The  Theban  generals,  Malkitas  and  Diogeiton,  conducted  a  powerful 
force  of  7,000  hoplites  into  Thessaly,  and  put  themselves  at  the  head 
of  their  partisans  in  that  country.  With  this  united  Jirmy  they 
l)i-essed  Alexander  hard,  completely  worsted  him,  and  reduced  him 
to  submit  to  their  own  terms.  He  was  compelled  to  relinquish  all  his 
dependencies  in  Thessaly;  to  confine  himself  to  Phene,  with  its  ter- 
ritory near  the  Gulf  of  Pagasa?  ;  and  to  swear  adherence  to  1  hebes 
as  a  leader.  All  Thessaly,^  together  with  the  Phthiot  Acluieans  and 
theMagnetes,  became  annexed  to  the  headship  of  the  Thebans,  wlio 
thus  acquired  greater  ascendency  in  northern  Greece  than  they  had 
everenjoved  before.  The  power  of  Alexander  was  effectually  put 
down  on  "land;  but  he  still  continued  both  powerful  and  predatory 
at  sea,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  ensuing  year. 


84 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


CHAPTER  LXXX. 

FROM  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS  TO  THE  BATTLE  CF  MANTIKEIA. 

llu  fircf  M   ruhika'dopidas  ^vas  engaged  in  thai  Tl.c.alian  cam- 
;i.M  VumtLc  ce  he  never  relurned-that  the  Thebans  destroyed 
<;  d    n    mis     That  city,  the  second  in  the  Baotian  federation,  had 
Hxv  vsbeen\lisaffec^  Thebes.     The  abKT.ce  ol   the  t>vo 

•^     '{  kade^s  as  °ell  as  oi  a  large  Theban  force   n  1  he>.aly,  seems 
fo  h-  ve  be  n  recorded  by  the  Or(h(.nienian  Knights  or  Horsemen 
U.efii'tamUichest  among  the  citizens.  800  m  number)  ^'H  «  favo - 
a  le  mom  nt  for    attack.     Some  Thiban   exdes  tock   rar    m  this 
f  hcn?eTith  avie^^'  to  oveithroTS'  the  existing  goven  mint;  and  a 
ch      •  DPoVn  ed  for  a  n.ilitarv  re^ie^v  near  Thebes,  ^vas  lixed  for  exe- 
u  irn^^  A   a  U  number  of  conspirators  joined,  .villi  apparen    ar- 
d         Butbefc^e  the  chiy  arrived,  several  of  th(m  repented  and  be- 
myed   the   pl^^^^       the  Ba-otarchs;  upon  .vliich    the   Orchomeniaii 
u  rc^^c>n%cTe  seized,  brought  before  the  Theban  assembly   con- 
en  n^d  "o  de ith  and    xecuted.     IVIoreoVer.  the  resolution  uas taken 
tor^Tic-V  t Ic  town,  to  kill  the  male  adults,  and  to  sell  the  women 
l?ul   rl   klrc  n     nto    slavery.     This  barbarous  decree  was  executed. 
ouA    m   "J    a  c'Sfraction  found  means  to  escape,    ornung 
e  keri^d   >    that  population  which  was  a{ter^vards  restored.     The 
•  n  men^,^^^^^        ancitJ^it  Theban   hatred  was  thus  satuited;  a  hatred 
r  d.?-  Us  ori^^  n  even  to  those  mythical  times  when  Thebes  was  said 
loha^^^^id^^l^ite  to  prchomei^us.     But  Uie  cra.ii.  of  this  v^^^ 
nhlo  cilv  from  the  list  <.f  autononums units  in  Ilcllas,  -svim  iiie-i\iioic 
fl  ^iJZ^  and  sale  of  so  many  free  kinsmen  '^^^^^^y;^;^ 
sirono-  M-mnatliv  throuclioiit  the   neighbors,  as  -nch  as  leingnancc 
a.™nstflSn  cn,elty>a  sentiment  probably  "Pf"'^  /J  !^'^J^^', 
TChich  we  must  presume  to  have  been  '""^"'l^"  -'''"\/^*-„J^n4^ 
appropriated  the  territory  among  their  o^vu  "'f'f-^i* ''^"'^.  t^^t 
th- 1  the  nei'diboring  town  of  Koroueia  shared  the  same  fate,  at  least 
htwoarr afterwards  spoken  of  together    «  f  ;-''  '-'X'e  n  o 
tnike  us  suDDOse  so.     Thebes  thus  absorbed  into  hei self  these  iano 
tZ  ns  and  tPPrrutdes  to  the  north  of  her  own  city,  as  well  as  Plata-a 

''"^ImrreconeTrat  during  the  -preniacy  of  Sparta  and  the 
Dcriod  of  Theban  struff-le  and  humiliation,  before  the  ^'^ttleof  Leuk 
?ra  Ordlome'ms  had  activdy  embraced  the  Spartan  ^-^^^-J^^^'^ 
after  that  victory   the  Thebans  had  been  anxious  under  their  tiist 
^u^uW^es^^^  to  destrov  the  city,  ^'11;-^  ^-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

the  lenient  recommendations  ot  Epammondas.  .^l^^^^^^i^.^^^^^^^^^^ 
pressed  wrath  was  revived  by  the  conspiracy  of  the  Orchomeman 


RETURN  OF  EPAMINONDAS. 


85 


Kni'-hts;  yet  the  extreme  severity  of  the  proceeding  wouM  never 
liavv?"  oeeirconsuramated  but  for  the  absence  of  Epaminondas,  who 
WIS  deeply  chagrinedon  his  return.  He  well  knew  the  bitter  cen- 
sures which  Thebes  would  draw  upon  herself  by  punishing  the  entire 
dty  for  the  conspiracy  of  the  wealthy  Knights,  and  in  a  mauuer 
even  more  rigorous  than  Platjea  and  Thespiie;  since  the  inhabitants 
of  the-e  two  latter  were  expelled  with  their  families  out  ot  Baolia, 
while  the  Orchomeniau  mule  adults  were  slain,  and  the  women  and 
children  sold  into  slavery.  f  qpo  „  ^ 

On  returning  from  his  maritime  expedition  at  the  end  ot  6b6  B.C., 
Epaminondas  was  re-elected  one  of  the  Ba-otarchs.  He  had  prob- 
ably intended  to  renew  his  cruise  during  the  coming  year.  But  his 
dia-riii  for  the  Orchoincuian  alfair,  and  his  grief  for  the  death  ot 
Polopidas— an  intimate  friend,  as  well  as  a  political  colleague  whom 
he  could  trust— mii^ht  deter  him  from  a  second  absence;  while  the 
affairs  of  Peloponnesus  also  were  now  becoming  so  complicated  as 
to  reader  the  necessity  of  renewed  Theban  interference  again  prob- 

able 

Since  the  peace  conduded  in  360  B.C.  with  Corinth.  Phlius,  etc.. 
Thebes  had  sent  no  army  into  that  peninsula;  though  her  harmost 
and  garrison  still  continued  at  Tegea,  perhaps  at  Megalopolis  and 
3Iess?ue  also.  The  Arcadians,  jealous  of  her  as  well  as  disunited 
ainoii<^  themselves,  had  even  gone  so  far  as  to  contract  an  alliance 
with  her  enemy  Athens.  The  main  conflict  however  now  was  be- 
tween the  Arcadians  and  the  Eleians,  respecting  the  possc>ssmu  of 
Triphylia  and  the  Pisatid.  The  Eleians  about  this  time  (36d  b.c.) 
cjuneinto  alliance  again  with  Sparta,  relinquishing  their  alliance  with 
Thebes;  while  the  Achieans,  having  come  into  vigorous  co-operatioii 
with  Sparta  ever  since  307  B.C.  (by  reaction  against  the  lliebans, 
who  reversing  the  judicious  and  moderate  policy  of  Epaminondas, 
violently  changed  the  Ach«an  governments),  allied  themselves  with 
Elis  also,  in  or  before  365  B.C.  And  thus  Sparta,  thougli  robbed  by 
the  pacification  of  366  b.c.  of  the  aid  of  Corinth,  Phlius,  Epidaurus. 
etc.,  had  now  acquired  in  exchange  Elis  and  .Acliaia— contederatei 

not  less  valuable. 

Tripliylia,  the  territory  touching  the  western  sea  of  Peloponnesus, 
imnvMliatdy  north  of  the  river  Neda— and  the  Pisatid  (in^ 
eluding  the  lower  course  of  the  river  Alpheius  and  the  plain  ot 
Olvmpia),  immediately  north  of  Triphylia-botli  of  them  between 
Messenia  and  Elis— had  been  in  former  times  conquered  and  long^ 
held  by  the  Eleians,  but  always  as  discontented  subjects.  Sparta, 
in  the  days  of  her  unquestioned  supremacy,  had  found  it  politic  to 
vindicate"^  their  independence,  and  had  compelled  the  Eleians,  atter 
a  war  of  two  or  three  years,  to  renounce  formally  all  dominion  over 
them.  No  sooner,  however,  had  the  battle  of  Leuktra  disarmed 
Sparta,  than  the  Eleians  redaimed  their  lost  dominion;  wtule  the 
subjects  on  their  side  found  new  protectors  m  the  Arcadians,  and 


86 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


SECOND   INVASION  OF  ELIS. 


87 


were  even  ;ulmitto«l,  under  prctensse  of  kindred  race,  into  the  Pan^ 
Arcadian  confederacy.  Tlie  lArsian  rescript  hroiiijrht  down  by  Pe, 
l')pid:is(867-o6(5  B.C.)  seems  to  have  reversed  this  arran;;eni(.nt.*recoe;. 
nizinir  the  imperial  rights  of  the  P^ieiuus.  But  us  the  Arcadians  had 
repudialetl  tlie  rescript, it  remained  for  the  Eleians  to  enforce  their  im- 
perial rigliis  by  arms,  if  they  could.  They  found  tSparta  in  the  same 
inlerest  as  themselves;  not  only  equally  hostile  to  the  Arcadians,  but 
also  complaining  that  she  liad  been 'robbed  of  Messene,  as  they 
complained  of  tlie  loss  of  Triphylia.  Sparta  had  just  «rained  a  sliudit 
advantage  over  tlie  Arcadians,  in  the  recapture  of  Sellasia;  chiefly 
throuirh  the  aid  of  a  Syracusan  re-enforcement  of  twelve  triremes, 
sent  to  them  by  the  younger  Dionysius,  but  with  orders  speedily  to 
return. 

Besides  the  imperial  claims  over  Trii)hylia  and  the  Pisatid,  wliieh 
thus  placed  p:iis  in  alliance  Aviih  Fparta  and  in  conflict  with  Arca- 
dia—there was  also  a  teiritory  lyii.g  north  of  the  Alpheius  (on  ll;e 
hilly  ground  forming  the  western  or  Eleian  side  of  Blount  Ervman- 
thus.  between  Elis  and  the  uorth-weslern  portion  of  Arcadia),  Avhicli 
included  Lasion  and  the  highland  townships  called  Akroreii,  an(i 
which  was  dis])uted  between  Elis  and  Arcadia.  At  this  nu  ment  it 
was  included  as  a  porlion  of  the  Pan-Arcadian  aggregate;  but  the 
Eleians,  claiming  it  as  their  own,  and  suddenly  marching  in  along 
with  a  body  of  Arcadian  exiles,  seized  and  occupied  Lasion  as  well 
as  some  of  the  neighboring  Akioreii.  The  Aicadians  were  not  slow 
in  avenging  the  affront.  A  Im  dy  of  their  Pan-Arcadian  militia 
called  the  Epariti,  collected  from'  the  various  cities  and  districts, 
marched  to  Lasion.  defeated  the  Eleian  hoplites  with  considerable 
I0.SS  both  of  men  and  arms,  and  drove  them  out  of  the  district.  The 
victors  recovered  both  Lasion  and  all  the  Akroreii,  except  Thraus 
tus;  after  which  they  ]>roceeded  to  the  sacred  ground  of  Olynipia, 
and  took  formal  jx-ssession  of  it,  planting  a  ,i:arrison,  protecteil  bv  -c 
regular  stockaded  circle,  on  the  lull  called  Kronion.  Having  n.adt 
good  this  position,  they  marclied  on  even  to  the  city  of  Elis  itself, 
which  was  unfortilied  (though  it  had  a  tenable  acropolis),  so  that  they 
were  enabled  to  enter  it,  iinding  no  resistance  until  they  reached  the 
^agora.  Here  they  found  nuistered  the  Eleian  horsemen  and  the  choser 
Jioplites,  who  repulsed  them  with  some  loss.  But  Elis  Avas  in  grea 
consternation;  while  a  democratical  opposition  now  manifested  i'.- 
self  against  the  ruling  oligarchy— seizing  the  acropolis  in  hopes  of 
admitting  the  Arcadians.  The  bravery  of  the  horsemen  and  '.lOp 
lites,  however,  put  down  this  internal  movement, recovered  thc-.d-op- 
olis,  and  forced  the  malcontents,  to  the  number  of  400,  to  e>acuate 
the  city.  Thus  expelled,  the  latter  seized  and  established  themselves 
at  Pylus  (in  the  Eleian  territory,  about  nine  miles  from  Elis  towards 
the  Arcadian  border),  where  they  were  re-enforced  not  only  by  a  body 
of  xlrcadians,  but  also  bv  many  of  their  partisans  who  came  from 
the  city  to  join  them.     I*rom  this  fortified  post,  planted  in  the  couii- 


m 


trv  like  D  'k(-leia  in  Attica,  thev  carried  on  harassing  war  against 
the  Eleians  in  the  city,  and  rechiccd  them  after  some  time  to  greuti 
str-u^s  There  were  even  hopes  of  compelling  the  city  to  surrender, 
and  afresh  invasion  of  the  Arcadians  was  invited  to  complete  the 
enterprise.  The  Eleians  were  only  rescued  by  a  re-en forcenieut  from 
their  allies  in  Achaia,  who  crime  in  large  force  tuul  placed  the  city 
in  safety,  so  that  the  Arcadians  could  do  nothing  more  than  lay 
waste  the  territory  around.  ,  .,    •    •         •  <. 

Retiring-  on  this  occasion,  the  Arcadians  renewed  their  mvasion  not 
lon<r  afterward;   their   garrison  still   occupying  Olympia,   and  tho 
e\[\G^  continuing  at  Pvlus.     They  now  marched  all  across  the  coun- 
try even  approaching'^Ivvllene,  the  harbor  of  Elis  on  the  western  sea. 
Between  the  harbor  and  (he  city,  the  Eleians  ventured  to  attack  them, 
but  were  defeated  with  such  loss,  that  their  general  Andromachus 
(who  had  prompted  the  attack)  fell  upon  his  sworel  111  despair       Uio 
distress  of  the  Eleians  became  greater  than  ever.     In  hopes  of  draw- 
ino-  off  the  Arcadian  invaders,  they  sent  an  envoy  to  bparta,  entreat- 
in-  that  the  Lacedjcmonians  would  make  a  diversion  on  tlunr  side  of 
A?cadia.     Accordingly  the  Spartan  prince  Archidamus  (son  ot  Km^ 
Vn-esilaus)   invading  the  south-western  portion  ot  Arcadia,  occupietl 
aliiU-town  or  post  called  Kromnus  (seemingly  in  the  territory  of 
Me-alopolis,  and  cutting  off  the  communication  between  that  city 
and  Messene),  which  he  fortitied  and  garrisoned  with  about  200  fepar- 
tans  and  Periceki.     The  effect  which  the  Eleians  contemplated  was 
produced.     The  Arcadian  army  (except  the  garrison   of  Olympia) 
being  withdrawn  hoiue.  they  had  leisure  to  act  against  1  ylus.     Ihe 
Pvlian  exihs  had  recen^v  made  an  abortive  attempt  upon  1  halamje, 
oii  their  return  from  which  they  were  overtaken  and  worsted  by  the 
Eleians,  with  severe  loss  in  killed,  and  200  of  their  number  ultuuately 
made  prisoners.      Among  these  latter,  all  the  Eleian  exues  were  at 
once  put  t.)  death;  all  the  remainder  sold  for  slaves. 

Meanwhile  the  main  Arcadian  force,  which  had  retiirn-d  from 
Elis,  was  ioined  by  allies  — Thebans,  Araeians,  and  Messenians— 
and  marclied  at  once  to  Kromnus.  They  there  blocked  up  the  Lace- 
dajmonian  garrison  by  a  double  palisade  carrieel  all  round,  which 
Ihev  kept  a  numerous  force  to  occupy.  In  vam  did  Archidamus  at- 
tempt to  draw  them  off,  by  carrying  his  devastations  mto  the  Skiritis 
and  other  portions  of  Arcadia;  for  theSkiritae,  informer  days  depend- 
ants of  Sparta  and  among  the  most  vaUuible  constituents  of  the  Lace- 
da3monian  armies,  had  now  become  independent  Arcadians.  Ihe 
blockade  wa^  still  continued  without  interruption.  Archidamus  next 
tried  to  n-ct  possession  of  a  hill-top  which  commanded  the  Arcadian 
position  But  in  mare^hing  along  the  road  up,  he  encountered  the 
enemy  in  great  force,  and  was  repulseelwith  some  oss;  himselt  bemg 
thrust  through  the  thi-h  with  a  spear,  and  his  relatives  Polpenidas 
and  Chilon' slain.  The  Laceeipemonian  tr()e)ps  retreated  for  some 
space  into  a  wider  breadth  of  ground,  where  they  were  again  formed 


88 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


in  battle  order,  yet  greatly  discouraged  both  by  the  repnlBC  nnd  by 
the  communication  of  the  nnmes  of  the  slain,  Tsho  were  nmong  the 
most  distinguished  Fokliers  of  Sparta.  The  Arcadians  on  tlie  con 
tiary  were  advancing  to  tlie  charge  in  high  spirits,  when  (\n  ancient 
Spartan,  stepping  forth  from  the  ranks,  shouted  with  a  loud  voice, 
•'  What  need  to  fiiiht,  gentlemen?  Is  it  not  belter  to  conclude  a  truce 
and  separate?"  Both  aimics  accepted  tlie  proposition  joyfully.  The 
truce  was  concluded;  the  Laccdanionians  took  up  their  de;id  nnd  re- 
tired: the  Arcadians  also  retreated  to  the  spot  where  they  had  gained 
their  advantage,  and  there  erected  their  trophy. 

Under  the  2:raphic  description  here  given  by  Xenophon,  seems  to 
be  concealed  a  defeat  of  the  Lacedamonians  more  serious  than  he 
likes  to  enunciate.  The  Arcadians  c(  mj^letcly  giiined  their  point,  by 
continuing  the  blockade  without  interruption.  One  more  attempt  was 
made  by  the  Laced{pmoiiians  for  the  relief  of  their  countrymen.  Sud- 
denly assailing  the  palisade  at  night,  they  succeeded  in  nuistering  the 
portion  of  it  guarded  bv  the  Argeians.  They  broke  down  an  open- 
ing, and  called  to  the  besieged  to  hasten  out.  But  the  relief  iiad 
come  unexpected,  fo  that  only  a  few  of  those  near  at  hand  could 
profit  by  it  to  escape.  The  Arcadians,  hurrying  to  the  spot  in  huge 
force,  drove  olf  the  nssailants  and  re-enclosed  the  besieged,  wlio  v. (re 
soon  'comp<'lled  to  surrender  for  want  of  provisions.  More  than  100 
prisoners,  Spartans  and  Pcrioeki  together,  were  distributed  among  tlie 
captors— Argeians,  Thebans.  Arcadians  and  ^Messenians— one  share 
to  each.  Sixtv  years  before,  the  capture  of  220  Spartans  and  Lace- 
daemonians in'Sphakteria,  by  Klcon  and  Demosthenes,  had  excited 
the  extreme  of  incredulous  wonder  throughout  all  Greece;  emphati- 
cally noted  bv  the  impartiid  Thucydides.  Now,  not  a  trace  of  such 
sentiment  appears,  even  in  the  philo-Laconian  Xenophon.  So  sadly 
had  Spartan  glory  declined! 

Having  thus  put  an  end  to  the  Spartan  attack,  the  Arcndians  re- 
sumed their  airirression  acrainst  Elis,  in  conjunction  with  a  new  proj- 
ect of  considerable  moment.  It  was  now  the  spring  immediate'/ 
preceding  the  celebration  of  the  great  quadrennial  Olympic  festival, 
which  came  about  midsummer.  The  presidency  over  this  sncred 
ceremonv  had  long  been  the  cherished  ]uivilege  of  the  Eleitms.  who 
had  acquired  it  when  they  conquered  the  Pisatans— the  inhabitants 
of  the  region  immediately  around  01yraj)ia,  and  the  first  curators  of 
the  festivjil  in  its  most  primitive  state.  These  Pisatans,  always  reluc- 
tant subjects  of  Elis.  had  never  lost  the  conviction  that  the  presidency 
of  the  festival  belomred  to  them  of  right;  and  had  entreated  Sparta 
to  restore  to  them  their  right,  thirty-live  years  before,  when  Agis  as 
conqueror  imposed  terms  of  peace  iipon  the  Eleians.  Their  request 
had  been  then  declined,  on  the  ground  that  they  were  too  poor  and 
rude  to  do  worthy  honor  to  the  ceremony.  But  on  now  renewing  it, 
they  found  the  Arcndians  more  compliant  than  the  Spnrtanshnd  been. 
The  Arcadian  garrison,  wliich  had   occupied  the  sacred  plain  of 


THE  ELEIANS  INVADE  THE  FESTIVAL. 


89 


Olvmpiafor  more  than  a  year,  being  strongly  re-enforced,  preparation 
Av:i^  made  for  celebrating  the  festival  by  the  Pisatans  under  Arcadian 
protection.  The  Grecian  states  would  receive  with  surprise,  on  tliis 
occasion,  two  distinct  notices  from  ofiicial  heralds,  announcing  to 
them  the  commencement  of  the  hieromenia  or  sacred  season,  and  the 
precise  day  when  the  ceremonies  would  begin:  since  doubtless  the 
Ek'inns,  though  expelled  by  force  from  Olympia,  still  asserted  their 
ri'dits  and  sent  round  their  notices  as  u^sual. 

It  was  evident  that  this  memorable  plain,  consecrated  as  it  was  to 
Hellenic  brotherhood  and  communion,  would  on  the  present  occasion 
be  dishonored  by  dispute  and  perhaps  by  bloodshed :  for  the  Arcadians 
summoned  to  the  spot,  besides  their  own  military  strength,  a  consid- 
erable body  of  allies;  2,000  hoplites  from  Argos,  and  400  horsemen 
from  Athens.      So  imposing  a  force  being  considered  sufiicient  to 
deter  the  unwarlike  Eleians  from  any  idea  of  asserting  their  rights  by 
Arms   the  Arcadians  and  Pisatans  began  the  festival  with  its  ordinary 
routine  of  sacrifice  and  matches.     Having  gone  through  the  chariot- 
race,  they  entered  upon  the  pentathlon,  or  quintuple  contest,  wherein 
tlie  running  match  and  the  wrestling  match  came  first  in  order.    The 
runnin"-  match  had  already  been  completed,  and  those  who  had  been 
successful  enough  in  it  to  go  on  contending  for  the  prize  in  the  other 
four  points,  had  besrun  to  WTCstle  in  the  space  between  the  stadium 
and  the  great  altar— when  suddenly  the  Eleians  were  seen  entering  the 
sacred  ground  in  arms,  accompanied  by  their  allies  the  Achaeans,  and 
marching  up  to  the  opposite  bank  of  the  little  river  Kladeus-— which 
flow^ed  at  a  little  distance  to  the  westw^ard  of  the  All  is,  or  interior 
inclosed  precinct  of  Zeus,  falling  af terw^ard  into  the  Alpheius.     Upon 
this  the  Arcadians  drew  up  in  armed  order,  on  their  own  side  of  the 
Kladeus,  to  resist  the  further  approach  of  the  Eleians.     The  latter, 
with  a  boldness  for  which  no  one  gave  them  credit,  forded  the  rivu- 
let, headed  by  Stratolas  with  his  chosen  band  of  300,  and  vigorously 
changed  first  the  Arcadians,  next  the  Argeians;  both  of  whom  were 
defeated  and  driven  back.     The  victorious  Eleians  forced  their  way 
into  the  Altis,  and  pressed  forward  to  reach  the  great  altar.     But  at 
every  step  of  their  advance  the  resistance  became  stronger,  aided  a'^ 
it  was  by  numerous  buildinsrs— the  Senate-house,  the  temple  of  Zeus, 
and  various  porticoes— which  l)i)th  deranged  their  ranks,and  furnished 
excellent  positions  of  defense  for  darters  and  archers  on  the  roofs. 
Stratolas  was  here  slain,  while  his  troops,  driven  out  of  the  sacred 
ground,  were  compelled  to  recross  the  Kladeus.     The  festival  was 
tlieii  resumed  and  prosecuted  in  its  usual  order.     But  the  Arcadians 
were  so  afraid  of  a  renew^ed  attack  on  the  following  day,  that  they 
not  only  occupied  the  roofs  of  all  the  buildings  more  completely  than 
before,  but  passed  the  night  in  erecting  a  palisade  of  defense;  tearing 
dow^n  for  that  purpose  the  temporary  booths  which  had  been  care- 
fully put  up  to  accommodate  the  crowd  of  visitors.     Such  precau- 
tions rendered  the  place  unassailable,  so  that  the  Eleians  were  obliged 


90 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOriDAS. 


DISSENSIONS   IN  ARCADIA. 


91 


to  return  homo  on  the  next  day;  not  without  sympathy  and  admuM- 
tion  amomr  many  of  the  Greeks,  lor  the  unwonted  boldness  which 
tliey  had  dlsphived.  Thev  revenged  themselves  by  pronouncing  the 
104th  Olympiad  to  be  no'Olympiad  at  all,  and  by  registeriniz;  it  as 
such  in  their  catalogue,  when  they  regained  power;  preserving  how- 
ever the  names  of 'those  who  had  been  proclaimed  victors,  which 
i.ppear  in  the  lists  like  the  rest. 

Such  was  the  unholy  combat  which  dishonored  the  sanctuary  of 
Paiihellenic  ])rotherhood,  and  in  which  the  great  temple,  with  its 
enthroned  inmate  the  majestic  Zeus  of  Pheidias,  was  for  the  lirst 
time  turned  into  a  fortress  against  its  habitual  presidents  the  Eleians. 
il  was  a  combat  wherein,  though  both  Thebes  and  Sparta,  the  com- 
peting leaders  of  Grtece,  stand  clear,  Athens  as  well  as  most  of  the 
Peloi"onnesian  chief  states  were  implicated.  It  had  been  brought  on 
bv  the  rapacious  anibition  of  the  xircadians,  and  its  result  seemed  to 
ct-ntirm  them,  imder  color  of  Pisatau  presidency,  in  the  jiernianent 
manerv  of  Olympia.  But  in  spite  of  such  apparent  promise,  it  was 
an  event  which  carried  in  itself  the  seeds  of  violent  reaction.  We 
cannot  doubt  that  the  crowd  of  Grecian  spectators  present  were  not 
merelv  annoyed  Ijy  the  interruption  of  the  proceedings  and  by  the 
demolition  of  their  tents,  but  aho  deeply  sh(^cUed  by  the  outrage  to 
the  sacred  irrounil — "imminentium  tcniplorum  religio."  Most  of 
them  probably  believed  the  Eleians  to  be  the  rightful  presidents, 
liayin<r  never  either  seen  or  heard  of  any  one  else  in  that  cajuicity. 
And  tliev  could  hardly  hv\p  feeling  strong  symp'ithy  for  the  unex- 
j.eetcd  couraue  (.f  the.-e  dispossessed  presidents;  which  appeared  so 
.-Iriking  to  Xeuophon  (himself  perhaps  a  spectator)  that  he  ascribes  it 
lo  a  special  inspiration  of  the  gods. 

If  they  disapproved  of  the  conduct  of  the  Arcadians  and  Pisatans 
jis  an  unjust  intrusion,  they  would  disapprove  yet  more  of  that  spoli- 
ation of  the  rich  temples  at  Olyn.pia,  whereby  the  intruders  lewarded 
themselves.  The  Arcadians,  alwjiys  on  the  look-out  for  plunder  and 
pay  as  mercenary  soldier.s  found  themselves  supplied  with  both,  in 
abundant  measure,  from  this  war;  the  one  from  the  farms,  the 
stock,  and  the  field-laborers,  of  the  Eleian  neighborhord  generally, 
more  plentiful  than  in  any  part  of  Peloponnous;  the  other  from  the 
ample  accumulation,  both  of  money  and  of  precious  otferiugs,  dis- 
Tributed  over  the  numerous  templesat  Olvmiua.  The  Pi.-atans,  now 
installed  as  administrators,  would  readily  consent  to  appropriate 
These  sacred  treasures  to  the  pay  of  their  own  defenders,  whom  they 
tioubtless  considered  as  acting  in  the  i-ervice  of  the  Olympian  Zeus. 
Accordinirly  the  Ep:iriti,  the  militia  of  joint  Arcadia,  were  better 
paid  than  ever  they  had  been  before,  so  that  the  service  attracted 
numerous  volunteers  of  the  poorer  class. 

At  the  outset  of  the  Peloponnesiiin  war,  the  Corinthians  and  Spar- 
tans had  talked  of  prosecuting  it  in  part  by  borrowed  money  from 
the  treasuries  of  Delpiii  and  Olympia.     liow  far  the  project  had  ever 


been  executed,  we  have  no  information.  But  at  least,  it  liad  not 
h'JL'u  realized  in  any  such  way  as  to  form  a  ])recedeut  for  the  large 
siiius  now  u;)propriated  by  the  Pisatans  and  Arcadians;  which  ap- 
propriation accordingly  excited  much  outcry,  as  flignmt  rapacity 
and  sacrilege.  This  sentiment  was  felt  with  peculiar  force  among 
many  even  of  the  Arcadians  themselves,  the  guilty  i)artie.s.  More- 
over some  of  the  leaders  employed  had  made  important  private 
acquisitions  for  themselves,  so  as  to  provoke  both  resentment  and 
jealousy  among  their  rivals.  The  Panarcadian  communion,  recently 
brought  together  and  ill-cemented,  w^as  little  calculated  to  resist  the 
effect  of  any  strong  special  cause  of  dissension.  It  was  composed  of 
cities  which  had  before  been  accustomed  to  act  ap;u"t  and  even  in 
hostility  to  each  other;  especially  Mantineia  and  Tegea.  These  two 
cities  now  resumed  their  ancient  rivalry.  The  Mantineians,  jealous 
both  of  Tegea  and  Megalopolis,  began  to  labor  underhand  -againsti 
Arcadian  unity  and  the  Theban  alliance — with  a  view  to  renewed 
connection  with  Sparta;  thouglionly  five  years  before  they  had  owed 
to  Thebes  the  re-establishment  of  their  ow^i  city,  after  it  had  been 
brokea  up  into  villages  by  Spartan  force.  The  appropriation  of  the 
sacred  funds,  offensive  as  it  was  to  much  of  sincere  sentiment,  sup- 
plied them  with  a  convenient  ground  for  commencing  opposition.  In 
the  Mantiueian  assembly,  a  resolution  was  passed,  renouncing  all 
participation  in  the  Olympic  treasures;  while  at  the  same  time  an 
atlequate  sum  was  raised  among  the  citizens,  to  furnish  pay  for  all 
members  of  the  Eparili  who  came  from  their  city.  This  sum  was 
forwarded  to  the  ofiicers  iu  command ;  \Yho  however  not  only  refused 
to  receive  it,  but  even  summoned  the  authors  of  the  proceeding  to  take 
their  trial  before  the  Panarcadian  assembly — the  Ten  Thousand  at 
]\Iegalopolis — on  the  charge  of  breaking  up  the  integrity  of  Arcadia. 
The  ]\Lantineian  leaders  thus  simimoned,  having  refused  to  appear, 
and  being  condemned  in  their  absence  by  the  Ten  Thousa.nd — a 
detachment  of  the  Epariti  was  sent  to  Mantineia  to  secure  their  per- 
sons. But  the  gates  were  found  shut,  and  the  order  was  set  at  defi- 
ance. So  nuich  sympathy  was  manifested  in  Arcadia  tow^ard  the 
Mantineians,  that  many  other  towns  copied  their  protest.  Nay,  even 
the  majority  of  the  Ten  Thousand  tliemselves,  moved  ])y  repeated 
appeals  made  to  them  in  the  name  of  the  offended  gods,  Avere  trradu- 
ailly  induced  to  adopt  it  also,  publicly  renouncing  and  interdicting 
all  further  participation  in  the  Olympian  treasures. 

Here  was  a  just  point  carried,  and  an  important  advantage  gained, 
in  desisting  from  a  scandalous  misappropriation.  The  party  which 
had  gaiifed  it  immediately  sought. to  push  it  further.  Beginning  as 
the  advocates  of  justice  and  of  the  Olympian  Zeus,  the  .Mantineians 
speedily  pronounced  themselves  more  clearlj^  as  the  champions  of 
oligarciiy;  friendly  to  Sparta  and  adverse  to  Thebes.  Supplies  from 
Olympia  being  no  longer  obtained,  the  means  presently  failed,  of 
paying  the  Epariti  or  public  luilitia.    Accordingly,  such  members  of 


92 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


that  corps  as  were  too  poor  to  continue  ^vitliout  pay,  srradiiallv  re- 
linquished the  service;  while  on  the  other  hniul,  the  more  Avenlthj' 
and  powerful    citizens,   by   preconcerted   iinderstandinc:  with  each 
other  enrolled  themselves  in  large  Dun.hers,  for  the  purpose  of  get- 
tino-  the  national  force  out  of  the  hands  of  the  opposite  party  and 
into  their  own.     The  leaders  of  that  opposite  party  saw  plainly,  that 
this  oli^'-archical  movement   would  not   only  bring  them  to  severe 
accouut'^for  the  appropriation  of  the  sacred  treasure,  but  would  also 
throw  Arcadia  rgain  into  alliance  with  Sparta.     Accordingly  they 
sent  intimation  to  the  Thebans  of  the  impending  change  of  policy, 
invitino-  them  to  prevent  it  by  an  immediate  expedition  into  Arcadia, 
inform'ed  of  thi^  proceeding,  the  opposite  leaders  brought  it  before 
the  Panarcadian    assembly;    in  which  they  obtained  a   resolution, 
that  envovs  should  be  dispatched  to  Thebes,  desinnir  that  no  Ihchan 
army  mi^dit  enter  into  Arcadia  until  formally  summoned— and  can- 
eefincr  the  preceding  invitation  as  unauthorized.     At  the  same  time, 
the  assembly  determined  to  conclude  peace  with  the  Eleians,  and  to 
restore  to  them  the  localitv  of  Olvmpia  with  all  their  previous  rights. 
The  Eleians  irladlv  consented,  and  peace  was  accordingly  concluded. 
The  transactions  just  recounted  occupied  about  one  year  and  nine 
or  ten  months,  from   IMidsunmier  i]C4  B.C.  (the  time  ot  the  battle  at 
Olvmpia)  to  about  April  302  B.C.     The  peace  was  generally  pq^ular 
throuo-hout  Arcadia,  seeminaiv  even  among  the  cities  which  adhered 
to  Thebes    though  it  had  been  concluded  without  consulting  the 
Thebans    '  Even^  at   Tegea,  the   center  of  Tlieban   influence,  satis- 
faction was  felt  at  the  abandonment  of  the  mischievous  aggression 
and  spoliation  of  Olvmpia,  wherein  the  Thebans  had  had  no  con- 
cern    Accordin<^ly  wiien  the  peace,  having  been  tirst  probably  sworn 
in  other  Arcadian  cities,  came  to  be  sworn  also  at  Tegea— not  only 
the  citv  authorities,  but  also  the  Theban  harmost,  who  occupied  the 
town  vVith  a  garrison  of  300  Boeotians,  were  present  and  took  part  in 
the  ceremony.     After  it  had  been  finished,  most  of  the  Mantineians 
went  home;  their  citv  being  both  unfriendly  to  Tegea  and  not  lar 
distant.     But  manv  other  Arcadians  passed  the  evening  m  the  town 
celebrating  the  peace  by  libations,  pa\ins,  and  feasting.^   On  a  sud- 
den the  gates  were  shut  bv  order,  and  the  most  prominent  of  the 
oli^rarchical  party  were  arrested  as  they  sat  at  the  feast,  by  the  ha^o- 
tia'n  garrison  aiul  the  Arcadian  Epariti  of  the  opposite  V^Y-     \\'^ 
leaders  seized  were  in  such  eonsiderable  number,  as  to  hll   >ot  i  tlie 
prison  and  the  government-house;  though  there  were  few  JNIantinei- 
ans  among  them,  since  most  of  these  last  had  gone  home     Among 
the  rest  tlie  consternation  was  extreme.     Some  let  themselves  down 
from  the  walls,  others  eseaped  surreptitiously  by  the  gates.     Great 
was  the  indignation  excited  at  ^lantineia  on  the  following  morning, 
when  the   news  of  this  violent  arrest  was  brought   thither,      liie 
authorities— while  they  sent  round  ^he  intelligence  to  the  remaining 
Arcadian  cities,  inviting  them  at  once  to  arms— dispatched  heraids 


CONDUCT  OF  THE  THEBAN  HARMOST. 


93 


to  Tegea,  demanding  all  the  Mantineian  prisoners  there  detained. 
They  at  the  same  time  protested  emphatically  against  the  arrest  or 
Ihe  execution  of  any  Arcadian,  without  previous  trial  beiore  the 
Panarcadian  community;  and  they  pledged  themselves  in  the  name 
of  Mantineia,  to  answer  for  the  appearance  of  any  Arcadian  against 
whom  charges  might  be  preferred. 

Upon  receiving'  this  requisition,  the  Theban  harmost  forthwith 
released  all  his  prisoners.  He  then  called  together  an  assembly — 
seemingly  attentled  by  only  a  few  i)ersons,  from  feelings  of  mistrust 
— wlicR'in  he  explained  that  he  had  been  misled,  and  that  he  had 
ordered  the  arrest  upon  a  false  report  that  a  Lacedaemonian  force 
was  on  the  borders,  prepared  to  seize  the  city  in  eoncert  with  treach- 
erous correspondents  within.  A  vote  was  passed  accepting  the  ex- 
planation, though  (according  to  Xenophon)  no  one  believed  it.  Yet 
envoys  were  immediately  sent  to  Thebes,  probably  from  the  Manti- 
neians  and  other  Arcadians,  complaining  loudly  of  his  conduct,  and 
insi-sting  that  he  should  be  punished  with  death. 

On  a  review  of  the  circumstances,  there  seems  reason  for  believing 
that  the  Theban  officer  gave  a  true  explanation  of  the  motives  under 
which  he  had  acted,  the  fact  of  his  releasing  the  prisoners  at  tiie 
first  summons,  is  more  consistent  w4th  this  supposition  than  with  any 
other.  Xenophon  indeed  says  that  his  m:;in  object  was  to  get  pos- 
session of  the  Mantineians,  and  that,  when  he  found  but  few  of  the 
latter  among  the  persons  seized,  he  was  indiifei'ent  to  the  detention 
of  the  rest.  But  if  such  had  been  his  purpose,  he  w^ould  hardly  have 
set  about  it  in  so  blind  and  clumsy  a  manner.  He  would  have  done 
it  while  the  Mantineiaiis  were  stiU  in  the  town,  instead  of  waiting 
until  after  their  departure.  He  would  not  have  perpetrated  an  act 
offensive  as  wx'll  as  iniquitous,  without  assuring  himself  that  it  was 
done  at  a  time  when  the  determining  purpose  wasj'ct  attainable.  On 
the  other  hand,  nothing  can  be  more  natural  than  the  supposition 
that  the  more  violent  among  the  Arcadian  Epariti  believed  in  the 
existence  of  a  plot  to  betray  Tegea  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  im- 
pres.sedthe  Theban  with  a  persuasion  of  the  like  impending  danger. 
To  cause  a  revolution  in  Tegea,  would  be  a  great  point  gained  for 
the  oligarchical  party,  and  would  be  rendered  -comparatively  practi- 
cable by  the  congregatioa  of  a  miscellaneous  body  of  Arcadians  in 
the  town.  It  is  indeed  not  impossible,  that  the  idea  of  such  a  plot 
may  really  have  been  conceived;  but  it  is  at  least  highly  probable, 
that  the  likelihood  of  such  an  occurrence  w  as  sincerely  believed  in 
by  opponents. 

The  explanation  of  the  Theban  governor,  aflSrming  that  his  order 
for  arrest  had  either  really  averted,  or  appeared  to  him  indispensable 
to  avert,  a  projected  treacherous  betrayal — reached  Thebes  at  the 
same  time  as  the  complaints  against  him.  It  was  not  only  received 
as  perfectly  satisfactory,  but  Epaminondas  even  replied  to  the  com- 
plaiaants  by  counter-complaints  uf  bis  own — "The  arrest  (he  said) 


94 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PLLOPIDAS. 


POLICY  OF  THE  THEBANS. 


95 


\Nas  an  act  more  justifiable  than  the  release  of  those  arrested.  1l ou 
Arcadians  have  already  committed  treason  against  us.  It  was  on 
your  account,  and  at  vour  request,  that  we  carried  the  war  into  1  elo- 
:,^,ii,i^.sns— and  you  now  conclude  peace  Avithout  consulting  us!  Be 
jissuicd  tliat  we  sliall  presently  come  in  arms  into  Arcadia,  and  make 
war  to  support  our  partisans  in  the  country." 

Such  was  the  peremptory  reply  which  the  Arcadian  enyoy  broudit 
hack  from  Thebes,  announcini:  to  his  countrymen  tluit  ihcy  must 
prepare  lor  war  lorthwiili.     They  accordingly  concerted  measures 
lor  resistance  with  the  Eleians  and  Acliajans.     Tliey  sent  an  invitr.- 
lion  to  llie  LacedLtmonians  to  march  into  Arcadia,  and  assist  in  iv- 
pellini::  any  enemy  who  should  approach  for  the  purpose  of  subji:- 
calint^PeloponncMis— vet  with  the  proviso,  as  to  headship,  that  each 
state  should  take  the  lead  when  the  war  was  in  its  own  territory;  and 
they  further  sent  to  solicit  aid  from  Athens.     Such  were  the  meas- 
ures taken  by  the  IMantineians  and  their  partisans,  now  foimuig  the 
inajoiiiy  in  the  Panarcadian  agirrcuate,  who  (to  use  the  language  of 
Xenoplion)   "were  really  solicitous  for  Peloponnesus."      .Why  do 
tliese  Th(;bans  (>aid  thev)  march  into  our  country  when  we  desire 
them  not  to  come?     For*  what  other  purpose,  except  to  do  us  mis- 
r-hief^  to  make  us  do  mischief  to  each   other,  in  order  that  both 
parlies  may  stand  in  need  of  ihtm?  to  enfeeble   Peloponnesus  as 
much  as  possible,  in  crder  that  they  may  hold  it  tl:e  more  easily  m 
slavery'^"     Tliouirh  Ihis   is  the  language  which   Xenophon  repeats, 
with  a  svmpathv^plainlv  evincing  his  Philo-Laconian  bias— yet  when 
we  follow  the  facts  as  he  liimself  narrates  them,  we  shall  find  theui 
much  more  in  liarmony  with  the  reproaches  whidi  he  puts  into  the 
mouth  of  Epaminondas.     Epaminondas  liad  first  marched  into  Pelo- 
P(uinesus  (in  ^09  u.c.)  at  the  request  of  both  Arcadians  and  Lleians, 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  them  against  Sparta.     He  had  been  the 
lir<t  to  give  stremrth   and   iliirnity  to  the  Arcadums.  by  organizing 
tliem  into  a  political  aj-iirt'uate,  and  by  forming  a  strong  frontier  lor 
them  atiainst  Sparta,  in  :\ie>sene  and  :Megalopolis.      >\  hen  thus  or- 
ganized, the  Arcadians  had  manifested  boih  jealousy  ot  1  hebes   and 
incompetence  to  act  wisely  for  themselves.     They  had  caused  the 
reversal  of  the  srentle  and  politic  measures  adopted  by  Eiiaminoudas 
toward  the  Ach«an  cities,  whom  they  htul  thus  thrown  again  into 
the  arms  of  Sparta.     They  had,  of  their  own  accord,  taken  up  the 
war  a'-'ainst  EHs  and  the  mischievous  encroachment  at  Olympia.     On 
the  otlier  hand,  the   Thcbans   had  not  marched  into  Pei()i>ounesus 
since  3(j7  rc— an  interval  now  of  nearly  five  years.     They  had  tried 
to  persuade  the    Arcadians  to  acce])t  the  Persian  rescript,  and  to 
desist  from  the    idea  of   alliance  with  Atliens;  but   when  leiused, 
they  had    made    no   attempt   to  carry   either  of   these   points   by 
force.     Epaminondas  had  a  fair  right  now  to  complain  of  them  lor 
having  made  peace  whh  Elis  and  Achaia,  the  friends  and  allies  ot 

Sparta,  without  any  consultation  with  Thebes.    He  probably  be- 


lieved that  there  had  been  a  real  plot  to  betray  Tcgea  to  the  Lacedse- 
monians,  as  one  fruit  of  this  treacherous  peace;  and  he  saAV  plainly 
that  the  maintenance  of  the  frontier  line  against  Sparta— Tegea, 
Megalopolis,  and  Messene— could  no  longer  be  assured  without  a  new 
Theban  invasion. 

This  appears  to  me  the  reasonable  estimate  of  the  situation  in  Pelo- 
ponnesus, in  June  303  B.C.— immediately  before  the  last  invasion 
of  Epaminondas.  We  cannot  trust  the  uufavoraljlc  judgment  of 
Xenophon  with  regard  either  to  this  great  man  or  to  the  Thebans. 
It  will  not  stand  good,  even  if  compared  with  the  facts  related  by 
himself;  still  less  probably  would  it  stand,  if  we  had  the  facts  from 
an  impartial  witness. 

I  have  already  recounted  as  much  as  can  be  made  out  of  the  pro- 
cfcdings  of  the*^Thebans,  between  the  return  of  Pelopidas  from  Per- 
sia with  the  rescript  (in  the  winter  807-36(5  B.C.)  to  the  close  of  363 
B.C.     In  300-365  B.C.,  they  had  experienced  great  loss  and  humilia- 
tion in  Thessaly  connected  with  the  detention  of  Pelopidas,  whom 
they  had  with  difficulty  rescued  from  the  dungeon  of  Pheraj.     In 
3(34-303  B.C.,  Pelopidas"^ had  been  invested  with  a  fresh  command  in 
Thes8aly,  and  though  he  was  slain,  the  Theban  arms  had  been  emi- 
nently successful  ac(piiriug  more  complete  ma.stery  of  the  country 
than  ever  they  possessed  "before;  while  Epaminondas,  liaving  per- 
suaded his  countrymen  to  aim  at  naval  supremacy,  had  spent  the 
summer  of  363  B.C.  as  admiral  of  a  powerful  Theban  fleet  on  the 
coast  of  Asia.     Returning  to  Thebes  at  the  close  of  383  B.C.,  he  found 
his  friend  Pelopidas  slain;  while  the  relations  of  Thebes,  both  in 
Peloponnesus  and  in  Thessaly,  were  becoming  sufficiently  compli- 
cated to  absorb  his  whole  attention   on   land,   without  admitting 
further  aspirations  toward  maritime   empire.      He  had   doubtless 
watched,  as  it  w^enfon,  the  gradual  change  of  politics  in  Arcadia  (in 
the  winter  and  spring  of  383-302  B.C.),  whereby  the  jMartineian  and 
oligarchical  party,  profiting  by  the  reaction  of  sentiment  agjunst  the 
proceedings  at  Olympia,   had  made  itself  a    majority  in   the  Pan- 
are;ulian  assembly  and  militia,  so  as  to  conclude  peace  with  Elis, 
and  to  present  the  prospect  of  probable  alliance  with  Sparta,  Elis, 
and   Achaia.      This  political    tendency   wns  doubtless  kept   before 
Epaminondas  by  the  Tegean  party  in  Arcadia,  ojiposed  to  the  party  of 
?l:uitineia:  being  cominunicated'  to  him  with  partisan  exagirerations 
ev(>n  beyoiul  the  reality.     The  danger,  actual  or  presumed,  of  Tegea, 
with  the  arrest  which  "had  been  there  operated,  satisfied  him  that  a 
powerful  Theban   intervention    could  be  no  longer  deferred.      As 
B(ro!arch,  he  obtained  the  consent  of  his  countrymen  to  assemble  a 
Ba"otian  force,  to  summon  the  allied  contingents,  and  to  conduct 
this  joint  expedition  into  Peloponnesus. 

The  army  with  which  he  began  his  march  was  numerous  and  im- 
posing. It  comprised  all  the  Boeotians  and  Eubo^ans,  with  a  large 
iiiimber  of  Thessalians  (some  even  seut  by  Alexander  of  Phenc,  who 


96 


AFTER  THE  DEATH   OF  PELOPIDAS. 


EPAMINONDAS  ARRIVES  AT  SPARTA. 


had  now  become  a  dependent  allv  of  Thebes),  the  Lokrians,  Malians, 
Euiane*^  and  probablv  various 'other  allies  from  Northern  Greece; 
liiou'di  tiie  Phokians  declined  to  join,  alle.sriiig  that  their  agreement 
^\  itirThelK^s  was  for  alliance  purely  defensive.  Havnig  passed  the 
line  of  Mount  Oneiuni— which  was  do  longer  defended,  as  it  had 
l»cen  at  his  former  entrance— he  reached  ISemea,  where  he  was  prob- 
ablv ioined  by  the  Sikvonian  continuent,  and  where  he  lialted,  m 
hopes  of  intercepting  the  Athenian  contingent  in  their  way  to  jom 
his  enemies.  He  probably  had  information  which  induced  him  to 
expect  them;  but  the  information  turned  out  false.  The  Athenians 
m-ver  appeared,  and  it  was  understood  that  they  were  preparing  to 
cross  by  sea  to  the  eastern  coast  of  Laeonia.  After  a  fruitless  halt, 
he  proceeded  onward  to  Te<rea,  where  his  Peloponnesian  allies  all 
presently  ioined  him:  the  Arcadians  of  Tegea,  Pallantium,  Asea,  and 
Megalopolis,  the  Messenians— (all  these  forming  the  line  of  frontier 
airainst  Laeonia)— and  the  Argeians.  .,.-,.. 

■  ^The  halt  at  Kemea,  since  Epaminondas  missed  its  direct  purpose, 
was  injurious  in  another  way,  as  it  enabU  il  the  main  body  of  his 
Peloponnesian  enemies  to  concentrate  at  Mantineia;  which  junction 
miMit  probablv  have  been  prevented,  h^d  he  entered  Arcadia  wilh- 
oufdelav.  A  powerful  Peloponnesian  army  was  there  united  con- 
si^tino-  of  the  Mantineians  with  the  major  part  of  the  other  Arcadians 
— the^Eleians- and  the  Ach«ans.  Invitation  had  been  sent  to  the 
Spartans;  and  old  Airesilaus,  now  in  his  eightieth  year  was  in  full 
march  with  the  LacedcTinonian  forces  to  Mantmeia.  Besides  this, 
the  Athenian  continirent  was  immediately  expected;  especially  valu- 
able from  its  cavalrv,  since  the  Pcloponnesians  were  not  strong  in 
that  description  of  force— some  of  them  indeed  having  none  at  all 

Epnminondas  established  his  camp  and  place  of  arms  within  the 
walN  of  Teirea;  a  precaution  which  Xenophon  praises,  as  making 
his  troops  more  secure  and  comfortable,  and  his  motions  less  observ- 
able by  the  enemv.  He  next  marched  to  ]Mantineia.  to  pnnoke  the 
enemvto  an  action  before  the  Spartans  and  Athenians  joined;  but 
they  kept  carefullv  on  their  guard,  close  to  Mantineia,  too  strongly 
posted  to  be  forced.  On  returning  to  his  camp  in  Tegea,  he  ^^•;ls  ap- 
prised that  Aijesilaus  with  the  Spartan  force,  having  quitted  Sparta 
on  the  niareli'  to  ^lantineia,  had  already  made  some  progress  and 
reached  Pellene.  Upon  this  he  resolved  to  attempt  the  surprise  ot 
Sparta  by  a  sudden  niirht-mareh  from  Tegea,  which  lay  in  the  direct 
road  from  Sparta  to  "Mantineia,  while  Agesilaus  in  getting  troni 
Sparta  to  Mantineia  had  to  pursue  a  more  circuitous  route  to  the  west- 
ward Moving  shortly  after  the  evening  meal,  Epaminondas  led  the 
Theban  force  with  all  s]ieed  toward  Sparta;  and  he  liad  well-nigh 
come  upon  that  town,  "like  a  nest  <^f  unprotected  young  birds  at  a 
moment  when  no  resistance  could  have  been  made.  Neither  Agesi- 
laus nor  any  one  else,  expected  so  dariu«:r  and  well-aimed  a  blow. 
Uie  success  of  which  would  have  changed  the  face  of  Greece.     Noth- 


97 


ing  saved  Sparta  except  the  providential  interposition  of  the  gods 
signiiied  by  the  accident  that  a  Kretau  runner  hurried  to  A"-esil-ms* 
Aviih  the  news  that  the  The  bans  were  in  full  march  southwiT-d  from 
Tegea,  and  happened  to  arrest  in  time  his  furtlier  progress  toward 
3[iiiitineia.  Agesilaus  instantly  returned  back  with  the  troops 
around  him  to  Sparta,  which  was  thus  put  in  a  suflicieut  posture  of 
defense  before  the  Thebans  arrived.  Though  sunieient  for  the  emer- 
gency,  however,  his  troops  were  not  numerous;  for  the  Spartan  cav- 
alry and  mercenary  forces  were  stiil  altsent,  having  been  sent  for- 
ward to  3Iantineia.  Orde'-s  were  sent  for  the  main  army  at  that  citv 
to  hasten  immediately  to  the  relief  of  Sparta. 
I  The  march  of  Epaminondas  had  been  undertaken  only  on  the  prob- 

-       ability,  well-nigh  realized,  of  finding  Sparta  undefended.      He  was 
111  110  condition  to  assault  the  city,  if  toleral)ly  occupied— still  less  to 
spend  time  before  it,  for  lie  knew  thnt  the  enemy  from  Mantineia 
would  immediately  follow^  him  into  Laeonia,  wiLhiu  which  he  did 
not  choose  to  hazard  a  general  action.     He  had  found  it  impracti- 
cable  to  take  this  unfortilied,  yet  unassailable  citv,  Sparta  even  at 
Ins  former  invasion  of  870-3o9  B.C. ;  when  he  had  niost  part' of  Pelo- 
ponnesus in  active  co-operation  with  him.  and  when  the  Lacedaj- 
luonians  had  no  army  in  the  tield.     Accordingly,  thou'di  he  crossed 
the  Eurotas  and  actually  entered  into  the  city  of  S])arta  (which  had 
no  walls  to  keep  him   out),  yet  as  soon   as  he  perceived  the  roofs 
manned  with  soldiers  and  other  preparations  for  resistance   he  ad- 
vanced with  great  caution,  not  adventuring  into  the  streets  and  amidst 
liie  occupied  houses.  He  only  tried  to  get  possession  of  various  points 
<>1   ugh  ground  commanding  the  city,  from  whence  it  nught  be  pos- 
sihle  to  charge  down  upon  il,e  defenders  with  advantage.     But  even 
Jiere,  though  inlerior  in  number,  they  prevented  hinrfrom  makin-r 
any  impression.     And  Archidamus  son  of  Airesilaus   sallyinn-  forth 
unexpccfedly  beyond  the  line  of  defense,  with  a  smkll  company  of 
1-M  hoplites,  scraml)led  over  some  dllTicult  ground  in  his  front  and 
charged  the  Thebans  even  up  the  hill,  with  such  -allantry,  that  he 
iU'tiiahy  beat  them  back  with  some  loss;  pursuing' them  for  a  space 
until  he  was  himself  repulsed  and  forced  to  retreat      The  bravery  of 
Ije  Spartan  Isidas,  too,  son  of  Phcrbidas  the  captor  of  the  Thebau 
ivadnieia,  did  signal  honor  to  Sparta,  in  this  day  of  her  comparative 
lee  inc.     Distm-uislied   for   beauty  and  stature,   this  voutii  sallied 
inrlh  naked  and  unshielded,  with  his  body  oiled  ns  in  the  pal.-estra 
\\  lelding  in  his  right-hand  a  spear  and  in  liis  left  a  sword  he  rushed 
among  the  enemy,  dealing  death  and  destruction;  in  spite  of  which 
i  e  was  suttered^  to  come  back  unwounded;  so  oreat  wa^  the  awe  in- 
^[  jert  l)y  his  singular  appearance  and  desperate  hardihood.     The 
Tn  ,n'r  ^'^^^i^^''^t,^'?.iiim  afterward  with  a  wreath  of  honor,  but  at  the 
same  time  fined  him  for  exposing  himself  without  defensive  armor 

inonghthe  Spartans  displayed  here  an  honorable  gallantry  yet 
uH'se  succes,-,es.  in  themselves  trifling,  are  magnified  into  importance 
II.  G.  IV.— 4 


AFTEU  THE  DEATH  OF   PELOPIDAS. 


98 

nnlv  hv  the  partiality  of  Xcnophon.  The  capital  fact  ^as  that  Age.i- 
?n„^  Iru  tou  ccidentally  forewarnt'd  .so  as  to  get  back  to  Sparla 
in  I  o  ;   it^n  ae  c'n  r^^  the  Thebai.s  arrived.    As  soon  as  Epam- 

fnnnd  s  'icer taVned  this,  he  saw  that  his  project  ^vas  do  Icn.ger  pra.^ 
inonaas  ♦^^^-'-^rV"*;'' '  '„^,  .,..,„  t.-ythe  cilv  louml,  to  see  it  he  could 
:  r.^r-iuTv^^t  bt*."  ..  'vUl'out  !;;™h in,  hm.sc.lf  in  u  lu,z;„.lous 
^n  t  IWtUc^  in  lis  Hist  sclieme,  he  applinl  li.uiself,  will,  cq  ml 
us»;  ult.  i'""^.^„ '''.'"?,,, J  ^leritv  of  moliou,  to  the  excciitiou  ot  :i 
^^eornr^H       ,^  w  U..Tu.e  h^'lile  anny  f.x,m  ^-Uinciu  .ouUl  be 

r^^'lU-e^.  =a.  ;.;e  .a,)  lyin,  .b^^^^ 

mmmm 

occupie.1  Ncmea).  tbey  took  ''-''•,  ;7^'';\''S;;':::";l-ca  so  n^oS 
mile  of  the  gales. 


MANTIXEIA   SAVED. 


99 


Tlie  Mantineians  were  terror-struck  at  this  event.  Their  military 
citizens  were  absent  on  the  march  to  Sparta,  Avliile  tlie  remainder 
were  dispersed  about  the  fields.  In  tins  lielpless  condition,  they  im- 
plored aid  from  the  newly-arrived  Athenian  cavalry;  who,  thouiT:h 
hungry  and  tired,  innnediately  went  forth — and  indeed  were  obli<2:ed 
to  do  so,  since  their  own  safety  depended  upon  it.  The  assailants 
were  excellent  cavalry,  Thebans  and  Thessaliaus,  and  more  numer- 
ous than  the  Athenians.  Yet  sucli  was  the  gallantry  with  which 
the  latter  fought,  in  a  close  and  bloody  action,  that  on  the  whole 
they  gained  the  advantage,  forced  the  assailants  to  retire,  and  had 
the  satisfaction  to  preserve  Mantineia  with  all  its  citizens  and  prop- 
erty. Xenophon  extols  (and  doubtless  with  good  reason)  the  gen- 
erous energy  of  the  Athenians,  in  uoing  forth  hungry  and  fatigued. 
But  we  must  recollect  that  the  Tiieban  cavalrv  luurundergone  yet 
more  severe  hunger  and  fatigue — that  Epaminondas  would  never 
have  sent  them  forward  in  such  condition,  had  he  expected  serious 
resistance;  and  that  they  probably  dispersed  to  some  extent,  for  the 
purpose  of  plundering  and  seizing  subsistence  in  the  fields  through 
which  tliey  passed,  so  that  they  were  found  in  disorder  when 
the  Athenians  sallied  out  upon  them.  The  Athenian  cavalry  com 
niauder  Kephisodorus,  together  with  Gryllus  (son  of  the  historian 
Xenophon),  then  serving  with  his  brother  Diodorus  among  the 
Aihenian  horse,  were  both  slain  in  the  battle.  A  memorable  picture 
at  Athens  by  the  contemporary  painter  Euphranor,  commemorated' 
both  the  battle  and  the  personal  gallantry  of  Gryllus,  to  whose 
memory  the  Mantineians  also  paid  distinguished  lion'ors. 

Here  were  two  successive  movements  of  Epaminondas,  both  well- 
conceived,  and  yet  botli  disappointed  by  accident,  without  any  omis- 
sion of  his  own.  He  had  his  forces  concentrated  at  Tegea*  while 
his  enemies  on  their  side,  returning  from  Sparta,  formed  a  united 
camp  in  the  neighborhood  of  3Iantineia.  They  comprised  Lacedae- 
monians, Eloians,  Arcadians,  Achanms,  and  Athenians;  to  the  num- 
ber in  all,  of  30.000  foot  and  2.000  horse,  if  we  coukl  trust  the  asser- 
tions of  Diodorus;  who  also  gives  the  numbers  of  Epaminondas  as 
30,000  foot  and  3,000  horse.  Little  value  can  be  assigned  to  either 
of  these  estimates;  nor  is  it  certain  which  of  the  two  armies  was  the 
more  numerous.  But  Epaminondas  saw  that  he  had  now  no  chance 
left  for  striking  a  4)low  except  through  a  pitched  battle,  nor  did  ho- 
at  all  despair  of  the  result.  He  had  brought  out  his  northern  allies 
for  a  limited  time;  w^hich  time  they  were  "probably  not  disposed  to 
prolong,  as  the  season  of  harvest  \vas  now  approaching.  ]VIoreo\  er 
his  stock  of  provisions  was  barely  sutficient;  the  new  crop  being  not 
yet  gathered  in,  while  the  cBop'  of  the  former  year  was  probablv 
almost  exhausted.  He  took  his  resolution  therefore  to  attack  the 
eiumiy  forthwith. 

But  I  cannot  adopt  the  view  of  Xenophon,  that  such  resolution 
was  forced  upon  Epaminondfis,  against  his  own  will,  by  a  desperate 


100  AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 

Tiosition  rendering  it  impossible  for  liim  to  get  away  without  fifflit- 
fn^ib^be  disappointnient  of  fiiulin-  so  few  allies  on  his  own  siae, 
ami  so  many  assembled  ac^ainst  him-and  by  the  neeessity  of  wiping 
off  the  Se  of  his  two  feeent  failures  (at  Sparta  and  at  Mantmeia 
ofn  n<h  i-^n  the  attempt.  This  is  an  estimate  of  the  position  of 
FnMm  non  his  not  e(msistent  with  the  faets  narrated  by  Xenop  ion 
Epan  nonaas  no    c  surprise  to  the  'lUieban  -eneral  that 

rt  me  Id  a  v'd  or  entering  a\attk^  With  what  other  view 
InVhreon  iitoPeloponnesusV  Or  for  what  other  purpose  eo  dd 
fhaie  brought  so  numerous  an  army?  Grant  ncr  that  he  expected 
c^rea  er  sup,  ort  in  Peloponnesus  than  he  aetually  lound,  we  eannot 
frnT-^ine  h^^^^^^^  have  hoVed  that  Ifis  mere  presence,  without  hghting. 
would  ^uffiee  to  put  down  enemies  courageous  as  well  as  powera  1. 
Xe  ophr'^^  the  importance  of  the  reeent  deiea  s  (as  he 

teTs  them)  fefore  Sparta  and  Manlineia.  These  were  checks  or 
disw.oSent^  r^^^  than  defeats.  On  arriving  at  Tegea,  Epnm.- 
n^Ed  foun<led  it  practicable  (Which  1--^;  ;^^-  ^j^ta'n^ 
i,ofr.rnlinn(H  to  altenipt  a  coup  dc  mail),  tirst  iisrain^t  ^l1a^a,  niy 
»'nh>'t  M-ntineta  Here  ^ere  aockUntal  opportunilies  winch  liis 
S' di'cerne  1  a.ul  turned  to  nccotmt.  Th.ir  M.ceess,  so  tuar  o 
frt,  1%  tahime  t  ^vonU\  have  liecn  a  rrodiffious  pomt  sra.ncd;  bu 
?hrir  .?c  dentaTfaiUtre  Uft  him  not  uorso  off  that,  he^vas  before      t 

comcmp"ate-d    from  .^oir-'flr.t  entrat.ce  into  Peloponnesus,  as  the 

«p,,oint«n.ope  a  t.l  stern  necessity  ^vhich  Xem.pbon  ascr,  oes  to   1  e 
cKan  iVr,  were  itnpatient  to  tj.d.t  <«'''\".  l''^,  ^'f''';:;,  "  )  ,,  ""l 
enthusiastic  ala.-rity  wb..n  he  •'^t  '^'^^ l''l'^|'r7»u  fno    S  sivin'- 
had  kept  them  within  the  walls   of    legea    thus  "»*  9'''J  .fc','"' 
them  bet  er  quarters  and  fuller  repose,  but  also  concealing  us  pi  - 

ceecUnS     0  m  the  enemy;  who  on  th<.iv  ^^o  «■"?'■"<;;'"' '"^„^.^t- 
border  of  the  JIantineiai.  territory.      He,loicing  m  the  1   o^t   « 

E"^:^-ri;:'thri-n;^^^^^ 
.b;^;!r^r::.';^!ir^vS'^riu:i:^';r'h^^^ 

Hie  r  shR.lds  (probablv  nothing  hut  mis<.rable  scpiares  of  «o    1) 
Th eb-m  en-iAi      The"  be<t  snirit  and  eonlidence  animated  1 11   11  _ 
Illi^  as  th,'v"p>it:e.l  the  gates  of  Tcgca.and  disposed  themselves  u. 
the  order  of  niarch  commanded  by  Epammondas 

The  loftj^Iantinico-Tecreatie  phiin,  2,000  feet  above  tl^e  evel  of  he 
sea  (now  known  as  the  plain  of  Tripolitza)--is  the  greatest  of  that 


MARCH  OF  EPAMIXOXDAS. 


101 


cluster  of  valleys  in  the  center  of  Peloponnesus,  each  of  which  is  so 
closely  shut  in  by  the  intersecting  mountains  that  no  outlet  is  afforded 
to  the  waters  except  through  the  mountains  themselvts,"  Its  length 
stretches  from  north  to  south,  bordered  by  the  mountain  ranges" of 
Mieualus  on  the  west,  and  of  Artemisiuni  and  PartheUiOn  on  the 
east.  It  has  a  breadth  of  about  eight  miles  in  the  broadest  part,  and 
of  one  mile  in  the  narrowest.  Mantineia  is  situated  near  its  northern 
extremity,  Tegea  near  its  southern;  the  direct  distance  between  th« 
two  cities,  in  a  line  not  much  different  from  north  and  south,  being 
about  ten  Englisii  miles.  The  frontier  line  between  their  two  domains 
was  formed  by  a  peculiarly  narrow  part  of  the  valley,  v.liere  a  low 
ridge  projecting  from  the  range  of  Mtenalus  on  the  one  side,  and 
another  from  Artemisium  on  the  oppo^ite.  contract  the  space  and 
make  a  sort  of  defen.^ible.pas.s  near  four  miles  south  of  3lantineia; 
tlius  about  six  miles  di.stant  from  Tegea.  It  was  at  this  i)osition,' 
covering  the  whole  Mantineian  territory,  that  the  army  opi)osed  to 
Epaminondas  was  concentrated;  the  inaiu  Laceda^mouiau  force  as 
well  as  the  rest  haviiig  now  returned  from  Spart.-i. 

Epaminondas  havini^  marched  out  from  Tegea  by  the  northern 
gate,  arrayed  his  army  in  columns  i)roper  for  advaindng  toward  the 
enemy ;  hinuelf  with  the  Theban  columns  forming  the  va^n.  His  array 
being  conii)leted,  he  at  first  began  his  forward  march  in  a  direction 
straight  toward  the  enemy.  ButT  presently  he  changed  his  course.',  turn- 
ing to  the  left  toward  the  ^benalian  range  of  mountains,  which  forms 
the  western  border  of  the  plain,  and  which  he  probably  reached  some- 
where near  the  site  of  the  present  Tripolitza.  From  thence  he  pur- 
sued his  march  northward,  .skirting  the  flunk  c*f  the  mountain  on  the 
side  which  lies  over  against  or  fronts  toward  Tegea;  until  at  length 
he  neared  the  enemy's  position,  upon  their  right  flank.  He  hero 
halted,  and  caused  his  columns  to  face  to  the  right;  thus  foniiiiig  a 
line,  or  phalanx  of  moderate  depth,  fronting  toward  the  enemy. 
During  the  march,  each  lochus  or  company  had  marehed  in  single 
lile  \ylth  the  loeliage  or  captain  (usually  the  strongest  and  best  sol- 
dier in  it)  at  the  head;  though  we  do  not  know  how  many  of  these 
loehages  marched  abreast,  or  what  was  the  breadth  of  the  column, 
\\  hen  the  phalanx  or  front  toward  the  enemy  was  formed,  each 
lochage  was  of  course  in  line  with  his  company,  and  at  its  left  hand; 
while  the  Thebans  and  Epaminondas  himsclfVcre  at  the  left  of  the 
whole  line.  In  this  po>iti.Hi,  Epammondas  gave  the  order  to  ground 
arms. 

The  enemy,  having  watched  him  ever  since  he  liad  left  Tegea  and 
formed  his  marching  array,  had  supposed  at  flrst  that  lie  wast'oming 
straight  up  to  the  front  of  their  position,  and  thus  expected  a  speedy 
hattle.  liut  when  he  turned  to  the  left  toward  the  mountains,  so 
that  tor  soine  time  he  did  not  approach  sensiblv  nearer  to  their  posi- 
tion, they  began  to  fancy  that  he  had  no  intention  of  fighting  on  that 
day.     Such  belief,  having  been  once  raiscnl,    still  continued,  even 


102  AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPUXVS. 

i^..uo•h   hv  ndvnnrin-  alon<r  the  skirt«  of  the  mountain,  he  gradually 

out^    tl,  no  i"<W  lima  tl,o  orcii...;}-  <!'rll..  a.-.a  uuhout  auj  nau- 
composed  of  less  liusUvorthy  troops,  uuul  the  bi.tlle  bLouia  lia\e  uceu 


ORDER  OF  BATTLE. 


103 


thus  wholly  or  partially  decided.  Accordingly,  he  caused  tlip  Boeo- 
tian hoplites— occupying  the  left  of  his  line  in  lochi  or  companies 
with  the  lochage  or  captain  at  the  left  extremity  of  each— to  wheel 
to  the  right  and  form  in  column  fronting  the  enemy,  in  advance  of 
his  remaining  line.  The  Theban  lochages  thus  became  placed  im- 
mediately in  face  of  the  enemy,  as  the  heads  of  a  cohnnn  of  extra- 
ordinary depth;  all  the  hopliles  of  each  lochus,  and  ]K'iiiaps  of  more 
than  one  lochus,  being  ranged  in  tile  behind  them.  Wiiat  the  actual 
depth  was,  or  what  was  the  exact  number  of  the  lochus,  we  do  not 
know.  At  Leuktra  Ei)amin()ndas  had  attacked  with  fifty  shields  of 
d('[)lh;  at  Mantineia,  the  depth  of  his  column  was  probably  not  less. 
IJiinself,  witii  the  chosen  Tlieban  warriors,  were  at  the  head  of  it,' 
and  he  relied  upon  breaking  through  the  eneniv's  phalanx  at  what- 
ever point  he  charged;  since  their  files  would  hardly  be  more  than 
eight  deej),  and  very  madecpiate  to  resist  so  overwhelming  a  siiock. 
His  column  would  cut  through  the  phalanx  f>f  the  enemy,  like  tho 
prow  of  a  trireme  imi)elled  in  sea-tight  against  the  midship  of  her 
antaironist. 

It  was  apparently  only  the  Boeotian  ho]ilites  who  were  tlius  formed 
in  column,  ])r()jccted  forward  in  advance';  while  the  remaininu' allies 
were  still  left  in  their  ordinary  phalanx  or  lines.  Epaminondas  cal- 
culated, that  when  he  should  have  once  broken  throuuii  the  enemy's 
phalanx  at  a  single  point,  the  rest  would  either  take  llHrht,  or  become 
80  dispirited,  that  his  allies  coming  up  in  phalanx  could' easily  deal 
with  them.  -^ 

Against  the  cavalry  on  the  enemy's  rii>-ht,  which  wn^  marshaled 
only  with  the  ordnyuy  depth  of  a  phalanx  of  hoplites  (four  -ix  or 
perhaps  eight  deep),  and  without  any  li;r]it  infantry  internnnHed 
with  the  ranks— the  Theban  general  opposed  on  his  left  his  own 
excellent  cavalry,  Theban  and  Thessalian,  but  in  stron-  and  deep 
column  so  as  to  insure  to  them  also  a  superior  weio-h?  of  attack 
Jle  further  mingled  in  their  ranks  some  actiye  footmen,  darters  and 
slmgers,  of  whom  he  had  many  from  Tliessalv  and  the  ^laliac  Gulf 

i  here  remained  one  other  precaution  to  take.  His  dee])  Theban 
and  Boiotian  column,  in  advancimj:  to  the  charn:e,  would  be  exposed- 
on  its  right  or  unshielded  side  to  the  attack  of  the  Athenian'^ 
especially  the  Athenian  cavalry,  fiom  the  enemy's  left.  To  ouanl 
ngainst  any  such  movement,  he  posted,  upon  some  risinjr  "-round 
near  ins  right,  a  special  body  of  reserve,  bolii  horse  and  foot,  in  order 
to  take  the  Athenians  in  the  rear  if  they  should  attempt  it. 

All  these  fresh  disposititms  for  attack,  made  on  the  spot,  must 
have  occui)ied  time,  and  caused  much  apparent  movement.  To  con- 
stitute both  the  column  of  infantry,  and  the  column  of  cavalry  for 
attack  on  his  left— and  to  post  the  body  of  reserve  on  the  rising 
grountl  at  his  right  against  the  Athenians- were  operations  which 
the  enemy  from  their  neighboring  jiosition  could  not  help  seeino- 
let  they  either  did  not  heed,  or  did  not  understand,  what  was  going  on 


104  AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS.       . 

I'ln  ,.      Holilkc   l.i<)<i<'liil:o(-iuniv's  Ihif  of  iiifnmvy  at  tins 
rlrc,^p.ll  .1'  »<«'•«■"■■<'•''■•''''  o,  ro>.<l  to  l,in,.  alter  :>  brave 

Isiiiississi 

"vi  o  Xnlv  intin.ates  that  the  stress  of  the  aetmn  fell  <"'  '"^  ^'  .' '' 
v.>  nnrt  T  MeedaMnonian  riuht  ai.d  ceiiter-and  ironi  wlieH'  na  latni 
left  y'" '"'■,.';  ^."  I  ';'  ,,.„i„.re(l  that  the  Eleinu  oavalry  beaten  on 
«;■.  1^::;;  ;^■K'hi  n 'av  have  be;.n  ni,le,l  hv  the  Athenian  euvalry  frou. 
tht^lpft-  revLTsin"- the  statement  of  Diocloms. 

in  i^^ni^d   o    his  important  hattle,  ho^vev<M^  .ve  cannot  grasp  ^vl 
Pn  fidrncc  anvtliino-  bevond  the  capital  detennining  teature  and  tl  c 
u  in    te  i^esul\      'rte  calcidations  of  Epaminondas  were  complet.lv 
r  alized      Theirresistible  charge,  both  of  infantry  an«]  cavalry,  made 
ty  him<elfVith  his  left  wing,  not  only  defeated  the  troops  immedi- 


EPAMIXONDAS  MORTALLY   WOUNDED.  105 

ately  ojiposed,  but  caused  the  enemy's  whole  army  to  take  flioht.    It 
was  under  these  victorious  circumstances,  and  while  he  was  m-essino- 
on  the  retiring  enemy  at  the  head  of  his  Theban  column  of  infantrv* 
that  he  received  a  mortal  wound  with  a  spear  in  the  breast.     He  was' 
by  habit  and  temper,  always  foremost  in  braving  danger,  and  on  this 
day  probably  exposed  himself  pre-eminentlv,  as  a  means  of  encour- 
aging those  around  him,  and  insuring  the  s'^iiccess  of  his  own  char-e 
on  which  so  much  depended;  moreover,  a  Grecian  general  fouoht  on 
foot  in  the  ranks,  and  carried  the  same  arms  (spear,  shiekl,  etc*)  as  a 
private  soldier.     Diodorus  tells  us  that  the  Laceda3mouian  infaulrv 
were  making  a  prolonged  resistance,  when  Epaminondas  put  himself 
at  the  hend  of  the  Thebnns  for  a  fresh  and  desperate  effort;  that  he 
stepped  forward,  darted  his  javelin,  and  slew  the  Lacedaemonian 
commander;   that  having  killed  several  warriors,   and  intimidated 
olhers,  he  forced  them  to  give  way;  that  the  LacedcTmouians,  seein-- 
him  in  advance  of  his  conu-adcs,  turned  upon  him  and  overwhelmed 
hini  with  darts,  some  of  which  he  avoided,  others  he  turned  oif  with 
his  shield,  while  others,  after  they  had  actually  entered  his  body  and 
wounded  him,  he  plucked  out  and  employed  Uiem  in  repellin''-  the 
enemy.     At  length  he  received  a  moital  wound  in  his  breast  with  <i 
spear.     I  cannot  altogether  omit  to  notice  these  details;  which  once 
passed  as  a  portion  of  Grecian  history   though  they  seem  rather  the 
offspring  of  an  imagination  fresh  from  the  perusal  of  the  Iliad  than 
a  reeJtal  of  an  actual  combat  of  Thebans  and  Lacedemonians,  both 
enunfent  for  close-rank  tighting,  with  long  spear  and  heavy  shield. 
Ihe  mortal  wound  of  Epaminondas,  with  a  spear  in  the  breast,  is  the 
only  part  of  the  case  which  w^e  really  know.     The  handle  of  the 
spear  broke,  and  the  point  was  left  sticking  in  his  breast.     He  im- 
mediately fell,  and  as  the  enemy  were  at  that  moment  in  retreat 
fell  mto  the  arms  of  his  own  comrades.     There  was  no  dispute  for 
the  possession  of  his  body,  as  there  had  been  for  Kleombrotus  at 
Lenklra. 

The  news  of  his  mortal  wound  spread  like  wild  fire  throudi  his 
army;  and  the  effect  produced  is  among  the  most  extraordinary 
phenomena  in  all  Grecian  military  history."  I  Lnve  it  in  the  words  of 
the  contemporary  historian.  "It  was 'thus  (says  Xenophon)  that 
Lpaminondas  arranged  his  order  of  attack;  and  he  was  not  disap- 
pointed in  his  expectation.  For  having  been  victorious,  on  the  point 
where  he  himself  charged,  he  caused  the  whole  army  of  the  enemy 
to  take  flight.  But  so  soon  as  he  fell,  those  who  remained  had  no 
longer  any  power  even  of  rigiitlv  usinix  the  victory.  Though  the 
phalanx  of  the  enemy's  infantry  was  in^fuU  flidit,  the  Theban  Iiop- 
htes  neither  killed  a  single  man  more,  nor  advanced  a  step  bevond 
the  actual  ground  of  conflict  Though  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  also 
m  full  flight,  yet  neither  did  the  Theban  horsemen  cont'inue  their 
pursuit,  nor  kill  any  more  either  of  horsemen  or  of  hoplites.  but  fell 
back  through  the  receding  enemies  with  the  timidity  of  beaten  men. 


104  AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS.       . 

in  lull  martu  iuonu      i    i  cj  .iiicn'd  luM     Its  nui  to  llicir 

1  o  hoi-H  non  l,as  CM.  a  t..  bridle  fl.dr  horses  ..ul  resuna-  <lH'.rl.Rarf. 
1^  M.  s      \na    rou'vl,  ll.e  srace  .livi.iinf:  M'i-  tuo  i.inncs  Avas  large 

!':'<^;,;a ?.;;;   c'lVc "of  < i.;;" '  ti.ci a.,  horm-  m  <u..p  coh:,.,,, 

TlM    m',  a    ■  irc^  of  attack,  Loll,  of  cavalry  and  inlan  ry   vl.ich 

'"V--'V  '/.      ,T    1   ',i.p  tliioin'li  ilic  ciunn  s  line  ol  iiit;ii;tiy  at  tins 
"•'^^  ''^^;        ni  ^^^  n     hJ  (e,u- until  tie  iiupic-ssion  of  his  (liniive 

P  "•  in  c^  v-  rv^o m  t^.e  Mit  c^lme  to  their  akl.  Here  ns  en  inany 
^.,  ^;^  t  kdiffic-ull  to  reeoneile  his  narrntive  ^vllh  \en()rlu)n, 
^^ho'Xn  v^,;Sn  it  ihc  stress  of  the  action  fell  on  the  Thehau 
1  It  nnd  I  -K-e  Z^^^  riirht  and  eenter-and  from  whose  narratne 
-udrri  e  h^^^^^^  fathered,  that  the  Eleiaii  cavalry  heaten  on 
^.h^own  t^d!;   in!;"have  been  aided^v  the  Athenian  cavalry  fron. 

^^1.|t;.';^tr;h^ti:^^^^^^  ---^  .rasp. nth 

CO  fidenee  a  V  n.  blvond  the  capital  .leternun  ng  feature  nnd  the 
uiinrvte  result  The  calcidations  of  Epanunondas  .vere  completelv 
r  dized  The  irresistible  charge,  bc^th  ol'  infantry  and  cavalry,  made 
'^f^J^h]ZleU^ins,  not  only  d^eaicd  the  troops  immedi- 


EPAMIXONDAS  MORTALLY  WOUNDED.  105 

ately  ojiposcd,  but  caused  tlie  enemy's  whole  army  to  take  fliolit.    R 
was  under  these  victorious  circumstances,  and  while  he  was  messiu'^ 
on  the  retiring  enemy  at  the  head  of  his  Tlieban  column  of  infaulr\* 
tliat  he  received  a  mortal  wound  witli  a  spear  in  tlie  breast.     He  was' 
by  habit  and  temper,  always  foremost  in  braving  danger,  and  on  this 
day  probably  exposed  himself  i)re-eminentlv,  as  a  means  of  encour- 
aging those  around  him,  and  insuring  the  s\iccess  of  his  own  char-e 
on  which  so  much  depended;  moreover,  a  Grecian  general  fought'ou 
foot  in  the  ranks,  and  carried  the  same  arms  (spear,  shield   etc*)  as  a 
private  soldier.     Diodorus  tells  us  that  the  Lacedaemonian  infanlrv 
were  making  a  prolonged  resistance,  when  Epaminondas  put  himself 
at  the  head  of  the  Thel)ans  for  a  fresh  and  desperate  efTDii  •  liiat  he 
stepped  forward,  darted  his  javelin,  and  slew  the  Lacedaemonian 
commander;   that  having  killed  several  warriors,   and  intimidaled 
olliers,  he  forced  them  to  give  way;  that  the  Lacedaemonians,  seein-r 
liini  in  advance  of  his  comrades,  turned  upon  him  and  overwhelmed 
him  with  darts,  some  of  which  he  avoided,  others  he  turned  olT  with 
Ins  shield,  wliile  others,  after  they  had  actuallv  entered  his  bodv  and 
wounded  him,  he  plucked  out  and  emploved  'them  in  repellin*'-  the 
enemy.     At  length  he  received  a  mortal  wound  in  his  breast  with  a 
spear.     I  cannot  altogether  omit  to  notice  these  details;  which  once 
passed  as  a  portion  of  Grecian  history   though  they  seem  rather  liie 
offspring  of  an  imagination  fresh  from  the  perusal  of  the  Iliad  than 
a  recJtal  of  an  actual  combat  of  Thebans  and  Lacedi^monians,  both 
emmfent  for  close-rank  fighting,  with  long  spear  and  heavy  shield, 
ihe  mortal  wound  of  Epaminondas,  with  a  spear  in  the  breast,  is  the 
only  part  of  the  case  which  we  really  know.     The  handle  of  the 
spear  broke,  and  the  point  was  left  sticking  in  his  breast.     He  im- 
mediately fell,  and  as  the  enemy  were  at  that  moment  in  retreat, 
fell  into  the  arms  of  his  own  ccmirades.     There  v/as  no  dispute  for 
the  possession  of  his  body,  as  there  had  been  for  Kleombrotus  at 
Lenktra. 

The  news  of  his  mortal  wound  si)read  like  wild  fire  throudi  his 
nrmy;  and  the  elfect  produced  is  among  the  most  extraordinary 
phenomena  in  all  Grecian  militaiy  history.  I  Lnve  it  in  the  words  of 
the  contemporary  historian.  "R  was 'thus  (says  Xenophon)  that 
Lpaminondas  arranged  his  order  of  attack;  and  he  was  not  disap- 
pointed in  his  expectation.  For  iiaving  been  victorious,  on  the  point 
where  he  himself  charged,  he  caused  the  whole  armv  of  the  enemy 
to  take  flight.  But  so  soon  as  he  fell,  those  who  remained  liad  no 
longer  any  power  even  of  rightly  usinir  the  victory.  Though  the 
phalanx  of  the  enemy's  infantry  was  in^full  tliuht,  the  Thebau  liop- 
iiles  neither  killed  a  single  man  more,  nor  advanced  a  step  bevond 
tlie  actual  ground  of  conflict  Though  the  enemy's  cavalry  was' also 
ni  full  flight,  yet  neither  did  the  Theban  horsemen  cont'inue  tlieir 
pursuit,  nor  kill  any  more  either  of  horsemen  or  of  hoplites.  but  fell 
back  through  the  receding  enemies  with  the  timidity  of  beaten  men. 


100  AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 

J      14  .+0  ,.]w^  inrl  hoen  niinffled  with  the  Theban 
The  light  troops  and  pelt^sts^^oa(lb^^  ^^^^^.  ^^ 

cav.h-y  and  I'-d^auU-d  ^.^'  1^'^^^-,^^^^^  but  tlieie 

;^2t^!;ns^^^oh^l  b^h^         h-scni»  they  were  n.ostly  cut  to 
pieces  by  the  AtlK'nmns  ^^^^^^^^^  ^j^^^^  .^  j^  ijj,,^,l^y 

Astonisbin-  as  ^l^i^  .^^/^^^a    i>,  ^e    '  recitinsr  \Yitness. 

true,  since  it  ^•^>"tnuhcts  the    }  mpat     c^  could  liave  con- 

Nothing  but  the  pressure  «/;";;,  .'"^'^^Vu  to  him  as  the  Lace- 

strained  Xenophon  to  record  a  >c  u     ^^  Pamm     o  ^^^^^^^,^^,^ 

damonian  army  beaten,  m  f^^^\^/  f  Vpf    ^^  That  Epami- 

!;'\^;:!..cd  by   a  -,ne.  at  once  c^ 

striking  a  proof  l.a>.  ''''^'Ij   on    )"n        <^  .J^^,,^,      s,n 

diers  t..w.r<l  their  gcnenil,  of  " "'^';/'^',  j  verse  elonients,  were 
the  hop<'.  "V''''-""'-V.''  nw.?r  out^lence  of  «,oeess,  all  their 
centered  in  .I-P/'^XI^T'^^aaf  derived  f"  idea  of  acting  nnder 
secunty  »f-'»'"f  'V *™ ;.,'^.''eve  of  striking  do^^n  a  defeated  emmy, 
his  orders;  all  their  powti.eM  11    '  =       wiihdra'.vn.     Vte  arc 

appeare,!  to  var.ish  ^vh...  < '"/;%''"';;'^,;  ,';  ,V^  Iconunendntion. 
not   indeed   to  ^P-;;\k   ot   Mich   a  procc^^^^^^^^^^^  „f  ,heir 

Th.lies  and  her  allied  "'"^.^^^''^/^Ju,'^;!- d  ,v  and  a  capital  dis- 
soldiers,  for  a  grave  ''^■"•>''^\'°.°",/^';'f,V,,„!  ',,;,.  he  o.u'  feelings 
appointment  of  v.ellear.ud  \Vrthe  m  n  v.1  o  vvould  he  most  cha- 
about  the  motive.  ^^^**™":''l>  '^^  "I'^m,  it  hav"  been  imbiltered 
prilled  of  all.  and  whose  dyin-  ";"™  °'l™"hi,,,«.lf  Hvit  when  we 
if  he  lived  to  hear  it-was  *^pan;'°"n  ''J J^";  *^ '^.j  ^^,^  s^oendency 
look  at  the  fact  simply  as  a  ".^"'.'^  J  ."''Ss  i  will  be  foui.il 
established  by  him  over  the  mmds  o  J''^  ,<;'»% '^,\,  p„g,,  ago, 
hardly  paralleled  in  history      1  have  "^coume  i   ^  .^^ 

the   intense  grief  disp  aved    by   '•l';T  "''""",:,'''' ,;,,  ^f  Kvuoske- 

in  the  tenip;ing  hour  of  victory. 


DEATH   OF  EPAMIAOKDAS. 


107 


That  the  real  victory,  tlie  lionors  of  the  dav,  belonged  to  Epami- 
nondas  and  the  Thebans,  we  know  from  tlie  conclusive  evidence  of 
Xenophon.  But  as  the  vanquished,  being  allowed  to  retire  unpur- 
sned.  were  only  separated  by  a  short  distance  from  the  walls  of 
3rantineia,  and  pcrh  ips  rallied  even  before  reaching  the  town— as  the 
Athenian  cavalry  had  cut  to  pieces  some  of  the  straggling  liuht 
troops— they  too  pretended  to  have  gained  a  victory.  Trophies  were 
erected  on  both  sides.  Nevertheless  the  Thebans  were  masters  of 
the  field  of  battle;  so  that  the  Laced;emonians,  after  some  hesitation 
were  forced  to  senrl  a  herald  to  solicit  truce  for  tlie  burial  of  the 
slain,  and  to  grant  for  burial  such  Theban  bodies  as  they  had  in  their 
possession.     This  was  the  understood  confession  of  defeat. 

The  surgeons,  on  examining  the  wound  of  Epaminondas,  with  the 
spear-head  yet  sticking  in  it,  pronounced  that  he  must  die  as  soon  as 
tliat  was  withdrawn.  He  first  inquired  whether  his  shield  was  safe- 
and  his  shield-bearer,  answering  in  the  attiimative,  produced  it 
before  his  eyes.  He  next  asked  about  the  issue  of  the  battle,  and 
was  informed  that  his  own  army  was  victorious.  He  then  desired 
to  see  lolaidas  and  Daiphantus,  whtmi  he  intended  to  succeed  him  as 
commanders;  but  received  the  mournful  reply,  that  ])oth  of  them 
had  been  slain.  "  Then  (said  he)  you  must  make  peace  with  the 
^'!].^'"^^''l'  J^e  ordered  the  spear-head  to  be  withdrawn,  when  the 
elHnx  of  blood  speedily  terminated  his  life. 

Of  the  three  questions  liere  ascribed  to  the  dying  chief  the  tliird 
IS  the  gravest  and  most  significant.  The  death  of'  these  two  other 
citizens,  the  only  men  in  the  camp  whom  Epaminondas  could 
trust,  shows  how  aggi-avated  and  irreparable  was  the  Thc])an  lo'^s 
not  indeed  as  to  number,  but  as  to  qualitv.  Not  merely  Epaminonl 
(las  himself,  but  the  only  two  men  qualified  in  some  measure  to 
replace  him,  perished  in  the  same  field;  and  Pelopidas  had  fallen  in 
the  preceding  year.  Such  accumulation  of  individual  losses  must  be 
borne  in  mind  when  t\x'  come  to  note  the  total  suspension  of  The- 
ban glory  and  dignity,  after  this  dearly-bought  victory  It  affords 
emphatic  evidence  of  the  extreme  forwardness  with  which  their 
leaders  exposed  themselves,  as  well  as  of  the  gallant  resistance  which 
they  experienced. 

The  death  of  Epaminondas  spreadrejoicinirin  the  Lacedirmonian 
camp  proportioned  to  the  sorrow  of  the  Theban.  To  more  than  one 
warrior  was  assigned,  the  honor  of  having  struck  the  blow.  The 
3Inntineians  gave  it  to  their  citizen  Macluerion;  the  Athenians,  to 
bryllus  son  of  Xenophon ;  the  Spartans,  to  their  countrj-man  Antik- 
rates  At  Sparta,  distinguished  honor  was  shown,  even  in  the  days 
ot  Plutarch,  to  the  posterity  of  Antikrates,  who  was  believed  to  have 
rescued  the  city  from  her  most  formidable  enemv.  Such  tokens 
afford  precious  testimony,  from  witnesses  beyond 'all  suspicion  to 
the  memory  of  Epaminondas. 
How  the  news  of  his  death  was  received  at  Thebes,  we  have  no 


108 


AFTER  tup:   death   of   PELOPIDAS. 


CIIARACTEIl  OF  EPAMINONDAS. 


109 


positive  account.     But  there  can  he  no  douht  that  the  sorrow,  so 
mnlv/in"-  to  the  victorious  soldiers  on  the  held  of  ]Mantineia,  was 
felt  wiih  ?qual  acutencss,  and  with  an  effect  not  less  d<  pressing,  hi 
the  senate-house  and  market-place  of  Thehes.     The  city   the  citizen- 
soldier^   and  tlie  allies,  would  be  alike  inipnssed  with  the  mournful 
conviction,  tliat  tiie  dving  injunction  of  Epaniinondas  must  he  exe- 
cuted.    Accordinglv,  negotiations  vere  opened  and  peace  was  coii- 
cluded-probahlv  at  once,  before  the  army  left  Peloponnesus.     The 
Thebans  and  thVir  Arcadian  allies  exacted  nothing  more  than  the 
recoo-nition  of  the  status  quo;  to  leave  everything  exactly  as  it  was, 
witliout  anv  change  or  reactionary  measure,  yet  admitting  Megalop- 
olis  with  the  Panarcadian  constitution  attached  to  it— antl  adinit- 
tinc;  al>o  Messene  as  an  independent  city.     Against  this  last  article 
Sparta  loudlv  and  pereminorily  protested     But  not  one  of  her  allies 
Fvmpathiz.-d  with  her  feelings.     Some  indeed  were  decided  y  agams 
liVr-  to  v-uch  a  degree,  that  we  find  the  maintenance  of  independent 
Messene  airainst  Sparta  ranking  shortly  afterward   as  an  admitted 
principle  in  Athenian  foreign  politics.     ISeither  Athenians,  nor  Elei- 
ans   nor  Arcadians,  desired  to  see  Sparta  strengthened      Isone  had 
any  interest  in  prolon-ing  the  war.  with  prospects  doubtful  to  every 
one- while  all  wished^o  see  the  large  armies  now  in  Arcada  dis- 
n'is^ed      Accordintrlv  the  peace  was  sworn  to  on  these  conditions. 
The  autonomv  of  M'essene  was  guaranteed  by  a'.i,  except  the  Si)ar- 
t-ms;  who  alone  stood  out,  keeping  themselves  without  Irienos  or 
auxiliaries,  in  the  hope  for  better  times-rather  than  submit  to  ^hat 
lliev  considered  as  an  intoleiable  degradation 

Under  these  conditions,  the  armies  on  both  sides  retired.  Xeno- 
Phon  is  ri-ht  in  saving,  that  neither  party  gained  anything,  either 
div  territory,  or  dominion;  though  before  the  battle  considering 
the  magnitude  of  the  two  contending  armies  every  one  had  expected 
that  the  victors,  whichever  they  were,  would  become  masters,  and 
the  vanquished,  subjects.  But  his  assertion-that  "there  was  more 
disturlZce,  and  more  matter  of  dispute,  in  Greece,  after  the  battle 
than  before  it"-must  be  interpreted,  partly  as  the  inspiration  of  a 
philo-Laconian  sentiment,  which  regards  a  peace  not  accepted  by 
Sparta  as  no  peace  at  ail-partly  as  based  on  the  circumstance,  that 
no  detinite  headship  was  recognized  as  possessed  by  any  state 
Sparta  had  once  enjoved  it,  and  had  set  the  disgraceful  example  o 
suin-  out  a  contirmation  of  it  from  the  Persian  king  at  the  peace  ot 
Antalkidas.  Both  Thebes  and  Athens  had  aspired  to  the  same 
di-nitv,  and  both  by  the  like  means,  since  the  battle  of  Leuktra; 
neitheV  of  them  had  succeeded.  Greece  was  thus  left  without  a 
head  and  to  this  extent  the  affirmation  of  Xenophon  is  true  But  it 
would  not  be  correct  to  suppose  that  the  last  expedition  of  Epami- 
nondas  into  Peloponnesus  was  unproductive  of  any  results— though 
it  was  disappointed  of  its  gnat  and  brilliant  fruits  by  his  untimely 
death      Before  he  marched  in,  the  Theban  party  in  Arcadia  Cfegea, 


I 


Megalopolis,  etc.)  was  on  the  point  of  being  crushed  by  the  Mantin^i- 
ans  and  their  allies.  His  expedition,  though  ending  in  an  indecisive 
victory,  nevertheless  broke  up  tlie  confederacy  enlisted  in  support  of 
]\hnitineia;  enabling  Tegea  and  ^Megalopolis  to  maintain  themselves 
against  their  Arcadian  opponents,  and  thus  leaving  the  frontier 
against  Sparta  unimpaired.  While  therefore  we  admit  the  alfirnia- 
tion  of  Xenophon — that  Thebes  did  not  gain  by  the  battle  either 
city,  or  territory,  or  dominion — we  must  at  the  same  time  add,  that 
s!ie  gained  the  preservation  of  her  Arcadian  allies,  and  of  her  anti- 
Spirtnn  frontier,  including  Messene. 

This  was  a  gain  of  considerable  importance.  But  dearly  indeed 
was  it  purchased,  by  the  blood  of  her  first  hero,  shed  on  the  field  of 
]Manlineia;  not  to  mention  his  two  seconds,  whom  we  know  only 
from  his  verdict — Daiphantus  and  lolaidas.  lie  was  buried  on  the 
field  of  battle,  and  a  monumental  column  was  erected  on  his  tomb. 

Scarcely  any  character  in  Grecian  history  has  been  judged  with  so 
much  unanimity  as  Epaminoudas.  lie  has  obtained  a  meetl  of  admira- 
tion— from  all,  sincere  and  hearty — from  some,  enthusiastic.  Cicero 
pronounces  him  to  be  the  first  man  of  Greece.  The  judgment  of 
Polybius,  though  not  summed  up  so  emphaticallj^in  a  single  epithet, 
is  delivered  in  a  manner  hardly  less  significant  and  laudatory.  Nor 
was  it  merely  historians  or  critics  who  formed  this  judgment.  The 
best  men  of  action,  combining  the  soldier  and  the  patriot,  such  as 
Tinioleon  and  Philopffimeu,  set  before  them  Epamiuondas  as  their 
modi'l  to  copy. 

The  remark  has  been  often  made,  and  suggests  itself  whenever  we 
speak  of  Epaminoudas,  though  its  full  force  will  be  felt  only  when 
Ave  come  to  follow^  the  subsequent  history — that  with  him  the  dignity 
jind  commanding  influence  of  Thv-^bes  both  began  and  ended.  His 
period  of  active  political  life  comprehends  sixteen  years,  from  the 
resurrection  of  Tiiebes  into  a  free  community,  by  the  expulsion  of 
the  Lacedaemonian  hai-most  and  garrison,  and  the  subversion  of  the 
ruling  oligarchy— to  the  fatal  day  of  xMantineia  (079-362  B.C.).  His 
prominent  and  unparalleled  ascendency  belongs  to  the  last  eight 
years,  from  the  victory  of  Leuktra  (871  B.C.).  Throughout  this 
whole  period,  both  all  that  we  know,  and  ail  that  we  can  reasonal)ly 
divine,  fully  bears  out  the  judgment  of  Polybius  and  Cicero,  wiio 
had  the  means  of  knowing  much  more.  And  this  too — let  it  be 
observed — though  Epaminoudas  is  tried  by  a  severe  canon;  for  the 
chief  contemporary  witness  remaining  is  one  decidedly  hostile. 
Even  the  philo-Laconian  Xenophon  finds  neither  misdeeds  nor 
omissions  to  reveal  in  the  capital  enemy  of  Sparta— mentions  him 
only  to  record  what  is  honorable — and  manifests  the  perverting  bias 
mainly  by  suppressing  or  slurring  over  his  triumphs.  The"  man 
whose  eloquence  bearded  Agesilaus  at  the  congress  immediatelv 
preceding  the  battle  of  Leuktra~who  in  that  battle  stripped  Sparta 
of  her  glory,  and  transferred  the  wreath  to  Thebes— who  a  few 


110 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOFIDAS. 


montli.  afterward,   not   only  ravaged  all    the  virgin   lerritorv  of 
Laconia,  but  eiit  off  the  best  balf  of  it  tor  the  restitution  of  mde- 
rcndeiit  Messene,  and  erected  tlie  hostile  Areadian  community  ot 
Alroalopolis  ou  its  frontier-tlie  author  of  these  fatal  disas  ers  in- 
^Dires  to  Xenophon  such  intolerable  chagrin  and  antiptithy,  that  in 
the  two  first  he  keeps  back  the  name,  and  in  the  third   suppresses 
the  thino  done.     But  in  the  last  campaign,  preceding  the  battle  ot 
]\Iantine!a  (whereby  Sparta  incurred  no  i)ositive  loss,  and  where  the 
death  of  Epaminmidas  softened  every  predisposition  against  him), 
there  was  no  such  violent  pressure  upon  the  hdelity  of  the  historian. 
Accordini'lv,   the  concluding  chapter  ot   Xenophon  s      Hellenica 
conlains  irpaneirvric,   ami)le   and    unqualified,   upon   the  military 
merits  of  the  Tlieban  iicneral;  upon  his  daring  enterprise,  his  com- 
prehensive foresii^ht.  his   care   to   avoid   imnccessary  exposure  ot 
soldiers,  his  excetlent  disciplmc,  his  well-ccmbined  tactics,  his  fer- 
tility of  a"-"-ressive   resource   in  sinking  at  tliewcak  points  ot  tlie 
enemy    avTio  content   themselves  with   following  and  parrying  his 
blows  (to  use  a  simile  of  Demostlu  nes)  like  r.n  unskillful  F^gdi  Jt,  tuid 
only  succeed  in  doing  so  by  ngnal  aid  from  accident.     The  (hort  ot 
^tratcnc  genius,  then  for  the  first  time  devisf  d  and  applud,  of  bimg- 
incr  an  irresistible  force  of  attack  to  bear  en  one  point  of  the  hcstile 
liife   wlnle  the  rest  of  his  army  was  kept  comparatively  lack  until 
the  action  had  been  thus  decided-is  ckr.rly  noted  by  Xc  iiopl  on,  to- 
ir-'ther  with  its  triumphant  (ffect,  at  the  battle  of  jyiantmeia;  thougli 
the  very  same  cembination  <  n  the  field  of  Leuktra  is  slurred  over  in 
his  description,  as  if  it  were  so  c(,mmonplace  as  not  to  k  quire  any 
inention  of  the  chief  with  whom  it  originaUd.     Compare  E]  ami- 
inondaswhhA-esilaus-h(>wgieatisthesi;peri()rityofthelirst--tAen 

in  the  narrative^  of  Xenoph<ni,  the  earnest  pamgyrist  of  the  other 
How  manifestly  are  we  n.ade  to  k-c  lliat  nothing  except  the  fa  al 
hpear  wound  at  Mantineia.  prevented  him  fixm  reaping  the  tiinl  ot  a 
series  of   admirable   arriiiigements,  ai;d  frcm  beceming  arbiter  ot 
reh)ponnesus,  including  8  i-irta  herself !       ,       ,     .    .  ,    , 

The  military  merils  alone  of  Epammomlas.  liad  thry  merely  be- 
lono-ed  to  a  jrcneral  of  mercenaries,  combined  with  nolhing  praise;- 
wortliy  in  other  ways— would  have  stamped  him  as  a  man  ot  high 
and  ofiiiinal  genius,  above  eveiy  otlier  Greek,  jmteceelent  or  contem- 
poiavy^^  But  it  is  the  pecidiar  excelknce  of  this  great  man  that  we 
are  not  compelled  to  be>rrow  f re m  one  side  e)f  his  ehaiaeter  in  older 
to  compem-ate  deficiene  ies  in  another.  His  splendid  military  cavacity 
was  never  prostituted  to  personal  ends;  neither  to  ayarict',  mn  am- 
bition nor  e)verwec'ning  vanity.  Poor  at  the  beginning  of  his  lile, 
he  left  at  the  end  of  it  not  enough  to  pay  his  funeral  expe^nses; 
havinjr  despised  the  many  opportunities  le,r  cnriel  me nt  which  his 
positiSn  afforded,  as  well  as  the  riclu'st  e^flers  from  foreigners.  Of 
ambition  he  had  so  little,  by  latural  temperament,  that  his  friends 
accused  hiin  of  torpor.     But  lis  scon  us  the  perilous  exposure  ot 


HIS  ELOQUENCE. 


Ill 


Thebes  required  it,  he  displayed  as  much  energy  in  her  defense  rs 
the  most  ambitious  of  her  citizens,  without  any  of  that  captious  exi- 
gence, frequent  in  ambitious  men,  as  to  the  amount  of  glorification 
or  deference  due  to  hira  from  his  countrymen.  And  his  personal 
vanity  was  so  faintly  kindled,  even  after  the  prodigious  success  at 
Leiiktra.  that  we  fiiid  him  serving  in  Thessaly  as  a  private  hoplito 
in  the  ranks,  antl  in  the  city  as  an  a^dilc  or  inferior  street-magistrate, 
under  the  title  of  Telearchus.  An  illustrious  specimen  of  that  cm- 
piK'itv  and  good-will,  both  to  command  and  lo  1);'^  comnuuieied,  whieli 
Aristotle  pronounces  to  form  in  their  combination  the  characteristic; 
feature  of  the  worthy  citizen.  He  once  incurred  the  displeasure  ou 
his  fellow-citizens,  iov  Ids  wise  and  moderate  policy  in  Achaia,  which 
tliev  were  ill-judged  enough  to  reverse.  We  cannot  doubt  also  that, 
ho  was  freqi'iently  attacked  by  political  censors  and  enemies — the 
condition  of  eminence  in  every  free  state;  but  neither  of  these  causes 
rulHed  the  dignified  calmness  of  his  political  course.  As  he  never 
courtiid  popularity  by  unworthy  arts,  so  he  bore  unpopularity  with- 
out murmurs,  and  without  any  angry  renunciation  eif  patriotic  duty. 

The  mildness  of  his  antipathie'S  against  political  opponents  at  homo 
was  undeviating;  and,  what  is  even  more  remarkable,  amid  the  prece- 
dents and  practice  of  the  Grecian  workl,  liis  hostility  against  foreign 
enemies,  Bepotian  dissentients,  audTheban  exiles,  was  uniformly  free 
from  reactionary  vengeance.  Sufiicient  proofs  h;ive  been  adduced  in 
the  preceding  pages  of  this  rare  union  of  attributes  i'l  the  same  indi- 
vidual; of  lofty  elisinterestedness,  not  merely  as  to  corrupt  gains,  but 
as  to  the  tnore*^  seductive  irritabilities  of  ambition,  combined  with  a 
just  measure  of  attachment  towarel  partisans,  and  unparalleled  gentle- 
ness toward  enemies.  His  friendship  withPelopidas  was  never  dis- 
turbed during  the  fifteen  years  of  tin  ir  joint  politie;al  career;  an 
absence  of  jealousy  signal  antl  creditable  to  both,  though  most  creel- 
itable  to  Pelojiidas,  the  richer,  as  well  as  the  inferior  man  of  the  two. 
To  both,  and  to  the  harmonious  co-operation  of  both,  Thebes  owed 
her  short-lived  splendor  and  ascenelency.  Yet  when  we  c^ompare  the 
one  with  the  other,  we  not  only  miss  in  Pelopidas  the  transcendent 
strategic  genius  and  cons])icuous  eloquence,  but  even  the  constant 
vigilance  and  pruelerice,  which  never  eleserteel  his  friend  K  Pelopi- 
das had  had  Epaminonelas  as  his  compiiniou  in  Thessaly,  he  wendel 
hardly  have  trusted  himself  to  the  good  faith,  nor  tasted -the  dungeon 
of  the  Phera?an  Alexander;  nor  v.ould  he  have  rushed  forward  to 
certain  destruction,  in  a  transport  of  frenzy,  at  the  view  of  that 
bated  tyrant  in  the  subserpient  battle. 

In  elociuene.'e,  Epaminondas  would  doubtless  have  found  superiors 
at  Athens;  but  at  Thebes,  he  had  neither  equal,  nor  predecessor,  nor 
successor.  Under  the  new  phase  into  which  Thebes  passed  liy  the 
expulsion  of  the  Laceekmnonians  out  of  the  Kadmeia.  such  a  gift  was 
see^onel  in  importance  only  to  the  great  strategic  qualities;  while  the 
eombination  of  both  eIevat(Ml  their  possessor  into  the  envejy,  the  couii- 


112 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


selor.  the  debater  of  his  countrv,  as  well  as  hrr  minister  at  war  and 
commander-in-chief.     Tlie  shame  of  acknowledging  Theles  as  lead- 
in"-  state  in  Greece,  embodied  in  the  current  phrases  about  Boeotian 
stupidity,  would  be  sensibly  mitigated,  whui  her  reprci-entntive  in 
an  assembled    congress  spo'kc  with   the   tiowing  abundance  of  the 
Homeric  Odysseus,  instead  of  the  loud,  biicf,  and  hurried  l)luster  of 
3[enelaus.     The  ]  ossession  of  such  eloi.uence.  amid  the  uninspiring 
atmosphere  of  Thebes,  imi^litd  far  greater  n.ental  force  than  a  similar 
accomplishment  would  haye  betokened  at  Athens.    In  Epjiminondas, 
it  was  steadily  associated  with  thought  and  action— that  triple  cem- 
bination  of  thinking,  siieaking.  and  acting,  which  Isokiates  and  other 
Athenian  sophists  seL  before  their  heavers  as  the  stock  and  qualitica- 
tiou  for  meritorious  civic  life.     To  the  bodily  training  and  soldier- 
like practice,  common  to  all  Thebans,  Epiiminondas  added  an  ardent 
intellectual  impulse  and  a  range  of  discussion  with  the  I'hilosophic  al 
men  arcAuid,  i^eculiar  to  himself.     HcAvas  not  floated  into  public  Wiv. 
by  the  accident  of  birth  or  wealth— nor  hoisted  and  pro}  ped  up  by 
oiio-archical  clubs— nor  eyen  determined  to  it  originally  by  any  tpon- 
tau^eous  ambition  of  his  own.     But  the  great  reyoluliou  of  o79  B.C., 
which  expelled  from  Thebes  both  the  Lacedamonian  garrison  and 
the  local  oligarchy  wlio  ruled  by  its  aid.  forced  him  forward  by  the 
strongest  obliirations  h'oth  of  duty  and  interest;  since  nothing  but  an 
energt^ic  defc^nse  could  rescue  both  him  and  every  other  free  Theban 
from  slavery.     It  was  by  the  like  necessity  that  the  American  revolu- 
tion, and  the  first  French  revolution,  thrust  into  the  front  rar.k  the 
most  instructed  and  capable  men  of  the  country,  whether  and»itious 
by  temperament  or  not.     As  the  j^ressure  of  the  time  impelled  Ejiami- 
nondas  forward,  so  it  also  disposed  bis  countrymen  to  h  ok  out  for  a 
competent  leader  wherever  he  was  to  be  found:  and  in  no  otlier  living 
man  could  they  obtain  the  same  union  of  the  soldier,  the  general,  the 
orator,  and  the  patriot.     Looking;  through  all  Grecian  history,  it  is 
only  in  Perikles  that  we  find  tlie  like   many-sided   excellence;  for 
thoiidi  much  inferior  to  Epaminondas  as  a  general,  Perikles  nmst  be 
lield  superior  to  him  as  a  statesman.     But  it  is  alike  true  of  both— 
and  the  remark  tends  much   to  illustrate   the  sources  of   Grecian 
excellence— that  neither  sprang  exclusively  from  the  school  of  practice 
and  experience.     They  l)oth  brought  to  that  school  minds  exercised 
in  the  conversation  of  the  most  instructed  philosophers  and  sophists 
accessible  to -them—trained  to  varied  intellectual  combinations,  and 
to  a  larger  range  of  subjects  than  those  tliat  came  before  the  public 
assembly— fandlituized  with  reasonings  v.hich  the  scrupulous  piety 
of  Nikias  foreswore,  and  which  the  devoted  military  patriotism  of 
Pelopidas  disdained. 

On  one  point,  as  I  have  already  noticed,  the  policy  recommended 
by  Epaminondas  to  his  countrymen  appears  of  questionaljle  wisdom 
— his  advice  to  c<nni)ete  with  Athens  for  transmarine  and  naval 
power.     One  cannot  reco;;nizc  in  this  advice  the  same  accurate  eiti- 


DISCOKD   AT   MEGALOPOLIS. 


113 


mate  of  permanent  causes — the  same  long-sighted  view,  of  the  con- 
ditions of  strength  to  Thebes  and  of  weakness  to  her  enemies,  which 
dictated  the  foundation  of  JMessene  and  Megalopolis.  These  two 
towns,  when  once  founded,  took  such  firm  root,  that  Sparta  could  not 
porsnnde  even  her  own  allies  to  aid  in  effacing  them;  a  clear  proof 
of  the  sound  reasoning  on  wldch  their  founder  had  j^roceeded.  What 
Epaminondas  would  have  done — whether  he  would  have  followed 
out  maxims  equally  ]U'udent  and  penetrating — if  he  had  survived 
the  victory  of  Mantineia — is  a  point  which  we  cannot  pretend  to 
divine.  He  would  have  found  himself  then  on  a  pinnacle  of  glory, 
and  iuvestetl  with  a  plenitude  of  power,  such  as  no  Greek  ever  held 
without  abusing.  But  all  that  w^e  know  of  Epaminondas  justifies  the 
conjecture  that  he  would  have  been  found  equal,  more  than  any  other 
Greek,  even  to  this  great  trial;  and  that  his  untimely  death  shut  him 
out  from  a  future  not  less  honorable  to  liimself,  tiian  beneficial  to 
Thebes  and  to  Greece  generally. 

Of  the  private  life  and  habits  of  Epaminondas  we  know  scarcely 
anytJiing.  We  are  told  that  he  never  married;  and  we  find  brief  allu- 
sions, without  any  details,  to  attachments  in  which  he  is  said  to  have 
indulged.  Among  the  countrymen  of  Pindar,  devoted  attachment 
between  mature  men  and  beau"tiful  youths  was  more  frequent  than 
in  otlier  parts  of  Greece.  It  was  confirmed  by  interchange  of  nuitual 
oaths  at  the  tomb  of  lolaus,  and  was  reckoned  upon  as  the  firmest 
tie  of  military  fidelity  in  the  hour  of  battle.  Asopichus  and  Kephi- 
sodorus  are  named  as  youths  to  whom  Epaminondas  was  much 
devoted.  The  first  fought  with  desperate  bravery  at  the  battle  of 
Leuktra,  and  after  the  victory  caused  an  image  of  the  Leuktrian 
trophy  to  be  carved  on  his  shield,  which  he  dedicated  at  Delphi;  the 
second  perished  along  with  his  illustrious  friend  and  chief  on  the 
field  of  Mantineia,  and  was  buried  in  a  grave  closely  adjacent  to  him. 

It  rather  ai)i)ears  that  the  Spartans,  deeply  incensed  against  their 
allies  for  having  abandoned  them  in  reference  to  Messene,  began  to 
turn  their  atten;ion  away  from  the  affairs  of  Greece  to  those  of  Asia 
and  Egypt.  But  the  dissensions  in  Arcadia  were  not  wholly  appeased 
even  by  the  recent  peace.  The  city  of  Megalopolis  had  been  founded 
only  eight  years  before  by  the  coalescence  of  many  smaller  town- 
ships, all  previously  enjoying  a  separate  autonomy  more  or  less  per- 
fect. The  vehement  anti-Spartan  impulse,  Avhieh  marked  the  two 
years  immediately  succeeding  the  battle  of  Leuktra,  had  overruled 
to  so  great  a  degree  the  prior  instincts  of  these  townships,  that  they 
had  lent  themselves  to  the  plans  of  Lykomedes  and  Epaminondas  for 
an  enlarged  community  in  the  new  city.  But  since  that  period, 
reaction  had  taken  place.  The  ]Mantineians  had  come  to  be  at  the 
head  of  an  anti-Megalopolilan  p:u-ty  iai  xVreadia;  and  several  of  the 
cominuuilies  which  had  been  merired  in  Megalopolis,  counting  upon 
aid  fi-om  them  and  from  the  Eleians,  insisted  on  seceding,  and 
returning  to  their  original  autonomy.     But  for  forei^ai  aid,  Mogalop- 


114 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


oTis  would  now  liave  been  in  crroat  difliculty.  A  prcssinc"  rcqnest 
was  sent  to  the  Tiieban.-^,  who  dispatched  into  Arcadia  o.OOO  hoitUtes 
under  Pamnienes.  Tins  force  enabkd  tlie  ^Megalopolilnns.  though 
not  without  measures  of  considerable  rigor,  to  upliold  ihe  integrity 
of  their  city,  and  keep  the  refractory  members  in  communion.  And 
it  appears  t'hat  the  inlerlerence  thus  obtained  was  permanently  effi- 
cacious, so  tiiat  the  integrily  of  this  recent  Pan-Arcadian -comnuniity 
was  lio  further  disturbi  il. 

Tlie  okl  king  Agesihuis  was  compelled,  at  the  age  of  eighty,  to  see 
the  dominion  of  Sparia  thus  irrevocai)ly  narrowed,  her  inlluence  .in 
Arcadia  overthrown,  and  the  loss  of  Messene  formally  sanctioned 
even  by  her  own  allies.  All  his  protests,  and  those  of  his  son  Archi- 
danuis,  so  strenuously  set  forth  by  Isokrates,  had  oidy  ended  by 
isolating  Sparta  more  than  ever  from  Grecian  support  and  sympathy. 
Archidamus  probably  never  seriously  attempted  to  execute  the  des- 
perate scheme  which  he  had  held  out  as  a  threat  sonu' two  or  three 
years  before  the  batth.'  of  Mantineia;  that  the  Lacedamcnians  wouUl 
send  away  their  wives  and  families,  and  convert  their  military  popu- 
lation into  a  perpetual  camp,  never  to  lay  down  arms  until  they  should 
have  reconquered  Messene  or  iKMished  in  the  attenipt.  Yet  lie  and 
Ids  father,  though  deserted  by  all  Grecian  allies,  htul  rot  yet  aban- 
doned the  hope  that  the}'  might  obtain  aid,  in  the  shape  ()f  money, 
for  levying  mercenary  troops,  from  the  native  princes  in  Egypt  and 
the  revolted  Persian  satraps  in  Asia,  wilh  whom  they  seem  to  have 
been  for  some  time  in  a  sort  of  eorres})ondence. 

About  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Mantineia— and  as  it  wo\dd  seem, 
for  some  years  before — a  large  portion  of  the  western  dominions  of 
theGreat  King  were  in  a  state  partly  of  revolt,  partly  of  dubious 
obedience.  Egypt  had  been  for  some  years  in  actual  revolt,  and 
under  native  })rinccs,  A\hom  the  Persians  had  vainly  endeavored  to 
subdue  (employing  for  that  purj^osc  the  aid  of  the  Athenian  generals 
Iphikrates  and  Tiinotlieus)  both  in  874  and  8T1  r.c.  ^\ri('barzanes, 
satrap  of  the  region  near  Propimtis  and  the  Hellespont,  appears  to 
have  revolted  about  the  year  oOT-60  B.C.  In  other  i»arts  of  Asia 
Elinor,  too — Paphlagonia,*Pisi(lia,  etc. — the  subordinaie  prince.^  or 
governors  became  disalTected  to  Artaxerxes.  But  their  disaffection 
was  for  a  certain  time  ke])t  down  by  the  extraordinary  ability  and 
vigor  of  a  Karian  named  Datamcs,  conmiander  for  the  king  in  a  part 
of  Kappadokia,  who  gained  several  important  victories  over  them, 
l)y  rapidity  of  movement  and  well-combined  stratagem.  At  length 
the  servic-es  of  Dalames  became  so  distinguished  as  to  excite  the 
jealousy  of  many  of  the  Persian  gnindees,  who  poisonul  tlie  royal 
mind  against  him,  and  thus  drove  him  to  raise  the  standard  of  revolt 
in  his  own  district  of  Kappodokia,  under  alliance  and  concert  with 
Ariobarzanes.  It  was  in  vr.in  that  Autophrj.dr.tes,  sntn  p  of  Lydia, 
was  sent  by  Artaxerxes  with  a  powerful  foice  to  subdue  Datames. 
The  latter  resisted  all   the  oi)en  force  of  Persia,  rnel  was  at  length 


REVOLT   OF  THE   SATPvAPS. 


115 


overcome  onlv  by  the  treacherous  conspiracy  of  ^lithridates  (son  e)f 
Ariobarzanes).'  who,  corrupted  by  the  Persitm  court  and  becoming  a 
traitor  to  his  father  Ariobarzanes  and  to  Datames,  simulated  zealous 
co-operation,  hMupted  the  latter  to  a  confidential  interview,  and  there 
assassinated  him. 

Still,  however,  there  remained  powerful  princes  and  satraps  in 
Asia  Minor,  disaffected  to  the  court;  Mausolus  prince  of  Karia, 
brontes  satrap  of  Mysia,  and  Autophraelates  satrap  of  Lydia— the 
last  having  now  apivu-ently  joined  tlu;  revolters,  though  he  hadbcf.)re 
Ix'en  active  in  upholding  the  authority  of  the  king.  It  seems  too  that 
the  revolt  extended  to  Syria  and  Pl'ienicia,  so  that  all  the  western 
coast  with  its  large  revenues,  as  well  as  Egypt,  was  at  once  sub- 
tracted from  the  empire.  Tachos.  native  king  of  Egypt,  was  pre- 
piired  to  lend  assistance  to  this  formidable  combination  of  disaffected 
commanders,  Avho  selected  Orontes  as  their  chief,  confiding  to  him 
their  united  forces,  and  sending  Rheomithres  to  Egypt  to  procure 
]\'eaniary  aid.  But  the  Persian  court  broke  the  force  of  this  com- 
bination by  corrupting  both  Orontcis  and  Rheomithres,  who  betrayed 
their  confederates,  and  caused  the  enterprise  to  fail.  Of  the  partic- 
ulars we  know  little  or  nothing. 

Both  the  Spartan  king  Agesilaus,  w^ith  1000  Lacedsemonian  or 
Peloponnesiau  'hoplites — and  "the  Athenian  general  Chabrias— were 
invited  to  Egypt  to  command  the  forces  of  Tachos;  the  former  on 
land,  the  latTer  at  sea.  Chabrias  came  simply  as  a  volunteer,  with- 
out any  public  sanction  or  order  from  Athens.  But  the  service  of 
Airesilaus  was  undertaken  for  the  ]iiuposes  anel  with  the  consent  of 
the  authorities  at  home,  attested  by  the  presence  of  thirty  Sj^artans 
who  came  out  as  his  counselors.  The  Spartans  were  displeased  with 
the  Persian  king  for  having  sanctioned  the  independence  of  Mes- 
sene;  and  as  the  prospect  of  overthrowing  or  enfeebling  his  empire 
appeared  at  t^s  moment  considerable,  they  calculated  on  reaping 
a  large  rew^ard  for  their  services  to  tlie  Egyptian  prince,  who  would 
in  return  lend  them  assistance  toward  their  views  in  Greece.  But 
dissension  and  bad  judgment  marred  all  the  combinations  against  the 
Persian  king.  Agesilaus,  on  reaching  Egypt,  was  received  with 
little  respect.  The  Egyptians  saw  with  astonishment,  that  one,  whom 
they  had  invited  as  a  formidable  warrior,  was  a  little  deformed  old 
man,  of  mean  attire,  and  sitting  on  the  grass  with  his  troops,  careless 
of  show  or  luxury.  They  not  only  vented  their  disappointment  in 
sarcastic  remarks,  but  also  declincel  to  invest  him  with  the  supreme 
command,  as  he  had  anticipated.  He  was  only  recognized  as  general 
of  the  mercenary  land  force,  while  Tachos  himself  commanded  in 
chief,  and  Chabrias  was  at  the  head  of  the  fleet.  Great  efforts  were 
made  to  assemble  a  force  ce:)nipetent  to  act  against  the  Great  Iving; 
and  Chabrias  is  said  to  have  suggested  various  stratagems  for  ob- 
taininc:  monev  from  tlic  Egyptians.  The  array  having  been  thus 
stremrlhened.' Agesilaus,  though  discontented  and  indignant,  never- 


116 


After  the  death  of  pelopidas. 


AGES1LAU3. 


117 


llielcss  accompanied  Taclios  on  an  expedition  airainst  the  Persian 
forces  in  Phenicia;  from  whence  they  were  forced  to  return  by  tlie 
revolt  of  ^\ktanel)is,  c^Aisiu  of  Tachos,  who  caused  himself  to  he 
proclaimed  king  of  E.<rypt.  Tachos  was  now  full  of  sui^plications  to 
Airesilaus  to  sustain  him  aira'nst  h\s  competitor  for  the  Eiryptian 
throne,  while  Nektanebis  also,  on  his  side,  began  to  bid  liigh  for 
the  favor  of  the  Spartans.  With  the  sanction  of  the  authorities  at 
liome,  but  in  spite  of  the  o]iposition  of  C'habrias,  Agesilaus  decided 
in  favor  of  iXektanebis,  w  ilhdrawing  the  mercenaries  from  the  camp 
of  Tachos,  who  was  accordingly  obliged  to  lake  flight.  Chabrias 
returned  home  to  Athens,  either  not  choosing  to  abandon  Tachos, 
whom  he  had  come  to  serve— or  recalled  by  special  order  of  his 
countrymen,  in  consequence  of  the  remonstrance  of  the  Persian  king. 
A  conipetitor  for  the  throne  presently  arose  in  the  :Mendesian  divi- 
sion of  Egypt.  AiiTsilaus,  vigorously  maintaining  the  cause  of  Kek- 
tanebis.  defeated  all  the  efforts  of'  his  opponent.  Yet  his  great 
scliemes  acainst  the  Persian  em]ure  were  abandoned,  and  nothing 
was  effected  as  the  result  of  his  Egy])tian  expedition  except  tlie 
establishment  of  Nektanebis;  who,  having  in  vain  tried  to  prevail 
upon  him  to  stav  longer,  dismissed  him  in  the  winter  season  with 
larjxe  presents,  and  with  a  public  donation  to  Sparta  of  230  talents. 
A"?silaus  marched  from  the  Nile  toward  Kyrene,  in  order  to  obtain 
from  that  town  and  its  port  ships  for  the  passage  home.  But  he  died 
on  the  march,  v  ithout  reaching  Kyrene.  His  body  was  conveyed 
liome  by  his  troops,  for  burial,  in  a  preparation  of  wax,  since  honey 
was  not  to  be  obtained. 

Thus  expired,  at  an  acre  somewhat  above  eighty,  the  ablest  and 
most  energetic  of  the  Spartan  kings.  He  has  enjoyed  the  advantage, 
denied  to'everv  otlier  eminent  Grecian  leader,  that  his  character  and 
exploits  have  been  set  out  in  the  most  favorable  point  of  view  by  a 
friend  and  companion— Xenophon.  :Making  every  allowance  for 
partialitv  m  this  picture,  there  will  still  remain  a  really  great  and 
distinguished  charactf  r.  We  find  the  virtues  of  a  soldier,  and  the 
abilities  of  a  commander,  combined  with  strenu«His  personal  will  and 
decision,  in  such  measure  as  to  insure  for  Agesilaus  constant  ascend- 
ency over  the  minds  of  others,  far  beyond  what  was  naturally  inci- 
dent to  his  station;  and  that,  too,  in  spite  of  conspicuous  bodily 
deformity,  amidst  a  nation  eminently  sensitive  on  that  point.  Of 
the  merits  which  Xenophon  ascribes  to  him,  some  are  the  fair  results 
of  a  Spartan  education— his  courage,  simplicity  of  life,  and  indif- 
ference to  indulgences— his  cheerful  endurance  of  hardship  under 
every  form.  But  his  fidelity  to  engagements,  his  uniform  superi- 
ority to  pecuniary  corruption,  and  those  winning  and  hearty  man- 
ners which  attacir  to  him  all  around,  were  virtues  not  Spartan,  but 
personal  to  himself.  We  find  in  him,  however,  more  analogy  to 
Lysander— a  man  equallv  above  reproach  on  the  score  of  pecuniary 
gain— than  to  Brasidas  or  Kallikratidas.     Agesilaus  succeeded  to  the 


throne  with  a  disputed  title,  under  the  auspices  and  through  the 
intri-nies  of  Lvsander,  wiiose  influence,  .at  that  time  predominant 
l)()th^''at  Sparta' and  in  Greece,  had  planted  everywhere  dekarchies 
and  harmosts  as  instruments  of  ascendency  for  imperial  Sparta,  and, 
iinder  the  name  of  Sparta,  for  himself.  Agesilaus,  too  high-spirited 
to  comport  himself  as  second  to  any  one,  speedily  broke  through  so 
much  of  the  svstem  as  had  been  constructed  to  promote  the  personal 
dominion  of  Lysander;  vet  without  following  out  the  same  selfish 
aspirations,  or  seeking  to  build  up  the  like  individual  dictatorship  on 
ills  own  account.  Ills  ambition  was  indeed  unbounded,  but  it  was 
for  Sparta  in  the  first  place,  and  for  himself  only  in  the  second. 
The  misfortune  was,  that  in  his  measures  for  upholding  and  admin- 
i-;terin<T  the  imperial  authority  of  Sparta,  he  still  continued  that  mix- 
ture of  domestic  and  foreign  coercion  (represented  by  the  dekarchy 
and  the  harmost)  which  had  been  introduced  by  Lysander;  a  sad 
r-ontrast  with  the  dignified  equality,  and  emphatic  repudiation  of 
pnrtisaii  interference,'proclaimed  by  Brasidas,  as  the  watchword  of 
Sparta,  at  Akanthus  and  Toroue— and  with  the  still  nobler  Pan- 
hellenic  aims  of  Kallikratidas. 

The  most  glorious  portion  of  the  life  of  Agesil:ius  was  that  spent 
in  his  three  Asiatic  campaigns,  when  acting  under  the  miso-Persian 
impulse  for  which  his  pauegyrist  gives  him  so  much  credit.  He  was 
liere  employed  in  a  Pan-ilelleuic  purpose,  to  protect  the  Asiatic 
Greeks  against  that  subjection  to  Persia  which  Siwrta  herself  had 
imposed  upon  them  a  few  years  before,  as  the  price  of  Persian  aid 

aixainst  Athens. 

^  The  Persians  presently  succeeded  in  applying  the  lessons  of  Sparta 
a"aiust  herself,  and  in  finding  Grecian  allies  to  make  war  upon  her 
near  home.  Here  was  an  enU  of  the  Pan-Hellenic  sentiment,  and  of 
the  trulv  honorable  ambition,  in  the  bosom  of  Agesilaus.  He  was 
recalh'd  to  make  war  nearer  home.  His  ob-dience  to  the  order  of 
recall  is  greatly  praised  by  Plutarch  and  Xenophon— in  my  judg- 
ment, wiUi  little  rea.son,  he  had  no  choice  but  to  come  back.  But 
he  came  back  an  altered  man.  His  miso-Persian  feeling  had  disap- 
peared, and  had  been  exchanged  for  a  miso-Theban  sentiment  winch 
gradually  acquired  the  force  of  a  passion.  As  principal  conductor 
of  the  war  between  :394-387  B.C.,  he  displayed  that  vigor  and  ability 
wliich  never  forsook  him  in  military  operations.  But  when  he  found 
that  the  empire  of  Sparta  near  home  could  not  be  enforced  except  by 
making  her  the  ally  of  Persia  and  the  executor  of  a  Persian  rescript, 
he  was^content  to  purchase  such  aid,  in  itself  dishonorable,  by  the 
still  greater  dishonor  of  sacrificing  the  Asiatic  Greeks.  For  the  lime 
his  policy  seemed  to  succeed.  From  387  to  379  B.C.  (that  is,  down  to 
the  time  of  the  revolution  at  Thebes,  effected  by  Pelopidas  and  his 
small  band),  the  ascendency  of  Sparta  on  land,  in  Central  Greece, 
was  continually  rising.  But  her  injustice  and  oppression  staud  con- 
fessed even  by  her  panegyrist  Xenophon,  and  this  is  just  the  period 


118 


AFTER    THE   DEATH   OF   PELOPIDAS. 


when  the  inrtucnce  of  Aj^csilaiis  was  at  its  maximum.  Afterwiircl 
we  tiud  him  personally  forward  in  sheltering:  Sphodrias  from  punish- 
ment and  thus  bringiui:  upon  his  countrymen  a  war  wUh  Athens  as 
well  as  with  Thebes.  In  tlie  conduct  of  that  war  his  military  opera- 
tions werp  as  usual,  strenuous  and  able,  with  a  certain  measure  of 
succes"^  But  on  the  whole,  the  war  turns  out  unfavorably  lor  Spnrta. 
in  371  B  c  she  is  obliged  to  accept  peace  on  terms  very  humiliating, 
•ds  compared  with  her  position  in  387  B.C. ;  and  the  only  compensa- 
ion  which  she  receives  is,  the  opportunity  of  striking  the  T  hebans 
out  of  the  treatv,  thus  leaving  them  to  contend  smgk -handedngamst 
what  seemed  overwhelming  odtls.  Of  this  intense  miso-lheban 
impulse  which  so  speedily  brought  about  the  unexpected  and  crush- 
in-  disaster  at  Leuktra,  A^esilaus  stands  out  as  the  i^rominent 
spokesman.  In  the  days  of  {Spartan  misfortune  which  follow  ed,  we 
find  his  conduct  creditable  and  energetic,  so  far  as  the  detensive 
position  in  which  Sparta  then  found  herself,  allowed.  And  though 
Plutarch  seems  displeased  vvith  him  for  obstinacy  in  refusing^  to 
acknowledue  the  auionomv  of  Messene  (at  the  peace  concluded  iiiter 
the  battle  of  Mantineia)  when  acknowledged  by  all  the  other  Greeks 
—yet  it  cannot  be  shown  that  this  refusal  brought  any  actual  mis- 
chief to  Sparta;  and  circumstances  might  well  have  so  turned  out, 
that  it  would  have  been  a  gain.  i         •,      r 

On  the  whole,  in  spite  of  the  manj;  military  and  personal  merits  ot 
A'^e^^ilaus  as  an  adviser  and  politician,  he  deserves  little  esteem. 
AV'e  are  compelled  to  remark  the  melancholy  contrast  between  the 
state  in  which  he  found  Sparta  at  his  accession,  and  that  wherein  he 
left  her  at  his  death— "  Marmoream  invenit,  lateritiam  reliquit. 
Xothin*'-  but  the  death  of  Epaminondas  ;it  :Mantineia  saved  her  from 
somethni'^  vet  worse;  though  it  would  be  unfair  to  Agesilaus,  while 
we  are  ccmsiderimc  the  mislortunes  of  Sparta  during  his  reign  not  to 
recollect  that  Epaminondas  was  an  enemy  more  formidable  than  she 
had  ever  before  encountered.  ,  .    i    * 

The  efficient  service  rendered  by  Agesilaus  during  his  last  cxpe^ 
dition  to  Eo-ypt  had  the  effect  of  establishing  tirmly  the  dominion  of 
Nektanebis  the  native  king,  and  of  protecting  that  country  for  the 
time  from  being  reconquered  by  the  Persians;  an  event  that  tlia 
not  ha]n)en  until  a  few  years  afterward,  during  the  reign  ot  the 
next  Persian  kinir.  Of  the  extensive  revolt,  however,  which  at 
one  time  threatened  to  wrest  from  the  Persian  ciwyn  Asia  ]Minor 
as  well  as  E"-vpt,  no  i)ermanent  consequence  remained.  1  he  treacn- 
ery  of  OrontVs  and  Rheomithres  so  completely  broke  up  the  schemes 
of  the  revolters,  that  Artaxerxes  Mnemon  still  mjiintained  the  Per- 
sian empire  (with  the  exception  of  Egypt)  unimpaired. 

He  died  not  lon^^  after  the  suppression  of  the  revolt  (apparently 
about  a  year  after  it,  in  359-358  B.C.),  having  reigned  forty -Jive  or 
forty-six  years.     His   death  was  preceded  by  one  of  those  bloody 


THE  SONS  OF   ARTAXERXES. 


119 


tnn-edies  which  go  frequently  stained  the  transmission  of  a  Persian 
'renter  '  Darius,  theehiest  son  of  Artaxerxes,  had  been  declared  by 
iii.'father  successor  to  the  throne.     According  to  Persian  custom 
10  successor  thus  declared  was  entitled  to  prefer  any  petition  which 
he'nleased-  the   immarch  being  held   bound   to  grant  it.     Darius 
"vailed  hlm'self  of  the  privilege  to  ask  for  one  of  the  favorite  inmates 
of  hi<  father's  harem,  for  whom  he  had  contracted  a  passion.      lh(i 
rcmcst  so  displeased  Artaxerxes  that  he  seemed  likely  to  makea  new 
Monointment  as  to  the  succession;  discarding  Darius  and  preferring 
1,  s  voun-er  son  Ochus,  whose  i.iterests  were  warmly  espoused  by 
\lo4a  w'ife  as  well  as  dau-hter  of  the  monarch.     Alarmed  at  this 
prosnect,  Darius  was  persuaded  by  a  discontented  courtier  name. 
Terii)a'/us,  to  lay  a  plot  for  assassinating  Artaxerxes;  but  the  plot 
was  betraved,  and  the  King  caused  both  Darius  and  Teribazus  to  bo 
nut  to  death.     Bv   this  catastrophe  the  chance  of  Ochus  was  un- 
proved, and  his  ambition  yet  further  stimulated       But  there  stil 
remained  two  princes,  older  than  he— Arsames  and  Ariaspes.     both 
these  brothers  he  contrived  to  put  out  of  the  way;  the  one  by  a 
treacherous  deceit,  entrapping  him   to  take   poison— the  other  by 
assassination.     Ochus  thus  stood  next  as  successor  to  the  crown, 
which  was  not  long  denied  to  him;  for  xVrtaxerxes— now  very  o  d, 
and  already  struck  down  by  the  fatal  consummation  respec^tmg  his 
eldest  son  Darius— did  not  survive  the  additional  sorrow  of  seeing 
his  two  other  sons  die  so  speedily  afterward.     He  expired    and  his 
son  Ochus  taking  the  name  of  Artaxerxes,  succeeded  to  him  willi- 
oiit  opposition;  manifesting  as  King  the   same  sanguinary  dispo- 
sitions as  those  by  which  he  had  placed  himself  on  the  thmne 

Durin"-  the  two  years  following  the  battle  of  Mantmeia,  Aihens, 
though  ndieved  by  the  general  peace  from  land-war  appears  to  have 
been  entan^ded  in  serious  maritime  contests  and  dithcultios.     She 
had  been  considerably  embarrassed  by  two  events;  by  the  Theban 
naval  armament  under  Epaminondas,  and  by  the  .subtnission  of  .Al- 
exander of  Pherse  to  Thebes— both  events  belonging  to  364-3()3  b.c 
It  was  in  363-362  B.C.  that  the  Athenian  Timothe^is-having  carried 
on  war  with  eminent  success  against  Olynthus  and  the  neighboring 
cities  -in  the  Thermaic  Gulf,  but  with  very  bad  success  against  Am- 
phipolis— transferred  his  forces  to  the  war  against  Kotys  king  ot 
Thrace  near  the  Thracian   Cherscmese.      The    arrival   ot   the    1  he- 
ban  fleet  in  the  Hellespont  greatly  distracted  the  Athenian  general, 
and  served  as  a  powerful   assistant  to   Kotys;  who  was  moreover 
aided  bv  tlie   Athenian   general   Iphikrates,  on  this  occasion  serv- 
incr  his  "^father  in-law  against  his  country.      Timotheus   is  said  to 
have  carried  on  war  against  Kotys  with  adv-^ntage,  and  to  have  ac- 
quired for  Athens  a  large  plunder.     It  would  a])pear  that  his  opera- 
tions were  of  an  ag-ressive  charac-ter,  and  that  during  his  command 
in  those  regions  the  Athenian  possessions  in  the  Chersonese  were 


120 


AFTER  THE   DEATH   OF  PELOPIDAS. 


safe  from  Kotys:  for  Ipliikrates  would  only  lend  his  aid  to  Kotj-s 
toward  defensive  warfare;  retirinc:  from  liis  serviee  when  hehegan 
to  attack  the  Athenian  possessions  in  the  Chersonese. 

We  do  not  know  what  circumstances  In'ought  about  the  dismissal 
or  retirement  of  Timotheus  from  the  command.     But  in  the  next 
year,  we  tind   Erirophilus  as  Atlienian  commander  in  the  Cherso- 
nese, and  Kallistheues  (seeminirly)  as  Athenian  commander  aiiainst 
Ampliipolis.     The  transmarine'alTairs  of  Athens,  however,  were  far 
from  im[)roviug.     Besides  that  under  the  new  general  she  seems  to 
have  been  losing  strength  near  the  Chersonese,  she  had  now  upon 
her  hands  a  new  maritime  enemy — Alexander  of  Phera\      A  short 
tinie  previously,  he  had  been  her  ally  against  Thebes,  but  the  victo- 
ries of  the  Thebans  during  the  pr'*ceding  year  had  so  completely 
liumbled  him,  that  he  no^^  identified  his  cause  with  theirs;  sending 
troops  to  join  the  expedilion  of  Kpaminondasinto  Peloponnesus,  and 
equipping  a  tleet  to  attack  the  nnirilime  allies  of  Athens.      His  lleet 
raptured  the  island  of  Tenos,  lavaged  several  of  the  other  Cyclades, 
and  laid  siege  to  Peparethus.     Great  alarm  prevailed  in  Athens,  and 
about  the  end  of  August  (062  B.C.),  two  months  after  the  battle  oi" 
Mantineia.  a  fleet  was   equipped  with  the  utmost  activity,  for  the 
purpose  of  defending  the  insular  allies,  as  well  as  of  acting  in  the 
Hellespont.     Vigorous  efforts  were  required  from  all  the  tiierarchs, 
and  really  exerted  by  some,  to  accelerate  the  departure  of  this  fleet. 
But  that  portion  of  it,  which,  while  the  rest  went  to  the  Hellespont, 
was  sent  under  Leostlienes  to  defend  Peparethus— met  with  a  def(  at 
from  the  ships  of  Alexander,  with  the  loss  of  live  triremes  and  GOO 
prisoners.     We  are  even  told  that  soon  after  this  naval  advantage, 
the  victors  were  bold  enough  to  make  a  dash  into  the  Peirseus  itself 
(asTeleufias  had  done  twenty-.^evcn  years  before),  where  they  seized 
both  projierty  on  ship-board  and  men*  on  the  quay,  before  there  was 
any  force  ready  to  repel  them.     The  Thessalian  niarauders  were  ul- 
timately driven  back  to  their  harbor  of  Pegasa' ;  yet  not  without  much 
annoyance  to  the  insular  confederates,  and  some  disgrace  to  Athens. 
The  defeated  admiral  Leostlienes  was  condemned  to  death;  whilo 
several  trienirclis — who,  instead  of  serving  in  person,  had  performed 
the  duties  incumbent  on  them  by  deputy  and  by  contract — were,  cen- 
sured or  put  upon  trial. 

Xot  only  had  the  alTairs  of  Athens  in  the  Hellespont  become  worse 
under  Ergophilus  than  under  Timotheus,  but  Kallistlienes  also, 
who  had  succeeded  Timotheus  in  the  operations  against  Ampliip- 
olis, achieved  no  permanent  result.  It  would  appear  that  tiie 
Amphipolitaus,  to  defend  themselves  against  Athens,  had  invoked 
the  ii'id  of  the  Macedonian  king  Perdikkas;  and  ]naced  their  cily 
in  his  hands.  That  prince  had  before  acted  in  conjunction  with 
the  Athenian  force  under  Timotheus  against  Olvnthus;  and  their 
joint  invasion  had  so  much  weakened  the  Olvntliians  as  to  disable 
them  fronvalTordingaid  to  Ampliipolis.     At  least  thishvpothesis  ex- 


EKGOPHILUS  AND  KALLISTHEXES. 


121 


plains  how  Ampliipolis  came  now,  for  the  first  time,  to  be  no  longer 
a  free  city;  but  to  be  disjoined  from  Olvnthus,  and  joined  with 
(probably  garrisoned  by)  Pertlikkas,  as  a  jiossession  ot  Mr.cedonia. 
Killisllienes  thus  found  himself  at  v/ar  under  greater  disadvantages 
tluiii  Timotlieus;  having  Perdikkas  as  his  enemy,  together  with  Am- 
pliipolis. Nevertheless,  it  wcmld  appear,  he  gained  at  first  great  ad- 
vantages, and  reduced  Perdikkas  to  the  necessity  of  purchasing  a 
truce  by  the  promise  to  abandon  the  Amphipolitaus.  Vhe  Macedo- 
nian prince  however,  having  gained  time  during  the  truce  to  recover 
his  stnuiglh,  no  longer  thought  of  performing  his  i)romise,  but  held 
Anqihipolis  against  the  Athenians  as  obstinately  as  before.  Kallis- 
tlienes had  let  slip  an  opportunity  which  never  again  returned.  After 
having  announced  at  Athens  the  victorious  truce  and  the  approach- 
ing surrender,  he  seems  to  have  been  compelled,  on  his  return,  lo 
adniit  that  he  had  been  cheated  into  susi)endiug  operations,  at  a  mo- 
ment when  (as  it  seemed)  Amphi polls  might  have  been  conquered. 
For  this  misjudgment  or  misconduct  he  was  put  upon  Vdal  at  Athens, 
on  retuniing  to  his  disappointed  countrymen  ;  and  a.  die  same  time 
Ergophilus  also,  who  had  been  summoned  home  from  the  Cherso- 
nesus  for  his  ill-success  or  bad  management  of  the  war  against  Ko- 
tys. The  people  were  much  incensed  against  both;  but  most  against 
Ergophilus.  Nevertheless  it  ha})pened  that  Kallistlienes  was  tried 
fust,  and  condemned  to  death.  On  the  next  d  ly,  Ergo])hilus  was 
tried.  But  the  verdict  of  the  preceiling  day  had  discharged  the  wratii 
of  tli(3  Dikasts,  and  rendered  them  so  much  more  indulgent,  that  they 
acquitted  him. 

Autokles  was  sent  in  ])1ace  of  Ergophilus  to  carry  on  war  for  Athens 
in  the  Hellespont  and  Bosporus.  It  was  not  merely  against  Kot3's 
that  ids  operations  were  necessary.  The  Prokonnesiaus,  allies  of 
Athens,  required  prcrtectiou  against  the  attacks  of  Kyzikus;  biisides 
which,  there  was  another  necessit}'  yet  more  urgent.  Tin  stock 
oi"  corn  was  becoming  short,  and  the  price  rising,  not  merely  at 
Athens,  but  at  many  of  the  islands  in  the  ^-Egean,  and  at  Byzan- 
tium and  Dther  places.  There  prevailed  therefore  unusual  anxiety, 
coupled  with  keen  competition,  for  the  corn  in  course  of  importation 
from  the  Euxine.  The  Byzantines,  Chalkedonians,  and  Kyzikenes, 
had  already  begun  to  detain  the  passing  corn-shiiis  for  the  supply  of 
their  own  markets;  and  nothing  less  than  a  powerful  Athenian  fleet 
could  insure  the  safe  transit  of  such  supplies  to  Athens  herself.  The 
Athenian  fleet,  guarding  the  Bosporus  even  from  the  Ilieron  in- 
ward (the  chapel  near  the  junction  of  the  Bosporus  with  the  Eux- 
ine). provided  safe  convoy  for  the  autumnal  exports  of  this  essential 
article. 

In  carrying  on  operations  against  Kotys,  Autokles  was  favored 
with  an.  unexpected  advantage  l)y  the  recent  revolt  of  a  powerful 
Tbraeian  named  Miltokythes  against  Uiat  prince.  This  revolt  so 
alarmed  Kotys,  that  he  wrote  a  letter  to  Athens  in  a  submissive  tone, 


^.sm 


122 


AFTER  THE  DEATH  OF  PELOPIDAS. 


ASSASSINATION  OF  KOTYS. 


123 


and  sent  envovs  to  purchase  peace  l)y  various  concessions.  At  tlie 
same  time  Miltokythes  also  first  sent  envoys— next,  went  in  person— 
to  Athens,  to  i^riseiit  Ills  own  case  and  .-olieit  aid.  lie  was  however 
coldly  received.  The  vote  of  the  Athenian  assembly,  jia^sed  on  hear- 
ing the  case  (and  probably  procured  in  part  through  the  fri.  nds  of 
Iphikrates),  was  so  unfavorable,  as  to  send  him  away  not  merely  in 
discouraiiement,  but  in  alarm;  wiiile  Kolys  recovered  all  his  ]>o\vcr 
in  Thra(T,  and  even  became  master  of  the  Sacred  Mountain  widi  its 
abundance  of  wealthy  deposits.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  this  im- 
prudent vote,  the  Athenians  really  intended  to  sustain  Miltokythes 
airainst  Kotys.  Their  general  Autokles  was  recalled  after  a  fe\v 
months,  an(ri)ut  \\\Hm  his  trial  for  having  sulTered  Kctys  to  put  down 
tliis  enemy  unassisted.  How  the  trial  ended  or  how  the  justice  of  the 
case  stood,  we  are  unable  to  make  out  from  the  passing  allusions  of 
Demosthenes. 

Menon  was  sent   as   commander  to   the  Hellespont  to  supersede 
Autokles;  and  was  himself  again  superseded  after  a  few  months,  by 
Tinu)machus.    Convoy  for  the  corn-vessels  out  of  the  Euxine  berair.e 
necessar'''  anew,  as  in'theprecc  ding  year;  and  was  furni^hed  a  second 
time  during  the  autmun  of  o(Jl  k.c.  l)y  the  Athenian  ships  of  war; 
not  merely" for  provisions,  under  transport  to  Athens,  but  jdso  for 
those  going  to  Maroneia,  Thasos,  and  other  pljices  in  or  near  Thr.ice. 
But  affairs'  in  tlie  Chersonese  became  yet  more  unfavorable  to  Athens. 
In  the  winter  of  801-oGO  B.C.,  Koiys,*with  the  co-operation  of  a  body 
of  Abydene  citizens  and  Sestian  exiles,  wiio  crossed  the  Hclkspi  nt 
from  Abvdos,  contrived  to  surprise  Sestos;  the  most  important  i>l:.ce 
in  the  Chersonese,  and  the  guard-post  of  the  Hellesp(mt  on  its  Euro- 
pean side,  for  all  vessels  pjWing  in  or  out.     The  whole  Chersonese 
was  now  throAvn  open  to  his  aggressions.     He  made  preparations  lor 
attacking  EUeus  and  Kritholer  the  two  other  ^hief  possessions  of 
Athens,  and  endeavored  to  prevail  on  Iphikrates  to  take  part  in  bis 
projects.     But  that  general  though  he  had  a.ssist(d  Kotys  in  defer.se 
ai;ainst  Athens,  refused  to  commit  the  more  patent  treason  involved  in 
aSmessive  hostility  against  her.     He  even  quitted  Thrace,  but  not 
daring  at  once  to*  visit  Athens,  retired  to  Lesbos.     In  spite  of  his 
refusal,  however,  tl  e  settlers  and  possessions  of  Athens  in  the  Cher- 
sonese were  attacked  and  imperik d  by  Kotys,  who  claimed  the  whole 
peninsula  as  his  own.  and  established  toll-gatherers  at  Sestos  to  levy 
the  dues  both  of  strait  and  harbor. 

The  fortune  of  Athens  in  these  regions  was  still  unpropitious.  All 
her  late  commanders,  Ergoi>hilus,  Autokles,  3Ienon^  Timomachus, 
had  been  successively  detkient  in  meaiis,  in  skill,  or  in  l:delity.  and 
liad  underixone  accu*sat:on  at  home.  Timomaehus  wr.s  now  super- 
seded by  Kephisodoius,  a  man  of  known  ennnly  toward  both  Iphik- 
rates and  Kotys.  But  Kephisodotus  achieved  no  more  than  his 
predecessors,  and  had  even  to  contend  against  a  new  enemy,  who 
crossed  over  from  Abvilos  to  Sestos  to  recnforce  Kotys— Charulenms 


with  the  mercenary  division  under  his  command.  That  oflicer.  since 
his  service  three  years  before  under  Timotlieus  against  xVmphipolis. 
had  been  for  some  time  in  Asia,  especially  in  the  Troad.  He  hired 
himself  to  the  satrap  Artabazus;  of  whose  embarrassments  he  took 
}ulvantas2:e  to  seize  by  fraud  the  towns  of  Skepsis,  Kebren,  and  Ilium; 
intending  to  hold  them  as  a  little  principality.  Fi!uiing  his  position, 
however,  ultimately  untenable  against  the  probable  force  of  the  sa- 
trap, he  sent  a  letter  across  to  the  Chersonese,  to  the  Athenian  com- 
mander Kephisodotus,  asking  for  Athenian  triremes  to  transport  his 
division  across  to  Europe;  in  return  for  which,  if  granted,  he  en- 
irairetl  to  crush  Kotys  and  reconiiuer  the  Chersonese  for  Athens. 
Tins  proposition,  wh'ether  accepted  or  not,  was  never  realized;  for 
Charidemus  was  enabled,  through  a  truce  unexpectedly  granted  to 
him  by  the  satrap,  to  cross  over  froju  Abydos  to  Sestos  without  any 
Athenian  ships.  But  as  soon  as  he  found  himself  in  tiie  Chersonese, 
far  from  aiding  Athens  to  recover  that  peninsula,  he  actually  took 
service  with  Kotys  against  her  ;  so  that  Elieus  and  Krithote,  her 
chief  remaining  posts,  were  in  greater  peril  than  ever. 

The  victorious  prospects  of  Kotys,  however,  were  now  unexpect- 
edlv  arrested.  After  a  reigu  of  twenty-four  years  he  was  assassi- 
nated by  two  biolhers.  Python  and  Ilerakleides,  Greeks  from  the 
city  of  ^'Enus  in  Thrace,'  and  formerly  students  under  Plato  at 
Athens.  They  committed  tlie  act  to  avenge  their  father;  upon 
whom,  as  it  wouhl  appear,  Kotys  had  inllicled  some  brutal  insult, 
muler  the  influence  of  that  violent  and  licentious  temper  which  \yas 
in  him  combined  with  an  energetic  military  character.  Having* 
made  their  escape,  Python  and  his  brother  retired  to  Athens,  where 
they  were  received  with  every  demonstration  of  honor,  and  presented 
with  the  citizenship  as  wh^U  as  wdth  golden  wreaths;  partly  as  tyran- 
nicides, party  as  having  relieved  the  Athenians  from  an  odious  and 
formidable  enemy.  Disclaiming  the  warm  eulogies  heaped  upon  him 
bv  various  speakers  in  the  assembly.  Python  is  said  to  have  re] died 
—"It  was  a  i^od  who  did  the  deed;  we  only  lent  our  hands:'  an 
anecdote,  which,  whether  it  be  truth  or  liction',  illustrates  powerfully 
the  Greek  admiration  of  tyrannicide. 

The  death  of  Kotys  gave  some  relief  to  Athenian  affairs  in  the 
Chersonese.  Of  his  children,  even  the  eldest,  Kersobleptes,  was  only 
ayoutli;  moreover  two  other  Thraclan  chiefs,  Berisades  and  Ama- 
(lokus,  now  started  up  as  pretenders  to  share  in  the  kingdom  of 
Thrace.  Kersobleptes  employed  as  his  main  support  and  minister 
the  mercenary  general  Charidemus.  who  either  had  already  married, 
or  did  now  niarry,  his  sister;  a  nu]itial  connection  had  been  formed 
in  like  manner  by  Amadokus  with  two  Greeks  named  Simon  and 
Bianor — and  by  Berisades  with  an  Athenian  citizen  named  Atheno- 
dorus.  who  (like  Iphikrates  and  others)  had  founded  a  city,  and 
possessed  a  certain  independent  dominion,  in  or  near  the  Chersonese. 
These  Grecian  mercenary  chiefs  thus  united  themselves  by  nuptial 


,..^S*B 


124 


AFTER  THK   DEATH   OF   PELOPIDAS. 


ATilExXS  REGAINS  THE  CHERSONESE. 


125 


ties  to  tlie  princes  wliom  tlicy  porvccl,  as  Pcutbrs  had  proposed  to 
Xenophou,  and  as  the  Italian  Condottleri  of  the  fifteenth  eenlury  en- 
iiol)led  lliemselves  by  similar  alliance  with  princely  faniilits — lor 
example,  Sforza  witirtlie  Yisconti  of  Milan.  All  these  three  Thra- 
cian  competitors  were  now  represented  hy  Grecian  ac:ents.  But  at 
first,  it  seems,  Charidemus  on  behalf  of  Kersobleptes  was  the  strong- 
est. He  and  Iiis  army  were  near  Perinthus  on  the  north  coast  cf  ihe 
Propontis,  where  the  Athenian  commander,  Kephisodotiis,  vi>-iud 
him.  with  a  small  squadron  of  ten  triremes,  in  order  to  ask  for  the 
fiiltillment  of  those  fair  promises  which  Charidemus  had  made  in  his 
letter  from  Asia.  But  Charidemus  treated  the  Athenians  asentniics, 
attacked  by  surprise  the  seamen  on  shore,  and  inflicted  upon  tluni 
creat  damaire.  He  then  pressed  the  Chersonese  severely  ft  r  sewral 
months,  aiul  marched  even  into  the  midst  of  it,  to  protect  a  nest  of 
pirates  whom  the  Athenians  were  besieging  at  the  neighboring  \>hi 
on  its  western  coast — Alopekonnesus.  At  kniilh,  after  i-t-xin 
months  of  ur.protita.ble  warfare  (dating  from  the  detjth  of  Kotys),  he 
forced  Kephisodoius  to  conclude  with  liim  a  convention  so  disastrei;s 
and  dishon()ra})le,  that  as  soon  as  known  at  Athens,  it  wasindignanlly 
repudiated.  Kephisodotus,  being  recalled  in  disgrace,  was  put  upcii 
his  trial,  and  fined;  the  orator  Demosthenes  (we  are  told),  who  had 
served  as  one  of  the  trierarchs  in  the  Heet,  being  among  his  ac(  users. 
Among  the  articles  of  this  unfavorable  convention,  one  was  that 
the  Greek  city  of  Kardia  should  be  specially  reseived  to  Charidemus 
himself.  That  city— eminently  convenic  nt  from  its  situation  on  the 
isthmus  connecting  the  Cheisonese  with  Thract— claimed  by  the 
Athenians  as  Avithiii  the  ChersQuese,  yet  at  the  same  time  intensely 
hostile  to  Athens — became  his  piiucipal  station.  He  was  fortur.ate 
enough  to  seize,  through  treachery,  the  person  of  the  Thracian]\Iiito- 
kytlies,  who  had  been  the  pronounced  enemy  of  Kotys,  and  had  co- 
operaied  wilh  Athens.  But  he  did  not  choose  to  hand  over  this 
important  prisoner  to  Kersobleptes.  because  the  life  of  ^liJtokylhes 
would  thus  have  been  saved;  it  not  being  the  custom  of  Thracians, 
in  their  intestine  disputes,  to  put  each  other  to  death.  We  remark 
with  surprise  a  practice  milder  tlian  that  of  Greece,  amidst  a  people 
decidedly  more  barbarous  and  bloodlhirsty  than  the  Greeks.  Charide- 
mus accordingly  surrendered  Miltokythes  to  the  Kardiaiis,  who  put 
the  prisoner  with  his  son  into  a  boat,  took  them  a  little  way  out  to  sea, 
slew  the  son  before  the  eyes  of  the  father,  and  then  drowned  the 
father  himself.  It  is  not  improbable  thai  there  may  have  beeri  some 
special  jintecedent  causes,  occasioning  ijitense  antipathy  on  the  part 
of  the  Kardians  toward  ]\Iiltokythes,  and  inducing  Charidenms  to 
hand  him  over  to  them  as  an  acceptable  subject  for  revenge.  How- 
ever this  may  be,  their  savage  deed  kindled  violent  indigmition 
among  all  thoThracians,  and  did  much  injury  to  the  cause  of  Kerso- 
bleptes and  Charitlemus.  Though  Kephisodotus  had  been  recjijled, 
and  though  a  considerable  interval  elapsed  before  anysucces^sorcauie 


from  xVthens,  yet  Berisades  and  Amadokus  joined  their  forces  in  one 
common  accord,  and  sent  to  the  Athenians  propositions  of  alliance, 
with  request  for  pecuniary  aid.  Athenodorus  the  general  of  Ber- 
isades, putting  himself  at  the  head  of  Thracians  and  Athenians 
together,  found  himself  superior  in  the  field  to  Kersobleptes  and 
Charideruus;  whom  he  constrained  to  accept  a  fresh  convention  dic- 
tated by  himself.  Herein  it  was  provided,  that  the  kingdom  of  Thrace 
should*^be  divided  in  equal  portions  between  the  three  competitors; 
that  all  three  should  conco"  in  surrendering  the  Cii<>rsonese  to 
Athens;  and  that  tlie  sou  of  a  leading  man  named  Iphiades  at  Se.sios, 
held  by  ChanJeuuis  as  hostage  for  the  adherence  cf  that  city,  should 
be  surrendered  lo  Athens  also. 

This  new  convention,  sw^oru  on  l)oth  sides,  promised  to  Athens  the 
fidl  acquisition  which  she  desired.  Considering  tlie  thing  as  done, 
the  Athenians  sent  Cluibrias  as  commander  in  one  trireme  to  receive 
the  surrender,  but  omitted  to  send  tlio  money  requested  by  Atheno- 
dorus; who  was, accordingly  constrained  to  disband  his  army  for 
want  of  pay.  Upon  this  Kersobleples  and  Charidemus  at  once  threw 
up  their  enii-agement,  refused  to  execute  the  convention  just  sworn, 
and  constrrUned  Cliahrias,  who  had  come  without  any  force,  to 
revert  to  the  former  convention  concluded  with  Kephisodotus.  Dis- 
appointed and  indignant,  the  Athenians  disavowed  the  act  of  Clia- 
hrias, in  spite  of  his  higli  reputation.  They  sent  ten  envoys  to  the 
Chersonese,  insisting  that  the  convention  of  Athenotlorus  sliould  be 
resworn  I\y  all  the  three  Thracian  competitors— Berisades,  Amado- 
kus, Kersobleptes;  if  the  third  declined,  the  envoys  were  instructed 
to  take  measures  for  nuiking  war  upon  him,  while  they  received  the 
en;xag>'meuts  of  the  other  two.  But  such  a  mission,  without  arms, 
obtained  nothing  from  Charidciuus  and  Kersobleptes,  except  delay 
or  refusal:  while  Berisades  and  Amadokus  sent  to  Athens  bitter 
complaints  respecting  the  breach  of  faith.  At  length,  after  some 
months— just  after  the  triumpliant  conclusion  of  the  expedition  of 
Athens  against  J^ubiea  (ooS  li.c.)— the  Athenian  Chares  arrived  in 
the  Ciiersonese,  at  the  head  of  a  considerable  mercenary  force.  Tlien 
at  leuLi-th  the  two  recusants  were  compelled  to  swear  anew  to  the 
convention  of  Athenodorus,  in  the  presence  of  the  latter  as  well  as 
of  Berisades  and  Amadokus.  And  it  w^ould  appear  that  before  lotig, 
its  conditions  were  realized.  Charidemus  surrendered  the  Chersui- 
ese,  of  course  including  its  principal  town  Sestos,  to  Athens;  yet 
he  retained  for  himself  Ku.dia,  which  was  allirmed  (though  the 
Athenians  denied  it)  not  to  be  inckided  in  the  boundaries  of  that 
peninsula.  The  kingdoin  of  Thrace  was  also  divided  between  Kerso- 
bleptes, Beri.sades.  and  Amadokus;  which  triple  division,  diminish- 
ing the  strength  of  eacli.  was  regarded  by  Athens  as  a  great  additional 
gu^arantee  for  her  secure  possession  of  the  Chersonese. 
^  It  was  thus  that  Atlnms  at  length  made  good  her  possession  of  the 
Chersonese  against  the  neighbouring  Thracian    potentates.     And   it 


■jfim^-^si'^j-&S!:^:im 


126 


AFTEK  THE  DEATH   OF    PELOFIDAS. 


SYRACUSE. 


127 


would  seem  that  lier  trausniarine  power,  with  its  depcndeucies  aiul 
coDfederates   now  stood  at  a  irreater  hei.^ht  than  it  had  ever  reaehtd 
since  the  terrible  reverses  of  405  B.C.     Anion i;-  them  w  ere  numbered 
not  only  a  ffreat  number  of  the  .Egean  i>lands  (even  tlie  largt>t, 
Euboea    Chi(%,  Samos,  and   Rliodes),  but   also  various  contiuenlal 
possessions:  Bvzautium—tlie  Chersonese— Maroneia  with  otlier  plaees 
on  the  ?outliem  eoast  of  Thrace— and  Pydna,  Metlione,  and  Potu.a^a, 
with  most  of  the  region  surrounding  the  'Ihermaic  Gvlf.      Ihi.s  lasl 
portion  of  empire  had  been  aecpiircd  at  the  cost  ot  :he  Olyntluan 
fraternal  alliance  of  neii-hboring  cities,  against  which  Athens,  too, 
as  well  as  Sparta,  by  an  impulse  most  disastrous  for  tlie  luture  mde- 
pendence  of  Greece,  had  made  war  with  an  inauspicious  success. 
The  :yiacedonian  king  Perdilvkas,  with  a  just   instinct  toward  the 
future  a<'-«'randizemfnt  of  his  dvnasty,  had  assisted  her  in  thus  weaii- 
euiii"-  oTynthus;  feeling  that  fhe  towns  on   the  Thermaic   GuU,  it 
they^formed  parts  of  a  strono-  Olynthian  ccufederacy  ol  brothers  and 
nei^dibors,  reciprocally   attacheil  and   self-sustaintng,   wouh     resist 
Macedonia  more  effectively,  than  if  they  were  hall-reliictant  depeud- 
encies  of  Athens,  even  with  the  chances  of  Atlienian  aid  by  sea.     Ihe 
a-o-ressive  hand  of  Athens  against  Oiynthus,  indeed,  between  368-63 
B^c    was  hardly  less  mischievous,  to  Greece  generally,  than  that  of 
Sparta   had   been    between   382-3S0  n.c.     Sparta   had   cruslud   the 
Olvnlhian  confederacy  in  its   first   brilliant   promise— Athens  pre- 
vented  it  from  rearing  its  head  anew.     Both   conspired  to  break 
down  the  most  eiTeclive  barrier  against  Macedonian  aggrahdizement; 
neither  was  found  competent  to  provide  any  adequate  protection  to 

Greece  in  its  room.  ,  .  ,   -r  ,  i     i  4i    4- 

The  maximum  of  her  second  empire,  which  I  have  remarked  ttiat 
Athens  attained  by  the  rccoverv  cf  the  C  heisoncse,  lasted  but  for  a 
moment.  Durinu^'  the  very  san>.e  year,  there  occurred  that  i"('V>lt 
amontf  his  princTpal  allies,  known  by  the  name  of  the  Social  U  ar, 
which  gave  to  her  power  a  fatal  shock,  and  left  the  field  comiuira- 
tively  cle.ir  for  the  early  airaressions  of  her  yet  more  formidable 
enemy— Philip  of  ^Macedon.  ^Thtit  prince  had  already  emerged  trom 
his  obscurity  as  a  hostage  in  Thebc  s,  and  had  succeeded  his  brother 
Perdikkas,  slain  in  a  batUe  with  the  lllyrians,  as  king  (360-359  B.C.). 
At  first  his  situation  appeared  not  merely  difilcull,  but  almost  hope- 
h^ss.  Not  the  most  i)rescient  eye  in  Greece  could  have  recognized,  in 
the  inexperienced  youth  struggling  at  ids  first  accession  against  rivals 
at  home,  enemies  abroad,  and  embarrassments  ol  every  kind— the 
future  conqueror  of  Chieroneia,  and  destroyer  of  Greci m  independ- 
ence. How,  by  his  own  genius,  energy,  and  perseverance,  assisted 
by  the  faults  and  dissensions  of  his  Grecian  enemies,  he  attained  this 
inauspicious  eminence— will  be  recounted  presently. 

In  403  B.C.,  after  the  surrender  of  Athens.  Greece  was  under  the 
Spartan  empire.     Its  numerous  independent  city-communities  were 


more  eomplelely  regimented  under  one  chief  than  they  had  ever 
been  before  Athens  and  Thebes  being  both  numbered  amjiig  the 
followers  of   'pu-ta. 

But  the  c  >iiliicts  already  recounted  (during  an  interval  of  forty- 
four  )^ears—f..04-40o  B.C.  to  360-359  B.C.)  have  wrought  the  melan- 
choly change  of  leaving  Greece  more  disunited,  and  more  destitute 
of  presidinsr  Hellenic  authority,  than  she  had  been  at  any  time  since 
the  Persian  invasion.  Thebes,  Sparta,  and  Athene  had  all  been 
engaged  in  w^eakeniiigeach  other;  in  which,  unhappily,  each  has  been 
fa?  more  siicix»3sfur  than  in  strengthening  herself.  The  maritime 
power  of  Atlwnis  is  now^  indeed  consideral)ie,  and  may  be  called  very 
irreat,  if  con  pared  with  the  state  of  degradation  to  wiiich  she  had 
been  brough',  in  403  B.C.  But  it  will  presently  be  seen  how  unsub- 
stantial is  th  '  foundation  of  her  authority,  ami  how  fearfully  she  has 
fallen  olf  from  that  imperial  feeling  and  energy  wdiich  ennobled  her 
ancestors  under  the  advice  of  Perikles. 

It  is  under  the^e  circumstances,  so  untoward  for  defense,  that  the 


affirressor  from  Macedonia  arises. 


CHAPTER  LXXXI. 

SICILIAN     AFFAIRS     AFTER     TIIK    DESTRUCTIOX     OF     THE     ATHENIAN 

ARMAMENT   BEFORE     SYRACUSE. 

In  thesixlleth  chapter  of  this  work,  I  brought  dowm  the  history 
of  the  Grecian  communities  in  Sicily  to  the  close  of  the  Athenian 
siege  of  Syracuse,  where  Nikias  and  Demosthen(?s  with  nearly  their 
entire  annament  perished  by  so  lamentable  a  fate.  I  now  resume 
from  that  point  the  thread  of  Sicilian  events,  which  still  continues 
so  distinct  from  those  of  Peloponnesus  and  Eastern  Greece,  that  it 
is  inconvenient  to  include  both  in  the  same  chapters. 

If  the  destruction  of  the  great  Athenian  armament  (in  September 
413  B.C.)  excited  the  strongest  sensation  throughout  every  part  of 
the  Grecian  world,  Ave  may  imagine  the  intoxication  of  triumph 
Avith  which  it  must  ha\^e  been  hailed  in  Sicily.  It  had  been  achieved 
(Gylippus  and  the  Peloponnesian  allies  aiding)  by  the  united  efforts 
of 'nearly  all  the  Grecian  cities  in  the  islancl— for  all  of  them  had 
joined  Syrac  se  as  soon  as  her  prospects  became  decidedly  encourag- 
ing: except  Ziaxos  and  Katana,  Avhich  Avere  allied  with  the  Athe- 
nians—and Agrigentum.  which  remained  neutral.  Unfortunately 
Ave  know  little  or  nothing  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Syracusans, 
immediately  following:  upon  circumstances  of  so  much  excite- 
ment and  interest.  They  appear  to  have  carried  on  Avar  against 
Katana.  where  some  fugiiives  from  the  A'anquished  Athenian  army 
•  ontributed  lo  the  resistance  ai]:ainst  them.     But  both  this  city  and 


128 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS.' 


DISAPPOINTED   HOPES. 


129 


Kaxos,  tbouffh  exposed  to  liiTm illation  and  danger  as  allies  of  the 
defented  Athenians,  contiivii  to  escape  wiihoiit  the  loss  of  their 
independence.  The  allies  of  Syiaeuse  were  probabl}' not  eager  to 
altaek  them,  and  thereby  to  aggrandize  that  city  further;  while  the 
Syracusans  themselves  'also  -would  be  sensible  of  great  exhaustion, 
arising-  from  the  immense  efforts  through  which  alone  their  triumph 
liad  been  achieved.  The  pecuniary  burdens  to  which  they  had  been 
obliired  to  submit — known  to  Nikias  during  the  last  months  of  the 
siege,  and  fatally  misleading  his  judgment— were  so  heavy  as  to  task 
se\-erely  their  powers  of  endurance."  After  paying,  and  dismissing 
with  appropriate  gratitude,  the  numerous  auxiliaries  whom  they  had 
l)(;eu  obliged  to  hire— after  celebrating  the  recent  triumph,  and  dec- 
orating the  temples,  in  a  manner  salisYactory  to  the  exuberant  joy  of 
the  citizens — there  would  j^robably  be  a  general  disposition  to  repose 
rather  than  to  aggres>ive  warfare.  There  would  Ijc  much  destruc- 
tion to  be  repaired  through(Mit  their  territory,  poorly  watched  or 
cultivated  during  the  year  of  the  siege. 

In  spite  of  such  exhaustion,  however,  the  sentiment  of  exaspera- 
tion and  vengeance  against  Athens,  combined  with  gratitude  toward 
the  Lacedaemonians,  was  too  ])o\verful  to  be  balked.  A  contident 
persiiasion  reigned  throughout  Greece  that  Athens  coidd  not  hold 
out  for  one  simile  sumnter  after  her  late  terrific  disaster;  a  jiersua- 
sion  founded  greatly  on  the  hope  of  a  large  auxiliary  squacbon  to 
act  against  herefrom  Syracuse  and  her  other  enemies  in  Sicily  and 
Italy!'  In  this  day  of'  Athenian  distress,  such  enemies  of  course 
became  more  nunierous.  Esjieciaily  the  city  of  Thurii  in  Italy, 
which  had  l;een  friendly  to  Athens  and  had  furnished  aid  to  Demos- 
thenes in  his  expedition  to  Sicily,  now  underwent  a  change,  ban- 
ishwl  three  hundred  of  the  leading  philo-Athenian  citizens  (among 
them  the  rhetor  Lysias).  and  espoused  the  Pcloponnesian  cause  with 
ardor.  The  feelinir  of  reaction  at  Thurii,  and  of  vengeance  at  Syia- 
cuse.  stimulated  the  citizens  of  both  places  to  take  active  part  in 
a!i  effort  promising  to  be  easy  and  glorious,  for  the  destruction  of 
Athens  and  her  empire.  And  volunteers  were  doubtless  the  more 
forward,  as  the  Persian  satraps  of  the  sea-board  were  now  compet- 
inir  with  each  other  in  invitations  to  the  Greeks,  with  oHers  of 
abundant  pay. 

Accordingly,  in  the  summer  of  the  year  412  K.c.  (the  year  folloAV- 
ius:  the  catastrophe  of  the  Athenian  armament),  a  Sicilian  squadion 
of^twenty  triremes  from  Syracuse  and  two  from  Selinus,  under  the 
command  of  llermokrates,*  reached  Peloponnesus  and  joined  the 
Lacedaemonian  tleet  in  its  expedition  across  the  zEgean  to  .Miletus. 
Another  squadron  of  ten  triremes  from  Thurii,  under  the  Khodian 
Dorieus.  and  a  further  re-enforcement  from  Tarentum  and  Lokri, 
followed  soon  after.  It  was  Herniokrates  who  chietly  instigated 
his  countrymen  to  this  effort.  Throughout  the  trying  months  of 
llae  siege,  he  had  taken  a  leading  part  in  the  defense  of  Syracuse, 


seconding  the  plans  of  Gylippus  with  equal  valor  and  discretion.  As 
coni.'nander  of  the  Syracusnn  squadron  in  the  main  fleet  now  actino' 
,;£Cai;)"^t  Athens  in  the  ..Egcan  (events  already  desrril)ed  in  mv  sixty3 
tir>l  chapter),  his  conduct  was  not  less  distifiguished.  He  was  ener- 
getic in  action,  and  popular  in  his  behavior  toward  those  Under 
his  command;  but  what  stood  out  most  conspicuously  as  well  as 
most  houoraI)ly.  was  his  pei-sonal  iucorruptibilitv.  Wiiile  the  Pel'o- 
]H)nnesiaii  admiral  and  trierarchs  accepted  the  bribes  of  Tissapher- 
ncs.  conniving  at  his  betrayal  of  the  common  cause  and  breach  of 
engagement  toward  tlu^  armament,  with  indifference  to  the  piiva- 
tions  of  their  own  unprdd  seamen— Herniokrates  and  Dorieus  were 
strenuous  in  remonstrance,  even  to  the  extent  of  drawin"-  i:r>on 
themselves  the  indignant  displeasure  of  the  Pcloponnesian  admiral 
Astyochus,  as  well  as  of  tiie  satraj)  himself.  Tiiey  were  the  more 
earnest  in  performing  this  duty,  because  the  Syracusan  and  Thuriaa 
trn-emes  were  manned  by  freemen  in  larger  proportion  than  the 
remaining  fleet. 

The  sanguine  expectation,  however,  entertained  by  Herniokrates 
and  his  companions  in  crossing  the  sea  from  Sicilv— \liat  one  single 
effort  would  gloriously  close  tlu;  war— was  far  from  beinjx  realized 
Athens  resisted  with  unexpected  eneriry;  the  Laceda'monians  weie 
so  slack  and  faint-hearted,  that  they  even  let  slip  the  golden  oppor- 
timity  p»-cseuted  to  tiieni  by  tl}c  usurpation  of  the  Athenian  Four 
lluudred.     Tissaphernes  was  discovered  to  be  studiously  starvin--- 
and  proiraciing  the  war  for  purposes  of  his  own,  which  Hermokr;v 
tcs  vainly  tried  to  counter-work  by  a  personal  visit  and  protest  at 
bparta.     Accordingly  the  war  trailed  on  witli   fluctuating  success 
and  even   renovated  elHciency  on   the  i)art  of  Athens;  so  that  the 
fc^yracusaus  at  home,  far  from  hearing  announced  tlie  accomplish- 
ment ot  those  sph;ndid  anticipations  under  which  tlieir  f-quadion  liad 
departed,  received   news  generally  unfavorable,  and  at  length  posi- 
tively disasirous.     Tliey   were  informed  that  tlieir  seamen  were  ill- 
paid  and  distressed;  while  Athens,  far  from  striking  her  colors   had 
touiid  means  to  assemble  a  fleetat  Samos  competent  still  to  dispute  the 
loastery  of  the  .Egean.    Tliey  heard  of  two  successive  naval  defeats 
wnch  the  Peloponnesian  and  Syracusan  fleets  sustained  in  the  Hel- 
lespont (one  at  Kynossema— 411  B.C.— a  second  between  Abvdos  and 
JJardanus— 410  u.c);  and  at  length  of  a  third,  more  decisive  and 
eilainitous  than    the  precedinir— the  battle    of  Kvzikus  (409  bc> 
wherein  the   Lacediemonian  admiral  3Iindanis  was  slain   ami  the 
^^  aole  of  his  fleet  captur-d  or  desu-oyed.    In  tins  defeat  the  Syracus-;ii 
squa-iron  were  joint   suiferers.     Their  seamen  were  compelled  to 
mirn  all  their  triremes  without  excepLion,  in  order  to  prevent  theia 
iioiu  tailing  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy;  and  were  left  destitute, 
v.itiiout  clothing  or  subsistence,  on  the  shores  of  the  Propontis  amid 
iiie  satrapy  of  Pharnahazus.     That  satrap,  with  generous  forward- 
ai^S  took  them  into  his  pay,  advanced  to  them  clothing  and  pro- 
H.  G.  IV. -0 


^^^  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 

voods  of  Mount  Ida  to  ^'"'' l/X/X'xport  for  IiUcan  timber). 
,.here  the  rccoDstnu.tKm  t.  oU  pU  cc        e^^   y  _^  ^^^^  ^^^  ,j^^^^,^^ 

selves  so  aceeplable  :>«,    i^d   1 ''' '^^/'j'^^^n  '^f  ji.em  vUo  chose  to 
au,l  u  "laul  of  tiuzeasliip  was  passtu 

^"l^^ieounting  thi.  buttle,  .1   ^^^  Z^^i:^^^^^'^^^ 
addr.ssc.1  to  ^i^^Laccxla.monu.ns  b>^U^^^^^^^^  eouaitionof 

officer  of  the  sUuu  ^\>"^^\^^^;^^^  ^^  ^a  '.one.  M.ndarus  is  slain, 
the  defeuad  ^^^^^^^^'"^-Tv.^Vnow  i  ot  Vlmt  to  do."  This  cunous 
The  mea  uie  huuirrv.  \l^.^\l^^,^^^^^^^^  .vas  intercepted  hy  the 
disoatch  hus  passed  into  ^^f  ^;^.:;^'^f,^,Uon  But  Avithout  doubt 
Athenmns.  and  "^'^•^'^:  r^^^''^^  1^4.^  intended  to  make  kntnvn, 
ihe  calamito^is  .tato  of  ^^r^^^^f^L  Doth  to  Pelopon- 
llew  rapidly,  ^^^^^^^'^^^^^^V  f'''  e  Sv  TNas,  the  first  impression 
iiesusand  to  Syracuse      ^ad  a.     c  itaiii}  ^^^^  intervcn- 

^:Klel>ytheDeNvsAVOuldproV^abh  I    v^^^^^^  ^^^^^^  ...^i       I, 

tioa  of  Pliaruabazus,  Avherebv  /.1^^^^^^,\  .^^^  Jj^^^  ,ome  interval.     At 
.vould  hardly  be  iMt  ^^J^^'^^^^^"^^^^  po^vcl•ful 

Syracuse,  the  event  on  being  "^^f  J^^"  ^  i'^.^^t  displeasure  against 

sympathy  Avith  ^^ ^'^^'^'^^^ ^^^^lu^r  instipited  their  coun- 
Hermokratts  and  his  colleagues  ^  .     ^^^^  assurances,  to 

trymen  three  years  ^^^^^^;./.7^  '?  ?Yl  «  p^nW^e  of  fimdly  pnttiiig 
commence  a  forcigu  f  l^^'j^f^^" /,^',a  "oU  nV^  but  bad  sustained  a 
down  Athens-had  not  ^"^^^V^^^ih  in  utter  luin,  from  the  very 

-:^^:y^hom  uS  bS-^ -^  ^^^^  ^'  '-''-'  "^"■ 

^^?^n..ndersuchsentimeut<.di^.^^^ 

of  Ivyzikus,  th;U  a  sentence  of  banis^^^^^^^^^^  1^^^^^^^^  ^,^^^ 

against  Herm,okr;^tes  ;;;!^\\;'^^^^  ,^i^^%^'Hernu.krates  himself  to  the 
.    milted  to  Asia,  and  made   f;  '''Lin ir %' bile  lamenting  and  pro- 
armament,  e(>nvoked  in  pubne  meeting      ^^^  ^^^  entreated  the 

testing  against  its  f^!^;S^^^^,^{;.  ^J^^^^  t^^  the  future,  and 

armament  to  maintain  ^;"^J^,^^^\y^^  ti,e  successors  nominated 

to  choose  ne^y  admuals  foi  ^^:^^  j^.^.a  ^-ith  deep  regret  by 
at  Syracuse  should  arrive.     ^  c  »on s  ^^ a.  ^  marines;  Tvbo. 

the  trierarchs  the  pilots,  and  the  ^^^^^^  "^^^  ,^^^^,,^,,er,  bis  constant 

attached  to  l^'^'^^^^^^.^^tl  '^ith  the.n^  and  bis  anxiety  to  colkvt 
openness  of  communication  TMth  ^^l'll\^^  ^^^^^^^  neither  choose, 
ti\eir  opinions,  loudly  proca.m       tl.      U>  ^^c^i.^^^^^  ^^  , 

nor  serve  under,  any  othei  ^^;^^;^J^;  J;  ^^  ^^,^  decree  of  the  cit> . 
disposition,  deprecating  an}  ^^' ^f.^'i^^^^i'^anV  man  dissatisfied  wuh 
They^laid  down  their  command  '^^^'ll^^^^^^  reminding  the 
"^^^St:  ^'Iir^;Sl^l^  td  g^^ous  e^ntlicts,  both  by  land 


HERMOKRATES  IS  BANISHED. 


131 


ami  sea,  which  liad  knit  them  toc-ether  by  the  ties  of  honorable 
leiiowship,  iSo  man  stood  forward  to  accuse  them;  and  they  con- 
sented, on  the  continued  request  of  the  armament,  to  remain  in  co'u- 
mand.  until  their  three  successors  arrived— Demarchus,  Myskon  and 
Fotamis.  They  then  retired  amid  universal  regret;  many  of  tli- 
trierarchs  even  hiiiciing  themselves  by  oath,  that  on  returnino-  to 
byracuse  they  would  procure  their  restoration.  The  chau"-e  of  com- 
manders took  place  at  Miletus.  ° 

Though  Hermokrates,  in  his  address  to  the  soldiers,  would  doubt- 
less hnd  response  when  he  invoked  the  remembrance  of  past  victories, 
yet  he  would  hardly  have  found  the  like  response  in  a  SyracusaTi 
assembly.     For  if  we  review  the  proceedings  of  the  armament  since 
he  conducted  It  from  Syracuse  to  join  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  we  shall 
tina  that  on  the  whole  his  expedition  had  been  a  complete  failure  and 
hat  his  assurances  of  success  against  Athens  had  ended  in  not^hin"- 
l)ut  disappointment.     There  was  therefore  ample  cause  for  the  dis"*- 
content  of  his  countrymen.     But  on  the  other  hand,  as  far  as  our 
imited  means  of  information  enable  us  to  judge,  the  sentence  of 
hanishment  against  mm  appears  to  have  been  imdeserved  and  unjust 
lor  we  cannot  trace  the  ill-success  of  Hermokrates  to  any  mis'conl 
duct  or  omission  on  his  part;  in  regard  to  personal  incorruptibility 
ana  strenuous  resistance  to  the  duplicity  of  Tissaphernes,  he  stood 
out  as  an  honorable  exception   anion?  a  body  of  venal  colleairues 
uiat  satrap,  indeed,  as  soon  as  Hermokrates  had  fallen  into  disgrace, 
circulated  a  vei-sion  of  his  own,  pretending  that  the  ktter,  havincr 
asked  money  from  him  and  been  refused,  had  sought  by  calumnious 
means  to  revenge  such  refusal.     But  this  story,  whether  believed 
elsewhere    or  not,    found   no  credit  with   the' other  satrap  Phar- 
nabazus;  w'Jio  warmly  espoused  the  cause  of  the  banished  general, 
prescmting  liim  with  a  sum  of  money  even  unsolicited.     This  money 
Hermokrates  immediately  employed  in  getting  totrether  triremes  and 
mercenary  soldiers  to   accomplish   his   restoration   to   Syracuse  by 
lorce.     W  e  shall  presently  see  how  he  fared  in  this  attempt.     Mean- 
while  we  may  re.nark  that  the  sentence  of  banishment,  thou<-h  in 
Itself  unjust,  would  appear  amply  justified  in  the  eyes  of  his  country. 
men  by  Ins  own  subscqufnt  rei^ort  to  hostile  measures  against  them. 

ihe  party  op])osed  to  Hermokrates  had  now  the  preponderance  in 
Syracuse,  and  by  their  influence  prof)al)lv  the  sentence  against  him 
was  passed  under  the  gilef  and  wrath  occasioned  by  the  defeat  of 
ivNzikus.  Lnforttinately  we  have  only  tlh-  most  scanty  iiiformation 
as  to  the  internal  state  of  Syracuse  durinir  the  neriod  immediately 
succeeding  the  Athenian  siege;  a  period  of  marked  popular  senli". 
ment  and  peculiar  interest.  As  at  Athens  under  tlie  pressure  of  the 
Aerxeian  invasion— the  energies  of  all  the  citizens,  rich  and  poor, 
young  and  old,  had  been  calie<i  forth  for  repulse  of  the  common 
<'nemy,  and  had  been  not  more  than  enous^h  to  achieve  it.  As  at 
Atheus  after  the  battles  of  Salamis  and  Plal£Ea,  so  at  Syracuse  aftei 


■iS» 


liMimiinminmiiw 


132 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 


STATE  OF  THE  CAKTHAGINIANS. 


183 


t,e  destruction  of  the  Atl-hm  be^^the  pe^^^^ 
pleuitude  of   recent  effor  '  fnd  con.uoi^s  Uu^^^^  ^^  .r^invaua 

defense  had  been  the  3omt  Y/^,  f  ^^^^;^^^^^^  a„d  eqi-ality  of 

tlemocnitical  impulse,  cnger  lor  t^'^'"  "^^^^^'^^^^"t  e  .ovcinment  had 
political  rights^  f  ^"  ^^  :^,'^  ^^d^nmU^B  as  among  the 
icen  democnitical ;  a  lac  .  ;\^^^^^^\y!'';\^         the  citizens  unanimous 

^^^"^^^  f  ?"  ^!^'i^':^J^^^^^  .xciting  intestine 

in  resistance,  ana  in  piotmin^  uic  ^        .       ..     s  e^'C,  it  under- 

discontent.  But  in  the  period  -«-^  ^f ^^^^^^f^^^^^  rstilfmore  demo- 
vant   changes  ^vhlch  '^''1^'''^.^^^^^^^^^ 

ciatical.     On  the  proposition  ^^^f  "J"^^^^^^^  president,  for  the 

u  commission  of  Ten  ^  as  "f  "^^'.^^  ^^^.^   j  ,^  '  a  'd  the  legislation  of  the 
purpose  of  revising  both  the  ^'^'^^^^    /l    "  ^^^^  o^^^^ 
].i,y^    Some  organic  '^^'f  \';^"1^;[';V  iffipTe  ^  i"  ''-^ 

ihe  lot  should  be  adopted    ^^^i^  .^j^^.  ./^^^.^^^^  code,  or  colleclion 

nomination  otnuigistrates.  ,^  ^"V'^'^i^'J %.,,,. n  up  and  sanctioned, 
of  criminal  and  civil  >;"^'f  "^V"^'^' ,  •\.;^:  .^  ^^"i  that  its  penalties 
AVe  know  nothing  of  ^^^,^^^^1^  ;.„\\^  ,   .^'^^^^  minute  and 

^•ere  extremely  severe,   ^^^^\!,^,^^\"Xcu^^^^^^  as  brief.     It  was 

special,  and  its  language  ^^^^'^^  ^J^T^V'^if,  ^'e  chief  of  the  Com - 
k\u,wn  by  the  name  of  ^^^ ^^,^^'^:;'X^L  at  Syracuse,  it 
mitteewho  had  prepared  it     Jh    i^  '  m  ^j^     .^.^  the  despo- 

did  not  last  long;  ^<^' ^''^.f\''^\^''t^' I^^^^ 

lism  of  Dionysius  extmgurshing  it  V'^^^^l  !,vas  a-^ain  revived  at  the 
the  Solonian  legislation  ^)t  Athens^     Bu   it  ^^  a.  a^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^ 

extinction  of  the  Dionysian  dynasty^  a    er^^  ^^  committee, 

Fixtv  years;  with  comments  "^Vm  hi  s  Kephalus  and  Timo- 
at^6ng' whose  members  were  ^^^^^y^^,u.  other  Sicilian 
leon.  It  is  also  said  to  Inue  b  n  Y^^-^j^  .^^^^^.^.ption  of  all  Sicily 
cities  and  to  have  remained  m  foicc  until  tu(.  ao..u  i 

under  the  dominion  of  the  Romans  illustrated  by  a  story  (of 

We  have  the  ^^^^^ere  charaet  m  (^t  Dio^^^^^^^  ^^      ,t. 

more  than  dubious  credit,  '^";\f^;\^;" V,[!'-j,^.  dvertentlv  violated  one 
m<r  other  Grecian  l^\^'^^l^f  >^-^)>^^:^*,]'^  ,  1  t' o^^  by  falling 

of  his  own  enactments,  he  ^"f.^^^^^J/^Ve  ^ Je  n^  ^lunv 

on  his  own  sword.     But  vmfortuiute  >  ^^      .tc  nip 

the  substance  of  his  laws,  which  ;^  ;;"^^l,.  >;Vian  Gi^X  Nor  c.n\Ne 

on  the  sentiments  and  position  of     le  ^^    'j^.^j^^,^^^^^  .f  Syra- 

distinctly  make  out  to -hat  ex  en    tl^K.  p^^^^^^^^^                ^^^  ^^^^   ^,^.  ,,, 

cuse  was  now  changed.     ■»'or  tliougii  w    ut  does  not 

^as  now  applied  to  the  nmnina  lo    of     u^^^tiai.  s^^^  ^^^^^.^^^ 

state  whether  it  was  applied  to  all  ^^  *'^''f  ^l^'-'f^Xpted  at  Athens, 
and  ^-ptions-^irch  for  exa^l;^^^^  ^^^h^l^lU  the  Athenian 
Aristotle,  too,  states  that  f"^."^^7r';.Vl  n'lvtial  democracy  into  an 
siege,  dianged  their  co-tit"  -n  ^^^^^  Dir>^  s  live  or  six  yean 
entire  democracy.  ^    \et  he  ocsciiDes  i        •>  ,      ^j     ^,^,,^t  vio- 

afterward.  as  pushing  himself  up  to  the  de>poti^m  uy 


lent  demagogic  opposition  ;  and  as  liaving  accused,  disgraced,  and 
overthrown  certain  rich  leaders  then  in  possession  of  th^  functions 
of  government.  Jf  the  constitutional  forms  were  ren(!ered  more 
deniocratical,  it  would  seem  lliat  the  practice  cannot  have  materially 
ehanged,  and  tliat  the  persons  actually  in  leading  function  tstill  con- 
tinued to  be  rich  men. 

The  war  carried  on  by  the  Syracusjuis  against  Naxos  and  Katana, 
alter  eontinuing  more  than  three  years,  was  brought  to  a  close  by 
an  enemy  from  without,  even  more  lot  midable  than  Athens.  This 
time,  the  invader  was  not  Hellenic,  but  Phoenician — tiie  ancient  foe 
of  Hellas,  Carthage. 

It  has  been  already  recounted,  how  in  the  same  eventful  year  (480 
15.C.)  which  tituisported  Xerxes  across  the  Hellespont  to  meet  his 
defeat  at  Salamis,  the  Carthaginians  had  poured  into  Sicily  a  vast  mer- 
cenary host  under  Hamilkar,  for  the  purpose  of  reinstating  in  Himera 
tlie  despot  Terillus,  who  had  been  expelled  by  Theron  of  Agiigen- 
tum.  On  that  occasion,  Hamilkar  had  been  slain,  and  his  large  army 
defeated,  by  the  Syiacusan  despot  Gelon,  in  the  raemoraljle  battle  of 
lliniera.  So  deep  had  been  the  impression  left  by  this  defeat,  that 
for  the  seventy  years  which  intervened  between  480-410  k.c,  the 
('arlhairiiuans  had  never  again  invaded  the  island.  They  resumed 
tiieir  aggressions  shortlj'  after  the  destruction  of  the  Athenian  power 
before  Syracuse  ;  which  same  event  had  also  stimulated  the  Tersians, 
who  had  been  kept  in  restraint  wdiile  the  Athenian  empire  remained 
unimpaired,  again  to  act  olfensively  for  the  recovery  of  their  do- 
minion over  the  Asiatic  Greeks.  The  great  naval  power  of  Athens, 
inspiring  not  merely  reserve  but  even  alarm  to  Carthage,  had  been  a 
safeguard  to  the  llelleiuc  world  both  at  its  eastern  and  its  western 
extremity.  No  sooner  was  that  safeguard  overthrown,  than  the  hos- 
tile pressure  of  the  foreigner  began  to  l)e  felt,  as  well  upon  Western 
Sieily  as  on  the  eastern  coast  of  the  .Egean. 

Froni  this  time  forward  for  two  centuries,  down  to  the  conclusion 
of  the  second  Punic  war,  the  Carthaginians  Avilj  be  found  frequent 
in  their  aggressive  interventions  in  Sicily,  and  uj)on  an  extensive 
scale,  so  as  to  act  powerfully  on  the  des(ini{»s  of  the  Sicilian  Greeks. 
Whether  any  internal  causes  Iiad  occurred  to  make  them  abstain  from 
intervention  during  the  preceding  g«'neratious,  we  ar(3  unable  to  say. 
The  history  of  this  powerlul  and  wealthy  city  is  very  little  knowii. 
We  make  out  a  few  facts,  which  impart  a  general  idea  both  of  her 
<'lig.irehical  governni^Mit,  arul  of  her  extensive  colonial  possessions, 
hat  wliieh  leave  us  in  tlie  dark  as  to  her  continuous  Instory.  Her 
possessions  were  most  extensive,  along  the  coast  of  Africa  both  cast- 
ward  and  westward  from  hereby  ;  comprehending  also  Sardinia  and 
the  Balearic  isles,  but  (at  this  time,  probably)  i'ew  settlements  in 
^i'ain.  She  had  quite  enough  to  occupy  her  attention  elsewhere, 
without  meddling  in  Sicilian  ailci-rs  ;  the  more  so,  as  her  pr:)vince 
in  Sicily  was  rather  a  dependent  ally  than  a  colonial  possession.     In 


134 


i^lClLlAN  AFFAIRS. 


COLONIES  OF  CARTHAGE. 


135 


the  early  treaties  made  with  Rome,  the  Carthaginians  restrict  and 
even  interdict  the  tratlic  of  the  Roniaus  both  witli  bardmia  and 
Africa  (except  Carlha-e  itself),  but  they  irraut  ihe  ainplesl  uense  cf 
intercourse  with  the  C^artha-iuiun  provuice  of  bicdy  ;  which  they 
consider  as  staiidiuL-  in  the  same  relation  to  Carthage  as  the  cities  ot 
Latium  stood  in  to  Rome.  AVhile  the  connection  of  Carthage  with 
Sicily  was  thus  less  close,  it  would  appear  that  her  other  depemUn- 
cies  gave  her  much  trouble,  chiefly  in  consequence  ot  her  own  harsh 

and  extortionate  dominion.  .     .       .      .   r^     4i  i 

\11  our  positive  information,  scanty  as  it  is,  about  Carthage  and 
her  institutions,  relates  to  the  fourth,  third,  or  second  centuries  b  c  ; 
vet  it  mav  be  held  to  justify  presumptive  conclusions  as  to  the  tilth 
centurv  n  c     especially  in  reference   to  the  general  system  pursu(( . 
The  maximum  of  her  power  was  attained  before  her  hrst  war  \\i.li 
]lome  which  began  in  ^64  B.C. ;  the  first  and  second  Punic  wars  both 
of  them  greatly  reduced  her  strength  and  dominion.      \  et  in  si-itc  c 
such  reduction  we  learn  that  about  150  B.C.,  shortly  before  the  third 
Punic  war   which  ended  in  the  capture  and  depopulation  ot  the  city, 
not  less  than  700,000  souls  were  c(  mputed  in  it,  as  occupants  ot  a 
foriitied  circumference  of  above  twenty  miles,  covering  a  penmMihi 
with  its  isthmus.     Upon  this  isthmus  its  ciiadel  Byrsa  was  situale^d, 
surrounded  bv  a  triple  wall  e.f  its  own,  and  crowned  at  its  sinnnnl  by 
a  ma-niticent  temple  of  ^:.culapius.     Ihe  numerous  pe.pulation  is 
the  inore  remarkable,  since  Itica  (a  considerable  city,  ce)le»nized  ire>m 
Pha-nicia  more  anciently  tlnm  even  Carthuge  itself,  and  always  inde- 
lendent  of  the  Carthaginians,  though  in  the  eondition  of  an  inlerior 
and  discontented  allv)  was  within  the  disUmce  of  K^ven  mik-s  liein 
Carthaire  on  the  ene  side,  and  Tuiiis  seemii  gly  not  much  furtlie'r  e^tt 
on  the  other.   Even  at  that  time,too.  the  Cartl  aginians  aie  said  to  h^ve 
ncs^essedSOO  Iributarv  cities  in  Libya.     Yet  this  was  but  a  Miiall 
fractie.ne)f  the  pre-diiiiVusenpiie%xhich  b;id  belorL'ed  te)  them  eer- 
tiiiidv  in  the  lourth  centurv  i.e.,  ai.d  in  r.ll  jirokibility  also  between 
4S0-410  B  c      That  en  pire  extended  ei,sl\\aid  as  lar  as  the  Altais  a 
the  Phila'ni,near  the  Gi(  at  ?yrti^-westM  ard  all  along  the  coast  to  the 
Pillars  of  llenikles  and  the  western  coast  ot  IVIoiocco.      ihe  line- oi 
coast  south-east  of  (  arth«ge,  as  larr.s  the  bay  e  ailed  the  Lesser  |.yrliN 
was  pre)verbial  (unekr  the  i.t.n.e  of  Byzacium  and  the  Lmpe>ria)  tor 
its  fertility.     A'ono-  this  extensive  line  were  distributed  indiger.ejus 
Libyan  tribes,  living  by  agrieultuie  ;  ar.d  a  mixed  pe^pulation  cailecl 
Liby-Phemicians,   le;in:ed    by  inteimnriir.ge  and  coalition  of  h  me 
of  these  tribes  either  with  colonists  from  1}  re  and  bidon.  e^'  peri.jiis 
with  a  Cnnaanitish  population  akin  in  lace  to  the  Phanieians,  yet  a 
still  earlier  settle  nu  nl  in  tie  country.     These  Liby-Pha?nicians  dwelt 
in  towns   seemiiuilv  of  mcderate  size  and  unlortilied,  but  each  siir- 
rouneied  by  a  territory  anple  and   fertile,  yielding  large  prod ncc^ 
They  were  assiduous  Vultivators,  but   generally  unwarlike,  wlucn 
latter  quality  was  ascribed  by  ancient  theory  to  the  extreme  richness 


of  their  .soil.  Of  the  Liby-Phopnieian  towns  the  number  is  not 
known  to  us,  but  it  must  haAC  b(^en  prodigiously  great,  since  we  are 
told  that  both  Agathokles  and  Remdus  in  their' respective  invasions 
captured  no  less  than  200.  A  single  district,  called  Tuska,  is  also 
spoken  of  as  having  50  towns. 

A  few  of  the  towns  along  tlie  coast— Hippo,  Utica,  Adrumetum 
Tliapsus.  Leptis,  etc— were  colonies  from  Tyre,  like  Carthaue  her- 
Fc'lf.     \\  itli  resi)ect  to  Carthage,  therefore,  they  stood  upon  a^ditfer- 
cnt  footing  from  the  Liby-Phenician  towns,  either  murilimeor  in  the 
interior.     Yet  the  Carthaginians  contrive^d  in  lime  to  render  every 
town  tributary,  with  the  exception  of  Utica.     They  thus  derived 
revenue  from  all  the  inhabitants  of  this  fertile  region,  Tvrian,  Liby- 
Pheideian,  and  indigenous  Libyan;   and   the  amount   which    they 
imposed  appears  to  have  been  exorbitant.     At  one  time,  immediately 
after  the  first  Punic  war,  they  took  from  the  rural  cultivators  as  much 
as  one-half  of  their  produce,  and  doubled  at  one  stroke  the  tribute 
levied  upon  the  towns.     The  town  and  district  of  Leptis  paid  to  them 
a  tribute  of  one  talent  per  elay,  or  3G5  talents  annually.     Such  exac- 
tions were  not  collected  without  extreme  harshness  of  enforcement 
sonietimevs  stripping  the  tax-payer  of  all  that  he  possessed;  and  even 
tearing  him  from  his  family  to  be  sold  in  pcM'son  for  a  slave.  Accord- 
ingly the  general  sentiment  among  theeleiiendeneies  toward  Carthage 
was  one  of  mixigled  fear  and  hatred,  which  rendered  them  eager  To 
revolt  on  the  landing  of  any  foreign  invader.     In  some  cases  the 
Carthaginians  seem  to  hav(;  guareled  against  such  continu-encies  by 
paid  garrisons;   but  they  also  provideei  a  species  of  garrison  from 
among  their  own  citizens;  by  sending  out  from  Carthage  poor  men, 
aiKJ  assigning  to  them  lots  of  laud  with  the  cultivators  attached! 
lliis  provision  for  poor  citizens  as  emigrants  (mainly  analogous  to  the 
Roman  colonies),  w^as  a  standing  feature  in  the  Carthadnian  political 
system,  serving  the  double  purpose  of  obviating  discontent  among 
their  town  population  at  home,  and  of  keeping  watch  over  their 
dependencies  abroad. 

In  the  fifth  century,  B.C.,  the  Carthaginians  had  no  apprehci.sion  of 
any  foreign  enemy  invading  them  fi-om  seaward;  an  enterprise  first 
attempted  in  316  B.C.,  to  the  surprise  of  everyone,  by  the  Syracu- 
san,  Agathokles.  Nor  were  their  enemies  oi.' the  land  side  formiel- 
al'le  as  conquerors,  though  they  were  extremely  annoying  as  plun- 
(l<rers.  The  Numidians  and  other  native  tribes,  half  naked  and 
predatory  horsemen,  distiniiuished  for  speed  as  well  as  for  indefntiir- 
ahle  activity,  so  harassed  the  indivielual  cultivators  of  the  soil,  that 
t  le  Carthaginians  dug  a  long  line  of  ditch  to  keep  them  off.  But 
tlic'se  barbarians  did  not  acquire  suflicient  oru-ani/.ation  to  act  for 
piM-manent  objects,  until  the  reign  of  ]Masiuissa^nid  the  second  Punic 
jvnr  with  Rome.  During  the  fifth  and  fourth  centuries  B.C.,  there- 
fore (prioi-  to  the  invasion  of  Agathokles),  the  warfare  carried  on  by 
the  Carthaginians  was  constantly  aggressive  and  in  foreign  parts.    For 


136 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 


OLIGARCHICAL  SYSTEM. 


137 


lhc><e  puiToscs  tl-.ev  chic  tiv  eiiipk yed  fornirn  ir ere cl^r^nvi^,  hired  foi  the 
on^sfo     fr<^^^^   ilalv.  Gm.l  Spn-n,  .lul    the    K^hmc  s  of    the  Ycstcrn 
S     mon:Mie.i.    lo^:llH■l•^vith  coixripts  from  thnr  Li bvnn  dq  eml- 
eu-c^     Th^'iative  CMtli.oii.inns,  ilioudi  encouraged  by  hon(mny 
^r•>  rkVto  urdert.he  this  nulitavy  service,  ^vere  p-nenilly  averse  to  ii 
nniupaHr'^lVemploved.     Lut  IIksc  citi/<  ns   tu.ti^h  i.ot  oiten  scr 
f()rei^n  M  rvic  .,  Oon.tituUd  a  n.  st  loniudt.bk-  force  ulicn  erl.d 
p(         ^<>  less   than   forty  thousand  hoplites  wen    forth  iron;  il.. 
^^1  (s  of  CVrthn-e  to  resist  A iiatholdcs,  together  with  one    h(.^.^:.^d 
fa  ^drv   ai  d     vo\hou.and  ^var-chariots.     An  inmicnse  pul>lic  nu;p- 
;\  ._;>f   anns.  nun.inu'nts   of   war  of  all    kinds,  an(     prov.Mons- 
a     car.  to   have  been   keep  in   the   walls  oi  Dyr.a,  the   cHm  cl  <. 
S-   noc       Acl,o.en   division  of  2.G0O  cili/cas  men  of  wcahh  ;  i,d 
k  nilv    formecl  wb.at  was  call,  d   the  Sacred   B.ud  of  Carthage,  dis 
i  m  ijied  ?or  their  biavery  in  the  held  as  .cH  as  for  tl.e  ^ph  ncUT  o 
ei"!u-ms,  and  the  gold  and  silver  plate  wh.cli  ^''^'l^;  .r^;''    *'  ,,    ^  "^ 
Ino-onae      AVe  shall  find  ihc-se  c-iti/(U  inn  ps  oceis.onall}  cn.p.o.yd 
on^K^l^e  U.  Sicily;  but  most  j.art  of  ll'^'^q^l;:;^;--.--^:. :};;;:  1^ 
or  Gauls,  Iberians,  Libyans,  etc.,  a  nnngleo    '"^  .,f^   J  f  ^^;i„;   '„  :^ 
occasion,  disc-ordant  in  language  as  well  as  n   /y^^'  »;f  r,,.^    ,        . 
had  nevr  any  attachment  to  tlie  cau>e  in  xNhich  ^''O /";f ^^  -  V" 
1    to  the  eomn.andc-rs  under  ulu.n;  they  >c  rvc-d;  NvLile     le>  weie 
t^;  ma  ed  bv  (  artlia^e  with  bad  faith,  and  iec:klessly  al.n^oii.  d 
^  deJruetion/  A  nnlitnry  system  ^"^h  as  this  was  r-p-i        i  h 
dan-r   if  ever  tlie  meivenary  soldiers  go    footing  m  ftnca    as   i..p 
eied  after  the  lir.t  Punic- war,  when  the  c.tv  was  brought  to  t..e 
kc^  ruin      But  on   foreign  seTvice  in  Siciy  these  mereena 
cue  riblMl   Carthaoe  to  make  conciuest  at  the  cost  cmly  of  1  ci 
^^  ;    wlll'-iU  a^  of  the  Wood  of  her  c>wn  -t-ens.        he 

Cnrlln-ir.iMn  i-enerals  seem  irenerally  to  have  re  i<  d,  like  1  e  im.' is. 
up;,n  nTunb"  ;i-uiunifesting  little  e.-  no  -^^^^^^  ^^^^.!\^^:Z 
tc)  the  Punic  wars  with  Rome,  conducted  under  Ilamuk.u  J^a.eaauQ 

'^I^:^;;;'e^;n:^r  "^;;;cai':onstitutlonof  Carthage,  the  facts  knc>wii 

are  U>o  few,^md  too  indistinct,  to  enali^e  us  to  ^'>'V1^''^  'j^.'^^,  jen^ 
^e>rkiii^.     The  magistrates  most  conspien.ous  m  ^^^^^^ ^^'£^^ 
Avciv    ihe  two    Kinos   or   Suffetes.  who   preside  el   over   tlie  ._ci...i(. 
Th^:  ■:;'n  lo  hav!>  been  renewed  annually,  tiiough  how  f.ir  the  s:n  . 
p.rs;,ns  were  re-eligilile  e>r  ac-tually  re-c-hoscai,  we  do  not  ^;-^r^';^ 
tlu'v  were    mIwivs  selected   out  of  some  few   principal   families  en 
^^c^rTh  1^  i  nelson  fe>r  believing  that  th<^  genuii.e,Carthagmn;n 
Jbiz  lis  we.re  distributed  into  thre-e  tribes,  thu^v  cunce,  ^^"  H,r  l . 
h  uid.red  cvontes-something  in  the  mannc-r  of  the  Ionian  pat nci. 
From  these  o-entes  emanated  a  Senate  ot  tbiTe  hundred,  out  oi  whul 
^ab!  w"  fe^meel  a  smaller  c-ouncil  or  eomminee  e>f  thirty  jnnn, 
reprcentimr  the  curia':  sometime  a  stdl  smaller,  of  o?^y    f "  f 'Z  , 
cip...     These  little  council,  are  boUi  frequently  mentioned   m  tlu 


political  proceedings  of  Carthage;  and  perliaps  tlie  Thirty  may  coin- 
cide with  wiiat  Polybius  called  the  Gerusia  or  Council  of  Ancients — 
tl'.e  Three  Hundred,  witli  that  whieii  he  calls  the  Senate.  Aristotle 
ji^similates  the  tw^o  Kijigs  (Sutfetes)  of  C^irtiiage  to  the  two  Kings  of 
Sp-irta— and  the  Gerusia  of  Carthage  also  to  'that  of  Sp;irta;  which 
hitter  consisted  of  thirty  mcmbe^rs," including  the  Kings  whc)  sfit  in 
it.  But  Aristotle  does  not  allude  to  any  assembly  nt  Carthaiie  analo- 
gous te)  what  Polybius  calls  the  Senate.'  He  mentions  two  ('ouncils, 
one  of  one  hundred  members,  the  other  of  one  hundred  and  four'; 
and  ce'i'tain  Boards  of  Five — the  Pent^u'chies.  \{o  compares  the  Coun-' 
cil  of  one  hundred  and  four  to  the  Spartan  Epliors;  yet  again  he  talks 
cf  die  Pent.irchies  as  invested  with  extensive  functions,  and  terms 
the  Council  of  one  hundred  the  greatest  authority  in  the  state.  Per- 
haps this  last  Council  was  ieleutical  with  the  assenildy  of  one  hun- 
dn^d  Judges  (saiel  to  have  been  chosen  from  the  Seiuite  as  a  check 
upon  the  generals  einployexl),  or  Ordo  Judicum;  of  Avhich  Livy 
speaks  after  the  second  Punic  war,  as  existing  with  its  members  per- 
petual, and  so  powerful  that  it  overruled  all  the  other  tissembliesaiid 
magistracies  of  the  state.  Through  the  influence  of  Hannibal,  a  hnv 
wa>  passed  to  lessen  the  overweening  power  of  this  Order  of  Judges; 
causing  them  to  be  elected  only  for  One  year,  instead  of  being  per- 
petual. 

The^e  statements,  though  coming  from  valutible  autliors.  convey 
so  little  information  and  a're  withal  so  difficult  to  reconcile,  that  both 
tke  structure  and  working  of  the  political  mac;hine  at  Carihaire  iiiay 
he  said  to  be  unknown.     But  it  seems  clear  that  the  n-eneral  spirit  o7 
the  government  was  hi'zhly  oligarc-liical;  that  a  few  rich.  old.  :ind 
powerful  families  divided   among  themselves   the  great  olficcs  and 
inlinence  of  the  State;  that  they  maintained  themselves  in  pointed  and 
even  insolent  distinction  from  the  multitude;  that  they  stood  opposed 
to  each  other  in  bitter  feuds,  often  stained  by  gross  perfidy  and  lilood- 
shed;  and  that  the  treatfuent  with  whicli,  through  these  violent  party 
antipathies,    unsuecessful  generals  we^re  visited,   wa^   cruel    in   the 
e.xtreme.    It  appears  that  wealth  was  one  indispensable  qualification, 
and  chat  magistrates  and  generals  procured  their  ajipointments  in  a 
great  measure  by  corrupt  means.     Of  such  corruption,  one  variety 
was  the  habit  of  e'onstantly  regaling  the  citizens  in  collective  ban- 
quets of  the  curiae,  or  the  political  ass')ciations;  a  habit  so  continual, 
and  embracing  so  wide  a  circle  e)f  citizens,  that  Aristotle  compares 
these  baiKjuets  to  the  phiditia,  or  public  mess  of  Sparta.     There  was 
a  Demos  or  people  at  Carthage,  who  were  consulted  on  particular 
occasions,  and  before  whom  propositions  were  publicly  debated,  in 
cases  where  the  Suffetes  and  the  small  Council  were  not  all  of  one  • 
mind.     How  numerous  this  Demos  wtis,  or  what  proportion  of  the 
whole  population  it  comprised,  we  have  no  means  of  knowing.     But 
It  is  plain,  that  whether  more  or  less  considerable,  its  multitude  v.-as 
kept  under  dependence  to  the  rich  families  bv  stratagems  sucli  as  t!ie 


138 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 


EGESTA  AND  SELINUS. 


139 


\ 


|:i 


banuufts  the  lucrative  appointments  with  lots  of  land  in  foreign 
depi-udencies,  etc.  The  purposes  of  government  wei-e  determined, 
its  powers  wielded,  and  the  crrcat  othees  held— bulletes  bemuors, 
General  or  Judires— by  the  members  of  a  .-mall  number  of  wealthy 
families-'  and  the  chief  opposition  which  they  encountered,  \Vas  from 
th"ir  feiuW  a^minst  each  other.  In  the  main,  the  government  was 
conducted  wiiii  skill  and  steadiness,  as  well  for  internal  trancjuilhty, 
as  for  systematic  foreiixu  and  commercial  aggrandizement.  VV  iilim 
the  kncnvledn-e  of  Ari>1otle,  Carthage  had  never  suilered  eilher  the 
successful  usurpation  of  a  despot,  or  any  violent  intestine  commo- 

Tiie  first  eminent  Carthaginian   leader  brought  to  our  notice,  is 
Ma^'orseeminiily  about  530-o00  B.C.),  who  is  said'  to  have  mainly  con- 
triblited  to  organize  the  forces,  and  extend  the  dominion  of  Carthage. 
Of  his  two  sons,  one.  Ilasdrubal,  perished  after  u  victorious  career  m 
Sardinia;  the  other,  Hamilkar,  commanding  at  the  battle  of  llimcra 
in  Sicily   was  there  defeated  and  slain  by  Gelon,  as  has  been  already 
recounted.     After  the  death  of  Hamilkar,  his  son  Giskon  was  con- 
demned to  Dcrpeiual  exile,  and  ims>cd  ids  life  in  Sicily  at  the  Greek 
city  of  Seliiius.    But  the  sons  of  1  !a.-drubal  still  remained  at  Carthage, 
the  most  powerful  citizens  in  the  slate;  carryingon  hostilities agalu^^t 
the  :do()rs  and  other  ind  L^enous  Africttns,  whom  they  compelled  to 
relinquish  the  tribute  which  CarlhaLC  had  paid,  down  :o  that  time, 
for   the   ground  whereon  the  city    was  situated.     Ihis   family  are 
said  indeed  to  have  been  so  powerful,  that  a  check  upon  their  a.<=- 
cendeucv  was  supposed  to  be  necessary;  and  for  tluit  purpose  tlie 
K'lect  One  Hundred  Senators  sitting  as  Judges  were  now  nommatul 
lor  the  first  time.     Such  uars  in  Africa  doubtless  tended  to  prevent 
the  Carthaiiinians  from   farther  interference  in   Sir-ily,   during  the 
interval  between  480-410  u.c.     There  were  probably  other  canoes 
also,  not  known  to  us-and  down  to  the  year  413  B.C.   the  formidable 
naval  iwwer  of  Athens  (as  has  been  already  remarked)  kept  Ihemon 
tiie  watch  even  for  themselves.     But  now,  after  the  great  Athenian 
catastrophe  before  Syracuse,  apprehensions  from  that  quarter  Avcie 
dissipated;  so  that  Carthage  again  found  leisure,  as  well  as  inclina- 
tion  to  seek  in  Sicily  both  aggrandizement  and  revenge. 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  same  persons,  acting  in  the  same  quarrel, 
who  furnished  the  i)ret(;xt  or  the  motive  for  the  recent  invasion  by 
Athens,  now  served  in  the  like  capacity  as  prompters  to  C;arthn!ie. 
The  inhabitants  of  Egesta,  engaged  in  an  unequal  war  with  ri\:il 
neighbors  at  Selinus,  were  in  both  cases  the  soliciting  parties.  Ibey 
had  applied  to  Carlhairc  first,  without  success,  before  they  thouiibl 
of  sending  to  iinoke  aid  from  Athens.  This  war,  indeed,  had  lieen 
for  the  time  merged  and  forgotten  in  the  larger  Athenian  enter- 
prise against  Syracuse;  but  it  reviyed  after  that  catastroi-he,  wherein 
Athen.^and  her  armament  were  shipwrecked.  The  Lgestaeans  had 
not  only  lost  their  protectors,  but  had  incurred  aggravated  hobtu- 


ity  from  their  neighbors,  for  having  brought  upon  Sicily  so  for- 
midable an  ultramarine  enemy.  Their  original  quarrel  witii  Selinus 
had  related  to  a  disputed  portion  of  border  territory.  This  point 
they  no  longer  felt  competent  to  maintain,  under  their  present  dis- 
udvantageous  circumstances.  But  the  Selinuutines,  confident,  as 
well  as  angry,  were  now  not  satisfied  with  success  in  their  original 
claim.  They  proceeded  to  strip  the  Egest^cans  of  other  lands  indis- 
putal)ly  belonging  to  them,  and  seriously  menaced  the  integrity  as 
well  as  the  independence  of  the  city.  To  no  other  quarter  could  the 
Egest^eans  turn,  with  any  chance  of  finding  both  will  and  power  to 
protect  them,  except  to  Carthage. 

The  town  of  Egesta  (non-Hellenic  or  at  least  only  semi-Hellenic) 
was  situated  on  or  near  the  northern  line  of  Sicilian  coast,  not  far 
from  the  western  cape  of  the  island,  and  in  the  immediate  neighbor- 
hood of  the  Carthaginian  settlements— Motye,  Panormus  (now  Pal- 
ermo), and  Soloeis  or  Sohmtum.  Selinus  also  was  near  the  western 
cape,  but  on  the  southern  coast  of  Sicily,  with  its  territory  conter- 
minus  to  the  southern  portion  of  Egesta.  When  therefore  the  E2:es- 
t.Tan  envoys  presented  their  urgent  supplications  at  Carthage  for  aid, 
proclaiming  that  unless  assisted  they  must  be  subjugated  and  become 
a  dependency  of  Selinus— the  Carthaginians  would  not  unreasonably 
conceive  that  their  own  Sicilian  settlements  would  be  endangered, 
if  their  closest  Hellenic  neighbor  were  allowed  thus  to  aggrcTndize 
her.self.  Accordingly  they  agreed  to  grant  the  aid  solicited;  yet  not 
■without  much  debate  and  hesitation.  They  were  uneasy  at  the  idea 
of  resuming  military  operations  in  Sicily— which  had  been  laid  aside 
for  seventy  years,  and  had  moreover  left  such  disastrous  recollections 
—at  a  moment  when  Syracusan  courage  stood  in  high  renown,  from 
the  recent  destruction  of  the  Athenian  armament.  But  the  recollec- 
tions of  the  Gelonian  victory  at  Himera,  while  they  suggested  appre- 
hension, also  kindled  the  appetite  of  revenge  ;  especiallyln  the  bosom 
of  Hannibal,  the  grandson  of  that  general  Hamilkar  who  had  there 
met  his  death.  Hannibal  was  at  this  moment  King,  or  rather  first  of 
the  two  Suffetes,  chief  executive  magistrate  of  Carthage,  as  his 
grandfather  had  been  seventy  years  before.  So  violent  had  been  the 
impression  made  upon  the  Carthaginians  by  the  defeat  of  Himera, 
that  they  had  banished  Giskon,  son  of  the  'slain  general  Hamilkar 
and  father  of  Hannibal,  and  liad  condemned  him  to  pass  his  Avhole 
life  in  exile.  He  had  chosen  the  Greek  city  of  Selinus,  where  prob- 
ably Hannibal  had  also  spent  his  youth,  though  restored  since  to  his 
country  and  to  his  family  consequence — and  from  whence  he  brought 
back  an  intense  antipathy  to  the  Greek  name,  as  well  as  an  impa- 
tience to  wipe  ofif  by  a  signal  revenge  the  dishonor  both  of  his  coun- 
try and  of  liis  fainily.  Accordingly,  espousing  with  warmth  the 
request  of  the  Egesta3ans,  he  obtained  from  the  Senate  authority  to 
take  effective  mea.sures  for  their  jirotection. 

His  first  proceeding  was  to  send  envoys  to  Eiresta  and  Selinus,  to 


110 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 


romonstnito   ni^-iinst  the  eiKToachnicnts  of   the  Seliuunliiios  ;   with 
furtht'i-  instriuMions.  in  case  rcnioiisnaiice  proved  iiulTrclnal,  to  i^ro- 
ceial  with  the  Eu(sta'an.<  to  Syracuse,  and   there  .^idjiuit  tlie  wliole 
(iis])i  te  to  the  arhitration  of  the  Syracusaiis.     He  foresaw  ihat  the 
Selinniitines..havin<j:  si.perority  of  force  on  their  >ide,  would  refuse 
to  acknowledLX'  any   arbitration;    and  that  tlie  Syraeusans,  respeel- 
fullv  invoked  bv  one   party  but  rej«  ( ted  by  the  other,  would  >Uind 
asidV  from  the  quarrel  alto.uether.     It  turned  out  as  he  had  cvpected. 
Tlie  Selinuntines  sent   envoys  to  Syracuse,  to   protest  against  the 
representations   from    Eiiestu    and  (  arthage  :   hut   declined  to  refer 
their  case  to  arbitration.  "  Acrordiniiiy,  the  Syraeusans  passt d  a  vole 
that  thev  would  maintain  tlieir  alliance  with  Selinus.  yet  without  im- 
peachment of  their  jnicitic  relations  with  C'arthac:e;  thus  leaviii"-  the 
latter  free  to  act  without   obstruction.     Ilaniiibai  immediately  sent 
over  a  body  of  troops  to  the  aid  of  Egesta:  o,C00  Libyans  or  African.-; 
and  800  (\unpanian  mercenaries,  who  had  been  foimerly  in  the  \y.\y 
and  service  of  the  Athenians   before  Syracuse,  but  had  quitted  that 
camp  before  the  final  catastrojihe  occurred. 

In  spite  of  the  re-enforcement  and  the  imposing  countenance  of 
Carthaire,  the  Selinunlines.  at  this  time  in  full  jiower  and  prosperity, 
still  believed  ihemselves  strong  enough  to  ,-ubdue  Egesta.  I  nder 
such  persuasion  thev  invaded  the  territory  with  their  full  force. 
They  began  to  ravage  the  country,  yet  at  first  with  order  and  precau- 
tion ;  bvTt  presently,  finding  no  enemy  in  the  field  to  opj^o^e  ihem, 
they' became  careless,  and  spread  themselves  about  for  dii-oiderly 
plunder  This  was  the  monu  nt  for  which  the  Egeslaans  and  C  artha- 
fdiiians  were  watching.  Tliev  attacked  tlie  tediuuntines  by  surprise. 
Tlefeated  them  with  a  loss  of  1000  men,  and  recaptured  the  whole 

booty.  «.      .  1  .     f 

The  war,  as  hitlierto  caiTied  on.  was  one  ofTensive  on  the  part  ot 
the  Selinuntines.  for  the  purpose  of  punishing  or  despoiling  their 
ancient  enemy  I\gesla.  Only  so  far  as  was  necessary  for  the  delense 
of  the  latter,  had'the  Carthai-inians  yet  interfered.  But  against  such 
an  interference  the  Selinuntines,  if  they  had  taken  a  prudent  meas- 
ure of  their  own  force,  would  have  seen  that  they  were  nc^t  likely 
to  achieve  any  ccmquest.  IMoreover,  they  might  perhaps  have 
obtained  peace  now,  had  they  sought  it;  as  a  consideir.ble  minority 
among  them,  headed  by  a  cit'izen  named  Empcdion  urgently  n com- 
mended: for  Selinus  appears  always  to  have  been  on  more  friendly 
terms  with  Carthaire  than  any  other  Grecian  city  in  Sicily.  Even  at 
the  "-reat  batlle  (.f  Himera.  the  Selinuntine  troops  had  not  only  not 
assisted  Gelon,  but  had  actually  fought  in  the  Carthaginian  army 
under  Ilan^.ilkar;  a  plea,  which,  had  it  been  pressed,  might  probably 
have  had  weight  with  Hannibal.  But  this  claim  upon  the  goodwill 
of  Carthaire  appears  oidv  to  have  rendered  ihem  more  confident  and 
passionate^ in  bravinL^icr  force  and  in  prosecuting  the  war.  They 
sent  to  Syracuse  to  usk  for  aid,  which  the  Syraeusans,  under  present 


SIEGE  OF  SELINUS. 


141 


circumstances,  promised  to  send  them.  But  the  promise  was  given 
with  little  coiTliality,  as  appears  by  the  manner  in  which  they  ful- 
filled it,  as  well  as  from  the  neutrality  which  they  bad  professed  so 
recently  before;  for  the  contest  seemed  to  b(?  aggressive  on  the  part 
of  Selinus,  so  that  Syracuse  iiad  little  interest  in  helping  her  to  con- 
quer  Egesta.  Neitlier  Syraeusans  nor  Selinuntines  were  i)repared  for 
the  immense  preparations,  and  energetic  rapidity  of  movement,  by 
which  Hannibal  at  once  altered  the  cliaracter,  and  enlarged  the  pur- 
poses, of  the  war.  He  employed  all  the  ensuing  autumn  and  winter 
in  collecting  a  numerous  host  of  mercenary  troops  from  Africa, 
Spain,  and  Campania,  with  various  Greeks  w'iio  w^re  willing  to  take 
service. 

In  the  spring  of  the  memorable  year  409  B.C.,  through  the  exuberant 
wealth  of  Carthage,  he  was  in  a  condition  to  leave  Africa  with  a 
great  fleet  of  sixty  triremes,  and  1500  transi)orts  or  vessels  of  burden; 
conveying  an  army,  which,  according  to  ihe  comparjitively  low  esti- 
mate of  Tima'us,  amounted  to  more  then  100,000  men;  while  Epho- 
rus  extended  the  number  to  200,000  infantry,  and  4,000  cavalry, 
together  with  muniments  of  w'ar  and  battering  machines  for  siege. 
With  these  he  steered  directly  for  the  western  Cape  of  Sicily,  Lily- 
hieum;  taking  care,  however,  to  land  his  troops  and  to  keep  his  fleet 
on  the  northern  side  of  that  cape,  in  the  bay  nearMotye — and  not  to 
approach  the  southern  shore,  lest  he  should  alarm  the  Syraeusans 
with  the  idea  that  he  was  about  to  prosecute  his  voyage  further  east- 
ward along  the  southern  coast  toward  their  city.  By  this  precau- 
tion, he  t(X)k  the  best  means  for  prolonging  the  period  of  Syracusjui 
inaction. 

The  Selinuntines,  panic-struck  at  the  advent  of  an  enemy  so  much 
more  overwhelming  than  they  had  expected,  sent  pressing  messen- 
gers to  Syracuse  to  accelerate  the  promised  help.  They  had  mad'j 
no  provision  for  standing  on  the  defensive  against  a  really  formidable 
aggressor.  Their  walls,  though  strong  euounh  to  hold  out  airainst 
Sicilian  neighbors,  had  been  neglected  during  the  long-continued 
absence  of  any  foreign  besieger,  and  were  now  in  many  places  out 
of  repair.  Hannibal  left  thein(|io  time  to  make  good  past  deficiencies. 
Instead  of  wasting  his  powerfiii  armament  (as  the  unfortunate  Nikias 
hud  done  five  years  before)  by  months  of  empt}'  flourish  and  real  in- 
action, he  waited  only  until  he  was  joined  by  the  troops  from  Egesla 
and  the  neighboring  Carthaginian  dependencies,  and  then  marched 
his  whole  force  straight  from  Lih'b^ieum  to  Selinus.  Crossing  the^ 
river  Mazara  in  his  way,  and  storming  the  fort  wiiich  lay  near  its 
mouth,  he  soon  found  himself  under  the  Selinuntine  walls.  He  dis- 
tributed his  army  into  two  parts,  each  provided  with  battering 
machines  and  movable  wooden  towers;  and  then  assailed  the  walls 
on  many  points  at  once,  choosing  the  points  where  they  w^re  most 
accessible  or  most  dilapidated.  Arcliers  and  slingers  in  great  num- 
bers were  posted  near  the  walls,  to  keep  up  a  discharge  of  missiles 


142 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 


and  chase  away  the  defenders  from  the  battlements.  Lnder  cover 
of  such  discharge,  six  wo(Kien  towers  were  rolled  up  to  the  loot  of 
the  wall,  to  which  they  were  equal  or  nearly  equal  in  height,  so  that 
th<'  armed  men  in  their  interior  were  prepared  to  contend  with  the 
defenders  almost  on  a  level.  Against  other  portions  of  the  wal  , 
batterino--rams  with  iron  heads  were  driven  by  the  combined  strength 
of  multitudes,  shaking  or  breaking  through  its  substance,  especially 
where  it  showed  symptoms  of  neglect  or  decay.  Such  were  the 
methods  of  attack  which  Hannibal  now  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
unprepared  Selinuntines.  He  was  eager  to  forestall  the  arrival  ot 
auxiliaries  by  the  impetuous  movements  of  his  innumerable  bar- 
baric host,' the  largest  seen  in  Sicily  since  his  grandfather  Hamilkar 
had  been  defeated  before  Himera.  Collected  from  all  the  shores  of 
the  western  Mediterranean,  it  presented  soldiers  heterogeneous  in 
race,  in  arms,  in  language— in  everything,  except  bravery  and  com 
mon  appetite  for  blood  as  well  as  plunder.  ,     ,    ^ 

The  dismay  of  the  Selinuntines,  when  they  suddenly  found  them- 
selves under  the  sweep  of  this  destroying  hurricane,  is  not  to  be 
described      It  was  no  part  of  the  scheme  of  Hannibal  to  impose  condi- 
tions or  crant  capitulation;  for  he  had  promised  the  plunder  of  their 
town  to  his  soldiers.    The  only  chance  of  the  besieged  was,  to  hold  out 
with  the  couraije  of  desperation,  until  they  could  receive  aid  from 
their  Hellenic  brethren  on  the  southern  coast— Agrigentum,  Gela,  and 
especially  Syracuse— all  of  whom  they  had  eent  to  warn  and  to  sup- 
pUeate.     Their  armed  population  crowded  to  man  the  walls,  with  a 
resolution  worthy  of  Greeks  and  citizens;  while  the  old  men  and  the 
females   though  oppressed  with  agony  from  the  fate  which  seemed 
to  menace  them,  lent  all  the  aid  and  encouragement  in  their  power. 
Under  the  sound  of  trumpets,   and  every  variety  of  war-cry  the 
assailants  approached  the  walls,  encountering  everywhere  a  valiant 
re^^istance.     They  were  repulsed  again  and  again,,  with  the  severest 
loss      But  fresh  troops  came  up  to  relieve  those  who  were  slam  or 
fatif^ued;  and  at  length,  after  a  murderous  stniggle,  a  body  of  Cam- 
panTans  forced  their  way  over  the  walls  into  the  town      let  in  spite 
of  such  temporary  advantage,  the  heroic  efforts  of  the  besieged  drove 
them  out  again  or  slew  them,  so  that  night  arrived  without  the  cap- 
ture being  accomplished.     For  nine  succcf-sive  days  was  the  assault 
thus  renewed  with  undiminished  fury;  for  nine  successive  days  did 
this  heroic  population  maintain  a  successful  resistance,  though  tfieur 
enemies  were  numerous  enough  to  relieve  each  other  perpetually— 
thoucrh  their  own  strength  was  every  day  failing— and  though  not  a 
single  friend  arrived  to  their  aid.     At  length,  on  the  tenth  day,  arid 
after  terrible  los,s  to  the  besiegers,  a  sulficient  breach  was  made  m 
the  weak  part  of  the  wall,  for  the  Iberians  to  force  their  way  mto 
the  city.    Still,  however,  the  Selinuntines,  even  after  their  walls  were 
carried  continued  with  unabated  resolution  to  barricade  and  defend 
their  narrow  streets,  in  which  their  women  al^oa.^sisted.  by  throwing 


CAPTURE  OF  SELINUS 


143 


down  stones  and  tiles  upon  the  assailants  from  the  house-tops.  All 
llu'se  barriers  were  successively  overthrow^u,  by  the  unexhausted 
numbers,  and  increasing  passion,  of  the  barbaric  host;  so  that  the 
defenders  were  driven  back  from  all  sides  into  the  agora,  where 
most  of  them  closed  their  gallant  defense  by  an  honorable  death. 
A  small  minority,  among  whom  was  Empedion,  escaped  to  Agrigen- 
tum, where  they  received  the  warmest  sympathy  and  the  most 
hospitable  treatment. 

Resistance  being  thus  at  an  end,  the  assailants  spread  themselves 
through  the  towniu  all  the  fury  of  insatiate  appetites— murderous, 
lustful,  and  rapacious.  They  slaughtered  indiscriminately  elders  and 
children,  preserving  only  the  grown  women  as  captives.  The  sad 
details  of  a  town  taken  by  storm  are  to  a  great  degree  the  same  in 
every  age  and  nation;  but  the  destroying  barbarians  at  Selinus  man- 
ifested one  peculiarity,  which  marks  them  as  lying  without  the  pale 
of  Hellenic  sympathy  and  sentiment.  They  mutilated  the  bodies  of 
the  slain;  some  were  seen  with  amputated  hands  strung  together  in 
a  row  and  fastened  round  their  girdles;  wiiilc  others  brandished 
heads  on  the  points  of  their  spears  and  javelins.  The  Greeks  (seem- 
ingly not  numerous)  who  served  under  Hannibal,  far  from  sharing  in 
these  ferocious  manifestations,  contributed  somewhat  to  mitigate  the 
deplorable  fate  of  the  sufferors.  Sixteen»thousaud  Selinuntines  are 
said  to  have  been  slain,  five  thousand  to  have  been  taken  captive; 
while  two  thousand  six  hundred  escaped  to  Agrigentum.  These 
figures  are  probably  under,  rather  than  above,  the  truth.  Yet  they 
do  not  seem  entitled  to  any  confidence;  nor  do  they  give  us  any 
account  of  the  e;itire  population  in  its  different  categories — old  ancl 
young — men  and  women — freemen  and  slaves — citizens  and  metics. 
'We  can  only  pretend  to  appreciate  this  mournful  event  in  the  gross. 
All  exact  knowledge  of  its  details  is  denied  to  us. 

It  does  little  honor  either  to  the  generosity  or  to  the  prudence  of 
the  Hellenic  neighbors  of  Selinus,  that  this  unfortunate  city  should 
have  been  left  to  its  fate  unassisted.  In  vain  was  messenger  after 
messenger  dispatched,  as  the  defense  became  more  and  more  critical, 
to  Agrigentum,  Gela,  and  Syracuse.  The  military  force  of  the  two 
former  w^as  indeed  made  ready,  but  postponed  its  march  until  joined 
by  that  of  the  last ;  so  formidable  was  the  account  given  of  the  invading 
host.  Meanwhile  the  Syracusans  were  not  ready.  They  thought 
it  requisite,  first,  to  close  the  war  wdiich  they  were  prosecuting 
against  Katana  and  Naxos — next,  to  muster  a  large  and  carefully- 
appointed  force.  Before  these  preliminaries  "were  finished,  the  nine 
days  of  siege  were  past,  and  the  death-hour  of  Selinus  had  sounded. 
Pr()i)ably  the  Syracusans  w^ere  misled  by  the  Sicilian  operations  of 
Nikias,  wdio,  beginning  with  a  long  interval  of  inaction,  had  then 
approached  their  town  by  slow  blockade,  such  as  the  circumstances 
of  his  case  required.  Expecting  in  the  case  of  Selinus  that  Hannibal 
would  enter  upqn  the  like  elaborate  siege — and  not  reflecting  that  lie 


144 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 


SYUACUSAN   SQl'ADROX. 


145 


was  at  the  head  of  a  vast  host  of  misc ellaiiroiis  foreigners  hired  for 
tlie  occasion,  of  whose  lives  he  could  afford  to  be  prodigal,  while 
Nikias  commanded  citizens  of  Athens  and  other  Grecian  slates, 
whom  he  could  not  expose  to  the  murderous  but  tlioroiigh-goiug 
process  of  ever-renewejl  assault  against  strong  walls  recently  cKcted 
— they  were  thunderstruck  on  being  informed  that  nine  days  of 
carnage  had  sufficed  for  tlie  capture. 

The  Syracusau  f-oldiers,  a  select  body  of  3.0C0,  who  at  lengtlj  joined 
the  Geloans  and  A-grigeniincs  at  Agrigentuni.  cnly  arrived  in  time 
to  partake  in  the  Lmcral  dismay  "everywlieie  diffused.  A  joint 
embassy  was  sent  by  the  three  citiisto  Hannibal,  entreating  liinj  to 
permit  the  ransom  of  the  captives,  and  to  spare  the  temples  of  the 
gods;  while  Em])edion  went  at  the  san  e  time  to  sue  for  compassion 
on  behalf  of  his  own  fugitive  fellow -citizens.  To  thefoimer  dtmaLd 
tlie  victorious  Carthagiiiijin  returned  an  answer  at  once  haughty  j.nd 
characteristic — "The  Selinuntints  liave  not  been  able  to  preserve 
their  freedom,  and  must  now  subndt  to  a  trial  of  slavery.  The  gods 
liave  become  rffended  with  them,  and  liave  taken  their  departure 
from  the  town."  To  Empedion,  an  ancient  friend  and  pronounecd 
partisan  of  the  Carthaginians,  his  reply  was  more  indulgent.  All 
the  relatives  of  Empedion,  found  alive  among  the  captivt^,  were  at 
once  given  up;  moreover,  permission  wr.s  gianted  to  the  fugitive 
Selinuntines  to  return  if  thry  ]>leased.  and  rtoccupy  the  town  with 
its  lands,  as  tril)utary  subject's  of  Carlbage.  At  the*  same  time  that 
he  granted  such  iH'rmission,  however,  Hannibal  at  onee  caused  the 
walls  to  be  razed,  and  even  the  town  with  its  tcmjiles  to  be  destroyed. 
AVhat  was  done  about  the  proposed  ransom,  we  do  not  hear. 

Having  satiated  his  troops  with  this  rich  plunder,  Hanni!;al  now 
quitted  the  scene  of  bloodshed  and  desolation,  and  marched  acress 
the  island  to  Ilimera  on  its  northern  coast.  Thou<ih  Selinus,  as  the 
eneniy  of  Egesta,  had  received  the  first  shock  of  his  arms,  yet  it  Mas 
against  Himera  that,  the  grand  purpose  of  his  soul  was  direct(d. 
Here  it  was  that  Hamilkar  had  lost  both  Ins  army  and  his  life,  entail- 
ing inexpiable  disirrace  upon  the  whole  life  of  his  son  Gi.'-^kon :  here  it 
was  that  his  grandson  intended  to  exact  full  vengeance  and  requital 
from  the  grandchildren  of  those  who  then  occupied  the  fated  spot. 
Not  only  was  the  Cartliaginian  army  elate  with  the  past  success,  but 
a  numl)ers  of  fresh  Sikels  and  Sikans,  eager  to  share  in  plunder  as 
well  as  to  gratify  the  antipathies  of  their'races  against  the  Grecnm 
intruders,  flocked  to  join  it;  thus  making  up  the  losses  sustained  in 
the  recent  assault.  Having  reached  Hiniera  and  disposed  his  army 
in  appropriate  positions  around,  Hannd)al  proceeded  to  instant  attack, 
as  at  Sellr^us;  pushing  up  his  battering  machines  and  towers  against 
the  vulnerable  portions  of  the  walls,  and  tr\ing  at  the  same  time  to 
Tindermine  them.  The  Himerfeans  defended  themselves  with  despe- 
rate bravery;  and  on  this  occasion  the  defense  was  not  unassisted,  for 
4,000  allies,  chiefly  S^'racusans,  and  headed  by  the  Syracusan  Dickies, 


had  come  to  their  city  as  a  re-enforcement.  For  a  whole  day  they 
repelled  with  slaughter  repeated  assaults.  No  impression  being  made 
ni)on  the  city,  the  besieged  became  so  conlident  in  their  own  valor, 
that  they  resolved  not  to  copy  the  Belinuntines  in  conflning  them- 
selves to  defense,  but  to  sally  out  at  daybreak  the  next  morning  and 
attack  the  besiegers  in  the  field.  Ten  thousand  gallant  men — Himc- 
neaus,  Syracusans.  and  other  Grecian  allies — accordingly  marched 
out  with  tlie  dawn;  while  the  battlements  were  lined  with  old  men 
and  women  as  anxious  spectators  of  their  exploits.  The  Carthagini- 
ans near  the  walls,  who,  preparing  to  renew  the  assault,  looked  for 
nothing  less  than  a  sally,  were  taken  by  surprise.  In  spite  of  their 
great  superiority  of  nundier,  and  in  spite  of  great  personal  braveiy, 
they  fell  into  confusion,  and  were  incapable  of  long  resisting  the  gal- 
lant and  orderly  charge  of  the  Greeks.  At  letigtii  they  gave  way  and 
fled  toward  the  neiirhboring  hill,  where  Hannibal  himself  with  his 
body  of  reserve  was  posted  to  cover  the  operations  of  assault.  The 
Greeks  pursued  them  fiercely  and  slaughtered  great  numbers  (G,000 
according  to  Timteus,  but  not  less  than  20,000,  if  we  are  to  accejjt 
the  broad  statements  of  Epnorus),  exhoitiug  each  other  not  to  think 
of  making  prisoners.  But  in  the  haste  and  exultation  of  pursuit, 
they  became  out  of  breath,  and  their  ranks  fell  into  disorder.  In  I  his 
untoward  condition  they  found  themselves  face  to  face  with  the  fresh 
body  of  reserve  brought  up  b}^  Hannibal,  who  marched  down  the  hill 
to  receive  and  succor  his  own  defeated  fugitives.  The  fortune  of  the 
battle  was  now  so  completely  turned,  that  the  IIimera?ans,  after  bravely 
contending  for  some  time  against  these  new  enemies,  found  them- 
selves overpowered  and  driven  back  to  their  own  gates.  Three  thou- 
sand of  their  bravest  warriors,  however,  despairing  of  their  city  and 
mindful  of  the  fate  of  Selinus,  disdained  to  turn  their  backs,  and 
l)erished  to  a  man  in  obstinate  conflict  with  the  overwhelming  num- 
bers of  the  Caithaginians. 

Violent  was  the  sorrow  and  dismay  in  Himera  when  the  flower  of  her 
troops  were  thus  driven  in  as  beaten  men,  with  the  loss  of  half  their 
nundjers.  At  this  moment  there  chanced  to  arrive  at  the  port  a  fleet 
of  twentv-tive  triremes,  belojiginir  to  Syracuse  and  other  Grecian 
cities  m  Sicily;  which  triremes  had  been  sent  to  aid  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  in  the  ^^gean,  but  had  sin(;e  come  back,  and  were  now  got 
together  for  the  special  purpose  of  relieving  the  besieged  city.  So 
ini})ortant  a  re  enforcement  ought  to  have  revived  the  spirit  of  the 
iiimeneans.  It  announced  that  the  Syracusans  were  in  full  march 
across  the  4sland,  with  the  main  force  of  the  city,  to  the  relief  of 
Himera.  But  this  good  news  was  more  than  countervailed  by  the 
statement  that  Hannibal  was  ordering  out  the  Carthaginian  fleet  in 
the  bay  of  Motye,  in  order  that  it  might  sail  round  Cape  Lilybti^uni 
and  along  the  southern  coast  into  the  harbor  of  Syracuse,  now  de- 
fenseless through  the  absence  of  its  main  force.  Apparently  the  Syra- 
cusan fleet,  in  sailing  from  Syracuse  to  Himera,  had  passed  by  tii? 


146 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 


HANNIBAL  DESTROYS  HIMERA. 


147 


bay  of  Motye,  observed  maritime  movement  among  the  Carthaginians 
there   and  picked  up  these  tidings  in  exphmation.     Here  was  intcHi- 
irence  more  than  sutiicient  to  excite  alarm  lor  home  in  the  bosom  of 
Dioldes  and  the  Svracusans  at  Himera;  especially  under  the  despon- 
dency now  reii^aiing.     DiokleS  not  only  enjoined  the  captains  ot  the 
fleet  "to  sail  back  immediately  to  Syracuse,  in  order  to  guard  against 
the  apprehended   surprise,  but   also  insisted  upon   marching  back 
thither  himself  by  land  with  the  Syracusan  forces,  and  abandoning 
the  further  defense  of  Himera.     He  wouhl  in  his  march  home  meet 
his  fellow-citizens  on  their  march  outward,  and  conduct  them  back 
alono-  with  him.     To  the  Himera'ans,  this  was  a  sentence  of  death. 
or  worse  than  death.     It  plunged  them  into  an  agony  of  fright  and 
despair.     But  there  was  no  safer  counsel  to  suggest,  nor  could  they 
prevail  upon  Diokles  to  grant  anything  more  than  means  of  transport 
for  carrying  olf  the  Himeraian  popidation,  when  the  city  was  relin- 
quished^o  the  besiegers.    It  was  agreed  that  the  fleet,  instead  of  sail- 
ing straight  to  Syracuse,  should  employ  itself  in  carrying  oil"  as  much 
of"the  population  as  could  be  put  on  board,  and  in  d^■po^iling  them 
safely  at  Messene:  after  which  it  would  return  to  fetch  the  remain 
der,  who  would  in  the  mean  time  defend  the  city  with  their  utmo^t 

force. 

Such  was  the  onlv  chance  of  refuge  now  open  to  these  unhappy 
Greeks,   airainst   the   devouring  enemy  without.     Immediately  the 
feebler  pail  of  the  ])opulalion— elders,  women,  and  children— crowd- 
ing on  board  until  the  triremes  could  hold  no  more,  sailed  away  along 
the   northern  coast  to  Messene.      On  the  same  niglit  Diokles  also 
marched  out  of  the  city  with  his  Syracusan  soldiers;  in  such  haste  to 
tret  home,  that  he  could  not  even*  tarry  to  bury  the  numerous  Syra- 
cusan soldiers  who  had  been  just  slain  in  the  recent  disastrous  sallv. 
Many  of  the  Himerteans,  with  their  wives  and  children,  took  their 
departure  along  with  Diokles.  as  their  only  chance  of  escape;  since 
it  was  but  too  plain  that   the   triremes  would   not  carry  away  all. 
The  bravest  and  most  devoted  portion  of  the  Ilimencan  warriors  still 
remained,  to  defend  their  city  until  the  triremes  came  back.     After 
keeping  armed  watch  on  the  walls  all  night,  they  were  again  assailed 
on  theliext  morning  bv  the  Carthaginians,  elate  with  their  triumph 
of  the  precedinu-  day  and  with  the  flight  of  so  many  defenders,     ^et 
notwithstaudiui  all' the  pressure  of  numbers,  ferocity,  and  battering 
machines,  the  resistance  was  still  successfully  maintained;   so  that 
night  found  Himera  still  a  Grecian  city.     On  the  next  day  the  tri- 
remes came  back,  having  probably  deposited  their  unfortunate  cargo 
in  some  place  of  safety  not  so  far  oft'  as  iMessene.     If  the  defenders 
could  have  maintained  their  walls  until  another  sunset,  many  of  them 
might  yet  have  escaped.     But  the  good  fortune,  and  probably  the 
physical  force,  of  these  brave  men  was  now  at  an  end.     The  goiU 
were  quitting  Himera,  as  they  had  before  quitted  Selinus.     At  the 
moment  when  the  triremes  were  seen  coming  near  to  the  port,  the 


Iberian  assailants  broke  down  a  wide  space  of  the  fortification  with 
their  battering-rams,  poured  in  through  the  breach,  and  overcame  all 
opposition.  Encouraged  by  their  shouts,  the  barbaric  host  now  on 
all  sides  forced  the  walls,  and  spread  themselves  over  the  city,  which 
became  one  scene  of  wholesale  slaughter  and  plunder.  It  was  no 
part  of  the  scheme  of  Hannibal  to  interrupt  the  plunder,  which  he 
made  over  as  a  recompense  to  his  soldiers.  But  he  speedily  checked 
the  slaughter,  being  anxious  to  take  as  many  prisoners  as  possible, 
and  increasing  the  number  by  dragging  away  all  who  had  taken  sanc- 
tuary in  the  temples.  A  few  among  this  wretched  population  may 
have  contrived  to  reach  the  approaching  triremes;  all  the  rest  either 
perished  or  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victor. 

It  was  a  proud  day  for  the  Carthaginian  general  when  he  stood  as 
master  on  the  ground  of  Himera;  enabled  to  fulfill  the  duty,  and 
satisfy  the  exigences,  of  revenge  for  his  slain  grandfather.  Tragical 
indeed  was  the  consummation  of  this  long-cherished  purpose.  Not 
merely  the  walls  and  temples  (as  at  Selinus),  but  all  the  houses  in 
Himera,  weie  razed  to  the  ground.  Its  temples,  having  been  stripped 
of  their  ornaments  and  valuables,  were  burnt.  The  women  and  chil- 
dren taken  captive  were  distributed  as  prizes  among  the  soldiers. 
But  all  the  male  captives,  3,000  in  number,  were  conveyed  to  the  pre- 
cise spot  where  Hamilkar  had  been  slain,  and  there  put  to  death  with 
indignity,  as  an  expiatory  satisfaction  to  his  lost  honor.  Lastly,  in 
order  that  even  the  hated  name  of  Himera  might  pass  into  oblivion, 
a  new  town  called  Therma  (so  designated  because  of  some  warm 
springs)  was  Shortly  afterwards  founded  by  the  Carthaginians  in  the 
neighborhood. 

No  man  can  now  read  the  account  of  this  wholesale  massacre 
without  horror  and  repugnance.  Yet  we  cannot  doubt,  that  among 
all  the  acts  of  Hannibal's  life,  this  was  the  one  in  which  he  most 
gloried;  that  it  realized  in  the  most  complete  and  emphatic  manner, 
his  concurrent  inspirations  of  filial  sentiment,  religious  obligation, 
and  honor  as  a  patriot;  that  to  show  mercy  would  have  been  regarded 
as  a  mean  dereliction  of  these  esteemed  impulses;  and  that  if  the 
prisoners  had  been  even  more  numerous,  all  of  them  would  have 
been  equally  slain,  rendering  the  expiatory  fulfillment  only  so  much 
the  more  honorable  and  efficacious.  In  the  Carthaginian  religion, 
human  sacrifices  were  not  merely  admitted,  but  passed  for  the  strong- 
est manifestation  of  d(;yotional  fervor,  and  were  especially  resorted 
to  in  times  of  distress,  when  the  necessity  for  propitiating  the  gods 
was  accounted  most  pressing.  Doubtless  the  feelings  of  Hannibal 
were  cordially  shared,  and  the  plenitude  of  his  revenge  envied,  by 
the  army  around  him.  So  difl'erent,  sometimes  so  totally  contrary, 
is  the  tone  and  direction  of  the  moral  sentiments,  among  different 
ages  and  nations. 

In  the  numerous  wars  of  Greeks  against  Greeks,  which  we  have 
been  unfortunately  called  upon  to  study,  we  have  found  few  or  no 


f 


148 


SICILIAN  AFFAIKS. 


TROOPS  LEVIED. 


149 


examples  of  anv  considciiible  town  taken  by  slorm.     Bo  nnicli  the 
more  terrible  was  tlie  shock  throiidioiit  the  Greeian  woild,  of  the 
events  just  leeounted:    ^^eJiniiN  and   Himera,  two  Greeinn  eilies  of 
ancient  stand. nu:   uninlenu|.lcd  prosperity— had   both  of  th.em  been 
stormed,    ruined,   and  depopulated,   by  a  barbiuic  host,  withm   the 
Fpace  of  tliree  months.     No  event  at  all  parallel  had  oeeiined  since 
the  sack  of  Miletus  bv  the  Persians  after  the   Ionic  levolt  (41)5  B.C.), 
which  raised   such    powerful   symi)alhy  and   mourninir   iu  Athens. 
The  wnr  now  rairimi-  in  the  ^Eiieau,  between  Alliens  and  Sparta  with 
their  respective  allies,  doubtless  contributed  to  deaden,  throutrhout 
Central  Greece,  the  impression  of  calnmities  sustained   by  Greeks  at 
the  western  e.xtreinitv  of  Sicily.     But  wiiliin  that  island  the  sympathy 
w  ilh  the  sulTerers  was  most  acute,  and  ncfgravated  by  terror  for  ilie 
future.     The  Carthauinian  general  had  displayed  a  degree  of  energy 
equal  to  any  Grecian  oflleer  throughout  the  war,  with  a  command  of 
besie"in<r  and  battering  machinerv  surivissing  even  thelxst  eojiiiiped 
Grecnin~^cities.     The  mercenaries  whom  he  had  got  tonetlier  were 
alike;  terrible  from  their  braverv  and  ferocity;  encouraging  Carthagin- 
ian ambition  to  follow   up  its  late  rapid  successes  by  attacks  against 
the  other  cities  of  the  island.     No  such  prospects  indeed  were  at 
once  realized.     IIannil)al,  having  completed  his  revenge  at  JIimerM, 
and  extended  the   Carthadnian  dominion  all  across  the  north-west 
corner  of  Sicilv  (from   Selinus  on  the  southern  sea  to  the  site  of 
liimera  or  Thefma  on  the  northern),  dismissed  his  mercenary  trooj^s 
and  returned  home.     Most  of  them  were  satinted  with  plunder  as 
well  as  pav,  thouirh  the  Cainpanians,  who  had  been  foR-most  at  the 
capture  of*  Selinus,  thouaht  themselves  unfairly  stinted,  and  retired 
in  disnust.     Hannibal  carried  back  a  rich  spoil,  with  glorious  tro- 
phies, lo  Carthage,  where  he  was  greeted  with  enthusiastic  welcome 
and  admiration.  . 

Never  was  there  a  time  when  the  Greek  cities  m  Sicily— and  Syra- 
cuse especiallv,  upon  whcmi  the  others  would  greatly  rest  m  the 
event  of  a  second  Carthaginian  invasion— had  stronger  motives  for 
keeping  themselves  iu  a  condition  of  etticacious  defense.  Unfortun- 
ately, it  was  just  at  this  moment  that  a  new  cause  of  intestine  discoid 
burst  upon  S'vracuse;  fatallv  impairing  her  strength,  and  inoving  in 
its  consequences  destructive  to  her  liberty.  The  banished  Syracusau 
general  Hermokrates  had  recently  arrived  at  Messene  in  Sicily;  w'here 
he  appears  to  have  been,  at  the  time  when  the  fuiritives  came  from 
Himeni.  It  has alreadv  been  mentioned  tlnit  he,  wilii  two  colleagues, 
had  commanded  the  Svracusan  contingent  serving  with  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  under  Mindafus  in  A^ia.  After  the  disastrous  defeat  of 
Kysikus,  in  which  Mindarus  was  slain  and  every  ship  in  the  fleet 
taken  or  destroyed,  sentence  of  banishment  was  passed  at  Syracuse 
ajrainst  the  three  admirals.  Hermokrates  was  exceedingly  popular 
amonsr  the  trierarchs  and  the  otficers:  he  had  stood  cons{>icuous  lor 
incorruptibility,  and  had  conducted  himself  (no  far  as  we  have  means 


of  judging)  with  energy  and  ability  in  his  command.  The  sentence, 
uiiinerited  by  his  behavior,  was  dictated  by  acute  vexation  for  the 
loss  of  the  iieet,  and  for  the  disappoiiitmeul  of  those  expeclalions 
wiiich  Hermokrates  had  held  out;  combined  with  the  fact  that 
Diokles  and  the  opposite  party  were  now  iutiie  ascendant  at  Syracw.se. 
AVhen  the  banished  general,  iu  making  it  known  to  the  armament, 
c(»nq)luined  of  its  injustice  and  illegality,  he  obtained  warm  sympa- 
thy, and  even  exhortations  still  to  retain  the  command,  in  spite  of 
orders  from  home.  He  forbade  them  earnestly  to  think  of  raising 
sedition  against  their  common  city  and  country:  upon  which  the 
trierarchs. When  they  took  their  last  and  alfectionate  leave  of  him, 
bound  themselves  by  oath,  as  soon  as  they  should  return  to  Syracuse, 
to  leave  no  means  untried  for  procuring  his  restoration. 

The  admonitory  words  addressed  by  llermokiates  to  the  forward- 
ness of  the  trierarchs.  would  have  been  honorable  to  his  patriotism, 
h:i(l  not  his  own  conduct  at  the  same  time  been  worthy  of  the  worst 
enemies  of  his  country.  For  immediately  on  being  superseded  by 
the  new  admirals,  he  went  to  the  satrap  Pliarnabazus,  in  whose  favor 
he  stood  high;  and  obtained  from  him  a  considerable  present  of 
monev,  w  hich  he  employed  in  collecting  mercenary  troops  and  build- 
inirsiilps,  to  levy  war  against  his  opponents  in  Syracuse  and  procure 
his  own  restoration,  thus  slrenglhened,  he  returned  from  Asia  to 
Sicily,  and  reached  the  Sicilian  Messene  rather  before  the  capture  of 
ilimera  by  the  Carthaginians.  At  Messene  he  caused  live  fresh 
triremes  to  be  built,  besides  taking  into  his  pay  1000  of  the  expelled 
lliim^neans.  At  the  head  of  these;  troops,  he  attempted  to  force  his 
way  into  Syracuse,  under  concert  witli  his  friends  in  the  city,  who 
engaged  to"^  assist  his  admission  by  arms.  Possibly  some  of  the 
trierarchs  of  ids  armainent,  who  had  before  sw^orn  to  lend  him  their 
aid,  had  now  returned  and  were  among  this  body  of  interior  par- 
tisans. 

The  moment  was  well  chosen  for  such  an  enterprjse.  As  the 
disaster  at  Kyzikus  had  exasperated  the  Syracusans  against  Hermo- 
krates, so  we  cannot  doubt  that  there  must  have  been  a  strong  reac- 
tion against  Diokles  and  his  partisans,  in  consequence  of  the  fall  of 
Selinus  unaided,  and  the  subsequent  abandonment  of  ilimera.  What 
degree  of  blame  may  fairly  attach  to  Diokles  for  these  misfortunes, 
we  are  not  in  a  condition  to  judge.  But  such  reverses  in  themselves 
were  sure  to  discredit  him  more  or  less,  and  to  lend  increased 
strength  and  stimulus  to  the  partisans  of  the  banished  Hermokrates. 
?severtheless  that  leader,  lliough  he  came  to  tlie  gates  of  Syracuse, 
failed  in  his  attempt  to  obtain  admission,  and  was  compelled  to  retire; 
upon  which  he  marched  his  little  army  across  the  interior  of  the 
island,  and  took  possession  of  the  dismantled  Selinus.  Iler-e  he 
established  himself  as  the  cliief  of  a  new  settlement,  got  together  as 
many  as  he  could  of  the  expelled  inhabitants  (nmong  whom  probably 
some  had  already  come  back  along  with  Empcdiou),   and  invited 


150 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 


many  fresh  colonists  from  otlicr  quarters.  Re-establishing  a  portion 
of  the  ck'niolibiied  fortifications,  he  found  hiujself  gradually  strength- 
ened by  so  many  new-comers,  as  to  place  at  his  conmuuul  a  body  of 
6.000  chosen  hoplites — probai)ly  independent  of  other  soldiers  of 
inferior  merit.  With  these  troops  he  began  to  invade  the  Cartha- 
ginian settlements  in  the  neighborhood,  ]Motye  and  Panormus. 
Having  defeated  the  forces  of  both  in  the  field,  he  carried  his  ravages 
successfully  over  their  territories,  with  large  acqusitions  of  })luiider, 
The  Carthaginians  had  now  no  army  remaining  in  Sicily;  for  their 
immen-^e  host  of  the  preceding  year  had  consisted  only  of  mercena- 
ries levied  for  the  occasion,  tmd  then  disbanded. 

These  events  excited  strong  sensation  throughout  Sicily,  The 
valor  of  Hermokrates,  who  had  restored  Selinus  and  conquered  the 
Carthaginians  on  the  very  groand  where  they  had  stood  so  recently 
in  terrific  force,  was  contrasted  with  the  inglorious  proceedings  of 
Diokk's  at  lUmera  In  the  public  assemblies  of  Syracuse,  this  topic, 
coupled  with  the  unjust  sentence  whereby  Hermokrates  had  been 
banished,  was  emphatically  set  forth  by  his  partisans;  producing 
some  reaction  in  his  favor,  and  a  still  greater  elfect  in  disgracing  his 
rival  Diokies.  Apprised  that  the  tiele  of  Sj'racnsan  opinion  was 
turning  toward  him,  Hermokrates  made  renewed  preparations  for 
his  return,  and  resorted  to  a  new  stratagem  for  thepinpose  of  smooth- 
ing tlie  dithculty.  He  marciied  from  Selinus  to  the  ruined  site  of 
Hmiera,  informed  himself  of  the  spot  where  the  Syracusan  troops 
had  undergone  their  murderous  defeat,  and  collected  together  the 
bones  of  his  slain-felhnv  citizens;  which  (or  rather  the  unburicd 
bodies)  must  have  lain  upon  the  field  unheeded  for  about  two  years. 
Having  placed  these  bones  on  cars  richly  decorated,  he  marched  with 
his  forces  and  conveyed  them  across  the  island  from  Himera  to  the 
Syracusan  border.  Here  as  an  exile  he  halted;  thinking  it  suitable 
now  to  display  respect  for  the  law — though  in  his*  previous  attempt 
he  had  gone  up  to  the  very  gates  of  the  city,  without  any  similar 
scruples.  But  lie  sent  forward  some  friends  with  the  cars  and  the 
bones,  tendering  them  to  the  citizens  for  the  purpose  of  being  hon- 
ored with  due  funeral  solemnities.  Their  arrival  was  the  signal  for 
a  violent  party  discussion,  and  for  an  outburst  of  aggravated  dis- 
pleasure against  Diokies,  who  liad  left  the  bodies  unburicd  on  the 
field  of  battle.  "  It  was  to  Hermokrates  (so  his  partisans  urged)  and 
to  his  valiant  efforts  against  the  Carthaginians,  that  the  recovery  of 
these  remnants  of  the  slain,  and  the  opportunity  of  administering  to 
them  the  funeral  solemnities,  was  now  owing.  Let  the  Syracusans, 
after  duly  performing  such  obsequies,  testify  their  gratitude  to 
Hermokrates  by  a  vote  of  restoration,  and  their  displeasure  against 
Diokies  by  a  sentence  of  banishment."  Diokies  with  his  partisans 
was  thus  placed  at  great  disadvantage.  In  opposing  the  restoration 
of  Hermokrates,  he  "thought  it  necessary  also  to  oppose  the  proposi- 
tion for  welcoming  and  l>urying  the  bones  of  the  slain  citizens.     Here 


IIEHMOKRATES  SLAIN. 


ir)i 


the  feelings  of  the  people  went  vehemently  against  him;  the  bones 
were  rect^ived  and  interred,  amid  the  respectful  attendance  of  all; 
and  so  stronir  was  the  reactionary  sentiment  generally,  that  the  parti- 
sans of  Hermokrates  carried  their  proposition  for  sentencing  Diokies 
to  banishment.  But  on  the  other  hand,  they  could  not  so  far  prevail 
as  to  obtain  the  restoration  of  Hermokrates  himself.  The  purposes 
of  the  latter  had  been  so  palpably  manifested,  in  trying  a  few  months 
before  to  force  his  wav  into  the  city  by  surprise,  and  in  now  present- 
ing himself  at  the  frontier  with  an  armed  force  under  his  command 
—that  his  re-admission  would  have  been  nothing  less  than  a  deliber- 
ate surrender  of  the  freedom  of  the  city  to  a  despot. 

Having  failed  in  this  well-laid  stratagem  for  obtaining  a  vote  of 
consent,  Irlermokrates  saw  that  his  return  could  not  at  that  moment 
be  consummated   bv  open   force.      He   therefore   retired  from  the 
Syracusan  frontier;  Vet  only  postponing  his  purposes  of  armed  attack 
until    his  friensls  in  the  city  could  provide  for   him  a  convenient 
opportunitv.     We  see  plainly  that  his  own  party  within  had  been 
much   streuirthened,   and   his  opponents   enfeebled,    by   the   recent 
manjuver.    l)f  this  a  proof  I:  to  be  found  in  the  l)anishment  of 
l)iokle>,   who  probably  was  uoi  ,'^ucceeded  by  any  other  leader  of 
equal  influence.     After  a  certain  uiterval,  the  partisans  of  Hermo- 
krates copt rived  a  plan  which  they  thought  practicable,  for  admitting 
him  into  the  citv  by  night.     Forewarned  by  them,  he  marched  from 
Selinus  at  the  liead  of  3,000  soldiers,  crossed  the  territoiy  of  Gela, 
and  reached  the  concerted  spot  near  the  gate  of  Archradina  during 
the  night.     From  the  rapidity  of  Ins  advance,  he  had  only  a  few 
troops  along  with  him;  the  main  body  not  having  been  able  to  keep 
up.     With  these  few,  however,  he  hastened  to  the  gate,  which  he 
found  alreadv  in  possession  of  his  friends,  who  had  probably  (like 
Pasimelus  at'^Corinth)  awaited  a  night  on  which  they  were  posted  to 
act  as  sentinels.     Master  of  the  irate,  Hermokrates,  though  joined  by 
his  partisans  within  in  arms,  thought  it  prudent  to  postpone  decisive 
attack  until  his  own  main  force  came  up.     But  during  this  interval, 
the  Syracusan  authorities  in  the  city,  apprised  of  what  had  happened, 
mustered  their  full  nnlitarv  strength  in  the  agora,  and  lost  no  time 
in  falling  upon  the  band  of  aggressors.     After  a  sharply  contested 
combat,  these  aggressors  were  completely  worsted,  and  Hermokrates 
himself  slain  with  a  considerable  jn'oportion  of  his  followers.     The 
remainder  having  fled,   sentence  of   banishment  was  passed  upon 
them.     Several   among  the  wounded,   however,  were   reported  by 
then-  relatives  as  slain,  in  order  that  they  might  escape  being  com- 
prised in  such  a  condenuiation. 

Thus  perished  one  of  the  most  energetic  of  the  Syracusan  citizens; 
a  man  not  less  effective  as  a  defender  of  his  country  against  foreign 
enennes,  than  himself  dangerous  as  a  formidable  enemy  to  her  mter- 
nal  liberties.  It  w^ould  seem,  as  far  as  we  can  make  out,  that  his 
r.t tempt  to   make   himself  master  of  his  country  was   powerfully 


ir)2 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS. 


seconded,  anil  miirlit  well  have  succeeded.  But  it  Incked  that  adven- 
titious support  arUinir  from  present  embarrnssnieiit  mid  dan.ii'er  iu  llie 
foreit^u  relations  of  the  city,  which  we  sliall  tind  so  ellicaeious  two 
year.'Tafterward  in  proniotin.ii-  the  ambitious  projects  of  Diouysius. 

Di(^nvsius— for  the  next  comini?  generation  the  nu)st  formidable 
name  in  the  Grecian  world— now  ;i])pears  for  tlie  tirst  time  in  history. 
lie  was  a  young  Syraciisan  of  no  eonsidpiation  fr(!m  family  or  posi- 
tion, described  as  even  of  low  birth  an<l  low  occ\ipati(  n;  as  a  scribe 
or  secretary,  which  was  looked  upon  as  a  subordinate,  ihoudi  csse!i- 
tial,  function,  lie  was  the  son  of  llermokrates— not  ihat  eminent 
person  whose  death  has  been  just  described,  but  another  jierson  of 
the  same  name,  whether  related  or  not.  we  do  not  know.  It  is  hiiihly 
probable  that  he  was  a  man  of  literary  ability  and  instruction,  since 
we  read  of  him  in  after  days  as  a  composer  of  odes  and  trjigedies;  and 
it  is  certain  that  he  stood  distinguished  in  all  the  talents  for  military 
action — bravery,  force  of  will,  and  quickness  of  discernnunt.  On 
the  preseiit  occasion,  he  espoused  strenuously  the  party  of  llerniok- 
rates,  and  was  one  of  those  who  took  arms  in  the  city  on  his  behalf, 
llavinu"  distinguished  himself  in  the  battle,  and  received  several 
wounds,  he  was  among  those  given  out  for  dead  l»y  his  relations.  In 
this  manner  he  esca]>ed  the  sentence  of  banishment  ].assed  ag:iins;t  the 
survivors.  And  when,  in  the  course  of  a  certain  time,  after  re( over- 
inir  from  his  wounds,  he  was  produced  as  une.xi.ectedly  living— we 
may  presume  that  his  opponents  and  the  h  ading  men  in  the  city  left 
liini  unmolested,  not  thiiddng  it  worth  while  to  reopen  political  in- 
quisition in  reference  to  matters  already  passed  and  finished.  He 
thus  remained  in  the  city,  marked  out  by  his  daring  and  address  to 
the  IIermokrata\an  i)arty,  as  the  person  nu\<t  fit  to  take  up  the  mantle, 
and  resume  the  anti-popular  designs  of  then-  late  leader.  It  will 
presently  be  seen  how  the  chiefs  of  this  party  lent  their  aid  to  exalt 
him. 

Meanwhile  the  internal  condition  of  Syracuse  was  grer.tly  enfeebled 
by  this  division.  Though  the  three  several  attempts  of  Hermokrates 
to  penetrate  bv  force  or  fraud  into  the  city  had  all  failed,  yet  they 
had  left  a  formidable  body  of  malcontents  behind;  while  the  oppo- 
nents also,  the  popular  government  and  its  leaders,  had  been  materially 
reduced  in  power  and  consideiation  by  tlu;  banishment  of  Diokles. 
This  mauistrate  was  succeeded  by  Dapluueus  and  others,  of  whom  we 
know  nothinir,  except  that  they  are  spoken  of  as  rich  men  and  repre- 
seniinsr  the  sentiments  of  the  rich — and  that  they  seem  to  have  mani- 
festcd'but  little  ability.  Nothing  could  be  more  unfortunate  than  the 
weakness  of  Syracuse  at  this  particuhir  juncture:  for  the  Cartha- 
ginians, elate  w'ith  their  successes  at  Selinus  and  Ilimera,  and  doubt- 
less also  piqued  by  the  subsequent  retaliation  of  Hermokrates  upon 
their  dependencies* at  Motye  and  Panornms,  were  just  now  nieditat- 
ing  a  second  invasion  of  Sicily  on  a  still  larger  scale.  Not  uninformed 
of  their  pn)jects,  the  Syracusaa  leaders  sent  envoys  to  Carthage  to 


FRESH   INVASION   OF   S.ClLi 


1  "^  ■> 


remonstn^to  against  them,  and  t(Muake  propositions  for  peace,  liut 
no  satisfactoiy  answer  could  be'bbtaiued,  nor  were  the  preparations 
discontinued. 

Ill  ih(.'  ensuing  spring,  thc^ storm  gallioring  from  Africa  burst;  with 
dcsiructivc  violence  upon  this  fated  island.  '  A  mercenary  force  had 
bcc-n  got  toilet  her  during  liie  winter,  greater  than  that  which  had 
sacked  Selinus  and  IViniL'V^;  'S0O,()i)0  men,  according  to  Ephorus— 
120,000,  according  to  Xenophon  and  Timjeus.  Hannibal  was  again 
l)laced  iu  comnnuul;  but  his  pre(L)minant  impulses  of  family  and 
religion  having  been  satiated  by  the  great  sacrifice  of  Himera,  ho 
excused  himself  on  the  score  of  old  age,  and  was  ouly  induced  to 
accept  the  duty  by  having  his  relative  Imilkon  named  as  colleague. 
By  their  joint 'efforts,  the  immense  host  of  Iberians,  iNlediterranean 
islanders,"  Campanians,  Libyans,  and  Numidians,  was  united  at  Car- 
thage, and  made  readv  to  be  conveyed  across,  in  a  fieet  of  120  tri- 
renies,  with  no  less  than  1500  transports.  To  protect  the  landing, 
fortv  Carthaginian  triremes  were  previously  sent  over  to  the  Bay  of 
Motve.  The  Svracusan  leaders,  with  conunendable  energy  and  watch- 
fnlness,  immedialelv  dispatched  the  like  number  of  triremes  to  attack 
them,  in  hopes  of  thereby  checking  the  furllier  arrival  of  the  grand 
annainent.  Thev  were  victorious,  destroying  fifteen  of  the  Cartha- 
iiinian  triremes,  and  driving  the  rest  back  to  Africa;  yet  their  object 
was  not-attained;  for  Hannibal  himself,  coming  forth  inunediately 
with  fiftv  fresh  triremes,  constraintKl  the  Syracusans  to  rctire.^  Pres- 
ently afterwanl  the  grand  armament  appeared,  disembarking  its  mol- 
lev  crowd  of  barbaru-  warriors  near  th j  western  cape;  of  Sicily. 

Great  was  the  alarm  caused  thiouirhout  Sicily  by  their  arrival.  All 
the  Greek  cities  either  now  began  to  prepare  for  war,  or  pushed  with 
a  more  viii:orous  hand  eepiipments  previously  begun,  since  they  seem 
to  have  had  some  previous  knowiedgt;  of  tlie  purpose  of  the  enemy. 
The  Syracusans  sent  to  entreat  assistance  both  from  the  Italian  Greeks 
and  from  Sparta.  From  the  latter  city,  however,  little  was  to  be  ex- 
pected, since  her  whole  efforts  w^ere  now  devoted  to  the  prosecution 
of  the  war  au-ainst  Athens;  this,  being  the  year  wherein  Kallikralidas 
eonunaiuhHl,  and  when  the  battle  of  Arginusie  Avas  fought. 

Of  all  Sicili:in  Greeks,  the  Agrigeutiues  were  both  the  most  fright- 
ened and  the  most  busily  employed.  Conterminous  as  they  were 
with  Selinus  on  their  western  frontier,  and  i'oreseeijig  that  the  first 
shock  of  the  invasion  would  fall  upon  them,  they  immediately  began 
to  carrv  in  their  outlying  proi)('riy  within  the  walls,  as  well  as  to 
accunuilate  a  stO(^k  of  provisions  for  enduring  blockade.  Sending 
for  Dexippus,  a  Lacedaunonian  then  in  Gela  asconunander  of  a  body 
of  mercenaries  for  the  defense  of  that  town,  they  engaged  him  in  their 
service,  w^ith  1500  hoplites;  re-enforced  by  800  of  those  Campanians 
who  had  served  with  Hannibal  at  Himera,  but  had  quitted  him  in 
disgust. 

Agrigentum  was  at  this  time  in  the  highest  state  of  prosperity  and 


W4: 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 


maijnificcnce;  a  tempting  prize  for  any  invade /.  Its  population  was 
very  great;  coniprisiuir,  accordinj];  to  one  aeco'int,  20,000  citizens 
among  an  aggregate  total  of  200,000  males— citizens,  metics,  Jind 
slaves;  according  to  anotlier  account,  an  aggregate  total  of  no  less 
than  800.000  persons;  nmnbers  unaulhenticated,  and  not  to  be  trusted 
fu:-l her  than  as  indicating  a  very  populous  city.  Situated  a  liltk-  more 
tlinn  two  miles  from  the  sea,  and  possessing  a  spacious  territory  highly 
culiivaled,  especially  with  vines  and  olives,  Agrigentum  carried  on  a 
lucrative  trade  witirthe  opposite  coast  of  Africa,  where  at  that  time 
no  such  plantations  flourished.  Its  temples  and  porticoes,  esiKci;illy 
the  spacious  temple  of  Zeus  Olympius— its  statues  and  pictures— its 
abundance  of  chariots  and  horses — its  fortilications — its  sewers— its 
arlitieial  lake  of  nearly  a  mile  in  circumference,  abundantly  stocked 
with  tish — all  these  placed  it  on  a  pur  with  the  most  splendid  cities 
of  the  Hellenic  world.  Of  the  numerous  prisoners  taken  at  the  de- 
feat of  the  Cartiiaginians  near  llimera  seventy  years  before,  a  very 
larire  proportion  Imd  fallen  to  the  lot  of  the  Agrigentines,  and  had 
been  emploved  by  tliem  in  public  works  contributing  to  the  advan- 
tasre  or  ornament'of  the  city.  The  liospitality  of  the  wealthy  citizens 
— Gellias,  Antisthenes,  and  others— was  carried  even  to  profusion. 
The  surrounding  territory  was  celebrated  for  its  bre(d  of  horses, 
which  the  rich ''Agrigentines  vied  with  each  other  in  training  and 
equipping  for  the  chariot-race.  At  the  last  Olympic  games  immedi- 
ately preceding  this  fatal  Carthaginian  invasion  (that  is  at  the  93d 
Olympiad— 408  u.c.).  the  Agrigenline  Exa'uetus  gained  the  prize  in  a 
cIki riot-race.  On  returning  to  Sicily  after  his  victory,  he  was  wel- 
comed by  many  of  his  friends,  who  escorted  him  home  in  procession 
with  300  chariots,  each  drawn  by  a  pair  of  white  horses,  and  all 
belonging  to  native  Agrigentines.  Of  the  festival  by  which  the 
wealthy  Antisthenes  celebrated  the  nuptials  of  his  daughter,  we  read 
an  account  almost  fabulous.  Amid  all  this  wealth  and  luxury,  it 
is  not  surprising  to  hear  that  the  rough  duties  of  military  exercise 
were  imperfectly  kept  up,  and  that  indulgences,  not  very  consistent 
with  soldierlike  etlicieucv,  were  allowed  to  the  citizens  on  guard. 

Such  was  Agrigentum  in  May,  406  u.c,  when  Hannibal  and 
Imilkon  approached  it  with  their  powerful  army.  Their  first  propo- 
sitions, however,  were  not  of  a  hostile  character.  They  invited  the 
Agriirentines  to  enter  into  alliance  with  Carthage;  or  if  this  were  not 
acceptable,  at  any  rate  to  remain  neutral  and  at  peace.  Both  propo- 
sitions were  declined. 

Besides  having  taken  engagements  with  Gela  and  Syracuse,  the 
Airriirentines  also  felt  a  contidence.  not  unreasonable,  in  the  strength 
of^their  own  walls  and  situation.  Agrigentum,  with  its  citadel,  was 
placed  on  an  aiiirregate  of  limestone  hills,  immediately  above  the 
confluence  of  two  rivers,  both  flowing  from  the  north:  the  river 
Akrao:as  on  the  eastern  and  southern  sides  of  the  city,  and  the  Ilypsas 
on  its  western  side.     Of  tliis  aggregate  of  hills,  separated  from  each 


ATTACK  ON  AGRIGENTUM. 


155 


othf^r  bv  clefts  and  vallevs,  the  northern  half  is  the  loftiest,  being 
about  liOO  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea— the  southern  half  is  less 
loflv  But  on  all  sides,  except  on  the  south-west,  it  rises  by  a  pre- 
cipi'tous  ascent;  on  the  side  toward  the  sea,  it  springs  immediately 
out  of  the  plain,  thus  presenting  a  tine  prospect  to  ships  passing 
alon<^  the  coast.  The  whole  of  this  aggregate  of  hills  was  encom- 
pissSl  by  a  continuous  wall,  built  round  the  declivity,  and  m  some 
parts  hewn  out  of  the  solid  rock.  The  town  of  Agrigentum  was 
situated  in  the  southern  half  of  the  walled  inck»sure.  The  citadel, 
separated  from  it  bv  a  ravine,  and  accessible  only  by  one  narrow 
ascent,  stood  on  the  north-eastern  hill;  it  was  the  most  conspicuous 
feature  in  the  place,  called  the  Athenaium,  and  decorated  by  temples 
of  Athene  and  of  Zeus  Atabyrius.  In  the  plain  under  the  southern 
wail  of  the  city  stood  the  Airrigentine  sepulchers. 

Re-enforced  by  800  Campanian  mercenaries,  with  the  1500  other 
nien-enaries    brouixht    bv    Dexippus   from    Gela— the   Agrigentines 
awaited  contidentlv  the' attack  upon   their  walls,  which  were  not 
only  in  far  better 'condition  than   those  of  Selinus,  but  also  unap- 
proachable by  battering-machines  or  movable  towers,  except  on  one 
part  of  the  south-western  side.     It  was  here  that  Hannibal,  after 
reeonnoitering  the  town  all  rountl.  began  his  attack.     But  after  hard 
fiiXhting  without  success  for  one  day,  he  was  forced  to  retire  at  night- 
M\\  and  even  lost  his  battering  train,  which  was  burnt  during  the 
night  by  a  sally  of  the  besieged.     Desisting  from  further  attempts  on 
that  point,  Hannibal  now  ordered  his  troops  to  pull  down  the  tombs; 
which  were  numerous  on  the  lower  or  southern  side  of  the  city,  and 
many  of  which,  especially  that  of  the  despot  Theron,  were  of  con- 
spicuous grandeur.     By  this  measure  he  calculated  on   providing 
materials  adequate  to  the  erection   of  immense  mounds,  equal  in 
height  to  the  southern  wall,  and  sufliciently  close  to  it  for  the  pur- 
pose of  assault.     His  numerous  host  had  made  considerable  progress 
in  demolishing  these  tombs,  and  w^ere  engaged  in  breaking  down  the 
monument  of  Tiieron,  when  their  progress  was  arrested  by  a  thunder- 
bolt fallimr  upon  it.     This  event  was  followed  by  religious  terrors, 
sudd(Mily  overspreading  the  camp.     The  proj^hets  declared  that  the 
violation   of  the  tombs  was  an   act  of   criminal   sacrilege.     Every 
aiuht  the  specters  of  those  whose  tombs  had  been  profaned  mani- 
fested themselves,  to  the  affright  of  the  soldiers  on  guard;  wliile  the 
judgment  of  the  gods  was  manifested  in  a  violent  pestilential  dis- 
temper.    Numbers  of  the  army  perished,  Hannibal  himself  among 
them;  and  even  of  those  who 'escaped  death,  many  were  disabled 
from  active  duty  bv  distress  and  suffering.     Imilkon  was  compelled 
to  appease   the   gods,  and  to  calm  the  agony  of  the  troops,  by  a 
solemn  supplication  according  to  the  Carthaginian  rites.     He  sacri- 
liced  a  child,  considered  as  the  most  propitiatory  of  all  offerings^  to 
Kronus;  and  cast  into  the  sea  a  number  of  animal  victims  as  offer- 
ings to  Poseidon. 


150 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 


These  religions  rites  cfilmed  the  terrors  of  tlie  army,  and  miiicrnted. 
or  were  supposed  to  iiju'e  niitiuatcd,  the  distemper;  so  thnt  Imilkon. 
while   desistiuir    from   all    furl  her   meddliiiir   willi    the   tombs,  was 
enabled  to  resume  his  batteries  and  assaults  airainst  the  walls,  though 
without  anv  considerable  success.     He  also  dammed  up  the  western 
river  Hvps'as,  so  as  to  turn   the  stream   against  the  wall;  but  the 
mtmeuver  produced  no  effect.     His  ()]H'rations  were  presently  inter- 
rupted bv   the   arrival  of  a  powerful  army   which  marched  from 
Syracuse;  und(r  Daphnauis,  to  tin-  relief  of   Agrigentum.     Re-en- 
forced in  its  road  bv  the  military  strength  of  Kamarina  and  Gela,  it 
amounted   to  JiO.OOO   foot   and  "5,000  horse,  on  reaching  the  river 
llimera,  the  eastern  frontier  of  tl-.e  Agrigentine  terriloiy;  while  :i 
licet  of  thirty  Svracusan  triremes  sailed  along  tlie  coast  to  second  its 
efforts.     As    these    troops    neared    the   town.    Imilkon   dispatched 
against  them  a  body  of  Iberians  and  Campanians;   who,  however, 
after  a  strenuous  combat,  were  completely  defeated,  and  driven  back 
to  the  Carthaginian  camp  near  the  city,  where  they  found  them- 
selves under  the  pvotcction  of  the  main  army.     Daplnneus,  having 
secured  the  victory  and  inflieted  severe  loss  upon  the  ent my,  was 
careful  to  prevenC  his  tr(U)ps  from  disordering  their  ranks  in  the 
ardor  of  pursuit,  in  the  apprehension  that  Imilkon  with  the  main 
body  mi<^ht  take  advantage  of  that  disorder  to  turn  the  fortune  of 
the  day— as  had  happened  in  the  terrible  defeat  before  llimera,  three 
years  before.     The  routed  Iberians  were  thus  allowed  to  get  back  to 
the  camp      At  the  same  time  the  Agrigenlin<s.  witnessing  from  the 
walls  with  ioyous  excitement,  thetiight  of  their  enemies,  vehemently 
iir"-ed  their' generals  to  lead  them  forth  for  an  immediate  sally,  m 
order  that  the  destruction  of  the  fugitives  might  thus  be  consum- 
mated     But  the  irenerals  Avere  inflexible  in  resisting  such  demand; 
conceiving-  that  tlie  city  its<'lf  would  thus  be  stripped  of  its  defend*  rs, 
and  that  fmilkon  might  seize  the  occasion  for  assaulting  it  with  his 
main  body,  when  there  was  not  sullicient  force  to  repel  them,      ihe 
defeated  Iberians  thus  escaped  to  the  main  camp;  neither  pursued 
by  the  Svracusans,  nor  impeded,  as  they  passed  near  the  Agrigen- 
tine walls,  by  the  population  within.  ,     1    »      ■ 

Presently  Daphmeus  with  his  victorious  army  reached  Aixrigen- 
tum,  and  joined  the  citizens;  who  Hocked  iu  crowds,  along  wUh  the 
Lacedtemonian  Dexippus.  to  meet  and  welc<mie  them.  But  the  joy 
of  meeting,  and  the  reciprocal  congratulations  on  the  recent  victory, 
were  fatally  poisoned  by  general'  indignation  for  the  unmoh'sted 
escape  of  the  defeated  Iberians;  occasioned  by  nothing  hss  than 
remissness,  cowardice,  or  corruption  (so  it  Avas  contended),  on  the 
part  of  the  generals— lirst  the  Svracusan  generals,  and  next  the  Agri- 
gentine. Against  the  fonr.er,  little  was  now  said,  though  much  was 
held  in  reserve,  as  we  shall  soon  hear.  But  against  the  latter,  the 
discontent  of  the  Airrifzentine  population  burst  forth  instantly  and 
impetuously.     A  public  assembly  being  held  on  the  spot,  the  Agn- 


PRIVATIONS  IX  BOTH  ARMIES. 


157 


o-entine  generals,  five  in  number,  were  put  under  accusation.  Among 
many  sptiakers  who  denounced  them  as  guilty  of  treason,  the  most 
violent  of  all  w^as  the  Kamarinseau  Menes— himself  one  of  the  leaders, 
seeniiniily  of  the  Kamariuccan  contingent  in  the  army  of  Daphmeus. 
The  concurrence  of  Menes,  carrying  to  the  Agrigeiitiues  a  full  sanction 
of  their  sentimenis,  wrought  tiiem  up  to  such  a  pilch  of  fury,  that 
the  generals,  when  they  came  to  delend  themselves,  found  neither 
sympathy  nor  even  common  fairness  of  hearing.  Four  out  of  the 
live  were  stoned  and  ])ut  to  death  on  the  spot;  the  fifth,  Argeius,  was 
spared  only  on  the  ground  of  his  youth;  and  even  the  Lacedaemonian 
Dexippus  was  severely  censured. 

How  far,  in  regard  to  these  proceedings,  the  generals  were  really 
o-uiltv,  or  how  far  their  defense,  had    it    been   fairly  heard,  would 
have  been  valid— is  a  point  which  our  scanty  information  does  not 
enable  us  to  determine.     BuL  it  is  certain  that   the  arrival  of  the 
victorious  Syracusans  at  Agrigentum  completely  altered  the  relative 
position  of  atfairs.     Instead  of  farther  assaulting  the  walls,  Imilkon 
was  attacked  in  his  camp  by  Daphna^Mis.     The  camp,  however,  was 
so  fortified  as  to  repel  all  attempts,  and  the  siege  from  this  time  for- 
ward became  only  a  blockade;  a  contest  of  patience  and  privation 
between  the  city  and  the  besiegers,  lasting  seven  or  eight  months  from 
the  commencement  of  the  siege.     At  tirst  Daphna-us,  wdth  his  own 
force  united  to  the  Agngeutines,  was  strong  enough  to  harass  the 
Carthaginians  and  intercept  their  supplies,  so  that  the  greatest  dis- 
tress beiran  to  prevail  among  their  army.     The  Campanian  mercen- 
aries even  broke  out  into  mutiny,  crowding,  with  clamorous  demands 
for  provision  and  with  menace  of  deserting,  round  the  tent  of  Imil- 
kon; who  barely  pacified  them  by  pledging  to  them  the  gold  and 
silver  drinking-cups  of  the  chief  Carthaginians  around  him,  cou])led 
with  entreaties  that  thev  would  wait  yet  a  few  d:iys.     During  that 
short  interval,  he  meditated  and  executed  a  bold  stroke  of  relief. 
The  Syracusans  and  Agrigentines  were  mainly  supplied  by  sea  from 
Syracuse;  from  wdience  a  large  transport  of  provision-ships  was  now 
expected,  under  convoy  of  some   Syracusan  triremes.     Apprised  of 
their  approach,   Imilkon    silently  brought    out    forty  Carthaginian 
triremes  from  Motye   and    Panormus,    with    which    he    suddenly 
attacked  the  Syracusan  convoy,  noway  expecting  such  a  surprise. 
Light  Syracusan  triremes  were  destroyed,  the  remainder  were  driven 
ashore,  tind  the  whole  fleet  of  transport  fell  into  the  liands  of  Imilkon. 
xibundance  and  satisfaciion  now  reigned  in  the  camp  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians, while  the  distress,  and  with  it  the  discontent,  was  transferred 
to  Agri'ixentum.      The  Campanian  mercenaries  in  the  service  of  Dex- 
ippus iTegan  the  mutiny,   complaining  to   him   of   their   condition. 
Perhaps  lie  had  been  alarmed  and  disgusted  at  the  violent  manifesta- 
tion of  the  Aii-rigenti nes  against  their  generals,  extending  partly  to 
himself  also.     At  any  rate,  he  manifested  no  zeal  in  the  defense,  and 
was  even  suspected  of  having  received  a  bribe  of  fifteen  talents  from 


158 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 


TERROR  THROUGHOUT   SICILY 


150 


I 


the  Cartliaidnians.  He  told  the  Cump-inijins  tliat  Agriwiituni  "VN-na 
no  Ioniser  teuuble  for  want  of  sup]>lies;  u]vmi  which  they  iiiimcdifitcly 
reiireil,  aud  inarched  away  to  Messene,  tilhrming  that  the  time  stipu- 
lated for  iheir  stay  had  expired.  Such  u  secession  struck  every  one 
with  discouragement.  The  Agrigentiiie  generals  immediately  nisti- 
tuted  an  examination,  to  ascertain  the  quantity  of  provision  still 
remaining  in  the  city.  Having  mtide  the  painful  discovery  that  there 
renmined  but  very  little,  they  took  the  resolution  of  causing  the  city 
to  be  evacuated  by  its  population  during  the  coming  night. 

A  night  followed,  even  more  replete  with  woe  and  desolation  than 
that  which  had  witnessed  the  tlight  of  Diokles  with  the  inhabitants 
of  Himera  from  their  native  city.  Few  scenes  can  be  imagined  more 
deplorable  than  the  vast  i)opulation  of  Agrigentum  obliged  to  hurry 
out  of  their  gates  during  a  December  night,  as  their  only  chance  of 
escape  from  famine  or  the  sword  of  a  merciless  enemy.  The  road  to 
Gela  was  beset  by  a  distracted  crowd,  of  both  sexes  and  of  every  age 
and  condition,  confounded  in  one  indiscriminate  lot  of  sulfering.  Ko 
thought  could  be  bestowed  on  the  preservation  of  property  or 
cherished  possessions.  Happy  were  they  who  could  save  tlieir  lives; 
for  not  a  few,  through  pergonal  weakness  or  the  immobility  of 
despair,  were  left  behind.  Perhaps  here  and  there  a  citizen,  com- 
bining the  personal  strength  with  the  tilial  piety  of  ^neas,  might 
carry  away  his  aged  father  with  the  household  gods  on  his  shoulders; 
but  for  the  most  part,  the  old,  the  sick,  and  the  impotent,  all  whose 
years  were  either  too  tender  or  too  decrepit  to  keep  up  with  a 
hurried  flight,  were  of  necessity  abandoned.  Some  remained  and 
slew  them>elves,  refusing  even  to  survive  the  loss  of  their  homes  and 
the  destruction  of  their  city;  others,  among  whom  was  the  wealthy 
Gellias,  consigned  themselves  to  the  protection  of  the  temples,  but 
with  little  hope  that  it  would  procure  them  safety.  The  morning's 
dawn  exhibited  to  Imilkon  unguarded  walls,  a  deserted  city,  and  a 
miserable  population  of  exiles  "huddled  together  in  disorderly  flight 
on  the  road  to  Gela. 

For  these  fugitives,  however,  the  Syracusan  and  Agrigcntine 
soldiers  forme<l  a  rearguard  sufflcient  to  keep  off  the  aggravated 
torture  of  a  pursuit.  But  the  Carthaginian  army  found  enough  to 
occupy  them  in  the  undefended  prey  which  was  before  their  eyes. 
They  rushed  upon  the  town  with  the  fury  of  men  who  had  been 
struggling  and  suffering  before  it  for  eight  months.  They  ran.^acked 
the  houses,  slew  every  living  person  that  was  left,  and  found  plunder 
enough  to  satiate  even  a  ravenous  appetite.  Temx)lts  as  well  as 
private  dwellingswere  alike  stripped,  so  that  those  w  ho  had  taken 
sanctuary  in  thL-in  became  victims  like  the  rest;  a  fate  which  Gellias 
only  avoided  by  setting  fire  to  the  temple  in  which  he  stood  and 
perishitig  in  its  ruins.  The  great  public  ornaments  and  trophies  of 
the  city — the  bull  of  Phalaris,  together  with  the  most  precious  statues 
and  x^ictures — were  preserved  by  Imilkon  and  sent  home  as  decora- 


tions to  Carthage.     While  he  gave  up  the  houses  of  Agrigentum  to 
he  thus  gutted,' he  still  kept  them -standing,  and.  caused  them  to  serve 
aswintcT-quarters  for  the  repose  of  his  soldiers,  after  t^he  hardships 
of  an  ei'dit  months'  siege.     The  unhappy  Agrigentme  fugitives  first 
found  shelter  and  kind  hospitality  at  Gela;  from  whence  they  were 
.vfterw-u-d   by  permission  of  the  Svracusans,  transferred  to  Leontini. 
'  I  have  described,  as  far  as  the  narrative  of  Diodorus  permits  us  to 
know    this  momentous  and  tragical  portion  of  Sicdian  history;  a 
suitable  preface  to  the  long  despotism  of  Dionysius.     It  is  evident 
tint  the  seven  or  eiirht   months  (the  former  of  these   numbers  is 
authenticated  hv  Xenophon,  while  the  latter  is  given  by  Diodorus) 
of  the  ^ie<i-e  or  blockade  must  have  contained  matters  of  the  greatest 
imnortance  Avhich  are  not  mentioned,  and  that  even  of  the  main 
ciicuiiKtances  which  brought  about  the  capture,  we  are  most  imper- 
fcctlv  informed.     But  thoimii  we  cannot  fully  comprehend  its  causes 
its  effects  are  easy  to  understand.     They  weie   terror-striking  and 
liirro\vin«i-  in  the  extreme.     When  the  storm  which  had  beaten  down 
Selinus  and  Himera  w^as  now^  perceived  to  have  extended  its  desola- 
tion to  a  city  so  much  more  conspicuous,  among  the  wealthiest  and 
most  populous  in  the  Grecian  world— Avhen  the  surviving  Agrigen- 
tine  population,  including  women  and  children,  and  the  great  pro- 
prietors of  chariots  whose  names  stood  recorded  as  victors  at  Oly  mpia 
were  seen  all  confounded  in  one  common  fate  of  homeless  flight  and 
nakedness— wiien  the  victorious  host  and  its  commanders  took  up 
their  quarters  in  the  deserted  houses,  ready  to  spread  their  conquests 
further  after  a  winter  of  repose— there  was  hardly  a  Greek  in  hicily 
who  did  not  tremble  for  his  life  and  property.     Several  of  them 
sought  shelter  at  Syracuse,  while  others  even  quitted  the  island  alto- 
gether, emigrating *^to  Italy. 

Amid  so  much  anguish,  humiliation,  and  terror,  there  were  loud 
complaints  against  the  conduct  of  the  Syracusan  generals  under  whose 
command  the  disaster  had  occurred.  The  censure  which  had  been 
cast  upon  them  before,  for  not  having  vigorously  pursued  the  de- 
feated Iberians,  was  now  revived,  and  ag--ravated  tenfold  by  the 
subsequent  misfortune.  To  their  inefliciency  the  capture  of  Agrigen- 
tum was  ascribed,  and  apparently  not  without  substantial  cause 
For  the  town  was  so  strongly  placed  as  to  defy  assault,  and  could 
onlv  be  taken  bv  blockade ;  now^  we  discern  no  impediments  Jidequate 
to  hinder  the  Syracusan  generals  from  procuring  supplies  of  provis- 
ions- and  it  seems  clear  that  the  surprise  of  the  Syracusan  storcships 
nvcrht  have  been  prevented  by  proper  precautions;  upon  which  sur- 
prise the  whole  question  turned,  betv/een  famine  in  the  Carthaginian 
camp  and  famine  in  Agrigentum.  The  efliciency  of  Dexippus  and 
the  other  generals,  in  defending  Agrigentum  (as  depicted  by 
Diodorus)  stands  sadly  inferior  to  the  vigor  and  ability  displayed  by 
Gvlippus  before  Syracuse,  as  described  by  Thucydides.  And  we  can 
hardly  wonder  that  by  men  in  the  depth  of  misery,  like  the  Agrigen- 


J()vJ 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS. 


SPEECH   OF  DIONYSIUS. 


161 


Xiui'S — or  in  extreme  alnini,  like  tlie  other  Sicilian  Greeks — these  gen- 
erals, incompetent  or  tieasonable,  should  be  regarded  as  tlie  cause  of 
the  ruin. 

Such  a  state  of  sentiment,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  would 
liave  led  to  the  coudenuialion  of  the  generals  and  to  the  noniiinilion 
of  others,  with  little  further  result.  But  it  became  of  far  liraver  im- 
]-i(»rt.  when  coml/med  with  the  actual  situation  of  ];arties  in  Syracrusc. 
The  IlermoUratean  opjKsilion-jxtrty — repelled  during  the  precedin.-r 
vear  with  the  loss  of  its  leader,  yet  nowise  crushed — now  re-appeared 
more  formidable  tlian  ever,  under  a  new  leader  more  aggressive  even 
than  llermokrates  himself. 

Throughout  ancient  as  well  as  modern  history,  defeat  and  embar- 
rassment in  the  foreign  relations  have  ])rov(  d  fruitful  causes  of  change 
in  the  internal  government.  Such  auxiliaries  had  been  wanting  to 
the  success  of  llermokrates  in  the  ]ireceding  year.  But  alarms  of 
every  kind  now  over  hung  the  city  in  terrific  magnitude,  and  when 
the  first  Syracusan  jissembly  was  convoked  on  returning  from  Agri- 
gentum.  a'mournful  silence  reigned;  as  in  the  memoraltle description 
given  by  Demosthenes  of  the  Athenian  assembly  held  inmicdiately 
after  the  taking  of  Elatei.'v.  The  generals  had  lost  the  confidence  of 
their  fellow-citizens;  yat  no  one  else  was  forward,  at  a  junction  so 
full  of  peril,  to  a-  ume  their  duty,  by  ])r()lTering  tit  counsel  for  the 
future  conduct  of  the  war.  Kow  was  the  time  for  the  Ilermokratean 
p-irtv  to  lay  their  train  for  putting  down  the  government.  Dionysius, 
though  both  young  and  of  mean  family,  was  adopted  as  leader  in 
conse(iuence  of  that  audacity  and  bravery  which  even  already  he  had 
displayed,  both  in  the  tight  along  with  llermokrates  and  in  the  bat- 
tles against  t!ie  Carthaginians.  Ilipparinus,  a  Syracusan  of  rich 
family  who  had  ruined  himself  by  dissolute  expenses,  was  eager  to 
renovate  his  fortunes  by  seconding  the  elevation  of  Dionysius  to  the 
despotism;  Philistus  (th(>  subse(iuent  historian  of  Syracuse),  rich, 
younir,  and  able,  threw  himself  ardently  into  the  same  cause;  and 
doubtless  other  leading  persons,  ancient  Ilermokrateans  aitd  others, 
^stood  forward  as  parHsans  in  the  conspiracy.  But  it  either  was, 
from  the  beginning,  or  speedily  became,  a  movement  organized  for 
the  purpose  of  putting  the  scepter  into  the  hards  of  Dionysius,  to 
whom  all  the  rest,  iliough  several  among  them  were  of  far  greater 
wealth  and  importance,  si-rved  bnt  as  satellites  and  auxiliaries. 

Ami(l  the  silence  and  disquietude  which  reigned  in  the  Syracusan 
assembly,  Dionysius  was  the  tin  t  who  rose  to  address  thein.  llct  en- 
larged upon  a  topic  suitable  alike  to  the  temper  of  his  r.'iditor;  iW.C. 
to  his  own  views,  lie  vehemently  denounced  the  generals  as  havii.g 
betrayed  the  security  of  Syracuse  to  the  Carthaginians — and  as  the 
persons  to  whom  the"  ruin  of  Agrigentum.  together  with  the  impend- 
ing peril  of  every  man  around,  was  owing.  He  set  forth  th'.'ir  mi  - 
(leeds,  real  or  afleged.  not  merely  with  fullness  and  acrimony,  bnt 
with  a  ferocious  violence  outstripping  all  the  limits  of  admissible  dc- 


])atc,  and  intended  to  bring  upon  them  a  lawless  murder,  like  the 
death  of  the  generals  recently  at  Agrigentum.  "  There  they  sit,  the 
liaitors!  Do  not  wait  for  legal  trial  or  verdict,  but  la}'  hands  upon 
them  at  once,  and  inflict  u|)on  them  summary  justice."  Such  a 
brutal  exhortation,  not  unlike  that  of  the  Athenian  Kritias,  when 
lie  caused  the  execution  of  Theramenes,  in  the  oligarchical  senate, 
was  an  offense  against  law  as  well  as  against  parliamentary 
order.  The  presiding  magistrates  reproved  Dionysius  as  a  disturber 
of  order,  and  fined  him,  as  they  were  empowered  by  law.  But  his 
partisans  were  loud  in  his  support.  Philistus  not  only  paid  down 
the  line  for  him  on  the  spot,  but  publicly  proclaimed  that  he  would 
go  on  for  the  whole  day  ])aying  all  similar  fines  which  might  be  im- 
posed— and  incited  Dionysius  to  persist  in  such  langujige  as  he 
thought  proper.  That  which  he  had  begun  as  illegality,  was  now 
aggravated  into  open  defiance  of  the  law.  Yet  so  feeble  was  the 
authority  of  the  magistrates,  and  so  vehement  the  cry  against  them, 
in  tiie  actual  position  of  the  city,  that  they  were  unable  either  to 
])nnish  or  to  repress  the  speaker.  Dionysius  pursued  his  harangue 
in  a  tone  yet  more  inflammatory,  not  only  accusing  the  generals  of 
]i;>ving  curruptly  l)etrayed  Agrigentum,  but  also  denouncing  the 
c  )nsi)icuous  and  wealthy  citizens  generally,  as  oligarchs  who  held 
tyrannical  sway — who  treated  the  many  with  scorn,"and  made  their 
own  profit  out  of  the  misfortunes  of'  the  city.  Syracuse  (he  con- 
tended) could  never  be  saved,  unless  men  of  a  totally  difi'erent  char- 
acter were  invested  with  authority;  men,  not  chosen  from  wealth 
and  station,  but  of  humble  birth,  belonging  to  the  people  In-^  position, 
a;ul  kind  in  their  deportment  from  couciousness  of  their  own  w^eak- 
ness.  His  bitter  invective  against  generals  already  discredited,  to- 
gether with  the  impetuous  warmth  of  his  apparent  sympathy  for  the 
jjeople  against  the  rich,  w^ere.Jboth  alike  favorably  received.  Plato 
slates  that  the  assembly  became  so  furiously  exasperated,  as  to  follow 
literally  the  lawless  and  blood-thirsty  inspirations  of  Dionysius,  and 
to  stone  all  these  generals,  ten  in  number,  on  the  sjiot,  without  any 
form  of  trial.  But  Diotlorus  simply  tells  us,  that  a  vote  was  passetl 
to  cashier  the  generals,  and  to  name  in  their  places  Dionysius,  Hip- 
parinns,  and  others.  This  latter  statement  is,  in  my  opinion,  the 
more  pro*)able. 

Such  was  the  first  stage  of  what  w^e  may  term  the  despot's  progress, 
successfully  consummated.  The  pseudo-demagogue  Dionysius  out- 
<loes,  in  fierce  professions  of  antipathy  against  the  rich,  anything 
that  we  read  as  coming  from  the  real  demagogues,  Athenagoras  at 
Syracuse,  or  Kleon  at  Athens.  Behold  him  now^  sitting  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  new  Board  of  Generals,  at  a  moment  when  the  most 
assiduous  care  and  energy,  combined  v/itli  the  greatest  unanimity, 
Avere  required  to  put  the  Syracusan  military  force  into  an  adequate 
^^tale  of  effiiriency.  It  suited  the  policy  of  Dionysius  not  only  to 
bestow  no  care  or  <'ncrgy  himself,  but  to  nullify  all  that  was  bestowed 


:^m 


1G2 


SICILIAN   AFFAinS. 


DlOXYSiUS  ACCUSi:S   HIS   COLLLACJUES. 


163 


l)V  ln«  cullca-nu's  and  to  fnistr:\1c  dcliboratcly  all  chance  of  una- 
nimitv      lie  ni)nutliatelv  bciran  a  syslcniatic  opposition  and  Yarlare 
ac-aiust  Lis  collca-ucs.     He  lefustd  to  attend  at  their  Board,  or  lo 
hold  anv  comnuinicatiou  Avith  them.     At  the  Irequeut  assemblus 
held  duriDi;-  this  a^dtated  state  of  the  public  mind,  he  openly  denounct  d 
them  as  eirga^edlu  treasonable  correspondence  with  the  enemy.     It 
is  obvious  that  his  colleagues,  men  newly  chosen  in  the  same  spnit 
^vith  himself,  could  not  as  yet  have  coumulted  any  such  treason  ni 
favor  of  the  Carthairinians.     But  among  them  ^vas  his  accomplice 
Hipparinus-   while   probably   the   rest  also,  nominated  by  a   i)ariy 
devoted  to  him  personally,  were  selected  in  a  spirit  of  collusion,  i:s 
either  thorough-i^oinff  partisans,  or  worthless  and  incompeUnt  men, 
easv  for  him  To  STt  aside.     At  any  rate  his  calumnies,  though  received 
with  ^'•reat  repuijnance  bv  the  leading  and  more  intelligent  citizens, 
found   favor  with   the   bulk  of  the   assembly,  predisposed   at  that 
moment  from  the  terrors  of  tlie  situation  to  suspect  every  one.     J  he 
new  Board  of  Generals  beinu-  thus  discredited,  Dionysius  alone  was 
listened  to  as  an  adviser.     His  tii'st  and  most  strenuous  recommenda- 
tion was   that  a  vote  should  be  passed  for  restoring  the  exiles;  men 
(he  amrmed)  attached  to   their  country,  and  burning  to  save  her, 
havin*'  already  refused  the  offers  of  her  enemies;  men  who  had  V.een 
tlirown  into  banishment  bv  ])revious  political  dispute,  but  who,  it 
now  creuerouslv  recalled,  would  manifest  their  gratitude  by  devoied 
i.atriotism,    and   serve    Svracuse   far  more  warmly  than  the  allies 
invoked  from  Italy  and  Peloponnesus.     His  discredited  co  kagr.es 
eiiher  could  not,  or  would  not,  oppose  the  i)ioposition;  which  b(ir.g 
Avarmlv   pressed    bv    Dionysius    and   all   his   iiarty,  was   at   lenglli 
adopted  bv  the  assemblv.     The  exiles  accordingly  returned    c^m- 
pri^in"-  all  the  most  violent  men  who  had  been  m  arms  with  Hei- 
inokrales  when  he  was  slain.      They  reiurned  glowing  with  pjaiy 
antipathv  and  reveni-e,  prepared  to  retaliate  upon  others  the  con- 
liseation"  under  wliich  themselves  had  sulTered,  and  looking  to  the 
desi)otism  of  Dionvsius  as  their  only  means  ot  success. 

The  second  step" of  the  despot's  progress  was  now  accomplisl:ert 
Dionvsius  had  filled  up  the  ranks  of  the  Hermokratean  party,  and 
obtained  an  cnenjetic  band  of  satellites,  whose  hojU's  and  interests 
w(>re  thoroughly  identified  with  his  own.  31e;inwhile  lettws  arrived 
from  Gela,  e^Ureatinn;  re-cnforcements,  aslmilkon  was  understood  to 
he  about  to  inarch  thither.  Dionysius,  being  empowered  to  conduct 
thither  a  bc:>dy  of  2,000  hoplites  with  400  horsemen,  turned  the  occa- 
sion to  protitable  account.  A  reginx  nt  of  mcrcenaricis,  under  tlie 
I.acedieraonian  Dexippus,  was  in  garri:  on  at  Gela;  while  \\w  goyein- 
ment  of  the  town  is  stiid  to  have  been  oligarchical,  in  the  hands  ol 
the  rich  though  with  a  strong  and  di^ contented  popular  opposition. 
On  reaching  Gela,  Dionvsius  immediately  took  part  with  the  lattei ; 
(.ri.'inarnH'-the  most  vicdcnt  proimsitions  against  the  governing  riel). 
a^  lie  had  done  at  Syracuse.     Accusing  ihcm  of  treason  in  the  publie 


assembly,  he  obtained  a  condemnatory  vote  under  which  they  were 
put  to  death  and  their  properties  confiscated.  ^  ith  the  funds  so 
accniired,  he  paid  the  arrears  due  to  the  soldiers  of  Dexippus,  and 
cloubled  the  pav  of  his  own  Syracusau  division.  These  measures 
procured  for  hini  immense  ponularity,  not  merely  with  all  the  sol- 
diers but  also  wdth  the  Geloan  Demos,  whom  he  had  relieved  from 
the  dominion  of  their  wealthv  oligarchy.  Accordingly,  after  pass- 
iii.r  a  public  vote,  testifying  their  gratitude,  and  bestowing  uponhini 
hiViXQ  rewards,  they  dispatched  cnvc^ys  to  carry  the  formal  expres- 
sion of  their  sentiiiients  to  Syracuse.  Dionysius  resolved  to  g(>  back 
thither  at  the  same  time,  with  his  Syracusan  soldiers;  and  tried  to 
prevail  on  Dcxipims  to  accompan\'  him  with  his  own  division.  This 
being  refused,  he  went  thither  wilh  his  Syracusans  alone.  To  tlu; 
GcloTius,  who  earnestly  entreated  that  they  might  not  be  forsake  n 
when  the  enemy  was  daily  expected,  he  contented  himself  with  ivply- 
ini^  that  he  would  presently  return  with  a  larger  force. 

A  third  step  was  tlius  obtained.  Dionysius  was  going  back  to 
Syracuse  with  a  testimonial  of  admiration  andgralitude  from  Gela— 
with  increased  attachment  on  the  part  of  his  own  soldiers,  on  account 
of  the  double  pay— and  with  the  means  of  coining  and  circulating  a  new^ 
delusion.  It  was  on  the  day  of  a  solemn  festival  ihat  he  reacdied  the 
town  just  as  the  citizens  were  coming  in  crowds  out  of  the  theater. 
Amid  the  bustle  of  such  a  scene  as  well  as  of  the  return  of  the  sol- 
diers, manv  citizens  flocked  around  him  to  imiuire.  What  news 
about  the  Carthaginians?  "  Do  not  ask  about  your  foreign  enemies 
(wasthereplv  of  Dionysius);  you  have  much  worse  enemies  within 
anion jr  you.'  Your  magistrates— these  very  men  upon  whose  watch 
you  rely  during  the  indulgence  of  the  festival— they  are  the  traitors 
who  are  pillaginu-  the  public  money,  leaving  the  soldiers  unpaid,  and 
netrlecting  all  necessarv  preparalion,  at  a  moment  when  the  enemy 
with  an  immense  host  "is  on  the  ])oint  of  assailing  you.  I  knew^  their 
treacliei  y  long  ago,  but  I  have  now^  positive  proof  of  it.  For  Imilkon 
sent  to  me  an  envoy,  under  pretense  of  treating  about  the  prisoners, 
hut  in  realitv  to  purchase  my  silence  and  connivance;  he  tendered  to 
mo  a  laro:er  bribe  than  he  had  given  to  them,  if  I  would  consent  to 
refrain  from  hindering:  them,  since  I  could  not  be  induced  to  take  part 
ill  their  irttrii2:ues.  This  is  too  mucdi.  I  am  come  home  now  to  throw 
lip  my  cominand.  AVhile  my  colleagues  are  corruptly  bartering  aw  ay 
their  countrv,  I  am  willing  to  take  my  share  as  a  citizen  in  the  coin- 
moii  risk,  but  I  cannot  endure  to  incur  shame  as  an  accomplice  in 
their  treachery." 

Such  bold  alleirations,  scattered  by  Dionysius  among  the  crowd 
pressing  round  him— renewed  at  length,  with  emphatic  formality,  in 
the  reirular  assemblv  held  the  next  day— and  concluding  with  actual 
resJLrnation— struc'k\leep  terror  into  the  Syracusan  mind.  He  spoke 
witii  authoritv,  not  merelv  as  one  fresh  from  the  frontier  exposed, 
hnt  also  as  bearing  the  L>-fateful  testimonial  of  the  Geloans,  echoed 


1(>4 


SICILIAN'   AFFAIKS. 


MARCH  TO  LEONTINI. 


im 


His  asser  ion  of  tl>e  ^P^^^^'^  ,X^,,^^  ,,,,,^tvd  and  I)ac.krd  hy  nil 
impudent  ^^^^^^^  >^i^  bv  Ins  Xr  partisans,  be  Ilermokratean  party, 
these  men,  juj  ^v  ell  as  by  ^^'fj'^^^^^^  P;'[;^  ^.j^.^^  j^.f^.^.e  the  nceused 
and  most  of  all  by  .^^f  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^,J/!f/^-  ^^^  ^ui      It  is  not  lik(>ly  to 

Leave  them  to  bo  trud  .nu  1  ";;'",,  ,,oAver<;  to  make  head  a-ainst 
but  elect  him  at  once  general  ^  |  ;"  ^?riK;tAv ait  until  the  enen.v 
the  pressing  em.T^eney  ^^•^"^  \^^^>^;V/-,„,.t^^,  "j,^  t  .e  man  for  our  pur- 

was  acliievcd_  liy  Ch;U m  »<  '■-*.:;;'  ,^.,.  ^f  ,i,p  avscml.h— n  1"" 
,■l,.to,■ie^v:,s.rres.s.b^M 

"',"  ^'^"''rpot^s  "v.  rm  clfii...!.  B»si.i<-i<H".s  of  euoh  olher,  nr,I 
when  his  opponents  ^^  Y;  ' !  t^  mnnnv;' "nd  ^^hcn  the  storm  wlncii 

t:^^''^.^:^^:^''^^  on^o  W  alone,  .ud^  .  i.U 

ai„^'Hy%as  to  propose   in  "- J-f^Sl^l^aic'S  3i  l"c  li,o 
soiaiers  should  be  'l""'.'"]-,,,^"'-''  '      t^^    le  in  re-ard  to  oxix-nsc, 

passed  in^o"^''"  '•"";  ,^^^"e b  e   uv?-iu. Umit^d and nnrcspousiblo 

tlmn  symptom,  orc^t  ami  a. ^^^^^^^^  ^  ^^,^^_^,,      ^^^,   , 

.  Smbly  m^t.\  "rl^vol-c't  keretorc  now  ron,ainod  for  Dtony.u. 


k 


to  insure  the  perpetuity  of  his  power  by  some  organized  means;  so 
as  to  prevent  the  repentance,  of  which  he  already  discerned  the  com- 
mencement, from  realizing  itself  in  any  actual  revocation.  For  this 
purpose  he  required  a  military  force  extra-popular  and  anti-popular; 
hound  to  himself  and  not  to  the  city.  He  had  indeed  acquired  popu- 
larity with  the  Syracusan  as  well  as  with  the  mercenary  soldiers,  by 
dDuhlingand  insuring  their  pay.  He  liad  energetic  adherents,  i)re- 
pared  to  go  all  lengths  on  his  behalf,  especially  among  the  rest(n-ed 
exiles.  This  \Vasan  important  basis,  but  not  sullicient  tor  his  objects 
Avitliout  the  presence  of  a  special  body  of  guards,  constantly  and 
inunediately  available,  chosen  as  well  as  controlled  by  himself,  yet 
acting  in  such  vocation  under  the  express  mandate  and  sanction  of 
the  people.  He  required  a  furthv:r  vote  of  the  people,  legalizing  fur 
his  use  such  a  bodv  of  guards. 

But  with  all  his  powers  of  delusion,  and  all  the  ze.'d  of  his  partisans, 
lie  despaired  of  getting  any  such  vote  from  an  assembly  held  at 
Syracuse.  Accordingly,  he  resorted  to  a  maneuver,  proclaiming 
that  he  had  resolved  on  a  march  to  Leontini,  and  summoning  the 
full  military  force  of  Syracuse  (up  to  the  age  .of  forty)  to  nuiicli 
along  with  him,  with  orders  for  each  man  to'bring  with  him  tliirty 
days'  provision.  Leontini  had  been,  a  few  years  before,  an  indepen- 
dent city;  but  was  now  an  outlying  fort ilied  post,  belonging  to  the 
Syracusans;  wherein  various  foreign  settlers,  and  exik'S  from  the 
cai)lured  Sicilian  cities,  had  obtained  permission  to  reside.  Such 
men.  thrown  out  of  their  position  and  expectations  as  citizens,  were 
likely  to  le?id  either  their  votes  or  their  swords  willingly  to  the  pur- 
poses of  Dionysius.  AYhile  he  thus  found  many  new  adherents  ■ 
there,  besides  those  whom  he  brought  with  him.  he  foresaw^  that  the 
general  bod}- of  the  Syracusans,  and  especially  those  most  disaffected 
to  him,  would  not  be  disposed  to  obey  his  summons  or  accompany 
him.  For  nothing  could  be  more  preposterous,  in  a  public  point  of 
view,  than  an  outmarch  of  the  whole  Syracusan  force  for  thirty  days 
to  Leontini,  where  there  was  neither  danger  to  be  averted  nor  proiit 
to  he  reaped;  at  a  moment  too  wiien  the  danger  on  the  side  of  Gela 
was  most  serious,  from  the,  formidable  Carthaginian  host  of  Agri- 
gent  um. 

Dionysius  accordingly  set  out  with  a  force  which  purported  osten- 
sibly and  according  to  summons,  to  bethe  full  military  manifestation 
of  Symcuse;  but  which,  in  reality,  comprised  mainly  his  own  adher- 
ents. On  encamping  for  the  night  near  to  Leontini,  he  caused  a 
factitious  clamor  and  disturbance  to  be  raised  during  the  darkness 
around  his  own*  tent — ordered  fires  to  be  kindled— summoned  on  a 
sudden  his  most  intimate  friends — and  affected  to  retire  under  their 
f'Sf()n  to  the  citadel.  On  the  morrow  an  assembly  was  convened,  of 
die  Syracusans  and  residents  present,  purporting  to  be  a  Syracusan 
iissembly;  Syracuse  in  military  guise,  or  as  it  w^ere  in  (\)m*itia  Cen- 
tuiiata— -to  employ  au  ancient  phrase  belonging  to  the  Iioman  repub- 


166 


SICILIAN    AFFAIRS. 


DiJXYSiUS  AS  DESPOT. 


167 


I 


\\c     Before  this  assembly  Dionysins  appeared    and  threw  hiir.si If 
U  the^r  protection ;  athVniinjr  that  his  life  had  b^^ 
riVe  V^^  "P<>^  '^'''''  en.phatiea  ly  to  s  and  by  hnn 

aiinst  tlie  iSce.S.ant  snares"  of  his  eneniies-and  demanding  for  iha 
^rpo^e  a  pern^anent  body  of  U'uards.  His  appeal  phiusibly  uiul 
pSieam  turned,  and  doubtless  warmly  seconded  by  zer.lous 
mrtt  IS  met  willi  complete  success.  The  assembly-Syiaci  san  or 
u-  si  S vmcusan,  thouirh  lield  at  Leontini-passed  a  formal  decree, 
irm  in-  to  Dio,  v.ius  a  body-gutud  of  CUO  ineu,  selected  by  hirn^  i 
Sid  "poM^  to  him  alone.  One  speaker  indeed  proposed  to  himl 
the  .  uar  s  to  Mich  a  number  as  should  oc  sufhcient  to  protect  hna 
n  nin.t  anv  sinall  number  of  personal  enemies  but  not  to  render  huu 
indipindent  of,  or  formidable  to.  the  many.  But  snch  precautionary 
re  nrm  r^^^  lik^^''}'  to  be  much  considered  when  the  assembly 

"v-?^  di  h  nest  or  misumided  enough  to  pa>s  the  destructive  yote  here 
s  lie  ted    and  even  it^^mbodied  in  the  words  ot  the  resolution,  there 
^^o  means  of  securing  its  observance  in  practice      T he  regmun 
oYou-irds  bein<r  once  formallv  sanctioned,  Dionysms  heeded   iltle  the 
HiM  of^^uml H^r  pre^  to  hhn.     He  immediately  enmlled  more 

t  ;  ()()0  men  selected  as  w(dl  for  tlieir  bravery  as  from  their 
p  w  rt\^id  c;pc".ae  position.  He  provided  them  with  the  choice st 
am.  an  promled  to  them  the  most  muniticent  pay  To  this  basis 
of  ce  "  1  permanent,  legalized,  regiment  of  household  troops,  he 
aLled  f  her  a  sort  of  slanding  army,  composed  of  merceiuuu 
hard  v  e^sat  his  devotion  than  the  guards  properly  so  called  In 
4Tdi  onto  he  mercenaries  already  around  him  he  invited  othes 
•fr  d  na  ers  by  tempting  offers;  choosing  by  preference  or. t- 
lavvs  aid  S  and   libeniting  slaves  for  the  purpose,     ^ext, 

sumn     dn?.Cn  Gela  Dexippus  the  Laced.emonmn   with  the  troops 
iin^r  1  is  c<,inman(l,  he  sent  this  officer  away  to  Peloponnesus-as 
n    1   1  t  trvis     (.rthy  for  his  purpose  and  likely  to  stand  iorjvard  on 
be  Id    of  the  freedom  of  Syracuse.     He  then  consolidated  all  the 
mercenaries  under  one  organization,  officering  them  anew  with  men 

^'^!u  fre.h  milil^iry  levy  and  organization  was  chiefly  accomplished 
duri m'  h  s  s  av  atYeontini.  without  the  opposition  which  won  I 
Sbly  have  arisen  if  it  Imd  been  done  at  Svracuse;  to  which  la 
S^e  Dio  VMius  marched  back,  in  an  attitude  far  more  imposinithai 
when  he  l^t  i        He  now  entered  the  gates  at  the  head  not  only  (f 
his  chosen  bo  y-n-uard   but  also  of  a  regular  army  ot  mercenaries, 
iredr   nd  dqK'm         upon  himsejf.     He  marchea  them  at  one. 
in  o  thi  islet  <>fOrtv<ria  (the  interior  and  strongest  part  ot  the  c u 
^ml^Klin,  the  h^r)>or),  established  1^-. -^"^^  >"  tl'^ -;c.-opoh.    f 
Svracuse.  and  stood  forth  as  despot  conspicuous  y  in  the  e}es  ot  .    • 
TWh  the  general  sentiment  among  the  people  was  one  of  s  lo  g 
remi^nLce   vet  his  powerful  military  force  and  strong  position  le  - 
deml  a    hope  of  open  resistance  desperate.    And  the  popular  assein- 


bly— convoked  under  the  pressure  of  his  force,  and  probably  composed 
of  none  but  his  partisans — was  found  so  subservient  as  to  condemn 
auil  execute,  upon  his  requisition,  Da|)!in;eus  and  Demarchus.  Tiiese 
two  men.  both  weallhy  and  powerful  in  Syracuse,  had  been  his  chief 
opponents,  and  were  seemingly  among  the  very  generals  whom  he 
had  incited  tiie  people  to  massacre  on  the  spot  without  any  form  of 
trial,  in  one  of  tiie  previous  public  assemblies.  One  step  alone  re- 
mained to  decorate  the  igno!)le  origin  of  Dionysius,  and  to  mark  the 
tiiuniph  of  the  Hermokratean  party  by  whoni  its  elevation  had  been 
mainly  brought  about.  He  immediately  married  the  daughter  of 
llorinokrates;  giving  his  own  sister  in  marriage  to  Polyxeiius,  the 
brolher  of  that  deceased  chief. 

Thus  was  consummated  the  fifth  or  closing  act  of  the  despot's  prog- 
ress, rendering  Dionysius  master  of  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  liTs 
fellow-countrymen,  the  successive  stages  of  his  rise  I  have  detailed 
from  Diodorus,  who  (excepting  a  hint  or  two  from  Aristotle)  is  our 
only  informant.  His  authority  is  on  this  occasion  better  than  usual, 
since  lie  had  before  him  not  merely  Euphorus  and  Tima'us,  but  also 
Piiilistus.  lie  is,  moreover,  throughout  this  whole  narrative  at  least 
clear  and  consistent  with  himself.'  We  understand  enouirh  of  the 
political  strategy  pursued  by  Dionysius.  to  pronounce  that  it  was 
adapted  to  Ids  end  with  a  degree  of  skill  that  would  have  greatly 
struck  a  critical  eye  like  :\[achiavel;  whose  analytical  appreciation  of 
means,  when  he  is  canvassing  men  like  Dionysius,  has  been  often 
unfairly  construed  as  if  it  implied  sympathy  wi'lh  and  approbation  of 
their  end.  AYe  see  that  Dionysius.  in  ])utting  himself  forward  as 
the  chief  and  representative  of  the  Hermokratean  partv,  acquired  the 
means  of  emiiloying  a  greater  measure  of  fraud  and  tlelusion  than  an 
exile  Uke  Hermokrates,  in  prosecution  of  the  same  ambitious  pur 
poses.  Favored  by  the  dangers  of  the  state  and  the  auony  of  the  public 
mind,  he  was  enabled  to  stimulate  an  ultra-democrat ical  ardor  both 
in  defense  of  the  people  against  the  rich,  and  in  denunciation  of  tlie 
unsuccessful  or  incompetent  generals,  as  if  they  w^ere  corrupt  trai- 
tors. Though  it  w^ould  seem  that  the  government  of  Syracuse,  in 
406  n.c,  must  have  been  strongly  democrat  ical,  yet  Dionvsius  in  his 
ardor  for  popular  rights,  treats  it  as  an  anti-popular  oliirarchy;  and 
tries  to  acquire  the  favor  of  the  peoi)le  by  placing  himself  "in  tlie 
m(jst  open  quarrel  and  antipathy  to  the  ricii.  Kine  years  before, 
HI  the  debate  between  Hermokrates  and  Athenasroras  in  the  Svra'- 
cu>an  assembly,  the  former  stood  forth,  or  at  least  was  considered 
tostatid  forth,  as  champion  of  the  rich;  while  the  latter. spoke  as  a 
conservative  democrat.  conq)laining  of  conspiracies  on  the  part  of  the 
rich.  In  406  u.o.  the  leader  of  the  Hermokratean  party  has  reversed 
tins  policy,  assuming  a  pretended  democratical  fervoV  much  more 
vioient  than  that  of  Athenagoras.  Dionysius— who  took  up  the 
trade  of  what  is  called  a  demagogue  on  this'^onc  occasion,  simply  for 
tlie  purpose  of  procuring  one  single  vote  in  his  own  favor,  and"thcu 


168 


SICILY. 


PLAN   ()F  GEXEKAL   ATTACK. 


169 


^hrttino- the  door  bv  force  a-ainst  all  future  yo  in- and  all  coirec- 
l  on-mi-^^^^^^^^  to  p-osser  falsehood  than  Athena.iroras;  ^vho,  as 

nnhihin  Speaker,  was  always  before  the  people,  and  even  if  suc- 
cesstul  by  friud  at  one  meeting,  was  nevertheless  oi.en  to  exposure 

''Mn'oX\hat  the  votin-  of  any  public  assembly  shall  be  really 

nvala  le  as  a  pr(>teetion  '?o  the  people,  its  votes  must  not  only  be 

f.h.\  hv  ful   -nid  free  discussion,  but  must  also  be  open  from  time 

r  hue   oViS-u^on  a^^  CO  That  ernn- will  from  tune 

o  time  be  co    mitled,  as  well  by  the  collective  people  as  by  partieu- 

ar    Actio^^^^^  the  i)eople,  is  ceVtain:  opportunity  lor  nnu  ndment  s 

fsS     A  v(,te  which  is  understood  to  be  tinal,  and  never  .dter^ 

w^rd   o  be  c^>n' hdble.  is  one  which  can  liardly  turn  to  the  benefit  of 

l^tcoX  n^^^^-^^^  though  it  may  often,  as  in  the  case  o    Diony- 

si  s^p  omo  e  the  sini  ter  purposes  of  some  desigmng  protector. 


CHAPTER  LXXXII. 

SICILY  DURDsG  THE  DESPOTISM  OF  THE  ELDER  DIONYSIUS  AT 

SYRACUSE. 

TnF  Droceenincr.  recounted  at  the  close  of  my  last  chapter,  where- 
hv  nimrvsh's  er et-ti'd  his  despotism,  can  hardly  have  occupied  les 
^  vn    Ini^nKm  h^  nearly  with  the  first  months  of  40a 

o    dKa        1    i1  0  s,>rin.-'  l.nilkot,  inovfil  f„rwar<    toward  G(   ., 

SI mnires  from  tlie  Carlluisinian  territory  in  Ins  rear.     F"  <   ",\  ' 
arnyo  oppose  l.im,  he  spread  hi.  'rfT'"'' ""',  :;'!;  ?^    m m 
Gel/a.Kl  «t- Ka,narina.  where  much  p  on,  er  "'^'J ';f  ^     '';^  ,        ; 
Dron,.rtv  ruined,     lie  Iheu  relumed  to  a  tack  UOa   a'"^'  ^^'  ';'',;■ 
rfmtitiod  eauip  bv  eleariu,.'  s,.me  phmtat.on-ground  a™,"-^  "^  "^ ,    ' 
the  same  «:>n.'.  between  the  city  and  the  sea.     «"  '    ;.,^i;°' '  ^    i 
without  tli«  walls,  a  colossal  statue  of  Apollo,  -which  Imilkou  cm.  u 
to  be  carried  oil  aiul  sent  as  a  present  to  lyre.  ..•,„„„  f„r 

Gela  was  nt  this  moment  defended  only  by  its  own  citi/.cns  for 
Diontiu    li:ul  called   away  l)..xippus  with   the  ■n^cenary    r    1-^ 
Alarmed  at  the  approach  of  the  for.m. lab  e  ^"f™.^"'^",,,''    '  ^^  .    fl 
Tii-istered  A"ri"entum,    -I  mcra,  and  Scbnus— the  Uelo.i  is  ""-^l"'' 
p;!.iiug  entmaie.s  to  biouysius  for  ai^^    at  the  same  time  rcsoh.nL 


to  send  away  their  w^omen  and  children  for  safety  to  Syracuse.  But 
the  women,  to  whom  the  idea  of  separation  was  intolerable,  suppli- 
cated so  earnestly  to  be  allowed  to  stay  and  share  the  fortunes  of 
their  fathers  and  luisbands,  that  this  resolution  was  abandoned.  In 
expectation  of  speedy  relief  from  Ditmysius,  the  defense  was  bi-ave 
and  energetic.  VVliile  parties  of  the  Geloaus,  well  acquainted  with 
the  country,  sallied  out  and  acted  with  great  partial  success  airaiust 
fhe  Carlhaginian  plunderers— the  mass  of  the  citizens  rejielled  the 
assaults  of  Imilkon  against  the  walls.  His  battering-machines  and 
stonning-parties  were  brought  to  bear  on  several  places  at  once;  the 
walls  themselves— being  neither  in  so  good  a  condition,  nor  placed 
iil)on  so  unassailable  an  eminence,  as  those  of  A.£:ri!rentuin— gave  way 
ou  more  than  one  point.  Yet  still  the  besieged,' w^lth  obstinate  valor, 
fnislraled  every  attempt  to  penetrate  within;  re-establishing  duriui^ 
the  night  the  breaches  which  had  been  made  during  the  day.  The 
feebler  part  of  their  population  aided,  by  every  incturs  in  their  power, 
the  warriors  on  the  battlements;  so  the  defense  was  thus  made  good 
until  Dionysius  appeared  with  the  long-ex}jected  re-enforcement.  It 
comprised  his  newly  levied  mercenaries,  with  the  Svraeusan  citizens, 
and  succors  from  the  Italian  as  well  as  fi-oni  the*^  Sicilian  Greeks' 
amounting  in  all  to  50,000  men,  according  to  Ephorns— to  30,00() 
foot,  and  1000  horse,  as  Tinui!us  representcnl.  A  lleet  of  fifty  ships 
of  war  sailed  round  Cape  Pachynus  to  co-operate  with  them  olT 
G(;la. 

Dionysius  fixed  his  position  betw^een  Gda  and  the  sea,  opposite  to 
tliat  of  the  CartJiaginians,  and  in  inunediate  communication  with  his 
fleet.  His  presence  having  suspended  the  assaults  upon  the  town, 
lie  became  in  his  turn  the  aggressor;  employing  both  his  cavalry  and 
liis  fleet  to  harass  the  Carthaginians  and  'intercept  their  supplies. 
The  contest  now  assumed  a  character  nearly  the  same  as  had  taken 
place  before  Agrigentum,  and  \n  hich  had  ended  so  unfavorably  to 
the  Greeks.  At  length,  after  twenty  days  of  such  desultory  waifare, 
Dionysius,  finding  that  he  had  accomplislied  little,  laid  his  plan  for 
a  direct  attack  upon  the  Carthaginian  camp.  On  the  side  towarJ^^ 
sea,  as  no  danger  had  been  expected,  that  camp  was  unfortifie(^it 
was  there,  accordingly,  that  Dionysius  resolved  to  make  his  i)rinci- 
Pid  attack  with  his  left  division,  consisting  principally  of  Italiot 
(iiecks,  sustained  by  the  Syracusan  ships,  who  were  to  attack  simul- 
taneously from  seaward.  He  designed  at  the  same  time  also  to  strike 
blows  from  two  other  points.  His  right  division,  consi.stinii-  of 
^ieiliau  allies,  was  ordered  to  march  on  the  right  or  western  si(ie  of 
the  town  of  Gela,  and  thus  fall  upon  the  left  of  the  Carthaginian 
camp;  while  he  himself,  with -the  mercenary  tioops  which  he  kept 
specially  anmnd  him,  intended  to  advance  through  the  town  itself, 
anil  assail  the  advanced  or  central  portion  of  their  position  near  tiie 
W;»lls,  where  their  battering-maehineiy  was  posted.  His  cavalry 
Were  directed  to  hold  themselves  in  reserve  for  pursuit,  in  case  the 


170 


SICILY 


CllAKGKS    OF   TMEACIIEUV 


171 


attack  proved  successful ;  or  for  protection  to  the  retreating  infantry, 

'" Of Thi' combined  scl.eme.  the  attack  upon  the  left  or  seawanl  side 
,.f Vw  C-irtl  "inian  cam,,,  l>v  tlie  Italiot  division  and  tlic  Heet  m 
"*  ri  mJ  "ffp  iveK-  executed  iu.<i  promised  at  first  to  1)0  suecess- 
Jur'-n.  "s.^la  t  oVerthr;^^  buFwarks,  forced  tlK.ir  «av  into 
,  ,^!   w,.rf.  niilv  driven  out  bv  extraordinary  ertorts  on  tie 

t^.H'oT'^^i.rl.fc'der     c    Jtt^^^  and  Can.panians.  but  re-e,,. 

Fnued  from  the  "tier  portions  of  the  army,  xvhich  m-re  as.ye  .in- 
toite.1  ™'"  '"'^  7  '^  '  ,|,^.r  divisions  of  Dionysius,  the  right  did 
not  nSk  ^m  i    10  ig     fte     Ihe   moment  intended,  and  the  center 

1    P      Prolr  bh  The  streets,  as  in  so  many  otlier  aneieiU  Knvns.  ^^'vr, 

E^u3=irirft^d^fe!;rt^^^^^^^^ 

itlt-le   b     t  e  ,o,,',>,,.,e,;t   force  of  the  "'"V\^'"'''riF'f;:nn.i'T l.t 
Di  m?iius  "aud  his   mercenari.'S,  coming  up  later  still,    found       . 
Uie  moment  for  attack  had  passed  altogether,  and  returned  back  into 
thp  rltv  without  ficlilinu"  at  all.  ,    ,,  ,y„ 

'  W^^tl  e    the  phin  or  the  execution  was  here  at  ^n^^lt;^-or  l:oth 
one  and  the  otliev-we  are  unable  certainly  to  determ  nc,     The  e  ^M 
nn  k'u  re  sons  lor  suspecting  that  Dionysius  was  "ot  displeased  at  ^ 
r  ?.u^^ldch  should  discourage  his  arn.y.  ^^^^'J^'^.^.'^^^J^ 
ab'andoninii   Gela.     After  retiring  again  witlnn  ^^'^.^   '^l^'  ^  f^  ^jf,' 
ton-ether  lii^s  principal  friends  to  consult  what  was  best  to  be  cum. 
A fl  were  of  opinion  that  it  was  in-prudent  to  inc^r  la^thc.-  laza  d 
i«Lnreservation  of  the  town.     Dionysnis  now  found  h  n  se  f  u 
Wk  position  as  Dickies  after  the  defc  at  near  1  iniera,  and  '^^  ^  ;'    ' 
'^s  and  the  other  ^yracusan  generals  before  Agrigcntuni    aftei    lu 
capture  of  their  provision-fleet  by  the  Cartliagmians.     He  IcU  cod 
siS'o  abandon  Gela.  taking  the  best  nu-ans  >"   1^^  r^^vver  fm J 
tectino-  the  escape  of  the  inhabitants.     Accordingly,  to  keep  1  i      ■ 
teuton  of  flioht^secret.  he  sent  a  herald  tolmilkon  to  ^-/^^^^    ^  '     jj 
t  uce  for  the^^nsuing  day;  he  .also  set  apar    nj^oc  y  of  ^^^;;;^ 
tvoon«   with  orders  to  make  noises  in  front  ot    he  cncni}  ihicii^ii 
u"^S:hc:jc:^ght,  and  to  keep  the  lights  and  «-«  burj-S;  ^-^^a!: 
prevent  any  suspicion  on   the  part   of   the   ^^/J* ;  f^^^^^^/^,,^       to 
cover  of  these   precautions,   he   caused   the   Gcloan   !■<  b^»»'  l       j,, 

evacuate  their  cily  in  mass  at  the  -^-----;;;^;\^^'|^!;^:^    t  lei^ 
himself  with  his  main  asmy  follovau  at  n..(lnighl  to  i  .o.cc. 


All  hurried  forward  on  their  inarch   to  Syracuse,  turnini^  to  best 
account  the  hours  of  darkness.     On  their  way  thither  lay  Kamarina 
—  Kaniarina  the   immovable,  as   it  was   pronounced  '  by" an   ancient 
or:icle  or  legend,  yet  on  that  fatal  night  seetning  to  falsify  the  ephi- 
tlK-'t.     Not  thinking  himself  competent  to  defend  this  city,' Dionysius 
forced,  all   the  Kamarin.e;m  population  to  become  partners  in  the 
tlight  of  the  Geloans.     The  same  heart-rendiniz;  scene,  which  has 
already  been  recounted  at  Agrigentum  and  ilimera,  was  now^  seen 
rcp.'atedou  the  road  fro:nG.'la  to  Syracuse;  a  fugitive  multitude, 
of  all  ages  and  of  both  sexes,  free  as  well  as  slave,  (lestitute  and  ter- 
ror-stricken,  hurrying  tht-y  knew  not  whither,   to  get  beyond  the 
reach  of  a  merciless  enemy.     The  tliuht  to  Syracuse,  however,  was 
fortunately  not  molested  by  any  pursuit.     At'davbreak  the  Cartha- 
gir.ians.    discovering  the   abandonment    of  the 'city,    irainediately 
rushed  in  and  took  possessi«)u  f)f  it.     As  very  little  of  the  valuable 
jiroperty  within  it  had   b"en  removed  a  rich  plunder  fell  into  the 
lifinds  of  the  conquering  ho.^t,  whose  baibarous  hands  massacred  in- 
discriminately the  miserable  remnant  left  behind;  old  men,  sick,  and 
children,  unable  to  accompany  a  flight   so  sudden   and   so  rapid. 
Some  of  the  conquerors  farther  satiaied  their  ferocious  instincts  by 
eracifying  or  mutilating  these  unhappy  prisoners. 

Amid  the  sulTerings   of  this  distressed  multitude,   how^ever,  and 
tli'j  compassion  of  the  protecting  army,  otiier  feeliutrs  also  were 
po\v(>rfu!ly  aroused.     Dio-iysius,  who  had  been  so  unmeasured  and 
so  effective  in  calumniating  unsuccessful  generals  before   was  now 
lumself  exposed   to   the  same  arrows.     Fierce  were   the   bursts   of 
wrath  and  hatred  against  him,  both  among  the  fugitives  and  among 
the  army.     He  was  accused  of  having  betrayed  to'thc  Carthaginians' 
not  only  the  army,  but  also  G  da  and  Kaniarina,  in  onier  that  the 
Syracusans,  intimidated  by  these  formidable  neigh])or8  so  close  to 
their  borders,  might  remain  in  patient  servitude  under  his  dominion. 
It  was  remarked  that  his  achievements  for  the  relief  of  Gela  had 
b'cn  unworthy  of  the  large  force  which  he  brouirht  with  him;  that 
tile  loss  sustained  in  the  recent  battle  had  been  nowise  sufficient  to 
c-oiiipel.  or  even  to  excuse,  a  disgraceful  flight;  that  the  mercenaries 
especially,  the  force  upon  which  lie  most'  relied,  had  not  only  su.s- 
t:uned  no  loss,  but  had  never  been  brought  into  action;  that  while 
m  measures  taken  against  the  enemy  had  thus  been  partial  and  in- 
c'ncient,  they  on  their  side  had  manifested  no  disposition  to  pursue 
'i!U  iu  his  flight— thus  affording  a  strong  presumption  of  connivance 
iK'tween  them.     Dionysius  was  denounced  as  a  traitor  by  all— ex- 
cept his  own   mercenaries,  wdiom  he   always  kept  near  hhn  for 
sj^curity.     The  Italiot  allies,  who  had  made  the  attack  and  sustained 
tiie  main  loss  during  the  recent  battle,  were  so  incensed  against  him 
lor  having  left  them  thus  unsup])orted,  that  they  retired  in  a  body, 
and  marched  across  the  center  of  the  island  home  to  Italy 

I^ut  the  Syracusans  in  the  army,  especially  the   horsemen,   the 


170 


SICILY. 


CHARGES    OF   TlJEACllEUr. 


171 


attack  proved  successful;  or  for  protection  to  the  retreating  infantry, 

'""Of't'ii'  combine(l  scheme,  the  attack  upon  the  left  or  seaward  side 
,,f?L  ('irt    H.nan  camp,  hv  the  llaliot  division  and  the  fleet  m 
i  vt   wM^  effcc   vcdv  executed,  and  promised  at  first  to  be  success- 
ful    tI.    "s^^ant^^  ^^^^^^^^^^^  bulwarks,  forced  their  way  into 
the  can  p  and  were  only  driven  out  by  extraordmarv  eftorts  on  the 
nm     ^111     d^^                             Iberians  and  Campaiuans,  but  re-en- 
force   from  the  other  portions  of  the  army,  which  were  as  ye   im- 
Zested      But  o^-  the  two  other  divisions  of  Dionysms,  the  right  (  ul 
nt  a  tack  until  Ion-  after  the   moment  intended,  and  tlie  ceulcr 
ctI  -ttt-k"    at^^                           had  to  make   a  circuitous  mnnlu 
ove^ti^^^-  Gehnm  plain  romurUn-  city,  which  occupied  lor.ger  t  me 
?7lut]hHm  calculated-    while   Dionvsius  with  the  merceuaius 
^o   nd  hinM   tem^^^^^^^^^^                 tlu-ough  the  city,  found  themselves 
r  billed  and  ei^.arrassed  that  they  '-^^ -^^ ^1'-  V-ojri.^; 
•iml  Avere  vet  lon.'-er  before   thev  could  emerge  on  the  (  aithaLinh.a 
si  e      Pro^  ably  the  streets,  as  in  so  many  other  anciei.t  to^us   were 
crooked   narrow,  and  irregular;  perhaps  r.lso,  tarther  bloelvcd  up  h 
Precautions  recen       taken  for  defense.     And  thus  the  Sicilir.ns  on 

ad  been  akeX  r^TulWd,  were  compelled  to  retreat  after  a  bravo 
Itit^rb     the  conl^  force  of  the  u.ain  (arthagiman  arm). 

t\    n?'his   and  his    mercenaries,   coming  up  later  stilK    Icund   that 
Uie  moment  for  attack  had  passed  altogether,  and  returned  back  uito 

the  citv  without  fighting  at  all.  ,  r     ^^      r.^  i>nih  iV.o 

Whither  the  plan  or  the  execution  was  here  at  ^"^'.^^'-^I-/'^^;;\.  | 
on    and  the  othlr-we  are  unable  certainlv  to  determine.     The  e  vul 
appe  r  reasons  lor  suspecting  tliat  Dionysius  was  "«V^''^Ivm   .  Ir 
r  ?.u  se  which  should  discourage  his  ain.y.  and  fimnsli  ^V^^xcuk    n 
ab'andonin-   Gela.     After  retiring  again  within  the  ^^  alls,  he  cah  a 
together  hi^  principal  friends  to\-onsult  what  was  best    o  ^e  d  n . 
Ad  were  of  opinion  tluit  it  was  imprudeni  to  incAir  farther  laza  ul 
gLieservati'on  of  the  town.     Dionysius  now' found  himse  f  in   1  e 
Sfe  position  as  Diokles  after  the  defeat  near  1  imera,  and  '^^  J  ;'    ' 
nl^is  and  the  other  ^yracusan  generals  before  Agngentu.n,  af tei  _tbc 
c'ptu^  of  their  provision-feet  by  the  Carthaginians.     He  ielt  cod- 
siS'o  abandon  Gela.  taking  the  best  means  ^"   l^^  r^^^^^^J 
tectino-  the  escape  of  the  inhabitants.     Accordingly,  to  keep  t  i      • 
Slight  secret,  he  sent  a  herald  tol-jlkon  to  s<^icini     n 
truce  for  the  ensuing  day;  he  also  set  ^i;^^^'^,  f,  ^  ^^^^^^^^^ 
troon«   witli  orders  to  make  noises  m  front  of  the  enem}  tinru  ii 
t  H-hole  nWht,  and  to  keep  the  lights  and  fires  burning,  so  ^.>     ; 
pev^enranv  suspicion  on   the  part   of   the   ^^^^'^'^'g'"''^^'^;  .-^ i'  ,  , 
■ove    of  the.se   precautions,   he   caused   the   Ge  oan  f^^^^^ 
evacuate  their  city  in  mass  at;he  commenceme  n   ^^^^  ^^^^:^/'    em. 
himself  with  his  main  aimy  follov.td  at  ii.idmght  to  i^o.ctt  uiei 


All  hurried  forward  on   their  inrtrch   to  Svracuse,  tuniiii«r  to  best 
account  the  hours  of  darkness.     On  tlieir  way  thither  lay  Kamarina 
—  Kaniarina   the   immovable,  as   it  was   pronounced 'by  an   ancient 
or:icle  or  legend,  yet  on  that  fatal  night  seeming  to  faisifv  the  ephi- 
thet.     Not  thinking  himself  competent  to  defend  this  city,"  Dionysius 
forced,  all   the  Kamariiuean  population  to  become  par'tners  in  the 
flight  of  the  Geloans.     The  same  heart-rendin«r  scene,  which  has 
already  been  recounted  at  Agrigentuni  and  llimera,  was  now  seen 
ivp.'atedon  the  road  fro;n  G.'la  to  Syracuse;  a  fugitive  multitude, 
of  all  ages  and  of  both  sexes,  free  as  well  as  slave,  destitute  and  ter- 
ror-stricken,  huirying  th-y  knew  not   whither,   to  get  beyond  the 
reach  of  a  merciless  enemy.     The  tliuht  to  Svracuse,  however,  was 
fortunately  not  molested  by  any  pursuit.     At'davbreak  tlie  Cartha- 
ginians,   discovering  the   ahandomneut    of  the 'city,    immediately 
rushed  in  and  took  possession  of  it.     As  very  little  of  the  valuable 
l)r()perty  within  it  had   b"en  n^moved,  a  rich  plunder  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  conquerinir  host,  whose  barbarous  hands  massacred  in- 
discriminately the  mis.'iMble  remnant  left  behind;  old  men,  sick,  and 
children,  unable  to  accompany  a  fiiuht   so  sudden   and   so  rapid. 
Some  of  the  conqu-rors  farther  satiaied  their  ferocious  instincts  by 
crucifying  or  mutilating  these  unliappy  prisoners. 

Ainid  the  suiTerings^  of  this  distressed  multitude,   how^ever,  and 
tlie  compassion  of  the  protecting  army,  other  feeliuirs  also  were 
powerfully  aroused.     Dionysius,  who  had  been  so  unnieasured  and 
-')  effective  in  calumniating  unsuccessful  generals  before   was  now 
himself  exposed   to   the  same  arrows.     Fierce  were  the   bursts   of 
wrath  and  hatred  against  him.  both  among  the  fim:it  ives  and  among 
'lie;u*my.     He  was  a(;cused  of  having  betrayed  to'tlie  Cartha2:inians' 
not  only  the  army,  but  also  G^la  and  Kaniarina,  in  order  that  the 
Syiacusans,  intimidated  by  these  formidable  neighbors  so  close  to 
tlieir  borders,  might  remain  in  patient  servitude  under  his  dominion. 
It  was  remarked  that  his  achievements  for  the  relief  of  Gela  had 
b'cn  unworthy  of  the  large  force  which  he  brouuht  with  him;  that 
the  loss  sustained  in  the  recent  battle  had  been  nowise  sufficient  to 
eonipel,  or  even  to  excuse,  a  disgraceful  tliglit;  that  ti>e  mercenaries 
especially,  the  force  upon  wdiicli  he  most^  relied,  had  not  only  sus- 
t:iined  no  loss,  but  had  never  been  bnmght  into  action;  that  while 
11!^  measures  taken  against  the  enemy  had  thus  been  partial  and  in- 
(;;neient,  they  on  their  side  had  manifested  no  disposition  to  pursue 
liiin  in  his  flight— thus  affording  a  strong  presumption  of  connivance 
iH'tween  them.     Dionysius  was  denounced  as  a  traitor  by  all— ex- 
••<n)t  his  own   mercenaries,  whom  he  always   kept  near  hun   for 
S'Turity.     The  Italiot  allies,  who  had  made  the  attack  and  sustained 
file  main  loss  during  the  recent  battle,  were  so  incensed  against  him 
tor  having  left  them  thus  unsiip])orted,  that  they  retired  in  a  body, 
i^D(l  marched  across  the  center  of  the  island  home  to  Italy 

But  the  Syracusaus  in  the  army,  especially  the   horsemen,   the 


172 


SICILY. 


DIOXYSILS  JIASTEU  OF  SYUACL'SE. 


173 


•    .!,„  ,.Hv   Irul  a  double  cround  of  anger  ajraiiist 

veeciit  enterpnse,  but  J       '"  FS  ^^^■^^  despotism,  baving  be<n 

j„.t  erected  over  !''«,  '  "^ ,  ' ;  ;:,,„,,,,a,ed  by  violenee.  was  now 
•ommenced  in  gross  f"  K,^,  '  '  •  wbiel.  it  had  ever  vvorn-snice 
d<.prlved  of  tbc  only  Pl''"S'^'',,i~'';".X  iv  unsueeessful  against  the 
Di'anysius.bad  '^'^^  ^"^^.I'^^'/Ss  '  on.  be  bad  denounced  am 
Cartbaaiiuans,  as  tbose  o'  '"-'.?;,  ,,'',_u.^.,  of  one  wliom  iIk'V  bated 
superseded.  Determined  to  > ''  <''^"  ^^  s  ,,.„", sau  borsen.eu  watebed 
M^onee  as  a  despot  '"'l^.*/' '™i^„''iionp  s  during  .be  retreat,  and 
lV,r  an  opportunity  ''  ,f,'^''^"t,  J'  ",,  .aveluUv  iiiavded  by  Ibe  mer- 
Uilling  liim.     But  finding  l""'  "  '  "_       ■„  ■.    ,„.„t  „fE  in  a  Iwdy, 

and  rode  at  tbeir  best  ^IH'i d   o  ^.|'''\";     Ueepiiu:  out  Dionysius.    As 

establisldng  tbc  f"->-'">'^"' "f  , '  .     .■,i  b  on  v  -(eivi.l  of  tbe  defeat  and 

bev  arriv<.d  be  ore  »/;>; .  »  '  |^,,  '    ^^      n^^^^^^^^   imp<'din,ent  into  tl,c 

flight  at  Gela,  tbey  obta  .id  .ds.^ion  ^,„„,„|,„„,ing  Ibe  docks 

islet  of  Ortygia;  ">^1\"X  \les^^  for  >  «  o«"  resi.ience  and  power, 
an.l  barbor,  set  apart  b)   ^'^/''f';  ',     ,  "..red  tbe  bouse  of  Dionysii.s 
They  immediately  ?^,-^\'  "'   „{^"    H      - ,  1,  silver,  and  valuables  of 
wliichtbev  found  richly  f'loc'^"'  ^v   "  <.„\veeks;  so  that  be  mast 
0 V cry  kind.    He  bad  been  (U;spo      .a  a   <      wu K  ;„„,  „„j 

have  begun  betimes  to  ''''^P:''  ''".;„':  ;'i\a,L,,  Tbe  iissailants  not 
his  own^rivate  properly  "f,;' ^'^'  ,'.!,„., vSdth.  but'also mallrent. 
„,dy  plundered  1"-  ->;j«,  ^  ;f,  ;'  d  die,l  of  the  outrage.  Against 
ed  his  wite  so  brutal!  V  '"'  ■•™"''\  ,,,  ei.,,,risbed  a  double  anlipa  bv, 
this  unfortunate  w.,ma.i.l^^l>.'>^^^^^  „,,  j„„„,„er  of  Ibr- 
not  on  y  as  the  wife  ot   •>'">">•'"■'  ,   abroad  the  news  that 

"lokrates.     Tbev  at  '"<;/•'"»,  J'^^  ?  r    lev  fuUy  <-<u.fided  in  the 
Pionvsius  bad  fled  "^'y^'V",!^*"™,!  amon<.-tbe  retiring  army,  an. 
disruption  which  they  ^i"  , 'Vl  "^     ,  ,1    h^  nl   universally   cMUX^sc,! 
in  the  tierce  wrath  Y>"">   '  ''^>  ., .'; ,^'  ,  's  armv,  together  with  Gela 
airainst  him.     ^  ter  baun;  b    r.,^>d  "  .-        ^^.i,,,^,,,  ,,„j,  ...al 

and  Kamarina,   to  the  •^''""'•>;=^  ""^  ,;.,a  i,e<ai  (■xposed,  disgiared, 
ground  of  ueeessitv  ('I'^V'J'jr'^'rforl  he       s    displeasure  of  bis  o«.. 

Snd  forced  to  flee  '."  ^"'''^^  i,  ;^.^';[f,e  v"^  »  ™-  f"'"-  "'"'  ""=^'  "" 
awakened  f^"'"^"  If'  fnrnVivlier  popular  government, 
the  morrow,  reconstitute  ?'";■''>''.' ^^I.'iVmble  precautions  again?' 
Had  these  Svracusans  taken  an)  ^J^^^^^^,,,,,};,,.  ,,ave  provcl  cor 
adverse  possibilities,  their,  "s.^'"''"<^fx,  V'''„  ',,,.,.„  ended  I5ut  whi.i 
?ect.    The  career  of  ^''^"^"^Z^^nJ^^^^^^^^  ""d  brutal  out; 

they  abandoned  thfjf  ^  ^^  ^^.^'^'^.rrasb  v  confi.lent  in  his  sup.pe^« 
rage  against  his  wife   tin  >  ^y/^  ^^  '„'',„,,;Vv  of  the  insular  port  ion  o 


army,  and  well  knowing  their  sentiments,  he  immediately  divined 
iheir  projects,  and  saw  that  he  could  only  defeat  them  by  audacity 
and  suddeuncss  of  attack.  Accordingly,  putting  himself  at  the  hea'd 
of  hi.s  best  and  most  devoted  soldiers — 100  horsemen  and  600  foot — 
ho  left  his  army  and  proceeded  b}'  a  forced  marcli  to  Syracuse;  a 
distance  cf  400  stadia,  or  about  45  English  miles.  He  arrived  there 
a'jout  midulglit,  and  presented  himself,  not  at  the  gate  of  Ortygia, 
Avhich  he  had  probably  ascertained  to  be  in  possession  of  his  ene- 
mies, but  at  that  of  Achradiua  which  latter  (as  has  been  already 
mentioned)  formed  a  separate  fortification  from  Ortygia,  willi  the 
Nekropolis  bet\ve(Mi  them.  Though  the  gate  was  shut,  he  presently 
discovered  it  to  be  unguarded,  and  was  enabled  to  apply  to  it  some 
reeds  gathered  in  the  marshes  on  his  road,  so  as  to  set  it  on  fire 
and  burn  it.  So  eager  had  he  been  for  celerity  of  progress,  that  at 
the  moment  when  he  reached  the  gate,  a  part  only  of  his  division 
were  with  him,  'But  as  the  rest  arrived  while  the  flames  were  doing 
their  work,  he  entered,  with  the  whole  body,  into  Achradiua  or  the 
outer  city.  Marching  rapidly  through  the  streets,  he  became  master, 
without  Vesisiance,  of  all  this  portion  of  the  city,  and  of  the  agora,  or 
market  place,  which  formed  its  chief  open  space.  Ills  principal 
enemies,  astounded  by  this  alarming  news,  hastened  out  of  Ortygia 
into  Achradiua,  and  tried  to  occupy  the  agora.  But  they  found  it 
already  in  possession  of  Dionysius:  and  being  themselves  very  few 
in  nuiliber.'having  taken  no  time  to  get  together  any  considerable 
armed  body,  they  were  overpowered  and  slain  ])y  his  mercenaries. 
Dionysius  was  thus  strong  enough  to  vanquish  all  his  enemies,  who 
catered  Achradiua  in  small  and  successive  parties,  without  any 
order,  as  they  came  out  of  Ortygia.  lie  then  proceeded  to  attack 
the  houses  of  those  whom  he  knew  to  be  unfriendly  to  his  dominion, 
sk^w  such  as  he  could  find  within,  and  forced  the  rest  to  seek  shelter 
in  exile.  The  great  body  of  the  Syracusan  horsemen — who  but  the 
the  evening  before  were  masters  of  the  city,  and  might  with  com- 
mon prudence  have  maintained  themselves  in  it — were  thus  either 
destroyed  or  driven  into  banishment.  As  exiles  they  established 
themselves  in  the  town  of  ^Etna. 

Thus  master  of  the  city,  Dionysius  was  joined  on  the  ensuing  day 
by  the  Sicilian  jillies,  who  had  now  completed  their  march.  The 
niis  Table  sufferers  from  Gela  and  Kamarina,  who  looked  upon  him 
with  indignation  as  their  betrayer — went  to  reside  atLeontini;  seem- 
iiigl}'  as  companions  of  the  original  Leontine  citizens,  who  had  been 
for  some  time  domiciliated  at  Syracuse,  but  who  no  longer  chose  to 
remain  there  under  Dionysius.  Leontini  thus  became  again  an  inde- 
pendent city, 

Though  the  disasters  at  Gela  had  threatened  to  ruin  Dionysius,  yet 
he  was  now,  through  his  recent  victory,  more  master  of  S^Tacuse 
than  ever;  and  had  more  completely  trodden  down  his  opponents. 
The  horsemen  whom  he  had  just  destroyed  and  chased  away,  were 


174 


SICILY. 


{SYMPATHY   (;F   SPARTA. 


175 


TiK-re  xvaMio  P";'^^^,;''^','^^,'^.,,^,:^^  at,  Gci  i  and  Kamarina,  and 

had  to  rc'naerax:c<,iuu  of     M>roci tan  ^^.^^^^^^  ^^^^^^ 

ss. St '^3H  ;;  sir 

:;;:nTf  upon  whilh  his'Jule  re^teU,  were  now  move  u.unifesl  and  n.ore 

•^"tJtwill'.sKndhi-  such    connruH.,1    position,   lunvcvor,  nim,vsi„s 
• ,  r^i    1  iveTound  defcnM-  (imi.-ull    if  In.ilkon  liad  nmrclied  ou 

™  ce   ",iii c^cnn  c  .ponlaneously  tenaer.-.!  by  the  Cart h,|,iru,uu,  gen- 

'''o''"Tt''h:halntants  of  I.oontini  an.l  Messene.  a.-cll  a.  alltheSikel 
jul'iiil-itauts,  sl.all  be  iiuUliendent  and  antoiu  nu.r.s. 

•S    The  Svracusans  f^l'^'l""' '^"''■iV":*  "\'*,"'"'"'T;,.,  .idr«  cb-tll  be 
i?    All  thi'  captives,  and  idl  tlie  ships,  taken  on  hot'.,  ndes,  shall  be 

""Sl'vJreMhe'conai.ions  upon  .vhieh  V^f<-^^^^::^,^::-:!^t 

?]r^i.:r^Xcr-"-H^;:^;;"'s^;'^.oi^^ 

f  4i     V     vet  -  Sv rac.  s  •  v  as,  after  all.  the  gr.'at  pvi/.o  to  be  obtained 

mmssmmi 

^v..  vi  U.(Uw  a  pestiU-niial  distc  mp^'i".  ^vlnch  is  said  to  have  tlestK  cd 
^r^^^r  V  t  e  1  alt  ot  it  ftnd  lo  have  forbidden  future  operations,  lie 
annoi.:^:^rl^  ^  this  event,  howevel^  ^^'^^i;^"^:^ 
exact,  comes  to  us  in  a  way  somewhat  ^'«n^^^^^'^^-_^";;^;^,f  Vm-o.^-^ion 
as  one  of  the  articles  in  the  treaty,  the  express  '-^^'^^^^'^i^'^i^l'^:  V,,n 
?h>rt  -The  Syraeusans  shall  be  subject  to  Dionysius  -we  discern 


betrnyed  Gela  and  Kaniariim  to  the  Cartlm.iiiniaus  in  order  to  assure 
Ills  own  dominion  at  Syracuse.  The  Carthag-inians,  in  reu()UHcin<r 
all  pretensions  to  Svraca^e  and  recoirnizing  its  autonomy,  could  have 
no  interest  in  dicta'tinu-  its  internal  ijjovernment.  If  tlu^y  determined 
to  recoa-nize  by  formal  treaty  the  sovereis-nty  as  vested  in  Dionysius, 
we  may  fairh'  conclude  that  he  had  purchased  the  favor  from  thcni 
by  some  underhand  service  ])reviously  rendered.  In  like  manner 
both  lliketas  and  Agathokles— the  latter  being  the  successor,  and  in 
so  many  points  the'paralhd  of  Dionysius,  ninety  years  afterward- 
availed  themselves  of  Carthaginian  support  as  oue  stepping  stone  to 
the  despotism  of  Syracuse. 

The  pestilence,  however,  among  the  C'arlhaginian  army,  is  said  to 
have  been  so  terrible  as  to  destroy  nearly  the  half  of  their  numlKirs. 
The  remaininu:  half,  on  returning  to  Africa,  either  found  it  already 
th(M-e,  or  carried  it  with  them;  for  the  mortality  at  and  around  Car- 
thau'e  was  not  less  deplorable  than  in  Sicily. 

iFwas  in  the  sumiiR-r  of  405  n  c.  that  this  treaty  was  concluded, 
which  ccmsigned  all  the  Ilelienic  ground  on  the  south  of  Sicily  to  the 
C>arth:iij:inian  dominion,  and  Syracuse  with  its  pop\dali<m  to  that  of 
Dionysius.  It  Avas  in  September  or  October  of  the  same  year  that 
Lysaiider  effected  his  capture  of  the  enlire  Athenian  lleet  at  ^]gos- 
potami,  destroyed  the  maritime  as(;endency  and  power  of  Athens, 
and  gave  commencement  to  tiie  Lacedinnonian  empire,  completed 
by  the  actual  surrender  of  Athens  during  the  ensuing  year.  The 
Dekarchles  and  llarmosts.  planted  by  Lysander  in  so  many  cities  of 
the  central  Hellenic  world,  ccinunenced  their  disastrous  working 
nearly  at  the  same  time  as  the  despotism  of  Dionysius  in  Syracuse. 
This  "is  a  point  to  be  boriHi  in  mind,  in  reference  to  the  coming  period. 
The  new  position  and  policy  wherein  Sparta  now  became  involved, 
imparted  to  her  a  sympathy" with  Dionysius  such  as  in  earlier  times 
she  probably  would  not  have  felt;  aiurwhich  contributed  materially, 
in  a  secondary  way,  to  the  durability  of  his  dominion,  as  well  by 
positive  intriiiues  *of  Lacedajuionian  agents,  as  by  depriving  the 
op])ressed  Syracusans  of  effective  aid  or  countenance  from  Corinth  or 
oilier  parts  of  Greece. 

The  period  immediately  succeeding  this  peace  was  one  of  distress, 
depression,  and  alarm,  throughout  all  the  south  of  Sicily.  According 
to  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  Gela  and  Kamarina  might  be  reoccupied 
hy  their  fugitive  population;  yet  with  demolished  walls— wiih  all 
traces  of  previous  opulence  an(f  comfort  effaced  by  tlie  plunderers— 
and  under  the  necessity  of  paying  tribute  to  Carthage.  The  condi- 
tion of  Agria:entum,  Selinus.'and  Himera,  now^  actually  portions  of 
Carthauinlan^territory,  w^as  worst;;  especiajly  Agrigentum,  hurled  at 
one  blow  from  the  loftiest  pinnacle  of  prosperous  in<lependence.  ^o 
free  Hellenic  territorv  was  any  longer  to  be  found  between  Cape 
Pachynus  and  Cap(^  LilvlKCum,"'  l)eyond  the  Syracusan  frontier. 

Amid  the  profound  discouragement  of   the  Syracusan  mind,  the 


170 


SICILV 


PUoPr/iiTY. 


177 


Avithdrawjil  from  Sicily  of  the  tcrrnr-st liking  Cnrtliaginian  army 
would  be  felt  as  a  relief,  and  would  procure  credit  for  Dionysiu^. 
It  had  been  brouirht  about  under  him,  though  not  as  a  consequence 
of  his  exploits;  for  his  military  operations  aj,^iiu8t  liiiiikon  at  Gela 
lind  been  completely  unsuccessful  (and  even  worse);  and  the  Cartha- 
cinians  had  suffered  no  harm  except  from  the  pestilence.  While  his 
partisans  had  thus  a  plea  for  extolling-  him  ms  the  savior  of  the  city, 
he  also  gathered  strength  in  other  ways  out  of  the  recent  events.  He 
liad  obtained  a  formaf  recognition  of  his  government  from  the  Car- 
thaginians;  he  had  deslroved  or  banished  the  chief  Syracusan  citi- 
zens opposed  to  Ids  dominnm.  and  struck  terror  into  the  rest;  he  had 
brouirht  back  all  his  mercenarv  troops  and  guards,  without  loss  or 
dissausfaction.  He  now  availed  himself  of  his  temporary  strength 
to  provide  precautions  for  perpetuity,  before  the  Syracusans  should 
recover  spirit,  or  obtain  a  favorable  opportunity,  to  resist. 

His  first  measure  was  to  increase  the  fortifications  of  the  islet  called 
Ortvi'ia,  strengthening  it  as  a  position  to  be  hehl  separately  from 
Achradina  and  the  remaining  city.  He  constructed  a  new  wall, 
provided  with  loftv  turrets  and  elaborate  defenses  of  every  kind. 
immediately  outside  of  the  mole  Avhich  connected  this  islet  with 
Sicily.  On  the  outside  of  this  new  wall,  he  provided  convenient 
places  for  transacting  business,  porticoes  spacious  enough  to  shelter 
a  considerable  multitude,  and  seemingly  a  distinct  strong  fort,  destined 
for  a  public  magazine  of  corn.  It  suited  his  puri)ose  that  the  trade  of 
the  town  should  be  carried  on,  and  the  persons  of  the  traders  congre- 
gated, under  or  near  the  outer  walls  of  his  i>eculiar  fortress.  As  a 
farther  means  of  security,  he  also  erected  a  distinct  citadel  or  acrop- 
olis within  the  islet  and  behind  the  new  wall.  The  citadel  was 
close  to  the  Lesser  Harbor  or  Portus  Lakkius.  Its  walls  were  so 
extended  as  to  embrace  the  whole  of  this  harbor,  closing  it  up  in 
such  a  way  as  to  admit  only  one  ship  at  a  time,  though  there  was 
room  for  sixty  ships  within.  He  was  thus  provided  with  an  almost 
impregnable  stronghold,  not  only  securing  him  against  attack  from 
the  more  numerous  population  in  the  outer  city,  but  enabling  hiin 
to  attack  them  whenever  he  chose— and  making  him  master,  at  the 
same  time,  of  the  grand  means  of  war  and  defense  against  foreign 

enemies. 

To  provide  a  fortress  in  the  islet  of  Ortygia,  was  one  step  toward 
perpetual  dominion  at  Syracuse;  to  fill  it  with  devoted  adherents,  was 
another.  For  Dionysius,  the  instruments  of  dominion  were  his  mer- 
cenary troops  and  bodv-guards;  men  chosen  by  himself  from  their 
aptitude  to  his  views,  identified  with  him  in  interest,  and  consisting 
in  large  proportion  not  merely  of  foreigners,  but  even  of  liberated 
slaves.  To  tliese  men  he  now  proceeded  to  assign  a  permanent  sup- 
port and  residence.  He  distributed  among  them  the  houses  in  the 
islet  or  interior  stronjihold.  expelling  the  previous  proprietors,  and 
permitting  no  one  to  reside  there  except  his  own  intimate  partisans 


and  soldiers.  Their  quarters  were  in  the  islet,  while  he  dwelt  in  the 
citadel— a  fortress  within  a  fortress,  sheltering  his  own  person  against 
the  very  garrison  or  standing  army,  by  means  of  which  he  kept 
Syracuse  in  subjection.  Having  provided  houses  for  his  soldiers,  by 
extruding  the  residents  in  Ortygia— he  proceeded  to  assign  to  them  a 
comfortable  maintenance,  by  the  like  wholesale  dispossession  of  pro- 
prietors, and  reappropriation  of  lands,  without.  He  distributed  anew 
the  entire  Svracusau  territory;  reserving  the  best  lauds,  and  the  best 
shares,  for  fiis  own  friends  and  for  the  oflacers  in  command  of  his 
mercenaries- and  apportoiniugthe  remaining  territory  in  equ:il  shares 
to  all  the  inhabitants,  citizens  as  w^U  as  non-citizens.  By  this  dis- 
tribution the  latter  became  henceforward  citizensas  wellas  the  former; 
so  far  at  least,  as  any  man  could  be  properly  called  a  citizen  under 
his  despotism.  Even  the  recently  infranchised  slaves  became  new 
citizens  and  proprietors  as  well  as  the  rest.  ^ 

Respecting  this  sweeping  change  of  property,  it  is  mortifying  to 
have  no  further  information  than  is  contained  in  two  or  three  brief 
sentences  of  Diodorus.  As  a  basis  for  entire  redivision  of  lauds, 
Dionysius  would  lind  himself  already  possessed  of  the  property  of  those 
Syracusan  Horsemen  or  Knights  whom  he  had  recently  put  down  or 
banished.  As  a  matter  of  course,  their  property  would  be  confiscated, 
and  would  fall  into  his  possession  for  reassignment.  It  would  doubt- 
less be  considerable,  inasmuch  as  tliese  Horsemen  were  for  the  most 
part  wealthy  men.  From  this  basis,  Dionysius  eidarged  his  scheme  to 
the  more  comprehensive  idea  of  a  general  spoliation  and  reappropri- 
ation, for  the  benefit  of  his  partisans  and  his  mercenary  soldiers. 
The  number  of  these  last  we  do  not  know;  but  on  an  occasion  not 
very  long  afterward,  the  mercenaries  under  him  are  mentioned  as 
ainounting  to  about  10,000.  To  insure  landed  properties  to  each  of 
these  men.  together  with  the  monopoly  of  residence  in  Ortygia, 
nothing  less  tliau  a  sweeping  confiscation  would  suftice.  How  far 
the  equalitv  of  share,  set  forth  in  principle,  was  or  could  be  adhered 
to  in  practice,  we  cannot  say.  The  maxim  of  allowing  residence  in 
Ortygia  to  none  but  friends  and  partisans,  passed  from  Dionysius  into 
a  traditional  observance  for  future  anti-popular  governments  of  Syra- 
cuse. The  Roman  consul  :Marcellus,  when  he  subdued  the  city  near 
two  centuries  afterward,  prescribed  the  rule  of  admitting  into  the 
islet  none  but  Romans,  and  of  excluding  all  native  Syracusan  resi- 
dents. ,     .  , 

Such  mighty  works  of  fortification,  combined  with  so  extensive  a 
revolutionl)0th  in  property  and  in  domicile,  cannot  have  been  accom- 
plished in  less  than  a  considerable  time,  nor  without  provoking  con- 
siderable resistance  in  detail.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten  that  the 
pecuniary  cost  of  such  fortification  must  have  been  very  heavy. 
How  Dionysius  contrived  to  levy  the  money,  we  do  not  know. 
Aristotle  informs  us  that  the  contributions  which  he  exacted  from 
the  Svracusaus  were  so  exorbitant,  that  within  the  space  of  five 


178 


SUILV. 


DESPAiii  OF  Dio::vsirs, 


370 


yeai-s,  the  citizens  liad  paid  into  his  hands  their  entire  property; 
that  is,  twenty  j)er  cent  per  annum  upon  their  whole  property.  To  wliat 
years  this  statement  refers,  we  do  not  know :  nor  wiiat  was  tiie amount 
of  contribution  exacted  on  the  special  occasion  now  before  us.  But 
we  may  justlv  infer  from  it  that  Dionysius  woukl  not  scruple  to  lay 
liis  hand  heavily  upon  the  Syracusaus  for  the  purpose  of  defniyinii: 
the  cost  of  his* fortifications*;  and  that  the  sinuiitaneous  burden  of 
hwiXi'  contributions  would  thus  come  to  agirravale  the  painful  spolia- 
tion and  transfers  of  property,  and  the  stid  more  intolerable  mis- 
chiefs of  u  numerous  standini^'army  donuciled  as  musters  in  the  heart 
o[  the  city.  Under  such  circumsiances.  we  are  not  surprised  to  learn 
that  the 'discontent  amor.ir  the  Syracusans  was  extreme,  and  that 
luunbers  of  tiiem  were  greatly  mortitied  at  haviuir  let  slip  the  favora- 
ble opportunity  of  exchiding  Dionysius  when  the  Horsemen  were 
'actually  for  a  niomeut  mabters  of  Syracuse,  before  he  suddenly  came 
back  from  Gela. 

Whatever  miirht  l)e  the  extent  of  indiirnation  actually  felt,  there 
could  be  no  concert  or  manifestation  in  iSyracuse,  under  a  watchful 
despot  with  the  overwhelming  force  assembleil  in  Orlvgia.  But  a 
suitable  moment  speedily  occuiTed.  Having  completed  his  fortress 
and  new  appropriation  tor  the  assured  maintenance  of  the  mercena- 
rii's,  Dionysius  resolved  to  att(  nipt  a  conquest  of  the  autonomous 
Sikel  tribes  in  the  interior  of  the  island,  some  of  whom  had  sided 
with  Carthage  in  the  recent  wj.r.  He  accoidingly  marched  out  with 
a  military  force,  consisting  partly  of  his  mercenary  troops,  partly  of 
armed  Syracusan  citizens,  under  a  connnnnder  named  Dorikus. 
"While  he  was  laying  siege  to  the  town  of  Krbessns,  the  Syracusan 
troops,  tindiug  themselves  assembled  in  arms  and  animated  with  one 
common  sentiment,  began  to  concert  measures  for  open  resistance 
to  Dionysius.  The  commander  Dorikus,  in  striving  to  repress  these 
manifestations,  lifted  up  his  hand  to  chastise  one  of  the  most  mutin- 
ous speakers;  upon  which  the  soldiers  rushed  forward  in  a  body  to 
defend  him.  They  slew  Dorikus,  and  proclaimed  themselves  again 
with  loud  shouts  free  Syracusan  citizens;  calling  upon  all  their  com- 
rades in  the  camp  to  unite  against  the  despot.  They  also  sent  anies- 
sage  forthwith  to  the  town  of  ^tna,  inviting  the  immediate  junction 
of^the  Svracusan  Horsemen,  who  had  sought  shelter  there  in  tlieir 
exile  from  Dionysius.  Their  appeal  found  the  warmest  sympathy 
amonir  the  Syracusan  soldiers  in  the  camp,  all  of  whom  declared 
themsdves  decisively  against  the  despot,  and  prepared  for  every  elf ort 
to  recover  their  lil»erty. 

So  rapidlv  did  this  sentiment  break  out  into  vehement  and  unani- 
mous action,  that  Dionysius  was  too  much  intimidated  to  attempt 
to  put  it  down  at  once  by  means  of  his  mercenaries.  Profiting  by 
the  lesson  which  he  had  received,  after  the  return  march  from  Gela, 
he  raised  the  siege  of  Erbessus  forthwith,  and  returned  to  Syracuse 
to    make    sure  "of   his   pivsition    in    Oilygia,  befc  re   his   Syraeusaa 


.nrnies  could  ar/ive  thcr^.     Meanwhile  the  lattc^r,  thus  left  full  <  1 
v^ndconlidence,  as  well  as  n.aslers  of  the  camp,  chose  for  their 
Sem  t^^e  soldiers  who  had  slain  Dorikus.  and  i^^^};^^  ^^^^^^^ 
^    edilv  re-enforced  bv  the  lb)rsemen,  or  returning  exiles  from  JLUui 
K^ov^Uo  spare  no  effort  for  lihernti.g Syracuse,  tliey  ^eii   |jnvoys 
>[essene  and  Khegiuni,  as  well  as  to  Corinth.  ^o^r;^'i\:^^^^"^  '^"l^. 
t  the  same  time  marched  with   all  their  force   to  S} racaise    and 
eie  mt  ed  on  the  hei-hts  of  Epipohe.     IL  is  not  clear  whether  they 
•"n     n  in  tm    j^sition,  or\vhether  they  were  emibled   through 
.\e  i  111^^^        of  the  population,  to  possess  theinselves  further  of    he 
;UfT  c  t^y  Achradina   and  with  its  appendages  Tycha  and  ^eapo  s 
13  onys ius  was  certainly  cut  off  from  all  communicaUon  with  the 
n  I  UT    hut  he  maintained  himself  in  his  impregnable  position  lu 
Sr  "^b/now  exclusively  occupied  by  his  chosen  partisans  and  mer- 
^;iS^.     n  he  even  cc^tinued  master  of  Achnidina,  Ij^  ;-^.  -- 
been  nrevented  from  easy  eoimnunication  with  it.     1  lie  assailants 
.cncfed  themselves  under  the  walls  of  Ortygia,  from  Epii>ok«  to 
-le  Greater  as  well  as  to  the  Lesser  Harl.or.     A  considerable  naval 
i"  n.c  waf  sent  to  their   aid  from   ^lessene  and   Rhegium,   giving 
rthemt^^em-ans        bloekin^^  him  up  on  the  sea-side;  ^vlule  the 
a>rJntSan^  though  they  c<>iil  I  grant  no  fu^hor  ^^^^^^^^^^ 
t'-.ir  sympathy  by  sendino:  .\  ikoteles  as  adviser,     fhe  h'^df  rs  ot  tiie 
mo  Tme  t  pr^laimed  Syracuse  again  a  f^^^  ^^^y,    offered    arge 
™^^^^^^^^^  head  of  Dionysuis.  and  promised  equal  citizenship  to 

•ill  the  mercenaries  \vho  should  desert  him.  • 

Srx.Rl  of  the  mercenaries  attracted  by  such  offers,  as  well  as 
vlnl^^ed\y  that  appearance  of  irresistible  ^l^^^^^)^ 
•ictcvizesthefi-st  burst  of  a  popular  movement,  actuall>  came  over 
'•idwere Veil  received.  Everything  seemed  to  promise  success  to 
iV^ins  u4n  s,  w-h().  not  content  with  the  slow  process  of  b Ockade 
b^med^t  UP  IK  ttering-machines,  and  vehemently  assaulted  the  walls 
Mmv4  Nothing  now  saved  Dionysius  except  those  cdaborate 
f  nVt  ;;ui  n^  he  had  so  recently  erected,  defying  aU  at  ack 

\ud  even  thou-h  sheltered  by  them,  his  position  appeared  to  be  so 
dc.vM-ae  that  deserliou  froin  Ortygia  every  dav  increased.^  ,He 
5  .  s.'lf  benm  to  abandon  the  hope  of  maintaining  his  dominion; 
;  seu.siniwith  his  intimate  friends  the  alternative,  between  death 
-d-r  a  valiant  but  hopeless  resistance,  and  safety  purchased  by  a 
shmi^ab  e  mght.      There  remained  but  one  means  of  jescue ;  to 


uZZutm^^^  hJi^  ,  to  vfit  Yn  pei'son  the  Campanians,  and 

inrt  em  \o  the  i^lief  of' Ortygia.     But  this  comi^el  was  strenu- 

OS?  resisted  bv  two  intimate  f  riends-Heloris  and  Megakles-who 

r>t  ^lmpre^^^^  hun,  that  the  royal  robe  was  the  only  bono  a- 

irfunend  garinent,  and  that,  instead  of  quitting  his  post  at  full 


180 


SICILY. 


Bpecd.  he  ouglit  to  rJiiig  to  it  until  lie  was  dragged  away  by  the  leg 
Aeeordiugly  Dionysus"  determined  to  hold  out,  without  quilting 
Ortyiria;  sending  private  envoys  to  the  Canipanians,  with  promises 
of  large  pay  if  they  would  mareh  immediately  to  his  defense.  The 
Carthaginians  were  probably  muler  obligation  not  to  oppose  this, 
liaving  insured  to  Dionysius  by  special  article  of  treaty  the  posses- 
sion of  Syracuse. 

To  gain  time  for  their  arrival  by  deluding  and  disarming  the 
assailants,  Dionvsius  affected  to  abandon  all  hope  of  prolonged 
defense,  and  sent  to  request  permission  to  quit  the  city,  along  with 
his  private  friends  and  effects.  Permission  was  readily  granted  to 
him  to  depart  with  live  triremes.  But  as  soon  as  this  evidence  of 
success  had  b<en  acquired,  the  assailants  without  abandoned  them- 
selves to  extravagant  joy  and  confidence,  considering  Dionysius  as 
alreadv  subdued,  and  the  siege  as  concluded.  Not  merely  was  all 
further  attack  suspended,  but  the  forces  were  in  a  great  measure 
broken  up.  The  Horsemen  were  disbanded,  by  a  proceeding  alike 
unjust  and  unjzrateful,  to  be  sent  back  toiEtnti;  while  the  hoplites 
dis]K'rsed  about  the  countrv  to  their  various  lands  and  proj^erties. 
The  same  ditticulty  of  keepi^ig  a  popular  force  long  together  for  any 
military  operation  requiring' time,  which  had  been  felt  Avhcn  the 
Athenians  besieged  their  usur]Kis  Kylon  and  Peisistnitus  in  the 
acropolis,  was  now  experienced  in  regard  to  the  siege  of  Ortygia. 
Tired  with  the  length  of  the  siege,  the  Syracusans  blindly  al)an- 
doned  themselves  to  the  delusivr-'assurauee  held  out  by  Dionvsius; 
without  taking  heed  to  maintain  their  force  and  elhciency  undimin- 
ished, until  his  promised  departure  should  be  converted  into  a 
reality.  In  this  iniprepared  and  disorderly  condition,  they  were  sur- 
prised by  the  sudden  arrival  of  the  Canipanians,  who,  attacking  and 
defeating  them  with  considerable  loss,  forced  their  way  through  to 
join  Dionysius  in  Ortvgia.  At  the  same  time,  a  re-enforcement  of 
300  fresh  mercenaries  reached  him  by  sea.  The  face  of  affairs  ^Yas 
now  completely  changed.  The  recent  defeat  produced  among  the 
assailants  not  onlv  discouragement,  but  also  mutual  recrimination 
and  quarrel.  Some  insisted  upon  still  prosecuting  the  siege  of 
Oi  tyiria,  while  others,  probablv  the  friends  of  the  recently  dismissed 
Horsemen,  declared  in  favor  of  throwing  it  up  altogether  and  jom- 
ing  the  Horsemen  at  .Etna;  a  resolution,  which  they  seem  at  once 
to  have  executed.  Observing  his  opponents  thus  enfeebled  and  torn 
by  dissension,  Dionvsius  sallied  out  and  attacked  them,  near  the 
suburb  called  Neapolis  or  Newton,  on  the  south-west  of  Achradina. 
He  was  victorious,  and  forced  them  to  disperse.  But  he  took  great 
.pains  to  prevent  slaughter  of  the  fugitives,  riding  up  himself  to 
restrain  his  own  troops;  and  he  subsecpiently  buried  the  slain  with 
due  solemnitv.  He  was  anxious  ])y  these  proceedings  to  conciliate 
the  remainder:  for  the  most  warlike  portion  of  his  opponents  had 
retired  to  ^tna,  where  no  less  than  7,000  hoplites  were  now  assem- 


NIKOTKJ.KS  PUT  TU   DEATH. 


181 


l,i,d  alono-with  the  Horsemen.  Dionysius  sent  thither  envoys  to 
vitetl  em  b  return  to  Svracuse,  promising  the  largest  amnesty  for 
tie  pa  t  Bii^  it  was  in  Vain  that  his  envovs  expatiated  upon  his 
neen  forbearance  toward  the  fugitives  and  decent  interment  of  the 
.  ■  in  Fev  could  be  induced  to  come  back,  except  s.ich  as  had-left 
tSwives  and  families  at  Syracuse  in  his  power.  1  he  larger  pro- 
n orthm  i^f  sing  .41  trust  in  his  word  and  all  subnussion  to  his  com- 
n  •  nrmnaiiied  in  exile  at  .Etna.  Such  as  did  return  were  well- 
Ir'^ehrin   h^^^^^^     of   inducing  the   rest   gradually  to   lollow   their 

''^Thus  was  Dionysius  rescued  from  a  situation  apparently  desperate, 

nnl    r-JS,Sied  in  his  dominion;  chietiy   through  the  ra.sh  prc^ 

s  uii  tion  as  on  the  former  occasion  after  the  retreat  from  Gela)   the 

w     lof      e^^^^^^^  tfie  absence  of  any  commanding 

0     er  mi^Se^a      S  his  antagonists.     His  first  ivrc^eeding  was  to 

di'  ni^s  t he  ne wl v-arrive(l  Camptuiians.     For  though  he  had  to  thank 

•m  m    nlv  for*  his  restoration,  he  was  well-aware  that  they  were 

u  '(^^^'iv  M  hless.  and  that  on  the  first  temptation  they  were  likely  to 

tni-     ao  i  It  him.     But  he  adopted  other  more  elhcient  means  for 

s    en<  the^K^  his  dominion  in  Syracuse,  and  for  guarding  against  a 

•  IK  tmon  ot^  that  danger  from  which  he   had  so  recently  escaped 

l\e  w  IS  as^ste  1  ^^^  his  proceedings  by  a  Lacedaemonian  envoy  named 

Avi    us^^e^^^^^^  bv  the  Spartans  for  the  ostensible  pur- 

f;    .  of    )rin "ing  about  an  amicable  adjustment  of  padies  at  Syra- 

M    ^      Wh  ^^NUcoteles,  who  had  been  .ent  from  Corinth,, esi^oused 

Wau  e  of  the  Svracusan  people,  an<l  put  himself  a    their  head  to 

obtain  for  them  more  or  less  of  f ••^^^^^^^•"^^^^^^-HTtdu^^^^ 
cont-irv  lent  himself  to  the  schemes  of  Dionysius      He  seducea  t  ui 
people  awa^^  whom  he  impeached  and  caused  to  be 

sh  Next  pretending  himself  to  act  along  with  the  people,  and  to 
fni  loy  the  -reat  ascemlency  of  Sparta  in  defense  of  their  freedom 
eglc  their  contidence,  and  then  betrayed  them  The  despot 
^^ist  us  enabled  to  strenothen  himself  more  decisively  than  betor 
and  p  bably  to  take  off  the  effective  popular  leaders  thus  made 
k  m)wn  to  him;  while  the  mass  of  the  citizens  were  profound  yd  is- 
coura^    by  limiing  Sparta  enlisted  in  the  conspiracy  against  their 

^' of  ?his  renovated  tide  of  success  Dionysius  ^^^^\  f'^^''^''^:'''^ 

strike  another  important  blow.     During  the  season  of  harvest   whi  o 

the  dtS  were  busv  in  the  tields,  he  caused  the  liouses  in  the  ci  v 

o  be  se'irched,  and  seized  all  the  arms  found,  therein.     Not  satisfied 

vihtliurroblinir  his  opponents  of  the  means  ot  attack   he  fur  her 

roceededTo  constructMdditional  fortifications  rou.id  the  islet  of 

Or  'oi^^^^^^  In^  standing  army  of  mercenaries,  and  to  build 

f  eiihinr   Fed        more  tha.f  ever  that  his  dominion  was  repug- 

u  nt  to   he  Sn.4cus.uis,  and  rested  only  on  naked  force,  he  thus  sur- 

ro^ded  dmself  with  precautions  probably  stronger  than  any  other 


182 


l^iClLY. 


Gre(;i;in  despot  liiul  ever  accnmulatcd.  Ho  was  yet  fMrtlirr  sIiXMiL'tli- 
eiu'd  by  the  pioiiouiiced  and  active  support  of*  !Spart:i,  now  at  ihe 
inaxinuim  of  lier  imperial  ascendency:  and  by  the  presence  of  the 
mighty  Lysander  at  Syracuse  ;is  her  embassador  to  countenance  and 
exalt  Idm.  Tlie  Spartan  alliance,  howc\er,  did  not  prevent  him  from 
enrolling  among  his  mercenaries  u  considerable  fraction  of  the  ]Mes- 
senians.  the  bitter  enemies  of  Sparta;  who  were  now  driven  out  of 
Naupaktus  and  Kephallenia  with  no  other  jiosscssiou  left  except 
tiieir  arms — and  whose  resloration  to  Peloponnesus  by  Kpaminondas, 
abotit  thirty  years  afterward,  has  been  described  'in  a  preceding 
chapter. 

So  large  a  mercenary  force,  while  the  pcop.le  at  Syracuse  wei-e 
prostrate  and  in  no  condition  for  resistance,  naturally  "tempted  ] -io- 
nysius  to  seek  conquest  sis  well  as  plunder  beyond  the  bolder.  Not 
choosing  as  yet  to  provoke  a  war  willi  Carthage,  he  turned  his  arms 
to  the  north  and  north-west  of  the  Syracu.san  territorv;  the  Grecian 
(Chalkidic  or  Ionic)  cities,  Naxus,  katana,  and  Leontini— and  the 
iSikels,  toward  the  center  of  Sicily.  The  three  Chalkidic  cities  were 
t lie  old  enemies  of  SyrjKUse,  l,>ut*^ Leontini  had  been  conquered  by 
the  Byracusans  even  before  the  Athenian  cxpt  dilion,  and  remained 
as  a  Syracusan  posscvssion  until  the  last  peace  with  the  Carthagin- 
ians, when  it  had  been  declared  independent.  Naxus  and  Katana 
liad  contrived  to  retain  their  ir.depcndence  against  Sjracuse,  even 
after  the  ruin  of  the  Athenian  armament  under  Isikias.  At  tlie  head 
of  a  p(>werful  force.  Dionysir.s  niarchetl  out  from  Syracuse  first 
against  the  town  of  ^Etna,  occupied  by  a  considerable  body  of  Syia- 
ciisan  exiles  hostile  to  his  dominion.  *Thougli  the  place  w'as  strong 
hy  situation,  yet  these  men,  too  feeble  to  resist,  were  obliged  to 
evacuate  it;  upon  which  he  proceeded  to  attack  Leontini.  But  on 
summoning  the  inhabitants  to  surrender,  he  found  his  propositions 
rejected,  and  every  pieparation  made  for  a  strenuous  defense;  so 
th;it  lie  could  do  nothing  more  than  plunder  the  tenitory  around, 
and  then  advanced  onward  into  the  interior  Sikel  territory,  toward 
Eiina  and  Erbita. 

His  march  in  this  direction,  liowever,  was  little  more  than  a  feint, 
for  the  purpose  of  masking  his  real  views  upon  isaxus  and  Katana, 
with  both  which  cities  lie  Jiad  already  opened  intrigues.  Arkesilaus, 
general  of  Katana,  and  Proklc  s,  general  of  Naxus,  were  both  carry- 
ing on  corrupt  negotiations  for  the  purpose  of  selling  to  him  the 
hl)erty  of  their  native  cities.  Until  the  negotiations  we're  completed, 
Dionysius  wished  to  appear  as  if  turning  his  arms  elsewhere,  and 
therefore  marched  against  Enna.  Here  he  entered  into  conspiracy 
with  an  Ennocan  citizen  named  Aeimnestus,  whom  he  instigated  to 
K'ize  the  scepter  of  liis  native  town — by  promises  of  assistance,  on 
condition  of  being  himself  admitted  afterward.  Aeimnestus  made 
the  attempt  and  succeeded,  but  did  not  fulfill  his  engagement  to  Dio 
Dysius:  who  resented  this  proceeding  ho  vehemently,  that  he  assisted 


ForXDATloN    OF   AL.ESA. 


18:5 


asi-asTiHa&*£:r::::;;;: 

At  R.n.^(l.  tljc  terms  }j;«'  ,[""^  .^^ »  ^;ta  the  o   v,  cU.anuecl  the  in- 

•put  into  Ins  liAnil-   "Y  "     ''^,',    ^^^}  ,,„,!  ,vith  the  pnvilcjie  of  p:v- 

Kcrvins  I'ls  kinsmen.  '>' "V^' '^^^..X  .,3  well  us  the  houses  were 
'r  ^f  lJ::,TU\uhe"nh  1  i.  u^^  :.; ! U^'^la";"  The  .iismautloa  silo 
''1^'r  /n  r;;"tl,e  1  a  s  ''ne  1 1.,  a  body  ot  Can.panian  mercenaries  lu 
cif  Katana  %\a>  "It n 'issi.^i".-'  ,,„„.,.,.„,.  vof-iined  in  his  possession 
the  serviee  of  Dionysms,  xvho  /'f^i^"' .  f,''"  ,  ",,  "cnous  Sikels 
hostages  for . Heir  «f  l''y,;,, ^«^.^,^,',!;'  n  ek  ,  udl  .?rror  into  the 
in  the  ne.S  1.  bortood^  n  oiv'sius're  ewed  his  attack  upon  them,  they 
Leontmes,  that  wnen  uioins  i»  h,.  ,.,.,, uired  them  to  surrender 
no  longer  felt  c^tipetent  to  le.ist       It   c^^  ^.^^^^^^.^ 

their  oily,  to  remove  to  ^yracusc   '^'^'V  ''"-'.y ?^f,   .,,  subiects  of  Ids 

z:^'  '^^.z!i>i>:^:^£'^^^.^^^^'^^  city 

'"K'oJSV"  ESS  "^hS^  moinly  by  corrupting  the 

So  mucli  alarm  7V'",S^  tho^^^lV  t  p  u^le  t  o  r enoun.e  his  town 
the  Sikel  prince  ot  ^'■'  ';/''?"-  ^^P."^^^^^^^^^  Nebrode  mountains, 
and  soil;  withdrawing  ''  '  ■^'-,  .^r,  ,^°",,,  of  the  reach  of  Svraeu- 
o„  «l'e"..v.l.ern  coast  oe  ;^^»„™!'^XS  and  with  a  large  por- 

Zm  pe!^;:^  whfvolunurily  accompanied  him,  he  founde.l  the 

•"It'^."!g^!Sat  home  bv  .>--  sueoess^  a.-id  t^ 

,.^f  .^i  Svr-ifMice  was  stimulated  to  still  gieaier  cnitii^n.  «^ -. 

pot  01  k?\iaeu>^c  \\aa  oil  ^  ,,..>,.  Avirh   iho  (  artha<anians.     l>ut 

case  ^}^^"'^";^^J /,7.^S  f4om^  in  Sicily,  had  already  undergone 
the  island,  one  ot  them  \  ^^  ■^^^^^;^^^  y^^  a  Carthairinian  host;  a  ca- 
the  deplorable  ^J^te  ^^^^^  f,  be  hire^Jrve  for  Syracuse  also,  espe- 
l:;::i;:^fS!e  t;:ei?p^^^^^^  ;;n;^^hemoLlaborate  precau- 

Kowthe  Athemanbl()cka  eim  ci  city  had  then  been 

^SrSg^Sluit";:^^.!^^  H^-aillU  Carried  from  sea 


184 


SICILY. 


to  sea;  •VNliich  "wns  nctually  moro  than  half  completed,  and  would 
have  been  entirely  completed,  liad  the  oricinal  c(  mmander  been 
Demosthenes  instead  of  rsikias.  The  prcdi^dous  importance  of  the 
tlope  of  Epipohe  to  tlie  J-afety  of  the  city  had  been  dem<tnstrated  by 
the  most  unequivocal  evidence.  In  a  precedinji  volume.  I  have  al- 
ready described  the  site  of  Syracuse  and  the  relation  of  this  slope  to 
the  outer  city  called  Achradina.  Kpipola?  was  a  gentle  ascent  west 
of  Achradina.  It  was  bordered,  along  both  the  north  side  and  tlie 
Fouth  side,  by  lines  of  descending  cliff,  cut  down  pn  cipitously. 
about  twenty  feet  deep  in  tlieir  lowest  part.  These  lines  of  ciilf 
nearly  converged  at  the  summit  of  the  slope,  called,  Eui-jalus; 
having  a  narrow  pass  or  road  ])elween  elevated  lianks,  which  coni- 
numicated  with  the  count ly  both  north  and  west  of  Syracuse.  Ej)ip- 
che  thus  formed  a  triangle  upon  an  inclined  plane,  sloping  upward 
from  its  base,  the  outer  wall  of  Achradina,  to  its  aiu'x  at  KiuyaUis; 
and  having  its  two  Bides  formed,  the  one  by  the  northern,  the* other 
by  the  southern,  line  of  cliffs.  This  apex  formed  a  post  of  the  high- 
est importance,  commanding  the  narrow  ro.'id  whuh  apjiroaclird 
EpipoUc  from  its  western  extn  niity  or  summit,  and  through  wliich 
alone  it  was  easy  for  an  army  to  get  on  the  declivity  of  Epipohe, 
since  the  cliffs  on  each  side  were  steep,  though  less  steep  on  the 
northern  side  than  on  the  southern.  Unless  an  eneni}'  acqirii'cd  pes 
session  of  this  slope,  Syracuse  could  never  be  blocked  up  liom  the 
northern  sea  at  Trogilus  to  the  Great  Harbor;  an  enterprise,  wlueh 
2sikias  and  the  Alheuians  were  near  accomplishing,  because  Iheylirst 
surprised  from  the  northward  tlie  position  of  Euryahin,  and  from 
thence  poured  down  upon  the  slope  of  Epipola*.  I  have  already  de- 
scribed how  the  arrival  of  Gylippus  deprived  theui  of  superiority  in 
the  tield  at  a  time  wlun  their  line  of  circumvallation  was  already  kilf 
tinished — iiaving  been  carried  from  the  center  of  Epipohe  southward 
down  to  the  Great  Harbor,  and  being  partially  compleied  fi'ora  the 
same  point  across  the  northern  half  of  Epipola?  to  the  sea  at  TrogiliL'^; 
how  he  next  intercepted  their  further  progress,  by  carrying  out, 
from  the  outer  wall  ot  Achradina,  a  cross-wall  traversing' their  in- 
tended line  of  circumvallation  and  ending  at  the  northern  cliff;  now 
he  tinally -erected  a  fort  or  guard-post  on  the  summit  of  Euryalus, 
which  he  connected  with  the  cross- wall  just  mentioned  by  a  single 
wall  of  junction  carried  down  the  slope  of  Epipohe. 

Both  *h(j  danger  which  Svracuse  had  then  incurred,  and  the  means 
whereby  it  had  been  obviated,  were  fresh  in  the  recollection  of 
Dionysius.  Since  the  Athenian  siege,  the  Syracusans  may  perhaps 
have  preserved  the  fort  erected  by  Gylippus  near  Euryalus;  but  they 
had  pulled  down  the  wall  of  junction,  the  cross-walh  and  the  outer 
wall  of  protection  constructed  between  the  arrival  of  Nikias  in  Sicily 
and  his  commencement  of  the  siege,  inclosing  the  sacred  precinct  of 
ApoUo  Temenites.  The  outer  city  of  Syracuse  was  thus  left  with 
nothing  but  the  wall  of  Achradina,  with*  its  two  suburbs  or  excres- 


ADDITIOXAL  FORTIFICATIONS. 


185 


cences,  Tjxhe  and  Neapolis.  Dionysius  now  resolved  to  provide  for 
Syracuse  a  protection  substantially  similar  to  that  contrived  by  Gylip- 
pus, yet  more  comprehensive,  elaborate,  and  permanent.  He  carried 
out' an  outer  line  of  defense,  starting  from  the  sea  near  the  port 
called  Trogilus,  inclosing  the  suburb  called  Tyche  (which  adjoined 
Achradimrto  the  north-west),  and  then  ascending  westward,  along 
the  brink  of  the  northern  cliff  of  Epipohe,  to  the  summit  of  that 
slope  at  Euryalus.  The  two  extrenuties  thus  became  connected 
together— not  as  in  the  time  of  Gylippus,  by  a  single  cross-wall  out 
from  the  city-wall  to  the  northern  cliff,  and  then  joined  at  an  angle 
by  another  single  wall  descending  the  slope  of  Epipohe  from  Eur\^ 
alus,  but— by  one  continuous  new  line  bordering  the  northern  cliff 
down  to  the  sea.  And  the  new  line,  instead  of  being  a  mere  single 
wall,  was  now  built  under  the  advice  of  the  best  engineers,  with 
lofty  and  frequent  towers  interspersed  throughout  its  length,  to 
serve  both  as  means  of  defense  and  as  permanent  quarters  for  sol- 
diers. Its  length  was  thirty  stadia  (about  3.V  English  miles);  it  was 
constructed  of  large  stones  "^carefully  hewn,  some  of  them  four  feet 
in  length.  The  quarries  at  hand  supplied  abundant  materials,  and 
for  the  labor  necessary,  Dionysius  brought  together  all  the  popula- 
tion of  the  city  and  its' neighborhood,  out  of  whom  he  selected  60,000 
of  the  most  effective  hands  to  work  on  the  wall.  Others  were  ordered 
to  cut  the  stones  in  the  quarry,  while  6,000  teams  of  oxen  were  put  in 
harness  to  draw  them  to  the  spot.  The  work  was  set  out  by  furlongs 
and  by  smaller  spaces  of  100  feet  each  to  regiments  of  suitable  num- 
ber, each  under  the  direction  of  an  overseer. 

As  yet  we  have;  heard  little  about  Dionysius  except  acts  of  fraud, 
violence,  and  spolialiou  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  his  own 
dominion  over  Syracuse,  and  aggrandizing  himself  by  new  conquests 
on  the  borders.  'But  this  new  fortiticatiou  was  a  work  of  clilferent 
import.  Instead  of  being,  like  his  forts  and  walls  in  Ortygia,  a 
auard-housj  both  of  defense  and  aggression  merely  for  himself  against 
"the  people  of  Syracuse— it  was  a  valuable  protection  to  the  people, 
and  to  himself  along  with  them,  against  foreign  besiegers.  It  tended 
much  to  guarantee  Syracuse  from  those  disasters  which  had  so 
recently  befallen  Agrigeutum  and  the  other  cities.  Accordingly,  it 
was  exceedingly  popular  among  the  Syracusans,  and  produced 
between  them  and  Dionysius  a  sentiment  of  friendship  and  harmony 
such  as  had  not  before  'been  seen.  Every  man  labored  at  the  work 
not  merely  with  good  will,  but  with  enthusiasm;  while  the  despot 
himself  displayed  unwearied  zeal,  passing  whole  days  on  the  spot, 
and  taking  part  in  all  the  hardship  and  diifieulty.  He  showed  him- 
self everywhere  amid  the  mass,  as  an  unguarded  citizen,  without 
suspicion  or  reserve,  in  marked  contrast  with  the  harshness  of  his 
previous  demeanor,  proclaiming  rewards  for  the  best  and  most  rapid 
workmen;  he  also  provided  attendance  or  relief  for  those  whoso 
strength  gave  way.     Such  was  the  emulation  thus  inspired,  that  the 


186 


SICILY 


POLICY    nKFOilE  THE    WAIl. 


187 


numbers  assembled,  f)ftc'n  toiiiim-  by  r.i-b.t  as  vrdl  as  by  day,  com- 
pleted ihc  whole  wall  in  Ihe  spare  of  twenty  days.     The   lort  at 
Eurvalus,  which  formed  the  termination  of  this  iiewly-constriictcd 
line^of  wall,  is  probably  not  to  1  e  understood  as  comprised  w  ithin  so 
short  a  period  of  execution,  at  least  in  its  complete  consummation. 
For  the  defenses  provided  at  this  fort  (either  now  or  at  a  later  per- 
iod) were  prodigious  in  extent  as  well  as  elaborate  in  workmanship; 
and  the  remains  of  them  exhibit,  even  to  modern  observers,  the  most 
complete  specimen  preserved  to  us  of  ancient  fortitication.    To  bring 
them  into  such  a  condition  must  have  occupied  a  longer  tin^.e  than 
twenty  days.     Even  as  to  the  wall,  perhaps,  twenty  days  is  rather 
to  1)0  understood  as  indicatinu-  the  time  reipiired  for  the  ( ssential  con- 
lin\iity  of  its  line,  leaving  towers,  gates,  etc.,  to  be  added  afterward. 
To  provide  defense  for  Syracuse  against  a  besieging  army,  hmv- 
rver,  was  onlv  a  small  part  of  the  exu  nsive  schemes  of  Dionysuis. 
AVliat  he  meditated  was  aggressive  war  acainst  the  Carthaginians; 
for  which  purpose,  he  not  only  lugan  to  accr.mulate  preparations  of 
everv  kind  on  the  most  extensive  scale,  but  also  modified  his  pohcy 
both  toward  the  Syracusans  and  toward  the  other  ^^icilian  Greeks. 

Toward  the  Syracusans  Ids  cor.duct  underwent  a  mnterial  change. 
The  cruelty  and  opi)ression  which  luul  hitherto  marked Jiis  domin- 
ion was  discontinued;  he  no'longer  put  nun  to  death,  or  sent  thim 
into  banishment,  w  ith  the  sjime  merciless  band  as  before.  In  place 
of  such  tyranny,  he  now  substituted  ( on'.in;rative  mildness,  forbear- 
ance, and'conciliation.  \Vhere  the  .system  had  befcre  1  (en  so  fraught 
with  positive  maltreatment  to  many  and  alarm  to  all,  ibe  mitigation 
of  it  must  have  been  sensibly  as  w  ell  as  immc  diately  felt.  And  when 
we  make  present  to  our  minds  the  relative  position  of  Dionysius  and 
th'.^  Syracusans,  we  shall  see  that  the  evil  iiiflicted  by  his  expres^^ 
order 'by  no  means  represent(  d  the  whole  anu  uut  of  evil  which  they 
suffered.  lie  occupied  tlie  im]>r<  gnable  f(»rtr(  ss  of  Ortygia,  with  the 
entire  harbor,  docks,  and  marilime  means  of  the  city.  'Ihe  mnner- 
ous  f-nrrison  in  bis  pay,  and  devoted  to  him,  ccuisisted  in  great  part 
of  ba'i-baric  or  n(>u-Henenic  soldiers  rid  of  liberated  slaves,  prol)al)lv 
also  non-IIelienic.  The  Svracusans  resident  in  the  outer  city  and 
arcnind  were  not  only  destitute  of  the  means  of  defensive  concert  and 
oruanization,  but  were  also  disarmed.  For  these  mercenaries  either 
]>ay  was  to  be  provided  from  the  contributions  of  the  citizens,  or 
lands  from  their  properties;  for  them,  and  for  other  partisans  also, 
])i(mysius  had  enforced  spoliations  and  transfers  of  land  and  h(;use- 
l>roperty  by  wholesale.  :Now,  while  the  despot  himself  was  inllict- 
inu-  tyrannical  sentfMues  for  his  own  purposes,  we  may  be  sure  that 
these  men,  the  indispensable  instruments  of  his  tyranny,  would 
neither  of  themselves  be  disposed  to  respect  the  tranquility  of  the  otlier 
eiti/.ens,  nor  be  easilv  constrained  to  do  so.  It  was  not,  therefore, 
merely  from  the  systematic  misrule  of  the  chief  that  the  Syracusans 
liad  to  suffer,  but  also  from  tlie  insolence  and  unruly  appetites  of  the 


<;nbordi nates.  And  accordingly  they  would  bo  doubly  gainers,when 
Dionvsius.  from  anxiety  to  attack  the  Cartliaginiuns,  thought  it  pru- 
dent to  soften  the  rigor  of  his  own  proceedings ;  since  his  example,  and 
in  ca.se  of  need  his  interference,  would  restrict  the  license  of  his  own 
partisans.  The  desire  for  foreign  conquest  made  it  now  his  interest 
to  conciliate  some  measure  of  uv)od-will  from  the  Syracusans;  or  at 
least  to  silence  antipathies  whi.h  might  become  embarrassing  if  they 
broke  out  in  the  midst  of  a  war.  And  he  had  in  this  case  the  advan- 
ta"-e  of  resting  on  another  antipathy,  powerful  and  genviine  in  their 
mrnds.  Hating  as  well  as  fearing  (^u'thage,  the  Syracusans  cordially 
sympatliized  in  the  aggressive  schemes  of  Dionysius  again.st  her; 
which  held  out  a  prospect  of  relief  from  the  tyranny  under  which 
they  groaned,  and  some  chance  of  procuring  a  restoration  of  the  arms 
snatched  from  them. 

Toward  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  also,  the  conduct  of  Dionysius  was 
mainly  influenced  by  his  anti-Carthaginian  projects,  which  made  hini 
eairer'to  put  aside,  or  at  least  to  defer,  all  possibilities  of  war  in  other 
qu^irters.     Tlie  inhabitants  of  lihegium,  on  the  Italian  side  of  the 
Strait  of  Messina,  had  recently  manifested  a  disposition  to  attack 
him.     They   were   of  common  CUialkidic  origin   with  Naxos  and 
Katana,  the  two  cities  which  Dionysius  had  recently  conquered  and 
enslaved.     Sixteen  years  before,  when  tlie  powxn'ful  Athenian  arma- 
ment  visited    Sicily   with    the   ostensible  view   of    protecting  the 
Chalkidic  cities  against  Syracuse,  the   Rhegines,  in  spite  of  their 
fellow\ship   of  race,  had  refused   the   invitation   of  Nikias  to  lend 
assistance,  being   then   afraid  of  Athens.     But  subsequent  painful 
experience  had  taught  them,  that  to  residents   in   or  near  Sicily, 
Syracu.se  was  the  more  formidable  enemy  of  the  two.'    The  ruin  ()f 
Naxos  and  Kntana.  with  the  great  extension  of  Syracusan  dominion 
liorthward,    had   tilled   them   with    apprehension   from   Dionysius, 
similar  to  the  feai-s  of  Carthage,  inspired  to  the  Cyracusans  them- 
selves by  the  disasters  of  Agrigentum  and  Gela.    Anxious  to  reyengo 
their  enslaved   kinsmen,   the   Rhegines  projected  an   attack  upon 
Dionysius  before  his  power  should  become  yet  more  formidable:  !i 
resolution  in  whieh  they  were  greatly  confirmed  by  the  instigations 
of  the  Syracusan  exiles  (now  driven  from  ^tna  and  the  other  neigh- 
boring cities  to  Rhegium),  confident  in  their  assurances  that  insur- 
rection would  break  out  against  Dionysius  at  Syracuse,  so.  soon  as 
any  foreign  succor  should  be  announced  as  approaching.     Envoys 
were  sent'^across  the  strait  to  ^fes.sene,  soliciting  co-operation  a^uainst 
Dionysius,  upon  the  urgent  plea  that  Uie  ruin  of  Naxos  and  Katana 
could  not' be  passed  over,  either  in  generosity  or  in  ])rudence,  by 
neighbors  on  either  side  of  the  strait.     These  representations  made 
so  much  impression  on  the   generals  of  Messene,  that  without  con- 
sulting the  public  assembly,  they  fcnlhwith  summoned  the  military 
force  of  the  city,  and  marched  along  with  the  Rhegines  toward  the 
Syracusan  frontier— S, 000  Rhegine  and  4,000  ^Mes.senian  hoplites— 


SICILY 


600  PJien-iuc  and  400  Mcsscnian  horsemen— \^ith  50  Rhogine  tnrcn^.cs. 
But  when  Ihcv  icaelKd  the  fioiilicrs  of  the  Mc^sciiian  tcrntoiy,  a 
laroe  portion  of  the  soldiers  retused  to  follow  their  generals  lartlRr. 
A  citiz(  n  named  Laomedon  headed  the  opposition,  eontending  that 
the  n-enerals  had  no  authority  to  deelare  war  without  a  public  vote  ot 
the  city  and  that  it  was  imprudent  to  attack  Dionysius  unprovokal. 
Such  was  the  elTcct  of  these  remonstrances,  that  the  :MessenKm 
soldiers  turned  back  to  their  city;  while  the  Khcgines,  believing 
theniselyes  to  be  inadequate  to  tlie  enterprise  smgle  handed,  went 

home  also.  _  .       ,     -,     ■■       i    i   i  i  • 

Apprised  of  the  attack  meditated,  Dionysuis  liad  already  led  ]:i3 
troops  to  defend  the  Svra(  usan  frontier,  ikit  he  now  re-conductul 
them  back  to  Syracuse,  and  listeneil  favorably  to  j-ropositions  lor 
peace  which  speedily  reached  him.  from  lUiegium  and  31e^sene.  lie 
was  anxious  to  conciliate  them  for  the  present,  at  all  price,  m  orc.er 
that  the  C'arthaninians,  when  he  came  to  execute  his  plans,  mii:iit 
find  no  Greciairallies  to  co-operate  with  them  in  Sicdy.  He  acquiied 
an  intiuence  in  Messene,  bv  making  to  the  city  large  concessions  ot 
conterminous  territory ;  onVhii  h  side  of  the  border,  or  how  accpured, 
we  do  not  know.  He  further  endetivored  to  open  an  intimate  con- 
nection with  Khedum  bv  marryir.g  a  Khegine  wife;  with  which  vie\v 
he  sent  a  formal  message  to  the  citizens,  asking  pcrHUSsion  to  contact 
such  an  alliance,  accompanied  with  a  promise  toconler  upon  tliein  nn- 
portant  benelits,  both  in  territorial  aggrandizement  and  m  other  wavs. 
After  a  public  debate,  the  Khegines  d( dined  his  proposition,  llie 
feelin-  in  their  city  was  decidedly  hostile  to  Dionysius.  as  the  recent 
de^tn'rver  of  Naxos  and  Katana;  and  it  appears  that  some  ot  the 
speakers  expr^-ssed  themselves  with  contemptuous  asperity.  lemaiR- 
incr  that  the  dauuhter  of  the  public  executioner  was  the  on  y  ht  wite 
foHiim  Taken  by  itself,  the  refusal  would  be  sutticientlv  gallirg 
to  Dionysius.  But  when  coupled  with  such  insulting  remarks  (proi> 
ai)ly  made  in  public  debate  in  the  presence  of  his  own  envoy.s,  tor  it 
seems  not  credible  that  the  words  should  have  been  embodied  in  the 
formal  reply  or  resolution  of  tlie  assend)ly),  it  left  the  bitterest  aiu- 
mo-itv  a  feeliiiix  which  we  shall  hereafter  tind  in  full  operation. 

Kefu'sed  at  Khedum,  Di(mysius  sent  to  prefer  a  similar  request, 
whh  similar  offers,  at  the  neiirhboring  city  of  Lokri;  where  it  was 
favorably  entertained.  It  is  remarkable  that  Aristotle  comments 
upon  this  acquiescence  of  the  Lokrians  as  an  ad  of  grave  impiii- 
deiice,  and  as  dictated  only  by  the  anxiety  of  the  principal  citizens,  in 
an  olioar(;hical  irovernment.  to  seek  for  aggrandizement  tothemselves 
out  of  such  an  alliance.  The  request  would  not  have  been  granted 
(Aristotle  observes)  either  iu  a  democracy  or  in  a  wed-balanced  aris- 
tocracy The  marital  c(mnection  ntnv  contracted  by  Dionysius  wilii 
a  Lokrian  female,  Doris,  the  (hiuLditer  of  a  citizen  of  distinction 
named  X(Mietus,  ])roduced  as  an  ultimate  conse(iuence  the  oyerthnjw 
uf  the   oligarchy  of  Lokri.     xVnd  even  among  the  Lokrians,  the 


PKEP A  RATIONS  FOIi  WAR. 


189 


roquest  was  not  granted  without  opposition.  A  citizen  named  Aris- 
teides  (one  of  the  companions  of  Plato),  whose  daughter  Dion3\sius 
had  solicited  in  marriage,  returned  f(jr  answer  that  he  would  rather 
see  her  dead  than  united  to  a  des})ot.  In  revenge  for  this  bitter 
reply,  Dionysius  caused  the  sons  of  Aristeides  to  be  put  to  death. 

But  the  amicable  relations  which  Dionysius  was  at  so  much  pains 
to  establish  with  the  Greek  cities  near  the  strait  of  Messene,  were 
destined  chiefly  to  leave  him  free  for  i)reparations  against  Cartlnige; 
which  ]>reparations  he  now  commenced  on  a  gigantic  scale.  Efforts 
so  great  and  varied,  combined  not  merely  with  forecast  but  with  all 
the'^scientiflc  appliances  then  avaihible,  have  not  hitherto  come  before 
us  throughout  this  history.    The  terrible  effect  with  which  Hannibal 


had  recently  employed  his  battering-machines  :igainst  Selinus  and 
llimera,  stinuilaied  Dionysius  to  provide  himself  with  the  like  im- 
plements in  greater  abundance  than  any  Greek  general  had  ever 
before  possessed.  He  collected  at  Syracuse,  partly  by  constraint, 
partly  by  allurement,  all  the  best  engineers,  mechanists,  armorers, 
artisans,  etc.,  whom  Sicily  or  Italy  could  furnish.  He  set  them  upon 
the  construction  of  machines  and  other  muniments  of  war,  and  upon 
the  manufacture  of  arms  offensive  as  well  as  defensive,  with  the 
greatest  possible  assiduity.  The  arms  provided  were  of  great  variety; 
not  merely  such  as-were  suitable  for  Grechiu  soldiers,  heavy  or  light, 
hut  also  such  as  were  in  use  among  the  different  barbaric  tribes  round 
the  Mediterranean,  Gauls,  Iberians,  Tyrrhenians,  etc.,  from  whom 
Dionysius  intended  to  hire  mercenaries;  so  that  every  different 
soldier  w^ould  be  furnislied,  on  arriving,  with  the  sort  of  weapon 
which  had  become  habitual  to  him.  All  Syracuse  became  a  bustling 
military  worksho}) — not  only  the  market-places,  porticoes,  pahestne, 
and  lariic  private  houses,  but  also  the  fore-chambers  and  back- 
chambers  of  the  various  temples.  Dionysius  distributed  the  busy 
niullitude  into  convenient  divisions,  each  with  some  eminent  citizeu 
as  superintendent.  Visiting  them  in  person  frequently,  and  review- 
ing their  progress,  he  recompensed  largely,  and  invited  to  his  table, 
tlio-e  who  ])roduced  the  greatest  amount  of  linished  work.  As  he 
further  offered  premiums  for  inventive  skill,  the  competition  of 
ingenious  mechanists  originated  several  valuable  warlike  novelties; 
especially  the  great  projectile  engine  for  stones  and  darts,  called 
Calapulta,  whicli  was  now  for  the  first  time  devised.  We  are  told 
that  the  shields  fabricated  during  this  season  of  assiduous  prepara- 
tion were  not  less  than  UO.OOO  in  number,  and  the  breast-plates 
14,000.  many  of  them  unrivaled  in  w^orkmanship,  destined  for  the 
body-guard  and  the  officers.  Helmets,  spears,  daggers,  etc.,  witli 
otht'r  arms  and  weapons  in  indefinite  variety,  were  multiplied  in  cor- 
responding proportion.  The  magazines  of  arms,  missiles,  machines, 
and  muniments  of  war  in  every  variety,  accumulated  in  Ortygia, 
continued  stupendous  in  amount  through  the  whole  life  of  Dionysius, 
and  even  down  to  the  downfall  of  his  son. 


190 


^^ICILY 


]\IAiaUAGE  OF   IMOXYSIUa 


191 


If  the  proparalions  for  lund-varfai-e  were  thus  stupendous,  lliose 
for  sea  wartlre  were  fully  e(iual   if  not  superior.     The  docks  of 
^vrac'i^^  were  tilled  with  tlic  De.st  sh.p-builders,  earpenters,  and  ar  i- 
^nf  mmerons  wood-cutters  were  sent  to  cut  ship-timl)er  on  the 
well-clothed  slopes  of  .-Etna  and  the  ('alabrian  Apennines;  teams  of 
oxc  I  were  thcu  piovided  to  dra-  it  to  tlie  coast,  from  whence  it  wa.s 
^nved  in  rafts  to  Svracus.'.     'fbe  exislin-  naval  est^iblislnnent  of 
8vracu5>e  coniprised'llO  triit^mes;  the  existing  (  ocks  conUimed  IM 
s^ip-lou>vs,  or  covered  slips  for  the  puri>osc  either  of  huikhn|r  <• 
iSin^^  a  ti'ireme.     But  this  was  very  inajk.juatc  to  the  conceptio! 
if  Diopv^ius  who  forthwith  undertook  the  construction  of  W)  ne\ 
shin-houses,  'each  competent   to  hold  two   vessels-and  tlien  coni- 
^^nc^^^d  the  building  of  Hew  ship  of  war  to  the  number  of  200-  win  e 
lie    It  the  <ame  time  put  all  the  exist hig  vessels  and  docks  into  the 
besi  state  of  repair.     Here  too,  as  in  the  case  of  the  cattipulta,  the 
ino-  'tuiitv  of  Ids  architects  enabled  him  to  stand  forth  as  a  mariiime 
inventor:     As  vet,  the  largest  ships  of  war  which  had  ever  moved  on 
the  Grecian  or  Mediterrauran  waters,  was  the  trimiie,  which  was 
rowcHl  bv  thn-e  b.mks  <.r  tiers  of  oai^.     It  was  now  three  centuries 
since  the-  tirst  trireme  had  been  constructed  at  Corinth  and  hamos  bv 
the  inventive  skill  of  the  Corinthian  Ameb^oklcs;  it  was  not  unti 
the  period  succe^Hling  the  Persian  invasion  that  even  triremes  had 
become  extensive! v  emplovftl;  nor  liatl  any  kn-er  vessels  ever  been 
Ihomdit  of      The  Athenians,  who  d.uring  the  mterva    between  the 
Per4'tin  invasion  and  their  great  disaster  at  Syracuse  had  stood  i>re- 
eminent  -and  set  the  fashion  in  all  nautical  mat tei-s   were  under  no 
imlueement  to  buikl  al>ove  the  size  of  the  trireme      As  their  sty  e  o 
manei'veri'K'-  consisted  of  rapi«t  evolutions  and  charges  in  the  slnp  s 
dinxti^on.  for  the  puir-ose  vd' striking  the  weak  parts  of  an  enemy  s 
ship  with  tiui  iK.ik  of  their  own-so,  if  the  size  ol  their  ship  h-.ul 
been  incri'ased.  her  capaoitv  for  such  nimble  linns  and  movements 
would  luavc  ln-en  diminished.     But  the  Syracusans  hi.d  made  no 
attempt  to  copv  the  rapid  evolutions  of  the  Athenian  navy      On  the 
eoiitruv,  wb^n  lighting  agahisl  the  latter  in  die  cx)nfmed  harlior  o 
Svi-acu^e,  tiiev  had  fovind  every  advantage  in  their  massive  builo    I 
ships,  and  straightiorwaixl  impact  of  bow  <lriven  a-amst  bow.     1  or 
them   the  larger  ships  were  the  m<.re  suitable  andethcient;  so  that 
Pionvsiiis  or  his  naval  architects,  full  of  ami )it ions  aspirations   noNv 
sn-uck  <»ut  the  plan  of  building  ships  of  war  with  four  or  live  bank> 
of  oars  instead  of  three;  that  is.   quadriremes,   or  quinqueremes 
inste-id  of  triremes.     Not  onlv  did  the  Symcusan  despot  thus  equip 
H  naval  force  equal  in  mrnb^r  of  ships  to  Athens  in  her  best  days; 
but  he  also  exhibited  ships  larger  than  Athens  h;id  ever  possessed,  or 
than  (ireece  had  ever  conceived.  , 

In  all  the'se  offensive  prep-arations  against  Carthage  as  in  the  pve- 
vious  defen<.^son  Epipoke.  the  spontaneous  impulse  of  the  ^viarusa  is 
c^euerally  went  hand  in  hand  with  Dionysiiis.     1  heir  sv  mpalhy  and 


concurrence  greatly  promoted  the  success  of  his  efforts,  for  thi.^ 
iniJnensc  ecpiipment  against  the  common  enemy.  Even  with  all  thin 
sympathy,  indeed,  we  are  al  a  loss  to  underst;md,  nor  are  we  at  all 
informed,  how  he  found  money  to  meet  so  prodigious  an  oullay. 

After  the  material  meane  for  war  had  thus  Ix'cn  completed — au 
operation  which  can  hardly  have  occupied  less  than  two  or  three 
years — it  remained  to  levy  men.  On  this  point  the  ideas  of  Diony- 
sius  were  not  less  asi)iring.  Besides  his  own  numerous  standin^g 
force,  he  enlisted  all  the  inost  effective  among  the  Syracusan  citi^ 
zens,  as  well  as  from  cities  in  his  dependencv.  lie  sent  friendly 
jiddresses,  and  tried  to  acquire  popularity,  among  the  general  body 
of  Greeks  throughout  the  island.  Of  his  large  fleet,  one  half  was 
manned  with  Svracusan  rowers,  marines,  and  officers;  the  other 
half  with  seamen  enlisted  from  abroad.  lie  farther  sent  envoys  botli 
to  ltal>'  and  to  Peloponnesus  to  ol)tain  auxiliaries,  with  offers  of  the 
inosl  liberal  pay.  From  Sparta,  now  at  the  height  of  her  power,  and 
courting  his  alliance  as  a  means  of  perpetuity  to  her  own  empire,  ho 
received  such  warm  encouragement,  tlmt  he  was  enabled  to  enlist  no 
inconsiderable  numbers  in  'Peloponnesus;  while  niany  barbaric  or 
non-Hellenic  soldiers  from  the  western  regions  near  the  Mediterra- 
nean were  hired  also.  He  at  lengtli  succeeded,  to  his  satisfaction,  in 
collecting  an  aggivgate  army,  formidable  not  less"  from  numbers  and 
braveiy.lhan  from  elalK)ratG  and  diversified  equipment.  His  large 
and  well-stocked  armory  (already  noticed)  enabled  him  to  furnisii 
each  newly-arrived  soldier,  from  all  the  different  nations,  with  native 
and  appro]n-iate  weapons. 

When  all  his  preparations  were  thus  com])]ete,  his  last  step  was  to 
celebrate  his  nuptials,  a  few  dtiys  previous  to  tlK'  active  commence- 
ment of  the  war.  He  married,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  two  wives 
—the  Lokrian  Doris  (already  mentioned ).  and  a  Syracusan  woinau 
named  Aristomache,  daughter*  of  his  ])artis:m  Ilij^pariuus  (and  sister 
of  Dion,  respecting  whom  much  will  occur  hereafter).  The  first  use 
made  of  one  among  his  newly-invented  quinquereme  vessels,  was  to 
i^ail  to  Lokii,  decked  out  in  the  richest  ornaments  of  gold  and  silver, 
for  the  purp(^se  of  conveying  Doris  in  state  to  Ortygia.  Aristomache 
was  also  brought  to  his'hoiise  in  a  splendid  chariot  with  four  widte 
lun'ses.  He  celebrated  his  nuptials  with  both  of  them  in  his  liouse  on 
the  same  day;  no  one  knew  which  Ix'd  chamber  he  visited  lirst;  and 

loth  of  theni  continued  constantly  to  live  with  him  at  the  same  table, 
with  equal  dignity,  for  many  years.  He  had  three  children  by  Doris, 
the  eldest  of  whom  was  Dionysius  the  younger;  and  fcmr  by  Aristo- 
mache; but  the  latter  was  for  a  considerable  time  childless;  which 
greatly  chagrined  monysiiis.  Ascribing  her  barrenness  to  magical 
incantations,  he  put  to 'death  the  mother  of  his  other  wife  Doris,  as 
the  alleged  worker  of  thesi;  mischievous  influences.  It  Avas  the 
rumor  at  Svracusc  tiiat  Aristomache  was  the  most  beloved  of  the 
two.     But  Dionysius  treated   both  of  them  well,  and  both  of  them 


192 


SICILY. 


MARCH  OF  DIOXYSIUS. 


193 


1 ;.  c^n  hv  rtnrU  succeeded  liim,  tbougb  he  Imd 
equally;  moreovevh     son        D.s^  ^^^^^^^^^^  ^,,.„. 

two  sons  In  tlit  o'l'i"^-  '".  „.i,, L.in  all  the  Svracusiin  cilizens  as 
H„ets  and  fesuve  v<-creat  o...,  'l';j^',"^^";;;^,;\„.oi,ably  the  ninn. 
well  as  I'-'-V^t;;;  '4,:.l'i'  ?seen:s  at  his  monu.nl,  when  every  uku.s 
grateful  to  Dpwiis  as    ^^Y,, pulse  ^__^^^  ^      .^,,^,,  ^.  ^ 

nundwas  f u  1  ot  ^'V<''.*'|\^'',%|,,,rt .lived  popularity,  and  to  have 
Carthage,  ^ '^''^''^ ''"^7' ^ ''!  ,„  \ w  Xlo  without  that  fear  of 
been  able  to  move    ■'i;  >  ^  ^.^V^'^,  7, ^Ufe  even  in  his  innx.st 

announcing  the  u.tended  ""^■^„"'  ."fj^"  ^'o,.;! ^ks  In  ireneral,  but 
the  Carthaginians  were  7"™""/';"  !,%  ,,  J  4  ,,s  but  too  plai.dy 
most  of  all  to  the  ^"''f »  ,<f,r  i::-';^Xsvmpatl.ies  on  behalf  of  Ihe 
tostitiod.    He  appealed  to  then  ^P'f,'^""^,';- "'f  ,,e  i,io„d.  which  luul 

five  Hellenic  cities  m  «'«  f™''f  "J,*, ^  bv  he  generals  of  Car- 
lately  ttn,lergone  the  m™  of^o^^ 

thage,  and  were  sti  ?'"'^"'  ;-,,":'  '  ,„  -..^^u.nd  lier  dominion  over 
Cartlmge  (he  added)  irom  " '""F'", j,  ," „Ve  Vmder  winch  she  had 
the  rest  of  the  .sland  ''^'^P'  "'^'  Pf^^'t  s,.  usans,  lids  ought  to 
{'r:;fin;;S!duf:tT,^.l  s'Jo;t;t,acUi,:g  lu^r  at  once,  and  rescuing 
i^^.'llel'len'ic  brethren,  ..efore  she  had  ttnu.  to^.ecov-  ^ 

These  motives  -"'^  -'  'V^,';!;  "^  •,;, r,*^,  "fl  Pionysius  ,o  hasten 
besidesanollierinduwmen  ,  A\ni(nwu  11...  .  j^ 

the  war,  tho.tgh  he  probably  c  1  '  <;'  ^  .^'J^  >  P™  'J  ,„„  gLilian 
address  to  the  Syraeusans.  "'/"P,V\Y,V,r  properties  into  tlie 
Gnvks  were  "^  ^--^'t'"? ,^"'"':;'f ' '^j  '  ' ,  „  '  hate'^^.d  and  oppres- 
territory  of  f'f'-'l'».'-'V.,"''"T,  'rie-mle       v  nu^^    ^vi'l.  less  t.rn.r 

^.^  S'G?ceUr';::tr7Lu.!;..y  s;^:]ects'of  Carthage  to  throw 

off  her  yoke  and  101.1  luin^  ^vraousan  assemblv  hailed  the  prop- 

T,ou.l  acclaniauons  from  the  Sjrac  van         ^^^_..^^  ^^^^^.^,_.j^,,, 

OS  tion  for  war  vvi.li  t^artiifiie ,  .i  I'"  ,.  „  '  ,.„,.,ti(,n  of  everv  niaa. 
into  reality  what  ha.l  been  long  J'' ^ '  '"^Xr  ;  "'^  Perm'issi.in, 
And  the.  war  was  '•^-"'l';^' .;,  ^l,  ^^^^  Sder  all  the  Carthaginian 
which  Dionysms  gran  ed  '"''h^,'  '':,  "J     ^',!^„,,,e  or  in  anv  of  his 

resi.lents  and  me.cannle  P'"Pf 'l^ ^-'I'^^r,  "  ^^^^ ere  „"'  onW  •several 
dependent  cities      We  "J«;^'^..^;^^e",'^f,:oma",v1oa.led  vessels 

llli2%.:!;ny^cS!»;''^.Uru,J';:cS:S  ^l^cumstan^cs,  any 


Carthaginian  (person  or  property)  can  have  been  at  Syracuse  except 
I)y  accident;  for  war  with  Carthatre  had  been  long  announced,  not 
merely  in  current  talk,  but  in  the  more  unequivocal  language  of 
overwhelming  prepaiation.  Nor  is  it  easy  to  understand  how  the 
prudent  Carthaginian  Senate  (who  probably  were  not  less  provided 
with  spies  at  Syracuse  than  Dionysius  was  at  Carthage)  can  have  been 
so  uiiinformedas  to  be  taken  by  surprise  at  the  last  moment,  when 
Dionysius  sent  thither  a  herald  formally  declaring  war;  which  herald 
was  not  sent  until  after  the  license  for  private  plunder  had  been  pre- 
viously granted.  He  peremptorily  required  the  Carthaginians  to 
relinquish  their  dominion  over  the  Greek  cities  in  Sicily,  as  the  only 
means  of  avoiding  war.  To  such  a  proposition  no  answer  was 
returned,  nor  probably  expected.  But  the  Carthaginians  were  now 
so  much  prostrated  (like  Athens  in  the  second  and  third  years  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war)  by  depopulation,  suffering,  terrors,  and  despond- 
ency, arising  out  of  the  pestilence  which  beset  them  in  Africa,  that 
they  felt  incompetent  to  any  serious  effort  and  heard  with  alarm  the 
letter  read  from  Dionysius.  There  was  however  no  alternative,  so 
that  they  forthwith  dispatclied  some  of  their  ablest  citizens  to  levy 
troops  for  the  defense  of  their  Sicilian  possessions. 

The  first  news  that  reached  them  was  appalling.  Dionysius  had 
marched  forth  witli  his  full  power,  Syracusan  as  well  as"  foreign, 
accumulated  by  so  long  a  preparation.  It  was  a  power,  tlie  like  of 
wliich  had  never  been  beheld  in  Greece;  greater  even  than  that 
wielded  by  his  ])redecessor  Gelon  eighty  years  before.  If  the  contem- 
poraries of  Gelon  had  been  struck  with  awe  at  the  superiorly  of  his 
force  to  anything  that  Helhis  could  show  elsewhere,  as  much  or  more 
Mould  the  same  sentiment  be  felt  by  those  who  surrounded  Diony- 
!^ius.  More  intimately  still  was  a  similar  comparison,  with  the 
mighty  victor  of  Himera,  present  to  Dionysius  himself.  He  exulted 
in  setting  out  with  an  army  yet  more  imposing,  against  the  same 
enemy,  and  for  the  same  purpose  of  liberating  the  maritime  cities 
of  Sicily  subject  to  Carthage;  cities  whose  number  and  importance 
had  since  fearfully  augmented. 

These  subject-cities,  from  Kamarina  on  one  side  of  the  island  to 
Selinus  and  Himera  on  the  other,  though  there  were  a  certain  num- 
ber of  Carthaginian-  residents  established  there,  had  no  effective 
standing  force  to  occupy  or  defend  them  on  the  part  of  Carthage; 
whose  habit  it  was  to  levy  large  mercenary  hosts  for  the  special 
occ:ision  and  then  to  disban<l  them  afterward.  Accordingly,  as  soon 
as  Dionysius  with  his  powerful  army  passed  the  Syracusan  border, 
and  entered  upon  his  march  westward  along  the  southern  coast  of 
the  island,  proclaiming  himself  as  liberator — the  most  intense  anti- 
(Jarthagiuiau  manifestations  hurst  forth  at  once,  at  Kamarina,  Gela, 
Agrigentum,  Selinus,  and  Himera.  These  Greeks  did  not  merely 
copy  the  Syracusans  in  plimdering  the  property  of  all  Carthaginians 
found  among  them,  but  ai-.>  >eized  their  per.-oiis.  and  put  them  to 

JI.  G.  IV— 7 


194 


SICILV 


SlK(;i-:   OF    MOTYM 


195 


turn  now  look  place  ^^'^}'l^^^^^^^^^^^^  A-rigeutuni,  and  th. 

thnginian  arnu^,  A^^^^^^Jr;  f  ^,^™  r-piac^ic^  in  itself  sulll- 
other  conquered  cities..  ^^**;.y'  '•  '',  .  .ijcn-ciless  and  studied  l>ar- 
,i,ntly  rigorous  --^j^!^^^^^  ^,  ^^  4g;Ki;d  Ihe  late  proceedings 
bar  tv,  analogous  to  lli.ii  nnuicji  luui  »      =rnu„.,.  "  Kipilim  ve<ners 

tUadniau  residents.  «"n'"^  ^^ J_^ >-, '  J'^^,;,^""^^-     ','eiu  the  Ansevine 

kn,.  Its  ""'"^  '■"•,;  the  Car    ^^'  mans  learned  from  tbe  retaliation 
Diouonis  telU  us  lli.it  tut  ^; '  "  ^  J,      j„  „„,  appear,  however, 

thus  suflere.1.  a  I'-'S^""  ^^ /'^^..f;  t'hiTesson  w  s  inuel    laid  to  beart; 

!5?:r S'^«i^:?^Kunr;rt.:«o  .bleU  cbaraeur. 
i.ed  tbe  Hellemc  '^^"ot^Z^!'"^^  c-itizou.  of  Kamarina,  Gela. 

separa  ed  iunn  ^^'>  '»>  ^^      V  ^    j^|,.,.^^  ^.-er  hv  nu-ans  of  a  mole,  so 

•n.m  fai-li,a,L'e.     «-'-lv'-l  '" ''^'"f'!-"' ,"f'"".,^'  '  .  :,""f  Tl^o    ,1  ee  ia 
V.aiL'eutuui  ami  J^elinus,  Dionysius  looiv  asuncv   ol   lUc  inae 


« 

conjunction  willi  liis  principal  engineers.  It  des-^rves  notice,  that 
this  is  among  the  earliest  sieges  recorded  in  Grecian  history  wherein 
\ve  read  of  a  professed  engineer  as  being  directly  and  deliberately 
called  on  to  advi<e  the  best  niode*of  proceeding. 

Having  formed  his  jilans.  he  left  his  admiral  Leptines  with  a  por- 
tion of    the   army  to   begin   the  necessary  works,  while  he  himself    ^ 
with  the  remainder  laid  waste  the  neighboring  territory  dependent 
on  or  allied  with  Cartilage.     The  Sikani  and  others  submitted  to 
him;  but  Ankyrte,  Boloeis,  Panormus,  Egesta,  and  Eulella  all  held 
out,  thougl)  the  citizens  ^'cre  confined  to  tlieir  walls,  and  obliged  to 
witness,  without  being  able  to  ])revent,  the  destruction  of  their  lands. 
Returning  from  this  inarch,  Dionysius  pressed  the  siege  of  Molyo 
with  the  utmost  ardor,  and  Mith  all  the  appliances  wliicli  his  en- 
gineers could  devise.     Having  moored  his  transports  along  the  beach, 
and  hauleil  his  ships  of  war  ashore  in  the  harbor,  he  undertook  the 
laborious  task  of  till  in  u*  up  the  strait  (probably  of  no  great  depth) 
which  divided  Motye  from  the  main  island,  or  at  least  as  much  of 
the  length  of  the  strait  as  was  sulficient  to  march  across  both  with 
sohliers  and  with  battering  engines,   and  to  biing  thein  up  close 
against  the  walls  of  the  ciiy.     The  numbers  under  his  command 
enabled  him  to  achieve  this   enterprise,  though  not  without  a  long 
period  of  effort,  during  which  the  Carthtiginians  tried  more  than 
once  to  interrupt  his  proceedings.     Not  having  a  fleet  capable  of 
contending  in  pitched  battle  against;  the  besiegers,  the  Caithaginian 
gx'iieral  Imilkon  tried  two  successive  maneuvers.      He  tirst  sent  a 
squadron  of  ten  ships  of  war  to  sail  suddenly  into  the  harbor  of 
iSvracuse,  in  hopes  tiiat  the  diversion  thus  operated  would  constrain 
liionysiiis  to  detach  a  portion  of  ids  fleet  from  Motye.     Though  \h(t 
attack,  however,  was  st)  far  successful  as  to  destroy  many  merchant- 
men in  the  harbor,  yet  the  assailants  were  beaten  off  without  making 
any  more  serious  impression,  or  creating  the  diversion  intended. 
Iniilkon  next  made  an  attempt  to  surprise  the  armed  ships  of  Diony- 
sius as  they  lav  hauled  ashore  in  the  harbor  near  Motye.     Crossing 
over  from  Carthage  by  night,  with  100  siiips  of  war,  to  the  Sell- 
lumtine  coast,  he  sailed  round  Cape  Lilyb^um,  and  appeared  at  day- 
break off  3Iotve.     His  appearance  look'  every  man  by  surprise.     He 
destroyed  or  put  to  flight  the  s!ii])s  on  guard,  and  sailed  into  ^he 
harbor  prepared  to  attack,  while  as  yet  only  a  few  of  the  Syracusa:» 
ships  had  been  got  afloat.     As  the  harbor  was  too  conlined  to  enable 
Dionvsius  to  profit  by  his  gretU   superiority  in  munber  and  size  of 
ships",  a  great  portion  of  his  fleet  would  liave  been  now  destroyed 
had  it  not  been  saved  bv  his  numerous  land-force  and  artillery  on 
the  beach.     Showers  of  inissiles  from  this  assembled  crowd,  as  well 
:is  from  the  decks  of  the  Syracusan  ships,  prevented  Imilkon  from 
advancing  far  enough  to  attack  with  eiTect.     The   nev>iy-invented 
(Miirine  called  the  caiapulla.  of  v.hich  the  Carthaginians  had  as  yet 
had  no  experience,  was  especitflly  eft'ective;  projecting  large  masses 


iim 


sicii.v. 


PLUNDER  OF  M(.)TYE. 


197 


onn-l.t.     His  m.nuTons  soUIkms  avc  c   I  .ecu  (i  ^^^^^^  ^^  ,,,,,,, 

'doJvn  to  the  harbor,  '"'J,,  f "j  ",^,tl'  a  hU  thoharl..rof  Mo.ve 
more  than  two  mi\es  ''  '>f";''''V,v' ,,  "jo'e  laid  so  as  to  form  a  piith- 
f  om  the  outer  sea.     ^omlen  ph..  Ks  ^ tre    «       _  ^^  ^^^^   „exvl> -.<...- 

^•av  for  th<.  ships,  and  in  ^^P  '«  "J,  "'.^J  ,he  sLennth  and  ardor  ot 
structfd  quadriremes  and  q.'»nfl'"  " '"!^,-  of  transnortinc  eighty  shii.s 
,he  army  Ueed  for  .b.s  U«  K,me  etlort  of  t  aM_^^,_^^,,^  ,,,„^  „f    ,,. 

„eross  in  .,ne  day.     Tl.c  -^  ^  [  «  ,o  •  S"„,,  Imilk.m  did  ..ol  venture 

Thev  knew  well  that  tl.cv  had  '^^\^^.',,\\>    i  of  victory,  and  espccially 
?eS  of  the  C'nrtlK..ima..^in   )K.^    ovnc^  ^-^^^'     itself  wcuUd 

the  cruel  treatment  of  <^  f /[J;'      [,'  ,i^,„ce  lay  in  a  brave  despau. 

row  be  retaliated-  and  ^^  ^/Y^^'^^'  ^',^,,,  at  lenLnh  eompleted   Diony- 

The  road  across  the  ^^r^^iJ^^V^,^;.  ,    , is  assault.     While  the-eata- 

sins  broudit  up  l^^^,^"?^""^""^^  i^^^^^^^^^         from  showing  themselves 

pnlta  with  its  missiles  P^^Y^'^^^^^^^  l'{!," ''   d^ven  up  to  shake  or  over- 
do     he  battlements   b.Utering-nim.  were  dm  ^^ 

throw  the  walls,    A^^^^^^  .^^j,;" ,'  th^m  one  above  the  other,  ami 
rolled  up,  with  six  different  .t()iKsm  me  ^^  ^^^.^^.^  ^^ 

in  held  t  equal  to  the  houses     /iran  ^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^  ,,.,,iis,  witl; 

;" slewed  on  their  side  ^^^^  f^^^^^^   ,^,,^^^4\l'  stood  men  protected 
yards^  projectinir  ^imvarcl       Lpon  t   c^^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^y^^^^  ^,,„,He..L.^ 

from  the  missiles  by  a  sort   of    »'[;^^f';.\^        thev  cast  down  up.^u 
orches.  pitch,  and  other  ^.\^";  Jf  ^^^^^j^^^^ ^^"^^^^^^         took  fire  in  the 
the  machines  of  the  '^^^^\^^^"  .''^^^^  ^itfteim  the  confiag.aliou 

TV'ood-work,  and  it  was  "^^  ^>t^^^"    .'^\"^Xmte  resistance,  liowever, 
^as  extinguished      After  a  long  and  obst    ate^        ^^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^    , 

the  walls  were  at  length  .^\<^'y  '^;\';,_.^,^  ^^^  ^^e  in  their  power.     But 

be<;ie-ers  rushed  in.  ^^^^''}''\^  ^}'^  yZlU'ld^^^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^■■' 

the  indefatigable  energy  of  th^'  b;-^^f ^^  .^^^^  ^.treets,  so  that  a 

behind  into  a  state  ^^'^'^^^'^^^^^^^^^^  to  be  undertaken. 

fresh  assault,  more  difficult  tl^»n   f  tiK  t,  urn        ^  ^^^     ^^^^^^  ^„t  he 

The  towers  on  wheels  were  ;'^\^^^\.V.  '  he  ou^e^  in  consequence  of 
pushed  into  immediate  ^-"^^^.^^^f  ^^  ^'u^^^p^^  their  approach, 
fhe  ruins  of  the  ^vc'rtlirown  wall  wluc^^^^      1      ^^^^^^^^   ^^^^  ^^.^^^^ 

Accordinoly  the  assailants  ^^f «  f^^":^^f^''^i,e  houses,  and  to  march 
platforms  or  bridges  ^[^>"^,.  1\  .^;\^^,!Vero    t  ^reat  disadvantage, 

;ir\^Xi^b:raS/^^t.;^  companies  to  the 


ground  by  severing  or  oversetting  the  platform.  For  several  days 
this  (lesperule  combat  was  renewed.  ISot  a  sti'p  was  gained  by  the 
besiegers,  yet  the  uni'ortunale  Motyenes  became  each  day  more  ex- 
hausted, while  portions  of  tlie  foremost  houses  were  also  overthiown. 
Every  evening  Diouysius  recalled  his  troops  to  their  niglit's  repose, 
renewing  the  assault  next  morning.  Having  thus  brought  the  enemy 
into  an  expectation  that  the  night  would  be  undisturbed,  he  one 
fiital  night  took  them  by  siu'piise,  sending  the  Thuriau  iVrchylus 
^vith  a  cliosen  body  of  troops  to  attack  the  foremost  defenses.  This 
detachment,  planting  ladders  and  climbing  up  by  means  of  the  half- 
demolished  houses,  established  themselves  firmly  in  a  position  within 
the  town  before  resistance  could  be  organized.  In  vain  did  the 
]\Iotyenes,  discovering  the  stratagem  too  late,  endeavor  to  dislodge 
them.  The  main  force  of  Diouysius  w^as  speedily  brought  up  across 
tlie  artificial  eartlivvay  to  confirm  their  success,  and  the  town  was 
thus  carried  in  spite  ol  the  most  gallant  resistance,  which  continued 
even  after  it  had  become  hopeless. 

The  victorious  host  who  now  poured  into  Motye,  incensed  not 
merely  by  tlie  length  and  obstinacy  of  the  defense,  but  also  by  ante- 
cedent Carthaginian  atrocities  at  Agrigentum  and  elsewhere,  gave 
full  loose  to  the  sanguinary  impulses  of  retaliation.  Tiny  butchered 
indiscriminately  men  and  women,  the  aged  and  the  children,  without 
mercy  to  any  one.  The  streets  were  thus  strewed  with  the  slain,  in 
spite  of  all  efforts  on  the  part  of  Diouysius,  avIio  desired  to  preserve 
the  captives  that  they  might  be  sold  as  slave-^,  and  thus  bring  in  a 
profitable  return.  But  his  orders  to  abstain  from  slaughter  were  not 
obeyed,  nor  could  he  do  anything  more  than  invite  the  sufferers  by 
proclamation  to  take  refuge  in  the  temples — a  step  which  most  of 
them  would  probably  resort  to  uninvited.  Restrained  from  further 
slaughter  by  the  sanctuary  of  the  temples,  the  victors  now  turiK?d  to 
pillage.  Abundance  of  gold,  silver,  precious  vestments,  and  other 
marks  of  opulence,  the  accumulations  of  a  long  period  of  active 
prosperity,  fell  into  their  hands,  and  Diouysius  allowed  to  them  the 
full  plunder  of  the  town  as  a  recompense  for  the  toils  of  the  siege, 
lie  further  distributed  specitd  recompenses  to  those  who  had  disliii- 
guished  themselves,  100  miniB  being  given  to  Archylus,  the  leader 
of  the  successful  night-surprise.  All  the  surviving  Motyenes  he  sold 
iuto  slavery,  but  he  reserved  for  a  more  cruel  fate  Daimenes  and 
various  other  Greeks  who  had  been  taken  among  them.  These 
Greeks  he  caused  to  be  crucilied,  a  sj^er-imen  of  the  Phenician  pen- 
alties transferred  l)y  example  to  their  Hellenic  neighbors  and  enemies. 

The  siege  of  Moiye  having  occupied  nearly  all  the  summer,  Diony- 
sius  now  re-conducted  his  army  homeward.  He  left  at  the  place  a 
•Sikel  garrison  under  the  comnifind  of  the  Syracusan  Biton,  as  well 
as  a  large  portion  of  his  fteet,  120  ships,  under  the  command  of  his 
brother  Leptines;  who  was  instructed  to  watch  for  the  arrival  of  any 
force  from  Carthage,  and  to  employ  himself  in  besieging  the  neigh- 


lt)8 


SICILY. 


IMILKON  CAPTURES  31Lfc)SEXE. 


VJd 


.ovin,  town,  of  I^^-ta  a^Ej.tdl.     T^^^^ 
two  tow  us  howevtr  ^^\^^,1'\4^^"^.*;'^"     ,e  "veu  successlul,  Ih 
then..elvos  bravdy   ^-^^f-j^^^^i    ^^^^  ^e  ^ue.uy's  camp,  ^s  ilh 
a  >vel!-i>la.med  iioclurnal  m      -        ''\^^"\;  -  ^^.^^t^.     ^^xhtv  of  the  two 
many  hor.es,  and  stores  o   a    \  "  ^-^^ '^  ^^^  ."  p,in-,  Dionysius  him- 

iug  territory  dependent  upon  ^^'^^^^'j^;       .  .     the  arrival  of  Iniilkon 
l>resently  the  i-;;;^,^  ^  J^IJ^^^^^^^  S'L^to  ^'^  ^1- 

from  Cartilage.  ,  ^^^^  f^,^"  , /'..i 'over^vhehnin.lr  force,  collected  as 
citv,  he  now  brought  wUi  ""//'"  ^     ,.  t.    V;..   .,,i(i  the  western 

vv^li  from  the  subjects  m  Atnca  .s  <^^'  .'^Jj  ^^^  ^  ,,^  Timanis, 
Mediterranean,  it  ^^^^''^^'''^i^''^'^  b  cihA  V  oO.OOO  num-aiul 
to  100,000  men,  ^-^^-^''^^^''^-^'^///^^V  !  'ei^  j^  to  ;>00  000  foot,  4,000 

in  the  more  ample  compu  atu  s  of  L  l'^.  ;;  ,a  6,000  transports 
horse,  400  chariots  ot  war,   "^  \^!    ^^^^J^^^f  j^^  '  i  at  Cnrthage, 

carrying  stores  and  engines.  ^'^)^^^  o  .apprise  him  of  all  move- 
even  among  men  o  rank  and  H  -;  -;,^^^J^L,owledge  of.  the 
meats  or  public  ordei^.   .^^^^/'"/'''^^^^^^^^^^^  oave  to  the  pilots 

precise  point  in  Sicily  where  1\^,  V^^^'^X^^^  out  at  sea, 

l;y,.acu^u>  n.e..     I  ut  ^o.hn,g  '  .;,  '\„V,  t^^f^lo,,,,.  t'o  l.  able  ,.. 
AvlnleLi-ptimso.i    '^^ '■"''•  "'^;,, ',,,,,.,  vessels  of  ihe  lar-e  trans 
attack,  will,  llnr-.y  tnie.nes      '''*"''-';'■'' lYc^iesl.ove.i  no  less  Iban 
iioit  fleet  o.i  tiieir  voyage   (>  I  •'"'''"",'%o  elr.iiols'of  "ar;  vet   Hie 
fifty  of  tl,em,  ^^itU  o(;00  men      "^.fetv  a  <    vere   ..ine,l  iW  Imil" 
remaiumt;  lle.-t  tea.  ly.l  1  be  ,;;      >  ^^;  ''>-''  ^,  ,|,i, ,„,„„.U..cl,  the 
k„n  witli  the  ships  of  wai       1 1  <•  ''     ' ''"'^('rino  his  ships  of  war  to 
(.•arthagiuian  {general  l^''   ''^■'» '"  ^^"V,r  1  s  v "iv'l  e  refined  Eryx, 
accompany  him  alonit  /'"^'-''f -..J:   J'^'Jv   J    inti.uidatert  into 
vvhicl,  was  at  heart  Carthaginian   ''"^ '"S  ""'>  ,  7„'         .       , le  then 
subntlssion   to  Dionvsms  .iur.ng    «' «    I  '„\  .*;'  ^.^  Itn'  little  resist- 

garrison  ha<l  far  less  '''^'I'^'^^'YTiio^^^^^^^         which  had  cost  him 
Thus;  w'is  Dionvs  US  deprived  ot  tlie  (onqmst  >>mcii 


though  he  was  then  not  far  off,  besieging  Egesta — and  though  his 
soldiers,  elate  with  the  successes  of  the  preceding  year,  were  eauer 
for  a  general  batlle.  But  Dionysius,  deeming  ^tliis  measure  Voo 
adventurous,  resolved  to  retreat  to  Syracuse.  His  provisions  were 
fiiiling,  and  he  was  at  a  great  distance  from  allies,  so  that  defeat 
would  have  been  ruinous.  lie  tlierefore  returned  to  Syracuse,  car- 
rying\vith  him  some  of  the  Sikaniaus,  wiiom  he  persuaded  to  evacu- 
ate their  abode  in  the  Carthaginian  neighborhood,  promising  to  pro- 
vide thein  with  better  homes  elsewhere.  3Iost  of  them  however 
declined  his  offers ;  some  (among  them,  the  Ilalikyjeaus)  preferring 
to  resume  their  alliance  with  Carthage.  Of  the  recent  accpiisitioiiH 
u  )thiug  now^  remiaued  to  Dion3'sius  beyond  the  Selinuntine  boun- 
dary; but  Gela,  Kamarina,  Agi'igentum,  and  Selinus  had  been 
emancipated  from  Cartilage,  and  were  still  in  a  state  of  dependent 
alliance  with  him;  a  result  of  moment — yet  seemingly  very  inade- 
quate to  the^  immense  warlike  preparations  whereby  it  had  been 
attained.  Whether  he  exercised  a  wise  discretion  in  declining  to 
light  the  Carthaginians,  we  have  not  sufiiiieut  information  to  deter- 
mine. But  hi8  army  appear  to  have  been  dissatisfied  with  it,  and  it 
was  among  the  causes  of  the  outbreak  against  him  shortly  af  terwarvi 
at  Syracuse. 

Tiius  left  master  of  the  country,  Imilkon,  instead  of  trvins:  to  re- 
couquer  Selinus  and  Ilimera,  which  had  probably  been  impoverished 
l)y  recent  misfortune— resolved  to  turn  his  arms  against  Messene  in 
tlie  north-east  of  the  island;  a  city  as  yet  fresh  and  untouched — so 
little  prepared  for  attack  that  its  walls^ver.'  not  in  good  repair— and 
moreover  at  the  present  moment  yet  further  enfeebfed  by  the  absence 
of  its  horsemen  in  the  army  of  Dionysius.  Accordingly,  he  marched 
along  the  northern  coast  of  Sicily,  with  his  fleet  coasting  in  the  same 
dir.'clion  to  co-operate  with  him.*^  He  made  terms  with  Kephuloedium 
and  Therma,  captured  the  island  of  Liparn,  and  at  length  reached 
Cape  Pelorus  a  few  miles  from  Messene.  His  rapid  march  and  unex- 
pected arrival  struck  the  Messenians  with  dismay.  Many  of  them, 
conceiving  defense  to  be  impossible  against  so  nunierous  a  host,  sent 
away  their  families  and  their  valuable  property  to  Rhegium  or  else- 
wliere.  On  tiie  whole,  however,  a  spirit  of  greater  confidence  pre- 
vailed, arising  in  part  from  an  ancient  prophecy  preserved  among 
the  traditions  of  the  town,  purporting  that  the  Carthaginians  should 
one  day  carry  water  in  Messene.  The  interpreters  affirmed  that  "to 
carry  water"  meant,  of  course,  "to  be  a  slave;"  hence  the  Messeni- 
ans, persuading  tliemselves  that  this  portended  defeat  to  Imilkon, 
seat  out  their  chosen  military  force  to  meet  him  at  Pelorus,  and 
oppose  his  disembarkation.  The  Carthaginian  commander,  seeing 
these  troops  on  their  march,  ordered  his  fleet  to  sail  forward  into  the 
harbor  of  the  city,  and  attack  it  from  seaward  during  the  absence  of 
the  defenders.  A  north  wind  so  favored  the  advance  of  the  ships, 
that  they  entered  the  harbor  full  sail,  and  found  the  city  on  that  side 


200 


SICILY. 


olmnst  iin^'mUd  The  troops  who  hiid  marched  out  toward  Pelorus 
?nTet"uS  mt  were  too  Inle;  while  Imilkon  himse  f  al.o  puslj- 
liasten.a  nacK   .  ^^^^.^^  ^^.|,,. „jp  neglected 

;,Trts  of  1  wxl  k."sone  was  taken;  and  its  unham-v  populati.m 
Sed  in  all  di  Action   f or  thei.  lives.     S<,me  found  refuge  m  (he  ne.gh- 

rian?d  as  a  protection  against  the  indigenous  S.kels;  while  about 
S-^ot  hem  near  the  harbor,  east  themselves  mto  the  sea,  and  un  ler- 
Took  the  arduous  task  of  swimming  across  to  the  Ituliun  coast,  m 

which  fifty  of  them  succeeded.  -. 

Though  Imilkon  tried  in  vain  to  carry  by  assaidt  ^o^c  of  t  e  Mcs- 
.cenian  hill  forts,  which  were  both  strongly  placed  and    >!«)hni\} 
detcnded-yet  his  capture   of   Wessene   itsclt   was  an  event   lioth 
Sng  and  profitable.     It  deprived  Diouysms  of  »"  in^iortan 
n  Iv   and  lessened  his  facilities  for  obtainmg  succor  from  Italy     It 
most  of  ,1!   it  sratitie<l  the  anti-Hellenic  sentimenl  of  the  Pun  c  geu- 

nl  and  1  s  armv,  counterlmlancing  the  capture  of  Motye  in  the  me^ 
c edimM-ear  Hiving  taken  scarce  any  captives,  Imdkon  hadnotl  g 
h  t  unconscioiis  stoife  and  «ood  upon  which  to  vent  his  ant.path. . 
Heordm-dlhetown,  the  walls  and  all  the  buildings,  to  be  utter y 
Heoruueaim  .  which  his  numenms  hosts  are  said  to 

have  e\ec,trJ^Xtu'.llv' that  there  remained  hardly  anything 

£k  i:^^  'r^^-  ffiikci^o^'gj^^S^ 
•Si^;!rSr;!n:;^ir^*s2tt;!iot^'^fV^ft;^^ 

from  h  m^pLv  had  migrated  to  a  point  somewhat  Dorth  of  >axos 
^^the  hill  of  "Taurus,  immediately  over  the  sea.  uufavorab  >  cr le- 
^^^moi^tlle  Sikei  population  as  being  tl^  spot  wl^c^  1.^^^^^ 
Greek  colonists  had  touched  on  arriving  in  the  sland  |  ^^^'  "V^ 
tion  ^-as  encouracred,  multiplied,  and  organi/ed,  under  the  auspices 
nf  TmiTon  Tho  prevailed  upon  them  to  consiruct,  upon  the  st.oi^g 
em  nene\  of  T^^^^  a  fortitied  post  ^vhich  formed  the  hcgmmng  o 
thrcitvafterwaid  known  as  Tauromenium.     Magon  uas  sent  v.Uh 

the  Carthndnian  fleet  to  assist  in  the  enterprise.  atoccptic 

^liaJiwhUeDlonysius,  greyly  discpiietc^  at  the  r^^^^^^ 

nvprtPd  lum^eir  to  put  Svracuse  in  an  eftective  position  ot  (leiui^e 

on  hei  n      hem  f  ontier/Naxus  and  K^.tana  l)eing  both  unfortitie; 

he  was  forc^^^^  them,  and  lie  induced  the  (  ^nU^an.an;; 

^h  n^  he  had  ph.'.nted  in  Katana  to  change  their  q'l^rters  t     th  . 

VrZ    own  called  .^-tna.  on  the  skirt  of  the  'mountain   so  na.. 
Tie  made  Leontini  his  chief  position;  ^t^'^^^Vu-ningasmuch    s  po  s 
b'c  Uie  fortitieations  of  the  city  as  well  as  U.ose  of  the  ^^r'^l'^'^  ' - 
rnun  A'  forts  Avhcreiii  he  accumulated  magazines  of  provisions  f mm 
Slc^^ik  J>ia^<  av^^nd.     He  had  still  a  force  of  m,m  foot  and 


XAVAT.  BATTLE  ()!•    KATAXA. 


201 


more  than  3,000  horse;  he  had  also  a  fleet  of  180  ships  of  war— trK 
n^mes  ;ind  others.  During  the  year  preceding,  he  had  brought  out 
both  a  hind  force  and  a  naval  force  much  superior  to  this,  even  for 
purposes  of  aggression ;  iiow  it  happened  that  he  could  now  com- 
mand no  more'even  for  defense  and  at  home; — or  what  had  become 
of  the  remainder — we  are  not  told.  Of  the  180  ships  of  war,  GO  were 
onlv  manned  by  the  extraordinary  proceeding  of  liberating  slaves. 
Such  sudden  and  serious  changes  in  the  amount  of  military  force 
from  year  to  year  are  perceptible  among  Carthaginians  as  well  as 
Greeks— indeed  throughout  most  part  of  Grecian  history:  the  armies 
being  got  toucether  cliietly  for  special  occasions,  and  then  dismissed. 
Dioify'sius  farther  dispatched  envoys  to  Sparta,  soliciting  a  re-en- 
forcement of  1000  mercenary  auxiliaries.  Having  thus  provided  the 
best  defense  tiuit  he  could  throught)ut  the  territory,  he  advanced 
forward  with  his  main  land-force^^to  Katana,  having  his  fleet  also 
moving  in  co-operation,  immediately  olf  sliore. 

Toward  this  same  point  of  Katana  the  Carthaginians  were  now 
moving,  in  their  march  against  Syracifse.  Magon  was  directed  to 
coast  along  with  the  fleet  from  Taurus  (Tauromenium)  to  Katana. 
while  Imilkon  intended  himself  to  inarch  with  the  land-force  on 
shore,  keeping  constantly  near  the  fleet  for  the  purpose  of  mutual 
support.  But  his  scheme  was  defeated,  by  a  remarkable  accident. 
A  sudden  eruption  took  place  I'rom^tna;  so  that  the  stream  of  lava 
from  tiie  mountriin  to  the  sea  forbade  all  possibility  of  marching  along 
the  shore  to  Katana,  and  constrained  him  to  make  a  considerable 
circuit  with  his  army  on  the  land-side  of  the  mountain.  Thougii  he 
accelerated  his  ma^'ch  as  much  as  possible,  yet  for  two  days  or  monj 
he  was  unavoidably  cut  oif  from  the  fleet;  which  under  the  command 
of  Magon  was  sailing  southward  toward  Katana. 

Dionysius  availed  himself  of  this  circumstance  to  advance  beyond 
Katana  along  the  beach  stretching  northward,  to  meet  Magon  in  his 
approach,  and  attack  him  separately.  The  Carthaginian  fleet  was 
much  superior  in  number,  consisting  of  500  sail  in  all;  a  portion  ot' 
wdiieli.  however,  were  not  strictly  ships  of  war,  but  armed  merchant- 
men—that is,  furnished  with  brazen  bows  for  impact  against  an 
enemy,  and  rowed  with  oars.  But  on  the  other  hand.  Dionysius  had 
a  land-force  close  at  hand  to  co-operate  with  his  fleet;  an  advantage. 
which  in  ancient  naval  warfare  counted  for  much,  serving  in  case  of 
defeat  as  a  refuge  to  the  ships,  and  in  case  of  victory  as  intercepting 
or  abridging  the  enemy's  means  of  escape.  Magon,  alarmed  when 
lie  came  in  sight  of  the  Grecian  laud-force  mustered  on  the  beach, 
and  the  Grecian  fleet  rowing  up  to  attack  him — was  nevertheless 
constrained  unwillingly  to  accept  the  battle.  Leptines,  the  Syracusan 
admiral — though  ordered  by  Dionysius  to  concentrate  his  ships  as 
much  as  i)os-^ible,  in  consequence  of  his  inf(,M*ior  numbers — attacketl 
with  boldness,  and  even  with  temerity;  advancing  himself  with 
thirty  .ships greatly  before  the  rest,  and  being  apparently  farther  out  to 


202 


SICILY 


cea  than  the  cncmv.  His  bravery  at  first  appeared  suecessf ul.  destroy- 
in"- or  damu-in-  the  headmost  ships  of  the  enemy.  But  I  heir  superior 
iurm])ers  presently  ch)se(l  round  him,  and  after  a  desperate  combat, 
fou-ht  in  the  closest  manner,  si.ip  to  ship  and  hand  to  hand,  he  ^Yas 
forc^ed  to  sheer  otf,  and  to  seek  escape  seawaid.  llis  main  fleet, 
comin--  up  in  disorder,  and  witnessing  his  defeat,  were  beaten  also, 
after  a'strenuous  contest.  All  of  them  fled,  either  landward  or  sea- 
ward as  thev  could,  under  vigorous  pursuit  by  the  C  arthaginiiui 
ves<^els-  and 'in  the  end.  no  less  than  100  of  the  Syracusan  ships,  with 
'>0  000  men  were  numbered  as  taken,  or  destroyed.  JVIany  ot  the 
crews  swimming  or  floatinir  in  the  water  on  spars,  strove  to  get  to 
land  to  the  protection  of  their  comrades.  But  the  Caith;.ginian  small 
crift  '^ailin*'-  very  near  to  the  shore,  slew  or  drowned  these  unlortuii- 
ate  men  evSu  under  the  eves  of  friends  ashore  who  could  lender  no 
assistance.  The  neighboring  water  became  strewed,  both  with  dead 
]K)dies  and  with  frasi-ments  of  broken  ships.  As  victors,  the  (  artlia- 
crinians  were  unable  to  save  n>any  of  their  own  seaim  n,  either  on 
board  of  damaged  shii>s.  or  swimming  for  their  lives.  \et  their  own 
loss  too  was  severe;  and  their  victory,  complete  as  it  proved,  was 

'dearlv  purchased.  ,     ,         ,  ^     n  i 

Tliou'di  the  land-force  c>f  Dionysius  had  not  been  at  all  engaged, 
yet  the'^awful  defeat  of  his  fleet  indudd  him  to  give  immcdiaie 
;,rders  for  retrealinff.  first  to  Katana  jind  afterward  yet     arlher  to 
Svracuve     As  soon  as  the  Svraeusan  army  had  evacuated  the  adpin- 
in«^  shore    3Ia<:(,n  towed  alfhis  prizxs  to  laid,  ai.d  there  hauled  them 
utron  the  beach;  partlv  for  repair,  where\er  practicable— partly  ns 
visible  proofs  of  the  maL^itude  of  the  triumph  .for  encouragement 
'lohis  own  annament.     ^Stormy  weather  just  then  supervening,  he 
was  forced  to  haul  his  own  ships  ashore  also  for  safety,  and  remained 
there  for  several  davs  refreshing  the  crews.     To  keep  the  sea  under 
such  weather  wt)uld  have  been  scarcely  practicable;  so  that  it  Diony- 
fius  instead  of  retreating,  had  continued  to  occupy  the  shore  with 
his  'unimpaired    land-force,  it  appears  that   the   C'arthagiman   ships 
would  have  been  in  the  greatest  danger;  constrained  either  to  tace 
the  Morm   to  run  back  a  considerable  distance  northward,  or  to  make 
a-ood  their  landinir  asiainst  a  formidable  enemy,  without  being  able 
to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  Imilkon.     The  latter,  after  no  very  long 
interval,  came  up,  so  that  the  land -force  and  the  navy  ol  the  Cartlia- 
oinians  were  now  airain  in  co-operation.     While  allowing  his  troops 
some  days  of  repose^  and  enjoyment  of  the  victory,  he  sent  envoys  to 
the  town  of  .Etna,  invitimr  *lhe  Campanian  mercenary  soldiers  to 
break  with  Dionvsius  and  join  him.     Beminding  them  that  their 
countrymen  at  E'ntella  were  living  in  satisfaction  as  a  dependency  ot 
Carthage  (whicii  they  had  recently  testified  by  resisting  the  Syracusnn 
invasion)   he  promiseil  lo  them  an  accession  of  territory,  and  a  sliaixi 
in  the  spoils  of  the  war,  to  be  wrested  from  Greeks  who  were  enemies 
of  Campanians  not  less  than  of  Carthnginians.     The  (^ampanians  ol 


RETltEAT   OF  DIONYSIUS. 


203 


.Etna  would  gladly  have  complied  w  ith  his  invitation,  and  were  only 
restrained  from  joining  him  by  the  cinuiinstauce  that  they  had  given 
hostages  to  the  despot  of  Syracuse,  iu  whose  army  also*^  their  best 
soldiers  were  now  serving. 

Meanwhile  Dionysius,  in  marching  back  to  Syracuse,  found  his 
army  grievously  discontented.  Withdrawn  from  tlie  scene  of  action 
without  even  using  their  arms,  they  looked  forward  to  nothing 
better  than  a  blockade  at  Syracuse,  full  of  hardship  and  ])rivationT 
Accordingly  many  of  them  protested  against  retreat,  conjuring  him  to 
lead  them  again  to  the  scene  of  action,  that  they  might  either  assail  the 
(artha.iiiinian  fleet  iu  the  confusion  of  landing,  or  join  battle  with  the 
advancing  laud-force  under  Imilkon.  At  first,  Dionysius  consented 
to  sucli  change  of  scheme.  But  he  was  presently  remindetl  that  uule? s 
he  hastened  back  to  Syracuse,  Magou  with  the  victorious  fleet  miirht 
sail  thither,  enter  the  harbor,  and'possess  himself  of  the  city;  in  tl.>e 
same  manner  as  Imilkon  had  rei-ently  succeeded  at  ]Messene'  Under 
these  apprehensions  he  renewed  his  original  order  for  retreat,  in 
spite  of  the  vehement  protest  of  liis  Sicilian  allies;  who  were  indeed 
so  incensed  that  most  of  them  quitted  him  at  once. 

AVhi('h  of  the  two  was  the  wiser  plan,  we  have  no  suificient  means 
to  determine.  But  the  circumstances  seem  not  to  ha\e  been  the 
same  as  those  ])receding  the  capture  of  ^lessene;  for  Mairon  was 
not  in  a  condition  to  move  forward  at  once  with  the  fleef,  i)arlly 
from  his  loss  in  the  recent  action,  partly  from  the  stormy  weather; 
and  might  perhaps  have  been  intercepted  in  the  very  act  of  landini: ' 
if  Dionysius  had  moved  rapidly  back  to  the  shore.  As  far  as  we  can 
judge,  it  would  appear  that  the  complaints  of  tho  army  au'aiust  tho 
hasty  retreat  of  Dionysius  rested  on  highly  plausible  eroiinds.  He 
nevertheless  persisted,  and  reached  Syracuse  with  his  army  not  only 
much  discouraged,  but  greatly  diminished  by  the  desertion  of  allies. 
He  lost  no  time  in  sending  forth  envoys  to  the  Italian  Greeks  and  to 
Peloponnesus,  with  ample  funds  for' engaging  soldiers,  and  urgent 
supplications  to  Sparta  :is  well  as  to  Corinth.  Polyxenus  his  brother- 
in-law,  employed  on  this  mission,  discharged  h'is  dutv  with  such 
diligence,  that  he  came  back  in  a  comparatively  short  sjiace  of  time, 
with  thirty-two  ships  of  war  under  the  command  of  the  Lacedae- 
monian Pharakidas. 

Meanwhile  Imilkon,  having  sufficiently  refreshed  his  troops  after 
the  naval  victory  off  Kataua,  moved  forward  toward  Syracuse  both 
with  the  fleet  and  the  land-force.  The  entry  of  his  fleet  into  the 
Great  Harbor  was  ostentatious  and  imposing;  far  above  even  that  of 
the  second  Athenian  armament,  when  Demosthenes  first  exhibited 
its  brilUant  but  short-lived  force.  Two  hundred  and  eiirht  ships  of 
war  first  rowed  in,  marshaled  in  the  best  order  and  adorned  with 
the  spoils  of  the  captured  Syracusan  ships.  These  were  followed  by 
transports,  500  of  them  carrying  soldiers,  and  1000  others  either 
empty  or  bringing  stores  and  machines.    The  total  number  of  vessels. 


204 


SICILY. 


r„ops  he  f'^.^P'l'^,',  ""enrich  Ihoinsolvis  by  unlimito.l  phmdor. 
■l-Z  he  woe  "cKle;  •  o  ".la  IM,  f..rtitio,l  ro.ls.  as  essentia  In  the 
>ext,  he  proeicaui  u  foRsaw  would  he  t(dioiis. 

prosecution  ol   a  '  «^»    ,; ,  "^  ,  ['Jiv^pian  Zens,  he  conslructed 

<;eems  that  at  this  time  there  was  no  hne  of  \Nall  alon?  ^^^J^;  "'^    • 
rlfff  Vs  Dionv^ius  had  recently  built  alon-  the  northern      Tl  e  posi 

jllunic-aliuis  otSyracuse  with  the  country  around  remauicd  partiall} 


6YRACUSAN  NAVAL  VICTORY. 


205 


oDcnon  two  sides— westward,  through  the  Euryalus  at  the  upper 
extremity  of  Epipolre— and  northward  toward  Thapsus  and  Megara, 
throu2:h  the  Hexapylon,  or  the  principal  gate  in  the  new  fortification 
constnicted  bv  Diouvsius  along  the  northern  cliff  of.Epipohe.  The 
full  value  was  now  telt  of  that^recent  fortification,  which,  protecting 
{Syracuse  both  to  the  north  and  west,  and  guarding  the  precious 
position  of  Euryalus,  materially  impeded  the  operations  of  Iniiikon. 
The  city  was  thus  open,  partially  at  least  on  two  sides,  to  receive 
«iui)plies  bv  land.  And  even  by  sea  means  were  found  to  introduce 
provisions"  Though  Imilkon  had  a  fleet  so  much  stronger  that  the 
Syracusans  did  not' dare  to  offer  pitched  battle,  yet  he  found  it  dilli- 
<ult  to  keep  such  constant  watch  as  to  exclude  their  store-ships,  and 
insure  the  arrival  of  his  own.  Dionysius  and  Leptines  went  forth 
tli"niselves  from  the  harbor  with  armed  squadrons  to  accelerate  and 
protect  the  approach  of  their  supplies;  while  several  desultory 
encounters  took  place,  both  of  laud- force  and  of  shippmg,  which 
proved  advantageous  to   the   Syracusans,  and  greatly  raised  their 

spirits.  ,     ,  .,    r>- 

One  naval  conflict,  especially,  which  occurred  whUe  Dionysius  was 
absent  on  his  cruise,  was  of  serious  moment.  A  corn-ship  belonging 
to  Imilkon's  fleet  being  seen  entering  the  Great  Harbor,  the  Syracus- 
ans suddenly  manned  Ave  shins  of  war,  mastered  it,  and  hauled  it 
into  their  own  dock.  To  prevent  such  capture,  the  Carthaginians  from 
their  station  sent  out  forty  ships  of  war;  upon  which  the  Syracusans 
equipped  their  whole  naval  force,  bore  down  upon  the  forty  with 
numbers  decidedly  superior,  and  completely  defeated  them.  They 
captured  the  admiral's  ship,  damaged  twenty-four  others,  and  pursued 
the  rest  to  the  naval  station;  in  front  of  which  they  paraded,  chal- 
leu-in!2:  the  enemy  to  battle.  As  the  challenge  was  not  accepted, 
they  returned  to  their  own  dock,  towing  in  their  prizes  in  triumph. 

This  naval  victory  indicated,  and  contributed  much  to  occasion, 
that  turn  in  the  fortune  of  the  siege  which  each  future  day  still 
further  accelerated.  Its  immediate  clfect  was  to  fill  the  Syracusan 
public  with  unl)ounded  exultation.  ''Without  Dionysius  we  con- 
quer our  enemies;  under  his  command  we  are  beaten;  why  submit 
to  slavery  under  him  any  longer?"  Such  w^as  the  burst  of  indignant 
sentimeift  which  largely  pervaded  the  groups  and  circles  in  the  city; 
strengthened  by  the  consciousness  that  they  were  now  all  armed  and 
comp't'tent  to  extort  freedom— since  Dionysius,  when  the  besieging 
enemy  actually  appeared  before  the  city,  had  been  obliged,  as  the 
less  of  two  hazards,  to  produce  and  redistribute  the  arms  which  he 
had  previously  taken  from  them.  In  the  midst  of  this  discontent, 
Dionysius  himself  returned  from  his  cruise.  To  soothe  the  prevalent 
temper,  he  was  forced  to  convene  a  public  assembly;  wherein  he 
warmly  extolled  the  recent  exploit  of  the  Syracusans.  and  exhorted 
them  to  strenuous  confidence,  promising  that  he  would  speedily 
brimi'  the  war  to  a  clj^se. 


206 


SICILY. 


It  is  pocsibln  that  Dionysius,  llirougliout  Ins  despot^.m   nia>  1  a^c 

nr-iX)n'illv  periintted  w  lat  were  called  public  as^eiublu.;  but  ^^e 

^^Xv^      re   that,  if  ever  convened,  they  were  mere  matters  ot 

;rm    md    hat  no  fr('e  discussion  oropposition  tohiSANjll  was  evertol- 

rued      On     l"e  p   '^^^^^^^^   occasion,  he'  anticipated    the   like   passu^ 

•miesceiK^    am    after  havin-  delivered  a  .peech,  doubt  less  much 

:  S  S\^-Ms  own  partisans:  he  was  about  to  chsnuss  the  assen  - 

I  V   when  a  citizen  named  Theodorus  unexpectedlv  rose      He  w  a.  a 

;>;Jn  1     or  Kni'dit-a  person  of  wealth  and  station  m  the  c  t^ .  of 

.         eh^a^rt^d  estal!li>hed   reputation  for  couraire      Gathering. 

;l  n ess  fnmi  tlR  time  and  circumstances,  he  now  stood   loiward  to 

nr.  ilm  m  bliclv  that  hatred  ot  Diouysius  and  ar.xn  iy  lor  tietd(  m. 

Ivhieil  soSy  of  his  ^^^^  around  had  been  heard  to  ut.er 

nrivitelv  and  were  well  known  to  teel. 

^  Di  dfrus    n  his  bislo.v  iiivos  us  a  long  liaranpi.e  (xvhc  ur  com- 
r,<"^   bv  1.  ".self,  or  cJinid  from  others,  «e  cannot  tell)  as  pr„- 
n    moed-by  Tbeod<,rus.     Vho  n.ain  Icpies  of  it  are  such  as  ue  si  old 
I  rill V  cxDoct   aud  arc  i.robal.lv.  on  Ibc  whole,  .■•cmiine.     It    s  a 
t^d    "  view^mui  an  cmpl'alic  den.ncintion  of  the  past  conduct  ot 
Donvslusc.mcludin-  vviib  an  a]  peal  to  the  Syracusans  to  enian.  .• 
m     Vhem'sc  v  V  fron'  bis  .ion.inion.     -  I)ionyf.M|l.o  speaker  con- 
e  ds    n  s.  bs  ap.ce)  is  auorse  en.  my  than  the  farlluignnans;  who, 
rvicio   ous  ;  ovdd  be  .atisfle,!  vbh  a  regular  tribute.  Icavin.u  us  to 

."••.rt  both      lie   has   pillajred  our  temples  ot  llieir  ^acred  (lepo  i    . 
lie    as  sb  in  or  banished  our  wealtby  citizens  an<l  «1'<»  «■"  '  "    ■' 
.Vroncrties  bv  wholesale,  to  be  translernd  to  bis  own  satelbtes.     lit 
ns  'i^n    !e  V  ve..  of  these  <xil.  s  in  niarriafie  Jo  1ns  barban.n  so  - 
fers°     lie     IS  liberated  our  slaves,  and  laben  Ihen,  into  h.s  pay.  m 
'   1«  to  keep      cir  masters  in  slavery.    He  has  gari  .s<.ned  our  own 
c    Kiel  Vd  ist  .1  "bv  means  of  these  slaves,  logelher  with  a  bos.  M 
oil  ci  mmenaries.     "He  has  put  to  denlli  every  eilizen  who  M^Hu  «! 
W  raisTl.U  V o  e^^  In   defense  ,f  the  laws  and  eonslit.it.on.     lie  has 
ah,  !  ?f  or  CO  irtdence-onco.   xmKntunatcly.  carried  ^o  far  as  to 

,    dnate  him  ge„eral-by  em,,lovins  his  1'<'^"X  ."  ^."V  ^j VX'e  of 
!l,>,„    -ind   rule  US  accord  112  to  his  own  selhsh  injiacilj  in  ),Kue  oi 

.    -rrce      lie   baTfar-ber   snipped   us   of  -■"'■  "'-rS;  ^r',;^.™' 
^.eeessity  has  compelkd  1;*"'.''-  -l^o-^-i''-^, ,'*:,, ^''-  """' 


^traved  Ge  a  anU  K.-miarina,  lor  lu^  o%mi   i  ,y,.v,o.o,  -   •-" 

tlri-in^ml      He  suffered  ]yiessene  to  fall  into  tlKir  hands  Avitlu^ut  the 

c'f  hep      Here   uced   to  slavery,  by  gross  tix^achery,  our  Grecu 

brethren  and  neidibors  of  Isaxus\md  Katana;  transierring  the  lat.ei 

1  e  non-ITellenic  Campanians,  and  ^^^^-y^"^^'}''^^-^ 

uiiu-ht  have    attacked    the    Carthaginians    immedialel)  after    tiitir 


SPEi:('lI    AGA1^'ST    DlONYSirS. 


207 


l-uui'n"-  from  Africa  at  Panormus,  ])efore  they  had  recovered  from 
the  fatb'-ue  of  the  vova<j:e.  He  miglit  have  fought  the  recent  naval 
eombat^near  the  port"  of  Katana,  instetid  of  near  the  beach  north  of 
that  town;  so  as  to  insure  to  our  flt'ei,  if  worsted,  an  easy  and  sure 
retreat  Had  he  chosen  to  keep  his  land-force  on  the  spot,  he  might 
li-ive  presented  the  victorious  Carthaginian  tleet  from  a])pr()a.ching 
land  when  the  storm  came  on  shortly  after  the  bitttlti*  or  he  might 
have  attacked  them  if  they  tried  to  land,  at  the  greatest  advantage. 
He  has  conducted  the  war.  altogether,  with  disgraceful  incompe- 
tence- not  wishincT  sincerely,  indeed,  to  get  rid  of  them  as  enemie.s. 
hut  preserving  the  terrors  of  Carthage  as  an  indirect  engine  to  keep 
Syracuse  in  subjection  to  himself.  As  hmg  as  we  fought  with  him 
we  have  been  constantly  unsuccessful;  now  that  w^e  have  come  to 
fight  without  him,  recent  experience  tells  us  that  w^e  can  beat  the 
Carthaginians,  even  with  inferior  numbers.        ,    ,    ,  ^,       .        ,  . 

"Let  us  look  out  for  another  leader  (concluded  Xlieodorus)  m 
l)lac.-  of  a  sacrilegious  temple-robber  whom  the  gods  have  now  aban- 
doned If  Dionvsius  will  consent  to  relinquish  his  dominion,  let 
him  retire  fronrthe  city  with  his  property  unmolested;  if  he  will 
not  we  are  here  all  asseinbled,  we  are  ])ossessed  of  our  arms,  and  we 
hnve  both  Italian  and  Peloponnoian  allies  by  our  side.  The  assein- 
biy  will  deterimne  whether  it  will  choose  leaders  from  our  own  citi- 
y^;,is— or  from  our  metropolis  Corinth— or  from  the  Spartans,  the 
l)residents  of  all  Greece." 

Such  are  the  main  points  of  the  long  harangue  ascribed  to  Iheo- 
(lorus-  ttie  tirst  occasion,  for  many  years,  on  which  the  voice  of  free 
speech  had  been  heard  publicly  in  Syracuse.  Among  tlw3  charges 
advanced  against  Dionvsius,  which  go  to  impeach  his  manner  ot 
earryino-  on  the  war  against  the  C^arthaginians,  there  are  several  which 
we  can  "^neither  admit  nor  reject,  from  our  insufficient  knowledge  of 
tiie  facts.  But  the  enormiiies  ascribed  to  him  in  his  dealing  with 
the  Syracusans  — the  fraud,  violence,  spoliation,  and  bloodshed, 
whereby  he  had  first,  acquired,  and  afterward  upheld,  his  dominion 
over  them— tlu^se  are  asserlions  of  matters  of  fact,  which  coincide  in 
the  main  with  the  previous  narrative  of  Diodorus,  and  which  we 
have  no  ground  for  contesting.  •  i         i        4.- 

Hailed  by  the  assembly  with  irreat  sympathy  and  acclamation, 
this  harangue  seriously  alarmed  Diouysius.  In  his  conchiding  words 
Theotlorus  had  invoked  the  protection  of  Corinth  as  well  as  ot 
Sparta  an-ainst  the  despot,  whom  with  such  signal  courage  he  had 
thus  ventured  publicly  to  arraign.  Corinthians  as  well  as  Spartans 
were  now  lendina"  aid  in  the  defense,  under  the  command  ot  1  hara- 
kidas.  That  Spartan  officer  came  forward  to  speak  next  after  1  heo- 
dorus  Amon<»-  various  other  sentiments  of  traditional  respect 
toward  Sparta,  there  still  prevailed  a  remnant  of  the  belief  that  she 
was  adverse  to  despots;  as  sue  really  had  once  been,  at  an  earlier 
period  of  her  history.     Hence  the  Syracusans  hoped,  and  even  ex- 


208 


SICILY. 


pectcd  that  Pharalddns  would  second  tlic  protest  of  Tlieodoms,  mid 
stand  forward  as  champion  of  freedom  to  the  first  Grecian  city  in 
Sicily  Bitterly,  indeed,  were  they  disappointed.  Dionysiiis  had 
e^tahlUhed  with  Pharakidas  relations  as  friendly  as  those  of  the 
Thirty  tyrants  of  Athens  with  Kallibius  the  Laeedspmonian  harmost 
in  the  acropolis.  Accordingly  Pharakidas  in  his  speech  not  only 
discountenanced  the  proposition  just  made,  but  declared  himself 
emphatically  in  favor  of  the  despot;  intimatin.ir  that  lie  had  heeu 
sent  to  aid  the  Syracusans  and  Dionysius  against  the  Carthaginians 
—not  to  put  down  the  dominion  of  Dionysius.  To  the  Syracusans 
thi^  declaration  was  denial  of  all  hope.  They  saw  plainly  that  in 
any  attempt  to  emancipate  themselves,  they  would  have  against 
ihem  not  merely  the  mercenaries  of  Dionysius,  but  also  the  whole 
force  of  Sparta," then  imperial  and  omnipotent;  represented  on  the 
pre<;ent  occasion  bv  Pharakidas,  as  it  had  been  in  a  previous  year  by 
Aristus.  They  were  condemned  to  bear  their  chains  in  silence,  not 
without  unavailing  curses  against  Sparta.  Meanwliile  Dionysius. 
thus  powerfully  ij^ustained.  was  enabled  to  ride  over  the  perilous  and 
critical  juncture.  His  mercenaries  crowded  in  haste  round  his  per- 
Fon— having  probably  been  sent  for  as  soon  as  the  voice  of  a  tree 
spokesman  was  heard.  And  he  was  thus  enabled  to  dismiss  an 
assembly,  which  liad  seemed  for  one  short  instant  to  threaten  the  per- 
petuity of  his  dominion,  and  to  womise  emancipation  for  Syracuse. 

Dufinn-  this  interestinir  and  momentous  scene,  the  fate  of  Syracuse 
had  hun''^  upon  the  decision  of  Pharakidas:  for  Theodorus,  well 
aware  that  with  a  besieging  enemy  before  the  gates,  the  city  could 
not  be  left  without  a  supreme  authority,  had  conjured  the  Spartan 
conunander,  with  hi^  Lacedaemonian  and  Corinthian  allies,  to  take 
into  his  own  hands  the  control  and  organization  of  the  popular  force. 
There  can  be  lijtle  doubt  that  Pharakidas  could  have  done  this,  if  he 
had  been  so  disposed,  so  as  at  once  to  make  bead  against  the  Cartha- 
ginians without,  and  to  restrain,  if  not  to  put  down,  the  despotisni 
within  Instead  of  undertaking  the  tutelary  intervention  solicited 
by  the  people,  he  threw  himself  into  the  opposite  scale,  and  strength- 
ened Dionysius  more  than  ever,  at  the  moment  of  his  greatest  peril. 
Tlie  proceeding  of  Pharakidas  was  doubtless  conformable  to  his 
instructions  from  home,  as  well  as  to  the  oppressive  and  crushing 
policy  which  Sparta,  in  these  davs  of  her  unresisted  empire  (between 
the  victory  of  .1^:gos]Hitami  and  the  defeat  of  Knidus),  pursued 
throughout  the  Grecian  world.  ,.,,,-,  .^      , 

Dionysius  was  fully  sensible  of  the  danger  which  ho  had  thus  been 
assisted  to  escape.  Under  the  first  impression  of  alarm,  he  strove  to 
<rain  something  like  popularity,  by  conciliatory  language  and  demean- 
or, by  presents  adroitly  distributed,  and  by  invitations  to  his  table. 
Whatever  may  liavebeen  the  success  of  such  artifices,  the  lucky  turn, 
which  the  siege  was  now  taking,  was  the  mo.n  powerful  of  all  nids 
for  building  up  his  full  power  anew. 


PLAGTE   AViOXG 


THE 


c;autiiagixians. 


200 


It  Avas  not  the  arms  of  the  Syracusans,  but  the  wrath  of  Demeter 
and  Persephone,  whose  temple  (in  the  suburb  of  Achradina)  Imiikon 
had  pillaged,  that  ruined  the  besieging  army  before  Syracuse.     So 
the  piety  of  the  citizens  interpreted  that  terrific  pestilence  which  now 
bc'-'an  to  rage  among  the  multitude  of  their  enemies  without.     Ihe 
divine  wrath  was  indeed  seconded  (as  the  historian  informs  us)  by 
physical  causes  of  no  ordinary  severity.     The  vast  numbers  of  the 
host  were  closely  packed  together;   it  was  now  the  beginning  of 
autunui   the  most  unhealthy  period  of  the  year;  moreover  this  sum- 
mer had'  been  preternatural ly  hot,  and  the  low  marshy  ground  near 
the  Great  Harbor,  under  the  chill  of  morning  contrasted  with  the 
buri)in*>-  sun  of  noon,  was  the  constant  source  of  fever  and  pestilence. 
The^e  unseen  and  irresistible  enemies  fell  witii  appalling  force  upon 
the  troops  of  Imilkon;  especiady  upon  the  Libyans,  or  native  Afri- 
cans  who  were  found  the  most  susceptible.     The  intense  and  varied 
bodily  sufferings  of  this  distemper— the  rapidity  with  which  it  spread 
froin^man  to  inan— and  the  countless  victims  which  it  speedily  accu- 
mulated—appear to  have  eqfialed,  if  not  surpassed,  the  worst  days 
of  the  pestilence  of  Athens  in  429  B.C.     Care  and  attendance  upon 
the  sick,,  or  even  interment  of  the  dead,  became  impracticable;  ^o 
that  the  whole  cam])  presented  a  scene  of  deplorable  agony,  aggra- 
vated by  the  Jiorrors  and  stench  of  150,000  unburied  bodies.      1  he 
miliuiry  strengtii  of  the  Carthaginians  was  completely  prostrated  by 
such  a  visitation.     Far  froiu'l^eing  able  to  make  progress  in  the  siege, 
they  were  not  even  able    to  defend    themselves    against  moderate 
euenn- on  the  part  of  the  Svracusans;  who  (like  the  Peloponnesians 
during  the  great  plague  of  Athens)  were  themselves  untouched  by 

the  distemper.  ^      ,      .   .  i      i 

Such  was  the  wretched  spectacle  of  the  Carthaginian  army,  clearly 
visible  from  the  walls  of  Syracuse.     To  overthrow  it  by  a  vigorous 
attack,  was  an  enterprise  not  dit^icult;  indeed,  so  sure,  in  the  opinion 
of  Dionysius,  that  in  organizing  his  plan  of  operation,  he  made  it 
the  means  of  deliberately  getting  rid  of  some  troops  in  the  city  who 
had  become  inconvenient  to  him.     Concerting  measures  for  a  simul 
taneous  assault  upon  the  Carthaginian  station  both  by  sea  and  land 
he  intrusted  ei^^ditv  .shios  of  war  to  Pharakidas  and  Leptines,  with 
orders  to  move  at  daybreak;  while  he  himself  conducted  a  body  of 
troops  out  of  the  city,  during  the  darkness  of  night;  issuing  forth  by 
Epipolai  and  Euryalus(as  Gvlippus  had  formerly  done  when  he  sur- 
prised Plemmyrium),  and  making  a  circuit  until  he  came,  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Anapus,  to  the  temple  of  Kyane;  thus  getting  on 
the  land-side  or  south-west  of  the  Carthaginian  position.     He  first 
dispatchcHl  his  horsemen,  together  with  a  regiment  of  1000  mercenary 
foot-soldiers,  to  commence  the  attack.     These  latter  troops  had  je- 
come  peculiarly  obnoxious  to  him,  having  several  times  engaged  in 
revolt  and  disturbance.     Accordingly,  while  he  now  ordered  them  up 
to  the  assault  in  conjunction  with  the  horse,  he  at  the  same  time  gave 


210 


SKILY. 


TREACHERY  OF  IMILKON. 


211 


Qocrct  directions  to  the  liorscto  desert  their  comrades  and  take  fl-.ffht. 
Both  his  orders  were  obeved.  The  onset  having  l)een  made  jomt  y, 
in  the  heat  of  tlie  combat  tiie  horsemen  Red,  leaving  their  comi  juU  s 
all  to  be  cut  to  pieces  bv  the  Cai  tliairinians.  We  have  as  yet  heard 
nothing-  about  difficulties  arising  to  Dionysius  from  his  mercenary 
troops %n  whose  arms  his  dominion  rested;  and  wh:it  we  arejieie 
told  is  enough  merely  to  raise  curiosity  without  satisfying  it.  These 
men  are  said  to  have  been  mutinous  and  disaffected;  a  fact  wlncli 
explains  if  it  does  not  extenuate,  the  gross  pertidy  of  deliberately 
inveiglini?  them  to  destruction,  while  ite  still  professed  to  keep  them 
unilef  his  command.  ^   ,  _.         .  ,, 

In  the  actual   state  of  the   Carthaginian  army,  Dionysius  could 
afford  to  make  them  a  present  of  thi>  obnoxious  division.     His  o^^  ii 
attack   first  upon  the  fori  of  Polichne.  next  upon  that  near  the  naval 
station  at  Daskon.  was  ccmducted  with  spirit  and  success.     A^  hile 
the  d<'fenders  thinned  and  enfeebled  bv  the  pestilence,  were  striving 
to  repel  him  on  the  land-side,  the  Ir^vracusan  tieet  came  forth  from  its 
docks  in  excellent  spirits  and  order  to  atta(  k  the  sbips  at  the  station. 
These  Carthaginiau  ships,  thoudi  afloat  and  moored,  were  very  mi- 
r)t  i  f(  clly  manned.     Before  the  (  rews  could  g(  t  aboard  to-put  them 
o'l  their  defense,  the  Sviacrsan  triremes  and  qumqueremes,   ably 
rowed  and  with  their  brazen  beaks  well  directed,  drove  apunst  thnn 
<.n  the  quarter  or  mid  ships,  and  broke  Jhrough  the  hue  of  their  tmi- 
1  ers      The  crash  of  such  impact  was  heard  afar  off,  and  the  best 
ships  were  thus  spetdilv  disabled.     Following  up  their  success  the 
Sviacusans  iumped  aboard,  overpowered  the  crews,  or  forced  them 
to  seek  safetv  as  ihev  could  in  tlisiht.     The  distracted  Carlhagmiaus 
leino-  thus  pres>ed  at  the  same  time  by  sea  and  by  land,  the  soldiers 
of  Dionysius  frcw  the  land  side  forced  their  way  through  the  en- 
trenchment to  the  shore,  where  forty  p.entekonters  were  hauled  up 
v.hile  immrdiatelv  near  them  were  moored  both  merchautmen  ami 
triremes     The  assailants  set  fire  to  the  pentekonters;  upon  wnich  the 
fames,  rapidlv  spreading  under  a  strong  wind,  communicated  pres- 
ently to  all  the  merchantmen  and  triremes  adjacent.    I  nable  to  arrest 
ti;i/lerriticconflai,nation,  the  crews  were  obliged  to  leap  overboard; 
w  bile  the  vessels,  Wered  from  tlieir  moorings  by  the  burning  ot  the 
cables,  drifted  against  each  other  under  the  wind,  until  the  naval 
station  at  Daskon  became  one  scene  of  ruin. 

Such  a  volum.e  of  flame,  though  destroying  tlie  naval  resources  ol 
the  Carthaijiiiians,  must  at  the  same  time  have  driven  off  the  assai  - 
intr  Svracusan  ships  of  war,  and  probably  also  the  assailants  by  land. 
But  to  those  who  contemplated  it  fi<  m  the  city  of  Syracuse,  across 
the  breadth  of  the  Great  Harbor,  it  presented  a  spectacle  grand  ami 
stimulating  in  the  hidiest  degree;  especially  when  the  Are  was  seen 
toweriu^'-  aloft  amidst  the  masts,  yards,  and  sails  of  the  merchant- 
men. The  walls  of  the  citv  were  crowded  with  spectators,  women, 
children,  and  aged  men,  testifving  their  exultation  by  loud  slioutg, 


and  stretchiug  their  hands  to  heaven — as  on  the  memorable  day, 
near  twenty  3'ears  before,  when  they  gained  their  final  victory  in  the 
sinie 'harbor,  over  the  Athenian  tleet.  Many  lads  and  ekUrs,  too 
niiich  excitcMl  to  remain  stationary,  rushed  into  such  small  craft  as 
they  could  find,  and  rowed  across  the  harbor  to  the  scene  of  action, 
where  they  rendered  much  service  by  preservinii'  part  of  the  cargoes, 
and  towing  away  some  of  the  enemy's  vessels  <leserted  but  not  yet 
on  lire.  The  evening  of  this  memorable  day  left  Dionysius  and  the 
Syracusans  victorious  by  land  as  well  as  by  sea,  encamped  near  th(^ 
tiiuple  of  Olympian  Zeus,  which  had  so  recently  been  occupied  by 
Imilkon.  Though  they  had  succeeded  in  forcing  tlu;  defenses  of  tho 
1. liter  both  at  Polichne  and  at  Daskon,  and  in  inilicting  upon  him  a. 
(i(!slriietive  defeat,  yet  they  would  not  aim  at  occupying  his  camp, 
iu  its  infected  and  deplorable  condition. 

On  two  former  occasions  during  the  last  few  years,  we  have  seen 
the  Carthai^inian  armies  decimated  bv  pestilence — near  Ai::riLientiir.i 
and  near  Gela — previcms  to  this  last  and  worst  calamity.  Imilkon, 
e:)pying  the  weakness  of  Xikias  rather  than  the  resolute  prudence  of 
Demosthenes,  had  clung  to  his  insalubrious  camp  near  tl.ie  Great 
Harbor,  long  after  all  hope  of  reducing  Syracuse  had  teased,  and 
while  suffering:  and  death  t\)  the  most  awful  extent  were  dailv  accumu- 
lating  around  him.  But  the  recent  defeat  satisfied  even  liim  that 
liis  position  was  no  longer  tei.able.  Retreat  was  indispensable;  yet 
nowise  impracticabh' — witii  the  brave  men,  Iberians  and  others,  in 
his  army,  with  the  SikeLs  of  tiie  interior  on  Ids  side — had  he  pos- 
Si'ssed  the  good  qualities  as  well  as  the  defects  of  Xikias,  or  been 
capable  of  anything  like  that  unconquerable  energy  which  ennobled 
the  closing  days  of  the  latter.  Instead  of  taking  the  best  measures 
available  for  a  retiring  march,  Imilkon  dispatched  a  secret  envoy  to 
Dionysius,  unknown  to  the  Syracusans  generally;  tendering  to  him 
the  sum  of  oOO  talents  which  yet  remained  in  the  camp,  on  condiiioa 
of  the  fleet  and  army  being  allowed  to  sail  to  Africa  unmolested.  Dio- 
nvsius  would  not  consent,  i\oy  would  the  Syracusans  have  confirmed 
any  such  consent,  to  let  tliem  all  escape;  but  he  engaged  to  permit 
the  departure  of  Imilkon  himself  with  the  native  Carthaginians.  The 
sum  of  oOO  talents  was  accordingly  sent  across  by  night  to  Ortygia; 
and  the  fourth  night  ensuing  was  fixed  for  the  de])arture  of  imilkon 
and  his  Carthaginians,  without  opposition  from  Dionysius.  During 
tiait  night  forty  of  their  ships,  filled  with  Carthaginians,  put  to  sea 
and  sailed  in  silence  out  of  the  harbor.  Their  stealthj-  flight,  how- 
ever, did  not  altogether  escape  the  notice  of  the  Corinthian  seamen 
in  Syracuse;  who  not  only  apprised  Dionysius,  but  also  manned 
some  of  their  own  ships  and  started  i»i  pursuit.  They  overtook  and 
destroyed  one  or  two  of  the  slowest  sailers;  but  all  the  rest,  with 
Imilkon  himself,  accomplishe''  their  flight  to  Carthage. 

Dionysius — wliile  he  affected  to  obey  the  warning  of  the  Corin- 
lliians,  \vith  movements  intentionally  tardy  and  unavailing — applied 


Hi 


212 


SICILY. 


DANGER  OF  CAKTIIAGE. 


21  J? 


himself  ^  iih  rarnest  nrtivity  to  act  against  the  forsaken  amy  reniam- 
ino-     Diirin«^  llie  same  nii-ht  he  led  out  his  troops  liom  the  city  to 
the'vicinity  of  their  canip^.     The  fli^lit  of  Iniilkon.  speedily  pronuil- 
fi-ited   had  tilled  the  whole  arniv  with  astonishment  and  constcnia- 
tion    '  Iso  command— no  common  cause— no  bond  of  union— now 
rt-maintd  amoni?  this  miscellaneous  host,  alnady  prostrated  by  pre- 
vious misfortune.     The  Sikels  in  the  army,  being  near  to  their  ( wn 
t(  rritorv  and  knowing  the  roads,  retired  at  once,  before  dayl.ieak. 
f.nd  reached  their  honu's.     Scarcely  had  they  passed,  ^vhen  the  ^yrn- 
<u-an   soldiers   occupied   the  roads,   and  barred  the  like  escape  to 
others       Amid  the    titneral    dispersion   of  the  abandoned  soldiers, 
some  perished  in  vain  attempts  to  force  the  passes,  others  tlirew 
down  their  aims  and  solicited  mercy..    The  Iberians  alone,  maintam- 
inn-  their  arms  and  order  with  unshaken  resolution,  sent  to  Dionysius 
propositions  to  transfer    to    him    their   service;   which  he  thougbi 
pioper  to  accept,  enrolling  tlum  among  his  mercenaries.      All  the 
lemaiuiug  host,  principally  Libyans,  being  stripped  and  plundered 
bv  his  sofdiers,  became  his  captives,  and  were  i^robably  sold  as  slaves. 
'The  heroic  efforts  of  N'ikias.  to  open  for  his  army  a  retreat  m  ihe 
face  of  deM)erate  obstacles,  had  ended  in  a  speedy  death  as  prisoner 
at  Syracuse- vet   without  anvthing  worse  than  the  usual  late  ut 
prisoners  of  war.  But  thebase  treason  of  linilkon.  though  he  insured 
a  safe  retreat  home  bv  betraying  the    larger  portion  of  his  army 
earned  for  him  onlv  j\  short  prolongation  of  lite  amid  the  fxtrenie  of 
i.-nominv  and  rem6rse.     When  he  lauded  at  Carthage  with  the  frac- 
tTou  of  his   army  preserved,   tlie  city  was  lu  the  deepest  distress. 
Countless  family  losses,  inflicted  by  the  pcslilence.  added  a  keener 
stino-  to  the  unexampled  public  loss  and  humiliation  now  fully  ma(.e 
known      Universal  mourning  prevailed ;  all  public  and  priva  e  busi- 
ms.  was  suspended:  all  the  temples  were  shut;  while  the  authoritrus 
and  the  citizens  met  Imilkon  in  sad  procession  on  the  shore      Ihe 
defeated  commander  strove  to  disarm  their  wrath,  by  every  demon- 
stration of  a  broken  and  prostrate  spirit.     Clothed  in  tne  sordid  gar- 
ment of  a  slave,  he  acknowledged  himself  as  the  cause  of  all   he  luin. 
bv  his  impiety  toward  the  gods;  for  it  was  they,  and  not  the  Syra- 
ciisans,  who  had  been  his  real  enemies  and  conquerors     He  visitc( 
all  the  temples,  with  words  of  atonement  and  supplication- replu  U 
to  all  the  inquiries  about  relatives  who  had  perished  under  the  dis- 
temper-and  then  retiring,  blocked  up  the  doors  of  his  house,  wliere 

he  starved  himself  to  death.  .    ^      a  i>,r  i,Tg 

Yet  the  season  of  misfortune  to  Carthage  was  not  c  osed  1}  his 
decease  Her  dominion  over  her  Libyan  subjects  was  always  har.ii 
and  unpopular,  rendering  them  disposed  to  >^.^e.  against  her  at  any 
moment  of  calamity.  Her  recent  disaster  in  Sicily  would  ha^ c  bee 
in  itself  perhaps  sufficient  to  stimulate  them  mto  insurrection;  but 
its  effect  was  ao-irravated  bv  their  resentment  for  the  deliberaic 
betrayal  of  their  ^troops  serving  under  Imilkon,  not  one  of  wlioiu 


lived  to  come  back.     All  the  various  Libyan  subject-tow^ns  had  on 
this  matter  one  common  feeling  of  indignation;  all  came  together  in 
C()n"-ress,  agreed  to  unite  their  I'orces,  and  formed  an  army  which  is 
suid^'lo  have  reached  120,000  men.    They  established  their  head-quar- 
ters at  Tiies  (Tunis),  a  town  within  short  distance  of  Carthage  itself, 
and  were  for  a  certain  time  so  much  stronger  in  the  lieid  that  the 
Carthadnians  were   obliged  to  remain    within  their  walls.     For  a 
moment  it  seemed  as  if  llie  star  of  this  great  commercial  city  was 
iibout  to  set  for  ever.      The  Carthaginians  themselves  were  in  the 
depth  of  despondency,  believing  themselves  to  be  under  the  w^ralh  of 
the  goddesses  Demeter  and  herXlaughter  Persephone;  who,  not  con- 
tent^vith  the  terrible  nivenge  already  taken  in   Sicily,  for  the  sae- 
rilege  committed  by  Imilkon,  were  siill  pursuiug  them  into  Afriea. 
Under  the  extreme  reliirious  terror  which  beset  the  city,  every  means 
were  tried  to  appease  the  offended  goddesses.     Had  it  been  supposed 
that  the  Carthaginian  gods  had  been  insulted,  exphition  would  have 
been  offered  bv  the  sacrifice  of  human  victims— and  those  too  the 
most  precious, "such  as  beautiful  captives,  or  children  of  conspicuous 
citizens.     But  on  this  occasion,  the  insult   had  been  offered  to  Gre- 
ci<in  gods,  and  atonement  was  to  be  made  according  to  the  milder 
ceremonies  of  Greece.     The  Carthaginians  had  never  yet  instituted 
in  their  eitv  auv  worship  of  Demeter  or  Pereplione;  they  now  estab- 
lished temples  in  honor  of  these  goddesses,  appointed  several  of  their 
most  eminent  citizens  to  be  priests,  and  consulted  the  Greeks  resident 
amonir  them,  as  to  tlie  form  of  worship  most  suitable  to  be  offered. 
After  having  done  this,  and  cleared  their  own  consciences,  they  devoted 
themselves  to  the  preparation  of  ships  and  men  for  the  purpose  of  car- 
■  ryiiiir  on  the  war.     It  was  soon  found  that  Demeter  and  Persephone 
were^'not  implacable,  and  that  the  fortune  of  Carthage  was  returning. 
The  insurgents,  though  at  first  irresistible,  presently  fell  into  discord 
among  themselves  about  the  command.     Having  no  fleet,  they  became 
straitcMied  for  w^ant  of  provisions,  while  Carthage  was  well  supplied 
by  sea  from  Sardinia.     From  these  and  similar  causes,  their  numer- 
ous host  gradually  melted  away,  and  rescued  the  Carthaginians  from 
alarm  at  the  point  where  they  were  always  weakest.   The  relations  of 
command  and  submission,  between  Cartilage  and  her  Libyan  subjects, 
were  established  as  they  had  previously  stood,  leaving  her  to  recover 
slowly  from  her  disastrous  reverses. 

But  though  the  power  of  Carthage  in  Africa  was  thus  restored, 
in  Sicily  it  was  reduced  to  the  lowest  ebb.  It  was  long  before  she 
could  again  make  head  with  effect  against  Di(mysius,  who  was  left 
at  liberty  to  push  his  conquests  in  another  direction  against  the  italiot 
Greeks.  The  remaining  oiierations  of  his  reign — successful  against 
the  Italiots,  unsuccessful  against  Carthage— will  come  to  be  recounted 
ill  my  next  succeeding  chapter. 


Ui 


214  SICILIAN  ArFAii;s-co:rn.NUi:D. 


CHAPTER  LXXXIII. 
siciLi\N   AFF\ms  {contni"ea).—v\wyi    the   DESTOrcTiox   of   thk 

CUITIIAGIMAN    AKMY    BY    rESTILENCE    BEFORE    SYHACrSE,    DOWN 
TO  THE  DEATH  OF   DIONYSIUS  THE  ELDER.      B.C.  Ji9i-36<. 

In  mv  preceding-  clinptcr  I  dcsrribed  the  first  eleven  ye;us  of  the 
rein-n  of  Diouvsius-called  the  elder,  us  desj^.t  at  Syracuse,  down  to 
his'^tirst  o-reat'war  npiiust  the  Carthagmians;  which  uar  ended  by  a 
sudden  turn  of  fortune  in  his  favor,  at  a  time  when  he  was  hard 
pressed  and  actually  besieged.  The  victorious  Carthagnuan  arr.iv 
before  Syracuse  was^ltterlv  ruined  by  a  terrible  pestilence,  lollowcd 
bv  i'-noininious  treason  on  the  part  of  its  commander  Imilkon 

"XUthin  the  space  of  less  thau  80  years  we  read  of  four  aij^tmct 
epidemic  distempers,  each  of  frightful  severity,  as  having  afflicted 
Carthaffe  and  her  armies  in  Sicily,  without  touching  either  ^ynK•use 
or  the  Sicilian  Greeks.  Such  epidemics  were  the  most  irresistible  ot 
all  enemies  to  the  Carthai^nnians,  and  the  most  effective  allies  to 
Dionysius  The  second  and  third— conspicuous  among  tlie  many 
fortunate  events  of  his  life— occurred  at  the  exact  juncture  necessary 
for  rescuing  him  from  a  tide  of  superiority  in  the  Carthaginian  arms, 
Avhich  seemed  in  a  fair  wav  to  overwhelm  him  completely.  I  poii 
what  physical  conditions  the  frequent  repetition  of  suc4i  a  calumity 
depended,  to-ether  with  the  remarkable  fact  that  it  was  contined  to 
Carthaire  and  her  armies,  we  know  partially  m  respect  to  the  thiiU 
of  the  four  cases,  but  not  at  all  in  ngaid  to  the  others. 

The  fli'dit  of  Imilkon  with  the  Carthaginians  from  Syracuse  let t 
DionysiuJandthc  Svracusans  in  the  full   swing  of  triiunph       liie 
ronouests  made  by  linilkon  were  altogether  lost,  and  the  (^arthagni- 
ian  dominion  in  Sicily  Avas  now  cut  down  t.,  that  restricted  spuce  lu 
the  western  corner  of  the  island,  which  it  bad  o«-upied  prior  to   lie 
invasion  of  Hannil)al  in  4<;'9  B.C.     So  prodiiiious  a  .success  proba hlv 
enabled  Dionvsius  to  put  down  the  opposition  recently  manitestc( 
among  the  Svracusans  to  the  ccmtinuance  of  his  rule.     \\  e  are  told 
that  he  was"  greatly  embarrassed  by  his  mercenaries,  who,  having 
been  for  some  time  wit.iout  pay,  manifested  such  angry  disc-on  eiit 
as  to  threaten  liis  downfall.     Dionjsius  seized  the  person  of  then 
commander,    the    Spartan    Aristoteles:    upon    which    the    soldic is 
mutinied  and  flocked  in  arms  round  his  residence,  demanding  n 
fierce  terms  both  the  liberty  of  their  commander  and  the  payment  or 
their  arrears.    Of  the.se  demands  Dionysius  eluded  the  first  by  saying 
that  he  would  send  away  Aristoteles  to  Sparta,  to  be  tried  and  den  t 
with  among  his  own  ccmntrymen:  as  to  tll^  second,  be  pacitied  tlic 
soldiers  by  assigning  to  them,  in  exchange  for  their  P5»y,  the  t()^^n 
and  territory  of  Leontini.     AVillingly  accepting  this  rich  bribe,  lUc 


DIFFICULTIES  OF  DIONYSIUS. 


215 


most  fertile  soil  of  tlic  islmd.  the  mercenaries  quitted  Syracuse  to 
the  number  of  10,000  to  take  up  their  residence  in  the  newly  assigned 
town   while  Dionvsius  hired   new  mercenaries  in  their  place.     To 
these' (including  perhaps  the  Iberians  or  Spaniards  who  had  recently 
massed  from  the  Carthaginian   service  into  his)  and  to  the  slaves 
whom  he  had  liberated,  he   intrusted  the  maintenance   of  his  do- 
minion. ,  ,  ,  ^  ,.    . 
These  few  facts,  wdiich  are  all  that  we  hear,  enable  us  to  see  that 
the  relations  between  Dionvsius  and  the  mercenaries  by  whose  means 
he  ruled  Syracuse  were  troubled  and  difficult  to  manage.     But  they 
do  not  exphiin  to  us  the  full  causf*  of  such  discord.     We  know  that 
a  short  time  before  Dionysius  had  rid  himself  of  1000  obnoxious 
mercenaries  by  treacherously  betraying  them  to  death  in  a  battle  with 
the  Carthaginians.     Moreover,  he  would  hardly  have  seized  the  per- 
son of  Aristoteles,  and  sent  him  awjiy  for  trial,  if  the  latter  had  done 
nothing  more  than  demand  p:iy  really  due  to  his  soldiers.     It  seems 
iM-obabie  that  the  discontent  of  the  mercenaries  rested  upon  deeper 
causes,  perhaps  connected  with  that  movement  in  tlie  Syracusan 
mind  against  Dionysius,  manifested  openly  in  the  invective  of  Theo- 
dorns.  "  We  should  have  been  glad  also  to  know  how  Dionysius  pro- 
posed to  pay  the  new  mercenaries,  if  he  had  no  means  of  paying  the 
ol(i.     The  cost  of  mtiintaining  his  standing  army,  upon  whomsoever 
it  fell,  must  have  been  burdensome  in  the  extreme.     What  became 
of  the  previous  residents  and  proprietors  at  Leontini,  who  must  have 
been  dispossessed  when  this  much  covetel  site  was  transferred  to 
the  mercenaries?     On  all  these  points  we  are  unfortunately  left  in 

ignorance. 
•  "  Dionysius  now  set  forth  toward  the  north  of  Sicily  to  re  establish 
Mes.scne:  while  tho.se  other  Sicilians,  who  had  been  expelled  from 
their  abodes  bv  the  Carthaginians,  got  together  and  returned.     In 
reconstituting  Mes>ene  after  its  demolition  by  Imilkon,  he  obtained 
the  means  of^'of  planting  there  a  population  altogether  in  his  inter- 
ests, suitable  to  the  agixressive  designs  which  he  was  already  contem- 
plat'insr  against  Hhegium  and  the  other  Italian  Greeks.     He  estab- 
lidied'in  it  1000  Loki ians— i.OOO  persons  from  another  city  the  name 
of  which  we  cannot  certainly  make  out— and  600  of  the  Peloponne- 
sian  Messenians.     These  latter  had  been  expelled  by  Sparta  from 
Zakvnthus  and  Naupaktus  at  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war, 
and*  had  taken  service  in  Sicily  with  Dionysius.      Even  here  the 
hatred  of  Sparta  followed  them.      Her   remonstrances  against  his 
project  of  establishino-  them  in  a  city  of  consideration  bearing  their 
own  ancient  name,  obljo-ed  him  to  withdraw  them:  upon  which  he 
planted  them  on  a  portion  of  the  Abakene  territory  on  the  northern 
coast.     Thev  jraye  to  their  new  city  the  name  of  Tyndaris,  admitted 
many  new^  residents,  atid   conducted  their  affairs  so  prudently  as 
presently  to  attain  a  total   of  5.000  citizens.     Neither  here  nor  at 
Mc.s.sene  do  we  lind  any  mention  made  of  the  re-estabiishment  of 


216 


SICILIAN  AFFAUl— ('OXTIXl'ED. 


ATTACK   UPOX   RllEGlUM. 


217 


llio^e  inlKibiiants  ^vlio  htul  fled  ulion  Imilkon  took  Messene,  and  t\Iio 
formed  lu-arlv  all  the  pivvious  population  of  the  city,  for  very  few  arc 
mciilioued  .-is'liaviui:  heeii  slain.  It  seems  doubtful  whether  Dionysius 
readmitted  tlnm  wiieu  he  reconstituted  3Iessene.  Kenewmg  with 
care  the  fortitications  of  the  city,  which  had  been  demolished  by 
Imilkon,  he  placed  in  it  some  of  his  mercenaries  as  garrison. 

Dionysius  next  undertook  several  expeditions  a^rainst  the  8ikelsin 
the  interior  of  the  island,  who  had  joined  Imilkon  in  bis  recent 
auack  upon  Syracuse.  He  conquered  several  of  their  towns,  and 
established  alliances  with  two  of  their  most  powerful  princes,  at 
A^-vrium  and  K^ntoripfB.  Enna  and  Kephahedium  were  also  be- 
trayed to  bim.  as  well  as  the  Cartha«i:iniau  dependency  of  Solus.  By 
these  proceedinfirs,  which  appear  to  have  occupied  some  time,  he 
acquired  pov.erful  ascendency  in  the  central  and  north-east  parts  of 
the  island,  while  his  garrison  at  :Messene  insured  to  bim  the  com- 
mand of  the  strait  between  Sicily  and  Italy. 

His  acquisition  of  this  important  forlitied  position  was  well  uuder- 
stoo(i  to  implv  ulterior  desiirns  against  Rhegium  and  the  other  Grecian 
ciii'-s  in  the  south  of  Italv,' among  whom  accordingly  a  lively  alarm 
prevailed      The  numerous  exiles  whom  be  had  expelled,  not  merely 
from  Syracuse,  but  also  from  Xaxos,  Kataua,  and  the  other  cou- 
Quered 'towns,  having  no  lonirer  any  assured  shelter  m  bicUy,  .iml 
been  forced  to   cros^.  over  into  Italy,  where  they  were  favorably 
received  both  at  Kroton  and  Rhegium.     One  of  these  exdes  Heloris 
once  the  intimate  friend  of  Dionysius,  was  even  appointed  general 
of  the  forces  of  RhcLdum;  forces  at  that  time  not  only  powertul  on 
land   but  sustained  by  a  fleet  of  70  or  80  triremes.     Under  his  com- 
mand  a  Rbedne  force  crossed  the  strait  for  the  purpose  partly  ot 
be^cc^incr  Messene,  partly  of  establishing  the  Xaxiau  and  Katanean 
exiles'  at  Mvl.'B  on  the  northern  coast  of  the  island,  not  far  troni 
ycfsene.     Neither  scheme  succeeded:  Heloris  was  repulsed  at  3le.- 
8cne  with  loss,  while  the  new  settlers  atMyhrwere  speedily  expeliea. 
The  command  of  the  strait  was  thus  fully  maintained  to  Diouysius: 
who   on  the  point  of  undertaking  an  aggressive  expedition  over  .o 
Italy   was  delayed  only  by  the  necessity  of  capturing  the  newly 
established  Sikel  town  on    the  hill  of  Taurus-or  Tauromennini 
The  Sikels  defended  this  position,  in  itself  high  and  strong,  witli 
unexpected  valor  and  obstinacy.     It  was  the  spot  on  which  the  primi- 
tive^ Grecian  colonists  who  first  came  to  Sicily  bad  originally  landed, 
and  from  whence  therefore  the  successive  Hellenic  encroachments 
upon  the  ])re-established  Sikel  population  had  taken  their  commenee- 
uient      This  fact,  well  known  to  both  parties,  rendered  the  captuie 
on  one  side  as  much  a  point  of  honor  as  the  preservation  on  the  other. 
I)i(mysius  spent  months  in  the  siege,  even  throughout  niidwintei, 
whilJ  the  snow  covered  this  hill-top.     He  made  reiterated  assault^ 
which  were  always  repulsed.     At  last,  on  one  moonless  winter  night, 
he  found  means  to  scramble  over  some  almost  iuiiccessible  crags  to 


a  portion  of  the  town  less  defended,  and  to  effect  a  lodgment  in  one 
of  the  two  fortilied  portions  into  t^liicb  it  was  divided.  Having 
taken  the  tirst  part,  he  immediately  proceeded  to  attack  the  second. 
But  the  Sikels,  resisting  with  desperate  valor,  repulsed  liini,  and 
compelled  the  storming  party  to  tiee  in  disorder,  amid  the  darkness 
of  night  and  over  the  most  dilficult  ground.  Six  hundred  of  them 
Ave  re  slain  on  the  spot,  scarcely  any  escaped  without  tiirowing  away 
their  arms.  Even  Dionysius  himself,  being  overthrown  by  the  thrust 
of  a  spear  on  his  cuirass,  was  with  dilticulty  picked  up  and  carried 
off  alive;  all  his  arms  except  the  cuirass  being  left  behind.  He  was 
obliged  to  raise  the  siege,  and  was  long  in  recovering  from  his  wound : 
the  rather  as  his  eyes  also  had  suffered  considerably  from  the  snow. 

So  manifest  a  reverse,  before  a  town  comparatively  insignificant, 
lowered  his  military  reputation,  and  encouraged  his  enemies  through- 
out the  island.  The  Agrigenlines  and  others,  throwing  off  their 
dependence  upon  him,  proclaimed  themselves  autonomous;  bani^h- 
iug  those  leaders  among  them  wdio  upheld  his  interest.  Many  of  the 
Sikels  also,  elated  with  the  success  of  tJieir  countrymen  at  Taurome- 
niuni,  declared  openly  against  him;  joining  the  Carthaginian  general 
!ibigon,  who  now,  for  the  tirst  time  since  the  disaster  before  Syra- 
cuse; again,  exhibited  the  force  of  Carthage  in  the  field. 

Since  the  disaster  before  Syracuse,  Magoii  bad  remained  tranquil 
iu  the  western  or  Cartliagini:ui  corner  of  the  island,  recruiting  the 
strength  and  courage  of  his  countrymen,  and  taking  unusual  pains 
to  conciliate  the  attachment  of  the  dependent  native  tow^ns.  Re-en- 
forced in  part  by  the  exiles  expelled  by  Dionysius,  he  Avas  now  in  a 
condition  to  assume  the  aggressive,  and  to  espouse  the  cause  of  the 
Sikels  after  their  successful  defense  of  Tauromenium.  He  even 
ventured  to  overrun  and  ravage  the  Messenian  territory;  but  Diony- 
sius, being  now  recovered  from  his  wound,  marched  against  hiin, 
defeated  him  in  a  battle  near  Abakiena,  and  forced  him  to  retire  again 
westward,  until  fresh  troops  were  sent  to  him  from  Carthage. 

Without  pursuing  flagon,  Dionysius  returned  to  Syracuse,  from 
whence  he  presently  set -forth  to  execute  bis  projects  agjiinst  Rhe- 
gium, With  a  fleet  of  100  ships  of  war.  So  skillfully  did  he  arrange 
or  mtisk  his  movements,  that  he  arrived  at  night  at  the  gates  and 
inider  the  walls  of  Rhegium,  without  the  least  suspicion  on  the  part 
of  the  citizens.  Applying  combustibles  to  set  Are  to  the  gate  (as  he 
had  once  done  successfully  at  the  gate  of  Achradina),  he  at  the  same 
time  planted  his  ladders  against  the  walls,  and  attempted  an  escalade. 
Surprised  and  in  small  numbers,  the  citizens  began  their  defense; 
hut  the  attack  was  making  progress,  had  not  the  general  Heloris, 
instead  of  trying  to  extinguish  the  flames,  bethought  himself  of  en- 
couraging them  by  heaping  on  dry  fagots  and  other  matters.  The  con- 
flagration became  so  violent,  that  even  the  assailants  themselves  were 
kept  off  until  time  was  given  for  th(3  citizens  to  mount  the  walls  in 
force;  and  the  city  was  saved  from  capture  by  burning  a  port  ion  of  it. 


2]S 


SICILIAN   AFFAIKS-roNTlNlEI). 


ITALIAN    CJiTLKKS. 


219 


Disappointed  in  his  hopes,  Dionvsiiis  wns  obliged  to  content  himself 
witli  rava<nnir  the  neighboriuii-  teiritor\  ;  aftrr  which,  he  concluded  ;i 
truce  of  one'^year  with  the  liliegines,  and  then  reluiued  to  Syra- 

Tl'iis  step  was  probably  determined  by  news  of  the  movements  of 
Mao-on   who  was  iu  the  tield  anew  with  a  mercenary  force  reckoned 
at  iSCObo  men— Libyan,  Sardinian,  and  Italian— obtained  from  (  ar- 
tha"-e   where  hope  of  Sicilian  success  was  again  reviviug.     ^Magon 
directed  his  march  throudi  the  Sikel  population  in  the  center  ol  the 
island,  receiving  the  adhesion  of  many  of  their  various  townships. 
A"-vrium   however,  the  largest  and  most  important  of  all,  resisiid 
him  as  an  enemv.     Agyris,  the  despot  of  the  ])lace,  Avho  ha(i  con- 
quered nmch  of  the  neighboring  lerritory.  and  had  enriched  himself 
by  the  murder  of  several  opulent  propiietors,  maintained  strict  alli- 
ance with  Dionvsius.     The  latter  speedily  came  to  his  aid,  with  a 
force  stated  at  20,000  men,  Syracusans  and  mercenaries.     Admittid 
into  the  city,  and  co-operalinV  with  Agyris,  who  furnished  abundant 
supplies,  he  soon  reduced  the  Carthaginians  to  great  ^tiaits.     Magon 
was  encamped  near  the  river  Chrysas,  between  Agyrium  and  .Mor- 
gantine:  in  an  enemy's  country,  harassed  by  natives  who  perlcctly 
knew  the   ground,  aiid   who  cut  off  in  detail-  all   his  parties   sent 
out   to   obtain   i)rovisions.       The   Syracusans   indetd.  disliking    or 
mistrusting   such   tardy  methods,   imi):itiently   demanded   leave   to 
make  a  vigorous  attack:    and  when  Dionysius   refused,   alhrming 
that   with   ix  little   patience  the  enemy  must   be   speedily  starvea 
out    they   left   the   camp  and    returned   home.     Alarnud  at   their 
desertion    he   forthwith   issued   a   re(iuisiti(^n   for  a   large   number 
of  slaves' to  supply   their  places.      But  at  ihis  very  juncture,  there 
arrived  a  proposition  from  the  Carthaginians  to  be  allowed  to  make 
peace  and  retire;  which  Dionvsius  granted,  on  condition  that  they 
should  abandon  to  him  the  Sikels  and  their  territory— especially  Taii- 
romenium.     Upon  these  terms  peace  was  accordingly  concluded,  and 
Mairon  again  returned  to  Carthage. 

lielieved  from  these  enemies,  Dionysius  was  enabled  to  restore 
those  slaves,  whom  he  had  levied  under  the  recent  requisition,  totluir 
masters.  Havir.g  established  his  d(miinion  fully  among  the  Sikels. 
he  a"-ain  marched  asxainst  Tauromenium.  which  on  this  occasion  w:is 
unable  to  resist  hiniT  The  Sikels,  who  had  so  valiantly  defended  it, 
were  driven  out  to  make  room  for  new  inhabitants,  chosen  ironi 
among  the  mercenaries  of  Dionysius. 

Tlius  master  both  of  Messene  and  Tauromenium,  the  two  most 
important  maritime  posts  on  the  Italian  side  of  Sicily,  Dionysius  ]  re- 
pared  to  execute  his  ulterior  schemes  against  the  Greeks  in  the  souih 
of  Italy.  These  still  powerful,  though  once  far  more  powerful,  citic^' 
were  now  sufferinsi  under  a  cause  of  decline  common  to  all  the  Hel- 
lenic colonies  on  the  continent.  The  indigenous  population  of  the 
interior  had  been  re-enforced,  or  enslaved,  by  more  warlike  emigrants 


from  behind,  who  now  pressed  upon  the  maritime  Grecian  cities  with 
encroachment  dillicult  to  resiijt. 

It  was  the  Samuites,  a  branch  of  the  hardy  Sabellian  race,  moun- 
t:iineers  from  the  central  portion  of  the  Apennine  range,  who  had 
h-en  recently  spreading  themselves  abroad  as  formidable  assailants. 
About  430  n.c.  they  had  established  themselves  in  Capua  and  the  fer- 
tile plains  of  Campania,  expelling  or  dispossessing  the  previous  Tus- 
enn  proprietors.  From  thence,  about  416  B.C.,  they  reduced  the 
neighboring  city  of  Cum;v,  the  most  ancient  western  colony  of  the 
Ih'llenic  race.  The  neighboring  Grecian  establishments  of  Neapolis 
and  Dik<T:irchia  seem  also  to  have  come,  like  Cum.e,  under  tribute  and 
dominion  to  the  Campauian  Samnites,  and  thus  became  partially  dis- 
liellenized.  These  Campanians  of  Samnite race  have  been  frequently 
mentioned  in  the  two  preceding  chaiiters.  as  employed  on  mercenary 
service  both  in  the  armies  of  the  Carthaginians  and"  in  those  of  Dio- 
nysius. But  the  great  migration  of  this  warlike  race  was  farther  to  the 
south-east,  down  the  line  of  the  Apennines  toward  the  Tarentine 
Gulf  and  the  Sicilian  strait.  Under  the  name  of  Lucanians  they 
established  a  formidable  power  in  these  regions,  subjugatmg  the 
ffinotrian  population  there  settled.  The  Lucanian  power  seems  to 
have  begun  and  to  Irive  gra(hiallv  increased  from  about  480  I5.c.  At 
its  maximum  (about  380-360  iJ.c.)  it  comprehended  most  part  of  the 
inland  territory  and  considerable  portions  of  the  coast,  especially  the 
southern  coa^l— bounded  by  an. imaginary  line  drawn  from  Metapo;i- 
tum.  on  the  Tarentine  Gulf,  across  the  breadth  of  It;;ly  toPoseidonia 
or  P;estum,  near  the  mouth  of  the  river  Silaris,  on  tlic  Tyrrhenian  or 
Lower  sea.  It  was  abv>ut  356  n.o.  that  the  rural  serfs  called  Bruttians 
re'):'lle(l  against  the  Lucanians  and  robbed  them  of  the  southern  part 
of  this  territory;  establishing  an  independent  dominion  in  the  inland 
portion  of  what  is  now  called  the  Farther  Calabria— extending  from 
u  boundary-line  drawn  across  Ittdv  between  Thurii  and  Laus'^'down 
to  near  the  Sicilian  strait.  About  33-3  B.C.  commenced  the  occasional 
intervention  of  the  Epirotic  kings  from  the  one  side,  and  the  perse- 
vering efforts  of  Rome  from  the  other,  Avhich,  after  long  and  valiant 
struggles,  left  Samnites.  Lucanians,  Brultians,  all  Ronian  subjects. 

At  the  period  which  we  have  now  reached  these  Lucmians,  haying- 
conquered  the  Greek  cities  of  Poseidonia  (or  Pjestum)  and  Laus.wiih 
much  of  the  territory  lying  between  the  Gulfs  of  Poseidonia  e.nd 
Ltn>ntum,  severely  harassed  the  inhabitants  of  Thurii,  and  alanneil 
iul  the  neighboring  Greek  cities  down  to  Rhegium.  So  serious  w.-is 
the  alarm  of  these  cities  that  several  of  them  contracted  an  inlimale 
defensive  alliance,  strengthening  for  the  occasion  that  feeble  synod- 
leal  band,  and  sense  of  Italiot"  communion,  the  form  and  trace  of 
v.'hich  seem  to  have  subsisted  without  the  reality,  even  under  marked 
enmity  between  particular  cities.  The  conditions  of  the  newly  con- 
tracted alliance  were  most  stringent;  not  only  binding  each  city  to 
assist  at  the  lirst  summons  any  other  city  invaded  by  the  Lucanians, 


220  SlCIl.lAX   AFWAiKS-CONTIMKI). 

Imt  also  pronouncing  tl.at,  if  this  ubli.^lion  «-orc  n^'''":;"'' ""■  ?™- 

W  hts    o'^ritx!'  ml';'       erfVomU: "south  than  of  the  Lucnnians 

?      ,  \l  :'n onli  •  -md  tlieir  ilefousive  alliance  was  intended  aga  nst 

,oth     To  D    n'y   "^,  on   he  eoulrary,  the  invasion  of  the  I.ucanmns 

f     m  land-war    was  a  f<.rtunateiuci.lenl  for  the  success  of  his  ow, 

lioin  I.  ml  ";;,.,.„,  ,i,.siL'ns  aiiainst  the  same  enemies  si.eedily 

W ';    Uie  f<   mat  0    0   a  distinct  alliance  betw«.n  the  two.   .  Among 

1  .     lies  of  D  o  ivsius,  too,  we  must  numher  the  Epi/.ephyrian  Lo.- 

iuis   who  not  only  did  no   join  the  Italiot  confe.  eracy  but  espous,  d 

; '  ea.::I  aliinst  it'  with  ard^.r.     The  -"f  If...^ ^l  -;  '.^^'^^iX    y 

^i!}^.Jf"Hhe.iunt;  His  ^^^x^'.^X^^^  zl^;  'uit !,'! jn,: 

ii-i:,^:^!^  h:^e'i^.f;«r:hi,^;w  ihg^^ 
K^^^e^f'^h^^^u^c-^'fr^;^^ 

!;;:;^r^STr;i;^h!"'o^t^ 


J)EFEAT  OF  THE  INHABITANTS  OF  THUHII.      221 

lioui-s.  Disheartened  ])y  thi.s  misfortimo  as  well  as  by  the  approach 
of  winter,  lie  witlulrew  his  forces  for  the  present  and  returned  to 
Syracuse. 

A  part  of  Ills  fleet,  however,  under  Leptines,  was  dispatched  north- 
ward along  (he  south-western  coast  of  Italy  to  the  Gulf  of  Flea,  toco- 
operate  with  the  Lucanians;  who  fiom  that  coast  and  from  inland 
were  invading   the   inhabitants   of  Thurii   on   the   Tarenline  Gulf. 
Thurii  was  the  successor,  thoui^h  with  far  inferior  power,  of  the  an- 
cient Sybaris-  wiiose  dominion  had  once  stretched  across  from  sea 
to  sea,  comprehending  the  town  of  Laus,  now  a  Lucanian  possession. 
Lninediately  on  the  appearance  of  the  Lucanians,  the  Thurians  hail 
disi)atched  an  urgent  message  to  their  allies,  who  were  making  all 
haste  to  arrive,  pursuant  to  covenant.      But  before  such  junction 
could  possibly  lake  phice  the  Thurians,  contiding  in  their  own  native 
forct3  of  14,000  foot  and  10,000  horse,  marched  against  the  enemy 
single-handed.    The  Lucanian  invaders  retreated,  pursued  by  the  Thu- 
rians; who  followed  them  even  into  that  mountainous  region  of  the 
Appenines  which  stretches  betw^een  the  two  seas,  and  which  presents 
the  most  formidable  danger  and  difficulty  for  all  military  operations. 
They  assailed  successfully  a  fortified  post  or  village  of  the  Lucani- 
aus,  wiiich  fell  into  thei/hands  with  a  rich  plunder.     By  such  par- 
tial advantage  they  were  so  elated  that  they  ventured  to  cross  over 
all  tlie  mountain  passes  even  to  the  neighborhood   of  the  southern 
sea,  with  the  intention  of  attacking  the   flourishing  town   of  Laus — 
once  the  dependency  of  their  Sybaritan  predecessors.     But  the  Luca- 
nians, having  allured  them  into  these  impracticable  paths,  closed 
upon  them  behind  with  greatly  increased  numbers,  forbade  all  retreat, 
and  shut  thtnu  up  in  a  plain  surrounded  with  high  and  precipitous 
clitfs.     Attacked  in  this  phiin  by  nund)ers  double  their  own,  the  un- 
fortunate Thurians  underwent ^one  of  the  most  bloody  defeats  re- 
corded in  Grecian  history.      Out  of  their  14,000  men,' 10, 000  were 
slain,  under  merciless  orders  from  thi  Lucanians  to  give  no  quarter. 
The  remainder  contrived  to  flee  to  a  hill  near  the  sea  shore,  from 
whence  they  saw  a  fleet  of  ships  of  war  coasting  along  at  no  great 
distance.     Distracted  with  terror,  they  were  led  to  fancv  or  to  hope 
that  the^e  were  the  ships  expected  froin  Rhegium  to  their  aid ;  thouah 
the  Rhegians  would  naturally  send  their  ships  when  demanded,"lo 
fhurii.  on  tlic  Tarentine  Gulf,  not  to  the  lower  sea  near  Laus.     Un- 
der tins  impression,  1000  of  them  sw^am  off  from  the  shore  to  seek 
protection  on  ship-board.    IkiL  they  found  themselves,  unfcrtunnteh', 
oil  hoard  the  fleet  of  Leptines,   brother  and  admiial  of  DionvsivTs,' 
t'oine  for  the  express  purpose  of  aiding  the  Lucanians.     With  a  gen- 
oiosiiy  not  less  unexpected  than  honorable,  this  oflicer  saved  their 
ives,  and  also,  as  it  would  appear,  the  lives  of  all  the  other  del'ense- 
k'ss  survivors;  persuading  or  constraining  the  Lucanians  to  release 
hiem,  on  receiving  one  mina  of  silver  per  man. 
This  act  of  Hellenic  sympathy  restored  three  or  four  thoiisfmd  cit- 


IW 


•222 


SUILIAX   AFFAIllS-(()NTlNn:i). 


VICTORY   OF   DIOKYLlUf^. 


tr.  TUiirii   iimtoid  of  loavin'^  them  to  be  innssacred 

,:;;;;;",«  'iXntl  .'.).',' tul^Sun,  ulone,  ..a  „g=un.,  .11  .he  l^ 
]'       1  =      11,.  .Irivuled  lioiu  SM-iicusc!  Willi  a  iiowcvful  ii)icc--U,()U 
■oortml  3     10    o  '      w  t    \vlVicl.  he  nin.chedVy  laml  in  1  vo  days  1, 

<^  rapidly  fonvard  i«  the  night.D.onvMus  Mirp.is  d  t) ,»  ad  a       1 
"mrdat  break  of  day,  cr.ini.h.trly  i.olalod  fr'''"''*,*^:-,  .",',; 
fi      ..liP  disiviKliod   astaiil  niessaiTcs  to  acccleiato  ll.e  com  ng  uji  " 
t  ,c  mn-m    X      e '.  uled  hin.Mlf  Vith  hi.  Huall  haiKl  nS"'>-'«t_o y 
^^^:,  M.,.eVi.>ri.y  .,f  nnmhers      .B-Ute  <>,,.. eve  g....; 

\ftpr  1  lioroic  rc^i^tnnce,  lio  "wns  slr.in,  ami  ins  loini^amv  u 
^m  cut  to  p'oc'^rbefo     the  main  body,  though  they  came  up  at  lull 

^'^^:  {^It'^KK^  of  n.c  Itahot  army,  ho^yever.thcugh  it  «t 
^utnce  t     save  the  .encral,  ^^v.s  of  lalar  cHicacy  m  ^  ^'••^^.^^  !'-/  ', 
rnvii  U^^^  nrniv.     Ooufused  :nul  (li.hcarteiud  by  ^n(bi-.i:  L  ';J 

?eorf  was  slain,  ^vhicl)  U-ft  tlicm  v.ithout  a  general  to   uiiect  the 


i);itlle  or  restore  order,  tlie  Italiots  foncrlit  for  sometime  aii'ainst  ])io- 
iiysuis,  but  were  at  lengrh  defeated  with  severe  loss.  Tiiev  elTected 
their  retreat  from  the  tield  of  battle  to  a  neio-hborinu-  eminence  wry 
dimcidt  to  attack,  yet  destitute  of  water  ;md  provisions.  Here  Dio- 
nysius  blocked  theui  up,  without  atteruj^timr  an  attack,  but  keepiu"-- 
the  strictest  guard  round  the  hill  during  the^vhole  remaining-- davaml 
the  ensuing  uight.  The  heat  of  the  next  day,  with  total  wimt  of  wa- 
ter, so  subdued  their  courage,  that  they  sent  to  Dionvsius  a  herald 
with  propositions  entreating  to  be  allowed  to  depart  on  a  stipulated 
ransom.  But  the  terms  were  ])eremptorily  relused;  they  were  or- 
dered to  lay  down  their  arms  and  surrender  at  discretion.  Airainst 
this  terrible  requisition  they  .siood  out  yet  awiiile,  until  the  increas- 
ing pressure  of  physical  exhaustion  and  suffering  drove  them  to  sur- 
render, about  the  eiglith  hour  of  the  day. 

3Iore  than  10,000  disarmed  Greeks  descended  from  the  liill  and 
defiled  beiore  Dionysius,  who  nu!nbered  the  companies  as  they 
passed  with  a  stick.  As  his  savage  temper  w^as  well  knoun  thev^ 
expected  nothing  short  of  the  hai-shest  sentence.  So  much  tho 
greater  was  then-  astonishment  and  delight,  when  they  found  them- 
selves treated  not  merely  with  lenitv,  but  Avith  generositv.  Diony- 
sius releaseii  them  all  without  even  exacting  a  ransom;  and  concluded 
a  treaty  with  most  of  Mm  cities  to  which  they  belonged  leavin-- 
their  autonomy  undisturbed.  He  received  the  warniest'  thanks" 
ace  )mpanied  by  votes  of  golden  wreaths,  from  the  prisoners  a**  well 
a.s  110111  the  cities;  while  among  the  general  i)ublic  of  Greece  thejict 
was  liaiied  as  fornung  the  prominent  glory  of  his  political  life  Sueh 
acl.mration  was  well  deserved,  looking  lo'the  laws  of  war  then  preva- 

With  the  Krotoniates  and  other  Italiot  Greeks  (except  Pdieoiniu 
ami  Lokri)  Dionysius  had  had  no  marked  previous  relations,^ and 
therefore  had  not  contracted  any  stron-  i)ersonal  sentiment  either  of 
an  ipatliy  or  favor.  With  Khegium  and  Lokri  the  case  was  differ- 
ent, lothe  Lokrians  he  was  strongly  attached:  against  the  Khe- 
gmcs  his  animosity  was  bitter  and  implacable,  manifesting  itself  in  a 
more  conspicuous  manner  by  contrast  with  his  recent  dismissal  of 
he  Ivrotoniate  prisoners;  a  proceeding  which  had  been  probably 
dieta  ed,  in  great  part,  by  his  anxiety  to  have  his  hands  free  for  the 
attack  of  isolated  Rhegium.  After  having  finished  the  arrano-e- 
iiu-nts  consequent  upon  his  victory,  lie  marched  a-ainst  that  city  and 
piepared  to  besugc  it.  The  citizens,  feeling  themselves  without 
hpe  of  succor  and  intimidated  by  the  disaster  of  the  Italiot  allies, 
^cn  out  heralas  to  beg  for  moderate  terms,  and  imploring-  liim  to 
aostain  from  extreme  or  unmeasured  rigor.  For  the  moment  Diony • 
^iiis  seemed  to  comply  with  tlieir  request.  He  granted  thein  peace 
ou  condition  that  they  should  surrender  all  theirshipsof  war  seventy 
m  number--that  they  should  pay  to  him  300  talents  in  nion'ev-and 
thut  they  should  place  in  his  hands  100  hostaiies.     All  these  demands 


224 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS-COXTINVED. 


SIEGE  OF  RHEGIUM. 


225 


were  stricllv  complied  wiili,  upon  Avliich  Bionysius  withdrew  liis 
army,  and  agr^-^ed  to  spare  tb?  oily.  . 

.His  next  proceedin*^  Avas,  to  attneklvfiiilonia  and  llipponiiim;  two 
citie-i  which  seem  beiween  them  to  have  ()(c\ii>ie(l  the  whole  breadth 
of  th'^  Calabrian   i)euinsula,  immediately    north   of   Rheguim  and 
Lokri^-  Kaulonia  on   the  eastern  coast,  llipponium  on  or  near  t ho 
western      Both  these  cities  he  besiecid,  tock,  and  destroyed;  prob- 
ably neither  of  them,   in    the   hopeless  circumstances   of   the  cai^e 
made  anv  strenuous  resistance.     He  then  caused  the  inhabitants  of 
both  of 'them,  such  at  least   as  did  not  make  tlieu-  escape,  to  he 
transported  to   Syracuse,  where   he  domiciliated  them  as  citizens, 
allow ino-  them  five  vears  of  exemption  fiom  taxes.     1  o  be  a  citizca 
of  Svra?use  meant,  *at  this  monR-nt,  to  be  a  sub.iect  of  his  despotism, 
and*^nolhiu'T  more:  how  he  miide  room  for  these   new  citizens,  or 
furnished   them  with   lands  and  houses,  we  are  unfortunately  not 
informed      But  the  territory  of  both  these  towns,  evacuated  by  its 
free  inhabitants  (though    probably  not  by  its  slaves,  or  serfs),  was 
handed  over  to  the  Lokrians  jukI  annexed  to  their  city.     T  hat  tavorul 
city  Avhich  hud  accepted  his  oiler  of  marriage,  was  thus  immensely 
enriched  both  in  lands  and  in  collective  property.     Here  again  it 
would  have  been  interesting  to  liear  what  measures  were  taken  to 
appropriate  or  distribute  the  new  lands;  but  our  intormant  is  silent. 
Dionvsius  had  thus  accumuhited  into  Syracuse,  not  only  all  Stcilv 
(\o  use  the  lansua-e  of  Plato),  but  even  no  inccmsiderable  portion  oi 
Italy      Such  wholesale  changes  of  domiJle  and  property  must  pro- 
bably have  occupied  some  months;  during  which  time  the  army  ot 
B  onysius  seems   never  to  have  c,uitted   the  (^alabr.an  peninsula 
1hou4  he  himself  may  probablv  have  g(  ne  lor  a  time  in  person  to 
&se      I    was  so^nseen  that  the  depopulation  of  Hii>pon.iun 
and  Kaulonia  was  intended  only  as  aprelude  to ^^^^^^^^^l^}^^ 
rpon  this  Dionvsius  had  resolved.     1  he  recent  covenan    >ijto  n  h 

lie  had  entered  with  the  Bhegines.  was  only  a  ^V^^^^^V^'  ' ;  ^''  'v  in 

the  purpose  of  entrappin-  them  into  a  surrender  ot  then  nav}.ni 

order  that  he  midit  afterward  attack  them  at  greater  advantage. 

]^,Iarchimr  his  armv  to  the  Italian  shore  of  the  strait,  near  Khc^^u m. 

he  effected  to  busV  himself  in  preparations  for  crossing  to  bicily 

In  the  mean  time,  he  sent  a  friendly  message  to  the  5^'.'^*.^'"^'^'    ' . 

Questing  them  to  supply  him  for  a  short  lime  with  provisions,  xwhi 

assurance  that  what  they  furnished  should  s]U'edily  be  replaced  iron 

Byracuse.     It  was  his  V"'Tose,  if  they   refused,  to  ^^^<;f  .^^  ",^;'f 

insult,  and  attack  them;  if  they  consented,  to  consume  then  p  uvi- 

sions  without  performing  his  (Miiia-ement  to  replace  the  qua""  > 

consumed;  and  then  to  make  his  attack  after  all,  when  their  meau. 

of  holdino-  out  had  been  diminished.     At  first  the  RheginescomplM*a 

willin'dy^furnishinir  abundant  supplies.     But  the  consumption  coii- 

tinued"!  and  the  departure  of  the  army  was  deferred—first  on  preten=>c 

Ol  Ihp  illness  of  Dionyslus,  next  on  (»ther  grounds— so  that  tney  ai 


length  detected  the  trick,  and  declined  to  furnish  any  more.  Diony- 
sius  now  hrew  off  the  mask,  gave  back  to  them  their  hundred  hos- 
tages and  'aid  siege  to  the  town  in  form 

Regretting  t(>()  late  that  they  had   Milfered  themselves  to  be  de- 
frauded of  their  means  of  defense,  the   Kheirines  nevertheless  pre- 
pared to  hold  out  with  all  the  energy  of  desi»air.     Phyton  was  chaseii 
coimnander    the  whole  population  was  armed,  and  all  the  line   of 
wall  carefully  watched.     Dionysi^is  made  vigorous  assaults  employ- 
ing all  the  resources  of  his  battering  machinery  to  effect  a  breach 
But  he  was  repelled  at  all  points  obstinately,  and  with  much  lo<s  on 
both  sides;  several  of  his  machines  were  also  burnt  or  destioAed  by 
opportune  sallies  of  the  besieged.     In  one  of  the  assaults,  Diony^ius 
himself  w^as  seriously  wounded  by  a  spear  thrust  in  the  groin   from 
which  he  ^yas  long  in  recovering.     Ho  was  at  length  obliged  to  con- 
vert the  siege  mto  a  blockade,  and  to  rely  upon  famine  alone  for 
subduing  these  valiant  citizens.     For  eleven  months  did  the  Rhe- 
gines  hold  out,  against  the  pressure  of  want  gradually  increasing 
and  at  ast  terminating  in  the  agony  and  distraction  of  famine      We 
are  told  that  a  medimnus  of  wheat  came  to  be  sold  for  the  enormous 
price  of  five  mina);  at  the  rate   of  about  £14:  sterling  ])er  bushel- 
every  horse  and  every  beast  of  burden  was  consumed:   at  leno-tli* 
hides  were  boiled  and  eaten,  and  even  the  grass  on  parts  of  the  wall 
iMaiiy  perislied  from  absolute  hunger,  while  the  survivors  lost  all 
s  reiigth  and  energy.     In  this  intolerable  condition,  they  w^ere  con- 
strained, at  the  end  of  near  eleven  months,  to  surrencfer  at  discretion 
So  numerous   were  these  victims  of  famine,  that  Dionysius  on 
entering  Rhegium,  found  heaps  of  unburied  corpses,  besides  g'oOO 
citizens  in  the   ast  stage  of  emaciation.     All  these  captives  were  sent 
to  Syracuse,  where  those  who  could  provide  a  mina  (about  £3  17s  ) 
were  allowed  to  ransom  themselves,   while  the   rest  were  sold  as 
slaves.     After  such  a  period  of  suffering,  the  number  of  those  who  ' 
U'Uiumi  the  means  of  ransom  w^as  probably  very  small.     But  the 
Kiiegnie  genera     Phyton,  was  detained  with  all  his  kindred  and 
reserved  for  a  different  fate.     First,  his  son  was  drowned   by  on  t 
of  Dionysiui:   next,   Phyton   himself  was   chained    to  one  of   the 
lottiest  siege-uiachmes,  as  a  spectacle  to  the  whole  army.     While  he 
was  thus  exhibited  to  scorn,  a  messenger  was  sent  to  apprise  him 
tliat  DioLiysius  had  just  caused  his  son  to  be  drowned.     -  He  is  more 
fmunate  than  his  father  by  one  day,"  was  the  reply  of  Plnton 
After  a  certain  time,  the  sufferer  was  taken  down  froln  this  pillory" 
and  led  round  the  city,  with  attendants  scour-ing  and  insulting  him 
at  every  step;  while  a  herald  proclaimed  aloud? ''Behold  ihf  man 
W'!'''pi'''1^'^  ^^''  Bhegines  to  war,  thus  signally  punished  by  Diony- 
dtin-fi   I  ^If^^'  enduring  all  these  torments  with  heroic  courage  and 
agnified  silence,  was  provoked  to  exclaim  in  reply  to  the  herald  that 
Uh  punishment  was  intlicted  because  he  had  refused  to  betray  the 
UI3  to  Dionysius,  who  would  himself  soon  be  overtaken  by  the  diviuo 
II.  G.  lY.— C 


SICIUA2t  AFFAIR^COHTINUED. 


226 

.en^eancc.  At  ,en.tU  ^^^^^fort^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
noWe  .iemcanor  ami  '<'f  J^Pf ^'^"  ^'ius  himself.  Tl.cir  „.«nmn-s 
sion  even  among  tUe  f"'  "Y,' ^^^^"^^ /apprehend  an  open  mulmy 
became  so  P'"""""'^'^^'      f,  p^.-toS      Un(  er  lUis  fear  he  gave  orders 

entire  kimired  should  K *'^'^;;^T''_.vi,.h  this  unhappy  man  perished. 

The  prophetic  P«'-^*f4'""V'^'",  overtake  his destJoyer.  ^as  no^vay 

that  divine  vengeance  ^%  ou  1  ";■»'.  "J'-^ti.c  power  and  prosperil  v  of 

home  out  by  the  ^^l^f  ^^^,4  n  enl  bV  hit^^ar^vitli  tl>e  Carlhag.nmns 
Dionvsiusunderwent  abat  mtutl}   n  ^^_^^^  ,^.^  ^^..^^  j^j.. 

in  383B.C.,  yet 't'»"'°f.:,fLuTMckiy  upon  his  son  the  younger 
And  the  misfortunes  v,-  cl.  f^"^'  ^,'f,';',>^.„  P,,  tuough  they  doubtless 
Dionvsius,  more  than  thirty  )  tare  .intr       j  d-Uics,  were 

received  k  religious  'nl^n^retat'on  fio  '  comei  ^  J  inmxeA  ou 
^rol^ably  ascribed  to  acts  moro  r«.f «"' ."""Xd  %^erc  at  least  laid  to 
Kn.^  But  *e^«»'«'l'»V,V,v\vtrconteS>porIry  world,  and  even 
heart  with  profound  fvnipathy  by  the.  conicu.i_        j  ^^^^^^  p,„. 

commemorated  with  »e"der-jc^s  and^^^^^^^^^^  ^^sently)  in  hopes 

nvsius  was  composmg  «'''S"'''',f;,\°,„,f  {  ,n,ishing  real  matter  of  his- 
o  applause  in  Greece  ',V:"^''Xri.. '«"  l-o^^  legendary  hwoes 
torv  not  less  tragical  than  the  >'""'^^""=;,  ,  ,,  „oets)  resorted  for 
ln?ri"roines  to  whteh  •'«  (J^^/^— V;,^^',  ^  ori  o'i  le.s  aggravated. 

a  subject.  An^ng  <''«  "f '>  'f '^^f  an  hi '  oriau  of  Greece  to  recount, 
,-hieh  it  is  tbomelancholy  duty  o  a    hr 'o        ^  ,^^,  ^^.,^<, 

there  are  few  so  revolting  *s  the  <'e<>"»  "'  ,   , -,^  j  gn  enemy  in 

w^s  not  a  subject,  tior  »  .^^^PJ^f  ^^^tTven  ntnysius  himself  could 
open  warfare— of  whom  the  w  o  ^  '"»'  «^"_  (  ^    , jje  war.     And 

Sy,  was,  that  he  had  P^y^.^^f.^''! ''  ^'..'.X^n  fpa  hy  of  the  Rhegines 
even  this  could  not  be  ^«''l  ^^^'/J  ^-^^  \,^,ceable  to  his  enslavement 
toward  Dionysius  was  "*  «'<l,"*»°f,',"|' '  t  earlier-thongh  the- s  ate- 
of  Naxos  and  Katana,  it  not  «o  Y^'^f.  f, ,  „  that  Dionysius  had  tried 
mcnt  of  Phyton  may  ^"X  Pr,«,^'^  ierc'ral  of  Naxos  and  KaUina 
to  bribe  him  'o  betray  Khegmm  (as  the  ^t"  ^  ^^^  i     eased 

had  been  bribed  to  bet  ay  their  >e^P'-f,\''j„„  ,  ,!„ed.  The  Hellenic 
beyond  measure  at  finding  *''£,,|^™P,';:  'Vuel  Both  Athenians  and 
war  practice  was  iu  itse  f  t"*"'"''?,,,  of^^ar  by  wholsesale,  after 
L:«^*Bmonia«s  put  »"  'l-ath  pr  son^.^,  o^  w a    by^    _^^^  ^,^,,„ere 

the  capture  of  Melos,  af"--V,"'^,,^,,,.u,,v  a  deliberate  and  protrae  ed 
But  ti  make  death  worse  till     <lc.ithbja^^^       .^  is  Carthaginian 

tissue  of  tortures  and  V"^'?"  V'^'i 'Vn  iiimst'lf  better  than  a  Greek 
and  Asiatic.     D.onj-sius  1 .      sho    -^  ^^^  prisoners  caplnred 

Phyton  aud  his  kindred. 


RHEGIUM  DISMANTLED. 


227 

Dionysius  caused  the  city  of  Rhe«^iuni  to  ho  Ho«trr^■c^o.^        t 

iira.'';,?n  eVo'i^:,'i!:i',teT 

of  all  Ihe  three  transfers  dcpeXl  on     e  a  ce^den^^  ."S^itf ''' •"' 

Greeks  generally.  tl,„se  victories  of  Oionvsiuswer?>.,fTm  ^'"'"" 
because  the  polilical  union  fornu-d  mm.rtir^T  .  '-^  ™"'o»s- 
resisting  the^ressure  of  the  Liie-mir^rln  '  he    nl'er  or  T'^,::  "' 

guislied'for^f'o  o  l^r  S.rteve!,,'T"''^^ 

Greece  under  Ihe.  <ZuZ^;Tp^rS^':^a%^'^  '"''"" '?  ^'T'^ 

th,  peace  of  Antalkldas;  and  the  ,!;;;;„;:'„&':  by  trfi'mif ""' 

UcGr«.'s?o  4rT;v  t  '''"^  piirchased,  by  surreuderimr  the\s 

f^l  en  al-^hefore  t  ,"def"  f  o^^^  ""if  '''T'  '°  «-' wliidrsl.e 

.  the  mari,i,ne  eni,Ji*re  forfd^d  bv  «";  dt^feat""'"  ""'°"^  '"'''''''"'^ 


228  SICILIAN  AFFAIIIS-CONTINUED. 

the  pcHodicl  festivals  ^^^^^^^^^^^  "^ 

wrought  Willi  the  greatest  ^Jj^^^"^;^  ^'^^^.n.ed  Alkimenc-s.  Dio- 
Tuanner,  the  votive  ^^^^^-^  ,^  ,f.,^^^:;"i^^  it  long  venmined  as  one 
m-sius  sold  this  robe  o  the  ^^^  '  f  i"^f  \i,eiVcitv,  being  probably 
of  the  permanent  religious  «^°^"^^^^U[iViLrecentlv  introduced 
dedicatl>d  to  the  honor  «/ ,^^»«-^^,",^'  i^^l^^^^^^  uere 

for  worship:  whom  (as  I  ^;,^;^^;^^^fj";  t  Le  of  averting 

about  this  time  pecn  larly  f  "^^^^X,,?-hs  Xrew  th  they  bad  been  so 
or  alleviating  tl-    "g»;  ^^^^^^  at  the  pro- 

ofleu  smilteu.  Ine)  P"""*^*^  ,'"',,  P07  nOO  «terlins.  Incredible  ns 
.lidous  price  of  120  t»l«"'^-«'f';""^,,^^-X,te  honor  done  to  tl.e 
this  sum  mny  nppear,  ^'^  ™'^\„'"T.KconU^  to  the  magnitude  of 
new  Gods  vvould  be  "l^^^'J^^'^^VtoSswould  prolu.bly  think  no 
the  sum  laid  down.  As  "'f  \;\"'  •;-"  .  vestment  from  the  wardrobe 
price  too  p-eat  to  trnnsfer  an  '""'''^'>^l'i,ea  temple  and  worship  of 
U  theLakinian  Here  to  the  new  J  ^^'^^  s^^ieU  tcmi        ^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^ 

Demeler  and  Persephone  in   her  ^>'>     ,/^J^„Vthe  holy  place,  would 

X^r.-'- ~e:|tj  !ri^:;-  crowd  of  Itahot 

Gr?eks  who  frequented  the  Lak.nmn  f^M  val^  ^j,,,^,^,  „,,r 

Thus  master  of  the  mP"''.''''''."  1.  l  Harrison  Dionvsiusdivested 
the  .sea  capable  of  being  held  by  a  sepnrat^^^^^^^^ 

the  inhabitants  of  then;  ■'^"""l^'",Xr  thrown  of  Lokri.     Whether 
nadeover  to  aggrandize  y*^' J"''' "  n,,rTarentine  Gulf  so  as  to 

he  ptished  his  7°;i;':;fThnr  i  ^rlletipontum.  we  cannot  say.   But 
acquire  the  like  hold  on  Thurii  or  Jieu  ,  extension  and 

from  he? disastrous  defeat  by  •'>;;Lm.a".ans  ^^^  ^^.^^ 

Profiting  by  his  "\»"l;"l^,,r"  "^^f,™  even  to  distant  ultramarine 
enabled  to  enlarge  Ins  "'^'"'"'"V  W  arm  Svracusai)  exiles  were 
enterprises.  To  escape  from  1"^  Ion?  "  ™' f 'tLeir  divisions  either 
oblijid  to  flee  to  a  .irreater  ''■f  ^  •  itv  of  Ancona!hid.  np  the  Adri- 
fo.mded.  orwas  admit  ed  into,  the  cit>  ol  Anc^     ,  i^^  ^^^.^^^^^ 

atie  Gulf.     On  tlie  other  side  f* /'f,  .^'^.V^  °e,  t  a  fleet,  and  estab- 
with  the  lUyrian  tribes  Dionysius  on  l.i^  par   se^^^        ^^_^^    rt.mpted 

lishedmore  «1'^^"  ""''.^'■"'7f"*>  T  oti  "AMossians,  named  Alketas, 
bv  a  dispossessed  prince  of  the  Epiro  c  J  "'o-       ^  j;    confidence. 

who,  resirling  at  Syr.ic.ise .  as  «"  <;^.''^; '^^^i^f ^"t,,e  lllvrian  coast, 
He  founded  the  town  of  Lissus  ('f^^'^'^^^^'^'^^ed  the  Parians  in 

considerably  north  of  Ep--1"'""I^,;^"^,,'''^nrrte  'till  farther  north- 
tlu-ir  plant^Uion  of  two  Grecian    etm^^  p,,^^,.^,      Ui, 

ward  up  tbc^  Adriatic  Gulf- he  1^1.  us  o  coast-boats, 

^SS^riarnulerof're;.^:Uh"San  panoplies.     It  is 


IS 


IMMENSE  POWER  OF  DIONYSIUS.  229 

affirmed  to  have   boon  tlie  purpose  of  Dionysius  and  Alketas  to 
employ  these  war  ike  barbarians,  first  in  invading  En  rus  and  restoi 
ing  Alketas  to  his   Molo.ssian   principality;  ncStT    »i]  "  n."  the 
wealthy  temple  of  Delphi-a  scheme  far-r4ching   vet     o    fmpl-a  t^ 
cable,  and  capable  ot  being  seconded  by  a  Syracu  an  fleerifXun i- 

Plsiied  "Ind  afe  All^^  i'^""     'T^r  ^""f  J^'"  '^'  ^'^^^  was'accom- 
piis  lul,  and  the  Molossians  were  defeated  in  a  bloody  battle  wherein 

lo,000  of  them  are  said  to  have  been  slain.  But  the  ulterior  proiects 
agamst  Delp In  were  arrested  by  the  intervention  of  Sp  u^  wl  (?sc^  t 
^l^et^^  \?  ''''  '^'''  "^^^  prevented  all  farther  march  Lout  ward 
Alketas,  however  seems  to  have  remained  prince  of  a  portion  of 
Lpirus,  in  the  territory  nearly  opposite  to  Korkyra  •  wiierr^e  h-ivP 
already  recognized  him,  in  a  former  chapter,  as^  having  te^^^^^ 
depenoent  ot  Jason  of  Phera3  in  Thessaly  °  'Jccome  tlie 

Another  enterprise  undertaken  by  Di6nysius  about  this  time  wa<» 
a  maritnne  expedition  along  the  coasts  of  Latium   Etru  h   and  Cor 

th,  rip?  .  1  ?  '  ^'i  ^  Pf  l^>^'  '''^'^'  ^^^  ^'^'^  P^"-P0^«  ^>f  pillaging 
Pyr<  In  Hn  ]f/'"'P^'  i^^i  Leukothea  at  AgyllL,  or  its  sea-port 
-t-^rgi.  In  this  he  succeeded,  stripping  it  of  money  and  Drecion<; 
ornaments  to  the  ainount  of  1000  tale'its  The  AgyllSan.  came  f orHi 
to  defend  their  temple,  but  were  completely  woVstId  LTloft  o 
much  lK)th  in  plunder  and  in  prisoners,  that  Dionysius  Xr  return 
^m  Sr  '""''"^  ''''  ^'^'''''''  obtained  an  adcii[^n  J  pl^ht 
fi.o^'n'  7^^^/^^^  military  celebrity  now  attained  by  Dionysius  that 

sent  ^'""nl.  J'''^l'>'"^,^?'^'   ^'''^y'  ''^'^  ^'^'^   ^-^^^^^y  sac^lfd  Ron  e 
sent  to   protfer  their  alliance  and  aid.     He   accepted  the  i)'^^' 

ard'  t[ndNn  h i^''  ''''''''''  ''''  ^'^'^  mercenaries^vhjin^'e  a^^e  . 
Mard  tind  in  his  service  as  mercenaries,  may  take  their  date      II  s 
long  arms  now  reached   from   Lissus   on  one  side    o  A^i  a  on  t  e 
o  her     Master  of  most  of  Sicily  and  much  of  Southern  Italy  as  weU 
as  of  the  most  powerful  standing  army  in  G-eece— thr>  ^tntnr\...,L 
phuulerer  of  the  holiest  teniples^ever/vv"e^-he  inspired  3  t" 
lor  and  dislike  throughout  Central  Greece.     He  was  the  moi^  vn 
nerable  to  this  sentiment,  as  he  was  not  only  a  trimnJiant  prince 
but  also  a  tragic  poet ;  competitor,  as  such   for  that  a  nhnS^  i^^^^^ 
.admiration  which  no  force  cL  extoVt.     Since  none  of  1  if  tm<'edies 
have  been  preserved,  we  can  form  no  judgment  of  our  own  rAnr^^^^ 
mg  them.    Yet  when  we  learn  that  he  liad'stood  second  or  fh  I'd^and 

ic^iudi  at  Athens,  in  368-367  u.c— the  favorable  iudgment  of  an 

t!l^<!ti:zS^.r'  "''■^"" ""'  '^■■'^^""-="  '^-  ^^"^ 

During  the  years  immediately  succeeding  387  BC    however  Dio- 

VZr!  '^^  P"'  r'  °",'  «kely<oreceiveanimpar,i  1  h   iriu''"^. 
where.    For  while  on  the  one  hand  his  own  circle  would  appiauU 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS-CONTINUED. 


230 

e.e,-v  word-on  the  Cher  ^^']- ^^^^J^Z:^^^^^'^^^ 
Greeks  ^voukl  ^^  ^^'f^ 'f^^l^^  '  uJ  a  .ecdotCl  recouut.,!  hy  . 
hatred  of  the  |VUtlH.r.  »,,Y, ,,',,,  .^vovtli"' '''''»'='-"'''^^'*'''^''*' ''™; 
Dio<lorus,  we  shou  d  <•""/;''""'";.,■,■,  l  of  Di.no^*"'' ">  "•'-'""l 
temimhle  eon>posil.o..s,  l^'  "'"'' ''^„",  i  v  weakness.  Tl,e  dithy- 
to  criticism  was  exaggerated  e\^"  *''.;'''>  ^^  Syracuse,  after  hear- 
rambic  ^o.i  Vm.^<^r^-^J^^^ ^^  ^'as^asked  his  opinion, 
ing  one  of  these  tragedies  1?'V''"^'>  'h^,' :„,,'  ^e  was  sent  to  prison  : 
hS  gave  an  unfavoral.le  OP'"'^"; /"  .,';,  f '  .,  em-  .d  his  release,  and 
on  the  next  <>">;  tl-..-;--:^^.."  ■  Ird'donbk-n.eaning  phrases, 

he  contrived  at  ei^.-»'l;  l^)  ^^^mmi  ,,i„,out  openly  compro""s.ng 
to  express  an  inottensiye  ^'-'  ''",  ,  „^o  ,.  njonys his  had  sent 
truth  At  the  Olyinpic  {^^"V'^.^^t^^u.er  will,  the  best  actors 
some  of  his  compositions  to  <A^^1P^>■  <;=  ^  „i^,,^.  ^,^,^  ,i.e  poems 
and  chorists  to  recite  t.'"™;    ,'f'"  "^.V,.^"^^^^^^^^^^ 

(we  are  toUl),  that  in  spite  «*  .<;  ^'^^ ,  "^';;"^,';  f,!er  the  actors  in  coming 
disgracefully  hissed  an,  ."'  ™^^^  •  ,°^^,',V,  ^^rew  of  the  ship  ascribed 
back  to  Syracuse  ^'^^.^'''P'^'^,"';"'; ''?,  ,V,  eiof  the  poems  intrust.d 
„11  the  sullenng  of  their  ^-7!,'?^^ '^.^^  ^'  iw  ■ver  (it  i    said),  still  con- 

;\?c,rDi;Sbr4i;°:ud'r^^^^^^^^ 

out  being  dislK-arU'iiecl.  ^:,.^„iMtP«n)v  witty  men  at  the  expense 

Amid  SUCH  nudicious  3ests  c   culat  d^^^  ^^  ^.^^^ 

of  the  princely  Vf^J^^^^/^^,,  year  384b.c  (l.otl| 
Perhaps  in  tlie  year  ^^^15,-' ^^^  tragedies  to  be  recited,  and 

of  tlieni  Olympic  y^^^^^'^  '  |?>^;  Ji^l^' !'«,^.„^^^  in  festiN'al  at  Olympia. 
chariots  to  run,  betoie  the  c^^>^^;,  \.f,  "V,  [  j^  Central  Greece  and  in 
The  year  387  b.c  Avas  a  ^^'"»«>^^^,^.^,[;;;  '  \:\  "  monien^  peace  of 
Sicily.     In  the  former,  it  %vas  -^g^  '^^  .^\^;.  ^  tne  mo  ^^i^^ama;  : 

Antilkidas,  which  t----;;-  .|;,£^'^^7f,:^\l  of  l^-" 

in  the  latter,  It  marked  the  ^'^'.^V  .^/J"^- t^\'1^^j,  .,i,athe 

,,vsius,  with  the  defeat  ^f  .^^rc rern^^^ 
GVeeks,and  subversions  ot  three  G^^^^^^^^^ 

and  Khegium-the  fate  of  ^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^h  »  ^,^x  Olympic  festival 
incidents  most  V^^'''^J^'''!^^^^nX  a  distinguished  epocli^ 
which  occurred  alter  f^l^^-^""'^^^^^^  of  392  B.C.  and  b88 

The  two  festivals  "J^^^^'^^^^^  ^  >  ^  u  S  of  a  -eneral  war,  had  not 
B.C.)  having  been  celebrated  in  ^^^XV.  llcnfc  lu.dy  ;  so  that  the 

been  visited  by  a  large  P^-^>i;;;!;V,""  J^J^^^^^a  \n  3^  ^'as  stamped 

next  ensuing  festival    he  mi  O^^^^^^^^^^^^  ;^  420  B.C.)  as 

with  a  peculiar  character  (Ike  Uit^y^^^^^  ^^  ^         ^,^.^.,, 

•ih  a  f^sS^"  TV^^-^irtUe'tcm'; ^-v.s  pecuUuriy  seduc 


DIKON  OF  KAULONIA. 


231 


"^n^^t^^l^^Z^  -emies-at  the 

personal  comnLid'^  Ac:^     i^^^^^'l^^  ''''  ^^J^ 

emn  legation  for  sucriflce  decked  ii ho    •;..  '^  Hieory,  or  sol- 

with  abundant  gohl  a.urs'ilver  d^^^  garments,  furnished 

to  serve  for  tlieir  k  Xn  r  onV^^^  '-pUmdid  tents 

farihersentseve  ale  a  ols  u  ont-t^^^^^^  TT^  ^^,  ^^^''"l^^'^-  ^e 
iot  races;  and  last ly  e^ko  sc  yr.^^^^^/^  '''V'l^  "•'  ^^^^  ^"^'^"^^^^  ^har- 
as  liighly  trained   t^o  exhMf  ?.  ''"'  ''"'^  f^^'^^^^,  skillful  as  well 

suchaswc^evdhM'tohe-i  hem  """^J^'^'f^^  compositions  before 
recitation  was  rH)t   nelu  k^  W        T'^  remember  that  poetical 

All  this  pr!  d  :4  s  HUit   in  itr  f;  '""'"^  programme  of  tlie  festival, 
brother  of  Dion?rs      '  f  ^x  1.,^^^^  ''^  Thearides, 

01ynij)ic  ci()wd  No  TV  L  «fl  ^^^'  dazzling  effect  before  the 
before!  them  as  thft  c^  lie  r4;rof  "^^^'"^^  T'  ostentatiotisly 
from  the  most  (listant  r  AUs  of  Pnl.^^^^^^^  Every  man,  evi^n 

into  his  past  exploit.s  ai/cln   K-f^^^^^^^  ^-timulated  to  inquire 

persons  present  pl'cu  i\r  ^fo nv  r  1  in 'o         ''■    ''''''"  Probably  many 
•numerou's  suffererr  Ka^h^  ''''^'  inquiries-tho 

quests  had  thrown    nZ  exi le^^^^^^^  ^vhom  his  con- 

nature  to  rai..ethe  str,)mres  nni n,l !•''";' t;":'"  '''^"^^  ^^e  of  a 
the  numerous  (lepop  1      7n;\,;',a  ^^^  I  lonysius.     Besides 

had  oeca.sioned  n  Sic  ;%  li"  "'  ''^  ^^^'^i^^^=^»l«  ^'Mch  he 
the  last  rhree  years  ex  Li^i:^'?,.^^'''^'^^  '%'''  ^^^'^^  ^'^  ^^^<  within 
Hhegium,  Kaulonia  II  om  h  m  t  "^  ^'"^  ^'^''^=^'^  coniniunities- 
the  two  latter  to"^:ra  ll^  ^  l.^c-l^^^^;^'^:^^^  ''''  -^^^^h.uts  of 
circumstance  occum-d  to  imn  e^rii^t/  .  ^^''"''^'  ^°  accidental 
the   spectators.      The   runner  wLc  /^  extinction  viyidly  upon 

stadiuni,  in  384  lt^T^}^n\l^!^^  '^%^^'?'  ^'''^^  "^  the 
man  pre-emhientlv  swift  of  foo    'eel.  '^     .  l       /^''"J'^^^^^'     ^^e  was  a 

sm-ren.lering'the  Asia. io  (i,X  "  >  "  ,,e  G  -;:.','^  f-"!"- P-'chased  by 
that  tins  emotion  .sliowld  nianife-.t  its  If  nf  li  .  ,     T     ^'.^''^  Didnral 

IVslival  iua84  U.C..  wl,ei-ei„  not  o,  v '^l  r.  ms    Sind-ln'-'^?'?''^'" 
andCorintli  ans   hut  also  \si-iti^  .,„.i  u;  -V-       /,"•'"  •  Tlieliaiis, 

after  a  long  sep  ,rat io        f  he  ,  no;  ,     r  ''''",'"  ^";'*''  ''''-■'"  "■'""'<■< 
in  the  orator  Lys ias      DV  ce,    ed  fr,  n   ^  ""  "'""1"'^'"  «l'^'k^'-^'"au 
once  .  Citizen  of^Thurii.U"^  '^Z^Z^^^^iX 


^iiUiri 


232  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS-CONTINUED. 

,  T,  V      n..„„i-Q     TT|.(l(.livcrcd  a  public  harangue 
^■itli  the  Sicilian  and  1'?''^'"  H,  .?1  -^iT.ir"  i    ^v  .ich  Ue\hvdt  npon  the 
„p<.n  the  actual  slato  of  P'    V™   '  ^1  ^^,,^  J';,  'rf  the  f.m.,re.     "  The 
n  ournfi.l  present  an.l  upon        ^f"^'"" '?^.'';-    i.^,,,  extrcmiti.s.     Our 
Gn'cian  world  (he  said)  is  \^  %^    n  lor  the  Great  Kin-,  otir 
eastern  brelhrei.  h.avc  passed  '"''^'^'  "us      These  t«o  are  the  iireat 
.vestern  under  the  '1<^^P""^»' "', ',  f'  ;',  tinev   the  real  instrn.n.ats 
potentate?,  both  in  ''■■''•■''^^"'^'^'  ""'\^}\l",Zv'-«m  extinguish  what 
S  dontiiiion:  if  both  of  them  '-">;!'    I^^l'^^^.^'^i.^ed^^o  consinn- 
remains  of  fre<.lom  m  (^J^^'^-.J^^l  'rf,,e  past  dissensions  aiming 
mate  all  this  nan  unopposed   J'P*^-'"^«  ™  1,  4,  time  that  these  cities 
the  leading  Grecian  cities;  but 't^, ""  \.  V"  "h,„v  ean  Sparta,  our 
should  tmite  eor<lia  ly  to  orr-       '    '  'jj   '^  ;i,^.o,,cl  is  olr  fire  and 

ledtimate  president,  si    still  ^^ '' f _ ' "''  ".      ,  v„.p,.„.en  ousrht  to  be  to 
consumingV     The  tnislortunes  ol       r  r»  n<  d  b.e^^.^  ^^^^^^ 

i^Tiol^-s^Xk  us  UlhUreir  united  force:  let  us  check  their  mso- 

lencc  at  once,  ybile  it  is  ^''^   ''«'■'•  i;::Xf.a.vn,ent  of  this  emphalic 
Vnfortunately  we  p..ssess  It    a  s  ,.     >  t  .i.-i^  ^j^^,  ^^.,^^,i,, 

harangue  (a  panegyrical  If fS"  ^'^  "  ,';!^.  J^'"  , "  „iarnuM!r  picture  of 
delivered  at  Olympm  by  I.ysias.  _.I\»  '  .  ,;,f„V.  [,,  adv  enslaved,  botli 
tl,e  time  which  he  labored  'o  "";";■  i .',  ,^„''  „"!  ,ates  of  the  age. 
in  the  east  and  in  lie  west.  »>  "'"^'"  V  -  .,Ve  .d  in  her  center  by  their 
Artaxerxes  n.ul  O-JO^-^  '^  ,<^^ ^^;Z^:;  of  so  gloomv  an  an.i- 
combined  eff(.rts.  1  <''^ '''"";  '',„';,,  ,],„  nnrpedine  vear  Dionysius. 
cipation,  we  must  recom-ct  that  od)  >"    ""^^P  ^j"^ ,,'  (,^,^-,io„  of  Italian 

already  master  of  Sicily  "";,«'  f^„^.".^^'^:^"ollviia,  armed  a  host 
Greece,  liad  stretched  his  '"7''' „7'^^\  •" '"'ontliward  nn<ler  Alketas 
of  Jllyrian  ''^^[-'-"f  "^^^^'h  the  v  ew  of^.h^r.ely  procce.ling  farther 
aL'ainst  the  Molossians,  wi.inui  vu»  <  .ifcdiemonians  had  Ixen 

ami  pillaging  the  Pelphum  ''''"r  '';,,  J'^l.^i^^e  s  No  wonder  then 
obliied  to  send  a  force  to  arrest  then  V;";-!  ;■   ^*„,^(,i,,,,i,,„  ,,ite. 

.„atXysias  should  1^-,' ^'f  J^^rceLa' a  T object  not  oily  of 
rior  proiects  against  centr.d  Gi  en     a  ^^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^ 

hatrcl  for  what  he  had  <■;"<-.'  <«„  .^  X„",'  f,.,mi  the  east, 
do.  in  con  unction  wit  .  the  "''    'f  i,"' Vu.  kin-)  was  out  of  read,. 
Of  these  two  enemies  one    the  f<^'f    "  J-'"-,   ;„      >rson,  stood 
But  the  ^ec<>nd-nionysius-  bougli.   r.ot  pr  su.     mjH       ^^^^^^^^  _ 

forth  by  his  envoys  and  f  PP"^'"';  f"^fi7^|;orv  or  s<.leinn  legati<.n 
ti(n,  bevond  any  man  on  the  ground  lUs  ' ''«'Ojy  ,  ^,.,.„rMums: 
outshone  every  other  l,y  the  ^P'^''^"^^  *  ?„  .'t  |ii^  orses  were  of 
his  chariots  to  run  in  the  races  ""^  .r^'  -"','',„  ,rted  otit  of  the 
rare  exeelleuce.  bred  t">"\''f.\frr'  -  i,  pcZ^s  recit.'d  bv  th,; 
innermost  d.^plhs  of  the  Adnatic  Gu  K^^^^^  .lelivrV  and 

best  .rtists  in  Greece  «?  '"  f '  JW^',;'',  iTnn^c  merit.  Now  the. 
fine  chonc  «1\»P"Y'  «t,\^h?s  was  n  orlv  L'-ravatcd  by  all  this  dis- 
^^:1^l^^:r.^^^^i^'^^  of  impoverished  exiles  whom 


E.MOTIOX   AT   OLYMPIA. 


2'S^ 


he  had  dispossess-d,  but  was  also  furniyhed  witli  something  to  strike 
at  and  vent  itself  upon.  Of  such  opportuuily  for  present  action 
against  a  visible  object,  Lysias  did  not  fail  to  avail  himself.  •  While 
ho  vehemently  preached  a  crusade  to  dethrone  Dionysius  and  liber- 
ate Sicily,  he  at  the  same  time  pointed  to  the  gold  and  purple  tent 
before  them,  rich  and  proud  above  all  its  lellows.  which  lodiicd  the 
brother  of  the  despot  with  his  Syracusan  leuation.  He  exhorted  his 
hearers  to  jiut  forth  at  once  an  avenging  hand,  in  partial  retribution 
for  the  sutferings  of  free  Greece,  by  plundc  ring  the  tent  which  in- 
sulted them  by  its  showy  decorations,  lie  adjured  them  to  interfere 
and  prevent  the  envoys  of  this  impious  despot  from  sacriticino-  or 
entering  their  chariots  in  the  lists,  or  taking  any  part  in  the  holy  Pan- 
Ilsllenic  festival. 

We  cannot  doubt  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  spectators  on  the 
plain  ot  Olyjupia  felt  with  greater  or  less  inten.sity  the  generous  Pan- 
Hellenic  patriotism  and  indignation  to  which  Lysias  irave  utterance 
To  what  extent  his  hearers  acted  upon  the  unbecoming  violence  of 
his  practical  recommendations— how  far  they  actually  laid  hands  on 
the  tents,  or  tried  to  hinder  the  Syracusans  from  sacriticin<^,  or  im- 
peded the  bringing  out  of  their  chariots  for  the  race— we  a?e  unable 
to  say.  We  are  told  that  some  ventured  to  i)lunder  the  tents:  how 
nmch  was  effected  we  do  not  heir.  It  is  certain  that  the  superin- 
tending Eleian  authorities  would  interfere  most  stl-enuously  to  check 
any  such  attempt  at  desecrating  the  festival,  and  to  protect  the  Syra- 
cusan envoys  in  their  tents,  their  regular  sacriiice,  and  their  chariot- 
running.  And  it  is  further  certain,  as  far  as  our  account  ir<x"s,  that 
the  Syracusan  chariots  actually  did  run  on  the  lists;  because  they 
were,  though  by  various  accidents,  disgracefully  unsuccessful,  or 
overturned  and  broken  in  pieces. 

To  any  one,  however,  who  reflects  on  the  Olympic  festival  witli 
all  its  solemnity  and  its  competition  for  honors  of  various  kinds,  it 
will  apj)ear  that  the  mere  manifestation  of  so  violent  an  antipathv, 
even  though  restrained  from  breaking  out  into  act,  would  be  su'f' 
ticiently  galling  to  the  Syracusan  envoys.  But  the  case  would  be 
far  worse  when  the  poems  of  Dionysius  came  to  be  recited.  The.se 
were  volunteer  manifestations,  delivered  (like  the  harani2:ue  of  Lysias) 
before  such  persons  as  chose  to  come  and  hear;  not  comprised  in  the 
regular  solemnity,  nor  therefore  under  any  peculiar  protection  by 
t-lie  Eleian  authorities.  Dionysius  stood  forward  of  his  own  accord 
to  put  himself  upon  his  trial  as  a  poet  before  the  auditors.  Here, 
therefore,  the  antipathy  against  the  despot  might  be  manifested  by 
the  most  unreserved  explosions.  And  when  we  are  told  that  the  bad- 
ness of  the  po(3ms  caused  them  to  be  received  with  opprobrious  ridi- 
cule, in  spite  of  the  excellence  of  the  recitation,  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
the  hatred  intended  for  the  person  of  Dionysius  was  discharixed  upon 
his  verses.  Of  course  the  hissers  and  hooters  Avould  make  it  clearly 
understood  what  they  really  meant,  and  would  indulge  in  the  full 


284 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS— CONTINUED. 


license  of  lionping  curses  upon  Ids  name  and  acts.     Neither  the  best 
reciters  of  Greece,  nor  tl»e  best  poems  even  of  Sophokles  or  rinUar, 
could  have  any  chance  airainsL  such  predetermuied  antipathy      And 
ilie  wliole  scene  would  end  in  the  keenest  disappointment  and  humil- 
iation, intiicted  upon   the  Syracusau  envoys  as  well   as  upon  the 
actoK-  beiuL-  the  only  channel  through  which  retributive  chastise- 
ment" of  Hellas  could  be  made  to  reach  the  author.     Though  not 
present  in  person  at  Olympia,  the  despot  felt  the  chastisement  in  his 
inmost  soul.     The  mere  narrative  of  what  had  passed  plunged  him 
into  an  a^ony  of  sorrow,  which  for  some  time  seemed  to  grow  worse 
bv  broodinu:  on  the  scene,  and  at  length  drove  him  nearly  mad      lie 
was  smitten  with  intolerable  consciousness  of  the  protound  hatred 
borne  towards  him.  even  throughout  a  large  portion  of  the  distant 
and  independent  Hellenic  world.     He  fancied  that  this  hatred  was 
shared  by  all  around  him.  and  suspected  every  one  as  plotting  against 
his  life      To  such  ;in  excess  of  crueltv  did  this  morbid  excitement 
carn^  him   that  he  seized  several  of  his  best  friends,  under  lalse  accu- 
sations  or  surmises,  and  caused  them  to  be  slain.     Even  his  brother 
Leptines  and  his  ancient  partisan  Philistus,  men  who  had  devoted 
their  lives  first  to  his  exaltation,  and  aflerwards  to  his  service,  did 
not  escape      Having  iriven  uml)rage  to  him  by  an  intermarriage  be^ 
iween  their  families  ninde  without  his  privity,  both  were  banished 
from  Syracuse,  and*  retired  to  Thurii  in  Iialy,  where  they  received 
that  shelter  and  welcome  which  Leptines  had  peculiarly  merited  by 
his  conduct  in  the  Lucanian  war.     The  exile  of  Leptines  did  not  last 
longer   than  (apparently)  about  a   year,   after  which    Dionysius  re- 
lented  recalled  him,  and  gave  him  his  djiughter  m  marriage,     i^ut 
Philistus  remained  in  banishment  more  than  sixteen  years:  not  re- 
turning to  Syracuse  until  after  the  death  of  Dionysius  the  elder,  and 
the  accession  of  Dionysius  the  younger.  .    r    .-     a    root      ^ 

Such  was  the  memorable  scene  at  the  Olympic  festival  o1  db4  B.C., 
to^'-ether  with  its  effect  upon   the  mind  of  Dionysius.     Diodorus, 
while  noticing  all  the  facts,  has  cast  an  air  of  ridicule  over  them  by 
recognizing  nothing  except  the  vexation  of  Dionysius,  at  the  ill  suc- 
cess of  his  poem,  as  the  cause  of  his  mental  siiftering;  and  by  reter- 
rin^rtothe  years  388  B.C.  and  886  B.C.  that  whhli  properly  belongs 
to  ;?84  B  c.  "Now  it   is  improbable,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  poem 
r-f  Dionysius— himself  a  man  of  ability  and  having  every  opportunity 
of   protitin^'"-  by    good   critics  whom   he   had   inirposely  assembled 
around  hiin— sliouhl  have  been  so  ridiculously  bad  as  to  disgust  an 
impartial  audience:  next,  it  is  still  more  improbable  that  a  simple 
poetical  failure,  thoimh  doubtless  mortifying  to  him,  should  work 
with  such  fearful  effc^ct  as  to  plunge  him  into  anguish  and  ma<lu(  ss. 
To  unnerve  thus  violently  a  person  like  Dionysius— deeply  stained 
with  the  great  crimes  of  unscru].ulous  ambition,  but  nmarkably  cx- 
(innt   from  in  tirini  tics— some  more  i-owertul  <  ausc  is  leijuired:  and 
that  cause  stands  out  conspicuously,  when  we  conceive  the  lull  cir- 


^^g^°°°'°'*T^iBannliBMa 


ANTIPATHY  TO  DIONYSIUS. 


235 


cumstances  of  the  Olympic  festival  of  3S4  b.c.     He  had  accumulated 
for  this  occasion  all  the  means  of  showing  himself  off,  like  Krcesusin 
his  interview  with  Solon,  as  the  most  i)rosperous  and  powerful  man 
in  the  Hellenic  world:  means  beyond  I  he  reacli  of  any  contcmiiorary 
and  surpassing  even  Hiero  or  Tiiero  of  former  days,  whose  praises  iii 
the  odes  of  Pindar  he  iirohahly  had  in  his  mind.     He  counted    prob- 
Jibly  with  good  reason,  that  his  splemiid  legation,  chariots,  and  out- 
fit of  acting  and  recitation  for  the  poems,  would  surpass  everythino- 
else  seen  on  the  holy  plain;  and  he  fully  expected  such  reward  as  the 
I)ublic  were  always  ghid  to  bestow  on  rich  men  who  exhausted  their 
purses  in  the  recognized  vein  of  Hellenic  pious  ostentation      In  this 
high-wrought  state  of  expectation,  what  does  Dionysius  hear  by  his 
messengers  returning  from  the   festival?    That  their  mission  liad 
proved  a  total  failure,  and  even   wor.se  than  a  failure;  that  the  dis- 
play Inul  ctdled  forth  none  of  the  usual  admiration,  not  because  there 
were  rivals  on  the  ground  equal  or  superior,  but  simply  because  it 
came  from  him;  that  its  very  magiiitleence  had  operated  to  render 
the  explosion  of  antipathy  against  him  louder  and  more  violent-  that 
Ills  tents  in  the  sacred  ground  had  been  actually  assailed   and  that 
access  to  sacritice,  as  well  as  to  the  matches,  had  been  secured  to 
urn  only  by  the  interposition  of  authority.     We  learn,  indeed,  that 
his  chariots  failed  in  the  tield  by  unlucky  accidents;  but  in  the  exist- 
ing temper  of  the  crowd,  these  very  accidents  would  be  seized  as  oc- 
casions for  derisory   cheering  against  him.     To  this  we  must  add 
explosions  of  hatred,  yet  more  furious,  elicited  by  his  poems  puttin-'- 
the  reciters  to  utter  shame.     At  the  moment  when  Dionysius  e\^- 
pected  to  hear  the  account  of  an  unparalleled  triumph   he  is  thus  in- 
formed, not   merely  of  disappoinrment,  but  of  insults  to  himself 
direct  and  personal,  the  most  poignant  ever  offered  by  Greeks  to  a 
Greek,  amidst  the  holiest  and  most  frecpiented  ceremony  of  the  Hel- 
lenic world.     Never  in  any  other  case  do  we  read  of  public  antipathy 
against  an  individual,  being  carried  to  the  pitch  of  desecratiu<r  bv 
violence  the  majesty  of  the  Olympic  festival.  ° 

Here  then  w^-re  the  real  and  sutflcient  cau.ses~not  the  mere  ill- 
success  of  his  poem— wiuch  penetrated  the  soul  of  Dionysius  driving- 
him  intoanguish  and  temporary  madness.  Though  he'had  silenced 
the  Vox  I  opuh  at  Syracuse,  not  all  his  mercenaries,  ships,  and  forts 
in  Ortygia,  could  save  him  from  feeling  its  force,  when  tbus  emphati- 
cally poured  forth  against  him  by  the  free-spoken  crowd  atOIvmpia 
^  It  was  apparently  shortly  after  the  peace  of  387  B.C.,  that  biony- 
sius  received  at  Syracuse  the  visit  of  the  philosopher  Plato  The 
latter,  having  come  to  Sicily  on  a  voyage  of  inquiry  and  curiosity 
especially  to  see  Mount  ^tna,  was  introduced  by  his  friends  the 
philosophers  of  Tarentum  to  Dion,  then  a  young  man,  resident  at 
b>Tacuse,  and  brother  of  Aristomache,  the  wife  of  Dionysius  Of 
Plato  and  Dion  I  shall  speak  more  elsewhere:  here  I  notice  the 
philosopher  only  as  illustrating  the  history  and  cjiaracter  of  Diony- 


2:]G 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS-CONTINUED. 


e;iu^      Dion,  bavin-  hocn  profmrndly  impressed  ^ith  the  conyersa- 
lion  of  Plain,  prevailed  upon  Dionysius  to  invite  and  talk  uith  Jum 
al<o      Plato  discoursed  eloquently  upon  justice  and  virtue  enforc- 
incr  his  doctrim?  that  wicked  men  were  inevitably  miserable— that 
true  bappiness  belonccd  only  to  tbe  virtuous-and  that  d(  spots  cou.d 
Bot  lay  claim  to  the  merit  of  couraoe.     This  meager  abstract  docH 
not  at  all  enable  us  to  follow  the  philosopher's  argument,     hut  it  is 
Dlain  that  be  set  forth  Ids  general  views  on  social  and  political  suD- 
iccts  with  as  much  freedom  and  dignity  of  speech  before  Dionysius 
as  before  any  simple  citizen;  and  we  are  further  told,  that  the  by- 
standers were  greatly  captivated  by  his  manner  and  J«;!'^"«^^;:,    -^^f 
so  the  despot  himself.     After  one  or  two  repetitions  ot  the-  like  dis- 
burse, he  ];e(ame  not  merely  averse  to  the  doctrine,  but  hostile  to 
the  person,  of  Plato.     According  to  the  statement  of  Diodorus.  he 
caused  the  phih^sopher  to  be  seized,  taken  down  to  the   bvracusau 
slave-market,  and  there  putupforsale  asaslaveat  the  price  of  twenty 
mincT   which  his  friends  subscribed  to  pay,.nnd  thus  released  him 
Accordino-  to   Plutarch,  Plato  himself  was  anxious  to  depart   and 
was  Dut  l"v  Dion  aboard  a  trireme  which  was  about  to  convey  home 
theLaeed'*monian  envoy  Pollis.     But  Dionysius  secretly  entreated 
Pollis  to  cause  him  to  be  slain  on  the  voyage   or  at  least  to  sell  h  m 
as  a  slave      Plato  was  accordingly  landed  at  A.gmn,  and  there  sold 
lie  was  purchased,  or   repurchased,  by  Annikeris  of  Kyrcne  and 
sent  back  to  Athens.     This  latter  is  the  more  probable  ^^tory  of  the 
two;  but  it  seems  to  be  a  certain  fact  that  Plato  was  really  sold,  and 
became  for  a  moment  a  slave. 

That  Dionvsius  should  listen  to  the  discourse  of  Plato  with  repug- 
nance not  less  decided  than  tliat  which  the  Emperor  Napoleon  was 
wont 'to  show  toward  ideologists,  was  an  event  naturally  to  be 
expected.  But  that,  not  satislied  with  dismissing  the  plnlosopher, 
l,e  should  seek  to  kill,  maltreat,  or  disgrace  him,  illustrates  forcibly 
the  vindictive  and  irritable  elements  of  his  character,  and  shows  how 
little  he  was  likdy  to  respect  the  lives  of  those  who  stood  in  his  way 

as  political  opponents.  ,     .  ,  *       *•     „ 

Dionysius  was  at  the  same  time  occupied  with  new  constructions, 
militaiT.  civil,  and  religious,  at  Syracuse.  He  enlarged  the  fortiti- 
cations  of  the  citv  bv  adding  a  new  line  of  wall,  extendmg  along  the 
southern  cliff  ofEpipoUe,  from  Euryalus  to  the  suburb  called  ^eap- 
olis  which  suburb  was  now,  it  would  appear,  surrounded  by  a 
separate  wall  of  its  own,  or  perhaps  may  have  been  so  surrounded  a 
few  vears  earlier,  though  we  know  that  it  was  unfortified  and  open 
durinir  the  attack  of  Imilkon  in  3i)6  B.C.  At  the  same  time,  prob- 
ably, the  fort  at  the  Euryalis  was  enlarged  and  completed  to  the 
point  of  irnmdeur  which  its  present  remains  indicate  The  whole 
slope  of  Epipohp  became  thus  bordered  and  protected  by  fortihca- 
tioiis  from  its  base  at  Achradina  to  its  apex  at  Euryalus.  And 
Syracuse  now  comprised  five  separately  fortified  portions— EpipolcX, 


DIONYSIUS'S  INTENTION  TO   RENEW   WAl] 


287 


Neapolis,  Tyclie,  Achradina,  and  Ortygia;  each  ])oitiou  having  its 
own  fortification,  though  the  four  first  were  included  within  the 
same  outer  walls.  S^Tacuse  thus  became  the  largest  fortified  city 
in  all  Greece;  larger  even  than  Athens  in  its  then  existing  state, 
though  not  so  large  as  Athens  had  been  during  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  while  the  Piialeric  wall  was  yet  standing. 

Besides  these  extensive  fortifications,  Dionysius  also  enlarged  the 
docks  and  arsenals  so  as  to  provide  accommodation  for  200  men  of 
w^ar.     He  constructed  spacious  gymnasia  on  the  banks  of  the  river 
Ana])us,  without  the  city  walls,  and  he  further  decorated  the  city, 
with  various  new  temples  in  honor  of  different  gods. 

Such  costly  novelties  added  grandeur  as  well  as  security  to  Syra- 
cuse, and  conferred  imposing  celebrity  on  the  despot  himself.  They 
were  dictated  by  the  same  aspirations  as  had  prompted  his  ostenta- 
tious legation  to  Olympia  in  384  B.C. ;  a  legation  of  which  the  result 
had  been  so  untoward  and  intolerable  to  his  feelings.  They  were 
intended  to  console,  and  doubtless  did  in  part  console,  theSyracusan 
people  for  the  loss  of  their  freedom.  And  they  were  further  designed 
to  serve  as  fuller  preparatir)iis  for  the  war  against  Carthage,  which 
he  was  now  bent  upon  renewing.  He  was  obliged  to  look  about  for 
a  pretext,  since  the  Carthaginians  had  given  him  no  just  cause.  But 
this,  though  an  aggression,  was  a  Pan-Hellenic  aggression,  calculated 
to  win  for  him  the  sym[tatliies  of  all  Greeks,  philosophers  as  well  as 
the  multitude.  And  as  the  w^ar  was  begun  in  the  year  immediately 
succeeding  the  insult  cast  upon  him  at  Olympia,  we  may  ascribe  it  in 
part  to  a  wish  to  perform  exploits  such  as  might  rescue  his  name  from 
the  like  opprobrium  in  future. 

The  sum  of  l.jOO  talents,  recently  pillaged  from  the  temple  at 
Agylla,  enabled  Dionysius  to  fit  out  a  large  army  for  his  projected 
war.  Entering  into  intrigues  with  some  of  the  disaffected  dependen- 
cies of  Carthage  in  Sicily,  he  encouraged  them  torev^olt,  and  received 
them  into  his  alliance.  The  Carthaginians  sent  envo3"s  to  remon- 
strate, but  could  obtain  no  redress;  upon  which  they  on  their  sidj 
prepared  for  war,  accumulated  a  large  force  of  hired  foreign  mer- 
cenaries under  Magon,  and  contracted  alliance  with  some  of  the 
Italiot  Greeks  hostile  to  Dionysius.  Both  parties  distributed  their 
forces  so  as  to  act  partly  in  Sicily,  partly  in  the  adjoining  peninsula 
of  Italy;  but  the  great  stress  of  war  fell  on  Sicily,  wiiere  Dionysius 
and  Magon  both  commanded  in  person.  After  several  coinbats 
partial  and  indecisive,  a  general  battle  was  joined  at  a  place  called 
Kabala.  The  contest  was  murderous,  and  the  bravery  great  on  both 
sides;  but  at  length  Dionysius  gained  a  complete  victory.  Magon 
himself  and  10,000  men  of  his  army  w^ere  slain;  5,000  w^ere  made 
prisoners,  while  th(?  remainder  were  driven  to  retreat  to  a  neighbor- 
ing eminence,  strong,  but  destitute  of  water.  They  were  forced  to 
send  envoys  entreating  peace,  wiiich  Dionysius  consented  to  grant, 
but  only  on  condition  that  every  Carthaginian  should  be  immediately 


sns    <fa3 


238 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS— CONTINUED. 


withdrawn  from  all  the  cities  in  the  island,  and  that  he  should  be 
reimbursed  for  the  costs  of  the  war. 

The  Carthaginian  generals  affected  to  accept  the  terms  offered,  but 
stated  (what  was  probably  the  truth),  they  could  not  pledge  them- 
selves for  the  execution  of  such  terms,  willi(,ut  assent  from  the 
authorities  at  home.  They  solicited  a  truce  ni  a  few  days,  to  enable 
them  to  send  thither  for  instructions.  PersuLded  that  they  could  not 
escape,  Dionysius  granted  their  request.  Accounting  the  emancipa- 
tion of  Sicily  from  the  Punic  yoke  to  be  already  a  fact  accomplished, 
he  triumphantly  exalted  him  on  a  pedestal  higher  even  than  that  of 
Gelon.  But  this  very  confidence  threw  him  off  his  guard  and  proved 
ruinous  to  him;  as  it  happened  frequently  in  Grecian  military  pro- 
ceeding. The  defeated  Carthaginian  army  gradually  recovered  their 
spirits.  In  place  of  the  slain  general  Magon,  who  was  buried  %ith 
magnificence,  his  son  was  named  commander;  a  youth  of  extraordi- 
nary energy  and  ability,  who  so  contrived  to  reassure  and  reorgnnize 
his  troops,  that  when  the  truce  expired,  he  was  ready  for  a  second 
battle.  Probably  the  Syracusaiis  were  taken  by  surprise  and  not 
fully  prepared.  At  least  the  fortune  of  Dionysius  had  fled.  In  this 
second  action,  fought  at  a  spot  called  Kronium,  he  underwent  a  ter- 
rible and  ruinous  defeat.  His  Lirother  Leptines,  who  commanded  on 
one  wing,  was  slain  gallantly  fighting;  those  around  him  were  de- 
feated; while  Dionysius  himself,  with  his  select  troops  on  the  other 
wing,  had  at  first  some  advantage,  but  Avas  at  length  beaten  and 
driven  back.  The  whole  army  flt*cl  in  disorder  to  the  camp,  pursued 
with  merciless  vehemence  by  the  Carthaginians,  who,  incensed  by 
their  previous  defeat,  neither  gave  quarter  nor  took  prisoners.  Four- 
teen thousand  dead  bodies,  of  the  defeated  Syracusan  army,  are  said 
to  have  been  picked  up  for  burial;  the  rest  were  only  preserved  by 
night  and  by  the  shelter  of  their  camp. 

Such  was  the  signal  victory — the  salvation  of  the  army,  perhaps 
even  of  Carthage  herself — gained  at  Kronium  by  the  youthfid  son  of 
Magon.  Immediately  after  it,  he  retired  to  Panormus.  ilis  army 
probably  had  been  too  much  enfeebled  by  the  former  defeat  to  umier- 
take  further  offensive  operations;  moreover  lie  himself  had  as  yet  no 
regular  appointment  as  general.  The  Carthaginian  authorities  too 
liad  the  prudence  to  seize  this  favorable  moment  for  making  peace, 
and  sent  to  Dionysius  envoys  with  full  powers.  But  Dionysius  only 
obtained  peace  by  large  concessions;  giving  up  to  Carthage  Selinus 
with  its  territory,  as  well  as  half  the  Agrigentine  territory— all  that 
lay  to  the  west  o*^f  the  river  Halykus;  and  further  covenanting  to  pay 
to  Carthage  the  sum  of  1000  talents.  To  these  unfavorable  conditions 
Dionysius  was  constrained  to  subscribe;  after  having  but  a  few  days 
before  required  the  Carthaginians  to  evacuate  all  Sicily,  and  pay  the 
?()sts  of  the  w;ir.  As  it  seems  doubt  fid  whether  Dionysius  would 
have  so  large  a  sum  ready  to  pay  down  at  once,  we  may  it.iM-nably 
presume  that  h(»would  undertake  to  li(iuidi;tc  it  by  uni;uul  install 


AFFAII13  07  SOUTHERN  ITALY, 


239 


ments.  And  we  thus  find  confirmation  of  the  memorable  statemerit 
of  Plat«^.  that  Dionysius  became  tributary  to  the  Carthaginians. 

Such  are  tliC  painful  gaps  in  Grecian  history  as  it  is  transmitted  to 
us,  that  we  hear  scarcely  anything  about  Dionysius  for  thirteen  yeai'S 
?.fter  the  peace  of  383-382  B.C.  It  seems  that  the  Carthaginians  (in 
379  iJ.c.)  sent  an  armament  to  the  southern  portion  of  Italy  for  the 
purpose  of  re-establishing  the  town  of  Hipponium  and  its  inhabi- 
tants. But  their  attention  appears  to  have  been  withdravvn  from  this 
enterprise  by  the  recurrence  of  previous  misfortunes — feiirful  pesti- 
lence, and  revolt  of  their  L3i)ian  dependencies,  ■wdiicli  seriously 
threatened  the  safety  of  their  city.  Again,  Dionysius  also,  during 
one  of  these  years,  undertook  some  operations,  of  which  a  faint  echo 
reaclKiS  us,  in  this  same  Italian  poiinsula  (now  Calabria  Ultra).  He 
projected  a  line  of  wall  across  the  narrowest  portion  or  isthmus  of 
the  "pen  insula,  from  the  Gulf  of  Skylletium  to  that  of  Hipponium,  so 
as  to  separate  the  territory  of  Lokri  from  the  northern  portion  of 
Italy,  and  secure  it  completely  to  his  own  control.  Professedly  the 
wall  was  destined  to  repel  the  incursions  of  the  Lucanians*  but  in 
reality  (we  are  told)  Dionysius  wished  to  cut  off  the  connection  be- 
tween Lokri  and  the  other  Greeks  in  the  Tarentine  Gulf.  These 
latter  are  said  to  have  interposed  from  without,  and  prevented  the 
execution  of  the  scheme;  but  its  natural  ditficulties  would  be  in 
themselves  no  small  impediment,  nor  are  we  sure  that  the  wall  was 
even  begun. 

During  this  interval,  momentous  events  (recounted  in  my  previous 
chapters)  had  occurred  in  Central  Greece.  In  382  B.C.,  the  Spartans 
made  themselves  by  fraud  masters  of  Thebes,  and  placed  a  perma- 
nent garrison  in  the  Ivadmeia.  In  380  B.C.,  they  put  down  the  Olyn- 
thian  confederacy,  thus  attaining  the  maximum  of  their  power.  But 
in  379  B.C.,  there  occurred  the  revolution  at  Thebes  achieved  by  the 
conspiracy  of  Pelopidas,  wiio  expelled  the  Lacedaemonians  from  the 
Kadmeia.  Involved  in  a  burdensome  war  against  Thebes  and  Ath- 
ens, together  with  other  allies,  the  Lacedsemonians  gradually  lost 
ground,  and  had  become  much  reduced  before  the  peace  of  371  B.C., 
which  left  them  to  contend  with  Thebes  alone.  Then  came  the  fatal 
battle  of  Leuktra  v.iiicli  prostrated  their  military  ascendency  alto- 
gether. These  incidents  have  been  already  related  at  large  in  former 
chapters.  Two  years  before  the  battle  of  Leuktra,  Dionysius  sent  to 
the  aid  of  the  Lacediemonians  at  Korkyra  a  squadron  of  ten  ships,  all 
of  which  were  captured  by  Iphikrates;  about  three  years  after  the 
battle,  wiien  the  Thebans  and  their  allies  were  pressing  Sj^arta  in 
Peloponnesus,  he  twice  sent  thither  a  military  force  of  Gauls  and 
Iberians  to  re-enforce  her  army.  But  his  troops  neither  stayed  long, 
nor  rendered  any  very  conspicuous  service. 

In  this  year  we  lu^ar  of  a  fresh  attack  by  Dionysius  against  the 
Carthaginians.  Observing  that  they  had  been  lately  much  enfeebled 
by  pestilence  and  by  mutiny  of  their  African  subjects,  he  thought  the 


240 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS— CONTINUED. 


opportunity  favorable  for  trying  to  recover  what  the  peace  of  383  B.C. 
had  obliged  him  to  relinquish,    A  false  pretense  being  readily  found, 
he  invaded  the  Carthaginian  possessions  in  the  west  of  Sicily  with  a 
large  land-force  of  30,000  foot,  and  8,000  horse;  together  with  a  fleet 
of  300  sail,  and  store  ships  in  proportion.     After  ravaging  much  of 
the  open  territory  of  the  Carthaginians,  lie  succeeded  in  mastering 
Seliiius,  Entella,  and  Eryx — and  tlien  laid  siege  to  Liiybannn.     This 
town,  close  to  the  western  cape  of  Sicily,  appears  to  have  arisen  as  a 
substitute  for  the  neighboring  town  of  Motye  (of  which  we  hear  little 
more  since  its  capture  by  Dionysius  in  39f)  B.C.),  and  to  have  become 
the  principal  Cartiiaginian  station.     He  began  to  attack  it  by  active 
siege  and  battering  machines.     But  it  was  so  numerously  garrisoned, 
and  so  well  defended,  that  he  was  forced  to  raise  the  siege  and  con- 
fine himself  to  blockade.     His  fleet  kept  the  harbor  guarded,  so  as  to 
intercept  supplies  from  Africa.     Not  long  afterward,  however,  he 
received  intelligence  that  a  tire  had  taken  place  in  the  port  of  Car- 
thage wheiebv  all  her  sliips  had  been  burnt.     Being  thus  led  to  con- 
ceive  that  there  was  no  longer  any  apprehension  of  naval  attack  from 
Carthage,  he  withdrew  his  fleet  from  continuous  watch  oif  Lily- 
Ineum;  keeping  loO  men-of-war  near  at  hand,  in  the  harbor  of  Eryx, 
and  sendifig  the  remainder  home  to  Syracuse.     Of  this  incautious 
l)roceeding  the  Carthaginians  took  speedy  advantage.     The  confla- 
gration in  their  port  had  been  much  overstated.    There  still  remained 
to  them  200  ships  of  war,  which,  after  being  equipped  in  silence, 
sailed  across  in  the  night  to  Eryx.     Appearing  suddenly  in  the  har 
bor,  they  attacked  the^Syracusan  ships  compktely  by  surprise;  and 
succeeded,  without  serious  resistance,  in  capturing  and  towing  off 
nearly  all  of  them.    After  so  capital  an  advantage,  Lilybfeum  became 
open  to  re-enforcement  and  supplies  by  sea,  so  tliat  Dionysius  no 
longer  thought  it  worth  while  to  prosecute  the  blockade.     On  the 
api^roach  of  winter,  both  parties  resumed  the  position  which  they 
had  occupied  before  the  recent  movement. 

The  despot  had  thus  gained  nothing  by  again  taking  up  arms,  nor 
were  the  Sicilian  depenaencies  of  the  Carthaginians  at  all  cut  down 
below  tliat  which  they  acquired  by  the  treat^  of  383  B.C.  But  he 
received  (about  January  or  February,  367  B.C.)  news  of  a  difl'erent 
species  of  success,  which  gave  him'  liardly  le^s  satisfaction  than  a 
victory  by  land  or  sea.  In  the  Lena^an  festival  of  Athens,  one  of  his 
tragedies  had  been  rew^arded  with  the  first  prize.  A  chorist  who  had 
been  employed  in  the  performance — eager  to  convey  the  first  intelli- 
gence of  this  success  to  Syracuse  and  to  obtain  the  recompense 
which  would  naturally  await  the  messenger — hasted  from  Athens  to 
Corinth,  foimd  a  vessel  just  starting  for  Syracuse,  and  reached  S\Ta- 
cu.'^e  by  a  straight  course  with  the  advantage  of  favorable  winds, 
lie  was  the  first  to  communicate  the  news,  and  received  the  full 
reward  of  his  diligence.  Dionysius  was  overjoyed  at  the  distinction 
conferred  upon  him;  for  though  on  former  occasions  he  had  obtained 


DEATH  OF  DIONYSIUS. 


241 


the  second  or  third  place  in  the  iVtheuian  competitions,  he  had  never 
before  been  adjudged  w^orthy  of  the  first  prize.  Oflering  sacrifice  to 
the  gods  tor  the  good  news,  lie  invited  his  friends  to  a  splendid  ban- 
quet, wherein  he  indulged  in  an  unusual  measure  of  conviviality 
Kut  the  joyous  excitement,  coupled  with  the  ellVcts  of  the  wiue 
In-ought  on  an  attack  of  fever,  of  which  ho  shortly  afterward  died* 
after  a  reign  of  38  years,  * 

Thirty-eight  years   of  a  cai-ecr  so  full  of  effort,  adventure    and 
duuger,  a.s  that  of  Dionysius,  must  have  left  a  constitution  sufficiently 
exhausted  to  give  way  easily  before  acute  disease.     Throughout  this 
long  period  he  had  never  spared  himself.     He  was  a  man  of  restless 
euergy  and  activity,  bodily  as  well  as  mental;  always  personally  at 
the  head  of  his  troops  in  war— keeping  a  vigilant  eye  and  a  decisive 
iinnd  upon  all  the  details  of  his  government  at  home— yet  emploviu^'" 
spare  time  (which  Philip  of  Macedcm  was  surprised  that  he  could 
tind)  m  composing  tragedies  of  his  own,  to  compete  for  prizes  fairly 
adjudged.     His  personal  bravery  was  conspicuous,  and  he  was  twice 
severely  wounded  in  leading  his  soldiers  to  assault.     His  effective 
skill  as  an  ambitious  politician— his  military  resource  as  a  commander 
-^nid  the  long-sighted  care  with  which  he  provided  imi)lements  of 
olTense  as  well  as  of  Tiefeusc  before  undertaking  war,— are  remark- 
able features  in   his  character.     The  Roman  Scipi.)  Africanus  was 
wont  to  single  out  Dionysius  and  Agathokles  (the  history  of  the  latter 
begins  about  fitty  years  after  the  death  of  the  former),  both  of  them 
despots  ot  Syracuse,  as  the  two  Greeks  of  greatest  ability  for  action 
known  to  him— men  who  combined,  in  the  most  memorable  de^'-rec 
darmg  with   sagacity.     This  criticism,   coming  from  an   excellent 
.HKlge.  is  borne  out  by  the  biography  of  both,  so  far  as  it  coinos  to 
our  knowledge.     No  other  Greek  can  be  pointed  out,  who,  startin*»- 
irorn  a  position  humble  and  unpromising,  raised  himself  to  so  lofty 
a  pinnacle  ot  dominion  at  home,  achieved   such  strikino-  militarv 
exploits  abroad   and  preserved  his  grandeur  unimpaired  througlioiit 
he  whole  of  a  long  lite.     Dionysius  boasted  that  he  bequeathed  to 
lis  son  an  empire  fastened  by  adamantine  chains;  so  powerful  was 
lis  mercenary  iorce-so  firm  his  position  in  Ortygia-so  completely 
had  the  Sy  racusans  been  broken  in  to  subjection.     There  cannot  be  'a 
hi-tter  test  ot  vigor  and  ability  than  the  unexampleci  success  with 
^vhlch  Dionysius  and  Agathokles  played  the  game  of  the  despot  and 
to  a  certain  extent  that  of  the  conqueror.     Of  the  two,  Dionysius  was 
liie  most  favored  by  fortune.     Both  indeed  profited  by  one  auxiliary 
accident    which  distinguished  Syracu.se  from  other  Grecian  cities- 
lie  local  specialty  of  Ortygia,     That  islet  seemed  expressly  made  tj 
be  garrisoned  as  a  separate  fortress,— a})art  from,  as  well  as  againsL 
the  rest  of  Syracuse,— having  full  command  of  the  harbor  docks 
naval  force    and  naval  approach.      But   Dionysius  had,    besides' 
several  peculiar  interventions  of  the  gods  in  his  favor,  sometimes  at 
the  most  critical  moments:  such  was  the  interpretation  put  by  his 


242 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS-CONTINUED 


CHARACTER  OF  DIONYSIUS. 


243 


enomios  (and  douhtlossby  his  friends  also)  upon  those  repeated  pesti- 
S™1  smote  the  Carthaginian  armies  ^vilh  a  force  f .jr  more 
de"idTy  than  the  spear  of  the  Syracusan  hophte.  On  four  or  hve  d^- 
^nc   oc^^^^^  d  irin- the  life  of  Dionysms   ^ve  read  ot  this  uiiseer 

f(^  as  desroyin-  the  Carthaginians  both  in  Sicily  and  m  Atnca   but 
e^viirMhe  S^^^  untoSched.     Twice  did  it  arrest    he  progress 

of  I  ill  n  <vhen  in  the  full  career  of  victory;  once,  a  ter  the  cap- 
ture oGda  and  Kamarina-a  second  time,  ^vhen,  alter  his  gren 
nav'il  vic-^ory  off  Katana.  he  had  brought  his  numerous  liost  nndcr 
{he  vals  of  Syracuse,  and  ^as  actually  master  of  the  open  suburb 
of  \chra(li.Ki.  On  both  these  occasions  the  pestiknce  made  a  com- 
pete revolution  in  the  face  of  the  ^^ar;  exulting  Dionysius  fn-ni 
hnoen  in-  ruin,  to  assured  safety  in  the  one,  and  to  unmeasured 
tri  in  in  the  other  We  are  bound  to  allow  for  this  good  ortune 
trUke  ov^ic  never  befell  Agathokles),  when  we  contanp  ate  the 
lonVpio^lH'ritv  of  Dionysius,  ancl  when  we  adopt,  as  m  justice  we 
must  ado])t,  the  paneiijyric  of  Scipio  Africanus.        ,       ,     -p.. 

'^epreckiing  chapter  has  detailed  the  means  whereby  Dionysius 
attained  his  prTze,  and  kept  it;  those  cmploy^"^  ^>y  ^\-';^^^'^''''^^ 
a  alo-ous  in  spirit  but  of  siill  darker  coloring^  m  the  detads-w  11 
a  PC a1-  hereafter.  That  Hcrmokrates-who  iK.l'blled  ^vith  credi  the 
h  <lhest  othces  in  the  slate  and  wliom  men  had  acquired  the  hab  t  of 
fTloVn--should  aspire  to  become  despot,  was  no  unusual  phe- 
110  n^^^^^^^^^  in  Grecian  politics;  but  that  Dionysius  should  aim  a 
mounting  the  same  ladder,  seemed  absurd  or  even  ,nsane---to  use  he 
pli, ase  of  Isokrates.  If,  then,  in  spite  of  such  ^^^^^Ivajihige  he  suc- 
ceeded in  fastening  round  his  countrymen,  ^^''''''?^^  ""^"P  ^ 

stiiutionas  their  birthright,  those  ''«t'"''"  llf  ?i^^  i.H  oVmo- 
were  well  known  to  abhor-we  may  be  sure  that  his  plan  ot  p 
ceedin-  must  have  been  dexterously  chosen,  and  prosecuted  ^M\h 
consnnnu  te  pe-lev,?rance  and  audacity ;  but  we  maybe  also  sure 
tW  i^t  was  nefarious  in  the  extreme.  The  machinery  ot  fraud 
w  h  reby  1^0  peop  e  wxM-e  to  be  cheated  into  a  temporarv  submission 
^^Sude  xl  Z  machinery  of  force  whereby  ^-^^ -.^"--^  ^  ^ 
to  be  rkf-rDctuated  a"-:iinst  their  consent— was  the  sto(  k  in  tiaiic  oi 
Greci^m  usi  p^^^^^^  ^eUh.m  does  it  appear  prefaced   by  more 

1^  imdent  calumnies,  or  worked  out  with  a  larger  measure  ot  violence 
n^Sion,  than'  in  the  case  of  Dionyshis.  J^^^^,^;^^^^'^^- 
erfullv  seconded  at  the  outset  by  the  danger  of  Syiacuse  liom  lie 
S  Sginian  arms.  But  his  scheme  of  usurpation,  .f ^^^^-i;^;^;  )  - 
ishincr  *uch  danoer,  tended  malerially  to  increase  it,  b}   oisuniiiLg 

he  cfly  at  s^ci  iticd  a  monn  nt.     Dionysius  achieved  -^^hii^  m  hi. 
first  enterprise  for  the  relief  of  Gela  and  Kamarma.     11^.  ^;^^^^^^^ 
to  retire  with  as  much  disgrace  as  those  previous  ^^^'Y;  ^'^\^^,] .     ^"^j^^! 
had  so  bitterly  vituperated;  and  apparently  even  ^M  h  g  eattr  (lis 
grace-since  {here  are  strong  groumls  for  ^^:^'^^^-V^\'y:^^'^ 

into  traitorous  coiiusiou  with  the  Carthaginians.     Ihe  bah  alien  ot 


Syracuse,  at  that  moment  of  peril,  arose  not  fcom  the  eneriry  or 
ability  ofDionysius,  but  from  the  opportune  epidemic  which  diSbled 
Imilkon  in  tlie  midst  of  a  victorious  career. 

Dionysius  liad  not  only  talents  to  organize,  and  boldness  to  make 
good,  a  despotism  more  formidable  than  anything  known  to  contem- 
porary Greeks,  but  also  systematic  prudence  to  ^keep  it  unimpaired 
for  38  years.     lie  maintained  carefully  those  two  precautions  which 
Thucydides  specilies  as  the  causes  of  permanence  t^  the  Atlieniau 
Ilippias,  under  similar  circumstances— intimidation  over  the  citizens, 
and  careful  organization,  with  liberal  pay  among  his  mercenaries.' 
He  was  temperate  in  indulgences;  never  led  by  any  of  Ids  appetites 
into   the    commission   of    violence.      This   abstinence    contributed 
materially  to  prolong  his  life,  since  many  a  Grecian  despot  perished 
through  desperate  feelinirs  of  individual  vengeance  provoked  by  his 
outrages.     With  Dionysius,  all  other  appetites  w^re  merged  in  the 
love  of  dominion,  at  home  and  abroad;  and  of  money  as  a  means  of 
dominion.     To  the  service  of  this  master-passion  all  his  eneriries  were 
devoted,    together  with    those  vast  military    resources   which    aa 
unscrupulous  ability  served  both  to  accumulate  and  to  recruit.     How 
his  treasury  was  supplied,   with   the  large   exigencies  continually 
pressing  upon  it,  we  are  but  little  informed.     We  know,  however 
that  his  exactions  from  the  Syracusans  were  exorbitant;  that  he  did 
not  hesitate  to  strip  the  holiest  temi)les;  and  that  he  left  behind  him 
a  great  reputation  for  ingenious  tricks  in  extracting  money  from  his 
subjects.     Besides  the  large  garrison  of  foreign  mercenaries  by  whom 
his  orders  were  enforced,  he  maintained  a  regular  body  of  spies 
seemingly  of  both  sexes,  disseminated  among  the  body  of  the  citizens* 
The  vast  quarry- prison  of  Syracuse  was  Ids  work.     Both  the  va^-ue 
general  picture,  and  the  fragmentary  details  which  come  before^'us 
of  his  conduct  toward  the  Syracusans,  jireseut  to  us  nothin^'T-  but  aa 
oppressive  and  extortionate  tyrant,  by  whose  fiat  numljerless' victims 
perished;   more  than  10.000  according  to  the  general  lan<i-ua«>e  of 
Plutarch.     lie  enriched  largely  his  younger  brothers  and  airxiliaries; 
among  which  latter,  Hipparinus  stood  prominent,  thus  recoverino-  a 
fortune  equal  to  or  larger  than  that  which  his  profligacy  had  dfssi- 
pated.     But  we  hear  also  of  acts  of  Dionysius,  indicatiii"-  a  iealous 
and  cruel  temper,  even  toward  near  relatives.     And  it  appears  cer- 
tain that  he  trusted  no  one,  not  even  them;  that  though  in  the  field 
he  Avas  a  perfectly  brave  man,  yet  his  suspicion  and  timorous  anxiety 
as  to  every  one  who  approached  his  person,  were  carried  to  the  most 
tormenting  excess,  and  extended  even  to  his  wives,  liis  brothers  his 
daughters.     Afraid  to  admits  any  one  with  a  razor  near  to  his  face 
he  is  said  to  have  singed  his  own  beard  with  a  burning  coal.     Both 
his  brother  and  his  son  Avere  searched  for  concealed^'weapons  and 
even  forced  to  change  their  clothes  in  the  presence  of  his  "-uards 
before  they  were  permitted  to  see  him.     An  ofiicer  of  tiie%iard3 
named  Marsyas,  having  dreamt  that  Jie  was  assassinating  Dionysius, 


244 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS-CONTINUED. 


FAMILY  LEFT  BY  DIONYSIUS. 


245 


^vas  pnt  to  death  for  this  dream,  as  provin- that  his  Tv^king  ^\oughi^ 
must  ave  been  dwellin-  upon  such  a  project.  And  it  has  already 
W^en  n  i-ntio  uxl  that  Dionvsius  put  to  death  the  mother  oi  one  of  s 
^^"  on  suspicion  that  she  had  by  incantations  ^ou|j^  a['^  .^ 
barreiuess  of  the  other— as  well  as  the  sons  of  a  Lokiian  c  tiztn 
earned  Aiisteides,  .vho  liad  refused,  ^vith  indignant  expression.,  to 

gra!it  to  him  his  daughter  in  marriaiie.  ^:  .t,:„«t   a-m^ov 

Such  ^vere  the  conditions  of  existence— perpetual  mistiust,  danger 

even  from  the  nearest  kindred,  enmity  both  to  ^^.^^-^l^"^;^^ 
nmed  freeman  and  reliance  only  on  arnu  d  barbarians  or  hbei a  a 
?H,„l"ich  beset  almost  every  Grecian  despot,  and  from  ^vl u ch 
tiT  Neatest  despot  of  his  age  enjoyed  no  exempUom  Thoug^  pb^- 
losonhers  emphatically  insisted  tliat  such  a  nian  must  be  misirai)  e. 
^E^iuTtoiself^s  .ell  as  the  ^^'^tmassof  adn^rm^sp^ 
tors  would  probably  feel  that  the  necessities  of  his  Vfll\onju^ 
Innreth-n  compensated  bvits  awe-striking  grandeur,  and  b}  the  full 
^uMaX^^^^^^  ^"^'^'^-^  indeed  to  poignant  suffer- 

inl\  hen   vounded  in  the  tender  point    and  when  reaping  insult  ,n 
plSee    f  admiration,  at  the  memorable  Olympic  f^'^Uvd       384  bc 
«bove-described.     But  the  Syracusans   oyer  ^N-l^mi  he  lul  d     11303  cd 
no  «=^uch  compensation   for  th:it  which  they  suffer  d  from  bis  jax 
^.^tlere  s-Tom  his  irarrison  of  Gauls,  Iberian.,  and  Campanians,  in 
fi' tvXlfro  u  hi    spies-his  prison-and  his  executioners  , 

N^(fr  did  S  rac  sJ  uffer  alone.  The  reign  of  the  elder  Dionysms 
.^as  desoiatii^g  for  the  Hellenic  population  |en-a  ly  bo  h  of  b  3 
and  Italy.  SyVacusc  became  a  great  f^>rtress  ;^  ith  vast  mi  ibir  P^  ^  ^i 
in  the  hands  of  its  governor,  '  whose  policy  it  was  to  pac  k  aj^  J'^;'J' 
ntoit-^^  while  the  remaining  free  Hellenic  communities  weie  de- 
graded '  enslaved  and  half  depopulated.  On  this  topic,  the  mourn- 
f;i?^ii;;;^!:ie:aii:ady  cited  i^oJ^iLysias  ^^^^^  th 
hv  the  letters  of  the  eve-witness  Plato,     in  lusauMd,  j^ivcu  ^ 

s^^„•!u>,l :uc" s"or  of  Dionysios.  Plato  ^™Pl'-;'-">X"'is  3,' 
♦wo  nnints-  tirst    as  to  the   Svracusans,  to  transloim  nis  niiuuuu 

^^rS^^  d^oti^m'into  the'rule  of  a  ^^^..^^^^  f^^^i^ 
by  tixed  laws;  next,  to  reconstitute  and  repeope^udu  Ik 
tutions,  the  other  Hellenic  communities  in  bicil>^hich  at  his  acces 
sion  had  become  nearly  barbarized  and  'al^-.^Vr*;'\^.f:^;^  ..-^  ^f  ^,,,. 

The  elder  Dionvsius  liad    mported  into  Sicdy  laige  bod  es  oi  nu 
ceS  b^  me^ns  of  whom  he  had  gained  his  eonqiiests,  a,.^^^^^^^^^^ 
Xmhe  had  provided  settlements  at  the  cost  ot  ^^^^  sub(^^^^-Vo^^^^ 
cities.     In  Naxos,  Katana,  Leontini,  and  Messene   the  \J\:^^^J^;^\ 
dents  had  been  dispossessed  and  others  substituted,  out  of  ^f^^^ 
Iberian  mercenaries.      Communities  thus  transformed     with  th  i 
forme?  f^ee  dVizens  degraded   into  dependence  or  exile,  not   on  } 
ceaTed  to  be  pi^^^^^^^^^  but  also  became  far  less  Populo"S  ^i 

^mHsll^g!    ^n  n^  manner  Dionysius  had  -'PP:--^^;;^^^: 
into  Syracuse  and  Lokri.  the  once  autonomous  Grecian  communiue. 


of  Khegium,  Hipponium,  and  Kauionia,  on  the  Italian  side  of  the 
strait.  In  tlie  inhmd  regions  of  Italy,  he  h:id  allied  himself  with 
the  barbarous  l^ucanians,  who,  even  without  his  aid,  were  gaiuiu"- 
ground  and  pressing-  hard  ui)on  the  It:diot  Greeks  on  the  coasi.  "^ 

If  we  examine  tiie  results  of  the  warfare  carried  on  by  Dionvsius 
against  the  Cirthaginians,  from  the  coniinencemeiit  to  the  end  of  his 
career,  we  shall  observe  that  he  began  by  losing  Gela  and  Kamarina, 
and  that  the  peace  by  which  he  was  enabled  to  preserve  Syracuse 
it^<!lf,  arose,  not  from  any  success  of  his  own,  but  f lom  the  pestilence 
whicii  ruined  his  enemies;  to  say  nothing  about  traitorous  collusion 
with  them,  which  I  have  already  remarked  to  have  been  the  probable 
])nce  of  their  guarantee  to  liis  dominion.     His  war  against  the  Car- 
thaginians  in  ^97  B.C.  was  undertaken   with  much  vigor,  recovered 
Gcia.  Kamarina,  Agrigeutum,  and  Selinus,  and  promised  the  most 
deii>ive   success.     But  jiresently   again  the  tide  of  fortune  turned 
against  him.     He  sustained  capital  defeats,  and  owed  the  safety  of 
Syracuse,  a  second  time,  to  nothing  but  the  territic  pestilence  which 
(Icsiroyed  the  army  of  Imilkon.     A  third  time,  in  381]  B.C.,  Dionysius 
gratuitously  renewed  the  war  against  .Carthage.     After  brilliant  suc- 
cess at  first,  he  was  again  totally  defeated,  and  forced  to  cede    to 
(^u-thage  all  the  territory  west  of  the  river  Halykus,  besides  paying 
a  tribute.     So  that  the  exact  difference  between Ihe  Sicilian  territory 
of  Carthage— as  it  stood  at  the  beginuin.g  of  his  command  and  at  the 
end  of  his  reign— amounts  to  this:  that  at  the  earlier  period  it  reached 
U)  the  river  Himera— at  the  later  period  only  to  the  river  Halykus. 
The  intermediate  space  between  the  two  comprehends  As-rigeiitum 
v.ith  the  greater  part  of  its  territory;  which  represents  thel-efore  the 
extent  of  Hellenic  soil  rescued  by  Dionysius  from  Carthaginian  do- 
minion. 


CHAPTER  LXXXIY. 

f^ICILIAN  AFFAIRS    AFTER  THE  DEATH   OF    THE  ELDER   DIONYSIUS— 
DIO^'YSIUS   THE   YOUNGER — AND   DION. 

The  elder  Dionysius,  at  the  moment  of  his  death,  boasted  of  hav- 
ing left  his  dominion  "fastened  by  chains  of  adamant;"  that  is,  sus- 
tained by  a  large  body  of  mercenaries,  well  trained  and  well  paid — 
by  impregnable  fortifications  in  the  islet  of  Ortygiu— by  400  ships  of 
war— l)y  immense  magazines  of  arms  and  military  stores— and  by 
established  intimidation  over  the  minds  of  the  Syracusans.  These 
were  really  "chains  of  adainaut"--so  long  as  there  was  a  man  like 
Dionysius  to  keep  them  in  hand.  But  he  left  no  successor  compe- 
tent to  the  task;  nor  indeed  an  unobstructed  succession.  He  had 
issue  by  two  wives,  whom  he  had  married  both  at  the  same  time,  as 


jiii 


240 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


DION. 


247 


has  bccu  nircadv  mentioned.  By  the  Lokrian  wife,  Dons,  he  had  Ins 
ekiest  sonniuned  Diunvshis,  and  two  others;  by  the  hyracusau  uile, 
Arisloniacbcdauirliter  of  Hipparinus,  he  had  two  sons,  Hipparmus 
and  N  vs*us— and  two  daughters,  Soplirosyue  and  Aivte.  Dionysius 
the  youn-er  can  hardlv  have  been  less  than  twenty-hve  years  okl  at 
the  death  of  his  father^iud  namesake.  Hipparmus,  the  eldest  sou  by 
the  other  wife,  ^vas  consitk-rably  younger.  Aristomache  his  mother 
had  kmg  remained  cbiklless  ;  a  fact  which  the  elder  Dionysius 
ascribedlo  incantations  wrought  by  the  mother  of  the  Lokriau  wite, 
and  punished  by  putting  m  death  the  supposed  sorceress. 

The  olfspriu'^  of  Aristomache,  though  the  younger  brood  of  tlie 
two   derived  considerable  advantage  from  the  presence  and  c()unto- 
nance  of  her  brother  Dion.      Hipparinus,  father  of  Dion  and  Aris- 
tomache, liadbeen  the  principal  abettor  of  the  elder  Dionysius  in 
his ori-inai usurpation,  in  onkr  to  retrieve  hisown  lorlune,  rumed  by 
profli'^ite  expemliture.     So  completely  had  that  object  been  acxom- 
plishell,  that  his  son  Dion  w^v^  ik)w  among  |J;e/\^i^f  ^,^;^'f^^^^^,  ^^"^ 
cuse  possessing  property  estimated  at  above  100  talents  (about  23,000/). 
Dion  was,  besides,  son-in-law.to  the  elder  Dionysius,  who  had  given 
his  daughter  Sophrosvne  in   marriage    to  his   son   (by   a  dillereiit 
mother)  the  younger  Dionysius;  and  his  daughter  Arete,  first  to  his 
brother  Thearidcs-next,  on  the  death  of  Thearidcs,  to  Dion.    As 
brother  of  Aristomache,  Dion  was  thus  brother-in-law  to  the  eklei 
Dionysius.  and  uncle  both  to  Arete  his  own  wife  and  to  bophrosyue 
the  wife  of  the  vounixcr  Dionysius;  as  husband  of  Arete,  he  was  son- 
in-law  to  the  elder  Dionysius.  and  brother-in-law  (as  we  1  as  uncle) 
to  the  wife  of  the  younger.     Marriages  between  near  relativc;s  (ex- 
cludinc^  anysuch  connection  between  uterine  brother  and  sister)  weic 
usual  in  Greek  manners.    AVe  cannot  doubt  that  the  despot  accounted 
the  harmony  likely  to  be  produced  by  such  ties  between  the  mem  .( rs 
of  his  two  families  and  Dion,  among  the  "  acUuuantiue  chains   whu  li 

held  fast  his  dominion.  .  .         ,  i     i      „«*„^  nf 

Apart  from  wealth  and  high  position,  the  personal  diaiacter  ot 
Dion  was  in  itself  marked  and  i)iomin(nt.  •  He  w:is  of  an  energea-,' 
temper,  creat  bravery,  and  very  considerable  mental^  capaciiKs. 
Thou'-h  his  nature  was  liaughty  and  disdainful  toward  ludividnab, 
yet  as^to  political  communion,  his  ambition  was  by  no  means  pureh 
self-seeking  and  egoistic,  like  that  of  the  elder  Dionysius.  Anima  eU 
with  vehement  love  of  power,  he  was  at  the  same  time  penetiate 
with  that  senseof  regulated  polity,  and  submission  of  lndlvldual^  i 
totixedlaws,  which  floated  in  the  atmosphere  of  Grecian  talk  aim 
literature,  and  stood  so  high  in  Grecian  moirdlty.  He  was  more^ei 
capable  of  acting  with  enthusiasm,  and  braving  every  hazard  lu 
prosecution  of  his  own  ccnivictions. 

Born  about  the  year  408  n.c,  Dion  was  twenty-one  years  of  age  in 
oS7  B  c  when  the  elder  Dionysius.  having  dismantled  Kliegium  uim. 
subdued  Kroton,  attained  the  maximum  of  his  dominion,  as  masui 

I 


of  the  Sicilian  and  Italian  Greeks.  Standing  high  in  the  favor  of  his 
biollier-in-Iaw  Dionysius,  Dion  doubtless  took  part  in  the  w:irs 
whereby  this  large  dominion  had  been  acquired;  as  well  as  in  the  life 
of  indulgence  and  luxury  wliicli  prevaik'd  generally  among  wealthy 
Greeks  in  Sicily  and  Italy,  and  which  to  the  Athenian  Plato"api)eai('d 
alike  surprising  and  repulsive.  Tliat  great  philosopher  visited  Ital  ,' 
and  Si(;ily  about  887  B.C.,  as  has  been  already  mentioned.  He  \Aa"s 
in  acquaintance  and  fellowship  with  the  school  of  philosophers  callcil 
Fy tliagoreans,  the  remnant  of  that  Pythagorean  brotherliood,  who 
had  once  exercised  so  powerful  a  political  influence  over  the  cities  of 
those  regions — and  who  still  enjoyed  considerable  reputation,  even 
after  complete  political  downfall,  through  individual  ability  ancl 
rank  of  the  members,  combined  with  habits  of  recluse  study,  mysti- 
cism, and  attachment  among  themselves.  With  these  Pythagoreans 
Dion  also,  a  young  man  of  open  mind  and  ardent  aspirations,  was 
naturally  thrown  into  communication  by  the  proceedings  of  the  elder 
Dionysius  in  Italy.  Through  them  he  came  into  intercourse  witli 
Plato,  whose  conversation  made  an  epoch  in  his  life. 

The  mystic  turn  of  imagination,  the  sentenlious  brevity,  and  the 
mathematical  researches,  of  the  Pythagoreans,  produced  doubtless  an 
nn])osingeffectuponDi()n;  just  as  Lysis,a  member  of  that  brotherhood, 
had  acquired  the  attachment  and  influenced  the  sentiments  of  Epami- 
nondas  at  Thebes.  But  Plato's  power  of  working  upon  the  minds  of 
young  men  was  far  more  impressive  and  irresistible.  He  possessed 
a  large  range  of  practical  experience,  a  mastery  of  political  and 
social  topics,  and  a  charm  of  eloquence,  to  which  the  Pythagoreans 
were  strangers.  The  stirring  effect  of  the  Sokratic  talk,  as  well  as 
of  the  democralical  atmosphere  in  which  Plato  had  been  brought  up, 
had  developed  all  tlie communicative  aptitude  of  his  mind;  and  great 
as  that  aptitude  appears  in  his  remaining  dialogues,  there  is  ground  for 
lielieving  that  it  w^-is  far  greater  in  his  conversation;  greater  perhaps 
iu  387  B.C.,  when  he  was  still  mainly  the  Sokratic  Plato — than  it  be- 
came in  later  days,  after  he  had  imbibed  to  a  certain  extent  the 
mysticism  of  these  Pythagoreans.  Brought  upas  Dion  had  been  at 
the  court  of  Dionysius — accustomed  to  see  around  him  onh^  slavish 
deference  and  luxurious  enjoyment — unused  to  open  speech  or  large 
philosophical  discus>ion — he  found  iu  Plato  a  new  man  exhibited 
and  a  new  world  opened  before  him. 

The  conception  of  a  free  community — with  correlative  rights  and 
duties  belonging  to  every  citizen,  determined  by  laws  and  protected 
or  enforced  by  power  emanating  from  the  collective  entity  called  the 
City — stood  in  the  foreground  of  ordinary  Grecian  morality — reigned 
spontaneously  in  the  bosoms  of  every  Grecian  festival  crowd — and 
had  been  partially  imbibed  by  Dion,  though  not  from  his  own  per- 
sonal experience,  yet  from  teachers,  sophists,  and  poets.  This  con- 
c'ption.  cssentiid  and  fundamental  with  philosophers  as  well  as 
^.i.h  the  vulgar,  was  not  merely  set  forth  by  Plato  with  commanding 


248 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER 


PATIENCE  OF  DION. 


240 


powers  of  speech,  but  also  exalted  with  improvements  arid  refine- 
ments into  an  ideal  perfection.  Above  all,  it  was  based  upon  a 
uri(t  even  an  abstemious  and  ascetic,  canon,  as  to  individual  eii- 
i(>vinenf  and  upon  a  careful  tridnin-  both  of  mind  and  bodv,  qunh- 
^in.r  each  man  lor  the  due  performance  of  his  duties  as  a  citizen:  a 
.Mbiect  which  Plato  (as  we  see  by  his  dialogues)  did  not  siniplv  pro- 
found with  the  direct  enforcement  of  a  preacher,  but  touched  wilh 
the  quickenino-  imd  pun.oent  effect,  and  re  enforced  with  the  copious 
practical  illustrations,  of  Sokratic  dialoiiue. 

\s  the  stimulus  from  the  teacher  was  here  put  forth  with  consum- 
mate etlicacy,  the  predisposition  of  the  learner  enabled  it  to  take  tull 
elTect      Dion  became  an  altered  man  both  in  public  sentiment  and  in 
individual  behavior.  He  recollected  that  twenty  years  before,  his  coiin- 
T  Sv  acuse  had  been  as  free  as  Athens.     He  learned  to  abhor  the 
inkimtv  of  the  despotism  by  which  her  liberty  had  been  oveitlirown. 
and  bv  which  subsequently  the  liberties  of  so  many  other  Greeks  in 
V-ilv  and  Sicilv  had  been  trodden  down  also.     He  was  made  to  rc- 
irark   thnt  Sicilv  had  ])een  h.alf-barbarized  through  the  foreign  mer- 
cenaries import'ed  as  the  despot's  instruments.     He  conceived  the 
sublime  idea  or  dream  of  rectifying  all  this  accumulation  of  wrong 
and  .uiTerin-.     It  was  his  wish   first  to  cleanse  Syracuse  from  the 
blot  o   slaverv,  and  to  clothe  her  anew  in  the  brightness  and  dignity 
of  freedom;  vet  not  with  the  view  of  restoring  the  popular  govern- 
ment asT  had  stood  prior  to  the  usurpation   but  of  establishing  an 
improved   constitutional   polity,  originated   by   himself,  witli   la^^s 
'Xh   should   not  onlv   secure  individual  rights,  but  also  educate 
and  morali'/e  the  citizens.     The  function  which  ^e  imagined  to  him- 
self and  which  the  conversation  ot  Plato  suggested    was  not  that  of 
a  despot  like  Dionysius,  but  that  of  a  despotic  legislator  like  Lykur- 
rus   takin-r  advantage  of  a  momentary  omnipotence,  conferred  upon 
him  bv  srateful  citizens  in  a  state  of  public  confusion   to  originate 
a  "ood  sVstem;  which,  when  once  put  in  motion,  would  keep  itselt 
aUve  bv'fashioning  the  minds  of  the  citizens  to  its  own  "^^rinsic  ex- 
cellence     After  having  thus  both  liberated  and  reform*  d  S3  racuse, 
Dion  promised  to  himself  that  he  would  einph)y  Svracusan  force  no. 
in  annihilatinu^  but  in  recreating,  other  free  He  enic  communities 
throughout  the  island;  expelling  from  thence  all  the  barbarians- 
both  the  important  mercenaries  and  the  Carthaginians 

Such  were  the  hopes  and  i)rojects  which  arose  in  the  mind  ot  the 
youthful  Dion  as  he  listened  to  Plato;  hopes  pregnant  with  tutuie 
results  which  neither  of  them  contemplated— and  not  unworthy  ot 
hemcr  compared  with  those  enthusiastic  aspirations  which  the  young 
Snarlan  kiiio-s  Agis  and  Kleomenes  imbibed  a  century  afterward,  in 
part  from  The  conversation  of  the  philosopher  Sphierus.  Never 
l)efore  had  Plato  met  wilh  a  ])upil  who  so  quicklv  apprehended  so 
profoundly  meditated,  or  so  passionately  laid  to  heart  his  lessons. 
Inflamed  with  his  newly  communicated  impulse  toward  philosopn^, 


a^  tlic   supreme   guide   and   directress   of  virtuous  conduct,    Dion 
aliered  his  ]i;!l)its  of  life;  exchanging  the  splendor  and  luxury  of  a 
Sicilian    rich  man   for  the  simple   fare  and   regulated  application 
])econn:ig  a  notary  of  the  Academy^    In    this  course  he  persisted 
without  faltering  throughout  all  his  residence  at  the  court  of  Diony- 
siiis,  in  spite  of  the  unpopularity  contracted  among  his  immediate 
companions.     His  enthusiasm  even  led  him  to  believe  that  the  despf)t 
himself,  unable  to  resist  that  persuasive  tongue  by  which  he  had  bcdi 
himself  converted,  miglit  be  gently  brought  round  into  an  emplov- 
ment  of  his  mighty  force  for  beneficent  and  reformatory  purposes. 
Accordingly  Dion,  inviting  Plato  to  Syracuse,  procured  for  him  an 
interview  with  Dionysius.     How  miserably  the   speculation  tailed 
has  been  recounted  in  my  last  chapter.     Instead  of  acquiring  a  new 
convert,  tlie  philosopher  was  fortunate  in  rescuing  his  owirperson, 
and  in  making  good  his  returning  footsteps  out  of  that  lion's  den, 
into  which  the   improvident   enthusiasm  of  his  young  friend  had 
inveigled  him. 

The  harsh  treatment  of  Plato  l)y  Dionysius  was  a  painful,  though 
salutary  warning  to  Dion.     Witliout  sacrificing  either  his  own  co"n- 
yictions,  or  the  philosophical  regularity  of  life  which  he  had  thought 
tit  to  adopt — he  saw  that  patience  was  imperatively  necessarv,  and 
he  so  conducted  himself  as  to  maintain  unabated  the  favor  and  confid- 
ence of  Dionysius.     Such  a  policy  would  probably  be  recommended 
to  him  even  by  Plato,  in  prospect  of  a  better  future.     But  it  would 
be  strenuously  urged  by  the  Pythagoreans  of  Southern  Italv;  among 
whom  was  Archytas,  distinguished  not  only  as  a  mathematician  and 
friend  of  Plato,  but  also  as  the  chief  political  magistrate  of  Tarentum. 
To  these  men,  who  dwelt  all  within  the  reach,  if  not  under  the 
dominion   of  this   formidable   Syracusan   despot,    it   would   be  an 
unspeakable  advantage  to  have  a  friend  like  Dion  near  him,  pos- 
sessing his  confidence,  and  serving  as  a  shield  to  them  against  his 
displeasure   or  interference.      Dion   so    far    surmounted "  his    own 
unbending  nature  as  to  conduct  liimself  toward  Dionysius  with  skill 
and  prudence.     He  was  employed  by  the  despot  in  other  important 
affairs,  as  well  as  in  embassies  to  Carthage,  which  he  fulfilled  well, 
especially  with  conspicuous  credit  for  eloquence;   and  also  in  the 
execution    of  various  cruel   orders,    which   his    humanity   secretly 
mitigated.     After  the  death  of  Tliearides,  Dionvsius  gave  to  Dion  in 
marriage  the  widow  Arete  (his  daughter),  and  continued  until  the 
last  to  treat  him  with  favor,  accepting  from  him  a  freedom  of  cen- 
sure such  as  he  would  tolerate  from  no  other  adviser. 

During  the  many  years  which  elapsed  before  the  despot  died,  w^e 
ctmnot  doubt  that  Dion  found  opportunities  of  visiting  Peloponnesus 
and  Athens,  for  the  great  festivals  and  other  purposes.  He  wcnild 
thus  keep  up  his  friendship  and  philosophical  communication  with 
Plato.  Being  as  he  was  minister  and  relative,  and  perhaps  successor 
presumptive,  of  the  most  powerful  prince  in  Greece,  he  would  enjoy 


250 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


CONDUCT  OF  DION. 


251 


everywhere  Jjreat  importance,  wliicli  would  be  enhanced  by  his  plii- 
losonhy  and  elociuence.  The  Spartans,  at  that  time  tlie  allies  of  I)io- 
ny^ius  conferred  upon  Dion  the  rare  honor  of  ti  vote  ot  citizenship; 
and  he  received  tesiiinoines  of  respect  from  other  cities  also.  Such 
honors  tended  to  exalt  his  reputation  at  Syracuse;  while  the  visits  to 
Athens  and  the  cities  of  Central  Greece  enlarged  his  knowledge  uotli 
of  politicians  and  philosophers.  , ,      -rx.         .  •       , 

At  len^^h  occurred  the  death  of  the  elder  Dionysius,  occasioned 
by  an  unt-xpected  attack  of  fever,  after  a  few  days'  illness.     lie  bad 
niade  no  speciid  announcement  about  his  succession.     Accordingly, 
as  soon  as  the  physicians  pronounced  him  to  be  in  nnminent  (^ail^^er, 
a  comiX3tition  arose  between  his  two  families:  on  the  one  hand  Dio- 
nv^ius  the  younger,  his  son  bv  the  Lokriaii  wife  Dons;  on  the  other, 
hU  wife  Aristomache  and  her   brother  Dion,  representing  her  chil- 
dren Ilippariiuis  and  Nvsa'us,  then  very  young.     Dion,  wishing  to 
obtain  for  these  two  youths  either  a  partnership  in  the  future  power, 
or  some  other  beneficial  provi.-ion,  solicited  leave  to  approach  ihe 
bedside  of  the  sick  man.     But  the  physicians  refused  to  grant  his 
request  without    apprising    the    younger    Dionysius;    who,    being 
re-olved  to  prevent  it,  directed  a  soporific  i)()ti()n  to  be  administered 
to  his  father,  from  the  effects  of  which  the  latter  never  awoke  so  as 
to  be  able  to  see  any  one.     The  interview  with  Di(m  being  thus  frus- 
trated  and  the  father  dying  without  giving  any  directions,  Dionysius 
the  youn'-'er  succeeded  as  eldest  son,  without  opposition,     lie  was 
presented  to  that  which  was  called  an  assembly  of  the  Syracusan 
people  and  delivered  some  conciliatory  phrases,  requesting  them  to 
continue  to  him  that  good  will  which  they  had  so  long  shown  to  his 
father      Consent  and  acclamation  were  of  cour.se  not  wanting  to  the 
new  master  of  the  troops,  treasures,  magazines,  and  fortihcatious  ni 
Ortv^-ia-  those  "adnmantHue  chains"  which  were  well  known  to  dis- 
pense with  the  necessity  of  any  real  popular  good  will. 

Dionysius  11.  (or  the  younger),  then  about  25  years  of  age  was  a 
youn'-  man  of  considerable  natural  capacity,  and  of  quick  and  lively 
impulses-  but  weak  and  vain  in  his  character,  given  to  transitory 
caprices  and  eager  in  his  appetite  for  praise  without  being  capable 
of  any  industrious  or  resolute  efforts  to  earn  it.  As  yet  he  \yas 
whollV  unpracticed  in  serious  business  of  any  kind,  lie  had  neither 
seen  military  service  nor  minded  in  the  discussion  ot  political 
measures-  having  been  studiously  kept  back  from  both  by  the 
extreme  iealousy  of  his  father.  His  life  had  been  passed  in  the  palace 
or  acr()i)oIis  of  Ortvgia,  amid  all  the  indulgences  and  luxuries  belong- 
in"-  to  a  princely  station,  diversified  with  amateur  carpenter  s  work 
and  turuprv  However,  the  tastes  of  the  father  introduced  among 
the  '--uests  at  the  palace  a  certain  num})er  of  poets,  reciters,  musi- 
cian? etc.,  so  that  the  vounger  Dionysius  had  contracted  a  reush  lor 
poetical  literature,  which  opened  his  mind  to  generous  sentiments, 
and  large  conceptions  of  excellence,  more  than  any  other  portion  ot  his 


vrry  confined  experience.     To  philosophy,  to  instructive  conversa- 
tion, 10  the  exercise  of  reason,  he  was  a  stranger.     But  the  very 
feebleness  and  indecision  of  his  character  presented  him  as  impres- 
sible, i)erhaps  improveable,  by  a  strong  will  and  inliuence  brought  to 
bear  upon  him  from  that  quarter,  at  least  as  well  as  from  any  other. 
Such  was  the  novice  who  suddenly  stept  into  the  place  of  the  most 
energetic  and  powerful  despot  of  the  Grecian  world.     Dion— being 
as  he  was  of  mature  age,  known  service  and  experience,  and  full 
enjoyment  of  the   conlidence  of  the  elder  Dionysius— might   have 
probably  raised   materhd   opposition   to   the   younger.     But  he  at- 
tempted no  such  thing.     He  acknowledged  and  supported  the  young 
prince  with  cordial  sincerity,  dropping  altogether  those  views,  what- 
ever they  were,  on  behalf  of  the  children  of  Aristomache,  which  had 
induced  him  to  solicit  the  last  interview  with  the  sick  man.     While 
exerting  himself  to  strengthen  and  facilitate  the  march  of  the  j^overn- 
meut,  he  tried  to  gain  intluence  and  ascendency  over  the  mind  of 
the  young  Dionysius.     At  the  tirst  meeting  of  council  which  took 
place  after  the  accession,  Dion  stood  conspicuous  not  less  for  his 
earnest  adhesion   than    for   his  dignified  language  and    intelligent 
advice.      Tlie    remaining   councilors— accustomed,   under  the   self- 
determining  despot  who  had  just  quitted  the  scene,  to  the  simple 
function   of  hearing,  api)lauding,  and   obeying,  his   directions— ex- 
hausted themselves  in  phrases  and  compliments',  waiting  to  catch  the 
tone  of  the  young  prince  before  they  ventured  to  pronounce  any  de- 
cided opinion.      But  Dion,  to  whose  freedom  of  speech  even  the 
elder  Dionysius  had  partially  submitted,  disdained  all  such  tamper- 
ing, entered  at  once  into  a  full  review  of  the  actual  situation,  and 
suggested  the  positive  measures  proper  to  be  adopted.     We  cannot 
doubt  that,  in  the  transmission  of  an  authority  which  had  rested  so 
much  on  the  individual  spirit  of  the  former  poss(.'ssor,  there  were 
many  precautions  to  be  taken,  especially  in  regard  to  the  mercenary 
troops  both  at  Syracuse  and  in  tlie  outlying  dependencies.    All  these 
necessities  of  the  moment  Dion  sent  forth,  together  with  suitable  ad- 
vice.    But  the  most  serious  of  all  the  difficulties  arose  out  of  the 
war  with  Carthage  still  subsisting,  which  it  was  foreseen  that  the 
Carthaginians  were  likely  to  press  more  vigorously,  calculating  on 
the  ill-assured   tenure  and  inexperienced  inanatrement  of  the  new 
prince.     This  difficulty  Dion   took  upon   himself.     If   the  council 
should  think  it  wise  to  make  peace,  he  engaged  to  go  to  Carthai^e 
and  negotiate  peace— a  task  in  which  he  had  been  more  than  once 
employed  under  the  elder  Dionysus.     If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  were 
resolved    to    prosecute  the   war,  he  advised  that     imposing  forces 
sliould  be  at  once  put  in  equipment,  promising  to  furnish,  out  of  his 
own  large  property,  a  sum  sufficient  for  the  outfit  of  fifty  triremes. 

The  young  Dionysius  was  not  only  profoundly  impressed  with  the 
superior  wisdom  and  suggestive  resource  of  Dion,  but  also  grateful 
for  his  generous  offer  of  pecuniary  as  well  as  personal  support.     la 


252 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


CONVICTIONS  OF  DION. 


253 


all  probability  Dion  acliially  carried  the  offer  into  effect,  for  to  a  man 
of  his  disposition,  money  had  little  value  except  as  a  niciuis  of  ex- 
tendin:?  inilueuce  and  acquiriiiir  reputation.  Tlie  war  with  Carthape 
seems  to  have  lasted  at  least  tliroughout  the  next  year,  and  to  have 
been  terminated  not  lonir  afterwanl.  But  it  never  assumed  those 
perilous  proportions  which  had  been  contemplated  by  the  council  as 
probal)le.  As  a  mere  contingency,  however,  it  was  sufficient  to  in- 
spire Dionysius  w.ith  alarm,  combined  with  the  other  exigencies  of 
his  new  situation.  At  first  he  was  painfully  conscious  of  his  o\Yn 
inexperience;  anxious  about  hazards  which  he  now  saw  for  the  first 
time,  and  not  merelv  open  to  advice,  but  eager  and  thankful  for  sug- 
gestions, from  anv  quarter  where  he  could  plnce  confidence.  Dion, 
identified  by  ancient  connection  as  well  as  by  marriage  with  the 
Dionysian  landlv— trusted,  more  than  any  one  else,  by  the  old  despot, 
and  surrounded  with  that  accessory  dignity  which  ascetic  strictness 
of  life  usually  confers  in  excess— presented  every  title  to  such  con- 
fidence. And  when  he  was  found  not  only  the  most  trustworthy 
but  the  most  frank  and  tearless  of  counselors,  Dionysius  gladly 
yielded  both  to  the  measures  which  he  advised  and  to  the  impulses 
which  he  inspired. 

Such  was  the  political  atmosphere  of  Syracuse  durmg  the  period 
immediately  succeeding  the  new  accession,  while  the  splendid  ob- 
sequies in  honor  of  the  departed  Dionysius  were  being  solemnized; 
coupled  with  a  funeral  pile  so  elaborate  as  to  confer  celebiity  ou 
Timirus  the  constructor— and  commemorated  by  architectural  monu- 
ments too  grand  to  be  permanent,  immediately  outside  of  Ortygia. 
near  the  Keeal  Gates  leading  to  that  citadel.  Among  the  popular 
measures,  natural  at  the  commencement  of  a  new  reign,  the  historian 
Philistus'was  recalled  from  exile.  He  had  been  one  of  the  oldest 
and  most  attached  i)artisans  of  the  elder  Dionysius;  by  whom,  how- 
ever, he  had  at  last  been  banished,  and  never  afterward  forgiven. 
His  recall  now  seemed  to  promise  a  new  and  valuable  assistant  to  the 
younger,  wiiom  it  also  presented  as  softening  the  rigorous  proceed- 
ings of  his  father.  In  this  respect  it  would  harm.onize  with  the 
views  of  Dion,  though  Philistus  afterward  became  his  great  oppo- 
nent. 

Dion  was  now^  both  the  prime  minister  and  the  confidential  moni- 
tor of  the  younir  Dionysius.  He  upheld  the  march  of  the  govern- 
ment with  undiminished  energy,  and  was  of  greater  political  impor- 
tance than  Dionysius  himself.  But  success  in  this  object  was  not 
the  end  for  whicli  Dion  labored.  He  neither  wished  to  serve  a  despot, 
nor  to  become  a  despot  himself.  The  moment  was  favorable  for  ic- 
suminc:  that  project  which  he  had  formerly  imbibed  from  Plato,  and 
whiclCin  spite  of  contemptuous  disparagement  by  his  formi^r  master, 
had  ever  since  clung  to  him  as  the  dream  of  his  heart  and  life.  To 
make  Syracuse  a  free  city,  under  a  government,  not  of  will,  but  of 
good  laws,  with  himself  as  lawgiver  in  substance,  if  not  in  name— to 


enfranchise  and  replant  the  semi-barbarized  Hellenic  cities  in  Sicily 
—and  to  expel  the  Carthaginians— were  schemes  to  whicli  he  now 
again  devoted   himself  with  unabated  enthusiasm.     But  he  did  not 
look  to  any  other  means  of  achieving  them  than  the  consent  and 
initiative  of  Dionysius  himself.     The  man  who  had  been  sau<>-uine 
enough  to  think  of  working  upon  the  iron  soul  of  the  father  wa's  not 
likely  to  despair  of  shaping  anew  the  more  malleable  metal  of  which 
th(3  son  was  composed.     Accordingly,  while  lending  to  Dionysius  his 
host  service  as  minister,  lie  also  took  up  the  Platonic  ])r()fession   and 
tried  to  persuade  him  to  reform  both  himself  and  his  governinent 
He  endeavored  to  awaken  in  him  a  relish  for  a  better^'and  nobler 
private  conduct  than  that  wiiich  prevailed  among  the  luxurious  com- 
panions around  liim.     He  dwelt  with  enthusiasm  on  the  scientific 
and  soul-stirring  conversation  of  Plato;  specimens  of  whith  he  either 
read  aloud  or  repeated,  exalting  the  hearer  not  only  to  a  higher  intel- 
lectual range,  but  also  to  the  full  majesty  of  mind  requisitel'or  rulin*'- 
others  with  honor  and  improvement,     lie  pointed  out  the  unrivaled 
glory  which  Dionysius  would  acquire  in  the  eves  of  Greece,  by  con- 
senting to  employ  his  vast  powder,  not  as  a  despot  working  on  the 
fears  of  subjects,  but  as  a  king  enforcing  temperance  and  justice   by 
his  own  paternal  example  as  well  as  by  good  laws.     He  tried  to  show- 
that  Dionysius,  after  having  iiberated'Syracuse,  and  enrolled  himself 
as  a  king  limited  and  responsible  amidst  grateful  citizeiis.  would  have 
far^more  real  force  against  the  barbarians  than  at  present. 

Such  were  the  new  convictions  which  Dion  tried  to  work  into  the 
mind  of  the  young  Dionysius,  as  a  living  faith  and  sentiment     Pene- 
trated as  he  was  with  the  Platonic  idea— that  nothing  could  be  done 
for  the  improvement  and  happiness   of  mankind,  until  philosophy 
and  ruling  power  came  together  in  the  same  hands;  but  everythinf^ 
if  the  two  did  so  come  together— he  thought  that  he  saw  before  hini 
a  chance  of  realizing  the  conjunction,  in  the  case  of  the  irreate^t 
among  all  Hellenic  potentates.      He   already  beheld   in   fancy  his 
native  country  and  fellow  citizens  liberated,  moralized,  ennobled 
and  conducted  to  happiness,  without  murder  or  peisecut'ion,  simply 
by  the  well-raeaning  and  instructed  employment  of  power' already 
organized.     If  accident  had  thrown  the  despotis:n  into  the  hands  of 
Dion  himself,  at  this  period  of  his  life,  the  Grecian  woild  would  prob- 
ably have  seen  an  experiment  tried,  as  memorable  and  generous  ;i3 
any  event  recorded  in  its  history:  what  would  have  been  its  result 
we  cannot  say.     But  it  wai  enough  to  fire  his  inmost  soul,  to  see 
himself  sepaiated  from  the  experinient  only  by  the  necessity  of  per- 
suading an  impressible  young  man  over  whom  he  had  much  infiu- 
ence;  and  for  himself,  he  was  quite  satisfied  with  the  humbler  posi- 
tion of  nominal  minister,  but  leal  originator  and  chief,  in  so  noble 
an  enterprise.     His  persuasive  powers,  strengthened  as  they  were  by 
intense  earnestness  as  well  as  by  his  imposing  station  and  practical 
capacity,  actually  wrought  a  great  effect  upon   Dionysius.     The 


254 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGEK. 


PLATO  VISITS  SYRACUSE. 


255 


voun.r    man   nppoare.l   animated  with   a   stroii-  desire   of   self-im 
•provcMnent,  and  of  qualifying,  himself  for  such  a  use  of  the  powers 
of  Government  as  Dion  depicted.     He  gave  proof  of  the  Vincent y  of 
hislv.elin<-s  by  expressinsx  eagerness  to  see  and  conver.-e  with  1  Into, 
to  whom  he  sent  severafpersonal  messages,  warmly  requesting  Imn 

^^Tlds  wirm-ecisely  the  first  step  which  Dion  had  been  laboring  to 
brinn- about:    He  well  knew,  and  had  personally  felt,  the  wonderiul 
ma*nc  of  Plato's  conversation  when  addressed   to  young  men.      J  o 
briS-- Plato  to  Syracuse,  and  to  pour  his  eloquent  language  mto  the 
predisposed  ears  of  Dionysius,  appeared  like  realizmg  the  coniunc- 
tlon  of  ]>hilosophv  and  power.      Accordingly  he  sent  to  Athens 
alon<-  with  the   invitation  from  Diouysms,   the  most  pressing  and 
emphatic  entreaties  from   himself.      He    represented   the   m.mense 
prize  to  be  won-nothing  less  than  the  means  of  diuctiug  the  action 
If  an  organized  power,  extending  over  all  the  Greeks  o    Italy  and 
Sicilv-provided  onlv  the  mind  of  Dionysius  could  be  tlioroiighly 
o-ained  over.     This  (he  said)  was  already  half  done;  not  only  Diony- 
sius himself,  but  al.o  his  youthful   half-brothers  of  the  other  hne 
had  been    impressul   with  earnest   mental   aspirations,  and  longed 
to  drink   at  the    i»ure   fountain   of    true  philosophy.     Everything 
presa<^ed   complete  success,  such  as  would  render  them  hearty  and 
acrive  proselytes,  if  Plato  would  only  come  f orthw it h-bef ore  hos- 
tile influences    could  have    time  to  corrupt   thcm-and   devote  to 
the  task  his  unrivaled  art  of  penetrating  the  youthlul  mmd.    Ihese 
hostile  influences  were  indeed  at  work,  and  with  great  activity;  if 
victorious,  they  would  not  only  defeat  the  project  ol  I>;^^^^' ^^^v 
even  provoke   his  expulsion,  or  threaten  his  life.     Could  Plato,  1} 
declining  the  invitation,  leave  his  devoted  champion  and  apostle  to 
flo^it  so  tn-eat  a  battle,  alone  r.nd  unassisted?     What  could  Plato  say 
fo"r  himself  afterward,  if  by  declining  to  come  he  not  only  le    slip 
the  greatest  prospective  \ictory  which  had  cvei"  been  opened  to  philos- 
ophy, but  alio  permitted  the  coiTuption  of  Dionysms  and  the  rum 

t*    T'V*  O 

^  SuSf "  appeals,  in  themselves  emphatic  and  touching,  reached 
Athens  re-enforced  by  solicitations."  hardly  less  strenuous,  frcpi 
Archvtas  of  Tarentum  and  the  other  Pythagorean  philosophers  m 
the  south  of  Italy;  to  whose  personal  well-being,  over  and  above  the 
interests  of  philosophy,  the  character  of  the  future  Svracusan  govern- 
ment was  of  capital  importance.  Plato  was  deeply  agitated  and 
embarrassed.  He  was  now  61  years  of  age.  He  enjoyed  pre- 
eminent estimation,  in  (he  grove  of  Akademus  near  Athens,  amid 
admiring  hearers  from  all  parts  of  Greece.  The  Athenian  dcmocraQ 
if  it  accSrded  to  him  no  influence  on  public  affairs,  neith.er  molested 
Inm  nor  dimmed  his  intellectual  glory.  The  proposed  voyage  to 
Syracuse  carried  him  out  of  this  enviable  position  into  a  new  field  ot 
hazard  and  speculation;  brilliant  indeed  and  flattering,  beyond  an>- 


tliing  which  had   ever  been   approached  by  philosophy    if  it   suc- 
ceeded; but  fraught  with  disgrace,   and    even   with   dano-or  to  all 
concerned   if  it  failed.     PLuo  had  already  seen  the  elder  Dionysius 
surrounded  by  his  walls  and  mercenaries  in  Ortvgia,  and  had  learned 
by  cruel  experience  the  painful  consequeuces  of  propoundinn-  philos 
ophy  to  an  intraciahle  hearer,  who>e  displeasure  passed  so"  readily 
into  act.      The  sight  of  contemporary  despots  nearer  home,  such  as 
Luphron  of  bikyoii  and  Alexander  of  Pliene,  was  by  no  means  reas- 
suring; nor  could  he  reasonably  stake    his   person   and   reputation 
on  the  chance,  that  the  younger  Dionysius  might  prove  a  <'lorious 
exception  to  the  general  rule.     To  out-weigh  such  scruiilcs  ""he  had 
indeed  the  positive  and  respectful  invitation  of  Dionvsius  himself- 
which  however  would  have  passed  for  a  transitory/ Ihou^di  vehe- 
ment, caprice  on  the  part  of  a  young  prince,  had  it  not  been  backed 
by  the  stronir  assurances  of  a  mature  man  and  valued  friend  like 
Dion,      lo  these  assurances,  and   to   the   shame   whicli   would   b- 
incurred  by  leaving  Dion  to  fight  the  battle  and  incur  the  danger 
siloue,  Plato  sacrificed  his  own  grounds  for  hesitation.     He  went~'to 
J^yracuse,  less  with  the  hope  of  succeeding  in  the  in!ende<l  conversion 
ot  Dionysius,  than  from  the  fear  of  hearing  both  himself  and  his 
philosophy  taunted  with  confessed  impotence— as  fit  onlv  for  th^' 
discussions  of  the  school,  shrinking  from  all  application  to"  practice^ 
betraying  the  interest  of  his  Pythagorean  friends,  and  basely  desert- 
ing that  devoted  champion  who  had  half  opened  the  door  to  him  for 
triumphant  admission. 

Such  is  the  account  which  the  philosopher  dves  of  his  own  state 
of  mind  in  going  to  Sj-racuse.  At  the  same  time,  he  intimates  that 
hi.,  motives  were  differently  interpreted  by  others.  And  as  the 
accouiit  which  we  possess  was  written  fifteen  years  after  the  event- 
when  Dion  had  perished,  when  the  Syracusan  enterprise  had  realized 
nothing  like  what  ^yas  expected  and  when  Plato  looked  back  up(Mi  it 
with  the  utmost  grief  and  aversion,  which  must  have  poisonecl  the 
last  three  or  four  years  of  his  life— we  mav  fairlv  suspect  that  he 
par  lally  transfers  back  to  367  B.C.  the  feelings  of  353  B.C. ;  and  that 
at  the  earlier  period,  he  went  to  Syracuse,  not  merely  because  he  was 
ashamed  to  decline,  but  because  he  really  flattered  himself  with  some 
hopes  of  success. 

However  desponding  he  may  have  been  before,  he  could  hardly 
tail  to  conceive  hopes  from  the  warmth  of  his  first  receiitiou  One 
the  royal  carriages  moi  him  at  his  landing,  and  conveyed  him  to  his 
lodging.  Dionysius  offered  a  sacrifice  of  thanksgiving  to  the  ^--ods 
lor  Ills  safe  arrival.  The  banquets  at  the  acropolis  became  distin- 
guished for  their  plainness  and  sobriety.  Never  had  Dionysius  been 
seen  so  gentle  in  answering  suitors  or  transactino;  public  l)usiness 
Ue  began  immediately  to  take  lessons  in  geometrv  from  Plato 
Every  one  around  him,  of  course,  was  suddenly  smitten  with  a  taste 
lor  geometry;  so  that  the  floors  were  all  spread  with  sand,  and  noth- 


256 


DIONYSILS  THE  YOUNGER 


inn-  wa-^!  to  be  seen  except  triar.des  and  other  f  gr.res  inFenbed  upon 
it  ^vith  expositors  and  a  listening  e^md  around  tlicm.  To  tlirso 
T\-ho  had  been  inmates  of  the  acropolis  v.nder  ibe  reign  of  tbe  forn  f  i- 
dcaiot  this  Chan  ire  was  {surprising  enough.  Put  their  surprise  \\:,s 
r(Hi verted  into  alarai,  Avhen,  at  a  periodical  sacrifice  just  Ihcn  oflercd, 
Dionysius  himself  arrested  the  herald  in  pioEOuncmg  the  custoniaiy 
praverto  the  gods— "That  the  despotism  might  long  remain  nii- 
^h'lken  "  "  Stop!  (said  Dionysius  to  the  herald)  imprecate  no  sucli 
curse  upon  usf"  To  the  ears  of  Philistus,  and  the  old  politicians, 
these  words  portended  nothing  less  than  revolution  to  the  dynasty, 
and  ruin  to  Syracusan  power.  A  single  Athenian  sophist  (they  ex- 
claimed), with  no  other  force  than  his  tongue  and  his  reputation, 
had  achieved  the  conquest  of  Syracuse;  an  attempt  in  which  thon- 
eands  of  his  countrymen  had  'miserably  perished  half  a  centui  y 
before  Ineffably  were  they  disgusted  to  see  Dionysius  abdicate  in 
favor  of  Plato,  and  exchange  the  care  of  his  vast  force  and  dominion 
for  o-eometrical  problems  and  discussions  on  the  (nimnnim  honnm. 

For  a  moment  Plato  seemed  to  be  despot  of  Syracuse:  so  that  the 
noble  objects  for  which  Dion  had  labored  were  apparently  within 
his  reach,  either  wholly  or  in  part.     And  as  far  as  we  can  judge. 
they  really  were  to  a  irfeat  degree  within  his  reach— had  tins  situa 
lion   so  interestincT  and  so  fraught  with  consequences  to  the  people 
of  Sicily,  been  properly  turned  to  account.     With  all  reverence  for 
the  greatest  philosopher  of  antiquity,  we  are  forced  to  confess  that 
upon  his  own  showing,  lie  not  only  failed  to  turn  the  situation  to 
account,  but  contributed  even  to  spoil  it  by  an  unseasonable  rigor 
To  admire  philosophy  in  its  distinguished  teachers,  is  one  thing;  to 
learn  and  appropriate  it,  is  another  stage,  rarer  and  more  diflicult 
requiring  assiduous  labor,  and  no  common  endowments;  while  that 
which  Plato  calls  "  the  philosophical  life."  or  practical  predommance 
of  a  well-trained  intellect   and  well-cb.osen  ethical  purposes,  com- 
bined with  the  minimum   of   personal    appetite— is  a  third  stjige. 
hicrher  and  rarer  still.     Now  Dionysius  had  reached  the  first  stiige 
only      He  had  contracted   a  warm   and    profound  admiration   lor 
Plato      He  had  imbibed  this  feeling  from  the  exhortations  of  Uiou. 
and  we  shall  see  bv  his  subsequent  conduct  that  it  was  really  a  teei- 
in-  both  sincere  and  durable.     But  he  admired  Plato  without  havnii: 
either  inclination  or  talent  to  ascend  higher,  and   to  acquire  \Muil 
Plato  called  philosophv.     Now  it  was  an  unexpected  ?oo(l  tortune. 
and  hiirhlv  creditable  *to  the  persevering  enthusiasni  ot  Dion   tJiat 
Dionysius"^ should  have  been  wound  up  so  far  as  to  admire  1  lato.  10 
invoke  his  presence,  and  to  instal  him  as  a  sort  of  spiritual  pmyer  D} 
the  side  of  the  tem.poral.     Thus  much  was  more  than  could  have 
been  expected;  but  to  demand  more,  and  to  insist  that  Dion>snis 
should  go  to  school  and  work  through  a  course  of  mental  regeneia 
tion— was  a  purpose  hardly  possible  to  attain,  and  positively  niis- 
chicvous  if  it  failed.     Unfortunately,  it  was  exactly  this  error  whieli 


CONDUCT  OF  PLATO. 


\. 


257 


Plato,  and  Dion  in  deference  to  Plato,  seem  to  have  committed 
Instead  ot  taking  advantjige  of  the  existing  ardor  of  Dionysius  to 
instigate  hini  at  once  into  active  political  measures  beneficial  to  the 
people  of  Syracuse  and  Sicily,  with  the  full  force  of  an  authority 
Aviiichat  that  moment  would  have  been  irresistible— instead  of  heart- 
ening him  up  against  groundless  fear  or  difiicultiesof  execution  and 
seeing  that  full  honor  was  (I(me  to  hini  for  all  the  good  which  he 
really  accomplished,  meditated,  or  adopted— Pluto  postponed  all 
these  as  matters  for  which  his  royal  pupil  was  not  yet  ripe.  He  and 
I)i(jn  began  to  deal  with  Dionysius  as  a  confessor  treats  his  penitent- 
to  probe  the  interior  man— to  expose  to  him  his  own  uuworthiness 
—to  show  that  his  life,  his  training,  his  companions,  had  all  been 
vicious— to  insist  upon  repentance  and  amendment  upon  these  points 
hefore  he  could  receive  absolution,  and  be  permitted  to  enter  upoii 
active  political  life— to  tell  him  that  he  must  reform  himself  and 
become  a  rational  and  temperate  man,  belorc  he  was  tit  to  enter 
seriously  on  the  task  of  governing  others. 

Such  was  the  langua^-e  which  Plato  and  Dion  held  to  Dionysius 
Ihey  well  knew  indeed  that  they  were  treading  on  delicate  ground 
—that  while  irritating  a  spirited  horse  in  the  sensitive  part   they  had 
no  security  against  his  kicks.     Acctordingly,  they  resorted  to  many 
circumlocutory  and  equivocal  expressions,  so  as  to  soften  the  offense 
given.  _  But  the  effect  was  not  the   less  produced,  of    dis'mstinn- 
Dionysius  with  his  velleities  toward  political  good.     Not  on'x  did 
Ilato  decline  entering  upon  political  recommendations  of  his  ow^n 
but  he  (lamped,  instead  of  enforcing,  the  positive  good  resolutions 
which  Dion  had  already  succeeded  in  infusing.    Dionysius  announced 
freely,  in  the  presence  of  Plato,  his  wish  and  intention  to  ti-ausforni 
ins  despotism  at  Syracuse  into  a  limited  kingship,  and  to  replant  the 
dis-hellenized  cities  in  Sicily.     These  were  the  two  grand  points  to 
which  Dion  had  been  laboring  so  generously  to  bringliim,  and  which 
he  had  invoked  Plato  for  the  exj)ress  purpose  of  seconding.     Yet 
what  does  Plato  say  when  this  momentous  announcement  is'^made^ 
Instead  of  bestowing  any  praise  or  encouragement,  he  drily  remarks 
to  Dionysius— "First  go  through  your  schooling:,  and  then  do  all 
these  things;  otherwise  leave  them  undone."     Dionysius  afterward 
complained,  and  with  good  show  of  reason  (when  Dion  was  in  exile 
menacing  attack  upon  Syracuse,  under  the  favorable  sympathies  of 
Plato),  that  the  great  philosopher  had  actually  deterred^  him  (Diony- 
sius) from  executinir  the  same  capital  improvements  which  he  was 
now  encouraging  Dion  to  accomplish  by  an  armed  invasion.     Plato 
was  keenly  sensiiive  to  this  reproach  afterward;  but  even  his  own 
exculpation  proves  it  to  have  been  in  the  main  not  undeserved 

Plutarch  observes  that  Plato  felt  a  proud  consciousness  of  philo- 
sophical dignity  in  disdaining  respect  to  persons,  and ;n  refusing-  to 
the  defects  of  Dionysius  any  greater  measure  of  indulgence  Uian 
he  would  have  shown  to  an  ordinary  pupil  of  the  Academy     If  we 
H  G.  IV. -» 


2f)8 


DIONYSIUS  THE   YOUNGER. 


JEALOUSY   OF   I)lOXY81US. 


2.VJ 


i? 


allow  him  credit  for  a  sentiment  in  itself  honorable,  it  can  only  be  at 
the  expense  of  his  titnessfor  dealinjj:  with  practical  life;  by  admittnii; 
(to  (iiiote  a  remarkable  phrase  from  one  of  his  own  dialogues)  lluiL 
"he  tried  to  deal  wiih  individual  men  without  knowing  those  rules 
of  art  or  practice  which  bear  on  human  alfairs."  Dionysius  was  not 
a  common  pupil,  nor  could  Plato  reasonably  expect  the  like  unmeas- 
ured docility  from  one  for  whose  ear  so  many  hostde  mtiuences 
were  competing.  Nor  were  Plato  and  Dionysius  the  only  parlies 
concerned.  There  was,  besides,  in  the  first  place,  Dion,  whose 
whole  position  was  at  stake— next,  and  of  yet  greater  moment,  the 
relief  of  the  people  of  Syracuse  and  Sicily.  For  them,  and  on  their 
behalf  Dion  had  been  laboring  with  such  zeal,  that  he  had  inspired 
Dionysius  with  readiness  to  execute  the  two  best  resolves  which  the 
situation  admitted;  resolves  not  only  pregnant  with  benefit  to  tue 
people,  but  also  insuring  the  position  of  Dion— since  if  Dionysius 
had  once  entered  upon  this  course  of  policy,  Dion  would  have  been 
essential  to  him  as  an  auxiliarv  and  man  of  executi(;n. 

It  is  by  no  means  certain,  indeed,  that  such  schemes  could  have 
been  successfully  realized,  even  with  full  sincerity  on  the  part  of 
Dionvsius,  and  *tho  energv  of  Dion  besides.  With  all  goveiu- 
ments,  to  do  evil  is  easv— to  effect  beneficial  change,  difiicult ;  and 
with  a  Grecian  despot'this  was  true  in  a  peculiar  manner.  Those 
great  mercenary  forces  and  other  instruments,  which  had  been  strong 
as  adamant  for  the  oppressive  rule  of  the  elder  Dionysius,  would 
have  been  found  hardly  manageable,  perhaps  even  obstructive,  li  his 
son  had  tried  to  emploV  them  tor  more  liberal  purposes.  But  sliil 
the  experiment  would  have  been  tiicd.  with  a  fair  chance  of  success 
—if  only  Plato,  durimr  his  short-lived  spiritual  authority  at  Syra- 
cuse, had  measured  more  accurately  the  practical  influence  which  a 
philosopher  might  reasonably  hope  to  exercise  over  Dionysius.  I 
make  these  remarks  upon  him  with  sincere  regret;  but  I  am  much 
mistaken  if  he  did  not  afterward  hear  them  in  more  poignant  lan- 
guage from  tlie  banished  Dion,  upon  whom  the  consequences  oi  the 

mistake  mainly  fell.  i      i    i 

Speedily  did  the  atmosphere  at  Svracuse  become  overclouded. 
The  conservative  parly— friends  of  the  old  despotism,  with  the 
veteran  Philistus  at  ihVir  hetid— plavcd  their  game  far  better  than 
that  of  the  reformers  was  played  by  Plalo,  or  by  Dion  since  the 
arrival  of  Plalo.  Philistus  saw  tiiat  Dion,  as  the  man  of  strong 
patriotic  impulses  and  of  enersrelic  execution,  was  the  leal  enemy  to 
be  aimed  at.  He  left  no  effoit  untried  to  calumniate  Dion,  and  to 
set  Dionvsius  a-ain^t  him.  Whispers  and  misrepresentations  from  a 
thousand  diiferent  (luarters  beset  ihe^arof  Dionysius,  alarming  him 
with  the  idea  that  Dion  was  usurping  to  himself  the  real  authority  in 
Svracuse,  with  the  view  of  ultimately  lianding  il  over  to  the  children 
o!  Aristomaclie,  and  of  reigning  in  iheir  name.  Plato  had  been 
brought  thither  (it  was  siud)  as  an  agent  in  the  couspirat  y.  tor  tlie 


purpose  of  winning  over  Dionysius  into  idle  speculations  enervat- 
ing his  active  vigor,  and  ultimately  setting  him  aside;  in  order  t^m 
all  serious  political  agency  might  fall  into  The  hands  of  Dion  Tlie4 
hostile  mtri^i^ues  were  no  secret  to  Piato  himself,  who,  even  shorliy 
after  his  arrival,  began  to  see  evidence  of  their  poisonoi^acivi  y 
He  trie(  sincerely  to  counterwork  them;  but  unf binunalefy  tf  e  la^^ 
giiage  w  iich  he  luniself  addressed  to  Dionysius  was  exact  y  s  cl  as 
o  give  them  the  best  chance  of  success.    When  l)ionys  us  Vecou  ted 

0  Phihs  us  or  other  courtiers  how  Plato  and  Dion  had  humi     te 

ImVh.  1!' r''"/^^''' ""^^^'^^  ^^^'"^  '^'''''  ^''''^'  unworthy  to  "^^ 
until  he  had  undergone  a  thorough  piirirication-he  would  be  exhorte 
to  resent  ,t  as  presumption  and  insull;  and  would  be  assured  uiti 
could  on  y  arise  from  a  design  to  dispossess  him  of  his  author  ty  in 
as'i^gent  ^""^  """  ^""'"'^'  "'  ''''  ''^^^^^'^'^^  ''^  Arislomache  with  l)ion 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  there  was  a  real  foundation  for  ieal- 
ousy  on  the  part  of  Dionysius  toward  Dion,  wlio  was  not  m^:  y 
superior  to  him  in  age,  in  dignity,  and  in  ability,  l,ut  also  personil'y 
h^iughty  in  his  bearing,  and  rigid  in  his  habits,  while  D^n vs  us 
relished  con  VI  via  1  y  and  enjoyments.  At  first  tJiis  jealousy  was  pv- 
veiited  Ironi  breaking  out-,)artly  by  the  consciousness  of  IW^us 

hat  he  needed  some  one  to  lean  upon-partly  by  what  seems  ?o  ha  ve 
been  great  self-command  on  the  part  of  Dion,  and  gr^atca"  to  carry 
with  him  the  real  m  nd  and  good-will  of  Dionysiuf.  Even  f  om  he 
beginning  the  enemies  of  Dion  were  doubtless  not  sparing    n  the  r 

lii  snUe'^^.n '  I  "'•'^;  ^'''''^y'^^i^^^  »'i'" ;  --i  the  wonder  on'ly  Is  how 

1  sp.l^  of  such  intrigues  and  in  spite  of  the  natural  causes  of  jeal- 
osy, Dion  could  have  implanted  his  political  aspirations,  and  mai  - 

f  If  n ' n ^'-^^^"^.^^'/^^^^^"^'^^  ;>ver  Dionysius  until  the  arrival  of  P     o 
Aftei   that  event  the  natural  causes  of  antipathy  tended  to  manifest 

cnmJ?^;rp'p^Tr'"'^"^^^'V^"^^'^^^"^^^  ^^-^"^^  '^^^  counteract^g  cir 
cu instances  all  disappeared.  ° 

Three  important  months  thus  passed  awav,  durin-  which  those 

Ihe'bo'o^ro'fn"^'^^-'''""^^^^^;^^^'^^ 

wl  acHon  L  in"''''l"''  T'^  ''^^'''^'  ^^"  '^'^^''  ^^''^  f'^""^d  into  life 
IhP  otho^^~  n'  '''•'*^''''.  ^'^  ^^^^^^^I'nent  of  Syracuse,  and  to  restore 
the  other  tree  Grecian  cities-disappeared  never  to  return.     In  place 

^I.  !f,\'\^r7'^"V'''^1^'^^V'''? '^"^'P*'^^^^^^^^   ^«''^'  «'"^  more  rancorous. 

ofi  i^.fp  ^^'^"'\''"'^  '^^^''?''^  7''^^'  '^'^^^"^  ^^'^'^  sentiments  had 
originated.     The  charges  against  Dion,  of  conspiracy  and  dangerous 

designs,  circulated  by  Philistus  and  his  cabaK  became  more  "auda- 
cious than  ev(;r.  At  length  in  the  fourth  month  Dionysius  resolved 
10  get  rid  oi  him. 

The   proceedings  of  Dion  being  watched,  a  letter  was  detected 
which  he  had  wrilten  to  the  Carthaginian  commanders  in  Sicily  (with 
Mhora  the  war  still  subsisted,  though  seemingly  not  in  great  activity) 
inviting  them,  if  they  sent  any  proposition  for  pence  to  Syracuse  'to 


260 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


send  it  through  him.  as  he  would  take  care  that  it  should  he  properly 
discu^^^ed.     Thave  already  stated  that,  even  iu  the  reigu  of  the  elder 
Dionvsius   Dion  had  been  the  person  to  whom  the  negotiations  witli 
Carthaire  were  habitually  intrusted.     Sueh  a  letter  from  him,  as  fr.r 
as  we  mnke  out  from  the  general  deseriplion,  implied  nothing  like  a 
treasonable  purpose.     But  Dionysius,  after  taking  council  with  1  hi- 
listu.   resolved  to  make  use  of  it  as  a  final  pretext.     Inviting  Dum 
into  the  acropolis,  under  color  of  seeking  to  heal  their  growing  dif- 
ferences —and  beginninix  to  enter  into  an  amicable  conversation.— 
he  condAeted  him  unsuspectingly  down  to  the  adjacent  harbor,  where 
lav  moored,  close  in  shore,  a  boat  with  the  rowers  aboard,  ready  for 
st-irtinn-      Diouvsius  then  produced  the  intercepted  letter,  handed  it 
to  Dion,  and  recused  him  to  his  face  of  treason      The  latter  pro- 
tested aijainst  the  imputation,  and  engerly  sought  to  reply,     but 
Dionysius   stopped   him   from    proceeding,    insisted    on    his    gomg 
aboard  the  boat,  and  ordered  the  rowers  to  carry  him  oil  forthwith 

to  Italy 

This  abrupt  and  isrnominions  expulsion,  of  so  great  a  person  as 
Dion   caused  as  much  consternation  among  his  numerous  iricnds  as 
triumph  to  Philistus  and  the  partisans  of  the  despotism.     All  con^ 
sumniati(m  of  the  liberal  projects  conceived  by  Dion  was  ";'^v  «  ^  r,f 
the  question,  not  less  from  the  incim.petency  of  Dionysius  to  execute 
tlipm  alone  than  from  his  indisposition  to  any  such  attempt      Aris- 
tclnwt  tL  si^^^       and  Arete  the  wife  of  Dion  (the  latter  half-sister 
of  Dionysius  himself),  gave  yen t  to  their  sorrow  and  ">< ligna  ion; 
while  the  political  associates  of  Dion,  and  Plato  beyond  all  otiieis, 
trembled  for  their  own   personal  safety.      Among  the   mercenary 
soldiers,  the  name  of  Plato  was  particularly  odious.     ^I;!'^^  jXTSons 
insti-ated  Dionysius  to  kill  him,  and  rumors  even  gained  looting  t.it 
he  had  been  killed,  as  the  author  of  the  whole  confusi()n.     hut  the 
despot,  having  sent  away  the  person  whom  he  most  hated  and  fearec 
was  not  disposed  to  do  harm  to  any  one  else.     \\  hile  he  ca  med  the 
anxieties  of  Arete  bv  affirminij  that  the  departure  of  her  husband  was 
not  to  be  regarded  as  an  exile,  but  only  as  a  temporary  separation   to 
allow  time  for  abating  the  animosity  which  prevailed— he  at   the 
same  time  ordereil  two  triremes  to  be  fitted  out,  for  sending  to  Dion 
his  slaves  and  valuable  property,  and  everything  necessary  to  per- 
sonal di-nitv  as  well  as  to  his  comfort.     Toward  Plato-who  was 
naturally  agitated   in  the   extreme,  thinking  only   of   the   readiest 
means  to  escape  from  so  dangerous  a  situation-his  nKinifestalions 
were  yet  more  remarkable.     He  soothed  the  philosopher  s  apprehen- 
sions—entreated him   to   remain,  in  a  manner  gentle,  indeed,  but 
admittincr  no  denial— and  conveyed  him  at  once  into  lus  own  resi- 
dence, the  acropolis,  under  color  of  doing  him  honor._    I  rom  hence 
there  was  no  possibility  of  escaping,  and  IMato  remained  there  for 
some  time.     Dionysius  treated  him  well,  communicated  with  liiiu 
freely  and  intimately,  and  proclaimed  everywhere  that  they  were  on 


DISMISSAL  AND   RECALL  OF  PLATO.  261 

the  best  terms  of  friendship.     What  is  yet  more  curious-lie  di. 
played  the  greatest  anxiety  to  obtain  the  esteem  aiul     ppmba  ion^c^ 
lie  sage,  and  to  occupy  u  phice  in  his  mind  higher  tl  an  U  ui^-oRlid 
to  Dion,   shrinking,  nevertheless,  from  philoscmliy   or  tlte  PMonic 
treatment  and  training,  under  the  imprc^ion  that^'then  was  a  du 
pose  to  ensnare  and  paralyze  him,  under  the  auspices  of  D  on      Thk 
IS  a  strange  account,  given  by  Plato  himself;  but  it  reads  Hke  ^ 
picture  ot   a  vam   and    weak   prince,  adinidn^/thc   nhil  t?nLv 
coquetting  with  him,  as  it  werdand  anxious   o^ativedsl^  nr^ 

During  this  long  and  irksome  detention,  which  probably  m^dp 
Plato  sensible  of  the  comparative  comf()rts  of  Atl  eSlibity  e 
obtained  from  Dionysius  one  Draetical  benefif      ii„  ^'^<'ity,  lie 

Mm  to  establish  fnei,dly  and  h'^piliruie  ^M  nx      tl^ A  chms^i'd 
he  T  arentmes,  wli.ch  to  tliese  latter  was  a  real  increase  o^ecuri^ 
a.Kl  convemenco.     But  iu  the  point  whieh  he  strove  most  e-mesr^ 

eoaMT'nd'  ''"t^^^"','?''-  ^""'y^'"^  'esisted  all  ent,^  c.  for  t| "e 
recal  of  Dion.  Finding  himself  at  lenijth  occupied  with  a  w-r 
(wliether    he  war  with   Cartilage   previously  men  io.cd    or  so^,;> 

seud  ioi  Jiuu  again  as  soon  as  peace  and  leisure  should  ivturn  ?n,l 

Kn'^n^^^i  •"  'f""  '^'"J'  "'  "'«  ^^'"^  "'"«;  upcm  which  covcumu 
Plato,  on  Ins  side,  agreed  to  come  back.     After  a  certain  im,^  v^ 

peace  arrived,  and  Uicmysius  reinvited  Plato,  ye  \vithoi"    erdli;^ 

himself,  who  pan  y  in  the  view  of  promoiing  bis  ow.  n  tu  e  reslo; 
at  ion  t-arneslly  exhorted  him  to  go.'  Dionysius  bes  "4  P  -uo  wh  b 
solicitations  to  come,  promising  that  all  wh  ch  ho  mb^la  itit  'm 

i  n'riXHiTnd'rh'.'T  '"  ^r""'"'-  ""'■  '^""■"S- '»  "-^^O" -ecS 
1 1  It  .vitlij  l.is  and  the  Tarentmes  to  prevai   upon  him      These  mpn 

throug],   their  companion   and   frieml   Arehilemus,   who  came    o 

Athens  n  a  Syracusan  trireme,  assured  Plato  that  Dionvs  is  wis  now 

nro'resiin  r   «"'  T  "■    "^"'''«»P"3-.  "■"'  I'^d  even  nS Tons l':,   b  e 
Phmt',      ,1   1^>  ."'.^■";<'"-"e'^t"il'e:'ties,  coupled  with  those  of  Dion 
1  l.ito  was  at  lengl  1  induced  to  go  to  Syracuse.     He  was  received  ms 
belore.  wi.b  .signal  lokens  of  honor.    He  was  con,pIim™ted  w  tl   the 
rivi  ege,  enjoyed  by  no  one  el.se,  of  approaching  tl  e  de  no     -i  h 
r  '^^nll  t,S'  rn'-^  «-• --ffec.iouate,y  wel<r.i;:i'',l^ 

beyond  udiat  lie  hiniself'^i^,;:!;  pr.?v:ll  i?!i\T.i,:tut  ,^;:S^ 
captivity,  as  the  compauiou  of  Dionysius  in  the  .Kn>polis  at  Ortreia 


262 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOl'NGETl. 


18 


Dionv^iu^  tlic  pl.ilosopher  obtained  abiindnnce  of  flattorors-as  his 
fall  r  bio  rysius  the  piet  had  obtained  before  h.m-aiKUvas  even 
embolde  uhUo  proclaim  himself  as  the  son  of  Apollo.  It  is  possible 
?lmt  even  an  impuissant  embrace  of  philosophy,  on  the  par  ot  so 
l  eat  a  K.tentate,  inav  have  tended  to  exalt  the  reputation  ol  philoso- 
phers ii  the  contemporary  ^^^orld.     Otherwise  the  dabblm-s  of  Dio- 

viius\vould  have  meritecl  no  attention;  though  he  seems  toha^e 
been  really  a  man  of  some  literary  talent-retammg  to  the  end  a 
sincere  admiration  of  Plato,  and  jealoiisly  pettish  bec^nuse  he  c^^^^^^^ 
not  nrevail  upon  Plato  to  admire  him.  But  the  second  visit  of  PLuo 
"o  him  a  Syracu.e-very  diflerent  from  his  first-presented  no 
cha  c^of  benelit  to  the  people  of  Syracuse,  and  on  y  deserves  no  ice 
as  it  bore  upon  the  destinv  of  Dion,  lleie.  -'  -^-;f ;  J',^  i'  ;^ 
could  accomiuishnothinir;  though  h'.s  zeal  on  behalf  ot  hi>  ^^ 
"n  as  unwearied.  Dionysius  broke  all  Ids  promises  of  kind  dealing, 
be  came  more  rancorous  in  his  hatred,  impatient  of  the  respec  uhich 
Dircnjoyed  even  as  an  exile,  and  fearful  of  the  revenge  which  he 
■mirrht  onedav  be  aT)le  to  exact.  _  , 

\V1  en  expc'ned  from  Bvracuse,  Dion  had  gone  to  Peloponnesus 
and  Athens  where  he  had  continued  for  s(;mc  years  to  receive 
regular  remittances  of  his  property.  But  at  length,  evTn  ^y  -'l;'  P  =  ;<; 
^-as  residing  at  Syracuse.  Dionysius  tliought  ht  to  ^T^^  ^^'f  ^  ^^^  \^ 
of  the  property,  on  pretense  of  reserving  it  for  Dion  s  son.  Pi<^^entl> 
he  took  steps  Vk  m;)re  violent,  threw  olf  all  disguise,  sold  the  whole 

f  Dion's  property,  and  appropriated  or  di^trbutc^  ainr)ng  his  fru-nds 
the  lar-e  proceeds. .not  less  than  ICO  talents.  Plato,  who  liad  tl  e 
nortkition  to  hear  this  intelligence  while  m  the  pabceof  Dio- 
m sins   was  full  of  urief  and  dis,,leasure.     He  imp  ored  permission 

o  cWrt  But  tho/iirh  the  min.l  of  Dionysius  mid  now  been  thor- 
ough v  set  aL^ainst  him  by  the  multiplied  insinuations  of  the  calumni- 
ators  it  was  not  without-'dilhculty  and  tiresome  solicitations  that  he 

obtained  peimission;  chietly  thromrh  the  ^^^^^'J^\J^Z''^:^'x)!^ 
Archvtas  and  Ids  companions,  who  represented  to  the  despot  111.  t 
Uic^  had  brought  liim  to  Syracuse,  and  thai  they  were  responsible 
for^iis  safe  return.  The  mercenaries  of  Dionysius  were  indeed  so  i  h 
disposed  to  Plato,  that  considerable  precautions  were  required  to 

'^i^^vas"  n^  tl^ '^^rh^^  BGO  ..c.  that  the  i>lnlosopher  appears  to 
have  returned  to  Peloponnesus  from  this,  his  ^^'^^;7\?;;r' .,\^, J^\^^ 
youn-er  Dionvshis.  and  third  ^isll  to  Syracuse.  At  tl  e  01}  n.p.c 
festival  of  thai  year,  he  met  Dion,  to  whom  he  recounted  the  recc.t 
Drocecdin-s  of  Dionysius.  Incensed  at  the  seizure  ot  the  piope  .}. 
and  hopeh-ss  of  Jinv  permission  to  return.  Dion  was  now  nuonalmg 
.  enLccmient  of  hi/ri^oration  at  the  poi.t  .i  the  sword  E"^^eie 
occurred  vet  another  insult  on  the  part  ot  Dionysius,  ^^  hich  mfuscd 
a  more  deadly  exasperation  into  the  quarrel  Z^'-^?' ^^'^^^^  ^v,.^l"e 
and  half-sister  of  Dionysius.  had  continued  to  reside  at  S)  iacu.se 


PLATO  imoim  DION.  2^3 

t^^  t^:^^^  "^^^^^^J^^Trl  ^  r^  between  the 

in  his  prc-sent  Iiatred  to^^D^^^^^^J'r  ^^^^^  '^'^^^'^^^^ 

0  pronounce  her  divorced,  n.!(^rrema?^1  "?  i/^ -j!?^/^!^""  ^^^"^ 

decided  repuunance  with  niww.f  i.; .  r .      V         '  i"  spite  ot  her  own 


strict  as  to  hh  own  p"    o^'  1  w,,,,"  Z  '"''"''P;'  7'"'  '"<""■■.>'•   ""J 

Plulo,  whom  1,0  as.  "t„,)  toZ       ?       \  "'  """2"'   ""-'  '^'•^'  t""-"''! 
at  Alliens.     Dio:,  als,    vis   "i  1    .^      "i"""  "'  "^''""«  ^^^'>t^M"<i 

f'lft   not  unknown  to  DiiVus  nJ    ,,^i  '^  "''^''"  "•ei-ywherc;  a 

Yet  Dion  was  Ion.  not  v  1  nt  iZ^  l^t^^l-  ''T  ''i^l^'^-»'-<-- 
i"iii.;ale,  so  as  to  allow  of  liis,i,M,'f.i  '''  '''•'Pl<"'-"i-e  "-onW 
Not-  .li,l  ],e  eherisl,  annX^es  I  in[,?'"'';-?"/'''f'''''y  '''"''■ 
iua;switl,  respect  to  Ws  i  ,"  irty.,  1  is  f''  '  "'  ""^  ''"'  l^''""-'-'d- 
and  awakened  vindictive  sen   ni',  It   ^      '""'?  ""  "^  "^^  '"'Pe 

train  f..r  allaekin- D  onvsh  s    ,  w     %       \'^^^^^      dierefore  to  lava 

invoking  the  cou'Tic^  4^Tp  l"!  li'rJ'";^!;-^'"-"'''^  ""'  '""'■ 
notw.ihoni  „,o,.,nlnl  reserves  sai'„,Vl,^,^',  '*  •>l'l"-"'«"i"".  Kt 
of  age-that  liion.r],  i,o  adniiier,  '  "'^'■'  ""»■  ^ventvvcara 

bad  Conduct  of  Dionvsfns  'i' m  o;  ,' wT™^       ',"■,"'""  '^"''  "'« 

to  his  feelin.-s   .,nd  he  ,.  I,  i,"    ""-'," '"^  ncveitlieless  repno-nant 

I'-l  l^'l^'i^r'lonr  n  vtu       M^^^^^^^^^^^^^  S"™'  f"'»  i>-.l.at  1^ 

and  c.nM  not  ,.;«■  lahor  fo"  .'of  o  .  ^',  i   '  ,  3"  "™^'""'^''  '''"--"- 

liis  intiniate  friend  and  r  |    w     .,.!,?„""•      *'P"'.'^M'l'us  especially, 

«'"sc,  had  conunuiti  •    ed  ,n  '  i^«-         fJ'''''"''!^'''''^   P'"'"  '«  Sy'"^'' 
gave  encoura..in.^  i-e     ris  of  /l„  ,  •  P"l"'i''tiou  in  the  city,  Iind 

came  with  ev?..  .5>  .sr/l';:  t",  v'  '    l.^^fDlinusin:''  "^"^y  "''^''  ''  "« 
iiidenuis  (the  friend  of  Ai-ist,>il,.     'r-      '-'.""J^"'^-     Kallippus,  w  ili 

men.hers  of  the     ,c  c     attl     t  '.l  .^'"""'''ri  "',"'  '^'iH'^'-all  three 

le»t  hin,  ai.l  and  emllL:  e  |  „  1  i  'S^;";:  *'' Tf''  "  '"•"'^"'"  "'^"- 
oils  body  of  e\il,.s  from  Sv,-  „  ,,  ,  „  i  '  "  '  ^'"'^''^  ^"■''<'  "  nuiner- 
niost  of\vhon,  Dio  open^,  '  mm  "^^^^^  Uian  1000  altogether;  with 
He  at  the  same  time  Uv^m^^  "^^Z''"'""^ur'' f^'"""-«'"P- 
Lis  measures  as  secret  as  ™eeoh^         ••        '■""""  '"V'^'^'  '«'^"Pi''s 

Ach.ans  in  Pelopon„esi.s^r.:'Li;!^\r''-n.™^;U!:i;^ 


264 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


HERAKLEIDES   EXILED. 


265 


to 


sympathy  ^vitll  the  Achrran  colony  Kroton   then  under  the  depend- 
2,  o   of   Diony^^iii^^)    conferring  upon  it  additional  dignity  by  his 
n  une  -md  p  e  ei  ce  '   A  con.idcM-able  quantity  of  spare  arms,  of  eyery 
;  ".^rii   i  n^  ^-argot  to.a^her,  in  order  to  supply  ne^y  unarmed  par- 
t;^^     l^^acldng  Sicily.     With  all  these  aids  0-^^-^^^^^^ 
in   he  inland  of  Zakynlhus,  a  little  after  ]\Iidsummer  o5.  b  c.    mus- 
r    f^  800  "oldiers  of  tried  experience  and  brayery,  tnIio  had  been 
rUT>  X  thither  silently  and  in  small  p.-rlies,  Avithout  being 
blflimed  whither  they  ^v  ere  go  big.     A  HttU.  sqnadion^as  pn-parec^ 
of  no  more  than  fiye  merchantmen,  t^vo  of  ^bcm  ^  esse  sot  tinny 
o'r«   %vilh  yictuals  adequate  to  the  direct  passage  across  the  ^^'a  fi oni 
7-l-;-nt  lis  to   Syracuse:    since  the  ordinary  passage,   across  from 
KcAvm  and  ah^ng  the  TaVentine  Gulf,  was  impracticable,  in  the 
f'lfp  of  the  maritime  power  of  Dionysius.  .  ,    ^.  ,       i  .^ 

Srch  was  the  contemptible  force  with  which  Dion  yentured  to 
attack  the  Neatest  of  .11  Grecian  potentates  in  his  own  strong- 
h  Id  ind  i.lan  Dionysius  had  now  reignc d  as  d(  ^pot  at  byracuse 
I  vmi  ten  ml  ck-yen  years.  Inferior  as  he  pei s(  nally  was  to  his 
f  ulKM  t  d  es  „ot  seem  that  the  Syracusan  power  had  yet  materially 
d  c  led  in  hishands      We  know  little  about  Ihe  political  facts  of 

"o  "rca"  .'""c  iKMoisn,  and  M,l,lin,i,y  ''V'^.^lTn'^rfo™ 
ins  liberation  of  l,is  country  from  »  5''-^l"1i  ,'1' "^^  .fniv  htul  in 
nilivi"-e«  to  himpclf— tliat  lie -n as  satisfied  if  lie  con  (1  only  land  in 
SHl'v"^Mt  1  no  m  tterhovv  .mall  a  force,  accounting  it  honor  enough 
to'  eri^l  1  "m- 1  a  cause.  Such  ^vas  the  (inphatic  lanpiage  of 
Rin  np-  ited  to  us  bv  Aristotle;  ^ho  (heing  then  amon^Mhe  J.upils 
of  Pl'-Jo  1 1'u  1  rohablV  have  heard  it  ^vitl,  his  own  ears.  1  o  inipar- 
,iilcoi?empormy  spectators,  like  Demosthenes,  the  attempt  seemed 

''"BuVtlic  intelligent  men  of  the  Academy  ^^;ho  accompanied  Dion 
,-o,  11  not   have' thrown  their   lives  away   in   ^o-'l""!;'" ,'°"  °f  .^ 
gioriousmnrtvrdom;  nor  were  either  they  or  l''\\^"™;    '\'' .''•',  ^;" 
Ixistcd  circumstances,  not  strikinff  the  eye  of  ""■  ""1'";  O  ^P^'a 
tor,  which   materially   weakened   the  great  apparent    secuiitj    of 

^Fi'S'"therc  was  the  pronounced  and  almost  unanimous  discon- 
tent of  the  people  of  Syracuse.  Though  prohibited  from  all  public 
maliif  .stmiSns,'tl,ey  had  been  greatly  agitated  l^)' !  ."j.-jf  ^1  ,f „"t 
i<.ct  of  Dion  to  srant  liberty  to  the  city-by  the  ineln.ations  '^^'  "t 
Dionvsius  himself  toward'  the  same  end  so  soot.  ""''j;i;i;  '^  .<^^'';.: 
guislied-by  the  dissembling  huiguage  of  Dionysius,  the  fc.reat  posi 


lion  of  Dion  s  wife  and  sister,  and  the  second  visit  of  Plato  all  of 
which  favored  Ihe  hope  that  Dion  might  be  amicably  recalled  At 
leng  1,  such  chance  disappeared,  when  his  property  w-as  conli'cated 
an.l  his  w-ife  re-marrie<l  to  another.  But  as  his  energetic  clmr^cl« 
was  well  known,  the  Syracusans  now  both  confidently  exacted  . La 
ar,  ently  wished  that  he  would  return  by  force,  a.ul  help  tl^ra  o 
put  down  one  who  was  alike  his  enemy  and  theirs      S leishmus 

pS?  'brouTt"  Mck'"*,"  '.".Syracuse  a^d  mingle.!  mucfwit'l'ue 
people     brougJ  t    back    decisive    testimonies   of    their    disaffection 
tmy:ird  Dionysius   and  of  tlieir  eager  longing  fc)r  rclie   bv  tl  e  h'S 
of  Dion.     It  would  be  sufficient  (they  said?  if  he  even  c'lme  a  Inn 
they  would  flock  around  him,  andU  him  it  onee^rh  r^dequatc; 

There  were  doubtless  many  other  messa^ges  of  similar  tenor  sent  to 
Peloponnesus;  and  one  Syraeusan  exile,  Herakleides,  wasln  li?n  self 
a  considerable  force.      Though  a  friend  of  Dion,  he  had  continu  d 
h  gh  m  the  service  of  Dionysius.  until  the  second  yi«it  of  P?ato     A 
that  time  he  was  di.sgraced,  and  obliged  to  save  his  life  bv  fltrht   or 
account  of  a  mutiny  among  the  mercenary  troops,  or  rather  of  the 
veteran  soldiers  among  them,  whose  pay  Dionysius  had  cut  dov  n 
The  men  sc5  curtailed    rose  in  arms,  denmmling^conti   imnce  of    he 
old  pay;  and  when  Dionysius  shut  the  gates  otMhe  acropolis   icf  s 
ing  attention  to  their  requisitions,  they  raised  the  furious  bii^baric 
paean  or  war  shout,  and  rushed  up  to  scale  the  walls.     Teiribe  wc  e 
«ie  voices  of  these  Gauls.  Iberians,  and  Campanians.  in  the  ears  of 
Plato,  who  knew  himself  to  be  the  object  ot'tiieir  hatred   and  who 
happened  to  be  then  in  the  garden  of  the  acropolis    Xit  Di  nv.  n. 
Sc.  w'  ^"T^«f  ''T  P'^^^-'^M^peased  the  muUnv''  by  conceS  ^^i 
that  was  asked   an(  even  more.    The  blame  of  this  nilidvent  rhv  i 
thrown  upon  Herakleides,  toward  whom  Dionysius  conZted  hm 
bot  "of Pht<f 'mV^  and  ti^achery-acconling  to  tlu  "udgme  t 

bromrht  won^^  to  n  '''^?TVv  ^"''.-  ^^  ''''  ^^^^'^^'  Herakleides  now 
I  rouglit  word  to  Dion  that  Dionysius  could  not  even  rely  upon  the 
mercenary  troops,  whom  he  treated  with  a  parsimonv^  he  mo  e 
TW  kl"^l^'  they  contrasted  it  with  the  munificence  ofhis  fatr, 
Ile.akleides  was  eager  to  co-operate  in  putting  down  the  despotism 
at  byracuse.  But  he  waited  to  equip  a  squadron  of  triremes  3 
was  no  ready  so  soon  as  Dion;  peAaps  intentiona  ly,  s  h J' I'e- 1 
ousy  between  the  two  soon  broke  out  ^  ^ 

actTr'mcniabitT"  tL'^I.'''"^'"'!'  '"  Dionysius  lay  in  his  own  char- 
ac  er  ami  nalnts.  Ihe  coiniiianding  eiiercy  of  Ihe  faiher  f.ir  fr.n.. 
being  of  service  to  the  son,  had  been  c'i^b  ned  dth  a  ie'.lo'wv 
which  intentionally  kept  him  down  and  cramped  Is  growfhH^ 
had  always  been  weak,  petty,  destitute  of  courage  or  fS'es  .'hi  and 

maint.  hLd  "h'"""  '"^'^  /!"*'  ^'^''""^  '"«  father^ad  accp,  ?e  1  nd 
maintained.     His  personal  incompetency  was  reco.niize.l  bv  all    ..nrJ 

would  probably  have  manifesled  itself  even  moi^ainspiciiusly,  iiad 


266 


DlONYSirS  THE   YOUNGER. 


DlOX  LANDS   AT   llEUAKLEIA. 


267 


he  not  found  a  minister  of  so  miicli  ability,  and  so  much  devotion  to  the 
dynasty,  as  Philistus.  But  in  addition  to  such  known  inromi»etcncy, 
he  had  contracted  recently  habits  which  inspired  every  one  around 
hiui  with  contempt.  HeVas  perpetually  intoxicated  and  plunged 
in  dissipation.  To  put  down  such  a  chief,  evt'U  though  surrounded 
by  walls,  soldiers,  and  armed  ships,  appeared  to  Dion  and  his  confi- 
dential companions  an  enterprise  no  way  impracticable. 

Nevertheless  tiiese  causes  of  weakness  were  known  only  to  close 
observers;  while  the  great  military  force  of  Syracuse  wns  obvious  to 
the  eves  of  every  one.  When  the  soldiers  mustered  by  Dion  at 
Zakynthus,  were* first  informed  that  they  were  destined  to  strike 
straight  across  tlie  sea  against  Syracuse,  they  shrank  from  tlie  prop- 
osition as  an  act  of  insanity.  They  complained  of  their  leaders  for 
not  htivinfr  before  told  th'em  what  was  projected;  just  as  the  Ten 
Thousand  Greeks  in  the  army  of  Cyrus,  on  reaching  Tarsus,  com- 
plained of  Klearchus  for  liaving  kept  back  the  fact  that  they  were 
inarching  against  the  Great  King.  It  required  ail  the  eloquence  of 
Dion,  with  his  advanced  age,  liis  dignified  presence,  and  the  quan- 
tity of  gold  and  silver  plate  in  his  possession,  to  remove  their  appre- 
hensions. How  widely  these  apprehensions  were  felt  is  shown  by 
the  circumstance,  that  out  of  1000  Syracusan  exiles,  only  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  dared  to  join  him. 

After  a  inagnificent  sacrifice  to  Apollo,  and  an  ample  banquet  to 
the  soldiers  \\  the  stadium  at  Zakynthus,  Dion  gave  orders  for 
embarkation  in  the  ensuing  morning.*^  On  that  very  night  tiie  moon 
was  eclipsed.  We  have  aiready  seen  what  disastrous  consequences 
turned  upon  the  occurrence  of 'this  same  plienomenon  fifty-six  years 
before,  when  Nikias  was  about  to  conduct  tlie  defeated  Athenian 
fleet  away  from  the  harbor  of  Syracuse.  Under  the  existing  api^re- 
hensionsof  Dion's  band,  the  ecfipse  might  well  have  induced  them 
to  renounce  the  enterprise;  and  so  it  probably  would,  under  a  gen- 
eral like  Nikias.  But  Dion  had  learnt  astronomy;  and  what  was  of 
not  less  consequence,  Miltas.  the  prophet  of  the  expedition,  bf  sides 
his  gift  of  proi)hecv,  had  received  instructions  in  the  Academy  also. 
When  the  affrighted  soldiers  inquired  what  new  res()lution  was  to 
be  adopted  in  consequence  of  so  grave  a  sign  from  the  gods,  Miltas 
rose  and  assured  them  that  they  had  mistaken  the  inqwrt  of  the 
sign.wliich  promised  them  good  fortune  and  victory.  By  the  eclipse 
of  the  moon,  the  gods  intimated  that  something  very  brilliant  was 
about  to  be  darkened  over;  now  there  was  nothing  in  Greece  so 
brilliant  as  the  despotism  of  Dionysius  at  Syracuse;  it  was  Diony- 
sius  who  was  about  to  suffer  eclipse,  to  be  brought  on  by  the  victory 
of  Dion.  Reassured  by  such  consoling  words,  the  soldiers  got  on 
board.  They  had  good  reason  at  first  to  believe  that  the  favor  of 
the  gods  waited  upon  them,  for  a  gentle  and  steady  Etesian  breeze 
carried  them  across  midsea  Avithout  accident  or  sufT<'ring,  in  twelve 
days,  from  Zakynthus  to  Cape  Pachynus,  the  south-eastern  corner 


of    Sicib   a.id   nearest  to   Syracuse.      The  pilot    Protus.  who  had 
steered  the   course   so  as  exactly  to  hit  the  ct.pe,  ur<rentlv  lecom 
mended  i.mned.ate  disembarkation,  without  going  farilier  donrthe 
south-western  coast  of  the  island;  since  stornn-  weather  was  ?om 
mencing,  whu-h  mi^ght  hinder  the  fleet  from  keeping  near  the  shor^ 
Hut    Dion  was  afraid  of   landing  so  near  to  the  n7ain  force  of  tlfe 
enemy.      Accordingly  t!,e    squadron    proceeded    onward    but  weie 
driven   by  a  violent  wind   away  from    Sicilv  toward   the  ^-oa^t  of 
A  1  ica,  narrowly  escaping  shipwreck.     Jt  was  uot  without  cons!  ie^- 
:ble   hard,h,p  and   danger  that  they  got   b.ack  to  Sicilv  after  live 
days;  touching  the  island  at  HeraklJia^MinJa  westward  of  aL,  o^en 
turn,   wi  hin  the  Carthaginian  supremacy.     The  Cartha^nnian  -ov 
ernor  of  >[,noa.  Synalus   (perhaps  a   Greek  in  the  sen^ci  of  C^tr- 
Mfn'll^'''-^  ncquaintanee    of    J)i(,n,    and  received  him 

\itli  all  possible  kindness;  though  knowing  iu)thing  beforehand  of 
his  approach,  and  at  first  resisting  his  landing  through  icrnomnce 

<rynu!u^    '  Ti      r''  ^'I'f  ^^'\y^}'^  of  ^-^ile,  once   more  on  Sicilian 
n  Z^l      n'\  ^^i^<>'-» 'Je  predictions  of  Miltas  had  been  completely 

f       b^^l.    I'S'T?-!"^'  ^'''^^'''  ^^'^^^^^  hardly  have  been  prepaS 

hV  vn     iHoM^^^  "'r  ^r'"^'  which  insured  the  success  o 

the  (xp ;>  ition.      Dionysius  had  recenllv  sailed   from    Svracu^e   to 

i^fc/a  nd?^he'l'^'^''*'^r^-    ,  ^^^^^--^^^ce^l  him  to'ccmmh    o 
wHii  a  n.(  t  in  the  Gulf  of  rarentum,  waiting  to  intercept  Dion   in'd 

m  111,11  du      I  liilistiis  <li,l  not  commit  the  same  mistake  as  Niliiua 

ad  made  m  reference  to  Oylippus-thnt  of  de.pisn,;.  Db ,  l^c-a,   e 

of  tlie  s  nul  ness  o    Ins  force,     lie  watclied  in  tl  e  usual  waters   ™<1 

wa.  only  disappointed  because  Dion,  venturing  on  th^    old  ™d 

.'I'^vi  -^'pr'-'r"''^'"'  f"?  ■'^'■''•■''•y  f"^-°"'d  "J- wind  and  weather 

I>.il  while  Philistus  watched  the  coast  of  Italv   it  was  natiiri  Imt 

Dionysius  himself  shouM  keep  s„anl  with  His' main ""aisyra 

u.e.     The  despot  was  fully  aware  of  the  disafleclion  whicli  rei-ned 

m  the  town   and  of  tlie  hopes  excited  bv  Di,m\s  proiect-  w  ,  eli  was 

gc^,«-ally  well  known,  thougli  noonecould  tell  hovv  oral  what  momen? 

he  deliverer  migh   be  expected.     Suspicious  now  to  a  greaterdt™ree 

1  an  ever,  Dionysius  had  caused  a  fresh  search  to  be  made   n"  he 

city  for  arms,  and  had  taken  away  all  that  he  could  find      We  may 

bo  sure  too  th.at  his  regiment  of  habitual  spies  were  moreon  theaTn 

han  ever,  an,l  that  unusual  rigor  was  the  order  of  the  dav      Ye  tat 

rl^norH   ^"'\T"-'i  ''"  ""i""*^.'"  P">P^'  •"  <J'"'  Sy™«"«  "-it"  a  very 
arge  Porlion  of  his  force,  leaving  the  command  to  Timokrales   the 

Notliing  could  exceed  the  joy  of  the  Dionian  soldiers  on  hearin- 
of  the  departure  of  Dionysius,  which  left  Syracuse  open  and  easy  of 


268 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


access.  Eager  to  avail  tlienir-clvcs  of  tlic  favorable  instant,  tliey 
oalkHl  upon  their  leader  to  march  thither  witlioiit  delay,  repudiating 
even  that  measure  of  rest  which  he  recommended  after  the  fatigues 
of  the  voyaixe.  Accordingly  Dion,  after  a  short  rcfreslimcnt  pro- 
vided by  *8ynalus— with  whom  lie  deposited  his  spare  arms,  to  be 
transmitted  to  him  when  required— set  forward  on  liis  march  toward 
Syracuse.  On  entering  the  Agrigentinc  territory,  he  was  joined  by 
200  horsemen  near  Eknomonr  Further  on,  while  passing  through 
Gela  and  Kamarina.  many  inhabitants  of  these  towns,  together  with 
some  neinhboiing  Sikans  and  ir^ikels,  s\veile(i  his  band.  Lastly,  when 
he  approached  the  Syracusan  bordc  r,  a  considerable  proportion  of 
the  rural  population  came  to  him  also,  though  without  arms;  making 
tlie  re-enforcemcMts  which  joined  liim  altogether  al-out  5,000  men. 
ilavinir  armed  these  volimteers  in  the  best  manner  he  could,  Dion 
continued  his  progress  as  far  as  Akra?,  wlure  he  made  a  short  even- 
in"- halt.  From  tlKnce,  rcceivimr  good  news  from  Syracuse,  he 
recommenced  his  march  during  the  latter  half  of  the  night,  liastening 
forward  to  the  i-assagc  over  the  river  Anapus;  which  he  had  the 
good  fortune  to  occiijiy  without  any  opposition,  before  daybreak. 

Dion  was  now  witliin  no  more  than  a  mile  and  a  quarter  of  the 
walls  of  Syracuse.  The  rising  sun  disclosed  his  aimy  to  the  view  of 
the  Syracusan  population,  who  were  doubtless  impatiently  watching 
for  him.  He  was  seen  olTeiing  sacrifice  to  the  river  Anapus,  and 
puttinn;  lip  ji  Folemn  prayer  to  the  Gf  d  Helios,  then  just  showing 
himself  above  the  horizon.*^  He  wore  the  wreath  habitual  with  those 
who  were  thus  employed;  \vhile  Ins  soldiers,  animated  by  the  conti- 
dent  encourajrement  of  the  prophets,  had  taken  wreaths  also.  Elate 
and  enthusiastic,  they  passed  the  Anapus  (seimingly  at  the  bridge 
which  formed  pai't  of  the  Helorine  way),  advanced  at  a  ruiuiingpace 
across  the  low  plain  which  divided  the  southern  cliff  of  Epipol.T  from 
the  Great  Harbor,  and  approached  the  gates  of  the  quarter  of  Syra- 
cuse called  Neapolis— the  Temenitid  Gates,  near  the  chapel  of  Apollo 
Temenites.  Dion  was  at  their  head,  in  resplendent  armor,  with  a 
body-iruard  near  him  composed  of  100  of  his  Peloponnesians.  His 
brother  Meirakles  was  on  one  side  of  him,  his  friend  the  Athenian 
Kallippus  on  the  other;  all  three,  and  a  large  proportion  of  tlje  sol- 
diers also,  still  crowned  with  their  sacritlcial  wreaths,  as  if  marching 
in  a  joyous  festival  procession,  with  victory  already  assured. 

As  yet  Dion  had  not  met  with  the  smallest  resistance.  Timokrates 
(left  at  Syracuse  with  the  large  mercenary  force  as  viceregent),  while 
he  sent  an  express  to  apprise  Dionysius,  kept  his  chief  hold  oii  the 
two  military  positions  or  horns  of  the  city;  the  island  of  Ortygia  at 
one  extreniity,  and  Epipola?  with  Euryalus  on  the  other.  It  has 
already  been  "^mentioned  that  Epipolae  was  a  triangular  slope,  with 
walls  bordering  both  the  northern  and  southern  cliffs,  and  forming 
an  ansle  on  the  western  apex,  where  stood  the  strong  fort  of  Eury- 
alus. ''  Between  Ortygia  and  Epipoloe  lay  the  populous  quarters  of 


i-.'iir^j.t^*W!;J^-aLitit^il 


i-.i.-A.^J.".-^-^..----^.  r.it.iK3tew.i5^a^ 


TLMOKRATES  EVACUATES  SYRACUSE. 


269 


Syracuse,  wherein  the  great  body  of  citizens  resided.  As  the  disaf- 
fection of  the  Syracusans  was  well  kriown,  limokrates  thought  it 
unsafe  to  go  out  of  the  city,  and  meet  Dion  on  the  road,  for  fear  of 
revolt  within.  But  he  perhaps  might  liave  occujued  the  important 
bridge  over  the  Anapus,  had  not  unreport  reached  him  that  Dion  was 
directing  his  attack  tirst  against  Leoutini.  Many  of  the  Campanian 
mercenaries  under  the  command  of  Timokrates,  having  properties  in 
Leontiui,  immediately  quitted  Epipol*  to  go  thither  and  defend 
them.  This  rumor — false,  and  perhaps  intentionally  spread  by  the 
invaders — not  only  carried  off  mucli  of  the  garrison  elsewhere,  but 
also  misled  Timokrates;  insomuch  that  Dion  w^as  alloyed  to  r'nake 
his  night  march,  to  reach  the  Anapus,  and  to  find  it  unoccupied. 

It  was  too  late  for  Timokrates  to  resist,  when  the  rising  sun  had 
once  exhibited  the  army  of  Dion  crossing  the  Anapus.  The  effect 
produced  upon  the  Syracusans  in  the  populous  quarters  w^as  electric. 
They  rose  like  one  man  to  welcome  their  deliverer,  and  to  put  down 
the  dynasty  which  had  hung  about  their  necks  for  forty-eight  years. 
Such  of  the  mercenaries  of  "Dionysius  as  w^ere  in  these  central  por- 
tions of  the  city  were  forced  to  seek  shelter  in  Epipolae,  while  his 
police  and  spies  were  pursued  and  seized,  to  undergo  the  full  terrors 
of  a  popular  vengeance.  Far  from  being  able  to  go  forth  against 
Dion,  Timokrates  could  not  even  curb  the  internal  insurrection.  So 
thoroughly  ^vas  he  intimidated  by  the  reports  of  his  territied  police, 
and  by  the  violent  and  unanimous  burst  of  wrath  among  a  people 
whom  every  Dionysian  partisan  had  long  been  accustomed  to  treat 
as  disarmed  slaves— that  he  did  not  think  himself  safe  even  in  Epip- 
okc.  But  he  could  not  find  means  of  getting  to  Ortygia,  since  the 
intermediate  city  was  in  the  hands  of  his  enemies,  wiule  Dion  and 
his  troops  were  crossing  the  low  plain  betw^een  Epipola?  and  the 
Great  Harbor.  It  only  remained  for  him  therefore  to  evacuate 
Syracuse  altogether,  and  to  escajie  from  Epipohe  either  by  the  north- 
ern or  the  western  side.  To  justify  his  hasty  tlight,  he  spread  the 
most  terrific  reports  respecting  the  army  of  Dion,  and  thus  contrib- 
uted still  farther  to  paralyze  the  discouraged  partisans  of  Dionysius. 

Already  had  Dion  reached  the  Temenitid  gate,  where  the  princi- 
pal citizens,  clothed  in  their  best  attire,  and  the  multitude  pouring 
forth  loud  and  joyous  acclamations,  were  assembled  to  meet  hiin. 
Halting  at  the  gate,  he  caused  his  trumpet  to  sound,  and  entreated 
silence;  after  which  he  formally  proclaimed,  that  he  and  his  brother 
Mcgakles  were  come  for  the  purpose  of  putting  down  the  Dionysian 
despotism,  and  of  giving  liberty  both  to  the  Syracusans  and  the  other 
Sicilian  Greeks.  Tlie  acclamations  redoubled  as  he  and  his  soldiers 
entered  the  city,  first  through  Neapolis,  next  by  the  ascent  up  to 
Achradina;  the  main  street  of  which  (broad,  continuous,  and  straight, 
as  was  rare  in  a  Grecian  city)  was  decorated  as  on  a  day  of  jubilee, 
with  victims  under  sacrifice  to  the  gods,  tables,  and  ])o\vls  of  wine 
ready  prepared  for  festival.     As  Dion  advanced  at  the  head  of  his 


lftu.>l<*it 


270 


DIONYSILS  THE   YOl \NGEll. 


soldiers  throiidi  a  lane  formed  in  the  midst  of  this  crowd,  from  each 
side  wreaths  were  cast  upon  him  as  upon  an  Olympic  victor,  and 
o-ratcful  })rayers  addressed  to  him  as  it  were  to  a  god.  Every  house 
was  a  scene  of  clamorous  joy,  in  which  men  and  women,  freemen 
and  shives.  took  part  alike;  the  outburst  of  feelings  long  compressed 
and  lelieved  from  the  past  despotism  with  its  inquisitorial  police  and 

garrison.  ,      .       , 

It  was  not  yet  time  for  Dion  to  yield  to  these  pleasing  hut  passive 
impulses.  Having  infused  courage  into  his  soldiers  as  well  as  into 
the  citizens  by  his  triumphant  procession  through  Achradina,  he 
descended  to  the  level  ground  in  tront  of  Ortygia.  That  stronghold 
was  still  occupied  by  the  Dionysian  garrison,  whom  he  thus  chal- 
lenired  to  come  forth  and  lighl.*  But  the  tliglit  of  Timokrates  had 
left'  them  without  orders,  while  the  imposing  demonstration  and 
unanimous  rising  of  the  people  in  Achradina— which  they  must  partly 
have  witnessed  from  their  walls,  and  partly  learned  through  fugitive 
si^ies  and  partisans — struck  them  with  discouragement  and  terror;  so 
that  tbev  were  in  no  disposition  to  quit  the  shelter  of  their  fortilica- 
tious.  i'heir  backwardness  was  hailed  as  a  confession  of  inferiority 
bv  the  insurgent  citizens,  w horn  Dion  now  addressed  as  an  assembly 
of  freemen.  Hard  by,  in  front  of  the  acropolis  with  its  Pentapyla 
or  live  gates,  there  stood  a  lofty  and  maguiticent  sun-dial,  erected  by 
the  elder  Dionysius.  3Iounting  on  the  lop  of  this  edifice,  with  the 
muniments  of  Uie  desj  ot  on  one  side  and  the  now  liberated  Achra- 
dina on  the  other,  Dion  addressed  an  animated  harangue  to  the  Syra- 
ciffeans  around,  exhorting  them  to  strenuous  elTorts  in  defense  of 
their  newly-acquired  rigiits  and  liberties,  and  inviting  them  to  elect 
generals  for  the  command,  in  order  to  accom])lish  the  total  expul- 
sion of  the  Dionysian  garrison.  The  Syracusans.  with  unanimous 
acclamations,  luuV.ed  Du)n  and  his  brother  Megakles  generals  with 
full  powers.  But  both  tlie  brothers  insisted  that  colleagues  should 
be  elected  along  with  them.  Accordingly  twenty  other  persons  were 
chosen  besides,  ten  of  them  being  from  that  small  baud  of  Syracusau 
exiles  who  had  joined  at  Zakynthus. 

f^uch  was  the  entry  of  Dion  into  Syracuse,  on  the  third  day  after 
'his  landing  in  Sicilv^;  and  such  the  first  public  act  of  renewed  Syra- 
cusun  freedom:  the  first  after  that  fatal  vote  which,  forty-eight  years 
before,  had  elected  the  elder  Dionysius  general  plenipotentiary,  and 
l)laced  in  his  hands  the  sword  of  s'late,  without  foresight  of  the  con- 
sequences. In  the  hands  of  Dion,  that  sword  was  viL-orously  em- 
])loyed  affninst  the  common  enemy.  He  immedintely  attacked 
Epipolap;  and  such  was  the  consternation  of  the  garrison  left  in  it  by 
the  fugitive  Timokrates,  that  they  allowed  him  to  acquire  possession 
of  it,  together  with  the  strong  fort  of  Euryalus,  which  a  little  cour- 
age and  devotion  might  long  have  defended.  This  acquisition,  made 
suddenly  in  the  tidcof  success  on  one  side  and  discouragement  on 
the  other,  was  of  supreme  importance,  and  went  far  to  determine 


RETURN  OF   DIONYSIUS. 


271 


the  ultimate  contest.  It  not  only  reduced  the  partisans  of  Dionysius 
within  the  limits  of  Ortygia,  but  also  enabled  Dion  to  set  free  many 
state  prisoners,  who  became  ardent  partisans  of  the  revolution.  Fol- 
lowing up  his  success,  he  lost  no  time  in  taking  measures  against 
Ortygia.  To  shut  it  up  completely  on  the  land-side,  he  commenced 
the  er(;ction  of  a  wall  of  blockade,  reaching  from  the  Great  Harbor 
at  one  extremity,  to  the  sea  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Portus  Lak- 
kius,  at  the  other.  He  at  the  same'  time  provided  arms  as  well  as  he 
could  for  the  citizens,  sending  for  those  spare  arms  which  he  had  de- 
posited with  Synalus  at  Minoa.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  garrison 
of  Ortygia  made  any  sally  to  impede  him:  so  that  in  the  course  of 
seven  days,  he  had  not  only  received  his  arms  from  Synalus,  but 
had  completed,  in  a  rough  way,  all  or  most  of  the  blockading  cross- 
wall. 

At  the  end  of  these  seven  days,  but  not  before  (having  been  pre- 
vented by  accident  from  receiving  the  express  sent  to  him),  Diony- 
sius returned  with  his  fleet  to  Ortygia.  Fatally  indeed  was  his  posi- 
tion changed.  The  islet  was  the  only  portion*  of  the  city  which  he 
possessed,  and  tliat  too  was  shut  up  on  the  land-side  by  a'^blockading 
wall  nearly  completed.  All  the  rest  of  the  city  was  occupied  by 
bitter  enemies  instead  of  by  subjects.  Leontini  also,  and  probably 
many  of  his  other  dependencies  out  of  Syracuse,  had  taken  the  op- 
portunity of  revolting.  Even  with  tlie'  large  fleet  which  he  had 
brought  home,  Dionysius  did  not  think  himself  strong  enough  to 
face  his  enemies  in  the  field,  but  resorted  to  stratagem.  He  first'tried 
to  open  a  private  intrigue  with  Dion;  who,  however,  refused  to  re- 
ceive any  separate  propositions,  and  desired  him  to  address  them 
publicly  to  the  freemen,  citizens  of  Syracuse,  Accordingly,  he  sent 
envoys  tendering  to  the  Syracusans  what  in  the  ])resent''day  would 
be  called  a  constitution.  He  deMiand<'(l  only  moderate  taxation,  and 
moderate  fulfillments  of  military  service,  subject  to  their  own  vote 
of  consent.  But  the  Syracusans  laughed  the  offer  to  scorn,  and 
Dion  leturm'd  in  their  name  the  i)eremptory  reply — that  no  proposi- 
tion from  Dionysius  could  be  received,  short  of  total  abdication; 
adding  in  his  own  name,  that  he  would  himself,  on  the  score  of  kin- 
.dred,  procure  for  Dionysius,  if  he  did  abdicate,  both  security  and 
other  reasonable  concessions.  These  terms  Dionysius  affected  to  ap- 
prove, desiring  that  envoys  might  be  sent  to  him  in  Ortygia  to  settle 
the  details.  Both  Dion  and  the  Syracusans  eagerly  caught  at  his 
offer,  without  for  a  moment  questioning  his  sincerity.  Some  of  the 
most  eminent  Syracusans,  approved  by  Dion,  were  dispatched  as  en- 
voys to  Dionysius.  A  general  confidence  prevailed,  that  the  retire- 
ment of  the  despot  was  now  assured;  and  the  soldiers  and  citizens 
employed  against  him,  full  of  joy  and  mutual  congratulations,  be- 
came negligent  of  their  guard  on  the  cross-wall  of  blockade;  many 
of  them  even  retiring  to  their  houses  in  the  city. 

This  was  what  Dionysius  expected.    Contriving  to  prolong  the  dis- 


272 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER 


cussion,  so  as  to  detain  the  envoys  in  Ortygia  all  night,  he  ordered  at 
daybreak  a  sudden  sallv  of  all  his  soldiers,  whom  he  had  previously 
stimulated  both  bv  wine  and  by  immense  promises  in  case  of  victory. 
The  sallv  was  well-limed  and  at  first  completely  successful.     One 
lialf  of  Dion's  soldiers  were  encamped  to  guard  the  cross-wall  (the 
other  half  being  quartered  in  Achradina),  together  Avitli  a  force  of 
Syracusan  citizens.     But  so  little  were  they  prepared  for  hosUlities, 
that  the  assailants,  rushing  out  with  shouts  and  at  a  run,  carried  the 
wall  at  the  first  onset,  slew  the  sentinels,  and  proceeded  to  demolish 
the  wall  (which  was  probably  a  rough  and  hasty  structure)  as  well  as 
to  charge  the  tro<-.ps  on  the  outside  of  it.     The  Syracusaus,  surprised 
and  teiTified,  tied  with  little  or  no  resi94ance.     Their  flight  partially 
disordered  the  stouter  Dionian   soldiers,  who  resisted  bravely,  but 
without  havinc:  had  time  to  form  their  regular  array.     Never  was 
Dion  more  illustrious,  both  as  an  otllcer  and  as  a  soldier.    lie  exerted 
himself  to  the  utmost  to  form  the  troops,  and  to  marshal  them  in 
ranks  essential  to  the  effective  fighting  of  the  Grecian  hoplite.     But 
his  orders  wx-re  unheard  in  the  clamor,  or  disregarded  in  the  confu- 
sion: his  troops  lost  courage,  the  assailants  gained  ground,  and  the 
dav  seemed  evidently  going  against  him.     Seeing  that  there  was  no 
other  resource,  he  put"  himself  at  the  head  of  his  best  and  most  at- 
tached soldiers,  and  threw  himself,  though  now  nji  elderly  man,  into 
the  thickest  of  the  frav.    The  struggle  was  the  more  violent  as  it  took 
place  in  a  narrow  space  between  the  new  blockading  wall  on  one  side, 
and  the  outer  wall  of  Neapolis  on  the  other.    Both  the  armor  and  the 
person  of  Dion  being  conspicuous,  he  was  known  to  enemies  as  well 
as  friends,  and  the  battle  around  him  was  among  the  most  obstinate 
in  Grecian  history.    Darts  rnttled  against  both  his  shield  and  his  hel- 
met, while  his  shield  was  also  pierced  through  by  several  spears 
which  were  kept  from  his  l)ody  only  by  the  breast-plate.     At  length 
he  was  wounded  through  the  right  arm  or  hand,  thrown  on  the 
ground,  and  in  imminent  danger  of  being  made  prisoner.     But  this 
forwardness  on  his  part  so  stimulated  the  courage  of  his  own  troops, 
that  they  both  rescued  him.  and  made  redou])led  efforts  against  the 
enemy.     Havinc:  nametl  Timonides  commander  in  his  place,  Dion 
with  his  disabled  hand  mounted  on  horseback,  rode  into  Achradina, 
and  led  forth  to  the  battle  that  portion  of  liis  troops  which  were  there 
in  garrison.    These  men,  fresh  and  good  soldiers,  restored  the  battle. 
The  Syracusans  came  back  to  the  field,  all  joined  in  strenuous  con- 
flict, and  the  Dionysian  assailants  were  at  length  again  driven  within 
the  walls  of  Ortvlda.     The  loss  on  both  sides  was  severe ;  that  of 
Dionysius  800  men ;  all  of  whom  he  caused  to  be  picked  up  from  the 
field  (under  a  truce  granted  on  his  request  by  Dion),  and  buried  with 
magnificent  obsequies,  as  a  means  of  popularizing  himself  with  the 

survivors.  ,    ,     ,  j 

When  w^e  consider  how  doubtful  the  issue  of  this  battle  had  proved, 
it  seems  evident  that  had  Timokrates  maintained  himself  in  Epipolae, 
SO  as  to  enable  Dionysius  to  remain  master  of  Epipolae  as  well  as  of 


DEATH  OF  PHILISTUS. 


273 


Ortygia,  the  success  of  Dion's  whole  enterprise  in  Syracuse  w^ould 
have  been  seriously  endangered. 

Great  w^as  the  joy  excited  at  Syracuse  by  the  victory.  The  Syra- 
cusaii  people  testified  their  gratitude  to  the  Dionian  soldiers  by  vot- 
ing a  golden  wreath  to  the  value  of  100  niinte;  while  these  soldiers, 
charmed  with  the  prowess  of  their  general,  voted  a  golden  WTeath  to 
him.  Dion  immediately  began  the  re-establishment  of  the  damaged 
cross-wall,  w^hich  he  repaired,  completed,  and  put  under  effective 
guard  for  the  future.  Dionysius  no  longer  tried  to  impede  it  by 
armed  attack.  But  as  he  was  still  superior  at  sea,  he  transported 
parties  across  the  harbor  to  ravage  the  country  for  provisions,  and 
dispatched  vessels  to  bring  in  stores  also  by  sea.  His  superiority  at; 
sea  was  presently  lessened  by  the  arrival  of  Herakleides  from  Pelo- 
ponnesus, with  twenty  triremes,  three  smaller  vessels,  and  loOO  sol- 
diers. The  Syracusans,  now^  beginning  to  show  themselves  actively 
on  shipboard,  got  together  a  tolerable  naval  force.  All  the  docks  and 
wharfs  lay  concentrated  in  and  round  Ortygia,  within  the  grasp  of 
Dionysius,  who  was  master  of  the  naval  force  belonging  to  the  city. 
But  it  would  seem  that  the  crews  of  some  of  the  ships  (who  wero 
mostly  native  Syracusans,  with  an  intermixture  of  Athenians,  doubt- 
less of  democratical  sentiments),  must  have  deserted  from  the  despot; 
to  the  people,  carrying  over  their  ships,  since  we  presently  find  the 
Syracusans  with  a  tieet  of  sixty  triremes,  w^hicli  they  could  hardly 
have  acquired  otherv^^ise. 

Dion^'sius  was  shortly  afterward  re-enforced  by  Philistus,  who 
brought  to  Ortygia,  not  only  his  fleet  from  the  Taientine  Gulf,  but 
also  a  considerable  regiment  of  cavalry.  With  these  latter,  and  some 
other  troops  besides,  Philistus  undertook  an  expedition  against  the 
revolted  Leontini.  But  though  he  made  his  way  into  the  town  by 
night,  he  w^as  presently  expelled  by  the  defenders,  seconded  by  re- 
enforcements  from  Syracuse. 

To  keep  Ortygia  provisioned,  however,  it  was  yet  more  indispen- 
sable for  Philistus  to  maintain  his  superiority  at  sea  against  the  growl- 
ing naval  power  of  the  Syracusans,  now  commanded  by  Herakleides. 
After  several  partial  engagements,  a  final  battle,  desperate  and  decis- 
ive, at  length  took  place  between  the  two  admirals.  Both  fleets  were 
sixty  triremes  strong.  At  first  Piillistus,  brave  and  forward,  appeared 
likely  to  be  victorious.  But  presently  the  fortune  of  the  day  turned 
against  him.  His  ship  was  run  ashore,  and  himself,  with  most  part 
of  his  fleet,  overpowered  by  the  enemy.  To  escape  captivity,  he 
stabbed  himself.  The  wound,  however,  w\as  not  mortal;  so  that  he 
fell  alive,  being  now  about  78  years  of  age,  into  the  hands  of  his  ene- 
mies— who  stripped  him  naked,  insulted  him  brutally,  and  at  length 
cut  off  his  head,  after  w^hich  they  dragged  his  body  by  the  leg  through 
the  streets  of  Syracuse.  Revolting  as  this  treaiment  is,  we  must 
recollect  that  it  was  less  horrible  than  that  which  the  elder  Dionysius 
had  inflicted  on  the  Bhegine  general  Phyton. 

The  last  hopes  of  the  Diouysian  dynasty  perished  with  Philistus, 


274 


DIOXYSIUS  THE    YOUXGi:i:. 


INTRIGUES  AGAINST   DION. 


275 


the  able!^t  and  mo^t  faithful  of  its  servants.  He  had  boon  an  r.ct -r 
in  its  first  duv  of  usurpation— its  eighteenth  Brumaire:  Ins  linul;:. 
though  miserable  death,  saved  him  irora  sharing  in  it.:  last  day  of 

exilAits  St.  Helena.  ^  t^.        -r^-         •      i     i  i    .    m 

Even  after  the  previous  victory  of  Dion.  Dionysius  had  lost  nil 
chance  of  overcominu  the  Syracusans  by  force.  But  he  had  now 
further  lost,  Ihrouiih  Ihe  victory  of  Herakleides,  his  superiority  at 
sea  and  therefore  liis  power  even  of  maintaining  himself  ncrinanently 
in  Ortvfia.  The  trium})h  of  Dion  seemed  assuied.  and  his  enemy 
luunbled  in  the  du.st.  But  though  thus  disarmed.  Diony  ins  was  stid 
lormidable  by  his  means  of  raising  inlriirue  and  dissen^on  in  Syra- 
cuse. His  ancient  antii)athy  against  Dion  became  more  vehement 
than  ever.  Obliged  to  forego  empire  himself,  yet  resolv.  d  at  any  rate 
that  Dion*  should  be  ruined  alo!ig  with  him— he  set  on  foot  a  tissue 
of  base  maneuvers;  availing  himself  of  the  fears  and  jealousies  of 
the  Syracusans,  the  rivalry  of  Herakleides.  the  defects  of  Dion,  and 
wliat  was  more  important  than  all— the  relationship  of  Dion  to  the 

Dionvsian  dynasty.  .-,,•,.• 

Dion  had  disidaved  devoted  courage,  and  merited  the  sign:d  grati- 
tude of  the  Svraciisans.     But  he  had  been  nursed  in  the  despotism 
of  which  his  father  had  been   one  of  the  chief  foun(..'*rs;    he  wns 
attached  by  every  tic  of  relationship  to  Dionysius,  wiih  whom  his 
bister  his  former  wife,  and  his  children,  were  still  dwelling  in  the 
acropolis.     The  circumstances,  therefore,  were  such  as  to  suggest  to 
the  Svracusa  s  r]iprehen>ions,  noway  \inreasonable,  that  some  pri- 
vate bargain  miirht  be  made  by  Dion  with  the  acropolis  and  tiiat  the 
eminent^services  which  he  had  just  rendered  might  only  be  made  the 
Rteppin"--slone  to  a  fresh  despotism  in  his  person.     Such  suspicions 
received  much  countenance  fnmi  the  intirmities  of  Dion,  who  com- 
bined   with  a  masculine  and  mngnanimous  character,  manners  so 
hiufrhtv  as  to  bo  painfullv  felt  even  by  his  own  compjuiions.     The 
f'-iendly  letters  from    Svracuse,   written   to   Plato  or   to  others  at 
Athen/(possiblv  those  from  Timonides  to  Speusippus)  diortly  after 
the  victory,  contained  much  complaint  of  tlie  repulsive  demeanor  ot 
Dion-  which  defect  the  philosopher  exhorted  his  friend  to  amend. 
All  tl'iose  whom  Dion's  arroixance  offended,  were  confirmed  m  their 
su^spicion  of  his  despotic  designs,  and  induced  to  turn  for  protection 
to  his  rival  Herakleides.     This  latter— formerly  general  in  the  service 
of  Dionvsius.  from  whose  displeasure  he  had  only  saved  his  hie  by 
flicrht—had  been  unable  or  unwilling  to  co-operate  with  Dion  in  his 
expedition  from  Zakvnthus,  but  had  since  brought  to  the  aid  of  the 
Syracusans  a  considerable   force,  including   several   ;.;med    ships. 
Thouirh   not  present   at  the  first  entry  into   Syracuse,  nor  arriving 
until  Ortyiria  had  already  been  ])laced  under  blockade.  Herakleides 
Avas  esteemed  the  equal  of  Dion  in  abilities  and  in  militi'ty  efiiciency; 
while  with  reii:ard  to  ulterior  designs,  he  had  the  prodi'-ious  advan- 
taije  of  being  "free  from  connection  with  the  despotism  and  of  rais- 
iu"^  no  mistrust.     Moreover,  his  manners  were  not  only  popular,  but 


accoi'vling  to  Plutarch,  more  than  po]iular — smooth,  insidious,  and, 
dexterous  in  criminatory  speech,  for  the  ruin  of  rivals  and  for  his 
own  exaltation. 

As  the  contest  presontly  came  to  be  carried  on  rather  at  sea  than 
on  land,  the  eeiuipment  of  a  fleet  became  indispensalile;  so  that  Hera- 
kleides, who  had  brought  the  greatest  number  of  triremes,  naturally 
rose  in  importance.  Shortly  after  his  arrival,  the  Syracusan  assem- 
bly passed  a  vote  to  appoint  him  admiral.  But  Dion,  wlio  seems 
only  to  have  heard  of  this  vote  after  it  had  passed,  protested  against 
it  as  derogating  from  the  full  powers  which  the  Syracusans  had  by 
their  former  vote  conferred  upon  himself.  Accordingly  the  people, 
though  with  reluctance,  cancelled  their  vote,  and  deposed  Hera- 
klei!les.  Having  then  genlly  rebuked  Herakleides  for  raising  dis- 
cord at  a  seas  )n  wlien  the  common  enemy  was  stiil  dangerous,  Dion 
convened  another  assembly;  wherein  he  proposed,  from  himself,  tho 
appointment  of  Herakleides  as  admiral,  with  a  guard  equal  to  his 
own.  The  riglit  of  nomination  thus  assumed  displeased  the  Syra- 
oiisans,  humiliated  Her;dsleides,  and  t-'xasperated  his  partisans  na 
v.ell  as  the  fleet  which  he  commanded.  It  gave  him  power — 
together  with  j)rovocalion  to  employ  that  power  for  the  ruin  of  Dion; 
who  thus  laid  himself  doubly  open^to  genuine  mistrust  from  some,' 
and  to  intentional  calumny  fro:n  otliers. 

It  is  necessary  to  understaiui  this  situation  in  ord"r  to  appreciate? 
the  means  atforded  to  Dionysius  for  personal  iniriguc  direcle^el 
against  Dion.  Though  the  vast  majority  of  SyracusansVere  hostile 
to  Dionysius,  yet  there  were  among  them  manv  individuals  con- 
nected with  the)se  serving  under  him  iii  Ortygia,  and  capable  of  being 
put  in  motion  to  promote  his  views.  Shortly  after  the  complete 
eleteat  of  his  sally,  he  renewed  his  solicitalions  for  peace;  to  which 
Dion  returned  the  peremptory  answer,  that  no  peac-e^.  could  be  con- 
cluded until  Dionysius  abdicated  and  retired.  Next,  Dionysius  sent 
out  heralds  from  Ortygia  with  letters  addressed  to  Dion'  from  his 
female  relatives.  All  these  letters  were  full  of  complaints  of  the 
misery  endured  by  these  i)oor  women;  together  with  pravers  that  he 
would  relax  in  his  hostility.  To  avert  suspicion,  Dion' caused  the 
letters  to  be  opened  and  read  publicly  before  the  Syracusan  assem- 
hly;  but  their  tenor  w^as  such,  that  suspicion,  whether  expressed  or 
not,  unavoidably  arose,  as  to  tlie  effect  on  Dion's  sympathies.  One 
letter  there  was.  bearing  on  its  su]ierscription  the  we)rils  "  Hippa- 
rinus  (the  son  of  Dion)  to  his  father."  At  first  many  persons  present 
refused  to  take  ce)gnizance  of  a  communication  so"^  strictly  private; 
hut  Dion  insisted,  and  the  letter  was  publiclv  read.  It  proved  to 
come,  not  from  the  j^outliful  Hipparinus,  but  from  Dionysius  him- 
self, and  was  insidiously  worded  for  the  purpose  of  discreeliting  Dion 
in  the  minds  of  the  Syracusans.  It  began  bv  reminding  him  "of  the 
long  service  which  he  had  rendered  to'  the  despotism.  It  implored 
liira  not  to  bury  that  great  power,  as  well  as  his  own  relatives,  in  one 
common  ruin,  for  the  sake  of  a  people  who  would  turn  round  and 


£i  Jift  tHi^Jaieali:'^] 


276 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUXGER. 


stin"-  him.  so  soon  as  lie  had  given  them  freedom.  Il  ofTcrcd.  on  the 
parf  of  bionysius  liimself,  immediate  retirement,  provided  Dion 
-vvould  consent  to  take  his  phice.  But  it  threatened,  if  Dion  re 
fused,  the  sharpest  tortures  against  his  female  relatives  and  his  son. 
This  letter,  well-turned  as  a  eomposition  for  its  own  ]nirpose,  was 
met  by  indisjnant  refusal  and  protestation  on  the  part  of  Dion. 
Without  doubt  his  refusal  v.ould  be  received  with  cheers  by  the 
assembly;  but  the  letter  did  not  the  less  instil  its  intended  poison 
into  their  minds.  Plutarch  displays  (in  my  judij^ment)  no  great 
knowledije  of  human  nature  when  he  complains  of  the  Syracusans 
for  sulfering  the  letter  to  impress  them  with  suspicions  of  Dion, 
instead  of  admiring  his  magnanimous  resistance  to  such  touching 
appeals.  It  was  precisely  the^magnanimity  required  for  the  situation 
which  made  them  mistrustful.  Who  could  assure  them  tliat  such  a 
feeling,  to  the  requisite  pitch,  was  to  be  fonnd  in  the  bosom  of  Dion? 
or  who' could  foretell  which,  among  painfully  conflicting  sentiments, 
would  determine  his  conduct?  The  position  of  Dion  forbade  the 
possibility  of  his  obtaining  full  confidence.  Moreover,  his  enemies, 
not  content  with  inflaming  the  real  causes  of  mistrust,  fabricated 
gross  falsehoods  airainst  liim  as  well  as  against  the  mercenaries  under 
his  connnand.  A  Syracusan  named  Sosis,  brother  to  one  of  the 
guards  of  Dionvsius,  made  a  violent  speech  in  the  Syracusan  assem- 
bly, warning  hi's  countrymen  to  beware  of  Dion,  lest  they  should 
liiid  themsefves  saddledwith  a  strict  and  sober  despot  in  place  of 
one  who  was  alvvavs  intoxicated.  On  the  next  day  Sosis  appeared 
in  the  assembly  with  a  wound  on  the  head,  which  he  said  that  some 
of  the  soldiers'  of  Dif^n  had  inflicted  upon  him  in  revenge  for  liis 
speech.  Many  persons  present,  believing  the  story,  wannly  espoused 
ins  cause;  while  Dion  had  great  difliculty  in  repelling  the  allegation, 
and  in  obtaining  time  for  the  investigation  of  its  truth.  On  inquiry, 
it  was  discovered  that  the  wound  was  a  superticial  cut  inflicted  by 
Sosis  himself  with  a  razor,  and  that  the  whole  tale  was  an  infamous 
calumny  which  he  had  been  bribed  to  propagate.  In  this  particular 
instance,  it  was  found  practicable  to  convict  the  delinquent  of  shame- 
less falsehood.  But  there  were  numerous  other  attacks  and  perver- 
sions less  tangible,  generated  by  the  same  hostile  interests,  and  tend- 
in"-  toward  the  same  end.  EverA'  day  the  suspicion  and  unfriendly 
sentiment  of  the  Syracusans  toward  Dion  and  his  soldiers  became 
more  imbittered. 

The  naval  victory  gained  by  Ilerakleides  and  the  Syracusan  fleet 
over  Philistus,  exalting  both' the  spirit  of  the  Syracusans  and  the 
clory  of  the  admiral,  still  further  lowered  the  influence  of  Dion. 
The'belief  gained  ground  that  even  without  him  and  his  soldiere,  the 
Syracusans  could  defend  themselves,  and  gain  possession  of  Onygia. 
It  was  now  that  the  defeated  Dionysius  sent  from  thence  a  fresh 
embassy  to  Dion,  offering  to  surrender  to  him  the  place  with  its  gar- 
rison, mairazine  of  arms,  and  treasure  equivalent  to  five  months'  full 
pay— on  condition  of  being  allowed  to  retire  to  Italy,  and  enjoy  the 


DION  DEPOSED. 


277 


revenues  of  a*  large  and  productive  portion  (called  Gyarta)  of  the 
Syracusan  territory.  Dion  again  refused  to  reply,  desiring  him  to 
address  the  Syracusan  public,  yet  advising  them  to  accept  the  terms. 
Under  the  existing  mistrust  toward  Dion,  this  advice  was  inter- 
preted as  concealing  an  intended  collusion  between  him  and  Dionys- 
ius. Ilerakleides  promised,  that  if  the  war  were  prosecuted,  lie 
would  keep  Ortygia  blocked  up  until  it  was  surrendered  at  discretion 
with  all  in  it  as  prisoners.  But  in  spile  of  his  promise,  Dionysius 
contrived  to  elude  his  vigilance  and  sail  oif  to  Lokri  in  Italy,  with 
mnny  companions  and  much  property,  leaving  Ortygia  in  command 
of  his  eldest  son  A])ollokrates. 

Though  the  blockade  was  immediately  resumed  and  rendered 
stricter  than  before,  yet  this  escape  of  the  despot  brought  considera- 
ble discredit  on  Ilerakleides.  Probably  the  Dionian  partisans  were 
not  sparing  in  their  reproach.  To  create  for  himself  fresh  popularity, 
Ilerakleides  warmly  espoused  the  proposition  of  a  citizen  named 
llipi)0,  for  a  fresh  division  of  landed  property;  a  proposition,  which, 
considering  the  sweeping  alteration  of  landed  property  made  by  the 
Dionysian  dynasty,  we  may  well  conceive  to  have  been  recommended 
upon  specious  grounds  of  retributive  justice,  as  well  as  upon  the 
necessity  of  pi-oviding  for  poor  citizens.  Dion  opposed  the  motion 
strenuously,  but  was  outvoted.  Other  suggestions  also,  yet  more 
repugnant  to  him,  and  even  pointedly  directed  against  him,  were 
adopted.  Lastly  Ilerakleides,  enlarging  upon  his  insupportable  arro- 
gance, prevailed  upon  the  people  to  decree  that  new  generals  should 
be  appointed,  and  that  the  pay  due  to  tiie  Dionian  soldiers,  now 
forming  a  large  arrear,  should  not  be  liquidated  out  of  the  public 
purse. 

It  was  toward  midsummer  that  Dion  was  thus  divested  of  liis 
command,  about  nine  months  after  his  arrival  at  Syracuse-.  Twenty- 
live  new  generals  were  named,  of  whom  Ilerakleides  was  one. 

The  measure,  scandalously  ungrateful  and  unjust,  whereby  the 
soldiers  were  deprived  of  the  pay  due  to  them,  was  dictated  by  pure 
antipathy  against  Dion:  for  it  does  not  seem  to  have  been  applied  to 
those  soldiers  who  had  come  with  Herakleides;  moreover  the  new 
generals  sent  private  messages  to  the  Dionian  soldiers,  inviting  them 
to  desert  their  leader  and  join  the  Syracusans,  in  which  case  the  grant 
of  citizenship  was  promised  to  them.  Had  the  soldiers  complied",'  it  is 
obvious,  that  either  the  pay  due,  or  some  equivalent,  must  have  been 
assigned  to  satisfy  them.  But  one  and  all  of  them  scorned  the  invi- 
tation, adhering  to  Dion  with  unshaken  fidelity.  The  purpose  of 
Herakleides  was  to  expel  him  alone.  This,  however,was  prevented  by 
the  temper  of  the  soldiers;  who,  indignant  at  the  treacherous  ingrat- 
itude of  the  Syracusans,  instigated  Dion  to  take  a  legitimate  revenge 
upon  them,  and  demanded  only  to  be  led  to  the  assault.  Refusing 
to  employ  force,  Dion  calmed  their  excitement,  and  put  himself  at 
their  head  to  conduct  them  out  of  the  city;  not  without  remonstrances 
addressed  to  the  generals  and  the  people  of  Syracuse  upon  their  pro- 


278 


D10^'VSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


ceedincrs  imprudent  as  well  as  wicked,  while  the  enemy  were  still 
m-isterS  of  Ortyi;ia.  Nevertheless  the  new  generals,  chosen  as  the 
most  violent  enemies  of  Dion,  not  only  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  his 
appeal  but  inflamed  the  antipathies  of  the  people,  and  spurred  them 
on  to  attack  the  soldiers  on  their  march  out  of  Syracuse  1  heir 
attack  thou^'-h  repeated  more  than  once,  was  vigorously  repulsed  by 
the  soldiers— excellent  troops,  3,000  in  number;  while  Dion,  anxious 
oniv  to  injure  their  safety,  and  to  avoid  bloodshed  on  both  sides, 
'oiitined  himself  strictly  to  the  defensive,  lie  forbade  all  pursuit, 
ixiving  up  the  piisoucrs  without  ransom  as  well  as  the  bodies  of  the 

slain  for  burial.  .   .       ,        ■,     r        i  .i 

In  this  guise  Dion  arrived  at  Leontini,  where  he  found  the  warm- 
est sympathy  toward  himself,  with  indignant  disgust  at  the  beha- 
vior of  the  Svraeusans.  Allied  with  the  newly  enfranchised  Syracuse 
ao-ain-^t  the  Dionysian  dynasty,  the  Leontines  not  only  received  the 
soldiers  of  Dion  into  their  citizenship,  and  voted  to  tliem  a  positive 
remuneration,  but  sent  an  embassy  to  Syracuse  insisting  that  justice 
should  be  done  to  them.  The  Syracusans,  on  their  side,  sent  envoys 
to  Leontini,  to  accuse  Dion  before  an  assembly  of  all  the  allies  there 
convoked.  Who  these  allies  were,  our  defective  information  does 
not  enable  us  to  say.  Tli^'ii"  sentence  went  in  favor  of  Dion  and 
atrainst  the  Syracusans;  who  nevertheless  stood  out  obstinately, 
refusin*'-  all  justice  or  reparation,  and  fancying  themselves  compet(HU 
to  redm-e  Ortvgia  without  Dion's  assistance— since  the  provisions 
therein  were  exhausted,  and  the  garrison  was  already  suffering  from 
famine.  Despairing  of  re- enforcement,  Apollokrates  had  already 
resolved  to  send  envoys  and  propose  a  capitidation,  when  Nypsius. 
a  Neapolitan  ofticer,  dispatched  by  Dion\  sius  from.  Lokri,  had  the 
good  fortune  to  reach  Ortygia  at  the  head  of  a  rc-enforcing  fleet 
convovin**-  numerous  transports  with  an  abundant  stock  of  pro- 
vision"^ 'There  was  now  no  farther  talk  of  surrender.  The  gnrri- 
son  of  Ortygia  was  re-enforced  to  10.000  mercenary  troops  of  consid- 
erable merit^  and  well  provisioned  .for  some  time. 

The  Syracusan  admirals,  either  from  carelessness  or  ill-fortune, 
had  not  been  able  to  prevent  the  entry  of  Nypsius.  But  they  made 
a  sudden  attack  upon  him  while  his  ships  were  in  the  harbor,  and 
while  the  crews,  thinking  themselves  save  from  an  enemy,  were 
interchanging  salutations  or  aiding  to  dLsembark  the  stores.  This 
attack  was  well-timed  and  successful.  Several  of  the  triremes  of 
Nypsius  were  ruined— others  were  towed  off  as  prizes,  while  the  vic- 
tory gained  by  Herakleides  without  Dion,  provoked  extravagant  joy 
throughout  Syracuse.  In  the  belief  that  Ortygia  could  not  longer 
hold  out,  the 'citizens,  the  soldiers,  and  even  the  generals  gave  loose 
to  mad  revelry  and  intoxication,  continued  into  the  ensuing  night. 
Nypsius,  an  able  officer,  watched  his  opportunity,  and  made  a  vigo- 
rous night-sally.  His  troops,  issuing  forth  in  good  order,  planted 
their  scaling  la'dders,  mounted  the  blockading  wall,  and  slew  the 
Bleeping  or  dmnken  sentinels  without  any  resistance.    Master  of  this 


DANGER  OF   SYRACUSE. 


:279 


important  work,  Nypsius  employed  a  part  of  his  men  to  pull  it  down, 
while  he  pushed  the  rest  forward  against  the  city.  At  (biybreak  the 
aiTrighted  Syracusnns  saw  themselves  vigorously  attacked  even  in 
their  own  stronghold,  wjien  neitlier  generals  nor  citizens  were  at  all 
piepanni  to  resist.  The  troops  of  Nypsius  first  forced  their  way  into 
Neapolis,  which  lay  the  nearest  to  the  wall  of  Ortygia;  next  into 
Tyclia,  the  oHier  fortified  suburb.  Over  these  they  ranged  victo- 
rious, vanquishing  all  the  detached  parties  of  Syracusans  which  could 
be  opposed  to  them.  The  streets  became  a  scene  of  bloodshed — th;' 
houses,  of  plunder;  for  as  Diouysius  had  now  given  up  the  idea,  of 
again  permanently  ruling  at  Syracuse,  his  troops  thought  of  iittk? 
else  except  satiating  the  revenge  of  their  master  and  their  own  rapa- 
city. The  soldiers  of  Nyp^^ius  stripped  the  private  dwellings  in  the 
town,  taking  away  not  only  the  property,  but  also  the  women  a!i:l 
childi-en,  as  booty  into  Ortygia.  At  last  (it  appears)  they  got  also 
into  Achradina,  the  largest  and  most  populous  ]X)rtion  of  Syracuse. 
Here  the  same  scene  of  i)illage,  destruction,  and  ])loodshed  was  con- 
tinued throughout  the  whole  day,  and  on  a  sliil  larger  scale;  with 
just  enough  resistance  to  pique  the  fury  of  the  victors,  without 
restraining  their  progress. 

It  soon  became  evident  to  Herakleides  and  his  colleagues,  as  well 
as  to  the  general  body  of  citizens,  that  there  was  no  luope  of  safety 
except  in  invoking  the  aid  of  Dion  and  his  soldiers  from  Leontini. 
Yet  the  appeal  to  one  whom  they  not  only  haled  and  feared,  but  had 
ignominiously  maltreated,  was  something  so  intolerable,  that  for  a  long 
time  no  one  would  speak  out  to  propose  wiiat  every  one  had  in  his 
mind.  At  length  some  of  the  allies  present,  less  concerned  in  the 
political  parties  of  the  city,  ventured  to  broach  the  proposition, 
which  ran  from  man  to  man,  and  was  adopted  under  a  press  of  min- 
gled and  opposite  emotions.  Accordingly  two  oflicers  of  the  allies, 
and  five  Syracusan  horsemen,  set  off  at  full  speed  to  Leontini,  to 
implore  the  instant  presence  of  Dion.  Reaching  the  place  towarcl 
evening,  they  encountered  Dion  himself  immediately  on  dismount- 
ing, and  described  to  him  the  miserable  scenes  now  going  on  at  Syra- 
cuse, Their  tears  and  distress  brought  around  them  a  crowd  of 
hearers,  Leontines  as  well  as  Peloponnesians;  and  a  general  assem- 
bly was  speedily  convened,  before  which  Dion  exhorted  them  to  tell 
their  story.  They  described,  in  the  tone  of  men  whose  all  was  at 
stake,  the  actual  sufferings  and  the  impending  total  ruin  of  the  city; 
entreating  oblivion  for  their  past  misdeeds,  which  were  already  but 
too  cruelly  expiated. 

Their  discourse,  profoundly  touching  to  the  audience,  was  heard 
in  silence.  Every  one  waited  for  Dion  to  begin,  and  to  determine 
tlie  fate  of  Syracuse.  He  rose  to  speak;  but  for  a  time  tears  checki^l 
ids  utterance,  while  his  soldiers  around  cheered  him  with  encour- 
aging sympathy.  At  length  he  found  voice  to  say:  ''1  have  con- 
vened you,  Peloponnesians  and  allies,  to  deli])erate  about  your  own 
conduct.     For  me,  deli]>eration  would  be  a  disgrace,  while  Syracuse 


280 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER 


DION  ENTERS  SYRACUSE. 


281 


is  in  the  hands  of  the  destroyer.  If  I  cannot  save  my  ronnfry,  I 
sliall  cro  and  biirv  mvsclf  in  its' flamincr  ruins.  For  von,  if,  in  s'liite 
of  what  has  happened,  3'ou  still  chose  to  assist  us,  niij-gnidc  d  ;ind 
unhappy  Syracusans,  we  shall  owe  it  to  you  that  we  still  continue  a 
city.  But  if,  in  disdainful  sense  of  wrong  endured,  you  shall  leave 
us  to  our  fate,  I  here  thank  you  for  all  your  past  valor  and  attach- 
ment to  me,  praying  that  the  gods  may  reward  you  for  it.  Remem- 
ber Dion,  as  one  who  neither  deserted  you  w  hen  you  were  wronged, 
nor  his  own  fellow-citizens  when  they  were  in  misery." 

This  address,  so  replete  with  pathos  nv.d  dignity,  went  home  to  the 
hearts  of  the  audience,  fdling  them  with  i)assi()nate  emotion  and 
eagerness  to  follow  him.  Universal  shouts  called  upon  him  to  put 
liimself  at  their  head  instantly  and  march  to  Syracuse;  while  the 
envoys  present  fell  upon  liis  neck,  invoking  blessings  both  upon  him 
and  upon  the  soldiers.  As  soon  as  the  excitement  had  subsided, 
Dion  gave  orders  that  every  man  should  take  his  evening  meal  forth- 
Avith,  and  return  in  arms  to  the  spot,  prepared  for  a  night  march  to 
Syracuse. 

By  daybreak,  Dion  and  his  band  were  within  a  few  miles  of  the 
northern  wall  of  Epipohe.  Messengers  from  Syracuse  here  met  him, 
inducing  him  to  slacktn  his  march  and  proceed  with  caution. 
Ilerakleides  and  the  other  generals  had  sent  a  message  forbi^lding 
Ins  near  approach,  with  notice  that  the  gates  would  be  closed  against 
him;  yet  at  the  same  time,  counter-messages  arrived  from  many 
eminent  citiz.ens,  entreating  liim  to  persevere,  and  promising  him 
both  admittance  and  support.  Nypsius,  having  permitt<  d  his  troops 
to  pillage  and  destroy  in  Syracuse  throughout  the  preceding  day,  had 
thought  it  prudent  to  withdraw  them  back  into  Ortygia  for  the  night. 
His  retreat  raised  the  courage  of  Ilerakleides  and  his  colleagues; 
who,  fancying  that  the  attack  was  now  over,  repented  of  the  invita- 
tion which  they  had  permitted  to  be  sent  to  Dion.  Under  this 
impression  they  dispatched  to  him  the  second  message  of  exclusion; 
keeping  gutird  at  the  gate  in  the  northern  w  all  to  make  their  threat 
good.  But  the  events  of  the  next  morning  speedily  undeceived  I  hem. 
Nypsius  renewed  his  attack  with  greater  ferocity  than  before,  com- 
pleted the  demolition  of  the  wall  of  blockade  before  Ortygia,  and  let 
loose  his  soldiers  with  merciless  hand  throughout  all  the  streets  of 
Syracuse.  There  was  on  this  day  less  of  pillage,  but  more  of  whole- 
sale slaughter.  Men,  women,  and  children  perished  indiscriminately, 
and  nothing  w^as  thought  of  by  these  barbarians  except  to  make 
Syracuse  a  heap  of  ruins  and  dead  bodies.  To  accelerate  the  process, 
and  to  forestall  Dion's  arrival,  which  they  fully  expected — they  set 
fire  to  the  city  in  several  places,  Avitli  torches  ancl  fire-bearing  arrows. 
The  miserable  inhabitants  knew  not  where  to  tlee,  to  escape  the 
flames  within  their  houses,  or  the  sword  without.  The  streets  were 
strewed  with  corpses,  while  the  fire  gained  ground  perpetually, 
threatening  to  spread  over  the  greater  part  of  the  city.  Under  such 
terrible  circumstances,  neither  Ilerakleides,  himself  wounded,  nur 


the  other  generals,  could  hold  out  any  longer  against  the  admission 
of  Dion;  to  whom  even  the  brother  and  uncle  of  Ilerakleides  were 
sent,  with  pressing  entreaties  to  accelerate  his  march,  since  the 
smallest  delay  would  occasion  ruin  to  Syracuse. 

Dion  was  about  seven  miles  from  the  gates  when  these  last  cries  of 
distress  reached  him.  Immediately  hurrying  forward  his  soldiers, 
whose  ardor  was  not  inferior  to  his  own,  at  a  running  pace,  he 
reached  speedily  the  gates  called  Ilexapyla,  in  the  northern  wall  of 
Epipolae.  When  once  within  these  gates,  he  halted  in  an  interior 
area  called  the  Hekatompedon.  His  light-armed  were  sent  forward 
at  once  to  arrest  the  destroying  enemy,  while  he  kept  back  the  hop- 
lites  until  he  could  form  them  into  separate  columns  under  proper 
captains,  along  with  the  citizens  who  crowded  round  him  with 
demonstrations  of  grateful  reverence,  lie  distributed  them  so  as  to 
enter  the  interior  portion  of  Syracuse,  and  attack  the  troops  of 
Nypsius,  on  several  points  at  once.  Being  now  within  the  exterior 
fortification  formed  by  the  wall  of  Epipokie,  there  lay  before  him  the 
tripartite  interior  city — Tycha,  Neapolis,  Achradina.  Each  of  these 
parts  had  its  separate  fortification;  between  Tycha  and  Neapolis  lay 
an  unfortified  space,  but  each  of  them  joined  on  to  Achradina,  the 
western  wall  of  which  formed  their  eastern  wall.  It  is  probable  that 
these  interior  fortifications  had  been  partially  neglected  since  the 
construction  of  the  outer  walls  along  Epipolse,  which  comprised  them 
all  within,  and  formed  the  principal  defense  against  a  foreign  enemy. 
3Ioreover,  the  troops  of  Nypsius,  having  been  masters  of  the  three 
towns,  and  roving  as  destroyers  around  them,  for  several  hours,  had 
doubtless  broken  down  the  gates  and  in  other  ways  weakened  the 
defenses.  The  scene  was  frightful,  and  the  ways  everywhere  im- 
peded by  flan-3  and  smoke,  by  falling  houses  and  fragments,  and  by 
the  numbers  who  lay  massacred  around.  It  was  amid  such  horrors 
that  Dion  and  his  soldiers  had  found  themselves — while  penetrating 
in  dilferent  divisions  at  once  into  Neapolis,  Tycha,  and  Achradina. 

Ilis  task  wouUl  probably  have  been  difficult,  had  Nypsius  been 
able  to  control  the  troops  under  his  command,  in  themselves  brave 
and  good.  But  these  troops  had  been  for  some  hours  dispersed 
throughout  the  streets,  satiating  their  licentious  and  murderous  pas- 
sions, and  destroying  a  town  which  Dionysius  now  no  longer 
expected  to  retain.  Recalling  as  many  soldiers  as  he  could  froin 
this  brutal  disorder,  Nypsius  marshaled  them  along  the  interior 
f()rtific;ation,  occupying  the  entrances  and  exposed  points  where 
Dion  would  seek  to' penetrate  into  the  city.  The  battle  was  thus  not 
continuous,  but  fought  between  detached  parties  at  separate  openings, 
often  very  narrow,  and  on  ground  sometimes  difficult  to  surmount, 
ami(l  the  conflagration  blazing  everywhere  around.  Disorganized 
by  pillage,  the  troops  of  Xypsius  could  oppose  no  long  resistance  to 
the  forward  advance  of  Dion,  with  soldiers  full  of  ardor  and  with 
the  Syracusans  around  him  stimulated  by  despair.  Nypsius  was 
overpowered,   compelled   to  abandon  his  line   of  defense,  and   to 


282 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


INTRIGUES  OF   IIERAKLEIDKS. 


:}\^ 


retreat  with  his  troops  into  Ortygia,  wliich  the  greater  number  of 
them  reached  in  safetv.  Diou  and  his  victorious  troojjs,  after  hav- 
ing forced  the  entrance' into  the  city,  did  not  attempt  to  pursue  them. 
TlTe  first  and  most  ])ressing  necessity  was  to  extinguish  the  flames; 
but  no  ineonsiderabk'  number  of  the  soldiers  of  Nypsius  were  found 
dispersed  tiirouirh  the  streets  and  houses,  and  siain  while  actually 
carrying  off  plunder  on  their  shoulders.  Long  after  the  town  was 
cleaied'^of  enemies,  liowever,  all  hands  within  it  were  employed  in 
slopping  the  conllagration;  a  task  in  which  they  h-u'dly  succeeded, 
even  byuuremilling  eilorts  tliroughout  the  day  and  the  following 

night. 

On  the  morrow  Svracuse  was  another  city;  disfigured  by  the  des- 
olating trace  of  flame  and  of  the  hostile  soldiery,  yet  still  refreshed 
iu  the  hearts  of  its  citizens,  who  felt  that  they  had  escajjcd  much 
worse;  and  above  all.  penetrated  by  a  renewed  political  spirit,  and  a 
deep  sense  of  repentant  gratitude  toward  Dion.  All  those  generals 
who  had  been  chosen  at  the  last  election  from  their  intense  opposi- 
tion to  him,  fled  forthwith,  except  llerakleides  and  Theodotes. 
These  two  men  were  his  most  violent  and  dangerous  enemies;  yet  it 
appears  that  they  knew  his  character  better  than  their  colleagues, 
and  therefore  did  not  hesitate  to  tl»row  themselves  upon  his  mercy. 
They  surrendered,  confessed  their  guilt,  and  implored  his  forgive- 
ness. His  magnanimity  (they  said)  would  derive  a  new  luster,  if  he 
now  rose  superior  to  his  just' resentment  over  misguided  rivals,  who 
stood  before  him  humbled  and  ashamed  of  their  former  opposition, 
entreating  bim  to  deal  with  them  better  than  they  had  dealt   with 

liim. 

If  Dion  had  put  their  request  to  tlie  vote,  it  would  have  been 
refused  by  a  large  niajority.  His  soldiers,  recently  defrauded  of 
their  pnv,  Vere  yet  burnlng'willi  indignation  against  the  authors  of 
such  an  injustice.  His  friends,  reminding  him  of  the  bitter  and 
unscrupulous  attacks  which  he  as  well  as  they  had  experienced  from 
Herakleides.  exhorted  him  to  purge  the  city  of  one  who  abused  the 
popular  forms  to  purposes  hardly  less  mischievous  than  despotism 
itself.  The  life  of  Herakleides  now  hung  upon  a  thread.  Without 
pronouncing  anv  decided  opinion,  Dion  had  only  to  maintain  an 
e(iuivocal  silence,  an<l  suffer  the  popular  sentiment  to  manifest  itself 
in  a  verdict  invoked  by  one  party,  expected  even  by  the  opposite. 
The  more  was  every  one  astonished  when  he  took  upon  himself  the 
responsibility  of  pardoning  Herakleides;  adding,  by  way  of  explana- 
tion nnd  satisfaction  to  his  disappointed  friends: 

"Other  generals  have  gone  throuuh  most  of  their  traininir  with  a 
view  to  anus  and  war.  ^ly  long  training  in  the  Academy  has  been 
devoted  to  aid  me  in  conquering  anger,  envy,  and  all  malignant 
jealousies.  To  show  that  I  have  profited  by  such  lessons,  it  is  not 
enough  that  I  do  niv  duty  toward  my  friends  and  toward  honest 
men.    The  true  test  is,  if.  after  being  wronged,  I  show^  myself  pla- 


cable and  gentle  toward  the  w^rong-doer.  My  wish  is  to  i)rove  myself 
superior  to  Herakleides  more  in  goodness  and  justice  than  in  power 
and  intelligence.  Successes  in  war.even  when  achieved  single-handed, 
are  half  owing  to  fortune.  If  Herakleides  has  been  treacherous  and 
wieked  through  envy,  it  is  not  for  Dion  to  dishonor  a  virtuous  lifeiu 
obedience  to  angry  sentiment.  Nor  is  human  wickedness,  great  as  it 
often  is,  ever  pushed  to  such  an  excess  of  stubborn  brutality  as  not 
to  be  amended  by  gentle  and  gracious  treatment  from  steady  bene- 
fa(;tors." 

We  may  reasonably  accept  this  as  something  near  the  genuine 
speech  of  Dion,  reported  by  his  companion  Timonides,  and  thus  ]>ass- 
ing  into  the  biography  of  Plutarch.  It  lends  a  peculiar  interest,  as 
an  exposition  of  motives,  to  the  act  which  it  accom]>anies.  The  sin- 
cerity of  the  exposition  admits  of  no  doubt,  for  all  the  ordinary 
motives  of  the  case  counseled  an  opjwsite  conduct;  and  had  Dion 
been  in  like  manner  at  the  feet  of  his  rival,  his  life  would  assuredly 
not  have  been  spared.  He  took  pride  (with  a  sentiment  something 
like  that  of  Kallikratidas  on  liberating  the  prisoners  taken  at  Mo- 
thymu'i)  in  realizing  by  a  conspicuous  act  the  lofty  morality  wiiich 
he  hail  imbibjd  from  the  Academy,  the  rather,  as  the  case  present-ed 
every  temptation  to  depart  from  it.  Persuading  himself  that  Ik; 
could  by  an  illustrious  example  put  to  shame  and  soften  the  mutual 
cruelties  so  fre(pient  in  Grecian  party  warfare,  and  regarding  the 
amnesty  toward  Herakleides  as  a  proper  sequel  to  the  generous 
impulse  which  had  led  him  to  march  from  Leontini  to  Syracuse — 
ne  probably  gloried  in  both,  more  than  in  the  victory  itself.  We 
shall  presently  have  the  pain  of  discovering  that  his  anticipations 
were  totally  disappointed.  And  w'e  may  be  sure  that  at  the  time,  the 
judgment  passed  on  his  proceeding  toward  Herakleides  was  very  dif- 
ferent from  what  it  now  receives.  Among  his  friends  and  soldiers, 
the  generosity  of  the  act  would  be  forgotten  in  its  imprudence. 
Among  his  enemies,  it  would  excite  surprise,  perhaps  admiration — 
yet  few  of  them  would  be  conciliated  or  converted  into  friends.  In 
the  bosom  of  Herakleides  himself,  the  mere  fact  of  owMng  his  life  to 
Dion  would  be  a  new^  and  intolerable  humiliation,  which  thcErinnys 
within  would  goad  him  on  to  avenire.  Dion  would  be  w^arned,  by  the 
criticism  of  his  friends,  as  well  as  by  the  instinct  of  his  soldiers,  that 
in  yielding  to  a  magnanimous  sentiment,  he  overlooked  the  reason- 
abfe  consequences;  and  that  Herakleides  continuing  at  Syracuse 
would  only  be  more  dangerous  both  to  him  and  them  than  he  had 
been  before.  Without  tnkiiig  his  life,  Dion  might  have  required  him 
to  depart  from  Syracuse;  which  sentence,  having  regard  to  the  prac- 
tice of  the  time,  would  have  been  accounted  generosity. 

It  was  Dion's  next  business  to  renew  tiie  wall  of  blockade  con- 
structed against  Ortygia,  and  partially  destroyed  in  the  late  sally  of 
Nypsius  Every  Syracusau  citizen  was  directed  to  cut  a  stake,  and 
deposit  it  near  the 'spot;  after  which,  during  the  ensuing  night,  the 


284 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER. 


GiESYLUS  THE  SPARTAN. 


285 


eolcliers  planted  a  stockade  so  as  to  restore  the  broken  parts  of  the 
line.  Protection  being  thus  ensured  to  tlie  city  against  Nypsius  and 
his  garrison,  Dion  proceeded  to  bury  the  numerous  dead  who  hjid 
been  shiin  in  the  sally,  and  to  ransom  the  captives,  no  less  than  2,000 
in  number,  who  had  been  carried  oif  into  Oitygia.  A  trophy,  with 
sacrifice  to  the  gods  for  the  victory,  was  not  forgotten. 

A  public  assembly  was  now  held  to  elect  new  generals  in  place  of 
those  who  had  tied.  Here  a  motion  was  made  by  Herakleides  him- 
self, that  Dion  should  be  chosen  general  with  full  powers  both  by 
land  and  sea.  The  motion  was  received  with  great  favor  by  the 
principal  citizens;  but  the  poorer  men  were  attached  to  Herakleides, 
especially  the  seamen;  who  preferred  serving  under  his  command  and 
loudly  required  that  he  should  be  named  admiral,  along  with  Dion 
as  general  on  land.  Forced  to  acquiesce  in  this  nomination,  Dion 
contented  himself  with  insisting  and  obtaining  that  the  resolution, 
which  had  been  previously  adopted  for  redistributing  lands  and 
houses,  should  be  rescinded.  The  position  of  affairs  at  Syracuse  was 
now  pregnant  with  mischief  and  quarrel.  On  land,  Dion  enjoyed  a 
dictatorial  authority;  at  sea,  Herakleides,  his  enemy  not  less  than 
ever,  was  admiral,  by  separate  and  independent  nomination.  The 
undefined  authority  of  Dion — exercised  by  one  self-willed,  though 
magnanimous,  in  spirit,  and  extremely  repulsive  in  manner — was 
sure  to  become  odious  after  the  feelings  arising  out  of  the  recent  res- 
cue had  worn  off;  and  abundant  opening  would  thus  l)e  made  for  the 
opposition  of  Herakleides,  often  on  just  grounds.  That  officer  indeed 
was  little  disposed  to  wait  for  just  pretenses.  Conducting  the  Syra- 
cusan  tleet  to  Messene  in  order  to  carry  on  war  against  Dionysius  at 
Lokri,  he  not  only  tried  to  raise  the  seamen  in  arms  against  Dion, 
by  charging  him  with  despotic  designs,  but  even  entered  into  a  secret 
treaty  witli  the  common  enemy  Dionysius,  through  the  intervention 
of  the  Spartan  Pharax,  who  commanded  the  Dionysian  troops.  His 
intrigues  being  discovered,  a  violent  opposition  was  raised  against 
them  by  the  leading  Syracusan  citizens.  It  would  seem  (as  far  as  we 
can  make  out  from  the  sctinty  information  of  Plutarch)  that  the  mili- 
tary operations  were  frustrated,  and  that  the  armament  was  forced  to 
return  to  Syracuse.  Here  again  the  (juarrel  was  renewed — the  sea- 
men apparently  standing  with  Herakleides,  the  principal  citizens  with 
Dion — and  carried  so  far,  that  the  city  suffered  not  only  from  dis- 
turbance, but  even  from  irregular  supply  of  provisions.  Among  the 
mortifications  of  Dion,  not  the  least  was  that  which  he  experienced 
from  his  own  friends  or  soldiers,  who  reminded  him  of  their  warn- 
ings and  predictions  when  he  consented  to  spare  Herakleides.  Mcan- 
"widle  Dionysius  had  sent  into  Sicily  a  body  of  troops  under  Piiarax, 
who  were  encamped  at  Neapolis  in  the  Agrigentinc  territory.  In 
what  scheme  of  operations  this  movement  forms  a  part,  we  cannot 
make  out;  for  Plutarch  tells  us  nothing  except  what  bears  immedi- 
ately on  the  quarrel  between  Dion  and  Herakleides.     To  attack  Pha- 


rax, the  forces  of  Syracuse  were  brought  out ;  the  fleet  under  Hera- 
kleides, the  soldiers  on  land  under  Dion.  The  latter,  though  he 
thought  it  imprudent  to  fight,  was  constrained  to  hazard  a  batile  by  the 
insinuation  of  Herakleides  and  tlie  clamor  of  the  seamen;  who 
accused  him  of  intentionally  eking  out  the  war  for  the  purpose  of 
prolonging  his  own  dictatorship.  Dion  accordingly  attacked  Pha- 
rax, but  was  repulsed.  Yet  the  repulse  was  not  a  serious  defeat,  so 
that  he  was  preparing  to  renew  the  attack,  when  he  was  apprised  that 
Herakleides  with  the  fleet  had  departed  and  were  returning  at  their 
best  speed  to  Syracuse,  with  the  intention  of  seizing  the  city,  and 
barring  out  Dion  with  his  troops.  Nothing  but  a  rapid  and  decisive 
movement  could  defeat  this  scheme.  Leaving  the  camp  immediately 
with  his  best  horsemen,  Dion  rode  back  to  Syracuse  as  fast  as  possi- 
ble; completing  a  distance  of  700  stadia  (about  82  miles)  in  a  very 
short  time,  and  lorestalling  the  arrival  of  Herakleides. 

Thus  disappointed  and  exposed,  Herakleides  found  means  to  direct 
another  maneuver  against  Dion  through  the  medium  of  a  Spart;m 
named  GjcsvIus,  who  had  been  sent;  by  the  Spartans,  informed  of 
the  dissensions  in  Syracuse,  to  offer  himself  (like  Gylippus)  for  the 
command.  Herakleides  eagerly  took  advantage  of  the  arrival  of 
this  officer,  pressing  the  Syracusans  to  accept  a  Spartan  as  their 
commander-in-chief.  But  Dion  replied  that  there  were  plenty  of 
native  Syracusans  qualifled  for  command;  moreover,  if  a  Spartan 
was  required  he  was  himself  a  Spartan  by  public  grant.  G:esvlus, 
having  ascertained  the  state  of  affairs,  had  the  virtue  and  prudence 
not  merely  to  desist  from  his  own  pretensions,  but  also  to  employ  his 
best  efforts  in  reconciling  Dion  and  Herakleides.  Sensible  that  the 
wrong  had  been  on  the  side  of  the  latter,  Gaesylus  constrained  him 
to  bind  himself  by  tlie  strongest  oaths  to  better  conduct  in  future. 
He  engaged  his  own  guarantee  for  the  observance  of  the  covenant; 
but  the  better  to  insure  such  observance  the  greater  part  of  the  Syra- 
cusan fleet  (the  chief  instrument  of  Herakleides)  was  disbanded, 
leaving  only  enough  to  keep  Ortygia  under  blockade. 

The  capture  of  that  islet  and  fortress,  now  more  strictly  watched 
than  ever,  was  approaching.  What  had  become  of  Pharax,  or  why 
he  did  not  advance,  after  the  retreat  of  Dion,  to  harass  the  Syra- 
cusans and  succor  Ortygia,  we  know  not.  But  no  succor  arrived; 
provisions  grew  scarce,  and  the  garrison  became  so  discontented 
that  Apollokrates,  the  sou  of  Dionysius,  could  not  hold  out  any 
longer.  Accordingly  he  capitulated  with  Dion,  handing  over  to  biin 
Ortygia,  with  its  fort,  arms,  magazines,  and  everything  contained  in 
it,  except  what  he  could  carry  away  in  five  triremes.  Aboard  of  these 
vessels  he  placed  his  mother,  his  sisters,  his  immediate  friends,  ar.d 
his  chief  valuables,  leaving  everythijig  else  behind  for  Dion  and  thj 
Syracusans,  who  crowded  to  the  beach  in  multitudes  to  see  hiiu 
depart.  To  them  the  moment  was  one  of  lively  joy  and  mutual 
self-congratulation,  promising  to  commence  a  new  era  of  freedom. 


280 


DIOXYSirS  THE    YOUNGEK. 


IXTE^'TIONS  OF  DION. 


287 


On  enterincr  Ortvi^ia,  Dion  saw.  for  the  first  time  after  a  separation 
of  about  twelve  vears,  his  sister  Aristonuiche,  his  wife  Arete,  and  his 
f'lmily  The  interview  was  one  of  the  teiiderest  eraolion  and  tears 
of  deli^^ht  to  all.  Arete  having  been  made  against  her  own  consent 
the  wife  of  Timokrates,  was  at  first  afraid  to  approach  Dion  But 
he  received  and  embraced  her  with  unabated  aifeetion.  He  con- 
ducted both  her  and  his  son  away  from  the  Dionysian  acropolis,  in 
which  they  had  been  living  since  his  absence,  into  his  own  house, 
havin"-  himself  resolved  not  to  dwell  in  the  acropolis,  but  to  leave  it 
as  a  public  fort  or  e(Utice  belonging  to  Syracuse.  However,  this  re- 
newal of  his  domestic  happiness  was  shortly  afterward  imbutered 
by  the  death  of  his  son,  who,  having  imbibed  from  Dionysius 
drunken  and  dissolute  habits,  fell  from  the  roof  of  the  house  m  u 
tit  of  intoxication  or  frenzy  and  perished. 

Dion  was  now  at  the  pinnacle  of  power  as  well  as  of  glory.  v\  itn 
means  ahogether  disproportionate  he  had  achieved  the  expulsion  of 
the  nreatesT  despot  in  Greece,  even  from  an  impregnable  stronghold. 
He  had  combated  danger  and  dilUculty  with  conspicuous  resolu- 
tion and  had  displayed  almost  chivalrous  magnanimity.  Had  he 
"breathed  out  his  s(ml"  at  the  instant  of  triumphant  entry  into 
Orty-ia  the  Academy  would  htive  been  glorified  by  a  pupil  of  first- 
rate  imd  unsullied  merit.  But  that  cup  of  prosperity  which  poisoned 
so  many  other  eminent  Greeks  had  now  the  fatal  effect  of  exaggerat- 
ino-  all  the  worst  of  Dion's  qualities  and  damping  all  the  best. 

Plutarch  indeed  boasts,  and  we  may  perfectly  believe,  that  he 
maintained  the  simplicity  of  his  table,  his  raiment,  and  his  habits  of 
life  completely  unchanffed,  now  that  he  had  become  master  of  Syra- 
cuse and  an  object  of  admiration  to  all  Greece.  In  this  resixict 
Plato  and  the  Academy  had  reason  to  be  proud  of  their  pupil,  l^ut 
the  public  mistakes  now  to  be  recountt^l  were  not  the  less  mis- 
chievous to  his  countrymen  as  well  as  to  himself. 

From  the  first  moment  of  his  entry  into  Syracuse  from  Pelopon- 
nesus Dion  had  been  suspected  and  accused  of  aiming  at  the  expul 
sion  of  Dionysius  only  in  order  to  transfer  the  despotism  to  himself. 
His  hauo-hty  and  repulsive  manners,  raising  against  him  personal 
antipathfes  everywhere,  were  cited  as  confirming  the  charge  Even 
at  moments  when  Dion  was  laboring  for  the  genuine  good  of  the 
Svracusans  this  suspicion  had  always  more  or  less  crossed  his  patli 
robbino-  him  of  well-merited  gratitude,  and  at  the  same  time  discred- 
iting Ins  opponents  wnd  the  people  of  Syracuse  as  guilty  of  mean 
jealousy  toward  a  benefactor. 

The  \ime  had  now  come  when  Dion  was  obliged  to  act  in  such  a 
manner  as  either  to  confirm  or  to  belie  such  unfavorable  auguries. 
Unfortunately  both  his  words  and  his  deeds  confirmed  them  m  the 
strono-est  manner.  The  proud  and  repulsive  external  demeanor  for 
which  he  had  always  been  notorious  was  rather  aggravated  than 


softened.     He  took  pride  in  showing,  more  plainly  than  ever,  that 
he  despised  everything  which  looked  like  courting  popularity. 

If  the  wor  Is  and  manner  of  Dion  were  thus  significant,  both  what 
he  dill  and  wiiat  he  left  undone  was  more  siguilicaut  still.  Of  that 
great  boon  of  freedom  which  he  had  so  loudly  promised  to  the  Syra- 
cusans,  and  which  he  had  directed  his  her.dd  to  proclaim  on  first 
entering  their  walls,  he  conferred  absolutely  nothing.  He  retained 
his  dictatorial  power  unabated,  and  his  military  force  certainly  with- 
out reduction,  if  not  actually  re-enforced;  for  as  Apollokiates  did 
not  convey  away  with  him  the  soldiers  in  Ortygia,  we  may  reason- 
ably presume  that  a  part  of  them  at  least  remained  to  embrace  the 
service  of  Dion.  He  preserved  the  acropolis  and  fortifications  of 
Ortygia  just  as  they  were,  only  garrisoned  by  troops  obeying  his 
coniniand  in-tead  of'^that  of  Dionysius.  His  victory  made  itself  felt 
in  abundant  i)resenls  to  his  own  friends  and  soldiers,  but  to  the 
people  of  Syracuse  it  produced  nothing  better  than  a  change  of 
masters. 

It  was  not,  indeed,  the  plan  of  Dion  to  constitute  a  permanent 
despotism.  He  intended  to  establish  himself  king,  but  to  grant  to 
Uie  Syracusans  what  in  modern  times  would  be  called  a  const itiriion. 
Having  imbi!)ed  from  Plato  and  the  Academy,  as  well  as  from  his 
own  convictions  and  tastes,  aversion  to  a  pure  democracy,  he  had 
resolved  to  introduce  a  Laceda'inonian  scheme  of  mixed  government, 
combining  king,  aristocracy,  and  people  under  certain  provisions 
and  limitations.  Of  this  general  tenor  are  the  recommendations  ad- 
tlressed  both  ;o  him  and  to  the  Syracusans  after  his  death  by  Plato, 
who,  however,  seems  tocontempltite,  along  with  the  political  scheme, 
a  Lykurgean  reform  of  manners  and  practice.  To  aid  in  framing 
aiKfrealizing  his  scheme.  I)i(m  had  sent  to  Corinth  to  invite  coun- 
selors and  auxiliaries,  for  Corinth  was  suitable  to  his  views,  not 
simply  as  molher-city  of  Syracu.se,  but  also  as  a  city  thoroughly 
oligarchical. 

That  these  intentions  on  the  part  of  Dion  were  sincere  we  need  not 
(}uestioii.  Tiiev  had  been  originally  conceived  without  any  views  of 
acquiring  the  first  place  for^himself,  during  the  life  of  the  elder 
Dionysius,  and  were  substantially  the  same  as  those  which  he  had 
exhorted  the  younger  Dionysius  to  realize,  immediately  after  the 
(le  itii  of  the  'father.  They'are  the  same  as  he  had  intended  to  fur- 
tiier  by  call"ng  in  Plato — with  what  success  has  been  already 
recounted.  I5ut  Dion  made  the  fattd  mistake  of  not  remarking,  tliat 
the  state  of  tilings,  both  as  to  himself  and  as  to  Syracuse,  was  totally 
altered  during  the  interval  between  307  B.C.  and  854  b.c.  If  at  the 
former  period  when  the  Dionysian  dynasty  was  at  the  zenith  of 
power,  and  Syracuse  completely  prostrated,  the  younger  Dionysius 
could  have  l/een  persuaded  spontaneously  and  without  contest  or 
constraint  to  merge  his  own  despotism  in  a  more  liberal  system,  even 


288 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER 


HERAKLEIDES  PRIVATELY  SLAIN. 


289 


dictated  by  himself— it  is  certain  that  such  a  free,  though  moderate 
concession,  would  at  tirst  have  provoked  unbounded  gratitude,  and 
Avould  have  had  a  chance  (though  that  is  more  doubiful)  of  giving 
lonir-continued  satisfaction.  But  the  situation  was  totally  differenl 
in  354  B.C.,  when  Dion,  after  the  expulsion  of  Apollokrates.  had  be- 
come master  in  Ortvgia;  and  it  was  his  mistake  that  he  still  insisted 
on  applving  the  old*  ])lans  when  they  had  become  not  merely  unsuit- 
able, but  mischievous.  Dion  was  not  in  the  position  of  an  estab- 
li>hed  despot,  who  consents  to  renounce,  for  tlie  public  good,  powers 
which  every  one  knows  that  he  can  retain,  if  he  chooses;  nor  were 
the  Syracusans  any  longer  passive,  prostrate,  and  liopeless.  They 
had  received  a  solemn  promise  of  liberty,  and  had  been  thereby  in- 
flamed into  vehement  action  by  Dion  hiniself ;  who  had  been  armed 
by  them  with  delegated  powers,  for  the  special  puri>ose  of  putting 
down  Dionysius.  "That  under  these  circumstances  Dion,  instead  of 
laving  down  his  trust,  should  constitute  himself  king— even  limited 
king— and  determine,  how  much  liberty  he  would  consent  to  allot  to 
the" Syracusans  who  had  appointed  him— this  was  a  proceeding 
which* they  could  not  but  resent  as  a  flagrant  usurpation,  and  which 
he  could  only  hope  to  maintain  by  force. 

The  real  conduct  of  Dion,  however,  was  worse  even  than  this. 
lie  manifested  no  evidence  of  realizing  even  that  fraction  of  popular 
libertv  which  had  entered  into  his  original  scheme.  What  exact 
promise  he  made  we  do  not  know.  But  he  maintained  his  own 
power,  the  military  force,  and  the  despotic  fortitications,  provision- 
allv  undiminished!'  And  who  could  tell  how  long  he  intended  to 
maintain  them  ?  That  he  really  h.ad  in  his  mind  purposes  such  as 
Plato  gives  him  credit  for,  I  believe  to  be  true.  But  he  took  no 
practicTd  step  toward  them.  He  had  resolved  to  accomplish  them, 
not  throui^h  persuasion  of  the  Syracusans,  but  through  his  own 
power.  This  was  the  excuse  which  he  probably  made  to  himself, 
and  wiiich  pushed  him  down  that  inclined  plane  from  whence  there 
was  afterward  no  escape. 

It  was  not  likely  that  Dion's  conduct  would  pass  without  a  pro- 
test. That  protest  came  loudest  from  Herakleides;  who,  so  long  as 
Dion  had  been  actinij:  in  the  real  service  of  Syracuse,  had  opposed 
him  in  a  culpable  and  traitorous  manner— and  who  now  again  found 
himself  in  opposition  to  Dion,  when  opposition  had  become  the 
side  of  patriotism  as  well  as  of  danger.  Invited  by  Dion  to  attend 
the  council,  he  declined,  saving  that  he  was  now  nothing  more  than 
a  private  citizen,  and  would  attend  the  public  assembly  along  with 
the  rest;  a  hint  which  implied,  plainly  as  well  as  reasonably,  that 
Dion  also  ousht  to  lay  down  his  power,  now  that  the  common 
enemy  Avas  put  down.  The  surrender  of  Ortygia  had  produced 
strong  excitement  among  the  Syracusans.  They  were  impatient  to 
demolish  the  dauirerous  stronghold  erected  in  that  islet  by  the  elder 
Dionysius;    thev  l>oth  hoped^iud   expected,   moreover,    to  see  the 


I 


flp<!tructioa  of  that  splendid  funeral  monument  which  his  son  had 
urhihH  honor,   ami  the  urn  with  its  ashes  cast  out.     I.ow  of 

n?ee  two  measures,  the  first  was  one  of  pressing  and  undeniabe 

cessUv   vWiich  Dion  on^ht  to  have  con.sun,.natod  without  a       v 

nent's  a>'lav-  the  second  was  compliance  with  a  popular  aniipahy 

thft  1     e  natural,  whi,li  would  have  served  as  an  ovnlen™  that 

;'l  ■•  k  de  not  stoo,l  condemned.  Yet  Dion  did  neither.  It  was 
traUh  desw   o  censured  him,  and  moved  for  the  <  euiohtiou  of 

tl,P  Dion vshuB. stile;  thus  liaving  the  glory  of  attaching  his  name 
f.lP,ne,sure«  'CMly  performed  by  Tim<.leonclevei^ 
L  moneut  'hat'he  found  himse'lf  master  of  Syracuse.     Not  only 

tlie  ™^  "^'"  ,"■*;„■  .,  ^^^^.  overthrow  of  tliis  dangerous  stronghold, 
but  when  Herak^de  proposed  it,  he  i-csisted  him  and  prevented  it 
from  Ic  '  "do'ie-  We  shall  find  the  same  deu  serving  lor  sue<-es. 
s he  dSpols-preserved  by  Dion  for  them  as  well  as  tor  himself. 

nnd  oiilv-  removed  hv  the  real  liberator  limoleon. 
"°H"^lddergained  extra,,rdinary  popularity  among  the^^^^^^^^ 

on«  l.v  his  courageous  and  nritnolic  conduct.  But  Dion  saw  plainly 
?lnt  he^uUi  not  coDsisteuth-  with  his  own  designs  permit  such 
f  r!  „?,,fr,  Uion  anv  lon-r  jlauv  of  his  adherents,  looking  upon 
I  eraSe  a  one  who'ought  not  to  have  been  spared  on  the  pre- 
V  nusoecasion  were  readv  to  put  him  to  death  at  any  moment;  bein- 
re?trai"SlonlV  by  a  special  prohibition  which  Dion  now  thought  it 
Umi  to  remove.  %cc,lrdingly,  with  his  privity,  they  made  their  way 
intr>  tlip  linuse  of  Herakleides  and  slew  hmi.  .     ,     .   .       c^ 

Ths  dark  deed  abolished  all  remaining  hope  of  obtaining  byn^ 
cnsa     freedom  from  the  hands  of  Dion,  and  stamped  hmi     s  the 
meii  successor  of  the  Dionv;sian  despotism     ,  [;™f  ■;^]7/," '"^^'..^e 
attended  tlie  ohscKiuies  of  Herakleides  with  his  lull  '""•"/y/"'^';.':- 
e4us  n.-  hs  Well-known  crime  to  the  people,  on  the  plea  that  Syra^ 
cfwPcnuH  never  be  at  peace  while  two  such  rivals  were  boih  in 
actfve  ,  0 litical  life     Vnder  the  circumstances  of  the  case  the  re- 
mark was  an   nsiltin-  derision;  though  it  miglit  have  been  advanced 
wl  ^pe    inence  as  a  reason  fm-  seirding  Herakleides  away  at    he 
mo  lent  when  he  before  spared  him.     Dion  had  now  conferred  upon 
hirrvl  tie  melancholy  honor  of  dying  as  a  martvr  to  Syracusaa 
freedoni    amMn  that  light  he  was  bitterly  mourned  bv  the  people 
No  in  n  after  this  murde'r  could  think  himself  secure.     Having  once 
mphm.l  the  soldiers  as  executioners  of  his  own  pohucal  ant  pa- 
thies     Dion   proceeded  to   lend  himself  more  and   more  to  then 
ex  .-enoier  He  provided  for  them  payand  largesses,  great  in  amon 
fir  t  at  the  cost  of  his  opponents  in  the  city,.next  at  Ihat^of    u, 
friends    until  at  length  discontent  became  universal.     Among  tu^ 
geueial  body  of  tUe^citizens  Dion  became  detested  as  a  tyrant,  and 
fhe  more  delsted  because  he  had  presented  himsel    as  a  liberator; 
while  the  soldiers  also  were  in  great  part  d'safEected  to  him. 
Tlie  spies  and  police  of  the  Dionysiaa  dynasty  not  liaving  been 

H.  G.  IV.— 10 


290 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YOUNGER 


DION  ASSASSINATED. 


291 


vet  re-established,  there  was  ample  liberty  at  least  ot  speech  and 
JeLure  so  t^^^^  Dion  was  soon  furnished  ^vith  lull  indications  o 
the  sentiment  entertained  toward  him.  He  became  disquieted  and 
rritable  at  this  chan-e  of  public  feeling;  angry  with  the  yeoi^e,  yet 
at  he  same  time  ashamed  of  himself.  Tiie  murder  of  Herakleides 
sat  heavv  on  his  soul.  Tlie  same  man  whom  he  had  spared  before 
vLn  7the  wrong,  he  had  now  slain  when  in  the  right.  The 
maxims  of  the  Academy  which  had  imparted  to  him  so  much  self- 
^liTt^ction  iu  the  former  act,  could  hardy  fail  to  occasion  a 
pi-oporlionate  sickness  of  self-reproach  in  the  latter  Dion  was  not  a 
mere  power-seeker,  nor  prepared  for  all  that  endless  apparatus  of 
mistrustful  precaution,  indispensable  to  a  Grecian  despot  \\hcn 
^Id  that  his  life  was  in  danger,  he  replied  that  he  would  rather 
perish  at  once  by  the  hands  of  the  first  assassin,  than  live  in  per- 
Detual  diffidence  toward  friends  as  well  as  enemies. 

One  thus  too  good  for  a  despot,  and  yet  untit  for  a  popular  leader 
could  not  remain  long  in  the  precarious  position  occupied  by  Dion. 
His  intimate  friend,  the   Athenian  Kallippus.  seeing  that  the  man 
wlio  could  destroy  him  would  become  popular  with  the  b.yracusans 
as  well  as  with  a  large  portion  of  the  soldiery,  tormed  a  coiispMacy 
accordin-ly.     He  stood  high  iu  the  confidence  of  Dion,  had  been  his 
companiSiI  during  his  exile  at  Athens,  had   accompanied   him  to 
Sicily   and  entered  Syracuse  by  his  side.     But  Plato  anxious  for  the 
credit' of  the  Academy,  is  careful  to  inform  us.  that  this  inauspicious 
friendship  arose,  not  out  of  fellowship  in  philosophy,  but  out  of 
common  hospitalities,  and  especially  common  initiation  in  the  Lleu- 
siniau  mysteries.     Brave  and  forward  in  battle.  Kallippus  enjoyed 
much  credit  with  the  soldier^-.     He  was  conveniently  placed  for  tam- 
pering with  them,  and  by  a  crafty  stratagem,  he  even  in^Jired Jhe 
unconscious  connivance  of  Dion  himsclt.     Having  learned  that  plots 
were  formed  against  his  life.  Dion  talked  about  theni  to  Kallippus 
who  offered  himself  to  undertake  the  part  of  spy,  and  by  simulated 
Dartnership  to  detect  as  well  as  to  betray  the  conspirators.     Lnder 
{his  confidence.  Kallippus  had  full  license  for  carrying  out  his  in- 
trio-ues  unimpeded,  since  Dion  disregarded  the  many  warnings  Avhich 
resfched  him.     Among  the  rumors  raised  out  of  Dion  s  new  position, 
and  industriously   circulated  by   Kallippus-oue  was.  that  he  was 
about  to  call   back  Apollokrates.  son  of  Dionysius.  as  his  partner 
and  succes:^r  in  the  despotism-as  a  substitute  for  the  youthful  son 
who  had  recently  perished.     By  these  and  other  reports,  Dion  be^ 
came  more  and  more  discredited,  while  Kallii)pus  secretly  organized 
a  wider  circle  of  adherents.     His  plot,  however,  did  no  escape  the 
penetration  of  Aristomache  and  Arete;  who  having  firs    addressed 
unavailing  hints  to  Dion,  at  last  took  upon  them  to  question  Kallip- 
pus himsdf.     The  latter  not  only  denied  the  charge,  but  even  con- 
firmed his  denial,  at  their  instance,  by  one  of  the  most  solemn  and 
terrific  oaths  recognized  in  Grecian  religion;  going  into  the  sacred 


grove  of  Deraeter  and  Persephone,  touching  the  purple  robe  of  the 
goddess,  and  taking  iu  his  hand  a  lighted  torch. 

Inquiry  being  thus  eluded,  there  came  on  presently  the  day  of  the 
Koreia:— the  festival  of  these  very  two  goddesses  in  whose  name  and 
presence  Kallippus  had  foresworn.     This  was  the  day  which  lie  had 
fixed  for  execution.    The  strong  points  of  defense  iu  Syracuse  w^ere 
confided  beforehand  to  his  principal  adherents,  while  his  brother 
Philostrates  kept  a  trireme  manned  in  the  harbor  ready  for  flight  in 
case  the  scheme  should  miscarry.     While  Dion,  taking  no  part  in 
the  festival,  remained  at  home,  tvallippus  caused  his  house  to  be  sur- 
rounded by  confidential  soldiers,  and  then  sent  into  it  a  select  com- 
pany of  Zakynthians,  unarmed,  as  if  for  the  purpose  of  addressin:^ 
Dion  on  business.     These  men,  young  and  of  distinguished  muscti: 
lar  strength,  being  admitted  into  the  house,  put  aside  or  intimidated 
the  slaves,  none  of  whom  manifested  any  zeal  or  attachment.    They 
then  made  their  way  up  to  Dion's  apartment,  and  attempted  to  throw 
him  down  and  strangle  him.     So  strenuously  did  he  resist,  however, 
that  they  found  it  impossible  to  kill  him  without  arms;  which  they 
were  perplexed  how  to  procure,  being  afraid  to  open  the  doors,  lest 
aid  might  be  introduced  against  them.     At  length  one  of  their  num- 
ber descended  to  a  back-door,  and  procured  from  a  Syracusan  with- 
out, named  Lykon,  a  short  sw^ord;  of  the  Laconiau  sort,   and  of 
peculiar  workmanship.     With  this  weapon  they  put  Dion  to  death. 
They  then  seized  Aristomache  and  Arete,  the  sister  and  wife  of 
Dion.     These  unfortunate  women  were  cast  into  prison,  where  they 
were  long  detained,  and  where  the  latter  was  delivered  of  a  posthu- 
mous son. 

Thus  perished  Dion,  having  lived  only  about  a  year  after  his 
expulsion  of  the  Diouysian  dynasty  from  Syracuse — but  a  year  too 
long  for  his  own  fame.  Notwithstanding  the  events  of  those  last 
mouths,  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  was  a  man  essentially  differing 
from  the  class  of  Grecian  despots;  a  man,  not  of  aspirations  purely 
personal,  nor  thirsting  merely  for  multitudes  of  submissive  subjects 
and  a  victorious  army — but  with  large  public-minded  purposes 
attached  as  co-ordinate  to  his  own  ambitious  views.  He  wished  to 
perpetuate  his  name  as  the  founder  of  a  polity,  cast  in  something  of 
the  general  features  of  Sparta;  which,  while  it  did  not  shock  Hel- 
lenic instincts,  should  reach  further  than  political  institutions  gewcv- 
ally  aim  to  do,  so  as  to  remodel  the  sentiments  and  habits  of  tlie 
citizens,  on  principles  suited  to  philosophers  like  Plato.  Brought 
up  as  Dion  was  from  childhood  at  the  court  of  the  elder  Dionysi\i>^. 
unused  to  that  established  legality,  free  speech,  and  habit  of  active 
citizenship,  from  whence  a  large  portion  of  Hellenic  virtue  flowid 
— the  wonder  is,  how  he  acquired  so  much  public  conviciion  and 
true  magnanimity  of  soul — not  how  he  missed  acquiring  mo#.  The 
influence  of  Plato  during  his  youth  stamped  his  mature  character; 
but  that  influence  (as  Plato  himself  tells  us)  found  a  rare  predispo- 


i 


292 


DIONYSIUS  THE  YUCNGER 


PROSPECTS  OF   KALLIPPUS. 


293 


M 


Mtion  fn  the  pupil.  Still.  Dion  hnd  ro  oxrericDce  of  the  woilvirig 
ofTfAe  ml  popular  governiuciit.  The  atmosphere  m  ^vhK•h  Ins 
fouth^rpt^T  was  that  of  an  energetic  despotism;  .vh.le  he 
Lniratk)a%vhich  he  imbibed  from  Plalowas.  to  restrain  and  regular- 
^eth.  despotism,  and  to  administer  to  the  people  a  ^^'t'^n  ^ose  ot 
i^lit^cal  liberty,  yet  reserving  to  himself  the  task  of  se  tling  how 
Imleh  wasgomVfor  them,  and  the  power  of  preventing  them  from 

'TowS'i^'ject-the  natural  gi-owth  of  Dion's  mind  for  which 
his  tn^tes  and  capacities  were  siiiled-was  violently  thrust  aside 
U  ro '^^^^^^^^^  of  the  younger  Dionysius-has  been 

nlreX  recounted.     The    position   ot   Dion   was   now   completely 
altered     He  became  a  banished,  ill-used  man,  stung  with  contemptu- 
"tipalhv  against  Dionysius,  and  eagerloput  ^^f^vn  hisdespoUsm 
over  S  racuie      Here  weie  new  motives  apparently  falling  in  Mth 
The  old'S  .     B^'t  11^^'  conditions  of  the  problem  l»acWdtogether 
clnn  'ed^    Dion  could  not  overthrow  Dionys  us  without  "taking  the 
^•racisan  people  into  partnership"  (to  use  the  phrase  of  1  eiodot 
liiTc   n-the  Athenian  Kleisthenes)-wilhout  promising  then  full 
freedom    as  an  inducement  for  their  liearty  co-operation-withou 
dvinrhem  arms,  and  awakening  in  them  the  stirring  impulse,  ot 
Giechn  c  Uzensh  p,  all  the  more  violent  because  they  had  been  so 
Ion"  VrocMen  down     With  these  new  allies  he  knew  not  how  to  deal. 
h" Imd  no  e^^^^^  of  a  free  and  jealous  popular  mind:  in  persua- 

sion he  was  utterly  unpracticed:  his  manners  were  lumghty  and  dis- 

plea^ng  Moreover,  hir  kindred  with  the  I^'<^">-^V\"  ^^^"//^Xof 
hni  to  antipathy  from  two  different  qm.rters  Like  the  Duke  of 
Orieans  (H  ite)  at  the  end  of  1793,  in  the  first  French  Reyohif  ^n- 
he  was  hared  both  by  the  royalists,  because,  though  related  to  the 
reVTdn-Xnasty,  he  had  taken  an  active  part  against  it-and  by  sin- 
ce f  democrats,  because  thev  suspected  him  cf  a  design  to  put  liinv 
set  in TplL^^^^  To  Dion,  such  coalition  of  antipathieswas  a  serious 
hinc/^uicerpresenting  a  strong  basis  of  .-PPO^  "  ^^^^ 
especially  for  the  unscrupulous  Herakleides.  Ihe  bad  tuat" |i^i 
wMch  he  underwent  both  from  the  Syracusans  and  from  Herakleides 
diriuVt^^  when  the  officers  of  Dionysius  still  renniincd  masters 

Orryl  a  ^s  been  already  related.  Dion  however  behaved,  though 
not  1  wavs  with  prudence,  yet  with  so  much  generpus  energy 
a'List  tircomli^^^  <lown  his  rival  and  mam- 

taii.ed  his  ascendency  unshaken,  until  the  surrend(T  of  Ortygia 

Tint  surrender  brouirht  his  power  to  a  maximum.  Jt  \\as  ine 
turn    -^^^^^^  crisis  of  his  life.     A  splendid   opportunity  was 

row  opened   of  earning  for  himself  fame  and  gratitude.     He  might 
ha  ^attached  his  nam?  to  an  act  as  sublime  and  impressive  as  riiy 
n  Gre^an  h  s  orv,  which,  in  an  evil  hour,  he  left  to  be  performed  m 
>fter  (lays  bv  Timoleon-the  razing  of  the  Dionysian  stronghold 
aad  the  erection  of  courts  of  justice  on  its  site.   He  might  have  taken 


the  lead  in  organizing,  under  the  discussion  and  consent  of  the  people 
M^ood  and  free  crovernment,  which,  more  or  less  exempt  Irom 
efc^  t  as  t  niidit  have  been,  would  at  least  have  s^xtisfied  them,  and 
XV  on  d  h  ive^pared  Syracuse  those  ten  years  of  suffering  which  m ter- 
(^ed  nliV'^^^  came  to  make  the  possibdity  a  fact.  Dion 
Adiea  umu    »»"'^  Timolcon  did— and  might  have  done  it 

;;;:i^^^lw  ^  t  waflcJ^^mb^d  both  b/the  other  towns 
4ih  and  by  the  Carthaginians.     Unfortunately  he  still  thought 
iniefsuong  enough  to  resume  his  original  project.     In  spile  of 
snirif  kim1?ed  pSrtly  bv  Idmself,  among  the  Syracusans-in  spite 
11      renu^nan^^^^^  manifested,  on  the  mere 

:  s^c^KsSr^tic  d^ign^he  fancied  himself  competent  ^ 
U'o\\  the  Svracusaus  as  a  tame  and  passive  herd;  to  caive  out  Tor 
.:;,\ '."stl^  much  liberty  «s  he  thought  J^gl^'. -'*  f";-;!'^,-   'l^  '^ 
to  be  iattefled  with  it;  nay,  even   worse    '°/*i^  f,"^ /'^'"g J^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
liberty  at  all.   on  the  plea,  or  pretense,   of  full  consultation  «iiu 

"'xitu^h  ti" deptaWe  mistake,  alike  miscliievous  to  Syracuse 

•MKi   o  hii  4lf  Dion  made  his  Kovenimeut  one  of  pure  force,    lie 

;^    ed  hms^lt'  in  a  groove  w herein  he  was  fatally  condemned  to 

m'e  on™om  bad  to  worse,  without  possibility  of  ameadment.     He 

■ri^lr^adv  made  a  martvr  of  Herakleides,  and  lie  would  have  be.-a 

"miSed  to  nXomer  martyrs  besides,  ha,l  his  life  continued       t 

s  Sate  for  his  reputation  that  his  career  -'''f.  "^^^^^X   ^  d 

lir.fiire  he  h.id  become  bad  cnoJ!?li  to  forfeit  that  sympainj   .uui 

„  teem  witl    which  the  philosoi>Uer  Plato  still  mourns  l"s  deaOi 

appeSin™  his  own  disappninlmeul  by  throwing  the  blame  of  Dion  3 

failure  on  every  one  but  Diou  hiniselt. 


CHAPTEK  LXXXV. 

SICILIAN    AFFAIRS     DOWK  TO  THE  CLOSE    OF    THE    EXPEDITION  OP 

TIMOLEOX.      B.C.    6i)6-660. 

TtTF  issassination  of  Dion,   as  recounted   in    my  last    chapter, 
vl^rs  tcSr^^^^     skillfully  planned  and  executed  for  the  purposes 
0^?^  lintrl^  the  Athenian'l^allippus.    ^f--f  I'l^j;^--,^^    ; 
eoMvnind  of  the  soldiers,  among  whom  ho  had  betoieb.cn  \cty 
;;^;,^^^^^^^^  mastery  of  Ortygia-ho  wa .practically  supreme 

a   Sv  •  icuse      We  read  in  Cornelius  Nepos,  that  after  the  assiis^ina- 
?i^m  of  d' o  .  there  was  deep  public  sorrow,  and  a  strong  reaction  la 
fu-or  tes  titled  by  splendid  obsequies  attended  by  the  mass  of  the 
nu laU^cin ^^  I^^^^^^  is  dimcult  to  believe;  not  merely 

Else  Kallippus  long  remaincHi  ^^^^^-^urbed  masteI^  but  beca^^^^^^ 
he  also  threw  into  prison  the  female  relatives  of  Dion-his  sister 


I 


294  SlCILLiN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-336. 

lippus  remained  master.     O^;  ['^^J  >^  ""friend  of  the  deceased  Dioti, 

min  on      Uiseouteuts  had  tlxm  .irro^vu  „p;  and  "-■, '""'''^ ''f  "'"", 

mmmMm 

tSi  com^»e7toT<^u-u.  lnm.elt  «i,,l>  the  uuprofitable  exchange  M 

Kalana  in  place  of  Syracuse.  -ninnv<;iim  the  elde^ 

iTii-innrinns  and  NvssDus  were  the  two  sons  ot  Dionjsins  i"^,/^'^'* 

K^u^^e   vetitw^  «tl^^'^"  portions  ol  fe}n. 

FrZ  uIeTeUe;s"orPlata"*u\^we\Stoaesatuteof  memcials  to 


PLATO  DESCRIBES  SYRACUSE. 


235 


make  out  anythins:  distinct  respecting  the  condition  of  Syracuse  or 
of  Sicilv  between  353  B.C.  and  344  B.C.— from  the  death  of  Dion  to 
the  invitation  sent  to  Corinth,  which  brouiiht  about  the  mission,  of 
Tinioleon.     We  are  assured  ircnerally  that  it  was  a  period  of  intoler- 
tib^e  contlicts,  disorders,  and  suiferini]:;  that  even  the  temples  and 
tombs  were   neglected;  tiitit  the  people  were  everywhere  trampled 
down  bv  despots  and  foreign  mercenaries;  that  the  despots  were  fre- 
quentlv  overthrown  by  violence  or  treachery,  yet  only  to  be  succeed- 
ed bv'^others  as  bad  or   worse;  that  the  multiplication  of  foreiga 
soldiers    seldom  regularly  ])aid,  spread  pillage  and  violence  every- 
where     The  piiilosopher  Plato— in  a  letter  written  about  a  year  or 
more  after  the  death  of  Dion  (seemingly  after  the  expulsion  of  Kal- 
lippus)  and  addressed  to  the  surviving  relatives  and  friends  of  thr^ 
letter— draws  a  lamentable  picture  of  "the  state  both  of  Syracuse  an  I 
Sicilv      He  goes  so  far  as  to  say,  that  under  the  distraction  and  deso- 
lutioawhicirpre vailed,  the  Hellenic  race  and  language  were  likelv 
to  perish  in  th(>  islaiul,  and  give  place  to  the  Punic  and  Oscan.    H  ; 
adiures  the  contendin-j:  parties  at  Syracuse  to  avert  this  miserabV; 
issue  by  coming  to  a  compromise,  and  by  constituting  a  moderate 
and  poi)ular  goverunvnt— yet  with  some  rights  reserved  to  the  ruling 
families,  among  whom  he  desires  to  see  a  fraternal  partnership  estab- 
lished, tripartite  in  its  character;  including  Dionysius  the  younger 
(now  at  Lokri)— Hipparinus  son  of  the  elder  Dionysius— and  the  son 
of  Dion.    On  the  absolute  necessity  of  such  comprom:se  and  concord, 
to  preserve  both  people  and  despots  from  one  common  ruin,  Plato 
delivers  the  most  pathetic  admonitions.    He  recommends  a  triple  co- 
ordinate kingship,  passing  by  the  hereditary  transmission  in  the  fami- 
lies of  the  three  persons  just  named:  and* including  the  presidency 
of  reliixious  ceremonies  with  an  ample  measure  of  dignity  and  vener- 
ation  butVery  little  active  political  power.     Advising  that  impartial 
arbitrators,  respected  by  all,  should  be  invoked  to  settle  terms  for 
the  compromise,  he  earnestly  iiuplores  each  of  the  combatants  to  ac- 
quiesce peaceably  in  their  adjudication. 

To  Plato— who  saw  before  him  the  double  line  of  Spartan  kings, 
the  only  hereditary  kings  in  Greece— the  proposition  of  three  co-ordi- 
nate kindly  families  did  not  appear  at  all  impracticable;  nor  indeed 
was  it  so,  considering  the  small  extent  of  politicnl  ]>ower  allotted  to 
to  them.  But  amid  the  angry  passions  which  then  rnged,  and  the 
muss  of  evil  which  had  been  done  and  suffered  on  all  sides,  it  was 
not  likely  that  any  pacific  arbitrator,  of  whatever  position  or  char- 
acter wcmld  tind  a  hearing,  or  would  be  enabled  to  effect  nny  such 
salutary  adjustment  as  had  emanated  from  the  :Mnntineian  Demonax 
at  Kyrene— between  the  discontented  Kyreneans  and  the  dynasty  of 
of  the  Baltiad  princes.  Plato's  n-commendaiion  passed  unheeded. 
He  died  in  348-347  B.C.,  without  seeing  any  mitigation  of  those  Sicil- 
ian calamities  which  saddened  the  last  years  of  his  long  life.  On  the 
contrary,  the  condition  of  Syracuse  grew  worse  instead  of  better. 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  35^336 


296 

'.;:.,;^iizc..l  ns  l,e!o.,g^  to  kings  •-'-^.^'-J.fl  •„,,,;,,..  not  o,.. 
Ot-allthcso  l-rincc.  descended  /."^.  J  .',,,'    '^oVtib.iled  so  much 

,,a  well  as  Uipparinns  and  ^-y'^f."^-.- "  'A'X"  ^.^  he  vepre.enta 
,vl,ilc  in  a  tit  of  into.xication;  so  '^a'  ^J^'^"^  ^''-^'^^'^'^'L  ,ie  return 
tive  of  this  familv,  untd  lie  was  expelled  tiom  uin  „w  uy 

cf  tlie  yonnger  Dionysms  ,,.      f,„„  Pyractise,  had  chiefly 

That  P""<^,'^•.^""i'^,^'^ f ';,  ?Xc itv  his  tnotlRT  Doris  «asa  native 
resided  at  Lokri  in  Italy ,  ot  A^  '"^H^ciij  iu._ '  j      ,  ^  ansnieuted 

It  has  already  been  ftalcd  that  the  eldtr  Uii>ny^uL   i  -         ,e. 

,,nd  nursed  up  Lokri  by  every  means  n  '"•  P'^^i'^^jj^.Vro  its  terri- 
nance  ot  his  own  domin...n  a    '^>;f'f  ;„,,'' ''-aieudeil  within  a 

tory  all  'l'%^<'"'^7"■"':■ '  P"'??^  'A  to  t^^  of  Skvletiuni),  once  be- 
line  drawn  f r  >m  the  Gulf  ol  '•-""•'/ TiV,"„ninm  '  But  though  the 
longing  to  Hhegium  Kaulo.na.  and  \iy;  .^'^  to  be  a  frc?e  city, 
power  of  Lokri  was  thus  '""J  =<-''• '1 1'j"'  p  ,,  L-m  family.  As 
icing  converted  into  » /''^^P;'"  ",  ^J^on  DUrrur^^^  beconld 
such,  it  became  « '«  J^''''^:""; "* '  "•;t,'^°"'\v7kiow  little  of  what  he 
no  longer  mamtain  himself  1°  !^>">'^  sc-      "     .        j  ,^    dismantled 

d-prS  ^rim^uid  Tirr  plc":twnfril  of  t..e  second 

^'^^rleason  between  3nf>-.46  n.c.  -"^X^'^l  SX^r^^l^ 

suffering  for  all  the  .I'^'«Vlf  irn'.ti.m  ^  . "^8™"!''"^'  -!">-?- 
of  the  inland  Luoanians  uid  15rutlian».      '    \  .        ie,,,ci,ed  from  the 

pie<l  the  southernmost  Calabria,  ^^"«  ^^^[;.\  ^y",  b  ving  consisted 
'general  bo.ly  of  Lucanians  and  ,^''  ;^"  ^/^  , S' comnu.nilies.  who 
chietlv  of   IK  lirenous  rural  sens  in  tlie  niouiucui  nnindepen- 

^on  the  sway  of  their  ^^^^^-^^^.^^ 
dent  aggre.-ate  for  themselves.    1 1'^-,^/;^^^^.^, J^' ^.^^     ^.-ere   forniichiblc 
effort  Vhielv   ir.irked    their   ^'^''Iv   "ulepu^^^^^^^^^^  ^^^.^^ 

enemies  of  tlie  Greeks  on  the  ^'^'^'iJ,'^^^^^^^  Epirols  invi- 

strait;  and  more  than  a  match  even  forlhe  hpaitans  auu  x.^ 
*^d  over  by  the  Greeks  as  anxilmnes  j^^^.^.. 

It  appears  that  the  serond  ^^'^'''y^'^^^;"^^^^^  his  rule 

•j-c:?;:iarrhis^  ersr^P^^^^^^^^^^ 


DISTRESS  OF  THE  SYRACUSANS. 


297 


PharaK,  a  man  of  profligacy  and  violence.     The  conduct  of  Diony- 
Jius  became  at  last  so  odious,  that  nothing  short  of  extreme  force 
could  keep  down  the  resentment  of  the  citizens.  -We  read  that  he  was 
in  the  liabit  of  practicini,'  the  most  licent  ious  outrage  toward  the  mar- 
vh-eablc  maidens  of  c:ood  family  in  Lokri.     The  detestation  thus 
nised  a^-ainst  him  was  repressed  by  his  superior  torce— not,  ^ye  may 
1)0 '^ure  "without  numerous  cruellies  perpetrated  against  individual 
nersons   who   stood  on    their  defense-untii   the   moment   arrived 
when  he  and  his  son  Apollokrates  etrected  their  second  return  to 
Ortvna.     To  insure  so  important  an  ac(iui<ihon,  l)it)nvsius  dirain- 
ished'his  military  force  at  Lokri,  where  he  at  the  same  time  lelt  his 
wife  his  two  dau-hters,  and  his  youthful  son.     But  at  er  his  de- 
narture   the  Lokrians  rose  in  insurrection,  overpowered  the  reduced 
Lrri^on    and  took  captive    these    unfortunate    members  of    hi3 
family.     Upon    their   guiltless  heads  fell   ail  the  terrors  of  retalia- 
on  for  thi  enormities  of  the    despot.     It  was  in  vain  that  both 
Dionvsius    himself,  and    the    Tarenlines    supplicated    pennissioa 

[o  rc-deem  the  captives  at  the  ^^^^\  ^^'"^^  I'^^^I^l 
Lokri  besieged,  and  its  territory  desolated.  Ihe  Lokriiis  could 
n^er  be  deduced  by  bribes  nor  deterred  by  tbre^Us  roru 
'^atiatinn-  the  full  extremity  of  vindictive  fury  After  multi. 
pi  H  erne  hies  and  brutalities,  the  wife  and  family,  of  Dionysius 
were  at  length  relieved  from  further  sntfering  by  being  stmngled 
With  this  Revolting  tragedy  terminated  the  inauspicious  marital 
connection  begun  bt'tweeli  the  elder  Dionysius  and  the  oligarchy  of 

T       It   .* 

B^the  manner  in  which  Dionysius  exercised  his  power  at  Lokri 
wcfmav  iudge  how  he  would  behave  at  Syracuse.  Tlic  Syracusans 
endured  Ui^  evil  than  ever,  without  knowing  where  to  look  for  help. 
Hildas  the  Svracusan  (once  the  friend  of  Dion,  ultimate  y  the  mur- 
doi-er  of  the  sfain  Dion's  widow  and  sister)  had  now  established  him- 
self as  despot  at  Leontini.  To  him  they  turned  as  an  auxiliary, 
hopin-  thus  to  obtain  force  sufficient  for  the  expulsion  of  Dionysius. 
Hifi^etas  gladly  accepted  the  proposition  with  full  purpose  of  reap- 
in-  the  reward  of  such  expulsion,  when  achieved,  for  himself 
^^loreover,  a  formidable  cloud  was  now  gathering  from  the  side  of 
Carthacre  What  causes  had  rendered  Carthage  inactive  for  the  last 
few  years,  while  Sicily  was  so  weak  and  disunited-we  ^o  not  know ; 
hut  "she  had  become  once  more  ag-ressive,  extending  her  alliance 

among  the  despots  of  the  island,  and  P^^^/'V^^" '^  f^  J^o^l 
fleet,  so  as  to  menace  the  independence  both  of  Sicily  '^"^  of  South- 
ern Italy  The  appearance  of  this  new  enemy  drove  the  Syracus- 
ans  to  despair,  and  left  them  no  hope  of  safety  except  in  assistance 
from  Corinth.  To  that  city  they  sent  a  pathetic  ^^"^  ."^^J^^"*,^^^^^^^^^ 
setting  forth  both  the  actual  suffering  ^"d  approachmg  peiil  fiom 
without.  And  such  indeed  was  the  peril,  that  even  to  a  calm  ob- 
server it  might  well  seem  as  if  the  mournful  prophecy  of  t'lato  was 


298  SICILIAN-   AFFAIRS  B.C.  853-330. 

on  the  point  of  receiving  fuimhncnt-IIcllcnism  as  well  as  freedom 

becon.ing  exlinct  ou  the  island  nikctas  was  a  party;  yet  an 

To  the  invocation  ot  tounmian  a'".  "  ,     .    ,  ,       ^^■^^    p^,.. 

unwilling  party.  He  ^  ^^^^^l^'^;^Xm  lu>  had 
pose,  it  was  better  to  30m  ^^^^,  j;^^\^ '^  ,"  ^^'li^h-  forces,  first  in  ex- 
alreadv  opened  »^'S^^^i^^^'?"^-f"^l^^,X   '.  fo^^^  But  these 

pelhng  Dionysius,  next  1^/;!  ^^S.^^yi'^^,"^^^^^^^^ 

Avere  schemes  not  to  be  yet  divulgul.  ^^.^/''^^^'"rj..^^^  to  C^^'lnth, 

to  concur  in  the  pressing  '^''^^^ '"^^^^^^"^  expected 

intendhig  from  tlie  ^^^^;"^^"^SJ,^,,/  "f^/^^^^^^^^^  compliance: 

indeed  tluU  the  ^«^'^"^'''^^"^^^?/^i,'^,^,"'  ^^^^^  they  had 

for  ihe  enterprise  proposed  to  ^^^^^i^  ^o  expect-  vvhde  the  force  ol 

the  ambitions  strides  of  l'"il'l>  «  .^^^^.^^^^^i,  „,  ^  favorable  moment. 

The   Syracusan  f°^«y*'/'^'',^/\'^^,,^;'""„e^      diminution  of  Gre- 

But  it  is  melanclioly  to  adver  to  ^^^^?e^^[f'JZl^    ears  before) 

cian  power,  as  C""'I'";:;V  ,  ww  ,o  "^^^  ""=  ^'''^'■^"^ 

their  foref^ithers  liad  ^^'   ,  f^!  ^^^^^Thens,  Sparta,  and  Syrnensc  her- 
armament  ot  Atneus,  u  iinic  V1.1 »-  •         :,.,,^o  ,.«(]   tiecdom. 

Belt,  were  all  in  ""l''™"  ,:i;f°;,%    U  is  iunctni'e  to  have  their 
However,  the  tor.mhnms  ''^  p^''  ,^  "l.""\^",  ,^1  tlic  voice  of  .cen- 

"^  fa^"  eard  with  nivor  and  sympathy.  A  decree  was  passed, 
S  u:,rnnd  unanimouslv,  to  g-"l ''- "'^^i^„t,i'  etlerwasnot  easily 
The  next  step  was  to  ^■l'<'"«;;'  '<,  "^fJ-tempt .  10^^^  da"g<^'-  «"rt 
fonnd.  The  enterprise  i;7^»«"'^^'>.  "'^  TlThcpdess  discord  of  Syra- 
dilliculty  abundant  a*"--''' f,  f  "'j  °„„,V  he  k.iding  Corinthian  pol- 
^'I^L^^-nS:^  Or;;l  '^^-rflJese.  tb^ 

-^^-"-F-^fSSSSrson^s 

obvious  was  the  cho.ee,  and  si.  P   -^  ,'^;°^^j^^!^?i,o,a  nuich  'inten- 

^•^^-ni^ifpointsmustbeherenotioedinlbepeV 

remarkable  man.  He  belonged  <0/  "  '"""'"°1'?,  "'  ni  y,^s  distin- 
and  was  now  of  mature  «?<^-l>};^'^'P^/,'^  ^'^.^  ^nes  of  his  disposi- 
guished  no  less  for  bis  courage  'l'"^" '"J ''',^,X' o,.  uy  ambition,  be 
^on.  Little  moved  either  l-y ,  P  ^  ^  «',"^'-\^°'ai"\atred  of  des- 
was  devoted  in  his  palrjolism.  and  unitser^cu 


TIMOLEOX  AND  TDIOPHANES. 


299 


nots  as  well  as  of  traitors.  Tlie  government  of  Corinth  was,  and  al- 
ways had  h.'cn,  oli-arch'cal;  but  it  was  a  regular,  constitutional,  o  i- 
siarchv  while  the"  Corinthian  antipathy  against  c.espots  was  ot  old 
sta'idin^-'— 'lardlv  less  strong  than  that  of  democratical  Athens  As 
jisoldicT-in  the 'ranks  of  Corinthian  hoplites,  the  bravery  ot  Timo- 
leon   and  his  submission  to  discipline,  were  alike  remarkable. 

These  points  of  his  character  stood  out  the  more  forcibly  from 
contrast  with  his  elder  brother  Timophanes;  who  possessed  the  sol- 
dierlike merits  of  bravery  and  energetic  enterprise,  but  combined 
with  them  an  unprincipled  ambition,  and    an  unscrupulous  pros- 
ecution of  selfish  advancement  at  all  cost  to  others.      The  military 
qualities  of  Timophanes,  however,  gained  for  him  so  much  popularity 
that  he  was  placed  high  as  an  officer  in  the  Corinthian  service.     1  imo- 
leon,  animated  with  a  full  measure  of   brotherly  attachment,  not 
only  tried  to  screen  his  defects  as  well   as  to  setoff  his  merits,  but 
also  incurred  the  greatest  perils  for  the  purpose  of  saving  his  lite. 
Ill  a  battle  against  the  Argeians  and  Kleonaeans,  Timophanes  was 
commanding  the  cavalry,  when  his  horse,  being  wounded,  threw  him 
on  the  ground,  veiy  near  to  the  enemy.     The   remaining  horsemen 
tied  leaving  their  commander  to  what  seemed  certain  destruction ;  but 
Tiinoleon,  who  w^as  serving  among  the  hoplites,  rusjied  singly  forth 
from  the  ranks  with  his  utmost  speed,  and  covered  rimophancs  with 
his  shield,  when  the  enemy  were  just  about  to  pierce  him.     He  made 
head  sin^-le-handed  against  them  warding  off  numerous  spears  and 
darts   anil  successfully  protected  his  fallen  brother  until  succor  ar- 
rived- though  at  the  cost  of  several  wounds  to  himself.     ^ 

This  act   of  generous  devotion   raised  great  admiration  toward 
Timoleon.     But  it  also  procured  sympathy  for  Timophanes,  who 
less  deserved  it.     The  Corinthitm^  had  recently  incurred  great  risk 
of  seeincr  their  citv  fall  into  the  hands  of  their  Athenian  allies,  who 
had  laid  a  plan  'to  seize  it,  but  were  disappointed  through  tiniely 
notice   given  at   Corinth.      To  arm  the  people  being  regaracd   r.s 
dan-erous  to  the  existing  oligarchy,  it  was  ]iidged  expedient  to  equip 
a  stJndin^r  force  of  400  paid  foreign  soldiers,  and  establish  them  as  a 
permanent  garrison  in  the  strong  and  lofty  citadel.  The  command  of 
this  n-arrison,  with  the  mastery  of  the  fort,  was  intrusted  to  Timoph- 
anes''   A  worse  choice  could  not  have  been  made.     The  new  com- 
man'der-seconded  not  only  by  his  regiment  and  his  strong  position 
but  also  by  some  violent  partisans  whom  he  took  into  his  pay  and 
armed  among  the  poorer  citizens— speedily  stood  forth  as  despot, 
takino-  the  whole  government  into  his  own  hands.     He  seized  num- 
bers a  the  chief  citizens,  probably  all  the  members  of  the  oligarchi- 
cal councils  who  resisted  his  orders,  and  put  them  to  death  wi  hout 
even  form   of  trial.     Now,  when  it  was  too    ate,  the  Corinthians 
repented  of  the  mistaken  vote  which  had  raised  up  a  new  Periander 
araoncr  them.     But  to  Timoleon,  the  crimes  of  his  brother  occasioned 
an  agSny  of  shame  and  sorrow.     He  first  went  up  to  the  acropohs  to 


300  5ICILIA>-  AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-336. 

sacrod  lumivcs  1-j^-  »:>,;;:>  e,ul£«lu',enppoal  uiU;  contempt, 
trous  projects.      ^""^P^^',^"' ^^  *  V,.,...,  ^^  ],i^    biotlier  ami  his  c-oim- 

Timoleon  ^^-^  ^^^^  ^  thHc      "u^  a^^^^^^  ^0'  ^-^'>-^-' 

try.  Again  he  ^VI^^^^^^^l  ^,^,  *^.[' \,.,_'bv  ibe  prophet  Orihairoras, 
brother  of  the  wife  of  Timophaii  s  ^l'^^^.;^,^^^  nanu-d  Tele- 
h\^  intimate  fricnd-perliaps  al^o  by  'y^l^l^'^/  \'^°,  ^hey  renewed 
kleides.     Admitted  into  ^^l^  PJ^'^^^^^.^^.j^^^^^^^^^^^  from 

their  prayers  and  ^^^PP^^^'^'f  f' ,|^  Cf  Xdin'Avas  without  effect, 
bis  tyrannical  courses.   ,^,  "\  "   /.^^'^.^ '^^^^^^^^        be  became  exas- 

and  in  a  flood  of  tears  ownv-  the  despotism  which 

AViUi  the  life  of  T'^^P'^'lTnt T.Xcnce  upon  u'e'^Corintl.iai.s. 
),ad  already  be.fft.n  '»„" M^ '  "=.„V^S  o7p°aced  in  safe  hands; 
The  mercenary  force  ^"^^  «".  ^of  a?r<  e  -i  v-  t  .e  forinthian  constl- 
'"'.''"''^'^''^'^^^'^{^^  \^^^<^^'--nor  this  change  .as 
tulion  was  revived  as  "J*-'""-*,.,.  „f..-,.i„,,pe  it  was  accompanied, 
accomplisl.e.l,.or^^utll^vba  nieas    0^^^^^^^ 

ue  arc  left  in  ignorance;  * "' ^"  ' ' ^"  "^{ve    ea"-"   i'owever.  that  tlie 
what  personally  concerns    rimo  CO  .     ^^^  ^'^^l'^,  „,- Timophancs 

expression  of  joy  among  "'«  ."  f^;"'\J^,^'  '.w'^cn^         universal, 
anil  the  restoration  of  the  const   ut  on.  :^^'^''  \'-  '^ ^^„,,  „,„„,  ^.^u  it, 

S,  strongly  did  this  ''^«  "^  ^f,"  '™  ";,,rd  °^^^^  departed  despot- 
in  appearance,  even  ''  "■•«  ^'"^  J„^X- f  -I't  about  the  deed,  tliese  men 
i.m.'  Afraid  to  say  ^^j'';'' I  '"^  \\  ,^  >  „^ei  ,o  l^ir  lialred  k  the  doer, 
jrave  oi.lv  the  more  •>';""'''»''"  .^,"f,'=  Ji^uld  le  killed  (they  said), 
Thongh  It  was  .?'?™'  '"'i^  ,  Ji-^J,  i'"  ,'o  or,  «u,l  bis  brother-in-law 
yet  that  he  should  be  V  ,f„,,' -hruiors  w  111  inexpiable  guilt  and 
was  Vleed  -hieli  ainte       oth  t  e  ac^^^^^^  P^^   ^^^  ^^ 

alx)mmation.     ine  majoiuv  ^\\"^  ,      viow  completely  oppo- 

well  as  the  most  distinguished  "''f "  • '""\.;^^ '^;\   l^/Vr  tlie  doer 

alTeelion  witli  'levotc.l  magnani.mtv  ami    .drio  i.^n  ^ac^  ^^^^^_ 

SativeIdrot%S'iim,rlhe  disregard  not  less  of  bis  owu 
SllSr  Tf  l:U  ml;;rbo;v"e?"r!r  .S'S-^in  of  enco^nium 


MEKTAL  DISTRESS  OF  TIMOLEON. 


301 


was  not  sufficient  to  drown,  or  even  to  compensate,  the  language  of 
reoroach,  in  itself  so  much  more  pungent,  which  emanated  trom  the 
minority.  Among  that  minority,  too,  was  found  one  p<'i;son  whose 
vin-de  voice  told  with  profound  impression— his  mother  Demariste 
raoUier  also  of  the  slain  Timophanes.  Demariste  not  only  thought 
of  her  murdered  son  with  the  keenest  maternal  sorrow  but  felt 
intense  horror  and  execration  for  the  authors  of  the  deed,  bhe 
i.nprecated  curses  on  the  head  of  Timoleon,  refused  evpu  to  see  him 
again,  and  shut  her  doors  against  his  visits,  m  spite  ot  earnest  sup. 

^'  Thel^^  wanted  nothing  more  to  render  Timoleon  thoroughly  miser- 
nble  amid  the  almost  universal  gratitude  of  Corinth.      Of  his  strong 
fraternal  affection  for  Timophanes,  his  previous  conduct  leaves  no 
doubt.     Such  affection  had  to  be  overcome  before  he  accompanied 
his  tvrannicidal  friends  to  the  acropolis,  and  doubtless  flowed  back 
witir  extreme  bitterness  upon   his  soul,   after  the  deed  was   done 
But  when  to  this  internal  source  of  distress  was  added  the  sight  of 
persons  who  shrank  from  contact  with  him  as  a  fratricide,  together 
with  the  sting  of  the  maternal  Erinnys-he  became  agonized  even  to 
distraction.     Life  was  odious  to  him;  he  refused  for  some  time  all 
food  and  determined  to  starve  himself  to  death.     Nothrngbutthc 
m-cssing  solicitude  of  friends  prevented    him  from  executing  the 
i-HSolve     But  no  consoling  voice  could  impart  to  him  spirit  for  the 
.luties  of  public  life.     He  fled  the  city  and  the  haunts  of  men  biirietl 
liimself  in  solitude  amid  his  fields  in  the   country,  and   refrained 
from  seeing  or  speaking  to  any  one.    For  several  years  he  thus  hid 
himself  like  a  self-condenmed  criminal;  and  even  when  time  had 
somewhat  mitigated  the  intensity  of  his  anguish,  he  still  shunned 
every  prominent  position,  performing  nothing  more  than  his  ludis- 
ponsable  duties  as  a  citizen.     An  interval  of  twenty  years  had  now 
elapsed  from  the  death  of  Timophanes,  to  the  arrival  of  the  bvra- 
cusan  application  for  aid.     During  all  this  time,  Timoleon,  in  spite 
of  the  sympathy  and  willimrness  of  admiring  fellow-ci.izens,  had 
never  once  chosen  to  undertake  any  important  command  or  office. 
At  length  the  vox  Dei   is   heard,   unexpectedly,   amid   the  crow(l; 
dispellin^r  the  tormentim,-  nighttnare  which  had  so  long  oppressed  hi3 
soul  and^ restoring-  him  to  heaithv  and  honorable  action. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  conduct  of  Timoleon  and  ^schylus  m 
killing'-  Timophanes  was  in  the  highest  degree  tutelary  to  Corintn. 
The  d'espot  had  already  imbrued  jiis  hands  in  the  blood  of  his  coun- 
trymen and  would  have  been  condemned,  by  fatal  necessity,  to  go 
on  fronl  bad  to  worse,  multiplying  the  number  of  victims,  as  a  con- 
dition of  preserving  his  own  power.  To  say  that  the  deed  ought  not 
to  have  been  done  by  near  relatives,  was  tantamount  to  saymg,  that 
it  ought  not  to  have  been  done  at  all ;  for  none  but  near  relatives 
could  have  obtained  that  easy  access  which  enabled  them  to  effect  it 
And  even  Timoleon  and  iEschylus -could   not  make  the  attempt 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS  r..C.   S53-336. 


PREPARATIONS  OF  TIMOLEON. 


803 


302 

^-ithout  the   gi-catest    ;«f-;^-^\\^J    ,^^^^  be  avenged  on  the 

likely  than  that  ^^«J  ,^^  ^^^,f  ^^^Jf ei^^^^^  such  vengeance  from  the 
spot;  nor  are  we  \f  f^.^^^^^HL'idy  st^^^^  that  the  contemporary 
MSldiers  at  hand.  It  has  been  »'^^'  ;,  .  between  admiration  of  the 
sentiment  toward  Timoleon  ^^ ^^^/  ^7^]''\S^         with  a  large  pre- 

^roic  patriot,  and  ^^^  »«^-^«\^^„^    '\\',/^*l'S    i^  '^'^  ^''S^''^''  ''f 
onderance  on  the  side  ^>^  .»^"^^^.^^^;^;"^^^^^^^  be  in  the 

best  minds.     In  modern    "''^^^^^  ^'^X   toward  family  covers  a 
opposite  scale.     The  sentiment  of  duty   to^ara  ^^^^  ^,^  ^^^.^.^^ 

hfxier  proportion  of  tlie  tield  o    "  «^„^^^^^^     times;    while  tluit 

tioSs  toward  c^^^^^^.'  \^^^;\.  .J^t  who  overtops  and  overrides  he 
intense  ant  pathy  against       dc.^^^^^  stood  in  the 

laws,  regarding  him  as  ^^;^^^,.*^[';^^f  feeling-has  now  disappeared, 
foreground  of  the  ancient  ^'"  ;^,^^^:  ^^'ig  l^arded  generally  among 
Usurpation  of  ^^e  supreme  aunK)rUys  it  a  ^^  ^^^^  ^^ 

the  European  public   as  a  cnmc,  o^uy  .^  ^^  ^^^ 

lished  king  ^^'^fyZZra\T^^^^^  and  few  readers 

cessful  usurper  tinds  ,^3";j^'\;:>  i^Vnm^^  had  he  even  seconded  his 

would  have  beendisplea^ ed  ^^  ith  Umoie^^^^^  ^^^  ^^  ^^.^  ^^^  g^^. 

brother's  attempt.     But  in  ^h^^  Y,??he  liVht  of  treason  to  his  country, 
erally.  even  neutrality  ^PP^^^^^^  ^,,'^'  e^^^^^  the  despot.    This 

when  no  other  man  but  he  could    esc  e  her  no  p^^^^^.^h;  who 

Tentiment  is  strikingly  f ^^^^^l^^^^,  "\'  ^'^^act  of  sublime  patriotism 
admires  the  ^^f  ^^^"f,,,\>'l  ^^^Ynternaremo^         of  Timoleon  were  not 
hud  only  complains  that  the  in;\^";' J.  .    ,  ^  ^he  great  mental  suffer- 
on  a  lev;4  with  the  ^^J^^^^J^^,^  ,^^!,  I'^^d  ^.  unworthy  weakness  of 
iug  which  he  endured  «ftei  nn  arcl  ^^|"j;^  -^     patriotic  duty,  having 

character;  th.t  the  ^^''"^J^'Z^  \S^  steeled  him  against 

been  once  cieliberately  adc^pted  ought^^  ^^^  repentance 

scruples,  and  preserved  lumfiom  ^^^'\^  ^^^      .^^  antithesis, 

which  spoiled  half  the   ^lorv  ot   ^^J^^  -^^^  ^f  view,  is  here 

between  Plutarch  and  the  .^f^^l^-^^'^gP^'n warranted.  There  is  no 
pointed;  though  \,\^;°^>^^^^:^' e^eT  feJt  ashamed  and  repentant 
reason  to  presume  hat  |;"  .^'^'5^  'T^  Jq  the  mournful  condition  of 
for  having  killed  his  brother.  PJ;  ;^^  °  ^^^  ^^  j^g  that  which  he 
a  man  agftated  hy  conflicting  sen   m^^^^^^^^^  .^g  ,ed 

deemed  to  carry  the  most  sac  ed  ^^>  ^^f^^^^^^        reflection  that  he  had 
from  the  violation  ol}^'lf\''^^S^^^^  the  latter  might 

Inmself  saved  the  li^^/J.   ^  !";^,  f^  !!!!contributed  materially  to  his 

the  command  of  ^^^^a"^^^^ji^■^?,/.^^o  him  a  few  words,  emphatically 
had  P-sea  ;r«lekk.des  ^^^^^^^^^X^  whathe  ^as  wortt 

!!Kgi^"nwSpo^^^^^  rconclusion^''  If  you  now  come  off 


with  success  and  glory,  we  shall  pass  for  having  slain  a  despot;  if 
vou  fail,  we  shall  be  held  as  fratricides.  .^i^Jn^o 

^  He  immediately  commenced  his  preparation  of  ships  and  soldiers. 
Burti"  Corinlhians.  though  they  had  resolved  on  the  expedition, 
weJe  not  p  ep^^^^^^  to  vote  any  considerable  subsidy,  or  to  serve 

in  lar^fm  Xr  as  volunteers.      The  means  of  Timoleon  were  so 
extrJmelv    imited,  that  he  was   unable  to  equip  more  than  seven 
^dreiTs   to  whi(-h  the  Korkvra3an.  (animated  by  common  ^vmpathy 
or  Syracuse,  as  of  old  m  the  time  of  the  despot  Hippokrutes)  added 
two  more   and  the  I.euka.lians  one.     Nor  could  he  muster  more  than 
1000  soldiers    re-enforced  afterward  on  the  voyage  to  1200      A  few 
o?  th^     incipal   Corinthians-Eukleides,  Telemachus.  and  Neon, 
n  non"     1  em^accompanied  him.     But  the  solciiers  seem   to  have 
been  chiefly  miscellaneous  mercenaries-some  of  whom  had  served 
under  the  Phokians  in  the  Sacred  war  (recently  brought    o  a  close) 
•  nd  hid  incurred  so  much  odium  as  partners  in  the  spoliation  of  the 
Delphian  temple,  that  they  were  glad  to  take  foreign  service  any- 

''some  enthusiasm  was  indeed  required  to  determine  volunteers  in 
an  eiUerpdse  of  which  the  form:  able  difficultie^s,  and  the  doubtful 
?eNv^nl,  were  obvious  from  U       beginning       But  even  before^  the 
preparations  were  completed,  news  came  which  seemed  to  render  it 
'ill  but  hopeless.    Hiketas  sent  a  second  mission,  retracting  all  that  ho 
had  said  fn  the  first,  and  desiring  that  no  expedi^Uon  might  be  sent 
from  Corinth.     Not  having  received  Corinthian  aid  in  time  (he  said), 
he  had  been  compelled  to  enter  hito  alliance  with  the  Carthag.^^^^^ 
who  would  not  permit  any  Corinthian  soldiers  to  set  foot  in  Sicily. 
This  communication,  greatly  exasperating  the   Cormthians  against 
lliketas  rendered  them  more  hearty  in  votes  to  put  him  down,     Yet 
f heirzeil  for  active  service,  far  from  being  increased,  was  probably 
even  abated   by   the  aggravation  of    obstacles  thus  revealed.     11 
T^moleo  1  even^eached^ Sicily,  he  would  find  numberless  enemies 
without  a  sin-le  friend  of   fmportance-.-for  without  Hiketas.  the 
Svrae  san  peol^le  were  almost  helpless.     But  it  now  seemed  impos- 
^llM^rTimoleon  with  his  small  force  could  eyertouch  the  Sicibau 
shore   in  the  face  of  a  numerous  and  active  Carthaginian  fleet. 

While  human  circumstances  thus  seemed  hostile,  the  gods  held  out 
to  Timoleon  the  most  favorable  signs  and  omens      Not  only  dul  he 
recehe  an  eacou^affinir  answer  at  Delphi,  but  while  he  was  actually 
n  tl  e  temple?a  fillet  with  intertwined  wreaths  and  sy^^bols of  victory 
fell  from  one  of  the  statues  upon  his  head.     The  priestesses  of  Per- 
eplSnri^rnt  from  the  goddess  in  a  dream   that  she  was  Jc^n    o 
sail  with  Timoleon  for  Sicily,  her  own  fworite  i^^^R^'^  .^^^^^^^^ 
he  caused  a  new  special  trireme  to  be  fitted  out,  ^ac^ed  to  thj  1  wo 
.^oddesess  (Demeter  and  PersephoneT  who  were  to  accqmpany  him 
I'nd  Xn   aLr  leaving  ^^P^vCtUe  squadron  s^^^^^^ 
uinht  vova-e  to  thf  ItafiairtpaPt,  thw  sacred  trireme  was  seen  ilium 


304 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-336. 


incd  by  a  blaze  of  lii^bt  from  heaven;  while  p.  burn incr torch  on  liidi, 
Himilmr  to  that  whu-li  was  usually  eanicd  in  the  Eleusinian  mys- 
teries ran  along  with  the  ship  and  cnided  the  pilot  to  the  proper 
landin'^  plarc  at  3I('tapontum.  Such  manifestations  ol  divme  pres- 
ence and  eucourairemeiit.  properly  certified  and  commented  upon 
by  the  prophets,  rendered  the  voyage  one  of  universal  hopefulness  to 

the  armament.  r        t  j 

These  hopes,  however,  were  sadlv  damped,  when,  after  disreaard- 
in^'  a  formal  notice  from  a  Carthaginian  man-of-war,  they  sailctt  down 
the  coast  of  Italy  and  at  last  reached  lihcginm.  This  city,  having  been 
liefore  partiallv  revived  under  the  name  of  Phoebia.  by  the  younger 
Dionysius,  appears  now  as  reconstituted  under  its  old  name  and  with 
its  full  former  autonomy,  since  the  overthrow  of  his  rule  at  Lokri 
and  in  Italy  generally.  Twenty  Carthaginian  triremes,  double  the 
force  of  Timoleon.  were  found' at  IJhegium  awniting  his  arrival— 
w  ith  envovs  from  Iliketas  aboard.  These  envoys  came  with  what 
they  pretended  to  be  cood  news.  "  Iliketas  had  recently  gained  a 
cap'ital  victf>ry  over  Dionvsius,  whom  he  liad  expelled  from  most  . 
part  of  Svraci'^se,  and  was  now  blocking  up  in  Ortygia:  with  hopes 
of  soon  starving  him  out,  bv  the  aid  of  a  Carthaginian  tlect.  The 
common  enemv  beincr  thus  at  the  end  of  his  resources,  the  war  could 
not  be  prolonged.  Hiketas  therefore  trusted  that  Timoleon  would 
send  back  lo  Corinth  his  fleet  and  troops,  now  become  superfluous, 
if  Timobon  would  do  this,  he  (Hiketas)  would  be  delighted  to  see  him 
personallv  at  Svracuse,  and  would  gladly  consuU  him  in  the  resettle- 
ment of  that  uuhappv  city.  But  he  could  not  admit  the  Corinthian 
armament  into  the  inland;  moreover,  even  had  he  been  willing,  the 
Carthaginian^  pereniDtorily  forbade  it,  and  were  prepared,  in  case 
of  need   to  repel  it  with  their  superior  naval  force  now  in  the  strait. 

The  name  which  Hiketas  was  playing  with  the  Carthaginians 
now  stood  plainly  revealed,  to  ^Iie  vehement  indignatn-n  of  the 
armament.  Instead  of  being  tueir  friend,  or  even  neutral,  he  was 
nothim^  less  than  a  pronounced  enemy,  emancipating  Syracuse  from 
Dionysius  only  to -divide  it  between  himself  and  the  Carthaginians. 
Yet  with  all  the  ardor  of  tlic  armament,  it  was  impossible  to  cross  the 
Btrait  in  opposition  to  an  enemy's  fleet  of  double  force.  Accordiuglv 
Timoleon  resorted  to  a  stratagem  in  which  the  leaders  and  people  of 
Ixhegium,  eagerly  sympathising  with  his  projects  of  Siciliiin  eman- 
cipation, cooperated.  In  an  interview  with  the  envoys  of  Iliketas  as 
well  as  with  the  Carthaginian  commanders,  he  affected  to  accept  the 
conr'ilions  prescribed  by  Hiketas;  admitting  at  once  that  it  was  useless 
to  stand  out.  But  he  at  the  same  time  reminded  them  that  he  had 
been  intrusted  with  the  command  of  the  armament  for  Sicilian  pur- 
poses—and that  he  should  be  a  disgraced  man  if  he  now  conducted 
it  back  without  touching  the  island;  except  under  the  pressure  of 
some  necessity  not  merely  real,  but  demonstrable  to  all  and  attested 
by  unexceptionable  witnesses.     He  therefore  desired  them  to  appear, 


PUBLIC  MEETING  IN  RHEGIUM. 


305 


along  with  him,  before  the  public  assemblv  of  Rhegium,  a  neutral 
city  and  common  friend  of  both  parties.  They  would  then  publicly 
repeat  the  communication  which  they  had  already  made  to  him,  and 
they  would  enter  into  formal  engagenient  for  the  good  treatment  of  the 
Syracusans,  as  soon  as  Diouysi^is  should  be  expelled.  Such  proced- 
ing  would  make  the  people'^of  Kliegium  witnesses  on  both  points. 
They  would  testify  on  his  (Tiinoleou's)  behalf,  when  he  came  to 
defend  himself  at  Corinth,  that  he  had  turned  his  back  only  before 
invincible  necessity,  and  that  he  had  exacted  everything  in  his  power 
in  the  way  of  guarantee'for  Syracuse ;  they  would  testify  also  on  behalf 
of  the  Syracusans,  in  case  the  guarantee  now  given  should  be  here- 
after evaded. 

Neither  the  envoys  of  Iliketas,  nor  the  Carthaginian  commanders, 
had  any  motive  to  decline  what  seemed  to  them  an  unmeaning  cere- 
mony.    Both  of  them  accordingly  attended,  along  with  Timoleon, 
before  the  public  assembly  of  Rhegium  formally  convened.    The  gates 
of  the  city  were  closed  (a  practice  usual  during  the  time  of  a  public  as- 
sembly); the  Onrthagiuian  men-of-war  hiy  as  usual  near  at  hand,  but 
in  no  state  for  immediate  movemeat,  and  perhaps  with  mi  ny  of  the 
crews  ashore;  since  all  chance  of  hosiiliiy  seemed  to  be  past.     What 
had  been  already  communicated  to  Timoleon  from  Ilikeias  and  the 
Cartiiaginians  was  now  repeated   in   formal   deposition    before   the 
assembly ;  the  envoys  of  Hiketas  probably  going  into  the  case  more 
at  length,  with  certain  flourishes  of  speech  prompted  by  their  own 
vanity.  ^  Timoleon  stood  by  as  an  attentive  listener;  but  before  he 
could  rise  to  reply,  various  Rhegine  speakers  came   forward  with 
comments  or  qu(;>tions,  which  called  up  the  envoys  again.     A  loisg 
time  was  thus  insensibly  wasted,  Timoleon  often  trying  to  get  au 
opportunity  to  speak,  but  being  always  apparently 'constrained  to 
give  way  to  some  obtrusive  Rhegine.     During  this  long  time,  how- 
ever, his  triremes  in  the  harbor  were  not  idle.     One  bv  one,  with  as 
little  noise  as  possible,  they  quitted  their  anchorage  am!  rowed  out  to 
sea,  directing  their  course  toward  Sicily.     The  Carthaginian  fleet, 
though  seeing  this  proceeding,  neither  knew  what  it  meant,  nor  had 
any  directions  to  prevent  it.     At  length  the  other  Grecian  triremes 
were  all  afloat  and  in  progress;  that  of  Timoleon  alone  remaining  in 
the  haibor.     Intimation  being  secretly  given  to  him  as  he  sat  in  the 
assembly,  he  slipped  away  from  the  crowd,  his  friends  concealinij:  his 
escjipe — and  got  aboaid  immediately.    His  absence  was  not  discovered 
at  first,  the  debate  continuing  as  if*  he  were  still  present,  and  inten- 
tionally proloniied  by  the  Rhegine  speakers.     At  length   the   truth 
could  no  longer  be  kept  back."    The  envoys  and  the  Carthaginians 
found  out  that  the  assembly  and  the  debate  were  mere  stratagems, 
and  that  their  real  enemy  had  disappeared.     But  they  found  it  out; 
too  late.     Timoleon  with  his  triremes  was  already  on  the  voyage  to 
TuilJOmenium  iu  Sicily,  where  ali  arrived  safe  and  without  opposi- 
tion,    Overreached  and  humiliated,  his  enemies  left  the  assembly  in 


306 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  853-336. 


vehement  wrath  againt  the  Rhegines,  who  reminded  them  that  Car- 
tha<-inians  ought  to  be  the  last  to  complain  of  deception  in  others. 
The  well-m°inaired  stratagem,  wliereby  Timoleon  had  overcome 
a  difficulty  to  all  appearance  insurmountable,  exalted  both  his  own 
fame  and'the  spirits  of  bis  soldiers.  They  were  now  safe  in  Sicily,  at 
Tauromenium,  a  recent  settlement  near  the  site  of  the  ancient  JSaxos 
receiving'  lieartv  welcome  from  Andromachus,  the  leading  citizen  ot 
the  nlacC— wiiJse  influence  was  Si)  mildly  exercised,  and  i-ave  such 
complete  satisfaction,  that  it  continued  through  and  after  the  reform 
of  Timoleon,  when  tlie  citizens  might  certainly  have  swept  it  away 
if  thev  had  desired.  Andromachus,  having  been  forward  m  inviting 
Timoleon  to  come,  now  prepared  to  co-operate  with  him,  and  retunu d 
a  spirited  reply  to  the  menaces  sent  over  from  Rhegium  by  the  Lar- 
thaginians,  after  they  had  vainly  pursued  the  Corintliian  squadron  to 

Tauromenium.  ,  ^^  •!•     • 

But  Andromachus  and  Tauromenium  were  but  pettv  auxiliaries, 
compared  with  the  enemies  against  whom  Timoleon  had  to  conteiul ; 
enemies  now  more  formidable  than  ever.     For  Iliketas;  incensed  with 
the  strata<>-em  practiced  at  Khegium,  and  apprehensive  of  interruption 
to  the  bloVknde  which  he  was  carrying  on  against  Ortvgia,  sent  lor 
an  additional  sqmidron  of  Carthaginian  men-of-war  to  Syracuse;  the 
liarbor  of  which  place  was  ^.i esently  con.pletely  beset.     A  large  Car- 
thaginian land-force  was  also  acting  under  Hanno  in   the  western 
Tccvfons  of  the  island,  with  considerable  success  agau.st  the  Csimpa- 
rians  of  Entella,  and  others.     The  Sicilian  towns  had  their  native 
ikspots,  Mameikus  at  Katana— Leptines  at  Apollonia— ^ikodemus 
fit  Kentoripa— Apolloniades  at  Agyrium— f rom  whcm  1  imoleon  could 
expect  no  aid,  except  in  so  far  as  they  might  feel  predominant  fear 
of  the  Carlhaoinians.     And  the  Syracusans,  even  when  they  heard  of 
his  arrival  at^Tauromenium,  scarcely  ventured  to  indulge  hopes  of 
terious  relief  from  such  a  handful  of   men,  against  the  formidable 
array  of  Iliketas  and  the  Carthnginians  under  their  walls.     ]Moieover 
what  guaranty  had  thev  that  Timoleon  would  turn  out  better  than 
Dion    Kallippus.  and   others  before   him?  seductive  promi.-ers  of 
emancipation,  who,  if  they  succeeded,  forgot  the  words  by  which 
they  had  won  men's  hearts,  and  thought  only  of  appropriating  to 
themselves  the  scepter  of  the  previous  despot,  perhaps  even  aggiava- 
tinff  all  that  wns  bad  in  his  rule?     Such  was  the  question  asked  by 
many  a  sulTerinc  citizen  of  Syracuse,  amid  that  despair  and  sickress 
of  heart  which  made  the  name  of  an  araitd  liberator  sound  only  like 
a  new  deceiver  and  a  new  scourge.  .       ^^  a^a 

It  was  by  acts  alone  that  Timoleon  could  refute  such  well-grounded 
suspicions "  But  at  first,  no  one  believed  in  him;  nor  could  he  escape 
the  baneful  effects  of  that  mistrust  which  his  predecessors  had  every- 
where inspired.  The  messengers  whom  he  sent  round  were  so  coldly 
received,  that  he  seemed  likely  to  find  no  allies  beyond  the  walls  ot 
Tauromenium 


TIMOLEON  AT  ADRANUM.  3^7 

At  length  one  invitation  of  great  importance   rcjirhpH  !>;,>,    f 

Syracuse  or  Leontini,  Iliketas  was  nearer  to  Adrinum^hp;   TiL 

n.a,Ie  no  great  progress  Su^he  first  day,  Tn  order  tV^^^reri'SVi" 

marcb   had  encamped  near  the  town,  not  aware'of  any  e  emv  n  ar 
His  officers  were  anxious  that  the  men  should  be  refre4ed  nfterM,  f; 

Ss^S''^;^:|^i^-i--c--^ 

earned  for  hin,  by  an  orderly),  in  spite  of  tlie  fatig  lU  mar^  wh/'^ 
be  had  himself  performed  on  foot  as  well  aVthev     Ti!„  '  m 
obeyed,  and  the  effort  was  crowned  by  comnlete  ^ucL,     T     f^""^ 
otrfiketas,  unarmed  and  at  their  supperr"™  taken  «eo,nT'",,'''r 
.urpr.se,  that  in  spi.e  of  their  superior  m.X  teyld°w   b'^^.e^ 

'  i'-'^:,':  r'^^i^f -P™  !  'fJ^P'""y  °f  ."-'■■  flight,  loo"  ftb'em™^ 
AUL   siain      ±iut  000  were   made   prisoners,  and   the  whole   p-im,-; 
mcludiug  Its  appurtenances,  was  taken,  with  scarcelyThe  loss  of^; 
m:ui      Iliketas  escaped  with  the  rest  to  Syracuse         ^  ""^  * 

This  victory,  so  rapidly  and  skillfully  won-and  the  acouisition 
of  Adranum  which  followed  it— nrndiirpri  ti,^  If  acquisition 

throughout  Sicily.  It  counted  veS?ormorXr.Ttorv°uf° 
a  declaration  of  the  gods  in  favor  of  Timoleon  TI,r.TlnT^'  .  "2 
the  holy  town,  opening  their  gatefanTa^ZclJn.  it  wjh  awe 

p^frfrrii-oSlbsl^EE^ 

tion  on  his  face.  Such  facts-vefified  and  aUes  ed  iL  «  luT% 
peculiar  sanctity,  and  circulated  from  trencethrou^lt  ?he  nei^hU! 


308 


SICILIAK   AFFAIRS  B.C.  35^336. 


in-  commiinities-conlributed  Imrdly  less  than  the  victoiT  to  exalt 
h?  Aor  M  Timoleon.  He  veeeived  offers  of  a  liance  fr«ni  1  yndans 
nnd  several  oilier  towDS,  as  well  as  from  Mamerkiis  despot  of  l^atana 
one  of  the  most  warlike  and  powerful  prinees  in  the  island  So 
n^men)  is^^re  the  re-enforeements  thus  acquired,  and  so  much  was 
hsroXLnce  enhanced  by  recent  success,  that  he  imw  ventured  to 
m  u-di  eveirunto  walls  of  Syracuse,  and  defy  Hiketas;  who  did 
not  illink  U  prudent  to  hazard  a  second  engagement  with  the  victor 

""Slikcl'lT w'ls  ^till  master  of  all  Svracuse-except  Ortyr-ir.,  against 
wl  dih  h^lud^^^^^^^^  lines  of  blockade  in  conjunction  with  the 

r.rthnnni'in  fleet  occupviug  the  harbor.     Timoleon  was  m  no  con- 
cliTioiUo  auack  tL^  and  would  have  been  obliged,  speed dy  to 

r^^  as  his  enendes  did'not  choose  to  come  out.  But  H  was  soon 
seen  ilmt  the  manifestations  of  the  Two  goddesses,  and  of  the  god 
Adrinus  in  his  favor,  were  neither  barren  nor  delusive.  A  real  boon 
was  now  thrown  inti  his  lap.  such  as  neither  ski  1  nor  va  or  cou  d 
h.ve  won  Dionysius,  blocked  up  in  Ortygia  with  a  scantT  supply 
nf  movHons  saw  froni  his  walls  the  approaching  amy  of  limolcon, 
^ndhrird  of  the  victory  of  Adranum.  He  had  already  begun  to 
de^m  r  o  hi  own  po  it  ion  of  Ortygia;  where  indeed  he  might  per- 
XhoUl  out  bv  bold  effort  and  steady  endurance,  but  without  an> 
rea^o^ble  cl  a^^^^  becomin-  master  of  Syracuse;  a  chance 

wh  ch  mio    on  and  the  Corinthianlntervention  cut  off  more  decid- 
<Hlh  th"r     Dionvsius  was  a  man  not  only  without  the  energetic 

,v  hard  t^^^hting  nor  stu^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

bothT— d  to  him^^^^^^  ^^'^  --^i^^  the  means, 

of m'  fcf-  li^s  rc^  gnation  subservient  to  the  purchase  of  a  safe 
nLlmn  and  cmf citable  future  maintenance:  for  to  a  Grecian  despot, 
5%  Vu  n  b  ^of  m  severities  accumulated  upon  his  head,  abnega- 
r  n  of  nowe  was  hafdirever  possible,  consistent  with  personal  sccu- 
r  t V  But  D  onysius  f.4t  a  sured  that  he  might  tnist  to  the  guarantee 
cPtimoi  on  She  Corinthians  for  shelter  and  ^o^-^  ^or-th 
^ith  as  much  property  as  he  could  ^'-^^^^  ^7^^> , V  the  s"  ^^^^^^^^^^     of 

^^'^^^pos^St^^^^^^^^^^     --^  --^  envoys  to  Timoleon  for  the  pur- 

^""There  was  little  difficulty  in  arranging  terms.  Dionysius  stipula- 
tPd  onlv  for  a  safe  transit  with  his  movable  property  to  Corinth,  and 
for  an  unm'uirbed  residence  in  that  city;  tendering  in  exchange  the 

Sdidonarsurrender  of  Ortygia  --^^f'^^^^^^'l'^'^Cl 
magazines.     The -convention  was  •  concluded  forthwith,  and  tmco 


SURRENDER  OF  ORTYGIA. 


309 


Corinthian  omcers— Telemachus,  Eukleides,  and  Neon— were  sent  in 
with  400  men  to  take  charge  of  the  place.  Their  entrance  was  accoiii- 
phshed  safely,  though  they  were  obliged  to  elude  the  blockade  by 
stealing  in  at  several  times,  and  in  small  companies.  Makin"-  over 
to  (heni  tlie  possession  of  Ortygia  with  the  command  of  his  garrison 
Dionysius  passed,  with  some  money  and  a  small  number  of  com- 
panions, into  the  camp  of  Timoleon;  who  conveyed  him  away  leav- 
ing at  the  same  time  the  neighborhood  of  Syracuse. 

Conceive  the  position  and  feelings  of  Dionysius,  a  prisoner  in  the 
camp  of  Timoleon,  traversing  tliat  island  over  wiiich  his  father  as 
well  as  himself  had  reigned  all-powerful,  and  knowinir  himself  to  be 
the  object  of  either  hatred  or  contempt  to  every  one— except  so  far 
as  the  immense  boon  which  he  had  conferred,  by  surrenderino-  Oitv- 
gia,  purchased  for  him  an  indulgent  forbearance!  He  was  doubtless 
eager  for  immediate  departure  to  Corinth,  while  Timoleon  was  no 
less  anxious  to  send  him  thither,  as  the  living  evidence  of  triumph 
accomplished.  Although  not  tifty  days  had  yet  elapsed  since  Tinio- 
leon's  landing  in  Sicily,  he  was  enabled  already  to  announce  a  deci- 
sive victory,  a  great  confederacy  grouped  around  him,  and  the  posses- 
sion of  the  inexpugnable  position  of  Ortygia,  with  a  garrison  equal 
in  number  to  his  own  army;  the  dispatches  being  accompanied  b\Mhe 
presence  of  that  very  despot,  bearing  the  terrific  name  of  Dionvsius 
against  wiioin  the  expedition  had  been  chiefly  aimed !  Timoleon  sent 
a  special  trireme  to  Corinth,  carrying  Dionysius  and  communic:itinff 
these  important  events,  together  with  the  convention  which  cuaran- 
teed  tothe  dethroned  ruler  an  undisturbed  residence  in  that  city 

The  impression  produced  at  Corinth  by  the  arrival  of  tids  trireme 
and  its  passengers  was  powerful  beyond  all  parallel.  Astonishment 
and  admiration  were  universal;  for  the  expedhion  of  Timoleon  had 
started  as  a  desperate  venture,  in  which  scarcely  one  amon*--  the 
leading  Corinthians  had  been  disposed  to  embark;  nor  had  an\^maa 
conceived  the  possibility  of  success  so  rapid  as  well  as  so  coniplete 
But  the  victorious  prospect  in  Sicily,  with  service  under  the  fortul 
nat«  general,  was  now  the  general  passion  of  the  citizens  A  rc-en- 
foreement  of  3,000  hoplites  and  200  cavalry  was  immediately  voted 
ami  equipped.  *^ 

If  the  triumph  excited  wonder  and  joy,  the  person  of  Dionysius 
himselt  appealed  no  less  powerfully  to  other  feelings.  A  fallen  des- 
pot was  a  sight  denied  to  Grecian  eyes;  whoever  aspired  to  despotism 
put  his  all  to  hazard,  forfeiting  his  chance  to  retire  to  a  private  sta- 
tion. By  a  remarkable  concurrence  of  circumstances,  the  exception 
to  this  rule  was  presented  just  where  it  w^as  least  likely  to  take  place- 
in  the  case  of  the  most  formidable  and  odious  despotism  whicli  had' 
ever  overridden  the  Grecian  world.  For  nearly  half  a  century  prior 
to  the  expedition  of  Dion  against  Syracuse,  every  one  had  been  accus- 
touaed  to  pronounce  the  name  of  Dionysius  with  a  mixture  of  fear 
and  hatred—the  sentiment  of  prostration  before  intsistible  force 


310 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-330. 


How  much  (lifficultv  Dion  himself  foimd  in  overcoming  this  impres- 
hi(>ii  in   liie   minds'of  his  own  soldievs.  has  been  already  rehited. 
Thou'^h  dissipated  by  the  success  of  Dion,  the  antecedent  alarm  be- 
came °xiiain  revived,   when  Dionysius  recovered  his  possession  of 
Ortv^ia  and  when  the  Svracusans  made  pathetic  appeal  to  Corinth  tor 
aid' J-ainst  him.      Now,  on    a  sudden,  the    representative  of  this 
extinct  greatness,  himself  bearing  the  awful  name  of  Dionysius,  enters 
C\)riuth  under  a  convention,  suing  only  for  the  humble  domicile  and 
unpretending  security  of  a  private  citizen.     The  Greek  mind  was 
keenly  sensitive  to  such  contrasts,  which  entered  largely  into  every 
man's  views  of  human  affairs,  and  were  reproduced  in  a  thousand 
forms  by  writers  and   speakers.     The   affluence   of  visitors— who 
crowded  to  gaze  upon  and  speak  to  Dionysius,  not  merely  from  Cor- 
inth   but  from  other  cities  of  Greece— was  immense ;  some  in  simple 
curiosity  others  with  compassion,  a  few  even  with  insulting  den- 
sion      The  anecdotes  which  are  recounted  seem  intended  to  convey  a 
degrading  impression  of  this  last  period  of  his  career.     But  even,  the 
common  offices  of  life— the  purchase  of  unguents  and  condiments  at 
the  tavern— the  nicety  of  criticism  displayed  respecting  robes  and 
furniture— looked  deirradinir  when  performed  by  the  ex-despot  ot 
Syracuse.     His  habit  of  drinking  largely,  already  contracted,  was  not 
likely  to  become  amended  in  these  days  of  mortification;  vet  on  the 
whole  his  conduct  seems  to  have  had  more  dignity  than  could  have 
been  expected.      His  literary  tastes,  manifested  during  the  time  of 
his  intercourse  with  Plato,  are  implied  even  in  the  anecdotes  intended 
to  dispara'^e  him.     Thus  he  is  said  to  have  opened  a  school  for  teach- 
in^'-  boys  to  read,  and  to  have  instructed  the  public  singers  in  the  art 
of'^sin^n^  or  reciting  poetr}^     His  name  served  to  subsequent  writ- 
ers  bSth" Greek  and  Roman— as  those  of  Croesus,  Polykrates,  and 
Xerxes   serve  to  Herodotus— for  an  instance  to  point  a  moral  on  the 
mutability  of  human  events.     Yet  the  anecdotes  recorded  about  him 
can  rarely  be  verified,  nor  can  we  distinguish  real  matters  ot  tact 
from  those  suitable  and  impressive  myths  which  so  pregnant  a  situa- 
tion was  sure  to  bring  forth.  ^     .     ,  *   .  ,  ^/ 
Amon^  those   who  visited  him  at  Corinth  was  Anstoxenus  of 
Tarentuin-  for  the  Tarentinc  leaders,  first  introduced  by  Plato,  had 
maintained  their  correspondence  with  Dionysius  even  after  his  first 
expulsion  from  Syracuse  to  Lokri,  and  had  vainly  endeavored  to  pre- 
serve his  unfortunate  wife  and  daughters  from  the  retributive  ven- 
ircance  of  the  Lokrians.      During  the  palmy  days  of  Dionysius  his 
envoy  Polvarchus,  had  been  sent  on  a  mission  to  Tarentum,  ^vhe^e 
he  came  into  conversation  with  the  chief  magistrate  Arciiytas      Ihis 
conversation  Aristoxenus  had  recorded  in  writing;  probably  from 
the  personal  testimony  of  Archytas,  whose  biography  he  composed. 
Polyarchus  dwelt  upon  wealth,  power,  and  sensual  enjoyments  as  the 
sole  objects  worth  living  for;  pronouncing  those  who  possessed  them 
in  large  masses  as  the  only  beings  deserving  admiration.    At  the  sum- 


STORIES  ABOUT  DIONYSIUS. 


1 


311 


mit  of  all  stood  the  Persian  King,  whom  Polyarchus  extolled  as  the 
most  enviable  and  admirable  of  mortals.  "  Next  to  the  Persian  Kino- 
(said  he),  though  with  a  very  long  interval,  comes  our  despot  of  Syra'- 
cuse."  What  had  became  of  Polyarchus,  we  do  not  know;  but  Aris- 
toxenus lived  to  see  the  envied  Dionysius  under  the  altered  phase  of  his 
life  at  Corinth,  and  probably  to  witness  the  ruin  of  the  Persian  Kings 
also.  On  being  asked  what  had  been  the  cause  of  his  displeasure  again'st 
Plato,  Dionysius  replied  in  languai-e  widely  different  from  that  of  his 
former  envoy  Polyarchus,  that  amid  the  many  evils  which  surrounded 
a  despot,  none  was  so  mischievous  as  the  unwillingness  of  his  so- 
called  friends  to  tell  him  the  truth.  Such  false  friends  had  poisoned 
the  good  feeling  between  liim  and  Plato.  This  anecdote  bears  greater 
mark  of  being  genuine,  than  others  which  w^e  read  more  witty  and 
pungent.  The  cynic  philosopher,  Diogenes,  treated  Dionysius  with 
haughty  scorn  for  submitting  to  live  in  private  station  after  having 
enjoyed  so  overruling  an  ascendency.  Such  was  more  or  less  the 
sentiment  of  every  visitor  who  saw  him ;  but  the  matter  to  be  lamented 
is,  that  he  had  not  been  in  a  private  station  from  the  beginnino-. 
He  was  by  nature  unfit  to  tread,  even  with  profit  to  himself,  the  pe?! 
ilous  and  thorny  path  of  a  Grecian  despot. 

The  re-enforcements  decreed  by  the  Corinthians,  though  equipped 
without  delay  and  forwarded  to  thurii  in  Italy,  were  prevented  from 
proceeding  farther  on  ship-board  by  the  Carthaginian  squadron  at 
the  strait,  and  were  condemned  to  wait  for  a  favorab'e  opportunity. 
But  the  greatest  of  all  re-enforcements  to  Timoleon  was  the  acquisition 
of  Ortygia.  It  contained  not  merely  a  garrison  of  2.000  soldiers— who 
passed  (probably  much  to  their  own  satisfaction)  from  the  declini no- 
cause  of  Dionysius  to  the  victorious  banner  of  Timoleon— but  also 
every  species  of  military  stores.  There  were  horses,  engines  for  siege 
and  battery,  missiles  of  every  sort,  and  above  all  shields  and  spears 
to  the  amazing  number  of  70,000— if  Plutarch's  statement  is  exact. 
Having  dismissed  Dionysius,  Timoleon  organized  a  service  of  small 
craft  from  Katana  to  convey  provisions  by  sea  to  Ortygia,  eluding 
the  Carthaginian  guard  squadron.  He  found  means  to'  do  this  with 
tolerable  success,  availing  himself  of  winds  or  bad  weather,  when 
the  ships  of  war  could  not  obstruct  the  entrance  of  the  lesser  har- 
bor. Meanwhile  he  himself  returned  to  Adranum,  a  post  conven- 
ient for  watcldng  both  Leontini  and  Syracuse.  Here  two  assassins, 
bribed  by  Hiketas,  were  on  the  point  of  taking  his  life,  while  sacii- 
ficing  at  a  festival;  and  were  only  prevented  by  an  incident  so 
remarkable,  that  every  one  recognized  the  visible  intervention  of  the 
gods  to  protect  him. 

Meanwhile  Hiketas,  being  resolved  to  acquire  possession  of  Ortygia, 
invoked  the  aid  of  the  full  Carthaginian  force  under  Magon.  The  Irreat 
harbor  of  Syracuse  was  presently  occupied  by  an  overwhelming'fleet 
of  150  Carthaginian  skills  of  war,  while  a  land  force,  said  to  consist 
of  60,000  men,  came  also  to  join  Hiketas.  and  were  quartered  by  him 


312 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-336. 


>.ilhin  the  walls  of  Syracuse.     Never  before  had  any  Caitha-i  nan 
Uoops  got  lootin-  >vitbin  those  walls.      Syracusan    iberty,  rerhai  s 
Sviacimn  Hellenism,  now  appeared  extinct.     Even  Ortyg.a.  in  spile 
ortho  braverv  of  its  garrison  under  the  Corinthian  Neon,  seeined  not 
hing  l.''able:against%epeated  attack  and  battery  of  the  w:j  K  com- 
bined with  strict  blockade  to  keei>  out  supplies  by  sea.     Mil  .  hovv- 
ever  though  the  garrison  was  distressed,  some  smal   craft  ^^  ^  P/^' 
Yisio'nsfrom  Katana  contrived  to  slip  in;  a  fact  which  induced  llike- 
tas    ml  Magonto  form  the  plan  of  attacking  that   town    thinking 
hemselves  strong  enough  to  accomplish  this  by  a  pait  of  their  ioice 
lithmi   discontinuing  the  siege  of  Ortygia.     Accordingly  they  sailed 
forth  from  the  harbo?,  and  marched  from  the  city  of  byracifse,  nn  ith 
the  best  part  of  their  armament,   to  attack  Katana   leavmg  Ortygia 
still  under  blockade.     But  the  commanders  left  Y''^^\;^'^''\''^ 
lio-ent  in  their  watch,  that  Neon  soon  saw  from  the  walls  ot  <J«i>^;b 
the  oDportunitv  of  attacking  them  with  advantage.     Making  a  suu- 
d  n Td  v?.or6us  sally,  he  fell  upon  the  blockading  ^^^y '-';J-:|[^^^ 
routed  them  at  all  points  with  serious  loss,  and  pix^sed  hispuisi.it  so 
w-un  Iv   tl^t  he  g(  t  possession  of  Achradina,  expelling  them  Irom 
hrimpola^  of  the   city.      The  provisions    and   nu.ney 

acquired^ herein  at  a  critical  moment,  rendered  this  victory  nu^orUn^ 
But  what  gave  it  the  chief  value  was,  the  V^^^'^^^^^^l^^^ 
which  Neon  immediately  caused  to  he  joined  on  ^^.^^^^g'^^  l>^;  -^  ^ 
hi  e  of  fortifications,  and  thus  held  the  two  in  combmalion  Ort}gia 
ad  been  before  (as  I  have  already  remarked)  complete  yd.s  met 
>om  Vchradna.  It  is  probable  that  the  population  of  Achraduia, 
de  "hted  [o  be  liberated  from  the  Carthaginians     ent  zealous  aid  to 

Ne  m  boih  in  the  defense  of  their  own  walls,  and  "V-^^rir  nnmei 
of  the  new  connecting  Hnes  toward  Ortygia-  for  which  the  numci- 

ous  intervening  tombs  would  supply  materials  -,■  „  ^f 

.  TOs^allant^exploit  of  Neon  permanently  changed  the  position  of 
the  combatant8  at  Syracuse.     A  horseman  started  ^"«^^"\\3^^.^^' " 
vey  the  bad  news  to  Hikelas  and  Magon  near  Katana.     Both  of  them 
returned  forthwith;  but  th(;y  returned  only  to  occupy  ii;^!^  ';|J  <^ 
citv-Tycha,  Neapolis.  and  fipipcda^     It  became  extremely  dificult 
t^^rosel-utea  sucx-essful  siege  or  blockade  of  Ortvgia  a''|l  Achra- 
dina  united:  besides  that.  Neon  had  now  obtained  abundant  sup- 
plies for  the  moment.  r        a  ^..r  th^n^vc- 
^  Meanwhile  Timoleon  too  was  approaching.  ^^-^I^^/^^.^^V^t  ThnrH 
Corinthian  division;  who,  having  been  at  hrst  detained  '^t  1  »'^»     ' 
and  iK'coming  sick  of  delay,  had  made  their  way  inland,  across  tie 
P.ruttian  territory,  to  Rhegium.     They  were  ^^'-^1^"^ ^,/"";;f  ^  1\^"^ 
the  strait  unguarded :  for  the  Carthaginian  admira    Hanno-1  uiMUg 
seen  their  ships  laid  up  at  Thurii,  and  not  '^ticiputing  the.r  adv^^^^^^^ 
bv  land-had  first  returned  with  his  squadron  to  ^l^e  Strait  of  Mes- 
sina, and  next,  hoping  by  a  stratagem  to  ^^^^S^^^"  J|'^J4"^'^?v°^ 
Ortygia  into  surrender,  had  sailed  to  the  harbor  of  Syracuse  with  hi3 


MESSENE  IN  FAVOH  OF  TIMOLEON. 


313 


triremes  decorated  as  if  after  a  victory.  His  seamen,  with  wreaths 
round  their  heads,  shouted  as  tliey  passed  into  the  harbor  under  the 
walls  of  Ortygia,  that  the  Corinthian  squadron  approaching  tlie  strait 
had  been  all  captured,  and  exhibited  as  proofs  of  the  victory  certain 
Grecian  shields  hung  up  aboanl.  By  this  silly  fabrication,  llanno 
l)r()(luced  a  serious  dismay  among  the  garrison  of  Ortygia  But  he 
purchased  such  temporary  satisfaction  at  tlie  cost  of  leavm*--  the  strait 
unguarded,  and  allowhig  the  Corinthian  division  to  cross  unopposed 
from  Italy  into  Sicily.  On  reaching  lihegium,  these  Corinthians  not 
only  tound  the  strait  free,  but  also  a  complete  and  sudden  calm 
succeeding  upon  several  days  of  stormv  weather.  Embarkin*^ 
immediately  on  such  ferry-boats  and  fishing"' craft  as  they  could  lincf 
find  swimming  their  horses  alongsid,'  by  the  bridle,  they  reached  the 
Sicilian  coast  without  loss  or  difficulty. 

Thus  did  the  gods  again  show  their  favor  toward  Timoleon  bv  an 
unusual  combination  of  circumst:mces.  and  by  smiting  the  enemv 
w_ith  blindness.  So  much  did  the  tide  of  success  ruii  alon*-- with 
hiin,  that  the  important  town  of  Messene  declared  itself  anioScr  hig 
allies,  admitting  the  new  Corinthian  soldiers  immediately  on  Uieir 
anding.  With  little  delay,  they  proceeded  forward  to  join  Timo- 
leon; who  thought  himself  strong  enough,  notwithstanding  that  even 
with  this  re-enlorcemeut  he  could  only  command  4,000  men  tomaich 
up  to  the  vicinity  of  Syracuse,  and  there  to  confrout^the  immeasura- 
bly superior  force  of  his  enemies.  He  appears  to  have  encamped 
near  the  Olympieion,  and  the  bridge  over  the  river  Anapus. 

Though  Timoleon  was  sure  of  iiie  co-operation  of  Neon  and  tho 
Corinthian  garrison  in  Ortygia  and  Achradina,  yet  he  was  separated 
from   thein    by  the   nuim-rous   force   of   Hiketas   and   ]\Iagon   who 
occupied  Epipola?,   Neapolis,   and  Tycha,   together  with    the  low 
ground  between  Epipoke  and  the  Great  Harbor;  while  the  large  Car- 
Ihaginian  fleet  filled  the  Harbor  itself.     On  a  reasonable  calculation 
1  imo  eon  seemed  to  have  little  chance  of  success.     But  susoicioii 
had  already  begun  in  the  mind  of  Magon,  sowing  the  seeds  of  dis- 
union-between  him  and  Hiketas.     The  alliance  between  Cartha'an- 
laus  and  Greeks  was  one  unnatural  to  both  parties,  and  liable  to'' be 
crossed   at  every   mischance,  by   mutunl   distrust,  growino-   out  of 
antipathy  which  each  party  felt  in  itself  and  knew  to  subsist  in  the 
other.      Ihe  untortunate  scheme  or  marching  to  Katana   with  the 
capital  victory  gained  by  Neon  inconsequence  of  that  absence  mad  • 
Magon  believe  that  Hiketas  was  betraying  him.     Such  apprehend 
sions  were  strenglhened.  when  he  saw  in  his  front  the  armv  of  Tnno- 
leon.  posted  on  the  river  Anapus— and  when  he  felt  tliat  lie  was  in  a 
Greek  city  generally  disaffected  to  him.  while  Neon  was  at  his  rear 
m  Ortygia  and  Achradina.     Under  such  circumstances,  Ma<rou  con- 
ceived the  whole  safety  of  his  Carthaginians  as   depending  on  the 
zealous  and  faithful  co-operation  of  Hiketas,  in  whom  heliadnow 
ceased  to  confide.    And  his  mistrust,  once  suggested,  was  aggravated 


ii.«.  mtttn  1-*^'  ^••r^ 


814 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C. 


353-336. 


bv  the  friendly  communication  which  he  saw  going  on  betvAcen  the 
Sk     1-   of  Timoleou   and   those   of   Hiketas.      These  soldiers,  all 
Greeks  and  mercenaries  lighting-  for  a  country  not  their  own,  encoiin- 
tJre  I  each  other,  on  the  tk^ld  of  battle,  like  enemies;   but  conversed 
napacmCand  amicable  way.  during  intervals,  in  their  respective 
camps      lioth  were  now  engaged,  without  disturbing  each  o  her,  in 
catch  n-^  eels  amidst  the  ma.  >hy  and  watery  ground  between  Lpipnla? 
Vnd      h\n  pus.     Interchanging  remarks  freely,  they  were  admiring 
the  spkM  dor  and  ma^niitude  of  Syracuse  with  its  great  mantmie  coii- 
v^it^  ce-when  one^of  Ti.noleon's  soldiers  observed  to  the  opposite 
mr  V-  '  And  this   magniticent  city,  you,  Greeks  as  you   are,  are 
rtrivin-to  barbarize,  planting  these  Carthaginian  cut-throats  nearer 
to  us   han  they  now  are ;  though  our  tirst  anxiety  ought  to  be,  1  o  keep 
them  as  far  off  as  possible  from  Greece.     Do  you  real  y  suppose  that 
t ley  have  brouoht  up  this  host  from  the  Atlantic  and    he  Pi  lars  of 
Herik  es  all  for  the  sake  of  Hiketas  and  his  rule?    >Yhy  if  Hiketas 
took  measure  of  affairs  like  a  true  ruler,  he  would  not  thu^  turn  out 
h^s  brethren,  and  bring  in  an  enen.y  to  his  country;  he  would  insuie 
to  himself  an  honorable  sway,  by  coming  to  an  understanding  ^Mth 
the  Corinthians  and  Timoleon."     Such  was  the  colloquy  passing  be- 
tween    he  soldiers  of  Timoleon  and  those  of  Hiketas,  and  speedily 
rnade  known  to  the  Carthaginians.     Having  made  apparently  strong 
S^pi^ssion  on  those  to  whSm  it  was  addressed,  it  justitied  alarm  m 
MaCi    who  was  led  to   believe   that  he   could  no  longer  trus    his 
Sicilian  allies.     AVithout  any  delay,  he  put  all  his  troops  aboard  the 
fleet,  and  in  spite  of  the  most  strenuous  remonstrances  trom  Hiketas, 

'"^u^e^  iwi'when  Timoleon  approached  to  the  attack,  he  w.is 
invi7ed  to  tind   the  Cartha£!:inian  army  and  fleet  withdrawn,     iiis 
'odfJrs  scared  V  believimr  their  eyes,  laughed  to  scorn  the  cowardice 
of   Ma-on      Still  howevtT,  Hiketas  determined  to  defend  Syracuse 
"^hhfs  own  troops,  in  spite  of  the  severe  blow  inflicted  by  Magon  s 
desertion      That  deserlicm  had  laid  oi>en  both    he  Harbor,  and  the 
wer  ground  near  the  Harbor;    so  that  Tin.oleon  was  enabled  to 
come  into  direct  communication  with  his  own  garrison  in  Ortvpand 
AcTiradina  and  to  lav  plans  for  a  triple  simultaneous  onset.     He  him- 
l     un  e  took  ^     aftack  the  southern  front  of  Epipola;  toward  the 
r  ver  Vnapus  where  the  city  was  strongest;  the  (  (>rinthian  Isias  was 
[nstructX  make  a  vigorofis  assault  trom  Achradina,  or  the  e.is  ern 
side-  while  Deinarchus  and  Demaretus,  the  generals  who  lad  con- 
ducted   the   recent   re-eniorcenient  from   Corinth,  were  ordered   to 
atlac^i^Sf^^orthern  wall  of  Epipola.,  or  the  ";-'P>; -V/!^>;;^i;;^:f 
probablv  sent   round   from   Ortygia,  by   sea,  to    land    at  liogilus. 
feiketas   holding  as   he   did   the  aggregate   consisting  of  Lpipol^ 
Tycha  and  Neapolis.  was  assailed  on  three  sides  at  once      He  hada 
most  defensible  posi  ion.  which  a  good  commander,  with  brave  and 
•  Suhfu  tiSop  !  might  have  maintained  against  forces  more  numerous 


CAPTURE  OF  SYRACUSE. 


'315 


than  those  of  Timoleon.  Yet  in  spite  of  such  advantages,  no  effective 
resistance  \vm  made,  nor  even  attempted.  Timoleon  not  orilv  took 
the  place,  but  took  it  without  tlie  loss  of  a  single  man,  kii'kd  or 
wounded.     Hiketas  and  liis  followers  fled  to  Leontini. 

The  desertion  of  Magou  explains  of  course  a  great  deal  of  dis- 
couragement among  the  soldiers  of  Hiketas.  But  when  we  read  the 
astonishing  facility  of  the  capture,  it  is  evident  that  there  must  have 
been  something  more  than  discouragement.  The  soldiers  on  defense 
were  really  unwilling  to  use  tlieir  arms  for  the  purpose  of  repellin<>- 
Timoleon,  and  keeping  up  the  dominion  of  Hiketas  in  Syracuse^ 
When  we  And  this  sentiment  so  powerfully  manifested,  we  cannot 
but  discern  that  the  aversion  of  these  men""  to  serve,  in  what  they 
looked  upon  as  a  Carthaginian  cause,  threw  into  the  hands  of  Timo- 
leon an  easy  victory,  and  that  I  he  mistrustful  retreat  of  Magon  was 
not  so  absurd  and  cowardly  as  Plutarch  represents. 

The  Grecian  public,  however,  not  minutely  scrutinizing  prelimi- 
nary events,  heard  the  easy  capture  as  a  fact,  and  heard  it  with 
unbounded  enthusiasm.  From  Sicily  and  Italy  the  news  rapid Iv 
spread  to  Corinth  and  other  parts  of  Greece.  Everywhere  the  senti- 
ment was  the  same;  astonishment  and  admiration,  not  merely  at  the 
magnitude  of  the  conquest^,  but  aNo  at  the  ease  and  rapidUv  with 
which  it  had  been  achieved.  The  arrival  of  the  captive  Dionvsiusat 
Corinth  liad  been  in  itself  a  most  impressive  event.  But  now  the 
Corinthians  learned  the  disappearance  of  the  large  Carthadnian  ho^t 
and  the  total  capture  of  Syracuse,  without  the 'loss  ofaluan-  and 
that  too  before  they  w^ere  even  assured  that  their  second  re-enforce- 
ment, which  they  knew  to  have  been  blocked  up  at  Tliurii  had  beeu 
able  to  touch  the  Sicilian  shore. 

Such  transcendent  novelties  excited  even  in  Greece,  and  muclimore 
in  Sicily  itself,  a  sentiment   toward   Timoleon  such  as  hardly  any 
Greek   had  ever  yet  drawn   to   himself.     His   bravery,  his  skillful 
plans,  his  quickness  of  movement,  were  indeed  deservedly  admired 
But  in  this  respect,  others   had  equaled  him  before;    and    we  may 
remark  that  even  the  Corinthian  Neon,  in  his  capture  of  Achradina 
had  rivaled  anything  performed  by  hi«  superior  oflicer.      But  that 
which  stood  without  like  or  second  in  Timoleon— that  wliich  set  a 
peculiar  stamp    upon  all  his  merilorious  qualities— was.  his  super- 
human good  fortune;  or— what  in  the  eyes  of  most  Greeks  was  the 
same  thing  in  other  words— the  unbounded  favor  with   wliich  the 
gods  had  cherished  both  his  person  and  his  enterprise.      Though 
greatly  praised  as  a  brave  and   able  man,  Timoleon  w^as  still  mo^re 
affectionately  hailed  as  an  enviable  man.     "  Never  had  the  ffodsbeen 
seen  so  manifest  in  their  dispensations  of  kindness  towaiTrlmy  mor- 
tal."   The  issue,  which  Telekleides  had  announced  as  beini,^"  upon 
trial  when  Timoleon  was  named,  now  stood  triumphantly  determined. 
After  the  capture  of  Syracuse,  we  maybe  sure  that  ^  no  one  ever 
denounced  Timoleon  as  a  fratricide— every  one  extolled  him  as  a 


316  SICILIAN  .VFFAIRS  B.C.  353-336. 

,..anBicide.  The  ^-eat  cxploU.  ^^;:^:;Sr:^n.:^^^^ 
Airesilaus  and  Epaminondas  '""V"'  ,  "'^^"^'e  concenicd,  etc..  all 
ship,  severe  «Sl''i''?-;r":f„'!t.  ^  „l%  om^t^^^^  perfect  mental 
of  ^vhich  counted  as  so  .""'^"J; '','', '™.;ti,,n  or  poMii  smelling  ol 
satisfaction  of  \1'«  ^Pf '^'7; ,J.' ^  „ nrks  of  preliminary  toil  and 
the  lamp,  tl.ev  Lore  too  clc.^rl>  ''  ^;  "'; ' '^"  "^^  dcsccndins  to  combat 
fatigue.  But  Timolcon,  as  '1\«.  """"'''' ^"^''{"ats-inerthrew  ^vl.at 
en  fhe  plain  of  ^'[0>-.  "^^X?  ;  f  a  m'^^e  fi  st  a?pearanc<.,  and  wilh- 
seemed  insuperable  °>f.\''.'''^:7^>.i"  "''„"  .nificM     result,  executed 

out  an  effort.     He  "l'jb^t"\\«  ;'^^^  ™;'f  "i.ilepe  to  the  inspira- 
,vithi.ll  that  apparent  taeiluybetong^^^^^^^^^^^^  ^_^^      ,^,,  f,„. 

;r  c;\ntLr^=  c^ns^lmTir^Hh  graceful  faciU.y-.a. 

"^For  attS  hX}::ne,  Tintoleon  to  U  ,i^  -lU  ^  hin..«. 
In  the  di..patch.vlucl.  annou.K«lto   h^^^^^^^^^ 

Vici.  .IS  well  as  in  his  discouises  at  ^>™"^^'  "^  .Ranked  for  l.avmg. 
achievement  to  fortune  or  to  the  ?  "^T' ^  ""'ji'^Jeree  for  liberating 
inseribe.1  his  name  as  "om;"«  ■7^„'-^  fin,  y  believed  Lim^elf  to  b.e  a 
Sicily.     We  need  "<>yl">f,,  H^'^^'ni   and  that  he  was  even  more 
favored  mstrumen    of  'f  ,;''\'"V  „  l^Vhich  locked  gates  flew  open 
astonished  than  others  «'/i'«  ^\",>  '"  ^'"/ipved  it  himself,  there  wr.s 
before  him.     But  even  it  ''f.'^^'IX.i j  .'n  the  facts;  not  simply 
great  pnulence    n  !"•'  >"?*',;  '  l?cks"~ot  envv  hut  because,  nr.l.r 
because  he  tl>e'-<'l'y/<'f  >''f 'U '   ,  "xnlted  hi  use  f  much  higher.    He 
the  pretense  of  modesty,  »>« '^7''>, "'{'i  ^;„  n",,-s  minds  toward  his 
purihase-d  for  himself  «  ?;r^  "  '\t  Z  g.d  .  than  he  would  ever 
future  achievemeias  as  the  }'«  'J' '' °' ' '^f^rta  .     And  though  whr.l 
have  possessed  as  only  a  '''S  ''>  ™,<^^^,"',",;:^.e's  ill   remained    n.ucl> 
!';nd!rntt:;lLtuie:,U"u^-;e  in  kind,  yet  hardly  less  .n 

-^■r  ^clld^r^J^^Uies  .ut  also  new  .em^ions,.^^^^^ 

Timoleon  had  to  combat      Tsow  be.Lan        '",„,{  .^-as  to  be  shown, 
fatal  to  so  many  emment  Greeks  te  ore  imnr^^^^^        perversion,  the 

whether  he  could  swallow  ;"•!""'"  ,'I^'':{!'rt,nving  fullness.    He 
cup  of  success  "dministere.l  t«  hm   m  smh  o     rtl  »  -  g^.^^  ^^^^  j,^,,,.. 

was  now  complete  master  of  ^.  ."™^„.™'-  f/,  '  ,"  i,,oomv  means  of 

fications  of  Ortygia  yet  ,*t™ f    ■;  -    '   '  :!^\  n'maining  i.i  his  hand, 
despoticcompression.niatcrialandmor.vl  octicn^^         „  ^^^^^^ 

In  ?e.pcct  of  personal  ^{••'"''•^"'"""^Ji't  ,c!ldcr  Wr^n-sius  in  the 
greatly  above  Dion,  and  yet  moie  above   be^  a  .^^  Syracuse. 

larly  part  of  b  s  career    ^ ''^  ^;  P  ^^.^    "ofp  «'"i«^d  ^^''"'-  ""f  t 

^i'^z^'?^"r^^^'^zs^  oT  rr^^sc^n't 

S^Sf  ai  re^rJsuStT?X- leading  Greek  poU- 


STRONGHOLD  IN  ORTYGIA. 


317 


tician  of  average  morality.  Probably  most  people  in  Sicily  actually 
expected  that  he  would  avail  liiuiself  of  liis  unparalleled  pos-ilion  to 
stand  forth  as  a  new  Dionysius.  Many  friends  and  partisans  would 
•  strenuously  recommend  it.  They  would  even  deride  him  as  an  idiot 
(as  Solon  had  been  called  in  his  time)  for  not  taking  the  boon  which 
the  gods  set  before  him,  and  for  not  hauling  up  the  net  when  the  lish 
were  already  caught  in  it.  There  would  not  be  wanting  other 
advisers,  to  insinuate  the  like  recommendation  under  the  pretense  of 
patriotic  disinterestedness,  and  regard  for  the  people  whom  he  had 
come  to  liberate.  The  Syracusans^(it  would  be  contended),  untit  for 
a  free  constitution,  must'^be  supplied  with  liberty  in  small  doses,  of 
which  Timoleon  was  the  best  judge:  their  best  interests  n.'quired  that 
Timoleon  should  keep  in  his  hands  the  auti-popuhir  power  with 
little  present  diminution,  in  order  to  restrain  their  follies,  and  insure 
to  them  benetits  which  they  would  miss  if  left  to  their  own  free 
determination. 

Considerations  of  this  latter  character  had  doubtless  gi-eatly 
weighed  with  Dion  in  the  hour  of  his  victoiy,  over  and  above  mere 
naked  ambition,  so  as  to  plunge  him  into  that  fatal  misjudgment 
and  misconduct  out  of  which  he  never  recovered.  But  the  lesson 
deducible  from  the  last  sad  months  of  Dion's  career  was  not  lost  upon 
Timoleon.  He  was  found  proof,  not  merely  against  seductions 
within  his  own  bosom,  but  against  provocations'  or  plausibilities 
from  wiiliout.  Neither  for  self-regardijig  purposes,  nor  for  beneti- 
jent  purposes,  would  he  be  persuaded  to  grasp  and  perpetuate  the 
anti-popular  power.  The  moment  of  tritil  was  that  in  which  the 
genuine  heroism  and  rectitude  of  judgment,  united  in  his  character, 
first  shone  forth  with  its  full  brightness. 

Master  as  he  now  was  of  all  Syracuse,  with  its  five-fold  agirrciiate, 
Ortygia,  Achradina,  Tycha,  Neapolis,  and  Epipolae— he  deterniined 
to  strike  down  at  once  that  great  monument  of  servitude  which  the 
elder  Dionysius  had  imposed  upon  his  fellow-citizens.  Without  a 
moment's  delay,  he  laid  his  hand  to  the  work.  He  invited  by  procla- 
mation every  Syracusan  who  chose,  to  come  with  iron  instruments, 
and  co-operate  with  him  in  demolishing  the  separate  stronghold, 
fortification,  and  residence  constructed  by  the  ekler  Dionysius  in 
Ortygia;  as  well  as  the  splendid  funereal  monument  erected  to  the 
memory  of  that  despot  i»y  his  son  and  successor.  This  was  the  first 
public  act  executed  in  Syracuse  by  his  order;  the  first  manifestation 
of  the  -restored  sovereignty  of  the  people;  the  first  outpourinu-  of 
sentiment,  at  once  free,  hearly,  and  unanimous^  amonir  men  trodden 
down  by  half  a  century  of  servitude;  the  first  fraternizing  co-opera- 
tion of  Timoleon  and  his  soldiers  with  them,  for  the  purpW  of  con- 
verting the  promise  of  liberation  into  an  assured  fact.  That  the 
actual  work  of  demolition  w^as  executed  by  the  liands  and  crowbars 
of  the  Syracusans  themselves,  rendered  the  whole  proceeamg  an 
impressive  compact  between  them  and  Timoleon.     It  cleared  away 


318  SICILIAN   AFF-VIUS  B.C.  353-380. 

.vheu  he  began  by  «^'>-'fl''™;'''\S^,  Vh  s  il  miut  o  the  past  5espots. 
meniento.  but  abo  the  must  P°'™^/^"'  V  ?^,?  Vo.  cc  coufldeuce  in 
it  achieved  tlie  inestiniable  good  of  ispu  ...feat  o'^tct^^^^^^  ^^^^^^^ 

his  future  proceedings  a^'l.'i'^P^f'^S  J^L^^^^^Sv  iu  smoothing 
,arily  to  hi.  advu,.^  n^lr  s'S     adrc'tcrstmctio'n,  but  also  i a 

![iSi:;gKa«  ^-^^^:zr^  ire 
frieTs'o^;Toh'^'^^uedrt^c";rdrf";oiiti^ 

iiiLsed  in  the  former  pro^'^.^^^^f ;.  ,^  ^.^^  r..,.^^^  ^y^,ae  subservient  to 

This  important  act  ot  .^^'''''^''^'l^^^^^^^^^^^^  in  ^vhich 

a  work  of  new  con>^tr action .  not  l^'^^^^^f  "'*^f|  ^^^^y^feti  4d  a^vay  the 

V'^'^'^Z  "i^^r^T^^i^^o^^^^^  ^d  ln.babl,^^vith 
obnoxious  toitress,  ue  t^r^-ciLu  "l  ^,„ru...ture      The  most  striking 

^mStrdt:!?— '^f  Xr '4v^c,tl;t  thus  met  the  eye  as  a 
l^al  substitute  for  that  of  ll'-;  Pf' !  !;,^!;;'^.;^^^^^       these  proccedi,.gs- 

.,  °';f^TuitnSet4''esS  it/^d  asc'nL  An<l  il'^ve 

the  hrst  fvi.tb  ot  !'°''''""^,.,,f  ,,,,.,,,.( i.^^elf— the  maniier  in  which 
regard  the  intnnsio  >"'P«"«°2.  u.  II  ns\  ell  upon  the  Syiacusui.  eye 
an  emphatic  m^''»'"»S  ^f^"  i"'*,,'"  *  "  "f  eviuccd  not  merely  of  di.sin- 
r.s  upon  tlie  Syracusan  "'  '''>-'^'':,P/"^.' ':''"s^,n,atin.'  the  necessities 
tercited  patriotism   but  also  ot  P   "'f^^;^^,^'^,;*;  ^''  C  laid  for  accom- 

he  most  impressive  phenomena  m  t-'™;^"  l';»^- ^„,,^„,   ,,„,,  «,  to 

weie  to  believe  wliat  must  '>'-/"/*i'efc';  ,       ,      „roonis  who 

pastu.-e  for  horses  and  as  a  P'"f  .^.f  i  ,\K  tlie    ke  evidcce  of 
|.,te,.ded  them.     Otlier  cities  of  ^<_'  >  ^^"^^1^^  f,  o'^',"  „{  city  life  had 
decay,  desertion,  anJ  ?<>-«!  >„  ^^^     'd  to  come  into'  the  ciiy. 
almost  ceased  in  b.cd. .     -^|*-" '^H^  ,,„,"., ..jik  retiring  themselves 
which  tliey  left  to  th.;  despot  and  l''V,"y'f,"uin"  from  all  ac:s  of 
to  live  oi  their  fields  and  *'••"'  f',  ™' :  ''"^.'^  "?,,"    so  ..s  to  pro- 
citizenship.    Even  tlie  helds  "e'-';'  I"/-''*  ^,^1  the  first  anxUl v  of 
duce  nothing  beyond  bare  ^''}>*'''''^'-^llt%\^^J^^  out  of  "this 
Timoleoii  to  revive  the  once  ''«'^f ''^ 'P'.^ J^if^ev  ,'  i  no  act  could  be 
.lepth  or  insecurity  am  .=> '«?*^^"'^^°VedU4  n  O^^^^^^^^^^     His  no.U  step 
more  conducive  than  his  lii>t.  procctuiUj^b  m  w.  jh 


COMMISSIONERS  SENT  TO  SYRACUSE.  3j() 

was  to  bring  together,  by  invitations  and  proclamations  everyw\»ere 
circuhited,  those  exiles  who  had  been  expelled,  or  forced  to  seek 
refuge  elsewhere,  during  the  recent  oppression.  Manv  of  these  wno 
had  found  shelter  in  various  parts  of  Sicily  and  Italy,  obeyed  Vus 
snninions  with  glad  readiness.  But  there  were  others,\vlio  had  hcvi 
t.)  Gieece  or  the  ^gcan  ishmds,  and  were  out  of  the  hearing  of  any 
prochimations  from  Timoleon.  To  reach  persons  thus'  remote, 
recourse  was  had,  by  him  and  by  the  Syracusans  conjointly,  to 
Corinthian  intervention.  The  Syracusans  felt  so  keenly  how  mucli 
was  required  to  be  done  for  the  secure  reorganization  oi' their  city  as 
a  free  community,  that  they  eagerly  concurred  witii  Timoleon  in 
entreating  the  Corinthians  to  undertake,  a  second  time,  the  honora- 
ble task  of  founders  of  Syracuse. 

Two  esteemed  citizens,  Kephalus  and  Dionysius,  were  sent  from 
Coimth  to  co-operate  with  Timoleon  and  the  Syracusans,  in  consti- 
tuting the  community  anew%  on  a  free  and  popular  basis,  and  in  pre- 
paring an  amended  legislation.  These  commissioners  adopted,  for 
their  main  text  and  theme,  the  democratical  constitution  and  laws  as 
established  by  Diokles  about  seventy  years  before,  which  the  usurpa- 
tion of  Dionysius  had  subverted  when  they  were  not  more  than  seven 
years  old.  Kephalus  professed  to  do  nothing  more  than  revive  the 
laws  of  Diokles,  with  such  comments,  modifications,  and  adaptations 
as  the  change  of  times  and  circumstances  had  rendered  necessary. 
In  the  laws  respecting  inheritance  and  property  he  is  said  to  have 
made  no  change  at  all;  but  unfortunately  we  are  left  without  any 
information  what  were  the  laws  of  Diokles,  or  how  they  were  now 
modified.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  the  political  constitution  of 
Diokles  was  a  democracy,  and  that  the  constitution  as  now  re-estab- 
lished was  democratical  also.  Beyond  this  general  fact  we  can  assert 
nothing. 

Though  a  free  popular  constitution,  however,  was  absolutely  indis- 
pensable, and  a  good  constitution  a  great  boon— it  was  not  the  only 
pressing  necessity  for  Syracuse.  There  was  required,  no  less  ah 
importation  of  new  citizens:  and  not  merely  of  poor  men  brinoin*'- 
with  them  their  arms  and  their  industry,  but  also  of  persons  in  afflu^ 
ent  or  easy  circumstances,  competent  to  purchase  lands  and  houses. 
Besides  much  laud  ruined  or  gone  out  of  cultivation,  the  general 
poverty  of  tjie  residents  was  extreme;  while  at  the  same  time  the 
public  exigences  were  considerable,  since  it  was  essential,  amon^"- 
other  things,  to  provide  pay  for  those  very  soldiers  of  Timoleon  to 
whom  they  owed  their  liberation.  The  extent  of  poverty  was  pain- 
fully attested  by  the  fact  that  they  were  constrained  to  sell  those 
public  statues  which  formed  the  ornaments  of  Syracuse  and  its  tem- 
ples; a  cruel  wound  to  the  sentiments  of  every  Grecian  community. 
From  this  compulsory  auction,  however,  they  excepted  by  special 
vote  the  statue  of  Gelon,  in  testimony  of  gratitude  for  hWapital 
victory  at  Himera  over  the  Carthaginians. 


320 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-336. 


Pnr  tlio  Innovation  of  a  community  thus  dcslitute,  now  func  s  as 
w^^U  as  U..W  non  were  wanted;  and'the  Corinthians  e.^erted  thenv 
r^iv-^s  act  velv  to  procure  both.  Their  first  proclamation  ^^;«s  mtl.;  d 
^rilre^e  1  MKxiall  •  to  Svracusan  exiles,  whom  they  .nvited  to  re>ume 
?^.  r  rS  ie  K-e  a,-Svraeus<.  as  free  an,l  autonomous  ct.zens  tm.le  a 
■  .  n  ,. nf  nf  linik  Thev  caused  such  proclamation  to  l)e  pnb- 
3„-;t  allot  "tot   :  "'1^-        ;  >  ^'   ^    ,  ,      ,  'f(.,tivals;  prefaced  by  a 

.'?;Hri";     .:u>f  (e  that'  ".rCori.' thians  had  already  overthrown  both 

Ue  leVnotis^  and  the  despot-a  fact  which  the  notorious  presence  ot 

n^,nv'?u"h'm'=elf  at  (^orinll.  contributed  to  pvomulgate  more  wide  y 

Un-inv  formal  announcement.     They  further  engaged,  it  the  exi  Is 

man  any  'o™  ' ""    .     ,     .    „,.„vide  transports,  convoy,  and  leaders, 

r"  iicu":;    fr '.  o   •  I'o  t   "Tl.e  number^f  exiles,  ^^^ho  pn.fited  by 

e   nvtaton  andcameto  Corinth,  though  not  ^"'^^'^'^■^ 

I  111     1  nllvstron"  enouih  to  enter  upon  ihe  proposed  !- u  ilian  rcnoya- 

H  n      T^vt'enselves  therefore  entreated  the  Corinthians  to  invite 

S.i<Iaf Zionists  fr.,n,  other  Gix.eiancl.ie.     It  was  v^^^ 

;''"''t:i'';ndel=H.t^'rcum^.a^^^- 

noimv^n^^tem^crf    ?o^Trful  presiding  city.  .  There  were  many 

^  :  '. m  p'STifnxious  \o  exchange  ^^^-jrXZ"\^eToi:i:n. 

\i    •»  -  +v^,.  tiiot  r>f  full  ritizens  in  a  new  one.     Irlence  ine  inoic  ^eu 

"r  I'nrW Ian  a.  on  now\s    ^bv  the  Corinthians  attracted  numerotis 

(M.u  piodaiu.ii  limine  ^f"^  r./^ir»ni«t<  wt;  nro^ont  V  assenU)iea  at 

applicants,  and  a  large  f"/™  "^  ^^^^^^'^V  '^^ejLa  "s  Syracusan 

Corinth;  an  airgrcgate  of  10,UUO  persons,   uicm^niij^  j 

^Ivhen  c-eyed  to  B,^^^^^^^  "r^ eimis.^fJX/rSi'll 

Italitm  (xieeks,  ai  mis  uiui.  im       J  *  berom  ns:  so  unable 

^vilh  this  lariie  intlnx.     Such  a  state  l^V^^'TU  U  .mKo    a  d^'^rce 
r^ow  emb'vira^^ments  an.l  conflicting  interests,  so  it  calls  loi  a  df  ...rce 
.     ^.roTCn  1  or io-inal  iufl-nient  which  furnishes  -ood  measure  of 
;l':;n^ciU'  of  al  ™  rendering  the  juncture  partic- 

'vS^r'^meie^^^      and  instructive.    Unfortunately  we  are  not  per- 


SUCCESSES  OF  TIMOLEON. 


321 


muted  to  know  the  details.  The  land  of  Syracuse  is  said  to  L-ive 
been  distributed  and  tlie  houses  to  have  been  sold  for  1000  alents- 
he  large  sum  of  £280.000.  A  right  of  pre-emption  waral lo  v°  to 
tlie  Syracu5;m  exiles  for  repurchasing  the  houses  formerly  their  own 
As  the  houses  were  sold,  and  that  too  for  a  considerable  price-so  we 
may  presume  that  the  lands  were  sold  also,  and  that  tieincomii^ 
seders  (Id  not  receive  their  lots  gratuitously.  But  how  tl  c^  we  ? 
sold,  or  how  much  of  the  territory  was  sold,  we  are  left  in  ignorance 
It  s  certain,  however,  that  the  effect  of  the  new  immigration  was  not 
only  to  renew  the  force  and  population  of  Syracuse,   but  atso  to 

ZTl'f'l  '"^  "'"  '''''''^'  ^""'"''y  «^  '^'^  antecedent  residems      A 
gre<it  deal  of  new  money  must  thus  have  been  brou-ht  in 

feuch  important  changes  doubtless  occupied  a  considerable  time 
hough  we  are  not  enabled  to  arrange  them  in  months  or  yea?s  Ta 
he  mean  time  Timoleon  continued  lo  act  in  such  a  manner  as  io  re 
tain,  and  even  to  strengthen,  the  contidence  and  attacliment  of  the 
byracusans  He  employed  his  forces  actively  in  putting  down  and 
^fP^^^^fJ.^^  r^^^'-^^n'mcr  despot,  throughout  the  island^  He  first 
attacked  Hiketas,  his  old  enemy,  at  Leontini;  and  compelled  him  to 

fnrhk'rl^^  Tr  ^ -^^^  ^^  demolishing  the  fortified  citadel^aMLt 
ing  his  rule,  and  living  as  a  private  citizen  in  the  town.     Leptines 
despot  of  Apollonia  and  of  several  other  neighboring  township  w^'s 
to  Corinth'"'"      '^        "^''^  ^""^  '^  embrace  the  offe?  of  a  trinVort 

It  appears  that  the  submission  of  Hiketas  w^js  merely  a  feint  to 

obtain  time  for  strengthening  himself  bv  urging  the  c/rtha^  i  ans 

o  try  another  invasion  of  Sicily.     TheyVereth?  more  disposed  ?o 

th  s  step,  as  Timoleon,  anxious  to  relieve  the  Syracusans  sent  his 

soldiers  under  the  Corinthian  Deinarchus  to  find  pay  and  plunde? 


f'ornpr  r^f  Q;^;Kr      T-i-    "' :»—    i'"--v^^iwiis   iitar   uie  western 

corner  of  bicily      This  invasion,  while  it  abundantly  supplied  the 
le  soldiers,  encouraged  Entella  and  several  other  towns  to 


1^  J.  ;; — -— .  ^•^^Kjvmi^y^yi  sunhisiiii  <iuu  scvcrai  oiuer  towns  to 

revolt  from  Carthage.  The  indignati,,,,  among  the  CartlSnkns 
lad  been  vio  ent  when  Magon  returned  after  suddenly  abandoidn' 
the  harbor  of  Syracuse  to  Timoleon.  Unafcle  to  make  hisdefensl 
satisfactory,  Magon  only  escaped  a  worse  death  by  suicide  S 
which  his  dead  body  was  crucified  by  public  order.  ^  And  the  Car- 

w^7'.?f,ri"r;?K°  ™.''  ™  *''■««''  effort,  to  repair  their  honor  as 
well  as  to  defend  their  territory.  vy  ^^i  as 

The  effort  was  made  on  a  vast  scale,  and  with  long  previous  pren- 
arations.  An  army  said  to  consist  of  70,000  men.  under  Hasdrubal 
and  llamilkar,  was  disembarked  at  Lilyba^um,  on  the  wcSern  cor 
1  oo7^  ^  f'1^ '  ^"'/^^^  ^^'^^^^'^  there  was  a  tiek.  of  200  n-irem?s  and 
1000  attendant  vessels  carrying  provisions,  warlike  stores'^ngines 
for  sieges,  war-chariots  with  four  horses,  etc.  But  the  most  con 
spicuous  proof  of  ejirnest  effort,  over  and  above  numbers  and  ex- 
pense, was  furnished  by  the  presence  of  no  less  than  10  000  native 
H.  G.    IV.— 11 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-838. 


822 

infantry  from  Carthage:  men  clothed  ^^V^^^'^^^Z^ 
^?«    and  far  heavier  than  o''!"  f  ^-^^.V^,"  men  hroughl  to  ihc 

i.rie  elite  of  the  division-2,oOO  m  numu  ^  ^^  ^  has 

!iWd^4t  >.as  called  ^^«  ,^;;^;^^;^,,^(^  rUmlinians  caused  their 
^eenaln^ady  stated  that  "^^^^^^^'I'^^ed^^^^  ^^f'' 

mmtary  service  to  l>«  P^^^"^"^^f,   amy  Vtood  plirticularly   distin- 
Uieir  own  citizens.      Hence    .^^^.  ^^^^^^^^^^ 

Sl'k  JJJIel'trrteatrii^t-a:^!  .nt  to  Timoleon  for  r 

^tl^'^rcenaneous  hody  of  --jf-f^fro!^'  ntr^eSen.. 
Sj4i"usTen.ployed  in  tnc  c^res    ^Ic  a  foe.     Though  TimoWcm 

cou  d%  S-'mhle  no  g"'-'" '"''l\i'Ce  ,v^eh  he  had  round  him  at 
3  000  Svracusan  ^•i'i'-'^'"''.7V'f,rm,derD(T«a>elu,s,  ^vho  had  been  just 
Syracuse-tl>at  other  Pf  ^^  ^°^*^'- '  ^'^.^'g'.e  he  Carthaginian  provm^r 
rmnoelled  by  the  iiwailers  to  <-^«.';"*";,.  ...valrv  was  ahont  1000  m 
and  m  ally  sueh  allies  »s«ould  join.    "';^,^';V  4,io.ity.  Timolcon 

eenarief  named  Thrasius  ook  "''''^"^f,!,",  soldiers  that  Timoleon 
?o  laile  a  mutiny  against  Inm,  P^/^^";^ '  ?f  ;H^,  \,^,»„,t  an  enemy  six 
*,°as  madly  hurrying  the^  on    o  cut.un  ™^^^.  ^,^ 

times  superior  m  number,  ana  i u  a  .^      salvation  foi  Ihtm  m 

tccommendations  under  the  actual  u  Timoleon.  ^^-o^^f,^ 

hmllv  be  counterworked  hx  all  tl  e  ^«^^\^  ^  e^  derived  as  Avell 
there  ever  any  conjecture  ^^  ^^^^f'p.^'VSfin  his  favor  >vith  the 
tlZ  un^bound'ed  pet.c.al  esteem  ^^^l  ,,eceeded  in  heart, 
gods,  was  so  near  failing,     as 


OMEN   ABOUT  PARSLEY. 


823 


ening  up  and  retaining  the  large  body  of  his  army,  yet  Thrasius, 
with  1000  of  the  mercenaries,  insisted'upon  returning,  and  actually 
did  return,  to  Syracuse.  Moreover,  Timoleon  was  obliged  to  send 
an  order  along  with  them  to  the  autliorities  at  home,  that  these  men 
must  immediately,  and  at  all  co.5t,  receive  their  arrears  of  pay.  The 
wonder  is  that  he  succeeded  in  his  efforts  to  retain  tiie  rest,  after  in- 
suring to  the  mutineers  a  lot  which  seemed  so  much  safer  and  moro 
enviable.  Thrasius,  a  brave  man,  having  engaged  in  the  .service  of 
the  Phokians  Philomehts  and  Onomarclms,  had  been  concerned  in 
the  pillagi)  of  the  Delphian  temple,  which  drew  upon  him  the  aver- 
sion of  the  Grecian  world.  How  many  of  the  1000  seceding  soldiers 
who  now  followed  him  to  Syracuse  had  been  partners  in  the  same 
sacrilegious  act  we  cannot  telL  But  it  is  certain  that  they  were  men 
who  had  taken  service  with  Timoleon  in  hopes  of  a  period,  not 
merelv  of  fighting,  but  also  of  lucrative  license,  such  as  his  generous 
regard  fof  the^settled  inhabitants  would  not  permit. 

Having  succeeded  in  keeping  up  the  spirits  of  his  remaining  army, 
and  affecting  to  treat  the  departure  of  so  man v  cowards  jis  a  positive 
advantage,  Timoleon  marched  on  westward  "into  the  Carthao-inian 
province,  until  he  approached  within  a  short  dislance  of  the  river 
Krimesus,  a  stream  which  rises  in  the  mountainous  resrion  south  of 
Panormus  (Palermo),  runs  nearly  southward,  and  falls^into  the  sea 
near  Selinus.  Some  mules  carrying  loads  of  parsley  met  him  on  the 
road,  a  fact  which  called  forth  again  the  half-suppressed  alarm  of 
the  soldiers,  since  parsley  was  habitually  emploved  for  the  wreaths 
dep.jslted  on  tombstones.  But  Timolcon,  taking  a  imndful  of  it  and 
weavHig  a  wreath  for  his  own  head,  exclaimed,'  "  Thi  ^  is  our  Corin- 
thian syml/ol  of  victorv:  it  is  the  sacred  herl)  with  wiiieji  we  decorate 
our  victors  at  the  Istimiian  festival.  It  comes  to  us  here  spontane- 
ously, as  an  earnest  of  our  approaching  success."  Insisting  emphati- 
caily  on  this  theme,  and  crowning  himself  as  well  as  his  officers  with 
the  parsley,  he  rekindled  the  spirits  of  the  armv,  and  conducted  them 
forward  to  the  top  (jf  the  eminence,  immediately  above  the  course  of 
the  Krimesus, 

It  was  just  at  that  moment  that  the  Carthadnian  army  were  pass- 
ing the  river,  on  their  march  to  meet  him.  the  confused  noise  and 
clatter  of  their  approach  were  plainlv  heard;  though  the  mist  of  a 
May  morning,  overhanging  the  valley,  still  concealed  from  the  eye 
tht?  army  crossing.  Presently  llie  *mist  ascended  from  the  lower 
ground  to  the  hill  tops  around,  leaving  the  river  and  the  Carthagin- 
ians beneath  in  conspicuous  view.  Formidable  was  the  aspect  which 
they  presented.  The  war-chariots-and-four,  which  formed  their 
front,  had  already  crossed  the  river,  and  appear  to  have  been  haltiiio- 
a  httle  way  in  advance.  Next  to  them  followed  the  native  Cartha'^ 
ginians,  10,000  chosen  hoplites  with  white  shields,  who  had  also  in 
part  crossed  and  were  still  crossing;  while  the  main  body  of  the  host, 
t.ie  foreign  mercenaries,  were  pressing  behind  in  a  disorderly  mass  to 


II 


324 


SICILIAN   AFFAIRS  B.C. 


353 


get  to  the  bank,  whiC,  »PPe»rs  Jo  l.=>ve  be^n Jr.  I-rt^™g^f -^^^tl 
how  faYoral)le  was  the  moment  ' "'  »"X'^  af  er  k  short  cxhorta- 

arrayed  and  bisected  '>{,«':;";"  .'J,  ^^t"^^;  the  hill.     His  Sicilian 
tiou:  gave  orders  immeduitely   oca  j^^^^^^^  „^^  Uvo  wings; 

..Hies  with  some  mercenaries  "i"-''"'"S"-«' 'J'^' ,  -  ^^g  „Hrcen- 

"     le  he  himself,  with  the  ^^'"^"^'J^^^J^  was  ordered 

,,ies.  occnpied  the  center.     Dj;;"»;Xre  t     y  c^-  '1  f'>™  ^''^"•"'y- 

to  assail  the  Carthaginians  ^'^V.^,*;  ^c  the  "reaur  part  of  the  line. 

But  the  chariots  in  their  front,  P™'"''"^  V^.^,='   ,,rtialv  throngh  the 

left  him  only  the  power  of  f »  "S  '^  l^.   °>  1.,,  ^j,  eavalvy  accom- 

■  vacant  intervals.     Timoleon,  '■9<'"  P^^V  J '  » ,j,  ^.^,,,■^,_rv  on  the  flanks. 

plished  little,  rec'illed  thcMn  and  o  U^red  th^^  undertook,  to 

^■hile  he  hi.nself.  with  all  the  ^'^^  "^.     ,,.,^,,,,  f^om  the  attendant 

attack  in  front.     ^\^<:""''!^,'.;';f;iiil,^  aloud  to  the  infunUT  >"0"nd 
he  marched  forward  '"  advance,  cat  n  g  •  _,^^,^,_j  ,^,,,,^(1  f^  . 

to  he  of  gocd  cheer  and  follow .  ^^^'^ ":  "„{  h  ,,,s  powerfully  fel 
predominant  an,l  heart-stirring;  »' «  ™'- , J.^^Vthat  they  heard  a  god 
L  the  spirits  of  all  »™«nd.  J!'  '-;,Vi  .!  1  si  out  em,,liatically,  they 
rS  ftw^nl'lo  t'rchalge'wi'.'i:  the  utmost  alacrity-m  compact 
order,  and  under  the  found  of  '"'"JPf  *';.^„de  or  break  through  the 
The  infantry  were  P'-"''''V1>  "  f,;^,r^,,^,e"  ease  than  the  cavalry 
bulwark  of  interposed  c  -ar.' «  ^^«h.  ^^  ^^.^^'.lone.  Ti.noleon  and 
though  Plutarch  docs  not  tell  us  how  tni  .^j^  „,p  ^.^^^^ea 

his  soldiers  then  came  into  close  f^^^  '""%', ira-e  worthy  of  their 
Carthaginian  inf'.""^v.'^  >?//;'^.^^,  .., plate  and  hra%c4  helmets 
reputation.  Their  vast  ^I'l-^^W^.  1"  ,*;;  Z..,  ,vorn  usuafly  even  by 
(forming  altogether  armor  h|»;^'«;  "'^'' .,  „,«  sp<ar-lhnists  of  the 

Grecian  hoplites),  enabled  'l"^"' J"  ".^f^  \.  -e  t(rtheir  swords,  and 
Grecian  assailants,  who  were  comFjelW;dUU^t        ^^  f.„a„gi„i,„ 

tlms40  procure  theinsclves  admission  ^iwn  ^^.^^^^,,  j^  ,„i,,,t  we 

spears,  so  as  to  break  their  a  k  .  |^^  ^  "^^i.e  contest  was  bravely 
rarely  read  of  in  a  G>-ecian  battle      1 ''"'.-  '  ,„o  n,„eh  loaded 

maintained  by  \''^^»"'''^V' J '  ^..ffi^  ufgTnadcn.emass.  They 
with  armor  to  a<lmit  f  ^an/''''"fJ^•^' j'r.'H  '  the  picked  men  of  the 
were  already  losing  'l'^'''- J^  '  T\"^„r.,dv  nta^l-whcn  the  gods,  yet 
whole,  and  beginning  to  fight  ".  f  ;>';''^;  7„;i„.ir  di.scon.fiturc  by  an 
farther  befriending  Timo  eon  >et  tl'«  ^^^'^  ^^  j,,^  „„„  violent  char- 
intervention  manifest  and  terrihc.  .;^,X,  in  complete  darkness;  the 
acter  began.  The  hill  tops  were  *™"«>  J^^" ,  Santly,  with  all  the 
wind  hkw  a  hurricane;  ra'"?^'"'  ;",P'r  i-h  ning.  To  the  Greeks, 
awfnl  accompaniments  of  ""  °'^[,  •>"^,^;^  "e  jt  came  on  their  backs, 
this  storm  was  of  little  inconvenience  iKoau.se^  .  j,^^^^   ,j 

But  to  the  Carthaginians  p*.lt.ng  as  It   luUrcny  ^^^^  ^^^.^ 

•     occasioned  both  great  snitering  ^'^   "f "  f  ^^    e  r^faces,  so  that  they 


VICTORY   OF  TIMOLEON. 


325 


and  of  hail  rattlin*:^  against  tlier  armor,  ]n-cventod  the  orders  oj  their 
otHcers  from  beiiiir  heard:  tlie  folds  of  their  voluminous  military 
tuuics  were  surehaiged  with  rain  water,  so  as  to  embarra.ss  their 
movements;  the  ground  presently  became  so  muddy  that  they  could 
not  keep  their  footing;  and  when  they  once  slipped,  the  weight  of 
their  equipment  forbade  all  recovery.  The  Greeks,  comparatively 
free  from  inconvenience,  and  encouraged  by  the  evident  disablement 
of  their  enemies,  pressed  them  with  redoubled  energy.  'At  length, 
wdien  the  four  hundred  front  rank  men  of  the  Carthaginians  had  per- 
ished by  a  brave  death  in  their  plRces,  the  rest  of  the  Whiteshields 
turned  their  backs  and  sought  relief  in  flight.  But  flight,  too,  was  all 
but  impossible.  They- encountered  their  own  troops  in  the  rear 
advancing  up  and  trying  to  cross  the  Krimesus,  which  river  itself 
was  becoming  every  minute  fuller  and  more  turbid,  through  the  vio- 
lent rain.  The  attempt  to  recross  was  one  of  such  unspeakable  con- 
fusion that  numbers  perished  in  the  tor^'ent.  Dispersing  in  total  rout, 
the  whok-  Carthaginian  army  thought  only  of  escape,  leaving  their 
camp  and  baggage  a  prey  to  the  victors,  who  pursued  them  across  tho 
river  and  over  the  hills  on  the  other  side,  inflicting  prodigious  slaugli- 
ter.  In  this  pursuit  the  cavalry  of  Timoleon,  not  very  eifective  dur- 
ing the  battle,  rendered  excellent  service;  pressing  the  fugitive  Car- 
thaunnians  one  over  another  in  mass,  and  driving  them,  overloaded 
with  their  armor,  into  mud  and  water,  from  whence  they  could  not 
get  clear. 

No  victory  in  Grecian  history  was  ever  more  complete  than  that  of 
Timoleon  at  the  Krimesus,  Ten  thousand  Carthaginians  are  said  to 
have  been  slain,  and  flfteen  thousand  made  prisoners.  Upon  these 
numbers  no  stress  is  to  be  laid;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  total  of  both 
must  have  been  very  great.  Of  the  war-chariots,  many  were  broken 
during  the  action,  a'^nd  all  that  remained,  200  in  number,  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  victors.  But  that  w^hieh  rendered  the  loss  most  serious, 
and  most  painfully  felt  at  Carthage,  was  that  it  fell  chiefly  upon 'the 
native  Carthaginian  troops,  and  much  less  upon  the  foreign  merceu- 
ari:is.  It  is  even  said  that  the  Sacred  Battalion  of  Cartilage,  com- 
prising 3,500  soldiers  belonging  to  the  most  considerable  families  in 
Carthage,  were  all  slain  to  a  man;  a  statement  doubtless  exaggerated, 
yet  implying  a  fearful  real  destruction.  Many  of  these  soldiers  pur- 
chased safe  escape  by  throwing  away  their  ornamented  shields  and 
costly  breastpLites,  w'liich  the  victors  picked  up  in  great  numbers — 
1000  breastplates,  and  not  k'ss  than  10,000  shields.  Altogether,  the 
spoil  collected  was  immense — in  arms,  in  baggage,  and  in  gold  and 
silver  from  the  plundered  camp;  occupying  the  Greeks  so  long  in  the 
work  of  pursuit  and  capture  that  they  did  not  find  time  to  erect  tbeir 
tiophy  untii  the  third  day  after  the  battle.  Timoleon  left  the  chief 
]i;irt  of  the  plunder,  as  well  as  most  part  of  the  prisoners,  in  the  hands 
of  t.»e  individual  captors, who  enriched  themselves  amply  by  the  day's 
work.     Yet  there  still  remained  a  Large  total  for  the  public  Syracusaa 


826 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  S5S-336. 


chest;  5.000  prisoners,  and  a  mkcdlaneous  spoil  of  armor  and  pre- 
cious articles,  piled  up  in  imposing  magnificence  around  the  general's 
tent. 

The  Carthaginian  fugitives  did  not  rest  until  they  reached  Lily- 
bcTiim.  And  even  there,  such  was  their  discouragement — so  pro- 
found their  conviction  that  the  wrath  of  the  gods  \vas  upon  them — 
that  they  could  scarcely  be  induced  to  go  on  shii)board  for  the  pur- 
pose of  returning  to  Carthage;  persuaded  as  they  were  that,  if  once 
cauirht  out  at  sea,  the  gods  in  their  present  displeasure  would  never 
let  them  reach  land.  At  Carthag*  itself  also,  the  sorrow  and  depres- 
sion were  unparalleled:  sorrow  private  as  well  as  public,  from  the 
loss  of  so  great  a  number  of  principal  citizens.  It  was  even  feared 
that  the  victorious  Timoleon  would  instantly  cross  the  sea  and  attack 
Carthage  on  her  own  soil.  Immediate  efforts  were,  however,  made 
to  furnish  a  fresh  army  for  Sicily,  composed  of  foreign  mercenaries 
with  few  or  no  native  citizens.  Giskon,  the  sou  of  Hanno,who  passed 
for  their  most  energetic  citizen,  was  recalled  from  exile,  and  directed 
to  get  together  this  new  armament. 

The  subduing  impression  of  the  wrath  of  the  gods,  under  which 
the  Carthaginians  labored,  arose  from  the  fact  that  their  defeat  liad 
been  owmg  not  less  to  the  terrilic  storm,  than  to  the  arms  of  Timo- 
leon. Conversely,  in  regard  to  Timoleon  himself,  the  very  same 
fact  produced  an  impression  of  awe-.striking  v.  onder  and  envy.  If 
there  were  any  scyptics  who  doubted  before  either  the  reality  of 
special  interventions  by  the  gods,  or  the  marked  kindness  which  de- 
termined the  gods  to  send  such  interventions  to  the  service  of  Timo- 
leon— the  victory  of  the  Krimesus  must  have  convinced  them.  The 
storm,  alike  violent  and  oj^portune,  coming  at  the  back  of  tlie  Greeks 
and  in  the  faces  of  the  Carthaginians,  was  a  nn.nifestation  uf  divine 
favor  scarcely  less  conspicuous  than  those  vouchsafed  to  Diomedes 
or  ^neas  in  the  Iliad.  And  the  sentiment  thus  raised  toward 
Timoleon — or  rather  ])re\  iously  rai.-ed,  and  now  yet  farther  confirmed 
— became  blended  with  that  genuine  admiration  which  he  had  richly 
earned  by  his  rapid  and  well-conducted  movements,  as  well  as  by  a 
force  of  character  striking  enough  to  uphold,  under  the  most  critical 
circumstances,  the  courage  of  a  desponding  army.  His  victory  at 
the  Krimesus,  like  his  victory  at  Adranum,  was  gained  mainly  by 
that  extreme  speed  in  advance*,  which  brought  him  upon  an  unpre- 
I)aretl  enemy  at  a  vulnerable  moment.  And  the  news  of  it  which  he 
despatched  at  once  to  Corinth— accompanied  with  a  cargo  of  showy 
Carthaginian  shields  to  decorate  the  Corinthian  temples — dilfu.'cd 
throughout  Central  Greece  both  joy  for  the  event  and  increased 
honor  to  his  name,  commemorated  by  the  inscription  attached — 
"The  Corinthians  and  the  general  Trmoleon,  after  liberating  the 
Sicilian  Greeks  from  the  Carthaginians,  have  dedicated  fliesc  shields 
as  offerings  of  gratitude  to  the  gods." 

Leaving  most  of  his  paid  troops  to  carry  on  war  in  the  Carthaginian 


HIKETAS  AND  MA3IERKCS. 


province,  Timoleon  co:iducted  his  Svracusans  home.  His  first  pn.- 
ceeding  was,  at  once  to  dismiss  Thrasius  with  the  1000  paid  soldiers 
wiio  had  deserted  him  before  the  battle.  He  commanded  them  to 
quit  Sicily,  allowing  them  only  twenty-four  hours  to  depart  from 
Syracuse  itself.  Probably  under  the  circumstances,  they  were  not 
less  anxious  to  go  Jiway  than  he  was  to  dismiss  them.  But  they 
went  away  only  to  destruction ;  for  having  crossed  the  Strait  of 
Messina  and  taken  possession  of  a  maritime  site  in  Italy  on  the 
Southern  sea,  the  Bruttians  of  the  inland  entrapped  them  by  pro- 
fessions of  simulated  friendship,  and  slew  them  all. 

Timoleon  had  now  to  deal  with  tw^o  Grecian  enemies— Hiketas  and 
Mamerkiis— the  despots  of  Leontini  and  Katana.  By  the  extraordi- 
nary rapidity  of  his  movements,  he  had  crushed  the  great  invading 
host  of  Carthage,  before  it  came  into  co-operation  with  these  two 
allies.  Both  now  wrote  in  terror  to  Carthage,  soliciting  a  new  arma- 
ment, as  indispensable  for  their  security  not  less  than  fortheCartha^i- 
nian  interest  in  the  island ;  Timoleon  being  the  comtnon  enemy  of  both. 
Presently  Giskon  son  of  Ilanno,  having  i)een  recalled  on  purpose  out 
of  banishment,  arrived  from  Carthage  with  a  considerable  force- 
seventy  triremes,  and  a  body  of  Grecian  mercenaries.  It  was  lare 
for  the  Carthaginians  to  employ  Grecian  mercenaries;  but  the  battle 
of  the  Krimesus  is  said  to  have  persuaded  them  that  there  were  no 
soldiers  to  be  compared  to  Greeks.  The  force  of  Giskon  was  appar- 
ently distributed  partly  in  the  Carthaginian  province  at  the  western 
angle  of  the  island— partly  in  the  neighborhood  of  Myl«  and  3Ies. 
sene  on  the  north-east,  where  Mamerkus  joined  him  with  the  troops 
of  Katana.  Messene  appears  to  have  recently  fallen  under  tlie  power 
of  a  despot  nam^d  Hippon,  who  acted  as  their  ally.  To  both  points 
Timoleon  despatched  a  portion  of  his  mercenary  force,  without  uoin^*- 
hnnself  in  command;  on  both,  his  troops  at  first  experienced  partial 
defeats;  two  divisions  of  them,  one  comprisins:  four  hundred  men, 
being  cut  to  pieces.  But  such  partial  reversosw^ere,  in  the  relidous 
appreciation  of  the  time,  proofs  more  conspicuous  than  ever  of  the 
peculiar  favor  shown  by  the  gods  toward  Timoleon.  For  the  soMi(>rs 
thus  slam  had  been  concerned  in  the  pillage  of  the  Delphian  temple 
and  were  therefore  marked  out  for  the  divine  wrath;  but  the  gods 
suspended  die  sentence  during  tlie  time  when  the  soldiers  were  serv- 
ing  under  Tinioleon  in  person,  in  order  that  he  midit  not  be  the  suf- 
ferer; and  executed  it  now  in  his  absence,  when  execution  would 
occasion  the  least  possible  inconvenience  to  him. 

r.Ianierkus  and  Iliket.-is,  however,  not  adopting  this  interpretation 
of  their  recent  successes  against  Timoleon,  were  full  (»f  hope  ;nd* 
conhdence.  The  former  dedicated  the  shields  of  the  slain  mercciia- 
ries  to  the  gods,  with  an  inscription  of  insolent  triumph:  the  latter 
—taking  advantage  of  the  absence  of  Timoleon,  who  had  made  an  ex- 
pedition against  a  place  not  far  off  called  Kalauria— undertook  an 
inroad  into  the  Syracusan  territory.      Not  content  with  inflicting 


3-23  SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  3o3-S36. 

^e.t  damage  an.,  carrying  off  an  -'Pl«,;,  tJ •/al'on^^^vUul.im'bf 

the  fanner  sicle  "f  «''<"  ll?"^/!^'^^?,  ""  ,;•      t^ain"  this  good  dc- 

the  Corintliians,  p.ibhcly  miorcd  at  J-w"''"  •  4'r^rn"c  where  they 
.  „f  nii-ot.,u  wiTo  eonveved  as  prisoners  to  bji.iciise,  imilh-  "'^} 
ters  of  IliKet.is  ^J<'^«5^"""j> .  , ,  ,„  „f  u,,.  Sviaciisan  assembly. 
WCTC  condemned  to  death  In  I'"''''*^'  „p  for  tl.c'pvevioiis  crime  of 
This  vote  ^v^s  passed  m  "^r-^^j-J^^Xw  "is  er  and  son  of  Dion. 
ITiUeta..  in  putting  to  f'™'>'  ,'«,!* '.f^';;.;dhc\m^ 
Thongi.  Timoleon  might  prohablv  '"  f.  f  ^f  •' '^;  " .,.  Tlie  ceneral 
bv  a  strong  exertion  of  influenee  '  <^  <!'  >  <'  'I'^^t^'eeial  retaliation, 
f;.elin-  of  tlie  p<>np)e  accounted  '''i^.  7"^''  '""  j^^  eould  not  l.ave 
ri.d.t  undpr  the  circumstances;  a"'*  T'"  °  «""•  " V  «  ["'„,,,  (o  ursrc 

[S"o^^Zir   ::^i:?alid?a^^:inS  f^^::^^--    ^ 

„  consid<  t-ahle  force,  strengthened  by  a  bodj^oG.nu^^^^^ 

tuiderGi-kon.    ."^' ";i^""";';^^'' ""^™   many  ^  belonging  to- 

river  Al>olus,  ;«-.il.  a  loss  of  -f ^„"'A"„Xn.,  ,„„  the  simple  fact  of 

V,  •^  Mut'whu";';;",;;;  iv  m\dc'"^^ 

tins  battle,  wnu  a  p.ouan.   i  .        .  earnest  propositions  for 

ginians  since  ^^^^;y^;.f  ^^^   •  f  :,[|T,.       Peace  was  accordindy  con- 
peace,  deserting  their  Sicilian  a   us     ^^|,      ^  ^^^j^j.,,,  dominion  in 

g^^Hf  m^ Te^atras  li  t^l^n  ^eu^  Sf  the  reign  of  the 


MAMEKKUS  CONDEMNED. 


829 


1 


'< 


elder  Dionysius,  as  well  as  at  the  landing  of  Dion  in  Sicily.  The  line 
of  separation  was  fixed  at  the  river  Halykus,  or  Lykus,  whicli  flows 
into  the  southern  sea  near  Herakleia  Miuoa,  and  formed  the  western 
1)()undary  of  the  territory  of  Agrii^entum.  All  westward  oi  llie  llaly- 
kiis  was  recognized  as  Carthaginian;  but  it  wasstipuhited  that  if  any 
Greeks  within  that  territory  dX\sired  to  emigrate  and  become  inmates 
of  Cn-racuse,  they  should  be  allowed  freely  to  come  with  their  famil- 
ies and  their  property.  It  was  further  covenanted  that  all  the  terri- 
tory eastward  of  the  Halykus  should  be  considered  I'.ot  only  as  Greek, 
but  as  free  Greek,  distributed  among  so  many  free  cities,  and  exempt 
from  despots.  And  the  Carthaginians  formally  covenanted  that  they 
would  neither  aid,  nor  adopt  as  ally,  any  Grecian  despot  in  Sicily. 
In  the  first  treaty  concluded  by  the  elder  Dionysius  with  the  Cartha- 
ginians, it  had  been  stipulated  by  an  exi)ress  article  that  the  Syra- 
cusans  should  be  subject  to  him.  Here  is  one  of  the  many  contrasts 
between  Dionj^sius  and  Timoleon. 

Having  thus  relieved  himself  from  his  most  formidable  enemy, 
Timoleon  put  a  speedy  end  to  the  war  in  other  parts  of  the  island. 
Mamerkus,  in  fact,  despaired  of  further  defense  without  foreign  aid. 
He  crossed  over  wilh  a  squadron  into  Italy  to  ask  for  the  introduc- 
tion of  a  Lucanian  army  into  Sicily;  which  he  might  perhtips  have 
obtained,  since  that  warlike  nation  were  now  very  powerful— had 
not  his  own  seamen  abandoned  him,  and  carried  back  their  vessels  to 
Katana,  surrenderirm-  both  the  city  and  themselves  to  Timoleon.  The 
same  thing,  and  even  more,  had  been  done  a  little  before  by  the 
troops  of  Hiketas  at  Leontini,  who  had  even  delivered  up  Hiketas 
himself  as  prisoner;  so  powerful,  seemingly,  was  the  ascendency 
exercised  l)y  the  name  of  Timoleon,  with  the  prestige  of  his  perpetual 
success.  ^lamerkus  could  now  find  no  refuge  except  at  Messene, 
where  he  was  welcomed  by  the  despot  Ilippon.  But  Timoleon 
speedily  came  thither  with  a  force  ample  enough  to  besiege  Messene 
by  land  and  by  sea.  After  a  certain  length  of  resistance,  the  town 
w"as  surrendered  to  him.  while  Hippon  tried  to  make  his  escape 
secretly  on  shipboard.  But  he  was  captured  and  brought  back  into 
the  midst  of  the  Messenian  populatioii,  who,  under  a  sentiment  of 
bitter  hatred  and  vengeance,  planted  him  in  the  midst  of  the  crowded 
theater  .and  there  put  him  to  death  with  insult,  summoning  all  the 
boys  from  school  into  the  theater  to  witness  what  was  considered  an 
elevating  scene.  Mamerkus,  without  attempting  escape,  surrendered 
himself  prisoner  to  Timoleon;  only  stipulating  that  his  fate  should 
be  determined  by  the  Syracusan  assembly  after  a  fair  hearing,  but 
that  Timoleon  himself  should  say  nothing  to  his  disfavor.  He  was 
accordingly  brought  to  Syracuse,  and  placed  on  his  trial  before  the 
assembled  people,  whom  he  addressed  in  an  elaborate  discourse; 
probably  skillfully  composed,  since  he  is  said  to  have  possessed  con- 
siderable talent  as  a  poet.  But  no  eloquence  could  surmount  the 
rooted  aversion  entertained  l?y  the  Syracusans  for  his  person  and 


380 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-336. 


GREAT  INFLUENCE  OF  TIMOLEON. 


331 


character.  Being  heard  with  murmurs,  and  seeing  that  he  had  no 
chance  of  obtaining  a  favorable  verdict,  he  suddenly  threw  aside  his 
garment,  and  rushed  with  violent  despair  against  one  of  the  stone 
leats.  head  foremost,  in  hopes  of  giving  himself  a  fata  blovv  liut 
not  succeeding  in  this  attempted  suicide,  he  was  led  out  of  the  thea- 
ter and  executed  like  a  robber.  .  ,    ^  ,  .  ^        .  ^  ^f^ 

Timoleon  had  now  nearly  accomplished  his  confirmed  purpose  of 
extiipatin-  everv  despotism  in  Sicily.  There  rcmamed  yet  ^ikode- 
mus  as  despot  at  Keutoripa,  and  Apolloniades  at  Agyrium.  Both  of 
these  he  speedily  dethroned  or  expelled,  restoring  the  two  cities  to 
the  condition  of  free  conmuuiities.  He  also  expelled  from  the  town 
of  yEtna  those  Campanian  mercenaries  who  had  been  planted  there 
by  the  elder  Dionysius.  In  this  way  did  he  proceed  until  there 
remained  only  free  communities,  without  a  single  despot,  in  tlie 
Grecian  portion  of  Sicily.  . 

Of  the  details  of  his  proceedings  our  scanty-  information  permits  us 
to  say  but  little.  But  the  great  pm  pose  with  which  he  had  started  from 
Corinth  was  now  achieved.     After  having  put  down  all  the  other 
despotisms  in  Sicilv,  there  remained  for  him  but  one  further  triumph-- 
the  noblest  and  rare.st  of  all— to  lay  down  his  own.     This  he  per- 
formed without  any  delay.  iu;meiliately  on  returning  to  Syracuse 
from  his  military  proceedings.     Congratulating  the  SyracAisans  on 
the  triumphant  consummation  already  attained,  he  entreated  them  to 
dispense  with  his  further  services  as  sole  c(  nimander;  the  rather  as 
his  evesi^^ht  was  now  failing.    It  is  probable  enough  that  his  demand 
wa<i  iit  first  refused,  and  that  he  was  wainily  requested  to  retain  his 
functions:  but  if  such  was  the  fact,  he  did  not  the  less  persist,  and 
the  people,  willing  or  not,  accakd.     We  ouglit  further  to  note,  that 
not  onlv  (lid  he  resign  his  geiM'ialship,  but  he  resigned  it  at  once  and 
immediately,  after  the  con.plcte  execution  of  his  proclaimed  purpose, 
t.)  emancipate  the   Sicilian  Greeks  fn-m  foreign  enemies  as  well  as 
from  despot-enemies;  just  as,  on  first  acquiring  possession  of  Syra- 
cuse, he  had  becun  his  authoritative  career,   without  a  moments 
delay   by  ordering  the  demolition  of  the  Dionysian  stronghold,  and 
the  construction  of  a  court  of  justice  in  its  place.     By  this  instan- 
taneous proceeding  he  foresl:illed  the  growth  of  that  suspicion  which 
delay  would  assuredly  have  raised,   and  for  which  the  free  com- 
muilities  of  Greece  had  in  general  such  ample  reason.     And  it  is  not 
the  least  of  his  manv  merits,  that  while  conscious  of  good  inten- 
tions him^^elf,  he  hacf  also  the  good  sense  to  see  that  others  could  not 
look  into  his  bosom;  that  all  iheir  presumptions,  except  what  were 
created  by  his  own  conduct,  would  be  derived  from  men  worse  than 
he— and  'therefore  unfavorable.     Hence  it  was  necessary  for  hmi  to 
be  prompt  and   forward,  even   to  a  sort  of  ostentation,  in  exhihilmg 
the  .".mplest  positive  proof  of  his  real  purposes,  so  as  to  stihe  betore- 
haiul  tiie  iirowlh  of  susj»icion.  ^ 

He  was' now  a  private  citizen  of  Syracuse,  having  neither  paid 


J 


soldiers  under  his  command  nor  any  other  puUic  function.  As  a 
reward  for  his  splendid  services,  the  Syracus.uis  voted  to  him  a  house 
ill  tiie  city,  a;id  a  landed  property  among  the  best  in  the  neighbor- 
hood, iiere  he  lixed  his  residence,  sending  for  his  wife  and  family 
to  Corinih. 

Yet  though  Timoleon  had  renounced  every  species  of  official 
authority,  and  all  means  of  constraint,  his  influence  as  an  adviser 
over  the"  judgment,  feelings,  and  actions,  not  only  of  Syracusans,  but 
of  Sicilians  generally,  was  as  great  as  ever;  perhaps  greater— because 
the  fact  of  his  spontaneous  resignation  gave  him  one  title  more  to 
conlidence.  Rarely  is  it  allowed  to  mortal  man,  to  establish  so  tran- 
scendent a  claim  to  confidence  and  esteem  as  Timoleon  now  ]>re- 
sented;  upon  so  many  different  grounds,  and  with  so  little  of  aHoy 
or  abatement.  To  possess  a  counselor  whom  every  one  reverenced, 
without  suspicious  or  fears  of  any  kind— who  had  not  only  given 
conspicuous  proofs  of  uncommon  energy  combined  with  skillful 
management,  but  enjoyeei  besides,  in  a  peculiar  degree,  the  favor  of 
the  gods— was  a  benefit  unspeakably  precious  to  the  Sicilians  at  this 
juncture.  For  it  was  now^  the  lime  when  not  merely  Syracuse,  but 
other  cities  of  Sicily  also,  were  aiming  to  strengthen  their  reconsti- 
tuted free  communities  by  a  fresh  supply  of  citizens  from  abroad. 
During  the  sixty  years  which  had  elapsed  since  the  first  formidable 
invasion  wherein  *the  Carthaginian  Hannibal  had  conquered  S<^'linus, 
there  had  been  a  series  of  causes  all  tending  to  cripple  and  diminish, 
and  none  to  renovate,  the  Grecian  population  of  Sicily.  The  Carth;i- 
ginian  attacks,  the  successful  despotism  of  the  first  Dionysius,  and 
the  disturbed  reiun  of  the  second — all  contributed  to  the  same  result. 
About  the  year  352-351  B.C.,  Plato  (as  has  been  already  mentioned) 
expresses  his  fear  of  an  extinction  of  Hellenism  in  Sicily,  giving 
place  before  Phenician  or  Campanian  force.  And  what  was  a  sad 
possibility,  even  in  352-351  B.C. — had  become  nearer  to  a  probability 
in  344  B.C.,  before  Timoleon  landed,  in  the  then  miserable  condition 
of  the  i.sland. 

His  unparalleled  success  and  matchless  personal  behavior,  combined 
with  the  active  countenance  of  Corintli  without — had  completely 
turned  the  tide.  In  the  belief  of  all  Greeks,  Sicily  was  now  aland 
restored  to  Hellenism  and  freedom,  but  requiring  new  colonists  as 
well  to  partake,  as  to  guard,  these  capital  privileges.  The  example 
of  colonization,  under  the  auspices  of  Corinth,  had  been  set  at  Syra- 
cuse, and  was  speedily  followed  elsewhere,  especially  at  Agrigentum, 
Gela,  and  Kamarina.  All  these  three  cities  had  sufiered  cruelly  dur- 
ing those  formidable  Carthaginian  invasions  which  immediately  pre- 
ceded the  despotism  of  Dionysius  at  Syracuse.  They  had  had  no 
opportunity,  during  the  continuance  of  the  Dion^^sian  dynasty,  even 
to  make  up  what  they  had  then  lost  ;  far  less  to  acquire  accessions 
from  without.  At  the  same  time  all  three  (especially  Agiigentun?) 
recollected  their  former  scale  of  opulence  and  power,  as  it  had  stood 


382 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  353-336. 


prior  to  407  b  c      It  was  with  eagerness  therefore  that  they  availed 
lh.ni^«lves  ot   the  new  life  and  Fecurily  imparted  to  Sicily  by  the 
c-iretTof  Tim.'ieon.  to  replenish  liieir  exhausted  numbers  ;  by  reeallmg 
tiio^e  Nvhoni  former  siiUcriui,'  had  driven  away,  and  by  inviting  fresh 
colonists  besides.     Megellus  ;'.nd  Plieristus.  citizens  of  hlea  on  the 
southern  eoast  of  Italy  ( wliieh  was  probably  at  this  time  distressed  by 
the  pressure  of  Lueanians  from  the  interior),  conducted  a  colony  to 
A-Ti'-M-utum:  Gorsjcus,  from  Keos,  went  with  another  band  to  Gela: 
hrboliii  cases,  a  proportion  of  expatriated   citizens  returned  among 
them      Kamnnna.  too.  and  Aiiviium  received  large  accessions  of  m- 
liabitan*^      The  inhabitanls  of  Lcontini   are  said  to  have  removed 
their  habitations  to  t^vracuse  ;  a  statement  difficult  to  understand, 
ami  probably  only  partially  true,  as  the  city  and  its  name  still  con- 
tinued to  exist.  /.It, 
Unfortunately  the  proceedimis  of  Timoleon  come  before  us  (tln-ough 
Biodorus  and  Plutarch)  in  a  manner  so  vague'and  eonfuKMl  that  we 
can  rarely  trace  the  sequence  or  assign  tlit*  date  of  particular  facts. 
But  about  the  general  circumstances,  ^^ith  their  character  and  bear-. 
m<r  there  is  no  room  either  for  mists^ke  or  doubt.     That  which  rhe- 
tors and  sophists  like  Lvsi:!S  had  preached  in  their  pancgvrieal  ha- 
rangues—that  for  which  Plato  sighed,  in  the  ei^istles  of  his  old  age-- 
conTmendirfg  it,  after  Dion's  death,  to  the   surviving   partisans  of 
Dion  as  having  been  the  unexecuted   purj-ose  of  their  departed 
leader— the  renewal  of  freccom.and  Ilelleiiisni  throughout  the  island 
—was  now  made- a  reality  under  the  ausinces  of  ^imioleon.     llie 
liouses,  the  temples,  the  walls,  were  rescued  from  decay;  the  lands  . 
from  comparitive  barrenness.     For  it  was  not  merely  his  personal 
reputation   and  achievements  which   constituted   the  main  allure- 
ment to  new  colonists,  but  also  his  superintending  advice  w  uch 
regulated   their  destination  when  they  arrived.     Without  the  least 
•poM-er  of  constraint,  or  even  official  dignity,  he  was  consulted  as  ;i 
sort- of  general  (Ekist  or  Patron-Founder,  by  the  affectionate  regard 
of  the  settlers  in  every  part  of  Sicily.     The  distribution  or  sale  of 
lands,  the  modification  required  in  existing  laws  and  customs,  the 
new  political  constitutions,   etc.,  were  all  submitted  to  his  review. 
Ko  stntlement  gave  satisfaction, except  such  as  he  had  i^ronounced  or 
approved  :  none  which  he  had  approved,  was  contested. 

•In  the  situation  in  which  Sicily  was  now  placed„it  is  clear  that 
numberless  matters  of  doubt  and  difficulty  would  inevitably  arise  ; 
that  the  claims  and  interests  of  pre-existing  residents,  returning  exiles 
and  new^  immiirrants.  would  often  be  conflicting  ;  that  the  rites  and 
customs  of  different  fractions  composing  the  new  whole,  might  have 
to  be  modified  for  the  sake  of  mutual  harmony  ;  .that  the  settlers, 
cominir  from  oligarchies  as  well  as  democracies,  might  bring  with 
them  different  ideas  as  to  the  proper  features  of  a  political  constitu- 
tion :  tlmt  the  apportionment  or  sale  of  lands,  and  the  adjustment  of 
all  debts,  pi-esented  but  too  many  chances  of   angry  dispute;  that 


RENOVATION  OF  SICILY. 


333 


i 


therf'  were,  in  fact,  a  thousand  novelties  in  the  situation,  which  could 
not  1)6  determined  either  by  precedent,  or  by  any  peremptory  rule, 
but  must  be  left  to  the  equity  of  a  supreme  arbitriitor.     Here  then 
the  advantages  were  unspeakable  of  having  a  .man  like  Timoleon  to 
appeal  to  ;  a  man  not  only  really  without  sinister  bias,  but  recog- 
nized by  every  one  as  being  so;  a  man  whom  everyone  loved,  trusted, 
and  was  grieved  to  offend;  a  man  who  sought  not  to  impose  his 
own  will  upon  free  communities,  but  addressed  them  as  freemen, 
buildin*^  only  upon  their  reason  and  sentiments,  and  carrying  out 
in  all  his  recommendations  of  detail  those  instincts  of  free  speech, 
universal  vote,  and  equal  laws,  which  formed  the  germ  of  political 
obligation  in  the  minds  .of  Greeks  generally.    It  would  have  been 
grktifyino-to  know  how  Timoleon  settled  the  many  new  and  difiicult 
questious^which  must  have  been  submitted  to  him  as  referee.    Then^ 
is  no  situation  in  human  society  so  valuable  to  study,  as  that  in  winch 
routine  is  of  necessity  broken  through,  and  the  constructive  faculties 
called  into  active  exertion.     Nor  was  there  ever  i3erhaps  through- 
out  Grecian  history,  a  simultaneous  colonization,  and  simultaneous 
recasting  of  poUticar institutions,  more  extensive  than  that  which 
now  took  place  in  Sicily.      Unfortunately  we  are  permitted  to  know^ 
only  the  "-eneral  fact,  without  either  the  eharm  or  the  instruction 
wdiich  wemld  have  been  presented  by  the  details.     Timoleon  was.  in 
Sicily   that  which  Epaniinondas  had  been  at  the  foundation  of  Mes- 
sene  and  Megalopolis,  though  with  far  greater  power:  and  we  have 
to  deplore  the  like  ignorance  respecting  the  detail  proceedings  of  bota 

these  great  men.  .  ... 

But  though  the  sphere  of  Timoleon's  activity  was  coextensive  with 
Sicily  his  residence,  his  citizenship,  and  his  peculiar  interests  and 
duties  were  at  Syracuse.  That  city,  like  most  of  the  other  Sicilian 
tow^ns,  had  been  born  anew,  with  a  numerous  body  of  settlers  and 
altered  political  institutions',  t  have  already  mentioned  that  Kephalus 
and  others,  invited  from  Corinth  by  express  vote  of  the  Syracusans, 
had  re-established  the  democratical  constitution  of  Diokles.  with 
suitable  modifications.  The  new  era  of  liberty  was  marked  by  the 
establishment  of  a  new  sacred  office,  that  of  Amphipolus  or  Attend- 
ant Priest  of  Zeus  Olympius;  an  office  changed  annually,  appointed 
bv  lot  (doubtless  under  some  conditions  of  qualification  which  are 
not  made  known  to  us),  and  intended,  like  the  Archon  Eponymus  at 
Athens,  as  the  recognized  name  to  distinguish  each  Syracusau-year. 
In  this  work  of  constitutional  reform,  as  well  as  in  all  the  labors  and 
adiustments.connected  with  the  new  settlers,  Timoleon  took  a  prom- 
inent part  But  so  soon  as  the  new  constitution  was  consummated 
and  set  at  work,  he  declined  undertaking  any  specific  duties  or  exer- 
cisinn-  any  powers  under  it.  Enjoying  the  highest  measure  of  public 
esteem,  and  loaded  with  honorary  and  grateful  votes  from  the  peo- 
ple he  had  the  wisdom  as  well  as  the  virtue  to  prefer  living  as  a  pri- 
vate citizen;  a  resolution  doubtless  promoted  by  his  increasing  failure 


334 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  853-330. 


of  eyesiffht,  which  presently  became  total  blindness.     He  dy]  m 
the  house  assigned  to  him  by  public  vote  of  the  people,  which  he  h  .d 
consecrated  to  the  Holv  God,  and  within  which  he  had  set  apart  u 
Chanel  to  the  goddess  Automatia-tiie  goddess  under  wliose  auspices 
blessinn^  and  dory  came  as  it  were  of  tiiemselves.     To  this  goddess 
he  offered  sacrifice,  as  the  great  and  constant  patroness  who  had 
accompanied  him  from  Corinth  all  through  his  proceedings  in  bicily. 
Bvrefusingthe  otHcial  prominence  tendered  to  hini,  and  by  keeping 
awav  from  the  details  of  public  life,  Timoleon  escaped  the  jealousy 
sure  to  attend  upon  influence  so  prodigious  as  his.     But  in  triilh.  lor 
all  great  and  imuortant  matters,  tliis  very  modesty  increased  inste:i(l 
of  diminishing  his  real  ascendency.     Here  as  elsewhere,  the  goddess 
Automatia  worked  for  him,   and  brought  to  him  docde  listeners 
without  his  own  seeking.     Though  the  Syracusans  transacted  their 
ordinary  business  through  others,  yet  when  any  matter  of  serior?> 
difficulty  occurred,  the  presence  of  Timoleon  was  specially  invokrcl 
in  the  discussion.     During  the  later  months  of  hi?  life,  when  he  had 
become  blind,  his  arrival   in   the  assembly   was  a  solemn  scene. 
Havino-  been  broudit  in  his  car  drawn  by  mules  across  the  market- 
Dliceto  the  door  of  the  theater  wherein  the  assembly  was  held,  at- 
tendants then  led  or  drew  the  car  into  the  theater  amid  the  assem- 
bled'people,  who  testified  their  affection  by  the  warmest  shouts  and 
congratulations.     As  soon  as  he  had  returned  their  welcome,  and 
silence  was  restored,  the  discussion  to  which  he  had  been  invited 
took  place,  Timoleon  sitting  on  his  car  and  listening.     Having  heard 
the  nVatter  thus  debated,  he  delivered  his  own  opinion,  which  was 
usually  ratified  at  once  by  the  show  of  hands  of  the  assi-mbly.    He 
then  took  leave  of  the  people  and  retired,  the  attendants  again  lead- 
ng  the  car  out  of  the  theater,  and  the  same  cheers  of  attachment 
accompanving  his  departure;  while  the  assembly  proceeded  with  its 
other  and  more  ordinary  business.  ^        .  ..         •         /^^„i.i 

Such  is  the  impressive  and  picturesque  description  given  (doubi- 
'  less  by  Athanis  or  some  other  eye-witness)  of  the  relations  betwx-en 
the  Svracusan  people  and  the  blind  Timoleon.  after  his  power  had 
been  abdicated,  and  when  there  remained  to  him  nothmg  except  his 
character  and  moral  ascendency.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  solemni- 
ties of  interposition,  here  recounted,  must  have  been  reserved  tor 
those  oases  in  which  the  assembly  had  been  disturbed  by  some  un- 
usual violence  or  collisioil  of  parties.  For  such  critical  junctiiivs, 
where  numbers  were  perhaps  nearly  balanced,  and  where  tl»e  disap- 
pointment of  an  angry  minority  threatened  to  beget  some  permanent 
feud  the  benefit  was 'inestimable,  of  an  umpire  whom  both  parlies 
revered  and  before  whom  neither  thought  it  a  dishonor  to  yield 
Keeping  aloof  from  the  details  and  embarrassments  of  daily  political 
life  and  preserving  himself  Qxke  the  Salaminian  trireme,  to  use  a 
phrase  which  Plutareh  applies  to  Perikles,  at  Athens)  for  occasions 
at  once  momentouii  and  difficult,  Timoleon  filled  up  a  gap  occasionally 


Vi 


rNCORKUPTED  MODERATION  OF  TIMOLEON.    835 

dan^-erous  to  all  free  societies,  but  which  even  at  Athens  had  always 
remained  a  gap,  because  there  was  no  Athenian  at  once  actually 
worthy,  and  known  to  be  worthy,  to  fill  it.  We  may  even  wonder 
how  he  continued  worthy,  when  the  intense  popular  sentiment  m  his 
favor  tended  so  strongly' to  turn  his  head,  and  when  no  contradiction 
or  censure  against  him  was  tolerated.  -,  ,      ,       , 

Two  persons,  Laphystius  and  Deraaenetus,  called  by  the  obnoxious 
names  of  sycophants  and  demagogues,  were  bold  enough  to  try  the 
experiment.  Tiie  former  required  him  to  give  bail  m  a  lawsuit;  the 
hitter  in  a  public  disv-ourse,  censured  various  parts  of  his  military 
campaio-ns.  The  public  indignation  against  both  these  men  was 
veheinetit;  yet  there  can  belittle  doubt  that  Laphystius  applied  to 
Timoleon  a  legal  process  applicable  universally  to  every  citizen: 
what  may  have  been  the  pertinence  of  the  censures  of  Demaenetus, 
we  are  unable  to  say.  However,  Timoleon  availed  himself  of  the 
well-meant  impatience  of  the  people  to  protect  him  either  from  legal 
process  or  from  censure,  only  to  administer  to  them  a  serious  and 
valuable  lesson.  Protesting  against  all  interruption  to  the  legal  pro- 
cess  of  Laphystius,  he  proclaimed  emphatically  that  this  was  the 
precise  purpose  for  which  he  had  so  long  labored,  and  combated— 
in  order  that  every  Syracusan  citizen  might  be  enabled  to  appeal  to 
the  laws  and  exercise  freely  his  legal  rights.  And  while  he  thought 
it  unnecessary  to  rebut  in  detail  the  objections  taken  against  his  pre- 
vious generalship,  he  publicly  declared  his  gratitude  to  the  goas,  for 
having  granted  his  piayer  that  he  might  witness  all  Syracusans  m 
possession  of  full  liberty  of  speech.  ,^.      ,  ^      f  ^ 

We  obtain  little  from  the  biographers  of  Timoleon,  except  a  few 
incidents,  striking,  impressive,  and  somewhat  theatrical,  like  those 
iust  recounted.     But  wiiat  is  really  important  is,  the  tone  and  tem- 
per which  these  incidents  reveal,  both  in  Timoleon  and  in  the  byra- 
cusan  people.     To  see  him  unperverted  by  a  career  of  superhuman 
success,  retaining  the  same  hearty  convictions  with  which  he  had 
started  from  Corinth;   renouncing  power,   the  most  ardent  ot  all 
aspirations  with  a  Greek  politician,  and  descending  to  a  private  sta- 
tion    in  spite  of  every  external  inducement  to  the  contrary;  resist- 
ing 'the  temptation  to  impose  his  own  will  upon  the  people,  and 
respecting-  their  free  speech  and  public  vote  in  a  manner  which  made 
it  impera'tively  necessary  for  everyone  else  to  follow  his  example; 
foreo-oing  command,  and  contenting  himself  with  advice  when  his 
opinion  was  asked— all  this  presents  a  model  of  genuine  and  intelli- 
e-eut  public  spirit,  such  as  is  associated  with  few  other  names  except 
that  of  Timoleon.     That  the  Syracusan  people  should  have  yielded 
to  such  conduct  an  obedience  not  merely  voluntary,  but  heartfelt  and 
almost  reverential,  is  no  matter  of  wonder.     And  we  may  be  quite 
sure  that  the  opinion  of  Timoleon,  tranquilly  and  unostentatiously 
consulted  was  the  guiding  star  which  they  followed  on  most  points 
of  moment  or  difficulty;  over  and  above  those  of  exceptional  ca»o» 


336 


SICILIAN  AFFAIRS  B.C.  303-336. 


of  ajTsravated  dissent  where  lie  was  called  in  with  sucli  iniposino^ 
ceremony  as  an  umpire.  On  the  value  of  such  an  oracle  close  at 
hand  it  is  needless  to  insist;  especially  in  a  city  which  for  the  last 
half  century  had  known  nothinc:  but  the  dominion  of  force,  and 
amid  a  new'miscellaneous  aggregate  composed  of  Greek  settlers  from 
manv  dilferent  quarters. 

Timoleon  now  enjoyed,  as  he  had  amply  earned,  what  Xenophon 
calls  *'that  good,  not  human,  but  divine— command  over  willing 
men— given  'manifestly  to  persons  of  genuine  and  highly  trained 
temperance  of  character."  In  him  the  condition  indicated  by  Xeno- 
phon was  found  completely  realized— temperance  in  the  largest  and 
most  comprehensive  sense  of  the  word— not  simply  sobriety  and 
continence  (which  had  belonged  to  the  elder  Dionysuis  also),  but  an 
absence  of  that  fatal  thirst  for. coercive  power  at  all  price,  which  in 
Greece  was  the  fruitful  parent  of  the  greater  crimes  and  enormities. 

Timoleon  lived  to  see  his  great  work  of  Sicilian  enfranchisement 
consummated,  to  carry  it  through  all  its  incipient  difficulties,  and  to 
see  it  prosperously  moving  on.  ^  Not  Syracuse  alone,  but  the  other 
Grecian  cities  in  the  ishand  also,  enjoyed  under  their  revived  free 
institutions  a  state  of  securitv,  comfort,  and  affluence,  to  which  they 
had  been  lomr  strangers,  ^he  lands  became  again  industriously 
tilled;  the  fertile  soif  yielded  anew  abundant  exports;  the  temples 
were  restored  from  their  previous  decay,  and  adorned  with  the  votive 
offerings  of  pious  munificence.  The  same  state  of  prosperous  and 
active  freedom,  which  had  followed  on  the  expulsion  of  the  Gelon- 
ian  dynasty  a  hundred  and  twenty  years  before,  and  lasted  about 
fifty  years,  without  either  despots  within  or  invaders  from  without— 
was  now  again  made  prevalent  throuixhout  Sicily  under  the  auspices 
of  .Timoleon.  It  did  not  indeed  last  so  long.  It  was  broken  up  in 
the  year  31C  B.C.,  twentv-four  years  after  the  battle  of  the  Krimesus, 
by  the  despot  Agathokles,  whose  father  was  among  the  immigrants 
to  Syracuse  under  the  settlement  of  Timoleon.  But  the  interval  of 
security  and  freedom  with  which  Sicily  was  blessed  between  these 
two  epochs,  she  owed  to  the  generous  patriotism  and  intelligent 
counsel  of  Timoleon.  There  are  few  other  names  among  the  Grecian 
annals,  with  which  we  can  connect  so  large  an  amount  of  predeter- 
mined and  beneficent  result. 

Endeared  to  the  Symcusans  as  a  common  father  and  benefactor, 
and  exhibited  as  their  hero  to  all  visitors  from  Greece,  he  passed  the 
remainder  of  his  life  amid  the  fullness  of  affectionate  honor.  Un- 
fortunately for  the  Syracusans,  that  remainder  was  but  too  short; 
for  he  die^  of  an  illness  apparently  slight,  in  the  year  337-336  B.C.— 
three  or  four  years  after  the  battle  of  the  Krimesus.  Profound  and 
unfeicrned  was  the  sorrow  which  his  death  excited,  universally 
throughout  Sicily.  Not  merely  the  Syracusans,  but  crowds  from  all 
other^parts  of  the  island,  attended  to  do  honor  to  his  funeral,  which 
was  splendidly  celebrated  at  the  public  cost.     Some  of  the  <?h«s^Q 


DEATH  AND  OBSEQUIES  OF  TIMOLEON.        3S7 


youths  of  the  city  carried  the  bier  whereon  his  body  was  deposited: 
a  countless  procession  of  men  and  women  followed  in  their  festival 
attire,  crowned  with  wreaths  and  mingling  with  their  tears  admira- 
tion and  envy  for  their  departed  liberator.  The  procession  was  made 
to  pass  over  that  ground  which  presented  the  most  honorable  me- 
mento of  Timoleon;  where  the  demolished  Dionysian  stronghold 
had  once  reared  its  head,  and  where  the  court  of  justice  was"  now 
placed,  at  the  entrance  of  Ortygia.  At  length.it  reached  the  Nekrop- 
olis,  between  Ortygia  and  Achradina,  where  a  massive  funeral  pile 
had  been  prepared.  As  soon  as  the  bier  had  been  placed  on  this  pile, 
and  fire  was  about  to  be  applied,  the  herald  Demetrius,  distinguished 
for  the  powers  of  his  voice,  proclaimed  with  loud  announcement  as 

follows: 

"  The  Syracusan  people  solemnize,  at  the  cost  of  200  mines,  the 
funeral  of  this  man,  the  Corinthian  Timoleon  son  of  Timodemus. 
They  have  passed  a  vote  to  honor  him  for  all  future  time  with  festi- 
val matches  in  music,  horse  and  chariot  race,  and  gymnastics— 
because,  after  having  put  down  the  despots,  subdued  the  foreign 
enemy,  and  recolonized  the  greatest  among  the  ruined  cities,  he 
restored  to  the  Sicilian  Greeks  their  constitution  and  laws." 

A  sepulchral  monument,  seemingly  with  this  inscription  recorded 
on  it,  was  erected  to  the  memory  of  timoleon  in  the  agora  of  Syra- 
cuse. To  this  monument  other  buildings  were  presently  annexed; 
porticoes  for  the  assembling  of  persons  in  business-  or  conversation— 
and  palajstne,  for  the  exercises  of  youths.  The  aggregate  of  buildings 
all  taken  together  was  called  the  tiraolcontion. 

When  we  reflect  that  the  fatal  battle  of  Chaeroneia  had  taken  place 
the  year  before  Timoleon's  decease,  and  that  his  native  city  Corinth  as 
well  as  all  her  neighbors  were  sinking  deeper  and  deeper  into  the 
dei^radation  of  subject-towns  of  Macedonia,  we  shall  not  regret,  for 
•his" sake,  that  a  tinielv  death  relieved  him  from  so  mournful  a  spec- 
tacle. It  was  owing' to  him  that  the  Sicilian  Greeks  were  rescued, 
for  nearly  one  generation,  from  the  like  fate.  He  had  the  rare  glory 
of  maintaining  to  the  end.  and  executing  to  the  full,  the  promise  of 
liberation  with  which  he  had  gone  forth  from  Corinth.  His  early 
years  had  been  years  of  acute  sufifeii:ig— and  that,  too,  incurred  in 
the  cause  of  freedom— arising  out  of  the  death  of  his  brother;  his 
later  period,  mtmifesting  the  like  sense  of  duty  under  happier  aus- 
pices, had  richly  repaid  him,  by  successes  overpassing  all  reasonable 
expectation,  and  by  the  ample  fiow  of  gratitude  and  attachment 
poured  forth  to  him  amid  the  liberated  Sicilians.  His  character 
aopeai-s  most  noble,  and  most  instructive,  if  we  contrast  him  with  Dion. 
T'imoleon  had  been  brought  up  as  the  citizen  of  a  free,  though  oligtir- 
chical  community  in  Greece,  surrounded  by  other  free  communities, 
and  amid  universal  hatred  of  despots.  The  politicians  whom  he  had 
learnt  to  esteem  were  men  trained  in  this  school,  maintaining  a  quali- 
fied as9enden(?y  against  more  or  less  of  open  competition  f roni  rivals, 


338 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


'"'V  °.l,.?m  .  e     an.l Trvinir  iceaes  to  the  end  of  l.i.s  career. 
''"no:  ."eauoaUou  of  DioMu.  I  ba..  recouu.e^  i^  fe  precedn,g 

WntTtukeaccS      Plunged  in  this  corrupting  atmosphere,  he 

fad  neverthelcsrimbibc.!  generous  and  publicspiri.ec   ^^^ 

^  hui  come  to  hold  iu  abhorrence  a  government  of  will,  and  to  look 

or  glor^ircontHbuting  to  replace  it  by  a  qual  fled  fje^^^m  and  a 

lor  giuij  lu  V  ^  source  from  which  he  druuk  wub,  tue 

Sion-o^mrast  strikingly  with  the  enviable  end  of  Tmioleon.  and  with 
the  grateful  inscripliSn  of  the  Syracusaus  on  his  tomb. 


CHAPTER  LXXXVI. 

CENTRAI.  GREECE:  THE  ACCESSION  OF  rnj"]^  0V'^«"°^  ''°  ^™ 
BIRTH   OF   ALEX4NDE11,    SOV-OOO   B.C. 

AlY  H.t  Drecedin-  chapters  have  followed  the  history  of  the  Sicil- 

-;?.».  ,lS."S':;il  Er-S  £X  'iri!^.-;,'  ,.> 


DEGIIADATIOX   07  SPARTA. 


339 


Hellenic  freedom;  a  result  standing  in  melancholy  contrast  with  the 
achievements  of  the  contemporary  liberator  Timoleon  in  Sicily.     ,  ^ 

No  such  struggles  could  have  appeand  within  the  limits  of  possi- 
l)nitv,  even  to  tlie  most  far-siihted  politician  either  of  Greece  or  (.f 
Macedon— at  tiie  time  when  Philip  mounted  tlie  throne.  Among  the 
hopes  and  fears  of  most  Grecian  cities,  Macedonia  then  passed 
wholly  unnoticed;  in  Athens,  Olynthus,  Thasus,  Thessaly,  and  a  few 
otliers,  it  formed  an  item  not  without  moment,  yet  by  no  means  of 
first-rate  magnitude. 

The  Hellenic  world  was  now  in  a  state  different  from  anything 
which  had  been  seen  since  the  repulse  of  Xerxes  in  480-479  B.C. 
The  defeat  and  degradation  of  Sparta  had  set  free  the  inland  states 
from  the  only  presiding  city  wdiom  they  had  ever  -learned  to  look  up 
to.  Her  imperial  ascendency,  long  possessed  and  grievously  abused, 
had  been  put  down  by  the  successes  of  Epaminondas  and  the  The- 
bans.  She  was  no  longer  the  head  of  .a  numerous  body  of  subordi- 
nate allies,  sending  deputies  to  her  periodical  synods — submitting 
their  external  politics  to  her  intiuence— placing  their  military  contin- 
gents under  command  of  her  officers  (xenagl) — and  even  administering 
their  iuternaigoveniment  through  oligarchies  devoted  to  her  purposes, 
with  the  re-enforcement,  wherever  needed,  of  a  Spartan  harmost  and 
garrison.  She  no  longer  found  on  her  northern  frontier  a  number  of 
detached  Arcadian  villages,  each  separately  manageable  under 
leaders  devoted  to  her,  and  furnishing  her  with  htirdy  soldiers;  nor 
had  she  the  friendly  city  of  Tegea,  tied  to  her  by  a  long-standing 
philo-Laconian  oligarchy  and  tradition.  Under  the  strong  revolution 
of  feeling  which  followed  on  the  defeat  of  thciBpartans  at  Leuktra, 
the  small  Arcadian  communities,  encouraged  and  guided  by  Epami- 
nondas, had  consolidated  themselves  into  the  great  fortified  city  of 
Megalopolis,  now  the  center  of  a  Pan-Arcadian  confederacy,  with  a 
synod  (called  the  Ten  Thousand)  frequently  assembled  there  to  de- 
cide upon  matters  of  interest  and  policy  common  to  the  various  sec- 
tions of  the  Arcadian  name.  Tegea  too  had  undergone  a  political 
revolution;  so  that  these  two  cities,  conterminous  with  each  other 
and  forming  together  the  northern  frontier  of  Sparta,  converted  her 
Arcadian  neighbors  from  valuable  instruments  intb  formidable  ene- 


mies. 


But  this  loss  of  foreign  auxiliary  force  and  dignity  was  not  the 
worst  which  Sparta  had  suffered.  On  her  north-western  frontier 
(conterminous  also  with  Megalopolis)  stood  the  newly-constituted  city 
of  Messene,  representing  an  amputation  of  nearly  one-half  of  Spartan 
territory  and  substance.  The  western  and  more  fertile  half  of  La- 
conia  had  been  severed  from  Sparta,  and  w\as  divided  between  Mes- 
sene and  various  other  independent  cities;  being  tilled  chiefly  by 
those  who  had  once  been  Perioeki  and  Helots  of  Sparta. 

In  the  phase  of  Grecian  historj^  on  which  we  are  now  about  to 
enter — wdien  the  collective  Hellenic  world,  for  the  first  time  since  the 


g^Q  PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 

invasion  ot  Xerxes   -s  about  ,o  he  t^™- >'P-  ;;;?J^;f;iTf  ^^Irfa 
a  foi-oisiu  enemy  from  Jlacedonia-this  a  tcrea  pi.  i  p,.,,',™,,,. 

t*  a  rircumstauce  of  CTuve  ""l-^J'", '   ..^mtn    ■  .cf    1  mf  Mc^al- 
iic-'ians  dkuu  tod.  and  deprived  of  "'<=''^  ^"'""„.,,/'fc '.,,,„  a.'aiust 

,l',c.m-a,ul  Uc-r  greutsuperiont.  of  force  eve^^^^^  .  ,,^.,.  ,,„„,k 

111  all  that  tliey  could  muster— lived. n  perptiu.u  .  rvcre  well-  ' 

Tl^^h-  neigUbirs  the  Argeiaus,  f''";'>;"|™7;riol.d  ic  n.  for  Their 
disposed  to  protect  them;  but  sud.  "'^  ,yff,^,.'°'" 'i ,.„,,,,,inn-lv  we 
lie/ense,   without    extra-Pelopx-unesian    al    u;  e       A^''-  »;;v'y,.  „f 

shall  find  them  ''•'"'""f  'r"  '^'^  „^"V»l°  tin.  telv  even  welconiing 
Athens,  whichever  could  ^'  ''«'*•  ''™'^era'iin-t  the  inexpiable 

to  insure,  to  both,  'Ke  >«^<'Vt;ry  ot  losldomm^^ 

tions  more  will  be  said  '';'>''^'"'4\P[f  "J^^bS  wil#l.er  perpetu- 
eral  fact  that  the  d,.gradation  of  ,^P5";„<^^,'^d"r" '<''''•  '"^^reaiized 
ally  menaced  aggression  "g^'f  ^^^^^'^  ""„'}  Pa,  -He  lenic  defense 
Peloponnesus,  and  destroyed  "^  P";;,^\\.  °  .:,{^^" 
against  tlie  new  foreign  enemy  now  ^'o"'}  _;"';.  'S:„  f^^  completely 
"The  once  powerful  P^1"P<'""X  "  ^^a'zen  a.'d  Epidaurus'^  valu- 
broken  up.  Corinth,  CMkyon,  PI  "«.  1  "^  »-.^'  "l^.^,.^  '„„«  detached 
able  as  secondary  st^es  and  as  a  les  of  Spa.ta   «c  t  ^^^^^  ^^^ 

from  all  political  cd^"  il»''''"^,"'"''''^«"".,\  ,,,a  Tliebes.  It  would 
itself,  of  all  share  in  co  lis.oii  '''^'^^'f,';"  ^f ''^Vl'lUed  and  disturbed 
appear  also  that  Corinth  had  recemlylKen^o^^^^^^^^  ^^  ,,,3^ 

by  tlie  temporary  despotism  of  Jm  opl_^^tts  a^'-  J^  ^^^ 

chapter;  though  the  dale  of  "■'it  event  ^JJ"^'^'  f  i^;:ii„,  „•„„  resided, 
Rut  the  "rand  and  preponderating  loicesoi  "••'..      p„i„„„,,. 

lof  tie  first  time  in  -J; ''f«o>-y-  -jlf-  C°c1ti":\^lr  i  'fuu"^^^^^ 
nesus;  at  Athens  and  Thebes^  „^?,  Jn  Bflee  *  A"""^'""^'  """" 
and  efficiency.  Athens  had  a  "'Ml^J"'''  "?;•,,,„,.  allies,  sending 
merce,  a  coBsiderable  bodv  of  niantime  "^ncl  'n^ida.  «"'  ■  j  .  „^'^ 
.   deputies  to  her  symKl  and  contributing  to  ^^^^^^J"  ^  „,,,,i. 

maintenance  of  the  joint  security,     bhe  « as  ^iJ'^J}^'^ Chapters,  how 

time  power  in  Greece.     I  have  >!'«\""'J''   !"  S'  ^  no°tant  >''»''^'  "^ 
.     her  general  Timotheus  had  acquir^^.^^^^^^^^ 

Samos,  together  with  P>dna,>Kllione'Umi_  j,i,n)  in  more 

Gulf;  how  he  failed  (as  Iph.kra  es  '  «1/; ''<^'^,„^f^"[V^^^  con- 

than  one  attempt  upon  A-phj^pohs    howO^e  plan^e^^^^  ^^^^^ 

quest  and  settlers  in  the  Thiacian  ^''"^Fi^.'^fTi.r.iciaii  prince  Kolvs, 
having  been  attacked  and  endangered  by  ^'^^^f  '^'^'fj^^P  ^  838  li.c. 
•was  regained  by  the  continued  cUorts  ot  Aiucns  in  luc  ) 


I 


POWER  OF  THEBES. 


341 


Athens  had  sustained  no  considerable  loss,  during  the  struggles 
which  ended  in  tlie  pacilicatiou  alter  the  battle  of  Mantineia;  and 
her  condiiion  apjjears  on  the  whole  to  have  been  better  than  it  had 
ever  been  ^ince  her  disasters  at  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

The  power  of  Thebes  also  was  imposing  and  formidable.  She  had 
indeed  lost  many  of  those  Peloponnesian  allies  who  formed  the  over- 
whelming array  of  Epaminontlas,  when  he  first  invaded  Laconin, 
under  tlie  fresh  anti-Sparlau  impulse  immediately  succeeding  the 
batfle  of  Leuktra.  She  retained  only  Argos,  together  with  Tegea, 
iVIeixalopolis,  and  Messeue.  The  three  last  added  little  to  her  strength, 
antf  .n(;eded  her  watchful  support;  a  price  which  Epaminondas  had 
been  perfectly  willing  to  p-iy  for  the  establishment  of  a  strong  frontier 
against  Sparta.  But  the  body  of  extra-Peioi)onnesian  allies  grouped 
round  Thebes  was  still  considerable;  the  Phcjldaus  and  Lokrians,  the 
Malians,  the  Herakleots,  most  of  the  Thessaliaus,  and  most  (if  not 
all)  of  the  inhabitants  of  Euboea;  perhaps  also  the  Akarnaniaiis. 
The  Phokiaus  were  indeed  reluctant  allies,  disposed  to  cu'cumscribe 
their  obligations  within  the  .narrowest  limits  of  mutual  defense  in 
case  (.f  invasion;  and  we  shall  presently  find  the  relations  between 
the  two  becoming  positively  hostile.  Besides  these  allies,  the  The- 
bans  po.>^sessed  the  valuable  position  of  Oropus,  on  the  north-eastern 
frontier  of  Attica;  a  town  which  had  been  wrested  from  Athens  six 
vears  before,  to  the  profound  mortification  of  the  Athenians. 

But  over  and  above  allies  without  Buiotia,  Thebes  had  prodigiously 
increased  the  power  of  her  city  within  Boeotia.  She  had  appropri- 
ated to  herself  the  territories  of  Plataea  and  Thespiaj  on  her  southern 
frontier,  and  of  Koroneia  and  Orchomenus  near  upon  her  north- 
ern; by  conquest  and  partial  expulsion  of  their  prior  inhabitants. 
How  and  when  these  acquisitions  had  been  brought  about,  has  been 
already  explained:  here  I  merely  recall  the  fact,  to  appreciate  the 
position  of  Thebes  in  359  B.C.— Tliat  these  four  towns,  haying  been 
in  372  B.C.  autonomous— joined  with  her  only  by  the  definite  obliga- 
tions of  the  Boeotian  confederacy— and  partly  even  in  actual  hostility 
against  her— had  now  lost  their  autonomy  with  their  free  citizens, 
and  had  become  absorbed  into  her  property  and  sovereignty.  The 
domain  of  Thebes  thus  extended  across  Boeoti  i  from  the  frontiers  of 
Phokis  on  the  horth-west  to  the  frontiers  of  Attica  an  the  south. 

The  new  position  thus  acquired  by  Thebes  in  Bceotia,  purchased 
at  the  cost  of  extinguishing  three  or  four  autonomous  cities,  is  a  fact, 
of  much  moment  in  reference  to  the  period  now  before  us;  not  sim- 
ply because  it  swelled  the  power  and  pride  of  the  Thebans  them, 
seives;  but  also  because  it  raised  a  strong  body  of  unfavorable  senti- 
ment against  them  in  the  Hellenic  mind.  Just  at  the  time  when 
the  Spartans  had  lost  nearly  one-half  of  Laconia.  the  Thebans  had 
annexed  to  their  own  city  one-third  of  the  free  Boeotian  territory. 
The  revival  of  free  Messeuian  citizenship,  after  a  suspended  existence 
of  more  than  two  centuries,  had  recently  been  welcomed  with  uni- 


342 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


v«M-9il  sati^^faction.  How  much  would  that  same  fcc4mg  be  shocked 
when  Thebes  extinguished,  for  her  own  aggrandizement,  four  autono- 
mous communi^es^  all  of  her  own  Bceotian  kmdrea-one  o  thef^e 
^  mmunhk-  Too  bein.^  Orchon.enus,  respected  both  for  Us  antiquuv 
and  U^traditionary  legends!  Little  pains  -^^  taken  ^  can va.s  ^ 
circumstances  of  the  case,  and  to  inquire  whethei  lhc4.es  Lad  ex- 
ceeded the  measure  of  ri-or  warranted  by  the  war-code  of  tic  tune. 
In  the  mtr'^tic  and  national  conceptions  of  every  Greek,  Hellas  con- 
sisted o?  a  1  a-."gate  of  autonomous,  fraternal,  city-commumties^ 
The  exUnction'Sf  any  one  of  these  was  like  the  amputation  of  a  lunb 
/rom  ihTo  ganized  body.  Repugnance  toward  Thebes,  arising  out 
of  these  proceedin-s,  affected  strongly  the  public  opinion  ot  thet  n^e, 
and  r^an^i's^itsdf  especially  in  the  language  of  At hemaii  orators. 
Pxi"-o-erated by  mortification  on  account  of  the  loss  of  Oiopus 

fe  «:  eat  'iJody  of  Thessalians,  as  well  as  the  Mr.gnetes  and  the 
PhthiofAcha^ans.  were  among  those  subject  to  the  ascendency  of 
Thebes  Even  the  powerful  and  cruel  despot,  Alexander  of  Pher.T, 
w4s  num4e^^  in  this  catalogue.      The  cities  of  fertile  Thessji ly, 


each  other:  disortierjy  as  weii  as  kuiuk-.-^.      i  ..^  —  -..v... -^     - 

LiH4-and  the  e^kopadaj,  at  Krannon-had  been  once  the  ascendant 
f'mfl  sinthe  country.  Lut  in  the  hnnds  of  Lvkophron  and  the 
eneriietic  Jason,  Pheri'  had  been  exalted  to  the  lirst  rank.  I  ncier 
Jasol  as  ta<n;s  (federal  rrencral).  the  whole  force  of  Thessnly  was 
untol  toc^efler  with  a  hirrc  number  of  ciicun.jaccnt  tributaries, 
il^^anX  Epirotic,  Dolopian,  etc.,  and  a  ^-'l^<^g-nzed  st.nd^ 
armv  of  mercenaries  besides,  lie  could  muster  8,000  cavalr}  ,  20.000 
Stes  ^nd  peltasts  or  light  infantry  in  numbers  far  more  consul^ 
Se  A  military  powci'of  such  magnitude,  in  the  hands  of  one 
a  fke  able  and  aspiring,  raised  universal  alarm,  and  would  doubtless 
he  been  en  plo  ed  in  some  great  scheme  of  conquest,  either  within 

or  without  Greece,  had  not  Jason  been  ^"f^^^^^^it'^f  T'f„l?;r''"Hh 
nation  in  370  B.C.,  in  tlie  year  succeeding  the  bait  e  of  Leuktia  his 
brothers  Polvphron  and  Polvdorus  succeeded  to  his  position  as  tngus 
but  nouo  his\ibilities  or  inhuence.  The  latter,  a  brutal  tyrant,  put 
to  deatli  the  former,  and  was  in  his  turn  slain  after  a  short  interval, 
hy  a  successor  yet  worse,  his  nephew  Alexander,^ who  lived  and  re- 
tMined  nower  at  Pherje,  for  about'ten  years  (36b-oo8  B.C.). 

DuringYponion  of  ihat  time  Alexander  contended  with  success 
ticrainst  the  Thebans,  and  maintained  his  ascendency  in  Thessnlv 
But  before  the  battle  of  Mantineia  in  863  B.C.,  he  had  been  reduced 
into  the  condition  of  a  dependent  ally  of  Thebes,  and  hnd  furnished 
aconUn^ent  to  the  army  which  marched  under  Epaminondas  into 
PeloDonnesus  During  the  year  862-361  B.C.,  he  even  turned  his 
LSes  against  Athens,  the  enemy  of  Thebes;  carrying  on  a  naval 
war  agSnst  her,  not  without  partial  success,  and  damage  to  her  com- 


ASSASSINATION  OF  ALEXANDER. 


843 


merce     And  as  the  foreign  ascendency  of  Thebes  everywhere  was 
probably  impaired  by  the  deatli  of  her  great  leader  Epaminondas, 
Alexander  of  Phen-e  recovered  strength;  continuing  to  be  the  great- 
est potentate  in  Thessalv,  as  well  as  the  most  sanguinary  tyrant,  until 
the  time  of  his  death  in*" the  beginning  of  359  B.C.     He  then  perished. 
in  the  vi<Tor  of  age  and  in  the  fullness  of  power.     Against  oppressed 
subjects  or  neighbors  he  could  take  security  by  means  of  mercenary 
o-uards;  but  he  was  slain  by  the  contrivance  of  his  wife  Thebe  and 
the  act'  of  her  brothers:— a  raein()rai)le  illustration  of    the   general 
position  laid  down  by  Xenophoii,  that  the  Grecian  despot  could  cal- 
culate neither  on  security  nor  on  affection  anywhere,  and  that  his 
most  dan<^erous  enemies  were  to  be  found  among  his  own  household 
or  kindred.     The  brutal  life  of  Alexander,  and  the  cruelty  of  his 
proceedings,  had  inspired  his  wife  with  mingled  hatred  and  fear. 
Moreover  she  had  learned  from  words  dropped  in  a  fit  of  intoxication, 
that  he  was  intending  to  put  to  death  her  brothers  Tisiphonus,  Pytho- 
laus  and  Lykophron— and  along  with  them  herself;  partly  because 
she  was  childless,  and  he  had  formed  the  design  of  remarrying  with 
the  widow  of  the  late  d'.^spot  Jason,  who  resided  at  Thebes.     Accord- 
ing v  Thebe,  apprising  her  brothers  of  their  peril,  concerted  with 
them  the  means  of  assassinating  Alexander.     The  bed-chamber  which 
she  shared  with  him  was  in  a;i  upper  story,  accessible  only  by  a 
removable  staircase  or  ladder;  at  the  foot  of  which  there  lay  every 
nin-ht  a  fierce  mastiff  in  chains,  and  a  Thracian  soldier  tattooed  after 
the  fashion  of  his  country.     The  whole  house  moreover  was  regularly 
occupied  by  a  com  pan  v  of  guards;  and  it  is  even  said  that  the  ward- 
robe and  closets  of  Thebe  w^eie  searched  every  evening  for  concealed 
wea])ons.     These  numerous  precautions  of  mistrust,  however,  were 
baffled  by  her  artifice.     She  concealed  her  brothers  during  all  the  day 
in  a  safe  adjacent  hiding-place.     At  night.  Alexander,  coming  to  bed 
intoxicated,  soon  fell  fast  asleep:  upon  which  Thebe  stole  out  of  the 
room— directed  the  dog  to  be  reiuoved  from  the  foot  of  the  stairs, 
under  pretense  that  the  despot  wished  to  enjoy  undisturbed  repose^ 
and  then  called  her  armed  brothers.     After  spreading  wool  upon  the 
stairs,  in  order  that  their  tread  might  be  noiseless,  she  went  again  up 
into  the  bedroom,  and  brought  away  the  sword  of  Alexander,  which 
always  hung  near  him.     Notwithstanding  this  encouragement,  how- 
ever'the  three  young  men  still  trembling  at  the  magnitude  of  the 
risk '  hesitated  to  mount  the  stair;  nor  could  they  be  prevailed  upon 
to  (io  so,  except  bv  her  distinct  threat,  that  if  they  flinched,  she 
would   awaken   Alexander   and    expose    them.       At    length    they 
mounted,  and  entered  the  bed-chamber,  wherein  a  lamp  was  burn- 
ino--  while  Thebe,  having  opened  the  door  for  them,  again  closed  it, 
an"d' posted  h'^self  to  hold  the  bar.     The  1  rothers  then  approached 
the  lied-  one  seized  the  sleeping  despot  by  the  feet,  another  by  the 
hai:-  of  his  head,  and  the  third  with  a  sword  thrust  him  through. 
After  successful lyafid  siecurely  consummating  this  deed,  popular  ou 


344 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


account  of  the  odious  character  of  tbe  slain  '^^^P^/.'JJ^^Ij^^^^^'^^^i;^^^^^^ 
to  win  over  the  mercenary  troops,  j.n.l  to  uisure    he  scepter  to  licr 
self  imUer  eldest  brothei-  Tisiphonus.     After  this  change,  it  would 
an  pea     hat  the  power  of  the  new  princes  wus  not  so  great  as  that  of 
\lev  nder  had   been,  so  that  additional  elements  of  weakness  and 
cuL^d  ^Ur;   in.roduced   into  Thessalv.      This  ^ VoJ%>",;;  [^  ^f 
one  of  the  material  circumstances  pavmg  the  way  ^oj  ^  ^  f 
Macedon  to  at  quire  ascendency  in  Grecce-as  wdl  l'/J'^«»[^t^^^f PP^'\  % 
1   was  in  the  year  360-359  b'c,  that  Pcrdikkas,  elder  l>rother  and 
predecessor  of  Philip  on  the  throne  of  iMacedonia,  was  slam   in   1  e 
Twer  of  Hs  aire.     He  perished,  according  to  one  account  in  u  bloody 
b  t  le  wi  h  the  Illyrians,  wherein  4,000  Macedonians  fell  also;  ac- 
cording to  another  statement,  by  the  hands  of  assassins  and   the 
treacherous  subornation  of  his  mother  Eurydike. 

Of  he  exploits  of  Pcrdikkas  during  the  live  years  of  his  reip  we 
know  ittle^^  He  had  assisted  the  Athenian  general  Timotheus  in  war 
n  "ai^st  he  Oivnthian  confederacy,  and  in  the  capture  of  Pydna   Po- 
Ikk^a  Torone  and  other  neighboring  places;  while  on  the  other  hand 
he  had  oppo^^^^^^^^         Athenians  in  their  attempt  against  Amphipolis 
sec  ring^hat  important  place  by  a  Macedonian  ^^^;^^-^:j}^'^ 
tbem  ind  for  himself.     He  was  engaged  in  serious  contlict  w  itli  tne 
Ihrians      ^t  ap^^^^        too  that  he  was   not  without   some  literary 
h  cl    a  ions-wafan  admirer  of  intellectual  men,  and  in  coriespoml- 
ence  with  Plato  at  Athens.     Distinguished  V^^^^^^^^}'^;^  '''^^;^;, 
like  Plato  and  Isokrates,  enjoyed  renown,  f  "^^''"^^^^  \  ^Vn    hn 
T^iPM^iire  of  influence   throughout  the  whole  range  of  the  Grecian 
wodd      Fort  vveLrs  before,  Arcl.elaus  king  of  Macedonia  had  shown 
to  r  to  P  ato   then  a  young  man,  as  well  as  to  his  master  Sokrates 
ATvnt  I.    l^c  fa  her  both  of  Pcrdikkas  and  of  Philip,  had  throughout 
bi"  rei<^n  cultivated  the  friendship  of  leading  Athenians,  especially 
Iphikra^esand  Timotheus;  the  former  of  whom  he  had  even  adopted 
«?  lis  .on     \ristotle   afterward  so  eminent  as  a  philosopner  (son  of 
Kikoma  hus  the  co^^^^^^^^^^^        physician  of  Amyntas).  had  been  for  s(>me 
time  St  ring  at  Athens  as  a  pupil  of  Plato;  nioreoverPerdkkas 
diTrLo-  h  sreiTvn  had  resident  with  him  a  friend  of  the  philosopher- 
Eunhrre  s  of  Oreus.     Pcrdikkas  lent  himself  much  to  the  gmdance  of 
lupl  rlu     w^    directed  him  in  the  choice  of  his  associates  and  per- 
mitted none  to  be  his  guests  except  persons  of  studious  habits;  thus 
^Ij^g^ch  disgust^mong.tlJnuliUiry  MaoHl^n.ins      I    is  a  .g- 
n-il  testimonv  to  the  ropulatioii   of  Puilo,  that  \\c  tiiul  liis  d<iMtc 
eourted  at  one  and  the  s'une  ti.ne.  l;y  Dioujsius  the  younger  at  Syra- 
ruse  and  bv  Pcrdikkas  in  Macedonia.  ^     ,  -r*     ti 

On  he  suggestion  of  Plato,  conveyed  through  Euphr.Tus,  Pcrdik- 
kas was  ind5?ed  to  bestow  upon  his  own  brother  Philip  a-porlion  of 
terdTory  or  an  appanage  in  Macedonia.  In  368  b.o  (during  the  rcign 
of  \lexlnder  e  der  brother  of  Pcrdikkas  and  Philip  ,  Pelopidas  hvA 
reduced  Macedonia  to  partial  submission,  and  had  taken  hostages  for 


PHILIP  AS  A  YOUTH. 


345 


its  fidelity;   among  which  hostages  was  the  youthful  Plnlip,    hen. 
about  fifteen  years  of  age.     In  this  character  Phihp  remained  about 
two  or  three  years  at  Thebes.     How  or  when  he  left  that  city,  we 
cannot  clearly  make  out.     He  seems  to  have  returned  to  Macedonia 
after  the  murder  of  Alexander  by  Ptolemy  Alorites;  probably  with- 
out opposition  from  the  Thcbans,  sim-.e  his  value  as  a  hostage  was 
then  diminished      The  fact  that  he  was  contided  (together  with  his 
broiher  Pcrdikkas)  by  his  mother  Eurydike  to  the  protec  ion  of  the 
Alheuian  general  Iphikrates,  then  on  the  coast  of  Macedonia— has 
been  recomitecl  in  a  previous  chapter.     How  Philip  fared  during  the 
rc«-ency  of  Ptolemy  Alorites  in  Macedonia,  we  do  not  know;  we 
mi'^-hl  even  suspect  that  he  would  return  back  to  Thebes  as  a  safer 
lesTdence      But  when  his  brother  Pcrdikkas,  having  slam  Ptolemy 
Aiorites,  'became  king.  Philip  resided  in  Macedonia,  and  even  ob- 
tained from  Pcrdikkas  (as  already  stated),  through  the  persuasion  of 
Plato  a  separate  district  to  govern  as  subordinate.    Here  he  remained 
until  the  death  of  Pcrdikkas  in  300-359  B.C.;  organizing  a  separate 
mi     arv  force  of  his  own  (like  Derdas  in  382  b  c    when  the  Lace- 
diemonians  made  war  upon  Olynthus);  and  probably  servmg  at  its 
head  in  the  wars  carried  on  by  his  brother.  ^f,^^„  t^ 

The  time  passed  by  Philip  at  Thebes,   however,  from  fifteen  to 
ei^'-hteen  years  of  age,  was  an  event  of  much  importance  in  deter- 
mTning  his  future  ciraracter.     Though  detained  at  Thebes,  Philip  was 
treated  with  courtesy  and  respect.     He  resided  with  Pammenes.  one 
of  the   principal  citizens;   he  probably  enjoyed  good  literary  and 
rhetorical  teaching,  since  as  a  speaker,  in  after  lite,  he  possessed  con- 
siderable talent;  and  he  may  also  have  received  some  mstrucnKmm 
phUosophv,  though  he  never  subsequently  manifested  any  tas  e  lor 
it   and  though  the  assertion  of  his  having  been  taught  by  Pythago- 
reans merits  little  credence.     But  the  lesson,  most  indehble  of  all, 
which  he  imbibed  at  Thebes,  was  derived  from  the  society  and  from 
the  livin"-  example  of  men  like  Epaminondas  and  Pelopidas.      Ihese 
were  Icadimr  citizens,  manifesting  those  qualities  which  insured  for 
them  the  steady  admiration  of  a  free  community— and  of  a  Iheban 
community,  more  given  to  action  than  to  speech;  moreover  they 
were  both  of  them  distinguished  military  leaders-one  of  them  the 
ablest  or'^-ani^er  and  the  most  scientific  tactician  of  his  day.     ine 
suectacle'of  the  Theban  military  force,  excellent  both  as  cavalry  and 
as  infantry,  under  the  training  of  such  a  man  as  Epaminondas,  was 
cMnin-ntly  suggestive  to  a  young  Macedonian  prince;  and  becanie 
still  mori  elHcacious  when  combined  with  the  personal  conversation 
of  the  victor  of  Leuktra-the  first  man  whom  Philip  learnt  to  admire  , 
and  whom  he  strove  to  imitate  in  his  military  career.     His  mind  was 
early  stored  with  the  most  advanced  strategic  ideas  of  the  day,  ami 
thrown  into  the  track  of  reflection,  comparison,  and  invention,  on  the 

^' Whertrausferred  from  Thebes,  to  the  subordinate  government  of 


346 


PHILIP  OF   MACKD9N. 


a  district  in  Macfdonia  under  his  elder  brother  Perdikkas,  Pliilip 
'organized  a  niilitaiT  force;  and  in  so  doin^i;  liad  the  opportunity  of 
applying  to  practice,  tliough  at  first  on  a  limited  scale,  the  lessons 
learnt  from  the  illustrious  Thehans.  He  was  thus  at  the  head  of 
troops  belonging  to  and  organized  by  himself — when  the  unexpected 
death  of  Perdikkas  opened  to  him  the  prospect  of  succeeding  to  the 
throne.  But  it  was  a  prospect  full  of  doubt  and  hazard.  Perdikkas 
had  left  an  infant  son;  there  existed,  moreover,  three  princes,  Arche- 
laus,  Aridieus,  and  Menelaus,  sous  of  Amyntas  by  another  wife  or 
mistress  GygcTa,  and  therefore  half-brothers  of  Perdikkas  and  Philip: 
there  were  also  two  other  pretenders  to  the  crown — Pausanias  (who 
had  before  aspired  to  the  throne  after  the  death  of  Amyntas), 
seconded  by  a  Thracian  prince — and  Arga^us,  aide  d  b}"  tlie  Athe- 
nians. To  these  dangers  was  to  be  added,  attack  from  the  neighbor- 
ing barbaric  nations,  Illyrians,  Paeonians,  and  Thracians— always 
ready  to  assail  and  plunder  Macedonia  at  every  moment  of  intestine 
weakness.  It  would  appear  thai  Perdikkas,  shortly  before  his  death, 
had  sustained  a  severe  defeat,  with  the  loss  of  4, COO  men,  from  the 
Illyrians:  his  death  followed,  either  from  a  wound  then  received,  or 
by  the  machinations  of  his  mother  Eurydike.  Perhaps  both  the 
wound  in  battle  and  the  assassination  may  be  real  facts. 

Philip  at  first  assumed  tlie  government  of  the  country  as  guardian 
of  his  young  nephew  Amyntas  the  son  of  Perdikkas.  But  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  conjuncture  were  so  formidable,  that  the  Macedonians 
around  constrained  him  to  assume  the  crown.  Of  his  three  half- 
brothers,  he  put  to  death  one,  and  was  only  prevented  from  killing 
the  other  two  by  their  flight  into  exile;  we  shall  find  them  hereafter 
at  Olynthus.  They  had  either  found,  or  were  thought  likely  to  find, 
a  party  in  Macedonia  to  sustain  their  j^retensions  to  the  crT)wn. 

The  succession  to  the  throne  in  3Iaccdonia,  though  descending  in 
a  particular  family,  was  open  to  frequent  and  bloody  dispute  lu'tween 
the  individual  members  of  that  family,  and  usually  fell  to  the  most 
daring  and  unscrupulous  among  them.  None  but  an  energetic  man, 
indeed,  could  well  maintain  himself  there,  especially  under  the  cir- 
cumstances of  Philip's  accession.  The  3lacedonian  monarchy  has 
been  called  a  limited  monarchy;  and  in  a  large  sense  of  the  word, 
this  proposition  is  true.  But  what  the  limitations  were,  or  how  they 
were  made  operative,  we  do  not  know.  '1  hat  there  were  some 
ancient  forms  and  customs,  which  the  king  habitually  respected,  we 
cannot  doubt:  as  there  probably  were  also  anu)ng  the  Illyriau  tribes, 
the  Epirots,  and  others  of  the  neighboring  warlike  nations.  A  gen- 
eral assembly  was  occasionally  convened,  for  the  purpose  of  consent- 
ing to  some  important  proposition,  or  trying  some  conspicuous 
accused  person.  But  though  such  ceremonies  were  recognized  and 
sometimes  occurred,  the  occ-jisions  were  rare  in  which  they  interposed 
any  serious  constitutional  check  upon  the  regal  authority.  The  facts 
of  Macedonian  history,  as  far  as  they  come  before  us,  exhibit  the 


SUCCESS  AGAINST  HIS  ENEMIES. 


347 


kins^  acting  on  their  own  feelings  and   carrying  out  their  own 
scliemes— consulting  whom  they  please  and  when  tliey  please— sub- 
ject onlv  to  the  necessity  of  not  offending  too  violently  the  senti- 
ments of  that  military  population  whom  they  commanded.     Philip 
and  Alexander,  combining  regal  station  with  personal  ability  and 
unexampled  success,  were  more  powerful  than  any  of  their  predeces- 
sors.    Each  of  them  required  extraordinary  efforts  from  their  sol- 
diers, whom  they  were  therefore  obliged  to  keep  in  willing  obedience » 
and  attachment;  just  as  Jason  of  Pheras  had  done  before  with  his 
standing  army  of  mercenaries.     During  the  reign  of  Alexander  the 
army  manifests  itself  as  the  only  power  by  his  side,  to  which  even  he 
is  constrained  occasionally  to  bow;  after  his  death,  its  power  becomes 
for  a  time  still  more  ascendant.     But  so  far  as  the  history  of  Mace- 
donia is  known  to  us,  I  perceive  no  evidence  of  co-ordinate  political 
bodies,  or  standing  apparatus  (either   aristocratical  or  popular)  to 
check  the  power  of  the  king— such  as  to  justify  in  any  way  the  com- 
parison drawn  by  a  modern  historian  between  the  Macedonian  and 
English  constitutions. 

the  first  proceeding  of  Philij),  in  dealing  with  his  numerous  ene- 
mies, was  to  buv  off  the  Thracians  by  seasonable  presents  and  prom- 
ises; so  that  the  competition  of  Pausanias  for  the  throne  became  no 
longer  dangerous.  There  remained  as  assailants  the  Athenians  with 
Argieus  from  seaward,  and  the  Illyrians  from  landward. 

But  Philip  showed  dexterity  and  energy  sufficient  to  make  head 
against  all.  While  he  hastened  to  re-organize  the  force  of  the  country, 
to  extend  the  application  of  those  improved  military  arrangements 
which  he  had  already  been  attempting  in  his  own  province,  and  to 
encouraL^e  his  friends  and  soldiers  by  collective  harangues,  in  a  style 
and  spirit  such  as  the  Macedonians  had  never  l)efore  heard  from 
regal  lips— he  contrived  to  fence  off  the  attack  of  the  Athenians  until 
a  more  convenient  moment. 

He  knew  that  the  possession  of  Ampliipolis  was  the  gi'cat  purpose 
for  which  they  had  been  carrying  on  war  against  ^lacedonia  for  some 
years,  and  for  which  they 'now  espoused  the  cause  of  Argajus. 
Accordiuiily,  he  professed  his  readiness  at  once  to  give  up  to  them 
this  important  i)]ace,  withdrawing  the  Macedonian  garrison  whereby 
Perdikkas  had  held  it  against  them,  and  leaving  the  town  to  its  own 
citizens.  This  act  was  probably  construed  by  the  Athenians  as  taii- 
tamouut  to  an  actual  cession;  ior  even  if  Amphipolis  should  still 
hold  out  against  them,  thev  doubted  not  of  their  power  to  reduce  it 
when  unaiiied.  Philip  further  dispatched  letters  to  Athens,  express- 
inir  an  anxious  desire  to  be  received  into  her  alliance,  on  the  same 
friendly  terms  as  his  father  Amvntas  before  him.  These  i)roceed- 
in"-s  seem  to  have  had  the  effect  of  making  the  Athenians  lukewarm 
iu'^he  cause  of  Arira^us.  For  Mantias  the  Athenian  admiral,  though 
lie  conveyed  that  prince  by  sea  to  Methone,  yet  stayed  in  the  seaport 
himself,  while  Argujus  marched  inland— with  some  returning  exiles, 


348 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


a  body  of  morccTiancs,  and  a  few  Atlierinn  volunteers— t^  JE^ve  or 
Ede^«a-  liopino-  to  procure  admission  into  that  aneient  capital  of  the 
Maced(inian  kinc:s.  But  the  inhabitants  refused  to  receive  hini :  and 
in  his  march  back  to  Methone,  he  was  attacked  and  completely  de- 
feated by  Philip.  His  fuiritive  troops  found  shelter  on  a  neighborinir 
eminence,  but  Mere  speedilv  oblifred  to  surrender.  Philip  suffered 
the  greater  part  of  them  to  dei>art  on  terms,  recjuiring  only  that 
Ar-neus  and  the  Macedonian  exiles  should  be  delivered  up  to  him. 
He'^treated  the  Athenian  citizens  with  especial  courtesy,  preserved  to 
them  all  their  property,  and  sent  them  home  full  of  gratitude,  with 
conciliatory  messages' to  the  people  of  Athens.  The  exiles,  Argseus 
among  them,   having  become  bis  prisoners,  were  probably  put  to 

death.  ,,».,. 

The  prudent  lenity  exhibited  by  Philip  toward  the  Athenian  pris- 
oners combined  with  his  evacuation  of  Amphipolis,  produced  the 
most  favorable  effect  upon  the  temper  of  the  Athenian  public,  and 
disposed  them  to  accept  his  pacific  offers.  Peace  was  accordingly 
concluded.  Philip  renounced  all  claim  to  Amphipolis,  acknowledg- 
ing that  town  as  a  possession  rightfully  belonging  to  Athens.  By 
such  renunciation  he  really  abandoned  no  rightful  po.=;session ;  for 
Amphipolis  had  never  belonged  to  the  :Macedonian  kings;  nor  had 
any  Macedoni:in  soldiers  ever  entered  it  until  three  or  four  years 
before  when  the  citizens  had  invoked  aid  from  Perdikkas  to  share 
in  the  defense  airainst  Athens.  But  the  Athenians  appeared  to  have 
gained  the  chief  prize  for  which  they  had  been  so  long  struggling, 
they  con-rratulated  themselves  in  the  hope,  probably  set  forth  with 
confidence  by  the  speakers  who  supported  the  peace,  that  the  Ampliip- 
olitans  alone  would  never  think  of  resisting  the  acknowledged  claims 

of  Athens.  i  i    j  v,- 

-     Philip  was  thus  relieved  from  enemies  on  the  coast,  and  had  nis 
hands  free  to  deal  with  the  Illyrians  and  Paeonians  of  the  interior. 
He  marched  into  the  territory  of  the  Pieonians  (seemingly  along  the 
upper  course  of  the  river  Axius),  whom  he  found  weakened  by  the 
recent  death  of  their  king  Acris.      He  defeated  their  troops,   and 
reduced  them  to  submit  to  Macedonian  supremacy.     From  thence  he 
proceeded  to  attack  the  Illyrians— a  more  serious  and  formidable 
undertaking.     Tlie  names  Illyrians,  Pa?onians,  Thracians,  etc.,  did 
not  degi^'nate  any  united  national  masses,  but  were  applied  to  a  great 
number  of  kindred  tribes  or  clans,  each  distinct,  separately  governed, 
and  having  its  particular  name  and  customs.     The  Illynan  and  Paeo- 
nian  tribes  occupied  a  wide  space  of  territory  to  tlie  north  and  north- 
west of  Macedonia,  over  the  modern  Bosnia  nearly  to  the  Julian  Alps 
and  the  river  Save.     But  during  the  middle  of  the  fourth  century 
before  Christ,  it  seems  that  a  large  immigration  of  Gallic  tribes  from 
the  westward  was  taking  place,  invading  the  territory  of  (he  more 
northerly  Illyrians  and  Paeoniaus,  circumscribing  their  occupancy 
and  security,  and  driving  them  farther  southward;  sometimes  iin- 


PHILIP  EVACUATES   AiiPHlPOLIS. 


349 


celling  them  to  find  subsistence  and  plunder  by  invasibn  of  Mace- 
donia  or  by   maritime  piracies   against  Grecian   commerce   in  the 
Adriatic      The  Illyrians  had  become  more  dangerous  neighbors  to 
Macedonia  than  they  were  in  the  time  of  Thucydides;  and  it  seems 
UiU  a  recent  coalition  of  their  warriors,  for  purposes  of  invasion  and 
plu  u  Ji    was  now  in  the  zenith  of  its  force.     It  was  under  a  chief 
u-.  lied  Bardylis,  who  had  raised  himself  to  command  from  the  liuni- 
b'e  occupation  of  a  charcoal  burner;  a  man  renowned  for  his  bravery, 
but  vc'  more  renowned  for  dealings  rigidly  just  toward  1^^  «;;1^1^;^^;«; 
especially  in  the  distribution  of  plunder.     Bardylis  and  his  lllv  lans 
-ill  possessed  tliemselves  of  a  considerable  portion  of  Wes  ern  Mace- 
donia (west  of  Mount  Bermius),  occupying  for  the  most  part  the 
tovv  s   villages,  aad  plains  and  restricting  the  native  Macedonians 
to   he  defensible,  yet  barren  hills.     Philip  marched  to  attack   hem. 
at  the  head  of  a  Orce  which  he  had  now  contrived  to  increase  to  tlie 
n  1    bero   10,000  foot  and  600  horse.    The  numbers  ot  Bardylis  were 
aloit  equal;  yet  on  hearing  of  Philip  s  approach,  he  sent  a  proposi- 
Uon  tendering  peace,  on  th?  condition  that  each  party  should  retain 
w  Kit  it  actually  possessed.     His  proposition  being  rejected   the  two 
armies  speedily  met.     Philip  had  collected  around  bun  on  the  right 
^vin-  his  chosen  Macedonian  troops,  with  whom  he  made  his  most 
yio-ol-ous  onset;  maneuvering  at  the  same  time  with  a  body  of  cav- 
al?y  so  as  to  aJtack  the  left  flank  of  the  Illyrians.     The  battle,  con- 
tested with  the  utmost  obstinacy  on  both  sides   was  for  some  tune 
undechled;  nor  could  the  king  of  Macedon  break  »  f  ^^^  «"g  ^his 
into  which  his  enemies  had  formed  themselves      But  at  length  his 
cavalry  were  enabled  to  charge  them  so  effectively  in  flank  and  rear, 
that  \lctory  declared  in  hislavor.     The  Illyrians  fled,  were  vigor- 
ously pursued  with  the  loss  of  7,000  men,  and  never  again  rallied. 
Bardylis  presently  sued  for  peace,  and  consented  to  purchase  it  by 
fenouncing  all  his"^ conquests  in  Macedonia;  while  Pliilip  pushed   ns 
victory  so  strenuously,  as  to  reduce  to  subjection  all  the  tribes  east- 
ward of  Lake  Lychnidus.  „  ^^       .     .  . 
These  operations  against  the  inland  neighbors  of  Macedonia  must 
have  occupied  a  year  or  two.     During  that  interval  Phibp  left  Am- 
uhiDolis  to  itself  having  wilhdrawu  from  it  the  Macedonian  garrison 
^s  ;f  ml^il:^  ^  conciliathig  the  Athenians.     We  might  l--^-^|^:^ 
tliat  they  would  forthwith  have  availed  themselves  of  the  open  ig 
and  taken  active  measures  for  regaining  Amphipolis.    They  ^'''^^Z 
value  of  that  city:  they  considered  it  as  of  right  theirs:  they  had  long 
been  anxious  for  its  repossession,  and  had  even  besieged  it  ti ye  years 
before   though  seemingly  only  with  a  mercenary  force   which  was 
repelled  mai^ily  by  tlie^Ud  of  Philip's  predecessor  Perdikkas      Ain- 
phipolis  was  not  likely  to  surrender  to  them  voluntarily;  but  ^hen 
thrown  upon  its  own  resources,  it  might  perhaps  have  been  assailed 
with  success.     Yet  they  remained  without  making  any  aUpmp    on 
the  region  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  Strymon.     We  must  recollect 


350 


PHILIP  OF   MACEDON. 


(as  has  been  alreatly  narrated),  that  during  359  B.C.,  and  the  first  part 
of  358  B.C.,  they  were  carrying  on  operations  in  the  Thracian  Cher- 
sonese, against  Charidenius  anii  Kersobleptes,  with  small  success  and 
dis"-racelul  embarrassment.  These  vexatious  operations  in  the  Cker- 
son'ese— in  which  peninsula  many  Athenians  were  interested  as  private 
proprietors,  besides  the  public  claims  of  the  city— may  perhaps  have 
absorped  vvliolly  the  attention  of  Athens,  so  as  to  induce  her  to  post- 
pone tlie  acquisition  of  Amphipolis  until  they  were  concluded;  a 
conclusion  which  did  not  arrive  (as  we  shall  presently  see)  until 
immediately  before  she  became  plunged  in  the  dangerous  crisis  of 
tlie  Social  War.  I  know  no  better  e.\planation  of  the  singular  cu\ 
cumstance,  that  Athens,  though  so  anxious,  both  before  and  after, 
for  the  possession  of  Amphipolis,  made  no  attempt  to  acquire  it 
during  more  than  a  year  alter  its  evacuation  by  Philip;  unless 
indeed  we  are  to  rank  this  opportunity  among  the  many  which  she 
lost  (according  to  Demosthenes)  from  pure  negligence;  little  suspect- 
ing how  bpeedilv  such  opportunity  would  disappear. 

in  358  B.C.  an  opening  was  aflorded  to  the  Athenians  for  regain- 
ing their  influence  in  Eubcea;  and  for  this  island,  so  near  their  own 
bliores,  they  struck  a  more  vigorous  blow  than  for  the  distant  posses- 
sion of  Amphipolis.     At  the  revival  of  the  maritime  confederacy 
imder   Athens  (immediately  after  378  B.C.).  most  of  the  cities  in 
Eubcea  had  joined  it  volunt'arilv;  but  after  the  battle  of  Leuktra  (in 
371  B.C.),  the  island  passed  under  Theban  supremacy.     Accordingly 
Eubo'ans  from  all  the  cities  served  in  the  army  of  Epaminondas, 
both  in  his  tha  and  his  last  expedition  into  Pelojionnesus  (369-3G2 
B.C.).     Moreover,  Oropus,  the  frontier  town  of  Attica  and  Ba^otia— 
immediately  opposite  to  Euboea,  having  been  wrested  from  Athens 
in   366   B.c!   by  a    body   of   exiles  crossing  the  strait  from  Eretria, 
tnrouiih  the  manniiement  of  the  Eretrian  despot  Themison— had  been 
placed  in  the  keeping  of  the  Thebans.  with  whom  it  still  remained. 
But  in  the  vear3.j8  B.C.,  discontent  began  in  the  Euboean  cities,  from 
what  cause  we  know  not,  against  the  supremacy  of  Thebes,  where- 
upon a  powerful  Theban  force  was  sent  into  the  i-land  to  keep  them 
down.     A  severe  contest  ensued,  in  which,  if  Thebes  had  succeeded, 
Chalkis  and  Eretiia  might  possibly  have  shared  the  fate  of  Orcho- 
menus.     These  cities  sent  urgent  messages  entreating  aid  from  the 
Athenians,  who  were  powerfully  moved  by  the  apprehension  of  see- 
ing their  hated  neighbor  Thebes  re-enforced  by  so  large  an  acquisition 
close  to  their  borders.     Tlie  public  assembly,  already  disjiosed  to 
sympathize  with  the  petitioners,  was  kiiidled  into  enthusiasm  by  the 
aurupt  and  emphatic  appeal  of  Timotheus  son  of  Kouon.     "How!- 
Athenians  (said  he),   when  vou  have  the  Thebans  actually  in  the 
island,  are  you  still  here  debating  what  is  to  be  done,  or  how  you 
shall  deal  with  the  case?     Will  you  not  fill  the  sea  Avith  triremes? 
Will  you  not  start  up  at  once,  hasten  down  to  PeirH?us,  and  haul  the 
triremes  down  to  the  water?"    This  anunated  apostrophe,  reported 


EUBCEA  BECOMES  ATHENIAN. 


351 


«nH  rloubtless  heard  by  Demosthenes  himself,  was  cordially  responded 
?o  bfti™  force  of  Athens,  military  as  well  as  naval 

wa  equHped  with  an  (Eagerness,  and  sent  forth  with  a  celerity,  sel- 
L  n  oa  •  Uieled  Such  wj^  the  general  enthusiasm,  that  the  costly 
otfiVo   tHcm  fil-st  time  undertaken  by  vo  unteers. 

b^tead  of  iwaitin-  the  more  tardy  process  of  singling  out  those  rich 
men  whose  turn  it^was  to  serve,  with  the  chance  of  still  further  delay 
f  Jom  the  len-al  process  called  Antidosis  or  Exchange  <^f  Pjopeny' 
instTtuted  by  any  one  of  the  persons  so  chosen  who  might  think  him- 
sel  Imrdlv  usc^  by  the  requisition.  Demosthenes  himse  f  was 
a"^^^^^^^  1^«  ^"d  ^  person  named  Phiiinus 

be^n>co  t?^^  of  the  same  ship.     We  are  told  that  i"  three  or  i a 

five  days  the  Athenian  fleet  and  army,  under  the  command  of  T  mo- 
theus  were  Imded  in  full  force  on  Euboea;  and  that  in  the  course  oi 
hir^y'  (hivs  the  Thebans  were  so  completely  worsted,  as  to  be  forced 
o  evacmite  it  under  capitulation.     A  body  of  mercenaries  under 
Chares  c^ntribu^^^^^^     the  Athenian  success.     Yet  it  seems  not  clear 
Uiirthc  success  was  so  easy  and  rapid  as  the  orators  are  fond  of 
assert^^-      H^^^^^         their  boast,  often  afterward  repeated,  is  so  far 
weU  founded,  that  Athens  fully  accomplished  her  object  i-escued  the 
Eubians  from  Thebes,  and  received  the  ^^fV^^^ill^J^,^ 
tnde  in  the  form  of  a  golden  wreath  dedicated  in  the  Athenian  aciop- 
ols       The  EuS«an  dties,   while  ^acknowledged    as    autonomous, 
continued  at  the  same  time  to  be  enrol  ed  as  "^^^itos  of  the  A^^^^^^^^ 
nian  confederacy,  sending  deputies  to  the  synod  ^^ Athens,  t^^^^^^^ 
the  «reneral  purposes  of  which  they  paid  an  annual  tribute,  assessed 
at  five  talents  each  for  Oreus  (or  Histiaea)  and  Eretrnu 

On  the  conclusion  of  this  Euba?an  enterprise.  Chares  with  his 
mercenaries  was  sent  forward  to  the  Chersonese,  where  he  at  length 
extorted  from  Charidemus  and  Kersobleptes  the  evacuation  of  hat 
peninsula  and  its  cession  to  Athens,  after  a  long  train  of  ^^^^f^x} 
maneuvers  and  bad  faith  on  their  part.  I  have  in  my  preced  ng 
chapters,  described  these  events,  remarking  at  the  same  time  that 
Athens  attained  at  this  moment  the  maximum  of  her  renewed  foreign 
power  and  second  confederacy,  which  had  begun  in  3.8b.c  iiiit 
her  period  of  exaltation  was  very  short.  It  was  spceddy  overth  ow^n 
by  two  important  events-the  Social  War,  and  the  conquests  of 

"^  The  Athenia'ii  confederacy,  recently  strengthened  by  the  rescue  of 
EubtT^a,  numbered  among  its  members  a  large  proportion  ot  the 
islands  in  the  iEgean  as  well  as  the  Grecian  sea-ports  in  Thrace,  me 
list  included  thelslands  Lesbos,  Chios  Samos  (this  la^.  "o^  partially 
occupied  by  a  body  of  Athenian  Kleruchs  ^^  ^^'ttlers)^  Kos,  and 
Rhodes;  together  with  the  i^porta^nt  city  of  Byzantium.  It  ^^^^^^ 
shortly  afte?  the  recent  success  in  Euboea,  that  Chios,  Kos,  Rhodes, 
•  and  Byzantium  revolted  from  Athens  by  concert,  raising  a  serious 
war  against  her,  known  by  the  name  of  the  Social  War. 


352 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


Respecting  the  proximate  causes  of  tliis  outbreak  we  find  ubfortu- 
nately  little  information.  There  was  now.  and  had  always  been 
since  378  B.C.,  a  synod  of  deputies  from  all  the  confederate  cities 
habitually  assembling  at  Athens;  such  as  liad  not  subsisted  under  the 
first  Athenian  empire  in  its  full  maturity.  How  far  the  Synod 
worked  efficiently,  we  do  not  know.  At  least  it  nuist  have  afCorded 
to  the  allies,  if  aggrieved,  a  full  opportunity  of  making  their  com- 
plaints heard;  and  of  criticising  the  application  of  the  common  fund 
to  which  each  of  them  contributed.  But  the  Athenian  confederacy 
which  had  begun  (378  B.C.)  in  a  generous  and  equal  .spirit  of  common 
maritime  defense,  had  gradually  become  perverted,  since  the  humilia- 
tion of  the  great  enemy  Sparta  at  Leuktra,  toward  purposes  and 
interests  more  exclusively  Athenian.  Athens  had  been  conquering 
the  island  of  Samos — Pydna,  Potida?a,  and  Methone,  on  the  coast  of 
Macedonia  and  Thrace— and  the  Thracian  Chersonese;  all  of  them 
acquisitions  made  for  herself  alone,  without  any  advantage  to  tlie 
confederate  svnod— and  made  too  in  great  part  to  become  the  private 
property  of  her  own  citizens  as  Kleruchs,  indirect  breach  of  her  pub- 
lic resolution  passed  in  378  B.C.,  not  to  permit  any  appropriation  of 
Jands  bv  Athenian  citizens  out  of  Attica. 

In  proportion  as  Athens  came  to  act  more  for  her  own  separate 
atr2:randizement.  and  less  for  interests  common  to  the  whole  con- 
federacy, the  adherence  of  the  larger  confederate  states  grew  more 
and  more  reluctant.  But  what  contributed  yet  further  to  detach 
them  from  Athens,  was,  the  behavior  of  her  armaments  on  service, 
consistinir  in  great  proportion  of  mercenaries,  scantily  and  irregu- 
larly paid;  whose  disorderly  and  rapacious  exaction,  especially  at  the 
cost  of  the  confederates  of  Athens,  is  characterized  in  strong  terms 
by  all  the  contemporary  orators— Demosthenes,  ^schines,  Isokrates, 
etc.  The  commander,'having  no  means  of  paying  his  soldit^rs,  was 
often  compelled  to  obey  their  predatory  impulses,  and  conduct  them 
to  the  easiest  place  from  whence  money  could  be  obtained;  indeed 
some  of  the  commanders,  especially  Chares,  were  themselves  not  less 
ready  than  their  soldiers  to  profit  by  such  depredations.  Hence  the 
armaments  sent  out  by  Athens  sometimes  saw  little  of  the  enemy 
whom  thev  were  sent  to  combat,  preferring  the  easier  and  lucrative 
proceedings  of  levying  cont^-ibutions  from  friends,  and  of  plundering 
the  trading  vessels  met  with  at  .sea.  Nor  was  it  practicable  for 
Athens  to^prevent  such  misconduct,  when  her  own  citizens  refused 
to  serve  personally,  and  when  she  employed  foreigners,  hired  for  the 
occasion,  but  seldom  regularly  paid.  *The  suffering,  alarm,  and 
alienation,  arising  from  hence  among  the  confederates,  was  not  less 
mischievious  than  discreditable  to  Athens.  We  cannot  doubt  that 
complaints  in  abundance  were  raised  in  the  confederate  synod ;  but 
they  must  have  been  unavailing,  since  the  abuse  continued  until  the 
period  shortly  preceding  the  battle  of  Chajroneia. 
ximid  such  apparent  dispositions  on  the  part  of  Athens  to  neglect 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  SOCIAL  AYAll. 


353 


the  interests  of  the  confederacy  for  purposes  of  her  own,  and  to  tole- 
rate  or  encourage  the  continued  positive  depredations  of  unpaid 
armaments— discontent  naturally  grew  up,  manifesting  itself  most 
powerfully  among  some  of  the  larger  dependencies  near  the  Asiatic 
coast.  The  islands  of  Chios,  Kos?  and' Rhodes,  together  with  the 
important  city  of  Byzantium  on  the  Thracian  Bosporus,  took  council 
together,  and  declared  themselves  detached  from  Athens  and  her  con- 
federacy. According  to  the  spirit  of  the  convention,  sworii  at  Sparta, 

immediately  before  the  battle  of  Leuktra, and  of  the  subsequent  alliaucei 
sworn  at  Athens,  a  few  monthsaflcrward— obligatory  and  indefeasil)le 
confederacies  stood  generally  condemned  among  the  Greeks,  so  that 
these  islands  were  justified  in  simply  seceding  when  they  thouiiht  fit. 
But  their  secession,  which  probably  Athens  Avould,  under  all  circum- 
stances, have  resisted,  w^as  proelaimed  in  a  hostile  manner,  accom 
panied  with  accusations  that  she  had  formed  treacherous  projcx'ts 
a^s^'ainst  them.     It  was  mo)-eover  fomented  by  the  intrigues,  as  well  as 
aided  by  the  arms,  of  the  Karian  prince  Mausolus.     Since  the  peace 
of  Antalkidas,  the  whole  Asiatic  coast  had  been  under  the  unresisted 
dominion  either  of  satraps  or  of  sulwrdinate  princes  dependent  upon 
Persia,  Wlio  were  watciiiiig  for  opportunities  of  extending  their  con- 
<[uests  in  the  neighboring  islands.     M;u]S(»Ius  appears  to  have  occu- 
pied botii  Kiiodes  and  Kos;  provoking  in  the  former  island  a  revolu- 
tion w  hich  placed  it  under  an  oligarchy,  not  only  devoted  to  him, 
but  further  sustained  by  the  presence  of  a  considerable  force  of  his 
mercenary  troops.     The  government  of  Chios  appears  to  have  been 
always  oligarchical;  wiiich  fact  was  one  ground  for  want  of  sympathy 
between  the  Chians  and  Athens.     Lastly,  the  Byzantines  had  also  a 
special  ground  for  diseontent;  since  they  assumed  the  privilege  of 
dct  doing  and  taxing  the  corn-ships  from  the  Euxiue  in  their  passage 
through  the  Bosporus— while   Athens,  as  chief  of  the  insular  con- 
federacy, claimed  that  right  for  hei-self,  and  at  any  rate  protested 
iigaiust  the  use  of  such  power  bv  any  other  city  for  its  own  separate 
proht. 

This  revolt,  the  bcginiiing  of  what  is  termed  the  Social  War,  waq 
a  formidable  shock  to  the  foreign  ascendency  of  Athens.  Among  all 
her  confederates,  Chios  was  the  largest  and  most  powerful,  the  entire 
island  being  under  one  single  government.  Old  men,  like  Plato  and 
Isokrates,  might  perhaps  recollect  the  affright  occasioned  at  Athens 
fifty-four  years  before  (B.C.  412)  by  the  news  of  the  former  revolt  of 
Chios,  shortly  after  the  great  disa.st«r  before  Syracu.se.  And  prob.-i- 
bly  the  alarm  was  not  nuich  less,  when  the  Athenians  were  now  i\\)- 
])rised  of  the  quadruple  defection  among  their  confederates  near  the 
Asiatic  coast.  The  joint  armament  of  all  four  was  mustered  at 
Chios,  whither  Mausolus  also  sent  a  re-enforcement.  The  Athenians 
equipped  a  fleet  with  land-forces  on  board,  to  attack  the  island;  and 
on  this  critical  occasion  we  may  presume  that  their  citizens  would 
overcome  the  reluctance  to  serve  in  person.  Chabrias  was  placed  in 
H.  G.  IV.— 12 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 

854 

comma,,,,  of  the  fleet.  Chares  of  the  ...^  ^^^^^^a^"^ 
baSon  the  island,  an.l  a  ]'»»» ''"*^';,"P"nVcrtcd.  When  Chares 
,e,  ami  land  .t  the  sa„.e  "^"'l f "':,^ ^^.^^^uL  felt  slro>,g e,>o,,gh 
ma,-ehed  up  to  •'•<^;-.^.;,'i'\^  S  "l.h  ,,o  .leci.ive  result;  «h.e 

C  .ub,  las  at  the  sanje  '/^'ISuons  for  defense  ha,l  hee„  e.Iect^ 

into  the  harbor.      B,it    he  l;'*""  """J    resolute.    Chabnas,  leading 

vely  take,,,  and  tl>e  Chiau  seame>     „,peti,osity,  became  euta„,alea 

he  attack  with  h.s  ^•'«™'^t"'^.,*'t,u\X     on  -dl  sid.'s.  ami  fell  g.d- 

among  the  enemy  s  "'^.^^^'X,  an  ships  either  were  not  forward 
lantlv'fiehting.     I  he  """e   Atl  emau  »    h  Their  attacl<  com- 

n  following  him.  or  could  n,ake  °o  ""P'f  "'^"^  ,vith  little  loss  ap- 
p^etely  failed.  a.,d  the  f  ^,  ^^^^^^  f^,,^!  Cl-res  with  his  land 
lrllliir.%?e,.'tglin^iu-Xr^heAthenia>,sf^^^^^ 

'^'^'^'^i  Cldos  .as  <^:^jt!^^  tt:;Sry  sS 
was  the  dearth  of  »>'  ''""Trw^r  ke  eitize'rdaring  as  a  soldier  and 
in  that  city,  that  the  '"f  "f,^  '  ,' Jl^^-asnever  afterwa.d  repaired, 
tried  as  a  commander  like  Chablla^^  The  other  hand,  tlie  event  was 
'  -o  the  Chians  and  their  allies,  on  <  •;  """^^  nievelv  ,o  maintain 
1  i°,ly  encouraging.     Thev  ^yere  enaWe  .  not  J'^  '    >,,,.^,„.  ;„,„  ,„« 

l,=eir-revolt.  l>"\ ''^•^°  .'°  "^lTi.*e„t-among  them  seemingly  Ses.os 
like  defection  other  f ''«^- «f, -^'^.^"i'  for  sSme  monllis  they  appear 
„nd  other  cities  on  ">«  «f"«^^^f""^a  ,,i,,,  a  fleet  of  100  triremes  dis- 
to  have  remained  masters  of  tlie  sea,  vvun  «  j      \AanAs  of  Lem- 

embarking  and  inflicting  devastation  on  the  Ah  ^m.  ^^_^^  ^^^,  ^,^f,.,^y. 
los,  IinbrSs,  Samos.  anS  e  sewhe  e,so  .^  to  c^^_^^^^  ^^  press  the  towr 


To   Chare'sriphi'krates  with  his  «°"-,;"^?;^'eU;e  Athenian 

Iheus.  Notwithstanding  ^^  ^^  ,,^Xe't  t  eir  first  efforts  to  the  rcduc- 
admirals  thought  it  prudent  ;  f  ^^^^^^^  f,  ,,ouut  importance  of  keep- 
tion  of  Byzantmm  probab  >  f^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^j  ^j^,  ^;Egean,  in  or  er 

ine  open  il»e  two  straits  belNv  cen  nie  r.  through  m  satety. 

hat  the  con.ships,  out  o   the    ormc  .^^^^  ^^^-^^.^  u.e  siege  of 

To  protect  Byzantium   ^^.^,  V  n,^!    k-o.)nt   in  which  narrow  strait 
Samos,  and  sailed   ^'"^  ^^^-^^^J^  ^^^^^^.^  ,  v,C^    Lacedamonians  had 
both  fleets  were  coHected^as  the  'J-^J^{,^^       ,^0,.,^      ^var.     A  plan  of 
been  during  the  dosing  i'^^^^f,.^/.  ll'^^e   h?ee  Athenian  commanders, 
naval  action  had  been  'f^^^^^^l^.^Zu  there  supervened  a  sud- 
and  was  on  the  point  of  taking  ^^^'\t  kouV  of  Iphikratcs  and  Timo- 
dpu   s  orm,  which,  in  the  judgment^  h?.lt  hi  the  execution.    They 
1\^"  if  rendered  U  -sl^,^^  P^^'^j^,  l^S'c^^  called  uiK^n  tlje 
therefore  hel<   off,  ^vhlle  <J     '*^«;^^^^^^^^a  ,u.hcd  into  the  tight  with- 
trierarchtj  and  seamen  to  loUow  him,  anu 


I 


TRIAL  OF  THE  AD^IIRALS. 


355 


/i 


To  wUl^n'!!^''^'''-  r^f  ^  ^'''^■^  defeated,  or  at  least  was  oblio-ed  to  re 

the  fleet  for  money  r'  ™"'°";s  the  r^  ^"''   V^.f'^'i'^*  """"^ 
wi?h  scran,  o„rf"r-  ""'V"'  Timothens  conducted  himself  fo   only 


356 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDOK. 


dered  yet  at  horae  his  demeanor  Avas  intolcraWy  arrogant  and  olTen- 
sive  especially  toward  the  leadini?  speakers  Avho  took  part  in  pubbc 
affairs.  While  reroirnized  as  a  man  of  ability  and  as  a  general  who 
Iiad  rendered  vahiable  service,  he  had  thus  incurred  personal  un- 
popularity and  made  nunurous  enemies,  cbietly  among  those  most 
able  to  do  him  harm.  Is(^kTates  tells  us  that  he  had  liimself  fre- 
quently remonstrated  with  Timothens  (as  Plato  admonislied  Dion) 
on  this  serious  fault,  ^vhich  overclouded  his  real  ability,  caused  him 
to  be  totally  misunderstood,  and  lai<l  up  against  him  a  fund  of  popu- 
lar dislike  sure  to  take  melancholy  effect  on  some  suitable  occasion 
Timotheus  (according  to  Isokrates),  though  admitting  the  justice  of 
the  reproof,  was  unable  to  conquer  his  own  natural  disposition.  If 
such  Avasthe  bearin«?  of  this  eminent  man,  as  described  bv  his  inti- 
mate friend,  we  may  judire  how  it  would  incense  unfriendly  politi- 
cians, and  even  indiliereiit  persons  wlio  knew  him  only  from  his 
obvious  exterior.  Iphikrates,  though  by  nature  a  proud  man,  was 
more  discreet  and  conciliatory  in  his  demeanor,  and  more  alive  to 
the  mischief  of  politicaf  odium.  ^Moreover,  he  seems  to  have  been 
an  effective  speaker  in  public,  and  his  popularity  among  the  military 
men  in  Athens  was  so  marked  that  on  this  very  trial  many  of  them 
manifested  their  sympathy  bv  appearing  in  arms  near  the  Dikastery. 
Under  these  circiimstances  we  may  easily  understand  that  C  hares 
and  Aristophon  miirht  find  it  convenient  to  press  their  charge  more 
pointedly  airainst  Timotheus  than  airainst  Iphikrates,  and  that  the 
Dikastery,  while  condemning  the  former,  may  have  been  less  con- 
vinced of  the  guilt  of  the  latter,  and  better  satisfied  in  every  way  to 

acquit  him.  ,  .  m-      ,i 

A  fine  of  100  talents  is  said  to  have  been  imposed  upon  limotheus, 
the  largest  fine  (according  to  Isokrates)  ever  imposed  at  Atiiens. 
Upon  his  condemnation  he  retired  to  Chalkis.  wiiere  he  died  three 
years  afterward,  in  354  B.C.  In  the  year  succeeding  his  death  his 
memory  was  still  very  unpopular,  yet  it  appears  that  the  fine  was 
remitted  to  his  family,  and  that  his  son  Konon  was  allowed  to  com- 
promise the  demand  by  a  disbursement  of  the  smaller  sum  of  tea 
talents  for  the  repairs  of  the  city  walls.  It  seems  evident  that 
Timotheus,  by  his  retirement,  evaded  payment  of  the  full  tine,  so 
that  his  son  Konon  appears  after  him  as  one  of  the  richest  citizens 

in  Athens.  .  r    ♦        4. 

The  loss  of  such  a  citizen  as  Timothens  was  a  fresh  misfortune  to 
her.  He  had  conducted  her  armies  with  signal  success,  maintsuned 
the  honor  of  her  name  throuixhout  the  Eastern  and  Western  Seas, 
and  ureatly  extended  the  list  of  her  foreign  allies.  She  had  recently 
lost  Chabrias  in  battle;  a  second  general.  Timotheus.  was  now  taken 
from  her;  and  the  third,  Iphikrates,  though  acquitted  at  the  last  trial, 
seems,  as  far  as  we  can  make  out,  never  to  have  been  subsequently 
employed  on  military  command.  These  three  were  the  last  eminent 
jliilitafy  citizens  at  Athens,  for  Phokion,  though  brave  and  deserv- 

trie 


EXPEDITION  OF   CHARES. 


357 


ing,  was  not  to  be  compared  with  either  of  them.  On  the  other 
hand,  Cliares,  a  man  of  great  personal  courage,  but  of  no  other  merit, 
was  now  in  the  full  swing  of  reputation.  The  recent  judicial  feud 
between  the  three  Athenian  admirals  had  been  doubly  injurious  to 
Athens,  first  as  discrediting  Iphikrates  and  Timotheus,  next  as  exalt- 
ing Chares,  to  whom  the  sole  command  was  now^  confided. 

In  the  succeeding  year,  356  B.C.,  Chares  conducted  another  powerful 
fleet  to  attack  tlie  revolted  allies.  Being,  however,  not  furni.shed 
with  adequate  funds  from  home  to  pay  his  troops,  chiefly  foreign 
mercenaries,  he  thought  it  expedient  on  his  own  responsibility  to 
accept  an  offer  from  Artabazus  (satrap  of  Daskylium  and  the  region 
south  of  the  Propontis),  then  in  revolt  against  the  Persian  king. 
Chares  joined  Artabazus  with  his  own  army,  re-enforced  by  addi- 
tional bodies  of  mercenaries  recently  disbanded  by  the  Persian 
satraps.  With  this  entire  force  he  gave  battle  to  the  king's  troops 
under  the  command  of  Tithraustes,  and  gained  a  splendid  victory; 
upon  which  Artabazus  remunerated  him  so  liberally  as  to  phice  the 
whole  Athenian  army  in  temporary  atHuence.  The  Athenians  at 
home  were  at  first  much  displeased  with  their  general  for  violating 
his  instructions  and  withdrawing  his  army  from  its  prescribed  and 
legitimate  task.  The  news  of  his  victory,  howx^ver,  and  of  the 
lucrative  recompense  following  it,  somewhat  mollified  them.  But 
presently  they  learned  tliat  the  Persian  king,  indignant  at  such  a 
gratuitous  aggression  on  their  part,  was  equipping  a  large  fleet  to 
second  the  operations  of  their  enemies.  Intimidated  by  the  prospect 
of  Persian  attack,  they  became  anxious  to  conclude  peace  with  the 
revolted  allies,  who  on  tlieir  part  were  not  less  anxious  to  terminate 
the  war.  Embassies  being  exchanged  and  negotiations  opened,  in 
the  ensuing  year  (355  B.C.,  the  third  of  the  war)  a  peace  was  sworn, 
whereby  the  Athenians  recognized  the  complete  autonomy  and  sever- 
ance from  their  confederacy  of  the  revolted  cities  Chios,  Rhodes, 
Ko8,  and  Byzantium. 

Such  was  the  termination  of  Ihe  Social  War,  which  fatally  impaired 
the  powTr  and  lowered  the  dignity  of  Athens.  Impei-fectly  as  we 
know  the  events,  it  .seems  clear  that' her  efforts  to  meet  this  formidable 
revolt  were  feeble  and  inadequate;  evincing  a  sad  downf-all  of  energy 
since  the  year  413  B.C.,  when  she  had  contended  with  tran.scendent 
vigor  against  similar  and  ever  greater  calamities,  only  a  year  after 
/ler  irreparable  disaster  before  Syracus.-.  Inglorious  as  'the  resuU 
of  the  Social  War  was,  it  had  nevertheless  been  costly,  and  left 
Athens  poor.  The  annual  revenues  of  her  confederacy  were  greatly 
lessened  by  the  secession  of  so  many  important  cities,  and  her  public 
treasury  was  exhausted.  It  is  just  at  this  time  that  the  activity  of 
Demosthenes  as  a  public  adviser  begins.  In  a  speecli  delivered  Uiis 
year  (355  B.C.)  he  notes  the  poverty  of  the  treasury;  and  refers  back 
to  it  in  discourses  of  after  time  as  a  fact  but  too  notorious. 

But  the  misfortunes  arising  to  Athens  from  the  Social  War  did 


356 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


derea  yet  at  home  his  demeanor  >va9  intolcvnhly  arrogant  «nd  «ff ai- 
.he  especially  toward  Ibe  leadin-  speakers  who  took  part  in  puh  c 
affair'  While  recognized  as  a  man  of  ability  and  as  a  general  .vho 
Ind  tendered  vahiable  serTice,  he  had  thus  incurred  personal  un- 
opula^^^  niatle  numerous  enennes,  cbielly  among  those  most 

iT  to  do  him  harm.  Isnkrates  tells  us  that  he  had  l'^  }'^f  f'^' 
m'ently  remonstnUed  with  Timothens  (as  Plato  f  ;j;«»^^^'^^\P;^"> 
on  this  serious  fault,  which  overclouded  his  real  abihtv.  csmscd  him 
to  be  mta  ly  misunderst.)od.  and  laid  up  against  him  a  fund  of  popu- 
l  r  di  like  siT^  to  take  mclaDch(,ly  effect  on  some  suitable  occasion 
T  nfot  icus  aceording  to  l.okratt4  though  admitting  the  .pis  ice  of 
the  reproof,  was  unable  to  conquer  his  own  ««  "'"^•I^'lw  .  inti 
such  was  the  bearing  of  this  eminent  man,  as  describee   bv  his  in  i- 

^^H^nd   we  m.:V  Judge  ^'^  ^^ --^^^  ^^^^hir  mW^'^oJ^r  1^^ 
cians  and  even  indifferent  persons  who  knew  him  only  i»<'"\'^>^ 
X  ous  exterior.     Iphikrates.  though  by  nature  a  proud  man,  as  as 
more  discreet  and  conciliatory  in  his  demeanor,  and  more  ahve  to 
Te  m  scldef  of  politicaf  odium.     Moreover,  he  seems  to  have  beea 
In  eSve  speaker  in  public,  and  his  popularity  an>ong  ihe  mill  ary 
iiKMi  in  \thens  was  so  narked  that  on  this  very  trial  many  of  them 
ni'sted  their  sympathy  by  appearing  in  arms  "-^  the   >ikas  ery 
Under  these  circumstances  we  may  easily  ""^^^•^-     '  .^/.f,^,^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
and  Aristophon  miiiht  find  it  convenient  to  pr;';^^    le  i       ;^^[    '^/.^ 
pointedly  against  Timothens  than  against  ^P^^^  vf>h;M  n  It^s  con 
DikasterV   while  condemnini?  the  former,  may  have  been  less  con 
vinced^^the  Luilt  of  the  latter,  and  better  satisfied  in  every  way  to 

''TfiiJ'J^f  100  talents  is  said  to  have  been  imposed  upon  Timothens 
the  larfiest  fine  (accordinir  to  Isokrates)  ever  imposed  at  Athens. 
L>n  hf  cr^lJdennmtion  he  retiie<l  to  Chalkis.  wbere  ^^^e  died  three 
ycLs  afterward,  in  354  n.c  In  the  year  «"^^'^^^;^>\*;\ /i:f;,\.'^^ 
memory  was  still  very  unpopular,  yet  it  appears  ^»»  ,\^^^»^,  ,^"\.;'^^" 
remitted  to  his  family,  and  that  his  son  Konon  ^vas  owe  to  on^. 
nrorai^e  the  demand  by  a  disbursement  of  the  smallei  sum  ot  un 
Ets  firthe  repairs^f  the  city  walls.  IV'T^ute^utfine  so 
Timothens,  by  his  retirement,  evaded  payment  o  the  u  fine  so 
that  his  son  Konon  appears  after  him  as  one  of  the  richest  citizens 

'"The Toss  of  such  a  citizen  as  Timothens  was  a  fresh  nii^^fortu^^ 
her      He  had  conducted  her  armies  with  signal  success,  manit^nnul 
the  honor  of  her  name  throughout  the  Ea.stern  '^^^.^^^'ff "  ^'l^ 
and  ureatly  extended  the  list  of  her  foreign  allies.     She  had  recently 
?o^  Chabria.s  in  battle;  a  second  general.  Timothens  ^va^mvw  taken 
from  her;  and  the  third,  Iphikrates,  though  acquitted  at  [^^^  la^^^ 
seem,   as  far  as  we  can  make  out,  never  to  have  been  subsequently 
emp  Ved  on  military  command.     These  three  were  the  I-^t  eminent 
pjaitaiy  citizens  at  Athens,  for  Phokion,  though  brave  and  deserv- 


EXPEDITION  OF   CHARES. 


357 


¥j 


ing,  was  not  to  be  compared  with  either  of  them.  On  the  other 
hand,  Chares,  a  man  of  great  personal  courage,  but  of  no  other  merit 
was  now  in  the  full  swing  of  reputation,  the  recent  judicial  feud 
between  the  three  Athenian  admirals  had  been  doubly  injurious  to 
Athens,  first  as  discrediting  Iphikrates  and  Timotheus,  next  as  exalt- 
ing Chares,  to  whom  the  sole  command  was  now^  confided. 

In  the  succeeding  year,  350  n.c,  Chares  conducted  another  powerful 
fleet  to  attack  the  revolted  allies.     Being,  however,  not  furnished 
with  adequate  funds  from  home  to  pay  his  troops,  chiefly  foreio'n 
mercenaries,  he  thought  it  expedient  on  his  own  responsibility  lo 
accept  an  offer  froiji  Artabazus  (satrap  of  Dusky  Hum  and  the  region 
south  of  the  Pioponlis),  then  in  revolt  against  the  Persian  k1ncr. 
Chares  joined  Artabazus  with  his  own  army,  re-enforced  by  addi- 
tional bodies  of    mercenaries  recently  disbanded   by  the    Persian 
satraps.     With  this  entire  force  he  gave  battle  to  the  king's  troops 
untler  the  command  of  Tithraustes,  and  gained  a  splendid  victory; 
upon  which  Artabazus  remunerated  him  so  liberally  as  to  place  the 
whole  Athenian  army  in  temporary  afliuence.     The  Athenians  at 
hoine  were  at  first  much  displeased  with  their  general  for  violating 
his  instructions  and  withdrawing  his  army  from  its  prescribed  and 
legitimate  task.      The   news  of  his  victory,  however,  and  of   the 
lucrative  recompense  following  it,  somewhat  mollified  tliem.     But 
presently  they  learned  that  the  Persian  king,  indignant  at  such  a 
gratuitous  aggression  on  their  part,  was  equippino-  a  large  fleet  to 
second  the  operations  of  tiieir  enemies.     IntimidateU  by  tlie  prospect 
of  Persian  attack,  they  became  anxious  to  conclude  peace  with  the 
revolted  allies,  who  on  their  part  were  not  less  anxious  to  terminate 
the  w^ar.     Embassies  being  exchanged  and  negotiations  opened   in 
the  ensuing  year  (355  B.C.,  the  third  of  the  war)  a  peace  was  sworn, 
w^hereby  the  Athenians  recognized  the  complete  autonomy  and  sever- 
ance from  their  confederacy  of  the  revolted  cities  Chios,  Khodes 
Ko8,  and  Byzantium.  '  ' 

Such  was\he  termination  of  Ihe  Social  War,  Avhich  fatally  impaired 
the  power  and  lowered  the  dignity  of  Athens.  Impeifectly  as  we 
know  the  events,  it  seems  clear  that' her  eff'ons  to  meet  this  formidable 
revolt  were  feeble  and  inadequate;  evincin<2:  a  sad  downfall  of  ener'^vr 
since  the  year  412  B.C.,  when  she  had  contended  with  transcendent 
vigor  against  similar  and  ever  greater  calamities,  only  a  year  after 
yier  irreparable  disaster  before  Syracus.^.  Inglorious  as  'the  result 
of  the  Social  War  was,  it  had  nevertheless  been  costly,  and  left 
Athens  poor.  The  annual  revenues  of  her  confederacy  were  greatly 
lessened  by  the  secession  of  so  many  important  cities,  and  her  public 
treasury  was  exhausted.  It  is  just  at  this  time  that  the  activity  of 
Demosthenes  as  a  public  adviser  begins.  In  a  speech  delivered  "this 
year  (355  B.C.)  he  notes  the  poverty  of  the  treasury;  and  refers  back 
to  it  in  discourses  of  after  time  as  a  fact  but  too  notorious. 
But  the  misfortunes  arising  to  Athens  from  the  Social  War  did 


SoS 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


not  come  alone.     It  had  the  further  effect  of  renderinir  her  less 
competent  for  defense  against  the  early  aggressions  ot  i'hilip  ot 

^^Tliarprince.  during  the  first  year  of  his  accession  (359  b.c  )  had 
souc'ht  to  conciliate  Athens  by  various  measures,  but  especial.y  by 
withdrawing  his  garrison  from  Amphipolis,  Nvhile  he  vvas  establish- 
ino-  his  military  strength  in  tlie  interior  a,;ainst   the    Ilynans  :iu«i 
PiSonians      He  had  employed  in  this  manner  a  period  ap.parcnlly 
somewhat  less  than  two  years;  and  employed  it  witli  such  success, 
as  to  humble  his  enemies  in  the  interior,  and  get  together  a  force 
competent  for  aggressive  operations  against  the. cities  on  the  coast 
During  tliis  interval  Amphipolis  remained  a  tree  r.nd  independent 
city  formallv  renounced  bv   Philip,  and  not  assailed  by  the  Athe- 
nian's    Whv'thev  let  slip  this  favorable  opportunity  of  again  entorc- 
in-  by  arms  pretensions  on  which  they  laid  so  much  stress— I  have 
before  partially  (though  not  very  satisfactorily)  explained.     Philip 
was  not  the  man  to  let  them  enjoy  the  opportunity  longer  than  he 
could  help   or  to  defer  the  moment  of  active  operations  as  they  aid. 
Toward  the  close  of  358  u.c,  finding  his  hands  free  from  impedi- 
ments in  the  interior,  he  forwith  commenced  the  siege  of  Amphipolis 
The  inhabitants  are  said  to  have  been  unfavorably  disposed  toward 
liiin   and  to  have  given  him  many  causes  for  war.     It  is  not  easy  to 
understand  what  these  causes  could  have  been,  seeing  that  so  short 
a  time  before,  the  town  had  been  garrisoned  by  Macedonians  invoked 
as  protectors  against  Athens;  nor  were  the  inhabitants  in  any  condi- 
tion to  act  acrgressively  against  Philip. 

Havinir  in  vain  summoned  Amphipolis  to  surrender,  Philip  com- 
menced a  strenuous  siege,  assailing  the  walls  with   batlering-rams 
and  other  militarv  enirines.     The  weak  points  of  the  lortihcation 
must  have  been  well  known  to  him,  from  Ids  own  soldiers  who  had 
])een  recentlv  in  garrison.     The  inhabittints  defended   themselves 
with  vi<^or-  but  such  was  now  the  change  of  circumstances,  that  they 
were  forced  to  solicit  their  ancient  enemy   iVthens  for  aid  against 
the  Macedonian  prince.     Their  ( nvoys  Hierax  and  SM;atokles,  reach- 
iu<r  Athens  shortlv  after  the  successful  close  of  the  Athenian  expe- 
diSon  to  EulKPa.  presented  themselves  before  the  public  assembly, 
urgentlv  inviting  the  Athenians  to  come  forthwith  and  occupy  Am- 
phipolis, as  the  onlv  chance  of  rescue  from  Macedonian  dominion 
We  are  not  certain  whether  the  Social  War  had  yet  broken  out;  it  it 
had   Athens  would  hv  too  much  pressed  with  anxieties  arising  out  ot 
so  formidable  a  revolt,  to  have  mean«^  disposable  even  ior  the  ti  mpl- 
in^  recovervof  the  lon<r-lost  Amphipolis.     But  at  any  rate  Imlip 
hall  foreseen  and  counteVworked  the  prayers  of  the  Amphipoliians 
He  sent  a  courteous  letter  to  the  Athenians,  acquainting  them  that 
he  was  besieL'inir  the  town,  yet  recognizing  it  as  belonging  of  right  to 
them.  ;ind  promising  to  restore  it  to  them  when  he^liould  have  suc- 
ceeded in  the  capture. 


. 


I 


H^ 


INACTION  OF  ATHENS, 


359 


Much  of  the  future  history  of  Greece  turned  upon  the  mnnner  i:i 
which  Athens  dealt  with  these  two  confiictino:  mv?ssaii:e^..  The  situation 
of  Amphipolis.  commanding  the  passage  over  the  Strymon.  was  not 
only  all-iinporlant— as  shutting  up  Macedonia  to  the  eastward  and  as 
op.uiing  the  gold  regions  around  Mount  Pangieus— but  was  alsoeasilv 
defensible  by  the  Athenians  fr:)m  seaward,  if  once  acquired.     Had 
they  been  clearsighted  in  the  appreciation  of  chances,  and  vigilant; 
in  respect  to  future  defease,   they  might  now  have  acquired  this 
important  place,  and  might  have  held  it  against  the  utmost  efforts 
of  Pliilip.     But  that  fatal  inaction  which  had  become  their  jxeneral 
besetting  sin,   was  on   the    present  occasion    en(;ouraged   by  some 
plausil)le,    yet  delusive,    pleas.     The   news  of  the   danger  *of  the 
Amphipolitans  would  be  not  unwelcome  at  Athens— where  strong- 
aversion  was  entertained  toward  tiiem,  as  refractory  occui)ants  of  u 
territory  not  their  own.  and  as  having  occasioned  repeated  loss  and 
humiliation    to   the  Athenian   arms.     Nor  could  t!ie   Athenians   at 
once  shift  their  point  of  view,  so  as  to  contemplate  the  question  on 
the  ground  of  policy  alone,  and  to  recognize  these  old  enemies  as  per- 
sons whose  interests  had  now  come  into  harmony  with  their  own 
On   the  oiher  han.j,  the  present  tem])er  of  the  Athenians  toward 
Phili])  was  highly  favorable.     Not  only  had  they  made  peace  with 
him  during  the  oreci.M.ing  year,  but  thev  also  felt  tliat  he  had  treated 
them  well  both  in  evacuating  Amphii)olis  and  in  di^missin"-  honor- 
ably their  eiiizens  who  had  been  taken  prisoners  in  the  armv  of  his 
competitor  Argicus.     Hence   they   were   predisposed   to  credit   his 
positive  assurance,  that  he  only  wished  to  take  the  place  in  order  to 
expel  a  troublesome' population  who  h:id  w^ronued  and  annoyed  him 
and  that  he  would  readily  liand  it  over  to  its  riirhtfnl  owners  the 
Athenians.     To  grant  the  applieation  of  t!ie  Amnhipolitans  for  aid 
would  thus  appear,  at  Athens,  to  be  courtinu;  a  new  war  and  break- 
ing with  a  \ialuable  friend,  in  order  to  protect  an  odious  enemy   and 
to  secure  an  acquisition  wiiich  would  at  all  events  come  to 'them 
even  if  they  remained  still,   through  the  cession  of  Pliilip      It  is 
necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  motives  which  determined  Athens  on 
tliis  occasion  to  refrain  from  interference;  since  there  were  probably- 
few  of  her  resolutions  which  she  afterward  more  bitterly  regretted 
The  letter  of  assurance  from  Philip  was  received  and  tmsted-  the 
envoys  from  Amphipolis  were  dismissed  with  a  refusal. 

Deprived  of  all  hope  of  aid  from  Athens,  the  Amphipolitans  still 
held  out  as  long  as  they  could.  But  a  parly  in  the  town  entered 
into  correspondence  v.-lth  Piiilip  to  betray  it.'and  the  defense  thus 
gradually  became  feebler.  At  length  he  made  a  breach  in  tiie  walls 
sutiicient,  with  the  aid  of  partisans  within,  to  carry  the  city  l)v 
assault,  not  without  a  brave  resistance  from  those  wdio  still  remained 
faithful.  All  the  citizens  unfriendly  to  him  were  expelled  or  fled 
the  rest  were  treated  with  lenity;  but  we  are  told  that  little  favor 
was  shown  by  Philip  toward  those  who  had  helped  in  the  betrayal 


360 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON. 


Amphipolis  was  to  Philip  an  acqi'isition  of  unspeakable  impor- 
X:n\vc,  uot  less  lor  det'i  iiise  than  for  olient^e.  it  was  not  only  the  most 
(oiiveuient  maritime  station  in  Thraee.  but  it  also  threw  open  to  li.m 
all  the  country  east  of  the  Strvmon,  and  (sjiecially  the  g<jld  region 
near  Mount  Pangaus.  He  established  liimseif  firmly  in  his  new 
position,  which  continued  from  henceforward  one  of  tlie  bulwarks  of 
Macedonia,  until  the  conquest  of  that  kingdom  by  the  Komaus.  He 
took  no  steps  to  fulfill  his  promise  of  handing  over  the  place  to  the 
Athenians,  who  doubtless  sent  embassies  to  den.and  it.  The  Social 
"VVar,  indeed,  which  just  now  broke  out,  ab-orbed  a'il  their  care  and 
all  their  forces,  so  llnit  Ihey  were  \u  able,  amidst  their  disastrous 
reverses  at  Chios  and  elsewlieie,  to  take  ci.ciiietic  measures  in  refer- 
ence to  Philip  and  AnJi)hipolis.  Nevertheless  he  still  did  not  per- 
emptorily refuse  the  surrender,  but  continued  to  amuse  the  Athenians 
with  deliisive  hopes,  suggested  through  his  partisans,  paitl  or  volun- 
tary, in  the  public  assembly. 

It  was  the  more  necissary  for  him  to  postpone  any  open  breach 
with  Athens,  because  the  Ohnthians  had  conceived  serious  alaim 
from  his  conquest  of  Amphij'olis,  and  had  sent  to  negotiate  a  treaty 
of  aniitv  and  alliance  with  the  Athenians,  ^^u(•h  an  alliance,  had  it 
been  concluded,  would  have  impeded  the  farther  schemes  of  Phdip. 
But  his  partisans  at  Athens  piocurid  the  dismissal  of  the  Olynlhijin 
envoys,  by  renewed  assurances  that  the  Macedonian  prince  was  still 
the  friend  of  Athens,  and  still  disposed  to  cede  Aniphipolis  as  her 
legitimate  possession.  Thev  represented,  however,  that  he  had  good 
gHMind  for  complaining  tha't  Athens  continue  d  to  ret-  in  Pydna,  an 
ancient  Macedonian  seaport.  Accordingly  they  proposed  to  open 
ncg(jtiations  with  him  for  the  exchange  of  Pydna  against  Amphipo- 
lis.  But  as  the  Pydna?ans  were  known  to  be  adverse  to  the  tiansler, 
secrecy  was  indispensable  in  tlie  preliminary  proceedings;  so  that 
Antiphon  and  Chariilemus,  the  t\vo  envoys  nan.ed,  took  their  instruc- 
tions from  the  Senate  and  made  their  reports  only  to  the  Senate. 
The  public  assembly  being  informed  that  negotiations,  unavoidably 
secret,  were  proceeding,  to  insure  the  acquisition  of  Amphipolis — 
was  persuaded  to  repel  the  advances  of  Olynthus,  as  well  as  to  look 
upon  Philip  still  as  a  friend. 

The  prolTenMl  alliance  of  the  Olynthians  was  thus  rejected,  as  the 
entreaty  of  the  Amphipolitans  for  aid  had  i)reviously  been.  AUiens 
had  good  reason  to  repent  of  both.  The  secret  negotiation  brought 
her  no  nearer  to  the  possession  of  Amphipolis.  It  ended  in  nothing, 
or  in  worse  than  nothinL^  as  it  amused  her  with  delusive  expecta- 
tions, while  Philip  opened  a  treaty  with  the  Olynthians.  irritated,  of 
course,  by  their  recent  repulse  at  Athens.  As  yet  he  had  maintained 
pacific  relations  with  the  Athenians,  even  while  holding  Amphipolis 
contrary  to  his  encragement.  But  he  now  altered  his  policy,  and  con- 
tracted^diiance  with  the  Olynthians,  whose  friendship  he  purchased 
not  only  by  ceding  to  them* the  district  of  Anthemus  (lying  between 


i 


J 


CONQUEST  OF  PYDNA  AND  POTID^A. 


361 


Olynthus  and  Therma,  and  disputed  by  the  Olynthians  with  former 
j\[acedoijian  kings),  but  also  by  conquering  and  handing  over  to 
them  the  important  Athenian  i)ossession  of  Polidrea.  We  know  no 
particulars  of  these  imi)ortant  tiansactions.  Our  scanty  authorities 
merely  inform  us,  that  during  the  tirst  two  years  (358-35G  n.c).  while 
Athens  was  absorbed  by  her  dis:iStrous  Social  \\  ar,  Philip  began  to 
act  as  her  avowed  enemy.  He  conquered  from  her  not  only  P3^diia 
and  other  places  for  himself,  but  also  Polidica  for  tie  Olynthians. 
We  are  told  that  Pydna  was  betrayed  to  Philip  by  a  party  of  traitors 
in  the  town;  and  lie  probably  availed  himself  of  the  propositions 
made  by  Athens  respeciiiig  the  exchange  of  Pydna  for  Amphipolis, 
to  exasperate  the  Pydmcans  against  her  bad  faiih,  since  they  would 
have  good  ground  for  resenting  the  project  of  transferring  them 
underhand,  contrary  to  their  own  inclination.  Pydna  was  the  first 
place  besieged  and  captured.  Several  of  its  inhabitants,  on  the 
ground  of  prior  offense  toward  ^Macedonia,  are  said  to  have  been 
slain,  while  even  those  who  had  betrayed  the  town  were  contemptu- 
ously treated.  The  siege  lasted  long  enough  to  transmit  news  to 
Athens,  and  to  receive  aid,  had  the"  Athenians  acted  with  proper 
celerity  in  dispatching  forces.  But  either  the  pressure  of  the  Social 
War,  or  the  impatience  of  personal  s(;rviceas  well  as  of  pecuniary  ])ay- 
ment,  or  both  causes  operating  together,  made  them  behindhand  with 
the  exigency.  Several  Athenian  citizens  were  taken  in  Pydna  and 
sold  into  slavery,  some  being  ransomed  by  Demosthenes  out  of  his 
own  funds;  yet  we  cannot  make  out  clearly  that  any  relief  at  all  was 
sent  from  Athens.     If  any  was  sent,  it  came  too  late. 

Equal  tardiness  was  shown  in  the  relief  sent  to  Potida3a,  though 
the  siege,  carried  on  jointly  by  Philip  and  the  Olynthians,  was  both 
long  and  costly,  and  though  there  was  a  body  o'^f  Athenian  settlers 
(Kleruchs)  resident  there,  whom  the  capture  of  the  phu-e  expelled 
from  their  houses  and  properties.  Even  for  the  rescue  of  these  fel- 
low-citizens, it  does  not  appear  that  any  native  Athenians  would 
undertake  the  burden  of  personal  servicjc."^  The  relieving  force  dis- 
patched seems  to  have  consisted  of  a  general  with  mercenary  foreign- 
ers, who,  as  no  pay  was  provided  for'them,  postponed  the  enterprise 
on  which  they  were  sent,  to  the  temptiUion  of  plundering  elsewhere  for 
their  own  profit.  It  was  thus  that  Philip,  without  any  express  declara- 
tion of  war,  commenced  a  series  of  hostile  measures  against  Athens, 
and  deprived  her  of  several  valuable  maritime  possessions  on  the 
coast  of  ^lacedonia  and  Thrace,  besides  his  breach  of  faith  respecting 
the  cession  of  Amphipolis.  After  her  hisses  from  the  Social  War, 
and  her  disappointment  about  Amphipolis,  she  was  yet  further  morti- 
fied by  seeing  Pydna  pass  into  his  hands,  and  Polida^a  (the  most 
important  possession  in  Thrace  next  to  Amphipolis)  into  those  of 
Olynthus.  Her  impoverished  settlers  returned  home,  doubtless  with 
bitter  complaints  against  the  aggression,  but  also  with  just  vexation 
against  the  tardiness  of  their  countrymen  in  sending  relief. 


362 


PHILIP   OF  MACEDON. 


These  two  years  had  been  so  employed  by  Philij^  as  to  advance 
prodigiously  his  power  and  ascendency.  He  had  deprived  Athens  of 
her  hold  upon  the  Thermaic  gulf,  in  which  she  now  seems  only  to 
have  retained  the  town  of  Methone,  instead  of  the  series  of  ports 
round  the  gulf  acquired  for  her  by  Tiuiotheus.  He  had  conciliated 
the  good-vv^ill  of  the  Olynthians  by  his  cession  of  Anthemus  and 
Potidica;  the  latter  place,  from  its  commanding  situation  on  the 
isthmus  of  Pallene,  giving  them  the  mastery  of  that  peninsula,  and 
insuring  (what  to  Philip  was  of  great  importance)  their  enmity  with 
Athens.  He  not  only  improved  the  maritime  conveniences  of  Am- 
phipolis.  but  also  extended  hisact|uisitious  into  the  auriferous  regions 
of  Mount  Pangicus  eastward  of  the  iStrymon.  He  possessed  himself 
of  that  productive  country  immediately  facing  the  island  of  Thasos; 
^where  both  Thasians  and  Athenians  had  once  contended  for  the 
rights  of  mining,  and  from  whence,  apparently,  both  had  extracted 
valuable  produce.  In  the  inteiior  of  this  region  he  founded  a  new 
city  called  Philippi,  enlarged  from  a  previous  town  called  Krenides, 
recent Iv  founded  bv  the  Thasians.  Moreover,  he  took  such  effective 
measures  for  increasing  the  metallic  works  in  the  neighborhood,  that 
they  presently  yielded  to  him  a  large  revenue;  according  to  Diodorus, 
not' less  than  1000  talents  per  annum.  He  caused  a  new  gold  coin  to 
be  struck,  bearing  a  name  derived  from  his  own.  The  fresh  source 
of  wealth  thus  opened  was  of  the  greatest  moment  to  him.  as  furnish- 
ing means  to  meet  the  constantly  increasing  expense  of  his  military 
force.  He  had  full  employment  to  keej)  his  soldiers  in  training;  for 
the  nations  of  the  interior — Illyrians,  Pseonians,  and  Thracians — 
humbled  but  not  subdued,  rose  again  in  arms,  and  tried  again  jointly 
to  reclaim  their  independence.  The  army  of  Philip — vinder  his  gen- 
eral Parmenio,  of  whom  we  now  hear  for  the  first  time — defeated 
them,  and  again  reduced  them  to  submission. 

It  was  during  this  interval  too  that  Philip  married  Olympias, 
daughter  of  Neoptolemos  prince  of  tlic  ]Molossi,  and  descended  trom 
the  ancient  Mok)ssian  kings,  who  boasted  of  an  heroic  ^akid  gene- 
alogy. Philip  had  seen  her  at  the  religious  mysteries  in  the  island 
of  Bamothrace,  where  both  were  initiated  at  the  same  time.  In  vio- 
lence of  temper — in  jealous,  cruel,  and  vindictive  disposition — she 
forms  almost  a  parallel  to  the  Persian  queens  Amestris  and  Paiysatis. 
The  Epirotic  wc  men,  as  well  as  the  Tliracian,  were  much  giveii  to 
the  Bacchanalian  reliuious  rites,  celebrated  with  fierce  ecstasv  amkl 
the  mountain  .*;oli;udes  in  honor  of  Dionysus.  To  this  spedes  of 
religious  excitement  Olynipius  wsis  peculiarly  susccptiljle.  Khe  is 
said  to  have  been  fond  of  tame  snakes  playing  around  her,  and  to 
have  indulged  in  (cremonies  ot  magic  and  iiK-antation.  Her  tetiiper 
and  diameter  !«  cauic.  alter  no  h  ng  time,  repulsive  and  even  alarm- 
ing to  Philip.  But  in  the  year  ooG  u.c.  she  bore  to  hini  a  son,  after- 
ward renowned  as  Alexander  tl<e  Great.  It  was  in  the  summer  of 
thi-;  year,  not  long  alur  tLc  t;  kii:^-  of  Potidtea,  that  Philip  received 


CAUSES  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 


363 


nearly  at  the  same  time,  three  messengers  with  good  news — the  birth 
of  his  son;  the  defeat  of  the  Illyrians  by  Parmenio;  and  the  success  of 
one  of  his  running  horses  at  the  Olympic  games. 


CHAPTER  LXXXVII. 

FROM  THE  COM>rENCEMENT   OF  THE   SACRED   WAR  TO  THAT   OF  THE 

OLYNTHIAN    WAR. 

It  has  been  recounted  in  the  preceding  chapter,  how  Philip,  dur- 
ing the  continuance  of  the  Social  War,  aggrandized  himself  in  Mace- 
donia and  Thrace  at  the  expense  of  Athens,  bv  the  acquisition  of 
Amphip,)]is,  Pydna,  and  Potiihea— the  two  last  actually  taken  from 
her,  the  first  captured  only  under  false  assurances  held  out  to  her 
while  he  was  besieging  it:  how  he  had  further  strengthened  himself 
by  enlisting  Olyntlius  both  as  an  ally  of  his  own,  and' as  an  enemy  of 
the  Athenians.  He  had  thus  begun  the  war  against  Athens,  usually 
spoken  of  as  the  war  about  Ainphipolis,  which  lasted  without  any 
formal  peace  for  twelve  years.  The  resistance  opposed  by  Athens 
to  Uiese  his  first  aggressions  had  been  faint  and  ineffective— partly- 
owing  to  embarrassments.  But  the  Soci:d  War  had  not  vet  terminatecl, 
when  new  embarrassments  and  complications,  of  a  far  more  formid- 
able nature,  sprang  up  elsewhere— known  l)y  the  name  of  the  Sacred 
War,  rending  the  very  entrails  of  the  Hellenic  world,  and  profitable 
only  to  the  indefatigable  aggressor  in  Macedonia. 

The  Amphiktyonic  assembly,  which  we  shall  now  find  exahed 
into  an  inauspicious  notoriety,  was  an  Hellenic  institution  ancient 
and  venerable,  but  rarely  invested  with  practical  cflicimcy.  T'louL'ii 
political  by  occasion,  it  was  religious  it\  its  main  purpose,  associated 
with  the  worship  of  Apollo  at  Delphi  and  of  Demeter  at  Thermo- 
pylae. Its  assemblies  were  held  twice  annually— in  spring  at  Delphi, 
in  autumn  at  Thermopylae:  vrhile  in  every  fourth  year  it  presided  at 
the  celebration  of  the  great  Pythian  festival  near  Delphi,  or  appointed 
persons  to  preside  in  its  name.  It  consisted  of  deputies  called  Hier- 
omnemones  and  Pylagorae,  sent  by  the  twelve  ancient  nations  or 
fractions  of  the  Hellenic  name,  who  were  recognized  as  its  constit- 
uent body:  Thessalians,  Bceotians,  Dorians.  lonians,  Perrhaebians, 
Magnetes,  Lokrians,  (Eta?ans  or  ^Enianes,  ^chseans.  Malians,  Pho- 
kiaus,  Dolo^oes.  These  were  the  twelve  nations,  sole  partners  in  the 
Amphiktyonic  sacred  riles  and  meetings:  each  nation,  small  and 
great  alike,  having  two  votes  in  the  decision  and  no  more;  and  each 
city,  small  and  great  alike,  contributing  equally  to  make  up  the 
two  votes  of  that  nation  to  which  it  belonged.  Tims  Sparta  counted 
only  us  one  of  the  various  communities  forming  the  Dorian  nation: 


364 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


Athens,  in  like  manner  in  the  Ionian,  not  superior  in  rank  to  Ery- 
thnie  or  Priene. 

Tliat  during  the  preceding  cenlurj^  the  Ainpliiktyonic  a.-sr-mbly 
had  meddled  rarely,  and  had  never  meddled  to  any  important  pur- 
pose, in  the  political  affairs  of  Greece — is  proved  by'tlie  fact  that  it  is 
not  once  mentioned  eitlier  in  the  history  of  Thucydides,  or  in  the 
Hellenica  of  Xenoplion.  But  after  the*  humiliation  of  Sparta  at 
Leuktra,  this  great  religious  convocation  of  the  Hellenic  world,  after 
long  torpor,  began  to  meet  for  the  dispatch  of  business.  Unfor- 
Uinately  its  manifestations  of  activity  were  for  the  most  part  abusive 
and  mischievous.  Probably  not  long  after  the  V.attle  of  Leuktra, 
though  we  do  not  know  the  precise  year — the  Thebans  exhibited 
before  the  Amphiktyons  an  accusation  against  Sparta,  for  having 
treacherously  seized  the  Kadmeia  (the  citadel  of  Tliebes)  in  a  period 
of  profound  peace.  Sentence  of  condemnation  was  pronounced 
against  her,  together  with  a  fine  of  500  talents,  doubled  after  a  certain 
interval  of  non-payment.  The  act  here  put  in  accusation  was  ip- 
disputably  a  gross  political  wrong;  and  a  pretense,  though  a  very 
slight  pretense,  for  bringing  political  wrong  under  cognizance  of  the 
Amphiktyons,  might  be  found  in  the  tenor  of  the  old  oath  taken  by 
each  included  city.  Still,  every  one  knew  that  for  generations  past, 
the  assembly  had  taken  no  actual  cognizance  of  political  wrong;  so 
that  both  trial  and  sentence  were  alike  glaring  departures  from  uiuler- 
stood  Grecian  custom — proving  only  the  hnmiliation  of  Sp'arta  and 
the  insolence  of  Thebes.  The  Spartans  of  course  did  not  submit  to 
pay,  nor  were  there  any  means  of  enforcement  against  them.  No 
practical  effect  followed  therefore,  except  (probably)  the  exclusion  of 
Sparta  from  the  Amphiktycnic  assembly — as  well  as  from  tlie  Del- 
phian temple  and  the  Pythian  games.  "  Indirectly,  however,  the 
example  was  most  pernicious,  as  demonstrating  that  the  authority  of 
a  Pan-Hellenic  convocation,  venerable  frcmi  its  religious  antiqiiity, 
could  be  abused  to  satisfy  the  political  antipathies  of  a  single  leading 
state. 

In  the  year  357  B.C.,  a  second  attempt  was  made  by  Thebes  to 
employ  the  authority  of  the  Amphiktyonic  assembly  as  a  means  of 
crushing  her  neighbors  ihc  Pliokians.  The  latter  had  l^een,  from 
old  time,  border-enemies  of  the  Thebans,  Lokrinns,  and  Tliessalians. 
Until  the  battle  of  Leuktra,  they  had  fought  as  allies  of  Sparta  against 
Thebes,  but  had  submitted  to  Thebes  after  that  battle,  and  contiinied 
to  be  her  allies,  thougli  less  and  less  cordial,  until  the  battle  of  ]\Lnn- 
tineia  and  the  death  of  Ep:iminondas.  Since  tliat  time,  the  old 
antipathy  appears  to  have  been  rekindled,  especially  on  tiie  part  of 
Thebes.  Irritated  airainst  the  Pliokians  pjobalily  as  having  broken 
off  from  a  sworn  alliance,  slie  determined  to  raise  against  them  an 
accusation  in  the  Amphiktyonic  assembly.  As  to  the  substnntive 
ground  of  accusation,  we  find  different  s'tatements.  According  to 
one  witness,  they  were  accused  c>f  having  cultivated  some  portion  of 


CONSECRATION  OF  THE  PHOKIAN  TERRITORY.  365 

tlie  Kirrha?an  pbin,  consecrated  from  of  old  to  Apollo;  according  to 
another,  they  were  charged  with  an  aggressive  invasum  of  Bwotia-; 
while  arc.(»rding  to  a  third,  the  war  was  caused  by  their  having 
carried  off  I'heiino,  a  married  Theban  woman.  Pausaaias  confesses 
that  he  cannot  distinctly  make  out  what  was  the  allegation  against 
them.  Assisted  by  the  antipatliy  of  the  Thessalians  and  Lokrians, 
not  less  vehement  'than  her  own,  Thebes  had  no  dithcuity  in  obtam- 
iu"-  sentence  of  condemnation  against  the  Pliokians.  A  fine  was 
iniposed  upon  them;  of  what  amount,  we  are  not  told,  but  so  heavy 
as  to  be  far  beyond  their  means  of  payment. 

It  was  thus  that  the  Thebans,  who  had  never" been  able  to  attach 
to  themselves  a  powerful  confedeiaey  such  as  that  which  formerly 
held  its  meetimrs  at  Sparta,  supplied  the  deficiency  by  abusing  their 
ascendency  in  the  Amphiktyonic  assembly  to  procure  vengeance 
upon  political  enemies.  A  certain  time  was  allowed  for  liquidating 
the  fine  which  the  Phokians  had  neitlier  means  nor  inclination  to 
do  Complaint  of  tlie  faci  was  then  made  at  the  next  meeting  of  the 
Amphiktyons,  wh  -w  a  decisive  resolution  was  adopted,  and  engraved 
alon"-  wit'h  the  rest  on  a  column  in  the  Delphian  temple,  to  expro- 
priat^e  the  recusant  Phokians,  and  consecrate  all  their  territory  to 
Apollo— as  Kirrha  with  its  fertile  plain  had  been  treated  two  centu- 
ries before.  It  becaaie  necessary,  at  the  same  time,  for  the  main- 
tenance of  cousistency  and  equal  dealing,  to  revive  the  mention  of 
the  previous  fine  still  remaining  unpaid  by  the  Lacedaemonians; 
against  whom  it  was  accordingly  proposed  to  pass  a  vote  of  some- 
thing like  excommunication.  .,11 

Such  impending  dangers,  likely  to  be  soon   realized  under  the 
instigation  of  Thebes,  excited  a  resolute  spirit  of  resistance  among 
the  Phokians.     A  wealth v  and  leading  citizen  of  the  Phokian  town 
Ledon   named  Philomelus  son  of  Theotimus,  stood  forward  as  the 
head  of  this  sentiment,  setting  himself  energetically  to  organize 
means  for  the  preservation  of  Phokian  liberty  as  well  as  property. 
Among  his  assembled  couutrymen,  he  protested  against  tlie  gross 
injustice  of  the  recent  sentence,  amercing  them  in  an  enormous  sum 
exceeding  their  means;  when  the  strip  of  land,  where  they  were 
ailo"-ed  to  have  tresoassed  on  the  property  of  the  god,  was  at  best 
narrow  and  insiixniti('ant.     Nothing  was  left  now  to  avert  from  them 
utter  ruin,  except  a  bold  front  and  an  obstinate  resistance;  which  he 
(Philomellis)  wouhi  pledge  himself  to  conduct  with  success,  if  they 
would  intrust  him  with  iiill  powers.     The  Phokians  (he  contended) 
were   the  ori<'-lnal  and  legitimate   administrators  of  the   Delphian 
temple— a  privilege  of  which  they  had  been  wrongfully  dispossessed 
bv  the  Amnhikty onic  assemblv and  the  Delphians.     ' '  Let  us  reply  to 
our  enemies  (he  urged)  by  reasserting  our  lost  rights  and  seizing  the 
temple- we  shall  obtain  support  and  countenance  from  many  Gre- 
cian states,  whose  interest  is  the  same  as  our  own,  to  resist  the  un]ust 
decrees  of  the  Amphiktyons.    Our  enemies,  the  Thebajis  (he  added) 


360 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


are  plotting  the  seizure  of  the  temple  for  themselves,  through  the 
corrupt  connivance  of  an  Amphiktyonic  majority:  let  ufe  anlicipate 
atid  prevent  their  injustice." 

Here  a  new  question  was  raised,  respecting  the  right  of  presidency 
over  the  most  venerated  sanctuary  in  Greece;  a  question  tnaight 
with  ruin  to  the  peace  of  the  Hellenic  world.  The  claim  of  the 
Phokiaus  was  not  a  mere  fiction,  but  founded  on  an  ancient  reality, 
and  doubtless  believed  by  themselves  to  be  just.  Delphi  and  its  in- 
habitants were  originally  a  portion  of  the  Phokian  name.  In  the 
Homeric  Catalogue,  which  Philomelus  emphatically  cited,  it  stands 
enumerated  among  the  Phokians  commanded  by  Schedius  and 
Epistrophus,  under  the  name  of  the  *' rocky  Pytho" — a  name  still 
applied  to  it  by  Herodotus.  The  Delphians  had  acquired  sufficient 
force  to  sever  themselves  from  their  Phokian  bretliren — to  stand  out 
as  a  community  by  themselves — and  to  assume  the  lucrative  privi- 
lege of  adniinistering  the  temple  as  their  own  peculiar.  Their  sev- 
erance had  been  first  brought  about,  and  their  pretensions  as  admin- 
istrators espoused,  by  Sparta,  upon  whose  powerful  interest  they 
mainly  depended.  But  the  Phokians  had  never  ceased  to  press  their 
claim,  and  so  far  was  the  dispute  from  being  settled  against  them, 
even  in  450  B.C.,  that  they  then  had  in  their  hands  the  actual  admin- 
istration. The  Spartans  dispatched  an  army  for  the  express  purpose 
of  taking  it  away  from  them  and  transferring  it  to  the  Delphians; 
but  Very  shortly  afterward,  when  the  Spartan  forces  had  retired, 
the  Athenians  marched  thither,  and  dispossessed  the  Delphians,  re- 
storing the  temple  to  the  Phokians.  This  contest  went  by  the  name 
of  the  Sacred  War.  Al  that  time  the  Athenians  were  masters  of  most 
parts  of  Bax)ti:i,  as  well  as  of  Megara  and  Pegae;  and  had  they  con- 
tinued so,  the  Phokians  would  probal^ly  have  l^een  sustained  in  their 
administration  of  the  holv  place;  the  rights  of  the  Delphians  on  one 
side,  against  thope  of  the  f^lu^kians  on  the  other,  being  then  obviously 
dependent  on  the  comparative  strength  of  Athens  and  Sparta.  But 
presently  evil  days  came  upon  Athens,  so  that  she  lost  all  her  inland 
possessions  north  of  Attica,  and  could  no  longer  uphold  her  allies  in 
Phokis.  The  Phokians  now  in  fact  ]>assed  into  allies  of  Sparta,  and 
were  forced  to  relinquish  their  temple  management  to  the  Delphians; 
T.'ho  were  coiifiruied  in  it  by  a  formal  article  of  the  peace  of  .Nikias 
in  421  B.C.,  and  retained  it  without  question,  under  the  recognized 
Hellenic  supremacy  of  Sparta,  down  to  the  battle  of  Leuktra.  Even 
tiien,  too,  it  continued  undisturbed;  since  Thebes  was  nowise  in- 
clined to  favor  the  claim  of  her  enemies  the  Phokians,  but  was  on 
the  contrary  glad  to  be  assisted  in  crushing  them  by  their  rivals  the 
Dflpliians;  w"ho,  as  managers  of  the  temple,  could  materially  con- 
tribute to  a  severe  sentence  of  the  Amphiktyonic  assembly. 

We  see  thus  that  the  claim  now  advanced  by  Philomelus  was  not 
fictitious,  but  genuine,  and  felt  by  himself  as  well  as  by  other  Pho- 
kians to  be  the  recovery  of  an  aneient  privilege,  lost  only  through 


THE  TEMPLE  FORTIFIED. 


367 


superior  force    His  views  being  heartly  embraced  by  his  countrymen, 
he  was  nominated  general  with  full  powers.     It  was  his  first  meas- 
ure to  i^oto  Sparta,  upon  whose  aid  he  counted,  m  consequence  of  the 
heavy  fine  which  still  stood  impo.sed  upon  her  by  the  Amphiktyonic 
sentence.     He  explained  his  views  privately  to  King  Archidamus, 
enfa^^ino-  if  the  Phokians  should  become  masters  of  the  temple,  to 
erase^'the'sentence  and  fine  from  the  column  of  record.     Archidamus 
did  not  dare  to  promise  him  public  countenance  or  support;    the 
rather  as  Sparta  had  always  been  the  chief  supporter  of  tlie  Del- 
phian presidency  (as  against  the  Phokian)  over  the  temple.     But  in 
secret  he  warmly  encouraged  the  scheme;  farnishmg  a  sum  of  fifteen 
talents,  besides   a  few   mercenary   soldiers,    toward   its   execution 
With  this  aid  Philomelus  resumed  home,  provided  an  equal  sum  of 
fifteen  talents  from  his  purse,  antl  collected  a  body  of  peltasts,  Pho- 
kians   as  well  as  strangers.     He  then  executed  his  design   against 
Delphi,  attacking  suddenlv  both  the  town  and  the  temple,  and  cap- 
turing- them    as^it  would' appear,  with  little  opposition.     To    the 
alarm'ed  Delphians,  lienerally,  he  promised  security  and  good  treat^- 
ment  •  but  he  put  to^leath  the  members  of  the  Gens  (or  Clan)  called 
Thrakidje.   and   seized  their  property:    these  men   constituted  one 
araono-  several  holy  Gentes,  leading  conductors  of  the  political  and 
religious  a'^-encv  of  the  place.     It  is  probable  that  when  thus  sud- 
denTv  assaifed,  they  had  sent  to  solicit  aid  from  their  neighbors  the 
Lokrians  of  Amphissa;  for  Philomelus  was  scarcely  in  possession  of 
Delphi,  wiien  these  latter  marched  up  to  the  rescue.     He  defeated 
them  however  with  serious  loss,  and  compelled  them  to  return  home. 
Thus  completely  successful  in  his  first  attempt,  Philomelus  lost  no 
time  in  announcing  solemnly  and  formally  his  real  purpose.     He 
proclaimed  that  he  had  come  only  to  resume  for  the  Phokians  their 
ancient  riy'hts  as  administrators;  that  the  treasures  of  the  temple 
should  be'safe  and  respected  as  before;  that  no  impiety  or  illegality 
of  any  kind  shovdd  be  tolerated;  and  that  the  temple  and  its_ oracle 
would  be  opened,  as  heretofore,  for  visitors,  sacrificers,  and  inquir- 
ers.    At  the  same  time,   well  aware  that  his  Lokrian  enemies  at 
Amphissa  w^ere  very  near,  he  erected  a  w^all  to  protect  the  town  and 
temple  which  appears  to  have  been  hitherto  undefended— especially 
its  we^ern  siile.     He  further  increased  his  levies  of  troops.     While 
the  Phokians,  inspirited  with  this  first  advantage,  obeyed  his  call  in 
considerable  num!)ers,  he  also  attracted  new  mercenaries  from  abjmv 
by  the  oiler  of  hiuher  pav.     He  was  presently  at  the  head  ot  5.000 
nien  strong  enough  to  li'old  a  difficult  post  like  Delphi  against  all 
immediate  attack.^  But  being  still  anxious  to  appease  Grecian  senti- 
ment and  avert  hostility,  he  dispatched  envoys  to  all  the  principal 
states— not  merely  to   Sparta  and  Athens,  but  also  to  his  enemy 
Thebes      His  envoys  were  instructed  to  offer  solemn  assurances 
that  the  Phokians  had  taken  Delphi  simply  to  reclaim  their  pateraaJ 
rin-ht  9f  presidency,  against  past  wrongful  -usurpataoo;   that  tiiey 


368 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


SUCCESS  OF  PHILOMELUS. 


8G9 


l» 


I! 


were  prepared  to  give  any  security  required  by  the  Hellenic  bodv, 
for  strict  preservation  of  tlie  valuables  in  the  temple,  and  to  exhibit 
and  verify  all,  by  weight  and  number  before  examiners;  that  con- 
scious of  their  oAvn  rectitude  of  purpose,  they  did  not  hesitate  to 
entreat  positive  sui>port  ;i gainst  their  enemies,  or  at  any  rate, 
neutrality. 

The  tiuswers  sent  to  Philomelus  were  not  all  of  the  snme  tenor. 
On  this  memorable  event,  the  sentiments  of  the  Grecian  world  Aviie 
painfully  divided.  While  Athens,  Sparta,  the  Poloponnesian  Acha*- 
ans  and  son^e  other  states  in  P(  loponne.sus,  recognized  the  possession 
of  the  Pl)okians,  and  ngreed  to  assist  them  in  retrining  it— the  The- 
bans  and  Thessalians  declared  strenuously  against  them,  supported  by 
all  the  states  north  of  Bceotia.  Lokrians,  Dorians,  ^Enianis,  Phthiot- 
Achseans.  Magnetes.  Perrha-bians.  Athamanes,  and  Dolopes.  Several 
of  these  last  were  dependents  of  the  Thessalians,  and  followed  their 
example;  many  of  them,  moreover,  belonging  to  the  Amphiktyonic 
constituency,  mu^t  have  taken  part  in  the  votes  of  condemnation  just 
rescinded  by  the  Phokians. 

"We  may  clearly  see  tliat  it  was  not  at  fn.A  the  intention  of  Philo- 
melus or  his  Phokian  comrades  to  lay  hands  on  the  property  of  the 
Delphian  temple;  and  Philojnelus.  while  taking  pains  to  set 'himself 
right  in  the  eyes  of  Greece,  tried  to  keep  the  prophetic  agency  of  the 
temple  in  its  ordinary  working,  so  as  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  sacri- 
ficers  and  inquirers  as  before.  He  required  tlie  Pythian  priesiess  to 
mount  the  tripod,  submit  herself  to  the  prophetic  ins[)iration,  and 
pronounce  the  words  thus  put  into  her  mouth,  as  usual.  But  tlie 
priestess— chosen  by  the  Delphians,  and  probably  he-rself  a  member 
of  one  amomg  the  sacred  Delphian  Gentes — obstinately  refused  to 
obey  him;  especially  as  the  first  question  which  he  addressed  con- 
cerned his  own  usurpation,  and  his  chances  of  success  against  ene- 
mies. On  his  injunctions,  that  she  should  pro]ihesy  according  to  the 
traditional  rites— she  replied,  that  these  rites  were  precisely  wliat  he 
had  just  overthrown:  upon  which  he  laid  hold  of  her,  and^tteinpted 
to  place  her  on  the  tripod  by  force.  Subdued  and  frightened  for  her 
own  personal  safety,  the  priestess  exclaimed  involuntarily,  that  he 
might  do  what  he  chose.  Philomelus  gladly  took  this  as  an  answer 
favorable  to  his  purpose.  Pie  caused  it  to  be  put  in  writing  and  pro- 
claimed, as  an  oracle  from  the  god,  sanctioning  .and  licensing  his 
designs.  He  convened  a  specir.l  meeting  of  his  partisans  and  the 
Delphians  generally,  wherein  appeal  was  m.'ide  to  this  encouraging 
answer,  as  w^arranting  full  conildence  with  reference  to  the  impend- 
ing war.  So  it  was  construed  by  nil  around,  and  confirmatory  evi- 
dence was  derived  from  further  signs  and  omens  occurring  at  the 
moment.  It  is  probable  however  that  Philomelus  took  care  for  the 
future  to  name  a  new  priestess,  more  favorable  to  his  interest,  and 
disposed  to  deliver  oracular  answers  under  the  new  administrators  ia 
the  same  manner  as  under  tb^  old. 


Though  so  large  a  portion  of  the  Grecian  name  had  thus  declared 
war  against  the  Phokians,  yet  none  at  first  appear  to  have  made  hos- 
tile movements,  except  the  -Lokrians,  with  whom  Philomelus  was 
fully  competent  to  deal.  He  found  himself  strong  enough  to  overrun 
and  plunder  their  territory,  engaging  in  some  indecisive  skirmishes. 
At  first  the  Lokrians  would  not  even  give  up  the  bodies  of  his  slain 
soldiers  for  burial;  alleging  that  sacrilegious  men  were  condemned 
by  the  general  custom  oi"  Greece  to  be  cast  out  w  ithout  sepulture. 
Nor  did  they  desist  from  their  refusal  until  he  threatened  retaliation 
toward  the  bodies  of  their  own  slain.  So  bitter  was  the  exaspera- 
tion arising  out  of  this  deplorable  war  throughout  the  Hellenic  world! 
Even  against  the  I^ukrlans  alone,  however,  Piiilomelus  soon  found 
himself  in  want  of  money,  for  the  payment  of  his  soldiers — native 
Phokians  as  well  as  meix^euary  strangers.  Accordingly,  while  he 
still  adhered  to  his  pledge  to  respect  the  temple  property,  he  did  not 
think  himself  precluded  from  levying  a  forced  contribution  on  the 
properties  of  his  enemies,  the  wealiliy  Delphian  citizens;  and  his 
arms  were  soon  crowned  with  a  brilliant  success  against  the  Lokrians, 
in  a  battle  fought  near  the  rocks  called  Phtedriades;  a  cragi^y  and 
difficult  locality  so  close  to  Delphi,  that  the  Lokrians  must  evidentl}'- 
have  been  the  aggressors,  marching  up  with  a  view  to  relieve  the 
towm.  They  were  defeated  with  great  loss,  boih  in  slain  and  in  pris- 
oners; several  of  them  only  escaping  the  spear  of  the  enemy  by  cast- 
ing themselves  to  certain  death  down  the  precipitous  cliffs. 

This  victory,  while  imparling  courage  to  the  Phokians,  proved  the 
signal  for  fresh  exertions  among  their  numerous  enemies.  The  loud 
complaints  of  the  defeated  Lokrians  raised  universal  sympathy;  and 
the  Thebans,  now  pressed  by  fea.",  as  well  as  animated  by  hatred,  of 
the  Phokians,  put  them-iLes  at  the  head  of  the  movement.  Send- 
ing round  envoys  to  the  Thessalians  and  the  other  Amphiktyonic 
states,  they  invoked  aid  and  urged  the  necessity  of  mustering  a  com- 
mon force — '"  to  assist  the  god," — to  vindicate  the  judicial  dignity  of 
the  Amphiktyonic  assembly, — and  to  put  down  the  sacrilegious  Pho- 
kians. It  appears  that  a  special  meeting  of  the  assembly  itself  was 
convened;  probably  at  Thermopylo),  since  Delphi  was  in  possession 
of  the  enemy.  Decided  resolutions  were  here  taken  to  form  an  Am- 
phiktyonic army  of  execution;  accompanied  by  severe  sentences  of 
fine  and  other  i)unishments,  against  the  Phokian  leaders  by  name — 
Philomelas  and  Onomarchus,  perhaps  brothers,  but  at  least  joint 
commanders,  together  with  others. 

The  peril 'of  the  Phokians  now  becanie  imminent.  Their  own 
unaided  strength  was  nowise  sulficient  to  resist  the  confederacy  about 
to  arm  in  defense  of  the  Amphiktyonic  assembly;  nor  does  it  appear 
that  eilher  Athens  or  Sparta  had  as  yet  given  them  anything  more 
than  promises  and  encouragement.  Their  only  chance  of  effective 
resistance  lay  in  the  levy  of  a  large  mercenary  force,  for  which  pur- 
pose neither  their. own   fuuds.  nor  any  further  aid  derivable  f ro  ii 


370 


THE  SACRED   WAR 


private  confiscation,  could  be  made  adequate.  There  remained  no 
other  resource  except  to  employ  the  treasures  and  valuables  in  the 
Delphian  temple,  upon  which  accordingly  Philomelus  now  laid 
hands  He  did  so,  however;  as  his  previous  conduct  evinced,  with 
sincere  reluctance,  jirobably  with  various  professions  at  tirst  ol 
borrowin-  onlv  a  -iven  sum,  destined  to  meet  the  actual  emcTgeucy, 
and  intended  to  be  repaid  as  soon  as  safety  should  be  provided  tor. 
But  whatever  may  have  been  hU  intentions  at  the  outset,  all  sucti 
reserves  or  limits,  or  obligations  to  repay,  were  speedily  forgotten  in 
practice  When  the  feelinir  which  protected  the  fund  was  broken 
throu'di  it  was  as  easy  to  ta^vc  much  as  little,  and  the  claimants  be- 
came'""more  numerous  and  importunate;  besides  which,  the  exigen- 
ces of  the  war  never  ceased,  and  the  implacable  repugnance  raised 
by  the  spoliation  amidst  half  of  the  Grecian  world,  left  to  the  1  hok- 
ians  no  security  except  under  the  protection  of  a  continued 
mercenary  force  Nor  were  Philomehis  and  his  succes?oi"S  sat»^tiert 
without  also  enriching  their  friends  and  adorning  tlieir  wives  or 

favorites 

Availintr  himself  of  the  larire  resources  of  the  temple,  Philomehis 
raised  the'pav  of  his  troops  to  a  sum  half  as  large  again  as  before,  and 
issued  proclamations  inviting  new  levies  at  the  ?;nme  rate      1  hrough 
such  temptin"-  offers  he  was  speedily  enabled  to  muster  a  force,  horse 
and  foot  tos^ether,  said  to  r.mount  to  10.000  men:  chiefiy,  ns  we  are 
told   men  ol'  peculiarlv  wicked  and  reckless  character,  since  no  pums 
Greek  would  enlist  in   such  a  service.     With  these  he  attacked  the 
Lokrians  who  were,  however,  now  assisted  by  the  Thebnns  from  one 
side   and'bv  the  ThesFalians  with  their  circumjacent  allies  from  the 
other       Philomelus   gained  successive  advantages  ag:nnst   ^'Jth  of 
them   and  conceived  inrreased  hopes  from  a  re-enforcement  of  laOO 
Achieans  who  came  to  him  from  Peloponnesus.     The  war  assumed  a 
peculiarly  ferocious  character;  for  the  Thebans,  confident  in   their 
superior  'force   and   chance  of  success,  even   though  the  Delphian 
treasure  was  emph)yed  against  them,  began  by  putting  to  death  all 
their   prisoners,   as  sacrileaious  men   standing  condemned   l)y  the 
Amphiktyonic  assembly.     This  so  exasperated  the  troops  of  1  hilo- 
meliis    that   they  conslrained  him   to  retaliate  upon   the  Boeotian 
prisoners      For  some  lime  such  ricorous  inflictions  were  continued 
on  both  sides,  until  at  length  the  I'hebans  felt  compelled  to  desist 
and  Philomelus  followed  tlieir  example.     The  w^ar  lasted  awhile  w  iih 
indecisive  result,  the  Thebans  and  their  allies  being  greatly  supenoT 
in  num])er.     But  presently  Philomelus  incautiously  exiiosed  himselt 
to  attack  in  an   unfavorable  position,  near  the  town  of   Neon,  anud 
embarrassing  woods  and  rocks.     He  was  her<>  defeated  with  severe 
loss  and  hi>^army  dispersed;  himself  receiving  several  wounds,  and 
fin-htin"-  with   desperate   bravery,  until   further   resistance   became 
impos<iV)k'.     He  then  tried  to  escrpe.  but  four.d  hiirrelf  driven  to 
the  brink  of  a  precipice,  where  he  could  rnly  uvoid  the  torturo  of 


DEATH  OF  PHILOMELUS. 


371 


captivity  by  leaping  down  and  perishing.     The  remnant  of  his  van- 
quished army  was  rallied  at  some  distance  by  Onomarciius. 

The  Thebans  and  their  allies,  instead  of  pressing  the  important 
victory  recently  gained  over  Philomelus,  seem  to  have  supposed  thati 
the  Piiokians  would  now  disperse  or  submit  of  their  own  accord, 
and  accordingly  returned  liome.  Their  remissness  gave  time  lo 
Onomarchus  toVeorganize  his  dispirited  countrymen.  Convening  at 
Delphi  a  general  assembly  of  Phokians  and  allies,  he  strenuously 
exhorted  them  to  persevere  in  the  projects,  and  avenge  the  death,  of 
their  late  general.  He  found,  however,  no  inconsiderable  amount  of 
opposition;  for  many  of  the  Phokians- noway  prepared  for  the 
struggle  in  which  they  now^  found  themselves  embarked,  and  thctn- 
selves  ashamed  of  the  spoliation  of  the  temple— were  anxious  by 
some  accommodation  to  put  themselves  again  within  the  pale  of 
Hellenic  religious  sentiment.  Onomarchus  doubtless  replied,  and 
with  too  good  reason,  that  peace  was  unattainable  upon  any  terms 
short  of  absolute  ruin;  and  that  there  was  no  course  open  except  to 
maintain  their  ground  as  they  stood,  by  renewed  efforts  of  force. 
But  even  if  the  necessities  of  the  case  had  been  less  imperative,  ho 
would  have  been  able  to  overbear  all  opposition  of  his  own  country- 
men through  the  numerous  mercenary  strangers,  now  in  Phokis  and 
present  at  the  assembly  under  the  name  of  allies.  In  fact,  so  irre- 
sistible was  his  ascendenc;y  by  means  of  this  large  paid  force  under 
his  command,  that  both  Dt'inosihenes  and  ^schines  denominate  him 
(as  well  as  his  predecessor  and  his  successor)  not  general,  but  despot, 
of  the  Phokians.  The  soldiers  were  not  less  anxious  than  Onomar- 
chus to  prosecute  the  war,  and  to  employ  the  yet  unexhausted 
wealth  of  the  temple  in  every  way  conducive  to  ultimate  success.  In 
this  sense  the  assembly  decreed,  naming  Onomarchus  general  with 
full  powers  for  carrying  the  decree  into  effect. 

His  energetic  measures  presently  retrieved  the  Phokian  cause. 
Employing  the  temple  funds  still  more  profusely  than  Philomelus, 
he  invited  fresh  soldiers  from  all  quarters,  and  found  himself  after 
some  time  at  the  head  of  a  larger  army  than  before.  The  temple 
exhibited  many  donatives,  not  only  of  gold  and  silver,  but  also  of 
brass  and  iron.  While  Onomarchus  melted  the  precious  metals  and 
coined  them  into  money,  he  at  the  same  time  turned  the  brass  and 
iron  into  arms;  so  that  lie  was  enabled  to  equip  both  his  own  soldiers 
disarmed  in  the  recent  defeat,  and  a  class  of  volunteers  poorer  than 
the  ordinary  self-armed  mercenaries.  Besides  paying  soldiers,  he 
scattered  everywhere  presents  or  bribes  to  gain  influential  partisans 
in  the  cities  favorable  to  his  cause;  probably  Athens  and  Sparta  first 
of  all.  We  are  told  that  the  Spartan  king  Archidamus,  with  his 
wife  Deinicha,  ^vere  among  the  recipients;  indeed  the  same  corrupt 
participation  w^as  imputed,  by  the  statement  of  the  hostile-minded 
Messenians,  to  the  Spartan  Ephors  and  Senate.  Even  among  ene 
mies,  Onomarchus  employed  his  gold  with  effect,  contriving  thus  to 


372 


THE  SACRED   WAR. 


gain  or  neutralize  a  portion  of  the  Tliessalians,  amoTjfr  them  the 
powerful  despots  of  I'herrc.  whom  we  afterward  find  allied  to  him. 
Thus  was  the  great  Delphian  treasure  turned  to  account  in  every 
way:  and  the  unscrupulous  Pliokian  despot  strengthened  his  hands 
Tetfurlher,  ])\  seizing  such  of  his  fellow-cohntrynien  as  had  hcen 
prominent  in  opposition  to  his  views,  putting  tlieni  to  death,  and 
confiscating  their  property. 

Tlirougli  such  combination  of  profuse  allurement,  corruption,  and 
violence,  the  tide  began  to  turn  again  in  favor  of  liie  Phokians. 
Onomarchus  found  himself  shortly  at  the  head  of  a  formidable  army, 
with  which  he  marched  forth  from  Delphi,  and  subdued  successively 
the  Lokrians  of  Am})]iis.<^a,  the  Epiknemidian  Lokiians,  and  the 
neighboring  territory  of  Doris,  lie  carried  his  conquests  even  as  far 
as  the  vicinity  of  riiermopyla';  capturing  Thronium.  one  of  the 
towns  wiiicli  commanded  that  imi)ortant  pass,  and  reducing  its  in- 
habitants to  slavery.  It  is  probable  that  he  also  took  Nikica  and 
Alponus — two  other  valuable  positions  near  Tliermopyltc,  which  we 
know  to  have  been  in  the  power  of  the  Phokians  until  tiie  moment 
immediately  preceding  their  ruin — since  we  find  him  Isenccforward 
master  of  Thcrmopyln%  and  speedily  oj^ening  his  communications 
Avith  Thessaly.  Besides  this  extension  of  dominion  to  the  north  and 
cast  of  Phokis,  Onomarchus  also  invaded  Ba^otia.  The  Thebans, 
now  deprived  of  their  northern  allies,  did  not  at  first  meet  him  in 
the  fiild,  so  that  he  was  enabled  to  capture  Orchomenu-^.  But  when 
he  proceeded  to  attack  Cha-roneia,  they  made  an  etlective  effort  l.o 
relieve  the  place.  They  brought  out  their  forces,  and  defeated  him, 
in  an  action  not  very  decisive,  yet  sulhcient  to  constrain  him  to 
return  into  Phokis. 

Probably  the  Thebans  were  at  this  time  much  pressed,  and  pre- 
vented from  acting  elTectively  against  the  Phokians  by  want  of 
money.  We  know,  at  least,  that  in  the  midst  of  the  Phokian  w\nr 
they  hired  out  a  force  of  5.000  hoplites  commanded  by  I'ammeues, 
to  Artabazus  the  revolted  Plsrygian  satrap.  Here  Pamniencs  willi 
his  soldiers  acquired  some  renown,  gaining  two  im])()rtant  victories 
over  the  Persians.  The  Thebans,  it  wouhl  seem,  having  no  fleet  and 
no  maritime  dep(  iidencies,  were  less  afraid  of  giving  olfenso  to  the 
Oreat  King  than  Athens  had  been,  when  she  interdicted  (hares 
from  aiding  Artabazus,  and  acquiesced  in  the  unfavorable  pacifica- 
tion which  terminated  the  Social  AVar.  How  long  Pammenes  ami 
the  Thebans  remained  in  Asia,  we  are  not  informed.  But  in  spile 
of  the  victories  gained  by  them,  Artabazus  was  not  long  able  to  main- 
tain himself  against  the  Persian  arms.  Three  3'ears  afterward,  wc 
hear  of  him  and  his  brother-in-law  IMemnon  as  expelled  from  Asia, 
and  as  exiles  residing  with  Philip  of  Macedon. 

While  Pammenes  was  serving  inider  Artabazus,  the  Atheuian  gen- 
eral Chares  recaptured  Sestos  in  the  Hellorpont,  which  appears  to 
have  revolted  from  Athens  during  the  Social  War.    He  treated  the 


IXTRlGUEo  OF  KERSOBLEPTES. 


873 


captive  Sestians  with  rigor;  putting  to  death  the  men  of  military 
a^'-e,  and  selling  the  remainder  as  slaves.  This  was  an  important 
acquisition  for  xVthens,  as  a  condition  of  security  in  the  Chersonese 
as  well  as  of  prepoiMerance  in  the  Hellespont. 

Alarmed  at  tlie  successes  of  Chares  in  the  Hellespont,  the  Thracian 
prince  Kersobleptes  now  entered  on  an  intrigue  with  Pammenes  in 
Asia,  and  with  Philip  of  Macedon  (who  was  on  the  coast  of  Thrace, 
attacking  Abdcra  and  Maroneia),  for  the  purpose  of  checking  the 
progress^of  the  Athenian  arms.     Philip  appears  to  h.ive  made  a  for- 
■  ward  movement,  and  to  have  menaced  the  possessions  of  Athens  in 
the  Chersonese,  but  his  access  thither  was  forbidtlen  by  Amadokus, 
another  prince  of  Thrace,  master  of  the  intermediate  territory,  as 
well  as  by  the  presence  of  Chares  with  his  fieet  off  the  Tiiracian 
coast.     Apollonides  of  Kardia  was  the  agent  of  Kersobleptes;  who 
however,  finding  his  schemes  abortive,  and  intimidated  by  the  pres- 
ence of  Chares,  came  to  terms  with  Athens,  and  surrendered  to  her 
the  portion  of  the  Chersonese  wiiich  still  remained  to  him,  w^ith  the 
exception  of  Kardia.     The  Athenians  sent  to  the  Chersonese  a  fur- 
tiier  detachment  of  Kleruchs  or  out-seltlers,  for  whom  considerable 
room  must  have  been  made  as  well  by  the  depopulation  of  Sestos,  as 
bv  the  recent  cession  from  Kersobleptes.    It  w^as  in  the  ensuing  year 
(352  B.C.)  that  the  Alhenians  also  dispatched  a  fresh  batch  of  2,000 
citizens  as  settlers  to  Samos,  in  addition  to  those  who  had  been  sent 
thither  thirteen  vears  before.  . 

The  mention  of  Philip  as  attacking  Maroneia  and  menacing  the 
Thracian  Chersonese,  shows  the  indefatigable  activity  of  that  prince 
and  the  steady  enlargement  of  his  power.     In  o58  n.c,  he  had  taken 
Amphi polls; 'before 'iJ55  B.C.,  he  had  captured  Pydna  and  Potidtea, 
founded  the  new   town  of  Philippi,  and   opened   for   himself  the 
resource  of  the  adjoining  auriferous  region;  he  had  establisl'cd  rela- 
tions  with  Thessaly,  as^sisting  the  great  family  of  the  Aleuadoe  at 
-Larissa  in  their  stnigiiles  against  Lykophron  and  Peitholaiis,  the  des- 
pots of  Phera^:  he  had  furtner  -d^ixm  ch:istised  the  interior  tribes  bor- 
dering on  Macedonia,  Thracians;  Pteonians,  and  illyrians,  who  were 
never'^long  at  rest,  and  who  had  combined  to  regain  their  independ- 
ence.    It^appears  to  have   been  in   854-853   B.C.,  that  he  attacked 
Methone,  the  last  remainimr  possession  of  Athens  on  the  Macedonian 
coast.     Situated  on  the  'I'herinaic  Gulf,  Methone  was  doubtless  a  con- 
venient station  for  Athenian  privateers  to  intercept  trading  vessels. 
not  merelv  to  and  from  Macedonian  ports,  but  also   from  Olynthus 
and  Pot  (hea;    so  that  the  Olynthians,  then  in  alliance  with  Phinp 
against  Athens,  would  he  glad  to  see  it  pass  into  his  power,  and  may 
pt'rhaps  iiave  lent  him  their  aid.     He  pressed  the  siege  of  the  place 
with  his  usual   vi2:or,   employing  all   the  engines   and    means    of 
assault  then  known;  while  the  besieged  on  their  side  were  not  less 
resolute   in  the  defense.     They  repelled  his  attacks    for  so  long  a 
time,  that  news  of  the  danger  of  the  place  reached  Athens,  and  ample 


874 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


lime  was  afforded  for  sendinir  relief,  had  the  Athcuians  ])eGn  ready 
and  viirorous  in  ilieir  movemcut.  But  uiiforluuatily  they  liad  not 
even  now  leaiut  experience  from  the'  loss  of  Pydna  and  Poti.liea. 
Eiiher  the  Etesian  winds  usual  in  summer,  or  the  slorms  of  wititcr' 
both  which  eircum.stances  were  taken  into  aecouut  by  Philip  in 
a-ljustmg  the  season  of  his  enterprises— or  (which  is  more  probable) 
—the  aversion  of  the  Aihenian  ropectable  citizens  to  personal  ser- 
vice on  shipboard,  and  their  slackness  even  in  pecuniary  payment— 
caused  so  much  delay  in  preparations,  that  the  expedition  sent  out 
did  not  reach  Methone  till  too  late.  The  Methonceans,  havinn-  £ral. 
lantly  held  out  until  all  their  means  were  exhausted,  were  at  len^'-th 
compelled  to  surrender.  Diodorus  tells  us  that  Philip  granted  teiins 
so  far  lenient  as  to  allow  them  to  dej^art  with  the  clothes  on  their 
backs.  But  this  can  hardly  be  accurate,  since  we  know  that  there 
were  Athenian  citizens  among  them  sold  as  slaves,  some  of  whom 
were  ransomed  by  Demosthenes  with  his  own  money 

Being  now  master  of  the  last  port  possessed  bv  Athens  in  the 
liiermaicCxulf— an  acquisition  of  great  importance,  which  had  never 
betore  belonged  to  the  INIacedoniau  kings— Philip  was  enabled  to 
extend  his  military  operations  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  Thracian 
Chersonese  on  the  one  side,  and  to  that  of  Thermopvla;  on  the  other 
How  he  ihreateued  the  Chersonese  has  been  already  related    and  his 
campaign  in  1  hessaly  was  yet  more  important.     That  country  was 
as  usual,   torn   by   intestine  disputes.     Lvkophron,   the  despot   of 
1  herae,  possessed  the  greatest  sway,  while  the  Aleuadse  of  Larissa 
too  weak  to  contend  against  hku  with   their  own  forces    invited 
assistance  from  Philip,  who  entered  Thessalv  with  a  powerful  army 
buch  a  re  enforcement  so  completely  altered  ihe  balance  of  Thessali;m 
power  that  Lykophron  in  his  turn  was  compelled  to  entreat  aid 
from  Onomarchus  and  the  Phokians. 

So  strong  were  the  Phokians  n(Av  that  they  were  more  than  a 
match  for  the  Ihebans  with  their  other  hostile  neighbors  and  hvd 
means  to  spare  for  combating  Philip  in  Thessaly.  As  their  force 
consisted  ot  a  large  body  of  mercenaries,  whom  they  were  constrained 
lor  security  to  retain  in  pay— to  keep  them  employed  bevond  the 
border  was  a  point  not  undesirable.  Hence  they  readily  entered 
upon  the  Thessalian  campaign.  At  this  moment  they  counted  in 
the  comparative  assessment  of  Hellenic  forces,  as  an  item  of  tl'r^t- 
late  magnitude.  They  were  hailed  both  by  Athenians  and  t^parlans 
S'M  ?i/'l^P^  enemy  and  counterpoise  of  Thebes,  alike  odious  to 
Dotti  While  the  Phokians  maintained  their  actual  power  Atliens 
could  manage  her  foreign  policy  abro:id,  and  Sparta  her  designs  iu 
Peloponnesus,  with  diminished  apprehensions  of  being  counter- 
worked hy  Thebes.  Both  Athens  and  Sparta  had  at  first  supported 
tne  Phokians  against  unjust  persecution  by  Thebes  and  abuse  of 
Amphiktyonic  jurisdiction  before  the  spoliation  of  the  Delphian 
temple  was  consummated,  or  even  anticipated.     And  though   when 


DEMOSTHENES. 


875 


that  spoliation  actually  occurred,  it  w-as  doubtless  viewed  with  rep- 
robation among  Athenians,  accustomed  to  unlimited  freedom  of 
public  discussion,  as  well  as  at  Sparta,  in  so  far  as  it  became  known 
amidst  the  habitual  secrecy  of  public  affairs;  nevertheless  political 
interests  so  far  prevailed  that  the  Phokians  (perhaps  in  part  by  aid 
of  bribery)  w^ere  still  countenanced,  though  not  much  assisted,  as 
useful  rivals  to  Thebes.  To  restrain  "  the  Leuktric  insolence  of  the 
Thebans,"  and  to  see  the  Boeotian  towns  Orchomenus,  Thespia?, 
Platc^a,  restored  to  their  pristine  autonomy  was  an  object  of  para- 
mount desire  with  each  of  the  two  ancient  heads  of  Greece.  So  far 
both  Atliens  and  Sparta  felt  in  unison.  But  Sparta  cherished  a 
farther  hope— in  which  Athens  by  no  means  concurred— to  avail 
herself  of  the  embarrassments  of  Thebes  for  the  purpose  of  break- 
ing up  Megalopolis  and  Messenc,  and  recovering  her  former  Pelopon- 
nesian  dominion.  These  two  new  Peloponnesian  cities,  erected  by 
Epaminondas  on  the  frontier  of  Laconia,  had  been  hitherto  upheld 
against  Sparta  by  the  certainty  of  Theban  interference  if  they  were 
inenaced.  But  so  little  did  Thebes  seem  in  a  condition  to  interfere, 
while  Onomarchus  and  the  Phokians  were  triumphant  iu  353-352 
B.C.,  that  the  Megalopolitans  dispatched  envoys  to  Athens  to  entreat 
protection  and  alliance,  while  the  Spartans  on  their  side  sent  to 
oppose  the  petition. 

It  is  on  occasion  of  the  political  debates  in  Athens  during  the  years 
354  and  353  B.C.  that  we  first  have  before  us  the  Athenian  Demos- 
thenes, as  adviser  of  his  countrymen  in  the  public  assembly.  His 
first  discourse  of  public  advice  was  delivered  in  354-353  B.C.  on  an 
alarm  of  approaching  war  with  Persia;  his  second,  in  353-352  B.C., 
was  intended  to  point  out  the  policy  proper  for  Athens  in  dealing 
with  the  Spartan  and  Megalopolitan  envoys. 

A  few  words  must  here  be  said  about  this  eminent  man,  who 
forms  the  principal  ornament  of  the  declining  Hellenic  world.  He 
was  above  twenty-seven  years  old,  being  born,  according  to  what 
seems  the  most  probable  among  contradictory  accounts,  in  382-381 
B.C.  His  father,  named  also  Demosthenes,  w\as  a  citizen  of  consid- 
erable property,  and  of  a  character  so  unimpeachable  that  even 
^schines  says  nothing  against  him;  his  mother  Kl-eobule  was  one 
of  the  two  daughters  and  V)- heiresses  of  a  citizen  named  Gylon.  an 
Ath3nian  exile,  who,  having  become  ric^h  as  a  proprietor  of  land  and 
exporter  of  corn  in  Bosporus,  sent  his  two  daughters  to  Athens, 
where,  pos.sessing  handsome  dowries,  they  married  two  Athenian 
citizens— Deraociiares  and  the  elder  Demosthenes.  The  latter  was  a 
man  of  considerable  wealth,  and  carried  on  two  di.^tinct  manufac- 
tories— one  of  swords  or  knives,  employing  thirty-two  slaves;  the 
other,  of  couches  or  beds,  employing  twenty.  In  the  new  schedule 
of  citizens  and  of  taxable  property,  introduced  »iu  the  archonship  of 
Nausinikus  (378  B.C.),  the  elder  Demosthenes  was  enrolled  among 
the  richest  class,  the  leaders  of  Symmories.     But  he  died  about  375 


376 


THE  SACRED   WAR. 


B.C.,  leaving  his  son  Demosthenes  seven  years  old,  with  a  yoiinirer 
daughter  about  live  years  of  age.     The  boy  and  his  laroe  paternal 
jH-operty  were  confided  to  the  care  of  three  guardians  nauK  d  under 
his  father's  will.     These  guardians— though  the  fiither,  in  hopts  of 
insuring  their  fidelity,  hail  bequeathed  to  t'liem  coui-iderable  legacies, 
away  from  his  own  son,  and  though  all  of  them  were  rich  men  as 
well  as  family  connections  and  fricniis—jidministered  the  property  with 
such  negligence  and  dislionesty  that  only  a  sum  conii>;ir;;tivc]v*'small 
was  left  when  they  came  to  render  account   to  their  ward.    'At  tlie 
age  of  sixteen  year.s  coniplete,  Demosthenes  attained  his  civil  mjijor- 
ity  and  became  entilicd   by  the  Athctdan  law  to  the  admini.slration 
of  his  own  pr(>];erty.     Duiing  his  minority  his  guardians  had  con- 
tinued to  enroll  him  among  the  we.dthiest  class'  (as  his  father  iiad 
ranked  before),  and  to  pay   the   increased   rate  of   diieet   taxation 
chargeable  upon  that  class;  but  the  real  sum  handed  over  to  him  bv 
his  guardians  was  too  small  to  justify  such  a  position.     Thouah  hi"^s 
father  had  died  worth  fourteen 'talents— which  w  oidd  be  diminished 
by  the  sums  bequeathed  as  legacies,  but  ought  to  have  been  increased- 
in  greater  proportion  ])y  the  interest  on" the  property  for  the  ten 
years  of  minority,  had  it  been  properly  adnunistered— the  sum -paid 
to  young  Demosthenes  on   liis  majority  was  less  than  two  talents, 
while  the  guardians  not  oidygaveiu  dishonest  accounts,  but  pro- 
fessed not  to  be  able  to  pro<luce  the  father's  will.     After  repeated 
complaints  and  remonstrances,  he  brought  n  judicitd  action  agtunst 
one  of  them— Ai>hobus— and  obtained  aVerdict  carrying  damages  to 
the  amount  of  ten  talents.     Payment,  however,  was  still  evaded  by 
the  debtor.     Five  speeches  remain  delivered  by  Demosthenes,  three 
against  Aphobus,  two  against   Onetor,  brother-in-law  of  Aphobus. 
At  the  date  of  the  latest  oration,  Demosthenes  had  still   received 
nothing,  nor  do  we  know  how^  much. he  ultimately  realized,  thouuh 
it  would  seem  that  the  difficulties  thrown  in  his  way  were  such  as  to 
compel  him  to  forego  the  greater  part  of  the  claim.'  Nor  is  it  certain 
whether  he  ever  brought  the  actions,  of  which  he  speaks  as  intended, 
against  the  other  two  guardians— Demoi)on  and  Therippides. 

Demosthenes  i-eceived  during  his  youth  the  ordinary  grammatical 
and  rhetorical  education  of  a  wealthy  Athenian.  Even  as  a  boy,  he 
is  said  to  have  manifested  extraordinary  appetite  and  interest  for 
rhetorical  exercise.  By  earnest  entreaty  he  prevailed  on  his  tutors 
to  conduct  him  to  hear  Kallistratus,  one  of  the  ablest  speakers  in 
Atheiis,  delivering  an  harangue  in  the  Dikastery  on  the  matter  of 
Oropus.  This  harangue,  producing  a  profound  impression  upon 
Demosthenes,  stimulated  his  fondness  for  rhetorical  studies.  Still 
more  was  the  passion  excited,  when,  on  attaining  his  majority, 
he  found  himself  cheated  of  most  of  his  paternal  property,  aiid 
constrained  to  claim  his  rights  by  a  suit  at  law  against  his  guardians 
Being  obliged,  according  to  Athenian  practice,  to  plead  his  own 
cause  personally,  he  was  made  to  feel  keenly  tlie  helpless  condition 


DEriOSTHENES  STUDIES  TO  BE  AN  ORATOR.   377 


of  an  incompetent  speaker  and  the  necessity  of  acquiring  oratorical 
power,  not  sinijily  as  an  instrument  of  ambition,  but  even  as  a  means 
of  individual  defense  and  safety.  It  appears  also  that  he  was,  froiu 
childhood,  of  sickly  (constitution  and  feeble  muscular  frame,  so  that 
partly  from  his  own  disinclination,  partly  from  the  solicitude  of  his 
moth'er,  he  took  little  part  either  as  boy  oV  youth  in  the  exercises  of 
the  palaestra.  His  delicate  clothing  and  somewhat  effeminate  habits 
procured  for  him  as  a  boy  the  nickname  of  Batalus,  which  remained 
attached  to  him  most  i>art  of  his  life,  and  which  his  enemies  tried  to 
connect  with  degrading  imputations.  Such  comparative  bodily  dis- 
ability probahly  contributed  to  incite  his  thirst  for  mental  and 
rhetorical  acquisitions,  as  the  only  road  to  celebrity  open.  But  it  at 
the  same  time  disqualified  him  from  approjiriating  to  himself  the 
full  range  of  a  comprehensive  Grecian  education,  as  conceived  by 
Plato,  Isokrates,  and  Aristotle — an  education  applying  alike  to 
thought,  word,  and  action,  .combining  bodily  strength,  endurance, 
and  iearl(\ssness  with  an  enlarged  mental  capacity  and  a  power  of 
making  it  felt  by  speech.  The  disproportion  between  the  physieal 
energy  and  the  mental  force  of  Demosthenes,  beginning  in  child- 
hood, is  recorded  and  lamented  in  the  inscription  placed  on  his  statue 
after  his  detitli. 

As  a  youth  of  eighteen  years  of  age,  Demosthenes  found  Inmself 
with  a  known  and  good  fa'mily  position  at  Athens,  being  ranked  iu 
the  class  of  richest  citizens  and  liai)le  to  the  performance  of  liturgies 
and  trierarchy  as  his  father  had  been  bt^forc  him;  yet  v/ith  a  real  for- 
tune very  inadecpnite  to  the  outlay  expected  from  him— embarrassed 
by  a  legal  proceeding  against  guardians  v>-ealthy  as  well  as  unscrupu- 
lous— and  an  object  of  dislike  and  annoyance  from  other  wealthy 
men,  such  as  Meidias  and  his  brother  Thrasylochus,  friends  of  those 
guanlians.  His  family  position  gave  him  a  good  introduction  to 
public  affairs,  for  which  he  proceeded  to  train  himself  carefully;  first 
as  a  writer  of  speeches  for  others,  next  as  a  speaker  in  his  own  per- 
son. Plato  and  Isokrates  were  both  at  this  moment  in  full  celebrity, 
visited  at  Athens  by  pupils  from  every  part  of  Greece;  Isa3us  also, 
who  had  studied  under  Isokrates,  was  in  great  reputation  as  a  com- 
poser of  judicial  harangues  for  plainliffs  or  defendants  in  civil  causes. 
Demosthenes  put  himself  under  the  teaching  of  Isa^us  (who  is  said  to 
have  assisted  him  in  composing  the  speeches  against  his  guardians), 
and  also  profited  largely  by  the  discourse  of  Plato,  of  Isokrates,  and 
others.  x\s  an  ardent  aspirant  he  would  seek  instruction  from  ^nost 
of  the  best  sources,  theoretical  as  wm'U  as  practical — wM-iters  as  well  as 
leeturers.  Bat  besides  living  teachers,  there  was  one  of  the  past 
generation  who  contributed  largely  to  his  improvement.  He  studied 
Thucydides  with  indefatigable  labor  and  attention;  according  to  one 
account,  he  copied  the  wdiole  history  eight  times  over  with  his  own 
hand ;  according  to  another,  he  learned  It  all  by  heart,  so  as  to  be  able 
to  rewrite  it  from  memory  when  the  manuscript  was  accidentally 


378 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


destroyed.  Without  minutely  criticising  these  details,  we  ascertain 
at  least  that  Tiuicydides  \v;is  the  object  of  liis  pecuhar  study  and 
iniiiation.  How  much  the  composition  of  Demostlieiies  was  fashioned 
by  the  n  ading  of  Thucydides— reproducing  the  daring,  majestic  and 
impressive  phraseology,  yet  without  the  overstrained  brevity  and 
involutions  of  that  great  historian— and  contriving  to  blend  with  it  a 
perspicuity  and  gnice  not  inferior  to  Lysias— may'be  seen  illustrated 
in  tlie  elaborate  criticism  of  the  rhetor  Dionysius. 

While  thus  striking  out  for  himself  a   bold  and  oriuinal  style, 
Demosthenes  had  still  greater  ditliculties  to  overcome  in  regard*  to 
the  external  requisites  of  an  orator.     He  was  not  endowed  by  nature, 
like  ^Eschines  witii  a  magniticent  voice;  nor,  like  Demades,  with  a 
ready  flow  of  vehement  improvisation.     His  thouirhts  required  to  be 
put  together  by  careful  preparation:  his  voice  was^bad  and  even  lisp- 
ing—his breath  short— his  gesiic  ulation  ungraceful;  moreover  he  was 
overawed  and  embarrassed  by  the  manifestations  of  tlie  multitude. 
{Such  an  accumulaliou  of  natural  im})ediments  were  at  least  equal  to 
those  of  which  Isokratcs  C(  niplains,  as  havinir  debarred  him  all  his 
life  from  addressing  the  public  asseipblv.  and  restrained  him   to  a 
select  audience  of  li lends  or  pupils.     The  energy  and  success  with 
■which  Demosthenes  overcame  his  defects,  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
satisfy  a  critical   a>Si  mbly  like   the  Athenian,   is  one  of  the  most 
memorable  circumstances  in  the  general  historv  of  self-education. 
Repeated  humiliation  ar.d  repulse  only  spurrtd  him  on  to  fresh  solitary 
efforts  for  improvemerit.     He  corrected  his  defective  elocution  by 
speaking  with  pebbles  in  his  mouth ;  he  prei.ared  himself  to  overcome 
the  noise  of  the  assembly  by  declaiminir  in  stc-rmy  weather  on  the 
sea-shore  of  rhaierum;  he  cpened  his  lungs  by  runninir.  and  extended 
his  powers  of  holding  breath  by  pronouncing   sentences  in  march- 
ii;g  up-hill;    he   sometimes   pa^i-ed    two  or  three  months  without 
interruption  in  a  subterranean   cliamler,  practiciiiir  i.ii:ht  and  day 
either  in  composition  (;r   d(  chimatic  n.   and   shaving  cne-hall  of  his 
head  in  order  lo  disqualify  himself  firm  goingabroad.     Afterseveral 
trials  without  success  before  the  assembly,  liis  courage  was  on  the 
point  of  giving'way.  when  Eunomus  and  other  old  citizens  reassured 
him  by  comparing  the  matter  of  his  speeclies  to  those  of  Perikles, 
and  exhorting  him  to  persevere  a  little  longer  in  the  correction  of  his 
external  defects.     On  another  occasion  he  was  pourinir  forth  his  dis- 
appointment to  Satyrus  the  actor,  who  undertook  to  i xplain  to  him 
the  cause,  desiring  him  to  repeat  in  his  own  way  a  speech  out  of 
S<.>pholi:les,  which  he  (Satyrus)  proceeded  to  repeat  alter  him,  with 
suitaliie  accent  and  delivery.     Demosthenes,  profoundlv  struck  with 
the  difference,  began  anew  the  task  of  self-improvement;  probably 
taking   constant   lessons   from   good   models.      In  his  unremitting 
private  practice,  he  devoted  himself  especially  to  acquiring  a  grace- 
ful action,  keeping  watch  on  all  his  movements  while  declaiming 
before  a  tall  looking  glass.     After  pertinacious  efforts  for  several 


ACTION   OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


879 


years,  he  was  rewarded  at  length  with  complete  success.  His 
delivery  became  full  of  decision  and  vehemence,  highly  popular 
with  tlie  (general  bodvof  the  asseniblv:  though  some  critics  censured 
his  modulation  as  artificial  and  out  of  nature,  and  savoring  of  low 
stage-eifect;  while  others,  in  the  same  spirit,  condemned  his  speeches 
as  over-labored  and  smelling  of  the  lamp. 

So  great  was  the  importance  assign-d  by  D;!mosthenes  himself  to 
these  external  means  of  effect,  that  he  is  said  to  have  pronounced 
"Action"  to  be  the  first,  second,  and  third  requisite  for  an  orat(,r. 
If  we  grant  this  estimate  to  be  correct,   with  reference  to   actual 
liearers— we  must  recollect  that  his  speeches  are  (not  less  truly  than 
the  history  of  Tliucydides)  "an  everlasting  possession  rather  than  a 
display  for  momentary  effect."     Even  among   his  contemporaries, 
the  effect  of  the  speeciies,  when  read  apart  from  the  speaker,  was 
very  powerful.     There  w^ere  some  who  thought  that  their  full  excel- 
lence could  only  be  thus  appreciated;  while  to  the  after- world,  who 
knows  them  o-.ilv  by  reading,  they  have  been  and  still  are  the  objects 
of  an  admiration  reaching  its  highest  pitch  in  the  enthusiastic  senti- 
ment of  the  fastidious  rhetor  Dionysius.     The  action  of  Demosthenes 
— consumate  as  it  doubtless  was,  and  highly  as  he  may  himself  have 
prized  an  accomplishment  so  laboriously  earned— produced  its  effect 
only  in  conjunction  with  the  matter  of  Demosthenes;  his  thoughts, 
sentiments,  words,  and  above  all,  his  stigacity  in  appreciating  and 
advisimj;  on  the  actual  situation.     His  political  wisdom,  rmd  his  lofty 
patriotic  ideal,  are  in  trutli  quite  as  remarkable  as  his  oratory.     Bv 
w^hat  training  he  attained  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  quali- 
ties, we  are  unfortunately  not  permitted  to  know.     Our  informants 
have  little  interesed  in  him  except  as  a  speaker;  they  tell  us  neither 
what  he  learned,  nor  from  whom,  nor  by  what  companions,  or  partj-- 
associates,  his  political  point  of  view  Vas  formed.     But  we  shall 
hardly  err  in  supposing  that  his  attentive  meditation  of  Thucydides 
supplied  him,  not  merely  with  force  and  majesty  of  expression,  but 
also  that  conception,  of  Athens  in  her  foretime  which  he  is  perpetu- 
ally impressing  on  his  countrymen— Athens  at  the  commencement  of 
the  Peleponnesian  war,  in  days  of  exuberant  energy,  and  under  the 
advice  of  her  noblest  statesman. 

In  other  respects,  we  are  left  in  ignorance  as  to  the  mentnl  history 
of  Demosthenes.  Before  he  acquired  reputation  as  a  public  adviser, 
he  was  already  known  as  a  logographer,  or  composer  of  discourses 
to  be  delivered  either  by  speakers  in  the  public  assembly  or  by 
liti<>;ants  in  the  Dikastery;  for  which  compositions  he  was  paid, 
accordim?  to  usual  practice  at  Athens.  He  had  also  pleaded  in  per- 
son befo?e  the  Dikastery;  in  support  of  an  accusation  preferred  by 
others  against  a  law,  proposed  by  Leptines,  for  abrogating  votes^  of 
immunity  passed  by  the  city  in  favor  of  individuals,  and  restraining 
such  grants  in  future.  Nothing  is  more  remarkable,  m  this  speech 
against  Leptines,  than  the  intensity  with  which  the  young  speaker 


380 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


enforces  on  the  people  the  necessity  of  strict  and  fuithful  adherence 
to  eugagements,  in  spite  of  great  occasional  inconvenience  in  so 
doing.  It  wouhl  appear  that  he  was  in  habitual  association  with 
some  wealthy  youtlis — among  others,  with  Apollodorns  son  of  the 
wealthy  banker  Pasion — whom  lie  undertook  to  instruct  in  the  art  of 
speaking.  This  we  learn  from  the  denunciations  of  his  rival  ^schi- 
nes;  who  accuses  him  of  having  thus  made  his  way  into  various 
wealthy  families — especially  where  there  was  an  orphan  youth  and  a 
-..idoued  mother— using  unworthy  arlitices to  del'raud  and  ruin  them. 
How  much  truth  there  may  be  in  such  imputations,  we  cannot  tell. 
But  ^s(rhiucs  was  not  unwarranted  in  api>lying  to  his  rival  the 
obnoxious  appellations  of  logographer  and  sophist;  appellations  all 
the  more  disparaging,  because  Demosthenes  belonged  to  a  trierarchic 
family,  of  tlie  highest  class  in  point  of  wealth. 

It  will  be  pro])er  here  to  notice  another  contemporary  adviser,  who 
stands  in  marked  antithesis  and  rivalry  to  Denjosthenes,  Phokion 
was  a  citizen  of  small  means,  son  of  a  pestle-maker.  Born  about  the 
year  402  B.C.,  he  was  about  twenty  years  older  than  Demosthenes. 
At  what  precise  time  his  political  importance  cojnnienccd  we  do  not 
know;  but  he  lived  to  the  gnat  age  of  84.  and  was  a  conspicuous 
man  throughout  the  last  half-century  of  his  life.  lie  becomes  known 
first  as  a  military  olKcer,  having  served  in  subordinate  command 
nnder  Chabrias,  to  whom  he  was  greatly  attached,  at  the  battle  of 
Naxos  in  3To  B.C.  lie  was  a  man  of  thorough  per.sonal  bravery,  and 
considerable  talents  for  command;  of  hardy  and  <>n(luring  tempera- 
ment, insensible  to  cold  or  fatigue;  strictly  Vim]>le  in  his  habits,  and 
above  all,  superior  to  every  kind  of  pcr>onal  corruption.  His  absti- 
nence from  plunder  and  peculation,  when  on  naval  expeditions, 
formed  an  honorable  contrast  with  otlier  Athenian  adnurals,  and  ]iro- 
cured  for  him  much  esteem  on  the  ])art  of  the  maritime  allies.  Hence 
probably  his  surname  of  Phokion  the  Good. 

I  have  already  remarked  how  deep  and  strong  was  the  hold  acquired 
on  the  Athenian  people,  by  any  public  man  who  once  established  for 
himself  a  character  ab(n'e  suspicion  on  the  score  of  personal  corrup- 
tion. Among  Athenian  politicians,  but  too  many  were  not  innocent 
on  this  point;  moreover,  even  when  a  man  was  really  innocent,  there 
were  often  circumstances  in  his  life  which  rendered  more  or  less  of 
doubt  admissible  against  him.  Thus  Demosthenes — being  known 
not  only  as  a  person  of  somewhat* costly  habits,  but  also  as  frequent- 
ing wealthy  houses,  and  receiving  money  for  speeches  composed  or 
rhetoric  communicated — was  sure  to  be  accused,  justh^  or  unjustly, 
by  his  enemies,  of  having  cheated  rich  clients,  and  would  never  ob- 
taiii  unquestioned  crcjtlit  for  a  high  pecuniary  independence,  even  in 
regard  to  the  public  aifairs;  although  he  certainly  was  not  corrupt, 
nor  generally  believed  to  be  corrupt — at  least  during  the  period  which 
this  volume  embraces,  down  to  the  death  of  Philip.  But  Phokion 
would  receive  neither  money  nor  gifts  from  any  one — was  notoriously 


PHOKIOK 


381 


and  obviously  poor — WTnt  bjirefoot  and  without  an  upper  garment 
even  in  very  cold  weather — had  only  one  female  slave  to  attend  on 
his  wife;  while  he  had  enjoyed  commands  suthcieut  to  enrich  him  if 
he  had  chosen.  His  personal  iiicorrupiibility  thus  stood  forth  i)romi- 
nently  to  the  i)ublic  eye.  Combined  as  it  was  with  bravery  antl  fair 
generalship,  it  procured  for  him  testimonies  of  conlidence  greater 
than  those  accorded  even  to  Perikles.  He  was  elected  no  less  than 
forty-five  times  to  the  annual  oltiec  of  Straiegus  or  General  of  the 
city — that  is,  one  of  the  Board  of  Ten  so  denominated,  the  greatest 
executive  function  at  Athens — and  elected  too,  without  having  ever 
on  any  occasion  solicited  the  office,  or  even  been  present  at  the  choice. 
In  all  Athenian  history  we  read  of  no  similar  nmltiplicatiou  of  dis- 
tinct appointments  and  honors  to  the  same  individual. 

According  to  the  picture  of  Athens  and  her  democracy,  as  usually 
presented  by  historians,  we  are  taught  to  believe  that  the  only  road 
open  to  honors  or  political  inliuence,  was,  by  a  seductive  address, 
and  by  courting  the  people  with  tine  speeches,  unworth}'  thittery,  or 
unmeasured  promises.  Those  who  take  this  view  of  the  Athenian 
character,  will  tind  it  difficult  to  explain  the  career  of  Phokion.  He 
w^as  no  orator — from  disdain  rather  than  incompetence.  Besides  re- 
ceiving a  good  education,  he  had  profited  by  the  conversation  of  Plato 
as  T^ell  as  of  Xenokrates,  in  the  Academy;  and  we  are  not  surprised 
that  in  their  school  he  contracted  a  contempt  for  popular  oratory,  as 
well  as  a  love  for  brief,  ccmcentrated,  pungent  reply.  Once  vvhen 
about  to  speak  in  public,  he  was  observed  to  be  ]Kirticularly  absorbed 
in  thought.  "You  seem  meditative,  Phokion,'  said  a  friend.  V  Ay, 
by  Zeus,"  was  the  reph^ — "  I  am  meilitating  whether  I  cannot  in  some 
way  abridge  the  speech  which  I  am  just  about  to  address  to  the  Athe- 
nians." He  knew  so  well,  however,  on  what  points  to  strike,  that  his 
telling  brevity,  strengthened  by  the  weight  of  ch:u-actcr  and  position, 
cut  through  the  tine  oratory  of  DemosLlienes  more  efleetively  than 
any  counter-oratory  from  men  like  ^Eschines.  Demosthenes  himself 
greatly  feared  Phokion  as  an  opponent,  and  w^as  heard  to  observe,  on 
seeing  him  rise  to  speak,  "Here  comes  the<;lcaver  of  my  harangues." 
Polyeuktus — himself  an  orator  a'ld  a  friend  of  Demosthenes — drew 
a  distinction  highly  complimentary  to  Phokion,  by  saying — "That 
Demosthenes  was  the  finest  orator,  but  Phokion  the  most  formidable 
in  speech."  In  public  policy,  in  means  of  political  clfect.  and  in  per- 
sonal character — Phokion  was  the  direct  antithesis  of  Demosthenes; 
whose  warlike  eloquence,  unwarlike  disposition,  paid  speech-writing, 
and  delicate  habits  of  life — he  doubtless  alike  despised. 

As  Phokion  had  in  his  nature  little  of  the  professed  orator,  so  he 
had  still  less  of  the  flatterer.  He  alfected  and  sustained  the  charac- 
ter of  a  blunt  soldier,  wiio  speaks  out  his  full  mind  without  suppres- 
sion or  ornament,  careless  whether  it  be  acceptable  to  hearers  or  nor. 
His  estimate  of  his  countrymen  was  thoroughly  and  undisguised  ly 
contemptuous.     This  is  manifest  in  his  wiiole  proceedings;  and  ap- 


r^C^O 


THE   SACKED   WAR. 


p(  ars  espociall y  in  the  memorable  remark  ascribed  to  him,  on  an  occa- 
sion when  sometliing  that  he  had  said  in  the  public  assembly  met 
Avith  peculiar  applause.  Turnini;-  round  to  a  friend,  he  asked— 
"Have  1  not  unconsciously  said  something  bad?"  His  manners, 
moreover  wire  ^urly  and  repulsive,  though  his  disposition  is  said  to 
have  been  kind.  He  had  hanicd  in  the  Aetidemy  a  sort  of  b^partau 
self-suppression  and  rigor  oi  life,  ^'o  one  ever  saw  him  either  laugli- 
in"-   or  weepiuix,  or  batiiing  in  tiie  public  baths. 

Tf  then  Phokion  attained  the  uni)aralleled  honor  of  being  chosen 
forty-tive  times  ircnerai.  we  may  be  sure  that  there  were  other  means 
of  reaching  it  besides  the  arts  of  oratory  and  demagogy.     We  may 
indeed  ask  witii  surprise,  how  it  was  possible  for  him  to  attain  it.  in 
the  face  of  so  many  repulsive  circumstances,  by  the  mere  force  of 
bravery  and  honesty:  especially  as  he  never  performed  any  super- 
eminent   service,  thouLdi  on  various  occasions   he  conducted   him- 
self with  credit  and  ability.  '  The  answer  to  this  question  may  be 
found  in  the  lacr,  that  Phokion,  though  not  a  flatterer  of  the  people, 
went  decidedly  alonir  with  the  capital  weakness  of  the  people.    \\  hile 
despising  theiV  judgment,  he  manifested  no  greater  foresight,  as  to 
the  pubfic  interests  and  security  of  Athens,  than  they  did       The 
Atlienian  people  had  doubtless  many  infirmities  and  committed  many 
errors;  but  the  wor.-t  error  of  all,  during  the  interval  between  oGO- 
836  B.C.,  was  their  unconquerable  repugnance  to  the  efforts,  personal 
and  pecuniary,  required  tor  prosecuting  a  hearty  war  against  Philip_ 
Of  this  aversion  to  a  strenuous  foreign  policy,  Phokion  m:ide  himself 
the' champion:  addressinir.  in  his  own  vein,  sarciistic  taunts  against 
those  who  called  for  action  agninst   Philip,  as  if  they  were  mere 
brawlers  and  cowards,  watching  for  opportunities  to  enrich  them- 
selves at  the  public  expense.     Eubulus  the  orator  was  among  the 
leadin«>-  statesmen  who  formed  what  may  be  called  the  peace-parly 
at  Athens,  and  who  continually  resisted  or  discouraged  eneigetic 
warlike  efforts,  stiiviiur  to  keep  out  of  sight  the  idea  of  Philip  as  a 
dant'erous  enemv.     Of  this  peace-party,  there  were  doubtless  some 
who  acted  conuptlv,  in  the  direct  pay  of  Philip.     But  many  others 
of  them,  without  anv  taint  of  personal  corruption,  espoused  the  same 
policy  merely  because  they  found  it  easier  f(>r  the  time  to  administer 
the  citv  under  peace  than'under  war— because  war  was  Ijuniensome 
and  disagreeable,  to  themselves  as  well  as  to  their  fellow-cinzens-- 
pnd  beciTuse  they  either  did  not.  or  would  not,  look  torwaid  to  the 
consequences  of  inaction.      ^'ow  it  was  a  great  advantage  to  this 
peace-part v,  who  wanted  a  military  leader  as  partner  to  tlieir  civil 
and  rhttorlcal  leaders,  to  strengthen  themselves  by  a  (olleague  like 
Phokion;  a  man  not  only  of  unsuspected  probity,  but  ptcuhaiiv  dis- 
interested in  advising  peace,  since  his  importance  would  have  been 
exalted  by  war.     Moreover  most  of  the  eminent  military  leaders  had 
now  come  to  love  oulv  the  license  of  war.  and  to  disdain  the  details 
of  the  war-office  at  home;  while  Phokion,  and  he  almost  alone  among 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHOKION. 


383 


tliem.  was  content  to  stay  at  Athens,  and  keep  up  that  combination 
of  civil  with  military  efficiency  which  had  been  formerly  habitual. 
Hence  he  wa-i  sustained  by  the  peace-party  and  by  the  aversion  to 
warlike  clTort  pre/ulcat  among  the  public,  in  a  sort  of  perpetuity  of 
th;;  straiej,ic  fiinctions.  without  any  solicitation  or  care  for  personal 
popularity  on  his  own  part. 

The  influence  of  Phokion  as  a  public  adviser,  during  the  period 
embraced  in  this  volume,  down  to  the  battle  of  Clueroneia.  was  emi- 
nently mischievous  to  Athens;  all  the  more  mischievous,  partly  (like 
that  of  Nikias)  from  the  respectability  of  his  personal  qualities — 
partly  because  he  espoused  and  sanctioned  the  most  dangerous 
infirmity  of  the  Athenian  mind.  His  biographers  mislead  our  judg- 
ment by  pointing  our  attention  chiefly  to  the  last  twenty  years  of  his 
long  life,  after  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia.  At  that  time,  Vheu  the  vic- 
torious military  force  of  Macedonia  had  been  fully  organized  and 
that  of  Greece  comparatively  prostrated,  it  might  be'argued  plausibly 
(I  do  not  say  decisively,  even  then)  that  submission  to  Macedonia 
had  become  a  fatal  necessity;  and  that  attempts  to  resist  could  only 
end  by  converting  bad  into  worse.  But  the  peace-policy  of  Phokioii 
—which  might  be  called  prudence,  after  the  accession  of  Alexander 
— was  ruinously  imprudent  as  well  as  dishonorable  during  the  reigu 
of  Philip.  The  odds  were  all  against  Philip  in  his  early  years;  they 
shifted  and  became  more  and  more  in  his  favor,  only  Ijecause  his 
game  was  played  well,  and  that  of  his  opponents  badly.  The  su^^e- 
riority  of  force  was  at  first  so  much  on  the  side  of  Athens,  that  if  she 
had  been  willing  to  employ  it  she  might  have  made  sure  of  keeping 
Philip  at  least  within  the  limits  of  Macedonia.  All  depended  upon 
her  will;  upon  the  question,  whether  her  citizens  were  prepared  ia 
their  own  minds  to  incur  the  expense  and  fatiaue  of  a  vii^orous  for- 
eign ix)licy— whether  they  w^ould  handle  tlieir  pikes,  "open  their 
purses,  and  forego  the  comforts  of  home,  for  the  maintenance  of 
Grecian  and  Athenian  liberty  against  a  growinir.  but  not  as  yet  irre- 
sistible, destroyer.  To  such  a  sacrifice  the  Athenians  could  not 
bring  themselves  to  submit;  and  in  consequente  of  that  reluctance, 
they  were  driven  in  tlie  end  to  a  much  graver  and  more  irreparable 
sacrifice— the  loss  of  liberty,  dignity,  and  security.  Now  it  w:is  pre- 
cisely at  such  a  moment,  and  when  such  a  question  was  pending, 
that  the  influence  of  the  peace  loving  Phokion  was  most  ruinous. 
His  anxiety  tliat  the  citizens  should  be  buried  at  home  in  their  own 
sepulcliers— his  despair,  mingled  with  contempt,  of  his  countrymen 
and  their  refined  habits— his  hatred  of  the  orators  who  mia-hl  profit 
by  an  increased  war  expenditure— all  contributed  to  make  him  dis- 
courage public  effort,  and  await  passively  the  preponderance  of  the 
^lacedonian  arms;  thus  playing  the  game  of  Philip,  and  sidinir, 
though  himself  incorruptible,  with  the  orators  in  Philip's  pav. 

The  love  of  peace,  either  in  a  community,  or  in  an  individual, 
usually  commands  sympathy  without  further  inquiry,  though  there 


384. 


THE  SACRED  AVAR. 


CHAXGE  IN  THE  ATHENIANS. 


385 


are  time<^  of  ffro^vin2:  dansrer  from  without,  in  whicli  the  adviser  of 
peace  is  tlie  worst  irnide  that  fan  be  followed.     Since  the  XVlopon- 
re^ian  war,   a  revolution   bad  been   silently   going  on  in  Greece, 
whereby  the  duties  of  soldiership  had  passed  to  a  great  degree  from 
citizen    militia   into  the  hands  of   paid  mercenaries.     The  resident 
citizens  irenerallv  had  become  adverse  to  the  burden  of  mditarv  ser- 
vice- wliile  on  the  other  hand,  tlie  miscellaneous  aggregate  ot  Greeks 
willi'no-  to  carrv  arms  aiivwhere   and  looking  merely  for  pay,    hatl 
o-reailv  auirmented.     Yerv  differently  liad  the  case  once  stood.      1  he 
Athenian  citizen  of  432  ii*.c.—bv  concurrent  testinM)ny  of  the  eulogist 
PerikU's  and  of  the  unfriendlv  Corintl:ians-was  ever  ready  to  brave 
the  dano-er,  fatigue,  and  ].rivation.  of  f(n-eign  expeditions,  ior  the 
irlorv  of^\lhens''   "  He  accounted  it  holiday  work  to  do  duly  m  lier 
Service  (it  is  an  eneinv  who  speaks):  he  wasted  his  body  for  her  as 
thou'di  it  had  been  the  bodv  of  anotlier."     Embracing  with  passion 
the  idea  of  imperial  Athens,  he  knew  that  she  could  only  be  upheld 
bv  the  enero-c'tic  eifcM-ts  of  her  individual  citizens,  and  thai  the  talk 
in  her  publfc  assemblies,  thoutdi  useful  as  a  preliminary  to  action, 
was  mischievous  if  allowed  as  a  substitute  for  aclicm      Such  was  the 
Periklean  Athenian  of  431  r>  c.     But  this  energy  had  been  crushed  in 
the-disasters  closing  the  Peloponne^ian  war,  and   had   never  again 
revived     The  Demosthenie  Athenian  of  80O  B.C.  had  as  it  were  grown 
old      Pu'^nacitv,  Punhellenic  chami)i«m.^h*p.  and  the  love  of  enter- 
T5rise  had'tiied  within  him.     He  was  a  (luiet,  home-keeping,  retined 
citizen   attached  to  the  democratic  constitution,  and  executing  with 
cheerful  pride  his  ordinarv  citv-duties  under  it;  but  immci-ed  m  in- 
dustrial or  professional  pursuits,  in  domestic  comforts,  in  the  mipres- 
sive  manifestations  of  the  public  religion,  in  the  atmosphere  ot  dis- 
cussi(Tn  and  thouuht,  intellectual  as  well  as  political.     To  renounce 
all  this  for  foreign  and  continued  military  service,  be  considc'i eel  as 
a  hardship  not  to  be  endured,  except  under  the  pressure  ot   danger 
near  and  inimediato.     Precautionarv  exigences  against  distant  perils, 
however  real,  could  not  be  broui^dit  home  to  his  feelings:  even  to  pay 
others  for  serving  in  Ifis  .place,  was  a  duty  which  he  could  scarcely 
be  induced  to  perform.  .  . 

Not  merelv  in  Athens,  but  also  amomr  the  Peloponnesian  allies  or 
Sparta  the  resident  citizens  had  contracted  the  like  indisposition  to 
militarv  service.  In  the  vear  431  B.C.,  these  Peloponnesians  (here 
too  we'have  tlie  concurrent  testimony  of  Perikles  and  Archidamus) 
had  been  forward  for  service  with  their  persons,  and  only  backward 
when  a>ke(l  for  monev.  In  383  B.C.,  Sparta  found  them  so  reluctant 
toioin  her  stan<lard,  especiidlv  for  operations  beyond  sea,  that  she 
was  foiced  to  admit  into  her  confederacy  the  principle  of  pecuniary 
commutation;  just  as  AtlienS  had  done  (about  460-450  B.C.)  with  tlie 
unwarlike  islanders  em-oiled  in  her  confederacy  of  Delos. 

Amid  this  increasing  indi<iH)sition  to  citizen  military  service   tlie 
floating,   miscellaneous,   bands  who   made  soldiership  a  livelihooa 


inder  --^"y^^e  who  would  pay  them,  increased  in  number  from  vear 
to  year.     In  402-401  b.c,,  when  the  Cyrelan  armv  (the  Ten  Thou 
sand  Greeks)  were   levied,  it  had  been  found  difficult  to  brin-  <n 
many  together;  large  premiums  were  given  to  the  chiefs  or  enlistiii.r 
agents;  the  recruits  consisted,  in  great  part,  of  settled  men  temntcd 
by  lucrative   promises  away  from  their  homes.      ]5ut  active  men 
ready  for  paid  foreign  service  were   perpetually  multiplying-   from 
poverty,  exile,  or  ove  of  enterprise;  they  were  put  under  constan 
tra  aing  and  greatly  improved,  by  Ipliikrates  and  others,  as  peltasts 
or  light  infan^ry  to  serve  in  conjunction  with  the  citizen  force  of  hoo- 
lites.     Jason  ot  Pherae  brought  together  a  greater  and  better  trained 
mercenary  force  than  had  ever  been  seen  since  the  Cyreians  in  their 
upward  inarch;  the  Phokiaus  also  iii  the  Sacred  AVar  liavin-  com- 
mand over  the  Delphian  treasures,  surrounded  themselves  with  a 
formidable  array  of  mercenary  soldiers.     There  arose  (as  in  the  four- 
teenth and  fifteenth  centuries  in  modern  Europe)  Condottieri  like 
Charidemus  and   others-generals   liaving  mercenary  bauds  under 
Uieir  command,  and  hiring  themselves  out^o  any  prince  or  poteiS 
who  would  employ  and  pay  them.     Of  these  armed  rovers-poor 
brave    desperate,   and  held    by    no    civic    ties-Isokrates    make; 
repeated   complaint     as   one   of   the   most   serious   misfortunes   of 
?,lmt?'j      "    '  ^'fQderers,  indeed,  usually  formed  the  natural  emi- 
.gants  in  new  colonial  enterprises.     But  it  so  happened  that  few 
Hellenic  colonies  were  formed  during  the  interval  between  400-350 
B.C.;  in  fact,  the  space  open  to  Hellenic  colonization  was  becomin- 
more  circumscribed  by  the  peace  of  Antalkidas-bv  the  dctpoti    n 
0.  Dionysius-and  by  the  increase  of  Lucanians,  Bruttians    and  the 
mlaiid  powers  generally.     Isokrates,  while  extolling  the  great   ser 
o^^ooTr/^^  r-ideredto  the  Hellenic  world  by  Aliens.  In    ettL 

maifv  m  t4H?J5'r'"'l°'^'''^"'  ^^  '^^  ^^'^^'^'^^S  new  homes  for  so 
many  unsettled  Greeks-insists  on  the  absolute  necessitv  of  similir 

s^iTat  ttr-S'or'  V'i^  ^"^  ^^^^  ^^^^^^^^^^  ^-  ™^p  ^^ p ""  - 

sclt  at  the  head  of  an  Hellenic  conquest  of  Asia  Minor,  and  thus  to 
aequire   erntory  which  might  furnish  settlement  to  the  nL  i  ude 

the^rce'of  gTcI.  ""^"'  "^^  '^'^  '^  ^^^  ^^-^•^'  ^^^  ^^^ 
This  decline  of  the  citizen  militia,  and  growing  aversion  to  per 

sonal  service,  or  m^ilitary  exercises-togethir  with  the  contemnor  - 
eous  increase  of  the  professional  soldiery  unmoved  by  civic  obZi  - 
iou.-,s  one  of  the  capital  facts  of  the  Demosthenic  a-e  Thorn  h 
?eE  o?l",;-^'"''  !J  ^.^'-'kes  us  more  forcibly  at  Athens   wlu^ 

vmmW^      h  f^f^'^^'f^  individual  effort  liad  once  been  so  hiWi 

most  co^\i ZL      1^'^"'^'   '"i'l  \^''  ''''''''''y  ^^"  i^^J^^'^trial  pursuit 
-^XrfroTnflS-^^  ^''^^^  severance  of  the  active  force  of 

M3ciety  trom   political  freedom  and  intelligence;  breaking  un  that 
many-suied  combination,  of  cultivated  Ihoilght  ^Cuth  vigLrouf  de^ 
H  G.  IV.— 13 


886 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


.Uic.  formed   the  ^fZ^^^i^X^  tifoTfhelr 
Mac'jdoniii  led  l)>  a  >"""=.}"'"„     .  in^nrovin"-   the  best  ideas  ot 

fn^tlle^am^rnb^-firrpidTua;!  "he,,  .he  k?]„g's  f -/'"H'-'l -^d 
li>  l,Pr  mv„  ha„d  on  the  luMutl,).  mounla,,,  sliephc-ids  ill-clothed 
In   \l   hou  Vd-e"t1us  and  drinking  fron>  --.<;- ,P;'';7V™  "^ 

;ji,'::^  \he;.an  .vho  h,u.  ne^^^^^^ 

;?c!^io"a\nili,a,ypopulatio.,  destined  ,on,a^^co^^^^^^^^^ 

l,ad  been  tlie  native  Persians,  at  the  ,  /^"^^f' ""  ^*^'^\  "  Xer.xes.  when 

"  vAthct  this  brief  sl^etch  of  the  great   n,iUtary  ehange  in  Grceco 


PUBLIC  ADVICE  OP  DEJIOSTHBNES.  337 

th:t<;,tsrtf'^Z^:rri:?'^.f  .."^^f "«  "^  !•-  -"-»  force  and 
either  tl.e  p,-oceedii  ij  o^Afi;;  1  i       f'  """'''  ^'^»'-<<^ly  understand 

bo!f;'.:f'l|te.  i-;r  t"p^<^2oXt?ir-^^  »-^  "'^'^  power, 

354  B.C.  to  devote  the.n  toTbo^ervce  of  r'^'7r'  "',","''  fo™"^<J  i" 
to  the  assembly  is  not  less  i,?,ereJf,?J^ .  '  '^"''',"'-  "'"  «'■«'  ^''''w^s 
theactnal  Hellenic  po  Uica   worid    f^t?f    "'"''^^  of 

as  an  evidence  of  his  own  mam?er  nf  J  yP?"--  I'an  subjeelivelv, 

that  momeut,  the  preTomh^a?,    !nn.    '"■''?'""°S."*'  ^''^'S^^ies.    Ai 
reports  respecting  tirOrcat  K  n"'  w  ^''''''^Y;'*■'^'"^  "^o*  f™™ 
measures  of  hostnity  aS  G^J^c^  a„T t'l^, r*";?  <="'".'">'P"'"i"S 
la,-,  in  consequence  of  The  aid  recnnJi     1  ff '"f  Athens  m  particn- 
Chares  to  the  revolted  Persian  s?tr?n  V^h  ''^  •'"^Athenian  geneml 
sion- which  had  al,-eadv  Tu  m^    ;  ^,      'J^''^"';     ^>'  """  -ipprehen- 
hefore)  to  make  peace  vUhMf.tLf '"?'!"'■''',  "'«  Athenians  (a  year 
Social  War-the'^puWic  ,,^,,  d  ,, ^'0  !'.  """  "  "'"*-''■  '^"''  "^'o^^  "^ 
ar,nament  of  300  sail,  with  ah,  o.eorce''f"r'^;^  ■''"'"""'•     ^  P^''^""" 
an  invasion  of  Greece— was  t.l-'^.^if^'?'^^'''"  mercenai'ies— and 
Mausolus,  prince  or  sa.rap  of  K,,-     VnTY^'    ^'  ''P^'''  '"^^ 
agent  in  iiitlamiug  the  Socud  Wnr  .HI,  "'*  J**^"  "'«  PnuPipal 

the  islands  even  after  the  peace  „,mn''-'''"T,"'"1 '"''"  ^''^  "'^''""st 
tion  of  the  kingVs  desgnrso  ;.?,?'''/,,"'''•  ^'^  ^'''"^  '"  "■^'^'■■ 
remonstrate  with  him.  The  Persi,, L  !„  Athenians  sent  envoys  to 
mg  inland  forces,  which  we  cemn,»tT  "'''' '"  '"'™  ''«'"  '^o'Hect- 
rec(,nq„e,-ing  Egypt,  but  of  whi^^  i  i^"";-'''''"'^  afterward  in 
moment  (leelareil  Hence  the  mnM^  ''''""■'•'"on  »as  not  at  this 
material  to  note-as  a  ,nak',' he  t^rie,Tf '''"'''''•''''  '"Athens.  It  is 
as  yet  enlerlaincd  appreherti  u,":,,  'otl  PhiM,?"rA  "'  l'^  P"'"""' 
that  prince  was  augnienlin"  s.M,)ri,,    •        ■,•''  of  M.acedon,  ihougU 

conquests.     Xay.  Phifip  after     '^'^  '"'^  ""'""-  '™"  " -'      '  ' 

of  Persian  invasion,  he  was  1 

assist  HI  the  defense  of  G,-eee=.  -      -  - 

rai.laW;=VcTnt''n'th 'prS'^sn'''  ?"' n  '""^"""^  "bvionslv  for- 
Pa^,-Hel]e„ic  pat,-iotism  ,vldch  Iffi^.v'"  ','''  ^^'"o^'l'enes  that  "s^ine 
tn  blowing  the  trumpet  a-  inst  Pi  ;r  ''  ''S."<i"-'-'^  l"m  so  stren„o-.-s 
up",ti  all  Greeks,  b  t  ,X  V'V^  "'  ^  "l  o^i.^^'ion  in.:,u,.i..c ut 
radjtions  and  lier  stat io'n  to  i  ,'  old ''h';  n'"-''  ,-,"  '^''''"''  "^  '"''■ 
lore.gner  at  all  cost,  is  iiisUt-drn  win  '''"'"  '','''"'''"  "?^""-^  *''« 
worthy  of  Pcrikles.  Bu  wh  le  nLn  •''"  ""^l^'^t'^  ""'i  'Ugnitv 
l"s  eou:,tryme„  noble  and  Pan  Ti,? ,  "  ■  "™'''  "'"'  i:npresses  „,v,u 
content  with  eloquent  dec  amafti""'  P".To«cs,  he  does  not  rest 
His  recoinmendatS  as  to  meins  .'."'■  "''?'*'''^  '■""'^'^"i  "-^  «'e  pnrt. 
nn  attentive  survey  and  a  s.^f?   ^^'^  posit,veand  explicit;  implvin^ 

chcnmstance.^"SteSbefn?i'''K '""•'"  "^  ""^  ^^^ronnd  ^i 

Keeping  before  his  countrymen  a  favombll 


3gg  THE  SACRED  WAR. 

view  of  tbeir  position,  he  -ver  Komj- them  ^c^^^  ^ 

aition  of  earnest  and  Pei'^^even^f  ^^;^^^^^^^^^^^  unpopular  task  of 

^vitb  money.     He  exhausts  all  his  i^yenti^"  i     insinuation, 

shamiiv^'  them,  by  direct  ^^P^J^f^ilit^rfsei^ice  w^^^^^  for  the  mis- 
out  of  that  aversion  to  personal  ™^^^^,^>  .^^J^J  j^^bit  Such  positive 
fortune  of  Athens.  ^-^^^^'^^'1^,^^^^^^  the  full 

and  practical  character  as  omeai^,a^N^^ )  the  constant  presenta- 
cxi-encies  of  a  given  ^^^ua  on-com^^^^^  freedom,  and 

tion  of  Athens,  as    he  P^^^^S^  ^.^^^^^Z;^,  a  pMrimony  to  rest  upon 
.vith  appcnils  to  Athenian  ^^^^"^;";,Vtitute  the    m perishable  charm  of 
hut  as  an  example  to  ^JJ^^^^^^^'^^^f  ^^^J'  ,el!.   mcmiorable  than  their 
these  harangues  ^^  ^^f  ;!;^,  ^on^  in  thT  latter  merit,  indeed, 
excellence  as  rhetorical  ^P";P?^'^^\^'\^n/than  in  the  former, 
his  rival  .Eschines  is  ^^-^;5;^7^j)Vn,oX^^^^  ^P^'^^  ^^  ^'^''''''^ 

In  no  one  of  the  ^P^^^^^f  .^/.J^^"  ^-^  j  i^^^^  known  discourse 

wisdom  more  predominant  than  ^I^  /^^^J^  !f^.;idelivered  bv  a  young 
to  the  public  assembly-on    he  bjmmoiu^^^^^^  ^^^  ..^^^^ 

man  of  twenty-seven  years  of  a^e  ^vl^^^^^  ^.j^^^^^^,^  ^^^ 

teaching  except   from  the  <^^^^;^^.  ^^^Jf/^  the  common  and 

actors.     While  P'--ehuming      e  l^;"g/>  ,/^  [attends  that  no  evidence 

dangerous  enemy  (>t  t^^^,^,y^^"^{  .Vv^t  ir  nspire(l.  sufficiently  obvious 
of  impending  Persian  attack  had  >   t     a     1  ^^^^^^  ^^  .^^^.^^  ,^i 

and  glaring  to  warrant  Atliens  "^  J^  " "  -^  ^  ,u-gested.  He  depre- 
leagSe  of  Greeks,  as  P^^'^'^^^'^^^P^.^^i^^^^  to  provoke  the  Persian 

cates  on  the  one  hand  ""^''^^'P  "^^  u^  oUier  lumd,  any  premature 
king  or  bring  on  a  war— ana  «"  "^  hpfore  thev  themselves  were 
npix^al  to  the  Greeks  for  c-ombination  betoie  tm>^^^^  ^^^^  ^  ^^^  ^^^^ 

h^,^-essed  with  a  feeling  o  ^o"^^^;;'^^^^!^,^;,^^.  the  diSerent  Hellenic 

inon  terror  could  ^>""-?V^^!;^^^Vp    ioso  sand^ 

cities;  nothingelse  ^^V^^^!:!  F^f^!^^^^^^^  would  probably 

^^:V- ^  -^Jher  be  injmoden.tc.y  afra^  ^  the  Ore.  K^^ -on 
the  other  hand  be  ourselves  ^„^^  ^^^^  J*^,;^-? ^'^i  "^  and  mistrust  preva- 
_as  well  on  our  account  ^^^  ^ 7^^  ^^^^.  ^ ^^.(JeVi  we.  with  the  full  and 
lent  among  the  Greeks  around  us      ^    ^^^^^  hin^  mas  1  should 

unanimous  force  of  Greece,  could  aU^^^^^^^  no  wrong  at  all. 

l;uve  hehl  that  even  ^^ong,  done  toward  lurn  ^^^^  ^^^^ 

liut  since  this  is  impossible,  I  ^^^^^^Y^J^^T.ims  of  right  on  behalf  of 

give  the  king  ^|  P-\^?^?,/^;/,"eS^  ''  '"^'"•'' 

the  other  Greeks      \\  ule  ^\^,^^'?^;'  "./*,.  i^^ve  been  the  first  to  begin 
thing  witb.out  being  mistrusted;  bu   ^J  ^^^  !^^ JS^  to  the  others, 

.var.^he  wiU  naturally  -'V'";/;; ^Jf "^ ^^^^^^^t  tl  ereFore.^expose  tolight 
on  account  of  their  aversion  {^ ;^^-^.^^,^,!^^'  \y  ealling  together  its 


SCHEME  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


when  you  will  have  no  adequate  force;  but  keep  the  peace,  confiding 
m  yourselves,  and  making  full  preparation." 

It  is  this  necessity  of  making  preparation,  which  constitutes  the 
special  purpose  of  Demostheues  in  his  harangue.     He  produces  an 
elaborate  plan,   matured  by  careful    retiection,   for  improving  and 
ex! ending  the  classification  by  Svmmories;  proposing  a  more  conve- 
nient and  systematic  distribution  of  the  leading  citizens  as  well  as  of 
the  total  financial  and  nautical  means— such  as  to   insure  both  the 
rjady  equipment   of  arjued   force  whenever  required,  and   a  fair 
a])portionment  both  of  effort  and  of  expense  among  the  citizens 
Into  the  details  of  this  plan  of  cconomieal  reform,  which  are  explained 
wnth  the  precision  of  an  administrator  and  not  with  the  vagueness  of 
a  rhetor,  I  do  not  here  enter;  especially  as  we  do  not  know  that  it 
was  actually  adopted.      But   the  spirit  in  which  it  was  proposed 
deserves  all  attention,  as  proclaiming,  even   at   this  eariy  day    the 
home-truth  which    the  orator   reiterates    in    so    many    subseci'uent 
harangues.     "In   the   preparation  which  I  propose   to  you   Athe- 
nians (he  says),  the  first    and  most  important  point    is,  that  your 
minds  shall  be  so  set,  as  that  each  man  individually  will  be  willhio- 
and   forward  in   doing  his  duty.     For  you   see   plainly  that  of  afl 
those  matters  on  winch  you  have  determined  collectively  and  on 
which    each    man    individually    has     looked    upon    the' duty    of 
execution  as  devolving   upon   himself— not    one  has    ever  slipped 
through  your  hands;  while,  on  the  contrary,  wdieuever,  after  deter- 
mmation  lias  been  taken,  you  have  stood  looking  at  one  another,  no 
man  intending  to  do  anything  himself,  but  every  one  throwino-'tho 
burden  of  action  upon  his  neighbor— nothing  has  ever  succeeded 
Assuming  you,  therefore,  to  be  thus  disposed  and  wound  up  to  the 
proper  pitch,  I  recommend,"  etc. 

This  is  the  true  Demosthenic  vein  of  exhortation,  runninn-  with 
unabated  force  through  the  Philippics  and  Olynthiacs,  and  striviu.'- 
to  revive  that  conjunction— of  which  Perikles^had  boasted  as  an  es'- 
tablished  fact  m  tiie  Athenian  character- energetic  individual  action 
tollowing  upon  full  public  debate  and  collective  resolution      How 
ottenhere,  and  elsewhere,  does  the  orator  denounce  the  uselessness 
ot  votes  m  the  public  assembly,  even  after  such   votes  had  been 
passed— if  the  citizens  individually  hung  back,  and  shrunk  from  the 
latigue    or    the    pecuniary    burden    indispensable    for   execution? 
Demus  in  the  Pnyx  (to  use,  in  an  altered  sense,  an  Aristophanic 
comparison)  stdl  remained  Pan-Hellenic  and  patriotic,  when  Demus 
at  home  had  come  to  think  that  the  city  would  march  s^ifeiy  by  itself 
without  any  sacrifice  on  his  part,  and  that  he  was  at  liberty  to  be- 
come absorbed  in  his  property,  family,  religion,   and  recreations. 
And  so  Athens  might  really  have  proeeeded,  in  her  enioyment  of 
liberty,   wealth,    refinement,    and    individual    security-could    the 
Grecian  worid  have  been  guaranteed  against  the  formidable  3Iaco- 
aonian  enemy  from  without. 


390 


THE  SACRED   WAR. 


It  was  in  the  ensuing  year,  when  the  alarm  respecting  Persia  hr.d 
worn  off,  that  the  Athenians  were  called  on  to  discuss  the  conllitt- 
m<r  applications  of  Sparta  and  of  Megalopolis.  The  success  oT  iLo 
Phokians  appeared  to  be  such  as  to  prevent  Thebes,  especially  wliiiu 
her  troops,  under  Pammenes,  were  absent  in  Asia,  from  inlerferiiig 
in  Peloponnesus  for  the  protection  of  Megalopolis.  There  were  even 
at  Athens  politicians  who  confidently  predicted  the  approaching  hu- 
miliation of  Thebes,  together  with  llie  emancipation  and  reconstilu- 
tion  of  those  Ba'otian  I'owns  which  she  now  held  in  dependence — 
Orchomenus,  Thespiie,  and  Platani;  predictions  cordially  welcomed 
by  the  miso-Theban  sentiment  at  Athens.  To  the  Spartans,  the  mo- 
ment appeared  favorable  for  breaking  up  ^Megalopolis  and  recovering 
Messene;  in  which  scheme  they  hoped  to  inure>t  not  only  Athens, 
but  also  Elis,  Phlius,  and  some  other  Peloponnesian  states.  Tg 
Athens  they  offered  aid  for  the  recovery  of  Oropus,  now  and  for 
about  twelve  years  past  in  the  hands  of' the  Thebans;  to  Elis  and 
Phlius  they  also  tendered  assistance  for  regaining  respectively  Tri- 
phylia  and*  the  Trikaranum,  from  the  Arcadians  and  Argeians.  This 
political  cond)inalion  was  warmly  espoused  by  a  considerable  party 
at  Athens;  being  reconunended  not  less  by  aversion  to  Thebes  than 
by  the  anxious  desire  for  repossessing  the  border  town  of  Oropus. 
B\it  it  was  combated  by  others,  and  by  Demosthenes  among  the 
number,  who  could  not  be  tempted  by  any  bait  to  ae(iuiesce  in  the 
reconstitutiou  of  the  Lacedamonian  power  as  it  had  stood  before  the 
battle  of  Leuktra.  In  then  Athenian  assembly,  the  discussion  was 
animated  and  even  angry;  the  envoys  from  ^legalopolis,  as  well  as 
those  from  Sparta  on  the«other  side,*finding  strenuous  partisans. 

Demosthenes  strikes  a  course  professedly  middle  between  the  two, 
yet  really  in  favor  of  defending  ^Megalopolis  against  Spartan  recon- 
quest.  We  remark  in  this  oration  (as  in  the  oration  De  Symmoriis, 
a  year  before)  that  there  is  no  alhision  to  Philip;  a  point  to  be  noticed 
as  evidence  of  the  gradual  changes  in  the  Demosthenic  point  of  view. 
All  tiie  arguments  urged  turn  ui-on  Hellenic  and  Athenian  interests, 
without  reference  to  Ihe  liklihood  of  hostilities  from  without.  In 
fact,  Demosthenes  lays  down,  as  a  position  not  to  ba  disputed  by 
any  one,  that  for  the  interest  of  Athens,  both  Sparta  and  Thebes 
ought  to  be  weak;  neither  of  them  in  condition  to  disturb  her  security; 
—a  position,  unfortunately,  but  too  well  recognized  among  all  the 
leading  Grecian  states  in  their  reciprocal  dealings  whh  each  other, 
rendering  the  Pan-Hellenic  aggregate  comparatirely  defenseless 
airainst  Philip  or  any  skillful  nggressor  from  without.  While,  how- 
ever, affirming  a  sieueral  maxim,  in  itself  questionable  and  perilous, 
Demosthenes  deduces  from  it  nothing  but  judicious  consequences. 
In  regard  to  Sparta,  he  insists  only  on  keeping  her  in  statu  quo,  and 
mainVaining  inviolate  against  her  the  independence  of  Megalopolis 
and  Messene.  He  will  ^not  be  prevailed  upon  to  surrender  to  her 
these   two  cities,  even  by  the  seductive  prospect  of  assistance  to 


PHILIP  IN  THESSALY. 


391 


Athens  in  recovermg  Oropus,  and  in  reviving  the  autonomy  of  the 
I  ffiot  an  cities.  At  that  moment  the  prevalent  disposition^  amon^ 
the  Athenian  public  was  antipathy  against  Thebes,  combined  w  1 1*! 

battle  of  Mantineia  agamst  the  Megalopolitans.  Thou.-ii  liimse  1 
sharing  tins  sentiment,  Demosthenes  will  not  suffer  his  count  S 
be  misled  by  it.  He  recommends  that  Athens  shall  herself  t  lie  im 
theTleban  policy  in  regard  to  Megalopolis  and  Messene  so  as  o 
pnnect  these  two  cities  against  Spai^i;  the  rather,  as  by  sue h^a  pro^ 
ceedmg  the  Thebans  will  be  excluded  frcun  Peloponnesus  ami  thS 
general  influence  narrowed.  He  even  goes  so  far  as  to  sav  tha  f 
Sparta  should  siicceed  in  reconquering  Megalopolis  and  Mes^^U 

nians  declined  to  undertake  the  protection  of  Me  ^al  p  lis  a-v  I't 
Sparta;  smce  we  presently  find  the  Thebans  conthu  .  to  aft^r 
that  pnnect ion,  as  they  had  done  before.  The  aggressive  schemes 
0  Sparta  appear  to  have  been  broached  at  the  i^omen  wiienTle 
Phokians  under  Onomarchns  were  so  decidedly  superior  to  Thebes 
as  to  place  that  city  in  some  embarrassment.  But  the  superior  ty  of 
the  Phokians  was  .s.on  lessened  by  their  collision  with  more  W 
Kudaole  enemy— Philip  of  Macedou  ^' 

That  prince  had  been  already  partially  interfering  in  Thessdian 
affan-s  at  the  instigation  of  Eulikus'and  Simus"  -hicrfs  of  he 
Aleuad.i?ot  Lanssa,  against  I.ykophron  the  despo  of  Phc^i'r  B^^^^^ 
his  recent  acquisit  on  of  Methone  left  him  more^it  1  beitt(f extend 
his  conquests  southward,  and  to  bring  a  lar-er  force  to  be-  .  on  t  p 
dissensions  of  Thessaly.  In  that  comitrv,  The  gix^U  cit  e^  we  e  as 
n  ;!•  7'"^^'"^^"^^^ /or  supremacy,  and  ^holding  in  snlXc  on  the 
smaller  by  ineans  of  garrisons;  while  Lvkophron  of  Plei4  vis  x 
ernng  himself  to  rc^gain  that  ascendency  over  the  wh^e  vh  ch  had 
h  to  th!'"  ^'^f^'^^^y  J^>fon  and  Alexander.  Philip  nmv  an  led 
nto  the  country  and  attacked  liim  so  vigonmsly  as  to  constr  ii   lim 

ouTover  tile  Th?/  ''"  '^''?'''''''''     ^^---^^''"'.  ^^t  that^Hme  y  o  o  ! 
10  i^  o^ei  the  Thebans  and  master  as  far  as  ThermopykT    was  inter 

exteml  ng  his  (twn  ascendency.  He  sent  into  Th,>ssalv  a  force  of 
Plmd  n'f;ri''i/"'  brother  Phayllus,  to  sustain  Lykoph  on  But 
Iw  T^         tailed  altogether;  being  defeated  and  driven  out  of  Thessaly 

^       ^  J  ^'-^  l^^^'^^'T  "^  ^^'^^^  ^^'^^  ^^'  ^'•^^^<^^-  ^^ange  '  t^n  h 
forp;  nf  ff  \  ''"'  ^"!»'^='^'^'^"-^  ^vent  himself  thither  with  the  ful 
force  of  Phokians  and  foreign  mercenaries.    An  obstinate  and  seen 
ingly  a  protracted  contest  now  took  place   in  the  course  of  wirlf?^^^^ 
was  at  first  decidedly  victorious.     H^deflated  Phihp   n  ?wo  batUes' 
^'ith  such  severe  loss  that  the  Macedonian  army  was  withdrawn  from 


392 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


Thes-alv,  «hile  Lvkophron  with  his  Phokian  allies  remained  mas- 

"=T,l""r:coL  of  ,he  Phokian  arms  was  followed  upM' further 
viot  wv  in  Ba-otia.  Ononiarclius  renewed  his  invasion  ol  that  tei ii- 
n  r  ae  "at^the  Thebans  in  bal.le,  and  made  himself  master  of 
K.ami  Va  in  ad.iilion  to  OiclKm.enus.  which  he  held  bef.ire  It 
w  1  d  «eeu  hat  tl,e  Thebans  were  at  this  time  deprived  of  mueh  of 
1  forc^  w^  ieh  was  serving  in  Asia  under  Artabazus.  and  whuh^ 
™.r lins  from  these  very  reverses,  they  presently  recalled.  The 
f'l  oki'^ms  on  the  other  hand,  were  at  the  height  of  their  power  At 
1  si  et.  re  alls,  probably,  the  aggressive  con.bina. on  of  he 
Spartans  a"lxUist  Megalopolis,  and  the  debate,  before  noticed,  m  the 

""  PMt\va'T.r'i:;n,e  time  in  embarrassment  from  his  defeats  in 
Tbe-  Iv  11  is  «>ldiers,  discouraged  and  even  mul.nons,  woul. 
1  .nlTv  consent  to  remain  under  bis  standard.  By  great  pains  and 
J;  niat<^";x  o  .-.tion,  be  at  last  succeeded  in  rea.mi.a,ing  tbcm. 
A  .V.r  n  rcrfiin  iiitcival  for  rcstofat Um  and  re-cnfoicement.  he  ad- 
V  Xd  wM  1  a  r  la  nv  into  Tlie.^saly.  and  resumed  bis  operatmns 
\<m<ea  ^'"•.\  ,  -  obli"ed  again  to  solicit  aid  from  Ono- 

Sb  IS -an! .Tpio^^  ise    ba.  aU 

bed  under  ht  .le,',e„dencc.     ^nomarcbus  ac<ord„,dy  joined  bn  in 
Ti.P^s.ilv  with  a  lar"-e  armv.  said  to  consist  of  20,000  loot  .um  ow 
^  X-      Be  found  on    his  occasion,  within  tbe  eounliy,  more 
obli  niie  re   stance  than  before;  for  the  cruel  dynasty  of  Iheia;  bad 
ni'S  an scd  nieir  previous  victory  by  aggravated  violence  and 
r  n  e  iv   'o    s  o  throNV  into  the  arms  of  their  enemy  a  multitude  of 
eXs-  On  Philips  coming  into  Tbessaly  with  a  new  army     be 
Tl  c^-diui"  en    r,aecd  bis  cause  so  warmly,  that  he  soon  found  bim- 
^If  at      e  be^d  o   an  armv  of  20,000  foot  an.l  3.000  horse.     Onomar- 
chismel  lim  in  the  field,  somewhere  near  tbe  soutbern  coast  of 
Tless^v    noTdiffi.lent  of  success,  as  well  froni  his  recent  victories, 
as  f?om  'the  ne  -liborbood  of  an  Athenian  fleet  under  Chares,  Co- 
nner ,h"wUb  him      Here  a  battle  was  joined,  and  obstinate  y  con- 
tested betweei  fhe  two  armies,  nearly  equal  in  numbers  <'f  ■nfantry 
Pbip  exalted  tbe  courage  of.  bis  sol.iiers  ''>"  decoratmg  thei    wUb 
u,uA  wre-ith-'   as  cni<aders    n   tbe  service  of  tbe  god  against  inc 
iesnoileis  o    the  Delpbiai.  temple:  wbile  tbe  Tbessaliaus  also,  form- 
ivMle  bes"  caralry  in  Greece  and  figbling  with  earnest  valor  gave 
leeis  ve  advanla''i  to  bis  cau.se,     Tbe  defeat  of  tbe  forces  of  On..- 
m-  Xs  and  U-kopliron  was  complete.     Six  thousand  «    tlieni      e 
"dd  to  have  iV'eii  slain,  and  three  thousand  to  have  been  taken 
nrisomr.    the  mnain.ler  escaped  either  by  flight,  or  by  throwing 
SwT  heir  arms  and  swimming  off  to  the  Atl.eiiian  ships.     Onj. 
marcb  s  himsel t  peri.bed.     According  to  one  account,  he  was  s  a m 
bv  his  ow     niercenarie<.  provoked  by  bis  cowardice:  a.^cordim;  to 
aLo^li  account,  he  was  lowned-lRing  carried  into  the  sea  by  an 


MfK^SMiii 


PHILIP  CONQUERS  PHER^:  AND  PAGAS.E.       393 

unruly  horse,  and  trying  to  escape  to  the  ship.s.  Philip  caused  his 
(lead  body  to  be  crucified,  and  drowned  all  the  prisoners  as  men 
guilty  of  sacrilege. 

This  victory  procured  for  the  Macedonian  prince  srreat  renown  as 
avenger  of  the  Delphian  god— and  became  an  important  step  in  his 
CJireer  of  aggrandizement.     It  not  only  tei-minaled  th(?  power  of  the 
Phokians  north  of  Thermopylae,  but  also  finally  crushed  the  power- 
ful dynasty  of  Pherae  in  Thcssaly.     Philip  laid  siege  to  that  city 
upon  which  Lykophron  and  Peitiiolaus,  surrounded  by  an  adverse 
population  and  unable  to  make  any  long  defense,  capitulated   and 
surrendered  it  to  him;  retiring  with  their  mercenaries,  2,000  in  num- 
ber, into  Phokis.     Having  obtained  possession  of  Phera?  and  pro- 
claimed It  a  free  city,  Philip  proceeded  to  besiege  the  neighboring- 
town  of  Pagasa?,  the  most  valuable  maritime  station  in  Thessaly* 
How  long  Pagasae  resisted,  wc  do  not  know;  but  long  enough  to  send 
intimation  to  Athens,  with  entreaties  for  succor.     The  Athenians 
alarmed  at  the  successive  conquests  of  Philip,  were  well  dispo<^ed  to 
keep  this  important  post  out  of  his  hands,  which  their  naval  power 
fu.ly  enabled  them  to  do.     But  here  again  (as  in  the  previous  ex- 
amples of  Pydua,  Potidr.'a,  and  Metiioue),  the  aversion  to  personal 
service  among  the  citizens  individually— and  the  impediments  as  to 
apportionment  of  duty  or  cost,  whenever  actual  outgoing  was  called 
for— produced  the  untoward  result,  that  though  an  expedition  was 
voted  and  dispatched,  it  did  not  arrive  in  time.    Pagasa?  surrendered 
and  came  into  the  power  of  Philip;  who  fortified  and  garrisoned  it 
tor  himse  t,  thus  becoming  master  of  the  Pagassean  Gulf,  the  great 
mlet  of  Thessaly.  ° 

Philip  was  probably  occupied  for  a  certain  time  in  making  good 
his  donimion  over  Thessaly.  But  as  soon  as  sufficient  precautions 
had  been  taken  for  this  purpo.se,  he  sought  to  push  this  advantage 
over  the  Pliokians  by  invading  them  in  their  own  territory  He 
marched  to  Thermopylae,  still  proclaiming  as  his  aim  the  liberation 
ot  the  Delphian  temple  and  the  punishment  of  its  saerilcnous  rob- 
bers; while  he  at  the  same  time  conciliated  the  favor  of  the  The^sa- 
lians  by  promising  to  restore  to  them  the  Pvl(«a,  or  half  yearly 
Amphiktvomc  festival  at  Thermopylae,  which  the  Phokians  had  dis- 
continued. 

The  Phokians,  though  masters  of  this  almost  inexpugnable  pass 
seemed  to  have  been  so  much  disheartened  by  their  recent  defeat' 
and  the  death  of  Onomarchus,  that  thev  felt  unable  to  maintain  it 
tong.  1  he  news  of  such  a  danger,  transmitted  to  Atliens,  excited 
extracrdiuary  agitation.  The  importance  of  defending  Therm()pyla3 
—and  of  prohibiting  the  victorious  king  of  Macedon  fmm  comiiK-  to 

a^^in^  f  '"li^  V  •'  ^^''}''''''  ^^  ^^'"^  •'^"^^^^^'"  «'de  of  it,  not  merely 
agdiubt    he  Phokians,  but   probably  also  against  Attica— were  so 

in  vl!!!    !^.  felt  that  the  usual  hesitations  and  delay  of  the  Athenians 
in  respect  ,0  military  expedition  were  overcome.    "'Chieflv  from  this 


394 


THE  SACRED   WAR. 


cause — but  partly  also,  wc  may  suppose,  from  the  vexatious  disap- 
l)()iiituient  recently  incurreti  in  the  attempt  to  relieve  Pagasai — an 
A I  lieiiiau  armament  under  Nausikles  (amountini!:  to  5,000  foot  and 
4U0  liorse,  accordinir  to  Diodoru^)  was  titled  out  with  not  less  vigor 
and  celerity  than  had  been  displayed  against  the  Thebans  in  Eubcea, 
seven  years  before.  Athenian  citizens  shook  off  their  lethargy,  and 
prompUy  volunteered.  They  reached  ThermopyLe  in  good  time, 
placing  the  pass  in  such  a  condition  of  defense  that' Philip  did  not 
attack^it  at  all.  Often  afterward  does  Demosthenes,  in  combating 
the  general  remissness  of  his  countrymen  when  military  exigences 
arose,  remind  them  of  this  unwonted  act  of  energetic  movement, 
crowned  with  complete  effect.  With  little  or  no  loss,  the  Athenians 
succeeded  in  guarding  both  themselves  and  their  allies  against  a  very 
menacing  contingency,  simply  by  the  promptitude  of  their  action. 
The  cost  of  the  armament  altogether  was  more  than  200  talents;  and 
from  the  stress  which  Demosthenes  lays  on  that  portion  of  the 
expense  which  was  defrayed  by  the  soldiers  privately  and  individu- 
ally, we  may  gather  that  these  soldiers  (as  in  the  Sicilian  expedition 
under  Nikias)  were  in  considerable  proportion  opulent  citizens. 
Among  a  portion  of  the  Grecian  public,  however,  the  Athenians 
incurred  oblo(juy  as  accomplices  in  the  Phokian  sacrilege,  and 
enemies  of  the  Delphian  god. 

Bui  though  Philip  was'thus  kept  out  of  Southern  Greece,  and  the 
Phokians  enabled  to  reorganize  themselves  against  Thebes,  yet  in 
Thessaly  and  without  the  strains  of  Thermopylae,  ^Macedonian 
ascendency  was  henceforward  an  uncontested  fact.  Before  we  fol- 
low his  subsequent  proceedings,  however,  it  will  be  convenient  to 
turn  to  events  both  in  Phokis  and  in  Pek)ponnesus. 

In  the  depressed  condition  of  the  Phokians  after  the  defeat  of 
Ononiarchus,  they  obtained  re-enforcement  not  only  from  Athens,  but 
also  from  Sparta'(1000  men),  and  from  the  Peloponnesian  Achaeaus 
(2.000  men).  Phayllus,  the  successor  (by  some  called  brother)  of  Ono- 
niarchus, put  himself  again  in  a  condition  of  defense.  He  had 
recourse  a  thiid  time  to  that  yet  unexhausted  store — the  Delphian 
treasures  and  valuables.  He  despoiled  the  temj)le  to  a  greater  extent 
than  Pliilomelus,  and  not  less  thnn  Onomarchus;  incurring  aggra- 
vated odiinii  from  the  fact,  that  he  (ould  x\ci  now  suj^jily  himself 
wi;Lout  laying  hands  on  offerings  of  conspicuous  mngnilicence  ;ind 
antiquity,  which  his  two  pn  deeessors  had  f-pared.  It  was  thus  that 
ti;e  splendid  golden  donr.tives  of  the  Lydian  king  Kroesus  were  r.ow 
iiieiied  down  and  4urncd  into  money;  117  bricks  or  ingots  of  gold, 
most  of  ther.i  W(  ighing  two  talents  each;  SCO  golden  goblets,  together 
with  a  hniah'  statue  three  ( ubits  hijih,  and  a  lion,  of  the  same  nu  tal 
— said  to  have  weighed  in  the  aggregate  thirt}'  talents.  The  alistiac- 
tion  of  such  oruameuts,  striking  ar.d  venerable  in  the  eyes  of  the 
numerous  visitors  of  the  temple,  was  doubtless  deeply  felt  among  the 
Grecian  public.     And  the  indignation  was  aggravated  by  the  fact, 


LARGESSES  OF  PHAYLLUS. 


395 


that  beautiftil  youths  or  women,  favorites  of  Onomarchus  or  Phavl- 
lus  rece.ved  some  of  the  most  precious  gifts,  and  wore  the  most 
noted  ornametits,  which  had  decorated  the  temple-even  the  neck- 
hices  of  He  en  atul  Eriphyle.     One  woman,  a  ttute-plnvc^r  named 

S'^i^h'^rV'"'^''  '''r^'^  ^"'^'^  Pliaylhts  a  silver  cup  .mdi  golden 
wreath  (the  former  dedicated  in  the  temple  by  the  Phoka>ans  the 
latter  by  he  Pepareth  ans),  but  was  also  introduced  by  him  in  hia 
capacity  of  sapertntendent  of  the  Pythian  festival,  to  contend 'fr  the 
pr./e  tn^  play mg  the  sacred  Hymn.  As  the  competitors  for  such  prize 
had  a  wavs  been  men,  the  assembled  crowd  so  loudly  resented  the 
novelty,  that  Bromias  was  obliged  to  withdraw.     Moreover  prof ue 

eTr' Th  "P  t.^:ir  IP  r^'^rf'^'U  '^^^^'^^  ™^-  notorlois  than 
ever.^    ilie  Phokian  leaders  displayed  with  ostentation  their  newlv- 

acqut|x?d  wealth  and  either  imported  for  the  first  time  boti^t]  t  slaves 

or  at   east  greatly  multiplied  the  pre-existing  number.    I  had  before 

been   he  practice  m  Phokis,  we  are  told,  fol-  the  wealthy  men  to  be 

served  by  the  poor  youthful  freemen  of  the  countrv;  and  complain  s 

arose  among  the  latter  class  that  their  daily  brea^  \va^hus  taken 

d  V>  il  V  . 

nnh^V'^^'V''"'!'??  ^^'^  ii^dignation  excited  bv  these  proceeding,  not 
only  throudiout  Greece,  but  even  in  Phokis  itself-Piiavllu^  carried 
noJT  '^  ^'"^'^"°  "  ^r^  ^'^y  ^f  '"^'rcenaries   and  op  V^^^^^^^ 
new  alliances  among  the  smaller  cities.     Both  Athens  and  S  iitf 
profite<l  more  or  less  by  the  distribution ;  though  tte  co" t  of   he  Athe 
man  expedition  to  Thermopyhe,  winch  rescued  the  Pholda  s  froin 

sdveT  PhVvir'  '^''•'^; '''  ''''''  ""''''  P'"^^  '^y  ''''  Athenians  tW 
sUves.     Phayllus  carried  on   war  for  some  time  against   both  the 

unl^vorU  le^o  ],?»?  ''^  ?'^V''  ^^^^*  ^^^^  -^"^''^^  ^^^"^^  ''"'''  "«t 
Wi^  n.H  h,  T'  ^^'""^  ^"^  '^''P^  possession  of  Orchomenus  in 
tion  P^'''''''  remained  without  substantial  diminu- 

PeTononnp'L''^wK^^  ^^'.  ^^'"  ^'"^'^  ^^  have  been  transferred  to 

±  eloponne.us,  whither  a  portion  both  of  the  Phokian  and  Tiicb-m 

IZT  """"'-'^  ^o-opeme.    The  Lacedaemonians  had  aUeng  h  opened 

n  nn  ZL  f 'l^'^f  "'^  ^f""'^  ^^'^  ^^^^^^5'-^"  P^^ic  assembh".  Thek 
c  ms  w^  .t  th/'''  *'"""  ^""'T^  '^"^^  "^^^^*^^  ^'^^'^^  when  Onomar- 
nosed  to  1.pM  1  maximum  of  his  power,  and  when  Thebes  was  sup- 

onlv  iw  V  ^"^  ^^?  Phokians,  depressed  for  the  time,  were  rescued 
had^th?  r  fn  ^r""^^  interference  of  Athens-and  when  th(^  Thebans 
tidch  hL  )  "^^  comparatively  free.  Moreover,  the  Theban  division 
tVaslt  It'i"  '""^  '"^^'  Asia  under  Pammenes  a  year  or  two  before, 
nllv  l«  t.  ^  ^^^^"«'  "fy  now  be  presumed  to  have  returned;  espec- 
mnpnr«.  ^""^y /hat  uo  very  long  time  afterward.  Artaba/us 
appears  as  completely  defeated  by  the  Persian  troops-expelled  from 


896 


THE  SACKED  WAR. 


i 


Asia— nnd  constrained  to  take  refuge,  together  with  his  hrother-in- 
law  Menuioi),  iiiuler  the  protection  of  Philip.  The  Megalopolitans 
had  sent  envoys  to  entreat  aid  from  Athens,  under  the  apprehension 
that  Thebos  would  not  be  in  a  condition  to  assist  them.  It  nij\y  be 
doubled  whether  Alliens  would  have  granted  their  prayer,  in  spite  of 
the  advice  of  Denioslhenes;  but  the  Tliebans  had  now  again  b(  come 
stronic  enough  to  uphold  with  their  own  force  their  natural  allies  in 
Peloponnesus. 

According V,  when  the  Lacedaemonian  army  under  kmg  Archida- 
mus  invaded  the  Megalopolitan  territory,  a  CDinpetcnt  force  was  soon 
brought  tocelher  to1:)pp()se  them;  furnished  partly  by  the  Argeians 
— wlfo  had^been  engaged  during  the  preceding  year  in  a  border  Avar* 
fare  with  Sparta,  and  had  experienced  a  partial  defeat  at   Ornde — 
partly  by  the  Sikvonians  and  Messenians,  who  came  in  full  muster. 
Besides  *this,  the  forces  on  both  sides  from  Bwotia  and  Phokis  were 
transferred  to  Peloponnesus.     The  Thebans  sent  4,000  foot,  and  500 
horse,  under  Kephision,  to  the  aid  of  Megalopolis;  while  the  Spar- 
tans not  only  recalled  their  own  troops  from  Phokis,  but  also  pro- 
cured 3.000  of  the  mercenaries  in  the  service  of  Phayllus,  and  150 
Thessalian  horse  from  Lvkophron,  the  expelled  despot  of  Piiern?. 
Archidamus  received  his  fe-enforcements,  and  got  together  his  aggre- 
gate forces,  earlier  than  the  enemy.    He  advanced  first  into  Arca- 
dia  where  he  posted  himself  near  Mantineia,  thus  cutting  olT  the 
Ar<''-eians  from  .Aleualopolis;  he  next  invaded  the  territory  of  Argos, 
attacked   Ornea>.   and   defeated   the   Argeians   in  a  partial   action. 
Presently  the  Thebans  arrived,  and  effected  a  junction  with  their  Ar- 
«'-eian  and  Arcadian  allies.     The  united  force  was  greatly  superior 
?n  number  to  the  Laced<T?monians;  but  such  superiority  was  coun- 
terbalanced by   the   bad  discipline   of   the  Thebans,  who  had  sadly 
declined  on  this  point  durini!;  the  interval  of  ten  years  since  the  death 
of  Epaminondas.     A   battle  ensued,   partially  advantageous  to  the 
Lacedtemonians;  while  the  Argeians  ai  d  Arcadians  chose  to  go  home 
to  their  neighboring  cities.     The  Laeeilfcmonians  also,  having  rav- 
aged a  portion  of  Are-dia,  and  stormed  the  Arcadian  town  of  llelis- 
sus,  presently  recrosCJd  their  own  frontier  and  returned  to  Sparta. 
They  left  however  a  division   in  Arcadia  under  Anaxander,   who. 
engaging  with  the  Tliebans  near  Ttlphusa,  was  worsted  with  great 
losl  and  made   prisoner.     In  two  other   battles,   also,  the  Thebans 
were  successively  victorious;   in  a  third,  they  were  vanquished  by 
the  Lacedaemonians.     With  such  balanced  and  undecided   success 
was  the  war  carried  on,   until   at   length  the  Laccdcemonians  pro- 
posed and  concluded  p^ace  with  Megalopolis.     Either  formally,  or 
by    implication,  they   were   forced  to  recognize    the  autonomy   ot 
that  city;   thus  abandoning,  for  the  time  at  least,  their  aggressive 
purposes,   which  Demosthenes   had  combated  and   sought   to  fru  - 
trate   before  the    Athenian  assembly.     The  Thebans   on    their  sit'c 
returned    home,   having   "ccomplisiied    their   object  of   protectin'.; 


DEATH  OF  PHAYLLUS. 


397 


Megalopolis  and  Messene;  and  we  may  presume  that  the  Phokian 
allies  of  Sparta  were  sent  home  also. 

The  war  between  the  Boeotians  and  Phokians  had  doubtless 
slackened  during  this  episode  in  Peloponnesus  ;  but  it  still  went  on, 
in  a  series  of  partial  actions,  on  the  river  Kephissus,  at  Koroneia,  at 
Abaj  in  Phokis,  and  near  the  Lokrian  town  of  Naryx.  For  the  most 
part,  the  Phokians  are  said  to  have  been  worsted  :  and  their  com- 
mander Phayllus  presently  died  of  a  painful  disease — the  suitable 
punishment  (in  the  point  of  view  of  a  Grecian  historian)  for  his  sacri- 
legious deeds.  He  left  as  his  successor  Phala?kus,  a  young  man,  son 
of  Onomarchus,  under  the  guardianship  and  advice  of  an  experienced 
friend  named  Mnaseas.  But  Mnaseiis  was  soon  surprised  at  night, 
defeated,  and  slain,  by  the  Thebans  ;  while  Phalaekus,  left  to  his  own 
resources,  was  defeated  in  two  battles  near  Chaeroneia,  and  was 
unable  to  hinder  his  enemies  from  ravaging  a  large  part  of  the  Pho- 
kian territory. 

We  know  the  successive  incidents  of  this  ten  years'  Sacred  War 
only  from  the  meager  annals  of  Diodorus  ;  whose  wai-m  sympathy 
in  favor  of  the  religious  side  of  the  cpiestion  seems  to  betra}-  him  into 
exaggeration  of  the  victories  of  the  Thebans,  or  at  least  into  some  omis- 
sion of  counterbalancing  reverses.  For  in  s\n\.Q  of  these  successive  vic- 
tories, the  Phokians  were  noway  put  down,  but  remained  in  possession 
of  the  Boeotian  town  of  Orchomenus  ;  moreover  the  Thebans  became 
so  tired  out  and  impoverished  by  the  war,  that  they  confined  them- 
selves presently  to  desultory  incursions  and  skirmishes.  Their  losses 
fell  wholly  upon  their  own  citizens  and  their  own  funds  ;  while  the 
Phokians  fought  with  foreign  mercenai'ies  and  with  the  treasures  of 
the  temple.  The  increasing  poverty  of  the  Thebans  even  induced 
them  to  send  an  embassy  to  the  Persian  king,  entreating  pecuniary 
aid  ;  which  drew  from  him  a  present  of  800  talents.  Ashe  was  at  this 
time  organizinii;  a  fresh  expedition  on  an  immense  scale,  for  the 
reconquest  of  Phenicia  and  Egypt,  after  more  than  one  preceding 
failure — he  required  Grecian  soldiers  as  much  as  the  Greeks  required 
his  money.  Hence  we  shall  see  presently  that  the  Thebans  were  able 
to  send  him  an  equivalent. 

In  the  war  just  recounted  on  the  Laconian  and  Arcadian  frontier, 
the  Athenians  had  taken  no  part.  Their  struggle  with  Philip  had 
been  becoming  from  month  to  month  more  serious  and  embarrassing. 
By  occupying  in  time  the  defensible  pass  of  Thermopylae,  they  had 
indeed  prevented  him  both  from  crushing  the  Phokians  and'^from 
meddlmg  with  the  Southern  states  of  Greece.  But  the  final  biUtle 
wherein  he  had  defeated  Onomarchus,  luul  materially  increased  both 
his  power  and  his  military  reputation.  The  numbers  on  both  sides 
w^ere  very  great ;  the  result  was  decisive,  and  ruinous  to  the  van- 
quished ;  moreover,  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  Macedonian  phalanx, 
with  the  other  military  improvements  and  maneuvers  which  Philip 
had  been  gradually  organizing  since  Jii^  acc'essign,  was  now  exhibited 


398 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


in  formidable  eflSciency.  The  kinj:^  of  Macedon  had  become  the 
ascendant  soldier  and  potentate  han<j:ing  on  the  skirts  of  the  Grecian 
v.'orld,  exciting  fears,  or  hopes,  or  both  at  once,  in  every  city  tiiroiigli- 
out  its  limits.  In  tlie  lirst  Philippic  of  Demosthenes,  and  in  liis  ora- 
tion against  AristokratL's  (delivered  between  Midsummer  052  B.C.  and 
Miilsuinmer  851  B.C.),  we  discern  evident  marks  of  the  terrors  which 
Philip  had  come  to  inspire,  within  a  year  after  his  repulse  from  Ther- 
mopylie,  to  reflecting  Grecian  politicians.  "It  is  impossible  for 
Athens  (says  the  orator)  to  provide  any  land  force  competent  to  con- 
tend in  the  field  against  that  of  Philip." 

The  reputation  of  his  generalship  and  his  indefatigable  activity 
■was  already  everywhere  felt  ;  as  well  as  that  of  the  officers  and  sol- 
diers, partly  native  Macedonians,  partly  chosen  Greeks,  whom  he  had 
assembled  round  him — especially  the  lochages  or  front  rank  men  of 
the  phalanx  and  the  liypaspistLC.  Moreover  the  excellent  cavalry  of 
Thcssaly  Ixjcame  embodied  from  henceforward  as  an  element  in  the 
3Iacedonian  anny  ;  since  Philip  had  acquired  unbounded  ascend- 
ency in  that  country,  from  his  expulsion  of  the  PheraDan  despots  and 
their  auxiliaries  the  Phokians.  'I'he  philo-Macedonian  party  in  the 
Thessalian  cities  had  constituted  him  federal  chief  (or  in  some  sort 
Tagus)  of  the  country,  not  only  enrolling  their  cavalry  in  his  armies, 
but  also  placing  at  his  disposal  the  customs  and  market-dues,  which 
formed  a  standing  common  fund  for  supporting  the  Thessalian 
collective  administration.  The  financial  means  of  Philip,  for  pay- 
ment  of  his  foreign  troops,  and  prosecution  of  his  military  enter- 
prises, were  thus  materi:illy  increased. 

But  besides  his  irresistible  land  force,  Philip  had  now  becon.e 
master  of  no  inconsiderable  naval  power  also.  During  the  early 
years  of  the  war,  though  he  hv.d  taken  not  only  Amphipolis  but  also 
al!  the  Athenian  possessions  on  the  ]\Iacedonian  coast,  yet  the  exports 
from  his  territory  had  been  interrupted  i)y  the  naval  force  of  Athens, 
so  as  to  lessen  seriously  the  produce  of  his  export  duties.  But  he 
bad  now  contrived  to  get  together  a  vSufTicient  number  of  armed  ships 
and  privateers,  if  not  to  ward  off  such  damage  from  himself,  at  least 
to  retaliate  it  upon  Athens.  Her  navy  indeed  was  still  incompara- 
bly superior,  but  the  languor  and  remissness  of  her  citizens  refused 
to  bring  it  out  with  efficiency  ;  while  Philip  had  opened  for  himself 
anew  avenue  to  maritime  power  by  his  acquisition  of  Phera;  and 
Pagasae,  and  by  establishiug  his  ascendency  over  the  Magnetes  and 
their  territory,  round  the  eastern  border  of  the  Pagasaean  Gulf.  That 
Gulf  (now^  known  by  the  name  of  Volo)  is  still  the  great  inlet  and 
outlet  for  Thessalian  trade  ;  the  eastern  coast  of  Thessaly,  along  the 
line  of  Mount  Pelion,  being  craggy  and  harborless.  Thenaval  force 
belonging  to  Pherse  and  its  sea  port  Pagasae  was  very  considerable, 
and  had  been  so  even  from  the  times  of  the  despots  Jascn  ar.d 
Alexander  ;  at  one  moment  painfully  felt  even  by  Athens.  All 
these  ships  now  passed   into   the  service  of  Philip,   together  with 


PHILIPS  CRUISERS. 


899 


the  dues  on  export  and  import  levied  round  the  Pagasaean  Gulf, 
the  command  of  which  he  further  secured  by  creeling  suitable 
fortifications  on  the  Magnesiau  shore,  and  by  placing  a  garrison 
in  Pagas;e.  Such  additional  naval  means,  combined  with  what 
he  already  possessed  at  Amphipolis  and  elsewhere,  made  him 
speedily  annoying,  if  not  formidable,  to  Athens,  even  at  sea.  His 
triremes  showed  the!nselves  everywhere,  probably  in  small  and 
rapidly  moving  squadrons.  He  levied  large  contributions  on  the 
insular  allies  of  Athens,  and  paid  the  costs  of  war  greatly  out  of  the 
capture  of  merchant  vessels  in  the  ^gean.  His  squadrons  made 
incursions  on  the  Athenian  Islands  of  Leninos  and  Imbros,  carrying 
off  several  Athenian  citizens  as  prisoners.  They  even  stretched 
southward  as  far  as  Geraestus.  the  southern  promontory  of  Euboea, 
where  they  not  only  fell  in  with  and  captured  a  lucrative  squadron 
of  corn-ships,  but  also  insulted  the  coast  of  Attica  itself  in  the  oppo- 
site bay  of  Marathon,  towing  off  as  a  prize  one  of  the  sacred  triremes. 
Such  was  the  mischief  successfully  inflicted  by  the  flying  squadrons 
of  Philip,  though  xVtheus  had  probably  a  considerablenumber  of 
cruisers  at  sea,  and  certainly  a  far  superior  number  of  ships  at  home 
in  PeiroEus.  Her  commerce  and  even  her  coasts  were  disturbed  and 
endangered;  her  insular  allies  suffered  yet  more.  Evd)oea  especially, 
the  nearest  and  most  important  of  all  her  allies,  separated  only  by 
a  narrow  strait  from  the  Pagas«an  Gulf  and  the  southern  coast  of 
Phthiotis,  was  now  within  the  immediate  reach  not  only  of  Philip's 
marauding  vessels,  but  also  of  his  political  intrigues. 

It  was  thus  that  the  war  against  Philip  turned  more  and  more  to 
the  diso:race  and  disadvantage  of  tJje  Athenians.  Though  they  had 
begun  it  in  the  hope  of  punishing  him  for  his  duplicity  in  appropri- 
ating Amphipolis,  they  had  been  themselves  the  losers  "by  the  capture 
of  Pydna,  Potidaea,  Methone,  etc. ;  and  they  were  now  thrown  upon 
the  defensive,  without  security  for  their  maritime  allies,  their  com- 
merce, or  their  coasts.  The  intelligence  of  these  various  losses  and 
insults  endured  at  sea,  in  spite  of  indisputable  maritime  preponder- 
ance, called  forth  at  Athens  acrimonious  complaints  against  the 
generals  of  the  state,  and  exaggerated  outbursts  of  enmity  against 
Philip.  That  prince,  having  spent  a  few  months,  after  his  repulse 
from  Thermopylae,  in  Thessaly,  and  having  so  far  established  his 
ascendency  over  that  country  that  he  could  leave  the  completion  of 
the  task  to  his  officers,  pushed  with  his  characteristic  activity  into 
Thrace.  He  there  took  part  in  the  disputes  between  various  native 
princf'S,  expelling  some,  confirming  or  installing  others,  and  extend- 
ing his  own  dominion  at  the  cost  of  all.  Among  these  princes  were 
probably  Kersobleptes  and  Ainadokus;  for  Philip  carried  his  aggres- 
sions to  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  the  Thracian  Chersonese. 

In  November  352  B.C.,  intelligence  reached  Athens,  that  he  was  in 
Thrace  besieging  Heraeon  Teichos;  a  place  so  near  to  the  Chersonese, 
that  the  Athenian  possession^  and  colonists  in  that  peninsula  were 


400 


THE  SACRED  WAR 


threatened  with  considerable  danger.  So  great  was  the  alarm  and 
excitement  caused  by  this  news,  that  a  vote  was  immediately  passed 
in  the  public  assembly  to  equip  a  fleet  of  forty  triremes — to  man  it 
with  Athenian  citizens,  all  persons  up  to  the  age  of  45  being  made 
liable  to  serve  on  the  expedition— and  to  raise  60  talents  by  a  direct 
property-tax.  At  first  active  steps  were  taken  to  accelerate  the 
armament.  But  before  the  difficulties  of  detail  could  be  surmounted 
— before  it  could  be  determined,  amid  the  general  aversion  to 
personal  service,  what  citizens  should  go  nbnnid,  and  how  the  burden 
of  trierarchy  should  be  distributed — fresh  messengers  arrived  from 
the  Chersonese,  reporting  first  that  Philip  had  fallen  sick,  next  that 
he  was  actually  dead.  The  last-mentioned  report  proved  false;  but 
the  sickness  of  Philip  was  an  actual  fact,  and  seems  to  have  been 
severe  enough  to  cause  a  temporary  suspension  of  his  military  opera- 
tions. Though  the  opportunity  became  thus  only  the  more  favorable 
for  attacking  Philip,  vet  the  Athenians,  no  longer  spurred  on  by  the 
fear  of  further  immediate  clanger,  relapsed  into  their  former  languor, 
and  renounced  or  postj)oned  their  intended  armament.  After  pass- 
ins  the  whole  ensuiiiir  summer  in  inaction,  they  could  only  be  })re- 
vailed  upon,  in  the  month  of  September  851,  to  dispatch  to  Tlirace  a 
feeble  force  under  the  mercenarv  chief  Charidemus;  ten  triremes, 
without  anv  soldiers  aboard,  and  with  no  more  than  five  talents  in 
money. 

At  this  time  Charidomus  was  at  the  height  of  his  popularity.  It 
was  supposed  that  he  could  rai.«;e  and  maintain  a  mercenary  band  by 
his  own  ingenuity  and  valor.  His  friends  confidently  averred  before 
the  Athenian  assembly  that  he  was  the  only  man  capable  of  putting 
down  Philip  and  conquering  Amphipolis.  One  of  these  ])ailisans, 
Aristokrates,  even  went  so  far  as  to  propose  that  a  vote  should  be 
passed  insuring  inviolability  to  his  person,  and  enacting  that  any 
one  who  killed  him  should  be  seized  wherever  found  in  the  territory 
of  Athens  or  her  allies.  This  proposition  was  attacked  judicially  by 
an  accuser  named  Euthykles,  who  borrowed  a  memorable  discourse 
from  the  pen  of  Demosthenes. 

It  was  thus  that  the  real  sickness,  and  reported  death,  of  Philip, 
which  ought  to  have  operated  as  a  stimulus  to  the  Athenians  by 
exposing  to  them  their  enemy  during  a  moment  of  peculiar  weak- 
ness, proved  rather  an  opiate  exaggerating  their  chronic  lethargy, 
and  cheating  them  into  a  belief  than  no  further  efforts  were  needed 
That  belief  appears  to  have  been  prrx-laimcd  by  the  leading,  best- 
known,  and  senior  speakers,  those  who  gave  the  tone  to  the  public 
assembly,  and  who  were  principally  relied  upon  for  advice.  These 
men — probably  Eubulus  at  their  head,  and  Phokion,  so  constantly 
named  as  general,  along  with  him — either  did  not  feel,  or  could  not 
bring  themselves  to  proclaim,  the  painful  necessity  of  personal  mili- 
tary service  and  increased  taxation.  Though  repeated  debates  took 
place  on  the  insults  offered  to  Athens  in  her  maritime  dignity,  and 


FIRST  PHILIPPIC   OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


401 


on  the  sufferings  of  those  allies  to  whom  she  owed  protection — com- 
bined with  accusations  against  liie  generals,  and  complaints  of  the 
inefficiency  of  such  mercenary  foreigners  as  Athens  took  into  com- 
mission but  never  paid — still  the  recognized  public  advisers  shrank 
from  appeal  to  the  dormant  patriotism  or  personal  endurance  of  the 
citizens.  The  serious,  but  indispensable,  duty  which  ihey  thus 
omitted,  was  performed  for  them  by  a  younger  competitor,  far 
beneath  them  in  established  footing  and  influence — Demosthenes, 
now  about  thirty  years  old — in  au  harangue  known  as  the  first  Phil- 
ippic. 

We  have  already  had  before  us  this  aspiring  man,  as  a  public 
adviser  in  the  assembly.  In  his  first  parliamentary  harangue  two 
years  before,  he  had  begun  to  inculcate  on  his  countrymen  the 
general  lesson  of  energy  and  self-reliance,  and  to  remind  them  of 
that  which  the  comfort,  activity,  and  peaceful  refinement  of  Athe- 
nian life,  had  a  constant  tendency  to  put  out  of  sight:— That  the 
City,  as  a  whole,  could  not  maintain  her  security  and  dignity  against 
enemies,  unless  each  citizen  individually,  besides  his  home-duties, 
were  prepared  to  take  his  fair  share,  readily  and  without  evasion,  of 
the  hardship  and  cost  of  personal  service  abroad.  But  he  had  then 
been  called  upon  to  deal  (in  his  discourse  De  Symmoriis)  only  with 
the  continge!icy  of  Persian  hostilities — possible*^  indeed,  yet  neither 
near  nor  declared;  he  now  renews  the  same  exhortation  under  more 
pressing  exigencies.  He  has  to  protect  interests  already  suffering,  and 
to  repel  dishonorable  insults,  becoming  from  month  to  month  more 
frequent,  from  an  indefatigable  enemy.  Successive  assemblies 
have  been  occupied  Avitli  complaints  from  sufferers,  amid  a  senti- 
ment of  unwonted  chagrin  and  helplessness  among  the  public — yet 
with  no  material  comfort  from  the  leading  and  established  speakers; 
who  content  themselves  with  inveighing  against  the  negligence  of 
the  mercenaries— taken  into  service  by  Athens  but  never  paid— and 
with  threatening  to  impeach  the  generals.  The  assembly,  wearied 
by  repetition  of  topics  promising  no  improvement  for  the  future,  is 
convoked,  probably  to  hear  some  further  instance  of  damage  com- 
mitted by  the  Macedonian  cruisers,  when  Demosthenes,  breaking 
through  the  common  formalities  of  precedence,  rises  first  to  address 
them. 

It  had  once  been  the  practice  at  Athens,  that  the  herald  formally 
proclaimed,  when  a  public  assembly  was  opened— "Who  among  the 
citizens  above  fifty  years  old  wishes  to  speak  ?  and  after  them,  which 
of  the  other  citizens  in  his  turn  ?"  Though  this  old  proclama- 
tion had  fallen  into  disuse,  the  habit  still  remained,  that  speakers  of 
advanced  age  and  experience  rose  first  after  the  debate  had  been 
opened  by  the  presiding  magistrates.  But  the  relations  of  Athens 
with  Philip  had  been  so  often  discussed,  that  all  these  men  had 
already  delivered  their  sentiments  and  exhausted  their  recommenda- 
tions.    "  Had  their  recommendations  been  good,  you  need  not  have 


402 


THE  SACKED  WAR 


l)oen  now  debating  the  same  topic  over  again" — says  DemoRllicncs 
as  an  apology  for  standing  forward  out  of  his  turn  to  produce  liU 
own  views. 

His  views  indeed  were  so  new,  so  independent  of  party  sympathies 
or  antipathies,  and  so  plain-spoken  in  comments  on  tlie  past  as  well 
as  in  demands  for  the  future — thai  they  would  hardly  have  been  pro- 
posed except  by  a  speaker  instinct  with  the  ideal  of  the  Periklcaa 
foretime,  familiar  to  him  from  his  study  of  Thucydides.  In  explicit 
language,  Demosthenes  throws  the  blame  of  the  pnblic  misfortunes, 
not  simply  on  tlie  past  advisers  and  generals  of  tiie  people,  but  also 
on  the  people  themselves.  It  is  from  this  proclaimed  fact  that  he 
starts,  as  his  main  ground  of  hope  for  future  improvement.  Athens 
conterided  formerly  with  honor  against  the  Lacedaemonians;  and  now 
also  she  will  exchange  disgrace  for  victory  in  her  war  against  Philip, 
if  her  citizens  individually  will  shake  oil  their  past  inertness  and 
negligence,  each  of  them  henceforward  becoming  readj'^lo  undertake 
Ills' full  share  of  personal  duty  in  the  common  cause.  Athens  had 
undergone  enough  humiliation,  and  more  than  enough,  to  teach  her 
this  lesson.  She  might  learn  it  farther  from  her  enemy  Philip  him- 
self, who  had  raised  hmiself  from  small  beginnings,  and  heaped  losses 
as  well  as  shame  upon  her,  mainly  by  his  own  personal  energy,  per- 
severance, and  ability,  while  the  Athenian  citizens  had  been  hitherto 
so  backward  as  individuals,  and  so  unprepared  as  a  public,  that  even 
if  a  lucky  turn  of  fortune  were  to  hand  over  to  thim  Amphipolis, 
they  would  be  in  no  condition  to  seize  it.  Should  the  rumor  prove 
true,  that  this  Philip  were  dead,  they  would  fcoou  make  for  them- 
selves another  Philip  equally  troublesome. 

After  thus  severely  commenting  on  the  past  npathy  of  the  citizens, 
and  insisting  upon  a'  change  of  disposition  as  indispensable,  Demos- 
thenes proceeds  to  specify  the  particular  acts  whereby  such  change 
ought  to  be  manifested.  He  entreats  them  not  to  be  startled  by  the 
novelty  of  his  plan,  but  to  hear  him  patiently  to  the  end.  It  is  the 
result  of  his  ow^n  meditations;  other  citizens  may  have  better  to  pro- 
pose; if  they  have,  he  shall  not  be  found  to  stand  in  their  way. 
What  is  past  cannot  be  helped;  nor  is  extemporaneous  speech  the 
best  way  of  providing  remedies  for  a  difficult  future. 

He  advises  first,  that  a  fleet  of  fifty  triremes  shall  be  immediately 
put  in  readiness;  that  the  citizens  shall  firmly  resolve  to  serve  in  per- 
son on  board,  whenever  the  occasion  may  require,  and  that  triremes 
and  other  vessels  shall  be  specially  fitted  out  for  half  of  the  horsemen 
of  the  city,  who  shall  serve  personally  also.  This  force  is  to  be  kept 
ready  to  sail  at  a  moment's  notice,  and  to  meet  Philip  in  any  of  his 
sudden  outmarches  to  Chersonesus,  to  Thermopylae,  to  Olynthus,  etc. 

Secondly,  that  a  farther  permanent  force  shall  be  set  on  foot 
immediately  to  take  the  aggressive,  and  carry  on  active  continuous 
warfare  against  Philip,  by  harassing  him  in  various  points  of  his 
own  counLry.     Two  thousand  infantry,  and  200  horse,  will  be  sufli- 


FINANCIAL  PROPOSITIONS. 


403 


oient;  but  it  is  essential  that  one-fourth  part— 500  of  the  former  and 
50  of  Ihe  latter— shall  be  citizens  of  Athens.  The  remainder  are  to 
l)e  foreign  mercenaries;  ten  swift  sailing  war  triremes  are  also  to  be 
provided  to  protect  the  transports  agaiiist  the  naval  force  of  Philip. 
The  citizens  are  to  serve  by  relays,  relieving  each  other;  every  one 
for  a  time  fixed  ])eforeliand,  yet  none  for  a  very  long  time.  The 
orator  then  proceeds  to  calculate  the  cost  of  such  a  standina-  force  for 
one  year.  He  assigns  to  each  seaman,  and  to  each  foot  soldier,  ten 
drachma?  per  month,  or  two  oboli  per  dav;  to  each  horseman,  thirty 
drachmie  per  month,  or  one  drachma  (six  oboli)  per  day.  No  differ- 
ence is  made  between  the  Athenian  citizen  and  the  foreigner.  The 
sura  here  assigned  is  not  full  pay,  but  simply  the  cost  of  each  man's 
maintenance.  At  the  same  time,  Demosthenes  pledges  himself  that 
if  thus  much  be  furnished  by  the  state,  the  remainder  of  a  full  pay  (or 
as  much  again)  will  be  made  up  by  what  the  soldiers  will  themselves 
acquire  in  the  war;  and  that,  too.  Avithout  wrong  done  to  allies  or 
neutral  Greeks.  The  total  annual  cost  thus  incurred  will  be  92 
talents  (=about  £23,000).  He  does  not  give  any  estimate  of  the 
probable  cost  of  his  other  armament,  of  50  trireiiies;  which  are  to 
be  equipped  and  ready  at  a  moment's  notice  for  emergencies,  but  not 
sent  out  on  permanent  service. 

_  His  next  task  is  to  provide  wavs  and  means  for  meeting  such  addi- 
tional cost  of  92  talents.  Here  he  jiroduces  and  reads  to  the  assem- 
biy  a  special  financial  scheme,  drawn  up  in  writin-i-.  Not  beino- 
actually  embodied  in  the  speech,  the  scheme  has  been^'unfortunately 
l()St;  though  Its  contents  would  help  us  materiallv  to  appreciate  the 
views  of  Demosthenes.  It  must  have  been  more  or  less  complicated 
in  Its  details;  not  a  simple  proposition  for  an  eisphora  or  property- 
tax,  which  would  have  been  announced  in  a  sentence  of  the  orator's 
speech. 

Assuming  the  money,  the  ships,  and  the  armament  for  permanent 
service,  to  be  provided,  Demosthenes  ])roposes  that  a  formal  law  be 
passed,  making  such  pennanent  service  pereraptorv ;  the  general  in  com- 
mand being  held  responsible  for  the  efficient  employment  of  the  force 
The  islands,  the  maritime  allies,  and  the  commerce  of  the  ^»ro:,n 
would  then  become  secure;  while  the  profits  of  Philip  from  his  cap- 
tures at  sea  would  be  arrested.  The  quarters  of  the  armament  mio-ht 
be  estabhshed,  during  winter  or  bad  weather,  in  Skiathos,  Tliasos 
Jx^mnos,  or  other  adjoining  islands,  from  wlience  they  could  act  at 
all  tunes  against  Philip  on  his  own  coast;  while  from  Athens  it  was 
fliftcult  to  arrive  thither  either  during  the  prevalence  of  the  Etesian 
winds  or  during  winter— the  seasons  usually  selected  by  Philip  for 
his  aggressions. 

The  aggregate  means  of  Athens  (Demosthenes  affirmed)  in  men, 
money,  ships,  hoplites,  horsemen,  were  greater  than  could  be  found 
anywhere  else.  But  hitherto  they  had  never  been  properly  employed. 
1  he  Athenians,  like  awkward  pugilists,  waited  for  Philip  to  strike, 


404 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


1  ,!,„„  „„t  iin  thpir  liands  to  follow  his  blow.  They  never  sought 
and  'hf-^P"  "f,'''f'^'""or  to  be  ready  with  a  good  defensive  sys- 
tolookhiraintlief.ice-Dor  to  uere     y  offensive    operations. 

•^M  V'^.wir'rdi^ious  fe.ti°^b.    the  P"  nathenaic,    Dionysiac,   and 
otles   '^  e  not' on  V  ce lebraied  with   costly  splendor,   but  pre- 

a  n  ..'ed \v  th"he  most  eareful  pains,  so  ^^J^^^'^^Z^^''];^^':^^ 
•   „  i;,M..tnil  nt  the  moment  of  execution— then-  nuhtar\    force  ^^a^ 

efl  wit  out  orlaniza^n  or  predetermined  ^J-'^m.     Wj---^,-;^' 
^  encroachment  of  Phm^^^^^^^^^^ 

rlxecutbn      or  «  cu^'spec  ^o^^^^^^^  the  time  for  aeUon  wa« 

SiiH  ;^^^s:^het:^^s?  ^^s^rt;;;  ^:aS^ 

'To  CvideTnd  P«V  luch  ?.'slanding  force  is  one  of  the  main  point^s 
in^hc?p™tet  o    Demosthenc:  the°absolute  necessity  that  «  sha 
CO.      t.'ln  i  large  proportion  at  least,  ot  citizens  .8  anothe       Tojhm 

orders  received  from  the  city.     To  t  >  limi  '^"^^^^VV"  ,\' '   ,^^,_^^  ...^..g 

to  attack  the  ^n^;">\^';^\y>»"^;,^"ta"  1^^^  ouh  ^v  v   n  ^vhk•h  the 
accountability  It  he  did  not.   .^"^^j^ 'V^^  ;^  ,^^^^^^^^^  could  be 

formidable  an.l  everiiTOWing  force  ^^^\^^"  ^'"^"  L   -"^  of 

successfully  combated.     As  ."^i^^^^^^,  °^  1.!;^;^^'^.^^^^  to 

Athenian  operations  Avas  so  ridiculous  that  inen  "^^1^  o    ^^     I 
doubt  whether  Athens  was  really  in  earnest.  J^'l^^^^^^ 
officers-her  ten  ,-enerals,   ten   taxiarchs    ^^^  P^,  ;i^^'^^^^ 

?i;-^dSr  %^hiLro7'='S'?rbe  ^^^la 

bv  hei  o4n-eifi/.ens  both  as  genera  s  and  i'«.«"'<  •;;--f-   ^,,„,  „,,  ^,,.1 
•Such  are  the  prhicipal  features  '"  ;';f,;''*°^''^f/Dl^nL    'nc   to 


ADVICE  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


405 


appeal  to  the  emotions,  bringing  the  audience  by  many  differei^ 
roads  to  the  main  conviction  which  the  orator  seeks  to  impress,  pro- 
foumlly  animated  with  genuine  Pan-Hellenic  patriotism,  and  with 
the  dignity  of  that  free  Grecian  world  now  threatened  by  a  monarch 
from  without.  It  has  other  merits  besides,  not  less  important  in 
themselves,  and  lying  more  immediatel}'^  within  the  scope  of  the 
historian.  We  find  Demosthenes,  yet  only  thirty  years  old — young 
in  ]iolilical  life — and  thirteen  years  before  the  battle  of  Chaerorieia, 
taking  accurate  measure  of  the  political  relations  between  Athens 
and  Philip;  examining  those  relations  during  the  past,  pointing  out 
how  they  had  become  every  year  more  unfavorable,  and  fortelliug 
the  dangerous  contingencies  of  the  future,  unless  better  precautions 
were  taken;  exposing  with  courageous  frankness  not  only  the  past 
mismanagement  of  public  men,  but  also  those  defective  dispositions 
of  the  people  themselves  wherein  such  management  had  its  roots; 
lastly,  after  fault  found,  adventuring  on  his  own  responsibility  to 
propose  sjiccific  measures  of  correction,  and  urging  upon  reluctant 
citizens  a  painful  imposition  of  personal  hardship  as  well  as  of  taxa- 
tion. We  shall  find  him  insisting  on  the  same  obligation,  irksome 
-alike  to  the  leading  politicians  and  to  the  people  throughout  all  the 
Olyntliiacs  and  Philippics.  We  note  his  warnings,  given  at  this 
early  day.  when  timely  prevention  would  have  been  easil}'  practica- 
ble; and  his  sui)eriority  to  elder  politicians  like  Eubulus  and  Pho- 
kion,  in  prudent  appreciation,  in  foresight,  and  hi  the  courage  of 
speaking  put  unpalatable  truths.  More  than  twenty  years  after  this 
period,  when  Athens  had  lost  the  game  and  was  in  her  phase  of 
hundliation,  Demosthenes  (in  repelling  the  charges  of  those  who  im- 
puted her  misfortunes  to  his  bad  advice)  measures  the  real  extent  to 
which  a  political  statesman  is  properly  responsible.  The  first  of  all 
things  is — "To  see  events  in  their  beginnings — to  discern  tendencies 
beforehand,  and  proclaim  them  beforehand  to  others — to  abridge  as 
much  as  possible  the  rubs,  impediments,  jealousies,  and  tardy  move- 
ment.-^, inseparable  from  the  march  of  a  free  city — and  to  infuse 
among  the  citizens  harmon}',  friendly  feelings,  and  zeal  for  the  per- 
formance of  their  duties."  The  first  Philippic  is  alone  sufficient  to 
prove  how  justlv  Demosthenes  lays  claim  to  tlie  merit  of  having 
"seen  events  in  their  beginnings'' and  given  timely  warning  to  liis 
countrymen.  It  will  also  go  to  show,  along  with  other  proofs  here- 
after to  be  seen,  that  he  was  not  less  honest  and  judicious  in  his 
attempts  to  fulfill  the  remaining  portion  of  the  statesman's  duty — 
that  of  working  up  his  countr^Miien  to  unanimous  and  resolute  enter-'^ 
prise;  to  the  pitch  requisite  not  merely  for  speaking  and  voting,  but 
for  acting  aiAl  suffering,  against  the  public  enemy. 

We  know  neither  the  actual  course,  nor  the  concluding  vote  of 
this  debate,  wherein  Demosthenes  took  a  part  so  unexpectedly  prom- 
inent. But  we  know  that  neither  of  the  two  positive  measures 
which  he  recommends  was  carried  into  effect.     The  working  jiima- 


406 


THE  SACRED  WAR. 


uicnt  wns  not  sent  out,  nor  was  the  home-force,  destined  to  be  held  in 
reserve  for  instnnt  movement  in  case  of  emertrencv,  ever  got  readv  It 
was  uot  until  the  loilowinir  month  of  September  (tiie  oration  l)ein«' 
delivered  some  lime  iu  the  first  half  of  351  B.C.)  tlial  any  actual  force 
was  sent  against  Philip;  and  even  ihen  nothim;  more  was  done  tlian 
to  send  tiie  mercenary  chief  Charidemns  to  the^Chersonese,  with  ten 
triremes,  and  five  talents  in  nionev,  but  no  soldiers.  Kor  is  there 
any  prol)abilily  that  DemostlKucs  even  obtain(  d  a  favorable  vote  of 
the  assembly,  though  strong  votes  airainst  Philip  were  often  passed 
without  being  even  put  in  execution  afterward. 

Demosthenes  was  doubtless  opposed   bv  those   senior  statesmen 
wliose  duty  it  w^ould  have  been  to  come  forwaid  themselves  witli  the 
same  propositions,  assuming  the  necessity  to  be  undeniable      Eut 
what  ground  was  taken  in  opiiosino-  hu^  we  do  not  know      Tliere 
existed  at  that  time  in  Athens  a  certain  party  or  section  who  under- 
valued 1  hilip  as  an  euemv  not  really  formidable-far  less  formidable 
tlian  the  Persian  king.     The  reports  of  Persian  force  iind  preparation 
prevalent  two  years  before,  when  Demosthenes  delivered  his  har- 
angue  on  the  Symmories,  seem  still  to  have  continued,  and  mav 
partly  explain  the  inaction  against  Philip.     Such  reports  would  be 
magnified,  or  fabricated,   by  another  Athenian   party  much  more 
dangerous    in  communication  with,  and  probablv  paid  bv    Philip 
*»'"^f  /tJ.v  ^H''^  party  Demosthenes  makes  his 'earliest  allusion  in 
the  tirst  Philippic,  and  reverts  to  them  on  manv  occasions  afterwaid 
\\  e  may  be  verv'  certain  that  there  were  Athenian  citizens  servino  as 
Philips  secret   agents,  though  we   cannot  assign   their  names  °  It 
would  be  not  less  his  interest  to  purchase  such  auxiliaries  than  to 
employ  paid  spies  in   his  operations  of  war;  while  the  prevalent 
political  antipathies  at  Athens,  coupled  with  the  laxitv  of  public 
morality  in   individuals,  would   render  it  perfectly  practicable   to 
obtain  suitable  instrument.s.     That  not  only  at  Atfiens,  but  also  at 
Amphipolis,  PotidcTa.  Olynthus,  and  elsewhere  Philip  achieved  his 
successes,  partly  by  purchasing  corrupt  partisans  amoncr  the  leaders 
ot  his  enemies,  is  an  as.sertion  so  intrinsically  probable  that  we  may 
readily  believe  it,  though  advanced  chiefiy  by  unfriendly  witnesses 
buch  corruption  alone,  indeed,  would  rot  have  availed  him   but  it 
was  eminently  useful  when  combined  with  well-employed  force  and 
military  genius.  "^ 


OLYNTHIAN   SENTIMENTS. 


407 


CHAPTER  LXXXVIII. 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTHIAN  WARS. 

If  even  in  Athens,  at  the  date  of  the  first  Philippic  of  Deraosthenes, 
the  uneasiness  about  Philip  was  considemble,  much  more  serious 
had  it  become  among  his  neighbors  the  Olyuthians.  He  had  gained 
them  over,  four  years  before,  by  transferring  to  them  the  territory 
of  Afhemus— and  the  still  more  important  town  of  Potidjea,  cap- 
tured by  his  own  arms  from  Athens.  Grateful  for  these  cessions, 
they  hid  become  his  allies  in  his  war  with  Athens,  wdiom  they  hatecl 
on  every  ground.  But  a  material  change  had  since  taken  place. 
Since  the  loss  of  Methone,  Athens,  expelled  from  the  coast  of  Thrace 
and  Macedonia,  had  ceased  to  be  a  hostile  neighbor,  or  to  inspire 
alarm  to  the  Olyuthians;  while  the  immense  increase  in  the  power 
of  Philij).  combined  with  his  ability  and  ambition  alike  manifest,  had 
overlaid  tlic-ir  gratitude  for  the  past  by  a  sentiment  of  fear  for  the 
future.  It  was  but  too  clear  that  a  Prince  who  stretched  his  en- 
croaching arms  in  all  directions— to  Thermopyla?,  to  Illyria,  and  to 
Thrace— would  not  long  suffer  the  fertile  peninsula  betw(K3n  the 
Thermaic  and  Strymonic  gulfs  to  remain  occupied  bv  free  Grecian 
communities.  Accordingly,  it  seems  that  after  the  ifreat  victory  of 
Philip  in  Thessaly  over  the  Phokians  (in  the  first  half  of  352  B.C.), 
the  Olynthians  manifested  their  uneasiness  by  seceding  from  alliance 
with  him  against  Athens.  They  concluded  peace  with  that  city,  and 
manifested  such  friendly  sentiments  that  an  alliance  beiran^to  he 
thouglit  possible.  This  peace  seems  to  have  been  concluded  before 
November  353  b.c. 

Here  was  an  important  chanjxeof  policy  on  the  part  of  the  Olyn- 
thians. Though  they  probably  intended  it,  not  as  a  measure"  of 
hostility  against  Philip,  but  simply  as  a  precaution  to  insure  to 
Ihemselyes  recourse  elsewhere  in  case  of  becoming  exposed  to  his 
attack,  it  was  not  likely  that  he  would  either  draw  or  recognize  any 
sucli  distinction.  He  would  probably  consider  that  by  the  cession 
of  Potidaea,  he  had  purchased  their  co-operation  against  Athens,  and 
would  treat  their  secession  as  at  least  making  an  end  to  all  amicable 
relations. 

A  few  months  afterward  (at  the  date  of  the  first  Philippic)  we  find 
that  he,  or  his  soldiers,  had  attacked,  and  made  sudden  excursions 
into  their  territory,  close  adjoining  to  his  own. 

In  this  state  of  partial  hostility,  yet  without  proclaimed  or  viiror^ 
ous  war.  matters  seem  to  have  re'ma'ined  throughout  the  year  351  b.c. 
Philip  was  engaged  during  that  year  in  his  Thracian  expedition, 
where  he  fell  sick,  so  that  aggressive  enterprise  was  for  the  time 
suspended.     Meanwhile  the  Athenians  seem  to  have  proposed   to 


408 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTHIAN   WARS. 


Olynthns  a  scheme  of  decided  alliance  a^irainst  Philip.  But  tlie 
()!}  nthians  had  too  iinich  to  fear  from  him,  to  hecome  themselves 
the  aggressors.  They  still  probably  hoped  tliat  he  miglit  find  siilfi- 
cient  enemies  and  occupation  elsewhere,  among  Thracians,  lllyrians, 
Pseonians,  Arymbas  and  the  Epirots.  and  Athenians;  at  any  rate, 
they  would  not  be  the  first  to  jnovoke  a  (ontcst.  This  state  of 
reciprocal  mistrust  continued  for  siveial  months,  until  at  h  ngth 
Philip  began  serious  operations  against  Ihcni;  not  very  long  after  his 
recovery  from  the  sickness  in  Thrace,  and  seemingly  toward  the 
middle  of  350  B.C. ;  a  little  before  the  beginning  of  Olympiad  107,  3. 

It  was  probably  during  the  continuance  of  such  semi-hostile  rela- 
tions that  two  half-brothers  of  Philip,  sons  of  his  father  Amyntas  by 
another  mother,  sought  and  obtained  shelter  at  Olynthus.  Tliey 
came  as  his  enemies;  for  he  had  put  to  death  already  one  of  their 
brothers,  and  they  themselves  only  escaped  the  same  fate  by  flight. 
Whether  tlu-y  had  committed  ;iny  positive  act  to  provoke  his  wrath, 
we  are  not  informed;  but  such  tragedies  were  not  unfiequent  in  tiie 
Macedonian  regal  family.  Wliile  Olynthus  was  friendly  and  grate- 
ful to  Philip,  these  exiles  would  not  have  resorted  thither;  but  they 
were  now  favorably  received,  and  may  ])erliaps  liave  held  out  hopes 
that  in  case  of  war  tliey  could  raise  a  ^huedoniau  party  against 
Philip.  To  that  prince,  the  r(ce])tion  of  his  fugitive  enemies  served 
as  a  plaiLsible  pretense  for  war — which  he  doubtless  would  inuier  all 
circumstances  have  prosecuted — against  Olynthus;  and  it  seems  to 
have  been  so  put  forward  in  his  jiublic  declarations. 

But  Philip,  in  accomplishing  his  (onquests,  knew  well  how  to 
blend  the  influences  of  deceit  and  .'^c  ductlon  with  those  of  arms,  and 
to  divide  or  corrupt  those  whom  he  intended  to  subdue.  To  such 
insiduous  approaches  Olyntlius  was  in  many  ways  open.  The  power 
of  that  city  consisted,  in  great  part,  in  her  position  as  chief  of  a 
numerous  confederacy,  including  a  large  proportion,  though  prob- 
ably not  all,  of  the  Grecian  cities  in  the  jieninsula  of  Chalkidike. 
Among  the  different  members  of  such  a  confederacy,  there  was  more 
or  less  of  a  dissentient  interest  or  sentiment,  which  accidental  cir- 
cumstances might  inflame  so  as  to  induce  a  wish  for  separation.  In 
each  city,  moreover,  and  in  Olynthus  itself,  there  were  ambitious 
citizens  competing  for  power,  and  not  scrupulous  as  to  the  means 
whereby  it  was  to  be  acquired  or  retamed.  In  each  of  them,  Philip 
could  open  intrigues,  and  enlist  partisans;  in  some,  he  would  prob- 
ably receive  invitations  to  do  so;  for  the  greatness  of  his  exploits, 
while  it  inspired  alarm  in  some  quarters,  raised  hopes  among  disap- 
pointed and  jealous  minorities.  If,  through  such  predisposing  cir- 
cumstances, he  either  made  or  found  partisans  and  traitors  in  the 
distant  cities  of  Peloponnesus,  much  more  was  this  practicable  for 
l»im  in  the  neighboring  peninsula  of  Chalkidike.  Olyntlius  and  the 
other  cities  were  nearly  all  conterminous  with  the  Macedonian  terri- 
tory, some  probably  with  boundaries  not  clearly  settleil.     Perdikkas 


PHILIP  AND  OLYNTHUS. 


409 


II.  liad  given  to  the  Olynthians  (at  the  beginning  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war)  a  portion  of"  his  territory  near  the  Lake  Bolbe:  Philip 
himself  had  given  to  them  the  district  of  Athemus.  Possessed  of  so 
much  neighboring  land,  he  had  the  means,  with  little  loss  to  himself, 
of  materially  favoring  or  enriching  such  individual  citizens,  of  Olyn- 
thus or  other  cities,  as  chose  to  promote  his  designs.  Besides  direct 
bribes,  where  that  mod(i  of  proceeding  was  most  effective,  he  could 
grant  the  right  of  gratuitous  pasture  to  the  flocks  and  herds  of  one, 
and  furnish  abundant  supplies  of  timber  to  another.  Master  as  lie 
now  was  of  Amphipolis  and  Philippi,  he  could  at  pleasure  open  or 
close  to  them  the  speculations  in  the  gold  mines  of  5lount  Pangajus, 
for  wdiich  they  had  always  hankered.  If  his  privateers  harassed 
even  the  powerful  Athens,  and  the  islands  under  her  protection, 
much  more  vexatious  would  they  be  to  his  neighbors  in  the  Chalki- 
dic  peninsula,  which  the}''  as  it  were  encircled,  from  the  Thermaic 
Gulf  on  one  side  to  the  Strymouic  Gulf  on  the  other.  Lastly,  we 
cannot  doubt  that  some  individuals  in  these  cities  had  found  it  profit- 
able to  take  service,  civil  or  military,  under  Philip,  which  would 
supply  him  with  correspondents  and  adherents  among  their  friends 
and  relatives. 

It  will  thus  be  easily  seen,  that  with  reference  to  Olvnthus  and  her 
confederate  cities,  Philip  had  at  his  command  means  of  private  bene- 
fit and  annoyance  to  such  an  extent,  as  would  insure  to  him  the 
co-operation  of  a  venal  and  traitorous  minority  in  each;  such  minor- 
ity of  course  blending  its  proceedings,  and  concealing  its  purposes, 
among  the  si  audi ug  political  feuds  of  the  place.  These  means,  how- 
ever, were  only  preliminary  to  the  direct  use  of  the  sword.  His  seduc- 
tions and  presents  commenced  the  work,  but  his  excellent  generalship 
and  soldiers — the  phalanx,  the  hypaspistte,  and  the  cavalr3%  all  non- 
brought  into  admirable  training  during  the  ten  years  of  his  reign — 
completed  it. 

Though  Demosthenes  in  one  passage  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that 
Philip  rated  his  established  influence  so  high  as  to  expect  to  incor- 
porate the  Chalkidic  confederacy  in  his  empire  without  serious 
difficulty  and  without  even  real  war — there  is  ground  for  believing 
that  he  encountered  strenuous  resistance,  avenged  by  umeasured 
rigors  after  the  victory.  The  two  years  and  a  half  betw^een  mid- 
summer 350  B.C.,  and  the  commencement  of  347  B.C.  (the  two  last 
years  of  Olympiad  107  and  the  nine  first  inonths  of  Olympiad  108), 
were  productive  of  phenomena  more  terror-striking  than  anything 
in  the  recent  annals  of  Greece.  No  less  than  thirty-two  free  Grecian 
cities  in  Chalkidike  were  taken  and  destroA'ed,  the  inhabitants  being 
reduced  to  slavery,  by  Philip.  Among  them  was  Olynthus,  one  of 
the  most  powerful,  flourishing,  and  energetic  members  of  the  Hel- 
lenic brotherhood;  Apollonia,  whose  inhabitants  would  now  repent 
the  untoward  obstinacy  of  their  fathers  (thirty-two  years  before)  in 
repudiating  a  generous  and  equal  confederacy  with  Olynthus,  and 


410 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTHLVN  WARS. 


invoking  Spartan  aid  to  revive  the  falling  power  of  Philip's  father, 
Amyuta^,  and  Stageira,  tlie  birth-place  of  Aristotle.  The  destruc- 
tion of  thirty-two  free  Hellenic  commnnities  in  two  years  by  a 
foreign  prince,  was  a  calamity  the  like  of  which  had  never  occurred 
siucethe  suppression  of  the  Ionic  revolt  and  the  invasion  of  Xerxes. 
1  li.ive  already  recounted  in  a  previous  chapter  the  manifestation  of 
wrath  at  the  festival  of  the  99lli  Olj'^mpiad  (384  B.C.)  against  the 
envoys  of  the  elder  Dionysius  of  Syracuse,  who  had  captured  and 
subverted  tive  or  six  free  Hellenic  communities  in  Italy.  Far  more 
vehement  would  be  the  sentiment  of  awe  and  ternir.  after  the  Olyn- 
thian  war.  against  llie  ^lacedonian  destroyer  of  thirty-two  Chalkidic 
cities.  We  shall  tind  this  plainly  indicated  in  the  phenomena 
immediately  succeeding.  We  shall  see  Athens  terrified  into  a  peace 
alike  dishonorable  and  improvident,  which  even  Demosthenes  does 
not  venture  to  oppose:  we  shall  see  ^^schines  passing  out  of  a  free- 
spoken  Athenian  citizen  into  a  servile  worshiper,  if  not  a  paid  agent, 
of  Phiiip:  we  shaU  observe  Isokrates,  once  the  champion  of  Pan- 
Helienic  freedom  and  integrity,  ostentatiously  proclaiming  Philip  as 
the  master  and  arbiter  of  Greece,  whih;  persuading  liim  at  the  same 
time  to  use  his  power  well  for  the  purpose  of  conquering  Persia. 
These  were  terrible  times;  suitably  illustrated  in  their  cruel  details 
by  the  gangs  of  enslaved  Chalkidic  Greeks  of  both  sexes,  seen  pass 
ing  even  into  Peloponnesus  as  the  proj)ert3''  of  new  grantees  wlio 
extolled  the  muniticence  of  the  donor  Philip;  and  suitably  ushered 
in  by  awful  celestial  signs,  showers  of  tire  and  blood  falling  from  the 
heavens  to  the  earth,  in  testimony  of  the  wrath  of  the  gods. 

While,  however,  we  make  out  with  tolerable  clearness  the  general 
result  of  Philip's  (Jlynthian  war,  and  the  terror  whicii  it  struck  into 
the  Grecian  mind — we  are  not  (-nly  left  without  information  jUs  loits 
details,  but  are  even  ptrplexc-d  by  its  chrouolog}'.  I  have  already  re- 
maikcd,  that  though  the  Olynthians  had  contracted  such  suspicions 
of  Philip,  even  before  the  beginning  of  351  uc,  as  to  induce  them 
to  make  peace  with  his  enemy  Athens — they  had,  nevertheless,  de- 
clined the  overtures  of  Athens  for  a  closer  alliance,  not  wishing  to  bring 
upon  themselves  decidi-d  hosiilily  from  so  powerful  a  neighbor,  until 
his  aggressions  should  become  such  as  to  leave  them  no  choice.  We 
have  no  precise  information  as  to  Philip's  movements  after  his  oper- 
ations in  Thrace  and  his  sickness  in  851  IJ.C.  But  we  know  that  it 
was  not  in  his  nature  to  remain  inactive;  that  he  was  incessantly 
pusiiing  his  conquestii;  and  that  no  conquest  could  be  so  important 
to  him  as  that  of  Ul/nthus  and  the  Chalkidic  peninsula.  Accord- 
ingly, we  are  not  surpr-.-^ed  to  tind.  that  theOlynthian  and  Chalkidian 
confederates  became  the  object  of  his  direct  hostility  in  850  B.C.  lie 
rais<'d  pivteiis(»s  for  attack  against  one  or  other  of  these  cities  separ- 
ately; avoidinir  to  deal  with  the  confederacy  as  a  whole,  and  disclaim- 
ing, by  special  envoys,  all  purposes  injurious  to  Olynthus. 

Probably  the  philippiziug  party  in  that  city  may  have  dwelt  rpon 


ALLIANCE  WITH  OLYNTHUS. 


411 


I'll  ^  disclaimer  as  satisfactory,  and  given  as  many  false  assurances 
ab  )ut  the  purposes  of  Philip,  as  we  shall  find  ^^schines  hereafter 
uttering  at  Athens.  But  the  general  body  of  citizens  were  not  so  de- 
ceived. Feeling  th:it  tlie  time  had  come  when  it  was  prudent  to  clo-c 
With  the  previous  Athenian  overtures,  they  sent  envovs  to  Athens  to 
propose  alliance  and  invite  co-operation  against  Philip.  Their  tii>t 
propositions  were  doubtless  not  couched  iu  the  language  of  uriieiuv 
and  distress.  They  were  not  as  yet  in  any  actual  danger ;''ili(Mr 
power  was  great  in  reality,  and  estimated  at  its  full  value  abroad- 
moreover,  as  prudent  diplomatists,  they  w^ould  naturally  overstal?^! 
their  own  dignity  and  the  magnitude  of  what  they  were  olferiu"-  Of 
couise  they  would  ask  for  Athenian  aid  to  be  sent  to  Chalkidike— 
since  it  was  there  that  the  war  was  being  carried  on;  but  they  would 
ask  for  aid  in  order  to  act  energetically  against  tlie  common  ^enemv 
and  repress  the  growth  of  his  power— not  to  avert  Immediate  dan"-er 
menacing  Olynthus.  ° 

There  needed  no  discussion  to  induce  the  Athenians  to  accept  this 
alliance.  It  was  what  they  had  long  been  seeking,  and  they  willindy 
closed  with  the  proposition.  Of  course  they  also  promised— what 
indeed  was  almost  involved  in  the  acceptance— to  send  a  force  to  co- 
operate against  Philip  in  Chalkidike.  On  this  first  recognition  of 
Olynthus  as  an  ally— or  perhaps  shortly  afterward,  but  before  cir- 
cumstances had  at  all  changed— Demosthenes  delivered  his  earliest 
Olynthiac  harangue.  Of  the  three  memorable  compositions  so  de- 
nommated,  the  earliest  is,  in  my  judgment,  that  which  stands 
second  m  the  edited  order.  Their  true  chronological  order  has  lon^ 
been,  and  still  is,  matter  of  controversy;  the  best  conclusion  which 
I  can  form,  is  that  the  first  and  the  second  are  erroneously  placed 
but  that  the  third  is  really  the  latest;  all  of  them  being  delivered  dur- 
ing the  six  or  seven  last  months  of  350  b.c. 

In  this  his  earliest  advocacy  (the  speech  which  stands  printed  as 
the  second  Olynthiac),  Demosthenes  insists  upon  the  advantageous 
contingency  which  has  just  tijrued  up  for  Athens,  throudi  the^bles- 
sing  of  the  gods,  in  the  spontaneous  tender  of  so  valuable  an  ally 
He  recommends  that  aid  be  dispatched  to  the  new  ally;  the  most 
prompt  and  effective  aid  will  please  him  the  best.  But  his  recom- 
mendation is  contained  in  a  single  sentence,  in  the  middle  of  the 
speech;  it  is  neither  repeated  a  second  time,  nor  emphatically  insisted 
upon,  nor  enlarged  by  specificati(.n  of  quantity  or  quality  of  aid  to 
be  sent.  No  allusion  is  made  to  necessities  or  danirer  of  Olynthus, 
nor  to  the  chance  that  Philip  might  conquer  the  town;  still  less  to 
ulterior  contingencies,  tliat  Philip,  if  he  did  con(iuer  it,  miirht  carry 
the  seat  of  war  from  his  own  coasts  to  those  of  Attica.  On  the  con- 
trary, Demosthenes  adverts  to  the  power  of  the  Olynthians  —to  the 
situation  of  tlieir  territory,  close  on  Philip's  flanks— to  their  fixed 
resolution  that  they  will  never  again  enter  into  amity  or  compromise 
with  him— as  evidences  how  valuable  their  alliance  will  prove  to 


412 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTHIAN  WARS. 


Athens-   enabling  her  to  prosecute  with  improved  success  the  war 
a-n^^st  Philip,  ami  to  retrieve  the  disgraceful  l<>sses  brought  upon 
h?r  by  previous  remissness.     The  main  purpose  ot  tiie  onitor  is  t.|m- 
flame  his  countrymen  into  more  hearty  and  vK<rorous  efforts   or  the 
prosecution  of  this  irenen.l  war;  while  to  furnish  aid  to  the  Olvnlhi- 
ans  \sonly  a  secondary  purpose,  and  a  part  of  the  larger  scheme 
-I. hall  not  (says  the  orator)  expatiate  on  the  formidabfe  power  of 
Philip  as  an  argument  to  urge  you  to  the  performance  ot  your  public 
duly      That  would  be  too  much  both  of  compliment  to  him  and  ot 
disparagement  to  vou.     I  siiould,  indeed,  myself  have  thought  him 
tru  y  fol-midable,  if  he  had  nchieved  his  present  eminence  by  means 
consistent  with  justice.     But  he  has  aggrandized  himself,   paitly 
throu-h  your  negligence   and  improvidence,  partly  by  treacherous 
inean^bv  takiu|  into  pav  corrupt  partisans  at  Athens,  and  by  cheat- 
^irs^ceisivelv'oivnthians,   Thessalians,  and  all  his  other  a  lies. 
These  allies  having^iow  detected  his  treachery,  are  deserting  him; 
without  them,  his  power  will  crumble  away.     Moreover  the  Mace- 
donians themselves  have  no  sympathy  with  his  personal  ambition; 
they  are  fatigued  with  the  labor  imposed  upon  them  by  his  endless 
military  momnents  and  impoverished  by  the  closing  of  their  ports 
"hroii.^^^  the  war.     His  vaunted  oflicers  are  men  of  worthless  and  dis- 
solute" habits;  his  personal  companions  are  thieves   vile  mmisters  of 
amusement,  outcasts  from  our  cities.  ^  His  past  good  fortune  impar  s 
to  all  this  real  weakness  a  fallacious  ai^.'  of  strength;  «"d  doubtless  h^^^ 
ffood  fortune  has  be<n  very  great      But  the  fortune  ot  Athens^^  an 
hov  title  to  the  benevolent  aid  of  the  gods  is  still  greater-if  onl>  joii 
Athenians,  will  do  your  duty.     Yet  here  you  «f '  f ^^^-f^^f/J^  '^t^;;! 
nothino-      The  sluiri-ard  cannot  even  command  h  s  tiK"  s  to  anoik 
?or    hii-much  leis^the  gods.     I  do  not  wonder,  that  1  l^'^U^  a  way| 
u  the  tield,  always  in  movement,  doing  everything  for  l>"'j^^'f '  ^,^^f 
let  in-  slip  an  opportunity-prevails  over  you  who  merely  talk,  m- 
mi  re"  and  vote     without   action.  *    Nay-the  contniry  would  be 
^^nderflT-if  under  such  circumstances,  he  had  mt  been  the  con- 
queror   But  what  T  do  wonder  at  is.  that  you  Athemans-who  in  for- 
mer  days   contended  for   Pan-Hellenic   freedom   'f;'«/\.^"^^ 
da^monians-who,  scorning  unjust   ^f^^^'^'"'^'^;^'''^:^^^^^^^^ 
fou-ht  in  person  and  lavished  your  substance  to  protect  the  ng/^ts  ot 
oth?r  Greeks-that  ,^on  now  shrink  from  personal  service  and  pav 
ment  of  money  for  the  defense  of  your  own  possessions.     1  ou,  an  no 
^we  so  ^ftenLcued  others,  can  now  ^^  f^]^  J^'^^  "^^P^J^^ 
much  of  your  own !    I  wonder  you  do  not  look  back  to  that  c^»*»»^J 
Tf  yours  which  has  brought  your  affairs  into  this  state  of  ruin,  and 
ak  voursXes  how  they  can  ever  mend,  while  such  conduct  remains 
u  clmiS     It^^^  at  first  to  preserve  what  we  once 

lad  Uian  o  recover  it  now  that  it  is  lost;  we  have  nothing  left  now 
to  lose_we  have  everything  to  recover.  This  must  be  done  by  our- 
selves  and  at  once :  we  mult  furnish  money,  we  must  serve  in  person 


SPEECHES  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


413 


Dy  turns;  we  must  give  our  generals  means  to  do  their  work  well, 
and  then  exact  from  them  a  severe  account  afterward — which  we 
cannot  do,  so  long  as  we  ourselves  will  neither  pay  nor  serve.  "We 
must  correct  that  abuse  which  has  grown  up,  whereby  particular 
symmories  in  the  state  combine  to  exempt  themselves  from  burden- 
some duties,  and  to  cast  them  all  unjustly  upon  others.  We  must 
not  only  come  forward  vigorously  and  heartily,  with  person  and  with 
money,  but  each  man  must  embrace  faithfully  his  fair  share  of  patri- 
otic obligation." 

Such  are  the  main  points  of  the  earliest  discourse  delivered  by 
Demosthenes  on  the  sul^ject  of  Oiynthus.  In  the  mind  of  modern 
readers,  as  in  that  of  the  rhetor  Dionsysius,  there  is  an  unconscious 
tendency  to  imagine  thai  these  memorable  pleadings  must  have  work- 
ed persuasion,  and  to  magnify  the  efficiency  of  their  author  as  an 
historical  and  directing  person.  But  there  are  no  facts  to  bear  out 
such  an  impression.  Demosthenes  was  still  comparatively  a  young 
man — thirty-one  years  of  age ;  admired  indeed  for  his  speeches  and 
his  compositions  written  to  be  spoken  by  others;  but  as  yet  not  en- 
joying much  practical  influence.  It  is  moreover  certain — to  his 
honor — that  he  descried  and  measured  foreign  dangers  before  they 
were  recognized  by  ordinary  politicians;  that  he  advised  a  course, 
energetic  and  salutary  indeed,  but  painful  for  the  people  to  act  upon, 
and  disagreeable  for  recognized  leaders  to  propose;  that  these  leaders, 
such  as  Kubulus  and  others,  were  accordingly  adverse  to  him.  The 
tone  of  Demosthenes  in  these  speeches  is  that  of  one  who  feels  that 
he  is  contending  against  heavy  odds — coml)ating  and  habitual  and 
deep-seated  reluctance.  He  is  an  earnest  remonstrant — an  opposition 
speaker — contributing  to  raise  up  gradually  a  body  of  public  senti- 
ment and  conviction  which  ultiinatel}'-  may  pass  into  act.  His  rival 
Eubulus  is  the  ministerial  spokesman,  whom  the  majorit5%  both  rich 
and  poor,  followed;  a  man  not  at  all  corrupt  (so  far  as  we  know),  but 
of  simple  conservative  routine,  evading  ail  painful  necessities  and 
and  extraording  precautions;  conciliating  the  rich  by  resisting  a 
pro|)erty-tax,  and  the  general  body  of  citizens  by  refusing  to  meddle 
with  the  Theoric  expenditure. 

The  Athenians  did  not  follow  the  counsel  of  Demosthenes.  They 
accepted  the  Olynthian  alliance,  but  took  no  active  step  to  co-operate 
with  Oiynthus  in  the  war  against  Philip.  Such  unhappily  was  their 
usual  habit.  The  habit  of  Philip  was  the  opposite.  We  need  no 
witness  to  satisfy  us  that  he  would  not  slacken  in  his  attack — and 
that  in  the  course  of  a  month  or  two  he  would  master  more  than  one 
of  the  Chalkidic  cities,  perhaps  defeating  the  Olynthian  forces  also. 
The  Olyuthians  would  discover  that  they  had  gained  Lolhing  by 
their  new  allies;  while  the  philippizing  party  among  themselves 
would  take  advantage  of  the  remissness  of  Athens  to  depreciate  her 
promises  as  worthless  or  insincere,  and  to  press  for  accommodation 
with  the  enemy.     Complaints  would  piemen lly  reach  Athens,  biougljt 


414 


EUDOIC  AND   OLYXTIIIAN    WARS. 


OLYNTHIAC  ORATION. 


415 


bv  fresh  envoys  from  the  Olvnthinns,  and   ]irob:i])ly  -also  from  the 
C'halkulians,  who  were  the  greatest  siilYerer.s  ])y  Pliihp's  arms.     Ihey 
would  naturally  justify  thLs  renewed  applu  anon  by  expatifitmg  ou 
the  victorious  progress" of  Philip;  tiiey  v.ouid  novr  call  for  aid  more 
ur-'-ently   and  might  even  glance  at  tiie  possibiiiiy  of  Philip's  con- 
quest of'ciialkidike.     It  was  in  this  jidvanced  stage  of  the  proceed- 
in"-s  that  Demosthenes  ajrain  exer;ed  hir.iself  in  the  cause,  delivering 
that  speech  which  stands  first  in  the  printed  order  of  the  Oiynthiacs. 
Here  we  have,  not  a  Philippic,  but  a  true  Olyirthiac.     Oi\  nlhus  is 
no  l()n--er  part  and  parcel  of  a  larger  tiienu-.  upon  the  whole  of  m  Inch 
Demosthenes  intends  to  discourse;  but  slantis  out  as  the  prominent 
feature  and   specialty  of  his  pleading.     It  is  now  pronounced  to  be 
in  danger  and  in  ])ressing  need  of  succor;  moreover  its  preservation 
is  strenuously  prosed  upon  the  Athenians,  as  essential  to  their  own 
safetv.     Vv'iille  it  stands  witli  its  confederacy  around  it,  the  Atheni- 
ans can  lii^dit  Philip  on  his  own  coast:  if  it  falls,  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent  hfm  from  trnnsferring  the  war  into  Attica,  aid  assailing  them 
on  their  own  soil.     Demostiu.nes  is  wound  up  to  a  higher  pitch  of 
emphasis,  complauiinir  of  the  lukewarnucss  of  his  countrymen  on  a 
cri<;is  which  c.iils  aloud  for  instant  action.     He  again  uriics  that  a 
vote  ])e  at  once  passed  to  assist  Olynthus.  and  two  armaments  dis- 
patched as  quickly  as  possible;  one'to  preserve  to  Olynthus  her  cou- 
f.'derate  cities— t lie  other,  to  mr.ke  a  diversion  by  .^multaneous  atttick 
on  Philip  at  home.     Without  such  twofold  aitl  (he  Mly^)  the  citi.  s 
cannot  be  pre^erv  d.     Advice  of  aid  generally  he  liad  already  given, 
thouirh  less  emphatically,    in  his  previous  harangue;   but  he   now 
superadds  a  new  suggestion— that   Athenian   envois  shall  be  !^eut 
thither   not  merely  to\announce  the  coming  of  the  force,  but  also  to 
remain' at  01  v  nth  us  and  watch  over  the  course  of  events.     For  he  is 
afraid    that  unless  such  immediate  encouragement  be  sent,  1  hiup 
mav   even  without  the  tedious  process  of  a  siege,  frighten  or  cajole 
the*  blvnthian    confederacy  into   submission:  partly  by   reminding 
them  that  Athens  had  done  nothing  for  them,  and  by  denouncing 
lier  as  a  treacherous  and  worthless  ally.     Philip  would  be  glad  to 
entrap  them  into  .some  plausible  capitulation;  and  tlumgh  they  knew^ 
that  thev  could  have  no  security  for  his  keeping  thetefms  of  it  alter- 
ward.  st'ill  he  miszht succeed,  if  Athens  remained  idle..  N(»w.  it  ever, 
was  the  time  for  Athenians  to  come  forward  and  do  their  outy  wiih- 
out  default;  to  serve  in  person  and  submit  to  the  necessary  iui.oint 
of  direct  taxation.     Thev  had  no  longer   the  smallest  i>retccs;-  )or 
continued  inaction;  the  very  conjuncture  which  they  had  so  loi.g 
desired,  had  turned  up  of  itself— war  beUveen  Olynthus  and  Plihip. 
and  that  too  upon  irrounds  special  to  Olynthus— not  at  the  msiigatioQ 
of  Athens.     The  Olynthian  alliance  had  been  thrown  in  the  way  of 
Athens  by  the  peculiar  goodness  of  the  gods,  to  enable  her  to  repair 
her  numerous  past  errors  and  shortcomings.     She  ought  to  look  well 
and  deal  rightly  with  these  last  remaining  opportunities,  in  order  to 


wipe  off  the  shame  of  the  past;  but  if  she  now  let  slip  Olynthus,  and 
suffer  Philip  to  conquer  it,  there  was  nothing  else  to  hinder  him  from 
I  marching  wiiithersoever  he  chose.  His  ambition  was  so  insatiable, 
'  his  activity  so  incessant,  that,  assuming  Athens  to  persist  in  her  care- 
less inaction,  he  would  carry  the  w^ar  forward  from  Thrace  into 
■  Attica — of  which  the  ruinous  consequences  were  but  too  clear. 
I  "  I  maintain  (continued  the  orator)  that  you  ought  to  lend  aid  at 

y  the  present  crisis  in  two  ways;  by  preserving  for  the  Olynthlans  their 
confederated  cities,  through  a  body  of  troops  sent  out  for  that  express 
purpose — and  by  employing  at  the  same  time  other  troops  and  other 
triremes  to  act  aggressively  against  Philip's  own  coast.  If  you 
neglect  either  of  these  measures,  I  fear  that  the  expedition  will  fail. 
— As  to  the  pecuniary  provision,  you  have  already  more  money  than 
any  other  city,  available  for  purposes  of  war;  if  you  will  pay  that 
money  to  soldiers  on  service,  no  need  exists  for  further  provision — if 
not,  then  need  exists;  but  above  all  things,  money  mud  be  found. 
What  then !  I  shall  be  asked — are  you  moving  that  the  Theoric  fund 
shall  be  devoted  to  war  purposes?  *Not  I,  by  Zeus.  I  merely  express 
my  conviction  that  sohliers  mud  be  e(juipped,  and  that  receipt  of 
public  money,  and  performance  of  public  service,  ought  to  go  hand 
.  in  hand;  but  your  practice  is  to  take  the  pul)lic  money,  without  any 
such  condition,  for  the  festivals.  Accordingly,  no'thiug  remains 
except  that  all  should  directly  contribute;  much*,  if  much  is  wanted 
—little,  if  little  will  suffice.  'Money  must  be  had;  without  it  not  a 
single  essential  step  can  be  taken.  There  are,  moreover,  different 
ways  and  means  suggested  by  others.  Choose  any  one  of  these  wliich 
you  think  advantageous;  and  laya  vigorous  grasp  on  events  while 
the  opportunity  still  lasts." 

It  w^as  thus  that  Demosthenes  addressed  his  countrymen  some  time 
after  the  Olynthians  had  been  received  as  allies,  but'before  any  aux- 
iliary force  had  been  either  sent  to  them  or  even  positively  decreed — 
yet  when  such  postponement  of  action  had  inspired  them  with  mi-- 
trust,  threatening  to  throw  them,  even  without  resistance,  into  the 
hands  of  Philip  and  their  own  })hilippiziiig  party.  We  observe  in 
Demosthenes  the  same  sagacious  appn^ciation,  both  of  the  presen'. 
and  the  future,  as  we  have  already  remarked  in  the  first  Philippic — 
foresight  of  the  terrible  consequences  of  this  Olynthian  war,  while 
as  yet  distant  and  unobserved  by  others.  We  perceive  the  same  good 
sense  and  courage  in  invoking  the  right  remedies;  though  his  propo- 
sitions of  personal  military  service,  direct  taxation,  or  the  diversion 
of  the  Theoric  fund — were  all  of  them  the  most  unpopular  AvhieU 
could  be  made.  The  last  of  the  three,  indeed,  he  does  not  embody 
in  a  substantive  motion;  nor  could  he  move  it  without  positive  ille- 
gality, which  -would  have  rendered  him  liable  to  the  indictment 
callctl  Graphe  Paranomon.  But  he  approaches  it  near  enough  to 
raise  in  the  public  mind  the  question  as  it  really  stood — that  money 
•must  be  had;  that  there  were  only  two  ways  of  getting  it — direct 


416 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTIIIAN   WARS. 


THIRD  OLYNTHIAC. 


taxation,  and  appropriation  of  the  festival  fund;  and  that  the  latter 
of  these  ought  to  be  resorted  to  as  well  as  the  former.  We  shall  find 
this  question  about  the  Theoric  Fund  coniini:;  forward  again  more 
than  once,  and  shall  have  presently  to  notice  it  more  at  hirge. 

At  some  time  after  this  new  haraniiue  of  Demosthenes— how  long 
after  it.  or  how  far  in  consequence  of  it,  we  cannot  say— the  Atheni- 
ans commissioned  and  sent  a  body  of  foreign  mercenaries  to  the  aid 
of  the  Olvnthians  and  Chalkidians.  The  outfit  and  transport  of  tiiese 
troops  was  in  part  defrayed  by  voluntary  subscriptions  from  rich 
Athenian  citizens.  But  no  Athenian  citizen-soldiers  were  sent;  nor 
was  any  money  assigned  for  the  pay  of  the  mercenaries.  The  expe- 
dition appears  to  have  been  sent  toward  the  autumn  of  350  B.C.,  as 
far  as  we  can  pretend  to  affirm  anything  respecting  the  obscure 
rhronologv  of  this  period.  It  presently  gained  some  victory  over 
Philip  or" "Philip's  generals,  and  was  enabled  to  transmit  good  ncMS 
to  xUliens,  which  excited  much  exultation  there,  and  led  the  people 
to  fancy  that  they  were  in  a  fair  way  of  taking  revenge  on  Philip  for 
past  miscarria-res.  According  to  some  speakers,  not  oidy  were  the 
Olvnthians  bevond  all  reach  of  danger,  but  Philip  was  in  a  fair  way 
of  being  punished  and  humbled.  It  is,  indeed,  possible  that  the  suc- 
cess may  really  have  been  something  considerable,  such  as  to  check 
Philip's'proirress  for  the  time.  Though  victorious  on  the  whole,  he 
must  have  experienced  partial  and  temporary  reverses,  otherwise  he 
would  have  concluded  the  war  before  the  early  spring  of  847  B.C. 
Whether  this  success  coincided  with  that  of  tlie  Athenian  general 
Chares  over  Philip's  general  Adaeus,  we  cannot  say. 

But  Demosthenes  iiad  sagacity  enough  to  perceive,  and  frankness 
to  proclaim,  that  it  was  a  success  noway  decisive  of  the  w  ar  gener- 
ally: worse  than  nothing,  if  it  induced  the  Athenians  to  fancy  that 
thev  had  carried  their  point. 

To  correct  the  delusive  fancy,  that  enough  had  been  done— to 
comlmt  that  chronic  malady  under  which  the  Athenians  so  readily 
found  encouratremcntand  excuses  for  inaction— to  revive  in  them  the 
conviction  that  thev  had  contracted  a  debt,  yet  unpaid,  toward  their 
Olvnthian  allies  and  tow^ard  their  own  ultimate  security —is  the  scope 
of  "Demosthenes  in  his  third  Olynthiac  harangue;  third  in  the  printed 
order,  and  third  also,  according  to  my  judgment,  in  order  of  time; 
delivered  toward  the  close  of  the  year  350  B.C.  Like  Perikles,  he 
was  not  less  watchful  to  abate  extravagant  and  unseasonable  illusions 
of  triumph  in  his  countrymen,  than  to  raise  their  spirits  in  moments 
of  undue  alarm  and  despondency, 

"The  talk  which  I  hear aboutVunishing Philip  (says  Demosthenes, 
in  substance)  is  founded  on  a  false  basis.  The  real  facts  of  the  case 
teach  us  a  very  different  lesson.  They  bid  us  look  well  to  our  own 
security,  that  we  be  not  ourselves  the  sufferers,  and  that  we  preserve 
our  allies.  There  was  indeed  a  time— and  that  too  within  my  ren  me- 
brance  not  long  ago — when  we  might  have  held  our  own  and  punished 


417 


P  idip  besides;  but  now.  our  first  care  must  be  to  preserve  our  own 
allies.  Atter  we  have  made  this  sure,  then  it  will  be  time  ?o  tS 
of  punishing  others.  The  present  juncture  calls  for  anxSus  de  ber 
eration.  Do  not  again  commit  the  same  error  as  vou  conm  tt^ri 
three  years  ago.  When  Philip  was  besieging  I IcU u m  in  Th,^.^^^^ 
you  passed  an  energetic  decree  to  send  an%xpediti?n  aga  nst  ^  d^^^^^ 
presently  came  reports  that  he  was  sick,  and  that  he  was  S-  th  , 
goo(  news  made  you  fancy  that  the  expedition  was  unnecessarv  ind 
you  let  It  drop     If  you  had  executed  promptly  what  y^u  re^ivtd 

no^ful-thTrtouble^  '^^^  ^^^  ^^^'^  '^'^^^  -^  -^^^  ha^e^^vef.^fu 
J.'r  '^/^^^^"^^"ers  indeed  are  passed,  and  cannot  be  mended  But  I 
admt  to  them  now,  because  the  present  war-crisis  is  v^ry  similar 
and  I  trust  you  will  not  make  the  like  mistake  a-aiu  IfvluZunt 
send  a.d  to  Olynthus  with  ail  your  force  and'neans,  30^!  llphy 
PlHhps  game  for  him  now,  exactly  as  you  did  then  Yo  h- ye 
Fmr%T^'r  '"^^  7^'-^i"^i«  g'^  tli  Olynthians  into  war  w U h 
tl  i  ' ;  r\  ^'^'1  """"^  hapi^ened:  what  choice  remains,  except  to  ad 
them  heartily  and  vigorously?  You  will  be  covered  with  shame  if 
you  do  not  But  this  not  all.  Your  own  security  at  hon  e  rSl 
t  of  you  also;  for  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  Philip,  if  he  coTuers 

fund     ""aAdfrT."?^^^"^  ^'''''''     ^^^^^  Pl^okiansa'reexhaustXn 
luiKis— and  the  1  liebans  are  vour  enemies 

"  All  this  is  superfluous.  1  "shall  lie  told. '  We  have  already  rcsolvorJ 
•nianmiously  to  succor  Olynthus.  and  we  will  succor  it  %Ven,lv 
want  you  to  te  1  us  how."'  You  will  be  surpri  cd    pcrj.ans  it  n  v 
answer     Appoint  Komothet*  at  onee.     Do  not  subn^k  o  them  a  v 
proposuious  for  new  laws,  for  you  have  laws  enouS  ah^cadvibu^ 
only  repeal  such  of  the  existing  laws  as  are  hurtfit  at    he,  resent 
;,'!  ."/■'T^'"*''?  ""•''*  '"^'''^  '-"S""!  H'«  Theoric  fund  (Kk  ou 
R>^   ft""^'*'  '""^  *<•'»«  «.hich  bear  on  the  citizens  in  railitary'^^rvice 
By  the  former  you  hand  over  money   which  ono-ht  to  o.n  tA  c^iV 
on  service,  in  Theoric  clistribu.ion^anrong    ho^  wl  o  ftay  at  In  me' 
By  ihe  latter,  you  let  off  without  penalty  those  who  evile service 
and  discourage  those  who  wish  to  do  their  duty      WhervoThav; 

Mil  laij  truths,  then  expect  some  oue  to  come  forward  with  a  formal 
wotion  such  as  you  all  know  t.,  be  required.     But  untiT   ou  do  th^^'s 
expect  no  that  any  one  will  make  these  indispensable  proposition; 
o     vpnr   behalf,  with   the  certainty  of  ruin  at  yoni   ImX    You 
,     "^"''  !"'=^  ?j*"'  «^P«cially  ashe  would  only  inenr    niust  du, 

slS  •    ?"  "^  '""^'^  ".  y"-  """■<-■  fo'-mWable  to  si^ak  out  upon  t  at 

Mibject  in  future,  than  it  is  even  now.     Moreover  the  same  n^n  w  1 

"oposed  these laws^should  also  take  upon  tlem  to  pto  1  e  reiS 

o     tis  no    right  that  these  men  should  continue  to  e^ov  -  Tnn 

U...y  -^'^h'Bwork^ng mischief  to  the  whole  city,  «iulelh'e un^oj^u: 


418 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTIIIAN   WARS. 


AID  SENT  TO   PLUTARCH. 


419 


laritv  of  a  reform  beneficial  to  tis  all.  falls  on  the  head  of  the  reform- 
in  o- mover.  But  while  vou  retain  tliis  prohibition,  you  can  neither 
t.(-)rcrate  that  anvone  amoni,' vnu  sIkiII  Iv  powertul  enouL-h  to  intnnfire 
a  law  with  impunity— nor  expect  that  r..y  one  will  be  fool  enough 
to  run  with  his  eyes'open  into  i)unishment." 

I  lament  that*  my  .space  contlnes  me  to  this  brief  and  meager 
abstract  of  one  of  the  most  splendid  harangues  ever  delivered— the 
third  Olvnthiacof  Demosthenes.  The  partial  advantage  gained  over 
Philip  beino-  prodi^nously  over-rated,  the  Athenians  seemed  to  fancy 
that  thev  had  done'enoiigh,  and  were  receding  from  their  resolution 
to  assist" Olynthus  energetically.  As  on  so  many  other  occasions,  w> 
on  this— Demosthenes  undertook  to  combat  a  prevalent  sentiment 
which  he  deemed  unfounded  and  unseasonable.  With  what  cour- 
ao-e  Avisdom,  and  dexteritv— so  suix-rior  to  the  insulting  sarcasms 
of  Phokiou— <loes  he  execute  this  self-imposed  duty,  well  knowing 

its  unpopularity  1  »   ,      •         • 

Whether  anv  movement  was  made  by  the  Athenians  m  conse 
quencc  of  the  third  Olynlhiac  of  D-.-mosthenes.  we  cannot  determine. 
AVe  have  no  ground  for  believing  the  nlhrmative:  while  we  are  cer- 
tain that  the  specific  me.isure  which  he  recommended— the  sending  of 
an  armament  of  citizens  personally  serving— was  not  at  that  time 
(before  the  end  of  350  B.C.) cnrriid  into  effect.  At  or  befo:^'  the  com- 
mencement of  349  li.c,  the  foreign  rdatii-ns  of  Athens  began  to  be 
disturbed  by   another  supervening   emkirrassment— the   revolt   of 

Eubcea.  ,       t     .i      *  *i      • 

After  the  succes.-ful  exp(  dition  of  SoS  B.C.  whereby  the  Athenians 
had  expelled  theThebans  from  Eubo'a,  that  island  remained  for  some 
years  in  undisturlx^d  connection  with  Athens.  Chalkis,  Eretria.  and 
Oreus,  its  three  principal  cities,  sent  each  a  member  to  the  synod 
of  allies  holding  session  at  Athens,  and  paid  their  annual  quota 
(seemino-ly  five  talents  each)  to  the  confederate  fund.  During  the 
third  quarter  of  352  B.C.,  Mencstratus  the  despot  or  principal  citizen 
of  Eretria  is  cited  as  a  particulnrly  devoted  friend  of  Athens,  ihit 
this  state  of  thinirs  changed  shortlv  after  Philip  cor.quered  Thessaly 
and  made  himseU"  master  of  the  Pagasiean  Gulf  (in  353  and  the  first 
half  of  352  B.C.).  His  power  was  then  established  immediately  over 
a"-ainst  Oreus  and  the  northern  coast  of  Eubu-a,  with  which  island  his 
rteans  of  communication  became  easy  and  fnqiunt.  ]k-foie  the 
date  of  the  first  Philippic  of  Demosthenes  (seemingly  toward  the 
summer  of  351  B.C.)  Philip  had  opened  correspondences  m  EuUra, 
and  had  dispatched  thither  various  letters,  some  of  which  the  orator 
reads  in  the  course  of  that  speech  to  the  Athenian  assembly.  Ihe 
actual  words  of  the  letters  are  not  civen;  but  from  tiie  cntichsm  ot 
the  orator  himself,  we  discern  that  they  were  highly  offensive  to 
Athenian  feehngs;  insti crating  the  Eub(rans  probably  to  sever  theni- 
/ielvcs  from  Athens,  with  off(>rs  of  Macedonian  aid  toward  that 
object.     Philip's  naval  warfare  also  brought  his  cruisers  to  Gera\<lu>» 


in  Euboea,  where  they  captured  several  Athenian  corn -ships;  insultin- 
even  the  opposite  coast  of  Attica  at  Marathon,  so  as  to  lo  ver  S 
reputation  of  Athens  among  her  allies.  Accordingly,  in  eacl  of  e 
Eubcean  ci  les,  parties  were  soon  formed  aiming  at^h^acqufs  lion  of 
ominion  through  the  support  of  Pniiip;  while^r  thesaL  Xose 
detac  iments  of  mercenaries  could  also  be  orocured  across  tl  e  wcS 
ern^LubcBan  strait,  out  of  the  large  numbers  now  under  arms fu 

About  the  beginning  of  349  B.c.-whilethe  war  of  Philip  unknown 
to  us  m  Its  details,  against  the  Olynthians  and  Chalkidian^  w  s  sU 
gouig  on,  with  more  or  ess  of  help  liom  mercenaries  sent  by  AtJien 
-hostilhies  probably  raised  by  the  intri-ues  of  Philip   broke  out  at 
Eretria  mEuba.1.     An  Eretrian  named  Plutarch  (we  do  not  know 
what  had  become  of  Menestratus)  with  a  certain  numl>er  of  soldieH 
his  disposal,  but  opposed  by  enemies  yet  more  powerful   pro  esscti 
to  represent  Athenian  interests  in  his  city,  and  sentto  1  li?nsto^'l 
for  aid.     Demosthenes  suspecting  this  man  to  be  a  ti  dtoi    dKuaded 
conip  lance  with  the  application.     But  Plutarch  had  powc'^fu  Mends 
a   Athens,  .seemingly  among  the  party  of  Eubulus    one  of  whom 
Meidias,  a  violent  personal  enemy  of  Demosthenes,  vhHe  advocatio; 
the  grant  of  aid,  tried  even  to  get  up  a  char-e  ao-ii  i..V  n^.,^..  ?i      ^ 
of  having  himself  fomented  ^^^esJ" U^S^  ^'^^^^^;^ 
reputed  philo-Atheuian  Plutarch       The   Afhonin'r^    .c^  »ffi      i  ; 
mi„.d  to  dispatch  a  force  u.ule.-  PhoIt^Xt^Z^nU^y'^rt^^i 
into  the  island,  somewhat  before  the  time  of  tho  fn^/;,'  .i   \  ^.i     f   • 
(February)  with  a  body,  of  hoplites^'  xTe  cos  \  f  m    .  i'jm   rfrem"' 
(oi  *li!s   ransport  was  iu  part  defrayed   by  v.,Iui.tarv  coutr  lm?S,w 

w'.^Kl'lnakrup  the  dS'JuS  '"""'""^  '"'"  '°  ""'  '"""^ 

fri™"H-''X 'i,m''J'.H/'.'.T'',  ""'  ^'^""'"'^-  ^^'"  »"  apparently 
fou  d  hi  nsd  b!  ,C  ,''  ??'■•;'.'"  ^'"y  »t  ,"'•.  "ear  Eretria,  Pholdou 
-nl     .i.'i  ,   i;'-\'^''-     I^iillias,  an  amb  t bus  leader  of  Clnlkis 

ffinn.   hn  i.  !  P->pecte(I,     (  rossing  the  eminence  named  Ko'vl 

posi  iiC wi's  s™.':;;^ :.■'.  V"^  ";e.-ce„ari..s alo,,,  wi, h'hin,.     PhS, 


420 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTIIIAN   WAUi^. 


derlv  soldiers  deserted;  a  loss  which  Phokion  affected  to  de^Pise-" 
thou-h  he  at  the  same  time  sent  to  Athens  to  make  known  his  (litti- 
cuhiJs  and  press  for  re-enforcemeut.     Meanwhile  he  kept   on  the 
defensive  in  his  camp,  which  the  enemy  marched  up  to  attack     Dis- 
re-ardim;  his  order,  and  actin-  with  a  deliberate  treason  which  was 
ac^unt^  at  Athens  unparalleled-Plutarch  advanced  forward  out 
of  the  camp  to  meet  them;  but  presently  tied,  drawing  along  with  his 
tli.'ht  the  Athenian  horse,  who  had  also  advanced  in  some  disorder. 
PhokioD  with  the  infantry  was  now  in  the  greatest  danger.      \  he 
enemv,  attacking  vigorously,  were  plucking  up  the  palisade   and  ou 
the  point  of  forcing  his  camp.     But  his  measures  were  so  well  taken, 
and  his  hoplites  behaved  with  so  much  intrepidity  and  steadiness  in 
this  trying  emergency,  that  he  repelled  the  assailants  with  loss   Jimi 
cained  a  Complete  victory.     Thallus  and  Kineas  distinguished  them- 
selves by  his  side;   Kleophanes  also  was  conspicuous  in   partially 
rallying  Uie  broken  horsemen;  while  ^schin.s  the  orator  serving 
am^ng  the  hoplites,  was  complimented  for  his  bravery,  and  sent  to 
Athens  to  carry  the  first  news  of  the  victor^^     Phokion  VY'Z\^^l^ 
success,  expelled  Plutarch  from  Eretria.  and  captured  a  stiong  tort 
called  Zaretra,  near  the  narrowest  part  of  the  island.     He  released 
all  his  Greek  captives,  fearing  that  the  Athenians,  i"<^^«^^^ J»/J»^ 
recent  treachery,  should  resolve  upon  treating    hem  with  extreme 
hai-shness.     Kallias  seems  to  have  left  the  island  and  found  shelter 

^'^Th?news  brought  by  .^.schines  (before  the  Dionysiac  festival)  of 
the  victory  of  Tamyn*,' relieved  the  Athenians  from  great  anxiety. 
On  the  former  dispatch  from  Phokion,  the  Senate  had  resolved  to 
send  to  Euboea  another  armament,  including  the  remaining  half  ot 
th"  cavalry,  a  re-enforcement  of  hophtes.  and  a  fresh  squadron  (^f 
iriremes.     But  the  victory  enabled  them  to  dispense  with  any  imme- 
diate re-enforcement,  and  to  celtbrnte  the  Dionysiac  festival  with  chetT- 
fulness.     The  festival  was  on  this  year  of  more  than  usual-notorK  ty. 
Demosthenes,  serving  in  it  as  choregus  for  his  tribe   he  Pa"^l> Ji  n 
was  brutally  insulted,  in  the  theater  and  amid  the  full  pomp  ot  inc 
ceremony,  by  his  enemy  the  wealthy  IVIeidias;  ^^l^^^^^^V^yi^'',^;;  I 
ra-es  struck  him  several  times  with  his  fist  on  the  head      The  ii  su  t 
was  tiie  more  poignant,  because  Meidias  at  this  time  held  the  high 
ottice  of  Hipparch,  or  one  of  the  commanders  of  the  horse.     It  ^^  as 
the  practice  at  Athens  to  convene  a  public  assembly  immediate  j 
after  the  Dionysiac  festival  for  the  special  purpose  of  receiving  noti- 
fications and  hearinor  complaints  about  matters  winch  had  occu  rcci 
at  the  festival  itself.     At  this  special  assembly  I>em«'-  ^^^'^^^^  l^'^" 
ferred  a  complaint  agjtinst  Meidias  for  the  unwarrantable  oiUiagc 
offered,  and  found  warm  sympathy  among  the  i>eop le,  who  P^^^^a  t. 
unanimous  vote  of   censure.     This  procedure  (called  P^obole)       I 
not  by  itself  carry  any  punishment,  but  served  as  a  sort  ot  V^^^^'''' 
cium,  or  finding  of  a  true  bill;  enabhng  Demosthenes  to  quote  tlx 


KEPRO ACHES  AGAINST   DE^IOSTHENES.         421 

public  as  a  witness  to  the  main  fact  of  insult,  and  encourairing  him  to 
pursue  31eidias  before  the  regular  tribunals;  which  h(fdid  a  few 
months  afterw^ard,  but  was  induced  to  accept  from  Meidias  the  self- 
imposed  fine  of  30  minaj  before  the  final  passing  of  sentence  by  the 
Dikasts. 

From  the  dispatches  of  Phokion,  the  treason  of  Plutarch  of  Eretria 
had  becom'j  manifest;  so  that  Demosthenes  gained  credit  for  his  pre- 
vious remarks  on  the  impolicy  of  granting  t1ie  armament:  while  the 
friends  of  Plutarch— Hegesilaus  and  others  of  the  party  of  Eubulus 
—incurred  displeasure;  and  some,  as  it  appears,  were  afterward  tried. 
But  he  was  reproached  by  his  enemies  for  having  been -absent  from 
the  battle  of  Tamyme;  and  a  citizen  named  Euktemou,  at  the  insti- 
gation of  Meidias,  threatened  an  indictment  against  him  for  desertion 
of  his  post.     Whether  Demosthenes  had  actually  gone  over  to  Euba'a 
as  a  hoplite  in  the  army  of  Phokion,  and  obtained  leave  of  absence  to 
come  back  for  the  Dionysia— or  whether  he  did  not  go  at  all— we  are 
unable  to  say      In  eitlier  case,  his  duties  as  choregus  for  this  year 
furnished  a  conclusive  excuse;  so  that  Euktemon,  though  he  formally 
hung  up  before  the  statues  of  the  Eponymous  Heroes  public  prochi- 
nialioii  of  his  intendetl  indictment,  never  thouuhttit  to  take  even  the 
first  step  for  bringing  it  to  actual  trial,  and  incurred  legal  disi^race 
for  such  non  performance  of  his  engagement.    Nevertheless  the  oppro- 
brious and  undeserved  epithet  of  deserter  was  ever  afterward  put 
upon  Demosthenes  by  .Eschines  and  his  other  enemies;  and  Meidias 
even  applied  the  like  vituperation  to  most  of  those  who  took  part  in 
that  assembly  wherein  the  Probole  or  vote  of  censure  against  hini 
had  been  passed.     Not  long  after  th:i  Dionysiac  festival,  however  it 
was  found  necessary  to  send  fresh  troops,  both  horsemen  and  hoplites, 
to  Eubcea;  probably  to  relieve  either  some  or  all  of  those  already  serv- 
ing there     Demosthenes  on  this  occasion  put  on  his  armor  and  served 
as  a  hoplite  in  the  island.     Meidias  also  went  to  Argura  in  Eubcea, 
as  commander  of  th6  horsemen;  yet,  when  the  horsemen  were  sum- 
moued  to  join  the  Athenian  army,  he  did  not  join  along  with  them, 
but  remained  as  trierarch  of  a  trireme  the  outfit  of  which  he  had 
liimself  defrayed.     How  long  the  army  stayed  in  Euboja,  we  do  not 
know.     It  appears  that  Demosthenes  had  returned  to  Athens  by  the 
tune  when  the  annual  Senate  was  chosen  in  the  last  month  of  the 
Attic  year  (Skin  ophorion— June);  having  probably  by  that  time  been 
reiiev'cd.     He  was  named  (by  the  lot)  among  the  Five  Hundred  Sena- 
tors for  the  coming  Attic  year  (beginning  Midsummer  349  B.C.— 
^lymp.  107,  4);  his  old  enemy  M'  idias  in  vain  impui^ning his  qualifi- 
ciiiou  as  he  passed  through  the  Dokiniasy  or  preliminary  examina- 
tion previous  to  entering  oliicc. 

Whiit  the  Athenian  anny  did  farther  in  Euboea,  we  cannot  make 
out.  Phokion  was  recalled— we  do  not  know^  when— and  replaced 
i>y  a  general  named  Molossus;  who  is  said  to  have  managed  the  war 
very  unsuccessfully,  and  even  to  have  been  made  prisoner  himself 


422 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTIIIAN   WAllS. 


APOLLODOKUS  FIX2D. 


423 


by  the  enemy.     Tlie  hostile  parties  in  the  island,  aided  bv  Philip 
were  not  subdued,  nor  was  it  until  the  summer  of  348  li.c.  that  thev 
applied  fm-  peace.     Even   then,  it  appears,  none  was  concluded   so 

•!i   xif-,.  H^'^'f/V"  ^•^''«'»i"t'^l  unfriendly  to  Athens  until  the  i)eace 
with  Philip  in  346  B.C.  ^ 

But  while  the  Athenians  were  thus  tasked  for  the  maintenance  of 
±.ubffa,  they  found  it  necessary  to  undeitake  more  effective  measures 
for  the  relief  of  Olynthus,  and  they  thus  h.-d  upon  their  hands  a^  the 
same  time  the  burden  of  two  wars.     We  know  that    thev  had  to 
provide  force  for  both  Eubcea  and  Olynthus  at  once;  ancl  that  the 
occasion   which  called  for  these   simultaneous   efforts  was    me  of 
stringent  urgency.     The  Oiynthiun  requisition  and  communications 
made  themselyes  so  strongly  felt,  as  to  induce  Athens  to  do,  what 
DemosthtMies  in  his  three  Olynlliiacs  had  vainlv  insisted  on  duriii- 
the  preceding  summer  and  autumn-to  send  thither  a  force  of  nativS 
Athenians,  in  the  first  half  of  349  n  c      Of  the  horsemen  w]'o  had 
gone  from  Athens  to  Euixea  under  Meidin.s  to  serve  under  Phokion 
either  all,  or  a  part,  crossed  by  ,va  from  Eubaa  to  Olvnihus,  during 
that  half-vear      Meidias  did  not  cross  with  them,  but*  came  back  as 
ti-ierarch  m   his  trireme  to  Athens.     Kou-  the  Athenian  horsemen 
were  not  merely  citizens,  but  citizens  of  wealth  and  consequence- 
moreover  the  transport^ of  tliem  by  sea  was  troublesome  as  well  n.s 
costly.     The  sending  of  such  troops  implies  a  strenuous  effort  and 
sense  of  urgency  on  the  part  of  Athens.     AVe  mav  farther  conclude 
that  a  more  numerous  body  of  hoiWiles  were  sent  along  with  the 
horsemen  at  the  same  time;  for  liorsemen  would  hardlv  under  anv 
circumstances  be  sent  across  sea  alone;  besides  which  Olvnthus  stood 
most  in  need  ot  auxiliary  hoplites,  since  her  native  force  con.sisted 
chietly  ot  horsemen  and  peltasts. 

The  evidence  derived  from  the  speech  ngainst  Neiera  beino-  thus 
corroborated  Ly  the  still  better  evidence  of  thespeeoh  a-airst  Akidia^ 
we  are  made  certain  of  the  important  fact,  that  the  tirst  half  of  the 
year  349  B.C.  was  one  in  which  Athens  was  driven  to  great  imblic 
exertions— even  to  armaments  of  native  citizens— for  the  .support  of 
Olynthus   as  well   as  for  the  mffinlenance  of  Euba'a.     What  the 
Athenians  achieved,  indeed,  or  helped  to  achieve,  bv  these  expedi- 
tions to  Oiynthus-or  how  long  they  stayed  there-we  have  no  in- 
lormation      But  we  may  reasonably  presume— thoutih  Philii^  during 
this  year  349  b.c.  probably  conquered  a  certain  number  of  the  thirtN- 
two  Chalkidic  towus-that  the  allied  forces.  Olvnthian,  Chal'Jdic 
and  Athenian,  contended  against  him  with  no  inconsiderable  effect, 
and  threw  back  his  cont^ucst  of  Chalkidike  into  the  followino-  year. 
At  erasumniers  camp-iign  in  that  i.cninsula,  the  Athenian  citizens 
^ould  probably  come  home.     We  learn   that  the  Olvnthiaiis  made 

n  an'^'^T;*'  ^y'»5'^;^«\'^:^"  ^^  i-aiik  named  Derdas,  with  other  Macedo- 
nians attached  to  him. 

So  extraordinary  a  military  effort,  however,  made  by  the  Atheni- 


ans in  the  first  half  of  349  b.c. -to  recover  Eubcea  and  to  protect 
Olynthus  at  once-naturally  placed  them   in   a  state   of   finanda 
embarrassment      Of  this,  one  proof  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact   tLit 
for  some  time  there  Was  not  sufficient  money  to  pay  the  Dikast'eries 
Ayhichaccordimriysat  little;  so  that  few  causes  were  tried  for  some 
tinie-for  how  long  we  do  not  know. 
To  meet  in  part  the  pecuniary  wants  of  the  moment,  a  courageous 

xh'%ZZ'''^^t  ^T  '  1 '  '.^T'  Apollodorus.  He  moved  a  decfee  in 
the  henate,  that  it  should  be  submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  nublic 
assembly,  whether  the  surplus  of  revenue,  over  and  above  the  or(  inarv 
Tl.'emr^^.n'  Pf  ^^^f  tablishment  of  the  city,  should  be  paid  to  the' 
Jncoiic  J^und  for  the  various  relii^ious  festivals— or  should  be 
devoted  to  the  pay,  outtit,  and  transport  of  soldiers  for  the  actual  war 
1  he  Senate  approved  the  motion  of  Apollodorus,  and  adopted  a 
pioboii  euma)  preliminary  resolution  authorizing  him  to  submit  it  to 
the  public  assembly.  Under  such  authority  Apollodorus  made  he 
motion  in  the  assembly,  where  also  he  was  fully  succes.^ilTe 
assembly  (without  a  single  dissentient  voice,  we*  are  told)  passed  a 
decree  enjoining  that  the  surplus  of  revenue  should  nnder  the  ac    a! 

Notn  ithstanding  such  unanimity,  however,  a  citizen  named  Steph- 
anus  impeached  both  the  decree  and  its  mover  on  the  score  of  ilSil- 
:;  U^Zf  ^''T^^^  Paranomon.  Apollodorus  was  brought  before 
the  Dlkaster3^  and  there  found  guilty;  mainly  (accordfno-  to  his 
fnend  and  relative  the  prosecutor  of  Ne.el^.)  through  suborned  wit! 
m^n?  'wi  ^'^^1  '^ll^^^-\li«»«  foreign  to  the  substance^f  the  in^peach- 
ment.     ^^  hen  the  verdict  of  guilty  had  been  pronounced.  Stephauus 

rft(THl!r>nr''T'^-^^'^"r''""^^^  pnnishment  at  the  lanxe  fine  of 
n  4I  T  '  ''^'''''•-,^''  '^'^''^  to  any  supplications  from  the  friends 
of  Apollodorus,  when  they  entreated  him  to  name  a  lower  sum  The 
i^ikasts  however,  more  lenient  than  Stephanus,  wei-e  satisfied  to 
a  op  the  measure  of  fineass(3ssed  by  Apollodorus  upon  himself-oue 
talent— which  he  actually  p.-tid. 

r.  Jn,7^  ??,  ^'''""'^'^  ^'"^ ""  stronger  evidence  both  of  the  urgency  and 

poveiy  of  the  moment,  than  the  fact,  that  both   Senate  and  people 

kMii^f  ni'"'  ^T?f  ''^.^^Vonndnvm.     That  fact  there  is  no  room  for 

ouDtmg.     But  the  additional  statement— tliat  there  was  n(  t  a  sino-le 

dissentient,   and  that   every  one,  both  at  the  time   and    afterward. 

tZ^K,  P'"''"^""^^^^^  the  motion  to  have  been  an   excellent  one- is 

n ou'o!  f  -^  '''"  ^7'^^^^?^'^'"°-     ^'^^  '^   •"  ^^ot  to   be  ima-ined   that   the 

me  tul  party,  who  habitually  resisted  the  diversion  of  money  from 

in    1  leoric  Fund  to  war  purposes,  should  have  been  wholly  si'lent  or 

aaually  concurrent  on   this  occasion,  thoudi  they  may  have  been 

T  v.,1^      •.;      ^    ..  "lotion  of  Apollodorus  was  one  which   could  not  be 

.11    ^y'^'\^"^  distinctly  breaking  the  law,  and  renderimr  the  mover 

.oe   to  those  penal    consequences  which  afterward   "actually  fell 

upon  Uim.     Now,  that  even  a  majority,  both  of  senate  and  assembly, 


424 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTHIAN  WARS. 


SALE  OF  oly:>tiiian  prisoners. 


425 


should  have  overleaped  this  illegality,  is  a  proof  sufficiently  remark- 
able how  strongly  the  crisis  pressed  upon  their  minds. 

The  expedition  of  Athenian  citizens,  sent  to  Olynthus  before  mid- 
gnmnuT  349  B.C.,  would  probably  return  after  acami)aign  of  two  or 
three  months,  and  after   having  rendered   some  service  against  the 
IVIacedonian   army.     Tlie   warlike   operations  of  Philip  against  the 
Chalkidians  and  Olynthians  were  noway  relaxed.     lie  pressed  the 
Chalkidians  more  and  more  closely  tlnoughout  all  the  ensuing  eight- 
een months  (from  midsummer  349  B.C.  to  the  early  spring  of  347  B.C.) 
During  the  year  Olymp.  107.  4,  if  the  citation  from  Philochorus  is  to 
be  trusted,  the  Athenians  dispatched  to  their  aid  three  expeditions; 
one  at  the  request  of  the  Olynthians,  who  sent  envoys  to  pray  for  it 
— consisting  of  2,000  peltasts  under  Chares,  in  thirty  ships  partly 
manned  by  Athenian  seamen.     A  second  went  thither  under  Chari- 
demus,  at  the  earnest  entreaty  of  the  suffering  Chalkidians;  consist- 
ing of  18  triremes,  4,000  peltasts  and  150  horsemen.     Charidemus,  in 
conjunction  with  the  Olynthians.  marched  over Bottiiea  and  the  pen- 
insula of  Pallene,  laying  waste  the  country ;  whether  he  achieved  any 
important  success,  we  do   not  know.     Respecting  both  Chares  and 
Charidemus,  the  anecdotes  descending  to  us  are  of  insolence,  extor- 
tion, and  amorous  indulgences,  rathtM-  than  of  military  exploits.     It 
is  clear  that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  achieved  anything  effec- 
tual against  Philip,  who.«;e  arms  and  corruption  made  terrible  pro- 
gress in  Chalkidike.    So  grieviously  did  the  strength  of  the  Olynthians 
fail,  that  they  transmitted  a  last  and  most  urgent  appeal  to  Athens; 
imploring  the  Athenians  not  to  abandon  them  to  ruin;  but  to  send 
them  a  force  of  citizens  in  addition  to  the  mercenaries  already  there. 
The  Athenians  complied,  dispatcliing  thiiher  17  triremes,  2,000  hop- 
lites,  and  300  horsemen,  all  under  tlie  command  of  Chares. 

To  make  out  anything  of  the  successive  steps  of  this  important 
war  is  impossible;  but  we  discern  that  during  this  latter  portion  of 
the  Olynthian  war,  the  efforts  made  by  Athens  were  considerable. 
Demosthenes  (in  a  speech  six  years  afterward)  affirms  that  the  Athe- 
nians had  sent  to  the  aid  of  Olynthus  4.000  citizens.  10.000  mercena- 
ries, and  50  triremes.  He  represonls  the  Chalkidic  cities  as  having 
been  betrayed  successively  to  Philip  by  corrupt  and  traitorous  ciii 
zens.  That  the  conquest  was  afhieved  greatly  by  the  aid  of  coiri:p- 
tion,  we  cannot  doubt;  but  the  orator's  languriire "carries  no  accurati' 
information.  MekyixM-na  and  Torone  are  said  t.(^  have  Ix-en  among 
the  towns  betrayed  without  resistance.  After  Philip  had  captured 
the  thirtj'-two  Chalkidic  cities,  he  marched  against  Olynthus  itseif, 
with  its  confederate  neighbors — the  Thracian'^Melhone  and  Apollo- 
nia.  In  forcing  the  passage  of  the  river  Sardon.  he  encountered 
such  resistance  that  his  troops  were  at  first  repulsed;  and  lie  was 
himself  obliged  to  seek  safety  by  swimming  back  across  the  river. 
He  was  moreover  wounded  in  the  eye  by  an  Olynthian  archer  named 
Aster,  and  lost  the  sight  of  that  eye  compietely*^  notwithstanding  the 


skill  of  his  Greek  surgeon  Kritobuhis.  On  arriving  within  forty  fur- 
longs of  Olynthus,  he  sent  to  the  inhabitants  a  peremptory  summons, 
intimating  that  either  they  must  evacuate  the  city,  or  he  must  leave 
Macedonia.  Rejecting  this  notice,  they  determined  to  defend  their 
town  to  the  last.  A  considerable  portion  of  the  last  Athenian  citi- 
zen armament  was  still  in  the  town  to  aid  in  the  defense,  so  that 
the  Olynthians  might  reasonably  calculate  that  Athens  would  strain 
every  nerve  to  guard  her  own  citizens  against  captivity.  But  their 
hopes  w^re  disappointed.  How  long  the  siege  lasted — or  whether 
there  was  time  for  Athens  to  send  further  re-enforcement^flve  cannot 
say.  The  Olynthians  are  said  to  have  repulsed  several  assaults  of 
Philip  with  loss;  but  according  to  Demosthenes,  the  philipizing 
party,  headed  by  the  venal  Euthykrates  and  Lasthenes,  brought 
about  the  banishment  of  their  chief  opponent  Appollonides,  nullilied 
all  measures  for  d^iergetic  defense,  and  treasonably  surrendered  the 
city.  Two  defeats  were  sustained  near  its  walls,  and  one  of  the  gen- 
erals of  this  party,  having  500  cavalry  under  his  command,  betrayed 
them  designedly  into  the  hands  of  the  invader.  Olynthus,  with  all 
its  inhabitants  and  property,  at  length  fell  into  the  hands  of  Philip, 
llis  mastery  of  the  Chalkidic  peninsula  thus  became  complete— to- 
ward the  end  of  winter  348-347  B.C. 

Miserable  was  the  ruin  which  fell  upon  this  flourishing  peninsula. 
The  persons  of  the  Olynthians — men,  women,  and  children — were 
sold  into  slavery.  The  wealth  of  the  city  gave  to  Philip  the  means 
of  recompensing  his  soldiers  for  the  toils  of  the  war;  the  city  itself 
he  is  said  to  have  destroyed  together  with  Apollonio,  Methone,  Sta- 
geira,  etc.— in  all,  thirty  two  Chalkidic  cities.  Demosthenes,  speak- 
ing about  live  years  afterward,  says  that  they  were  so  thoroughly 
and  cruelly  ruined  as  to  leave  their  very  sites  scarcely  discernible, 
flaking  every  allowance  for  exaggeration,  we  may  fairly  believe, 
that  they  were  dismantled  and  bereft  of  all  citizen  proprietors;  that; 
the  buildings  and  visible  marks  of  Hellenic  city-life  were  broken  up 
or  left  to  decay;  that  the  remaining  houses,  as  well  as  the  villatres 
around,  were  tenanted  by  dependent  cultivators  or  slaves — now 
working  for  the  benefit  of  new  Macedonian  proprietors,  in  great  part 
non-resident,  and  probably  of  favored  Grecian  grantees  also. 
Though  various  Greeks  thus  received  their  lecompense  for  services 
rendered  to  Philip,  yet  Demosthenes  affirms  that  Euthykrates  and 
Lasthenes,  the  traitors  w^ho  had  sold  Olynthus,  were  not  among  the 
number;  or  at  least  that  not  long  afterward  they  were  dismissed 
v/ith  dishonor  and  contempt. 

In  this  Olynthian  war— minous  to  the  Chalkidic  Greeks,  terrific 
to  all  other  Greeks,  and  doubling  the  power  of  Philip— Athens  too 
must  have  incurred  a  serious  amount  of  expense.  We  find  it  stated 
loosely,  that  in  her  entire  war  against  Philip  from  the  time  of  his 
capture  of  Amphipolis  in  358-357  B.C.  down  to  the  peace  of  346  B.C. 
or  shortly  afterward,  she  had  exixiuded  not  less  than  1500  talents. 


426 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTIIIAN   WARS. 


Od  these  conipnlatious  uo  great  stress  is  lobe  laid;  but  we  may  well 
believe  that  her  outlay  was  considerable.  In  spite  of  all  reluctance 
she  was  obliged  lo  do  something:  what  she  did  was  both  too  little, 
too  intermittent,  and  done  behind-time,  so  as  to  produce  no  satisfac- 
tory result;  but  nevertheless  the  aggregate  cost,  in  a  series  of  years, 
was  a  large  one.  During  the  latter  portion  of  the  Olvnthian  war,  as 
faraswa'cnn  judge,  she  really  seems  to  have  made"  efforts,  though 
she  had  done  little  in  the  beginning.  We  may  presume  that  the  cost 
must  have  been  defrayed,  in  i)art  at  le:ist,  by  a  direct  property  tax: 
for  the  ^ndemnation  of  Apollodorus  put  an  end  to  the  proposition 
of  taking  from  the  Theoric  Fund.  Means  may  ;dso  have  been  found 
of  economizing  from  the  other  expenses  of  the  state. 

Though  the  appropriation  of  the  Theoric  Fund  to  other  purposes 
continued  lo  be  thus  interdicted  to  any  formal^motion,  yet  in  the 
wav  of  suggestion  and  insinuation  it  was  from  time  to  time  glanced 
at  hy  Demosthenes  and  others.  And  whenever  money  was  wanted 
for  war,  the  (question  whether  it  should  be  taken  from  this  source  or 
from  direct  property  tax,  was  indirectly  revivt  d.  The  appropriation 
of  the  Theoric  Fund,  however,  remained  unchanued  until  the  very 
eve  of  the  battle  of  Cliajroneia.  Ju.st  before  that  Dies  Ira?,  when 
Philip  was  actually  fortifying  Elateia,  the  fund  was  made  applicable 
to  War  purposes;  the  views  of  Demosthenes  were  realized  twelve 
years  after  he  had  begun  to  enforce  them. 

This  question  about  the  Theoric  expenditure  is  rarely  presented  by 
modern  authors  in  the  real  way  that  it  affected  the  Athenian  mind'. 
It  has  been  sometimes  treated  as  a  sort  of  alms  giving  to  the  poor— 
and  sometimes  as  an  expenditure  by  the  Athenians  upon  their  pleas- 
ures. Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  gives  a  full  or  correct  view  of 
the  case;  each  only  brings  out  a  jnirt  ot'the  truth. 

Doubtless,  the  Athenian  democracy  cared  much  for  the  pleasures 
of  the  citizens.  It  provided  for  them  "the  largest  amount  of  retined 
and  imaginative  pleasures  ever  tasted  by  any  community  known  to 
history;  pleasures  essentially  social  and  inullftudinous,  at'laching  the 
citizens  to  each  other,  rich  and  poor,  by  the  strong  tie  of  community 
of  enjoyment. 

But  pleasure,  though  an  usual  accessory,  was  not  the  primary  idea 
or  predominant  purpose  of  the  Theoric  exjienditure.  That  expendi- 
ture was  essentially  religious  m  its  character,  incurred  only  for  vari- 
ous festivals,  and  devoted  exclusively  to  the  honor  of  the  gods.  The 
ancient  religion,  not  simply  at  Athens,  but  throughout  Greece  and 
the  contemporary  world— very  different  in  this  respect  from  the 
modern— included  within  itself  and  its  manifestations  nearly  the 
whole  range  of  social  pleasures.  Now  the  Theoric  Fund  was  essen 
tially  the  Church  Fund  at  Athens;  that  upon  which  were  charged 
all  the  expenses  incurred  by  the  state  in  the  festivals  and  the  worship 
of  the  gods.  The  Diobely*  or  distribution  of  two  oboli  to  each  pres- 
ent citizen,  was  one  part  of  thi^  expenditure,  i^'ivt'ii  in  order  lo  injure 


THEORIC  FUND. 


427 


that  every  citizen  should  have  the  opportunity  of  attending  the  festi- 
val, and  doing  honor  to  the  god;  never  given  to  any  one  who  was 
out  of  Attica — because,  of  course,  he  could  not  attend — but  given  to 
all  alike  within  the  country,  rich  or  poor.  It  was  essential  to  that 
universal  communion  which  formed  a  prominent  feature  of  the  festi- 
val, not  less  in  regard  to  the  gods  than  in  regard  to  the  city;  but  it 
was  only  one  portion  of  the  total  disbursements  covered  by  the 
Theoric  Fund.  To  this  general  religious  fund  it  was  provided  by 
law  that  the  surplus  of  ordinary  revenue  should  be  paid  over,  after 
ail  the  cost  of  the  peace  establishmenl  had  been  defrayed.  There 
was  no  appropriation  more  thoroughly  coming  home  to  (he  common 
sentiment,  more  conducive  as  a  binding  force  to  the  unity  of  the  city, 
or  more  productive  of  satisfaction  to  each  individual  citizen. 

We  neither  know  the  amount  of  the  Theoric  Fund,  nor  of  the  dis- 
tributions connected  with  it.  AVe  cannot,  therefore,  say  what  pro- 
portion it  formed  of  the  whole  peace-expenditure— itself  unknown 
also.  But  we  cannot  doubt  th  it  it  was  large.  To  be  sparing  of 
expenditure  in  manifestations  for  the  honor  of  the  gods,  was 
accounted  the  reverse  of  virtue  by  Greeks  generally;  and  the  Athe- 
nians especially,  whose  eyes  were  everyday  contemplating  the  glories 
of  their  acropolis,  would  learn  a  different  lesson;  moreover,  magniti- 
cent  religious  display  was  believed  to  conciliate  the  protection  and 
favor  of  the  gods.  We  may  affirm,  however,  upon  the  strongest  pre- 
sumptions, that  this  religious  expenditure  did  not  absorb  any  funds 
required  for  the  other  branches  of  a  peace  establishment.  Neither 
naval,  nor  military,  n(»r  administrative  exigences,  were  starved  in 
order  to  augment  the  Theoric  surplus.  Eubulus  was  distinguished 
for  his  excellent  keeping  of  the  docks  and  arsenals,  and  for  his  care 
in  replacing  the  decayed  triremes  by  new  ones.  And  after  all 
the  wants  of  a  wTll-mounted  peace-establi>:hment  Avere  satisfied,  no 
Athenian  had  scruple  in  appropriating  what  remained  under  the 
conspiring  impulses  of  piety,  pleasure,  and  social  brotherhood. 

It  is  true  that  the  Athenians  might  have  laid  up  that  surplus 
annually  in  the  acropolis,  to  form  an  accumulating  war  fund.  Such 
provision  ha.d  been  made  half  a  century  before  under  the  full  energy 
and  imperial  power  of  Athens — when  she  had  a  larger  revenue,  Avlth 
numerous  tribute-paying  allies — and  when  Perikles  piesided  over  her 
councils.  It  might  have  been  belter  if  she  had  done  something  of 
the  same  kind  in  the  age  after  the  Peloponnesian  war.  Perhaps  if 
men  like  Perikles,  or  even  like  Demosthenes,  had  enjoyed  marked 
ascendency,  she  would  have  been  advised  and  prevaileel  on  to  con- 
tinue such  a  precaution.  But  before  we  can  measure  the  extent  of 
improvidence  with  which  Athens  is  here  fairly  chargeable,  w^e  ought 
to  know  what  was  the  sum  thus  expended  on  the  festivals.  What 
amount  of  money  could  have  been  stored  up  for  the  contingency  of 
war,  even  if  all  the  festivals  and  all  the  distributions  had  been  sup- 
pressed?   How  far  would  it  have  been  possible,  in  any  other  case 


428 


EUBOIC  AND  OLYNTHIAN  WARS 


than  that  of  obvious  present  necessity,  to  carry  economy  into  the 
festival-expenditure— truly  denominat'ji  by  Deniades  the  cement  of 
the  political  system— witliout  impairinir  in  the  bosom  of  each  indi- 
vidual, that  sentiment  of  communiou,  religious,  social,  and  initriotic, 
which  made  the  Athenians  a  City,  and  not  a  simple  multiplication 
of  units?  These  are  points  on  which  we  ouijht  to  have  niformation. 
before  we  can  fairly  .graduate  our  censure  uj^on  Athens  for  not  con- 
verting her  Tlieoric  Fund  into  an  accumulated  cnpital  to  meet  the 
contingency  of  war.  We  ought  also  to  ask,  as  matter  for  impartial 
comparison,  how  many  governments,  ancient  or  modern,  have  ever 
thought  it  requisite  to  lay  up  during:  peace  a  stock  of  money  available 
for  war? 

The  Athenian  peace-establishment  maintained  more  ships  of  war, 
larger  docks,  and   better-stored  arsenals,  than  any  city  in  Greece, 
besides  expending  forty  talents  aimually  upon  the  Horsemen  of  the 
state,  and  doubtless  something  farther  (though  we  know  not  how 
much)  upon  the  other  descriptions  of  military  "force.     All  this,  let  it 
be  observed,   and   the  TheoriL^   expenditure*^  besides,  was  defrayed 
without  direct  taxation,  which  was  reserved  for  the  extraordinary 
cost  incident  to  a  state  of  war,  and  was  held  to  be  suflicient  to  meet 
it,  without  any  accumulated  war-fund.    When  the  war  against  Philip 
became  serious,  the  proprietary  classes  at  Athens,  those  included  in 
the  schedule  of  assessment,  were  called  upon  to  defray  the  expense 
by  a  direct  tax,  from  which  they  had  been  (piite  free  in  time  of 
peace.    They  tried  to  evade  this  burden  by  requiring  that  the  festival- 
fund  should  be  appropriated  instead;  thus  menacing  what  was  dear- 
est  to  the   feelings  of  the  majority  of  the  citizens.     The  ground 
which  they  took  was  the  same  in  principle,  as  if  the  proprietors  in 
France  or  BelLiium  claimed  to  exempt  themselves  from  direct  taxa- 
tion for  the  cost  of  a  war,  by  first  taking  either  all  or  half  of  the 
annual  sum  voted  out  of  the  budget  for  the  maintenance  of  religion. 
1\  e  may  judge  how  strong  a  feeling  would  be  raised  among  the 
Athenian  public  generally,  by  the  proposal   of  impoveiisliing  the 
festival  expenditure  in  order  to  save  a  propertv-tax.    Doubtless^  after 
the  proprietary  class  had  borne  a  certain  bunk'n  of  direct  taxation, 
their  complaints  would  become  legitimate.     The  cost  of  the  festivals 
could  not  be  kept  up  mulimini'shed,  under  severe  and  continued 
pressure  of  war.    As  a  second  and  subsidiarv  resource,  it  would 
become  essential  to  ai)ply  the  whole  or  a  part  of  the  fund  in  allevia 
tion  of  the  burdens  of  the  war.     But  even  if  all  had  been  so  api)lied, 
the  fund  could  not  have  been  large  enough  to  dispense  with  the 
necessity  of  a  property -tax  besiues. 

^  We  see  this  conflict  of  interests— between  direct  taxation  on  one 
side  and  the  festival-fund  on  the  other,  as  a  means  of  paying  for  war 
—running  through  the  Demosthenic  orations,  and  especially  marked 
in  the  fourth  Philippic.  Unhappily  the  conllict  served  as  an  excuse 
to  both  parties,  for  throwing  the  blame  on  each  other,  and  starving 


APPENDIX. 


429 


the  war;  as  well  as  for  giving  effect  to  the  repugnance,  shared  by 
both  rich  and  poor,  against  personal  military  service  abroad.   Demos- 
thenes sides  with  neither— tries  to  mediate  between  them— and  calls 
for  patriotic  sacrifice  from  both  alike.     Having  before  him  an  active 
and  living  enemy,  with  the  liberties  of  Greece  as  well  as  of  Athens 
at  stake— he  urges  every  species  of  sacrifice  at  once;  personal  service, 
direct  tax-payments,  abnegation  of  the  festivals.     Sometimes  the  one 
demand  stands  most  prominent,  sometimes  the  other;  but  oftenest  of 
all    comes  his  appeal   for  personal  service.     Under  such  military 
necessities   in  fact,  the  Theoric  expenditure  became  mischievous, 
not  mc-ely  because  it  absorbed  the  public  money,  but  also  because  it 
chained  the  citizens  to  their  home  and  disinclined  them  to  active 
service  abroad.     The  great  charm  and  body  of  sentiment  connected 
with  the  festival,  essentially  connected  as  it  was  with  presence  in 
Attica,  operated  as  a  bane;  at  an  exigency  when  one-third  or  one- 
fourth  of  the  citizens  ought  to  have  been  doing  hard  duty  as  soldiers 
on  the  coasts  of  Macedonia  or  Thrace,  against  an  enemy  who  nevex 
slept    Unfortunately  for  the  Athenians,  they  could  not  be  convinced, 
bv  air  the  patriotic  eloquence  of  Demosthenes,  that  the  festivals 
which  fed  their  piety  and  brightened  their  home-existence  during 
ptiace    were   unmaintainable  during  such  a  war,  and  must  be  re- 
nounced for  a  time,  if  the  liberty  and  security  of  Athens  were  to  be 
preserved.     The  same  want  of  energy  which  made  them  shrink  from 
the  hardship  of  personal  service,  also  rendered  them  indisposed  to  so 
great  a  sacrifice  as  that  of  their  festivals;  nor,  indeed,  would  it  have 
availed  them  to  spare  all  the  cost  of  their  festivals,  had  their  remiss- 
ness as  soldiers  still  continued.     Nothing  less  could  have  saved  theni 
than  simultaneous  compliance  with  all  the  three  requishions  urged 
by  Demosthenes  in  350  B.C. ;  which  compliance  ultimately  came,  but 
came  too  late,  in  339-338  B.C. 


APPENDIX. 

ON   THE   ORDEF   OF  THE   OLYNTHIAC   ORATIONS  OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

Respecting  the  tnie  chronological  order  of  these  three  harangues,  dissentient 
opinions  have  been  transmitted  from  ancient  times,  and  still  contmue  among 

Dionysius  of  ■  Halikarnassus  cites  the  three  speeches  by  their  initial  words 
but  places  them  in  a  different  chronological  order  from  that  in  whinh  they  stand 
edited.    He  gives  the  second  as  being  first  in  the  series;  the  third,  as  second ; 

^'it  will  b? understood  that  I  always  speak  of  and  describe  these  speeches  by 
the  order  in  which  they  stand  edited,  tliough,  as  far  as  I  can  judge,  that  order 
is  not  the  true  one.  ,,     ^jj 

Edited  order ' J-    ,fj-    ^^\- 

Order  of  Dionysius    *^"    ^^^*       . 

The  greater  number  of  modern  critics  defend  the  edited  order,  the  mam  argu- 


430 


APPENDIX. 


ments  for  which  have  been  ably  stated  in  a  dissertation  ]niblislied  bv  Petreiiz  in 
l^a.  Dindorf,  in  his  edition  of  DemoHtlienes.  j.laces  this  disseitation  in  front 
of  his  notes  to  the  Olyutliiacs,  aflfiniung  that  it  is  conclusive  and  sets  tiie  ques- 
tion at  rest.  Bolmecke  also  (Forschungen,  page  151)  treats  the  question  as  no 
longer  open  to  doubt. 

On  the  other  hand,  Flathe  (Geschichte  Makedoniena,  p.  183-87)  expresses 
himself  with  equal  confidence  in  favor  of  the  order  stated  by  Dionvsius.  A 
much  higher  authority.  Dr.  Thirlwall,  agrees  in  the  same  opinion,  though  with 
less  confidence,  and  with  a  juster  appreciation  of  our  inadequate  means  for 
settling  the  question.  See  the  Appendix  iii.  to  the  fifth  volume  of  his  History 
of  Greece,  p.  .512. 

Though  1  have  not  come  to  the  same  conclusion  as  Dr.  Thirlwall,  I  agree  with 
him  that  unqualified  confidence  in  any  conclusion  as  to  the  order  of  the.se 
harangues  is  unsuitable  and  not  warranted  by  the  amount  of  evidence.  We 
have  nothing  to  proceed  upon  except  the  intenial  evidence  of  the  speeches, 
taken  in  conjunction  with  the  contemporaneous  history,  of  which  we  know  little 
or  nothing  from  information  in  detail. 

On  the  best  judgment  that  I  can  form.  I  cannot  adopt  wholly  either  the  edited 
order  or  that  of  Dionysius.  thougli  agreeing  in  part  with  both.  1  concur  with 
Dionysius  and  Dr.  Thirlwall  in  placing  tlie  second  Olvnthiac;?/-*/  of  the  three.  I 
concur  with  the  edited  order  in  placing  the  third  last.  I  observe,  in  Dr.  Thirl- 
wall's  Appendix,  that  this  arrangement  has  been  vindicated  in  a  dissertation 
by  Stueve.  I  have  not  seen  this  fli.ssertation.  and  my  own  conclusion  was  de- 
duced—even before  I  knew  that  it  had  ever  been  advocated  else wjiere— only 
from  an  attentive  study  of  the  speeches. 

Edited  order I,      n.    III. 

Order  of  Dionysius H.    m.       i[ 

Orderof  Stueve  (which  I  think  the  most  probable) II.        I.    III!' 

To  consider  first  the  proper  i)lace  of  the  semnd  Olvnthiac  (I  mean  that  which 
stands  aecond  in  the  edited  order). 

The  most  i-emarkable  characteristic  of  this  oration  is  that  scarcely  anvthing 
is  said  in  it  about  Olj-nthus.  It  is.  in  fact,  a  Philippic  rather  tlian  anOlvnthiac. 
This  characteristic  is  not  merely  admitted,  but  strongly  put  forward,  by  Petrenz, 
p.  11— "Quid  :  quod  ipsorum  Oljnithioruni  hac  quidem  in  causa  tantmn  uno  loco 
facta  mentio  est— ut  uno  illo  versiculo  sublato.  vix  ex  ipsa  oratione.  qua  in  cau.'sa 
esset  habita,  certis  rationibus  evinci  posset."  How  are  we  to  explahi  the  ab- 
sence of  all  reference  to  Olynthus!-  According  to  Peti-enz.  it  is  because  the 
orator  had  already,  in  his  former  harangue,  said  all  tliat  could  be  nece.ssary 
in  respect  to  the  wants  of  Olynthus,  and  the  necessity  of  upholding  that  city 
even  for  the  safety  of  Athens:  he  might  now.  therefore,  calculate  that  his  first 
discourse  remained  impre.ssed  on  his  countiymen.  'nd  tliat  all  that  was  required 
was  to  combat  the  extraordinary  fear  of  Philip  which  hindered  them  from  giv- 
ing effect  to  a  resolution  already  taken  to  assist  the  Olynthians. 

In  this  liypothesis  I  ani  unable  to  acquiesce.  It  may  appear  natural  to  a 
reader  of  Demosthenes  who  pa.s.sesfrom  the  first  pihited  di.sc<«ir.se  to  the  second 
without  any  intervening  time  to  forget  what  lie  lias  just  read.  But  it  will  hardlv 
fit  the  case  of  a  real  speaker  in  busy  Athens.  Neither  Demosthenes  in  the  tiuctii- 
ating  Achenian  as.seinbly,  nor  even  any  oi  ator  in  the  more  fixed  English  Par- 
liament or  x\.merican  Congress,  could  'be  rash  enough  to  calculate  that  a  dis- 
course deUvered  some  time  before  had  remained  engraven  on  the  minds  of  his 
audience.  If  Demosthenes  had  previouslv  addressed  the  Athenians  with  so 
strong  a  conviction  of  the  distress  of  Olynthus.  and  of  the  motives  for  Athens  to 
assist  Olynthus.  as  is  embodied  in  the  first  discourse— if  his  speech,  however 
well  received,  was  not  acted  upon,  so  that  in  the  course  of  a  certain  time  he  had 
to  address  them  again  for  the  same  purpose— I  cannot  believe  that  he  would 
allude  to. Olynthus  only  onCe  by  the  by,  and  that  he  woidd  merely  dilate  upon 
the  general  chances  and  conditions  of  the  war  between  Athens  and  Philip. 
However  well  calculated  the  second  Olynthiac  may  be  "ad  concitandos  exacer- 
bandos<^ue  civium  anunos"  (to  use  the  w<uds  of'Petrenz).  it  is  not  peculiarly 
calculated  to  procure  aid  to  Olynthus.  If  the  orator  hafl  failed  to  procure  such 
aid  by  a  di^courstt  hke  the  first  Olynthiac,  he  woidd  never  resort  to  a  discourse 


OHDEU    OY   THE   OLYlNniUACS. 


431 


like  the  second  Olvnthiac  to  make  good  the  deficiency:  he  would  repeat  anev^ 
ami  more  impressively  than  before,  the  danger  of  Olynthus,  and  the  danger  to 
A  ens  berseft  if  she  suffered  Olynthus  to  fall.  This  would  V)e  the  way  to  accotn- 
pli!^h"iis  object,  and  at  the  same  tune  to  combat  the  fear  of  Philip  m  the  nunds 

*'^\cconling 'to  my  view  of  the  .subject,  the  omission  (or  mere  single  passing 
nodct"  of  Olynthus  clearly  shows  that  the  wants  of  that  city,  and  the  urgency  of 
S-i^^ting  it  were  not  the"  main  di'ift  of  Demostlienes  in  the  second  Olyntniac 
His  main  drift  is  to  encourage  and  stimulate  his  countrjmeu  in  then-  general 
war  aSiinst  Phihp,  taking  in,  thankfully,  the  new  aUy  Olynthus,  whoin  thej-  1mA  e 
intt  acauired  but  taking  her  in  only  as  a  valuable  auxiliary  (ev  Trpo(70T,KT,s  jttpei) 
?    coSate\S  against  Philip  as  well  as  to  receive  aid  from  Athens 

not  presenting  her  either  as  j.eculiarly  needing  succor,  or  as  likely,  it  allowed  to 
nerish.  to  expose  the  vitals  of  Athens.  „„  ^^i 

^  \  V  a  speech  of  this  character  is  what  I  cannot  satisfactonly  explain,  as  fol- 
low -af  ten  the  totally  different  spirit  of  the  first  Olynthiac;  but  it  is  natuivU 
a,^l  explicable,  if  we  suppose  it  to  precede  the  first  Olynthiac.  plj'nthus  does 
n  a^3prwh  Athens  at  first  in  forma  pauperis,  as  if  she  were  m  danpr  and 
rem  ring  aid  against  an  overwhelming  enemy.  She  presents  herself  as  an 
equal  offering  to  co-operate  against  a  common  enemy,  and  tendering  an  alliance 
which  the  \tl  enians  had  hitherto  sought  in  vain.  She  will,  of  course,  want  aid 
biS^e  can  ^ve  co-operation  of  equal  value..  Demosthenes  advises  to  a^si^J 
her-this  conies  of  coSrse,  when  her  alliance  is  accepted:  but  he  dwells  more 
fmxnblv  upon  the  value  of  what  she  will  ijivr  to  the  Athenians,  in  the  way  of 
CO  opera  ifjii  against  Philip.  Nay.  it  is  remarkable  that  the^  territorial  vicinity 
of  O  vntl  is  to  Philip  is  exhibited,  not  as  a  peril  to  her  which  the  Athenians 
mnVt  ass  St  her  in  averting,  but  as  a  godsend  to  enable  them  the  better  to  attack 
?i  n  p  if  con^i  ctlin  witi;  her.  Moreover,  Olynthus  is  represented,  not  as  ap- 
m-e  ?n  n-  any  danger  from  Philip's  arms,  but  as  having  recently  discoN-ered 
Erica  Serous  itif  to  be  in  alliance  with  hiin.  Let  us  thank  the  god.s  (says 
Demosthenes  at  the  opening  of  the  seco.id  Olpithiac).  rb  to.^  TroAeMWovra? 

aTirro^V,    tV    vnep    rov   TroAe/xou   yvi^ixr,u   TOtavTrju   exofra<;,    w<7t«    ra?    Trpo?     eKecpou 
«.aAAay<i?,  Trpwroi'  fJih'   imarov^,  elra  t^?   kavroiu   TrarptSo?   I'O^i^et./  aracrraaiv   ct^ai, 

The  general  tenor  of  the  second  Olynthiac  Is  in  harmony  with  this  open^n^- 
Demosthenes  looks  forward  to  a  vigorous  aggressive  war  earned  on  bj  Athens 
and  Olynthus  iointly  against  Philip,  and  he  enters  at  large  into  the  general 
c lanS  of  such  war,  nT.ticing  the  vulnerable  as  well  as  tlie  odious  points  of 
Philip!and  strtvMngV^  I'^trenz  justly  remarks)  to  "excite  and  exasperate  the 

"'s;fch''fsXfirst'^b^^^^  promise  of  the  Olynthian  alliance  ^^^th  Athens.  But 
Athens  as  usual  makis  no  exertions,  leaving  the  Olynthians  and  Chalkidians 
to  cSntend  against  Philip  by  themselves.  It  is  presently  found  that  he  gains 
advantages  S^?;  them :  bkd  news  come  from  Thrace,  and  probablj-  complaining 
envovs  to  announce  them.  It  is  then  that  Demosthenes  delu;ers  his  first  01}  n- 
thi^c  lo  mu  "h  more  urgent  in  its  tone  respecting  Olynthus..  The  main  topic  is 
now-" Protect  the  Olynthians;  save  theiV  confederate  cities;  think  what^wiU 
happen  if  they  are  ruiied:  the^e  is  nothing  to  hinder  Philip  in  that  case  from 
inS"ng  into  Attica."    The  views  of  Demosthenes  have  changed  from  the 

''fS£;^c^:\^SS^^^ef^^  that  all  the  internal  evidence  of  the  O^^^nthi-^ 

S^^ll^eli^l^^SvlJlE^^^UJ^^f^ 

cmiclus  Sn  Notldng  is  said  in  the  second  Olynthiac  about  meddling  with  the 
TheorirFund  vh^^^^^^  the  first,  that  subject  is  distinctly  adverted  to-and 
in  the  third  forcibly  and  rei-eatedlv  pressed  though  with  sufficient  artifice  to 
save  the  llegahty  This  is  difficult  to  explain,  assuming  the  second  to  be  pos- 
ter iV  to  the  fiJst:^  but  nowav  diflicult,  if  we  suppose  the  second  lo  be  the  earhest 

of  ;i/e  tliree,  and  to  be  delivered  with  the  PV^VP^^f^^^'l^Aij^il  ^f  i:,PStifthe  t^^ 
On  the  other  hand,  this  manner  of  handhng  the  Theoric  Fmid  m  the  tniiq 


482 


TERMINATION   OF  THE  SACHED   WAH. 


OLYNTHIANS   AND  CIIALKIDIANS. 


433 


S'?:^^nte'nTsrSI^t^^^  ^or  believing  (.s  Petren. 

sius  places  it  posterior  to  the  first,  and  not  prior,  as  Diony- 

in^L'aSSmenM^l^f?^^^^^^^^  -PP--r  to  me  correctly  stated 

some  su^-or  to  Olyntln  s  VhireS^  both  t^^^^  ^t'?^"«  ^^'^  ^*^"t 

before  anything  at  aU  had  3  et  b^en  dJnP  T  Sinl"!^^^  second  were  spoken 
following  Libanius  (as  Petrenz  anH  nth2r«  h^^  -^^x^  there  is  good  ground  for 
oration  Recognizes  Athens  as  havlSdnn.^^  '".^"^  statement  that  the  third 

importance.    He  wishes  t?strffirP^?h/i.o^^        ^^  ^^'°^?  ^^  ^^  "«  serious 

terior  in  time.    His  argfiment  is  naSv  fonn^^^^^^  ^"^  '^^^"^  ^^**  "  ^^  pos- 

Sinning  ot  the  first  Olvn  Sic  whe^rtiniheTfHt^^  sentence  near  the  be- 

as  involved -T<i^  npayJr^y^aluVIln;.',^  ^^. -^'^(^^[S  herself  IS  mentioned 

universally  admitted  Dindorf  in  his  eXt^n  rSLf?  '.*^^^"^^  avTa,v  is  not 
irpayfidTu^ir.  and  Statin?  in  his  noli  thnf      •     -      -^^u    '"^ '',*-»'•   referring  it  to 

Wchanged  by  Reis"lfe  TntoaTrV^on  ^hV Zhorik^  J fSl^c^  f  '""^  ^^^^^^^^ 
But  even  if  we  grant  that  the  fiiNroivnth?«^  Hm.;S^  ?i,^  *-^?  ^^^^^  Bavaricus. 
ous  and  urgent  than  the*  thh^d   we  cannotTn?^^^^^^^^  '".^'^  ^^^'^^''- 

third.  The  third  was  delivered  imniedl-itHiv  «ffL  ntl^^  ^'?'  '^l  posterior  to  the 
Olynthus:  Oh-nthian  affaii^  d  d  rea"v  d^^^^^^^  received  of  success  near 

extent-though  the  amounrof  pro  "per^trwlfie^^  ^^'•^f.'^ 

Demosthenes  sets  himself  to  combat  thi^^aJ,^^r:l-,-^^^^^^  by  the  public, 
he  can  over  the  recent  ecKJdne^^hnJh^  o^\Ft*''^*^'*??'  f  ^^''^^^  ^'^«  ^'^li^ly  as 
them,  and  throwing  ?he^S^gerof  OWnthusX^^^^^^  something  for 

tingency.  At  the  ^me  time  he  static  Tf  n  fi.t  .  ^^?  ^"*^  ^^^^  distinct  con- 
and  sections  9.  10  ^'^  '^  ""  ^^^  strongest  manner,  both  section  2 

Without  being  insensible,  therefore  to  thp  faiiiKn.>T^  «f  «ii 
upon  such  imperfect  evidence  I  think  that  thltl^.     ^  ^  *,"  opinions  founded 
Olynthiac8  is  that  proposed  bv  Stue\ e  11    I    III     wSh  ni^i^^-^^'r'^''^^^  «^  '^^ 
as  to  put  the  second  Olynthiai  first  and  with  t ho  ;li   Dionysius  I  agree  so  far 
third  Olynthiac  last  '^'•^"'''^^  ^^^^  and  with  the  common  order  in  putting  the 


CHAPTER  LXXXIX. 

FROM    THE   CAPTrRE    OF   OLYNTHUS   TO    THE    TERMINATION   OP   THE 

SACRED   WAR  BY  PHILIP. 

It  was  dnrinir  the  early  sprina:  of  347  r.c    as  far  as  we  rnn  mnVo 
oijt,  that  Olynthus.  after'haiin.^revionslv  seen  1 1  e  thirty  ChalSc 

rl^  iiT-^-  ^'''^''  ^"'    l^overty  became  the  lot  of  such  Olvnlhians  ai  f] 
Chalkidians  as  could  make  their  escape;  while  the  ^realer  m  X 
both  sexes  were  sold  into  slavery.     A  few  painful  traces  present 


ki 


themselves  of  the  diversities  of  suffering  which  befell  these  unhappy 
victims.  Atreslidas,  an  Arcadian  who  had  probably  served  in  the 
Macedonian  army,  received  from  Philip  a  grant  of  thirty  Olynthian 
slaves,  chiefly  women  and  children,  who  were  seen  following  him  in 
a  string,  as  he  traveled  homeward  through  the  Grecian  cities.  Many 
young  Olynthian  women  were  bought  for  the  purpose  of  having 
their°persons  turned  to  account  by  their  new  proprietors.  Of  these 
purchasers,  one,  an  Athenian  citizen  who  had  exposed  his  new  pur- 
chase at  Athens,  was  tried  and  condemned  for  the  proceeding  by  the 
Dikastery.  Other  anecdotes  come  before  us,  inaccurate  probably  as 
to  names  and  details,  yet  illustrating  the  general  hardships  brought 
upon  this  once  free  Chalkidic  population. 

Meanwhile  the  victor  Philip  was  at  the  maximum  of  his  glory.  In 
commemoration  of  his  conquest,  he  celebrated  a  splendid  festival  to 
the  Olympian  Zeus  in  Macedonia,  with  unbounded  hospitality,  and 
prizes  of  everv  sort,  for  matches  and  exhibitions,  both  gymnastic  and 
poetical.  His  donations  were  muniticent,  as  v»?ell  to  the  Grecian  and 
Macedonian  officers  who  had  served  him,  as  to  the  eminent  poets  or 
actors  who  pleased  his  taste.  Satyr  us  the  comic  actor,  refusing  all 
presents  for  himself,  asked  and  obtained  from  him  the  release  of  two 
voung  women  taken  in  Olynthus,  daughters  of  his  friend  the 
tydnTean  Apollophanes,  whohad  b^cu  one  of  the  persons  concerned 
in  the  death  of  Philip's  elder  brot'.ier  ^Alexander.  Satyrus  announced 
his  intention  not  only  of  insuring  freedom  to  these  young  women, 
but  likewise  of  providing  portions  for  them  and  giving  them  out  in 
marriaire.  Philip  also  found  at  Olynthus  his  two  exiled  half- 
brothers,  who  had  served  as  pretexts  for  the  war— and  put  both  of 
tliem  to  death. 

It  has  alreadv  been  stated  that  Athens  had  sent  to  Olynthus  more 
than  one  considerable  re  enforcement,  especially  during  the  last  year 
of  the  war.  Though  we  are  ignorant  what  these  expeditions 
achieved,  or  even  how  much  was  their  exact  force,  we  And  reason 
to  suspect  that  they  were  employed  by  Chares  and  other  generals  to 
no  good  purpose.  The  opponents  of  Chares  accused  him,  as  well  as 
Defares  and  other  mercenary  chiefs,  of  having  wasted  the  naval  and 
military  strength  of  the  city  in  idle  enterprises  or  rapacious  extor- 
tions upon  the  traders  of  the  ^gean.  They  summed  up  1500  talents 
and  150  trii-emes  thus  lost  to  Athens,  besides  widespread  odium 
incairred  among  the  islanders  by  the  unjust  contributions  levied  up(^n 
them  to  enrich  the  general.  In  addition  to  this  disgraceful  ill- 
success,  came  now  the  fearful  ruin  in  Olynthus  and  Chalkidike,  and 
the  great  aggrandizement  of  their  enemy  Philip.  The  loss  of  Olyn- 
thus, with  the  miserable  captivity  of  its  population,  would  have  been 
sutticient  of  themselves  to  excite  powerful  sentiment  among  the 
Athenians.  But  there  was  a  further  circumstance  which  came  yet 
more  home  to  their  feelinj:s.  Many  of  their  own  citizens  were  serving 
ia  Olynthus  as  an  au  jlia.'-y  garrison,  and  had  now  become  captives 


484 


TERMINATION   OF   THE   SACRED   WAR. 


.ESCIilNES   AS  ENVOY. 


along  with  the  rest.  No  such  calamity  as  this  had  befallen  Athens 
for  a  century  past,  since  the  defeat  of  Tolniedes  at  Koroneia  in 
B(eotia.  The  whole  Athenian  people,  and  especially  the  relations  of 
the  captives,  were  full  of  agitation  and  anxiety,  increased  by  alarm- 
in  ir  news  from  other  quarters.  The  conquest  threatened  the  secmily 
of  all  the  Athenian  possessions  in  Eenuios,  Imbros,  and  the  Cherso- 
nese. This  last  peninsula,  especially,  was  altogether  unprotected 
agfdnst  Philip,  wlio  was  even  reported  to  be  on  his  march  thither: 
insomuch  that  the  Athenian  settlers  within  it  began  to  forsake  their 
properties  and  transfer  their  families  to  Athens.  Amid  tlie  grief 
and  apprehension  which  disturbed  the  Athenian  mind,  many  special 
a-^semblies  were  held  to  discuss  suitable  remedies.  What  was  done, 
we  are  not  exactly  informed.  But  it  seems  that  no  one  knew  where 
the  general  Chares  with  his  armament  was;  so  that  it  became  neces- 
sary even  for  his  friends  in  the  assend)ly  to  echo  the  strong  expres- 
isions  of  displeasure  among  the  people,  and  to  send  a  light  vessel 
immediately  in  search  of  him. 

The  gravity  of  the  crisis  forced  even  Eubulus,  and  others  among 
the  statesmen  hitherto  languid  in  the  war,  to  hold  a  more  energetic 
langimge  than  before  against  Philip  Denouncing  him  now  as  the 
con^mon  enemy  of  Greece,  they  pioposed  missions  into  Pelopon- 
nesus and  elsewhere  for  the  jnirpose  of  animating  the  Grecian  states 
into  confederacy  against  him.  ^schines  assisted  strenuously  in 
procuring  the  adoption  of  this  pro])osition,  and  was  himself  named 
as  one  of  the  envoys  into  Peloi-onnesus. 

This  able  orator,  immortalized  as  the  rival  of  Demosthenes,  has 
come  before  us  hitherto  only  as  a  soldier  in  various  Athenian  expedi- 
tions— to  Phlius  in  Peloponnesus  (368)  to  the  battle  of  ]Mantineia 
(362)— and  to  Eubcea  under  Phokion  (349  B.C.);  in  which  last  he  had 
earned  the  favorable  notice  of  the  general,  and  had  been  sent  to 
Athens  with  the  news  of  the  victory  at  Tamyi!a\  ^schines  was 
about  six  years  older  than  Demosthenes,  but  born  in  a  much  hum 
bier  and  poorer  station.  His  father  Atnmelus  taught  to  boys  the 
elements  of  letters;  his  mother  Glauk(;ihea  made  a  living  by  presid- 
ing over  certain  religious  assemblies  and  rights  of  initiation,  intended 
chiefly  for  poor  communicants;  the  boy  ^schincs  assisting  both  one 
and  tiie  other  in  a  menial  capacity.  Such  at  least  is  the  statement 
which  comes  to  us,  enriched  with  various  degrading  details,  on  the 
doubtful  authority  of  his  rival  Demosthenes;  who  also  affirms,  what 
we  may  accept  as  generally^  true,  that  ^schines  had  passed  his  early 
manhood  partly  as  an  actor,  partly  as  a  scribe  or  reader  to  the  official 
boards.  For  Imth  functions  he  possessed  some  natural  advantages — 
an  athletic  fram(%  a  powerful  voice,  a  ready  flow  of  unpiemeditated 
speech.  After  some  years  passed  as  scribe,  in  which  he  made  him- 
self useful  to  Eubulus  and  others,  he  was  chosen  public  scribe  to  the 
assembly — acquired  familiarity  with  the  adndnistrative  and  parlia- 
mentary bu.inesii  of  the  city — and  thus  elevated  himseir  by  degiecij 


to  influence  as  a  speaker.     Tn  rhetorical  power  he  seems  to  have  been 
surpassed  onlv  bv  Demosthenes.  ^  t^   ,    , 

As  envoy  of  Athens  dispatched  under  the  moticni  of  Eubulus, 
.^^chines  proceeded  into  Peloponnesus  in  the  spring  of  347;  others 
b.'ing  sent  at  the  same  time  to  other  Grecian  cities.  Among  other 
i^laces  he  visited  Megalopolis,  where  he  was  heard  before  the  Arca- 
dian collective  assembly  called  the  Ten  Thousand.  He  addressed 
them  in  a  strain  of  aniniated  exhortation,  adjuring  them  to  combine 
with  Athens  for  the  defense  of  the  liberties  of  Greece  against  Philip, 
and  inveig  ling  strenuously  against  those  traitors  who,  in  Arcadia  as 
well  as  ii/'other  i)arts  of  GVeece,  sold  themselves  to  the  aggressor  and 
p  u-alyzed  all  resistance.  He  encountered,  however,  much  opposition 
from  a  speaker  named  Ilieronymus,  who  espoused  the  interest  of 
Piillip  in  the  assemblv:  and  though  he  professed  to  bring  back  some 
flattering  hopes,  it  is  certain  that  neither  in  Arcadia,  nor  elsewdiere  in 
Peloponnesus,  was  his  inlluence  of  any  real  efficacy.  The  .strongest 
feeling  among  the  Arcadians  was  fear  and  dislike  of  Sparta,  wdiich 
rendered  them  in  the  main  indifferent,  if  not  favorable,  to  the  [Mace- 
donian successes.  In  returning  from  Arcadia  to  Athens,  ^Eschines 
met  the  Arcadian  Atrestidas,  with  the  unhappy  troop  of  Olynthian 
slaves  following;  a  sight  which  so  deeply  affected  the  Athenian 
orator,  that  he^ dwell  upon  it  afterw\ard  in  his  speech  before  the 
assembly  with  indignant  sympathv;  deploring  the  sad  effects  of 
Gi-eciair  dissension, ^xnd  the  ruin  produced  by  Philip's  combined 
employment  of  arms  and  corruption. 

yEschines  returned  probably  about  the  middle  of  the  summer  of 
347  n.c.      Other  envoys,  sent  to  more  distant  cities,  remained  out 
l()n<^er;'  some  indeed  even  until   the   ensuing  winter.      Though  it 
appl'ars  that  some  euvovs  from  other  cities  were  ifiduced  in  return 
to  visit  Athens,  yet  no  sincere  or  hearty  co-operation  against  Philip 
could  be  obtainecl  in  anv  part  of  Greece.     While  Philip,  in  the  full- 
ness of  triumph,  was  celebrating  his  magnificent  Olympic  festival  in 
Macedonia,  the  Athenians  were  disheartened  by  finding  that  they 
could  expect  little  support  from  independent  Greeks,  and  w^ere  left 
to  act  only  with  their  own  narrow  synod  of  allies.     Hence  Eubulus 
and  ^Eschinos  became  earnest  partisans  of  peace,  and  Demosthenes 
also  seems  to  have  been  driven  by  the  general  despondency  into  a 
willinsrness  to  negotiate.     The  two  orators,  though  they  afterward 
becam^  bitter  rivals,  were  at  this  juncture  not  very  discordant  in 
sentiment.     On  the  other  hand,  the  philippizing  speakers  at  Athens 
held  a  bolder  tone  than  ever.     As  Philip  found  his  ports  greatly 
blocked  up  by  the  Athenian  cruisers,  he  was  likely  to  profit  by  his 
existing   ascendencv  for   the  purpose   of  strengthening  his   naval 
cquipinents.      Now^  there  was  no  place  so  abundantly  supplied  as 
Athens,  with  marine  stores  and  muniments  for  armed  ships.     Prob- 
a])ly  there  were  agents  or  speculators  taking  measures  to  supply 
Plillip  'A-iih  these  articles,  and  it  was  against  them  that  a  decree  of 


436         TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACKED  WAR. 

the  assembly  was  now  directed,  adopted  on  the  motion  of  a  senator 
named  Timarchus — to  punish  with  death  all  who  should  export  from 
Athens  to  Philip  either  arms  or  stores  for  ships  of  war.  This  severe 
decree,  however,  was  passed  at  the  same  time  that  the  disposition 
toward  peace,  if  peace  were  attainable,  was  on  the  increase  at 
Athens. 

Some  months  before  the  capture  of  Olvnthus,  ideas  of  peace  had 
already  been  started,  partly  throuirh  the  indirect  overtures  of  Pliilin 
liiniself.    During  the  summer  of  348  B.C.,  the  Euba\ins  tried  to  nego- 
tiate an  accommodation  with  Athens;  the  contest  in  Eubcea,  though 
we  know  no  particidars  of  it,  having  never  wholly  ceased  for  the  hist 
year  and  a  half.     Nor  does  it  appear  that  any  peace  was  even  now 
concluded;  for  Eubopa  is  spoken  of  as   under  the  dependence  of 
Philip  during  the  ensuing  year.     The  Euba?an  envoys,  however,  inti- 
mated tiiat  Philip  had  desired  them  to  communicate  from  him  a  wish 
to  linish  the  war  and  conclude  peace  with  Athens.     Though  Philip 
had  at  this  time  conquered  the  larger  portion  of  Chalkidike,  and  was 
proceeding  successfully  against  the  remainder,  it  was  still  his  interest 
to  detach  Athens  from  the  war,  if  he  could.    Her  manner  of  carryiiii? 
on  war  was  indeed  faint  and  slack,  yet  she  did  him  much  harm  a^t 
sea,  and  she  was  the  only  city  competent  to  organize  an  extensive 
Grecian  confederacy  against  hfm;  which,  thougli  it  had  not  yet  been 
brought  about,  was  at  least  a  possible  contiugencv  under  her  presi- 
dency 

An  Athenian  of  influence  named  Phrvnon  had  been  cnptured  by 
Philip's  cruisers,  during  the  truce  of  the  Olympic  festival  in  348  B.C.'; 
after  a  certain  detention,  he  procured  from  home  the  required  r;iu 
som  and  obtained  his  release.     On  returning  to  Athens,  h«  had  suffi- 
cieut  credit  to  prevail  on  the  public  assembly  to  send  another  citizen 
along  with  him,  as  public  envoy  from  the  city  to  Philip;  in  order  to 
aid  Jiim  in  getting  back  his  ransom,  wliich  he  alleged  to  have  been 
wrongfully  demanded  from  one  captured  during  the  holy  truce. 
Though  tills  .seems  a  strange  proceeding  during  mid-war,  yet  the 
Athenian  public  took  up  the  case  with  sympat'hv;  Ktcsiphon  wiis 
named  envoy,  and  went  with  Phrynon  to  Philip,  whom  they  found 
engaged  in  the  war  against  Olynthus.     Being  received  in  the  most 
courteous  manner,  they  not  only  obtained  icstitution  of  the  ransom, 
but  were  completely  won  over  by  Philip.    With  his  usual  good  poiicv, 
lie  had  seized  the  opportunity  of  gaining  (we  may  properly  say,  of 
bribing,  since  the  restoration  of  ransom  was  substantially  a  bribe)  two 
powerful  Athenian  citizens,  whom  he  now  sent  back  to  Athens  as  lii3 
pronounced  partisans. 

Phrynon  and  Ktesiphon,  on  their  return,  expatiated  warmly  on  the 
generosity  of  Philip,  and  reported  much  about  his  flattering* expres- 
sions toward  Athens,  and  his  reluctance  to  continue  the  war  against 
her.  The  public  assembly  being  favorably  disposed,  a  citizen  named 
Philokrutes.  who  now  comes  before  us  for  the  first  time,  proposed  a 


CAPTIVES  AT   OLYNTHUS. 


Orf 


437 


decr-e  "ranting  to  Philip  leave  to  send  a  herald  and  envoys,  if  he 
chose  'to  treat  for  peace;  whi(;h  was  what  Philip  was  anxious  to  do 
aecordino-  to  the  allegation  of  Ktesiphon.  The  decree  was  passed 
unanimously  in  the  assemby,but  the  mover  Philokrates  was  impeached 
some  time  afterward  before  the  Dikastery,  as  for  an  illegal  proposi- 
tion by  a  citizen  named  Lykinus.  On  the  cause  coming  to  trial,  the 
Dik'istery  pronounced  an  acquittal  so  triumphant,  that  Lykinus  did 
not  even  obtain  the  fifth  part  of  the  suffrages.  Philokrates  being  so 
sick  as  to  be  unable  to  do  justice  to  his  own  case,  Demosthenes  stood 
forward  as  his  supporter,  and  made  a  long  speech  in  his  favor. 

The  motion  of  Philokrates  determined  nothing  positive,  and  only 
made  an  opening,  of  which,  however,  it  did  not  suit  Philip's  purpose 
to  avail  himself.     But  we  see  that  ideas  of  peace  had  been  throvyn 
out  bv  some  persons  at  Athens,  even  during  the  last  months  ot.tlie 
Olvntl.ian  war,  and  while  a  body  of  Athenian  citizens  were  actuay 
assistinir  Olynthus  against  the  besieging  force  of  Pliil?P-     Presently 
arrived  Uie  "terrible  news  of  the  fall  of  Olynthus.  and  of  the  captivity 
of  the  Athenian  citizens  in  garrison  there.    Wliile  this  great  alarm  (as 
ha^  been  already  stated)  gave  birth  to  new  missions  for  anti-Macedonian 
alliances  it  enlisted  on  the  side  of  peace  all  the  friends  ot  those  captives 
whose  lives  were  now  in  Philip's  hands.     The  sorrow  thus  directly 
inflicted  on  many  private  families,  together  with  the  force  of  inili- 
vidual  sympathy  widely  dilfused  among  the  citizens,  operated  pow- 
erfully- upon  the  decisions  of  the  public  assembly.     A  century  before, 
the  Aiheiiians  had  relinquished  all  their  acquisitions  in  B(Boti;i,  m  order 
to  recover  their  captives  taken  in  the  defeat  of  Tolmides  at  koroneia; 
and  durino-  the  Pelopounesian  war,  the  policy  of  the  Spartans  had 
been  chietiy  guided  for  three  or  four  years  by  the  aiixiely  to  insure 
the  restoration   of  the  captives   of  Sphakteria.     Moreover,  several 
Athenians  of  personal  consequence  were  taken  at  Olynthus;  among 
them  Eukratus  and  latrokles.     Shortly  after  the  news  arrived,  the 
relatives  of  these  two  men,  presenting  themselves  before  the  assembly 
in  the  solemn  guise  of  suppliants,  deposited  an  olive  branch  on  the 
altar  hard  by,  and  entreated  that  care  might  be  had  for  the  safety  ot 
their  captive  kinsmen.     This  touching  appeal,  echoed  as  it  wouUl  1k5 
by  the  cries  of  so  many  other  citizens  in  the  like  distress,  called  lorth 
unanimous  sympathy  in  the  assembly.     Both  Philokrates  and  Demos- 
thenes spoke  in  favor  of  it;  Demosthenes  probably,  as  having  l)een 
a  strenuous  advocate  of  the  war,  was  the  more  anxious  to  show  tliat 
he  was  keenly  alive  to  so  much  individual  suffering.     It  was  resolved 
to  open  indirect  negotiations  with  Philip  for  the  release  of  the  cap- 
tives  through  some  of  the  great  tragic  and  comic  actors;  who,  travcl- 
ino-  in  the  exercise  of  their  profession  to  every  city  in  Greece  were 
everywhere  regarded  in  some  sort  as  privileged  persons.     One  ot 
these  Neoptolemus,  had  already  availed  himself  of  his  favored  pro- 
fession and  liberty  of  transit  to  assist  in  Philip's  intrigues  and  corre- 
spondences at  Athens;  another,  Aristod^mus,  was  also  in  good  esteem 


438 


TEILMINATIOX  OF  THE  SACKED   WAR. 


AID  ASKED  FROM  PHILIP. 


439 


with  Philip;  both  were  probably  goin.2:  to  :>racedouiu  to  take  part  in 
the  splendid  Olympic  festival  there  prepjiiinir.  Tliey  were  charged 
to  make  applieatioii.  and  take  the  best  sieps  iu  their  power,  for  the 
safely  or  release  of  the  cdptives. 

It  would  api)ear  that  tliese  actors  were  by  no  means  expeditious  in 
the  performance  of  their  mission.  They  probably  spent  some  time 
in  their  professional  avocations  iu  Macedonia;  and  Arislodemus,  not 
being  a  responsible  envoy,  delayed  some  time  even  after  his  return 
before  he  made  any  report.  That  his  mission  had  not  been  wholly 
fruitless,  however,  became  presently  evident  from  the  arrival  of 
the  captive  Iatrokl©8,  whom  Philip  had  released  without  ransom. 
The  Senate  then  summoned  Aristodemus  before  them  inviting  him 
to  make  a  general  report  of  his  proceedings;  which  he  didt  first 
l^efore  the  Senate— next  before  the  public  assembly.  He  afhrmed 
that  Philip  had  entertained  his  propositions  kindly,  and  that  he  was 
in  the  best  dispositions  toward  Athens;  desirous  not  only  to  be  at 
peace  with  her,  but  even  to  be  admitted  as  her  ally.  Denlosthenes 
then  a  senator,  moved  a  vote  of  thanks  and  a  wreath  to  Aristodemus.' 

This  report,  as  far  as  we  can  make  out,  appears  to  have  been  made 
about  September  or  October  347  B.C.;  ^Eschines,  and  the  other  rov- 
ing cominissioners  sent  out  by  Athens  to  raise  up  anti-Macedonian 
combinations,  had  returned  with  nothing  but  dishearteninir  announce- 
ment of  refusal  or  lukewarmness.  And  there  occurred  also  about 
the  same  time  in  Phokis  and  ThermopvUe,  other  events  of  uiave 
augury  to  Athens,  showing  that  the  Sacred  AVar  and  the  contest 
between  the  Phokians  and  Thebans  was  turning— as  all  events  had 

ll!'7?f'^^   ^^^  ^^»6   1^'"^   t^'"   years— to   the   farther  agirrandizement   of 
Philip. 

During  the  preceding  two  years,  the  Phokians,  now  under  the 
command  of  Phahekus  in  place  of  Phayllus,  had  maintained  their 
position  against  Thebes— liad  kept  possession  of  tlie  Bceotian  towns 
Orchomenus,  Koroneia,  and  Korsia— and  were  still  masters  of 
Alponus,  Thronium.  and  Mktea,  as  well  as  of  the  important  i)ass  of 
Therniopylae  adjoining.  But  though  on  the  whole  successful  iu 
regard  to  Thebes,  they  had  fallen  into  dissension  among  themselves. 
The  mercenary  force  necessary  to  their  defense  could  only  be  main- 
tained by  continued  appropriation  of  the  Delphiau  treasures;  an 
appropriation  becoming  from  year  to  year  both  less  lucrative  and  inore 
odiou.s.  By  successive  spoliati(m  of  gold  and  silver  ornaments  the 
temple  is  said  to  have  been  stripped  of  10,000  talents  (=  about 
£2,300,000).  all  its  available  wealth;  so  that  the  Phokian  leaders  were 
now  reduced  to  dig  for  an  unauthenticated  treasure,  supposed  (on  the 
faith  of  a  verse  in  the  Ili.id.  as  well  as  on  other  grounds  of  surmise) 
to  lie  concealed  beneath  ils  stone  floor.  Their  search,  however,  was 
not  only  unsuccessful,  but  arrested,  as  we  are  told,  by  violent  carth- 
qnakes,  significant  of  the  anger  of  Aik)11o. 

As  the  Dclpliiau  ticusuic  V'camc  less  and  less,  so  the  means  of 


Phahekus  to  pay  troops  and  maintain  ascendency  declined.  While 
the  foreign  mercenaries  relaxed  in  their  obedience,  his  opponents  in 
Phokis  iTKinifested  increased  animosity  against  his  continued  sacri- 
le"-e  So  o-reatly  did  tliese  onponents  increase  in  power,  that  they 
de^posed  Phah^kus,  elected  Deinokrates  with  two  others  iu  his  place,^ 
and  instituted  a  strict  inqnirv  into  the  antecedent  appropriation  of 
the  Delphian  treasure.  Gross  peculation  was  found  to  have  been 
committed  for  the  prolit  of  individual  leaders,  especially  one  named 
Philon;  who,  on  being  seized  and  put  to  the  torture,  disclosed  the 
names  of  several  accomplices.  These  men  were  tried,  compelled  to 
refund,  and  ultiniat(ay  put  to  death.  Phahekus  however  still 
retained  his  ascendency  over  the  mercenaries,  about  8,000  in  number, 
so  as  to  hold  Thermopyhr  and  the  places  adjacent,  and  even  pres- 
ently to  be  re-appointed  general. 

Such  intestine  dispute,  combine  I  with  the  gradual  exliaustion  of 
the  temple-funds,  sensibly  dimiuishetl  the  power  of  the  Phokians. 
Yet  they  still  remained  too  strong  for  their  enemies  the  Thebans; 
wdio,  deprived  of  Orchomenus  and  Koroneia,  impoverished  by  mili- 
tary'efforts  of  nine  years,  and  unable  to  terminate  the  contest  by 
their  own  force,  resolved  to  invoke  foreign  aid.     An  opportunity 
miccht  perhaps  have  been  obtained  for  closing  the  war  by  some  com- 
promise, if  it  had  been  possible  novr  to  bring  about  an  accommoda- 
tion between  Thebes  and  Athens;  which  some  of  the  philo-Thcbau 
orators  (Demosthenes  seemingly  among  them)  attempted,  under  the 
prevalent  uneasiness  about  Philip.     But  the  adverse  sentiments  in 
both   cities,  especially  in  Thebes,  were  found  invincible;  and  the 
Thebans,  little  anticipating  consequences,  determined  to  invoke  the 
ruinous  intervention'  of  the  conqueror  of   Olynthus.     The  Tliessa- 
lians,  already  valuable  allies  of  Philip,  joined  them  in  soliciting  hini 
to  crush  the"  Phokians,  and  to  restore  the  ancient  Thessalian  privi- 
lege of  the  Pyla^a  (or  regular  yearly  Ampliiktyonic  meeting  at  Ther- 
mopylre)  which  the  Pliokiaus  had  suppressed  during  the   last   ten 
years.     This  joint  prayer  for  interv(>ntion  was  preferred  in  the  name 
of  the  Delphian  god,  investing  Philip  with  the  august  character  of 
champion  of  the  Amphiktj^onic  assembly,  to  rescue  the  Delphian 
temple  from  its  sacrilegious  plunderers. 

The  king  of  Macedon,  with  his  past  conquests  and  his  well-known 
spirit  of  aggressive  entei-prise,  was  now  a  sort  of  present  Deity,  ready 
to  lend  force  to  all  the  seltish  ambition,  or  blind  fear  and  antipathy, 
prevalent  among  the  discontented  fractions  of  the  Hellenic  world. 
While  his  intrigues  had  procured  numerous  partisans  even  in  the 
center  of  Peloponnesus— as  .Eschines,  on  return  from  his  mission, 
had  denounced,  not  having  yet  liimself  enlisted  in  the  number— he 
was  now  furnished  with  a^pious  pretense,  and  invited  by  po\yerful 
cities,  to  penetrate  into  the  heart  of  Greece,  within  its  la.st  line  of 
common  defense,  Ther!no])vhr.  ,      ,         . 

The  application  of  the  Theban^-  to  Philip  excited  much  alarm  m 


440  TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED   WAR 

Phokis.     A  Macedonian  ai-my  under  Paiinenio  did  actually  enter 
riiessaly— wliere  ^\c  find  them,  three  months  later,  besie^'in''-  Halus 
Krports  seem  to  have  been  spread,  about  September  347  b'c    that 
t.e  Macedomans  were  about  to  march  to  Thermopylae  upon  which 
the  Phokians  took  alarm,  and  sent  envoys  to  Athens  as  well  as  to 
Sparta,  entreating'  aid  to  enable  them  to  hold  the  pass,  and  offering 
to  deliver  up  the  three  important  townsnear  it— Alponus,  Thronium 
and  Nika^a.     So  mucli  were  the  Athenians  alarmed  by  tlie  message' 
that  they  not  only  ordered  Proxenus.  their  treneral  at  Oieus  to  take 
immediate  possession  of  the  pass,  but  also  passed  a  decree  to  equip 
fitty  triremes,  and  to  send  forth  their  military  citizens  under  tliirtv 
vears  of  age,  witli  an  energy  like  that  di^plaved  when  thev  checked 
Phihp  before  at  the  same  place.     But  it  appears  tliat  the  application 
had  been  made  by  the  party  in  Pliokis  opposed  to  Phala^kus     So 
vehemently  did  that  chief  resent  the  proceeding,  that  he  threw  tiie 
Phokian  envoys  into  jirison  on  their  return;  refusing  to  admit  either 
Proxenus  or  Archidamus  into  possession  of  Thermopylae  and  even 
dismissing  without  recognition   the  Athenian  heralds,*who  came  iu 
their  regular  rounds  to  proclaim  the  solemn  truce  of  the  Eleusiuian 
mysteries.     This  proceeding  on  the  part  of  Phah-ekus  was  dictated 
seemingly  by  jealousy  of  Athens  and  Sparta,  and  by  fear  that  they 
would  support  the  party  opposed  to  liim  in  Phokis.     It  could  not 
have  originated  (as   ^schines  alleir?s)  in  superior  confidence  and 
liking  toward  Pliilip;  for  if  Phahekus  had  entertained  such  senti- 
ments,  he  might   have  admitted   the   ^lacedonian   troops  at  once; 
which  he  did  not  do  until  ten  months  later,  under  the  greatest  pres- 
sure of  circumstances. 

Such  insulting  repudiation  of  the  aid  tendered  by  Proxenus  at 
Thermopylae,  combined  with  the  distracted  state  of  parties  in  Phokis 
menaced  Atiiens  with  a  new  embarrassment.  Thouirh  Phalakus 
still  held  the  pass,  his  conduct  had  been  such  as  to^ raise  doubts 
whether  he  might  not  treat  separately  with  Philip.  Here  was  another 
circumstance  operating  on  Athens— besides  the  refusal  of  co-opera- 
tion from  other  Greeks  and  the  danger  of  her  captives  at  Olyullius- 
to  dishearten  her  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  and  to  strengthen 
the  case  of  those  who  advocated  peace.  It  was  a  circumstance  the 
more  weighty  because  it  really  involved  the  question  of  safety  or 
exposure  to  her  own  territory,  through  the  opening  of  the  pass  of 
ThermopylcT.  It  was  here  that  she  was  now  under  the  necessity  of 
keeping  watch;  being  thrown  on  the  defensive  for  her  own  security 
at  home— not,  as  before,  stretching  out  a  long  arm  for  the  protection 
of  distant  possessions  such  as  the  Chersonese,  or  distant  allies  such 
as  the  Olynthians.  So  speedily  had  the  predictions  of  Demosthenes 
bet^n-  realized,  that  if  the  Athenians  refused  to  carry  on  strenuous 
war  against  Philip  on  his  coast,  they  would  bring  upon  themselves 
the  graver  evil  of  having  to  resist  him  on  or  near  their  own  frontier 
The  maintenance  of  freedom  in  the  Hellenic  world  against   the 


ugiSiljgiU^^^ 


PASS  OF  THERMOPYLAE. 


441 


extra-Hellenic  invader,  now  turned  once  more  upon  the  pass  of 
Thermopyl*;  as  it  liad  turned  183  years  before,  during  the  onward 
march  of  the  Persian  Xerxes. 

To  Philip,  tliat  pass  was  of  incalculable  importance.  It  was  his 
only  road  into  Greece;  it  could  not  be  forced  by  any  laud-army; 
wiiilc  at  sea  tlie  Athenian  fleet  was  stronger  than  his.  In  spite  of  the 
general  remissness  of  Athens  in  warlike  undertakings,  she  had  now 
twice  manifested  her  readiness  for  a  vigorous  eli'ort  to  maintain 
ThermopyUe  against  him.  To  become  master  of  the  position,  it  was 
necessary' that ^he  should  disarm  Atliens  by  concluding  peace— keep 
her  in  iirnorance  or  delusion  as  to  his  real  purposes— prevent  her 
from  conceiving  alarm  or  sending  aid  to  Thennopyla^— and  then 
overawe  or  buy  off  the  isolated  Phokians.  How  ably  and  cunningly 
his  diplomacy \vas  managed  for  this  purpose,  will  presently  appear. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  Athens,  to  Sparta,  and  to  the  general  cause 
of  Pan-Hellenic  independence,  it  was  of  capital  moment  that  Pliilip 
should  be  kept  on  the  outside  of  Thermopyla.  And  here  Athens 
had  more  at  stake  than  the  rest;  since  not  merely  her  influence 
abroad,  but  the  safety  of  her  own  city  and  territory  against  invasion, 
was  involved  in  the  question.  The  Thebans  had  already  invited  the 
presence  of  Philip,  himself  always  ready  even  without  invitation,  to 
come  within  the  pas:^;  it  was  the  first  interest,  as  wx'U  as  the  first  duty, 
of  Atliens,  to  counterw^ork  them,  and  to  keep  him  out.  With  toler- 
able prudence,  her  guaranty  of  the  pass  might  have  been  made  effec- 
tive; but  we  shall  iind  her  measures  ending  only  in  shame  and  dis- 
appointment, through  the  flagrant  improvidence,  and  apparent 
corruption,  of  her  own  negotiators. 

Tlie  increasing  discouragement  as  to  war,  and  yearning  for  peace, 
which  prevailed  at  Athens  during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  o47 
B.C.,  has  been  already  described.  We  may  be  sure  that  the  friends 
of  tiie  captives  taken  at  Olynthus  would  be  importamite  in  demand- 
inir  peace,  because  there  was  no  otlier  way  of  procuring  their  release; 
sluQi  Philip  did  not  choose  to  exchange  them  for  money,  reserving 
them  as  an  item  in  political  negotiation.  At  length,  about  the  montli 
of  November,  the  public  assembly  decreed  that  envoys  should  bj 
sent  to  Philip  to  ascertain  on  what  conditiotis  peace  could  be  made; 
ten  Athenian  envoys,  and  one  from  the  synod  of  confederate  allies, 
sitting  at  Athens.  The  mover  of  the  decree  was  Philokrates,  the 
same  who  had  moved  the  previous  decree  permitting  Philip  to  sen  I 
envoys  if  he  choose.  Of  this  permission  Pliilip  had  not  availed  him- 
self, in  spite  of  all  that  the  philippiztrs  at  Athens  had  alleged  about 
his  anxiety  for  peace  and  alliatice  with  the  city.  It  suited  his  pur- 
pose to  have  the  negotiations  cai-ried  on  in  Macetlonia,  where  he 
could  act  better  upon  the  individual  negotiators  of  Athens. 

The  decree  having  been  passed  in  the  assembly,  ten  envoys  were 
chosen— Philokrates,  Deiiiosthenes,  Jj^schines,  Ktesiphon,  Phrynon, 
lalrokles,  Derkyllus,  Kinion,  Nausikles,  and  Aristodemus  the  actor. 


442  TEUMIXATIOX  OF   THE  SACnED   WAR 

Aglaokrcon  of  Tcnclos  «as  sol"cl,d  lo  accoinDuiiv  tin™   'is  r,.>,rn 
semutive  o    Hit-  alliud  syn„d.     Of  these  t-nv,,«  S«i,  |,o™'p  'J'     ,^- 
.m,    latn^cles  Im,!  already  bec„  gained  ovel  l.^l     au"\n  Rm  ' 
h  le  lu  i  acedotua;  u.o.eover  Arislodemus  wa/a  person  to  wo' 

a      h'tZ^LTuh™''  "'i-'r'*^''  ''''''"'  "-^'^  ■"o.ev,:Sle 
luaii  iiie  iiueiebts  ot  AtheiiLs     .Lschines  was  proposetl  l)v  Xaii^iklps- 

pemosthenes,  by  Pliilokrutes  ll.e  liiover.     Thouoh  Den  o^fheueri  ad 

been  before  so  earnest  in  advocalin-  viuorous  p-oicution  of   tto 

war  It  ( bes  not  appear  that  he  was  no^^\iWvv.tiT^^^^^ 

iiegoiiations.     Had  he  been  ever  so  adverse  he  would  ,7,;.!  ITi      " 

wliieh  the  negotiations  were  talciii"     Xor  m,  tl,l;>iil!i       i 
^schines  as  ye,  suspected  of  a  lc;;nfn.  toward  PI  1^^  Bo  ,t  .nid 

Tiie  eleven  envoys  were  appointed  to  visit  Pliilip    not  w^tli  nnv 
^vLl      H  '^^  the  original  decree  under  whicli  Ihev  were  noin 

;  m  pi?ii:''ji.rMt''4,T''^  '"^r  "."';^'""  •" "'""'" « «"^  ^o.  d  "t 

jiom  liiiiip,  tiiej  jett  Athens  about  December    347  n  r     mul  n,v. 

ex-^wl  i^;'"''  "^  S'™'  "°  ""^  ■'°'""™  coast  o'L,da>'wlKre  they 
c\peeted  to  meet  the  returning  herald      Find!.,,,  n...,  i..  i     i      .^ 

come  bae^.  they  erossed  the  .Malt  at  one!^  w    l£u  wa  t,^'  ^h^ 
nto  the  Paga^tau  Gulf,  where  Parn.enio  with  a  Ma oed  mi-m  ^rm^ 
^vas  then  besieging  Hahis.     To  him  they  nolifitVt li^ir      ,iv,l   n^^ 
received  permissn.n   K,  pass  on.    first  to  Pagas*      ext  ,o  iarissa 

i^::!^^:^i>:^ri::::/T^:}^f  '■«-'-'^'  -<^-  ^vhoUsa^^s 

.v.:^ivi?^':sS:;.^%i:'^,!Jt^-\;;^;;^.p-^ 

rv  .lay  of  setting  out,  iutolerablv  troublesonie  both  to  I  hn  md     k 

i^n  "L^ri^r^ed  a.?;'in '{■.["''■''•'■^'■/i '"'"  '"'"  '■'»S  fo'i-^sllch  ^i" It  ^^ 
1  ,J  V    V.    ,;"'"^^  a.uauist  them  in  tlie  way  of  accusation  aflerward- 
asth ,  boas  fu],  even  to  absurd  excess,  of  Jiisown  power.V.f  e  oar^^^^^^^^ 

f:alkd  upon  to  appear  before  Philip  in  his  full  pomp  ami  ';^te,  and 


HARANGUE  BY   .ESCHINES. 


443 


there  address  to  him  formal  haran2:ues  (either  by  one  or  more  of  their 
number  as  they  chose),  setting  forth  the  case  of  Athens;  after  which 
Philip  would  deliver  his  reply  in  the  like  publicity,  either  with  his 
own  lips  or  by  those  of  a  chosen  minister.  The  Athenian  envoys 
resolved  amoni]^  themselves,  that  Avhen  introduced,  each  of  them 
should  address  Philip,  in  the  ordt  r  of  seniority;  Demosthenes  being 
the  youngest  of  the  Ten,  and  ^Eschines  next  above  him.  Accord- 
ingly, when  summoned  before  Philip,  Ktesiphon,  the  oldest  envoy, 
began  with  a  short  address;  the  other  seven  followed  w^ith  equal 
brevitv,  while  the  stress  of  the  business  was  left  to  ^schiues  and 
Demosthenes. 

^schines  recounts  in  abridgment  to  the  Athenians,  with  much 
satisfaction,  his  own  elaborate  harangue,  establishing  the  right  of 
Athens  to  Amphipolis,  the  wrong  done  by  Philip  in  taking  it  and 
liolding  it  against  iier,  and  his  paramount  obligation  to  make  restitu- 
tion— but  touching  upon  no  other  subject  wiiatever.  He  then  pro- 
ceeds to  state — probably  with  yet  greater  satisfaction — that  Demos- 
thenes, who  followed  next,  becoming  terrified  and  confused,  utterly 
broke  down,  forgot  his  prepared  speech,  and  was  obliged  to  stop 
short,  in  spite  of  courteous  encouragements  from  Philip.  Gross 
failure,  after  full  preparation,  on  the'part  of  the  greatest  orator  of 
ancient  or  modern  times,  appears  at  first  hearing  so  incredible,  that 
we  are  disposed  to  treat  if  as  pure  fabrication  of  his  opponent.  Yet 
I  incline  to  believe  that  the  fact  was  substantially  as  ^Eschines  states 
it;  and  that  Demosthenes  was  partially  divested  of  his  oratorical 
powers  by  finding  himself  not  oidy  speaking  before  the  enemy  whom 
he  had  so  bitterly  denounced,  but  surrounded  by  all  the  evidences  of 
Macedonian  power,  and  doubtless  exposed  to  unequivocal  marks  of 
well-earned  hatred,  from  those  Macedonians  who  took  less  pains  than 
Philip  to  disguise  their  real  feelings. 

Having  dismissed  the  envoys  after  their  harangues,  and  taken  ^v 
short  time  for  consideration,  Philip  recalled  them  into  his  presence. 
He  then  delivered  his  reply  with  his  own  lii)S,  combating  especially 
the  arguments  of  ^Eschines,  and  according  to  that  orator,  with  such 
pertinence  and  presence  of  mind,  as  to  excite  the  admiration  of  all 
the  envoys,  Demosthenes  among  the  rest.  What  Pliilip  said,  we  do 
not  learn  from  JEschines;  who  expatiates  only  on  the  shuflling.  arti- 
fice, and  false  pretenses  of  Demosthenes,  to  conceal  his  failun;  as  an 
orator,  and  to  put  himself  on  a  point  of  advantage  above  his  colleagues. 
Of  these  personalities  it  is  impossible  to  say  how  much  is  true;  and 
even  were  they  true,  they  are  scarcely  matter  of  general  history. 

It  was  about  the  beginning  of  March  when  the  envoys  returned  to 
Athens.  Some  were  completely  fascinated  by  the  hospitable  treat- 
ment and  engaging  mannv'rs  of  Philip,  especially  when  entertaining 
them  at  the  banquet:  with  others  he  had  come  loan  understanding 
at  once  more  intimate  and  more  corrupt.  They  brought  back  a  let- 
ter from  Pliilip,  which  was  read  both  in  the  Senate  and  the  assem« 


444  TEHMINATIOX   OF  THE  SACKED   WAR. 


l)]y:  while  Demosthenes,  seimtor  of  tliat  year,  not  only  praised  them 
nil  in  the  Senate,  but  also  heeame  himself  the  mover  of  a  resolution 
lliat  they  should  be  erowued  with  a  wreath  of  honor,  and  invited 
to  (line  next  day  in  the  prytaneium. 

We  have  hardly  any  means  of  appreeiatinjj  the  real  proceedings  of 
this  embassy,   or  the    matters   treated    in    discussion   with    Philip 
^schmes  tells  us  nothiuo-,  except  the  formalities  of  the  interview 
and  the  speeches  about  Amphipolis.     But  we  shall  at  any  rate  do 
him  no  injustice  if  we  judij^e  him  upon  his  own  accoi.nt-  which  if  it 
does  not  represent  what  he  actually  did,  represents  what  he  wished 
to  be  thought  to  have  done.     His  own  account  certainly  shows  a 
stran2:e  misconception  of  the  actual  situation  of  affairs.     In  order  to 
justify  Inmself  for  being  desirous  for  peace,  he  lays  considerable 
stress  on  the  losing  game  which  A'thens  had  been  playing  during  the 
war,  and  on  the  probability  of  yet  farther  loss  if  she' persisted.     He 
completes    the    cheerless   picture   by  addinir— what    was  doubtless 
but  too  familiar  to  his  Atlienian  audience— that  Philip  on  his  side 
marching  from  one  success  to  another,  had  raised  the  Macedonian 
kingdom  to  an  elevation  truly  formidable,  by  the  recent  extinction 
of  Olynlhus.     Yet  under  this  state  of  comparative  force  between  the 
.two   contending   parties,   iEschines  presents  himself  before  Philip 
with  a  demand  of  exorbitant  magnitude— for  the  cession  of  Amphip- 
olis.    He  says  not  a  word  about  anything  else.     He  delivers  an  elo- 
quent harangue    to  convince   Phil'ip  of   the   incontestable  rii,^ht  of 
Athens  to  Amphipolis.  and  to  prove  to  him  that  he  was  in  the  wron" 
for  taking  and  keeping  it.     He  affects  to  think  that,  by  this  process^ 
he  should  induce  Philip  to  part  with  a  town,  the  most  capital  and 
unparalleled  position  in  all   his  dominions;  which  he  had  now  pos- 
sessed  for  twelve  years,  and  which  placed  him  in  communication 
with  his  new  foundation  Philippi  and  the  auriferous  region  around 
it.     The  arguments  of  .Eschines  would  have  been  much  to  the  pur- 
pose in  an  action  tried  between  two  li'luants  before  an  impartial 
Dikastery  at  Athens.     But  here  were  two  belliirerent  parties,  in  a 
given  ratio  of  strength  and  position  as  to  the  future,  debating  terms 
of  peace.     That  an  envoy  on  the  part  of  Athens,  the  losing  party 
should  now  stand  forward  to  demand  from  a  victorious  enemy  the 
^erv  place  which  formed  the  original  cause  of  the  war,  and  whieh 
ad  become  far  more  valuable  to  Philip  than  when  he  first  took  it- 
was  a  pretension  altogether  preposterous.     When  ^Eschines  repro- 
duces his  eloquent  speech  reclaiming  Amphipolis,  ashavinc;  been  the 
principal   necessity  and  most  honorable   achievement  of 'his  diplo- 
matic mission,  he  only  shows  how  little  qualified  he  was  to  render 
real  service  to  Athens  in  that  eapacify— to  sav  nothing  as  yet  ;bout 
corruption.     The  Athenian  people,  extremely  retentive  of' past  con- 
victions. Lad  it  deeply  impressed  on  their  minds  that  Amphipolis 
was  theirs  by  right;  and  probably  the  first  envoys  to  Macedonia— 
Vristodemus,  Neoptolemus,    Ktesiphon,    Phrvnon,  etc.— had   been 


PHILIP   OFFERS   PEACE. 


445 


so  cajoled  by  the  courteous  phrases,  deceptions,  and  presents  of 
Plnlip,  that  they  represented  him  on  their  return  as  not  uuwiiling  to 
purchase  frfendship  with  Athens  by  the  restoration  of  Amphipolis. 
To  this  delusive  expectation  in  the  Athenian  mind  ^schines  ad- 
dressed himself,  when  he  took  credit  for  his  earnest  pleading  before 
Philip  on  behalf  of  Athenian  right  to  the  place,  as  if  it  were  "the  sole 
purpose  of  his  mission.  We  shall  see  him  throughout,  in  his  char- 
acter of  envoy,  not  only  fostering  the  actual  delusions  of  the  public 
ill  Athens,  but  even  circulating  gross  fictions  and  impostures  of  his 
own,  respecting  the  proceedings  and  purposes  of  Philip. 

It  was  on  or  about  the  first  day  of  tlie  month  of  Elaphebolion 
(March)  when  the  envoys  reached  Athens  on  returning  from  the 
court  of  Philip.  They  brought  a  letter  from  him  couched  in  the 
most  friendly  terms,  expressing  great  anxiety  not  only  to  be  at  peace 
with  Athens,  but  also  to  become  her  ally,  stating  moreover  that  he 
was  prepared  to  render  her  valuable  service,  and  that  he  would  have 
specified  more  particularly  what  the  service  would  be,  if  he  coukl 
have  felt  certain  that  he  should  be  received  as  her  ally.  But  in  spite 
of  such  amenities  of  language,  affording  an  occasion  for  his  partisans 
in  the  assembly — ^schines,  Philokrates,  Ktesiphon,  Phrynon,  lat- 
rokles,  and  others — to  expathite  upon  his  excellent  dispositions — 
Philip  would  grant  no  better  terms  of  peace  than  that  each  party 
should  retain  what  they  already  possessed.  Pursuant  to  this  general 
principle,  the  Chersonesus  was  assured  to  Athens,  of  which  ^schines 
appears  to  have  made  some  boast.  Moreover,  at  the  moment  w  hen 
tiie  envoys  were  quitting  Pella  to  return  home,  Philip  was  also  leav- 
iug  it  at  the  head  of  his  array  on  an  expedition  against  Kersobleptes 
in  Thrace.  He  gave  a  special  pledge  to  the  envoys  that  he  would 
not  attack  the  Chersonese  until  the  Athenians  should  have  had  an 
opportunity  of  debating,  accepting,  or  rejecting,  the  propositions  of 
peace.  His  envoys,  Antipater  luid  Parmenio,  received  orders  to  visit 
Athens  with  little  delay;  and  a  Macedonian  herald  accompanied  the 
Athenian  envoys  on  their  return. 

Having  ascertained  on  what  terms  peace  could  be  had,  the  envo3'S 
were  competent  to  advise  the  Athenian  people,  and  prepare  them  for 
a  definite  conclusion,  as  soon  as  this  Macedonian  mission  should 
arrive.  They  first  gave  an  account  of  their  proceedings  to  the  public 
assembly.  Ktesiphon,  the  oldest,  who  spoke  first,  expatiated  on  the 
graceful  presence  and  manners  of  Philip,  as  well  as  upon  the 
(iiarin  of  his  company  in  wine-drinking.  yEschines  dw^elt  upon  his 
powerful  and  pertinent  oratory — after  which  he  recounted  the  princi- 
pal occurrences  of  the  journey,  and  the  debate  with  Philip,  intimat- 
ing that  in  the  previous  understanding  of  the  envoys  among  them- 
selves, the  duty  of  speaking  about  Ampldpolis  had  been  confided  to 
Demosthenes,  in  case  any  point  should  have  been  omitted  by  the 
previous  speakers.  DemostlKJues  then  made  his  own  statement,  in 
language  (according  to  ^schines)  censorious    and   even  insulting 


446  TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 

1   iwc  PollPio-ue'^-  cspocially  affirming   that  ^scliincs  in  his 

move  various  (leciees,  O"?;, '."."'    .„^- ,.„  -iiircdonian  oiivovs  wliO 
ac.-o.npanied  then  tro.n  ?'"'  '  '"1'    L' the  prv  a  d^s  k        c..nv<.BC 

to  ^Esculapius,  on  w   Kb   -^  "^^'^^'>  J^^  ^,^„,  Macedonia  I.mcI  i!h  n 
transacted),  in  order  that   /.  J  ^/".\^>'^t\i^.i,,v  their  political   rela- 

?"^I  witl'p^ll^  V?;^  ^  t^mmeil^Slellehiwior  of\he  Athenian 
lions  with  rniiip,  a  uiuu,  iw  v^  hivite  them  to  diniH-r  in 

envoys  (his  co'leaS.-J^,^^^^^^,^;;^/'!^,,'^:'^  miVd  in  X  Senate,  that 
*;':erC\;""nvo?s"ore':Ty  should  be  acconnnoda.ed  «  Ub  scats 

"•Sly  (='^  i'  " "w  i  .l-n^h    e    eo  flVi  t^  ""latVr  days  for  Ihe  s,x cial 

svnod   of  Atbe.iian   'oniiiui  m  voi>res<ntativc  alons; 

report  of  Aglaokr.on   -bo    ^^  ^^^^^^^^        ,U     ion  !mr<.r.ant  in  rc-fr- 
witb  tlie  Ten.     This  s> nod  nLneiiui  j,s«(inblv,  vet  nnfcr- 

enoe  to  the  approa<-  nn-  f'^^^'"'^,''',,^,  ''","'„'';  ,"ial "and  i.ulireet 
innately  nowhere  given  to  us  '  '■^■. /'"  .^-i"  ^^  .^  \  ,  „„,,.  „>cnlion<d. 
no'ice  from  the  two  rival  oratois  1'  '''"  '  '..ni.  s  bad  sent  l-rtb 
,hat  since  the  capture  of  ^^^y^"^ ';^J^^^^'^uf,l:e  various 
euvovs  throuL'hout  a  large  1"^}'''  "',\;,7'';"ainst  Philip,  or  in 
citi«->-  to  unite  -itb  then  eillur  n.  <;","'";.;:•  ,!-.t,"„f  his  furl  l;er 
eonioint  pe.uje  '",-;''t;;;-«-5.rnr  hi  r.dtr'^Tmnber  ba.i  abo- 
eneronobnients  Ot  '"'f"  ";V  '  ,,'  '  i„«„,,p<;s  of  the  Athenian  pio- 
getber  failed.  <^^^<^f\^'XVVZ^c^:^^^^  deputies,  more  or 

:;l^(^dwlZirr;:^H^"  £'inl';:.'^S.^ent  pU.esat  sonte 


RESOLUTION  OF  THE  ALLIED   SYNOD. 


4-n 


llistance  from  each  other.  The  resolution  of  the  synod  (noway  hind- 
ing  upon  the  Athenian  i-)eople.  hut  merely  recommendtitory)  was 
adapted  tQ  this  state  of  alfairs,  nnd  to  the  dispositions  recently  mani- 
fested at  A.thens  toward  conjoint  action  with  other  Greeks  against 
Philip.  The  synod  advised,  that  immediately  on  the  return  of  the 
envoys  still  absent  on  mission  (when  probably  all  such  Greeks,  as 
were' willing  even  to  talk  over  the  proposition,  would  send  their 
deputies  also),  the  Athenian  prytaneis  should  convene  two  public 
assemblies,  according  to  the  laws,  for  the  purjiose  of  debating  and 
deciding  the  question  of  peace.  Whatever  decision  midit  be  here 
taken,  the  synod  adopted  it  beforehand  as  their  ov.-n.  They  further 
recommended  that  an  article  should  bo  annexed,  reserving  an  interval 
of  three  months  for  any  Grecian  city  not  a  ])arty  to  the  peace,  to 
declare  its  adhesion,  to  inscribe  its  name  on  tiie  column  of  record, 
and  to  be  included  under  the  same  condition  as  the  rest.  Apparently 
this  resolution  of  the  synod  was  adopted  before  the  arrival  of  the 
I^Iacedonian  deputies  in  Athens,  and  before  the  last-mentioned  decree 
proposed  by  Demosthenes  in  the  public  assembly;  which  decree,  lix- 
ing  two  days  (the  18th  and  19th  of  Elaphebolion)  for  decision  of  the 
question  of  peace  and  alliance  with  Philip,  coincided  in  part  with 
the  resolution  of  the  synod. 

Accordingly,  after  the  great  Dionysiac  festival,  these  two  pre- 
scribed assemblies  were  held — on  the  iSth  and  19th  of  Elaphebolion. 
The  three  ambassadors  from  Philip — Parmcnio.  Antipater,  and  Eury- 
lochus — were  present  botii  at  the  festival  and  the  assemblies.  The 
general  question  of  the  relations  between  Athens  and  Philip  being 
iiere  submitted  for  discussion,  the  resolution  of  the  confederate 
synod  was  at  the  same  time  communicated.  Of  this  resolution  the 
most  significant  article  was  that  the  synod  accepted  beforehand  the 
decree  of  the  Athenian  assembly,  whatever  that  might  be;  the  other 
articles  were  recommendations,  doubtless  heard  with  respect,  and 
constituting  a  theme  for  speakers  to  insist  on,  yet  carrying  no  posi- 
tive authority.  But  in  the  pleadings  of  the  two  rival  orators  some 
years  afterward  (from  which  alone  we  know  the  facts)  the  entire 
resolution  of  the  synod  appears  invested  with  a  factitious  importance; 
because  each  of  them  had  an  interest  in  professing  to  have  supported 
it — each  accuses  the  other  of  having  opposed  it;  both  wished  to  dis- 
connect themselves  from  Philokrates,  then  a  disgraced  exile,  and 
from  the  peace  moved  by  him,  which  had  become  discredited.  It 
was  Philokrates  who  stood  forward  in  the  assembly  as  the  prominent 
mover  of  peace  and  alliance  with  Philip.  His  mdtion  did  not  em- 
hrace  either  of  the  recommendations  of  the  synod  respecting  absent 
envoys  and  interval  to  be  left  for  adhesions  from  other  Greeks;  nor 
did  he  confine  himself,  as  the  synod  had  done,  to  the  proposition  of 
IK'ace  with  Philip.  He  proposed  that  not  only  peace,  but  alliance, 
should  be  concluded  between  the  Athenians  and  Philip:  who  had 
( xpressed  by  letter  his  great  anxiety  both  for  one  and  for  the  other. 


44S 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 


LANGUAGE  OF  EULULUS. 


449 


He  included  in  his  proposition  Philip  with  all  his  allies  on  one  side, 
and  Athens  with  all  her  allies  on  the  other;  making  special  excep- 
tion, however,  of  two  among  the  allies  of  Athens — the  Phokians, 
and  the  town  of  Halus  near  the  Pagasu-'au  Gulf,  recently  under  siege 
by  Parmeuio. 

What  part  ^schines  and  Demosthenes  took  in  reference  to  this 
motion  it  is  not  easy  to  determine.  In  their  speeches  delivered  three 
years  afterward,  both  denounce  Philokrates;  each  accuses  the  other 
of  having  supported  him;  each  affirms  himself  to  have  advocated 
the  reconVmendatious  of  the  synod.  The  contradictions  between  the 
two,  and  between  .^schines  in  his  earlier  and  ^schines  in  his  later 
speech,  are  here  very  glaring.  Thus,  Demosthenes  accuses  his  rival 
of  having,  on  the  18th  of  the  month  or  on  the  first  of  the  two  assem- 
blies, delivered  a  speech  strongly  opposed  to  Philokrates;  but  of 
having  changed  his  politics  during  the  night,  and  spoken  on  the  19th 
in  support  of  the  latter  so  warmly  as  to  convert  the  hearers  when 
they  were  predisposed  the  other  way.  iEschines  altogether  denies 
sucli  sudden  change  of  opinion,  alleging  that  he  made  but  one 
speech,  and  that  infavor  of  the  recommendation  of  the  synod;  and 
averring  moreover  that  to  speak  on  the  secoiid  assembly-day  was  im- 
]>ossible,  since  that  day  was  exclusively  consecrated  to  putting  ques- 
lions  and  voting,  so  that  no  oratory  was  allowed.  Yet  ^schines, 
though  in  his  earlier  harangue  (De  Fals.  Leg.)  he  insists  so  strenu- 
ously on  this  impossibility  of  speaking  on  the  19th,  in  his  later 
harangue  (against  Ktesiphon)  accuses  Demosthenes  of  having  spoken 
at  great  length  on  that  very  day,  the  19th,  and  of  having  thereby 
altered  the  temper  of  the  assembly. 

In  spite,  however,  of  the  discredit  thus  thrown  by  ^schines  upon 
his  own  denial,  I  do  not  believe  the  sudden  change  of  speech  in  the 
assembly  ascribed  to  him  by  Demosthenes.  It  is  loo  unexplained, 
and  in  itself  too  improbable  to  be  credited  on  the  mere  assertion  of 
a  rival.  But  I  think  it  certain  that  neither  he  nor  Demosthenes  can 
have  advocated  the  recommendations  of  the  synod,  though  both  pro- 
fess to  have  done  so — if  we  are  to  believe  the  statement  of  JEschincs 
(we  have  no  statement  from  Demosthenes)  as  to  the  tenor  of  those 
recommendations.  For  the  synod  (according  to  ^schines)  had 
recommended  to  await  the  return  of  the  absent  envoys  before  the 
question  of  peace  was  debated.  Now  this  proposition  was  imprac- 
ticable under  the  circumstances,  since  it  amounted  to  nothing  less 
than  an  indefinite  postponement  of  the  question.  But  the  3racc- 
donian  envoys* Antipater  and  Parmenio  were  now  in  Athens,  i\i.d 
actually  present  in  tlie  assembly;  having  come,  by  special  invitation, 
for  the  purpose  either  of  concluding  peace  or  of  breaking  off  the 
negotiation;  and  Philip  had  agreed  (as  ^schincs  himself  states)  to 
refrain  from  all  attack  on  the  Chersonese  while  the  Athenians  were 
debating  about  peace.  Under  these  conditions  it  w^as  imperatively 
necessary  to  give  some  decisive  and  immediate  answer  to  the  3Iaec- 


donian  envoys.  To  tell  them— "We  can  say  nothin-  pnsi'?ve  at 
present;  you  must  wait  until  our  absent  envoys  return  and  until 
we  ascertain  how  many  Greeks  we  can  get  into  our  alliance"— would 
liave  been  not  only  in  itself  preposterous,  but  would  have  been  con- 
strued by  able  men  like  Antipater  and  Parmenio  as  a  mere  dilatory 
maneuver  for  breaking  off  the  peace  altogether.  Neither  Demo<:tlie- 
nes  nor  .ii:schmes  can  have  really  supported  such  a  proposition 
whatever  both  may  pretend  three  years  afterward.  For  at  that  time 
of  the  actual  discussion,  not  only  ^schines  himself,  but  the  general 
public  of  Athv^ns,  were  strongly  anxious  for  peace;  while  Demosthe- 
nes, though  less  anxious,  was  favorable  to  it.  Neither  of  them  was 
at  all  disposed  to  frustrate  the  negotiations  by  insidious  delay  nor 
if  they  had  been  so  disposed,  would  the  Athenian  public  have 'toler- 
ated the  attempt. 

On  the  best  conclusion  which  I  can  form,  Demosthenes  supported 
the  motion  of  Philokrates  (enacting  both  peace  and  alliance  with 
Philip),  except  only  that  sjK'cial  clause  which  excluded  both   the 
Phokians  and  the  town  of  Halus.  and  w^iich  was  ultimately  ne^'-a- 
tived  by  the  assembly.     That  .Eschiues  supported  the  same  mot i'on 
entire,  and  in  a  still  more  unqualified  manner,  we  may  infer  from 
his  remarkable  admission  in  the  oration  against  Timarchiis  (delivered 
in  the  year  after  the  peace,  and  three  years  before  his  own  trial) 
^'!;f^;i".^^/^-l^nowledges  himself  as  joint  author  of  the  peace  alon"- 
withFhdokrates,  and  avows  his  hearty  approbation  of  the  conducl 
and  language  of  Philip,  even  after  the  ruin  of  the  Phokians.     Eubu- 
lus,  the  friend  and  partisan  of  ^schines,  told  the  Athenians  the 
plain  alternative:  "You  must  either  march  forthwith  to  PeirfEus 
serve  on  shipboard,  pay  direct  taxes,  and  convert  the  Thcoric  Fund 
to  military  piirposes-or  else  you  must  vote  the   terms  of  peace 
nioved  by  Philokrates."    Our  inference   respecting  the  conduct  of 
-Aschmes  is  strengthened  by  what  is  here  affirmed  respecting  Eubu- 
lus.    Demosthenes  had  been  vainly  urging  upon  his  countrymen   for 
the  last  five  years  at  a  time  when  Philip  was  less  formidable!  the 
real  adoption  of  these  energetic  measures:   Eubulus   his  opponent 
now  holds  them  out  in  terrorera,  as  an    irksome  and  intolerable 
necessity  constraining  the  people  to  vote  for  the  terms  of  peace  pro- 
posed.    And  however  painful  it  might  be  to  acquiesce  in  the  statu 
quo,  wiiich  recognized   Philip  as  master  of  Amphipolis  and  of  '^o 
many  other  possessions  once  belonging  to  Athens-I  do  not  believe 
lat  even  Demosthenes,  at  the  time  when  the  peace  was  actually 
uuder  debate  would  put  the  conclusion  of  it  to  hazard  bv  denouncing 
tlie  shame  of  such  unavoidable  cession,  though  he  professes  threS 
3  ears  afterward  to  have  vehenienlly  opposed  it. 
1-.  .*^*P^^'  ^.^^<^>'^^'<>'e'  that  the  terms  of  peace  proposed  by  Philo- 
Krates  met  with  unqualified  support  from  one  of  our  two  rival  ora- 
nihnV^    u^^^  ^  ^^"^^'  P^^'^^*^  opposition  to  one  special  clause,  from  the 
oiaer.     However  this  may  be,  the  proposition  passed,  with  no  other 
H.  G.  IV.-15 


450         TERMINATION  OF.  THK  SACRED  WAR. 

.odification  (.o  far  .s  ..  ^^^  S.^^:' Vuoufl^o- 
which  s'pecial  y.:xcei.tod    lalu,am     >c  ^^^^^^^  ^^  each  of  thu 

vidcd-that  all  ilic  P;'^=;  i^V. Mnaii  to  each,  ^vithout  disturbance  from 
belligerent  parties,  ,f'0"'^''i'^"\Xs  there  should  be  both  peace  and 
the  other:  that  on  tl'f «  P^'H^  P'^^'j  \  „  allies  on  Ihe  one  s.de,  and 
alliance  betsveen  A  kus  «    h   .1  her  .  ^^^  ^ 

Philip  with  all  his  al.es  "»      '•  ""^^^;,  ,/;  i  ,bout  other  Greeks,  uot 

^^l^r'^S-or'^f^^  ^^-  -'^  -^  ^''"^""  ''"^"'°" 
made  about  Kersebloptes.  alliance  enacted  on  the  second 

"^  Such  was  the  decree  of  P-^^^^^  "l^^"^^  fo  ihe  month  Elaphebol  on. 
of  the  twoassembly-;  ajs-thenmteim^^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^,^^  a.lvanlage 

Of  course-wilhoutUicfmltof^^^^^^^^^  ,  .^  ,„„et  oned  his 

sLSiionVan  '^^^^h^^^:.^izr^- 
»«tsl;Ttti!;t^:efru^tfiJSui!;;iieta:^ 

being  driven  from  had  <»  ^^'f'f ;  „,„s  much  was  not  realized. 

b5i  it  presently  appeared  tut  c^  en    »  days  after  the  pre- 

On  the  tweutyfilth  day  of  the  f " '«  X"V'  „.  ,i,e  purpose  of  pro- 
visos assembly),  a  fresh  «^»«^">'?f;^',/^\'l:jy'^v^^Wcin.ad  been  just 
aiding  ratification  by  solemii  «»  ' /"'  'j^,  \V.7lhe  same  ten  citizens, 
decreed.  It  was  now  "'o^"' »"'^'=""  p,  I,  '  \h<)uld  acain  be  sent  to 
tho  hod  been  before  »<;«;^'^f,^,^?,,?"n^  S  from  him 
Macedonia  for  the  pnrpo  e  f  ,^^,"  V"'Vt  ,^nians,  together  with  the 
allies.  Next,  it  was  r<-'f  °  I'^'l  "^  »'„/•  ^,  1  'eu  .  should  take  the  oath 
deputies  of  Ihcir  allies  ""-"  PJ,";'h°Venvovs. 

forthwith,  in  the  presence  of  ^  'Pi^,^"\?y-  ^-ere  to  be  included  as 
But  now  arose  '''e  "''''^•''  'J%Y,T,;,„s  aiui  Kersobleptes  to  be 
allies  of  Athens?  ^f  c  ,  '»^,,,^/  ™  those  two  ca,.ital  posi- 
included?  The  one  atid  the  "'''  ^^  ,;^_,.i,i,h  Philip  was  su.c  to 
tions-Thermopvla!  au'l  '"''jXJ'.'d  Athens  io  insure  against  h.m. 
covet,  and  winch  it  nio.t  ^''^;'^'  .,'^'",,.,„.u  out  the  special  exclu- 
The  kssembly.  by  its  recent  "'*<^'.  ,''^,  .Y'A',\jj^.,  ,i,„s  i,y  implication 
.ion  of  the   I'hokians  pix'posed  b    »  i„  1,,„1. 

admitting  tl.cni  »^,.»'"^''„,;  "':5,  „ble  thev  had  probably  envoys 
allies  of  old  slamlmg  »«''^"  ,.,':,,;„/ in  the  syiiod.  Norliad 
p  esenl  in  Athens,  but  no  ,'^.1™^'  jJ.Td'y    bu   a  dtizen  of  Lamp- 

and  to  take  the  oaths  i"  /'If  "'^"^^i,,,  Kersobleptes,  ^schines  tells  us 

As  to  the  manner  of  <1''"''''- ''''.' i.l   Uie  other  in  the  latter)  quite 

two  stories  (one  in  the  "^f ''«  ^^'edlig  only  in  this-that  in  both 

different  from  each  9«''*7'„  ""'i/S'a^e  f,resi.ling  magistrates  of    he 
Demosthenes  s  described  as  on^ot  the  p  fe^^^^  ^^  ,i,„ 


PHOKIANS  EXCLUDED. 


451 


ally  of  Athens.      Amid  such  discrepancies,  to  state  in  detail  what 
passed  is  impossible.     But  it  seems  clear-both  from  ^schines  Cm 
his  earliest   speech)  and  Demosthenes-first,  that   tlie   envoy  froni 
Kersobleptes,  not  havinir  a  seat  in  the  confederate  svnod   but  pre 
senting  him.self  and  claiming  to   be   sworn   as   an  ally  of  Athens 
found  his  claim  disputed;  secondly,  that   upcm  this  dispute  arisin- 
the  question  was  submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  public  assembly   wlm 
decided  that   Kersobleptes  was  an  ally,  and  should  be  admitted  to 
take  the  oath  as  such. 

Antipater  and  Parmenio,  on  the  part  of  Philip,  did  not  refuse  to 
recocrnize  Kersobleptes  as  an  ally  of  Athens,  and  to  receive  his  oath 
Lut  in  re-ard  to  the  Phokians,  they  announced  a  determination  dis- 
tinctly opposite  They  gave  notice,  at  or  after  the  assembly  of  the 
2ath  Elaphebohon,  tliat  Philip  positively  refused  to  admit  the 
rhokians  as  parties  to  the  convention. 

This  determination,  formally  announced  by  Antipater  at  Athens 
must  probaWy  Inive  been  made  known  by  Philip  himself  to  Philo- 
krates  and  ^schines,  when  on  mission  in  Macedonia.  Hence  Philo- 
krates,  in  his  niotion  about  the  terms  of  peace,  had  proposed  that  the 
1  hokians  and  Halus  should  be  specially  excluded  (as  I  have  already 
related).  IS ow  however,  when  the  Athenian  assembly,  by  expressly 
repudiating  such  exclusion,  had  determined  that  the  Phokians  should 
be  .-eceiyed  as  parties,  while  the  envoys  of  Philip  were  not  less 
express  m  rejecting  them-the  leaders  of  the  peace,  ^schines  aifd 
Pnilokrates,  were  in  great  embarrassment.  Tiiey  had  no  other  way 
of  surmounting  the  difficulty,  except  by  holding  out  mendacious 
promises,  and  unauthorized  assurances  of  future  intention  in  the 
name  of  Philip.  Accordingly,  they  confidently  announced  that  tie 
king  of  Macedon,  though  precluded  by  his  relations  with  the  The 
win!  Tt  ^^^^^f^^^««(»eccssaiyto  him  while  he  remained  at  war 
with  Athens)  from  openly  receiving  the  Phokians  as  allies  was 
nevertheless  in  his  heart  decidetlly  adverse  to  the  Thebans;  andV^^^^^^ 
If  his  hands  were  once  set  free  by  concluding  peace  with  Athens  he 
won  d  interfere  in  the  quarrel  just  in  the  manner  that  the  Athenians 

msotncpTTh'f  ^'  ^T'^'^  "?^^"'f  '^'  ^^^^ians,  put  down  Uie 
insolence  of  Thebes,  and  even  break  up  the  integrity  of  the  city— 

toZTLtZ%  T'^"r^  i  ^^'''t'''  Platrea,  and  the  Bc^ofian 
tonns,  now  in   Theban  dependence.     The  general  assurances-pre- 

an'ltvTo  w  n^f  ^'^  Aristodemus,  Ktesiphon,  and  others-of  Philip's 
l^u  ?  I?  °  favorable  opinions  from  the  Athenians-were  now 
a-  n.rTlf'i  ^"^'-"^?^'^  ^"^«  ^  supposed  community  of  antipathy 
fS^  tl  o  In  f'  T^  7.'^''''''?  ^  ^l^,sposition  to  compensate  Athens 
Vuh^^  ^?^  Amphipohs,  by  making  her  complete  mistress  of 

i^ubcea  as  well  as  by  recovering  for  her  Oropu*^ 

atf  .1  pir/  ,S'«;^'^"ffJa^rications  and  falsehoods,  confidently  assever- 
atul,  Philokrates,  Ji^schines,  and  the  other  partisans  of  Philip  pres- 
ent, completely  deluded  the  assembly;  and  induced  them,  not  indeed 


452 


TERMIXATIOX  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 


to  decree  the  special  excTiision  of  the  Phokians,  as  Phitokratcs  had 
at  first  proposed — but  (o  swear  the  convention  with  Antipater  and 
Parmenio  without  the  Pbokians.  These  latter  were  thus  shut  out  la 
fact,  thouprh  by  the  general  words  of  the  peace,  Athens  had  recog- 
nized their  right  to'be  included.  Their  deputies  were  probably 
present,  claimed  to  be  adniilled,  and  were  refused  by  Antipater, 
wiihout  any  peremptory  protest  on  the  part  of  Athens. 

This  tissue,  not  of  mere  exaggerations,  but  of  impudent  and  mon- 
strous falsehood,  respecting  the^'purposes  of  Philip— will  be  seen  to 
continue  until  he  had  carried  ids  point  of  penetrating  within  the 
pass  of  Thermopyla\  and  even  afterward.  We  can  hardly  wonder 
that  the  people  believed  it,  when  proclaimed  and  guaranteed  to 
Ihem  by  Philokrates,  ^schines,  and  the  other  enjoys,  wiio  had  been 
sent  into  Macedonia  for  the  express  purpose  of  examining  on  the 
spot  and  reporting,  and  whose  assurance  was  tiie  natural  authority 
for  the  people  to  rely  upon.  In  this  case,  the  deceptions  found  easier 
credence  and  welcome,  because  they  were  in  complete  harmony 
with  the  wishes  and  hopes  of  Athens,  and  with  the  prevalent  thirst 
for  peace.  To  betray  allies  like  the  Phokians  appeared  of  little  con- 
i^equence,  when  once  it  became  a  settled  conviction  that  the  Phokians 
themselves  would  be  no  losers  by  it.  But  this  plea,  though  sufficient 
as  a  tolerable  excuse  for  the  Athenian  people,  will  not  serve  for  a 
.'Statesman  like  Demosthenes:  who,  on  this  occasion  (as  far  as  w^e  can 
make  out  even  from  his  own  language),  did  not  enter  any  emphatic 
protest  acainst  the  tacit  omission  of  the  Phokians,  though  he  had 
opposed  the  clause  (in  the  motion  of  Philokrates)  which  formally 
omitted  them  l)y  name.  Three  months  afterAvard,  when  the  ruin  of 
the  isolated  Phokians  was  about  to  be  consummated  as  a  fact,  we 
shall  find  Demosthenes  earnest  in  warning  and  denunciation;  but 
there  is  reason  to  presume  that  his  opposition  was  at  best  only  faint, 
when  the  positive  refusal  of  Antipater  was  llrst  proclaim.ed  against 
that  acquiescence  on  the  part  of  Athens,  whereby  the  Phokians 
were  really  surrendered  to  Philip.  Yet  in  truth  this  was  the  great 
diplomatic  turning-point,  from  whence  the  sin  of  Athens,  against 
duty  to  allies  as  well  as  against  her  own  security,  took  its  rise.  It 
was  a  false  step  of  serious'magnitude,  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to 
retrieve  afterward.  Probably  the  temper  of  the  Athenians— then 
eager  for  peace,  trembling  for  the  lives  of  their  captives,  and  pre- 
possessed with  the  positive  assurancesof  ^schinesand  Philokrates— 
would  have  heard  with  repugnance  any  strong  protest  again.^t  aban- 
doning the  Phokians,  which  threatened  to  send  Antipater  home  in 
disiTust  and  intercept  the  coming  peace;  the  more  so  as  Demos- 
thenes, if  he  called  in  question  the  assurances  of  ^schines  as  to  the 
projects  of  Philip,  would  have  no  positive  facts  to  produce  in  refut- 
ing them,  and  woidd  be  constrained  to  'take  the  ground  of  mere 
skepticism  and  negation:  of  which  a  public,  charmed  with  hopeful 
auguries  and  already  disarmed  through  the  mere  comfortable  antici- 


SECOXD  EMBASSY  FROM  ATHENS. 


453 


pations  of  peace,  would  be  very  impatient.  Nevertheless,  we  might 
have  e^xpected  from  a  statesman  like  Demosthenes,  that  he  wouul 
have  begun  his  energetic  opposition  to  the  disastrous  treaty  of  846 
B.C.,  at  that  moment  when  the  most  disastrous  and  disgraceful  por- 
tion of  it— the  abandonment  of  the  Phokians— was  first  shuftled  in 

After  the  assembly  of  the  2.5th  Elaphebolion,  Antipater  adminis- 
tered the  oaths  of  peace  and  alliance  to  Athens  and  to  all  her  other 
allies  (seemingly  including  the  envoy  of  KersobTeptes)  in  the  Board- 
room of  the  Generals.  It  now  became  the  duty  of  the  ten  Athenian 
envoys,  with  one  more  from  the  confederate  svnod— the  same  per- 
sons who  had  been  employed  in  the  first  embassy— to  go  and  receive 
the  oaths  from  Philip.     Let  us  see  how  this  duty  was  performed. 

The  decree  of  the  assembly,  under  which  these  envoys  held  their 
trust,  was  large  and  comprehensive.     They  were  to  receive  an  oath 
of  amity  and  alliance  with  Athens  and  her  allies,  from  Philip  as 
well  as  from  the  chief  magistrate  in  each  city  allied  with  him.     They 
were  forbidden  (by  a  curious  restriction)  to  hold  any   intercourse 
singly  and  individually  with  Philip;  but  they  were  further  enjoined 
hv  a  comprehensive  general  clause,  "to  do  anything  else   which 
might  be  within  their  power  for  the  advantage  of  Athens."— "It  was 
our  duty  as  prudent  envoys  (says  /Eschines  to  the  Athenian  people) 
to  take  a  right  measure  of  the  whole  state  of  affairs,  as  they  con- 
cerned either  you  or  Philip. "    Upon  these  rational  views  of  the  duties 
of  the  envoys,  however,  ^schiues  unfortunately  did  not  act.    It  was 
JX-mosthenes  who  acted  upon  them,  and  who  insisted,  immediately 
atler  the  departure  of  Antipater  and  Parmenio,  on  going  strai^-'ht 
to  the_  place   where  Philip  actually  was,  in  order  that  thev  might 
administer  the  oath  to  him  with  as  little  delay  as  possible.    It\vasnot 
only  certain  that  the  king  of  :\Iacedon,  the  most  active  of  livino-  men 
^vould  push  his  conquests  up  to  the  last  moment;  but  it  was  further 
known  to  ^schines  and  the  envoys  that  he  had  left  Pella  to  make 
war  against  Iversobleptes  in  Thrace,  at  the  time  when  they  returned 
trom  their  first  embassy.     Moreover  on  the  day  of,  or  the  day  after 
the  public  assembly  last  described  (that  is,  on  the  25th  or  26th  of  the 
month  Elaphebolion),  a  dispatch  had  reached  Athens  from  Chares 
tiie  Athenian  commander  at  the  Hellespont,  intimating  that  Philip 
Kul  gained  important  advantaijes  in  Thrace,  had  taken  the  impor- 
tant place  called  the  Sacred  Mountain,  and  deprived  Kersobleptes  of 
'^Tui  -r^^^  ^^  ^^^^  kingdom.     Such  successive  conquests  on  the  part 
<)t  FliUip  strengthened  tJie  reasons  for  dispatch  on  the  part  of  the 
e!»voys,  and  for  going  straight  to  Thrace  to  arrest  Ids  progress      As 
tie  peace  just  concluded  was  based  on  the  uti  possidetis,  datiu"-  from 
iiic  (lay  on  which  the  Macedonian  envoys  had  administered  the  oaths 
at  Athens--Philip  was  bound  to  restore  all  conquests  made  after 
ni.it  day.    But  it  did  not  escapo  Demosthenes  that  this  was  an  obli- 
gation which  Philip  was  likely  to  evade;  and  which  the  Athenian 
P'opie,  bent  as  they  were  on  peace,  were  very  unlikely  to  enforce. 


AU  TERMINATIOX  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR 

Tl.P  more  auickly  the  envoys  reached  him,  the  fewer  would  be  the 
The  '"?'^«  ,3",^,p  J^,,'  ,oouer  wouhl  he  be  reduced  to  luncwou-^r  at 
|e'::rirhfst^ll  couUnrd"  o  a^c..  the  more  speca.ly  would  h.s  >asm- 

Thh  ;  SrAuUpit^    ul^  '"ueuio)  D cnJo.theues m.de {.omphdnt 

h«  envivs  werc^forccd   o  lea^e  Atheus  and  repair  to  Oreus,  not  nng 

™inedTn  respect  to  the  nu.in  object;  f«>- •^''^y.^f^t'.^.e  uul 
In,  look  uDon  then,  to  difobev  the  express  order  of  the  Senate,  an 
revertentTSnd  Philip,    After  a  certain  f  ;0  •;'.  O--- f^J'^^^^^^^ 

Sf  ^«S/=u..:^'  ol-S-f-  ->":S  m  days 

''^Hnd' tL''envoyVdo;,c''their  dnty  as  Den,os,hem.  recommended 
the;^mi<^.t  luuc  r(  ached  the  camp  of  Philil.  "'Thrace  with  >fi^e 
or  «ix    ays  after  the  conclusion  of  the  pc'ace  at  A  hens;  l"d     ^y 
be^ev^  content  to  obey  the  express  orders  of  the  »     'ej 

;?,'.«,«  S.i»  among  ll»m  w,  k™li»S  ll.«m.«lv..  Wi™P« 

tithcr  OD  the  road  or  at  the  restuig-placcs. 


DISSENSION  AMONur  THE  EXVOYS.  455 

Grecl^Tvorld '"^  Am .?"'"',  "^  ^^"^''  ^^^V'  ''^"/^  ''''''^'''^  ^"^  ^^^  -'"tiro 
o  x^  ?      •     Ambussadors   were    already   there    from    Theh<- 

S;i^^"und1e^f  ^  •  "^"7^''  ^  ^^^^  Macedouian  arm;  was 
ammniLaaioiina,  leady  for  immediate  action 

At  len-rh  t!ie  Athenian  envoys,  after  so  lon^  a  delay  of  their  own 
makmg,  toimd  themselves  in  the  presence  of  Philip.    And  we   houia 
have  expected  that  tliey  would  forthwith  perform  tiieir  w^^^ 
mission  by  administering  the  oaths.     But  they  still  w^nto     r^^^^^^ 
ponm,^  tins  ceremony,  and   saying   nothing  about   the   olXmtioa 
iMcumben   on  him,  to  restore  all  the  places  captured  since  tfev 
of  taking  the  oaths  to  Antipater  at  Athens;  places   which  ha      now 
indeed  become  so  numerous,  through  waste  of  time  oi^^he  mrHf 
the  envoys  themselves,  that  Philip  was  not  likely  to  yLldUi    no i^t 
even  if  demanded.    In  a  conference  held  with  his  cr^^  '   e    X 
nes— assuming  credit  to  himself  for  a  view   lar-er  thon  tlv;^  tof 
by  them,  of  the  ambassadorial  duties-S.   the  adt^^  i    la^^ 
he  o^Tth  as  merely  secondary ;  he  insisted  on  the  propr  etv  of  address 
ng  Pn  ip  on  the  subject  of  the  intended  expeditioirto  Th  Vi^^^^^^^^^^^ 
which  he  was  on  the  point  of  undertaking \as  was  Dla  n  f^-o3  i^ 
large  torce  miistered  near  Pel.a).  and  exhorting    d?n  S  emp  o^  it  so 
as  to  humble  Thebes  and  reconstitute  the  BaS)tian  citier  The  en 
Toys  (he  said)  ought  not  to  be  afraid  of  braving  any  11-^.     that 

t^  f  tatleT^f'"^^    ^'^  '\'  ^"""^T'     I>^'"^osthfnes  accorcHng  to 
e  statement  of  ^schmes)  opposed  this  recommendation-insis?in<r 

S  dcchrerth  't"  he"  f  »«;f /^"^^elves  t!>  their  spech^l  ^ission^ 
TlLioiv^^^^  A  nJ^I'^'^V''^^  no  notice  of  Philip's  march  to 
'imn       h;1  l?^'^^'  '''^^^^    '^"^h  discussion,    it  was  agreed 

slSl  iv^hatT'th''  tTi^"^  tfiem,  when  called  before  P^Ih^, 
snoulcl  say  what  he  thought  tit,  and  that  the  youngest  should  speak 

a  sneeeh'^rl'f  w  ^^^  ^"1«' ^9mosthenes  was  first  heard,  and  delivered 
m?fn7in^      '^"i  '^'^  ^  ^""^'^''^  ^^schines)  not  onlv  leavin^^  out  aU 

iSto  sh  me      T   ''['''''^^'^^^^'  fl'-^<tery  to  Philip,  as  to  put  the 

abri  liement  bl  1  ^'"■"  '''''^  ''''^^  ^^  .Eschines.  who  repeats  in 

mgtmeut  his  own  long  oration   delivered  to  Philip      We   cm 

nZ^'^Z^^'lV'"'''^-'''''''^'''^''^  '^  '>"'•  estimate!]}  ^schines 
SscS  l.^^"i;  '"T  .^^'^  ''^T'  ^'^^"^  Demosthenes,  .^schine 
Sn  to^^^^^  ^>f  Pl'^lip's  intended ex-oe- 

pSnl  J  h?'^^-''ln-  I}'  "^^^^^^^^^  P^^^^^P  ^«  '^'^^^  the  controve^-;v. 
WDcaee^?!  o  ff-^  ^^  the  Amphiktyons  and  the  Delphian  temple 

'  is^ inc'^^^^^^  ^"^^  r'  ^'^  T'"«-     ^'''  ^^  ^^"^^^1  interference 

ancientrnr  Ai  k'''^.  ought  carefully  to  inform  himself  of  the 
Sher  TW^^  ^^"^'^  '^^''•'''^7  ^^'^  Amphiktyonic  synod  was  held 
SoTihp  w  1?^?''^'^^"'^^^^^^^  different  nations  or  sec- 

nons  of  the  Hellenic  name,  each  including  many  cities,  small  as  well 


456  TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 

^,nTcit-  each  hoWinc  two  vote  iird  no  more;  each  bindiDg  itself 
l^-?nimD^"iveoalh   to  uplioUl  a.i.l  protect  every  other  Amphik- 
v^o",  °c  olt"^      i-uder   his  veuerahle  st,nction,  the  Boeoti|m  cities,  bei,^ 
^^^^hSvic  hue  ihe  ns,   .-ere  ^^^^^^^ 

fvc%e  ot  er  Bcroti an  towns,  he  vvouhl  do  ^vl•o.,!;  on  his  o«n  side 
add  to  tie  numbcrof  his  enemies,  and  reap  no  gratitude  from  those 

"Tmo^thrne'tn  his  comments  upon  this  second  embassy,  touches 
1,'ttio  r^n  whMt  either  ^Eschines  or    nnisclt  said  to  1  Inlip.     lit    pio 

esLTo'l^:^"o"of  the  second  embassy  wi^.m.ch  re  ucUince 
Iiavino-  detected  llie  trea<herous  puriioses  of  ^scliines  aiiu  i  n  lo 
k  rates"    S«y,  he  ^vould  have  positively  refused  to  go  (he  tells  us)  had 
he  not  bounJl'bimself  by  ?  promise  made  ^'"""S    -  *"-;^  "iw     for 
^ome  of  the  DOor  Athen  an  prisoners  m  :Maceclonia,  to  pioviut  loi 

h  m  the  mea^s  of  release.     He  dwells  much  ^^'P- 1-^;;;^- 
for  their  ransom  during  the  second  ^1"^'^^^^',^ "t^"^^  f  i,  ,"     f^^er 
the  consent  of  Philip.     This  (he  says  was  all    hat  la>  in  his  p(n\ei 

o  do?  as  an  incUvidial:  in  regard  to  Ibe  collect m^proeeedmgso^^^^ 
embassy,  he  was  constantly  outvoted.     He  ^  y^}^^  that  he  1  ad 
the  foul  plav  of  ^scliines  and  the  rest  with  Phihp,  that  i  e  lac 
writ  en  a  dispatch  to  send  home  for  the  purpose  of  ^;^P«^!"^;      '^'^ 
his  coUeai^ue^  not  only  prevented  him  from  ^^'-^^f  ^^"H,   '  ^'^  ^  ^.'1 
another  disnatch  of  their  own  with  false  information.     1  hen,  he  hcCi 
Tcll^edloTome  hoine%ersonally   for  the  ---7-P-^^ -_!j;^Vw^^^^ 
his  coUennues.  and  had  actually  hired  a  meichant-vcssel-but  was 

hindered  by  Philip  from  sailing  out  of  ^\^'^^^;!^^^"^'\- ,  ^^^^   _.  |.;,  ^^^ 

The  general  description  here  given  by  I^^j^^.^ft^^f^^f^^'     T„     ed  it 

conduct  during  the  second  embassy,   is  P''^»;^^^;^;    ,"^;  ,J^^'/^„ 

coincides  subsinntially  witii  the  statement  of  ^^f,^^  "^;^J'^^^^^^^ 

nl-uns  of  him  as  in  a  state  of  constant  and  vexatious  opposition  to 

Eis  colleUi^      We  must  recollect  that  Demosthenes  had  no  means 

ot\now  n-  wliat  the  particular  projects  of  Phi  ip  r(;a  ly  were,      im^ 

was  a  secret  to  every  one  except  Philip  bimselt.  --^,^^1^^ 

ti-il  a^rcnts  or  partisans.     Whatever  Demosthenes  might  suspect,  nc 

had  no  ^ic  evidence  by  which  to  impress  ^%;^^^'^:^ 

others,  or  to  counterveil  confident  assertions  on  the  hivorable  sicic 

transmitted  home  by  his  colleagues.  th^  r.mnt  of 

The  army  of  Philip  was  now  ready,  and  he  was  on  ^he  point  ot 

marchinir  southward  toward  Thessaly  and  Thermopyl*.     7^^^  pass 

was  still  held  by  the  Phokians,  with  a  tody  of  Laceda:monian  auxili- 


MARCH  OF  PHILIP  SOUTHWARD. 


457 


nries;  a  force  quite  sufficient  to  maintain  it  against  Philip's  open 
attack,  and  likely  to  be  strengthened  by  Athens  from  seaward,  if  the 
Athenians  came  to  penetrate  his  real  purposes.  It  was  therefore 
essential  to  Phdip  to  keep  alive  a  certain  belief  in  the  minds  of  others 
tiiat  he  was  marching  southward  with  intentions  favorable  to  the 
Phokians— though  not  to  proclaim  it  in  any  such  authentic  manner 
as  to  alienate  his  actual  allies  the  Thebans  and  Thessalians.  And 
the  Athenian  envoys  were  his  most  useful  agents  in  circulatiuo*  the 
imposture,  ® 

Some  of  the    Macedonian   officers  round   Philip  gave  most  ex- 
phcit  assurance,  that  the  purpose  of  his  march  was  to  conquer  Thebe*^ 
and  reconstitute  the  Boeotian  cities.     So  far  indeed  w^as  this  decep- 
tion carried,   that  (according  to  ^schines)  tlie  Thebau  envoys  in 
Macedonia,  and  the-Tiiebans  themselves,  became  seriously  alarmed 
The  movements  of  Philip  were  now  the  pivot  on  which  Grecian 
attairs  turned,   and  Pella  the  scene  wherein  the  greatest  cities  in 
Greece  were  bidding  for  bin  favor.     While  the  Thebans  and  Thessa- 
lians were  calling  upon  him  to  proclaim  himself  openly  Amphiktyo- 
nic  champion  against  tiie   Phokians— the  Phokian  envoys,  together 
with  those  from  Sparta  and  Athens,  w^erc  endeavorinn:  to  e'nlis't  him 
in  their  cause  against  Thebes.     Wishing  to  isolate  thel^hokiaiis  from 
such  support,  Philip  made  many  tempting  promises  to  the  Laceda3- 
monian  envoys;  who  on  their  side  came  to  open  quarrel,  and  induh^ed 
in  open  menace,  against  those  of  Thebes.     Such  was  the  disgracefid 
auction  wherein  these  once    great    states,  in   prosecution  of  their 
mutual  antipathies,  bartered  away  to  a  foreign  prince  the  dignity  of 
the  Hellenic  name  and  the  independence  of  the  Hellenic  world -'fol- 
lowing the  example  set  by  Sparta  in  her  applications  to  the  Great 
King,  during  the  latter  years  of  the  Peloponuesiau  war,  and  at  the 
Iteace  of  Antalkidas.     Amid  such  a  crowd  of  humble  petitioners 
and  expectants,  all  trembling  to  offend  him— with  tlie  aid  too  of 
^schiues,  Philokrates,   and  the  other  Athenian  envoys  w^ho  con- 
sented to  play  his  game— Philip  had  little  difficulty  in  keepino-  alive 
the  hopes  of  all,  and  preventing  the  formation  of  any  common  force 
or  decisive  resolution  to  resist  him. 

After  completing  his  march  southw\ard  through  Thessaly  he 
reached  Phera?  near  the  Pagasa^an  Gulf,  at  the  head  of  a  powerful 
army  of  Macedonians  and  allies.  The  Phokian  envoys  accompanied 
his  inarch,  and  were  treated,  if  not  as  friends,  at  least  in  such  man- 
ner a^  to  make  it  appear  doubtful  whether  Philip  was  going  to  attack 
the  Phokians  or  the  Thebans.  It  was  at  Pliei'c^  that  the  Athenian 
envoys  i\t  length  administered  the  oath  both  to  Philip  and  to  his 
5U  les  This  w^is  done  the  last  thing  before  they  returned  to  Athens- 
Which  city  they  reached  on  the  18th  of  the  month  Skirrophorion  • 
atter  an  absence  of  seventy  days,  comprising  all  the  intervenin«r 
month  Thargehon,  and  the  remnant  (from  the  third  day)  of  the  montS 
jyiuuychion.     They  accepted,  as  representatives  of  the  allied  cities 


458  TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 

nil  whom  Philip  sent  to  them;  though  Demosthenes  remarks  thfrt 
thli^iusuuctions  directed  them  to  administer  the  oath  to  the  chiet 
!  lo-istrate  in  each  city  respectively.  And  among  tlie  cities  whom 
t^^ef  Admitted  to  take  the  oath  as  Philip's  allies,  w.is  comprised 
K'niia  on  the  borders  of  the  Thracian  Cher.oncse.  The  Athenians 
considered  Kardia  as  within  the  limits  of  the  Chersonese,  and  there- 

^^^I^was^huft"^^^  postponed  both  the  execution  of  their 

special  mission,  and  their  return,, until  the  last  moment,  when  Phihp 
w-as  within  three  days' march  of  Thermopylae.   .That  they  so  post- 
poned  it     in   corrupt   connivance   with   him,    is  the   allegation  of 
Demosthenes,  sustained  by  all  the  probabilities  of  the  case.     Philip 
was  anxious  to  come  upon  Thermopylffi  by  surprise,  and  to  leave  as 
little  time  as  possible  either  to  the  Phokians  or  to  Athens  for  organ- 
i7in<'  defense      The  oath  which  ought  to  have  been  admiuistered  iii 
Thrace— but  at  anv  rate  at  Pella— was  not  taken  until  Philip  had 
iroMis  near  as  possible  to  the  important  pass;  nor  had  the  envoys 
vi^Lcdone  single  citvamong  his  allies  in  execution  of  their  mandate. 
And  as  Ji:schines  was  well  aware  that  this  would  provoke  inquiry, 
he  took  the  precaution  ofbrin-ing  with  him  a  letter  from  Philip  t  ) 
the    \theniau  people,  couched  in  the  most  friendly  terms;  wherein 
miilip  took   upon   himself  anv  blame   which  might  tall  upon  the 
envoys  affirming  that  they  themselves  had  been  anxious  to  go  and 
vi^itthe  allied   cities,  but  that  he  had  detained  them  in  order  that 
thev  mi'dit  assist  him  in  accommodating  the  difference  between  the 
cities  oF  Halus  and  Pharsalus.     This  letter,  affording  further  pre- 
sumption of  the  connivance  between  the  envoys  and  Philip    ^as 
besides  founded  on  a  false  pretense;  for  Ilalus  was  (either  at  that 
very  time  or  shortlv  afterward)  con(|uered  l)y  his  arms,  given  up  to 
the>harsalians,  and  its  population  sold  or  expelled. 

In  administering  the  oaths  at  Pljerse  to  Philip  and  his  allies 
iEschines  and  the  majority  of  the  Athenian  envoys  had  formally  am 
publicly  pronounced  the  Phokians  to  be  excluded  and  out  of  the 
treaty,  *and  had  said  nothing  about  Kersobleptes  1  his  was  if  not 
a  departure  from  their  mandate,  at  least  a  step  beyond  it;  for  the 
Athenian  people  had  expressly  rejected  the  same  exclusion  when 
proposed  by  PhiloUrates  at  Athens;  though  when  the  Macedoninn 
invov  declared  that  he  could  not  admit  the  Phokians  the  Athenians 
liad  consented  to  swear  the  treaty  without  them.  Probably  1  hilip 
Mul  his  allies  would  not  consent  to  take  the  oath,  to  Athens  and 
her  allies,  without  an  ^express  declaration  that  the  Phokians  were 
out  r.f  the  pale.  But  thoudi  Philokrates  and  ^schines  thus  open!} 
repudiated  the  Plokinns,  they  still  persisted  in  •..ffirming  that  he 
intentions  of  Philip  toward  that  people  were  highly  lavoiable.  llity 
alhrmed  this  prol  ablv  to  ihe  I'hoki:  ns  themselves,  as  an  excuse  toi 
Itvii)-  rronouiued  the  spccitd  exclusion;  tiny  repeated  it  louoi} 
aLd  eniphaticallv  at  Alliius,  inm.cdialely  on  their  return.  •  it  was 


PUBLIC  ASSEMBLY  AT  ATHENS. 


459 


then    th'it   Demosthenes  also,    after    having    b^jen     outvoted    and 
silenced  during  the  mission,  obtained  an    opportunity  for  making- 
his  own  pro«e.t  public.     Being  among  the  senators  of  that  year    hS 
made  his  report  to  the  Senate  forthwith,  seemingly  on  the  diy    or 
tlie  day  next  but  one,  after  his  arrival,  before  a  large  audience  of 
private  citizens  standing  by  to  witness  so  important  a   proceed  in '^ 
He  recounted  all  the  proceedings  of  the  embassy— recalling  the  hopei 
and  promises  under  which  ^Eschines  and  others  had  persuaded  tho 
Athenians  to  agree  to  the  peace— arraigning  these  envoys  as  fabrica- 
tors, in  collusion  with  Philip,  of  falsehoods  and  delusive  assurances 
—and    accusing  tjiem   of  iiaving  already  by  their    unwarrantable 
(lelays  betrayed  Kersobleptes  to  ruin.      Demosthenes  at  the  same 
^'i^i^,^-^    '  ^'i^^w'i  to  the  Senate  the  near  approach  and  rapid  march 
ot  Plulip;  entreating  them  to  interpose  even  now  ht  the  eleventh 
hour,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  what  yet  remained,  the  Phoki- 
ans and  riiermopyhc,  from  being  given  up  under  the  like  tieacher- 
ous  fallacies.     A  fleet  of  fifty  triremes  had  been  voted,  and  wero 
ready  at  a  moment's  notice  to  be  employed  on   sudden  occasion 
Ihe  majority  of  the  Senate  went  decidedly  along  with  Demosthenes 
and  passed  a  resolution  in  that  sense  to  be  submitted  to  the  public 
assembly.     So  adverse  was  this  resolution   to  the  envoys   that  it 
neither  commended  them  nor  invited  them  to  dinner  in  the'pi-yt'm- 
eium;  an  insult  (according  to  Demosthenes)  without  any  former  pre, 
cedent.  "^  * 

On  the  16th  of  the  month  Skirrophorion,  three  days  after  the 
return  of  the  envoys,  the  first  public  assembly  was  held-  where 
according  to  usual  form,  the  resolution  just  passed  by  the  Senate  ouoht 
to  have  been  discussed.  But  it  was  not  even  read  to  the  assemlily 
lor  immediately  on  the  opening  of  business  (so  Demosthenes  teJIs 
us),  .±.sehines  rose  and  proceeded  to  address  the  people  who  were 
naturally  impatient  to  hear  him  before  any  one  else,  speakin"-  as  he 
did  in  the  name  of  his  colleagues  generally.  He  said  nothin'^  either 
about  the  recent  statements  of  Demosthenes  before  the  Seiratc  or 
the  senatorial  resolution  followinsr,  or  even  the  past  history  f/f'tii- 
embassy— but  passed  at  once  to  the  actual  state  of  affairs  'and  the 
coming  future.  He  acquainted  the  people  that  Philip,  having  sworn 
the  oaths  at  Pher?e,  had  by  this  time  reached  Thermopyla3  with  his 
army  ''But  he  comes  there  (said  .^schines)  as  the  friend  and  ally 
ot  Athens,  the  protector  of  the  Phokians,  the  restorer  of  the  enslaved 
Boeotian  cities,  and  the  enemy  of  Thebes  alone.  We  j^onr  envoys 
have  satisfied  him  that  the  Thebans  are  the  real  wroiiir-doers  not 
only  111  their  oppression  toward  the  Boeotian  cities,  but  also  in 
reg-ard  to  the  spoliation  of  the  temple,  which  they  had  conspired  to 
perpetrate  earlier  than  the  Phokians,  I  (^schines)  exposed  in  an 
emphatic  speech  before  Philip  the  iniquities  of  the  Thebans  for 
which  proceeding  they  have  set  a  price  on  my  life.  You  Athenians 
Will  hear,  in  two  or  three  days,  without  any  trouble  of  your  own 


460 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 


that  PhiUp  is  vigorously  prosecuting  the  sirge  of  Thebes  You 
uiU  find  that  he  Avill  cnpline  and  break  up  that  city-that  be  ^^■lU 
rxict  from  the  ^I'liebans  compensation  for  tlie  treasure  ravished  froin 
I)eh)hi— and  that  he  uill  restore  tlie  subjugated  communities  of 
Phitsea  an.l  Thespia?.  Kay  more,  you  will  hear  of  benefits  still  more 
direct  which  wo  have  deterndned  Philip  to  confer  upon  you,  but 
Mhich  it  would  not  be  prudent  as  yet  to  particularize.  Euboea  will 
be  restored  to  vou  as  a  compensation  for  Amphii^olis:  the  Euboeans 
liive  already  expressed  the  greatest  alarm  at  the(onhdcntial  relations 
hetween  Athens  and  Philip,  ar.d  the  piobability  of  his  ceding  to  you 
their  inland  There  are  other  matters  too,  on  which  I  do  not  wish 
to  ^peak  out  fully,  because  I  have  false  friends  even  among  my  own 
eofle'in-ue«  '*  These  last  ambiguous  allusions  W(  re  generally  under- 
stooiL^and  proclliimed  by  the  persons  round  the  orator,  to  refer  to 
Oropus  the  ancient  possession  of  Athens,  now  in  the  hands  of 
Thebes  tSuch  giowinir  pr(  mises,  of  lentfits  to  come,  were  pioba- 
blv  crowned  by  the  a^inouncement,  more  worthy  of  credit  that 
Philip  had  emraged  to  send  1  aek  all  the  Athenian  prisonei-s  by  the 
coming   Panathenaic    festival,  which    fell  during  the  next  month 

Hekatombicon.  ,       .        ^n.    ,  •         ^  „ 

The  first  impression  of  the  Athenians,  on  hearing  ^schines,  was 
that  of  surprise,  alarm,  and  disple::snre,  at  the  unforseen  vicinity  of 
I'liilip-  which  left  no  time  for  deliberation,  and  scarcely  the  mini 
mum  of  time  for  instant  jn  (aulionary  <  eeupation  of  Thermopylae, 
if  such  a  step  were  deemed  necessary.     But  the  sequel  ot  the  speech 
-pioclaimincr  to  them  the  speedy  accomplishment  ot  such  favorable 
results,  to-ether  with    the  gratification   of  their  antipathy    against 
Tiiebes-effaced  this  sentiment,  ai.d  filled  them  with  agi'ceable  pros- 
nects      It  was  in  vain  that    Demosthenes  rose  to  rtply    arraigned 
the  assurances  as  fallacious,  and   tried  to   bring  forward  the  same 
statement  as  had  already    prevailed  with  the   benate     The  people 
n.fusedtohearhim;  Philokrates  with  the  other  friends  of  ^sclnnes 
hooted  him  off;  and  the  majority  were  so  full  of  the  satisfactory 
prospect  opened  to  them,  that  all    mistrust  or  impeachment  of  its 
truth  appeared  spiteful  and  vexatious.     It  is  to  be  remembered  that 
these  were  the  same  promises  previously  made  to  them  by   i^lulo- 
krates  and  others,  nearly  three  months  before,  when  the  peace  with 
Philip  was  first  voted.     The  immediate  accomplishment    ot  tlieni 
was  now  ao-ain  promised  on  the  same  authority— by  envoys  wJio 
had  communicated  a  second  time  witli  Philip,  and  thus  had  turtiier 
means  of  information— s.)  that  the  comfortable   anticipation  previ^ 
ously  raised  was  confirmed  and  strengthened.     No  one  thouglit  or 
the  damrer  of  admitting  Philip  within  ThermopyUr,  when  the  pur- 
pose of  his  comini?  was  understocxl  U)  be  the  protection  ot  the  i  iio- 
kians  and  the  punishment  of  the  hated  Thebans.     Demosthenes  was 
scarcely  allowed  even  to  make  a  protest,  or  to  disclaim  responsibi  ity 
.   us  to  the  result.     Ji:schines  triumphantly  assumed  the- responsibility 


LETTERS  OV  PHILIP. 


461 


to  himself;  while  Phih^krates  amused  the  people  by  saving— -Ko 
wonder,  Athenians,  that  Demosthenes  and  I  should  not  think  alike 
He  IS  au  ungenial  water-drinker;  I  am  fond  of  wine  " 

It  was  (luring  this  temper  of  the  assembly  that  the  letter  of  PIuIId 
brought  by  the  envoys,  was  productid  and  read.  His  abundant  e\' 
pressious  of  regard,  and  promises  of  future  lx3uefit,  to  Athens  were 
vyarmly  applauded;  while,  prepossessed  as  the  hearers  were,  none  of 
them  discerned,  nor  was  any  speaker  permitted  to  point  out  that 
these  expressions  were  thoroughly  vague  and  general,  and  that'n(^t  a 
word  was  said  about  the  Thebans  or  the  Phokiaus.  Philokrates  next 
proposed  a  decree,  extolling  Philip  for  his  just  and  beneficent  prom- 
ises—providing that  the  peace  and  alliunc-e  with  him  should  be 
extended,  not  merely  to  the  existing  Athenians,  but  also  to  their 
posterity— and  enacting  that  if  the  Phokians  should  still  refuse  to 
yield  possession  of  the  Delphian  temple  to  the  Amphiktyous  the 
people  of  Athens  would  compel  them  to  do  so  by  armed  interveu- 

During  the  few  days  immediately  succeedin  g  the  return  of  the  envovs 
to  Athens  on  the  (13th  of  Skirrophorion),  Philip  wrote  two  successive 
letters  inviting  the  Athenian  troops  to  join  him  forthwith  at  Ther- 
mopylaj.     Probably  these  were  sent  at  the  moment  when  PIiala?kus 
the  l^hokian  leader  at  that  pass,  answered  his  fii-st  summons  by  a 
negative   reply     The   two  letters  must  have  been  dispatched  6no 
immednitely  after  the  other,  betraying  considerable  anxiety  on  the 
part  of  Phihp,  which  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand.     He  could  not 
be  at  first  certain  what  effect  would  be  produced  by  his  unforeseen 
arrival  at  Thermopyhe  on  the  public  mind  at  Athens.     In  spite  of 
all   the  persuasions  of  ^schines  and   Philokrates,    the   Athenians 
might  conceive  so  much  alarm  as  to  obstruct  his  admission  within 
that  important  barrier,  while  Phakekus  and  the  Phokians   havino-  -i 
powerful  mercenary  force,  competent,  even  unaided,  to  a  resistance 
ot  some  length,  were  sure  to  attempt  resistance  if  any  hope  of  aid 
were  held  out  to  them  from  Athens.     Moreover  it  would  be  difficult 
tor  Phihp  to  carry  on  prolonged  military  operations  in  the  neiirJibor- 
1  ood  from   the  want  provisions,  the   lands  having  been  unsown 
through  the  continued  antecedent  war,  and  the  Athenian  triremes 
being  at  hand  to  intercept  his  supplies  by  sea.     Hence  it  was  impor- 
tant to  him  to  keep  the  Athenians  in  illusion  and  quiescence  for  the 
moment,  to  which  purpose  his  letters  were  well  adapted  in  whit  h- 
ever  way  they  were  taken.     If  the  Athenians  came  to  Thermopyio; 
they  would  corneas  his  allies,  not  as  allies  of  the  Phokians     Not 
only  they  would  be  in  the  midst  of  his  superior  force,  and  therefore 
as  It  vvere  hostages,  but  they  would  be  removed  from  contact  with 
iiie  I'hokians.  and  would  bring  to  bear  upon  the  latter  an  additional 
lorce  ot   intimidation.     If.  on  the  contrary,  the   Athenians  deter- 
mined not  to  come,  they  would  at  any  rate  interpret  his  desire  for 
uicir  presence  as  a  proof  that  he  contcmphited  no  purposes  at  Yariauco 


462 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 


Tvith  their  wishes  and  interests,  and  would  trust  the  assurances,  given 
by  ^schines  and  his  oilier  partisans  at  Athens,  that  he  secretly 
meant  well  toward  the  Phokians.  This  last  alternative  was  what 
Philip  both  desired  and  anticipated.  He  wished  only  to  deprive  the 
Phokians  of  all  chance  of  aid  from  Athens,  and  to  be  left  to  deal 
with  them  himself.  His  letters  served  to  blind  the  Athenian  public, 
but  his  i)artisims  took  care  not  to  move  the  assembly  to  a  direct  com- 
pliance with  their  invitation.  Indeed  the  proposal  of  such  an  expe- 
dition (beside  the  standing  dislike  of  the  citizens  toward  military 
service)  would  have  been  singularly  repulsive,  seeing  that  the  Athe- 
nians would  have  had  to  appear,  ostensibly  at  least,  in  arms  against 
their  Phokian  allies.  The  conditional  menace  of  the  Athenian 
assembly  against  the  Phokians  (in  case  of  refusal  to  surrender  the 
temple  to  the  Amphiktyons),  decreed  on  the  motion  of  Philokrates, 
was  in  itself  sufficiently  harsh,  against  allies  of  ten  years'  standing, 
»  and  was  tantamount  at  least  to  a  declaration  that  Athens  would  not 
interfere  on  their  behalf;  which  was  all  that  Philip  wanted. 

Among  tlie  hearers  of  these  debates  at  Athens  were  deputies  from 
these  very  Phokians,  whose  fate  now  hnng  in  suspense.  It  has 
already  been  stated  that  during  the  preceding  September,  while  the 
Phokians  were  torn  by  intestine  dissensions,  Phala-kus,  the  chief  o\ 
the  mercenaries,  had  repudiated  aid  (invited  by  his  Phokian  oppon- 
ents) both  from  Athens  and  Sparta,  feeling  strong  enough  to  held 
Thermopylae  by  his  own  force.  During  the  intervening  monihs, 
liowever,  both  his  strength  and  his  piide  had  declined.  Though  he 
still  occupied  Thermopylae  with  8,C00  or  10,000  mercenaries,  and 
still  retained  superiority  over  Thtbes,  with  possession  of  Orchome- 
nus,  Koroneia,  and  other  places  taken  from  the  Thebans,  yet  his 
financial  resources  had  become  so  insufficient  for  a  numerous  force, 
and  the  soldiers  had  grown  so  disorderly  from  want  of  regidar  i  ay, 
that  he  thought  it  prudent  to  invite  aid  from  Sparta,  during  the 
spring,  while  Athens  was  deserting  the  Phokians  to  make  terms  with 
Philip.  Archidamus  accordingly  came  to  Thermopylae,  with  ICOO 
Lacedemonian  auxiliaries.  The  defensive  force  thus  assembled  was 
amply  sufficient  aaainst  Philip  by  land;  but  that  important  pass 
could  not  be  held  without  the  co-operation  of  a  superior  fleet  at  sea. 
Now  the  Phokians  had  powerful  enemies  even  within  the  pass— the 
Thebans;  and  there  was  no  obstacle,  except  the  Athenian  fleet  under 
Proxenus  at  Oreus,  to  prevent  Philip  from  landing  troops  in  the 
rear  of  Thermopylae,  joining  the  Thebans,  and  making  himselt  mas- 
ter of  Phokis  from  the  side  toward  Bceotia. 

To  the  safety  of  the  Phokians,  therefore,  the  continued  mnntime 
protection  of  Athena  was  indispensable;  and  they  doubtless  watched 
with  trembling  anxiety  the  deceitful  phases  of  Athenian  diplomacy 
during  the  wiiiter  and  spring  of  347-846  B.C.  Their  deputies  must 
have  been  present  at  Athens  when  the  treaty  was  concluded  and 
sworn  in  March,  346  B.C.    Though  compelled  to  endure  not  only  the 


THE  PHOKIANS  YIELD  TO  PHILIP. 


463 


refusal  of  Antipater  excluding  them  from  the  oath,  but  also  the  con- 
sent of  their  Athenian  allies,  tacitly  acted  upon  without  being  for- 
mally announced,  to  take  the  oath  without  them,  thev  nevertheless 
heard  the  assurances,  confidently  addressed  by  Philokrates  and 
^schines  to  the  people,  that  this  refusal  was  a  mere  feint  to  deceive 
the  Thessalians  and  Thebans,  that  Philip  would  stand  forward  as 
the  protector  of  the  Phokians,  and  that  all  his  real  hostile  purposes 
were  directed  against  Thebes.  How  the  Phokians  interpreted  such 
tortuous  and  contradictory  policy  we  are  not  told.  But  their  fate 
hung  upon  the  determination  of  Athens;  and  during  the  time  when 
the  Ten  Athenian  envoys  were  negotiating  or  intriguing  with  Philip 
at  Pella,  Phokian  envoys  were  there  also  trying  to  establish  some 
understanding  with  Philip,  through  Lacedaemonian  and  Atheuian 
support.  Both  Philip  and  ^schines  probably  amused  them  with 
favorable  promises.  And  though,  when  the  oaths  w^ere  at  last 
administered  to  Philip  at  Pherte,  the  Phokians  were  formally  pro- 
nounced to  be  excluded;  still  the  fair  words  of  ^schines,  and  his 
assurances  of  Philip's  good  intentions  toward  them,  were  not  dis- 
continued. 

While  Philip  marched  straight  from  Pherae  to  Thermopylae,  and 
while  the  Athenian  envoys  returned  to  Athens,  Phokian  deputies 
visited  Athens  also,  to  learn  the  last  determination  of  the  Athenian 
people,  upon  which  their  own  destiny  4urned.  Though  Philip,  on 
reaching  the  neighborhood  of  Thermopylae,  summoned  the  Phokian 
leader  Phahekus  to  surrender  the  pass,  and  offered  him  terms,  Phalse- 
kus  would  make  no  reply  until  his  deputies  returned  from  Athens. 
These  deputies,  present  at  the  public  assembly  of  the  16th  Skirro- 
phorion,  heard  the  same  fallacious  assurances  as  before,  respecting- 
Philip's  designs,  repeated  by  Philokrates  and  JSschines  withunabateS 
impudence,  and  still  accepted  by  the  people.  But  they  also  heard,  in 
the  very  same  assembly,  the  decree  proposed  by  Philokrates  and 
adopted,  that  unless  the  Phokians  restored  the  Delphian  temple  forth- 
with to  the  Amphiktyons,  the  Athenian  people  would  compel  them 
to  do  so  by  armed  force.  If  the  Phokians  still  cherished  hopes,  this 
conditional  declaration  of  war,  from  a  city  which  still  continued  in 
name  to  be  their  ally,  opened  their  eyes,  and  satisfied  them  that  no 
hope  was  left  except  to  make  the  best  terms  they  could  with  Philip. 
To  defend  Thermopylae  successfully  without  Athens— much  more 
against  Athens — was  impracticable. 

Leaving  Athens  after  the  assembly  of  the  16th  Skirrophorion.  the 
Phokian  deputies  carried  back  the  tidings  of  what  had  passed  to  Pha- 
laekus,  whom  they  reached  at  Nikea  near  Thermopylai  about  the  20th 
of  the  same  month.  Three  days  afterward,  Phalaekus,  with  his  power- 
ful army  of  8,000  or  10.000 mercenary'  infantrvand  lOOOcavalry.  had 
concluded  a  convention  with  Philip.  The  Lacedaemonian  auxiliaries; 
perceiving  the  insincere  policy  of  Athens  and  the  certain  ruin  of  the 
Phokians,  had  gone  away  a  little  before.    It  was  stipulated  in  the 


464  TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 

convention  that  Phaltekus  should  evacuate  the  territory,  and  retire 
whereverelse  he  pleased,  ^sith  his  entire  mercenary  force  and  with 
all  such  Phokiaus  as  chose  to  accompany  him.  The  remaining 
natives  threw  themselves  on  the  mercy  of  ihe  conqueror 

All  the  towns  in  Phokis,  twenty-two  in  number,  to.cether  with  the 
pass  of  ThermopvlcT.  were  placed  in  the  hands  of  Philip;  all  surr^n- 
derincr  at  discretum;  all  without  r(sist:mce.  The  moment  1  hilip 
was  thus  master  of  the  country,  he  joined  his  forces  with  those  of  the 
Thebaus.  and  proclaimed  his  purpose  of  acting  thoroughly  upon 
their  policy ;  of  transferring  to  them  a  considerable  portion  ot  1  hokis , 
of  restoring  to  them  Orchomenus,  Korsiie,  and  Koroneia,  hceotinn 
towns  which  the  Phokians  had  taken  from  them;  and  of  keeping  the 
rest  of  Bcjeotia  in  their  dependence,  just  as  he  found  it. 

In  the  meantime,    the  Athenians,   after  having  passed  the  decree 
above  mentioned,  reappointed  (in  the  very  same  assemb  y  of  the  Ibtli 
Skirrophorion— June)  the  same  ten  envoys  to  carry  intelligence  ot  i 
to  Philip   and  to  be  witnesses  of  the  accomplishment  of  the  splendid 
promises' made  in  his  name.     But  Demosthenes  immediately  swore 
off  and  n-fused  to  serve;  while  vEschines,  though  he  did  not  swear 
off'  was   nevertheless  so  much  indisposed  as  to  be  unable  to  go 
Th'is  at  least  is  his  own  statement;  though  Demosthenes  aftini'^'i ' 
tha  illness  was  a  mere  concerted  pretense,  in  order  that  ^schines 
micrht  remain  at  home  to  counterwork  any  reaction  of  public  feeling 
at   Athens  likely   to   arise  on  the  arrival   of   the  bad  news,  which 
^schines  knew-  to  be  at  hand,  from  Phokis.     Others  having  been 
chosen  in  place  of  ^schines  and  Demosthenes,  the  ten  envoys  set 
out  and  proceeded  as  far  as  Chalkis  in  Euboea.     It  was  there  that   hey 
learned  the  fatal  intelligence  from  the  mauiland  on  the  other  su  e  ot 
the  Eubcean  strait.     On  the  23d  of  Skirrophorion,  Phalcekus  and  all 
the   Phokian  towns   had  surrendered;   Philip  was  master  of  1  her- 
mopylae,  had  joined  his  forces  with  the  Thebans,  and  proclaimed  an 
^qualified   philo-Theban   policy;   on   the   27th    of  ^Skirrophorion, 
Derkyllus,  one  of  the  envoys,  arrived  in  haste  back  at  Athens,  hav- 
iugstopped  short  in  his  mission  on  hearing  the  facts. 

At  the  moment  when  he  arrived,  the  people  were  holding  an  assem- 
blv  in  the  Peirjens,  on  matters  connected  with  the  docks  and  arsenal; 
and  to  this  assembly,  actually  sitting.  Derkyllus  made  his  unexpecied 
report.  The  shock  to  the  public  of  Athens  was  prodigious.  Not 
onlv  were  all  their  splendid  anticipations  of  nnti-Theban  policy  from 
Philip  (hitherto  believed  and  welcomed  by  the  }>eople  on  the  positive 
assurances  of  Philokrates  and  ^Eschines)  now  da.shed  to  the  ground 
—not  only  were  the  Athenians  smitten  with  the  consciousness  that  they 
had  been'oven-eached  bv  Philip,  that  they  had  played  into  the  hands 
of  their  enemies  the  Thebans,  and  that  they  had  betrayed  their  allH>s 
the  Phokians  to  ruin— but  they  felt  also  that  they  had  yielded  up  Ther- 
mopvlK.  the  defense  at  once  of  Attica  nnd  of  Groere.  and  that  the  rond 
to  Athens  lav  opeu  to  their  worst  enemie*  Oie  Thebans,  now  aided  by 


CELEBRATION  OF  PHILIPS  SUCCESS.  465 

Macedonian  force.  Under  this  pressure  of  surprise,  sorrow  and 
terror,  the  Athenians  on  the  motion  of  Kallisthenes,  passed  these 
votes-lo  put  tlie  Peiraeas,  as  well  as  the 'fortresses  throughout 
Attica,  in  immediate  defense-To  bring  within  these  walls  for  safetv 
all  the  women  nnd  children,  and  all  the  movable  property  now 
^^recid  .'.broad  in  AlMca-To  celebrate  the  approaching  festival  of 
the  Ilerakleia,  not  in  the  country,  as  was  usual,  but  in  the  interiorof 
Athens. 

Such  were  the  significant  votes,  the  like  of  whicli  had  not  been  passed 
at  Alliens  since  the  Peloponnesian  war,  attesting  the  terrible  reaction 
of  feeling  occasioned  at  Athens  by  the  disastrous  news  from  Phokis 
^schines  had  now  recovered  from  his  indisposition  ;  or  (if  we  are 
to  believe  Demosthenes)  found  it  convenient  to  lay  aside  -tlic  pre- 
tense     He  set  out  as  self-appointed  envoy,  without  any  new  noinina- 

lon  by  the  people-probably  with  such  of  the  Ten  as  were  favorable 
to  his  yiews-to  Phihp  and  to  the  joint  Mabedonian  and  Tlieban 
army  in  Phokis.  And  what  is  yet  more  remarkable,  he  took  his 
journey  thither  through  Thebes  itself  ;  though  his  speeches  and  his 
policy  had  been  for  months  past  (according  to  his  own  statement) 
violently  ant  1-1  heban;  and  though  he  had  affirmed  (this  however 
rests  upon  the  testimony  of  his  rival)  that  the  Thebans  had  set  a 
price  upon  his  head.  Having  joined  Philip,  .Eschines  took  part  i-i 
the  fesli ye  sacrifices  and  solemn  pieans  celebrated  by  the  Macedo- 
nians, Ihebans,  and  Thessalians,  in  commemoration  and  thankso-jv- 
mg  for  their  easy,  though  long  deferred  triumph  over  the  Phokians 
and  tor  the  conclusion  of  the  Ten-Years  Sacred  War 

Shortly  after  Philip  had  become  master  of  Thermopyl£E  and  Pho- 
kis, he  communicated  his  success  in  a  letter  to  the  Athenians.  His 
e  ter  betokened  a  full  consciousness  of  the  fear  and  repugnance 
wJiieh  his  recent  unexpected  proceedings  had  excited  at  Athens-  but 
in  other  respects,  it  was  conciliatory  and  even  seductive;  exoressin- 
great  regard  for  them  as  his  sworn  allies,  and  promising  again  thai 
they  should  reap  solid  fruits  from  the  alliance.  It  allayed  that  keen 
apprehension  of  Macedonian  and  Theban  attack,  which  had  induced 
nnlrVi  #'^?-T^''^^^^'  ^'\  ^-y^^tiou  the  precautionary  measures  pro- 
An-pl^^n-  'I^'^^'f  \  .  ^".'^^'  subsequent  communications  also  with 
frS  i'  ;f  ]\  """."^  ^'''  advantage  in  continuing  to  profess  the  same 
r  cnd^hip  and  to  intersperse  similar  promises;  which,  when  enlarged 
upon  by  his  partisans  in  the  assembly,  contributed  to  please  th'3 
A  enians  and  lull  them  into  repose,  thus  enabling  him  to  carry  oi 
Vvon"^  opposition  real  measures  of  an  insidious  or  hostile  charakei-. 
.en  shortly  after  Philip's  passage  of  Thermopyh^,  when  he  was  in 

ifi:d^t'''^'rT/^^'  ^^^^  ^^'^^"'  ^"^  Thessalians,  ^schines  boldly 
i^t  hpi  t""  ^f  ^^'^  assertion,  that  these  Thebans  and  Thessalians 
till  tn  !^.       .f '''°-  v""'  H'""'  ^"^  ^^^^  constrained  him  against  his 

S  of?onc  ""'l  ^l'!l'  P^^^7'  ^^^'  ^^  ^^^^  ^^^^^  ^f  t^^e  Phokians  and  to 
the  offense  ot  Athens.    And  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  restoration  of 


466  TEUMIXATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 

.„!,„„  „»  oivntluii  which  must  soon  have  occurrcil, 
JJlffu^TaXcf «Uistonf""t  irhens.  and  tended  for  the  time  to 

tntu  iLimuij,  rr,,^|,,,,,„.  1,1,1  iiiev  were  irtumoQ  to  pa\  to  lut 

trausfened  to    he  Tl»el)an^,  but  t  lej  «ut  .    j  ;,    ,  -  m, 

Delphian  temple  au  auuual  trihi  te  of  «*'y '»^  J;  ■  "'"  f  „,^.  i>j,<,ki. 
„ui„  awav  should  have  l^^"  "-'^^,.e«^^;,  ^^  o'be  cL  do'vu  the 
a„s  were  dn^cted  to  be  sold  .   --^ -jj,;;;^)^^,  ,,  „„„  p  ,,Ui. 

n^:d'hivt.mUjM". lie  spoliation,  were  proclaimed  accursed,  and 

r:°:'onh    Do  i;,n  >uu;on.'''Th!s  vote  probably,  emanated  from  ,hc 
'p'o¥i^.l  antipathies  of  the  Arf eians  and  J  essc.,an  . 

The  sentence   r,g„r,..^  as  .t.p.onot,^^^^^^^       ,,,,„  J„,,  „£  „  .• 
asaiDSt  the  Phokians,  was  mcriuui  «       rut^ons  went  so  farr.s  lo 


ASCENDENCY  OF  PHILIP. 


467 


from  their  husbands,  and  the  imai^es  of  the  gods  from  their  temples  - 
that  Philip  took  for  himself  the  lion's  share'of  the  plunder  and  mov- 
able property — all  these  are  facts  naturally  lo  be  expected,  as  incu- 
dental  to  the  violent  measure  of  breaking:  up  the  cities  and  scattering- 
the  inhabitants.  Of  those,  however,  who  had  taken  known  part  iii 
the  sp;>liation  of  the  temple,  the  greater  number  went  into  exile  Avitli 
Phalaekus;  and  not  they  alone,  but  even  all  such  of  the  moderate  ani 
meritorious  citizens  as  could  find  means  to  emigrate.  Many  of  them 
obtained  shelter  at  Athens.  The  poorer  Phokians  remained  at  homo 
by  necessity.  But  such  was  the  destruction  inflicted  by  the  conquer- 
ors, that  even  two  or  three  years  afterward,  when  Demosthenes  and 
other  Athenian  envoys  passed  through  the  country  in  their  way  to 
the  Amphiktyonic  meeting  at  Delphi,  they  saw  nothing  but  evidence.^; 
of  misery;  old  men,  women,  and  little  children,  without  adults- 
ruined  houses,  impoverished  villages,  half-cultivated  fields.  Well 
might  Demosthenes  say  that  events  more  terrific  and  momentous  had 
never  occurred  in  the  Grecian  world,  either  in  his  own  time  or  in  that 
of  his  predecessors. 

It  was  but  two  years  since  the  conquest  and  ruin  of  Olynthus,  and 
of  thirty-two  Chalkidic  Grecian  cities  besides,  had  spread  abroad 
everywhere  the  terrors  and  majesty  of  Philip's  name.     But  he  was 
now  exalted  to  a  still  hiuher  pinnacle,  by  the  destruction  of  the  Pho- 
kians, the  capture  of  Thermopyla?,  and  the  sight  of  a  permanent 
Macedonian  garrison,  occupying  from  henceforward  Nikjea  and  other 
places  commanding  the  pass.     He  was  extolled  as  restorer  of  the 
Amphiktyonic  assem1)ly,  and  as  avenging  champion  of  the  Delphian 
god,  against  the  sacrilegious  Phokians.     That  he  should   have  ac- 
quired possession  of  an  unassailable  pass,  dismissed  the  formidable 
force  of  Phahekus.  and  become  master  of  the  twenty-two  Phokian 
cldes,  all  without  striking  a  blow— was  accounted  the  most  wonder- 
ful of  all  his  exploits.     It  strengthened  more  than  ever  the  prestii^e 
of  his  constant  good  fortune.     Having  been  now,  by  the  vote  of  the 
Amphiktyons,  invested  with  the  ricrht  of  Amphiktyonic  suffrage  pre- 
viously exercised  by  the  Phokians,^  he  acquired  a  new  Hellenic  rank, 
with  increased  facilities  for  encroachment  and  predominance  in  Hel- 
lenic affairs.     Moreover,  in  the  month  of  August,  346  B.C.,  about  two 
mouths  after  the  surrender  of  Phokis  to  Philip,  the  season  recurriti<7 
lor  celebrating  the  great  Pythian  festival,  after  the  usual  interval  of 
tour  years,  the  Amphiktyons  conferred  upon  Philip  the  signal  honor 
of  nominating  him  president  to  celebrate  this  festival,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Thebans  and  Thessalians;  an  honorary  pre-eminence,  which 
ranked  among  the  loftiest  aspirations  of  ambitious  Grecian  despots, 
aim  which  Jason  of  Phenc  had  prepared  to  appropriate  for  himself 
twenty-four  years  before,  at  the  moment  when  he  was  assassinatcvi. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  Athenians,  mortified  and  indiijnant  at  t]:e 
unexpected  prostration  of  their  hopes  and  the  utter  ruin  of  their 
"llics,  refused  to  send  deputies  to  the  Amphiktyons— affected  even  Lo 


403 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 


COEKUPTION  OF  .^SCHINES. 


469 


di«rcn-ard  the  assembly  as  irregular-and  vefraincd  from  dispatching 
their  sacred  legation  as  usual,  to  saciifice  at  the  Pythian  festival. 
The  Amphiktyonic  vote  did  not  the  less  pass;  without  the  concur- 
rViTce  indeed,  either  of  Athens  or  of  Sparta  yet  with  the  hearty 
support  pot  only  of  Thebans  and  Thessalians.  but  also  of  Argeians. 
Senians,  Arcadians,  and  all  those  who  counted  upon  Philip  as  a 
nrobible  auxiliary  a-ainst  their  dangerous  Spartan  neighbor  And 
wi™voys  froin  Philip  and  from  the  Thessalians  arrived  at  Athens, 
notifvino-  that  he  had  been  invested  with  the  Amphiktyonic  suffrage 
and  inviting  the  concurrence  of  Athens  in  his  reception,  prudentml 
con.ideratiSns  obliged  the  Athenians,  thouob  against  their  feelings. 
U,  pa^s  a  vote  of  concurrence.  Even  Demosthenes  was  afnml.  to 
break  the  recent  peace.  hoNvever  inglorious,  and  to  draw  upon  Athens 
fl  .roneral  Amphiktyonic  war.  headed  by  the  king  of  Mace.lor 

Here  then  was  a  momentous  political  change  doubly  fat.l  to  the 
ITelSc  world:  first,  in  the  new  position  of  Philip  both  as  mastei;  of 
the  kevs  of  Greece  and  as  recognized  Amphiktyonic  leader,  with 
means  *of  direct  access  and  influence  even  on  the  inmost  cities  of 
Peloponnesus;  next,  in  the  lowered  banner  and  uncovered  frontier  o 
Athtrs  di^crriced  bv  the  betrayal  both  of  her  Phokian  allies  and  of 
llie  general" safety  of  Greece,  and  recompensed  only  in  so  far  as  she 

^"^  HoTLinTeTlirrthenians  to  sanction  a  peace  at  once  dishon(»rable 
nnd  ruinous   yielding  to  Philip  that  important  pass,  the  common 
n^pa  t  of  A^Jica  and  of  Southern  Greece   wliich  he  could  never 
1  ave  carried  in  war  at  the  point  of  the  sword?     Doubtless  the  expla- 
iiation  of  this  proceeding  is  to  be  found,  partly,  in  the  general      a^ 
of  the  Athenian  mind;  remignance  to  nuhtary  cost  and  effort-sic^ 
ness  and  shame  at  their  past  war  with  Philip-alarm  from  the  pro- 
digious success  of  his  arms-and  pressing  anxiety  to  recover  the  cap- 
tives taken  at  Olvnthus.     But  the  feelings  here  noticed   powerf iil  a. 
they  were,  would  not  have  ended  in  such  a  peace,  had  they  not  been 
seconded  by  the  deliberate  dishonesty  of  ^schines  and  a  majority 
of  his  collea-ues.  who  deceived  their  countrymen  with  a  tissue  ot 
false  assuninces  as  to  the  purposes  of  Philip,  and  delayed  their  pro- 
ceedings on  the  second  embassy  in  such  manner  that  he  was  artuailv 
at  ThermopvlfB  before  the  real  danger  of  the  pass  was  known  at  Athens. 
Makino- all  iust  allowance  for  mistrust  of  Demosthenes  as  a  wit- 
ne^^s  the?e  appears  in  the  admissions  of  iEschines  himself  suthcient 
evidence  of  corruption.     His  reply  to  Demosthenes,  though  success- 
fully meeting  some  collaterial  aggravations,  seldom  touches,  ami  ne\  cr 
repels,   the   main  articles  of   impeachment   against   himself        1  le 
dilatory  measures  of  the  second  embassy-the  postponement  of  t lit 
oath-takimr  until  Philip   was  within   three   days    march  of  Ther- 
mopvl^-the  keeping  back  of  information  about  the  danpr  of  tl.a 
pass   until  the  Athenians  were  left  without  leisure  for  deliberating  on 
the  conjuncture-all  these  grave  charges  remain  without  denial  or  justi- 


fication.     Therefusa    to  depart  at  once  on  the  second  embassy  and 

0  go  straight  to  Philip  in  Thrace  for  tiie  protection  of  KeisobL?eT 

IS  indeed  explained,  but  in  a  manner  which  makes  the  case  n  he;- 

worse  than  bet  er.     And  the  gravest  matter  of  all-the  false  a  sm ' 

;S;Si^ed^b^chlnr''^  respecting  Philip's  purposes-are 

In  re-ard  to  these  public  assurances  given   by  ^schines  about 

Philips  intentions,  corrupt  mendacity  appears  to  me  the  only  suppl 

siti.jn  admissible.     There  is  nothing,   even  in  his  own  acc^,un^^to 

cxp lain  liow  he  came  to  be  beguiled  into  such  flagrant  misjud^ment 

while  the  hypothesis  of  honest  error  is  yet  refuted  by  his-'own  sub-' 

equen    conduct       -  If  (argues   Demosthenes)  ^schines  had  bc^en 

et  r  uf  the   n  uL^/"^'^V'"  "'  '"  ^^^"^°^  ''''  """  veracity  and  ch^i^ 
acttr  to  the   tiuth  of  positive  assurances  given  publicly  before  his 

countrymen     respecting  of   Philip's   designs-theu  on  ^fiudin^  th  t 

he  result^behed  hini,  and  that  he  had  fatally  misled  those  whSm  he 

undertook  to  guide,   he  would  be  smitten  witli  compunction    and 

wouh  in  particular  abominate  the  name  of  Philip  as  one  wl^  had  d  s 

graced  h.m  and  made  him  an  unconscious  instmment  of  tre  c  lerv 

biU   he  fact  has  bec'u  totally  otherwise;  immediately  after  the  pe'ce' 

.t.seh.nes  visited  Philip  to  share  his  triumph,  and  has  been  ever  s  fee 

avowed  partisan  and  advocate."      Sudi  conduct  is  inconsistiit 

^^  th  the  supposition  of  honest  mistake,  and  goes  to  prove-what  Uie 

pro(-eedings  of  the  second  embassy  all  bear  out-that  ^schines  was 

he  lured  agent  of  Philip  for  deliberately  deceiving  hifcou   tn^neu 

E  ehi:r/tL^^^"i-  ^'''^  ^^  reported'by  himself,  the  Z|uaie  o? 
.L>chines  bet.)kens  ins  ready  surrender  of  Grecian  freedom  and  his 
recognition  o    Philip  a,  a  master;  for  he  gives  not  only  ^  con se 

^.artln^'^'^'T  '?  '^''  '''''y  ^^  Philip  within  Thermopyl^  ,  I^ 
ex  oiting  hini,  when  he  coiues  there,  to  act  a-ainst  Tliebt^  and  n 
letenseof  t^lie  Boeotian  cities.  This,  in  an  Athenian  envoy  r^ues 
bl.ndncsslitte  short  of  treason.  The  irreparable  miSne  both 
to  Athens  and  for  free  Greece  generally,  was  to  bring  Philip  with  i 
r  ennopylae,  with  power  sufficient  to  put  down  Thtbes  andrecon 
j-  tu te  B(.otia-e ven  if  it  could  have  been  made  sure  that  sue  would 
he  the  Jirst  employment  of  his  jiower.  The  same  neo-otiato  ^^MuV  ,vJ 
begun  his  mission  by  the  preposterous  flouris    of  c'aTlin"  u^^^^^ 

0  give  up  Amphipolis,  ended  by  treacherously  handin  "over  to       n 

mSr^h?;'''  ^t'^"'  'r?"^^  "^'  otherwise^have  acquired      T  er- 
^vn  'n    '  ^!'^y^^J  *^"^<^  ^^^^«re  by  Ephialtes  the  Mali  in  to  Xerxes  k 

1  I.  n  n'  ^^'^'^^-ed  a  .second  time  by  the  Athenian  envoys  to  an  exTrt^ 
lb  I  enic  power  yet  more  formidable.  ^ 

sin  tVlV'/""""-'.^',^''^*^  ""^  ^^^  ^'•^-  ^^s  thus  brought  upon  Athene  not 

F  H  L'r  "'T  r^'^'  '"'^''^'''  ^^  ^'''  ^^'^'  butalso  by  the  comSn  of 

no    aSit  "s^^r?' "^^T"^- , I^emostLnes had c^S^y 

of  the  envo  t      f  ;.    ^^^^!r^ '"  ^en/^ed  opposition  to  (he  majority 

lue  envois,  a  fact  manifest  as  well  from  his  own  assurances,  as 


470  TERMINATION  OF  THE  SACRED  WAR. 

minpd-  but  we  tind  no  proof  of  any  shortcomings.  The  on)}  point 
u^of wl'ich  DemonstheiL  appcars'open  to  cen.ure  -JJ^l-y-^ 
Zn  to  protest  emphalically  during  the  debates  of  the  ™ont  i  h  a 
S)o  ion  at  \thens,  when  tlie  Phokians  were  tirst  practically  excluded 
f rom  t^  rJat^  r^^  cliscover  no  other  fault  established  on  pi-obable 
oTound  a.S  him.  amid  the  multifarious  accusations,  chietiy  per- 
4nal    nd  Torei^rn  to  the  main  issue,  preferred  by  his  opponent. 

F^snectin  '  Philokrates-the  actual  mover,  in  the  Athenian  assem- 
huXaU  the  important  resolutions  tendin-  to  bring  about  this  peace 
WP  learn  that  beiucr  impeached  by  Hvperides  not  long  afterward 
To  retired  from  At  It^n  without  standing  trial,  and  w^s  condemned 
fn  his  absence  Both  he  and  .Eschines  (so  Demosthenes  asserts  had 
received  fioinPhUip  bribes  and  grants  out  of  the  spoils  o  Olyn  uis; 
Inrt  Ph  1  okrates  esoecially,  displayed  his  newly-acquired  weal  h  at 
Ifhen^with  Impud^-Tt  ostentation'  These  are  f  egations  m  them- 
tlves  nrobable  though  coming  from  a  political  rival.  Ihe  peace 
havin^^drsapp^^^^^  e^very  one's  hopes,  came  speedily  to  be  regarded 
wmi?hame  and  reoret,  of  which  Philokrates  bore  the  brunt  as  its 
^hie'f  llXr.  "Botir^schines  and  Deni<>sthenes  scmght^^  cast  upon 
each  other  the  imputation  of  contederacy  with  Phdokiatcs 

The  pious  feel  ng  of  Diodorus  leads  him  to  describe,  with  peculiar 
seril^L^rthe  div^ie  Judgmeiits  winch  fdloiia  t^c.e^nc.i^^ 
in  despoilin«T  the  Delphian  temple.  Phal^kus,  with  his  meiccnai  es 
ou  of  Phokis  retired  tirst  into  Peloponnesus;  from  hence  seeking 
?o  cJ^oss  to  Ta^^^  he  was  forced  back  wiien  actuan,^^^^^^^^^ 

by  a  mutiny  of  his  soldiers,  and  passed  into  Krcte      Heie  !'<;««•- 
service  with    the  inhabitants  of  Knossus  against  those  of  L}k  us 
Ovei  thelatter  he  gained  a  victory,  and  their  city  was  only  rescued 
from  hmbv  the  unexpected  arrival  of  the  Spartan  king  Arch.damus. 
Th^t  iTucI  ece  ny  t^ie  auxiliary  of  Phal^kus  in  Phokis,  was  now 
on  Kay  across  the  sea  toward  Tarentum,  near  which  city  he  wa 
^ain  a  few  years  afterward.     Phal^kus.  repulsed  from  Ly^Ui«,  next 
Hid  4-eto  Kvdonia,  and  was  bringing  up  engines  to  .^f  er    1  e 
walls  when  a  storm  of  thunder  and  lightning  arose   so  y>o\^'"/  U\^ 
^sengTnes  "were  burned  by  the  divine  tire."  and  he  himself  ^ut 
several  soldiers  perished    in  trying  to  extinguish  the  flames,      nis 
remaning  army  passed  into  Peloponnesus,  ^vhere  they  embracec^^^tj^^^ 

cause  of  s^ome  Eleian  exiles  against  ^b^^«;-^'"^";^^;i\;\^/J^,\:e^ 
vanquished,  compelled  to  surrender,  and  either  sold  ^"^0  ^l^^^f  L^,',.|  ". 
to  d^eath.     Even  the  wives  of  the  Pl^f^^n  leaders  >^' »«  haci^^jm^^^^^ 
themselves  with  some  of  the  sacred  donatives  out  of  the  Dtipnic.-! 


POSITION  OF  PHILIP. 


471 


temple,  were  visited  with  tho  like  extremity  of  suffering.  And  while 
the  gods  dealt  thus  rigorously  with  the  authors  of  the  sacrilege,  they 
exiiibited  favor  no  less  manifest  toward  their  champion  Philip,  wiiom 
they  exalted  more  and  more  toward  the  pinnacle  of  honor  ana 
dominion. 


CHAPTER  XC. 

FROM     THE    PEACE    OP    346    B.C.    TO    THE    BATTLE     OF    CHvERONEIA 

AND   THE   DEATH    OF   PHILIP. 

I  HAVE  described  in  my  last  chapter  the  conclusion  of  the  Sacred 
War,  and  the  re-establishment  of  the  Amphiktyonic  assemblv  by 
PJiilip;  together  with  the  dishonorable  peace  of\34G  B.C.,  wheVeby 
Athens,  after  a  war  feeble  in  management  and  inglorious  in  result, 
was  betrayed  by  the  treachery  of  her  own  envovs  into  the  al)andou- 
ment  of  the  pass  of  Therinopyhie— a  new  sacrifice,  not  required  by 
her  actual  position,  and  more  fatal  to  lier  futre  security  than  any  of 
the  previous  losses.  This  important  pass,  the  key  of  Greece,  had 
now  come  into  possession  of  Philip,  who  occupied  it,  together' with 
the  Phokian  territory,  by  a  permanent  garrison  of  hi^  own  troops. 
The  Amphiktyonic  assembly  had  become  an  instrument  for  his 
exaltation.  Both  Thebans  and  Thessalians  were  devoted  to  his 
interest;  rejoicing  in  the  ruin  of  their  common  enemies  the  Phokians 
without  reflecting  on  the  more  formidable  power  now  established  on 
their  frontiers.  Though  the  power  of  Thebes  had  been  positively 
increased  by  regaining  Orchomenus  and  Koroneia;  yet,  compara- 
tively speaking,  the  new  position  of  Philip  broimht  uf)on  her,  as  well 
as  upon  Athens  and  the  rest  of  Greece,  a  degradation  and  extraneous 
mastery  such  as  had  never  ])efore  been  endured. 

This  new  position  of  Philip, -as  champion  of  the  Amphiktvonic 
asseni bly,  and  within  the  line  of  common  Grecian  defense,  was  pro- 
toundly  felt  by  Demosthenes.  A  short  time  after  the  surrender  of 
lliermopylae,  when  the  Thessalian  and  Macedonian  envoys  had 
arriveil  at  Athens,  announcing  the  recent  determination  of  the 
Amphiklyons  to  confer  upon  Philip  the  place  in  that  assembly  from 
whence  the  Phokians  had  been  just  expelled,  concurrence  of  Athens 
in  this  vote  was  invited;  but  the  Athenians,  mortified  and  exas- 
perated at  the  recent  turn  of  events,  were  hardly  disposed  to  acqui- 
esce. Here  we  find  Demosthenes  taking  the  cautious  side,  and 
sinjnglv  advising  compliance.  He  insists  upon  the  necessity  of 
retraining  from  any  measure  calculated  to  break  the  existing  peace 
However  deplorable  may  have  been  its  conditions;  and  of  giviug  no 
pretense  to  the  Amphiktyons  for  voting  conjoint  war  against  Athens, 
to  be  executed  by  Philip.     These  recommendations,  prudent  under 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 

,,e  c-.rcun,st«nces,  prove  t,.t  ^^--^^^1'.°"?^!-^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
he  ware,  was  a..xi'o..3  to  keep  "  ""^  ."f^^'J  ,„  «ar,  this  was  owing 

SB::^^^^^^^^''^''''  -  "^  7  : 

^•^'e%ave  otUe.  evMonce.  ^^  ^:J^P^:Z  ^SlJC 
cited   to  auest  the  effect  ''«  ^''P^  ,Xe\ue  breaking  t.po    ll.e 

■mMmmimB 

^hich  had  come  over  Uie  oM  '^^  ?.    ^^,^,,,  y,ars  be/ore  ,^vbcrcllt 

liSiissiSli 


POSITION   OF  OCIIUS. 


473 


;^ 


and  the  declining  sentimsnt  of  Hellenic  independence  and  dignity, 
conspicuous  after  the  peace  of  34G  b.c.  in  reference  to  Philip. 

From  Isokrales  as  well  as  from  Demosthenes  we  thus  obtain 
evidence  of  the  imposing  and  intimidating  effect  of  Philip's  name  in 
Greece  after  the  peace  of  346  B.C.  Ochus,  the  Persian  king,  was  at 
this  time  embarrassed  by  unsubdued  revolt  among  his  subjects; 
which  Isokrates  urges  as  one  motive  for  Philip  to  attack  him.  Not 
only  Egypt,  but  also  Phenicia  and  Cyprus,  were  in  revolt  against  the 
Persian  king.  One  expedition  (if  not  two)  on  a  large  scale,  under- 
taken by  him  for  tlie  purpose  of  reconquering  Egypt,  had  been  dis- 
gracefully repulsed,  in  consequence  of  the  ability  of  the  generals 
(Diophantus  an  Athenian  and  Lamius  a  Spartan)  who  commanded 
the  Grecian  mercenaries  in  the  service  of  the  Egyptian  prince 
Nektanebus.  About  the  time  of  the  peace  of  346  b.c.  in  Greece, 
however,  Ochus  appears  to  have  renewed  with  better  success  his 
attack  on  Cyprus,  Phenicia,  and  Egypt.  To  reconquer  Cyprus,  he 
put  in  requisition  the  force  of  the  Karian  prince  Idrieus  (brother  and 
successor  of  Mausolus  and  Artemisia),  at  this  time  not  only  the  most 
powerful  prince  in  Asia  3Iinor,  but  also  master  of  the  Grecian 
islands  Chios,  Kos,  and  Rhodes,  probably  by  means  of  an  internal 
oligarchy  in  each,  who  ruled  in  liis  interest  and  through  his  soldiers. 
Idrieus  sent  to  Cyprus  a  force  of  40  triremes  and  8,000  mercenary 
troops,  under  the  command  of  the  Athenian  Phokion  and  of  Evag- 
oras,  an  exiled  member  of  the  dynasty  reigning  at  Salamis  in  the 
island.  After  a  long  siege  of  Salamis  itself,  which  was  held  against 
the  Persian  king  by  Protagoras,  probably  another  member  of  the 
same  dynasty— and  after  extensive  operations  throughout  the  rest 
of  this  rich  island,  affording  copious  plunder  to  the  soldiers,  so  as  to 
attract  numerous  volunteers  from  the  mainland— all  Cyprus  was 
again  brought  under  the  Persian  authority. 

The  Phenicians  had  revolted  from  Ochus  at  the  same  time  as  the 
typriots,  and  in  concert  with  Nektanebus  prince  of  Egypt,  fi-oni 
whom  they  received  a  re -enforcement  of  4,000  Greek  mercenaries 
luider  Mentor  the  Rhodian.  Of  the  three  great  Phenician  cities, 
bidon.  Tyre,  and  Aradus— each  a  separate  political  connnunity,  but 
adramistermg  their  common  affairs  at  a  joint  town  called  Tripolis, 
composed  of  three  separate  walled  circuits,  a  furlong  apart  from 
each  other— Sidon  was  at  once  the  oldest,  the  richest,  and  the  greatest 
sutterer  from  Persian  oppression.  Hence  the  Sidonian  population, 
with  their  prmce  Tennes,  stood  foremost  in  the  revolt  aijainst  Ochus 
employing  their  great  wealth  in  hiring  soldiers,  prepaiing  arms,  and 
aceumulating  every  means  of  defense.  In  the  first  outbreak  they 
txpeiled  the  Persian  garrison,  seized  and  punished  some  of  the 
principal  officers,  and  destroyed  the  adjoining  palace  and  park 
reserved  tor  the  satrap  or  king.  Havini::  further  defeated  the  ncigh- 
001  ing  satraps  of  Kilikia  and  Syria,  they  strengthened  the  defenses 
«i  me  city  by  triple  ditches,  heightened  walls,  and  a  fleet  of  100 


li 


,„^  DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 

triremes  and  qu.n-emes    J"      -,  ^t  O.ese  V^f^^^^ 

marched  with  "^•\'^"'":;,,p?  tl  ,n  hW  a  ns.  Tlie  Sidonian  pn..ce 
comiptiou  served  liim  belter  «'  »"  '"J"  f  ^^  i,„o  private  bargain 
Tennes,  in  combn.ation  wiih  11  ntor  em^^^^^  p,.  ,uipal  citizens, 

,..!,!.  him,  betrayed  to  ';"^^^•^\'^.■^.!'  '^'^^e  s^^  k  the^ity  walls. 
and  ne.xt  P  -ced  U.e     ,"»  •  "  »  "^  '^  ;,,„,    surret.der^l    to    hm, 


POWER  OF  MENTOR. 


475 


rp^'th  ti,;ir  families,  and  ^,^"'°f„%«'^^,,Ton"  are  said  to  have 
I^  this  deplorable  <^«"f 'f/^;;"i,i^''£o^ved  '^l^'t  the  privilege  of 
perished;  and  such  was  '1^  \^,;','i.f. ,,';,. oe  sum  of  money.  Instead 

^SiKt^  unexpected  ..ecess^^O^^^^^^^^^^^ 

mense  force  aga h.st  Egyp  •  ^^^}^%^X  Asia  Minor;  3,000  by 
6,000  by  requisition  f ro  i  '  -^  O'^'^,^,^,  \'^^,.  To  Alliens  and  ?parla, 
reqitestfrom  Argos;  and  1,000  fomim^^^^^  ,^^^1^  .^  courteous 

lie  had  sent  a  like  request  b  '"j  [f"  ,;  ,„,^,p,t  which  Persia  had 
refusal.  His  army,  Greek  and  -^^  •'  ,';;,^'^'=i„to'-  u,,ee  divisions,  each 
sent  forth  for  many  vea.s^^  ^\f^J  f '" '^Xn  „eneral ;  one  of  the  three 
commanded  by  one  Greek  """l"'"- .J^'j  '  ^  fu„uch  Bagons.  the  t«o 
divisions  was  co"fi'>'-'''  '"  .^^'i':"'„  The  E-vptian  prince  Nrklane- 
ablest  servants  of  the  Pe  ^  an  king  i^L^.^alng  attack,  had  also  as- 
bus,  having  been  long  a«aie  of    he    mpciw    „  „,,^y  Grciks, 

sembled  a  numerous  '<>7'jX,°°.^f„';  Libyans.  He  had  also  taken 
^vith  a  far  larger  body  ol  I;;>.P"'™f,Xof  he  Kile,  with  the  forlress 
special  care  to  put  the  "^f  "'/''•'".„  i,i"e  of  defense.  But  thcfe 
o^f  Pelusium  at  its  moulh,  m  a  full  ^'a»«  "^  ^,     „,„,,  ^.  Ub  own 

ample  means  of  defense  ^"■';^,,  "'^f,  ,^'^|""itv'  e  abilitv  and  cunning 
uns'kiirullness  and  '"'=">»F'<  \'f  ■.,  j;''^,,  ^\,  i"  ,d  to  retire  into  Ethio. 
of  Mentor  and  Bagoas  ,^,^,'^'''"^1'  f  "fj^  '  f,,"  hands  of  the  Per- 
pia;  all  Egypt  fell  will,  1'''1<:J  f,^,"Xu  e  emi  hs  were  pillaged 
Lms;  the  fortitied  paces  ,^-'\"'^^,i;,lf ,,.,,, ',l,e  facri.lanh.ives 
with  an  inimense  booty  to  the  ^lctrsa^'l^  ^^^^^^      .^^,3 

^  of  the  temples  were  carried  off  to  l^^  at'<'j;;  ,  ^^^,^^^,y  of  Egypt 
for  an  additional  sum  of  moi  ey^  u„der  the  satrap  Pherendales; 
a.zain  became  a  P^''-«f»  P{"\  ","'  "^  ,h  a  h.rge  increase  b..lh  of 
while  Oeiius  returned  to  I-'''!-.  °"^  :^^'k' „  ercem,.iesweredi^nussed 
.ioininionandotrepulation.      IheGicekmc^^^^^  ^^^^       .__^^j. 

to  return  home,  vyiih  •^.."^^"P'f^,*^  e^  e™en   -.^fo'ce  on  both  sides; 
They  constituted  m  f,  !''?,PX7kin-  to  subdue  revolters,  while 


By  this  re-conquest  of  Plienicia  and  Eirypt,  Ochiis  relieved  himself 
from  that  contempt  into  which  he  had  fallen  through  the  failure  of 
Lis  former  expedition,  and  even  exalted  the  Persian  empire  in  force 
and  credit  to  a  point  nearly  as  high  as  it  had  ever  occupied  before. 
Tiu!  lihodian  Mentor,  and  the  Peisian  Bagoas,  both  of  whom  had 
distinguished  themselves  in  the  Egyptian  campaign,  became  from 
tills  time  among  his  most  effective" olHcers.  Bagoas  accompanied 
Oelius  into  the  interior  provinces,  retaiuing  liis  full  confidence:  while 
:\f"Utor,  rewarded  with  the  sum  of  100  talents,  and  loaded  with 
Egyptian  plunder,  was  invested  with  the  satrapy  of  the  Asiatic  sea- 
l)o;ird.  He  here  got  together  a  considerable  body  of  Greek  merce- 
naii-s,  with  wdiom  he  rendered  signal  service  to  the  Persian  king. 
Though  the  whole  coast  was  understood  to  belong  to  the  Persian 
eaipiie.  yet  there  were  many  separate  strong  towns  and  positions, 
held  by  chiefs  who  had  their  own  military  force;  neither  paying  ** 
tribute  nor  obeying  orders.  Among  these  chiefs,  one  of  the  mos't 
eonspieuous  was  Hermeias,  who  resided  in  the  stronghold  of  Atar- 
neus  (on  the  main-land  opposite  to  Lesbos),  but  had  in  pay  many 
troops  and  kept  garrisons  in  many  neighboring  places.  Though 
])artially  disabled  by  accidental  injuiy  in  childhood,  Hermeias  waf  a 
mail  of  singular  energy  and  ability,  and  had  conquered  for  himself 
this  dominion.  But  what  has  contributed  most  to  his  celebrity  is 
that  he  was  the  attached  friend  and  admirer  of  Aristotle;  who  passed 
three  years  with  him  at  Atarneus,  after  the  death  of  Plato  in  348-347 
n.c— and  who  has  commemorated  his  merits  in  a  noble  ode.  By 
treachery  and  false  promises,  Mentor  seduced  Hermeias  into  an  inter- 
view, seized  his  person,  and  employed  his  signet-ring  to  send  coun- 
terfeit orders  whereby  he  became  master  of  Atarneus  and  all  the 
remaining  places  held  by  Harmeias.  Thus  by  successful  perfidy, 
3Ientor  reduced  the  most  vigorous  of  the  independent  chiefs  on  the 
Asiatic  coast;  after  which,  by  successive  conquests  of  the  same  kind, 
he  at  length  brought  the  whole  coast  effectively  under  Persian 
dominion. 

The  peace  between  Philip  and  the  Athenians  lasted  without  any 
formal  renunciation  on  either  side  fwr  more  than  six  years;  from 
March  346  B.C.  to  beyond  Midsummer  340  u.c.  But  thvnigh  never 
formally  renounced  during  that  interval,  it  became  gradually  more 
and  more  violated  in  practice  by  both  parties.  To  furnish  a  consecu- 
tive history  of  the  events  of  these  few  years  is  beyond  our  power. 
AVe  have  nothing  to  guide  us  but  a  few  orations  of  Demosthenes; 
^vhich,  while  conveying  a  lively  idea  of  the  feeling  of  tlietime,  touch, 
by  way  of  allusion,  and  as  materials  for  I'easoning,  upon  some  few 
laets;  yet  hardly  enabling  us  to  string  together  tlio.se  facts  into  an 
historical  series.  A  brief  sketch  of  the  general  tendencies  of  this 
period  is  all  that  we  can  venture  upon. 

Philip  was  the  great  aggressor  of  the  age.  The  movement  every- 
where, in  or  near  Greece,  began  with  him,  and  with  those  parties  in 


476 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP 


ADVICE  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


477 


for  support.  AVe  bear  of  Ij^^J^^^;^^^^  Peloponnesus,  at  Anibra- 
of  his  excilin-  suggestions,  even  a  /le^^^  %^,  inhabitants  of  Megalo- 
kia  and  Leukas,  ^"  Eubcra,  ^"^^/^^^^^^^^^^^  presence  in  Pelopon- 

nolis  Messene,  and  Argos.  were  soiianii^  i    ^  i  intimated 

e  us,  and  his  active  co-opera  .on  «f^  "^;^„^,^*  n  tl.e  meaS  time  sol- 

a  purpose  of  going  .^  '^^%^';"\^  \^:,"^^„e  that  she  must 

diers  and  "^oney,  ^vlth  a  foimal  u^^^^^^  ^  footing  in 

renounce  all.  pretension  f .  ^^^f  "^   „,^^^^^  faction,  and  enabling 

Elis,  by  furnishing  ^''^^^^^^JVie  go™        after  a  violent  rcvo  u- 
them  to  become  nmstcr>  of  the  gmern  .^^  ^^.^  j 

tiou.     Connected  probably  T^^^^^^^^^  Bucheta,  and  Elateia. 

c^apture  of  the  three  ^^i^n  ^olonies^^^^^  .^  ^^  Ambrakia. 

on  the  coast  of  the  i^lV'^^^^,,^t.^''''to  ^^1)'^  Alexander, 

lie  made  over  these  tl"'9^  ^^^'?'  ^  Eniro  ic  Moh)ssians-deposing 
.vhom  he  exalted  to  be  prmce  ^f^^^^^^f^.l^;;f',t backed  the  t^vo  prin- 
therei-ning  P^^^^e  Arrhybas  He  imine^  and  Leukas;  but  here 
cipal  Grecian  cities  in  that  rj.^^^^"'^^^^^^  troops  showed  them- 

he  appears  to  have  f^^^^^^^^,..^^,^"?'^  he  aid  of  philipi>izi"g  V<}^^^^^  ^^ 
selves  near  Megara  and  EreUia,  to  llie  am  ^J^      pi^^^p  estab- 

these  cities  and  to  ^l^f  prions  ^d am  oUh^^^^  distributing  the 

lished  more  <i/"^^>V*'?'.±"  phuitTncr  a  garrison  in  Pherse,  the 
country  into  four  divisions,  ^^^^'|.J''Xj'';ead  th  he  again  overran 
citv  most  disaffected  to  lnm.J^Ve  also  \^^^'  -.^^^^  ,Hbes  on  his 

and  subdued  the  ^^^yP'^^;^.^;^^^^^^^^^^ 

northern  and  western  ^^''}y^'l^J:.l^^l^^^^^  Thracian  prince 

bringing  back  much  ^P«\^ '  '^^f. .    .^^  cities  on  and  near 

KerJobleptes,  to  the  ?^'^^^^f  f^ !  ^;j,^^  ^  iiave  r^  ^^'^  P^^l^* 

the  Hellespont.     He  is  said  fuither  ^  ;  V.'  j^om   one  town  to 

ation    of'^lacedonia.    t-- err-g  m  K.b^^  ,esidence-to 

another  according  as  ^^c  cles  red  to  tavor  o^^  removed. 

the  great  misery  a^^^^^^^^y"^",?;:  !  Vf  S     ^''^^  everywhere  from 
Such  was  the  extdierant  act  vit    o^^^^  ,^d.the 

the  coasts  of  the  Propontis  to  ^""'^^^^''J, '"^„^t.,] .  ^vhile  the  cities 
Corinthian  Gulf.  Everv  ye^^v  us  po^ or  -cr^a-;;;^^,^^  ^.^  itUout 
of  the  Grecian  world  remained  P'issiye,  "°^"  ,  rp^  philippiz- 
^^colini^ng  any  one  of  tl-j---!;;-^-  .^^  "l^conspirinl  to  seize 
ing  factions  were  everyxxhwe  \l^'''^''lJ\,^^,.r  Philip's  auspices; 
Ihe  governments  for  their  own  ^^^^^^^^^^  ileilenisln  were  dis- 
Avhile  those  who  clung  to  tree  ana  popu 

coura-ed  and  thrown  on  the  ^^^i^f"^,!''^-    .^^^^   any  breach  of  peace 

It  was  Philp's  policy  to  «^;^i;\2le^r  Xo m  GiLian  combination 

^nth  Athens;   the  onlv  power  u  der  ^^^^^^^^^  y^^^  Demosthen  ^ 

t^  eS^l^' W  ^  rS^  ao^n^^^  — ers  a  spirit  of 


vigorous  and  united  defense.  In  or  before  the  year  344  B.C.,  we  find 
this  orator  again  coming  forward  in  the  Athenian  assembly  per- 
suading his  countrymen  to  send  a  mission  into  Peloponnesus'  and 
going  liimself  among  the  envoys.  He  addressed  both  to  the  'Mcs- 
senians  and  Argeiaus  emphatic  remonstrances  on  their  devotion  to 
Philip;  reminding  them  that  from  excessive  fear  and  antipathy 
toward  Sparta,  they  were  betraying  to  him  their  own  freedom  as 
well  as  that  of  all  their  Hellenic  brethren.  Though  heard  with 
iipprobation,  he  does  not  flatter  himself  with  having  worked  any 
practical  change  in  their  views.  But  it  appears  that  envoys  reached 
Athens  (in  844-318  B.C.)  to  whom  some  answer  was  required  and  it 
is  ill  suggesting  tiiat  auswx'r  that  Demosthenes  delivers  his  second 
Pliilippic.  He  denounces  Philip  anew,  as  an  aiigressor  stretchin"- 
his  ])ower  on  every  side,  violating  the  peace  with  Athens,  and  pre'- 
panug  rum  for  the  Grecian  world.  Without  advisinir  immediate 
war,  he  calls  on  the  Athenians  to  keep  watch  and  w^ird,  and  to 
organize.defensive  alliance  among  the  Greeks  generally. 

The  activity  of  Athens,  unfortunately,  was  shown  in  nothing-  but 
words;  to  set  oflf  against  the  vigorous  deeds  of  Philip.      But°they 
were  words  of  Demosthenes,  the  force  of  which  was  felt  by  Philip's 
partisans  in  Greece,  and  occasioned  such  annoyance  to  Philip  him- 
self that  he  sent  to  Athens  more  than  once  envoys  and  letters  of 
remonstrance.     His  envoy,  au  eloquent  Bvzantine  named   Python 
addressed  the  Athenian  assembly  with  much  success,  complainino-  of 
the  calumnies  of  the  orators  against  Philip— asserting  emphatically 
that  Phihp  w^as  animated  with  the  best  sentiments  toward  Athens 
and  desired  only  to  have  an  ()i)portunity  of  rendering  service  to  her— 
and  offering  to  review  and  amend  the  terms  of  the  Jate  peace.     Such 
general  assurances  of  friendship,  given  with  eloquence  and  emphasis 
produced  considerable  effect  in  the  Athenian  assembly,  as  they  had 
aoiie  from  the  mouth  of  ^schines  during  the  discussions  on  the 
peace.     The  proposal  of  Python  was  takf^n  up  by  the  Athenians  and 
two  amendments  were  proposed.     1.  Instead  of  the  existing  words  of 
tlie  peace— "  That  each  party  should  have  what  they  actually  had  " 
-it  was  moved  to  substitute  this  phrase— "  That  each  party  should 
have  their  own."    2.  That  not  merely  the  allies  of  Athens  and  of 
^^aihj)  but  also  all  the  other  Greeks,  should  be  included  in  the  peace- 
that  all  of  them  should  remain  free  and.autonomou>;  That  if  any  of 
tiiem  were  attacked,  the  i^arties  to  the  treaty  on  both  sides  Avoiild 
lend  them  armed  assistance  forthwith.     3.  that  Philip  should   be 
required  to  make  restitution  of  those  places,  Doriskus,  Serreium  etc 
wiueh  he  had  captured  from  Kersobleptes  after  the  day  when  ]3eace 
Was  sworn  at  Athens. 

The  first  amendment  appears  to  have  been  moved  by  a  citizen 
named  Hegesippus,  a  strenuous  anti-philippizing  politician,  support- 
nf  PI  M-^'^'"^  ^'^^^^  ^^  Demosthenes.  Python,  with  the  other  envoys 
'Ji  ihilip,  present  m  the  asiem!)ly,  eitiier  accepted  these  amend- 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 

Jents  or  nt  least  did  not  protest  -^i-JjS.n  "l^' — ^^T^ 

HcUsil.pus  Willi  other  Atlienaus  "•''^  "';"\,'^,  .^^tice  ot  the  second 
KaHcatiou  of  Pl'i'P; ,«>';;  J^l'  eth.  he.l.i"!.^"'  refused  t„ 
a,nend.nent,  offered  '"■'^'  ■'"^"  J,' ^'e  general  proposition  and  the 
ralilv  ll'e  tirst-d.savov  ing  ho  h^  ;«  o  .„^      Moreover  he  d,»- 

therefore  ?«•«'"»«;' """''ih;:.nies  had  -one  to  Macedonia,  not  sin.plv 
lle-esippus  and  Ins  colleagues  "'  "  ■"  nd.nentsjuslindie^ted 

to  prefenffor  Philip's  atcepmncelhe  t  oan  em.  ^^^^  J.^^^^  .^,^^_,,  ,,j 
nU  also  to  den,and  irom  Imn    he  les.o  a  ^.^^^^ 

Halonnesus  (near  Sl<"(l  '"^ •,  i  '  ^, Ud  to  Hie  Alheidans,  or  that  l  kv 
Philip  denied  Uiat  the  islau  ^^'f^  J",  ,„,,„!„.  that  he  had  taken 
had  m\  rigl-.t  to  make  such  a  dtma      .  Sostratus,  who  was 

,    not^rom   them,   hut  from  .'f,  P^^'^,.,  S'^a-and  that  it  now 

decide  iu  liis  favor.  ^  Hcjiesippus  and  tlie  otliei 

Since  we  know  tLal  PI  l-P  ^^J^^^^^^^^^ 
cuvovs  Willi  peculiar  l»*^^^l^?y^^\\ '"'^'V^^s  well  as  about  other  matter>. 
mPit  between  them  about  y*^V-'"w.HT  sides  Hence  an  islniul. 
^.xs  conducted  with  -S^X/-  -^.;;;,  t^  U.-ectof  prolonged  alter- 
in  itself  small  and  i^^ignittcant,  b^^came^nt  J  ^^^^  Demosthene. 
cition  for  two  or  three  years.  ^,  f^^uf  A\Kenians  about  Halon- 
nSained  that  Philip  had  ^;^^^  ^^^^^j^,,^  i^^  i„  restitution  oi 
"esus,  and  that  it  could  on  y  ^^  ^\^^^^'f,i  ^  p^oprio  inotu-Asclnne> 
riohtful  Athenian  ownership,  not  as  a  ^  ui^  controversy  about 

and  others  treated  the  question  ^^    /^^'^';;'''^;  Halonnesus.     Let  us 

sv  able!     '•  PlnliP  O^'^'X  ^^^^^^  ft      Wlr  t  n^d  to  care  whether  he 
^keitandsctthequestion^res^  ^^^^^^^^.^i^  writers  made 
qives   it  to  us,  or  (jive^  it  t>ack    f^  ^-  •        ,^^  ^i^ough  it  were  anurt 
Various  jests  on  the  same  ^'"^^^^^^^^  vsits  might  liere  Imd 
silly  subtlety.     But  ^^^^^^' tl^^ ^,n^  that  well  conduee 
poi^^ttoturn  ora^ircntsn  U>placc.^  bas  been  always  c^eU.  ' o 


;;^U  l^Tmrl/or  a  sarcasn.  U>  place   U  1^  ^,,,,  no 

diplomacy,  modern  '»^^^^7.t,'''''Ti,e  question  here  had  no  lei 
lote  the  distinction  as  ^"'P,"^      f  \.^|.   '  ^^^^^^^^  Ko  modern  dipl o^ 

cnce  to  capture  durmg  war,  ^;\\\^^  "i^,rbeen  unlawfully  taken  i^ 
inatist  >vill  accept  restitutn-n  o    ^  ^'^^^^^^^^^j  , ,,,  eession  from  the  nip- 


HALONNESUS  TAKEN  AND  RETAKEN.  47^ 

piratical  damage,  Philip  ought  to  liave  ap-:>]io(l  to  Vthcns  for  redres; 
which  he  evideutly  did  not  do.  It  was  ofily  i,,  c-isu  ol  redress  hvWr 
refused,  that  he  could  be  entitled  to  right  liimseif  by  force-  andeve^i 
then,  It  niay  be  doubted  whether  Ids  taking  of  the  island  coul'i 
give  him  any  right  to  it  against  Athy.is.  The  Athenians  refused  li^s 
proposition  of  arbitration:  partly  bceartse  they  were  satisfied  of  tluh- 
own  right  to  the  ishmd— partly  because  they  were  jealous  of  adniit- 
tmg  Phihp  to  any  recognized  right  of  interference  with  their  insu!  ir 
ascendency. 

Halonnesus  remained  under  garrison  by  Philip,  forming  one  amono- 
many  topics  of  angry  coinmunicatioa  by  letters  and  by  envoys'' 
l)et\yeen  hini  and  Athens— until  at  length  (seemindy  about  341  b  c  ) 
the  inhabitants  of  the  neighboring  ishmd  of  Pepareiliu.s  retock  it  and 
earned  off  his  garrison.  Upon  this  proceeding  Philip  .addressed  sev- 
eral remonstrances,  both  to  tiie  Peparethians  and  to  the  Athenians 
Obtaining  no  redress,  he  attacked  Peparethus,  and  took  severe  reveii'^o 
upon  the  inhabitants.  The  Athenians  then  ordered  their  admiral  To 
make  reprisals  upon  him,  so  that  the  war,  though  not  vet  actually 
declared,  was  approaching  nearer  and  nearer  toward  lenewal 

But  it  was  not  only  in  Halonnesus  that  Athens  found  herself  beset 
by  1  hilip  and  the  philippizing  factions.      Even  her  own  frontier  oa 
the  side  toward  Bceotia,  now  required  constant  watching,  since  tin 
lliebtms  had  been  relieved  from  their  Phokian   enemies;  so  that  slii 
was  obliged  to  keep  garrisons  of  hoplites  at  Drymus  and  Panaktum 
la  31egaria  an  insurgent  party  under  Periluus  had  laid  plans  fot* 
seizing  the  city  through  the  aid  of  a  body  of  Philip  s  troops,  whic'i 
eoulcl  easily  be  sent  from  the  Macedonian  army  now  occupyiuo-  Pho- 
kis,   by  sea  to  Peg^e,  the  Megarian   port   on   the   Krissc^an^GuIF. 
Apprised  ot  this  consi)iracy  the  Megarian  government  solicited  ai  I 
irom  Athens.     Phokian,  conducting  the  Athenian  hoplites  to  3Iegara 
with  the  utmost  celerity,  assured  Wui  safety  of  the  city,  and  at  tlu3 
same  time  re-established  the  Long  Walls  to  Nisjea,  so  as  to  render  it 
always  accessible  to  Athenians  by  sea.    Li  Euboea,  the  cities  of  Oreus 
ana  Lretria  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  i)hilippizing  leadei^,  and  became 
nc^tue  to  Athens.     In  Oreus,  the  greater  part  of  the  citizens  were 
persuaded  to  second  the  views  of  Philip's  chief  adherent  Philistides; 
WHO  prevailed  on  them  to  silence  the  remonstrances,  and  imprison 
uie  person  of  the  opposing  leader  Euplmcus,  as  a  disturber  of  the 
UDiic  peace.^    Philistides  then,  watching  his  opportunity,  procured 
jue  introduction  of  a  body  of  IMacedonian  troops,  by  means  of  whom 
ue  assured  to  himself  the  rul(3  of  the  city  as  Philip's  instrument ;  while 
^uimraeus^  agonized  with  grief  and  jilarm,  slew  himself  in  prison. 
AiJ^retria,  Kleitarchus  with  others  carried  on  the  like  conspiracy, 
^jiving  expelled  their  principal  opponents,  and  refused  admission  to 
Aincnian  envoys,  they  procured  1000  ^Macedonian  troops  under  Hip- 
PODiKus;  they  thus  mastered  Eretria  itself,  and  destroyed  the  forti- 
ta  seaport  called  Porthemus,  in  order  to  break  the  easy  communi- 


480 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


THIRD  PHILIPPIC. 


481 


cation  .vith  Athens.     On.s  ^^^^^^^^^^H:^'^ ^^ 

S  ^^o  ^K  ^^  ale  ^^i^n^^^inliueoce  of  a  lead- 

iiiir  citizen  named  Kallins.  r^nrQAmllv  occupied  with  opr- 

At  this  time,  it  appears   Pl^^l^Pj^^  [c^T^kvln  3hs,  andproh 
rations  in  Thrace,  "vvhtTe  he  V^'^^''\''l^'^t^^^^^^  to  his  com- 

1  hose  coiists.     '-P*'"'"'^^''?„  ,'"'„„,  of,!,..  Grtoian  word;  nnd 

ported  corn  for  A'l"'"%^'|'i/ ''[,^'irr'o"U^  on  o^^^  (he  Chersonese, 
hence  the  sjreat  vah.e  of  the  Athenian  F^^«'-^ '»°  «  r,.^     ,o,eot 

Respecting  this  peiimsula  a"?.'^,,*''  .l^^"''  .".^d;  '  [■  ,'  .s^vilh  ahodj- 
her  settler.  'l«'-'-'*^'''"''''.^^f  •  t/.^  v  .o^vever  a  d  left  tole^T  con- 
of  mercenaries,  ,;nprovidcd  « >\1' n\;,  i'V'r,' t,  n  under  his  pro- 
trilmtions  >vherc  they  co.dd :  7"^.  ^''^^„.  '^^  ^^  hin  "ho  peninsula 

t,<.tion  an.l  P«'"TTM,^To,s';:;rto  Athens  assT-rtinc  indtV-"!™''^ 
near  its  isthmtis,  nit  i"-''''^!;''.^"  'V'^.V<,,\i  jesandthe  Athenian 
„„d  admitted  «' 'I'^'^'hilio  to  taU;  parHn  tl  'l^Ue.oall.s.  In  con^ 
envoys,  as  an  a  ly  of  I  hiiip  '"  ,f,^SI',',V„propriatcd  and  distributed 
imiction  Avith  the  Kardians,  J"  »''P  ^:;'' ',7™'^ «  Uioirs.  And  %vh(n 
imds  vvhich  .•!'«  •\'h'?"'l'"/f"^f  ,f;;Th;Vld  deaf^lth  Ka.dia  as  an 
'"?  '"'t^,  ?  eUv  'hv' re;;!rlee  o  a  hiti^tioD.  This  they  refused 
Jhou^rihelr^n^m'ysS  liad  recognized  Kardiaas  an  independ- 
ent ally  of  Philip Vhcn  the  peace  ^^■•'«  ^^.''™-     j  ^f  ^hidi  hostilities 

Herl  .as  a  state  ^^^t^^^^^^-^^^'^^^'^'^r- 
■Kere  sure  to  jrrow.  1  le  ^:'f<=''^'"'"'  '.„„!,„  „,,,  of  the  pen  nsula, 
vvhile  Riop<'itl'esonhis  sideniadecxcuis     IS  oiu  ot  J      r  ^^ 

inva.ling  portions  <>( ,^J--«  ™  ;    ?\li''Xl^^'M^      «'  ^''^1"^l 

ferrcd.  ,  ,     ,      «.,.ppphos  of  his  r.artisnns  at 

The  complaints  of  Philip,  and  the  |.l^^^;^^^^^  go  that 

Atliens  raised  a  strono;  feelm-  a.nnmst  ^'^P^l''  fs  at  Aimi   , 

^e  people  seemed  disposed  to  Y''f^J':^:^:n'^c 
this  step  that  ^e'"^>'^^^;".^^^^  rph     n  ic  Avere  d^^^^^^^  841-010 

Both  that  ^P<-^V^'\^^^'^;;^\TihlV  '\?c      Inb^^^^^^^       resumes  th::t 
B.C.;  seemin.uly  in  tlielasthal    of  ^41  i,.c      j"^^^^^^^^^^  i^hiiip 

ener'getic   and    uncomi^i-om.sing    U>ne   o     ^^^^^  ^,  ^>^^\^,^.Sacs.     He 
^vhich  had  characterized  the  ^\^^^P/^^\'^^^  f,.^^^^^  but  r.l^o 

calls  upon  his  countrymen  not  only  to  sustain  jjiopcuuc  , 


Ph-r'''}^       ""  ^^ar  vigorously  against  Philip  in  every  other  wiv 
Philip  (he  says),  while  pretendiug  in  words  to  keep  the  peace  Vnd 

ffthfn^"?^^''  '!  ^^'''^'''  a'idby"g.^r,essionsiununfberresrquarte;f  ^ 
If  Athens  chose  to  imitate  him  by  keepm<r  the  dcicc  b^  n-^mJ  ff; 

her  do  so;  but  at  any  rate,  let  herlmitat^^rin  also^  bv  pm^^^^^^ 
strenuous  war  in  reality.  Chersonesus,  the  ancient  ^osSs^  on^f 
Athens  could  be  protected  only  by  encouraging  and^;?nfZini 
Diopeithes;  Byzantium  also  was  sure  to  bec^ne^he  next  obiect  of 
Phil  p  s  attack,  and  ought  to  be  preserved,  asessential  to  the  interests 
of  Athens,  riiough  hitherto  the  Byzantines  had  licen  dislffected 
toward  her.  But  even  these  interests,  i,nix>rtant  as  they  we^-e  mus 
be  viewed  o.dy  as  parts  of  a  still  more  important  ihoTe    ^fhe 

Sn'in'^^r'^•^''^^'•''''*'n'  ^^  imminent  danger;  overridden  by 
Philip,  prodigious  military  force;  torn  in  piecc^s  by  local  fact?on{ 
leaning  upon  his  support;  and  sinking  evefy- day  into  (k™^^^^ 
more  irrecoverable.  There  was  no  hope  of  rescue  for  t  e^HelS 
name  except  from  the  energetic  and  well-directed  mditary  action  of 
A  hens.  She  must  stand  forth  in  all  her  might  and  resofuUon  her 
ei  izens  must  serve  m  person,  pay  direct  taxes  readilTand  fore  'o 
for  the  time  their  festival-fund;  when  they  had  thus  shown  them 
elves  ready  to  bear  the  real  pincli  and  hardship  of  the  c^nlest  thSi* 

tbbirpi.ir  '^-  "^'if  ^^  ^''''^'  ^'  ^^'^  ^^^^^i°^?  harangue  known  as  the 
thd  Philippic.  It  appears  that  the  Athenians  were  now  comiW 
roimd  mt)re  mtoharmony  with  Demosthenes  than  thev  had  ever  heel 
^,'^^V''y  perceived-what  the  orator  had  long  ao<  pointed  ou^ 
b^o  nl"^r'^'  ^^  y^^^""-  ^^-^"^  ^>°^  acquisition  to  ano  h^  and 
cen?  tTo^  ^^''  more  dangerous  in  proportion  as  others  were  qides 
cent  They  were  really  alarmed  for  the  safetv  of  the  two  imDortant 
positions  of  the  Hellespont  and  Bosphorus  important 

^i-om  this  time  to  the  battle  of  Chjeroueia,  the  positive  influence 
of  Demosthenes  m  determining  the  proceedings  of  his  coimUvmen 
becomes  very  considerable.      He  had  already  ibeen  cnnZ^a  sev' 

wi  li  tt'xuTl  ^-'"'^f  ''""'  "•'""'«';  Kleitarchus  and  Phi  Sel 
k  .  5?cedqnian  troops,  were  expelled  from  the  island  tliouffh 
bm     ,,,  vum  tried  to  propitiate  Athens.      Kallias  also    w    ^  he 

Suifsuccel^"o?'h?f '""'''  ''??''™"^-  -""'"-^"ted  .^s  auxiliaries 
th„„,,  ^'l^'^"^^-     y".  '"S   proposition,  supported    bv  Demosthenes 

ynod  ?[  aTh';';'"'''  *"'^"'"  from  deputies  o'f  the  Eub^oic  cuLs  to  tlfe 
>.jnod  at  Athens  were  renounced;  and  in  place  of  it  was  constituted 
H  G.  IV.— 16 


482 


DEATH   OF  PHILIP. 


aa  Euboic  »,-.o,l,  sitting  »t(l'f\HiV,J"t'.PT,X.Unrma^"'ft«al^ 
A.heu..     In  this  ^"^0.0  sj-nod  K  >  te  ^w^^^^^^^^  ,^^        ,,,,, 

b.)t!.  as  a  p^.rusan  of  A  I.e.  >  ''""^.^f '"' ^'  „  ,f  „  G„if  „t  Pagai^a;,  from 
his  attack  bevoua  tbe  limits  ot  l-"]<^»/°  "\''s  ,"L^^^  trn.cd  the 
whence  prol.-ably  cunie  'l;e?.''  f/'"'''\^J'^°;. [:*,,;;,  ,/cd  several  ..f  the 
gaiTls....  of  Oreus  u.ider  Ihilislide^      "^  ;^'.\';,'i;\''(.,.  ,,5,1.   various 

Towns  allied  wit!.  "^g""'^«°''"J,^J  J,,H  '  P^MSsilaves,  For  these 
Macedouhu.  vessels,  tl.e  crewsof  «  . uU  he  ^0'^"^f,f"';,^-.„f  u.anks. 
successes  .he  Athenia..s  a^^•arded  U,  >^  »^  ';'^^"=^.  „,„  „f  34,_«40 
He  also  employed  '""'^s'^^a"  '"=,  f  *', ''V"  i",:,oponnesu.s,  to  organize 
''•^■n^'™^::i'af..i'us°pSnr'ln   bat=  .isii",'hf"renu^ 

r^l^-rse^n^'""4  f  oa  e-l^ess  "« ,A'.I^- j",.:'- .^tiat^ 
S''ro';rernt«So1to;^™e  and  s^upport  promised 
to  him,  the  Projeeted  c,.ngress  came  to  n«  ^^^^ 

the  Bosphoms;  moreover,  U  ^''^^\/;',^"X;.X^^^^^  the  Byznn- 

Philip-  \vho  ^as  uonv  exerting  all  his  elloits  to  l^^^^^'y^  .-  {  ^ud 
^^o  join  him  in  -tlye  ^adare  ^gau.^^^A^^^^^  t^t"  h"ln.M 
Demosthenes  employ  l»^s  ^^^^'^^  ence  at  B}z.  ni  im^^  citizens,  nnd 

this  purpose,  overcame  the  ^^»  ^'l^'^^^^  ^^"^?'\"\|^^  and 

hrougbt  tbem  to  ^^,^' ^^^^  "-^^;.;  .[^irie    <ii^^^  P'-P^"" 

their  safety  to  ^omblno^^  It  h^Mhr^^  ^j^^.^.  J^^  ^^^^^ 

deranceot  I'hilip.     Ihc  ^^3  Z'^i^JJ^^;^^^' ^^^^^^^^  Dcmos- 

ueighbors  the  ^f^^^^^^^^^':;^^;^^  thissuc- 

thenestalves  jnst  P^"^^  "  V'\^'^Sf  "^^^^^^^  '^     ^^.^.^.^j  probnbiliiies. 
cess  as  a  statesmen  and  ^M->\om^  ;M.  in  ^  ite  o   a^^^^^^^^^      ofBYZMntinm 

have  become  almost  impractictd)le  foiAthn^  Y.yyanimvA  Tvas 

At  iliis  nnexDeeted  levohition  m  ilic  pohcj   01   V^^,,     't'lifv 
enU  enU  ■  aS'geous  to  A-.ljens  so  it  -"^P-P-  -.-.''>„f°'J^  [^ 
ing  to  Ailip;  ^vho  '^'■^"/" ^  it  so  m  eh   tl  a    he  ^^l^.^^,^  j,^,f„„ 
commenced  this  siege  of  reiuill  us  l>  -.m     •.  •  j 

Midsummer  840  B.C.    He  I'l-t'^S'l^"?^'  :  °,\  ,t "  ™  -t^^a  nst  the  attack 


WAR  DECLARED  AGAINST  ATHENS.  483 

renew  the  war  openlv  a, ,   ,Pv.^ieiUv;t  ,w  &  '•^■??'''<^'^-  '""'  '" 
Hhle  that  this  w  is  dnn..  uii'i.'.  r>    •   •14''""''  I 'uliP-     It  scans  pro  .- 

mission  at  the  ife  csno,  V  nn/  R    ''',*""''^'  ?'='"  '""  "l"*''''  o"  ''i^ 

that  none  of  ihe  &S'r,  Jiftllv?'-'  ^"'"  '"^  ".''•"^'^■'^'y  ^""^'' 
moved  bv  him   but  a  I  <ff  tl  ^  ,  h    i-r   '"■."?.^''n.'=r  on  I:(,sli1ities  we.-e 

we  may^-ea "onab ly    ebeve      nee  heZZfT'  ".f  "^■""="'  "••'i^-l^ 
nsl.umeJ  of  such  an  inil"-,tive  ^  ''"   """'"■  P'""'l  """^ 

dr:ss:d'V''LXs.o'ami'declaT«ion  "T"''  ^'""P  ""  '''''  ■"''dead- 
this  paper  lie  e  .,  men  ed  ,  m,  v  \non'^,  T  ",'  '"lAM'enia.is.  In 
still  re.'naining  .ni.4V  estd  " ,  i  e  ;^?  ?  '"^  \'^'  """^  '"  ''™'  ""^^ 
which  wrongs  he  ai.nouneeli.'f  5  f"™'al  i-emonst.ance;  for 
hy  open  hoSili  i!.s  h"  "dvc^  e,;"^"  ;°''  «!  '"''"'S  a  just  revenge 
s6il,  if  Nibias  his  hf-,',;,]  i,t'.?  '°,.""'  'r'^""*'  "n  Macedonian 
allese,l)h-       let    '  di.palch.-s;    the  Athenians  (he 

refidtha  di  n  Uc  "   ll    c  v         ,     P'-'*"''.^  f"'' !«'  m<.nths  and  had 

AM.e,.s  hadCc™,^  1L     ,  n^^^ 

tiiiemes  fion.  Bv?mii^um -1  d  n';-  ,         <•         Tl.asos   in   h.-.iboring 

Sw;''i^e^ES::r;?e^:!sr'°'^ 
Sd  ^if^h^it^^^S '5^^ 

tlieirdiif.k.nces  w   h    t,.,,  ;^,,    ,  Athenians    ,«d  r<.f»sc.l  10  submit 
ncllcd  il,„\;i,     •         Ihatciyio  an  eqmtabJe  aibiliatioii      He  r»- 

K '  1      bft^rrl"hf T^'';hrn.  1   ""'"  //^  AmphipoILs'-aJenln. 

especially  of  he  oirensivebeKavioro°f  it  IT "^'^     ^'  Y'"''^ 
^vI<en  he  had  sent  .nvoys  c^n,  1^.,^  S  4"Sr't^°..^X|; 


484 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


SIEGE  OF  PERINTHUS. 


485 


I 


4 


'"K^U:^^^  S'or' appreciate  .he  pnr.kuUr  com 
It  IS  ot  ""'e  luo"  i-  .        ^  .Kieuuate  information  for  the 

plumt,  here  set  fmtb   even  .^  -^c  1  au  'l«rin^'  the  last  two 

purpose.  I ndci  '"i^'^^^'  "=•;',  p^^p'  .„e  cuDnot  doubt  tbat  many 
vears  be  «cen  th  At_^™'X?"clr  1  a  been  committed  on  tl.eir  side 
detaclied  acts  o  a  '"i^^  ^'f^^'^.  ;;,i'o„_u,nt  be  bad  repeatedly  pro- 
"'  ''l'\f  tl^cm  .mictWe  a  liu  n  cnt  of  differenccs-%vbetbcr  true  or 
posed  to  them  .imicauit  '"'J"  „,-,.nilv  to  bis  interest  to  keep 

£ot.is  little  to  the  purpose     I*  ^.f  jf'^^  ^J^.i^.d  ii  s  ascendency 

irttiSifo^orrpr^^i^b^^tlnfefdSl'^s^ 


1 


ex  ended  sea  e  of  the  military  operations.     PerisHuiR  was  stron-  -md 
detensible.  .situated   on  a  promontory  terminatiii-  In  abrant  ei  S:, 
»<,utliward   toward    the  Propoutis,   unassailable   from  seaward    but 
sop.njr,  lliotig.  with  a  steep  declivity,  toward  ,he  land,  wi  it  whic 
n  vvas  jomed  by  an  isthmus  of  not  more  than  a  furlong  in  brea    1 
Across  this  IS  hmus  stretched  the  outer  wall,  behind  which  wen;   een 
the  houses  of  the  town,    ofty,  strongly  built,  and  rising  one  above 
he  o  her  in  terraces  up  the  ascent  of  the  promonlorv.  Philip  pressed 
be  place  with  repeated  assaults  on  the  outer  wall;  batter  i^o-'^S 
ranis,  underraiiiing  it  by  sap,  and  rolling  up  movable  to«?ers  said 
tobelSO    eet  m  height  (higher  even  than  the  towers  of  the  Perin 
tl  an  wall),  so  as  to  chase  away  the  defenders  by  missiles    and  to 
11  ?r/?  ••'f.*""  "'>•  l^oarding.plaiiks  hand  to  iiand.     Tlie  Perin 
hiaiis,  defending  themselves  with  energetic  valor,  repelled  him  for  a 
ong  time  from  the  outer  wall.     At  length  the  besiegiiig  engines  with 
the  reiterated  attacks  of  Macedonian  s,)ldiers  animated  bvPhiTiD's 

TwTf '•  °Tr"'''""^  •!"^  "•«"•  >"«*  '''■»^«  "«=>"  back  into^he tr 
It  was  found,  however,  that  the  town  itself  supplied  a  new  defensive 

position  to  its  citizens.     The  lower  range  of  boLes.  uS  bTstron  " 

barricades-  across  the  streets,  enabled  th?  Perinthians  still  to  hold  out 

In  spite  of  all  their  efforts,  however,  the  town  would  I     4  shared  the 

fate  of  O  yut lius   had  they  nr.t  been  sustained  by  etfeefive  fo  e    n 

aid.     Not  only  did  their  Byzantine  kinsmen  exhaust  tl  en?sehxs1o 

furnish  every  sort  of  assistance  by  sea,  but  also  the  A  1  lenUiu  fleVt 

A  1  nnf^f"^""  •'I''""  ""^  ^'"^^"^  '''^^  °f  '"«  Propoutis,  cooperated 
A  body  of  Grecian  mercenaries  under  Apollodorus,  sent  across  from 
Asia  by  the  Phrygian  satrap  Arsites,  together  with  amp  esunnlieso^ 
stores  by  sea,  placed  Perinthus  in  condition  to  defy  the.  besieges 

PWl  p  'founf  aTl   h  s?ff  '';'""-'  '•'""'  'r'^''  '<'^-^'«'""  t'o-ee  months, 
,h„    '^  I  ,"      ,    '   '"?  efforts  against  Periuthns  balfled      He  th<.i 
changed  Ins  plan,  withdrew  a  portion  of  liis  forces    tnd  snd.l  .,,1^ 
appeared   before   Byzantium,    'rhe   walls  werrs'ron"  but  i  ade^ 

S'i.''s:&'^:^in',?l''''"r'™'^'  '""•^''f  ""^  ByzautlnS' force  ";^s 

iveH\r„i    ,  "'•     -^™"T  '"''"■™'  Vigorous  attacks,  Philip  coif- 

mved  to  effect  a  surprise  ou  a  dark  and  stormy  iiio-bt  which  w'  s  verv 

near  succeeding.     The  Byzantines  defended  them  ".'vcs  braveiV  ami 

id"  Tl  e"(';        •  """'■  "•"  ""^'^'  '""  "'^'^  ""''"''^  cliiefly  bv    Li"a 
•lift.     I  lie  Alhenians— now  actin?  under  the  inspirations  of  D<  nm^ 

theues,  who  e.Yhorled  them  to  bury  in  a  generous  obMvion-.l^r; 

lidLlno";  '  '"■  """'-"  ^"""r  B.^--'-iu.n-se,H' a  .still  mo  e'p.n! 

ui  nee  10  the  rescue,  under  the  vigorous  guidance  of  Phokion  iiiste  id 

the  loose  and  rapacious  Chares.     Moreover  the  d.-in-ei  of  Bvra 

n^il  i    7  P h  1    •  ^'"' '  ■""•  'f"""'-  «"^-  '»  "•'"'■"  '<■  was  highly  impor- 
nn,   li  P*"'"  ^''oul^l  "Ot  become  ma,ster  of  the  great  passao-elV^r 

"  ?n  bled'w'.;',  'f  .?i ""  S'"'^"^' "  "-'"■     "r''"  '"'•«'-■  combined  tleet°?hus 
a.,embled  was  fully  sulheieut  to  protect  Byzantium.     Compelled  to 


486 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


TRIERARCHIC   REFORM. 


487 


abnndon  .he  siege  of  that  city  as  wdla^^^^^^^^^^^ 
furlher  baffled  m  an  attack  ""  "'^^,';^,'''''"^,'^',[;,  propontis  and  its 
^S^^Sa^'^^^^  ^v^lu^lesU  id.  bot.> 
%'bese"  persons  pn.bubly  oecupied  the  last  six  m<mU.s  of  340 
B  cThev  constituted  the  n.ost  in,porta,.t  -'-^-.^f'^'-;  .  >,i  ^';'„':;- 
and  the  n>ost  serious  reverse  «^^l>";':;;;;;';i,^>„/,  ','  ''au'  ^n  edi ,M 
menceti^ent  of  «ar  between  U;e,        U,    m    a    .hcj  a,U^  ^  ^^ 

after  the  liberation  of  i-''b»;    '»    ''4;  ',;!>,  ;,■,?,.     Phokion  and  his 
improved  the  Po^",'";'  ^^f^i'''*"''  of  Bv.  .H    n    fron,  all  the  misery 

of  acapluie  d>  -;^.^^^'-^^"'"  .  ..,^..  ^,.  i„   <u.,y  (-orn  became  unusually 
proteeted  trade^h.ps  f "  ^;«  ^'«;[»^^'> '   ^     tUro«Ldn,ut  Greece:  aul 

^::feeS'ti'^:::n.£.hepuUiea^^^ 

:::'e,l  bi^also  Ve°c:cXuu'r  ^Ibi'iuf  proelaint..  ;^J;f^^^^  ;;^ 
thanks -and  admiration  to  U-^"''-^  -^r  .]  he  t\me  tl  at  tuither 
^^■iSll"rany^of'ii;rXrl^^.S''of  Its^nes  thought  it 

''"?n\"hl"SVn"ir;;'Vp..rntions.  on   so  large  a  scale    against 

iS£|IEfitc:.;^^^pS^^pea-,^^^^^^ 

r  li.^ir."  them      The  eonibimilion  iigamsl  linn  was  thus  .l-FOl^c  . 
U,nVwb  Athens  «n,l  her  nu.re  irUnn.te  allies  l,,s  >mva   w  ,r  ;  : 
ton  in  led      Wldle  he  nuilli|.lied  cnii^eis  ano  pnvaletis  t.   i  ,..k(    . 
bv  pi-^s  IHS  heavy  ou,h,y  during,  the  ktc  s-,e,es,  IjV'',';;''^""'^^  ' 
lis 'land-force  an  -enterprise,  during  'l'f,.^^P™^  "' ^i^?„^;,^t'  I'^^mn 


r| 


sudden  by  the  1  hracian  tribe  Triballi,  and  sustained  a  ch^f^.t    i.v 
all  his  accompanvinir  captives   ind   bpinrr  h;»  1  ?^  f   n  ^^^'"^^' 

tl.roii-h  the  thiurh.    °TJ,N  cKnedih"on     nH^'f!  .  ^'^''"^''  wounded 

Piulip  dnrin,  the  spring aX'n^u^^r'lJJ^ao  b^""^"""'^  ^^^"^'^^ 
Meanwhile   the  naval   war  of  \theiH   '.o-nn^i   Pi,;i; 

seated  abuses  whtel   fi  Ihi  ed  'th^^^^^^  '^''l^' 

department.  emcienc}  of  the  Athenian  marine 

The  law  of  Periander  (adonted  in  S=;7  t?  n  \  ^.^^    t  .^  -i    .   , 
bunlen  of  the  trier.irehy  a,no  ,!  tl  e  ?■  00  r^lfn!^ '•'"■'''"'"''  *''' 
taxable  property-schedule,  airLSe'   in  twe,,  I    r  ctio  fc!!l,  T<  "' ' 
mones,  ol  sixty  persons  each,     Ainon"  Ihese  men   ?  !  qoo   '  r""" 
slnndmg  d  st  n^'nished   as  leaHer<<  cf  fh„  «  •'      ^  ^^  richest. 

with  the  direction  an  i  e  ifoiten'cnfof  dl^w";"'''"''  "'^T  L"^'"^""' 
leelive  agency  ,md  ihiiies      Th     nn,,l:      "!'«  9'"i,<^'''-ne(l  their  col- 

lransf;.r  Si!,  co.st  of  ri  Si-chr  , '  '  f  "f  "'"  ''"^  ''■■"^'  ''e«n  to 
for  encli  triretne.  do  i  in  .  ',J~^^  or  k-s's  of 'm"  '"''f '  <>••  «0  ™i".« 
ori.-i„  ,lly  b.en  liorne  1^1%"''  Hcl  man  .  ifi  "t""""^"''''''  '''■"' 
and  afterwards  bv  two"  ricli   mm,  :.t„-  "^ '"^ '^«™  round, 

more  or  less  numerous  consis  i^'i^f'^  :r''sK""o7':;.':rfl;"''"''"'' 
Sixteen  members  of  the  same  svmMiorv  TN«  ",^  ^'^^yi  fifteen  or 
ners  varied   ac(.>nlin-  to    i,e  W^^^^  Pa^'t- 

state  to  be  fitted  out^n  any  oTve;/^I^^^^^^^^^^^^  ^'^  '^'^ 

required,  sixteen  c..;,triI,ntors  m  !];n>p  ;iinVtn  w'  !T  ^"'''''"'''  '^'^''*- 
tlie  trierarehic  cost  of  ea'^/  if  m"^^^^^^^^^  f'  "^''^"''^  collectively 

needed,   a  less  numlLr  o  \  irh Ir^^^^ 

six,  could  be  aliolte  to  e.^1-'  ,  oJ'Ht*?otT  "''^T  ''T  ""'''  ^' 
who.se  turn  it  was  to  be  as  essed  h?t!  It  n  ^w^^^  number  of  citizens 

-dh.u  Of  .1 ,  ;i'i  s,;^' n:^rg;;;^r'^s,:^^;;;i5r  a.ff?^eri" 

s^l\e.  e.)  Iwrtcd  from  these  poorer  iih^mbers  *      ^^^  ^^^'-'^^' 


488 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


TRIERARCHY   EQUALIZED. 


489 


selves  in  the  characteristic  attitude  of  supphants  at  Mim>chia  or 
Phlwhere  in  the  city.  When  tlieir  liabilities  to  the  slate  were  not 
furn^.hed  in  I  me,  thly  became  subject  to  imprisonmen  by  the  oft- 
rerr^uDcr  nten  liD!;  the  oultil  of  the  armameut.  .In  addition  to  such 
^r  vate^l  arlVip,  there  arose  great  public  mischief  from  the  money 
Sot  l^ini  at  oice  forthcoming;  the  arnuiment  being  delajec  in  its 
demrme  nd  forced  to  leav?  Peiia-us  either  m  bad  condition  or 
' Xm  its'l^  numbers.  Hence  arose,  in  f-|,P^{;j^^^^-^: 
of  Athens  in  her  maritime  enterprises  against  Philip,  betoie  tlic  peace 

""^  The  same  influences,  which  had  led  originally  to  the  introduction 
of  such  a  uses  stood  opposed  to  the  orator  in  his  attempted  amend- 
Sient  TlTbodv  of  Tlr  e  Hundred,  the  richest  men  in  the  state-- 
Uekader  or  dchest  individual  in  each  symmory,  with  those  who  stood 

nnt^  hemZsIt  on    uKl  tendered  large  bribes  to  Demosthenes  (if  we 
«    vcredUl^^^  as  induce  nrenis  for  dropping  it.     He  was 

We  Che      inoreover,  under  the  Graphe  Paranomon,  as  mover  of  an 
impe.K  iRu   11  u  rtqu  red  no  small  share  of  firm- 

;;~rr  ub  c  spl  t^om^^^         -ith  Approved  eloquence  and  an 
cstablislU  mmie/to  Jnable  Demosthenes  to  contend  against  these 

""^  m?new  Hw'caused  the  charge  of  trierafchy  to  be  levied  upon  all 
the  memberrof  t^^^^^  "PO"  all  above  a  cerian^minimum 

o   iXp"'^^^^^^^^^  to  their  nued  property;  but  it  seems,  i  we 

rLh?m!^e  oi^.  t^have  some,  hat  ^^^^^^^-^^^^^l!;^'  '^ 
tiio  n.roT.c-ite  iiunilior  of  persons  cliargeable  wiisdmuuislitt..     Ji-vtij 

c  Xlont  ng  to  one  trireme;   if  rated  a»  twenty  »"'«"  ,^ /»■■ '''«  ^'.'^ 
rirel  V  of  two-  at  thirty  talents,  for  tl.e  trierarchy  of  tliree    it  .<bo%e 
[bIrl?,:Lnl  'for  that'of  tlnee   trin.mes  a»d  »--,]--, 'tnii;^- 
wn«  bpld  to  be  the  max  mum  pavable   b>   an)    singit  uhuviuucj. 
CltLt'kl^d'aVless  than  ten  talents .  were  grou^^^^^^ 
ratings  of  ten  talents  in  the  aggregate,  in  oidei  ^^^  Uai   collcctivu 
the  tdearchv  of  one  trireme;  the  ^o«tV^;"^\^;"\^"7^'.  ^'^^^^^^ 

person  in  the  group  being  P^^PV^-^'^^'^^  ^  If.,  .1^ /^.leUe^^^ 
fttnnd  rated      This  new   proposition,  while  mateiiall}   iciieMUj,  m^^ 
DoorT^^^^^^^  '^'^  assessments  of  the  rich 

K  n^led  ai  twenty  talents,  who  ^^-^ ^-'-^^'-Z^;;''S:^ 
only  the  sixteenth  part  of  the  expense  of  one  ^'-^^^Vl  '  ^rti     -n(^^^^^ 
partners  much   poorer    than    himself    but    ^       .;.;;^^^^^^    ""^^i 
became  cbrw-eable  with  the  entire  expense  of  t^^otneiaichies^   i\ 
n^rsonOi  W^  assessed  in  fair  proportion  to  the  sum  for  ^h 

LTs  0)    rated  in  the  schedule.     When  the  impeachment  agn      j 
Demo'then^^^^^^^       to  be  tried  before  the  Dikastery,  he  was  acquit 
bv  more  tha^^^^^  ^^  the  Dikasts;  so  that   the  accuser  ^ 

compe  ed    o  pa    the  established  fine.     And  so  animated  was  the 


temper  of  the  public  at  that  moment,  in  favor  of  vigorous  measures 
lor  prosecuting  the  war  just  declared,  that  thev  went  heartily  alono- 
with  him,  and  adopted  tlie  muiu  features  of  his  trierarchic  reforn? 
Tiic  resistance  from  the  rich,  however,  tliough  insufficient  to  throw 
out  tiie  measure,  constrained  him  to  modify  it  more  than  once  dur- 
1,1  "iJ^'  the  progress  of   the   discussion;  partly  in  consequence  of  the 

opposition  ot  ^iiischines,  wliom  lie  accuses  of  liaviug  been  hired  by 
the  rich  for  the  purpose.  It  is  deei)lv  to  be  regretted  that  the 
speeches  of  both  of  them— especially  those  of  Deniosthenes  which 
must  have  b.eeri  numerous— have  not  been  pieserved.  ' 

Thus  were  the  trierarchic  symmories  distributed  and  assessed 
anew  upon  each  man  in  the  ratio  of  his  wealth,  and  therefore  most 
largely  upon  the  Three  Hundred  richest.  How  lon*^  the  law 
remained  unchanged  we  do  not  know.  But  it  was  found  to  work 
admirably  well;  and  Demosthenes  boasts  that  during  the  entire  war 
(that  IS  troni  the  renewal  of  the  war  about  August,  340  b  c  to  the 
battle  of  Clueroneia  in  August,  33S  B.C.)  all  the  trierarchies  named 
under  the  law  were  ready  in  time  without  complaint  or  suffering-- 
Wiule  the  ships,  well  equipped  and  exempt  from  the  previous  causes 
of  (lehiy,  were  found  i)ronipt  and  elfective  for  all  exi"-encies  Kot 
one  was  either  leit  behind,  or  lost  at  sea,  throughout  these  two 
years. 

Probably  the  first  fruits  of  the  Demosthenic  reform  in  Athenian 
naval  administratiou  was  the  lleet  equipped  under  Piiokion  which 
act^^d  so  successfully  at  and  near  Byzantium.  The  operations  of 
Athens  at  sea,  though  not  known  in  detail,  appear  to  have  been  bet- 
ter conducted  and  more  prospei-ous  iu  their  general  effect  than  thev 
Jiad  ever  been  since  the  Social  War. 

But^ there  arose  now  a  gmve  and  melancholy  dispute  in  the  inte- 
rior of  Greece,  which  threw  her  upon  her  defense  by  land.  This  new 
disturbing  cause  was  nothing  less  than  another  Sacred  War,  declared 
by  the  Ampluktyonic  assembly  against  the  Lokrians  of  Amphissa 
Kindled  chietly  by  the  Athenian  /Eschines,  it  more  than  compen- 
sated Pliilip  for  his  repulse  at  Byzantium  and  bis  defeat  by  the  Tri- 
oaUi;  oringiug,  like  the  former  Sacred  War,  aggrandizement  to  him 
•  alone,  iCnd  ruin  to  Grecian  libertv. 

I  have  recounted,  in  an  earfier  portion  of  this  work,  the  first 
bacred  War  recorded  in  Grecian  history  (590-580  b.c),  about  two 
centuries  before  the  birth  of  yEschines  and  Demosthenes.  That 
war  had  been  undertaken  by  the  Amphiktvonic  Greeks  to  punish 
and  ended  by  destroying,  the  flourishing  seaport  of  Kirrha,  situated 
near  the  mouth  of  the  river  Pleistus,  on  the  coast  of  the  fertile  plain 
stretching  from  the  southern  declivity  of  Delphi  to  the  sea.  Kirrha 
was  ongmally  the  port  of  Delphi,  and  of  the  ancient  Phokian  town 
ot  Krissa,  to  which  Delphi  w^as  once  an  annexed  sanctuary.  .  But  in 
process  of  time  KiiTha  increased  at  the  expense  of  both,  through 
prolila  ac.G.ujgaiaated  from  the  imuiinerable  visitors  by  gqii  wh9  landed 


490 


DEATH   OF  PHILIP. 


LOHRIAI^S  AT  KIRRHA. 


491 


there  as  the  nearest  access  to  the  temple.  The  prosperous  Kirrhffans, 
uspirino-  iealousv  at  Delphi  and  Krissa,  were  accused  of  extortion 
n\Crolls  levied  from  visitors,  as  well  as  of  other  guilty  or  offensive 
proceediu-s.  An  Amphiktyonic  Avar,  wherein  the  Athenian  bolon 
Ttood  prominently  forward/being  declared  against  tljem,  Kinh- ^vas 
taken  and  destroyed.  Its  fertile  plain  was  consecrated  to  the  Dei- 
piiian  god.  under  an  oath  taken  by  all  the  Amphilayon.c  members, 
with  solemn  pledixes  and  formidable  imprecations  against  all  (Us- 
turbers  The  entire  space  between  the  temple  and  the  sea  now  be^ 
came  as  the  oracle  had  required,  sacred  property  of  the  god;  that  is, 
incapable  of  bein-  tilled,  planted,  or  occupied  in  any  Pf/ni^"^!;,^ 
way,  by  man,  and  devoted  only  to  spontaneous  herbage  with  pastui- 

^°BurtlK)u«^h  the  Delphians  thus  procured  the  extirpation  of  their 
troublesomc^icighbors  at  Kirrha,  it  was  indispensable  that  on  or  near 
the  same  spot  tlfere  should  exist  a  town  and  port,  for  the  accommo- 
daUon  of  the  guests  who  came  from  all  quarters  to  Delphi;  the  more 
so  as  such  persons,  not  merely  visitors,  but  also  traders  with  goods 
o'sdl,  now  came  in  greater  multitudes  thaj.  ever     rom  the  increased 
attrac  ions  imparted  out  of  the  rich  spoils  ot  Kurha  itsdf.  to  tl  e 
Pythian  festival.     How  this  want  was  at  fir:;t  supplied,  while   he  re- 
membrance of  the  oalh  was  yet  fresh,  we  arc  nol  infornried.     But  in 
process  of  time  Kiirha  became  rcoccupied   and  refortiticd  b}  the 
western  nr  ighbors  of  Delphi-the  Lokrians  of  Amphissa-  on  whose 
borders  it  stood,  and  for  whom  probably  it  serv'ed  as  a  port  not  less 
than  for  Delphi.     These  new  occupants  received  the  guests  comirg 
to  the  temple,  enriched  themselves  by  the  accompanying  profit   and 
took  into  cultivation  a  certain  portion  of  the  plain  around  the  town. 
\t  what  period  the  occupation  by  the  Lokrians  had  its  origin  we 
are  unable  to  say.    So  much,  however,  we  make  out-not  merely  from 
Demosthenes,  but  even  from  .Eschines-that  in  their  time  it  was  an 
ancient  and  established  occupation-not  a  recent  intrusion  or  noye  y. 
The  town  was  fortified;  the  space  immediately  adiacent  being  tilled 
and  claimed  by  the  Lokrians  as  their  own      Ihis,  indeed,  was  a 
departure  from  the  oath,  sworn  by  Solon  with  his  Amphiktyonic  co  • 
temporaries,  to  consecr.ite  Kirrha  and  its  lands  to  the  Delphian  god 
But  if  that  oath  had  been  literally  carried  out,  the  god  himselt,  and 
the  Delphians  amon-  whom  he  dwelt,  would  have  been  the  principal 
loser-  because  the  want  of  a  convenient  port  would  have  been  a  seri^ 
ous  discoura^-eraent,  if  not  a  positive  barrier,  against  the  arrival  ol 
?K1tors  md^t^f  wliom  came  by  sea.     Accordingly  the  renovation  o 
the  town  and  port  of  Kirrha,  doubtless  on  a  modest  scale  togetfier  with 
a  space  of  adjacent  land  lor   tillage   was  at  least  .tolerated    if  not 
encoura-cd.     Much  of  the  plain,  imleed,  still  remained  untilhd  mid 
rnplant?d,  as  the  property  of  Apollo;  the  boundaries  bemg  perhaps 

""""W^'rule  Lotrirs  had  thus  been  serviceable  to  the  Delphian  tom- 


pie  by  occupying  Kirrha,  they  had.  been  still  more  valuable  as  its 
toremost  auxdiaries  and  protectors  a-ainst  the  Phok.ans   tlieir  ene- 
mies of  Ions:  standmg.     One  of  the  first  objects  of  Philomelus  th^ 
Phokian,  after  defeating  the  Lokrian  armed  force,  a'.is  irfort  >  the 
sacred  precinct  ot  Delphi  on  its  western  side,  against  tlieir  at  ads 
and  we  cannot  doubt  that  their  position  in  close  neighbor lood  to 
Delphi  must  have  been  one  of  positive  suffering  as  wellls  of  danger 
during  the  years  when  the  Phokian  leaders, Vith  their  numciffus 
mercenary  bands  remained  in  victorious  occupation  of  the  temple 
and  probab  y  of  the  harbor  of  Kirrha  also.     The  subsequent  Uirno^ 
fortnne-when  Philip  erushed  the  Phokians  and  whenihe  Imp  ik^ 
tyonic  assembly  was  reorganized,  with  him  as  its  chief-must  have 
fouml  the  Amphissian  Lokrians  among  the  warmest  allies  and  svm 
path.zers     Resuming  possession  of  Kh-rha,  they  ma/perhaps    fav^ 
been  emboldened,   in  such  a  moment  o:  triumphant^reac^on    lo 
enlarge  their  occupancy  round  the  walls  to  a  greater  extent  than  they 
had    (lone    before.     Moreover,   they  were  animated  with    feelints 
attjiched  to  Thebes;  and  were  hostile  to  Athens,  as  the  ally  and  up- 
holder of  their  enemies,  the  Phokians.  ^  ^ 
Matters  were  in  this  condition  when  the  spring  meetine-of  fhn  Am 
piikt.yonic  assembly  (February  or  March,  339  if  cTwK 
pill.    D.ognetus  was  named  by  the  Athenians  to  at  end  it  as  Hierom 
nemoii,  or  chief  legate;  with  three  Pylagora3  or  vice-le«rates^srh' 
nes,  Meidias.  and  Thrasykles.     We  need  hardly  behe'^e  Dei^sthe 
nes,  when  he  states  that  the  name  of  .Esehines  was  put  up  wi^houi 
foreknowledge  on  the  part  of  any  one;  and  that  though  t  passed  vet 
not  more  than  two  or  three  hands  were  held  up  in    ?q  f-ivor     V 
after  they  reached  Delplii,  Diognetus  was  se  zed  w  th  a  fe^e  '  JtlZ 
%^^  '^'^-S  in  the  Amphiktyonic  assembl^^^^fS^^^^^^^^^ 

There  stood  in  the  Delphian  temple  some  golden  or  gilt  shiel.ls  dedi 
cated  as  an  offering  out  of  the  spoils  taken  at  the  ])aUl  •  of  P M^^^^ 
centiiry  and  a  half  betore-with  an  inscription  to  this  effm-'  Dedi 
cated  by  the  Athenians,  out  of  the  spoils  of  Persi-mq  on/i  Ti.fi 
engaged  in  joint  battle  against  the  Gre^L ''     iTapp^^^^^^ 
Shields  had  recently  been  set  up  afresh  (havinir  beenSnps  ^tr/nn^H 
of  their  gilding  by  the  Phokian  plundWers)  in  fnew    elTor  d^ 
vithout  the  full  customary  forms  of  prayer  or  Sn   ies-  S 
erhaps  might  be  supposed  unnecessarv.  as  the  offerin"  no^now 
dedicated  for  the  first  time.     The  inscription,  little  no^icecTrd  r>  J 
liaps  obscured  by  the  lapse  of  time  on  the  or  ginal  sM^ 
now  stand  forth  brightly  and   conspicuousiron  tl  e  new  d^^^ 
oVrf  ^''T'^''^  recollections  highly  offensil^e  to  the  Thebal     arfd 
to  the  Amphissian  Lokrians  as  friends  of  Thebes.     These  hmer  not 

cvi^  'ZT''''''jh'''^''''''''  ''  ?  "!}'  Amphiktyonic  assembly  „t  were 
even  preparing  (if  we  are  to  believe  iEschines)  to  accuse  Athens  of 
impiety;  and  to  invoke  against  her  a  fine  of  fifty  talent^oT  omTs«i6Q 


I 


492 


DEATH  OF  PBIILIP. 


of  the  relin-ious  solemnities.     But  this  is  denied  by  Demosthenes; 
wh'j  states^ that  the  Lokrians  could  not  brine:  any  such  accusation 
a'-ainst  Athens  without  sending  a  formal   summons— which   they 
never  had  sent.     Demosthenes  \\ovM  be  doubtless  right  as  to  the 
recrular  form,  probably  also  as  to  the  actual  fact;  though  ^schines 
accuses  him  of  havimr  received  bribes  to  defend  the  iniquities  of  the 
Lokriaus     Whether  the  Lokrians  went  so  far  as  to  invoke  a  penalty, 
or  not— at  any  rate  they  spoke  in  terms  of  complaint  against  the  pro- 
ceeding-     Such  complaint  was  not  without  real  foundation;  since  it 
was  better  tor  the  common  safety  of  Hellenic  liberty  against  the  Mace- 
donian airgressor,  that  the  treason  of  Thebes  at  the  battle  ot  Platjea 
should  strand  as  matter  of  past  antiquity,  rather  than  be  republished 
in  a  new  edltioi^     But  this  was  not  the  ground  taken  by  the  com- 
plainants, nor  could  they  directly  impeach  the  right  of  Athens  to 
burnish  up  her  old  donatives.     Accordingly  they  assailed  the  act  on 
the  allegation  of  impietv,  as  not  having  been  preceded  by  the  proper 
reli<nous  solemnities;   thereby   they  obtained    the   opportunity  of 
inveio-hing  a^^ainst  Athens,  as  ally  of  the  Phokians  in  their  recent  sacn- 
le-^e  °  nd  enemv  of  Thebes,  the  steadfast  champion  of  the  god. 

°"'The  \mphiktyons  being  assembled  (I  here  give  the  main  recital, 
thou-h  not  the  exact  words  of  ^schinc.-).  a  friendly  person  came  to 
acquaint  us  that  the  Amphissians  were  bringing  on  their  accusation 
acrainst  Athens.  Mv  sick  colleagues  requested  me  immediately  to 
enter  the  assembly  and  undertake  her  defense.  I  made  haste  to  com- 
ply and  was  just  be-inning  to  speak,  when  an  Amphissian-of  ex- 
treiiie  rudeness  and  brutality-perhaps  even  under  the  influence  of 
some  misguiding  divine  impulse-interrupted  me  and  exclaimed- 
•  Do  not  hear  him.  men  of  Hellas!  Do  not  permit  the  name  of  the 
Athenian  people  to  be  pronounced  among  you  at. this  holy  season! 
Turn  them  out  of  the  sacred  ground,  like  men  under  a  curse  W  ith 
that  he  denounced  us  for  our  allianre  witli  the  Phokians,  and  poured 
out  ma^v  other  ,r.urage..us  i  ivictivcs  against  the  city. 

••Tome  (continues  ^Eschines)  all  this  was  intolerable  to  hear:  1 
cannot  even  now  think  on  it  with  ralmness-and  at  the  momeiit   1 
was  provoked  to  anger  such  as  I  had  never  f el t  in  my  life  before.    1  he 
thouo-ht  crossed  me  that  I  would  retort  upon  the  Amphissians  for 
their^'impious  invasion  of  the  Kirrh^an  land.     That  plain,  lying  im- 
mediately beiow  the  sacred  precinct  in  which  we  were  assembled, 
was  visible  throughout.     '  You  see,  Amphiktyons  (said  I)   that  plain 
cultivated  by  the  Amphissians.  with  buildings  erected  m  it  for  farm- 
ino-  and  pottery!    You  l-.ave  before  your  eyes  the  harbor,  consecrated 
bv'the  oath  of  your  forefathers,  now  occupied  and  fortified.     You 
know  of  vourselves,  without  needing  witnesses  to  tell  you,  that  these 
Amphissians  have  levied  tolls  and  are  taking  profit  out  of  the  sacred 
harbor''    I  then  caused  to  be  read  publicly  the  ancient  oracle,  the 
oath    and  the  imprecations  (pronounced  after  the  first  Sacred  War, 
wherein  Kirrha  was  destroyed).    Then  continuing,  I  &ud— '  Here  am 


I 


SPEECH    OF  .€SCHINES. 


493 


■J 


. 


I,  ready  to  defend  the  god  and  the  sacred  property,  according  to  the 
oath  of  our  forefathers,  with  hand,  foot,  voice,  and  all  the  powers 
that  I.  possess.  I  stand  prepared,  to  clear  my  own  city  of  her- obliga- 
tions to  the  gods;  do  you  take  counsel  forthwith  for  yourselves.  You 
are  here  about  to  offer  sacrifice  and  pray  to  the  gods" for  good  things, 
publicly  and  individually.  Look  well  then— where  will  you  find 
voice,  or  soul,  or  eyes,  or  courage,  to  pronounce  such  supplications 
if  you  permit  these  accursed  Amphissians  to  remain  unpunished, 
when  they  have  come  under  the  imprecations'of  the  recorded  oath? 
Recollect  that  the  oath  distinctly  proclaims  the  sufferings  awaiting  all 
impious  transgressors,  and  even  menaces  those  who  tolerate  tjieir 
proceedings,  by  declaring,  -They  who  do  not  stand  forward  to  vin- 
dicate Apollo,  Artemis,  Latona,  and  Athene  Pronsea,  may  not  sacri- 
fice undefiled  or  with  favorable  acceptance.'" 

Such  is  the  graphic  and  impressive  description,  given  by^schines 
himself  some  years  afterward  to  the  Athenian  assembly,  of  his  own 
address  to  the  Amphiktyouic  meeting  in  spring  339  B.C. ;  on  the  lofty 
site  of  the  Delphian  Pylaja,  with  Kirrha  and  its  plain  spread  out 
before  his  eyes,  and  with  the  ancient  oath  and  all  its  fearful  impre- 
cations recorded  on  the  brass  plate  hard  by,  readable  by  every  one. 
His  speech,  received  with  loud  shouts,  roused  violent  passion  in  the 
bosoms  of  the  Amphiktyons,  as  well  as  of  the  hearers  assembled 
round.  The  audience  at  Delphi  was  not  liko  that  of  Athens. 
Athenian  citizens  were  accustomed  to  excellent  oratory,  and  to  the 
task  of  balancing  opposite  arguments  :  though  susceptible  of  high- 
wrought  intellectual  excitement— admiration  or  repugnance  as  the 
case  might  be— they  discharged  it  all  in  the  final  vote,  and  then 
went  home  to  their  private  affairs.  But  to  the  comparatively  rude 
men  at  Delphi,  the  speech  of  a  first-rate  Athenian  orator  was  a  rarity. 
When  .^schines",  with  great  rhetorical  force,  unexpectedly  revived 
in  their  imaginations  the  ancient  and  terrific  history  of  the  curse  of 
Kirrha— assisted  by  all  the  force  of  visible  and  local  association— 
they  were  worked  up  to  madness  ;  while  in  such  minds  as  theirs,  the 
emotion  raised  would  not  pass  off  b}^  simple  votimr,  but  required  to 
be  discharged  by  instant  action. 

How  intense  and  ungovernable  that  emotion  became,  is  shown  by 
the  monstrous  proceedings  which  followed.  The  original  char<>-c  of 
impiety  brought  against  Athens,  set  forth  by  the  Amphissian  speaker 
coarsely  and  ineffectively,  and  indeed  no  wavleudiuir  itself  to  rhetor- 
ical exaggeration— was  now  altogether  forgotten  in  the  more  heinous 
mipiety  of  which  .'Eschines  had  accused  the  Amphissians  themselves. 
About  the  necessity  of  punishing  them,  tJiere  was  but  one  language.' 
1  he  Amphissian  speakers  appear  to  have  fied— since  even  their  per- 
sons would  hardly  have  been  safe  amid  such  an  excitement.  And  if 
the  day  had  not  been  already  far  advanced,  the  multitude  would  have 
rushed  at  once  down  from  the  sceueof  debate  to  Kirrha.  On  account 
of  the  lateness  of  the  hour,  a  resolution  was  passed,  wliich  the  herald 


494 


DEATH  OF   PinLIP. 


CONDUCT  OF  THE  AMPHIKTYONS. 


495 


f 


i 


formally  procIaimed-That  on  the  morrow  at  daybreak  the  whole 
Delphian  population  of  sixteen  years  nud  upward,  freemen  as  well 
Sve«  shouUl  muster  at  the  sacrificing  place,  provided  with  spades 
and  pickaxes  ;  That  the  assembly  of  Amphlktyomc  legates  would 
th.  re^meet  them,  to  act  in  defense  of  the  pi  and  the  sacred  pmp- 
vnw  That  if  there  were  any  city  whose  deputies  did  not  uppear,  it 
should  be  excluded  from  the  temple,  and  proclaimed  unholy  and 

'''lufaybreak.  accordingly,  the  muster  took  place.     The  Delphian 
muliitudc  came  with  their  imi)lements  tor  demolilion-the  Amphik- 
tvons  with  JCschines  placed  themselves  at  the  head-and  all  marched 
down   to    the    port    of    Kirrha.      Those   there  re8ident---probably 
a^^tounded  and  terrified  at  so  furious  an  inroad  from  an  entire  popu- 
lation with  whom  a  few  hours  before   they  had  been  on   triendlj 
terms-abandoned  the  place  without  resistance  and  ran  to  acquaint 
their  fellow-citizens  at  Amphissa.     The  Amphiktyons  with  their  fol- 
owers  then  entered  Kirrha.  demolished  all  the  harl^r  convemences 
and  even  set  fire  to  the  Iwuses  in  the  town.    This  ^schines  himself 
tells  u'^;  and  we  may  be  very  sure  (though  he  does  not  tell  us)  that 
the  multitude  thus  sJt  on  were  not  contented  with  simply  demolish- 
ine    but  plundered    and   carried    away  whatever  they  could    lay 
hands  on      Presently,  however,  the  Amphissians,  whose   town  was 
on  the  high   ground  about   seven  or  eight  miles  west  of  Delphi, 
apprised  of  th?  destruc:ion  cf  their  property  and  seeing  their  houses 
in  flames,  arrived  in  haste  to  the  rescue,  with  their  full-armed  lo.ce^ 
The  Amphiktyons  and  the  Delphian  multitude  were  obliged  in  l heir 
turn  io  evacuate  Kirrha,  r.nd  hurr^- back  to  Delphi  at  their  best 
eneed      They  were  in  the  greatest  personal  danger.     According  to 
Demosthenas,  some  were  actually  seized;  but  they  must  l^ave  been 
set  at  liberty  almost   immediately,     ^one  were  put   to  death;  an 
escape  which  they   probably  owed    to   the  respect  borne  by    he 
Ami^is-sians.even  under  such    exasperating  circumstances,  to  the 

Amphiktycmic  function.  •  i     ♦   „  rri,oc 

On  the  mornim:  after  this  narrow  escape  the  president   a  Thes^ 

salian  of  Pharsalus  named  Kottyphus,  convoked  a  full  Amphiktyonic 

Ekklesia;  that  is,  not  merely  the  Amphiktyons  proper,  or  the  legates 

and  co-leo-ates  deputed  from  the  various  cities— but  a.so.  along  with 

them    thS  proniis(;uous  multitude   present   for  purpose  of   sacnlice 

and  consultation  of  the  oracle.    Loud  and  indignant  were  the  denun- 

ciations  pron()unce<l  in  this  meeting  agamst  the  Amphissians;  while 

Athens  was  eulo-ized  as  having  taken  the   lead  in  viudica  ing  the 

^-bts    of  .Apollo.     It  was   finally   resolved   that  the  Amphissians 

should  be  punished  as  sinners  airainst  the  god  and  the  sacred  domain. 

:.swell  as  against  tiie  Amphiktyons    personally;    that  the  legates 

vbouM  nowko  home,  to  consult  each  his  respective  city;  and  that  as 

sooti  as  some  positive  resolution  for  executoiy  "^^^f.^^f s^'^HI^^^ 

obiuined.  each  should  come  xo  a  special  meeting.  appt)intedat  Iher 


mopylas  for  a  future  day — seemingly  not  far  distant,  and  certainly 
prior  to  the  regular  season  of  autumnal  convocation. 

Thus  was  tiie  spark  applied,  and  the  flame  kindled,  of  a  second 
Amphiktyonic  wnr,  between  six  and  seven  years  j;fler  the  conclusion 
of  the  former  in  343  so.  What  lias  been  -jiist  recounted  comes  to  U3 
from  ^Fschines,  lii:nself  the  witness  as  well  as  the  incendiary.  Yv"c 
here  judge  him,  not  from  accusation  preferred  by  his  rival  bemo.s- 
theaes,  but  from  his  own  depositions;  and  from  facts  which  ho 
details  not  simply  without  regret,  but  with  a  strong  feeling  of  pride. 
It  is  impossible  to  read  them  without  becoming  sensible  cf  the  pro- 
found misiortuno  which  had  come  over  the  Grecian  world;  since  tho 
unanimity  or  dissidenco  of  its  component  portions  were  now  deter- 
mined, not  by  political  congresses  at  Athensor  Sparta,  but  by  debates 
in  the  religious  convocitioii  at  Delphi  and  Thermopylaj.  'llcrc  wo 
have  the  poliiical  sentiment  of  tho  Amphissian  Lokrians — their  sym- 
pithy  for  Thebes,  and  dislike  to  Athens — dictating  complaint  and 
invective  against  the  Athenians  oa  the  allegation  of  impiety. 
Against  every  one.  it  was  comnimily  easy  to  find  matter  for  such  an 
allegation,  if  parties  were  on  the  lookout  for  it;  while  defense  was 
difficult,  and  the  fuel  for  kindling  religious  antipathy  all  at  the  com- 
mand of  the  accuser.  Accordingly  i^ischines  troubles  himself  liitlo 
with  the  defense,  but  plants  himself  at  once  on  the  vantage-ground  of 
the  accuser,  and  retorts  the  like  charge  of  impiety  againstlhe  Amphis- 
sians, on  totally  different  allegation?.  By  superior  oratory,  as  well 
as  by  the  appeal  to  an  ancient  historical  fact  of  a  character  peculiarly 
terror-striking,  he  exasperates  the  Amphiktyons  to  a  pilch  of  religious 
ardor,  in  vindication  of  the  god,  such  as  to  make  them  disdain  alike  tho 
suggestions  either  of  social  justice  or  of  political  prudence.  Demos- 
thenes—giving credit  to  the  Amphiktyons  for  something  like  the 
equity  of  procedure,  familiar  to  Athenian  ideas  and  practice — 
atfirme<l  that  no  charge  against  Athens  could  havo  been  made  before 
tlieni  by  the  Lokrians,  because  no  charge  would  be  entertained 
without  previous  notice  given  to  Athens.  But  ^-i-^schines,  when 
accusing  the  Lokrians — on  a  matter  of  which  he  had  given  no  notice, 
and  which  it  first  crossed  his  mind  to  mention  at  the  niomentwhenho 
made  his  speecii— found  these  Amphiktyons  so  inflammable  in  their 
religions  antipathies,  that  they  forthwith  call  out  and  head  the  Del- 
phian mob  armed  with  pickaxes  for  demolition.  To  evoke,  from  a 
far  gone  aiid  halt-forgotten  patit,  the  memory  of  that  fierce  religious 
feiid,  for  the  p.irpose  of  extruding  established  proprietors,  friends  and 
defenders  of  the  teiijple,  from  an  occupancy  wherein  they  rendered 
essential  r,ervice  to  the  numerous  visitors  of  Delphi — to  execute  this 
purpose  with  brutal  violence,  creating  the  maximum  of  exasperation 
in  the  sufferers,  endangering  the  lives  of  the  Amphiktyonic  legates; 
and  raising  another  Steered  Waf  pregnant  with  calamitous  results — 
this  \^as  an  amount  of  mischief  such  as  the  bitterest  enemy  of  Greece 
could  hardly  have  surpassed.     The  prior  imputations  of  irreligion* 


496 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


thrown  out  by  the  Lokriati  orator  against  Athens,  may  have  been 
futile  and  malicious ;  but  the  retort  of  ..'Escliines  was  far  worse, 
cxtenrling  as  well  as  embittering  the  poison  of  pious  discord,  and 
])lunging  the  Amphiktyouic  assembly  in  a  contest  from  which  there 
was  no  exit  except  by  the  sword  of  Philip, 

Some  coinnietits  on  this  proceeding  appeared  requisite,  partly 
because  it  is  the  only  distinct  matter  known  to  us,  from  an  actual 
witness;  respecting  the  Am]>hiktyonic  council — partly  from  its  iiiin- 
ous  consequences,  which  will  presently  appear.  At  first,  indeed, 
these  consequences  did  not  mr.nifest  theujselves,  and  when  ^Eschi- 
nes  returned  to  Athens,  he  told  his  story  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
people.  AVe  may  presume  that  ho  reported  the  proceedings  at  the 
time  and  in  the  same  manner  as  he  stated  them  afterward,  in  the  ora- 
tion now  prcser\-ed.  The  Athenians,  indignant  at  the  accusation 
brought  by  the  Lokrians  against  Alliens,  were  disposed  to  take  part 
in  that  movement  of  pious  entlnisi;!sm  Aviiich  u5Cschines  had  kindled 
on  the  subject  of  Kirrha,  pursuant  to  the  ancient  oath  sworn  by  their 
forefathers.  So  forcibly  was  the  religious  point  of  view  of  this  ques- 
tion thrust  upon  the  public  mind,  that  theojiposition  of  Demosthenes 
was  hardly  listened  to.  He  laid  open  at  once  the  consequences  of 
what  had  happened,  saying — "  iEsehines,  you  are  bringing  war  into 
Attica-^an  Amphiktyonic  war."  But  his  predictions  were  cried  down 
as  illusions  or  mere  manifestations  of  party  feeling  against  a  rival, 
^schines  denounced  him  opeidy  as  the  hired  agent  of  the  impious 
Lokrians;  a  charge  sufliciently' refuted  by  the"  conduct  of  these 
Lokrians  themselves,  who  are  described  by  JEschines  as  gratuitously 
insulting  Athens. 

But  though  the  general  feeling  at  Athens,  immediately  after  the 
return  of  ^Eschines,  was  favorable  to  his  proceedings  at' Delphi,  it 
did  not  long  continue  so.  Nor  is  the  change  difficult  to  imderstand. 
The  first  mention  of  the  old  oath,  and  the  original  devastation  of 
Kirrha,  sanctioned  4)y  the  name  and  authority  of  Solon,  would  natu- 
rally turn  the  Athenian  mind  into  a  strong  feeling  of  pious  sentiment 
against  the  tenants  of  that  accursed  spot.  Butfurther  information 
would  tend  to  prove  that  the  Lokrians  were  more  sinned  against  than 
sinning;  that  the  occupation  of  Kirrha  as  a  harbor  was  a  convenience 
to  all  Greeks,  and  most  of  all  to  the  temple  itself;  lastl}',  that  the 
imputations  said  to  have  been  cast  by  the  Lokrians  upon  Athens  had 
either  never  been  made  at  all  (so  we  find  Demosthenes  affirming),  or 
were  nothing  worse  than  an  unauthorized  burst  of  ill-temper  from 
some  rude  individual.  Though  ^Eschines  had  obtained  at  first  a  vote 
of  approbation  for  his  proceedings,  yet  when  his  proposition  came  to 
be  made — that  Athens  should  take  part  in  the  special  Amphiktyonic 
meeting  convened  for  punishing  the  Amphissians — the  opposition  of 
Demosthenes  was  found  more  effective.  Both  the  Senate  and  the 
puMi©  assembly  passed  a  resolution  peremptorily  forbidding  all 


.;•*  il:\:' 


AMPHIKTYOXIC  iVIEETING.  49^ 

shall  take  no  part  either  in  wm^  ^l  V  ,^  ^^"^  ^^'^  ^^^^^"^^^^  prescribed) 
sons  assembleli  at\hat^yc"iTmee  h^^  ^'^^  P^- 

ThermopvlfE  at  the  reo-uhr  /„"'-  ^^^  1  ^  ^  -  '''^'^  ^^"-'^^^'^  ^"^ 
i.npoi.a^t  decree  n.arkS  t Le  cZ^J^t^^l'^''^^^^^  Tins 
indeed  tells  us  that  it  was  onh' n men  Ij^h  >  ^^^^''^"^-    -^^^chines 

part  of  Demosthenes  itin  r  h,m^  'n,^  ^J  cratty  maneuver  on  the 
the  close  of  business  ^i.'rna^'dt^^^^^^^^  ''^^^  ^^^^^^"^^^>''  ^^ 

had  gone  aNv^iy.  But  there  is  m^in.  o  e^i^m  sn^^^^^  f  "•^"^'  '^''"^^ 
moreover,  ^schiues   if  h^  i,.wi  .hmi      .  •  ^^^7"^  ^^^^^^  insinuations- 

1..  favor;  could  oas^y  iwe  ''tffflt^'  .l^S  tel^lt':.,"'"""^"' '" 

-a  fact  ma.le  known  to  us  bv^/^^        ''''"'"f'  "<"• ''"J  f'om  Tl,el.el 

existcl  bcfoiv  bL'tween  tbc.P  r^i  •  ''"'"="''<^<'<'?:  sucU  as  Imd  never 
kgates  met,  detennine  W^:,  .  "?"/*'""/"''-''-  The  remaining 
iAing  the  Amp  1,  s"  an     ind    ho  ,  Till    °'''''/'"'  'll"  ""•■P°'*«  "f  P^"" 

•igamk  Die  Lokrians.  and  reduced  .l^lm  tT°!  .losetuer,  marched 
tothemin,lulseutten4  rm„i-;n/f  ,  submission,  but  granted 
god,  payable  at  stated  intov%f?'"  '"''"  ''  """^  "^ "'«  ^^'P^an 

leaders  io  banisju'l^nl  as  b/v b  ^T^sTi  atoi'tLT'  ''^""^  ^"'^""'^ 
sacred  domain-and  recall  m'  nihil,  °i.  ?  encroachment  on  tho 
Lokrians(hesays)  ft7r  '  rf?,,ephf^  ?  had  opposed  it.  But  the; 
fes.  and  brought  Wk  a  the  "ni^vl!;';i'''-''''  ^'-R^"  ''""'•  P'"J  oolh- 
contrary,  state?  that  ICn.f  'r.!,  ^  ^  leaders.  Demosthenes,  on  ib- 
ous  Amphtojinic  ±?et^.P,^^^  contingents  from  the  vari: 

wlm  ,lid  come  Ce  Inkewu-n   '°7,  °"^<^':  <=«■"«  '«  all,  while  tbosj 
allosether  miscarHed'Th"  account"  of  n'"^  '?,  "'"'  .""^  P"'-Pos.    ' 
Probableof  thetwoforwnL^^  ?         I  Deuioslbenes  is  the  more 

Athens  nor  Thebes' t«,knnr^  .'h^'  ^''^""<''  ''™**'^'^  l'"*'  "hither 
been  excluded  from  it  il   nbikr  nni"™'"'"^'-'?".'  '^''"'^  ^P"""  bad 
remained  therefore  only  thcT^nfZ  in"?""''' , '"  ^  ^■*^-    There 
the  Peloponnesians,  e?en  if     ,W  kY  could  no,'?' -f'     ^^  "^^■• 
tliey  could  neither  march  W  i,  ,  .  ,  i  V?°'  '^"^''y  come,  s  nee 

caseby.seawliietL  imnhi^;  ;  ™''^''  ^"">^"'-  "Of  come  with 

anJ  the  Thessaltn,  ;  nPH"?'"" ' -'^f  '"''^'"-^  of  'be  port  of  Kirrha 
imense  an  n  e  ^tTnZeme  n,W%''''>™''  ^''"'-  "<"  "^ely  to  take  ^■ 
fest.  Moreover  he  ArU  wTn  ?lr'  '°  T"^'  !'.""-«"gh  ^^•ithout  the 
invite  the  interference  of  PWl,°r>  3  ,7'^  T""^'"S  ^"'^  "  P'-ete.xt  to 
"^  order  to  show  how  imoos^  &  u  "'"^  ,'^""-'''  P'^'-'^'^''  "^  do  nothing, 
'e  may  fairl/assumeZ?  what  IpZ  '°  '''''  ''■'""^"'  ''"»•  H«"ce 
>-»  .ramei  to  ri^l^^U'^^Lfa^Xd^S^i^^^  J^t^^ 


498 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


PHaiP  ENTERS  PHOKIS. 


il 


^°Auhe  autumnal  meeting,  whore  this  f^'t^^'^^^^Xs'^p^SclTt 

Pl.ilir.  ^vns  adonted    Icales  from   Athens  were   doubtless  piisem 

rSinefumoD    .hemf,  acordiug  to  usual  custom;  for  he  de.Tee 

:pDoZ:.Ces  had  e./aeted  .hatlue  u.ual  cu^'om  shot.W  be      ^ 

mS-  lie  liimk'lt-  only  laments  thai  Atbecs  ^Jiff^^'Cf^.l^^^^lI.,  ^ 
L'&ecl  by  the  corrupt  suggestions  of  ^/-^^^  j^;^^!^;^^^ 
ing  the  erusade  against  Aniphissa,  ^vLen  the  ^f  <^^^,  .  ^^^^^'^L  the 
c^n  .]( (1  her  out  fo?  that  pious  dutv.  AN  hat  part  ThcLcs  look  m  me 
"o"mhudion  of\'l,ilip.  or^vhe.i.er  Lor  legates  a'<f  nf'  ^at  the  aotun-.. 

nal  Amphiktyouic  meeting,  we  do  no  know.  ];^' «  ' '^, ''iiLVern"; 
hered  that  one  of  the  twelve  Amphiklyonc  douhle  suffrages  no« 

he  onsed  to  the  Macedonians  theni^'lves^^  ^'",1';? "ihe  The^Su"' 
in-memlK-rs  had  become  dependent  on  Slacedpum-lhelhessal  au  , 
Pi?thir,t  AchfEan<;  Perrhwbians,  Dolopians,  Magnctes,  etc.  It  \\.is 
Sob  b  V  not  verv  difficult  for  Koltvphus  and^schiues  to  procu 
a  voieinTesti  "-Philip  with  the  command.  Even  those  ^vll0^y  -^ 
n.XS"'X-t  d.?ad  the  cl-rge  of  impie|  .f  .hey  opi>osed  . , 

in  his  exp.'diti(.n  against  tl:c  hcythians.  aLd  in  ^is    utlle^  ^^ 
ji«  m    V   ^  TrUnlli    w  1  t'lT  H  Leitcdved  the  seveie  ^^oui.l 

'X'ldf^nr    i    u       ^  is     'ovei-v  froin  this  .....d  was  con.pl-.;. 
V    "n  -th r.Vn  phiktvonic  vole.  coV.ferring  upc^.  f  ^V-'n^^rirus''    d 
v^-  s  pa-ed       le  re adilv  accepted  a  niissum  win. h  hi>  partis„i  s  .-  •< 
;  obablv  hislaibes.  hadbeen  ■.ah.ly  u-.necrned  .n  procuv 

diatelvct.lleelinghis  for<:es,  heniaiclicd  souihwaid  V''"  Ife''  ''',,-,  •„ 


498 

took  NikiBa  (one  of  the  towns  most  psspntut  .„  .i. 

pass)  from  thcThebans,  in  wlL"  i,  .nd,"^ '",  „  ,°, '"''  ?<'<="nlj  of  the 

fli:.ring  in  the  oecunat  ou  i^V,  .?,  "  T  ''  "  -^''"'"■'^"''i''n  garrison 
cf  tieThe!,a„.s  in  1  f  mhnr^m  ec  ?  ''he  I'lf  ""T  "  "'^'  concurrence 
(His  imponaut  town  to  lh^TSS'•  1  ''"''S'''  ", »"'c''' '"  consign 
ilependence  1  hessahans,  who  were  tlioroughlj-  in  his 

or  in'to'SYlr.  tlro^™?'^!^^:'"-^',"/"  V'""'"  -"  ^™P'='-- 
coniinued  in     lie\lcSlfs-7^    h-,-       !'  ""/."Munate  territory  si  ill 

fortirted  town,  occi   .  'd  me -1    n^;  ,  ,,f  i''^  """,•  Vii'l'o'"  «  single 
popalation  scituv  as  vel    as  nom-     o     ''■^'I'^T*''' Y,'l>^'ges  and  bf  a 

pri  .cipal  Phokial,  tmv^  1^;  nSw  disnn  uled '  Phi^^  r^'  '"« 

and  beg.ui  forthwith  to  re-esf-illii:'         .,'''''''  ''a"e<i  lus  armv, 

str,,ngr.laeeforperm,.nennni'  yoccupS^  Xn',' ,"=  ''  '"'?'' 

portion  of  the  Grec.)"  '"?o,W  '  Hi.te  t  "h^T-ld'Vr^T'?''"",'','^  '■•"■"<' 
as  general  aclino-  u„der  the  .\mr.i,  if.       '.'«"•"'  proclaimed  himself 

as  on  his  ma,-cl.°imX  to  vi„d  cm  n^"^^^^  T"  "'  """"""'i™.  -nd 
legions  Lokrians.  lladsich  been  ?-^  '?'"'''''  g°<l  ='.'?■'!"«'  sacri- 
wouki  have  had  no  oec 'sion  to  halt  a  F|.  f,:l'.  ^"^'Tl'  '"'"•"'■^.  ''= 
and  garrison  it  Acco -din"  I  ;?;,„'  ,""'''  "'J'''''  '<^''«'"  reforrify 
somJiliing  diffMvnt  or  at  if  LL,?w,' •'■'''"'",''  'V'^''"'  "»"  •'«  '"«<"t 

d.e,l no loliger affected  to  concein-^^  """■'°''-  "''  '"'"'^^-'f  in- 
to Thebes,  he  an,,  ,  need  tint  be  I  nH  ^  ''  P'T'^''^'''-  ,  Siding  envoys 
and  earnestly  inviinlher  ,.„''»,  '^^  come  to  attack  the  Athenians, 

od,o„s  to  ij  as\:^,,  .•  otSf  °BuTif  t'lie'T?/  ,"='""?'  ""V""- 
an  exec  lent  ODDortnnitv  m  ,^r„«i  .      "?  Thehans,  in  spite  of 

mine  to  stanr/,  oof  4  elai7n«  I  ZT""^  /T'  ''"""''  ^'iH  ^eter- 
'frough  Bceotia,  that  he  „^"il,^/e  lt^"a  wi  hts  o  """r  '"""S" 

liie  relations  between  Vthens  and  Ti,l?        r  1  ^  ""'"  ^''''<=<"S- 
altogether  unfriendlvThlri  if]  "^if'*^^  "'  ""*  moment  were 

ttes  to  discred  t  as  haTin"  hc^^T'""?""'  ^"T'^^-  """"'  ^«-hines 
Tliebans     Never  lll^U"       ?■  ^''^Pl'mented  and  corrupted  hy  the 

Thebes  where  an  1  IVk"  '•'""'  "-^  ^"""""'^  ^'''i'^  and  embassies  to 
s.  Where  a  phho-^henian  mmoTity  also  suhsistert,  noth  ng  ,»d 


500 


MATH  OF  PHILIP. 


ALARM  AT  ATHENS. 


Pver  been  accomplished.  The  enmity  slill  remained,  and  had  been 
even  artificially  aggravated  (if  we  are  to  believe  Demosthenes)  during 
thfsii  months  ^^-hU)h  elapsed  since  the  breaking  out  of  the  Amphis- 
.^fn  miarrel  by  ^schines  and  the  partisans  of  Philip  in  both  cities. 
'xbHlw  11  subsisting  between  Athens  and  Thebes  at  tlie  moment 
Tv^hen  Philip  took  possession  of  Elateia,  was  so  acknow  edged  tha 
Xad  good^reasoii  for  looking  upon  confederacy  of  the  two  against 
im  S  impossible.  To  enforce  the  request,  that  Thebes,  already  his 
ally  woXontinue  to  act  as  such  at  this  critical  jimctui-e.  he  dis- 
mfched  thither  envoys  not  merely  Macedonhin,  but  a  so  Thessalian. 
Doloptn  Phtliiot  Ach^an,  ^tolian,  and  ^niane^the  Amphikiv- 
cnic  allies  wlio  were  accompanying  his  marc^ 

If  such  were  the  hopes,  and  the  reasonable  hopes,  of  Pl»liP'  ^e 
may  ea'iy  understand  how  intense  was  the  alarm  among  the  Athe- 
nians when  they  first  heard  of  the  occupation  of  Elateia.  Should 
rThebans  complv  Philip  would  be  in  three  daf  s  on  he  frontier 
o  Amca  andTro  u  the  sentiment  understood  as  well  felt  to  be  pre- 
vakn  the  A  henians  could  not  but  anticipate  that  free  passage,  and 
a  Kn  re-^  ^'^^i^^^^^'  would  be  reacbly  granted     Ten 

vonis  More  Demosthenes  himself  (in  his  first  Olynthiac)  had  as- 
LrtSl  that  the  Thebans  would  gladly  join  Philip  m  an  attack  on 
\t  ica  If  such  was  then  the  alienation,  it  had  been  njcreasiug 
rntler\handminishing  ever  since.  As  the  march  of  Philip  Inu 
[u  lerto  been  o  n.erefy  rapid,  but  understood  as  directed  toNvard 
Shi  and  A,,,ph,ssa,  the  Athenians  had  made  no  preparations  lor 
the  def^^e  of  their  frontier.  Neither  their  fannlies  nor  then-  move- 
able Dopcrty  had  yet  been  carried  within  walls.  Nevertheless  they 
IndnoTtot^xp^^  niore  than  .forty-eight  hours,  an  iiv 

vadiSHrmy  affoi^idable  and  desolating  as  any  of  those  during  the 
PeliponnSfan  war,  under  a  commander  far  abler  than  Archidamus 

""'Tlfoudi  the  general  history  of  this  important  period  can  be  made 
r^ntonlv  in  outline  ^ve  are  fortunate  enough  to  obtam  from  Demos- 
?benes  a  strU  i  i-^D^^^^^^^  i"  ^«»^^  detail,  of  the  proceedings  at 
Athens  imSafel?  after  the  news  of  the  capture  of  EJut^ui^  P  u^P; 
It  was  evenino-  when  the  messenger  arrived,  ]ust  at  the  time  A^  lien 
the  D^v^anes  (or  senators  of  the  reskling  tribe)  were  at  supper  in  thcai 
offid^re^kto^^^^  Immediately  breaking  up  their  meal,  some  ran  to 
c^l  ;  le  geSs  whose  duty  'it  was  to  convoke  the  public  as.  m- 
bly  with^thc  trumpeter  wh'o  gave  public  notice  thereof;  so  1  at 
the'^en"tc  and  assembly  were  convoked  for  the  next  morning  at  da) 
break      Others  bestiiTeSth 

whfch  was  full  of  booths  and  stands  for  traders  selling  merchandise 
They  even  set  fire  to  these  booths,  in  their  hurr>^  to  get  the  s]  ac 
clear      Such  was  the  excitement  and  terror  throughout  the  city    li 
the  Dublic  assembly  was  crowded  at  the  earliest  dawn,  even  befoie 
Ihe  Senate  cbuld  go  through  their  forms  and  present  themselves  for 


501 


the  openins  ceremonies     At  length  the  Senate  joined  tlie  assemblv 
and  tl,e  prytanes  came  forward  to  announce  the  news,  producinTthe 

,fj     IT  ,  •  ^.''V"^''*^^  •"  speak?"    Not  a  man  came  for- 

rose  P™<--''"»«'1  the  words  again  and  again,  yet  stiii  no  one 

At  length    after  a  considerable  interi-al  of  silence,  Demosthenes 
rose  to  speak.     He  addressed  himself  to  tliat  alarm  ng  c,.nvk^"ou 
which  beset  the  minds  of  all,  though  no  one  liad  yet  given  it  utte, 
jnce-lliat  the  Thebans  were  in  hearty  sympathy  with  KZ      "suf 
fernot  yourselves  (he  said)  to  believe  any  such  thing,     ff 'the  foe 

out  InTtin'nt^Fl'th't'  'T  "f^"  ""rP  ""  your'frontie'  w  •'i'^,' 

out  naiting  at  Elateia.     He  lias  a  large  body  of  nartisans  "it  TIipIu.q 

procured  by  fraud  and  corruption;  but  he^msCZ  wl.Jc'  dtv' 

ablv  to  you.     It  is  for  the  purpose  of  emboldening  his  own  partisans 

LL    r''7'"'"",°°  !"'  opponents,  and  thus  extorting  a'^osittve 

declaration  from  the  city  in  his  favor,  that  he  is  making  diinW  ,f 

i.s  force  at  Elateia.     And  in  this  he  will  succeed,  unless^you   A"  he 

a  ans  shall  e.x-crt  yourselves  vigorously  and  prudently  in  counteract  on 

i?  Ph=Hn''^  Z  ?""■■  '*'  r"?'°"  *°"-'"-^  Thebis,  shall  novl     oW 
aloof,  Phdip  s  partisans  m  the  city  will  become  all-powerful   so  that 
Uic  whole  Theban  force  will  maich  along  with  him  agaiim  Attica 
For  your  own  security,  you  must  shake  off  these  old  feelin-s     owl 
eve   well  gioundcd-and  stand  forward  for  the  protection  of  Thebel 
a     eing  in  greater  danger  than  yourselves.     March  forth  your  entire 
n  iht,^y  strength  to  the  frontier,  and  thus  embolden  vour  p"  rfi^anf 

Thebes  to  speak  out  openly  against  their  philippizi-„.r  op,  ci  cuts 

?o  r=mil  ("Jrv  I  """"'i  '"  ^""J^r"""  ^^"I'  tl'e  generals,  to  call  iu 

>our  military  force  whenever  tliey   thing  lit.     Let    your    envovq 

rtcraand  neither  concessions  nor  eonditio.S  from  the  Thebans   ?et 

m  simply  tender  the  full  force  of  Athens  to  assist  the  IvSn's  in 

ei   present  straits      If  the  offer  be  .accepted,  you  will  have  secured 

,  In  ?;,'"f  A  ir**'"  ^?/.y°"""  °"'"  «'f«'y.  ^^''"e  «cling  wi  1     generosity 
>o   hy  of  A  hens;  if  it  be  refused,  llie  Thebans  wMl  have  themselvc^ 

W  ^^'welfafof  ^l';.'.^^'  ^'^"'^  ""'"'P-^'-"^  -  "-  ^^  o? 
wa?e„S!"?'-°'''"'?°  "^  Demosthenes,  alike  wise  and  generous 
IH  OS    o°i      v;iM,pr ^='T-  "'"^  "'^"P'"''  ^y^'  Athenian!  wi-hoiu 
«;'s.hS\7mfltS^^ 

phniunz'in^.'TlIX/''"".'^,'^^''-"^''  "f  ^^"'P  «°<'  I'is  allies,  and  the 

meTdiliTiin^  '?K  M  °i  '"""'Pl':  while  the  friends  of  Athens 

'^"  so  dispiiiied.  that  the  first  letters  of  Demdsthenes,  sent  home 


502 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


MARCH   TO  THEBES. 


503 


immediately  on  reaching  Thebes,  were  of  a  .cloomy  cast.  According 
to  GrLciau"^custoin,  the  two  opposing  legaiious  were  heard  in  turn 
before  the  Theb.in  assembly.  Amynlas  and  Klearchus  were  the  Mace- 
donian envoys,  together  with  the  eloquent  Byzantine  Python,  as 
ciiic  f  spoUonian,  and  the  Tiiessalians  Daochus  and  Thrasylaus. 
Having  the  tirst  word,  as  established  allies  of  Thebes,  these  orators 
found  it  an  easy  theme  to  denounce  Athens,  and  to  support  their 
case  by  the  general  tenor  of  pa^t  history  since  the  battle  of  Leuktra. 
The  Maccdfuiian  orator  contrasted  the  perpetual  hostility  of  Athens 
with  the  valuable  aid  furuislud  to  Thebes  by  Philip,  when  he  rescued 
her  from  the  Phokians,  and  coiitirmeii  her  ascendency  over  Boeolia. 
"If  (said  the  orator)  Philip  had  stipulated,  before  he  assisted  you 
against  the  Phokiaus,  that  you  should  grant  him  in  return  a  free 
passage  against  Attica,  you  would  have  gladly  acceded.  Will  you 
refuse  it  now,  when  he  has  rendered  to  you  the  service  without 
stipulation  ?  Either  let  us  pass  through  to  xVttica— or  join  our  march; 
"wherebv  you  will  enrich  yourself  with  the  plunder  of  that  country, 
instead  of  being  impoverished  by  having  Boeotia  as  the  seat  of 
war. " 

All  these  topics  were  so  thoroughly  in  harmony  with  the  previous 
sentiments  of  the  Thebans.  that  they  must  have  nuide  a  lively 
impression.  How  Demosthenes  replied  to  them,  we  are  not  per- 
mitted to  know.  His  powers  of  oratory  must  have  been  severely 
tasked;  for  the  pre-established  feeling  was  ail  adverse,  and  he  had 
nothing  to  work  upon,  except  fear,  on  the  part  of  Thebes,  of  too 
near  contrast  with  the  Macedonian  arms — combined  with  her  gratitude 
for  the  spontaneous  and  unconditional  tender  of  Athens.  And  even 
as  to  fears,  the  Thebans  had  only  to  chooj^e  between  admitting  the 
Athenian  army  or  that  of  Philip;  a  choice  in  which  all  presumption 
was  in  favor  of  the  latter,  as  present  ally  and  recent  benefactor— against 
the  former,  as  standing  rival  and  enemy.  Such  was  the  result  antici- 
pated by  the  hopes  of  Philip  as  well  as  by  the  fears  of  Athens.  Yet 
with  alf  the  chances  thus  against  him,  Demosthenes  carried  his  pomt 
in  the  Theban  assembly:  determining  them  to  accept  the  offered 
alliance  of  Athens  and  to  brave  the  hostility  of  Philip.  He  boasts, 
•with  good  reason,  of  such  a  diplomatic  and  oratorical  triumph:  by 
which  he  not  only  obtained  a  powerful  ally  against  Philip,  but  also 
— a  benefit  yet  more  important— rescued  Attica  from  being  overruu 
by  a  united  Macedonian  and  Theban  army.  Justly  does  the  contem- 
porary historian  Theopompus  extol  the  unrivaled  eloquence  ^Yhereby 
Demosthenes  kindled  in  the  bosoms  of  the  Thebans  a  generous  flame 
of  Pan-Hellenic  patriotism  But  it  was  not  simply  by  superior  elo- 
quence—though that  doubtless  was  an  essential  condition— that  his 
triumph  at  Thebes  was  achieved.  It  was  still  more  owing  to  the 
wise  and  gcmerous  offer  which  he  carried  with  him,  and  which  he 
had  himself  prevailed  on  the  Athenians  to  make — of  unconditional 
alliance  without  aoy  reference  to  the  jealousies  and  animosities  of 


the  past    and  on  terms  even  favorable   to  Thebes,  as  beino-  more 
exposed  than  Athens  in  the  war  against  Philip  °        ^ 

The  answer  brought  back  by  Demosthenes  was  checrino-     ThP 
irapor tan    alliance  combining  Athens  and  Thebes  in  defe TsT^e  w  ir 
agauist  Phihp.  had  been  successfully  brought  about.     Tl  eTthei^-l  i 
army    already  mustered  in  Attica,^vas  invited   into   B^^Uf    n^^^^ 
marehec  to  Thebes  without  delay.     While  a  portion  of  l^n  ioined 
the  Theban  force  at  the  northern  frontier  of  Bmoti  i   ./ r^«?«f^f 
approach  of  Philip,  the  rest  were  left  in  quarte  s   /t  TiicVes  '  A^^^ 
Demosthenes  extols  not  only  the  kindncsi  with  whic  Ihev  wem 
received    in    private    houses,    but   also   their  correct    and   orHpH^ 
behavior  amidst  the  families  and  propertieo    tie  Thebans    no^^^^^ 
single  complaint  being  preferred  against  them.     tL  a-itimthv  .nd 
jealousy  between  the  two  cities  seenled  effaced  in  cordial  c^oner^.ti^^ 
against   he  common  enemj-.     Of  the  cost  of  the  joint  ooeraTonT  on 
land  and  s.a,  two-thirds  were  undertaken  bv  Ath^n       The  comm'-inS 

In  this  as  well  as  in  other  ways,  V\e  dm^-erows  vioinif,-  ^f  di  m- 


"vtha^-'ovcnu^n^'^nnv    h "v '"  •'  should  ,„,poar  on  il,e  fron'.i.'r 
enenL        t".^".".!^".  ^l^'":^'    •'"'•■''I*<'.'«i    «like    Uy  friends  and 


write  to  hi,     1  Lf„        /^-^'P'"""   ?o<l   «Sainst  Amplussa-and  to 

^l>ceific  ,  r„o  e  '^,,^t7T^'"^ '"  ""'"■"  "'"'  -1°'"  """•  f"-- this 
••i.ni,  .  P'"^!'"^^-  ."19  letters  were  press  nsr.  often  reoeated  frnrl 
:»plymg  much  ombamssmew,  according  to  DemostlS^s!    As  f« 


504 


DEATH  OF   PHILIP. 


WAR  IN  PHOKIS. 


505 


as  we  can  iudge,  they  do  not  seem  to  have  produced  much  effect; 
ror  was  it  easy  for  the  Pe!oponnesian8  to  join  Pliihi>-eilher  by  hmd 
^^•hi]e  Bceotia  was  hostile-or  by  sea  while  the  Amphissians  held 
Kin-ha,  and  the  Athenians  had  a  superior  navy.  ^         .  „      ,. 

War  was  now  carried  on,  in  Phokis  and  on  the  frontiers  of  Bo'otia 
durin- the  autumn  and  av inter  of  ^39-338  B.C.  Tne  Athenians  and 
Thc'bans  not  only  maintained  their  ground  ngainst  Philip,  but  even 
cninedsomc  advantages  over  him;  especially  in  tAN-o  en-agements- 
ealled  the  battle  on  the  river,  and  the  Nvinter-battle-of  which 
Demosthenes  finds  room  to  l.oi.st,  and  which  called  forth  manifesta- 
tions of  rejoicing  and  sacritice,  when  made  known  at  Athens,  lo 
Demrsthenes  himself,  as  the  chief  adviser  of  the  Theban  alliance,  a 
M-rcath  of  gold  was  proposed  by  Demomelcs  and  llyperides,  and 
decreed  b\^  the  people;  and  tho\igh  a  citizen  named  Diondas 
impeached  the  mover  for  an  illegal  decree,  yet  he  did  not  even 
obtain  the  fifth  part  of  the  suffrages  of  the  Dikastery.  and  tlierefore 
became  liable  to  the  fine  of  1000  drachmas.  Demosthenes  was 
crowned  with  public  proclamation  at  the  Dionysiac  lestivalof  March, 

But  the  most  memorable  step  taken  by  the  Athenians  and  The- 
bans    in   this  joint   war  against   Philip,  was  that  of  reconstituting 
t  ,'  Pli')kian9  as  an  independent  and  self  delendin^  section  ot  the 
Hellenic  nar^e      On  the  part  of  the  Thebans,  hithefto  the  bitterese 
enemies  of  the  Phokians,  this  proceeding  evinced   adoption  ot  an 
'mpm  ed  and  generous  policy,  worthy  of  the  Pan-Helenic  cause  m 
^hkh  t'lev  had  now  embarked.     In  846  B.C.  the  Phokians  had  been 
Smq  ered"  and  ruined  by  the  arms  of  Philip,  under  coiidemnation 
prZunced  bv  the  Amphiktyons.     The  r  cities  had  all  l^een  dis- 
mantkd.  and  their  population  distributed  m  villages,  impoverished, 
^r  driven  into  exile.     These  exiles,  many  of  whom  were  at  Athens, 
now  returned,.and  the  Pliokian  population  ^'ere  aided  by  the  Athe- 
nians and  Thebans  in  reoccupying  and  securing  their  towns       boine 
indeed  of  these  towns  were  so  small,  such  as  Para potamii  and  othe  s. 
that  it  was  thouudit  inexpedient  to  reconstitute  them.     T^^^^ir  popula- 
tion was  transferred  to  the  others,  as  a  means  of  increased  strength. 
An^bn^us,  in  the  south-western  portion  of  Phokis,  was  refortified 
by  the  Athenians  and  Thebans  with  peculiar  care  and  solidit}      It 
was  surrounded  with  a  double  circ'c  of  wail  of  the  black  stone  of  tie 
country;   each  wall  being  fifteen  feet  high  and  nearly  six  feet  m 
thickness,  with  an  interval  of  six  feet  between  the  two^     These  walls 
were  seen,  five  centuries  afterward,  by  the  traveler  Pausanias,  iMo 
numbers  them  among  the  most   solid   defeDsive   structures  m    he 
•incient  world.     Ambrvsus  was  valuable  to  the  Athenians  and  Tlic- 
'bans  as  a  military-  posilion  for  the  defense  of  Bceotia,  inasmuch  as  it 
lay  on  that  rou-h  southerly  road  near  the  sea,  which  the  Laceds 
monian  ^ing  Kleombrotus  had  forced  when  he  marched  from  Phoki3 
to  the  p^t&n  of  Leuktra ;  eluding  Epamlnotidas  aud  the  main  The- 


ban  force,  who  were  posted  to  resist  him  on  the  more  frequented 
road  by  Koroneia.  .Moreover  by  occupying  the  south-wesle?n  parts 
of  Phokis  on  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  they  prevented  the  arrival  of  re- 
cutorceinents  to  Piiilip  by  sea  out  of  Peloponnesus 

The  war  in  Phokis,  prosecuted  seemingly  upon' a  lar-e  scale  and 
^ylth  much  activity,  between  Philip  and  his  allies  on  one  side   and 
the  Athenians  and  Thebans  with  their  allies  on  the  other— ended 
with  the  fatal  battle  of  Chieroneia,  fought  in  August,  J^8  b.c  •  Iiaviuu- 
continued  about  ten  months  from  the  time  when  Philip   after  bein* 
named  general  at  the  Amphiktyouic  assembly  (about  the  autumnal 
eiiuinox),  marehed  southward  and  occupied  Elateia.     But  respecting 
the  intermediate  events  we  are  unfortunately  without  distinct  infor- 
mation.    We  pick  up  only  a  few  hints  and  allusions  which  do  not 
enal)le  us  to  understand  what  passed.     We  cannot  make  out  either 
the  auxiliaries  engaged,  or  the  total  numbers  in  the  field   on  either 
side.     Demosthenes  boasts  of  having  procured  for  Athens  as  allies 
the  Lubffiaus,  Achjeans,   Corinthians,  Thebans,  3Iegariaus   Leuka- 
dians,  and  Korkyra^ans— arraying  along  with  the  Athenian  soldiers 
no  less  than  lo,000  infantry  and  3,000  cavalry,  and  pecuniary  con- 
tributions besides,  to  no  inconsiderable  amount,  for  the  payment  of 
mercenary  troops.     Whether  all  these  troops  fought  either  in  Phokis 
or  at  Clia?roneia,  we  cannot  determine;  we  verify  the  Acha?aus  and 
the  Corinthians      As  far  as  we  can  trust  Demosthenes,  the  autumn 
ana  winter  of  339-338  B.C.  w^as  a  season  of  advantages  gained  by  the 
Athenians  and  Thebans  over  Phihp,  and  of  rejoidng  in  theii  two 
cities;  not  without  much  embarrassment  to  Philip,  testified  by  his 
1  gent  requisitions  ot  aid  from  his  Peloponnesian  allies,  with  which 
they  did  not  comply.     Demosthenes  was  the  war-minister  of  the  day 
exercising  greater  influence  than  thegenerals-deliberatin^r  at  Thebes 
HI  concert  with  the  Bceotarchs-advising  and  swayino-  tlie  Theban 
pubie  assembly  as  well  as  the  Athenian-and  pr6bably  in  m^sio 
to  other  cities  a  so,  for  the  purpose  of  pressing  military  efforts      The 
c  own  bestowed  upon  him  at  the  Dionysiac  festival  (March,  338  b  c  ) 
Kuks  the  pinnacle  of  his  glory  and  the  meridian  of  his  hopes  when 
here  seemed  a  fair  chance  of  successfully  resisting  the  Macedonian 

Philip  had  calculated  on  the  positive  aid  of  Thebes;  at  the  very 

vnnf  1  "^''r  n '''  ^e^^^'^lity   between  him   and   Athens.     That  shi 

mvl^^n}Tl^^^^^^^  ""f^^'  ^'^  "^^"  '-^ny  one  else  imaoined; 

Z  o-n?,     ^^VTJr^^'^i^^  ""  '^'"^^  i'^^'^^  ^^^^'^^  ^'^'^"^^I't  about,  had  not 

mlf]      A    ^^^^\''"^  been  played  with  unusual  decision  and  iudg- 

liK-tJl  ^f-"'^'^h?^%,  Accordingly,  when  opposed   by  the  iineS- 

ul   ht^Pv r^"  ?^  ^^?  7^''^T  ^"^  ^^^l»^'»i=in  force,  it  is  not  wonder- 

aiesl^^Mi^    l?''''^^'T^^•^'^"f^  ^''^  repulsed.     Such  disadVan- 

Sp    >     1^'''^^'^^'?i^''^i^^"^^^  ^^^  ^^  send  instant  propositions  of 

to  rp^o     J^-^^  would  admonish  him  to  bring  up  fresh  forces,  and 

10  renew  his  invasion  during  the  ensuing  spring  and  summer  with 


506 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


SUCCESS  OF  PHILIP. 


means  adequate  to  the  known  resistance.  It  seems  probable  that  the 
full  streijgth  of  the  Macedonian  army,  now  brought  to  a  high  excel- 
Icuce  of  organization  after  the  continued  improvcnienliT  of  his 
twenty  years'  rcijn— would  be  marched  into  Phol^is  during  the  sum- 
mer of  3:J8  B  c,  to  put  down  the  most  lormidable  combination  of  cii- 
cmier,  iliat  Philip  had  ever  encountered.  His  youthful  son  Alexander, 
now  eigiiteen  years  of  age,  came  along  with  them. 

It  is  among  flie  accusations  urged  by  JEschincs  against  Demosthe- 
nes, that  in  levying  mercenary  troops, *he  wrongfully  took  the  public 
money  to  pay  men  who  never  appeared;  and  further,  that  he  jilaced 
at  the  disp(jsal  of  the  Aniphissians  a  large  body  of  10,000  mercenary 
troops,  thus  withdrawing  them  from  the  main  Athenian  and  Boeotian 
army;  whereby  Philip  was  enabled  to  cut  to  pieces  the  mercenaries 
separately,  while  the  entire  force,  if  kept  together,  could  never  have 
been  defeated.  aEschines  atlirms  that  he  himself  strenuously  opposed 
this  separation  of  forces,  the  consequences  of  which  weie  disastrous 
and  discouraging  to  the  whole  cause.  It  would  appear  that  Philip 
attacked  and  took  Amphissa.  We  read  of  his  having  deceived  the 
Athenians  and  Thebans  by  a  false  dispatch  intended  to  be  intercepted; 
80  as  to  induce  them  to  al»andon  their  guard  of  the  road  which  led 
to  that  place.  The  sacred  domain  was  restored,  and  *he  Aniphissians, 
or  at  least  such  of  them  as  hud  taken  a  leading  part  against  Delphi, 
were  banished. 

It  was  on  the  seventh  day  of  the  month  iVIetageitnion  (the  second 
month  of  the  Attic  year,  corresponding  nearly  to  August)  that  the 
allied  Grechm  army  met  Philip  near  Chceioneia.  the  last  Boeotian 
town  on  the  fronlieis  of  Phokis.  He  seems  to  have  been  now  strong 
enough  to  attempt  to  force  his  way  into  Ba?otia,  and  is  said  to  have 
drawn  down  the  allies  from  a  strong  position  into  the  plain,  by  lav- 
ing waste  the  neighboring  fields.  "His  numbers  are  stated  bV  l3i- 
odorus  at  30.000  foot  and  2,000  horse;  he  doubtless  had  "^ with 
him  Thessaiians  and  other  allies  from  Northern  Greece;  but  not  a 
single  ally  from  Peloponnesus.  Of  the  united  Greeks  opposed  to 
him,  the  tota.l  is  not  known.  We  can  therefore  make  no  comparison 
as  to  numbers,  though  the  superiority  of  the  Macedonian  army  in  or- 
gruiization  is  incontestable.  The  large  t  Gn  cian  contingents  were 
tiiose  of  Athens,  und -r  Lysikles  and  (  lu.res — and  of  Theb(  s.  coin- 
mar.. led  l)y  Tii'rigenes;  there  were,  bcshli.s.  Phokian- ,  AeLa-iLs, 
and  Corinthians— prohai)ly  j-lso  Kuboeans  nnd  Megaritins.  The  L.it- 
eiiiemoni  tn<.  Messeniaris,  Ar-adians.  ]m  inr.s.  aiul  ArL'cians  t<H  k 
nop»:tin  the  war.  All  of  them  had  (1  lii  tless  been  "solicitu;  en 
boh  sides;  by  Demostlienes  ;;S  well  cs  by  ti^e  j  anisans  ol  Philp. 
But  jealousy  and  fear  (»f  Sparta  led  tli:)  last*  four  slates  r;  ther  to  letk 
toward  Philip  as  a  protector  against  Lcr — though  on  this  occatioa 
they  took  no  positive  part. 

The  command  of  the  army  was  shared  between  the  Athenians  and 
Thebans,  and  its  movements  determined  by  the  joint  decision  of  their 


507 


statesmen  and  generals.     As  to  statesmen,  the  presence  of  Demos 
thenes  at  least  insured  to  them  sound  and  patriUic  coimsel  now^r* 
fully  set  iorth;  as  to  generals,  not  one  of  the  three  vvsii    for  an 
emergency  so  grave  and  terrible.     It  was  the  sad  fortune  of  Greece 
that  at  this  criMs  of  her  liberty,  when  everythir^g  was  stal^^d  .m  the 
issue  of  the  campaign,  neither  an  EpammoiulTs  m)r  ^,7  w,     ../.^ 
was  at  hand      Phokion  was  absent  L  comn^u^^^oi^J^!^^^ 
fleet  m  tne  Hellespont  or  the  .Egean.     Portents  were  said  to  ha v" 
oceurred-onicles.  and  prophecies,  were  in  circulati(m-ea  cuhied'to 
discourage  the  Greeks;  but  Demosthenes,  animated  by  Vie  ^'^ht  of 
o  numerous  an  ariny  hearty  and  combined  in  defence  o^"  Grecian 
independence   treated  all  such  stories  with  the  same  inditfei^.u-e  w 
Epaniinondas  had  shown  before  the  battle  of  Leukira     mraccused 
the  Delphian  priestess  of  philippizincr      Nav   so  roiVr  /m     xJ.f  ^     • 
the  result  (according  toKlJ^^a^cn;;.,^^^'^^^^^''^:^  ^^ 
Piuhp,  himself  apprehensive,  was  prepared  to  offe    terms  of  neace 
;;    ^;±^!r  f  .!^^3;ecl  accept  tlLn-Demosthene'dcl^LS 


"o"  »^vA,^na  tv^  uLiueiv  1  ni  in  sin^**  e-nande.i      Thio  Jo  ...i,,/       i 

an  accusation   by  ^.schines;    who"lu.«tver  iiinisolf   ?,    ,        '"''.f' 

ustilicatiou  of  liis  rival   bv  inlima     "  ih.f.         n      ,'"'""^'"'^  "'e 

™ger  for  peace,  that  they  ,,,0  01"!    efo  e  rl ,  T,p '"".■''f-"'"!'." 

begun,  to  send  borne  iUo  Llni'n^^^lZ  A^^^u'T' !^''^ 

L  tie,  If,  bv  holding  out  the  lure  of  negotiation  for  peace   he  cm  Id 
lave  prevailed  upon  the  allied  army  to  disnerse      Tn  }.  ,v     .     -/^ 
to  full  force  of  Athens  and  Thebes,i!th  oZ-^ubor  din  ue    tat^^^^^ 
tae  s,ime  ranks  and  for  the  same  purpose,  was  a  rare      od   or  une 
not  likely   to   be   reproduced,  shonld   it   once  slip^ wa        Am    ff 
^mo^henes,  by  warni  or  even  passionate  remm'^r^^^^n^ventc:^ 

ea  pivmature  d.spers.on.  he  rendered  the  valuable  serv  ccm  f  ins  r. 

g  to  Grecian   liberty  a  full  trial  of  strenglh  uiuier  ci  cunis,  noes 
not^npn>mismg;  and  at  the  very  worst,  a^Uastropl^ wonii^'^ 

In  the  Held  of  battle  near  Ch;T?roneia,  Philio  himself  commanded  -i 
chosen  body  of  troops  on  the  winir  opposed  to  the  \  he  i-  v       -1   l' 
^is  youthfu     son   Alexander,  aided    l.V   experi^^d     ffc  X'  ^o  n 
nianued  against  the  Thebans  on  the  o^hev  wi^     n^n,c^\,fT: 

it  is  said  to  have  been  so  obst]nat(dv  contested  tleif  fnr  «,..>.»  t:\7r' 
result  was  .ioubtful.  The  Sacred  ban  „  Tbeb^  « 1  o  ol  •  ?ed  in 
one  ponton  of  the  Thcban  pbalan.,  exhausted  all  their  str^'flfatlS 


508 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


DISTRESS  AT  ATHENS. 


o09 


enerfry  in  an  unavailing  attempt  to  bear  down  the  stronger  plialanx 
and  multiplied  pikes  opposed  to  them.  The  youthful  Alexander 
here  first  displayed  his  great  military  energy  and  abdity.  After  a 
long  and  murderous  struggle,  the  Theban  Sacred  Baud  were  all  over- 
powered and  perished  in  their  ranks,  while  the  Theban  phalanx  was 
broken  and  pushed  back.  Philip  on  his  side  was  still  engaged  in 
undecided  conflict  with  the  Athenians,  whose  first  onset  is  said  to 
have  been  so  impetuous,  as  to  put  to  flight  some  of  the  troops  in  his 
army;  insomuch  that  the  Athenian  general  exclaimed  in  triumph, 
"Let  us  pursue  them  even  to  3Iacedonia."  It  is  further  said  that 
Philip  on  his  side  simulated  a  retreat,  for  the  purpose  of  inducing 
them  to  pursue  and  to  break  their  order.  We  read  another  states 
ment,  more  likely  to  be  true— that  the  Athenian  hoplites,  though  full 
of  energy  at  the  first  shock,  could  not  endure  fatigue  and  prolonged 
struggle  like  the  trained  veterans  in  the  opposite  ranks.  Having 
steadily  repelled  them  for  a  considerable  time,  Philip  became  eniu^- 
lous  on  witnessing  the  success  of  his  son,  and  redoubled  his  efforts; 
so  as  to  break  and  disperse  them.  The  whole  Grecian  army  waJ 
thus  put  to  flight  with  severe  loss. 

The  Macedonian  phalanx,  as  armed  and  organized  by  Philip,  was 
sixteen  deep;  less  deep  than  that  of  the  Thebans  either  at  Delium  or 
at  Leuktra.  It  had  veteran  soldiers  of  great  strength  and  comi)k'tc 
training,  in  its  front  ranks;  yet  probably  soldiers  hardly  superior  to 
the  Sacred  Band,  who  formed  the  Theban  front  rank.  But  its  great 
superiority  was  in  the  length  of  the  Macedonian  pike  or  sarissa— iu 
the  number  of  these  weapons  which  projected  in  front  of  the  fore- 
most soldiers— and  the  long  practice  of  the  men  to  manage  this 
impenetrable  array  of  pikes  in  an  eflicient  manner.  The  value  of 
Philip's  improved  phalanx  was  attested  by  his  victory  at  Cha^roneia 

But  the  victory  was  not  gained  by  the  phalanx  alone.  The  mili- 
tary organization  of  Philip  comprised  an  agcrregate  of  many  sorts  of 
troops  besides  the  plialanx;  the  body-piards,  horse  as  wx'll  as  foot— 
the  hypaspistfe,  or  light  hoplites — the  light  cavalry,  bowmen,  slingers. 
etc.  When  we  read  the  military  operations  of  Alexander,  three 
years  afterward,  in  the  very  first  j^ear  of  his  reign,  before  he  could 
nave  made  any  addition  of  his  own  to  the  force  inherited  from 
Philip;  and  when  we  see  with  what  efficiency  all  these  various 
descriptions  of  troops  are  employed  in  the  field;  we  may  feel  assured 
that  Philip  both  had  them  near  him  and  employed  'them  at  the 
battle  of  Cha'roneia. 

One  thousand  Athenian  citizens  perished  in  this  disastrous  field; 
two  thousand  more  fell  into  the  hands  of  Philip  as  prisoners.  The 
Theban  loss  is  said  also  to  have  been  as  heavy  as  the  Achaean.  But 
we  do  not  know  the  numbers;  nor  have  we  any  statement  of  the 
^Lacedonian  loss.  Demosthenes,  himself  present  in  the  ranks  of  the 
hoplites,  shared  in  the  flight  of  his  defeated  countrymen.  He  is 
accused  by  his  political  enemies  of  having  behaved  with  extreme  and 


disgraceful  cowardice;  but  we  see  plainly  from  the  continued  con- 
fidence and  respect  shown  to  him  by  the  general  body  of  h"s  coun 
trymen.  that  they  cannot  have  credited  the  imputation      The  Two 
Athenian  generals  Chares  and  Lysikles,  both  escaped  from  the  field 
The  latter  was  afterward  publicly  accused  at  Athens  by  the  orator 
Lyknrgus-a  citizen  highly  respected  for  his  integrity  and  dili" 
m  the  managemen   of  the  finances,  and  severe  in  arraigning  nofiticS 
de  Hiquents.     Lysikles  was  condemned  to  death  by  O^e  Dikaslerv 
\Vhat  there  was  to  distinguish  his  conduct  from  that  of  his  coUeaJue 
Chares-who  certainly  was  not  condemned,  and  is  not  even  stafed 
to  have  been  accused-we  do  not  know.    The  memory  of  the  Theban 

Unspeakable  was  the  agony  at  Athens,  on  the  report  of  this  disaster 
with  a  multitude  of  citizens  as  yet  unknown  left  on  the  fieldTn^^^^^^ 
oners,  and  a  victorious  enemy  within  three  or  four  days' march  of  the 
city.     The  wljole  population,  even  old  men,  women,  audchikren 
were  spread  about  the  streets  in  all  the  violence  of  grief  and  terror' 
nterchan^ing  effusions  of  distress  and  sympathy,  and  quest  on in^ 

battle.     The  flower  of  the  citizens  of  military  a-e  had  been  eno-icrl   . 
and  before  the  extent  of  loss  had  been  ascertained,  ifw^s  feart^d  that 

rfJ^''tP'/^'f^^'''^^"^^^  ^''  ^^'^^  to  defend  the  cit>'  At  Ten  tl 
the  definite  loss  became  known:  severe  indeed  and  terVible-yet  So 
a  total  shipwreck,  like  that  of  the  army  of  Xikias  in  Sicily       ^ 

As  on  that  trying  occasion,  so  now:  amid  all  the  distress  ind 
alarm,  i  was  not  in  the  Athenian  character  to^despair  'm  mass  o 
citizens  hastened  unbidden  to  form  a  public  asse^miiy,  whei"'in  the 
most  energetic  resolutions  were  taken  for  defense  Decrees  wro 
passed  enjoining  every  one  to  carry  his  family  and  prone rtv  out  o 
he  open  country  of  Attica  into  the  various  strong^Tcddr  ^^recdne  tl^ 
body  of  he  senators,  who  by  general  rule  were  exempt Vrommft.ir^ 
service,  to  march  down  in  arms  to  Peiraus   and  nnFthTi  ^l^^^'^'J 

he  same  circumstances,  and  restoHng  to  the  full  pr  viWes  nfTiH 

Kniin:: T  l'""'  been  disfraucbisetl   by  judknal        ,c^?e      T  U 

m;  move7lt  n';Mnn:Mf ''™''T''  "^y  «>:P«-iJ««:  but  several  others 
iM,      p .,      .   J  Ufiuostheiies,  who,  uotw  t  ist«in(liii<>-  Ihe  late  n.isf„r 

X  «de;'co'"T,V""'^'  "'Y  "^'"'"'  "'^''''  "■'^-'b'isbod  "^  ptt 

hou.?L  •      ■','.^ »'•'"';'.'•''  '"e->s'"-es  reduisile  for  strennmeirn- 

a?t  nvorks'^w^'.''^  1"""'i  'listr ibuting  military  posts  and  con?t  uc  ^S 

inm»^  ^    •  ,^^'?'<'\'''^<=reed  on  iMs  motion;  aucl  he  seems  to  have  beeS 

id  nT^^',"^,""  'Pf'^''^'  Board  for  superintending  the  forliflca 

tioBs.  Not  only  he.but  also  most  of  the  conspicuous  citizens  and  habit- 


I 


510 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


CONDUCT  OF  .^SCHINKS. 


511 


« 


I 


ual  speakers  in  the  assembly,  came  forward  witli  large  private  con- 
tributions to  meet  the  pressing  wants  of  the  moment.  Every  man  in 
the  city  lent  a  hand  to  make  good  the  defective  points  in  tlie  fortifi- 
cation. Materials  were  obtained  by  felling  the  trees  near  the  city, 
and  even  by  taking  stones  from  the  adj.icent  sepulcliers — as  had  btcn 
done  after  tlie  Persian  war  when  the  walls  were  built  under  the  am 
trivance  of  Themistokles.  The  temples  were  stri^^ped  of  the  arms 
suspended  within  them,  for  the  purpose  of  equipping  unarmed  eiti 
zens.  By  such  earne.-^t  and  unanimous  efforts,  the  defenses  of  the 
city  and  of  Peirieus  were  soon  materially  improved.  At  sea  Athens 
had  nothing  to  fear.  Her  powerful  naval  force  was  untouched,  jicd 
her  superiority  to  Philip  on  that  element  incontestable.  Envoys  were 
sent  to  Trwzen,  Epidaurus,  Andros,  Keos,  and  other  places,  to  5(  licit 
aid,  and  collect  money,  in  one  or  other  of  which  emhaj-sies  Demos- 
thenes served,  after  he  had  provided  for  the  immediate  exigencies  of 
defense. 

What  was  the  immediate  result  of  these  applications  to  other  cities, 
we  do  not  know.  But  the  (ffect  produced  \i\  on  some  of  the  Agian 
islands  by  the  reported  jircsiration  of  Athens,  is  rcmaikable.  Au 
Athenian  citizen  named  Leokrales,  iLsttj.dof  sta>  iiig  at  Athens  to 
join  m  the  defense,  lisier.ed  oidy  to  a  diji:ia<efiir timidity,  aid  l;(d 
lorthwith  fr«;m  Peira'us  ^^ith  his  fj.n:i!y  aid  property,  lie  I  aMci  (d 
to  lihodos,  where  hecirculatcd  llie  lahe  icwsil.at  Alhtns  wj.ss.luiiiiy 
taken  aiid  the  Peira^us  under  ticge.  In.n.idiately  en  l.eaiirg  this 
intelligence,  and  lelie^ing  it  lo  le  true,  the  I  hccij  nswilh  their  tii- 
remes  b<*gan  a  erui^e  to  seize  tl  e  nuKhssnt  vet-sels  at  f-ca.  lUrce  we 
Jtarn,  indirectly,  that  rtie  Alluni.-.n  na\al  pov\cr tonf^titutcd  ihcJti.Ld- 
)rg  protection  lor  these  men hj.nt-v(f-sels;  iri-cnudi  that  .'o  Mxn  i;s 
ihat  protection  wa.s  lemoved,  cin.cd  crui&trs  L(gau  to  prey  ufcn 
them  from  variouji  islands  in  the  -^gean. 

Such  were  the  precautions  taken  at  Athens  after  this  fatal  cLiy. 
r>ut  Athens  lay  .' t  a  distrnre  rf  thiee  or  f(;nr  e'a}s'  mr.reh  li(ni  d.e 
Held  of  Cha?r()neia;  while  Thebes,  Leirgn.i.eh  r.eaur.  l<ie  ilefiJ-t 
attack  of  Philip.  Cf  U:e  I  ehavicr  rf  that  i  rinee  ifter  his  \i(tcry,  v.e 
liave  conTradiele>ry  statements.  Actoieiiig  to  olc  j  e((  i:nt,  he  iu- 
dulgeel  in  the  i:i<  st  ii  suliii:g  :  nd  1  eenlie  i  s  c.\ultj.ti(  n  rn  the  fe:d  of 
battle,  jesting  e-pcci.-jily  en  lh«»  oiaiciy  j.rdn  oliciis  ef  Len oMl.eieF: 
a  temper,fr<:m  which  he  WasbroUL'ht  leiund  l\  ll  e  eouu-^ee  is  lepecf 
of  Deniades,  ihen  Im  ]  lisontr  as  rre  cf  tl  t'  Athenian  hcpliUs.  At 
lirst  he  even  refuseii  lo  i  rant  ]  ein;i^sie  u  to  liter  the  f  h.in,  ^^l  en  d:e 
heralel  cam"  *^roni  Leb.u'e'ia  to  n.ake  tl  e  erstenuuy  elen^jrd.  i\ec(u':- 
ing  to  anoihef  account,  the  (!( nuanor  cf  I  hilip  tewiid  ileeieiejl'-cl 
Athenians  v.as  gentle  and  forbearing.  I:iOMe\er  ihe  lael  nay  li.^e 
stood  as  to  his  first  manifestations,  it  is  certain  that  Ids  j  csilise*  ncjs- 
uros  were  harsh  toward  Thebes  and  lenient  toward  Athens.  He  k)1(1 
the  Thebau  captives  into  shivery;  he  is  said  also  to  have  exacted  a 
price  for  the  liberty  granted  to  bury  the  Theban  slain — ■s\hich  liberty, 


4 


accord  ng  to  Gteciau  ciistom,  ^v^lg  never  refused,  and  certainly  never 
sold  bv  the  victor.     Whether  Thebes  made  any  further  resistance 
0^;  stood  a  s.ege,  we  do  not  know.     But  presently  the  citv^fe  1   nto 
Pnhps  power,     lie  put^  to  .leath  several  of  the  leadiV  c  tiz  ns 
kiiiis  ic:d  o.h.rs  and  confiscated  the  property  of  both,     i^coi  iic  I  etf 
Ihi-ee  Hundred -omposcd  of  philippizing  Thebans    for     he  m^^^ 
part  jast  recalled  from  exiie-wks  investe  I%viih      eVvern  n^^^^^^ 
thecitv,  and  with  p  ,vvers  of  life  and  death  over  ever/one      Thf 

Ui:i  Phcebidus.  m  concert  with  the  Theban  party  headed  Irv  Leon' h' 
des  surprised  the  Kadmeia.  A  Macedonian  ganisonw^s  i^w  i  h;:i 
mthe  Kadmeia,  as  a  Spartan  garrison  had  lien  placed  then  ^  Si^i 

Kei-s  ^f 'tl^/?hT'wUh'?  ^I^^'^P" 
usteis  ot  the  city;  \m  h  full  power,  and  no  reluctance   to  nritifv 

th'Mr  pohticul  antipathy's.     At  the  same  time,  Phili,    restorfd  (he 
mm  >r  Bce.t.an  towns-Orchomenus  and  Phita^a  pro  S)lv  al^o  Ties 
ZPi::^^^^  '^^  ^^"^^^^-  ^^  ^-  coJ.nuniti!^^!^eIi\;f 

a.i^;^^  fi"'!'"  ?]"''•  ^^'^  P^^ili.PPJzing  orators  raised  their  voices  loudly 
and  confidently,  demmncing  Demosthenes  and  his  pol^y  Xe  v 
speakers,  who  would  hardly  have  come  forward  befo  e  ^Verc  ro  v 
put  up  against  him.  The  accus:ilion3  however  al(o::eth  r  failed  •  f  e 
people  conlinued  to  trust  bin,,  omlttin:nio  measure  Sf  'k4se  wid,- 
he  su^ested.  ^.cliines^  who  had  before  disclaim^  U  cm^cn  on 
t     Phdip.  now  altered   his  tone,  and  made  boast  of  th^""hs  r 

lie  tendered  his  services  lo  so  rs  envov  t^^  iiir.  Arn.^  i 

whi,i,oj;  he  appears  to  l.we  b£a  ^^^"IS.uU'" W   fo  fe"  S'"?^ 

^Mlh  Xenokrates  and  Phokion      Amon-r  ibom   wL.   r^       •  P      ,  ^^^ 

»ions  of  Deuudt'S,  or  by  a  chango  i:i  l.is  owu  (lispositions  PhiM',  I  ,'  1 
«ow  become  mcli.icl  lo  treat  with  Atliens  on  favn ri  l,"f;.vm.  '  t^ 
..dies  „    the  slain  Atl.e,u:,n.  were  bwr=S  1  -  the    ic  ors  and  tS'? 
aslies  calleoled  to  be  carried  lo  Alliens-   thoil-b  i',e  fm,r,\?        V- 
...a  of  .he  herald,  to  the  saino  effect  iiad^Vpn-vSy  i^^^^^^ 
^■'cliiiies  according  to  1  ic  assertion  of  De"i.«,'i,-  ,v.^^  ,^„<  u.  i^td. 
sympathising  gne.t'i:,  the  banque   a-uiferki'cfvi^riln  •■-■'' 
cdebrated  his  triumph  over  Grecian  libeiVv     f^  I  ;  "  U^e  ,  '  dS 
tl  theotner  envoys  retr.rnc  1  to  AUiei.s/iTport  n-  h  e  cons,  rf  .  f 
lip  to  conclude  peace,  loglvc  back  Ihc  minfero^V.i^o^cT^i  i  hif 
luad    and  dso  to  iransfer  Oropus  f.oin  the  Thcbans't    A  hen' 

U^     1  v  wlSTi*^  ^°"ri'""!'"  '  f  r""'^  '"  "'«  Athen  an    sscm- 
■J}),    0}    wjiom   It  was  readily   decreee       To  p^r-ir*,.   iMT-oc,-^  ^ 


512 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


Oropus — a  possession  which  they  liad  once  enjoyed,  nnd  for-^-hicb 
they  had  long  v.rangled  with  the  Thchans — was  a  further  cause  of 
satfsfaction.  Such  conditions  wore  doubtlcf-s  acccptabJe  at  Atlitn?. 
But  th3re  was  a  submission  to  be  n:ade  on  the  otlier  side.  wlii(h  to 
the  contemporaries  of  Perikles  would  liave  j^ccmed  intoleuible,  cvdi 
as  the  price  of  averted  invasion  or  recovered  captives.  Tlie  Atl  e- 
nians  were  recpiired  to  acknowledge  tlie  exaltation  of  Fliilip  to  lie 
headship  of  the  Grecian  world,  and  to  promote  the  like  acknowl- 
edgment ])y  all  other  Greeks,  in  a  congress  to  be  speedily  convericd 
They  were  to  renounce  all  pretensions  to  head.'-hip,  not  only  for 
themselves,  but  for  every  other  Grecian  state;  to  recojjuizenot  Sparta 
or  Thebes,  but  the  king  of  Macedon,  as  Pan-Hellenic  chief;  to 
acquiesce  in  the  transitien  of  Greece  from  the  position  of  a  free, 
self-detennining,  political  aggregate,  into  a  piovincial  dependency 
of  the  kings  oi  Telia  and  JE£;ii\  It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  a  more 
terrible  shock  to  that  traditional  sentiment  of  pride  and  patriotism, 
inherited  from  forefathers,  who.  after  rcpellirg  and  worsting  the 
Persians,  had  first  organized  the  maritime  Greeks  into  a  Ccnfederaey 
running  parallel  with  and  supplementary  to  the  rcn-maritim.e  Greeks 
allied  with  Sparta;  thus  keeping  out  fc^reign  dcminion  and  casting 
the  Grecian  world  into  a  system  founded  on  native  sympathies  and 
free  government.  Such  traditional  sentiment,  th.ough  it  no  longer 
governed  the  character  of  the  Athenians  or  impressed  upon  them 
motives  of  action,  had  still  a  strong  hold  upon  their  imiiginatinn 
and  memory,  where  it  had  been  constantly  kept  alive  by  the  elo- 
quence of  Demosthenes  and  others.  The  peace  of  Demades,  rec 
ognizing  Philip  as  chief  of  Greece,  was  a  renunciation  of  all  tliis 
proud  historical  past^  and  the  jcceptance  of  a  new  and  degraded 
position,  for  Athens  as  well  as  for  Greece  generally. 

Polybius  prf?<ses  the  generosity  of  Philip'in  granting  such  favor 
able  terms,  and  even  aflirms,  not  very  accurately,  that  he  secnred 
thereby  the  steady  gratitude  and  attachment  of  the  Athenia.ns.  But 
Philip  would  have  gained  nothing  by  killing  his  prisoners;  not  to 
mention  that  he  would  have  provoked  an  implacable  spirit  of  reven^ire 
among  the  Athenians.  By  selling  his  prisoners  for  slaves  he  would 
have  gained  something,  but  by  the  use  actually  made  of  them  he 
gained  more.  The  recognition  of  his  Hellenic  supremacy  by  Athenf? 
was  the  capital  step  for  the  prosecution  of  his  objects,  ft  insured 
him  against  dissentients  among  the  remaining  Grecian  states,  \vho>e 
aclhesion  had  not  yet  been  made  certain,  and  who  might  possibly 
have  stood  out  against  a  proposition  so  novel  and  so  anti-IIellcnie. 
had  Athens  set  tliem  the  example.  Moreover,  if  Philip  had  not 
purchased  the  recognition  of  .Athens  in  this  way,  he  might  have 
failed  in  trying  to  extort  it  by  force.  For  though,  being  master  of 
the  field,  he  could  lay  waste  Attica  with  impunity,  and  even  estab- 
lish a  permanent  fortress  in  it  like  Dekeleia — yet  the  fleet  of  Athens 
was  as  strong  as  ever,  and  her  preponderance  at   sea    irresistible. 


HOxNOKARY   VOTES   TO  PHILIP. 


513 

i  V^fl^^  these  circumstances    Atl.Prw  ..^^   r*  • 

I  defended  against  liim,  as  Bv7a  timrind  P ''•'";^  ^^¥^^  ^»^^'«  ^eea 
f  vears  before;  the  Atiier.ian'Ct  Xht  1 .  .'"'  ^'^^  ^^^«'  ^wo 
^  tionsm  many  wavs-  and  tho  <ttL  /l!.  ^''^^'^  obstructed  liis  onera- 
u  burst  of  Hellenic  ;;^^>au^^^^^^^^^  l^ve  called  t^th 

ress.     Thebes-an  inlai      c U^  h^.l. f,'  /"  embarrass  his  further  pro  - 
Avas  prostrated  bv  the  Imttl  ^^nf   pi      ^^  ^'^^  ^^^^^^''  Bceotian  cities-1 
means  of  successf\il  defense     But   I.T.'"'"^', /^"^^  ^'^'  withou    any 
mortal  to  Athens,  united  in  her  poulSon  t"'"'?^  "^'^  absolutel} 
of  Attica,  and  superior  at  se-i    ^\^'  t         tliroughout  all  the  are  a 
such  difficulties  b/^fore  hhn  if  he  ^^^i^M^'''^^'^  that-with 
Phdip  acted  wisely  in  emnlovin.r  ^f/      •  .     -^^^^eujans  to  despair- 
procure  her  recogLtioa  ?f^'^jl^l,^;^j,:;^^^^ff  ^"^  his  prison^  to 
well  played,  now  as  always-  hut  fn  f  «    ^   •  "^^'f  PolUical  game  was 
by  Polybius,  he  has  litrie^claim  '  ^'''"^'^  ^^  ^enerosit/bestowed 

nia^t  Z  '^ar^i  tSs  ""1^1  ^'  .^--'  «-  Athe- 
compliinentary  votes  iu  his  Wr  nf  ,  T^  ''''."^"'  lionorary  and 
know.  Lnmediate  reliW  frc  m^^ln/er  w^rn'''"  ?^"''?  '''  ^^  "^^ 
captive  citizens,  were  mmckntttfo!^^^^^^ 

first  moment;  moreover,  the  At lienh^^  a  1?  ^'"''^ P^l^^^^'  at'the 
resolution  and  strength  were  nnw^n/'  ^  conscious  of  failinrr 
;eiTto  powerful  kings 'Xeh  we  .?nh"f  'T^  j}^^^  ^^vecr  of  naU 

tlie  seasou  favorable  for  br  no-!n,r^,r       •'    '""^■''''^Pl'«"<-'»'stliou"-Ut 
none  of  them  proved  suocesffnT  """>' ""P«'ehmeu(s  against  hi°" 
electing  a  publiL  orator  tS^'"  tl,;;:  „"''',"",•  ""=  *™^°  ^^""«  f"' 
quics  celebrated  for  the  siSn   ,?  ri      ^''^F'-al  disc.uir.-e  at  the  obse- 

;^a,  solemn  duty,  not  only  in'"p,^^^™^r,7"^"i"  '--'«' -i'^ 
put  up  in  competition  but  ikn  fr>  n  i  ^^'^nues,  who  was 
'!'«  peace.  He  was  further  hZZ  w'i'n  "'f  ""^  '■'^=«'«  •"«ver  of 
•^J'J  sympathy  from  the  ^'rvivi  ^rer.  .'-. ''J?;''  '"^'■'«  "^  (esteem 
an.7'"  .i'/l'P'--''rs  that  Demoifhene  ™,°c'nf^''  ^f :'°' ^iUzens. 
fanttinaueial  nost  as  o  .p  ,.f  tu  '  .^ ."^"^^  ^^«is  continued  in  an  imnor 

an.l  as  men^hHr  Ct,"d^onCd;"^"^r^  "^  "'"^  Theoric  Fu^^^, 

»  eru-ard   appointed  s,,periUe,d"no''M,^    "',,''''  '"'^'^  "*'''*"  ^'"^rtly 

'e  city.     The  orator  Hvpcr  d'  s   t    ■  nnli  •     ,'^'^'"^'""1   flefenses  of 

liencs.  was  impeached  bv  Vrkin.'.^  t^  Political  coadjutor  of  Demos- 

»rliis  illegal  and  unoonsliluti^n^i    "!'""'"'''«  ^''^'PlioParanonior^ 

;'ate  terro!-  of  the  defea    a    Phln  '"•'T  d'^'P^^^'J  ""derthe  i.ume- 

»  slaves,  citizensl  ip  to  met^;'",''J'^'>>  /»  Sjant  ■nannmissi<,n  to 


514 


DEATH  OF   PHILIP. 


Wt 


rpiice  of  peace  had  reniovucl  all  necessity  for  actmir  ui»<'!i  Uns  ckcree; 
ne  J^^theless  an  impeachment  was  entered  and  brought  apmst  its 
move  Hyperides,  unable  to  deny  its  illegality,  placed  Us  defense 
on  the  true  and  obvious  c^round-"  The  Macedonian  arms  (he  said) 
darkened  my  vision.  It  Vas  not  I  .vho  moved  the  decree ,  it  was 
I  it  k  mle  ot^  Chu^rone  The  substantive   defense  was  admitted 

b>\li^^Dikastery;  while  the  bold  oratoiical  turn  attracted  notice  from 

'^iS^  thul'subjugated  and  garrisoned  Thebes-having  reconsti- 
tute    thtTanti-Theim  cities  in  Bceotia-having  constrained  Athens 
o  .ubmis^    and  dependent  alliance-and  haying  established  a  ^^ar- 
rLon  in  Ambrakia.  at  the  same  time  mastering  ^Vf  ^'IZ' PMli^^  exi 
in-  the  leadin.r  Akaruanians  who  were  opposed  to  him— Philip  next 
proceeded  t "carry  his  arms  into  Peloponnesus     n^^^--^^  Ij^^l^'  P-^ 
live  resistance   anywhere,  except  in  the  territory  of   Sparta.      The 
Corinthians   Argeians.  Messeninns,  Eleians,  and  many  Arcadians,  all 
Bubmiued  tVhis  dominion;    some  even  courted   his  alliance  from 
f^rand  antipathy  against  Sparta.     Philip  i"v^}<i^d  Laconia  with  nn 
army  too  powerful  for  the  Spartans  to  resist  in  the  field      He  lai 
S  the  country,  and  took  ^ome  detached  po|ts;  bu    he  did  no^, 
tike  nor  do  we  know  that  he  even  attacked,  Sparta  itself.      Ihc 
S^^^^^^^^^  not  resist;  yet  would  they  neither  submit,  J^oraskfo^ 

S  It  appears  that  Philip  cut  down  their  territory  and  narro^^e(l 
FhdrbouncLfdesonallthe  three  sides;  to^vard  Argos,  Messene  an^ 
\le4lopolis.  We  have  no  precise  account  of  the  details  of  his  pio- 
ceea?n-s  but  it  is  clear  that  he  did  just  what  seemed  to  him  good 
andthS  'the  governments  of  all  the  P^oponnesian  cities  came^^i^^^^^^ 
the  hands  of  his  partisans.  Sparta  was  the  only  city  ^^-^l^^'^^f^^^^^^^.^^ 
n0-Vnst  him-  maintaining  her  ancient  freedom  and  dignity  under 
cfrcumstares^f  ?e;^^^  and   humiliation,  with  more  unshaken 

resolution  than  Athens.  nr.^r.;n-n  nU\n<i  at 

Philip  next  proceeded  to  convene  a  congress  of  Grecian  citie^  a 
Corinth  He  here  announced  himself  as  resolved  on  an  expe  itioa 
against  the  Persian  king,  for  the  purpose  both  of  l^^^^^ating  the  A  ^ 
aUc  Greeks,  and  avenging  the  invasion  of  Greece  |>y  ^.^^^,^f '  ^  J/J,^ 
ff.^neral  vote  of  tlic  congress  nominated  him  leader  of  the  m  ' 
Greeks  for  this  purpose.^nd  decreed  a  Grecian  force  to  ]om  Inn 
U)  be  fonned  of  contingents  furnished  by  the  various  citie..  m 
totalof  the  force  promised  is  stated  only  bv  Juslm,  ^v^'O  ^^^.;;^^.|J] 
mOOO  foot,  and  15,000  horse;  an  army  which  Greece  ^•^;^;^a"ib  co  dd 
not  have  furnished,  and  which  we  can  hard  y  1'^'  '^^  ^^  ^'^^^^  \'^,l 
even  promised.  The  Spartan?  stood  aloof  from  ^l-e  congK>s.  con^ 
tinning  to  refuse  all  recognition  of  the  headship  of  Philip  1  e 
AthenFans  attended  and  concurred  in  the  vote;  which  ^;a  « Ja 
the  next  step  to  carry  out  the  peace  made  by  Hemades  Thc>  ^J^^*^ 
required  to  furnish.a  well-equipped  fleet  to  serve  "I'^^^^-^J  ^'^^a 
Ihey  wore  at  the  same  time  divested  of  their  dignity  of  chiets  ot 


MORTIFICATION  TO  ATHENIAN  FEELINGS.     515 

maritime  cc^nfederacy,  the  islands  bein?  enrolled  is  mnritJm.  .i 

enciesof  Philip,  instead  of  continuin- to  s^nd  cW^^^^^ 

meeting  at  Athens      It  annPMrQ  iHfZ^^^  deputies  to  a  Bvnod 

belo„g,?,g  to  tl.r-0?  atT<^^rsu  r po;  brof'Thcf '!'',  uh"^'"""'  '' 
ciipioil  by  the  numerous  Atlieniaa  kleruelH  or  o,f.  „  n  "^  f  ^'"^  ""- 
lis hed  in  the  island  after  the  conque  t  by  Ti,iru"1  363  b  r'^n'''," 
afterward  re-enforced      For  spv(^rol  va.,v«  oVI  i     ,    "'"*  ^'^'  and 

in  the  dockyard,  of  Athe^rsturcm u  ,  ^d  r  e'^'n'a  o7erfu,  'T"? 
her  raarmme  ascendency  henceforward  disa  pears       ^'"""''^''^  ■  l*"' 

with  the  other  free  citils  orXetr  fey  we  "  ciro  JcT.,  JT'-1'^'^ 
tory  aDDendao-es  of  tliP  HMnr  ^^?  at       i  •'^  enrolled  as  coniii bu- 

galL|?hauto  the  re^t  s^f  e  n?ff  n''°°i  "evolution,  to  them  more 

gmplc?autonomy  but  fVon  a  con%^;jroK*,'; ''"•'•  "S^'  "^'""^i'  f™'" 
common  dependence     AtV,i?  W    „  ?   superior  dignity,  into  tlie 

dictated  by  Sp  and  to  fu  ni.^f1,„.  i^  \°  f  "'''"r  «"«  «<=''«'"« 
Moreover,  this  scL,n°_  2c  inTs  „«  "f  pT"  'TT*  ""^  execution, 
ohject  of  genuine  aspiration  throu"b™,r«t^*n'''''^  """""^  '«  ^^  ■•"> 
Groat  Kins,  no  l(.n.w  insSrinr,p"£>,^^i  n      ^'"""'^J"  "'"''''l-     Tlie 

now  be  regirdcd  ^xs'likiJ^^Kld'',  acUo'^^T^ln'S'lr "h^'^' •  ™'''" 
pression.     To  eminciivUp  thn  a '-ot;    n      ,    ngain.st  Macedonian  op- 

w.uld  be  in  itsc"f  an  e^«^  ^'^V"  ^^"^'»^«'^ 

all  such  wishes  must  have  been  S lu.    .  ?lv?''^''^?  ^^'^'"•-  '^^^?^ 

to  his  insatiable  ambition  '"t-iative  to  his  soldiers  and  suited 

resoled."  During -thafJ^i?  Stratfo'"'^""'"'  ^-^---tod  and 

nmgnitudetoexhrms  thifinan'^e?r™iin"t:'>  '""'"  "^  '^"'«"'-''" 
timeengagedinmiliiar\  oDcrSs  Lnf^"^  ,  "  ''''"  ■"*'  ""'  "<'"''' 
the  Illvri-m  l;in-  P  leuris'^  In    fp'.f "  '  f""/,''' "severe  battle  against 

Macedonian  army  .SrParmenfo     nd\';  ..if,:  ''f'  *"  P""'"""  ''^  '^" 

Wm.-fronl  rhe^u ,' o"  f  a^d "ava'e'ln  puV^rof'T"'"^^^ 

I'e  is  said  to  have  iepu<Su)l vmp  a  ^  w  1 ,  rmi'!  ■  'T/';''''''f  <^ ',''"' 
•^■oxandcr  of  Epirtis"   This  s.ep  pro^^^ked  l\'ol'ent  diLek'i^'L'roiig 


516 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP. 


the  partisans  of  the  two  queens,  and  even  between  Phihpnndhisson 
Alexander,  who  expressed  a  strong  re>enlment  at  the  repudiation  of 
his  mother  Amid  the  iutoxieation  of  the  marriage  banquet,  Atta- 
ins proposed  a  toast  and  prayer,  that  there  might  speedily  appear  a 
eo-itimate  son,  from  Philip  and  Klcopatra,  to  sueeetd  totluOIacedo- 
d'Sq  throne.  Vpon  wl.ieh  AUxander  exclaimed  in  wrath-"  Do  you 
then  proclaim  7>^.  as  a  bastard  V"-at  the  same  time  hurhng  a  goblet 
at  him  Ineensed  at  this  ])roeeeding,  Philip  started  np,  drew  his 
sword,  and  made  furiously  at  his  son;  but  fell  to  the  ground  from 
passion  and  iutoxieation.  This  aceidc  nt  alone  preserved  the  life  ot 
Alexander;  who  retorted-"  Here  is  a  man,  preparing  to  cross  from 
Europe  into  Asia-who  yet  cannot  st( p  sunly  from  one  couch  to 
another"  After  this  violent  quarrel  the  father  and  son  separated 
llexander  conducted  his  n:other  into  Epirus  and  then  went  Limselt 
{q  the  lllyrian  king.  J^c me  months  afterward,  at  the  instance  of  the 
Cor  nthian  Demarfitus.  Philip  sent  for  him  back,  and  became  recon- 
ciled to  him;  but  another  cause  of  dispkasr.re  .s(.on  arose  l.ecauso 
A  exander  had  opened  a  negotiation  for  mnrrir.ge  with  the  daughter 
of  the  satnip  ol'  Karia.  Kejecting  such  an  alliance  as  unworthy, 
Phillip  sharp  V  reproved  his  son,  and  banished  !'oni  Macedonia  se  - 
eral  courtiers  whom  he  suspected  as  intimate  with  Alexander;  vshile 
the  friends  of  Attalus  stood  high  in  favor.  ^       j  r       i     ^f 

Such  w<re  the  animosities  ^distracting  the  court  and  ^^nMh;  oi 
Philip  A  son  had  iust  been  born  to  him  from  his  new  wife  Kleo- 
p.  tr  lii.  expedition  airainst  Persia,  resolved  and  prepared  durin.r 
[hf  precedinrr\ear.  had  l)een  actually  eommenc^c^d;  Parmenio  and 
Attafus  havfe  been  sent  across  to  Asia  witli  tlie  first  div.^on  o  be 
followed  presintlv  bv  himself  with  the  remaining  army.  But  1  hil  p 
foreTaw  that  during  his  absence  danger  might  anse  from  the  urious 
Olvmpias,  bitterlv  exasperated  by  the  recent  events,  and  ^ri.Ug^amg 

hvT  brother  Alexander  king  of  Epirus,  with  ^\^>«^".  f  ^Xikh  tl  e 
sidinc-      Philip  indeed  held  a  Macedonian  garrison  in  Aiu»)rakia  t  le 
chief^reciancityonthe  Epirotic  border;  and  he  ^^^^^^  ^Iso  c^nt   b 
S  much  to  establish  Alexander  as  prince.     But  f/ow  dee mc.l 
it  essential  to  conciliate  him  still  further  by  a  special  f\^'j^^^^^'^^ 
giving  to  him  in  marriage  Kleopatra,  his  daughter  b^    Oljmpia 
For  this  marriane,  celebrated  at  .Eg*  in  :\Iacedonia  I'^August  ^^^ 
B.C..  Philip  provided  festivals  of  the  utmost  cost  «;^;\  ^P^^^°^  ^J'^/^f ''. 
memonmnVat  the  same  time  the  recent  birth  of  his  >onb}Eeo 
patra.   Bampiets.munificent  presents, gymnastic  and  musical  rnfchos 
trade  exhibitions,  among  which  Neoptolemus  the^  ^\f  ^^F  i^^^^' 
in  the  tragedv  of  Kinyras.  etc.,  with  every  species  «^.f  ^tract  on  W^^^ 
to  the  age-were  accumulated,  in  order  to  reconcile  the  ^  ssenticn 
parties  in  Macedonia,  and  to  render  the  effect  imposing  ob  the  n  m  1^ 
of  the  Greeks;  who,  from  every  city,  sent  (  epmies  ^^r  con^ran^^^^^^^^ 
tion      Statues  of  the  twelve  great  gods,  admirably  executed,  ^^ut 


i 


OUTRAGE  INFLICTED  ON  PAUSANIUS.  517 

carried  in  solernn  procession  into  the  theater;  immediately  after  tlie.>i 
the  statue  ot  Philip  himself  as  a  thirteenth  god  ^^^^3^'^tLer  iJieia, 

Amidst -this  festive  multitude,  however, ''there  were  not  wautincr 
discontented  partisans  of  Olympias  and  Alexander,  to  both  oTwl     n 
^r^c  young  queen  with  her  new-born  child  threatened  a  formhia 
rivalry.     I  here  was  also  a  malcontent  yet  more  dangeiius-P- n^^^^^ 
mas,  one  of   he  royal  body-guards,  a  noble  youth  born  in  the  di^trhf" 
culled  Orestis  in   Upper  Macedonia;   who    from  TiuspVf  ./f'?^^^^^^ 
peculiar  to  himself,  nourished  a  dead'ly  hatreHga  rS  Phil      T^^^ 
provocation  which  he  had  received  is  one  which  "an  nd^        In 
veniently  transcribe,  nor  indeed  accurately  make  out  ^mM^i^L 
aiicies  of  statement.     It  was  Attalus  the  iintlP  nf  til         ^^^^^'^P' 
Kleopatra,  who  had  given  the^^tc^tfon^^r^^^ 
sanias  an  outrage  of  the  most  brutal  and  revolfin"  ch  I'a" te^^^^F^^^^^ 

I  appears  that  tliis  t»ra  c,f  sentiment,  divcTln- the  aDDe^itrf™'^' 

«n  instrum?,u  am  to  d  '1     i«  r"  "'  "•'''  '"'«1'1™«1  I^usanias  as 
lushandiaud  even  tt  h    ir  n  n,     ?S"?  ?'''^^ 

0"  Pausanif.;  fr.  ^  vjiidictive  Oiympias  would  positiveiv  spur 

dence  to  warr.?nri  c-^^  ^^'^''^  '«  no  sufficient  evi- 

sanslmen  ea^'     f,T"^''u  f  "'^i^",.'  ^^^  '^''^^  ««"^«  ^^^ong  his  pari i- 
-lentThSr  encoui-^^^^^^^^^  ^''^''"^'  f"^  '^  '^'^'^  Insluccisiou 

C^^eek  sophisrnnmll^^Sf     .'  ''^'^''^'^''   olerably  well  established.     A 
sophist  named  Hermokrates  is  also  said  to  have  contributed  to 


518 


DEATH  OP  PHILIP. 


the  deed,  tl.ougli  seemin-rly  ^vitUo,.t  intention  by  his  conversation, 
anil  the  Persiim  kinir  (an  inipvobable  report)  by  his  gold. 

Unconscious  of  the  plot.'philii.  wu.  abo.U  to  enter  the  then  er 
alreX  c  onXi  with  siLctators.  As  he  approached  the  door,  elotl.e.l 
fnrwiite  robe  lie  felt  so  exalted  with  impressions  ot  las  own  d^^- 
n",tVands.  confident  In  the  admiring  sympathy  of  the  snrronnding 
m uUitude  Iml  he  advanced  both  unarmed  and  unproteeled  diuc:- 
h"  his  -uants  to  hoUl  back.  At  this  moment  Pausan.as,  standing 
nclr  with  a  Gallic  sword  concealed  under  his  garment  rusht;^  upon 
Sm  Thrus  U,e  weapon  through  his  body,  and  killed  him.  Havm. 
a  ■™mpl  shed  his  purpose,  the  assassin  immediately  ran  off,  and  tii-a 
?^  re^ch  the  "ates,  where  he  had  previously  caused  horses  to  be 
statTonedBern^  strong  and  active,  he  might  have  succeeded  meffect- 
fnt  Wrescfpe-^like  most  of  the  assassins  of  Jason  of  Pherp  undiT 
Ph?.umst  mcS'verv  similar-had  not  his  fool  stumblc^d  amid  some 
vncs^^k"  The  guards  and  friends  of  Philip  were  at  tirst  paralyzed 
Ifthi^tonishn  c'nf  and  eonsternati,>n.  At  length  however,  some 
^  :;„^,lTo  «ss  St  the  dviiK'  kins;  while  others  rushed  m  pursuit  of 
Ktlf  Leonnutus-^Id  Pei^dikkas   overtook  him  and  slew  him 

'Tn'w^a  way  or  to  ^vhat  extent,  the  accomplices  of  Pausanias  lent 
him  all  vlari  not  permitted  to  know.  It  is  possible  that  they  ma 
h  ™ted  1  emseli-es  artfully  so  as  to  obstruct  pursuit,  and  a 
>  s  ehaiice  of  escape;  which  would  appear  extremely  snjall,  aftei  a 
deed  o  such  unmeasured  audacity.  Three  on  y  of  the  .epu  d 
„,^r,.n,nlic,  s  are  known  to  us  by  name-three  brothers  from  IheL.Mi; 
keCn  dW;^t  o  Upper  Jlac^-donia- Alexander,  Heroincnes,a,m 
i?i  ;«us,s,msof  Ac!,opus;  but  ,1  seems  ''-t  '1'?';^,-'-'- ,^  J 
besides  The  Lynkestiau  Alexandei-whose  fa  hei-uilaw  A"  1  •'"■' 
v.^^,  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  and  contidential  officers  in  the  so- 
vife  ot"philip-bel  onged  to  a  go<.d  family  iu  5  acedon.a,  iwhap 
I  endescei  dints  fronfthe  anoint  family  of  ' '«  P"nces  of  Lyuke.li.. 
1  was  he  who  immediately  after  Pausanias  had  assassinated  Pbi  . 
T.UtPn,.,!  to  saute  the  prince  Altxander  as  king,  helped  him  to  ])" 
o^Ws  .^JiJior,  and  marcL.!  as  one  of  his  guards  to  take  possessioao. 

*^Thif  "p^^aVox"  was  not  simply  an  omen  or  presage  to  Alo.™^ 
der  em pVi"  o  come,  but  essentially  serviceable  to  him  as  a  • 
dete  ml"  ng  cause  or  Condition.  The  succession  to  tbe  Mac  d  " 
toone  was'often  disturbed  by  feud  or  bloodshed  among  tbe  n ';  ,^ 
o,rreiral  family;  and  und.r  the  latter  c>.;cumstanee  of  1  hdip. 
rei-n,  such  distnrlwnce  was  peculiarly  probab  e.  "«  ;'°,,'^.'-^"i,, 
bad  terms  with  Alexan.ler,  and  on  stUl  worse  l*^^' "^" '!'',  V,  M  e»i 
AVhile  banishing  persons  attached  to  Alexander,  hc' had  leut  "^  ^1 
to  Attains  withd.e  partisans  of  tte  new  qHO-^"!^'"  P'^  '.\S  te" 
latter  got  the  first  start  after  the  assassination  '  '^'J  J,  ^  .  nee: 
organized  an  opposition  to  Alexander  in  favor  of  the  lutam  p 


ACCESSION  OF  ALEXAXDEU.  r^g 

wliich  opposition  mislit  have  Infl  onmn  «i, 

they  had' Seen  in  favor  wi,rtli'"i  ^^  dti  rLd^v^Sr^r'' 

;"ns'Zp  e,s  'rdr;;,e'";^ien't"'  ^^{^^^^ 

liefore  they  co''nl,l  ^'^oo^VZ^'c^S^l,^:::^!^:^^:^-''^^^ 
the  as.«assm  r.-in  to  put  Alexander  in  motion  witho  ,Sr»^'f  ^l^-^ 
sive  initiatory  movement  fro;n  him  and  his  frien  ,  fi.';.  -f-  ,' 
lUMclure,  determined  waverers  nnrl  fnrn  .,ii    ,  "^""^•;'  ""s  critical 

in.  wonder.  therefoi^T  at  .'^  ewndef whe  I'k  ,^F^^^^  ^^"^  ""'<^ 

nary  gratitn,le  and  esieem  for  1  "  LynSst "u^nfm  .^^^^^^^^^^^  e.xtraor,li- 
e.xcnipling  him  from  the  puni^hnient  of  H  -nfl,  I  T  f '  °",'  '""P'-^ 
aeeomplie'es,  but  also  promotin"  im  to  ^Sn  "^^^^^^^^ 
military  commands.  Neither  <le"Zl.^-?m  A.  -"'"^  important 
side,  nor  Attains  and  Kleopaira  on  Uie  ofhpi  ^^^"P'''"'  "»  "i«  ""e 
e.\-cept  by  acquirimr  the  succession  It  was  on!!^^?  ,?"'""'^"y  ^•'''«' 
eeedings  of  Alexandc'r  to  s™d  ,  v-er  a "0^0111  offl.l   "  a""""'"?'  P™" 

r^il^!ar«;nf::^^^^jiii«  »^^^^ 

^a-Kp-ies-^J^ 

.lio^imS'lit're^^ttX^dli'ir^^^ 

i.  the  theater,  when  t/iesuddrn  "mrde  of  ?1  il  p°i^Sl  ecr,"A""^'' 

~  oi,'^npii;r"  '^'"'"^  '--'^'^  -nEsltys;,:^^^ 

uvemy^three  years.     Oui;inforni,ftio\^abouTSm"'SV.^it  Se^e'f^lvf 

eaae  no  .',!"??,';"•  •°"'' '""  P'^'"'''  ""'  "'«  difflculties\li  3,  he  ov™: 
came  noi  his  interior  government,  are  known  to  us  with  cxie  np« 

"  ippn  contemporary  liistorical  authority.     But  t  lie  ereat  re^^nt^  ol 
ills  reign,  and  the  main  lines  of  his  cl,,ar,acfer,.stad,aSnfi^.n^^^ 

r«  1  r  STxciildrd-"!;:;.^!':,';;™;  ;""i"""  r^'^^^-^^^ 

fcdonian  ascendency  was 

4l  « J     5.°°^  '^°"l.'°5  crowning  the  efforts  of  a  rare  talent   do  iti' 
«1  and  military.    Indeed  the  restless  ambition,  the  indefatfg°'ble 


520 


DEATH  OF  PHILIP 


CONDITION  OF  GREECE. 


521 


1  o^t?^Uv  nnfl  piKlurance    and  the  adventurous  courage,  of 
trTrl^rriuc^ivsiiran^  suffice  almost  of  themselves  to  guar- 

as  an  Ln-,int.  >ca  liistorv      But  the  more  we  extol  the  gen- 

fJw  .Tf  PwiFp  .s  a  L  n    uw^^  m^^^^^^^^    f-v  successful  encroaclunen.  and 

S^r  tnrnl;''ialio:rof  ;:iuauu\  aud  .niserable  fanu.ics  f.o.u  one 
"'^;::iSiS'i^a  .cnera,  aud  poU.icia.  ^^1-'- ,-  -- 

)^nXTqmL^  some  allowance,  is  not  to  be  noeetcd.  ^^^^^ 
addresses  him  as  a  friend  of  letters  and  phi  osoplij  ;  a  "P"';'  o" 
w  -h  h's  choice  of  Aristotle  as  ir.Mructor  of  his  son  Alexander,  temU 
^\U.(U  n,»  cnoKc  "  Dionysii  of  Syracuse  and 

drunkenness,  cramhlinir.  an.l  exee-sses of  all ^^l"/  f ;";;'' '^^^ 

pnpouri-ino- the  like  in  those  around  hini.    His  M:  certonian  anauu 

"i™ed^n:^"i:r^n^^^  Tlnlip,  we  have  to  appreeiate  also 
the  laities  to  whom  he  stood  opposed.  His  good  fortune  was  no^ 
wL^r^m^re  conspieuoiis  than  in  the  fart,  that  he  fell  upon  tho.c 


days  of  disunion  and  backwardness  in  Greece  (indicated  in  the  last 
sentence  ot  Xenophon's  Hehenica)  when  there  was  neither  leading 
city  prepared  to  keep  watch,  nor  Icadinu"  n-eueral  to  take  command 
nor  citizcn-soldiers  willing  and  ready  to   endure   the  hardships  of 
steady  service      Philip  combated  iw  opponents  like  Kpaminondas  or 
Agesilaus,  or  Iphikrates,     llow  diltcrent  mi-ht  iiave  been  his  career 
had  Lpaminondas  survived  the  victory  of  ^Mantineia,  iruined  only 
two    years    before    Pliilip's   accession!      To   oppose   Philip     there 
needed  a  man  hke  Inmself,  competent  not  only  to  advise  and  pro- 
ject   but  to  command  in   person,   to  stimulate  the  zeal  of  citizen- 
soldiers,  and  to  set  the  example  of  bravinu-  danger  and  fati«'ue      Un- 
lortunately  for  Greece,  no  such  leader  stood  forward,     in  council 
and  speech  Demosthenes  sufficed  for  the  emergency.     Twice  before 
the  battle  of  ChcTroneia— at  Byzantium  and  at  Thebes— did  he  sio-nally 
frustrate  Phdip's  combinations.     But  he  was  not  formed  to  take  the 
lead  in  action,  nor  was  there  any  one  near  him  to  supply  the  defect 
In  the  field,  Philip  encountered  only  that  "public  inethciency  "  at 
Athens  and  elsewhere  in  Greece,  of  which  even  ^schines  complains- 
and  to  this  decay  of  Grecian  enerj^v,  not  less  than  to  his  own  dis- 
Imguished   attributes,   the   unparaUeled   success   of    Jiis   rei<ni  wag 
owing.     We  shall  find,  during  the  rei^m  of  his  son  Alexander  the 
hke  genius  and  vigor  exhibited  on  a  still  larger  scale,  and  achievino- 
still  more  wonderful  results;  while  the  once  stirring  politics  of  Greece^ 
after  one  feeble  effort,  sink  yet  lower,  into  the  nullity  of  a  subiect 
provmce.  *' 


CHAPTER  XCI. 

FTUST   PERIQD   OF   THE   REIGX    OF    ALEXANDER    THE     GREAT— SIEGE 

AND   CAPTURE    OF  THEBES. 

My  last  preceding  chapter  ended  with  the  assassination  of  Philip 
of  Macedon,  and  the  accession  of  his  son  Alexander  the  Great  then 
tweniy  years  of  age.  ' 

It  demonstrates  the  altered  complexion  of  Grecian  history,  that  we 
are  now  obliged  to  seek  for  marking  events  in  the  succession  to  the 
.Macedonian  crown,  or  in  the  ordinances  of  Macedonian  kings  la 
fact,  the  Hellenic  world  has  ceased  to  be  autonomous.  In  Sicily 
nideed,  the  free  and  constitutional  march,  revived  by  Timoleon  is 
still  destined  to  continue  for  a  few  years  longer;  but  all  the  Grecian 
Cities  south  of  Mount  Olympus  have  descended  into  dependants  of 
31acedonia.  Such  dependence,  established  as  a  fact  by  the  battle  of 
bhproneia  and  by  the  subsequent  victorious  march  of  Philip  over 
Peloponnesus,  was  acknowledged  in  form  by  the  vote  of  the  Grecian 
synod  at  Corinth.     While  eve^  th?  Athenians  had  been  compelled  to 


522 


REIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 

concur  in  submission,  Sparta  alone,  braving  all  consequences,  con- 
tinue 1  iutiexible  in  ber  ix^usal.  Tbe  adherence  of  Thebes  ^vas  not 
trnedtothe  wordof  theTheban.,  but  insured  by  the  ^^lacedo.nan 
can-  sm^^  i"  I'^r  ^•^tadcb  called  the  Kadmeia.     l>ach  1  el- 

knic  d^^^^  small  and  oreat-marilime.  inland  and  insular- (^vlth  the 
1  ogle  e-xception  of  Sparta),  ^vas  thus  enrolled  as  u  separate  urn  ui 
the  list  of  subject-allies  attached  to  the  nnpenal  headship  uf  Philip. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  history  of  conquered  Greece  joscs 
its  separate  course,  and  becomes  merged  in  that  ot  conquering  Mace- 
coni-i      Nevertheless,  there  are  particular  reasons  ^bich  constrain 
he  historian  of  Greece  to  carry  on  the  two  together  for  a  few  years 
lou-er.     First,  conquered  Greece  exercised  a  powerful  action  on  her 
conqueror-- Grtecia  capta  ferum   victorem  cepit  "     Ihe  3Iacedo- 
nians  thou-h  speakin-  a  language  of  their  own,  had  neither  langungo 
for  communicating   with   others,    nor   literature     nor    philosophy, 
except  Grecian   and  derived  from  Greeks.     1  hilip,  while  causing 
himself  to  be  chosen  chief  of  Hellas,  was  himself  not  only  partial  y 
Hellenized.  but   an   eairer   candidate   for  Hellenic  admiration.     He 
demtinded  the  headship  under  the  declared  pretense  of  satisfying  the 
old  antipathy  against  Persia.     Next,  the   conquests   of  Alexander, 
though  essentially  ]\Iacedonian.  operated  indirectly  as  the  inituitory 
etepSf  a  series  of  events,  difTu.sing  Hellenic  language  (with  some 
tiuo-e  of  Hellenic  literature)  over  a  large  breadth  of  Asia— (opening 
tha't  territory  to  the  better  observation,  in  some  degree  even  to  tiie 
superintendence,  of  intelligent  Greeks-and  thus  producing  conse- 
Quences  important  in  many  ways  tothehistory  of  mankind      LastU, 
the  generation  of  free  Greeks  upon  whom  the  battle  of  Choeroneia 
fell   were  not  disposed  to  lie  quiet  if  any  opportunity  occurred  for 
shaking  off  their  :\Iacedonian  masters.     In  the  succeeding  chapters 
will  be  recorded  the  unavailing  efforts  made  for  this  purpose,  m 
which  Demosthenes  and  most  of  the  other  leaders  penshed. 

Alexander  (born  in  July,  356  B.C.),  like  his  father  Phi  ip,  was  not 
a  Greek,  but  a  Macedonian  and  Epirot,  partially  imbued  with  Gre 
cian  sentiment  and  intelligence.  It  is  true  that  his  ancestors,  some 
centuries  before,  had  been  emigrants  from  Argos;  but  the  kings  ot 
.Alacedonia  had  long  lost  all  trace  of  any  such  pecubarity  as  might 
ori-nnally  have  distinszuished  them  from  their  subjects.  The  basis 
of  Philip's  character ^^ as  Macedonian,  not  Greek:  it  was  the  seit- 
wiU  of  a  barbarian  prince,  not  the  ingenium  civile,  or  sense  of  recipe 
rocal  obligation  and  right  in  society  with  others,  which  marked 
more  or  less  even  the  most  powerful  members  of  a  Grecian  eil\. 
whether  oliirarchical  or  democratical.  If  tliis  was  true  ot  1  hilip,  u 
was  still  more  true  of  Alexander,  who  inherited  the  violent  tempera- 
ment and  headstrong  will  of  his  furious  Epirotic  mother  Olympias. 
A  kinsman  of  Olympias,  named  Leonidas,  and  an  Akarnanian 
named  Lvsimachus.  are  mentioned  as  the  chief  tutors  to  whom 
^Uexandei-'s  cbiUlhocd  was  intrusted.     Of  tourie  the  Iliad  of  Homer 


BOYHOOD  OF  ALEXANDER. 


523 


w^as  among  the  first  things  which  he  learned  as  a  boy.  Throughout 
most  of  his  life  he  retained  a  strong  interest  in  this  poem,  a  copy  of 
which,  said  to  have  been  corrected  by  Aristotle,  he  carried  with  him 
ill  his  military  campaigns.     We  are  not  told,  nor  is  it  probable,  that; 


The  tutor  Lysimachus  won  his  heart  by  calling  himself  Phoenix— » 
Alexander,  Achilles— and  Pliilip,  by  the  name  of  Peleus.  Oi 
Alexander's  boyish  ])oetical  recitations,  one  anecdote  remains,  both 
curious  and  of  unquestionable  authenticity.  He  was  ten  years  old 
when  the  Athenian  legation,  including  both  iEschines  and  Demos- 
thenes, came  to  Pel  la  to  treat  about  peace.  While  Philip  entertained 
them  at  table,  in  his  usual  agreeable  and  convivial  manner,  the  boy 
Alexander  recited  for  their  amusement  certain  passages  of  poetry 
which  he  had  learned,  and  delivered,  inresponse  with  another  boy,  a 
dialogue  out  of  one  of  the  Grecian  dramas. 

At  the  age  of  thirteen,  Alexander  was  placed  under  the  instruction 
of  Aristotle,  wdioin  Philip  expressly  invited  for  the  purpose,  and 
whose  father  Nikomachus  had  been  both  friend  and  pliysicirm  of 
Philip's  father  Amyntas.  What  course  of  study  Alexander  w^as 
made  to  go  through,  we  unfortunately  cannot  state.  He  enjoyed 
the  teaching  of  Aristotle  for  at  least  three  years,  and  we  are  told 
that  he  devoted  himself  to  it  with  ardor,  contracting  a  strong  attach- 
ment to  his  preceptor.  His  powers  of  addressing  an  audience, 
though  not  so  well  attested  as  those  of  his  father,  were  always  found 
sufficient  for  his  purpose;  moreover,  he  retained,  even  in  the  midst 
of  his  fatiguing  Asiatic  campaigns,  an  interest  in  Greek  literature 
and  poetry. 

At  what  precise  moment,  during  the  lifetinio  of  his  father.  Alex- 
ander first  took  part  in  active  service,  we  do  not  know.  Il  is  said 
that  once,  Avhen  quite  a  youth,  he  received  some  Persian  envoys 
during  the  absence  of  his  father;  and  that  he  surprised  them  by  the 
maturity  of  his  demeanor,  as  well  as  by  the  political  bearing  and 
pertinence  of  his  questions.  Though  only  sixteen  years  of  age,  in 
340  B.C.  he  was  left  at  home  as  regent  while  Philip  was  engaged  in 
the  sieges  of  Byzantium  and  Perinthus.  He  put  down  a  revolt  of 
the  neighboring  Thracian  tribe  called  Msedi,  took  one  of  their  towns, 
and  founded  it  anew  under  the  title  of  Alexandria;  the  earliest  town 
which  bore  that  name,  afterward  applied  to  various  other  towns 
planted  by  him  and  his  succQ.ssors.  In  the  march  of  Pliilip  into 
Greece  (338  B.C.).  Alexander  took  part,  commanded  one  of  the  wings 
at  the  battle  of  Cha?roneia,  and  is  said  to  have  first  gained  the  advan- 
tage on  his  side  over  the  Theban  sacred  band. 

«  Yet  notwithstanding  such  marks  of  confidence  and  co-operation, 
other  incidents  occurred  producing  bitter  animosity  between  the 
father  and  the  son.    By  his  wife  Olympias,  Pliilip  had  as  offspring 


i 


524 


REIGX  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 


» 1  1.^  on.i  K'lr.nnMtra-  bv  a  Thcssalian  mistress  named Philinna, 

iaS  a  rnnanuS  Siccus    af.crwar.l  called   Philip  Arul.TUs); 

.    nd  al<o  dauiibteis  nan,cd    Kynna  (or  Kvnano)   and   1  licssa- 

nike      O  vmnial,  a  ^voman  <>f  sanguinary  and  in.  placable  disposi- 

I    M.irtDdired  herself  so  odious  to  him  that  he  repudiated  her, 

V^n  aiTied  anew  wife  named  Kleopatra.     I  have  recounted  >u  my 

unerth  chapter  the  indignation  felt  by  Alexander  at  this  pioceed- 

"and  the  iiolenl  altercation  which  occurred  during  the  couviv. 

^^tvof  the  marriage  banctiut;  where  Pliilip  actually  snatched  his 

s«md   tl  ren tened  liis  sons  life,  and  was  only  prevented  from  exe- 

cu   na  tic  threat  by  falling  down  through  intoxication.      After  this 

a  arrll    Alexander  retired  from  JIacedonia,  conducting  his  motlicr 

?o  her  brother  Alexan.ler  king  of  Epinis.     A  son  was  born  to  Philip 

IvKleomtni.     Her  brother  or  uncle  Attains  acquired  high  favor. 

Uer   ki^ismen  an.l  partisans  generally  were  also  promoted,  while 

ttolemy,  Srchus.  and  othe?  persons  attached  to  Alexander,  were 

'"'tm^p  m'osDects  of  Alexander  were  thus  full  of  uncertainty  and 
ijcTi  ItiP  3.e  verv  dav  of  I'hilip's  assassination.  The  succession  to 
fheMacldonian  ,r6wn,-tl.ou,di  transmitted  in  the  same  family,  was 

V  no  means  assured  as  to  individual  members;  moreover  m  the 
^ga  hm'«  of  Macclonia  (as  among  the  kings  called  Diadochi,  wlio 
acmired  lominhin  after  the  death  of  Alexander  the  Great),  vio^^e  t 
fern'  and  stan.limr  mistru.st  between  father,  sons,  and  brethren,  were 
rr  In-irv  i.henomena  to  which  the  family  of  the  Autigonids  formed 
:n  lion'Ullre  cTce^tion.  Between  Alexander  and  Olympias  on  the 
om^^U\e  and  KU'opatra  \vith  her  son  and  Attains  on  lie  omer,  a 
Murderous  co^test^^ ius  sure  to  arise.     Kleopatra  was  at  tins  time  in 

le  tcendunt;  Olympias  was  violent  and  mischievous;  a"d  Phihp 
wis  onl  forty-seven  years  of  a-e.  Hence  the  future  hreatened 
nothin"Vit  aggravated  dissension  and  ditiieuUies  for  Alexander 
Moreovei  is  strong  will  and  im].erious.  temper,  eminently  suitab  e 
forsunrene  command,  disqualitied  him  from  playing  a  subordiim  e 
mrt  even  to  hi^own  father'  The  prudence  of  Philip  when  about  to 
de[wt  on  his  Asiatic  expedition,  imluced  him  to  attempt  to  heal 
fhi^e  family  dissensions  by  givinghis  daughter  Kleopatra  in  marrmge 

to  her  uncle  Alexander  of  Epirus,  brother  o  <^1>"/PJ;^^>]V  t1  nt^  e 
incr  the  splendid  marriage  festival,  then  celebrated  at  ^gte,  t  ud  he 
was  a  snsSnated-Olympias,  Kleopatra  and  Alexander,  being  all  pre  - 
Tnt,  while  Attains  was  m  Asia,  commanduKir  the  Macedoiiian  j  v  - 
sron  ^ent  forward  in  advance,  jointly  with  Parmenio.  Had  Philip 
escaped  this  catastrophe,  he  would  doubtless  have  earned  onthe  war 
in  S  Minor  with  quite  as  much  energy  and  skill  as  it  was  af ter- 
ward  piwcuted  bv  Alexander;  though  we  may  doubt  wlicther  the 
father  would  have  stretched  out  to  those  ulterior  undertakings  which, 
gio^ntic  a  d  far-reaching  as  they  were,  fell  short  of  the  insatiable 
urabmon  ot  the  son.     But  successful  as  Philip  might  have  been  m 


EFFECT  OF  PHILIPS  DEATH. 


525 


Asia,  he  would  hardly  have  escaped  gloomv  family  feuds;  with  Alex- 
ander as  a  mutinous  son,  under  the  instigations  of  Olympias,— and 
with  Kleopatra  on  the  other  side,  feeUng  that  her  own  safety  depended 
upon  the  removal  of  regal  or  quasi-regal  competitors. 

From  such  formidable  perils,  visible  in  the  distance,  if  not  imme- 
diately impending,  the  sword  of  Pausanias  guaranteed  both  Alexan- 
der and  the  Macedonian  kingdom.  But  at  the  moment  when  the 
blow  was  struck,  and  when  the  Lynkestian  Alexander,  one  of  those 
privy  to  it,  ran  to  forestall  resistance  and  place  the  crown  on  the  head 
of  Alexander  the  Great— no  one  knew  what  to  expect  from  tlie  young 
prince  thus  suddenly  exalted  at  the  age  of  twenty  vears.  The  sud- 
den death  of  Philip  in  the  fullness  of  glory  and  ambitious  hopes,  must 
have  produced  the  strongest  impression,  first  upon  the  festive  crowd 
assembled— next  throughout  Macedonia— lastly,  upon  the  foreigners 
whom  he  hacF reduced  to  dependence  from  the  Danube  to  the'^bor- 
ders  of  Picgaiia.  All  these  dependencies  were  held  only  by  the  fear  of 
Macedonian  force.  It  remained  to  be  proved  whether  the  youthful 
son  of  Philip  was  capable  of  putting  down  opposition  and  upholding 
the  powerful  organization  created  by  his  father.  Moreover  Perdik- 
kas,  the  elder  brother  and  predecessor  of  Philip,  had  left  a  son  named 
Amyntas,  now  at  least  twenty^-four  years  of  age,  to  whom  many- 
looked  as  the  proper  successor. 

But  Alexander,  present  and  proclaimed  at  once  by  his  friends, 
showed  himself,  both  in  word  and  deed,  perfectly  competent  to  the 
emergency.  He  mustered,  caressed,  and  conciliated  the  divisions  of 
the  Macedonian  army  and  the  chief  officers.  His  addresses  were 
judicious  and  energetic,  engaging  that  the  dignity  of  the  kin2:doni 
should  be  maintained  unimpaired,  and  that  even  the  Asiatic  projects 
already  proclaimed  should  be  prosecuted  with  as  much  vigor  as  if 
Philip  still  lived. 

It  was  one  of  the  first  measures  of  Alexander  to  celebrate  with  mag- 
nificent solemnities  the  funeral  of  his  deceased  father.  Wliile  the 
preparations  for  it  were  going  on,  he  instituted  researches  to  find  out 
and  punish  the  accomplices  of  Pausanias  Of  these  indeed,  the  most 
illustrious  person  mentioned  to  us— Olympias— was  not  only  pro- 
tected by  her  position  from  punishment,  but  retained  great  ascend- 
ency over  her  son  to  the  end  of  his  life.  Three  other  persons  are 
mentioned  by  name  as  accomplice;?— brothers  and  persons  of  ijood 
family  from  the  district  of  Upper  Macedonia  called  Lynkestis— Alex- 
ander, Heromenes,  and  Arrhaboeus.  sons  of  Aeropus.  The  tw^o  latter 
were  put  to  death,  but  the  first  of  the  three  was  spared,  and  even  ^ 
promoted  to  important  charges  as  a  reward  for  his  useful  for- 
wardness in  instantly  saluting  Alexander  king.  Others  also,  we 
know  not  how  many,  were  executed;  and  Alexander  seems  to 
have  imagined  that  Miere  still  remained  some  undetected.  The 
Persian  king  boasted  in  public  letters,  with  how  much  truth  vvecaa- 
not  my,  that  he  too  had  been  among  the  instigators  of  Pausanias. 


556  I^EIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 

4mon<r  the  persons  shiin  about  this  time  by  Alexander  wc  may 
n^m^r  Sis  firrm^^^  brother  in-law  Amyntas-son  of  Perdik- 

KSieiess  Alexander  now  put  him  to  death   on  accusation  of  con- 
iseverincie.s.v  ^^reci^c  circumstances  does  not  appear— but 

'P^'Sl'v    WntvsXo  besides  being  the  son   of  Philip's  elder 
probably  -''''' >  "11:11,  \^^^^^^  age,  while  Alexander  was 

onttwem>^ 

Son,  and  was  so  conceived  by  many  .^^bers      The  infant  ^on  of 

KlPonatra  bv  Philip  is  said   to  have   been    killed    by   Alexander 

^sTrval    hi   the  Accession;    Kleopatra   he^^^^^, ^^  f  ^/.^^"if 

♦  f/  w],  hv  Olvmoias  during  his  absence,  and   to  his  repet. 

iualus  Tl  o   i?nc?e^o?Spat^'a  and  joint  commander  of  the^^face^ 

Ionian  armv  in  Asia,  was  assassinated  under  the  Pnvate  orders  of 

Uexander  by  Hekatseus  and  Philotas.      Another  Amyntas,  son  of 

V  nt  whn^'  ahere  seem  to  have  been  several  Macedonians  named 

Antiochu.  0rt  seem   lo^^  probnblv  others  who  felt  them- 

^l^s  tte^^J^ec^^^sl^l^c;^.  didVhe  like-since  ^7  ^^^^edo- 
Dian  custom,  not  merely  a  person  convicted  of  high  tieason,  but  all 
liU  kindred  alon^^  with  him,  w^ere  put  to  deatn.  j  v    ^;« 

Bv  uS  v^  manifestkions  of  energy  and  address  and  by  dis- 
patching i^I^s  or  dangerous  malcontents,  Alexander  thus  speedily 
Cifi"d^h  posiLn  on  the  throne  at  home.  But  from  the  foreign 
dependams  ^of  Macedonia-Greeks,  Thracians,  and  "bnaj-tl^ 
1  S  icknowled-nient  was  not  so  easily  obtained  Most  of  them 
^^^re  dispo^^^^^  off  the  yoke;  yet  none  dared  to  take  the  ini- 

tiative oTmovincr,  and  the  suddenness  of  Philip's  death  /ound  them 
nWether  unprepared  for  combination.  By  that  event  the  Greeks 
^'pTc  Mr^r" ed  f rom  all  engagement,  since  the  vote  of  the  confeder- 
acThKcted  hhn  persomillv  as  Imperator.  They  ^ere  now.at 
m)ertv  in  so  far  as  there  was  any  liberty  at  all  in  the  proceedmg,  o 
;kc^an^  one  ele  or  to  abstain  fm  at  all,  and  even  to 

ipfthPronfedemcv  expire.    Now  it  was  only  under  constraint  and 
n  in  daTon  asTas  w^H  known  both  -  Gn.ce  .md    n  Macex^^^^^^^^^^ 
tint  tl.pv  had  ooufcrred  this  (  ed  ty  even  ou  Pliilip,  who  bail  earnea 
hv  nlcndidexp bits  and  had  proved  himself  the  ablest  capta.u  and 
l^ftichn  oHhe  age      Thev  were  bv  no  means  inclined  to  transfer  it 
?oa  vou  li    ike  Afexander.-tintil  he  had  shown  himself  capable  of 
rrin-ine  he  like  coercion  to  bear,  and  extorting  the  samtj  stibm.ssion 
The^l.  to  b K-ak  loose  from  Macedonia,  widely  ^P-J^-lJ^^^f  °^] 
the  fiierian  cities    found  open  expression  from  Demosthenes  ana 
omeS  in  t!.^  aakembly  at  AtLns.     That  orator  (if  we  are  to  beheve 


DISCONTENT  IN  GREECE. 


627 


his  rival  ^schines),  having  received  private  intelligence  of  the  assas- 
tiinationof  Philip,  through  certain  spies  of  Chariilenius,  before  it  was 
publicly  known  to  others,  pretended  to  have  had  it  revealed  to  him 
in  a  dream  by  the  gods.  Appearing  in  the  assembly  with  his  gayest 
attire,  he  congratulated  his  countrymen  on  the  death  of  their  greatest 
enemy,  and  pronounced  high  encomiums  on  the  brave  tyrannicide  of 
Pausanias,  which  he  would  probably  compare  to  that  of  Harraodius 
and  Aristogeiton.  He  dej)reciated  the  abilities  of  Alexander,  calling 
him  Margites  (the  name  of  a  silly  character  in  one  of  the  Homeric 
poems),  and  intimating  that  he  would  be  too  much  distracted  with 
embarrassments  and  ceremonial  diUies  at  home,  to  have  leisure  for  a 
foreign  march.  Such,  according  to  ^Eschines,  was  the  language  of 
Demosthenes  on  the  lirst  news  of  Philip's  death.  We  cannot  doubt 
that  the  public  of  Athens,  as  well  as  Demosthenes,  felt  great  joy  at 
an  event  which  seemed  to  open  to  them  fresh  chances  of  freedom,  and 
tliat  the  motion  for  a  sacrifice  of  thanksgiving,  in  spite  of  Phokion's 
opposition,  was  readily  adopted.  But  though  the  manifestation  of 
sentiment  at  Athens  was  thus  anti-Macedonian,  exhibiting  aversion 
to  the  renewal  of  that  obedience  which  had  been  recently  promised 
to  Philip,  Demosthenes  did  not  go  so  far  as  to  declare  any  positive 
hostility.  He  tried  to  open  communication  with  the"  Persians  in 
Asia  Minor,  and  also,  if  we  may  believe  Diodorus,  with  the  Mace- 
donian commander  in  Asia  Minor,  Attains.  But  neither  of  the  two 
missions  w^as  successful.  Attains  sent  his  letter  to  Alexander;  while 
the  Persian  king,  probably  relieved  by  the  death  of  Philip  from  im- 
mediate fear  of  the  Macedonian  power,  dispatched  a  peremptory 
refusal  to  Athens,  intimating  that  he  would  furnish  no  more  money. 

Not  merely  in  Atliens,  but  in  other  Grecian  states  also,  the  death 
of  Philip  excited  aspirations  for  freedom.  The  Lacedaemonians, 
who,  though  unsupported,  had  stood  out  inflexibly  against  any 
obedience  to  him,  w^ere  now  on  the  watch  for  new  allies;  wdiile  the 
Arcadians,  Argeians,  and  Eleians,  manifested  sentiments  adverse  to 
Macedonia.  The  Ambrakiots  expelled  the  garrison  placed  by  Philip 
in  their  city;  the  ^tolians  passed  a  vote  to  assist  in  restoring  those 
Akaruanian  exiles  whom  he  had  banished.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Thessalians  manifested  unshaken  adherence  to  Macedonia.  But  the 
Macedonian  garrison  at  Thebes,  and  the  Macedonizing  Thebans  who 
now  f^overned  that  city,  w^ere  probably  the  main  obstacles  to  any 
combined  manifestation  in  favor  of  Hellenic  autonomy. 

Apprised  of  these  impulses  prevalent  throughout  the  Grecian 
world,  Alexander  felt  the  necessity  of  checking  them  by  a  demonstra- 
tion immediate,  as  well  as  intimiilating.  His  energy  and  rapidity  of 
proceedings  speedily  overawed  all  those  who  had  speculated  on  his 
youth,  or  had  adopted  the  epithets  applied  to  him  by  Demosthenes. 
Having  surmounted,  in  a  shorter  time  than  was  supposed  possible, 
the  dil^culties  of  his  newly-acquired  position  at  home,  he  marched 
into  Gre3Ci?  at  th.>  bend  o^^  a  forjju'yV.ibij  r.rn:y,  s^gmiagly  about  two 


528 


REIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 


months  after  tlie  death  of  Philip.  He  was  favorably  received  by  the 
Thessalians,  who  passed  a  vote  constituting  Alexander  head  of  Greece 
in  plac£  of  his  father  Tliilip;  which  vote  was  speedily  confirmed  by 
the  Amphiktyonic  assembly,  convoked  at  Thermopylae.  Ak'?;nnder 
next  advanced  to  Thebes,  and  from  thence  over  the  isthmus  of  Cor- 
inth into  Peloponnesus.  The  details  of  this  march  we  do  not  know; 
but  his  great  force,  probably  not  inferior  to  that  which  had  conquered 
at  Chferoneia,  spreiid  terror  everywhere,  silencing  all  except  his 
partisans.  Nowhere  was  the  alarm  greater  than  at  Athens.  The 
Athenians,  recollectinir  both  the  speeches  of  their  orators  and  tlie 
votes  of  their  assembly — offensive  at  least,  if  not  hostile,  to  the 
Macedonians — trembled  lest  the  march  of  Alexander  should  be  di- 
rected against  their  city,  and  accordingly  made  prepaiation  for  stand- 
ing a  siege.  All  citizens  were  enjoined  to  bring  in  their  families  and 
properties  from  the  country,  insomuch  that  the  space  within  the  walls 
was  full  both  of  fugitives  and  of  cattle.  At  the  same  time,  the  as- 
semblv  adopted,  on  the  motion  of  Demades,  a  resolution  of  apology 
and  full  submission  to  Alexander:  they  not  only  recognized  him  as 
chief  of  Greece,  but  ctrnferred  upon  him  divine  honors,  in  terui>  even 
more  emphatic  than  'those  bestowed  on  Philip.  The  mover,  with 
other  legates,  carried  the  resolution  to  Alexander,  whom  they  found 
at  Thebes,  and  who  accepted  their  submission.  A  young  speaker 
named  Pythras  is  said  to  have  op])Osed  the  Vote  in  the  Athenian 
assembly.'  Whether  Demosthenes  did  the  like— or  whether,  under 
the  feeling  of  disappointed  anticipations  and  overwhelming  >Iace- 
donian  force,  he  condemned  himself  to  silence— we  cannot  sa}^ 
That  he  did  not  go  with  Demades  on  the  mission  to  Alexander,  seems  a 
matter  of  course,  though  he  is  Siud  to  have  been  appointed  by  puldic 
vote  to  do  so,  and  to  liave  declined  the  duty.  He  accompanied  the 
legation  as  far  as  Mount  Kitha?ron,  on  the  frontier,  and  then  returned 
to  Athens.  We  read  with  astonishment  that  ^Eschines  and  his  other 
enemies  denounced  this  step  as  a  cowardly  desertion.  No  envoy 
could  be  so  odious  to  Alexander,  or  so  likely  to  provoke  refusal  for 
the  proposition  which  he  carried,  as  Demosthenes.  To  employ  him 
in  such  a  mission  would  have  been  absurd;  except  for  the  purpose 
probably  intended  by  his  enemies,  that  he  might  be  either  detained 
by  the  conqueror  as  an  expiatory  victim,  or  sent  back  as  a  pardoned 
and  humiliated  prisoner. 

After  displaying  his  force  in  various  portions  of  Peloponnesus, 
Alexander  returnexl  to  Corinth, where  he  convened  deputies  from  the 
Grecian  cities  generally.  The  list  of  those  cities  which  obeyed  the 
summons  is  not  before  us,  but  j^robably  it  included  nearly  all  the  cit- 
ies of  Central  Greece.  We  know  only  that  the  Laceda?monians  con- 
tinued to  stand  aloof,  refusing  all  concurrence.  Alexander  asked 
from  the  assembled  deputies  the  same  appointment  which  the  victo- 
rious Philip  had  required  and  obtained  two  years  before — the  hege- 
mony or  headship  of  the  Greeks  collectively  for  the  purpose  of  prose- 


CONVENTION  BROKEN  BY  MACEDONIANS.      529 

cuting  war  against  Persia.  To  the  request  of  a  prince  at  the  head  of 
an  irresistible  army,  one  answer  only  was  admissible.  He  was  no m^. 
nated  Imperator  with  lull  powers,  by  land  and  sea.  Overawed  by 
the  presence  and  seutnnent  of  Macedonian  force,  all  acquiesced  in 
this  vote  excei)l  the  LacedcCmonians.  -'^  quicscea  in 

J^IZ^'ZITI'"''  sanctioned  by  Alexander  was  probably  the  same 
as  that  settled  by  and  vyith  his  father  Philip.     Its  Vrand  and  signifi- 
cant  feature  was,  that  it  recognized  Hellas  as  a  confederacy  imder 
the  Macedonian  prince  as  iniperator,  or  executive  head  and  arm 
It  crowned  him  with  a  legal  sanction  as  keeper  of  the  peace  within 
Gn^ece,  and  conqueror  abroad  in  the  name  of  Greece.     Of  its  other 
conditions,some  are  made  known  to  us  by  subsequent  complaints  •  such 
conditions  as,   being  equitable  and    tutelary  toward   the    members 
generally  the  Macedonian  chief  found  it  inconvenient  to  observe 
hv  th  ^r  !  ''  ^?'°  jo, violate.     Each  Hellenic  city  was  pronounced.' 
by  the  tirst  article  of  the  convention,  to  be  free  and  autonomous.     In 
each   the  existing  political  constitution  was  reco-nized  as  it  stood- 
aU  o  her  cities  were  forbidden  to  interfere  with  it,  or  to  second  any 
attack  by  its  hostile  exiles.     No  new  despot  was  to  be  established; 
no  disposses.sed  despot  was  to  be  restored.     EacJl  city  became  bound 
to  discourage  in  every  other,  as  far  as  possible,  all  iile-al  violence- 
such  as  political  executions,  contiscution,  spoliation,^redivision  of 
land  or  abolition  of  debts,  factious  manumission  of  slaves  etc      To 
each  was  guaranteed  freedom  of  navigation,  mr.ritimc  capture  was 
prohibited,  OM  pum  of  enmity  from  all.     Each  was  forbidden  to  send 
armed  vessels  into  the  harbor  of  any  other,  or  to  build  vessels  or 
engage  seamen  there.     By  each,  an  oath  was  taken  to  observe  these 
conditions   to  declare  war  against  all  who  violated  them,  and  to  keep 
them  inscribed  on  a  co-aniemorative   column.     Provision   seems  to 
have  been   made   for  admitting  any  additional   city   on  its  subse- 
quent application,  though   it  might  not   have  been  a  party  to  the 
original   contract.     Moreover,  it  appears  that  a  standing  military 
lorce,  under  Macedonian  onlers,  was  provided  to  enforce  Sbservance 
of  the  convention;  and  that  the  synod  of  deputies  was  contemplated 
as  bkely  to  meet  periodically.  ^ 

t..^w^l'''''n^^^•''''''''f"^'''"'  '''  '''^''^  ''^s  ^'^  know  its  terms,  agreed 
to  by  the  Grecian  deputies  at  Corinth  with  Alexander;  but  with 
Ak'Xiindcr  at  the  head  of  an  irresistible  armv.  He  proclaimed  it  as 
the- public  statute  of  the  Greeks,"  constituting  a  jSount  obi^ 
W  ??;  f  V''"^}'  !^  '^'''  ^^^  enforcer.  l,inding  on  all,  and  authoriz- 
ing him  to  treat  al  transgressors  as  n  Ijels.  It  was  set  forth  as  coun- 
terpart of,  and  substitute  for,  the  convention  of  Antalkidas,  which 
we  shall  present  y  see  the  otllcers  of  Darius  trying  to  revive  against 
h  ni-the  lieadship  of  Persia  against  that  of  Macedonia.  Such  is 
the  melancholy  degradation  of  the  Grecian  world,  that  its  cities  Iiave 
no  alternative  except  to  choose  between  these  two  foreign  potentates 
—or  to  mnte  the  help  of  Datius,  the  most  distant  andleagt  danger- 


530  R^IGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 

nus  whose  headship  could  hardly  be  more  than  "O^inal  "^'"^  ? 
^f^  sure  to  '^e^aotne;.;;^:.^^- 

to  be  tyrannical.  Of  tl.t  o°^^  P^^^,  ^,,^^.1^  „{  ,vhom  the  Grecian 
S!oria"i;;d"hS^;  ^X  l  Is  'n  iuTpcndent  and  .elf-detcrmiuiug 
r.°J;yS   admiUinni-  free  ,.lay  of  J.ative  --''■-'fj'-dcluuac  er 

anion"  the  subject  allies  of  Alexander;  while  bpait.i  priserves  oniy 
the  dilni.y  of  an  is<^uted  indc^eudence^^^^^  ^^^^^^^^^  ^^^ 

JeartJ^ro  th  'tveuUc^ii/Alexande?  and  his  officers  (after  his  n. 
tum  to  f lacedonia)  were  active,  both  by  armed  f"'^"^"^,^/.  "f^'°° 
o" envoys,  in  procuring  new  adhesions  and   in  ■"''""'^''''''f.'^'Vfi^to 
ernmentsof  virions  cities  suitably  to  their  own  views    ^o"\P  ' '°f 
of  such  a-'sressious  were  ndsed  in  the  public  assembly  ot  Aliens 
?,    li„i..  ^1  ,Vp  in  Greece  where  anv  1  berty  of  discussion  still  sur- 
vived^ -.^n  omt^n  pronoimced  bv  Demosthenes,  Hyperides,  or  one 
o  Tlfe  con.empomry  anti  Macedonian  politiciatts  (al.out  t"e  springer 
early  summer  of  3sr,  B.C.)  imparts  to  us  s'ome  idea  _'^"''^, °.    '"^^ 
rionian  interventions  steadilv  goinc  cm,  and  of  the  unavailing  remon 
fn.^n,>^.rr\iscd  ""ainst  tl.em'bv  individual  Athenian  citizens.     At  the 
Hn'^  of  t  its  o  atC  such  remonstrances  had  alrea.ly  been  often  re- 
peated    They   were  always  met  by  Macedonizing  Athenians  vn 
M^emptorv  declarations  that  the  convention  must  beobserved.     But 

! -Mt,.rx=.e  rihi-'cin^ei^;^^ 
S^-'ri;rrpr:ir'A=er^rdTi^^^^^^^^ 

S%i^^^€^^^,iiv;imS^.:^^ 

^fhPv..rioiis  cities  to  promote  their  own  partisans  to  po^^el.  In 
?f  clp  S?kvon  and  Pellene  they  bad  subverted  the  popular  con- 
Srn^  tl^"he^^  and  established  friends  of  their 

o.^^  ^s  de.po"s      The  Ma^^  force,  destined  as  a  P^^ljl'^  guar- 

MntVto  enforce  the  observance  of  the  convention,  had  been  em- 
B?oTdonTv  to  overrule  its  best  conditions,  and  to  arm  the  hands  of 
factious  part  sans.  Thus  Alexander,  in  hLs  capacity  of  Impem  ^i 
dIsrSnff  an  the  restraints  of  the  convention,  acted  as  chiet  es- 
^ot  f or  the  m  I  nlenance  of  subordinate  despots  in  the  separate  cities 
Fven  V  \tl?er  is  imperial  authority  had  rescinded  sentences  of 
nie  DfM^  compelled  the  adoption  of  measures  contrary  to 

'^ltT.\t":^^t^ra.^^^  Alexander  or  his  officers  had 

betn  not  le  s  mL^f est  thaS  on  land,  The  convention  guaranteeing 
?oair  cities  the  right  of  free  navigation,  distinctly  forbade  each 
to  take  o    detain  ve^U  belonging  to  any  other.    I^feverthe^ss  th. 


COMPLAINTS  OF  ATHENIANS 


531 


Macedonians  had  seized,  in  the  Hellespont,  all  the  merchantmen  com- 
ing out  with  cargoes  from  the  Euxiue,  and  carried  them  into  Tene- 
dos.  where  they  were  detained,  under  various  fraudulent  pretenses 
in  spite  of  remonstrances  from  the  proprietors  and  cities  whose  sup- 
ply of  corn  w^as  thus  intercepted.  Among  these  sufferers,  Athens 
stood  conspicuous;  since  consumers  of  imported  corn,  ship-owners 
and  merchants,  were  more  numerous  there  than  elsewhere.  The 
Athenians,  addressing  complaints  and  remonstrances  without  effect 
became  at  length  so  incensed,  and  perhaps  uneasy  about  their  pro- 
visions, that  tiiey  passed  a  decree  to  equip  and  dispatch  100  tri- 
remes, appointing  Menestheus  (son  of  Iphikrates)  admiral.  By  this 
strenuous  manifestation,  the  Macedonians  were  induced  to  release 
the  detained  vessels.  Had  the  detention  been  prolonged,  the  Athe- 
nian fleet  would  have  sailed  to  extort  redress  by  force;  so  that  as 
Athens  was  more  than  a  match  for  Macedon  on  sea,  the  maritime 
empire  of  the  latter  would  have  been  overthrown,  while  even  on 
land  much  encouragement  would  have  been  given  to  malcontents 
against  it.  Another  incident  had  occurred,  less  grave  than  this  yet 
still  dwelt  upon  by  the  orator  as  an  infringement  of  the  convention 
and  as  an  insult  to  the  Athenians.  Though  an  express  article  of  the 
convention  prohibiied  armed  ships  of  one  city  from  entering  the  har- 
bor of  anolher,  still  a  Macedonian  trireme  had  been  sent  into  Peiraus 
to  ask  permission  that  smaller  vessels  might  be  built  there  for  Mace- 
donian account.  This  was  offensive  to  a  large  proportion  of  Athe- 
nians, not  only  as  violating  the  convention,  but  as  a  manifest  step 
toward  employing  the  nautical  equipments  and  seamen  of  Athens 
for  the  augmentation  of  the  Macedonian  navy. 

"Let  those  speakers  who  are  perpetually  admonishing  us  to  observe 
the  convention  (the  orator  contends),  prevail  on  the  imperial  chief  to 
set  the  example  of  observing  it  on  his  part.  I  too  impress  upon  you 
the  like  observance.  To  a  democracy  nothing  is  more  essential  than 
scrupulous  regard  to  equity  and  justice.  But  the  convention  itself 
enjoins  all  its  members  to  make  war  accainst  transgressors;  and  pur- 
suant to  this  article,  you  ought  to  make  war  against  Macedon.  Be 
assured  that  all  Greeks  will  see  that  the  war  is  neither  directed 
against^  them  nor  brought  on  by  your  fault.  At  this  juncture,  such 
a  step  for  the  maintenance  of  your  own  freedom  as  well  as  Hellenic 
treedom  generally,  will  not  be  less  opportune  and  advantageous  than 
It  IS  just.  The  time  is  coming  for  shaking  off  your  disgraceful  sub- 
mission to  others,  and  your  oblivion  of  our  own  past  dignity.  If  you 
encoura,^e  mo,  I  am  prepared  to  make  a  formal  motion— To  declare 
war  against  the  violators  of  the  convention,  as  the  convention  itself 
directs." 

A  formal  motion  for  declaring  war  would  have  brought  upon  the 
niover  a  prosecution  under  the  Graphe  Paranomon.     Accordindy 
though  intimating  clearly  that  he  thougiit  the  actual  juncture  (w'hat 
it  was  we  do  not  know)  suitable,  he  declined  to  incur  such  responsi- 


f 


532 


REIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 


bililv  wiiliDut  seeing  beforehand  a  manifestation  of  public  sentiment 
^^iitlicient  to  give  him  hopes  of  ji  favorable  verdict  from  the  D^kas- 
tery  The  motion  wjis  probably  not  made.  But  a  speech  so  bold, 
even  thouirh  not  followed  up  bv  a  motion,  is  in  itself  significant  of 
the  state  ol  feeling  in  Greece,  durinccthe  months  immediately  follow- 
in"^  the  Alexandrine  convention.  This  harangue  is  only  one  among 
nmny  delivered  in  the  Athenian  assembly,  complaining  of  INIacedo- 
nian  supremacy  as  exercised  under  the  convent un.  It  is  plain  that 
the  acts  of  Macedonian  oftlcersweie  such  as  to  furnish  ample  ground 
for  complaint;  and  the  detention  of  all  the  trading  ships  coming  out 
of  the  Euxine,  shows  us  that  even  the  subsistence  of  Athens  and  the 
inlands  had  beccme  more  or  less  endangered.  Though  the  Athe- 
nians resorted  to  no  armed  interference.their  assembly  at  least  aflorded 
a  theater  where  public  protest  could  be  raised  and  public  sympathy 

manifested.  •  ,  .1       *,  ♦; 

It  is  probable  too  that  at  this  time  Demosthenes  and  the  other  anti- 
^lacedonian  sp(  akers  were  encouraged  by  assurances  and  subsidies 
from  Persia      Thomih  the  death  ot  Philip,  and  the  accession  of  an 
untried  youth  of  twenly,  had  led  Darius  to  believe  for  the  moment 
that  all  dano-er  of  Asiatic  invasion  was  passed,  yet  his  apprehensions 
were  now  revived  by  Alexander's  manifested  energy,  and  by  the  re- 
newal of  the  Grecian  leimue  under  his  supremacy.      It  was  appa- 
rcntlv  duiinir  thesprin<r  of  335  B.C.,  that  Darius  sent  money  to  sus- 
tiin  the  anti-Macedonia^n  party  at  Athens  and  elsewhere,     ^schines 
:;t!irms   and  Deinarchus  afterward  repeats  (both  of  them  orators  hos- 
tile to  Di  most henes)— That  about  this  time.  Darius  sent  to  Athens 
;;00  talents  which  the  Athenian  people  lefused,  but  which  Demos- 
thenes took  reserving  however  70  talents  out  of  the  sum  for  his  own 
private  purse:   That  public  inquiry  was  afterward  instituted  on  the 
subiect.     Yet  nothing  is  alleged  as  having  been  made  out;  at  least 
Demo^tlienes  was  neither  condemned,  nor  even  brought  (:;s  far  as 
appears)  to  any  formal  trial.     Out  of  such  data  we  can  elicit  no  spe- 
cific fact      But  they  warrant  the  general  conclusion.  th;)t  Darius,  or 
the  satraps  in  Asia  .Minor,  sent  money  to  Athens  in  the  spring  of 
335  B.C.,  and  letters  or  emissaries  to  excite  hostilities  against  Alex- 
ander. ,  ,        T  .  'A 

Thit  Demosthenes,  and  probably  other  leading  orators,  received 
such  remittances  from  Persia,  is  no  evidence  of  that  personal  corrup- 
tion which  is  imputed  to  them  by  their  enemies.  It  is  noway  proved 
that  Demosthenes  applied  the  m'oney  to  his  own  private  purposes. 
To  receive  and  expend  it  in  trying  to  organize  combinations  for  the 
enfranchisement  of  Greece,  was  a  proceeding  which  he  w  ould  avow 
a<*  not  onlv  legitimate,  but  patriotic.  It  was  aid  obtained  from  one 
forei-m  prince  to  enable  Hellas  to  throw  off  the  worse  dominion  of 
another  At  this  moment,  the  political  interest  of  Persia  coincided 
with  that  of  all  Greeks  who  aspired  to  freedom.  Darius  had  no  chance 
of  becoming  master  of  Greece;  but  his  own  security  prescribed  to 


MARCH  INTO  THRACE. 


533 


him  to  protect  her  from  being  made  an  appendage  of  the  Macedonian 
kingdom,  and  lus  means  of  doing  so  were  at  this  moment  ample  had 
they  been  etticaciously  put  forth.     Now  the  purpose  of  a  Greek  ua- 
triot  would  be  to  preserve  the  integrity  and  autonomy  of  the  Hellenic 
world  against  all  foreign  interference.     To  invoke  the  ai<l  of  Persia 
against  Hellenic  enemies— as  Sparta  had  done  both  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war  and  at  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  and  as  Thebes  and  Athens 
had  followed  her  example  in  doing  afterward-was  an  unwarranta- 
ble proceeding:  but  to  invoke  the  same  aid  against  the  dominion  of 
another  foreigner,  at  once  nearer  and  more  fo^-midable,  was  open  to 
no  blame  on  the  score  either  of  patriotism  or  policy.     Demosthenes 
had. vainly  urged  his  countrymen  to  act  with  eneriiy  against  Philin 
at  a  time  w^heu  they  might  by  their  own  efforts  have  upheld  the  exist- 
ing autonomy  both  for  Athens  and  for  Greece  generally      He  now 
seconded  or  mvited  Darius,  at  a  time  when  Greece  single-handed  h'ld 
become  incompetent  to  the  struggle  against  Alexander,  the  common 
enemy  both  of  Grecian  liberty  and  of  the  Persian  empire      Unfortu 
nat^ely  for  Athens  as  w^ell  as  for  himself,  Darius,  with  full  means  of 
resistance  in  his  iiands,  played  his  game  against  Alexander  even  with 
more  stupidity  and  improvidence  than  Athens  had  played  hers  acainst 
Philip.  &        " 

While  such  were  the  aggressions  of  Macedonian  officers  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  their  new  imperial  authority,  throughout  Greece  and  the 
islands— and  such  the  growing  manifestations  of  repugnance  to  it  at 
Athens— Alexander  had  returned  home  to  push  the  preparations  for 
his  Persian  campaign.  He  did  not  however  think  it  prudent  to  trans- 
port his  main  force  into  Asia,  until  he  had  made  his  power  and  per- 
sonal  ascendency  felt  by  the  Macedonian  dependencies,  westward 
northward,  and  north-eastward  of  Pella— Illyrians,   Pteonians  and 

hracians.  Luder  these  general  names  were  comprised  a  number  of 
distinct  tribes,  or  nations,  warlike  and  for  the  most  part  predatory 
Having  remained  unconquered  until  the  victories  of  Philip  they 
Avere  not  kept  in  subjection  even  bv  him  without  difficulty  nor  were 
they  at  all  likely  t^)  obey  his  youthful  successor,  until  they  had  seen 
some  sensible  evidence  of  his  personal  energy. 

Accordingly,  in  the  spring.  Alexander  put  liimself  at  the  head  of  a 
large  force,  and  marched  in  an  easterly  direction  from  Amphipolis 
through  the  narrow  Sapajan  pass  between  Philippi  and  the  sea  Iri 
ten  days'  march  he  reached  the  difficult  mountain  path  over  which 
alone  he  could  cross  Mount  Hiemus  (Balkan).  Here  he  found  a  body 
of  the  free  Thracians  and  of  armed  merchants  of  the  country  assem- 
bled to  oppose  his  progress,  posted  on  the  high  ground  with  wa^^-ons 
in  their  front,  which  it  was  their  purpose  to  roll  down  the  steep  de- 
c  ivity  against  the  advancing  ranks  of  the  Macedonians.  Alexander 
eluded  this  danger  by  ordering  his  soldiers  either  to  open  their  ranks 
so  as  to  let  the  wagons  go  through  freely— or  where  there  was  no 
room  lor  such  loose  array,  to  throw  themselves  on  the  ground  with 


».A«iS&«i&JflaiefciBtfiaB3aha.»«i«BK. 


534  BEIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 

tlH-ir  shields  closely  packod  together  and  slanting  over  their  bodies; 
^      In    the  wao-ons,  dashing  down  the  steep  and  conung  against  the 
shie  ds   were  carried  off  the  ground,  and  made  to  bound  over  the 
bodies  on  the  space  below.    All  the  wagons  rolled  down  wituout  ki  1- 
iT a  sin-le  man.    The  Thracians,  badly  armed,  were  then  easily  dis 
Sd  by  the  Macedonian  attack,  with  the  loss  of  1500  me^  killed 
and  all  their  wometi  and  children  made  prisoners      The  captives  and 
plunder  were  sent  back  under  an  escort  to  be  sold  at  the  seaports. 
^Having  thus  forced  the  mountain  road,  Alexander  led  his  army 
over  the  chain  of  Mount  Hsemus,  and  marched  against  the  Triballi; 
a  powerful  Thracian  tribe-extending  (as  tar  as  can  be  determined) 
from  the  plain  of  Kossovo  in  moilern  Servia  northward  toward  the 
Danube-whom  Philip  had  conquered,  yet  not  without  considerable 
Ssl^ance  and  even  occasional  defeat      Their  P^JJ^^  f {rmus J^!;; 
alreadv  retired  with  the  women  and  children  of  the  tribe  into  an 
island'of  the  Danube  called  Peuke.  where  many  other  Thracians  had 
also  t)ught  shelter.     The  main  force  of  the  Triballi  took  post  in 
woody  gmund  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Lyginus,  about  three  days 
march  from  the  Danube.     Being  tempted,  however,  by  an  annoy- 
ance from  the  Macedonian  light-armed,  to  emerge  from  their  covered 
position  into  the  open  plain,  they  were  here  attacked  by  Alexander 
with   his   cavalry  and   infantr>^  in  close  combat,  and    complete  y 
defeated      Three  thousand  of  them  were  slain,  but  the  rest  mostly 
eluded  pursuit  by  means  of  the  wood,  so  that  they  lost  few  prisoners. 
The  loss  of  the  Macedonians  was  only  eleven  horsemen  and  forty 
foot  slain,  according  to  the  statement  of  Ptoleniy.  son  of  Lagus,  then 
one  of  Alexander's  confidential  officers,  and  afterward  founder  of  the 
dvnastv  of  Greco-Eiryptian  kings.  ,      » ,         j     ♦ 

^Three  days'  march  from  the  scene  of  action,  brought  Alexander  to 
the  Danube,  where  he  found  some  armed  ships  which  had  been  pre- 
viouslv  ordered  to  sail  (probably  with  stores  of  provision)  from  Byzan- 
SrlWnd  by  thcEuxine  and  up  the  river.    He  fnst  employed  these 
ships  in  trving  to  land  a  body  of  troops  on  the  island  of  Peuke;  but 
his  attempt  w?is  frustrated  by  the  steep  banks  the  ^-^Pid/^tream   and 
the  resolute  front  of  the  defenders  on  shore.     ^J  o  compensate  for  this 
disappointment,  Alexander  resolved  to  make  a  disp  ay  of  I'.^s  strength 
by  crossing  the  Danube  and  attacking  the  Get^ ;  tribes  chiefly  ho  se- 
men armed  with  bows,  analogous  to  the  Thracians  in  habits  and  lan- 
ffuaffe      They  occupied  the  left  bank  of  the  river  from  which  then 
town  was  about  four  miles  distant.    The  terror  of  the  Macedonian 
successes  had  brought  together  a  body  of  4,000,  Get^,  visible  from 
the  opposite  shore,  to  resist  any  crossing.    Accordingly  Alexander  go 
tojrether  a  quantity  of  the  rude  boats  (hollowed  out  f  ^f  "^  f^^^J*"^) 
employed  for  transport  on  the  river,  and  caused  the  tent-skins  of  the 
army  to  be  stutfed  with  hay  in  order  to  support  rafts.     He  then  put 
himself  on  shipboard  during  the  night,  and  contrived  to  carry  across 
the  river  a  body  of  4.000  infantrv,  and  1500  cavalry,  laodwig  on  a 


EMBASSY  OF  GAULS. 


535 


part  of  the  bank  where  there  was  high  standing  wheat  and  no  enemy's 
post.  The  Getae,  intimidated  not  less  by  this  successful  passage  than 
by  the  excellent  array  of  Alexander's  army,  hardly  stayed  to  sustain 
a  charge  of  cavalry,  but  hastened  to  abandon  their  poorly  fortified 
town  and  retire  further  away  from  the  river.  Entering  the  town 
without  resistance,  he  destroyed  it,  carried  away  such  movables  as  he 
found,  and  then  returned  to  the  river  without  delay.  Before  he 
quitted  the  northern  bank,  he  ofTered  sacrifice  to  Zeus  the  Preserver 
—to  Herakles— and  to  the  God  Ister  (Danube)  himself,  whom  he 
thanked  for  having  shown  himself  not  impassable.  On  the  very 
same  day.  he  recrossed  the  river  to  his  camp;  after  an  empty  demon- 
stration of  force,  intended  to  prove  that  he  could  do  what  neither 
his  father  nor  any  Grecian  army  had  ever  yet  done,  and  what  every 
one  deemed  impossible— crossing  the  greatest  of  all  known  rivers 
without  a  bridge  and  in  the  face  of  an  enemy. 

The  terror  spread  by  Alexander's  military  operations  was  so  crreat, 
that  not  only  the  Triballi,  but  the  other  autonomous  Thracians 
around,  sent  envoys  tendering  presents  or  tribute,  and  soliciting 
peace.  Alexander  granted  their  request.  His  mind  being  bent 
upon  war  with  Asia,  he  was  satisfied  with  having  intimidated  these 
tribes  so  as  to  deter  them  from  rising  during  liis  absence.  What 
conditions  he  imposed,  we  do  no*  know,  but  he  accepted  the  pres- 
ents. 

While  these  applications  from  the  Thracians  were  under  debate, 
envoys  arrived  from  a  tribe  of  Gauls  occupying  a  distant  mountain- 
ous region  westward  tow^ard  the  Ionic  Gulf.  Though  strangers  to 
Alexander,  they  had  heard  so  much  of  the  recent  exploits,  that  they 
came  with  demands  to  be  admitted  to  his  friendship.  They  were 
distinguished  both  for  tall  stature  and  for  boastful  language.  Alex- 
ander readily  exchanged  with  them  assurances  of  alliance.  Enter- 
taining them  at  a  feast,  he  asked,  in  the  course  of  conversation,  what  it 
was  that  they  were  most  afraid  of,  among  human  contingencies?  They 
replied,  that  they  feared  no  man,  nor'any  danger,  except  only,  lest 
the  heavens  should  fall  upon  them.  Their  answ^er  disappointed 
Alexander,  who  had  expected  that  they  would  name  him,  as  the  per- 
son of  whom  they  wx're  most  afraid;  so  prodigious  was  his  conceit 
of  his  own  exploits.  He  observed  to  his  friends  that  these  Gauls 
were  swaggerers.  Yet  if  w^e  attend  to  the  sentiment  rather  than  the 
language,  we  shall  see  that  such  an  epithet  applies  with  equal  or 
greater  propriety  to  Alexander  himself.  The  anecdote  is  chiefly  inter- 
esting as  It  proves  at  how  early  an  age  the  exorbitant  self-esteem, 
which  we  shall  hereafter  find  him  manifesting,  began.  That  after  the 
battle  of  Issus  he  should  fancy  himself  superhuman,  we  can  hardly 
be  astonished;  but  he  was  as  yet  only  in  the  first  year  of  his  reign, 
and  had  accomplished  nothing  beyond  his  march  into  Thrace  and  his 
victory  over  the  Triballi. 

Al'ter  crrr^ngiug.  these  matters,  he  marched  in  a  south-westerly 


m 


j.aWMwaiuwr*"""'! 


536    REIG^'  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 

direction  into  the  territory  of  the  A-rianes  and  the  otlier  rjconians 
Vetween  the  rivers  Strymon  and  Axius  in  tlie  highest  portion  of  theit 
CO uri      Here  lie  ^vns  met  by  a  body  of  Agrianes  under    heir  prince 
Lnn'^rus  M-ho  had  already  contracted  a  personal  friendship  f or  h  m 
at  R-  la  l)^>fore  Philip's  dt^th.     Ncnvs  c.me  tliat  the  lllvrian  K lei  us 
2on  ()    Bardvlis.Tvho  had  been  subdued  by  Philip,  had  revolted  at 
Pe  ion  (a^iino:  post  south  of  Lake  Lychnidus.  on  the  ^est  side  of 
theXin  of  Skardus  and  Pindus,  near  the  p'ace  where  thjit  chain  is 
b^ken  bv  he  cleft  called  the  Klissura  of  Tzangon  or  Devol>-nnd 
Inttle  western  Illyrians,  called  Taulantii,  under  their  prince  Glau- 
as      ere  on  the  march  to  assist  him.    Acconhngly  Alexander  pro- 
ceede    th'ther  forthwith,  leaving  Langarus  to  deal  with  tiie  Illyr  an 
tribe  Aiitariatie,  who  had   threatened  to  oppose  his  progress,     lie 
marched  aloncr    he  bank   and   up  the  course  of  the  Lngon.  from  a 
poTnt  near  vh?re  it  joins  the  Axius.     On  approaching  Pehon  he  tound 

firilhT  ans  posted  in  front  of  the  town  «°^l«^^^^,^^^^^,^^,rATv' 
await  in-  the  arrival  of  Glaukias  their  promised  alh'.     ^^  hile  Alex- 
Swa'  making  his  dispositions  for  attack,  they  offered  their  sacri- 
fices to  the   ffods;  the    victims  being  three  boys,  three  girls    and 
fhree  bhck  rafns.    At  first  they  stepped  boldly  forward  to  mee   him 
but  before  coming   to  close  quarters,  they  turned  and  fled  into    lie 
town  wh  such  haste  that  the  slain  victims  were  left  lying  on  the 
soot      Havi  v'  thus  driven  in  the  defenders.  Alexander  was  prepar- 
in"  io  draw  a%-all  of  circumvallation  round  tlie Pehon,  when  he  was 
nferruph^^^       the  arrival  of  Glaukias  with  so  large  a  force  as  to  com- 
pel hVmo  al)andon  the  project.     A  body  of  cavalry,  sent  out  trom 
[he  Macedonian   camp  undt^l-  Philotas  to  forage,  were  in  danger  of 
beL'^  ci^^^^       by  Glaukias,  and  were  only  rescued  by  the  arrival  of 
Alexiider  himself  with  a  re-enforcement.     In  the  face  of  this  supe- 
rior force  it  was  necessary  to  bringoff  the  Macedonian  army,  through 
Tnarrow  1  ne  of  road  along  the  river  Eordaik us.  wherein  some  places 
?he?rwas  only  room  for  four  abreast,  with  hill  or  marsh  evervwhere 
around     By  a  series  of  bold  and  skillful  maneuvers,  and  by  elfec  ive 
em  lovment  of  his  battering-train  or  projectile  machines  to  protec 
the  rear  cruard,  Alexander  completely  batfied  the  enemy,  and  brough 
off  [ds  army  without  loss.     Moreover  these  Illynans,  who  had  no 
known  how  to  make  use  of  such  advantages  of  position,  abandoned 
them^elverto  disorder  as  soon  as  their  enemy  had  ^-etreated,  neglec  - 
in^dl  precautions  for  the  safetv  of  their  camp.     Apprised  of  this 
c^mdess^neS  AU'xander  made  a  forced  night-march  back,  at  the  head 
of  his  Agrianian  division  and  light  troops  supported  by  the  remain- 
iicr  a^m^^     He  surprised  the  Illyrians  in  their  camp  betore  daylight 
The  success  of  this  attack  against  a  sleeping  and  unguarded  army 
4as  ;o  complete,  that  the  Illyrians  fled  at  once  without  resistance 
Many  were  slain  or  taken  prisoners;  the  rest  throwin.g  away  their 
arms  hurried  awav  homeward,  pursued  by  Alexander  for  a  consid- 
erable distance,    the  lUyrian  prince  Kleitu8  was  fopcqd  to  evacuate 


RISl^'G  OF  THEBES. 


537 


Pelion,  which  place  he  burned,  aud  then  retired  into  the  territory  of 
Glaukias. 

Just  as  Alexander  had  completed  this  victory  over  Kleitus  and  the 
Taulantiau  auxiliaries,  and  before  he  had  returned  home,  news 
reached  liiin  of  a  menacing  character.  The  Thebaus  had  declared 
themselves  independent  of  him,  and  were  beseigin^  his  garrison  in 
the  Kadmeia. 

Of  this  event,  alike  important  and  disastrous  to  those  who  stood 
forward,  the  immediate  antecedents  are  very  imjx'rfectly  known  to 
us.  It  has  already  been  remarked  that  the  vote  of  submission  on  the 
part  o*f  tlie  Greeks  to  Alexander  as  Imperator,  during  the  preceding 
autumn,  had  been  passed  only  under  the  intimidation  of  a  present 
Macedonian  force.  Though  the  Spartans  alone  had  courage  to  pro- 
claim their  dissent,  the  Atlieuiaus,  Arcadians,  JEtolians,  aud  others, 
were  well  known,  even  to  Alexander  himself,  as  ready  to  do  the  like 
on  any  serious  reverse  to  the  Macedonian  arms.  Moreover  the  energy 
and  ability  displayed  by  Alexander  had  taught  the  Persian  king  that 
all  danger  to  himself  was  not  removed  by  the  death  of  Piiilip,  and 
induced  him  either  to  send,  or  to  promise,  pecuniary  aid  to  the  anti- 
Macedonian  Greeks.  We  have  already  noticed  the  manifestation  of 
anti-Macedonian  sentiment  at  Athens — proclaimed  by  several  of  the 
most  eminent  orators — Demosthenes,  Lykurgus,  Hyperidcs,  and 
others;  as  well  as  by  active  military  men  like  Charidemus  and 
Ephialtes,  who  probably  spoke  out  more  boldly  when  Alexander  was 
absent  on  the  Danube,  In  other  cities,  the  same  sentiment  doubtles-i 
found  advocates,  though  less  distinguished;  but  at  Thebes,  where  it 
could  not  be  openly  proclaimed,  it  prevailed  with  the  greatest  force. 
The  Thebans  suffered  an  o[)pression  from  which  most  of  the  other 
cities  were  free — the  presence  of  a  Macedonian  garrison  in  their  cita- 
del; just  as  they  had  endured,  fifty  years  before,  the  curb  of  a  Spar- 
tan garrison  after  the  fraud  of  Phoebidas  and  Leontiades.  In  this 
case,  as  in  the  former,  the  effect  was  to  arm  the  Macedonizing  lead- 
ers with  absolute  power  over  their  fellow- citizens,  and  to  inflict  upon 
the  latter  not  merely  the  public  mischief  of  extinguishing  all  free 
speech,  but  also  multiplied  individual  insults  and  injuries,  prompted 
by  the  lust  and  rapacity  of  rulers,  foreign  as  well  as  domestic.  A 
number  of  Tlieban  citizens,  among  them  the  freest  and  boldest  spirits, 
were  in  exile  at  Athens,  receiving  from  the  public  indeed  nothing 
beyond  a  safe  home,  but  secretly  (iucou raged  to  hope  for  better  things 
by  Demosthenes  and  the  other  anti-Macedonian  leaders.  In  like  man- 
ner fift}^  years  before,  it  was  at  Athens,  aud  from  i)rivate  Athenian 
citizens,  that  the  Thebans  Pelopidas  and  Mellon  had  found  that, 
sympathy  which  enabled  them  to  organize  their  daring  conspiracy 
for  rescuing  Thebes  from  the  Spartans.  That  enterprise,  admired 
throughout  Greece  as  alike  adventurous,  skillful,  and  heroic,  was  the 
model  present  to  the  imagination  of  the  Tlieban  exiles,  to  be  copied 
if  any  tolerable  opportunity  occurred. 


C38 


liEIGX  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 


Such  was  the  feehng  in  Greece,  during  tlie  long  absence  of  Alex- 
auder  on  his  march  into  Thrace  and  Ulyria;  a  period  of  four  or  tive 
mouths  ending  at  August  335  B.C.  Not  only  was  Alexander  thus 
lono-  absent,  but  he  sent  home  no  reports  of  his  proceedings.  Cour- 
ier /were  lilvcly  enough  to  be  intercepted  among  tbe  niountams  ana 
robbers  of  Thrace;  and  even  if  they  reached  Pella,  their  dispatches 
were  not  publicly  read,  as  such  communications  would  have  beeii 
read  to  the  xVthenian  assembly.  Accordingly  we  are  not  surprised 
to  hear  that  rumors  arose  of  his  having  been  deteated  and  slain. 
Amoncr  these  reports,  both  multiplied  and  confident,  one  was  even 
certified  by  a  liar  who  pretended  to  have  just  arrived  from  Thrace, 
to  have  been  an  eye-witness  of  the  fact,  and  to  have  been  himself 
wounded  in  the  action  against  the  Triballi,  where  Alexander  had  per- 
ished. This  welcome  news,  not  fabricated,  but  too  hastily  credited, 
by  Demosthenes  and  Lykurgus,  was  announced  to  the  Athenian 
assembly.  In  spite  of  doubts  expressed  by  Demades  and  Phokion, 
it  was  believed  not  only  by  the  Athenians  and  the  Theban  exiles 
there  present,  but  also  bvthe  Arcadians,  Eleians.  ^tolians  and  other 
Greeks  For  a  considerable  time,  through  the  absence  of  Alex- 
ander, it  remained  uncontradicted,  which  increased  the  confidence  m 

its  truth.  ^  , ,         J    ,   J  r    4.       1 

It  was  upon  the  full  belief  in  this  rumor,  of  Alexander  s  defeat  and 
death  that  the  Grecian  cities  proceeded.  The  event  severed  by 
itself  their  connection  with  Macedonia.  There  was  neither  son  nor 
adult  brother  to  succeed  to  the  throne:  so  that  not  merely  the  fomgn 
ascendencv,  but  even  the  intestine  unity,  of  >Iacedouia,  was  likely 
to  be  broken  up.  In  regard  to  Athens,  Arcadia,  Elis.  .^itolia,  etc., 
the  anti-Macedonian  sentiment  was  doubtless  vehemently  manifested, 
but  no  special  action  was  called  for.  It  was  otherwise  in  regard  to 
Thebes  Phcenix,  Prochytes,  and  other  Theban  exiles nU  Athens, 
immediately  laid  their  plan  for  liberating  their  city  and  expelling  the 
Macedonian  garrison  from  the  Kadmeia.  Assisted  with  arms  and 
money  by  Demosthenes  and  other  Athenian  citizens,  and  invited  by 
their  partisans  at  Thebes,  they  suddenly  entered  that  city  in  arms. 
Though  unable  to  carry  the  Kadmeia  by  suri)rise,  they  seized  in  the 
city,  itnd  put  to  death,  Amyntas,  a  principal  Mnci^donian  oftcer, 
with  Timolaus,  one  of  the  leading  Macedonizing  Thebans  Ihey 
then  immediately  convoked  a  general  assembly  of  the  Ihebaus,  to 
whom  they  earnestly  appealed  for  a  vigorous  effort  to  expel  the 
Macedonians,  and  reconquer  the  ancient  freedom  of  the  city.  tuX- 
patiatino-  upon  the  misdeeds  of  the  garrison  and  upon  the  oppres- 
sions of'those  Thebans  who  iroverned  by  means  of  the  garrison,  they 
proclaimed  that  the  happy  moment  of  liberation  had  uow^  'iy^^^^^^' 
through  the  recent  death  of  Alexander.  They  doubtless  recalled  the 
memory  of  Pelopidas,  and  the  glorious  enterprise,  cherished  by  all 
Theban  patriots,  whereby  he  had  rescued  the  city  from  Spartan  occu- 
pation, forty-six  years  before.     To  this  appeal  the  Thebans  cordially 


RETURN  OF  THE  THEBAN  EXILES. 


539 


responded.  The  assembly  passed  a  vote,  declaring  severance  from 
Macedonia,  and  autonomy  of  Thebes — and  naming  as  Boeotarclis 
some  of  the  returned  exiles,  with  olhei-3  of  the  same  party,  for  the 
purpose  of  energetic  measures  against  the  garrison  in  the  Kadmeia. 

Unfortunately  for  Thebes,  none  of  these  new  Boeotarclis  were  men 
of  the  stamp  of  Epaminondas,  probably  not  even  of  Pelopidas.  Yet 
their  scheme,  though  from  its  melancholy  result  it  is  geneially  de- 
nounced as  insane,  really  promised  better  at  first  than  that  of  the 
anti-Spartan  conspirators  in  380  B.C.  The  Kadmeia  was  instantly 
summoned;  hopes  being  perhaps  indulged,  that  the  Macedonian 
commander  w^ould  surrender  it  with  as  little  resistance  as  the  Spartan 
harmost  had  done.  But  such  hopes  were  not  realized.  Philip  had 
probably  caused  the  citadel  to  be  both  strengthened  and  provisioned. 
The  garrison  defied  the  Theban  leaders,  who  did  not  feel  themselves 
strong  enough  to  give  orders  for  an  assault,  as  Pelopidas  in  his  time 
was  prepared  to  do,  if  surrender  had  been  denied.  They  contented 
themselves  with  drawing  and  guarding  a  double  line  of  circumvalla- 
tion  round  the  Kadmeia,  so  as  to  prevent  both  sallies  from  within 
and  supplies  from  without.  They  then  sent  envoys  in  the  melan- 
choly equipment  of  suppliants,  to  the  Arcadians  and  others,  rep- 
resenting that  their  recent  movement  was  directed,  not  against 
Hellenic  union,  but  against  Macedonian  oppression  and  outrage, 
which  pressed  upon  them  with  intolerable  bitterness.  As  Greeks 
and  freemen  they  entreated  aid  to  rescue  them  from  sucli  a  calamity. 
They  obtained  much  favorable  sympathy,  with  some  promise  and 
even  half-performance.  Many  of  the  leading  orators  at  Athens — 
Demosthenes,  Lykurgus,  llyperides,  and  others — together 'with  the 
military  men  Gharidemus  and  Ephialtes — strongly  urged  their  coun- 
trymen to  declare  in  favor  of  Thebes  and  send  aid  against  the  Kad- 
meia. But  the  citizens  generally,  following  Demades  and  Phokion, 
waited  to  be  better  assured  both  of  Alexander's  death  and  of  its 
consequences,  before  they  w^ould  incur  the  hazard  of  open  hostility 
against  Macedonia,  though  they  seem  to  have  declared  sympathy 
with  the  Theban  revolution.  Demosthenes  further  went  as  envoy 
into  Peloponnesus,  while  the  Macedonian  Antipater  also  sent  round 
urgent  applications  to  the  Pelopounesian  cities,  requiring  their  con- 
tingents, as  members  of  the  confederacy  under  Alexander,  to  act 
against  Thebes.  The  eloquence  of  Demosthenes,  backed  by  his 
money,  or  by  Persian  money  admiriistei'cd  through  him,  prevailed 
on  the  Peloponnesians  to  refuse  compliance  with  Antipater,  and  to 
send  no  com  ingents  against  Thebes.  The  Eleians  and  ^4]tolians  held 
out  general  assurances  favorable  to  the  revolution  at  Thebes,  ^rhile 
life  Arcadians  even  Avent  so  far  as  to  send  out  some  Iroops-to  second 
it,  though  they  did  not  advance  beyond  the  isthmus. 

Here  was  a  crisis  in  Grecian  affairs,  opening  new  possibilities  for 
the  recovery  of  freedom.  Had  the  Arcadians  and  other  Greeks  lent 
decisive  aid  to  Thebes — Iind  Athens  acted  even  with  i\3  much  energy 


540 


REIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 


as  «he  did  twelve  years  afterward  durini?  the  Lamian  war,  occupying 
Thermopvlffi  with  an  army  and  a  tlcet— the  gates  of  Greece  nu.ul it 
well  have  been  barred  against  a  new  Macedonian  force  even  with 
Vlexander  alive  and  at  its  head.     That  the  struggle  of  lliebcs  was 
not  rc"-ardcd  at  the  time,  even  by  Macedonizing  Greeks  as  hopeless 
is   shown   bv  the   subsequent   observations  both  of  ^.schnics  and 
De-marchus  at  Athens,     ^schines  (delivering  five  ye^irs  afterward  his 
oration  against  Ktesiplion)  accuses  Demosthenes  of  having  by  his 
perverse  backwardness  brought  about  the  ruin  of  Thebes.     Ihe 
forei"-n  mercenaries  forming  part  of  the  garrison  of  the  Ivadmcia 
werercady  (.Eschines  affirms)  to  deliver  up  that  fortress  on  receiy- 
ino-  five  talents:  the  Arcadian  generals  would  have  brought  up  their 
troops  to  the  aid  of  Thebes,  if  nine  or  ten  talents  had  been  paid  to 
them— having  repudiated    the   solicitations  of  Antipater      Demos- 
thenes (^av  these  two  orators)  having  in  his  possession  300  talents 
from  the  Ver^ian  kinir.  to  insti-ate  anti-Macedonian  movements  in 
Greece   was  supplicated  bv  the  Theban  envoys  to  furnish  money  for 
these  purposes,  but  refused  the  request,  kept  the  money  for  himself, 
and  thus  prevented  both  the  surrender  of  the  Kadmeia  and  the  on- 
ward march  of  the  Arcadian^.     The  charge  here  advanced  against 
Demosthenes  appears  utterly  incredible.     To  suppose  that  anti-Mace- 
donian movements  counted  for  so  little  in  his  eyes   is  an  hypothesis 
belied  by  his  whole  history.     But  the  fact  that  such  allegations  were 
made  by  ^schines  only  five  years  after^vard,  proves  the  reports  and 
the  feelings  of  the  time-that  the  chances  of  successful  resistance  to 
Macedonia  on  the  part  of  the  Thebans  were  not  deemed  unfavora-ble 
And  when  the  Athenians,  following  the  counsels  of  Demades  and 
Phokion,  refused  to  aid  Thebes  or  occupy  Thermopyla?-they  perhaps 
consulted  the  safety  of  Athens  separately,  but  they  receded  from  the 
generous  and  Pan-Hellenic   patriotism  whicli  had  animated  then- 
ancestors  against  Xerxes  and  [Mardonius.  .     ,  ,.  i  ,, 

The  Thebans,  tlioudi  left  in  this  ungenerous  isolation,  pressed  the 
blockade  of  the  Kadmeia,  and  would  presently  have  reduced  the 
Macedonian  garrison,  had  the>;  not  been  surprised  />>' .  t^^e  awe  • 
strikin-  event  of  Alexander  arriving  in  person  at  Onchestus  in  Boeotia. 
at  the  head  of  his  victorious  army.  The  first  news  ol  his  being  alive 
was  furnished  by  his  arrival  at  Onchestus.  Is  o  one  could  at  first 
l,elieve  the  fact  The  Theban  leaders  contende«l  that  it  was  another 
Alexander,  the'son  of  Aeropus,  at  the  head  of  a  3Iacedonian  army 

^  in  \his  incident  we  mav  note  two  features,  which  ejiaracterized 
Alexander  to  the  end  of  his  life;  matchless  celerity  of  mo^Tment, 
and  no  less  remarkable  favor  of  fortune.  Had  news  of  the  Theban 
ri^inn-  first  reached  him  while  on  the  Danube  or  among  the  distant 
Triballi-or  even  embarrassed  in  the  difficult  region  round  Ijli^^^i— 
he  could  hardly  by  any  effort  have  arrived  in  time  to  ^ave  the  Kad- 
meia      But  he  learned  it  just  when  he  had  vanquished  Kleitus  and 


ALEXANDER  BEFORE  THEBES. 


541 


Glaukias,  so  that  his  hands  were  perfectly  free— and  also  when  lie 
was  in  a  position  peculiarly  near  and  convenient  for  a  strai"-ht  march 
into  Greece  T/ithout  going  back  to  Pella.  From  the  pass  (ff  Tschan- 
gon  (or  of  the  river  Devol).  near  wliich  Alexanders  last  victories 
were  gained,  his  road  lay  southward,  following  downward  in  part 
the  higher  course  of  the  river  Halinkmon,  through  Upper  Macedonia 
or  the  regions  called  Eoithea  and  Elymeia  which  lay  on  his  left 
while  the  heights  of  Pindus  and  tlie  upper  course  of  the  river  Aous' 
occupied  by  the  Epirots  called  Tvmphj^i  and  Parauau,  were  on  the 
right.  On  the  seventh  day  of  march,  crossing  the  lower  ridges  of 
the  Carabunian  mountains  (which  separate  Olvinpus  from  Pindus  and 
Lpper  Macedonia  from  Thessaiy),  Alexauder*^reached  the  Thessalian 
town  of  Pelinna.  Six  days  more  brought  him  to  the  Boeotian  Onches- 
tus. He  was  already  within  Thermopylae,  before  any  Greeks  w  ere 
aware  that  he  Avas  in  march,  or  even  that  he  was  alive.  The  ques- 
tion about  occupying  Thermopyla3  by  a  Grecian  force  was  thus  set 
aside.  The  difficulty  of  forcing  that  pass,  and  the  necessity  of  fore- 
stalling Athens  in  it  by  stratairem  or  celerity,  was  present  to  the 
mind  of  Alexander,  as  it  had  been  to  that  of  Phihp  in  his  expedi- 
tion of  846  B.C.  against  the  Phokians. 

His  arrival,  in^itself  a  most  formidable  event,  told  with  double 
force  on  the  Greeks  from  its  extreme  suddenness.  We  can  hardly 
doubt  that  both  Athenians  and  Thebans  had  communications  at 
Pella— that  they  looked  upon  any  Macedonian  invasion  as  likely 
to  come  from  thence— and  that  they  expected  Alexander  himself 
(assuming  him  to  be  still  living,  contrary  lo  their  belief)  back  in  his 
capital  before  he  began  any  new^  enterprise.  Upon  this  hypothesis 
—in  itself  probable,  and  such  as  would  have  been  realized'  if  Alex- 
ander had  not  already  advanced  so  far  southward  at  the  moment 
when  he  received  the  news— they  would  at  least  have  known  before- 
hand of  his  approach,  and  would  have  had  the  option  of  a  defensiye 
com  1)1  nation  open.  As  it  happened,  his  unexpected  appearance  in 
the  heart  of  Greece  precluded  all  combinations,  and  checked  all  idea 
of  resistance. 

Two  days  after  his  arrival  in  Boeotia,  he  marched  his  army  round 
Thebes,  so  as  to  encamp  on  the  south  side  of  the  city;  wiiereby  he 
both  intercepted  the  communication  of  the  Thebans  with  Athens 
and  exhibited  his  force  more  visibly  to  the  garrison  in  the  Kadmeia' 
Ihe  riiebans,  though  alone  and  without  hope  of  succor  maintained 
their  courage  unshaken.  Alexander  deferred  the  attack  for  a  day 
or  two,  in  hopes  that  they  would  submit;  he  wislied  to  avoid  an 
assault  which  miglit  cost  the  lives  of  many  of  his  soldiers,  whom  he 
required  for  his  Asiatic  schemes.  He  even  made  public  proclama- 
tion, demanding  the  surrender  of  the  anti-Macedonian  leaders  Phcenix 
and  Prochytes,  but  offering  to  any  other  Tlieban  who  chose  to  quit 
the  city,  permission  to  come  and  join  him  on  the  terms  of  the  con- 
vention sworn  in  the  preceding  autumn.     A  general  assembly  being 


542  RE1<^-^^  ^^  ALEXANDf:R  THE  GREAT. 

ronvened  the  Macedoniziug  Tliebans  enforced  the  prudence  of  eub- 
^S  to  an  irresistible  fJrce.     But  the  leaders  recently  returned 
J?  >m  exile   who  had  headed  the  rising,  warmly  opposed  this  propo- 
siion    contemlinn;    for    resistance    to    the    death.     In   them,    such 
reXVion  may  not  be  wonderlul,  since  (as  Arrian  remarks)  they  had 
To^^e  too  far  to  hope  for  lenity.     As  it  appears  however  that  the  mass 
of  cit  zens  deliberately  adopted  the  same  resolution,  in  spite  of  strong 
^r^uasion  to  the  contrary,  we  see  plainly  that  they  had  already  felt 
{^e  biuerne^s  of  Macedonian  donunion,  and  that  sooner  than  endure 
a  renewal  of  it.  sure  to  be  yet  worse,  coupled  with  the  dishonor  of 
surrendering  their  leaders-they  had  made  up  their  minds  to  perish 
wUh  the  fr?edom  of  their  city.     At  a  time  when  the  sentiment  of 
Hellas  as  an  autonomous  system  was  pass  ng  away,  and  when  Grecian 
coura-e  was  deirenen;tin|  into  a  mere  instrument  for  the  aggran- 
dizement of  Macedonian  chiefs,  these  countrymen  of  Epaminondas 
and  Pelopidas  set  an  example  of  devoted  self-sacrifice  in  the  cause  of 
Gredan  liberty,  not  less  honorable  than  that  of  Leonidas  at  Thermo- 
Dvl*   and  onlv  less  esteemed  because  it  proved  infructuous. 

In 'reply  to  the  proclamation  of  Alexander.  theThebans  n.ade  from 
their  walls  a  counter-i)roclamation,  demanding  the  suiTcnder  of  his 
otticers  Antipater  and  Philotas,  and  inviting  every  one  to  join  them, 
^^10  desired^in  concert  with  the  Persian  king  and  the  Thebans  to 
HbtM-ae  the  Greeks  and  put  down  the  despot  ot  Hellas.     Such  a 
hau-htv  defiance  and  retort  incensed  Alexander  to   he  quick.     He 
brou-ht  up  his  battering  engines  and  prepared  everything  for  storm- 
in^  fhe  town.     Of  the  murderous  assault  which  followed  we  tind 
different  accounts,  not  agreeing  with  each  other,  y^'t  "ot  who  ly  irrec- 
oncilable.    It  appears  that  the  Thebans  had  erected,  probably  in 
conection  with    heir  operations  against  the  Kadmeia,  an  outwork 
dSed  by  a  double  palisade.     Their  walls  were  guarded  bjMhe 
k^st  Active  soldiers,  metics  and  liberated  slaves;  while  their  best 
troops  were  bold  enoudi  to  go  forth  in  front  of  the  gates  and  give 
battle      Alexander  divided  his  urmy  into  three  divisions;  one  under 
Perdikkas  and  Amyntas,  airainst  the  outwork-a  second  destined  to 
L  n  at  the  ThebaL  wiio  Rallied  out-and  a  third,  held  in  reserve 
Be  ween  the  second  of  these  three  divisions,  and  the  Thebans  in  fron 
of  the  gates,  the  battle  was  so  obstinately  contested,  that  success  at 
one  time  seamed  doubtful,  nnd  Alexander  was  forced  to  mder  uP 
Lis  reserve      The  first  Macedonnm  success  wtis  gained  by  1  eidikkas. 
who  aided  bv  the  division  of  Amyntas  and  also  by  the  Agrianian 
^e^t^ient  and  the  bowmen,  carried  the  first  of  the  two  outworks,  as 
wJll  as  a  postern  gate  which  had  been  left  unguarded.     His  troops 
also  otormcd    he  second  outwork,  though  he  himself  was  severely 
wounded ^id  tone  away  to  the  camp.     Here  the  Theban  defenders 
flccrback  into  the  city,  along  the  hollow  ^v ay  which  led  to  the  te^mple 
of  llerakles.  pursued  by  the  light  t»-««PS^»J^dyance  of  the  rest^  Lpon 
tiie.=<e  men.  however,  the  Thebans  presently  turned,  repelling  them 


THEBES  IS  RAZED. 


^43 


with  the  loss  of  Eurybotas  their  commanding  ofllcer  and  seventy  men 
slain.  In  pursuing  these  bowmen,  the  ranks  of  the  Thebans  became 
somewhat  disordered,  so  that  they  were  unable  to  resist  the  steady 
charge  of  the  Macedonian  guards  and  heavy  iufantrv  cominjr  up  in 
support.  They  were  broken,  and  pushed  back  into*^  the  city;  their 
rout  being  rendered  still  more  complete  by  a  sally  of  the  Macedonian 
g'vrrison  out  of  the  Kadmeia.  Tlie  assailants  being  victorious  on 
this  side,  the  Thebans  who  were  maintaining  the  combat  witliout  the 
gates  wTre  compelled  to  retreat,  and  the  advancing  Macedonians 
forced  their  way  into  the  town  along  with  them.  Within  the  town, 
however,  the  fighting  still  continued;  the  Thebans  resisting  in  oriran- 
ized  bodies  as  long  as  they  could;  and  when  broken,  still  resisdno- 
even  single-handed.  None  of  the  military  population  sued  for 
mercy;  most  of  them  were  slain  in  the  streets;  but  a  few  cavalry  and 
infantry  cut  their  way  out  into  the  plain  and  escaped.  The  fif^lit 
now  degenerated  into  a  carnage.  The  Macedonians  with  their 
PjEonian  contingents  were  incensed  with  the  obstinate  resistance; 
while  various  Greeks  serving  as  auxiliaries— Phokians,  Orchome- 
nians.  Tliespians.  Plata^^ms— had  to  avenge  ancient  and  grievous 
injuries  endured  from  Thebes.  Such  furious  feelings  were  satiated 
by  an  indiscriminate  massacre  of  all  who  came  in  their  way,  without 
distinction  of  age  or  sex— old  men,  women,  and  children,  in  houses 
and  even  in  temples.  This  wiiolesale  slaughter  w^as  accompanied  of 
course  by  all  the  ^ilunder  and  manifold  outrage  with  which  victori- 
ous assailants  usually  reward  themselves. 

More  than  five  hundred  Macedonians  are  asserted  to  have  been 
slain,  and  six  thousand  Thebans.  Thirty  thousnnd  captives  were 
collected.  The  final  destiny  of  these  captives,  and  of  Thebes  itself, 
was  submitted  by  Alexander  to  the  Orchomenians,  Plataans,  Pho- 
kians, and  other  Grecian  auxiliaries  in  the  assault.  He  must  have 
known  well  beforehand  what  the  sentence  of  such  judges  would  be 
They  pronounced,  that  the  city  of  Thebes  should  be  razed  to  the  ' 
ground:  that  the  Kadmeia  alone  should  be  maintained,  as  a  military 
post  with  Macedonian  garrison:  that  the  Theban  territory  should  be 
distributed  among  the  allies  themselves:  that  Orchomenus  and 
Plata?a  should  be  rebuilt  and  fortified:  that  all  the  captive  Thebans, 
men,  women,  and  children,  should  be  sold  as  slaves— excepting  only 
priests  and  priestesses,  and  such  as  were  connected  by  reco.^nized 
ties  of  hospitality  with  Philip  or  Alexander,  or  such  as  had  been 
proxeni  of  the  Macedonians:  that  the  Thebans  who  had  escaped 
should  be  proclaimed  outlaws,  liable  to  arrest  and  death,  wherever 
they  were  found;  and  that  every  Grecian  city  should  be  interdicted 
from  harboring  them. 

This  overwhelming  sentence,  in  spite  of  an  appeal  for  lenity  by  a 
Theban  named  Kleadas,  was  passed  by  tlie  Grecian  auxiliaries  of 
Alexander,  and  executed  by  Alexander  himself,  who  made  but  one 
addition   to   the   excepting  clauses.     Ho  left  the  house  of  Pindar 


544  i^EIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 

stiuOino-  and  spared  the  dcsccndauts  of  the  poet  With  these  re- 
se^-ef  "Tirebes  was  effaced  from  tlie  earih.  The  Theban  territory 
'v^  par  iticmed  among  the  rec  onstitutcd  cities  of  Orcliomenus  and 
PI uea  Nolhiiv'-,  except  the  Macedonian  military  post  at  the  Kad- 
„,d';  remained  to  mark  the  pUice  where  the  chief  of  the  Ba^otian  con- 
fXac  hid  once  stood.  The  captives  were  all  sold  and  are  said 
o    ive\i^^  440  talents;  large  prices  being  offered  bvbi^^^^^^^^^^ 

from  feelin-s  of  hostility  toward  the  city.  Diodorus  tells  us  that 
thr.entcmc?  was  passed  by  the  general  synod  of  Greeks.  I  ut  we 
a  fnot  caned  upon  to  believe  that  tliis  synod,  subservient  though 
Uw^s^etobewhen  called  upon  to  deliberate  under  the  armed 
forcfof  Alexander,  couhl  be  brought  to  sanction  such  a  ruin  upon 
o^e  of  he  first  and  most  ancient  Hellenic  cities.  For  we  learn  from 
Vrrin  that  the  question  was  discussed  and  settled  only  by  he  Grecian 
nix  l^i^r  is  who  had  taken  part  with  Alexander;  and  that  the  sentence 
ih^efore  represents  the  bifter  antipathies  of  ihe  Orchomemans  Pla^ 
•i^ns  etc  Without  doubt,  these  cities  had  sustained  harsh  and 
c  u.  1  tr^itment  from  Thebes.  In  so  far  as  they  were  concerned,  the 
r:;ril>:;;^on  upon  th.  Thebans  -s  n.rited.^_^Th;>se  pe.s.m 


TERROR  IN  GREECE. 


545 


^^;Z:Z:^t:^e^nA^^roi  .lacedon  the  ---J^and 
pivdecessor  of  the  destroying  conqueror,  had  served  in  the  arm}  ot 
Vcrxes  alou'^  with  the  Thebans.  ,      .    ., 

Arrian  varnlv  endeavors  to  transfer  from  Alexander  to  the  minor 
Bteotian  towns  the  odium  of  this  cruel  destruction,  unparalleled  in 
GiTdm  history  (as  he  himself  s^iys),  when  we  look  to  the  magnitude 
of  the  city;  vet  surpassed  in  the  aggregate  by  the  subversion  under 
?le  arms  o   l^hilip,  of  no  less  than  thirty-two  free  Chalkidic  cities, 
tirfeen  years  before.     The  known  antipathy  of  tbese  B«otians  was 
1  vcS  by  Alexander  to  color  an  infliction  which  satisfied  at  once 
r  c-ntiment,  by  destroying  an  enemy   who  defied  him-and  h  s 
policy   by  serving  as  a  terrifi^c  example  to  keep  down  other  Greeks 
Bu   U  oi^-h  such  were  the  views  which  governed  him  at  the  moment 
he  ca  le  afterward  to  look  back  upon  the  prbceeding  with  shame  and 
sorrow      The  shock  to  Hellenic  feeling,  when  a  city  was  Bubyerted 
aro.e  not  merely  from  the  vioU-nt  extinction  of  life,  proper  y,  liberty 
nd  so  :ial  (.r  political  in>titutions-but  also  from  the  obliteration  of 
Wends  and  the  suppression  of  religious  obs(  rvances,  thus  wrongmg 
aiS  provoking  the\I>cal  Gods  and  hero<.s.     We  shall  presently  find 
Alex-mder  himself  sacrificing  at  Ilium,  in  order  to  appease  he  wrath 
of  Priam  still  subsisting  and  eiricruMous,  against  himself  and  his  race, 
as  being  descended  from  Nec.ptolemus  the  slayer  of  Priam      By  his 
hlrsh  t?eatment  of  Thebes,  he  incurred  the  displeasure  of  Dionvsu. 
the  <^od  of  wine,  said  to  have  been  born  in  that  city,  and  one  ot  tho 
principal  fi-ures  in  Theban  legend.     It  was  to  inspirations  of  tho 


offended  Dion^^sus  that  Alexander  believed  himself  to  owe  that  un- 
governable  drunken  passion  under  which  he  afterward  killed  Kleitus 
as  well  as  the  refusal  of  his  Macedonian  soldiers  to  follow  him  further 
into  India.    If  Alexander  in  after  days  thus  repented  of  his  own  act 
we  may  be  sure  that  the  like  repugnance  was  felt  still  more  stron'>-ly 
by  others;  and  we  can  understand  the  sentiment  under  which   a  few 
years  after  his  decease,  the  Macedonian  Kassander,  son  of  xintipater 
restored  the  destroyed  city. 

At  the  time,  hovvever,  the  effect  produced  by  the  destruction  of 
Thebes  was  one  of  unmitigated  terror  throughout  the  Grecian  cities 
All  of  them  sought  to  make  their  peace  with  the  conqueror.    The  \r- 
cadian  contingent  not  only  returned  home  from  the  Isthmus  but  even 
condemned  their  leaders  to  death.     The  Eleians  recalled  their  chief 
Macedonizing  citizens  out  of  exile  into  ascendency  at  home.     Each 
tribe  of  .Etolians  sent  envoys  to  Alexander,  entreating  forgiveness 
for  their  manifestations  against  him.     At  Athens,  we  read  vvith  sur- 
prise, that  on  the  very  day  when  Thebes  was  assaulted  and  taken 
tiie  great  festival  of  Eleusinian  Demeter,  with  its  multitudinous  pro- 
cession of  votaries  from  Athens  to  Eleusis,  was  actually  takin<^  place 
at  a  distance  of  two  days'  march  from  the  besieued  city.     Most  The- 
ban fugitives  who  contrived  to  escape,  fled  to  Attica  as  the  nearest 
place  of  refuge,  communicating  to  the  Athenians  their.own  distress 
and  terror.    The  festival  was  forthwith  suspended.     Every  one  hur- 
ried within  the  walls  of  Athens,  carrying  with  him  his  movable  prop- 
erty  into  a  state  of  security.    Under  the  general  alarm  prevalent   that 
tiie  conqueror  would  march  directly  into  Attica,  and  under  the  hurry 
ot  preparation  for  defense,  the  persons  both  most  alarmed  and  most  iii 
real  danger  were,  of  course,  Demosthenes,  Lykurgus,  Charidemus 
and  those  others  who  had  been  loudest  in  speech  against  Macedonia' 
'Trrf   ,  ^^^^^  ^^  prevail  on  the  Athenians  to  espouse  openly  the  causi 
ot   Ihebes.     let  notwithstanding  such  terror  of  consequences  to 
themselves,  the  Athenians  afforded  shelter  and   sympathy   to   the 
miserable  Theban  fugitives.     They  continued  to  do  this  even  when 
they  must  have  known  that  they  were  contravening  the  edict  of  pro- 
scription just  sanctioned  by  Alexander. 

Shortly  afterward,  envoys  arrived  from  that  monarch  with  a  men- 
acing^ letter,  formally  demanding  the  surrender  of  eight  or  ten  lead- 
ing citizens  of  Athens— Demostiieues,  Lykurgus,  Hyperides  Poly- 
euktus,  Moerokles,  Diotimus,  Ephialtes,  and  Charidemus.  Of  these 
the  first  fcmr  were  eminent  orators,  the  last  two  military  men- 
all  strenuous  advocates  of  an  anti-Macedonian  policy.  Alexan- 
der in  his  letter  denounced  the  ten  as  the  causes  of  the  battle  of 
thajroneia,  of  the  offensive  resolutions  which  had  been  adopted  at 
Athens  after  the  death  of  Philip,  and  even  of  the  recent  hostile  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Thebans.  This  momentous  summons,  involvino-  the 
right  of  free  speech  and  public  debate  at  Athens,  was  submitted  to 
the  assembly.  A  similar  demand  had  just  been  made  upon  the  The- 
H.  G.  IV.— 18 


546  KEIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GKEAT. 

, .  „f  rofiwnl  wprc  to  be  read  no  less  plainly 
bans,  and  the  f."°^X'Xuy  tint  the  tl.reats  of  the  conqueror, 
in  the  ilej'troc  ion  of  '  >  'I5„  pirri  mstiinccs,  neither  orators  nor  peo- 
That  even  under  such  trying  '^'",""'''  "\r  ,  f.,^, .  though  we  have 
pie  failed  in  coura-e-we  know  .^  a  gYmc  of  reading  the  speeches 
U  the  advantage  (as  L.vy  ''"d      h^-    Sinl'  ilVat  the  fate  of  the 

n,ade  in  the  'I'^J'"'*^;, ,  J'^^;^,'",;^' r^.tVed  f^  m  ^^  of  the  specific  vic- 
citizens  generally  could  not  be  i'e%ereu  speech,  the  old 

tims,  is  said  10  have  recounted  '"  '"''./""'^"uj  ^^.^  ,„  him  their 
fabli-of  the  wolf  requ.rmg  the  ^'^^^^^^.'^'XthJn  devouring,  the 
protecting  dogs,  »«  »  fj;"'  ""  j^*  rndWote  demanded  along  with 
unprotected  sheep  tortliwuh.     "'^^  ;•""'">      ij,,^^  pause  alone  they 

Unl  daitued  the  P™'^« ■""  f '''",  P^ta-o  "  Pl^kion  on  the  other 
had  incurred  the  wn>th  o^  the^ couquuor.  ^_^|  ^^^ 

l,a„rt-sdent  at  first,  and  "-^'^S  ^"f ,"  '  ,',;™;is  nol'to-^c^  '-''^'•"f?'' 
from  the  popular  "'"Vn^:  ?hXrsonl  irquestio,^  must  be  given 
to  resist  Alexander  and  tl.at  "^'''..Pl'^^^pf  j^.iivi.luallv,  reminding 

up.     He  even  made  »rP^«'  J"  j'^*^" 'f'lf„f  KiUlitlau 

them  of  the  ^el^devollon  of  the  laugl  tcisrf  ^^^  ^._^j^^_ 

in  Attic  legend-and  -^^^.l^'S^^"  i'\^,;,^ie"alam^^^  He  added,  that 
tarily  for  the  purpose  ot«;;>''"f «''"',„  .Uler  himself,  or  his  best 
he(tliokion)  would  rejoice  to  ottci  "P /'  'f' .  Lvkurgus,  one 
?riend,  if  by  such  sacrifice  he  could  sa^  e  l^lt  ^^'^^^  ^,f„,if  ,^eech 
of  the  orators  wliose  «>''"«>'"""  ^?;;;',".l'^;„u^    p.i  He  sentiment 

by  judicial  sentence,  >   ^"J^^''^;^^,^  '^''|^  .^  7>mo?.benes  a  bribe  of 
mades,  who  is  said  to  '  "^^ jeccma  ir  ,  ^^  j,.gt  ,n- 

five  talents,  undertook  this  m'^^^'on-     ^"J.i;.,  ^"d  persisting  in  his 
exorable;   -fusing  even  to  he  r    ^^e  --?  -  ^j /,,,      ,  ,|tbassy, 

renuisition.     It  ^as  omy   vy  ii>^  f  iormc  xvns  obtaiuid.     Alex- 

Lided  by  Pl'okion,  that  a  mn.ssion^o   icim    w^  ^ 

^^'SfS^:^'^  .?:.t  palt'ed' Into  AsiS.' where  they 

took  service  under  Darius         ,.„„,,„..  ,,,.,„  ,„  ,,ndertnke  a  siege  of 

It  was  indeed  no  part  of  AlcNande   M  j^"   «  "^^^    ,     AdK^nians 

Athens,  which  might  prove  'o-^f  f "     "  ^.  "   '  ^"  „'      cm.  and  the 

to  relax. 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHOKION. 


547 

^  Phokion  returned  to  Atliens  as  the  bearer  of  Alexander'^  rnnnno 
sions  thus  relieving  the  Athenians  from  extreme  a'SSy  and  p^^^^^^ 
His  intluenoe-already  great  and  of  long  star.ding,  since  for  veiism.; 
he  had  been  i)erj)etuall  v  re-elerhnl  o-onrM-Ml     ho.  .^>\  7     ^      '^  ^^'^^^ 

while  that  of  oLiostlie.  's  and     ife  o  l^'.^nt    "rS^^^ 
must  have  been  lowered.     It  wL  uo  me   ,  aX  nUit'f  "o    t'le^UKlcr' 

JhlTJ",^"-'''-^''  '"'""'''  "">  '"corruptible  pir„,^?„L'£d;; 
of  the  Macedonizing  party  at  Atliens.     His  nroiects  ii<r-,Ltt  P  ,  v 
were  mainly  exposed  to  /nilure  from  the  poSlitylS  op  JS 
being  raised  against  li  in  in  Greece  bv  the  ■i<v,.„pv;  nfp™.,.-"^  ' 

and  ships,     t'o  keep  Atliens  on  t  of  sucli  con    ,?aions  he  nd  5?.' >"F 
upon  the  personal  influence  and  purty  of  iCldo  iwhon    he  kn^ 

the  Athenian  assembly:  ind'eed  the  Mac^d™ i,    "princ^^f  m  ."^ht  ii itir 
rally  prefer  the  idea  of  Athenian  hcadshii)  to  ihJ,!eUZ°         • 
that  Sparta  stood  aloof  from  him,  auoi^L  IVXt       "  ''"'  ''""^ 
The  animosity  of  Ale.xander  being  app(sised    Vthens  v„c„n,„,i  i 

reply  provoked  lauglu'ir  f rom"l''e  bvs.t d  rfbu"  "i^^"?  ^'i:,,'!'!;'  .'^i? 

Having  visited  the  oracle  of  D(!lplii,  and  received  or  extorted  from 

the  priestess  an  answer  bearing  favorable  itromil'tovhl.  xl!T 

schemes,  he  returned  to  M.ace.lonia  bef    e    he  wrn.c"      Th;^   !    ? 

nportant  permanent  effect  of  his  slay  in  Greece  w'sfhe  Jc„n 

ion  of  Itootia;  that  is,  the  destru<-ti,,M  "f  tS.     mlmfrecon  ,T 

he  Tbeh  "'T""!?"'"''  ,P"=^PT'  ■'^"'^  P''"'''^.  'lividing  be  ween  U  em 
theTheban  territory;  all  guarded  and  controlled  b/a  iCdoftk^ 


548  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

garrison  in  tl>e  Kndmeia.  Tt  -^l-l ''«;;:i,^rLd  \?^'u^n°.'f  th" 
Sme  details  abont  this  P™«'f^«f;^^!^  fj^"  ^"strongr^nnife.tntions 
Boeotian  towns;  M'rocess  not  on  >  cal   r^^^^  questions  to 

"^l^^xlll^fer^M^^^^^^         for  Pella  in  the  antumn  of  335  B.C.,  and 

never  saw  it  ajrain^     ,  summer  while  he  Tvas  occupied  in  his 

Itappeai-s.  tlmt  during  this  sura mcrwim^  ^^^^^^  p^^ 

Blyrian  and  Thcl  an  operations  the  IVlac.edon  an  of  Greek 

i;/nio  in  Asia  had  had  \o^^^]^J^f^^lf^^^^^^^ 

mercenaries,  commanded  by  Memnon  ^^^  ^^^^^^^^^ 

incr  into  ^olis,  besieged  and  took  ^^^\"\\\"' ' .;'' '^j^g  ^jeo-e.     Memnon 
Pitane,  but  ^vas  compel  ed  ^^J^^,^,  V  ,^  ^ce  u^^  the 

even  gained  a  victory  over  tlie  ^^lf^%\'":;"  '        j^.^t  he  failed  in  an 
Troal,  compelling  tl^em  toreUre  to  K^^^^^^^ 
attempt  to  surprise  IvN  zikNa^^^^^^^  ^^^^^  jy^,.,,,^  ,vas 

erate  force. 


CHAPTER  XCII. 

ASIATIC  CAMPAIOSS  OF  ALEXASDEK. 

,i.c  i,n,l  siifflcpd  for  Alexander  to  make  afirst 
Ateae  and  some  montl.s    ad  "™.<^"'rL-    (,  foraohicvementsyet 

display  of  his  energy  and  ""'""J,^]^''';^;  ""s  for  freedom  among 
greater;  and  to  crush  the  PT'"!"'^";?"-^  ^"cians  on  the  north,  of 
Sreokson  the  south,  as  ^'f".  "f„'"""°S ,  '  Wa  ;U  ,^,j„     ,,;, 

Macedonia,  The  onsum?;  }""  <"  J,rfnl-  of  334b  c  his  armv  des- 
preparations;  ^o  that  earlv  m    he  spnn^  of  334  1^^.^^^^  ^^^j^  ^^^ 

i-;!,/,^^iir.s:r«f^:^'s  at  1^  ]^X^c.r...., .. 

June  333  B.C.,  eleven  y^'^^j;^;;"^^  .^..^.^^  fan^^  con- 
Asia,  amid  unceasing  nulitai}  ^I'^T;  1^  ;;.•;;''  his  achievements 
quests.  He  ntver  lived  ore  VISUM,  edo^^^^^^  of  territory  so 
,vere  on  so  transcench  nt  a^  scae^^^^^^^^^  ^^.^^  ,^  i„,,,. 
unmea-^ured,  and  his  thiist  ^  J^^^nei  ^^  ^^.^ 

tiate,  that  Macedonia  ^^"^^/"J^J^^^f    \TtiJ^^  into  outlying 

sessions.     Much  more  ^doJhe^G^ecian^  cine  ^.^^^^      ^  ^^^  ^^^^^ 


PLANS  AND  PRETENSES. 


649 


sessions.     .Hucu  moie  uu  .i.v    -—•:",  ^^nire 
appendages  of  a  newly-grown  Oriental  empiie. 


eleven  years  the  liistory  of  Greece  is  almost  a  blank,  except  here  nnd 
there  a  few  scattered  events.  It  is  only  at  the  death  of  Alexander 
thnt  the  Grecian  cities  again  awaken  into  active  movemem 

The   A.siatic  conquests  of  Alexander  do  not  belong  directly  and 
hterally  to  the  proymce  of  an  historian  of  Greece.  The^"were  achieved 
by  armies  of  which  the  general,  the  principal  officers;  and  most  part 
of  the  .soldiers   were  Macedonian.     The  Greeks  who  served  with  him 
were  only  anxilianes,along  with  the  Thracians  and  Pceonians   Thoii-h 
lil'c  theTpTThn^''"  'VU^'^f '^^''-^'^'iliaries.  they  did  not  constituTe 
hUc  the  lei  Thousand  Greeks  in  the  army  of  the  vounuer  Cvriis   the 
invcc  on  which  he  mainly  relied  for  victory.      Tlis  chief  sicretary 
Emnenes  of  Ivardia.  was  a  Greek,  and  probably  most  of  the  civil  and 
inhdlectual  tunctions  connected  with  the  service  were  also  perfornu>d 
by  Greeks.     3Iany  Gre.'ks  also  served  in  the  armv  of  Persia  aoaili^t 
linn,  and  composed  indeed  a  larger  proportion  of  the  real  force  (dis- 
regarding mere  numb-rs)  in  the  army  of  Darius  than  in  that  of  Vlex- 
aiuler.     Hence  the  expedition  l)ecomes  directly  incorporated  wiUi  the 
s.ream  of  Grecnin  liistory  by  the  powerful  ati.xiliarya-cney  of  G^eeUs 
oa  bothsides-and  still  more  by  its  connection   witirprcvious  pro'i- 
eets,  dreams,  and  legends  long  antecedent  to  the  airu-randizemeiit  of 
.Macedon— as  well  as  by  the  character  which  Alexander  thom'-ht  lit 
to  assume.     To  take  revenge  on  Persia  for  the  invasion  of  Grwcebv 
Aerxes,  and  to  liberate  the  Asiatic  Greeks  had   been   the  scheme  of 
the  bpirtan   Agesilaus,  and   of  the    Phencan   Jason;    with   hopes 
grounded  on  the  m<'morable  expedition  and  safe  return  of  the  Ten 
thousand.     It  hail  been  recommended  by  the  rhetor  Isokrates   first 
to  the  combined  force  of  Greece,  while  yet  Grecian  ciiies  were' free 
nnler  the  joint  headship  of  Athens  and  Sparta-next,  to  Philip  of 
lUacedon  as  the  chief  of  united  Greece,  when  his  victorious  arms  had 
extorted   a  recognition  of  headship,  setting  aside  both  Athens  and 
bparta.      I  he  enterprising  ambition  of  Philip  was  well  pleased  to  be 
nominated  chief  of  Greece  for  the  execution  of  this  proiect.      From 
Iiini  It  passed  to  his  yet  more  ambitious  son. 

Though  reallv  a  scheme  of  Macedonian  appetite  and  for  Mace- 
donian aggrandizement,  the  expedition  airainst  Asia  thus  becomes 
thrust  into  the  series  of  Grecian  events,  under  the  Pan-Hellenic  pre 
tense  of  retaliation  for  the  louu:-pa>t  insults  of  Xerxes  I  call  it  a 
pretence,  because  it  had  ceased  to  be  a  real  Hellenic  feelino-  and 
served  now  two  different  purpos.^s;  first,  to  ennoble  the  underlakin- 
in  the  eyes  of  Alexander  himself,  whose  mind  was  very  accessible  to 
I-'  igious  and  legendary  sentiment,  and  who  willinn-ly identified  him- 
se  with  Agamemnon  or  Achilles,  immortalized  as  Executors  of  the 
collective  vengeance  of  Greece  for  Asiatic  insult— next  to  assist  in 
keeping  the  Gieeks  quiet  during  his  absence.  He  was  himself  aware 
that  the  real  symp  ithies  of  the  Greeks  were  rather  adverse  than 
lavorable  to  his  success. 
Apart  from  this  body  of  extinct  sentiment,  ostentatiously  rekindled 


550  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER 

for  Alexander's  purpose.,  the  VO^^^o.o(n.oGrc^rekv^ce^Xo 
,us  Asiatic  conquers  ^.u.  very  mud^ 

wft'en  Fan^hmran^  "Tnounce  the  Germans  in  the  service 
'fj^  .  fa  m-'  vho  had  forfeited  the  alle.sianee  whie  i  tlRV 
of  Russia  a^  ''■i'l';'~„",  ,"',,, ,.j„i,,,r  tlie  same  pointed  distinction 
.owed  to  \'"'„,,^V'^  f"     'X  Gem  n  prisoners  taken,  as  Alexander 

h^i^ri Sle;;l'\^i;;?g«?e 'lias  ^ir^sed  to  exis.:  except  i. 
,n   ■>;  as  Al eSe    en.pioy?  the  name  for  his  ovvu  purposes.     Its 

!?nuP     cons^lered  i^s   an  appeiuhige.  is  of  uo  mean  va  uc-   but  b 
^  oif   u  ?r4c'  k  -md  lull  of  eiiibarrassmeuts."     Inveiting  the  posi- 
!nth.Danier these  ^vords  repieseut  cxaetly  ^hat  Greeee  her- 

5lSSS's!r-i:d'$;fer  ^ti:vl^^ 

^li^id^r's'meilnr  a^d';ii?;^iious  manifestation.on  ^di 
^•e  re  no  v  euterin-',  are  those,  not  of  the  ruler  or  politician,  1  ul  ol 
The  sener     and  tie?  soldier.     In  this  character  his  appearance   orn.s 

a'soft  of  iM^orical  d-oeh.  It  is  no,  "■"-l>V"  "^  l''"  .lYnS  ^'^^e 
in  the  most  forward  and  even  adventurous  bra\e  >— in  incKIall^.uw 
"pvsonT^rcl  V  tv-aud  in  enduran.e  as  to  hardship  and  faligue-lliat 
LP  sti^idspe  eminent-  thou-h  these  qualities  alone,  when  tound  in  a 
kLi  act  s  po  eil-ul  ■  on  those  under  his  <„mn,and  that  they  su  ■ 
fie e'io'' pmdSce  great-a.-hievements,  even  when  -;;;'-";;-   IJ^ 

sui^^c  e<  mhi  lations,  his  cn.plovinent  of  dilTeient^  '^'^"^'^^^ 
force  eouspirin"  toward   one  end,  his  long-sighted   Pl"D^  fo       « 
nr^ecuUou  of  eampaiirns,  his  constant  foresight  aud  re^oul■ec  again 
new  dil  c  lix's    to"cUier  with   rapi.Uty  of  movement  even  m  A 
wst  count'  y-aUou  a  scale  of  prodigious  magnitude-are  without 


CHANGES  m  GRECIAN  WARFARE. 


551 


p.iral  el  m  ancien    history.     They  carry  tlie  art  of  systematic  and 
scientific  warfare  to  a  degree  of  efficiency  such  as  ev^n  successors 
trained  in  hi.,  school  were  unable  to  keep  up  uniniiiaired        ''^''''^^''''' 
We  must  recollecf,  however,  that  Alexander  found  the  "Macedonian 
nulitary  system  built  up  by  Philip,  and  h.-.d  only  to  ap,,lv  and  e  Z"e 
It.     As  transmitted  to  him.  it  embodied  the  accumulated  res  ul   and 
matured  fruit  of  a  series  of  successive  inii)rovements,  applied  by  G," 
can  tacticians  to  the  primitive  Hellenic  arrancvements      During  the 
sixty  years  before  the  a.ces.sion  of  Alexander,  the  art  of  war  had  been 
conspicuously  progressive-to  the  sad  (ietriment  of  Grecian  pcditiA 
freedom.      "Everything  around  us  (says  Demosthenes    nrlhv.  in 
the  people  of  Athei^  inl342  h.c.)  has  be^i'in  all^c  'S  ^^^ 
past-nothing  is   like  what  it  was   formerly-but   nowhere   is  the 
alteration  and  enlargement  more  conspicuous  than  in  the  .-Affairs  of 
war.     formerly,  the   Laeed.emonlans  as  well    as  other  Greek     Ih 
nothing  more  than  invade  each  other's  territory,  durino-tlic  foui     r 
live  summer  months,  with  their  native  force  of  citizen"^holites- 
winter  they  stayed  at  home.     But  now  we  see  Philin  in  consta 
action,  winter  as  well  as  summer,  attacking  all   aro  U    hhn    no 
merely  with  Macedonian  hoplites,  but  with  cavalry,  lio-ht  in    ntry 
bowmen,  foreigners  of  all  descriptions,  and  .siege  batteries  -^' 
I  have  in  several  preceding  chapters  dwelt  upon  this  progressive 
change  in  the  character  of  Grecian  soldiership.     At  Athens   a^^d  In 
most  other  parts  of  Greece,  the  burghers  had  become  av^se'to    ad 
ami  ac  ive  military  service.     The  use  of  arms  hadpa.ssed  mabil      o 
professional  soldiers,  who.  without  any  feeling  of  cilizi^,^^yl^ 
wherever  good  pay  was  offered,  and  becanie^^niniens'^^m  Jtin  ied 
10  tiie  detriment  and  danger  of  Grecian  society.     M  ny^f  tl^^^  LCc^/ 
een^mes  wc^-e  li^ht^y  arme(l-peltasts  served  in  combim.Jion  wi^iX 
oplitos.     Iph.krates  greatly  improved  and  partly  rearmed  the  pel 
ass;  whonj  he  employed  conjointly  with  hopliies  so  effectively  as 
to  astonish  his  contemporaries.     His  innovation  was  further  devel 
oped  by  the  great  military  genius  of  Epaminondas;  wl  o    mt  only 
made  infantry  and  cavalry,  light-armed  and  hCavy-armed   cons^^re 
to  one  scheme  of  operations,  but  also  completely  altered  the  recdv  d 
pnncip  es   of    battle-maneuvering,   by  concentiting   an   irrcSs  ibie 
force  ot  attack  on  one  pcnnt  of  the  enemy's  line,  and"keepin<.  the  rest 
of  his  own   line  more  on   the  defensive.     B(^sides  these    mnortm 
m,>n)veiuents.  realizea  by  generals  in  actual  practice     n  el  S  i^ 

^  ]'.  .^'"^'m-'!  '''f'^^^l''^  ^''^'  '^^'^^^  of  their  military  exper  e?"e 
m  valuable  published  criticisms.  Such  were  the  lessons  w lich  the 
Macedonian  Ph.lip  learned  and  applied  to  the  enslavement  of  hose 
Greeks,  especially  of  the  Thebans,  from  whom  they  were  derved 
In  his  youth,  as  a  hostage  at  Thebes,  he  had  probablyV(>nverseTwhh 
^Lpa.nmondas,  and  must  certainly  have  become  familiar  with  the 
heban  military  arrangements.  He  had  every  motive  not  merely 
Irom  ambition  of  conquest,  but  even  from  the  necessities  of  dSe 


t  .;MJ&iMBijftg'»^-*'-*'-^'g'iii  Iffifwittiiii 


552         ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

1  i,o  i.rnno-ht  to  the  task  military  jrctiiua 
to  mm  thorn  to  account;  «nd  he  «^f  ;  ."^^-oU.tion.,  iningino., 
n„d  .plUtule  ot  t).e  l''?'''^:' ^"^^^.^i "..'^  .^V,  l.c  inlro,l.iced  important 
in  ,e.-'imunlin,s.  '^'\"'-<f  ^'^.sf  Jf"?'J.or«    he  Ma.  .'.Ionian   military 
„„veltios;   licqucallnn.,'  "'.''';„,';'  "^''I'v'f.iJ.on.  lasl.d  until  the  ecu- 
,vs.en..  whi.  h.  ^vM,h  ""I-  ";'^"'^,  !, .     „"  .e,„„ries  allcr^ard.       .  . 
qnest  of  the  cuntry  ''y>{^"'' •,,"'•'    i,,,i,c  ii„,.s  anteri.)r  to  Phil.]. 
^  The  n>ililary  tor.e  ot  ,^  " "^.-^  -"i,  'Vl    s^alv.  in  a  ucll-arnied  an.l 
appear,  to  have  eons.sl.d     Kc     ;«;,';, „„;„i,,  pvopvict.irs  of  U..- 
,,Vll-ni..nntc-d  cavalry. '"'"'',.",,  ...c  of  ocllnMs  or  light  infantry 
ro.:ntvy-an.l  in  a  .nuncro  >  l^'"^^  tLi^):  these- latter  were 
(somewhat  ana h.gous  to  '';,  •■.^'„;''';,i\,,,„,.i:.   who  tende.l  sheep 
\u,  rural  P<M>''l;iy7- ,'''''■        ,'^^,'^^',,,"'e"^  mountains  an, 

and  cattle  or  tilled  •l'''^"'''''^.;';-^  =  ;,  't, nvns  near  the  coast,  an.l 
valleys  of  Upper  Macedonia.  I  '".^M ''.",,.,,,  eiiizen-hoplitcs  hcttoi 
U^e  few  Macdonian  '/>^^f,!,f ''  ''j/t  ^  .'.toni:  l,c  natiVes.and  the 
armed-,  but  f'?o>^;;7;!',VreigciS  character  were  hardly  more 
JIace.  onian  inlaiitiv  m  tnc  i    t' '  "^^  .   .    „„„„s,i,„;   ihey  were  arm™ 

i„an  a  rabble.  At  -l'«  PJ^'"!^:^  .'."^'^P,;  am  1vi^-ker  shields,  nowov 
with  nothing  better  than  instv  ^  o"  -  ,  f  ,,,^.5,.  Thracian  a.iil 
sufficient  to  make  he.'ul  "X  n  t  k-v  wm  co^tantly  c.impelled  t,. 
Illyrian  neighbors;  before  ^^l'"^  "l-^^J  't  ,eir  condiiu.n  was  that  ., 
fle^  for  refuge  up  o  ''^,  "'""";". 'a  01  ly  will,  hi.les.  and  catin,: 
poor  herdsmen  half-naked  "' ^d  fl'.  ren  f...m  that  of  the  popul" 
from  wooden  ,.Iattcrs;  ■?'■'"■;'' ',',', .-,"',  of  ..re,  when  first  visile.l 
tion  of  Upper  Mticcdonia  «'"/'f  J'^ '"',,'  ,^,„ ',„  kinss.  and  when  the 

bv  Perdikkas,  the  «""'^'':^,  "f^''  ^,e\a  wh  "''  cv^"  l'auJ«-  <'"  "'« 
wife  ot  the  native  prmec  l«»^;-«  ff,f  j^,  ■  „,,.  „.;,s  thus  indifferenl. 
other  hand,  though  «'''  Mf^f''^';;  ,J  "Yot  ,  in  the  Peloponnesiaa 
the  cavalry  of  the  c^nt^y;  "^'^r  ^  "•     ,i„st  Olvnthus  more  Ihau 

^1^^^  iotltXs  tT'^^Sartlll^ho^t  thrLting.plke  for 

close  combat.  '         „;,:,„„.  orn-anizalion  which  Philip  found. 

Thus  .Icfective  was  the  ""  ''"  >  ".[r„  .,  ,ew     The  poor  and  hardy 

rn.ler  his  auspices  it  was  cas   a  to^  ,'     '  J  e    cfensive  against  pie.la; 

Lamlwehr  of  >If  ^'^""'l '^"'  rj  '    (  nteal  for  soldiers,  ami  proved 
torv  neighbors,  formed  an e.\te  lent  "'•'  <^'';"  ..         •  fiiey  ^-ere 

'not'  intractable  to  the  ^^-X;;;\7^ire^  .'ul  ™.kTn' r  of 'heav;^ 
placed  under  constant  training  m  "'V  ",„  „tont  1  new  descript  on  M 
n?antiy ;  they. -\"S?^"'-::°^rJ":,;T/;  ^"nagX.t  so  compamtivelv 
arm.  not  only  m  itself  ^"  t^,^:  /^j^'  .^".^^^  uded,  and  only  available 
useless  to  the  soldier  ^^'^'^'^''^'''''l^J,;:'^:;  \o  move  or  stand  together 
by  a  body  of  men  >° '='°  .«  <^trfl  ^  ear  t he  name  in  the  army  of 
The  new  weapon,  ?{«'''  ;\^,  "  ,„„  ,„  pike  or  lance.     The  saris^^;' 


MACEDONIAN  PHALANX. 


553 


monts  of  his  cavalry:  in  both  cases  it  was  loner,  though  that  of  tlie 
l,ji:ilanx  was  much  the  longer  of  the  two.  The  rc-imcnts  of  cavalrv 
cnlled  Sarissophori  or  Lancers  were  a  sort  of  liii-ht-liorse,  carryin'>-  a, 
l.>iig  lance,  and  distinguished  from  the  heavy ^cavahy  intended  lor 
tiie  shock  of  hand  combat,  who  carried  the  xvston  or  short  ])ike 
The  sarissa  of  this  cavalry  may  have  been  fourteen  feet  in  lenii'lh  as 
long  as  the  Cossack  pike  now  is;  that  of  the  infantry  iii  phahinx  was 
not  less  than  twenty-one  feet  long.  This  dimension  is  so  prodiinous 
and  so  unwieldy,  that  Me  should  hardly  believe  it,  if  it  did  not  come 
attested  by  the  distinct  assertion  of  an  historian  like  Polvbius 

The  extraordinary  reach  of   the  sarissa  or  i^ike   con.^tituted  the 
prominent   atlribute  and  force  of   the   ]\Iacedonian  phalanx.     The 
lihnlangites  were  drawn  up  in  files  generally  of  sixteen  deep,  each 
enlled  a  Lochus;   with  an  interval  of  three 'feet  between  each  two 
soldiers  from  front  to  rear.     Li  front  stood  the  lochage,  a  man  of 
sujierior  strength,  and  of  tried  military  experience.     The  second  and 
tlnrd  men  in  the  tile,  as  well  as  the  rearmost  man  who  brouaht  up 
the  whole,  were  also  picked  soldiers,  receiving  larger  pay  than  the 
rest.     Now  the  sarissa,  when  in  horizontal  position,  Mas'  held  wilh 
both  hands  (distinguished  in  this  respect  from  the  i)ike  of  the  Gre- 
cian hoplite,  which  occupied  only  one  hand,  the  other  bein*'-  required 
for  the  shield),  and  so  held  that' it  projected  fifteen  feet  before  the 
body  of  the  pikeman ;  while  the  hinder  portion  of  six  feet  was  so 
jveighted   as   to   make   the   i)ressure   convenient    m   such  division. 
Hence,  the  saris.sa  of  the  man  standing  second  in  the  file   pi'oiccted 
luelve  feet  beyond  the  front  rank;  tiiat  of  tiie  third  man,'  2iine  feet- 
those  of  the  fourth  and  tiflh  ranks  respectively  six  feet  and  three  feet' 
There  was  thus  presented  a  quintuple  series  of  pikes  bv  each  file  to 
meet  an  advancing  enemy.     Of  ihe.se  live,  the  three  first  would  lie 
decidedly  of  greater  projection,  and  even  the  fourth  of  not  less  pro- 
jection, than  the  pikes  of  Grecian  hoplites  coming  up  as  enemies  to 
the  charge.     The  ranks  behind  the  fifth,  while  serving  to  sustain  and 
press  onward  the  front,  did  not  earry  the  sarissa  in  a'horizontal  posi- 
tion, but  slanted  it  over  the  shoulders  of  those  before  them,  so  as  to 
break  the  force  of  any  darts  or  arrows  which  might  be  shot  overhead 
iroin  the  rear  ranks  of  the  enemy. 

The  phalangite  (soldier  of  the''phalanx)  was  further  provided  wilh 
a  short  sword,  a  circular  shield  of  rather  more  than  two  feet  in 
aiaineter,  a  breast-piece,  leggings,  and  a  kausia  or  broad-brimmed 
liat— the  head-covering  common  in  the  Macedonian  army.  But  the 
long  pikes  Mere  in  truth  the  main  weapons  of  defense  as  Mell  as  of 
oitense.  They  M-ere  destined  to  contend  against  the  charge  of  Grecian 
lophtesMith  the  one-handed  pike  and  heavy  shield;  especially  against 
the  most  formidable  manifestation  of  that  force,  the  deep  T"h(>l)an 
column  organized  by  Epaminondas.  This  was  what  Philip  had  to 
aeal  M'lth,  at  his  accession,  as  the  irresistible  infantry  of  Greece 
bearing  down  everything:. before  4t  by  thrust  of  pike  and  propul^ign 


fcana.  iwi^a^iti 


n^.A  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

of  .hiold.     He  p.ovi,led  .he  n,.u.  ^ -^'^  '^i  ^tn^'C: 

handed  piUe.  '1  he  T  heb:  n  «"  ""\">  ,' '  ,f  ?,„.  ^f  p.-olendod  pikes. 
fo«..d  themselves  unal.  0  °  l"'^;V.^^,\  ,'  '  -,,1  the  battle  of  Ch» 
or  to  come  to  push  of  s_h  el  )) ,';,;  'V  e  chosen  men  of  the  city, 
roneia.  the  front  rank  Theba  so  un  '  ^^  ^'^^  [  f„,  „.he,vwe  con- 
all  perished  on  the  S'O"'"  /;"''''» ',^'4'^^"!  \,  ,,s\,v  the  pressvu, 
eeive  ^^^"^  f'"'^ri^y  ^^  "'^^t'y^^^nM.  the  length  o. 
upon  them  '-;?!;' '^'^/.^'^J^^Pdi  Vphldanx  vvilh  reference  to  the 

their  own.  We  must  '^f ''  Z,  V  •  '  ,  ,ije  jmer  Koman  oicin- 
enemies  bcf<aeh.m   not  u.tl    1    eu.o 

ization,  which  l'"'y'""*^'""f  ''  "  ;.;S  i  mai  dv  to  stand  the 
fectlvthe  purposes  of  P'"'"'!'';,  °/V  .'   .  „  ),o  hies  in  Iheir  own 

*"f  Tatnck  '^^'^^^tton^^Z'i^^  the.phalanx.as 
mode  of  at  ack.  ^"\^  ''■"  ,  ,,,.„„„a  s.„ital.le  for  il ;  and  wher- 
never  once  "«-'^'^,^-»-  '»,f "  ,!  ^  pi  "s"     was  also  fit  for  the  phalanx. 

IXr  :r:;^.";"l-'u^^;:ch  !;;e:>'n^eniences  .ere  hardl,  less 
ft'lt  by  Greciau  liophtcs.  Po/otfpri  or  Foot  Com- 

^!'^  f  ^f^tetni'^i' d  r'^'ni'arb.^^ 
r:S«ishefe.Te<^a.  corps  d^ 

it  whieh%ve  find  ""■"''"""l;'!';  'f\,it     on    s  ca  tal  I  Taxis. '  Ho« 

gate  or  permaDent  battalion,  ^^^7  "S  ^f  ^1  ^^  ^  \\  ''^u,^^^^^^^^^      ^or  orderly, 
fics,  an  ensign,  a  rear-man.  a  l'^'^'^^  f  ^;^"  ^^?"  f '^^^  called  a 

T^vo  of  these  Synta.crmas  ^i\"^}?^^=:^^l.^,,^^>^^^  the 

rentakosiarchy,  ^^hich  i"  l^^^^Vl^v  under  ^ ^vlw  c  mmand;  but 
ordinary  regiment,  aeting  «f  ^'  ^^;/".^^^[^,!^,  ^^  le  reorganized  his 
several  of  these  were  doiil)led  b>  ^^\^^^^:^"7( '^'\  .,^  each  under  his 
army  at  Siisa.  so  as  to  torm  ^^^^"^  '"^^.^^.^J^^fs  All  this  systematic 
Chiliareh,  and  each  comprising         .f  > "J^^l^'^^'i^en  ^  appears 

distribution  of  the  Maee^doniau  "^^^.\  f  V'^f  ^j'^'''' on  actua  foreigu 
-to-bavebeon  arranged  by  the. genius,  of  FluUp.     un  aciu 


LIGHT  INFANTRY  AND  GUARDS. 


dd5 


service,  no  mimericnl  precision  could  be  observed;  n  regiment  or  a 
division  could  not  always  contain  the  same  lixed  number  of  n^en 
but  as  to  the  array,  a,  depth  of  sixteen,  for  the  tiles  of  the  nh    anl 
gites,  appears  to  have  been  regarded  as  important  and  charact^^rist  c 
perhaps  essential  to  imp.irt  a  feeling  of  contidence  to  the  troons      li 
was  a  deinh  much  greater  than  was  common  with  Grecian  honiites 
and  never  surpassed  by  any  Greeks  except  the  Thebans  ^       ' 

13ut  the  phahmx  though  an  essential  item,  was  yet  only  one  amon"- 
many,  in  the  varied  military  organization  introduced  b^- Philip      jT 
was  neither  intended   nor  fit,  to  act  alone;  being  clumsy  in  chano-in<^ 
front   o  protect  itself  either  in  tlank  or  rear.  Tin d  unable  to  adapl 
Itself  to  unevei,  ground      There  was  another  description  of  infant  Jy 
organized  by  Philip  called  the  Hypaspists-shield-bearers  or  Gua^-ds- 
originally  few  ,n  number,  and  employed  for  personal  defense  of  the 
pnnce-but  afterward  enlarged  into' several  distinct  corps  dWe 
Ihese  Hypaspists  or  Guards  were  light  infantry  of  the  line    t^,ev 
were  hopli  es.  keeping  regular  array  and  intended  for  close  comlmt^ 
hu   more  lightly  armed,  and  more  fit  for  diversities  of  circunn^mce 
and  position  than  the  phalanx.     They  seem  to  have  fought  wilthe 
one-handed  pike  and  shield,  like  the  Greeks;  and  not  to  have  Carried 
he  two-handed  phalangite  pike  or  sarissa.     They  occupied  a  sor    of 
intermediate  place  between  the  heaw  infantry  of  t^alanx  nron 
erlv  so  called-and  the  peltasts  and  light  troops  genera  ^    A  ex^ 
anderin  his  later  campaigns  had  them  distributed  Into  C^IiJiarcl  ies 
(1  ow  the  distribution  stood  earlier,  we  have  no  distinct  information) 

hv  IHn     rf  '''  ""i''^^' i'  '"^^  ^''^'''^^y  "^^^'•'-    ^^e  ^^'^  them  employed 
by  him  in  forward  and  aggressive  movements;  first  his  li.rl)t  troons 

P,  lastly,  the  phalanx  is  brought  up  to  support  them.     The  hvpas- 
sts  are  usee    also  for  assault  of  walled  places,  and  for  rapid  ni4t 
marches.     What  was  the  total  number  of  them  we  do  not  know    ° 

iiesidesthe  phalanx,  and  the  hypaspists  or  Guards,  the  Macedonian 
army,  as  employed  by  Philip  and  Alexander,  included  a  num?rous 
a  emblage  of  desiiltory  or  irregular  troops,  partly  native  Macedo- 
iiins.  partly  foreigners.  Thracians,  Pi^eonians,  etc.  They  were  of 
(liferent  descriptions;  peltasts,  darters,  and  bowmen.     The  be^^t  of 

use  of  the  javehn.     All  of  them  were  kept  in  vigorous  movement  bv 
Alexander,  on  the  flanks  and  in  front  of  his  hea?y  infantry  orTnter 
defeated'''  c^^-^lry-as  well  as  for  pursuit  after  the  enemy. was 

JP.^f  1^^''  1^'"^  T^''^''^'  }""  Alexander's  army  was  also  admirable-at 
nffnf.'^''''  V  'V'^  •seemingly  even  superior  in  efficiency,  to  his  best 
nnt  vlT'         iZ""   '^i''<^'\^ly  "i<?"tioned  that   cavalry  was  the  choice 
h  wf  1  .  Macedonia,  long  before  the  reign  of  Philip;  by  whom 

It  had  been  extended  and  improved.     The  heavy  cavalry,  wholly  or 
cliiefly  composed  ofnative  Alacedonians.  was  known  by  the  denom- 


550  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

TiiprP  w-ns  besides  a  new  ami  liii;liter 

vaiioly  of  cavalry  appasenlh  '"'""'"f™  ^i  for  a.lvanoca  posts  or 
Sari^sopbori,  or  L;'f*^^y!'i^j^,^fSu,<.v  carried  was  probablv 
scourins  the  country.  .T'"-/'"''^;  ',.';'.  ^„.,  ;{  ,vas  long,  if  compared 
much  shorter  than  that  of  tlie  P"'';'"f, •,"!',  ,  ^y  cavalrv  for  llie 
"  i.h  the  xvston  or  ' brusttng-pdu    ■    a  b^^^^   -^  ^^  ,.,^,,,„  ,„ 

sliock  of  close  combat.  .^V '';;',;.'"  ,V,,,-idr<)n^  of  this  licavy  cavalry 
at  Arbela  ^-"^T^^^^Z^'o^tZA  nnmher  bal.Hkd  in 
-or  cavalry  of  the  C  ""'1';"  *  '.,  '.(.,■■«  accession,  is  not  known, 
the  Macedonian  army  at  A'(X<>  -f  ^  ""^^  :,in  were  named  after 
Among  the  scpnuirot.s  ^"fj^^^l^J^L^..  Amphipoli., 
particular  towns  or  ^'^V^'-.'",,"*  „  'vas  one  o'r  more,  distinguished  as 
Apollonia.  A"'l'™'"'*^f '^V  'X  ,  r  leadin"  h<.(lv  of  cavalry-at  the 

linrS'':^c:;a;,d;S^^^ 

^°«^fr!l;utr:!f'r  c^l  into  ^tadrons  ..  Jhat  ..i.t 

Alexander  found  at  l>'V""f'], ',"^;J^f  (j    330  i  c  )  ^'t  ^..sa,  so  as  to 

mod.-led  the  "'■«".i?V"''^'''.'^  ™  ' '  t  'a,';   „nd  to  establish  the  I.ochus 
suUlividethescp.adr.m,tjtotvvoLoch,^  ^       ^  ^^^^^  ^^ 

s:;'Sn^io'l;ri.:^"h2pf  ^^^|^'-« --— 

chosen  cohort  whtch  ^™^^^;'""' "P°°  °*f  °  ,c  B^  a  small 

the  fight.  A  St  ill  more  select  cf>rps  w  ei  ^;  '  .^  ,j  ,  ^.^  jo  Alex- 
company  of  tried  and  <;o"fi'  "  '^''  "!"Cl  aclin -as  adjutauts  or  as 
ander.  always  attache.    ^" .  /!  P"Th";e  Bodv-GuTtrds  appear  to  have 

by  Philip  into  service,  and  ^^.^l  "  P",*,"  .,",p„,,ionslnp.  They 
for  purposes  of  .'^o"'''"''';,/'  i'  ''""n^e  al  ernalinir  among  them- 
maintained  perpetual  guard  ''fj^P"'"",-, .•",,, ,,.  received  his  horfc 

f'^"^r"Jr,us'*Us]:-ed:hn"m-mmr 

from  the  Jiroonis,  •^^^\^;^\V  Llurcd  nersons  who  came  to  polin 
.vent  to  the  chase:   they  ^\' ^^ ^;l" ^' '^^^^^  through  a  special 

interviews,  and  admit  e.l  ^  .^  "^^^^"^^f  ^^  to  dinnerNvith 

door.  Thev  enpred  ^^i^^P V;;\VeL^^oL^e3  except  by  his  specia 
him,  as  well  as    hat  ""^  J^^^^l  ,\^'l^^^^^  but  it 


FOREIGN  AUXILIARIES. 


557 


out  from  Macedonia  at  once  by  Amyntas  to  join  Alexander,  and  to 
be  added  to  the  company  at  Babylon.  At  the  same  time  the  mor- 
tality amona:  them  was  piobably  considerable;  since,  in  accompan\^- 
m^  Alexander,  ihcy  endured  even  more  than  the  prodigious  fali<Tues 
which  he  imposed  upon  himself.  The  training  in  this  coriis  M^as  a 
preparation  tirst  for  becoming  Body-Guards  of  Alexander— next 
tor  appointment  to  the  great  and  important  military  command'?' 
Accordmgly,  it  had  been  the  first  stage  of  advancement  to  most  of 
the  Diadochi,  or  great  officers  of  Alexander,  who  alter  his  death 
carved  kingdoms  for  themselves  out  of  his  conquests. 

It  was  thus  that  the  native  3Iacedouian  force  was  enlarired  and 
diversified  by  Pliilip,  inchiding  at  iiis  death:— 1.  The  phalanx   Foot- 
companions,  or  general  mass  of  heavy  infantrv,  drilled  to  the  use  of 
the  long  two-handed  pike  or  .<aii.ssa— 2.  The' Hypaspists,  or  li'diter- 
armed  corps  of  foot-guards— 3.  Tiie  companions,  or  heavy  cavalrv, 
the  ancient  indigenous  force  consisting  of  the  more  opulent  or  sub- 
stantial 3Iacedonians— 4   The    lighter  cavalry,  lancers,   or  Sarisso- 
phori.^    With  these  were  joined  foreign  auxiliaries  of  jrreat  value 
The  Tlicssalians.  whom  l-'iiilip  had  partlv  subjuuated  "and  p:u-tly 
gained  over,  furnishe<l  him  with  a  body  of  heavy  cavalry  not  inferior 
to  the  native  31acedonian.     From  various  parts  of  Greece  he  derived 
hoplites,  volunteers  taken  into  his  pay,  armed  with  the  full-sized 
sluehi  and  one-handed  pike.     From  the  warlike  tribes  of  Thracians 
Pieonians,   Illyrians,  etc.,   whom   he  had   subdued  around  him   he 
levied  contingents  of  light  troops  of  various  descriptions,  peltasts, 
bowmen,  darters,  etc.,  all  excellent  in  their  way,  and  eminently  ser- 
viceable to  his  combinations,  in  conjunction  with  the  heavier  masses. 
Lastly,  Philip  had  completed  his  militarv  arrangements  by  organiziuo- 
what  may  be  called  an  etfective  siege-train  for  sieges  as  well  as  for 
battles;  a  stock  of  projectile  and  battering  machines',  superior  to  any- 
thing at  that  time  extant.     Wo  find  this  artillery  used  by  Alexander 
in  the  very  first  year  of  his  reign,  in  his  campaign  against  the  lily- 
nans.     Even  in  his  most  distant  Indian  marches,  he  either  carried  it 
with  him,  or  had  the  means  of  constructing  new  enaines  for  the 
occasion.     There  was  no  part  of  his  military  equipment  more  essen- 
tial to  his  conquests.     The  victorious  sieges  of  Alexander  are  amouff 
his  most  memorable  exploits. 

To  all  this  large,  multifarious  and  systematized  array  of  actual 
force,  are  to  be  added  the  civil  establislunents,  the  depots,  magazines 
of  arms,  provision  for  remounts,  drill  olficers  and  adjutant?,  etc., . 
indispensable  for  maintaining  it  in  constant  trainiun;  and  efllciencv.' 
At  the  time  of  Philip's  accession,  Pella  was  an  unimportant  place; 
at  his  death,  it  was  not  only  stromr  as  a  fortification  and  place  of 
deposit  for  regal  treasure,  but  also  the  permanent  center,  war-ofllce 
and  training  quarters,  of  the  greatest  military  force  then  known! 
I  he  military  registers  as  well  as  the  traditions  of  Macedonian  disci- 
pline were  preserved  there  until  the  fall  of  the  jjiooarchy.     Philip 


558  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

Irui  enployed  bis  life  in  organizing  this  powerful  instrument  of 
;  ninion  His  revenues,  large  as  they  were,  both  from  mmes  and 
fi^onXtarv' conquests,  hacfbeen  exhausted  m  tl;e  work  so  that  he 
iTler^t  his  decease  a  debt  of  500  talents.  But  his  son  Alexander 
fmmd  the  instrument  ready-made,  with  excellent  o&cers,  and  trained 
veterans  for  the  front  ranks  of  his  phalanx.     • 

This  scientific  organization  of  military  force,  on  a  large  scale  and 
with  all  the  varietic^s  of  arming  and  equipment  made  to  co-operate  for 
one  end  is  the  great  fact  of  Macedonian  history.  Nothin-  ofthe 
same  kind  and  mai^Miitudeh^^^^  been  seen.     The  Macedo- 

n  ms  Uke  Epirots%nd  .Elolians.  had  no  other  aptitude  or  marking 
n  ;'dL  exccM)t  those  of  soldiership.     Their  rude  and  scattered  tribes 
2rfnfest   no  definite   political   institutions   and  little  sentiment   o 
Snalbr(>therhood;  their  union  was  manly  that  of  occasional 
fdlow<hip   in   arms  under  the   king  as   chief.     Philip  the  son  of 
\m^tas  was  the  first  to  organize  this  military  union  into  a  system 
permanently  and  efficaciously  operative,  achieving  by  means  of  i 
J^^nmiests  such  as  to  create  in  the  3Iacedonians  a  common  pride  of 
t^nSy   n  a  i.s,  which  served  as  substitute  for  political  institu- 
S^o^^^^^^^  Such  pride  Tvas  still  further  exalted  by  the 

re dysu^'hunian  career  of  Alexander.  The  Macedonian  kingdom 
was  nohing  but  a  well- combined  military  machine,  illustrating  the 
Wsi^tible  supeiioritv  of  the  rudest  men,  trained  in  arms  and  con- 
uSed  l)  a  Tl  le  general,  not  merely  over  undiscipl  ned  multitudes, 
imt  also  over  free,   courageous,   and  disciplined  citizenship,   with 

Iiin-hly  gifted  intelligence.  ,      ,    *       ,•         t  rri,«i.oc! 

During  the  winte?  of  335-334  B.C.,  after  the  destruction  of  Thebes 
and  nie  ?eturn  of  Alexander  from  Greece  to  Pella  his  fina  prepara- 
?  ons  ^^Tre  made  for  the  Asiatic  expedition.  The  Macedonian  army, 
with  Tl^  anxiliarv  contingeiUs  destined  for  this  enterprise,   were 

roug      togt^her  Varly  in  the  spring.     Antipater,  one  of  the  oldest 

nd  fblest  cflticers  of  Philip,  was  appointed  to  act  as  viceroy  of  Mace^ 
Ionia  during  the  king's  absence.     .\  military  force,  stated  at  12,0^ 

ufanti  V  an(i  1500  ( avalry,  was  left  with  him  to  keep  down  the  cities 
of  Greece  to  resist  acgressions  from  the  Persian  fleet,  and  o  repress 
d  sc^ntenis  at  home:°  Such  discontents  were  likely  to  be  instigated 
Inleading  Macedonians  or  pretenders  to  the  throne  especially  as 
A'lexandef  had  no  direct  heir:  and  we  are  told  that  An  ipater  and 
P-  rmenio  advised  postponement  of  the  expedition  until  the  young 
kin"  coidd  1^^  behind  him  an  heir  of  his  own  lineage.  Alexander 
ove?ru  ed  hese  representations,  yet  he  did  not  disdain  to  lessen  the 
peril'  at  home  by  putting  to  death  such  men  as  he  principally  feared 
Tm  .Uu  "d,  especially"the  kinsmen  of  Philip's  last  wife  Kleopatra 
Of^he  dependent  tribis  around,  the  most  energetic  chiefs  acconv 
mnied  his  army  into  Asia,  either  by  their  own  preference  or  at  his 

iqu  sitk^n  \fter  these  precautions,  the  tranquility  of  Macedonia 
wrSlvus4^d4<>44i^  ^rudiHoe  and  fi<ielity^f  A^t, pater,  ^vhich  we 
still  further  insured  by  the  fact  that  three  of  his  sons  accompanied 


MARCH   TO   THE  HELLESPONT. 


550 


the  king  s  army  and  person.  Though  unpopular  in  his  deportment 
An  ipater  discharged  the  duties  of  his  very  respon.sible  position  with 
zeal  and  jibihty ;  notwithstanding  the  dangerous  enmity  of  Olvmnias 
against  whom  he  sent  many  complaints  to  Alexander  wJien  in  Vsia' 
while  she  on  her  side  wrote  frequent  but  unavailing  letters  with  a 
view  to  rum  lum  in  the  esteem  of  her  son.  After  a  long  period  (,f 
uuahated  confidence,  Alexander  began  during  the  last  vears  of  his 
hfc  to  dislike  and  mistrust  Antipater.  He  always  treated  (Jlympias 
with  the  greatest  respect;  trying  however  to  restmin  her  from 
meddling  with  palitieal  affairs,  and  complaining  sometimes  of  her 
imperious  exigencies  and  violence. 

The  army  intended  for  Asia,  having  been  assembled  at  Pella  was 
conducted  by  Alexander  himself  first  to  Amphipolis,  where  it  crossed 
the  htrymon;  next  along  the  road  near  the  coast  to  the  river  Nestus 
and  to  the  towns  of  Abdera  and  Maroneia;  then  tlirou"-h  Thrace 
across  the  rivers  Hebrus  and  Melas;  lastly,  through  the' Th-aeian 
Chersonese  to  Sestos.  Here  it  was  met  by  his  fieet,  eonsistino-  of  160 
triremes,  with  a  number  of  trading  vessels  besides,  made  ud  in  larffe 
proportions  from  contingents  furnished  by  Athens  and  Grecian  citils 
1  lie  passage  of  the  whole  army-infantry,  cavalry,  and  machines,  on 
ships,  across  the  strait  from  Sestos  in  Europe  to  Abydos  in  Asia- 
was  superintended  by  Parmenio,  and  accomplished  without  either 
ditticulty  or  resistanee  But  Alexander  himself,  separating  from  the 
army  at  besto.s,  went  down  to  Elseus  at  the  southern  extremitv  of  the 
Caersonese.  Here  stood  the  chapel  and  sacred  precinet  of  tlie  hero 
1  rotesilaus  who  was  slain  by  Hektor;  having  been  the  first  Greek 
(according  to  the  legend  of  the  Trojan  war)  who  touched  the  shore  of 
iroy.  Alexander,  whose  imagination  was  then  full  of  Homeric 
reminiscences,  offered  sacrifice  to  the  hero,  praying  that  his  own 
disembarkation  might  terminate  more  auspiciously. 

Hetlien  sailed  across  in  the  admiral's  trireme,' steerino' with  his 
own  hand,  to  the  landing-place  near  Ilium   called  the  Harbor  of 
he  Achasans.     At  mid-channel  of  the  strait,  he  sacrificed  a  bull  with 
hbation.s  out  of  a  golden  goblet,  to  Poseidon  and  the  Nereids     'Him- 
self too  in  full  armor,  he  was  the  first  (like  Protesilaus)  to  tread  the 
Asiatic  shore;    but  he  found  no  enemy  like  Hektor  to  meet  him 
Jrom  hence,  mounting  the  hill  on  which  Ilium  was  placed,  he  sacri- 
ficed to  the  patron-goddess  Athene;  and  deposited  in  her  temple  his 
own  panoply  taking  in  exchange  some  of  the  arms  said  to  have  been 
worn  by  the  heroes  in  the  Trojan  war,  whieh  he  caused  to  be  carried 
by  guards  along  with  him  in  his  subsequent  battles.     Amono-  orhei\ 
real  or  supposed   monuments  of  this  interesting  leirend   the"'  Ilians 
showed  to  him  the  residence  of  Priam  with  its  altar  of  Zeus  Herkeios 
where  that  unhappy  old  king  was   alleged  to  haVe  been  slain  by 
JNeoptolemus.     Numbering  Neoptohanus  amgng  his  ancestors,  Alex^- 
ander  felt  himself  to  be  the  object  of  Priam's  yet  unappea^ed  wrath- 
and  accordingly  offered  sacrifice  to  him  at  the  same  altar  for  the 
purpose  of  expiation  and  reconcUiatlon.     On  the  tomb  and  monu- 


560  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

n^ental  column  of  Achilles,  father  of  Ncoptolenius,  he  not  only  plnccd 
^decoritive^'-ar^^  but  also  ^vcnt  through  the  customary  ceremony 
of  aSn- hin  L^^  winning  naked  up  to  it:  cxclainnng 

r/oH  uch  le  ?nvk-^  the  lot  of  Achilles,  Avho  had  been  blest  dunng 
f^  Tith  1  fa  thful  friend,   and  after  death  Avith  a  grent  poet  to 
r^febmte  hi.  e^^^^^^^^         La.ly,  to  commemorate  his  crossing.  Alex- 
ander c^ce^^^^^^^^  ^'ItaV;  in  honor  of  Zeus,  Atlu^ne,  and    lenv 
kles ;  both  on  the  point  of  Europe  ^^hich  his  ai my  had  ciuitted,  and 
nn  tlVit  of  \'*ra  where  it  had  landed.  ^ 
T  e  procee  ings   of   Alexander,  on  the  ever-memorable  site  of 
Tlirm   m^  ntcrelunir  as  thev  reveal  one  side  of  his  in.pos.rg  c barae- 
tl      the  Vin  of  1  i^^^          svmpatby  and  religious  scnnment  vvhcrein 
^^^ns  "c^  ^g  annlogy  with  the  Greeks     The  yo^^?  ^"- 
i^i^n  mhice  had  nothin-  of  that  sense  of  correlative  right  and  obhga- 
Hon  Si  c laracterizJd  the  free  Greeks  of  the  city  comnulmO^ 
Vut  he  w'ls  in  many  points  a  reproduction  of  tlie  heroic  Greeks   his 
w^  lil  e  nn^^^^^             le^rend,  Achilles  and  Neoptolemus.  and  others 
of  1- 1  Jakk  race  unparalleled  in  the  attributes  of  force-a  man  of 
V  olei  1 1^^^^^^^^^                  directions,  sometimes  generous,  c;f  en  vindic- 
tivc-airnt   n  1  iVindiviclual  affections  both  of  love  and  hatred,  but 
dlvmm^  especially  by  an  inextinguishable  pugn.eity.  appetite  for 
cc^no   e-^r  ancT  t   irst  for  establishing  at  all  c-ost  his  superiority  ot 
foTover  oth^                    i^L^at  sibi  nata.  nihil  non  arrogat  armis  - 
t  d- hi-  nri(?e    not  simply  in  Victorious  generalship  and  directicm  of 
hVarnfs  of  scMiers,   but  also  in  the   personal   forwardness  ot  an 
llon^edc  chi(  f  the  foremost  to  encounter  both  danger  and  hardship 
To  d  spo^i   oni  resembling  those  of  Achilles.  Alexander  indeed  adcd 
ot?e  Xbute  of  a  far  lii-her  order.     As  a  general,  he  surpassed    us 
Zt  in  nr  V  dent  and  even  long-sidited  combinations.    A\  ith  al    us 
^^^co^a^'^san^uir^  temper,  -Uiing  was  c..^^^ 
in  the  way  of  systematic  military  precaution.    Thus  "^"^h  lie  noi 
rowecl   thou-h  with  many  improvements  of  his  own,  from  Grecian 
intelligence  Ss  a             to  soldiership.    But  the  character  and  dispo- 
smons'  which   he  tc,ok  with  him  to  Asia,   had  the  features    both 
sinking  amrrepu'sive,  of  Achilles,  rather  than  those  of  Agesilaus  or 

^TheTrmt'when  reviewed  on  the  Asiatic  shore  after  its  crcjssing, 
pn^eiuecl  a 'total  of  30,000  infantry,  and  4,500  cavalry,  thus  distrib- 

lUed: — 

Infantry. 

12  000 
Macedoriin  phalanx  and hypaspists •  •  •      -^^ 

Alhes 5  000 

Mercenaries J 

Under  the  command  of  Parmenio ;  v,; ' '  '• VfkK) 

OdI•^  s.iaus:  Triballi  (b^th  Tbracians),  and  Illynans 5.000 

Agnaue^aud  archers '_ 

Total  Infantry ^0,000 


TOTAL  OF  MACEDONIAN  ARMY  IN  ASIA. 


561 


Cavalry. 

^racedonian  heavy— rmder  Philotas  son  of  Parmenio l.t)0O 

Thcs:-;alian  (aLso  heavy)— under  KaUas i^5ijo 

I^Iisc'clluneous  Grecian— under  Erifryius 'ooo 

Thraciau  and  Paeouian  (hglitj— under  Kassander 900 

Total  Cavalry 4,500 

Such  seems  the  most  trustworthy  enumeration  of  Alexander's  first 
invading  army.  There  were  liow(;ver  other  accounts,  the  highest  of 
which  staled  as  much  as  43,000  infantry  with  4.000  cavalry.  Besides 
tiiese  troops,  also,  there  must  have  been  an  elfective  traiii  of  projec- 
tile machines  and  engines,  for  battles  and  sieges,  which  we  siiail 
soon  lind  in  operation.  As  to  money,  the  military  chest  of  Alex- 
:nider,  exhausted  in  part  by  profuse  donatives  to*^  his  Macedonian 
ollicers,  was  ns  ]ioorly  furnished  as  that  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte  on 
first  entering  Italy  for  his  brilliant  campaign  of'lTDO.  According  to 
Aristobulus,  he  had  wiih  him  only  seventy  talents;  according  to 
another  authority,  no  inoi-e  than  the  means  of  inaintainiiig  his  army 
for  thirty  days.  Nor  had  he  even  been  able  to  bring  togeilier  his 
auxiliaries,  or  complete  the  outfit  of  his  army,  without  incurrino,-  a 
debt  of  800  talents,  in  addition  to  that  of  500^  talents  contracted  bv 
his  father  Philip.  Though  Plutarch  wonders  at  the  smallness  of  the 
force  with  which  Alextuider  contemphited  the  execution  of  such 
great  projects,  yet  the  fact  is.  that  in  infantry  he  was  fnr  above  any 
force  wiiich  the  Persians  had  to  oppose  hini;  not  to  speak  of  coni- 
pirative  discipline  and  organization,  surpassing  even  that  of  the 
Grecian  mercenaries,  who"  formed  the  only  good  infantry  in  the 
Persian  .service;  while  his  cavalry,  though  inferior  as  to  number, 
was  superior  in  quality  and  in  the^shock  of  close  combat. 

Most  of  the  olhcers  exercising  important  command  in  Alexan- 
der's army  were  native  Macedonians.  His  intimate  personal  friend 
Hephasstion,  as  well  as  his  body-guards  Leonnatus  and  Lysimachus, 
were  natives  of  Pella:  Ptolemy  the  son  of  Lagus,  and  Pithon,  were 
Eordians  from  Upper  Macedonia;  Kraterus  and  Perdikkas,  from  the 
djstrict  of  Ui)per  Macedonia;  called  Orestis;  Ai)tii)ater  witii  his  son 
Kassander,  Kleitus  son  of  Dropides,  Parml'uio  with  his  two  sons 
Philotas  and  Nikanor,  Seleukus.  Kamus,  Amyntas,  Philippus  (these 
tw^o  last  names  were  borne  by  more  than  oiie  person),  Antlgonus, 
Neoptolrmus,  Meleager,  Peukestes.  etc.,  all  these  seem  to  have  been 
native  Macedonians.  All  or  most  of  them  had  been  trained  to  war, 
under  Philij),  in  whose  service  Parmenio  and  Antipater  especially, 
had  occui)ied  a  high  rank. 

Of  the  many  Greeks  in  Alexander's  service,  we  hear  of  few  in 
important  station.  Medius,  a  Thessalian  from  Lariss:i,  was  among 
his  famiii.ir  companions;  but  the  ablest  and  most  distinguished  of  all 
was  Eumenes,  a  native  of  Kardia  in  the  Tliraciau  Chei^onese.  Eu- 
menes,  combining  an  excellent  Grecian  education  with  bodily  activ- 
ity and  enterprise,  had  attracted  when  a  young  man  the  notice  of 


562 


ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


Philip  and  had  hcen  appointed  as  his  secretary.  After  discharging 
these  duties  for  seven  years  until  the  death  of  Phihp.  he  was  con- 
tinned  bv  Alexander  in  the  post  of  chief  secretary  during  the  ^vhole 
of  that  kin"-'s  life.  He  conducted  most  of  Alexander's  correspond- 
ence/and  the  dailv  record  of  his  proceedings,  which  was  kept  un- 
der the  name  of  the  Royal  Ei)hemerides.  But  though  his  special 
duties  were  thus  of  a  civil  character,  he  was  not  less  eminent  as  an 
officer  in  the  held.  Occasionally  intrusted  with  high  miiilary  com- 
mand he  received  from  Alexander  signal  recompenses  and  tokens  of 
esteem  In  spite  of  these  great  qualities— or  perhaps  in  consequence 
of  them— he  was  the  object  of  marked  jealousy  and  dislike  on  the 
part  of  the  Macedonians— from  Hephirstiou  the  friend,  and  Aeop- 
tolemus  the  chief  armor-bearer  of  Alexander,  down  to  the  principal 
soldiers  of  the  phalanx.  Neoptolemus  despised  Eumenes  as  an  un 
warlike  penman.  The  contemptuous  pride  witli  which  Macedonians 
had  now  come  to  look  down  on  Greeks,  is  a  notable  characteristic  of 
the  victorious  army  of  Alexander,  as  well  as  a  new  feature  in  his- 
tory retorting  the  ancient  Hellenic  sentiment,  in  which  Demosthe- 
nes a  few  years  before,  hatl  indulged  toward  the  Macedonians. 

Thouidi  Alexander  had  been  aUowed  to  land  in  Asia  unopposed, 
an  armv  was  already  assembled  under  the  Persian  satraps  within  a 
few  davs' march  ol'' Abydos.     Since  the  reconquest  of  Egypt  and 
Phenicia.  about  eiuht  or  nine  years  before,  by  the  Persian   king 
Ochus   the  power  of  that  empire  had  been  restored  to  a  point  equal 
to  any'anterior  epoch  since  the  repulse  of  Xerxes  from  Greece.    Ihe 
Persian  successes  in  Eirypt  had  been  achieved  mainly  by  the  arms  of 
Greek  mercenaries,  uiufer  the  conduct  and  through  the  craft  of  the 
Rhodian  ireneral  Mentor;  who,  being  seconded  by  the  preponderant 
influence  \)f  the  eunuch  Bagoas,  confidential  minister  of  Ochus,  ob- 
tained not  only  ample  presents,  but  also  the  appointment  of  military 
commander  on  the  Hellespont  and  the  Asiatic  sea-board.     He  pro- 
cured the  recall  of  his  brother  Memnon,  who  with  his  brolher-in-law 
Artabazus  had  been  obliired  to  leave  Asia  from  unsuccessful   revolt 
ao-ainst  the  Persians,  and  had  found  shelter  with  Philip.     He  further 
sSbdued.  by  force  or  bt  fraud,  various  Greek  and  Asiatic  chieftains 
on  the  Asiatic  coast;  among  them  the  distinguished  Heimeias,  triend 
of  Aristotle,  and  master  of  the  strong  post  of  Atarneus.     1  hese  suc- 
cesses of  Mentor  seem  to  have   occurred  about   843  r..c.      He.  and 
liis  brother  INIemnon  after  him,  uphehl  vigorously  the  authority  of 
the  Persian  king  in  the  regions  near  the  Hellespont.     It  was  prob- 
ably by  them  that  troops  were  sent  across  the  strait  both  to  rescae 
the  besieged  town  of  Perinthus  from  Philip,  and  to  act  against  tnat 
prince  in  other  parts  of  Thrace;  thai  an  Asiatic  chief,  who  was  in- 
tri"-nin'T  to  facilitate  Philip's  intended  invasion  of  Asia,  was  seized 
and  sent  prisoner  to  the  Persian  court ;  and  that  envoys  from  Athens, 
solicitinir  aid  against  Philip,  were  forwarded  to  the  same  place. 
Ochus"  though  successful  in  regiiining  the  full,  extent  of  Persian 


PREPARATIONS  OF  DARIUS  FOR  DEFENSE.     563 

dominion,  was  a  sanguinary  tyrant,  who  shed  by  wholesale  the  blood 
of  his  family  and  courtiers.  "About  the  year  3o8  B.C.,  he  died  poi- 
soned by  the  eunuch  Bagoas,  who  placed  upon  the  throne  Arses,  one 
of  the  king's  sons,  killing  all  the  rest.  After  two  years,  however, 
Bagoas  conceived  mistrust  of  Arses,  and  put  him  to  death  also! 
together  with  all  his  children:  thus  leaving  no  direct  descendant  of 
the  regiil  family  .'dive.  He  then  exalted  to  the  throne  one  of  his 
friends  named  Darius  Codomannus  (descended  fnmi  one  of  the 
brothers  of  Artaxerxes  Mnenion),  who  had  acquired  glory,  in  a 
recent  war  against  the  Kadusians,  by  killing  in  single  combat  a 
formidable  champion  of  llie  enemy's  army.'  Presently,  however, 
Bagoas  attempted  to  poison  Darius  also;  but  the  latter,  detecting  the 
snare,  forced  him  to  drink  the  deadly  draught  himself.  In  spite  of 
such  murders  and  change  in  the  line  of  succession,  which  Alexander 
afterward  reproached  to  Darius,  the  authority  of  Darius  seems  to 
have  bf.'en  recognized,  without  any  material  opposition,  throughout 
all  the  Persian  empire. 

Suc^'ceding  to  the  throne  in  the  early  part  of  b.c.  336,  when 
Philip  was  organizing  the  projected  invasion  of  Persia,  and  when  the 
first  Macedo'dan  division  under  Parmenio  and  Attains  was  already 
making  war  in  Asia,  Darius  prepared  measures  of  defense  at  home, 
and  tried  to  encourage  anti-Macedonian  movements  in  Greece.  On 
the  assassination  of  Philip  by  Pausanias,  the  Persian  king  publicly 
proclaimed  himself  (probably  untruly)  as  haviuG:  instisrated  the  deed, 
and  alluded  in  contempt  jous  terms  to  the  youthful  Alexander.  Con- 
ceiving the  danger  from  Micedonia  to  be  passed,  he  imprudently 
slackened  his  efforts  and  withheld  his  supplie.^.  during  the  first 
months  of  Alexander's  reign,  when  the  latter  might  have  been  seri- 
ously embarrassed  in  Greece  and  in  Europe  by  the  effective  employ- 
ment of  Persian  ships  and  money.  But  the  recent  successes  of 
Alexander  in  Thrace,  Illyria,  and  Boeotia  satisfied  Darius  that  the 
danger  was  not  pjissed,  so  that  he  resumed  his  preparations  for  de- 
fense. The  Phenician  fleet  w^as  ordered  to  be  equipped;  the  satraps 
in  Phrygia  and  Lydia  got  together  a  considerable  force,  consisting  in 
part, of  Grecian  mercenaries;  while  Memnon,  on  the  sea-board,  was 
furnished  with  the  means  of  taking  5,000  of  these  mercenaries  under 
his  separate  command. 

We  cannot  trace  with  any  exactness  the  course  of  these  events 
during  the  nineteen  months  between  Alexander's  accession  and  his 
landing  in  Asia  (August  386  b.c.  to  March  or  April  334  B.C.).  We 
learn  generally  that  Memnon  was  active  and  even  aggressive  on  the 
north-eastern  coast  of  the  .Egean.  Marching  northward  from  his  own 
territory  (the  region  of  Assus  or  Atarneus  skirting  the  Gulf  of  Adra- 
myttium)  across  the  range  of  Mount  Ida,  he  came  suddenly  upon 
the  town  of  Kyzikus  on  the  Propontis.  He  failed,  however,  though 
only  by  a  little,  in  his  attempt  to  surprise  it,  and  w^as  forced  to  con- 
tent himself  with  a  rieh  booty  from  the  district  around.     The  Mace- 


564 


ASIATIC   CAMPAIGNS   OF  ALEXANDER. 


(Ionian  cencrals  Parmcnio  and  Knllas  had  crossed  into  Asia  with 
bo      H  of  troops.    Par,neuio,.  actin.,^  in  .Eolis,  took  G^T nmm   but  ^^^a3 
CO    ix'lled  by  Meninon  to  raise  the  siege  of  Pilanc;  while  Kabas 
h?  Ihe  Tioad,  v.'as  aUacked,  defeated,  and  compelled   to  retire  to 

^X'e\Zs  see  that  during  the  season  preeeding  tl^ebmjing  of  Alex- 
ander the  Persians  ^vere  in  considerable  force,  and  .Memnon  both 
;  r  ve  ad  successful  even  against  the  Macedonian  generals  on  the 
V  tXu  north-east  of  the  ^gean.  This  may  hdp  to  explain  that  fata 
imDrudence  whereby  the  Persians  permitted  Alexander  to  cair> 
ovrrwilhou't  opposition  his  grand  arniy  int._^ia.^inJ^he^^siMing  d 


f 
<1S4  B  c  Tliev  possessed  ample  means  of  fiiaidiiig  Hie  Hellespont 
1.^  U,ey  chosen  to  bring  up  their  fleet,  ^vhi,  h  comprising  as  it  did 
he  S  of  the  Phenictu,  t.nvns,  was  decide,  ly  superior  to  ay 
^i^fva  arm:^ent  at  the  disposal  ,.f  Alexander.  J  -  P'"-^""  «<^^  .^^^l 
ally  came  into  the  .EL-ean  a  tew  weeks  »f  ",^\?'''-  .^°'\,.f'''^u°t 
der's  designs  preparations,  and  even  mienoed  time  of  mauli.  must 
I,'ve  been  "ven  known  not  merely   to  JI.;mn.,n,  but    o   he  Per  lan 


l;;'^on;n?rv,"and  e::;;'ove;™li.rg  his  P-deut  advice  by  mistrustful 


ites.  rineoiniinrt'^,  imi-U'Ii^  -.  ^  v.-..v.. .  .^.-  ^ 

of  these  'men   w  ere  of  higli  rank  (denominated  kinsmen  of  D'-^f'^sX 
an<     di^tin-ui.hedfor  personal  valor.     The  greater   number  of   the 
n^mv^msisledof  cavaby,  including  ^ledes.  Baktrjans   Hyi^j^"^^^  ' 
Kappadokians,  Paphlagonians,   etc.     In   ^i^'^'^'^O^.^l^JX^^^   f  „^^ 
mmibered  Alexander;  but  their  infantry  was  "}^;.",f„\^\^^^^^^^^^^ 
ber  composed  however,  in  large  proportion.  <'l^''^^'''''^'''''-\l'^ll^t 
Th;  PcM-ian  total  is  given  b^Arrian  as  20  000  f  ^alry  and  neaily 
20.000  mercenary  foot!  by  Diodor.is  as  10,000  ^^^^^  7;;,^"  Z^^^^;,^^,^^?; 
fantrv  bv  Justin  even  at  600,000.  The  numbers  of  Arrian  aie  tlie  moie 
c^e^ble;^n  1^^^^^^^     Diodorus  the  total  of  infantry  is  certainly  much 
above  the  truth-tliat  of  cavalry  probably  below  it     ^  ^K^kion 

Memnon,  who  was  present  with  h  s  sons  and  with  his  own  duision 
eavnestlv  dissuaded  the  Persian  leaders  from  hazarding  ^  b'^^tle  Ke- 
mindin^  them  that  the  Macedonians  were  not  only  much  ^"Pf  nor  in 
Sfanr?.  but  also  encouraged  by  the  leadership  of  Alexander-he 
enforced  the  necessity  of  employing  their  numerous  cavalry  to  de- 
stroy the  fora-e  and  provisions,  and  if  necessary,  even  towns  them- 
seives-in  ord'ir  to  render  any  considerable  advance  of  the  invading 
force  impracticable.     While  keeping  strictly  on  the  defensive  m 


PLAN  ADVISED  BY  MEMNON. 


m5 


Asia,  he  recommended  that  aggressive  war  should  be  carried  into 
Macedonia;  tliat  the  fleet  should  be  brought  up,  v  powerful  land- 
force  put  aboard,  and  strenuous  etforts  made,  not  only  to  attack  the 
vulnerable  points  of  Alexander  at  home,  but  also  to  encourage  active 
hostility  against  him  from  the  Greeks  and  other  neighbors. 

Had  his  plan  been  energetically  executed  by  Persian  arms  and 
money,  we  can  hardly  doubt  that  Antipater  in  Macedonia  would 
speedily  have  found  himself  pressed  by  serious  dangers  and  embar- 
rassments, and  that  Alexander  would  have  been  forced  to  come  back 
and  protect  his  own  dominions;  perhaps  prevented  by  the  Persian 
fleet  from  bringing  back  his  whole  army.  At  jmy  rate,  his  schemes 
of  Asiatic  invasion  must  for  the  time  have  been  suspended.  But  he 
was  rescued  from  this  dilemma  by  the  ignorance,  pride,  and  pecuni- 
ary interests  of  the  Persian  leaders.  Unable  to  appreciate  Alexan- 
der's military  superiority,  and  conscious  at  the  same  time  of  their 
own  ])ers()nal  bravery,  they  repudiated  the  proposition  of  retreat  as 
dishonorable,  insinuating  that  Memnon  desired  to  prolong  the  war 
in  order  to  exalt  his  owu  importance  in  the  eyes  of  Darius.  This 
sentiment  of  military  dignity  was  further  strengthened  by  the  fact, 
that  the  Persian  military  leaders,  deriving  all  their  revenues  from 
the  land,  would  have  been  impoverished  by  destroying  the  landed 
]>roduce.  Arsites,  in  whose  territory  the  army  stood,  and  upon 
whom  the  scheme  would  iirst  take  elTect,  haughtily  announced  iliat 
he  would  not  permit  a  single  house  in  it  to  be  burned.  Occupying 
the  same  satrapy  asPharnabazus  had  possessed  sixty  years  before,  he 
felt  that  he  woul  I  be  redticed  to  the  same  straits  as  Pharnabazus 
under  the  pressure  of  Agesilaus — '*  of  not  being  able  to  procure  a  din- 
ner in  his  own  country."  The  proposition  of  Memnon  was  rejected, 
and  it  was  resolved  toiiwait  the  arrival  of  Alexander  on  the  banks  of 
tiie  river  Granikus. 

This  unimportant  stream,  commemorated  in  the  Iliad,  and  immor- 
talized by  iis  association  with  the  name  of  Alexander,  takes  its  rise 
from  one  of  the  heights  of  3L)unt  Ida,  near  Skepsis,  and  flows  north- 
ward into  the  Proponlis,  which  it  reaches  at  a  point  somewhat  east 
of  the  Greek  town  of  Pariuni.  It  is  of  no  great  depth;  near  the  point 
where  the  Persians  encamped,  it  seems  ^o  have  been  fordabie  in 
many  places;  but  its  right  bank  was  somewliat  high  and  sleep,'  thus 
clTering  obstruction  to  an  cjiemy's  attack.  The  Persians,  marching 
forward  from  Zeleia,  took  up  a  position  near  the  eastern  side  of  Uic 
Granikus,  where  the  last  declivities  of  Mount  Ida  descend  Into  the 
plain  of  Adrasteia,  a  Greek  city,  situated  between  Priapns  and 
Pariuui. 

Meanwhile  Alexander  marched  onward  toward  this  position,  from 
Arisbe  (where  he  had  reviewed  his  army) — on  the  first  day  to  Per- 
kote,  on  the  second  to  the  river  Praktius,  on  the  third  to  liermotus; 
receiving  on  his  way  the  spontaneous  surrender  of  the  town  of  Pria- 
pus.     Aware  that  the  enemy  was  not  far  distant,  he  threw  out  in  ad- 


r^m 


ASIATIC   CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


va"CL'  a  l)C(ly  of  scouts  under  Amyntas,  consisting  of  four  squad- 
rons of  lii-iit  cavalry  aud  one  of  tlie'heavy  Macedonian  (Companion) 
cavalry.  "From  IlJrinotus  (the  fourt}i  day  from  Arisbe)  ho  marclied 
toward  the  Granikus,  in  careful  order,  with  his  main  phalanx  in 
double  tiles,  his  cavalry  on  each  w'luy:,  and  the  baggage  in  the  rear. 
On  approaching  the  river,  he  made  his  dispositions  for  immediate 
attack,  thouirh  Parmenio  advised  waiting  until  the  next  morning. 
Knowing  well,  like  Memnon  on  the  other  side,  that  the  chances  of  a 
pitched  battle  were  all  against  the  Persians,  he  resolved  to  leave  them 
no  opportunity  of  decamping  during  the  night. 

In  Alexand*^er's  array,  the  })halanx  or   heavy  infantry  formed  the 
central  body.     The  six   Taxeis  or  divisions,  of  which  it  consisted, 
were  commanded (reekoniug  from  right  to  left)  by  Perdikkas,  Ka'nus, 
Amyntas  son   of   Andromenes,  Philii)pus.  Meleager,  and  Kraterus. 
Immedititelv  on  the  right  of   the   phalanx,  were   the  hypaspistje,  or 
light  infantry,  under  Nikanor  son  of  Parmenio— then  the  light  horse 
o? lancers,  the  Pteonians.  and  the  Apolloniate  squadron  of  Compan- 
ion cavalry  commanded  by  the  Ilarch  Sokrates,  all  under  Amyntas 
son  of  Arrhibieus— lastly  the  full  body  of  Companion  cavalry,  the 
bowmen  and   the  Agrianian  darters,  all  under  Philotas  (son  of  Par- 
menio), whose  division  formed  the  extreme  right.     The  left  flank  of 
the  phalanx  was  in  likenianner  protected  by  three  distinct   divisions 
of  cavalry  or  lighter  troops— first,  by  the  Thracians,  under  Agathon 
—next,  by  the  ciivalry  of  the  allies,  under  Philippus,  son  of  ^lenelaus 
—lastly,  l>y  the   Thessalian   cavalry,    under   Kallas,  whose  division 
formed  the  extreme  left.     Alexander  liimself  took  the  command  of 
the  ria:ht,  givinir  that  of  the  left  to  Parmenio;   by  right  and  left  are 
meant  the  two  halves  of  the  army,  each  of  them  including  three  Tax- 
eis or  divisions  of  the  phalanx  with  the  cavalry  on  its  flank— for  there 
was  no  recoiinized  center  under  a  distinct  command.     On  the  other 
side  of  the  Granikus,  the  Persian  cavalry  lined  the  bank.     The  Medes 
and  Baktrians  were  on  their  right,  under  Rheomithres— the  Paphla- 
gonians  and  Tlvrkanians  in  the*' center,  under  Arsites  and  Spithridatcs 
—on  the  left  \vere  Memnou  and  Arsamenes  with  their  divisions.  The 
Persian   infantry,  both   Asiatic  and   Grecian,  were  kept   back  in  re- 
serve: the  cayalry  alone  being  relied  upon  to  dispute  the  passage  of 
the  river. 

In  this  arrnv,  both  parties  remained  for  some  time,  -watching  each 
other  in  anxious  silence.  There  being  no  firing  or  smoke,  as  with 
modern  armies,  all  the  details  on  each  side  were  clearly  visible  to  the 
otlier;  so  that  the  Persians  easily  recognized  Alexander  himself  on 
the  Macedonian  right  from  the  splendor  of  his  armor  and  military 
costume,  as  well  as  from  the  respectful  demeanor  of  those  around 
him.  Their  principal  leaders  accordingly  thronged  to  their  own  left, 
which  they  re-enforced  with  the  main"  strength  of  their  cavalry,  in 
order  to  oppose  him  personally.  Presently  he  addressed  a  few  words 
of  encouragement  to  the  troops,  and  gave  the  order  for  advance.     He 


COURAGE  OF  ALEXANDER 


567 


directed  the  first  attack  to  be  made  by  t]ie  squadron  of  Companion- 
cavalry  whose  turn  it  was  on  that  day  to  take  the  lead — (the  squad- 
rons of  Apollonia,  of  which  Sokrates  was  captain — commanded  o!i 
this  day  by  Ptolem<Tus  son  of  Philippus)  supported  by  the  light  horse 
or  Lancers,  the  PMeonian  darters  (infantry),  and  ouc3  division  of  regu- 
larly armed  infantry,  seemingly  hypaspist.-e.  He  then  himself  en- 
tered the  river,  at  the  head  of  the  right  half  of  the  army,  cavalry  and 
infantry,  which  advanced  under  sound  of  trumpets  and  with  the 
usual  war-shouts.  As  the  occasional  dqpths  of  water  prevented  a 
straightforward  march  with  one  uniform  line,  the  Macedonians 
slanted  their  course  suitably  to  the  fordable  spaces;  kee|>iug  their 
front  extended  so  as  to  approach  the  opposite  bank  as  much  as  possi- 
ble in  line,  and  not  in  separate  columns  with  flanks  exposed  to  the  Per- 
sian cavalry.  Not  merely  the  right  under  Alexander,  but  also  the 
left  under  Parmenio,  advanced  and  crossed  in  the  same  movement 
and  under  the  like  precautions. 

The  foremost  detachment  under  Ptolemy  and  Amyntas,  on  reach- 
ing the  opposite  bank,  encountered  a  strenuous  resistance,  concen- 
trated as  it  was  here  upon  one  point.  They  found  Memnon  and  his 
sons  with  the  best  of  the  Persian  cavalr}^  immediately  in  their  front; 
some  on  the  summit  of  the  bank,  from  whence  they  hurled  down 
their  javelins — others  down  at  tlie  water's  edge,  so  as  to  come  to 
closer  quarters.  The  Macedonians  tried  every  effort  to  make  good 
their  landing,  and  push  their  way  by  main  force  through  the  Persian 
horse,  but  in  vain.  Having  both  lower  ground  and  insecure  footing, 
they  could  make  no  impression,  but  were  thrust  back  with  some  loss, 
and  retired  upon  the  main  body  which  Alexander  was  now  bringing 
across.  On  his  approaching  the  shore,  the  same  struggle  was  re- 
newed around  his  person  with  increased  fervor  on  both  sides.  He 
was  himself  among  the  foremost,  and  all  near  him  were  animated  by 
his  example.  The  horsemen  on  both  sides  became  jammed  together, 
and  the  contest  w^as  one  of  physical  force  and  pressure  by  man  and 
horse;  but  the  Macedonians  had  a  great  advantage  in  being  accus- 
tomed to  the  use  of  the  strong  close-fighting  pike,  while  the  Persian 
weapon  was  the  missile  javelin.  At  length  the  resistance  was  sur- 
mounted, and  Alexander,  with  those  around  him,  gradually  thrust- 
ing back  the  defenders,  made  good  their  way  up  the  high  bank  to  the 
level  ground.  At  other  points  the  resistance  was  not  equally  vigor- 
ous. The  left  and  center  of  the  Macedonians,  crossing  at  the  same 
time  on  all  practicable  spaces  along  the  whole  line,  overpowered  the 
Persians  ctationed  on  the  slope,  and  got  up  to  the  level  ground  with 
comparative  facility.  Indeed  no  cavalry  could  possibly  stand  on  the 
bank  to  offer  opposition  to  the  phalanx  with  its  array  of  long  pikes, 
wherever  this  could  reach  the  ascent  in  any  continuous  front.  The 
easy  crossing  of  the  Macedonians  at  other  points  helped  to  constrain 
those  Persians,  who  were  contending  with  Alexander  himself  on  the 
•slope,  to  recede  to  the  level  ground  above.  .... 


568 


ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER 


Here  ao-ain,  as  at  the  water's  cdse,  Alexander  was  foremost  m  per- 
sonal  couflict.  His  pike  having  been  broken,  he  lurnecl  to  a  soldier 
nearhim— Aretis,  oneof  the  horseguards  who  .Lienerally  aided  him 
in  mountimr  Ins  liorse— and  asked  for  anollier.  But  tliis  man,  having 
broken  Ids  pike  also,  showed  the  fra-ment  to  Alexander,  requesting 
him  to  ask  some  one  else;  upon  which  the  Corinthian  D.inaratus,  one 
of  the  C(»mpanion-cavalry  clo>e  at  hand,  gave  hini  his  weapon  instead. 
Thus  arnu-d  anew,  Alexander  spurred  his  horse  forward  against 
Mithridales  (son-in-law  of  Darius),  who  was  bringing  up  a  co.umn  ot 
cavalry  to  attack  him.  but  was  himself  considerably  m  advance  ot  it. 
Alexander  thrust  his  pike  into  the  face  of  ]\Iithridates  and  hud  him 
prostrate  on  the  ground;  he  then  turned  to  another  of  the  1  ersian 
leaders,  Rho'sakes,  who  struck  him  a  blow  on  the  head  with  his 
scimitar,  knocked  off  a  portion  of  his  l.elmet,  but  did  not  penetrate 
beyond.  Alexander  avenged  this  blow  by  thrusting  Khcesakes 
thfou'di  the  body  with  his  pike.  Meanwhile  a  third  Persian  leader 
Snithridates,  was  actuallv  close  behind  Alexander,  with  ham  ami 
scimitar  uplifted  to  cut  him  down.  At  this  critical  moment  Kleilus 
son  of  Dropides— one  of  the  ancient  otlicers  of  Philip,  high  in  the 
Macedonian  service-struck  with  full  force  at.  the  uplifted  arm  of 
Snithridates  and  severed  it  from  the  body,  thus  preserving  Alexan- 
der's life  Other  leadimr  Persians,  kinsmen  ot  Spithridates.  ruslied 
de^neratelv  on  Alexander,  who  received  many  blows  on  his  armor, 
and  was  in  much  dan-er.  But  the  efforts  of  his  companions  near 
were  redoubled,  both  to  defend  his  person  and  to  second  his  adven- 
turous daring.  It  was  on4hat  point  that  the  Persian  cavalry  was 
first  broken.  On  the  left  of  the  Macedonian  line,  the  Thcssalian  cav- 
alry also  fouo-ht  with  vigor  and  success;  and  the  light-armed  toot,  m- 
terminded  with  Alexander's  cavalry  generally,  did  great  damage  to 
the  enemy  The  rout  of  the  Persian  cavalry,  once  begun,  speedily 
became  general.  They  fled  in  all  directions,  pursued  by  the  Mace- 
donians. ,,-,-,.  1  e  •*. 

But  Alexander  and  his  officers  soon  checked  this  ardor  of  pursuit, 
callin<^  back  their  cavalry  to  complete  his  victory.  The  Persian  in- 
fantn^  Asiatics  as  well  as  Greeks,  had  remained  without  movement 
or  orders  looking  on  the  cavalry  battle  which  had  just  disastrously 
terminated.  To^hem  Alexander  immediately  turned  his  attention. 
He  brought  up  his  phalanx  and  hvpaspista)  to  attack  them  in  front 
while  his  cavalry  assailed  on  all  sides  their  unprotected  flanks  and 
rear-  he  himself  charged  with  the  cavalry,  and  had  a  horse  killed 
under  him  His  infantry  alone  was  more  numerous  than  they  so 
that  a"-ainst  su(;h  odds  the  result  could  hardly  be  doubtful.  The 
irreater  part  of  these  mercenaries,  after  a  valiant  resistance,  were  cut 
to  pieces  on  the  field.  We  are  told  that  none  escaped,  except  2,000 
made  prisoners,  and  some  who  remained  concealed  in  the  field  among 

the  dead  bodies.  ,  ,     -r^      .  ^ 

In  this  complete  and  signal  defeat,  the  loss  of  the  Persian  cavalry 


LOSS  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES. 


569 


was  not  very  serious  in  mere  number— for  only  1000  of  them  were 
slain.  But  tiie  slaughter  of  tlie  leading  Persians,  who  had  exposed 
themselves  with  extreme  bravery  in  the  personal  contlict  against  Al- 
exander, was  terrible.  There  were  slain  not  only  Mitliridates,  Rhoi- 
sakes.  Spithridates,  whose  names  have  been  already  mentioned, — but 
also  Pharuakes,  brother-in-la-w  of  Darius,  Mithrobarzanes  stit'rap  of 
Kai)pad()kia,  Atizyes,  Nipliates,  Petiues  and  others  ;  all  Persians  of 
rank  and  cons(^quence.  Arsites,  the  satrap  of  Phrygia,  whose  rash- 
ness had  mainly  caused  the  rejection  of  Memnon's  advice,  escaped 
from  the  field,  but  died  shortly  afterward  by  his  own  hand,  from 
anguish  and  humiliation.  The  Persian  or  Perso- Grecian  infantry, 
though  probably  more  of  them  individually  escaped  than  is  implied 
in  Arrian's  account,  was  as  a  body  irretrievably  ruined.  No  force 
was  either  left  in  the  field,  or  could  be  afterward  re-assembled  in 
Asia  Minor. 

The  loss  on  the  side  of  Alexander  is  said  to  have  been  very  small. 
Twenty-five   of  the  Companion-cavalry,  belonging  to   the  division 
under  i^tolemy  and  Amyntas,  were  slain  in  the  first  unsuccessful  at- 
tempt to  pass  tlie  river.    Of  the  other  cavalry,  sixty  in  all  were  slain  ; 
of  the  infantry,  thirty.     This  is  given  to  us  as  the  entire  loss  on  the 
side  of  Alexander.     It  is  only  the  number  of  killed  ;  that  of  the 
wounded  is  not  stated  ;  but  assuming  it  to  be  ten  times  the  number 
of  killed,  the  total  of  both  together  will  be  1265.     If  this  be  correct, 
the  resistance  of  the  Persian  cavalry,  except  near  that  point  where 
Alexander  himself  and  the  Persian  chiefs  came  into  conflict,  cannot 
have  been  either  serious  or  long  protracted.      But  when  we  add 
further  the  contest  with  the  infantry,  the  smalluess  of  the  total  as- 
signed for  Macedonian  killed  and  wounded  will  apjx'ar  still  more 
surprising.     The  total  of  the  Persian  infantry  is  stated  at  nearly 
20,000,  most  part  of  them  Greek  mercenaries.     Of  these  only  2,000 
were  made  prisoners  ;  nearly  all  the  rest  (according  to  Arrian)  were 
slain.     Now  the  Greek  mercenaries  were  well  armed,  and  not  likely 
to  let  themselves  be  slain  with  impunity;    moreover  Plutarch  ex- 
pressly aflirms  that   they  resisted  with  desperate  valor,  and  that 
most  of  the  Macedonian  loss  was  incurred  in  the  conflict  against 
them.     It  is  not  easy  therefore  to  co.-nprehend  how  the  total  number 
of  slain  can  be  brought  within  the  statement  of  Arrian. 

After  the  victory,  Alexander  manifested  the  greatest  solicitude  for 
his  wounded  soldiers,  whom  he  visited  and  consoled  in  person.  Of 
the  twenty-five  Companions  slain,  he  caused  brazen  statues,  by  Ly- 
sippus,  to  be  erected  at  Diiim  in  Macedonia,  where  thev  were  still 
standing  in  the  time  of  Arrian.  To  the  surviving  relatives  of  all  the 
slain  he  also  granted  immunity  from  taxation  and  from  personal  ser-' 
vice.  The  dead  bodies  were  honorably  buried,  those  of  the  enemy 
as  well  as  of  his  own  soldiers.  The  two  thousand  Greeks  in  the 
Persian  service  who  had  become  his  prisoners,  were  put  in  chains, 
and  transported  to  Macedonia  there  to  work  as  slaves  ;  to  which 


570  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

treatment  Alexander  condemned  them  on  the  .irround  that  they  had 
taken  arms  on  behalf  of  the  foreigner  against  Greece,  m  contraven- 
tion  of  the  general  vote  passed  by  the  synod  at  Cornitii.  At  tlie 
same  time,  he  sent  to  Athens  three  hundred  panophes  selected  frcHU 
the  *Doil  to  be  dedicated  to  Athene  in  the  acropolis  with  this  mscrip- 
tioii—"  Alexander,  sou  of  Philip,  and  the  Greeks  except  the  Lace- 
diemonians  {present  these  offerinfjs).  out  of  the  spoils  of  the  foreigners 
inhabiting  Asia."  Thou-h  the  vote  to  which  Alexander  appealed 
reore-ented  no  existing  Grecian  aspiration,  and  granted  only  a  sanc- 
tion which  could  not  be  saftlv  refused,  yet  he  found  satisfaction  m 
clothiii"-  his  own  self-aL^Jxrandizing  impulse  under  the  name  of  tv  sup- 
posed Pan-Hellenic  purpose  :  which  was  at  the  same  time  useful  as 
stren^nhenin^'-  his  hold  upon  the  Greeks,  who  were  the  only  persons 
comp'ctent.  cTlher  as  officers  or  soldiers,  to  uphold  the  Persian  empire 
ao•ain^t  him.  His  conquests  were  the  extinction  of  genuine  Hellen- 
ism thouo-h  thev  dillused  an  exterior  varnish  of  it,  and  especially  the 
Greek  iamjuaire',  over  much  of  the  Oriental  world.  True  Grecian  in- 
terests lav^more  on  the  side  of  Darius  than  of  Alexander. 

The  battle  of  the  Granikus,  brought  on  by  Arsites  and  the  other 
satraDS  contrary  to  the  advice  of  Memnon,  was  moreover  so  unskiU- 
fullv'fou'^ht  by  them,  that  the  gallantry  of  their  infantry,  the  most 
formidabte  corps  of  Greeks  that  had  ever  been  in  the  Persian  ser- 
vice was  rendered  of  little  use.     The  battle,  properly  speaking,  was 
fought  only  by  the  Persian  cavalry;  the  infantry  was  left  to  be  sur- 
rounded and  destroyed  afterward.  ..    ,     t 
No  victory  could  be  more  decisive  or  tcrror-stnking  than  that  ot 
Alexander      There  remained  no  force  in  the  held  to  oppose  him 
The  impression  made  by  so  irreat  a  public  catastrophe  was  enhanced 
by  two  accompanvimr  circumstances;  tirst.  by  the  number  ot  Per- 
sian "randees  who  ptTished,  realizing  almost  the  wailings  of  Atosa 
Xerxes  and  the  Chorus,  in  the  Persjcof  J!:schylus,  after  the  battle  ot 
Salamis— next  by  the  chivalrous  and  successful  prowess  of  Alexander 
himself   who,  emulating  the  Homeric  Achilles,  not  only  rushed  fore- 
most into  the  melee.  biU  killed  two  of  these  grandees  with  his  own 
hand      Such  exploits,  impressive  even  when  we  read  ot  them  now, 
must  at  the  moment  when  they  occurred  have  acted  most  power- 
fully upon  the  imad nation  of  contemporaries. 

Several  of  the  neighborinfi:  INlysian  mountaineers,  though  mutinous 
subiect^  toward  Persia,  came  down  to  make  submission  to  him,  and 
were  permitted  to  occupy  their  lands  under  the  same  tribute  as  they 
had  paid  before.  The  inhabitants  of  the  neighboring  Grecian  oily  ot 
Zeleia  whose  troops  had  served  with  the  Persians,  surrendered  and 
obtained  their  pardon;  Alexander  admitting  the  plea  that  they  had 
served  only  under  constraint.  He  then  sent  Parmenio  to  iittack 
Daskyliuin  the  stronghold  and  chief  residence  of  the  satrap  of  Phry- 
gia  Even  this  place  was  evacuated  by  the  garrison  and  surren- 
dered doubtless  with  a  considerable  treasure  therein.    The  whole  sa- 


MARCH  TO  THE  COAST. 


571 


trapy  of  Phrygia  thus  fell  into  Alexander's  power  and  was  appointed 
to  be  administered  by  Kallas  for  his  bc^half,  levying -the  same  amount 
ot  tribute  as  had  been  paid  before.     He  himself  then  marched   wirh 
his   main  force,  in  a  southeily  direction  toward  Sardis— the' chief 
town  of  Lydia-and  the  main  station  of  the  Persians  in  A>ia  .Alinor 
rhe  citadel  ot  bardis— situated  on  a  lofty  and  steep  rock  proiectiii''- 
from  Mount  Imolus,  fortified  by  a  triple  wall  with  an  adec.uate  "-ir- 
rison--was  accounted   impregnal)le,  and   at  any  rate   could   hanily 
have  been  taken  by  anything  less  than  a  long  blockade,  which  would 
have  allowed  time  for  the  arrival  of  the  fleet  and  the  operations  of 
Memnon.     let  such  was  the  terror  which   now   accompanied   the 
Macx3donmn  conqueror,  that  when  he  arrived  within  eight  miles  of 
Sardis,  he  met  not  only  a  deputation  of  the  chief  citizens,  but  also 
the  Persian  governor  of  the  citadel,  Mitlirines.     The  town   citadel 
garrison  and  treasure  were  delivered  up   to  him   without 'a  blow' 
fortunately  for  Alexander,  there  was  not  in  Asia  any  Persian  <^oy- 
ernor  of  courage  and  fldelity  such  as  had  been  disp'layed  bv  Mas- 
kames  am    Boges  after  the  repulse  of  Xerxes  from  Greece      (lex'ui- 
der  treated  Miihrines  with  courtesy  and  honor,  granted  freedom*  to 
he  Sardians  and  to  the  other  Lydians  generally,  with  the  use   of 
their  own  Lvdian  laws.     The  betrayal  of  Sardis  by  Mithrines  was  a 
Signal  good  fortune  to  Alexander.     On  goino;  up  to  the  citadel   he 
contemplated  with  astonishment  its  prodigioiis  stren-th-   con-nitu- 
ating    umself  on  so  easy   an  acquisition,\and  dving  di'rections   to 
build  there  a  temple  of  Olympian  Zeus,  on  the  spot  where  the  old 
palace  of  the  kings  of  Lydia  had  been  situated.     He  named  Pau^an- 
las  governor  of  the  citadel,  with  a  garrison  of  Peloponnesians  from 
.Argos;  Asander,  satrap  of  the  country;  and  Nikas,  collector  of  trib- 
ute.    The  freedom  gi-anted  to  the  Lydians,  whatever  it  may  have 
amounted  to  did  not  exonerate  them  from  paving  the  usual  tribute 
Irom  hardis   he  ordered  Kallas,  the  new  satrap  of  Hellespontine 
Phrygia-and  Alexander  son  of  Aeropus,  who  had  been  promoted  in 
place  of  Kallas  to  the  command  of  the  Thessalian  cavalry— to  attack 
Atarneus  and  the  district  belonging  to  Memnon,  on  the  Asiatic  const 
opposite   Lesbos       Meanwhile  he   himself  directed   his   march   to 
Ephesus   which  he  reached  on  the  fourth  day.     Both  at  Ephesus 
and  at  Miletus— the  two  principal  strongholds  of  the  Persians  on  the 
coast,  as  Sardis  was  in  the  interior— the  sudden  catastrophe  at  the 
Granikus  had  stmck  unspeakaUle  terror.     Heire<istratus,  croverr.or 
ot  the  I  ersian  garrison  (Greek  mercenaries)  at^Miletus,  sent  letters 
to  Alexander  otlenng  to  surrender  the  town  on  his  approach-  while 
the  garrison  at  Ephesus,  with  the  Macedonian  exile  Amyntas  'got  on 
board  two  triremes  in  the  harljor  and  fled.     It  appears  that  there  had 
been  recently  a  political  revolution  in  the  town,  conducted  by  Syr- 
phax  and  other  leaders,  who  had  establisiied  an  oligarchical  govern- 
ment.    These  men,  ])anishing  their  political  opponents,   had  com- 
mitted depredations  on  the  temple  of  Artemis,  overthrown  the  statue 


572 


ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


of  Philip  of  Maccdon  dedicated  therein,  and  destroyed  the  sepiilcher 
of  Heropvthiis  the  liberator  in  the  agora.  Some  of  the  party,  though 
abandoned  by  their  garrison,  were  still  trying  to  invoke  aid  trom 
]Memmou,  who  however  was  yet  at  a  distance.  Alexander  entered 
tlie  town  without  resistance,  restored  the  exiles,  established  a  demo- 
rratical  constitution,  and  directed  that  the  tribute  heretolore  paid  to 
the  PersiaiLS  should  now  be  paid  to  the  Ephesian  Artemis,  byrpliax 
and  his  familv  souirht  refucre  in  llie  temple,  from  whence  they  were 
dra<-'-ed  bv  the  peo^^le  and  stoned  to  death.  More  of  the  same  party 
woukUiave  been  dispatciied,  had  not  the  popular  vengeance  been 
restrained  by  Alexander;  who  displayed  an  honorable  and  pmdent 

^Thus  master  of  Ephesus,  Alexander  found  himself  in  communica- 
tion with  his  fleet,  under  the  conmiand  of  Nikanor;  and  received 
propositions  of  surrender  from  the  two  neidiborino-  inland  cities, 
ila^nesia  and  Tralleis.  To  occupy  these  cities,  i^^/^^-^rfl,;"^.^"^/;];*^ 
meniowith  o.OOO  foot  (half  of  them  Macedonians)  and  200  ot  tlie 
Companion-cavalrv;  while  he  at  the  same  time  sent  Antimachus  with 
an  equal  force  in  a  northerlv  direction,  to  liberate  the  various  cities 
of  .Eolic  and  Ionic  Greeks.  Tliis  otlicer  was  instructed  to  put  down 
in  each  of  them  the  riding  oligarchy,  which  acted  with  a  mercenary 
can-isonasan  instrument  of  Persian  Supremacy-to  place  the  govern- 
ment in  the  hands  of  the  citizens-and  to  abolish  all  paym.ent  ot 
tribute  He  himself— after  taking  part  in  a  solemn  testival  ana 
procession  to  the  temple  of  Ephesian  Artemis,  with  his  whole  army 
in  battle-arrav-marched  southward  toward  ^Sliletus:  his  fleet  under 
Nikanor  proceedim?  thither  by  sea.  He  expected  probably  to  enter 
Miletus  with  as  little  resistance  as  Ephesus.  But  his  hopes  were  clis- 
anpointed:  Heiresistratus.  commander  of  the  garrison  in  that  town, 
thou.di  under  the  immediate  terror  of  the  defeat  at  the  Granikus  he 
had  written  to  offer  submission,  had  now  altered  his  tone,  and  (.eter- 
mincd  to  hold  out.  The  formidable  Persian  fleet,  four  hundred  sail 
of  Pheuician  and  Cyprian  ships  of  war  with  well-trained  seamen,  was 

^^This  mlvjd  force,  which  a  few  weeks  earlier  would  have  prevented 
Alexander  from  crossing  into  Asia,  now  affordrd  the  only  hoy^e  ot 
arresting  the  rapiditv  and  ease  of  hi'^  conqu«'sts.  A\  hat  steps  had 
been  taken  bv  the  Pl-rsian  olflcers  since  the  defeat  at  the  (^ranilvus, 
TN-e  do  not  hear.  Many  of  them  had  fled,  along  with  Memnon  to 
Miletus;  and  they  were  probably  disposed,  under  the  present  des- 
perate circumstances,  to  accept  the  command  of  Memnon  as  tlieir 
oiilv  hope  of  safetv,  though  thev  had  despised  his  counsel  on  tlie  day 
of  the  battle  AVlWtlier  the  towns  in  :\Iemnon's  principality  of  Atar- 
neus  had  attempted  anv  resistance  against  the  Macedonians,  we  do 
not  know,  liis  interests  liowever  were  so  closely  identilied  vilh 
tho«e  of  Persia,  that  lie  had  sent  up  his  wife  and  children  as  host^ 
a^res  to  induce  Darius  to  intrust  him  with  the  supreme  conduct  of 


CAPTURE  OP  MILETUS. 


573 


the  war.  Orders  to  this  effect  were  presently  sent  down  by  that 
prince;  but  at  the  first  arrival  of  the  fleet,  "it  seems  not  to  liave 
been  under  the  command  of  Memnon,  who  was  however  probably 
on  board. 

It  came  too  late  to  aid  in  the  defense  of  Miletus.    Three  days  before 
its  arrival,  Nikanor  the  Macedonian  admiral,  with  his  flee't  of  one 
hundred  and  sixty  ships,  had  occupied  tlie  island  of  Lade,  which 
commanded  the  harbor  of  that  city.     Alexander  found  the  outer  por- 
tion of  Miletus  evacuated,  and  took  it  without  resistance.     He  was 
making  preparations  to  besiege  the  inner  city,  and  had  alreadv  trans- 
ported 4,000  troops  across  to  the  island  of  Lade,  wiieu  the  powerful 
Persianfleet  came  in  sight,  but  found  itself  excluded  from  Miletus, 
and  obliged  to  take  moorings  under  the  neighboring  promontory  of 
Mykale.     Unwilling  to  abandon  without  a  ^battle  the  command  of 
the  sea,  Parmeiiio  advised  Alexander  to   fight   this  fleet,   oirerin"- 
him-^elf  to  share  the  hazard  abounl.     But  Alexander  disapproved  the 
proposition,  alfirming  that  his  fleet  was  inferior  not  less  in  skill  lliau 
in  numbers;  that  the  high  training  of  the  Macedonians  would  tell  for 
nothing  on  shipboard;  and  tJmt  a  naval  defeat  would  be  the  signal 
for  insurrection  in  Greece.     Besidv-s  debating  such  prudential  reasons, 
Alexander  and  Parmenio  also  diifered  about  tlie  religious  promirse  of 
the  case.     On  the  sea-shore,  near  tlie  stern  of  the  Macedonian  ships, 
Parmenio  had  seen  an  eagle,  which  filled  him  with  confidence  that 
the  ships  would  prove  victorious.     But  Alexander  contended  that 
this   interpretation   was    incorrect.      Though    the    cade    doubtless 
promised  to  him  victory,  yet  it  had  been  seen  on  land— and  there- 
fore his  victories  would  be  on  land:  lience  the  result  signified  was, 
that  he  would  overcome  the  Persian  fleet,  by  means  of  land  opera- 
tions.    This  part  of  the  debate,  between  two  practical  military  men 
of  ability,  is  not  the  least  interesting  of  the  whole;  illustrating  as  it 
does,  not  only  the  religious  susceptibilities  of  the  age,  but  also  the 
pliancy  of  the  interpretative  process,  lending  itself  equally  well  to 
inferences  totally  opposite.     The  diiference  between  a  sagacious  and 
a  dull-witted  prophet,  accommodating  ambiguous  omens  to  useful  or 
mischievous  conclusions,   was  one  of  very 'material  importance  in 
the  ancient  world. 

Alexander  now  prepared  vigorously  to  assault  Miletus,  repudiating 
with  disdain  an  offer  brought  to  him  by  a  Milesian  citizen  named 
Glaukippus— that  the  city  should  be  neutral  and  open  to  him  as  well 
as  to  the  Persians.  His  fleet  under  Nikanor  occupied  the  harbor, 
blocked  up  its  narrow  mouth  against  the  Persians,  and  made  threaten- 
mg  demonstrations  from  the  water's  edge;  while  he  himself  brought 
up  his  battering-engines  against  the  w^alls,  shook  or  overthrew  them 
in  several  places,  and  then  stormed  the  citv.  The  Milesians,  with 
the  Grecian  mercenary  garrison,  made  a  brave  defense,  but'  were 
ovei-powered  by  the  impetuosity  of  the  assault.  A  large  number  of 
them  were  slain,  and  there  was  no  way  of  escape  except  by  jumpin<^ 


574  ASL\T1C  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

into  little  boats,  or  swimming  off  upon  the  hollow  of  the  shield. 
Even  of  these  fuiritives,  most  part  were  killed  by  the  seamen  ot  the 
Macedonian  triremes;  but  a  division  of  800  Grecian  mercenaries  got 
on  to  an  isolated  rock  near  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  and  there  pre- 
pared to  sell  their  lives  dearly.  Alexander,  as  soon  as  his  soldiers 
were  thoroudilv  masters  of  the  city,  went  himself  on  shipboard  to 
attack  the  nrerJenaries  on  the  ro(tk,  taking  with  him  ladders  in  order 
to  effect  a  landing  upon  it.  But  when  he  saw  that  they  were  resolved 
on  a  desperate  defense,  he  preferred  admitting  theni  to  terms  ot 
capitulation,  and  received  them  into  his  own  service.  To  the  surviv- 
ing Milesian  citizens  he  granted  the  condition  of  a  free  city,  while  He 
cau'^ed  all  the  remaining^prisoners  to  be  sold  as  slaves. 

The  powerful  Persian  tleet,  from  thu  neighboring  promontory  ot 
Mvkale  was  compelled  to  witness,  without  being  able  to  prevent,  the 
capture'of  Miletus,  and  was  presently  withdrawn  to  llahkarnassus. 
At  the  same  time  Alexander  came  to  the  re.-olution  of  disbanding  Ins 
own  fleet;  which,  while  costing  more  than  he  could  then  allo.rd,  was 
nevertheless  untit  to  cope  witli  the  enemy  in  open  sea.  He  e:ilcu- 
lated  that  by  concentraiing  all  his  efforts  on  land  oi)erations,  especially 
n^^aiust  the  cities  on  the  coast,  he  should  exclude  the  Persian  tleet 
i?om  all  effective  hold  on  Asia  Minor,  and  insure  that  counlry  to 
himself.  He  thtrefore  paid  off  all  the  ships,  retaining  only  a  mod- 
erate squadron  for  the  ])urposes  of  transport. 

Before  this  time,  prol)ablv,   tlie  ^hole  Asiatic  coast  northward  ot 
Miletus— includimx  the  Ionic  and  yEolic  cities  and  the  principality  ot 
]\Iemnon— had  either  accepted  willingly  the  dominion  of  Alexamier, 
or  had  been  reduced  bv  liis  detachments.     Accoriimgly  he  now  di- 
rected his  march  southward  of  Miletus,  toward  Karia,  and  especially 
toward  Halikarnassus,  the  principal  city  of  that  terrilory.     On  en- 
terinii  Karia,  he  was  met  by  Ada,  a  member  of  the  Ivanan  pnuceiy 
famiiv   who  tendered  to  him  her  town  of  Alinda  and  her  other  pos- 
sessions, adopting  him  r.s  her  son,  and  entrealinghis  protection.  JSot 
many  years  earlter.  under  Mausolus   and  Artemisia,  the  powertul 
iiriuces  of  this  famiiv  had  been  formidable  to  all  the  Grecian  islands. 
It  was  the  custom  of'  Karia  that  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  reigning 
famiiv  intermarried  with  each  other:   Mausolus  and  his  wite  Ar- 
temisia were  su(  ceeded  bv  Idrieus  and  his  wile  Ada,  all  four  being 
brothers  and  sisters,  sons  and  daughters  of  llekatomnus.     On  the 
death  of  Idiieus,  his  widow  Ada  was  expelled  from  Hahkarnassus 
and  other    parts    of    Karia  bv   her  surviving   brother  Pixodarus; 
thouo-h  she  still  retained  S(mie  strong  towns,  which  proved  a  wei- 
coint^  addition  to  the  coi  quests  of  Alexaiuhr.     Pixodarus,  on    the 
contrary,  who  had  i^iven  his  daiightcr  in  marriage  to  a  leading  Fer- 
sian  named  Oroiitolales,  waimlv  espoused  the  Persian  cause,  and 
mjule  Halikarnassus  a  capital  point  of  resistance  against  the  mvadcT. 
But  it  was  not  bv  him  alone  that  this  city  was  delended.      1  he 
Persian  fleet  had  repaired  thither  from  Miletus;  Memnon,  now  m- 


SIEGE  OP  HALIKARNASSUS. 


575 


vested  by  Darius  with  supreme  command  on  the  Asiatic  coast  and 
the  .Egean,  was  there  in  person.  There  was  not  only  Orontobues 
with  many  other  Asiatics,  but  also  a  large  garrison  of  mercen  ry 
Greeks  commanded  by  Ephialtes,  a  brave  Athenian  exile  The  citv^ 
strong  both  bv  nature  and  by  art,  with  a  surrounding  ditch  forty-live 
leet  broad  and  twenty-two  feet  deep,  had  been  still  "further  strencrti,. 
ened  under  the  prolonged  superintendence  of  Memnon;  lastly  there 
were  two  citadels,  a  fortified  harbor  with  its  entrance  frontin<t  the 
south,  abundant  magazines  of  arms,  and  good  provision  of  defen- 
sive engines.  The  siege  of  Halikarnassus  was  the  most  arduous  en- 
terprise which  Alexander  had  yet  undertaken.  Instead  of  attacking 
It  by  land  and  sea  at  once,  as  at  Miletus,  he  €ould  make  his  -iiv 
proaches  only  from  the  land,  while  defenders  were  powerfully  aided 
trom  seaward  by  the  Persian  ships  with  their  numerous  crews 

His  first  efforts,  ciirected  against  the  gate  on  the  north  or  north-east 
of  the  city,  which  led  toward  Mylasa,  were  interrupted  by  filler 
salhes  and  discharges  from  the  engines  on  the  walls  After  a  W 
days  thus  spent  ^yithout  much  avail,  he  passed  with  a  lar-e  section 
of  his  army  to  the  western  side  of  the  town,  toward  the"'  outlvin  r 
portion  ot  the  projecting  tongue  of  lanrl,  on  which  Halkrnas  "^ 
an(l  Myndus  (the  latter  further  westward)  were  si fuated  While 
makiivg  demonstrations  on  this  side  of  Halikarnas.^us,  he  at  le 
saine  tune  attempted  a  night  attack  on  Myndus.  but  was  oblio-ed  to 
retire  after  some  hours  of  fruitless  effort.  Hc3  then  ('onfined  ifm^^^^^^^^ 
to  the  siege  of  Halikarnassus.     His  soldiers,  protec  ted  froni  iSJ 

by  movabepentdiouses  (called  Toitoises),  gradually  filled  up  th^^^^^^^^^^ 
and  deep  ditch  around  the  town,  so  as  to  open  a  level  road  for  h^s 
engmes  roilin-  towers  of  wood)  to  come  up  close  to  the  walls      Tie 
engines  being  brought  up  close,  the  work  of  demolition  was  success 
fully  prosecuted:  notwithsfanding  vigorous  sallies  from  the-ariison 
repulsed,  though  not  without  loss  and  difliculty,  bv  theMacSon ians' 
Presently  the  shock  of  the   batlering<..ginerhadx,yer  ^0^0 
towers  of  the  city  wall,  togetlier  with  two  intermediate  breadths  o? 
wall ;  and  a  third  tower  was  beginning  to  totter.     The  besie-ed  were 
employed  in  erecting  an  inner  wall  of  brick  to  cover  the  opc^  snace 
and  a  wooden  tower  of  the  great  height  of  150  feet  for  the  pu^pos^ 
of  casting  p...j'.ctiles.     It  appears  that  Alexander  waited  for  U  e^f?U 
demolition  of  the  third  tower,  before  he  thought  the  breach  wide 
enough  to  be  stormed;  but  an  assault  was  prematurely  brou^^ht  on 
by  two  adventurous  soldiers  from  the  division  of  Perdikkas      Tl  P.e 
men,  elate  with  wine,  rushed  up  single-handed  to  attack  the  ^ryla^eau 
gate,  and  slew  the  foremost  of  the  defenders  who  came  ou    to  on 
pose  them,  until  at  length,  re-enforcements  arrivimr  successively  on 
both  sides,  a  general  combat  took  place  at  a  short  distance  from  the 
wall.     In  the  end,  the  Macedonians  were  victorious,  and  drove  the 
besieged  back  into  the  ciiy.     Such  was  the  confusion,  that  the  city 
might  then  have  been  assaulted  and  taken,  had  measures  been  pre 


670  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

p.,....,  for  it  beforehand,    The  thud  '-- --.^S-^^'^ VelS^^"-! 

ci,y..-all,  .be  ^^^^^ ^'^^^^^^^^^n.^^us  on  o„<h 
ens  nes  in  their  fi out,  ''"I  "'*<'.",  ,'.w.u.  «m11v  wiis  nnide  w  ih  so 
sid-e  of  them.  Sloreover,  at  ■'•fi';,^/  .^,\'' .^1 ' '  ^i'uc"-  vc.rU  of  lUe 
much  imi.etuofity,  that  s;..me  of  ^\'  '\\'^,/li,,„,  ,vas  hurncd. 
.ndnes,  and.eTen  '''« '"''V'^^""'  7,^,^  l,;a'„a  1    ■   a niUns.  the  offl- 

Itwas  not  without  diihculty  '''"^^  '7'"^,.'^,"  .„  .jje  bcsiewd  tinaliy 
eers  on  guani.  preserved  .herema.nd.^  no  wo^^^^^^ 

driven  in  until  Ahx.inder  l"'"!*;^"  'n;P^"4",ucce=sive  c()uihats,  yet 

Tlioudi  his  troops  liad  'V<-" ''"^'"^l  >  1  v  do'c  to  he  walls,  without 
He  could  not  '^^any  off  his  dead      ho  lay  dose  to  I  e        ^^^^^  ^^  ^ 

soliciting  =^  tJ"-j-.'^';;;;^,,,|';^'ATe^i;anirsorici,ed  the  truce 
whilrrs  grantt^Ly  Memnon.  in  spite  of  the  contrary  opinton  of 

^■litrafew  days  of  --val  J.- hurp^^^^^^ 
•  the  endues,   Alexander  rec, .mm  W^^^^^ 
under  his  own  personal  «"n  n     he  Dhce  c^uhl  not  long  holdout, 
a  conviction  gained  ground  '^f' «;\';  P'^.^^„g7le  capture  seeing 

Ephialtes  especially,  resolved  no  to  ^"'^Jf  ''?  '^'^^gj,, '.jng  ,Uc  be- 
tlmt  the  only  chance  of  preservation  ^  nsisted  in  acstr  j     k  ^^ 

sieging  engiDes  obtaine<l  permission  fl""^^'^'^"'^  ^.^i  P,ely  near  him 
the  head  of  a  last  desperate  sally.  ,1"*,,  °'.;,.  "",,„if  u4th  torches 
2.000  chosen  troops,  ha  to  enco.inte  he  "^  ^^^  J'^"'',„ddenly  and 
to  burn  the  engines.  At  d«yl^'-<lf:»"'rtifs  rushed  out  froin  each 
simultaueously  thrown  open,  f^l'J ''  ?  f  ^.  'f,i;";^pporting  tlicm  by 
asaiust  the  besiegers;  tl'^  engines  fioiuvtlim^wo       o  J 

multiplied    discharges    of    "''^^J  "^s-   ,^1^'' f ''^'   J^^^,  "^^  main 

of  tiie  enginesweresuceess  ulb-hrcd  aiul  11^  a^l^a^^^^^  .^_^^j  ^^,^, 

Macedonian  troops,  consisting  of  \oiing  troop,    fci     but  still  more 
Thev  were  rallied  partly  by  the  efforts  ot  Alcxa    Itr   ""i 
ly  L  older  >hice,lonian  soldiers,  '•"'"Pj;"'';,, ■"''',  .,^i''e\'^,„.pcd 
p^dgns;  who,  standuig  cxen,,^    rona  m^^^^^  -^  ^e,  c^^^  ^ _^^ 


ALEXANDER  ENTERS  HALIKARNASSUS.         577 

foremo.st  among  tlio  combatants,  was  slain,  the  rest  were  driven 
back  to  tbe  city,  and  tbe  burning  engines  were  saved  with  some 
damage.  During  thi-<  same  time,  an  obstinate  conflict  had  al.-^o  taken 
place  at  the  gale  called  Tripylon,  where  the  besieged  had  made 
auotiior  sally  over  a  narrow  bridue  thrown  across  the  ditch  Here 
the  ^Macedonians  were  under  the  command  of  Ptolemy  (not  the  «ou 
of  Lagus),  one  of  the  king's  body-guards.  He,  with  two  or  three 
other  conspicuous  officers,  perished  in  the  severe  strug'de  which  en- 
sued, but  ti^-  Sitllying  ]^arty  were  at  length  repulsed  and  driven  into 
the  city.  The  loss  of  the  besieged  was  severe,  in  trving  to  «>-et  a^-ain 
within  the  walls,  under  vigorous  pursuit  from  the  Macedonians  "" 

By  this  last  unsuccessful  effort,  the  defensive  force  of  ilalikar- 
nassus  was  broken.     Memuon  and  Orontobates,  satistied  that    no 
longer  defense  of  the  town  wa^  practicable,  took  advantage  of  the 
night  to  set  tire  to  their  wooden  projectile  engines  and  towers  as 
well  as  to  their  magazines  of  arms,  with  the  houses  near  the  exterior 
wall   while  they  carried   away  the  troops,  stores,  and  inhabitants 
partly  to  the  citadel  called  Salmakis— parllv  to  the  neighborin"--  islet 
called  Arkonnesus— p.iitlv  to  the  island  of  Kos.     Thou'di  thu?evac- 
nating  the  town,  however,  they  still  kept  good  garrison's  well  provis- 
ioned in  the  two  citadels  belonging  to  it.     The  conflagration   stimu- 
lated by  a  strong  wind,  spread  widely.     It  was  only  exliiiL-uished  by 
the  orders  of  Alexander,  when  he  entered  the  town,  and  put  to  death 
all  those  whom  he  found  with  flrebrands.     He  directed  that  the  Hali- 
karnassians  found  in  the  houses  should  be  spared,  but  that  the  city 
Itself  should  be  demolished.     He  assigned  the  whole  of  Karia  to  Ada 
as  a  principality,  doubtless  under  condition  of  tribute.     As  the  cita- 
dels still  occupied  by  the  enemy  were  strong  enough  to  require  a  louo- 
siege,  he  did  not  think  it  necessarv  to  remain  in  person  for  the  pur"^ 
pose  of  reducing  them ;  but  surrounding  them  with  a  wall  of  block- 
ade, he  left  Ptolemy  and  3,000  men  to  guard  it. 

Having  concluded  the  siege  of  Halikarnassus,  Alexamler  sent 
back  his  artillery  to  Tralles,  orderino-  Parmenio,  with  a  lar<^e  por- 
tion ot  the  cavalry,  the  allied  infanliy,  and  the  baggage  v/aSous  to 
oaniis.  00  o         o 

The  ensuing  winter  months  he  emplo3'ed  in  the  conquest  of  Lykia 
1  ampliyha,  and  Pisidia.     All  this  southern  coast  of  Asia  Minor  i.s 
mountainous;  the  range  of  Mount  Taurus  descendinn-  nearly  to  the 
sea  so  as  to  leave  little  or  no  intervening  breadth  of  plain.    In  spite 
ot  great  strength  of  situation,  such  was  the  terror  of  Vlexander's 
arms,  tliat  all  the  Lykian  towms— Hyparna,- Telmissus,  Pinara  Xau- 
tlius,  Patara,  and  thirty  others— submitted  to  him  without  a 'blow 
One  alone  among  them,  called  Marmareis,  resisted  to  desperation 
On  reaching  the   territory  called  Milvas,  the  Phrvgian  frontier  of 
J^ykia  Alexander  received  the  surrender  of  the  Greek  maritime  city 
Phasehs.     He  assisted  the  Phaselites  in  destroying  a  mountain  fort 
erected  and  garrisoned  against  them  by  the  neighboring  Pisidian 
H.  G.    IV.--19 


JifHiffB&tiSfrJffiirt 


578  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDER 

„,„„ntaineers.  and  paid  a  public  --E'-^XV^t-f  "^  "P"''^'"  "'  ""' 
deceased  townsmau^  the  rhetonm^^  „,  ,„ 

After  tins  brief  1  alt  "'f^i""^'?^,'  mountain  roa.l.  by  wl.icU  be 
Perge  in  Pamphylia.  The  o"'"  :[y  .'j""„„ire  some  leveling  by 
senrmosl  of  bis  army,  ^^as.so  'fticult  "^  \°  ^^^^^  "-^.g.  But  Ibe  king 
Thracian  liL'ht  Iroops  sent  m  »''^f  ^^^  "V!,^,i  'more  difficult  still. 

Wmself.  with  a  select  d«^^'';«  J"''^"  •  ^  ^be  bri  k"f  tie  sea.  Wbcn 
called  Kbmax.  under  the  mounUins  by  t^e  on  (       .^^  „  ^eplb 

the  wind  blew  from  the  «?"XV."\'fJ"^'' ^  t  me  before  l.e  reached  the 
of  water  as  tote. mpract,ca^^^^^^^^  „^  1^    ,„,„e 

spot,  tlie  wind  had  blown  *"" "y^^,  "" ,,'  reo  he  and  his  friends  con- 
Z^r:  the  special  P™^"!^*^."^ '''^,^'^11°  so  tC  the  sea  receded 
ceived  it)  brought  on  a  d'^nge  o  the  »""»•,  ,^°;\J,^,  ^i^e  water  up  to 

and -.eft  an  ava«ab^.  '^^^^^''^S^^'fZiiL,  receiving,  on  hi. 
their  waists.  Irom  ^^-^^,  ""'ho  offered  to  surrender  their  city,  but 
way  envoys  from  Aspendub  ^  >»»  .^^'.^^i^jj.,,  they  were  allowed  to 
deprecated  the  e.«."«°^f  "^ '\  S^"'f„*'^;oirer  og "ther  with  tl«;  horses 
buy  off  by  promising  tifty  '»«;"'.f ,'"  °  Pf^'/'/ihe  Persian  king.  Hav- 
which  they  were  l'^"'SJ|JgV'L,yvan^d  onward  to  a  strong  place 
ingleft  a  gavnson  »'  ^;^'<;: ''t  "^^J.^^^^^^ 

called  Syllium  dctended  b), b> •''''■•"a*!^^^ ^ "°  ,,^5  ^  first  assault; 
to  aid  them.  These  men  ''^'^''"'•.rreirat  1  c4ug  apprised  that  the 
which  Alexander  could  not  ^«»y /°, '^I^^  ;rt'i^"ms  imposed,  and  had 
Aspendia.m  had  refused  to  f'^"''%\''"t„',^;„7rp1dly  he  constrained 
put  their  city-iu  a  state  of  defense,     f^turmng  rapia.^  ^^^^^ 

Them  to  submission,  and  '''J"  ■"•f^^e^t^r  P,. rygia  th  o^^      the  diffi- 

bc  directed  his  coupe  '«^^f^^  ',  "'..f '^f,^,^    ,{goi,  of  Pisidia. 
cult  mountains,  «ndalm<>stindomitabtpopuai      .  ^^^^ 

''After  remaining  in  the  ^'^■'^••'""'XrproSed  northward  into 

severaltowns  or  strong  P^^'f'.f''  "Xd  aS      lo  the  steep  and 

Plirygia,  passing  by  "f ^«!'' 'f  ^^'^^^^d  bflOOO  Karians  and  100 
impregnable  fortress  of  Keten^,g^n-sonea    y       ^^ 

mercenary  Greeks.  These  i"«°' "''  ?  uyi^fss  such  relief  should 
Persians,  offered  to  de  iver  up  he  fo.Ues.    n         ^  ^^^   ^^^^^ 

arrive  before  the  ,«'«'^*  '  \>KeUen.e!  and  left  there  Antigonus 
sitions,  remained  ten  days  at  »^  *  '.  ,„„cessors)  as  satiap  of 
(afterward  the  most  PO^'^^V^^tlre  fed  norttwaid  to  Gordium 
o^^f^ivrS  n^t^Cwh^rVpannTnio  w,.  directed  to  meet  litm. 
and  wherliis  winter^ampaigu  was  concluded. 


APPENDIX. 


APPENDIX 


579 


ON  THE  LENGTH  OF  THE  MACEDONIAN  SARISSA  OB  PIKE. 


tlioush  none  state  thJeSrsocTearlTS  he  does  """  "'  ""''"  "^"""-"di"  him. 

Messrs.  RUstow  and  Koclilv  (fiesi-h  .!»=  rvi^,!;  tr  ■ 
oftlie  Iwst  work  that  I  knw  re^MuSl  aS^Af'^™??"''^"^- P- ^). ''"'•i"" 
authority  of  Po^ybius  as  it  terestaSsThS?™  ■"!''!'*.''?  matters,  reject  the 
be  corrupt,  and  that  Polvbius  m.S  b^Jl.  J„  ^.  "^"'^'^'n  "lat  the  passage  must 
teen/eefin  length-not  siS  "cThftr  T^!^^!,'" '^f  ^  'i*'  J"'"  saSssawas  si:£- 
do  I  think  thatfheir  c,ntiS''o„™olybii  isTjSit'on?"*^  '"  "'"'"  "P""""'  ■"«• 

w£lLf?2J'Srifni^  Co^^pu^Tinfejlfe  f  T''»  °'-'-'  -""=« 
thickness  required  in  the  shStthi^nriTf^.^^'^^^  *  weapon  from  the 

Bnt  Polybius  sives  the  Lfual 'len|{,P^^^«""^^/hat  ,t  would  be  unmanageable. 

difference.  iFwe  accepr?KxShe^ifnf  hL^'''''t^^''  """l^^*^'  *  ^^''^^  material 
text  has  made  us  read  ?;S  a^S  w'e  ol4f  ?n  *"5«»^«^at  corruption  of  the 
that  the  length  of  tiie  sarksa  a^  Jfv^n  k^^T  i  \3  ^^""^  \^^^  feet-it  will  follow 
sixteen  feet.  Now  thiflenlth  if  no?  «^ffl^-^^'"^  "^'^^  3  be/o»rrfeen/eef,  not 
which  it^  prodigious  length  g  set  forth  ""^^'^°^  ^«  J^^^'^^  ^^^ous  Passag^  in 

dier  55cipS??p"a'cV2f'*^^^^^^  riSt^hT. '"  ^^^^"5  ^^^^  i""'  ^^^^^  ^'^ 
dier-andyet  that  in  the  fiSt  he  hS  Jll  M^'^^^'^'^'^HP^^'^d  by  a  Macedonian  sol- 
opposed  to  him  (^iii  13)  But  tLr^«  il  ^''^'**'"i''".?°'^^^'^  ^"^  ^^n  Rikes 
bins  expressly  sav^s  that  the  Rn^?«%t^'''' ,?^  contradiction  at  all:  for  f  oly- 

legion  was  d'rawn^  up  in  orSer  r^aSired'*''J?pn'^fi"P?'"^  ^^"*^^  '^^^  ^'^^^  ^^^ 
ranks  and  an  increased  interval  ^n?^^  I  ?'  ^^^n  fighting,  an  expansion  of  the 
each  side  of  hinuSwua  7at  S^Ll         •  a?^°  ^^^'"^  ^^^  ^"^  ^n 

and  shield.  It  THSifrreTXpfZ  inJ^'ih''':  ^^  ^l""^'  ^""  1^^*>'  ^""^  ^is  sword 
tually  marching  unt^fttopt?h?^hlT  '®  ^^'*^.  ^.^^^  ^^'"a"  soldier,  when  ac- 
langiles,  a^d  ETen^pUl^t  dea?'iith"^  ^"""^^^^  ^'  "^"^'^  ^^""^  ^«  '^^'^  P^^' 
mL^nt/e^>?  becm,?eSan^'?.  juppose  that  Polybius,  in  speaking  of  crchif..  really 
rank  in  the' fil?  and  tS  Iw  fSf i\'  ''^i  *^''T ^''\ ^«  ^^^« '"t^^^'-^^  ^'^^^'^'^  ^"^'^ 


580       SECONB  AND  TIIIHD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

donianUn^Persev.  in  which  ^™rV»hU„^^^^^^ 

Siitir  ttid'pafd  gr"a.  X"„ti^a"to  kcl's,  uid  ha^  even  .-rittou  an  express 

work-in  the  subject.  .  ctntement  of  Polvbius,  though  tme  as 

It  might,  mdeed,  be  ^f  f,5;»^"J'/J^5fe^tne  o^^^^^  Alexander.    But  there 

L^n^^hin^t^oull^eir^""^^^^^^^  ^«  expressly  a. - 

men  properly  trained  and  '".^oj^^;";,^"i.J^YanLite  s^^  spoken  of.    So  Livy 

the  terms  under  ^vhich  the  T/*^^  .^.^.J^,*^  P^f  Si^  pLlangi  maxime  Mace- 

xxxi.  39,  ''ErantpleTaquesdvestnauica^^  clypeos  objecit  (quod 

donum:  qua?,  ni<i  u^>  P'-^L^J^^;;?,  "fi^'Vm^^^^^^  Compare  alsoL  yy, 

ut  fiat,  libero  campo  opus  ^^J^^ T/nStSnsTthe  length  of  the  pike, 

mXsU^nll7:ic^^^^  had  to  fight 

Xeuophon  tells  us  that  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  mti^^^^^^^^^      ^n\,^  fifteen  cubits 
their  way  across  the  temtory  of   he  Clml^^^^^^^^^^  ^  ^^^.i^^  ^^^  ^^^^^ 

long,  together  ^Nith  a  short  s>a ord    he  «?,^«J^^^^^  jh  greater  than  what  Poly 
givavesand  helmets  (Anab  IV   .lo)^Tm^^;^^^^^  ^^^  Mosynceki  de- 

bius  ascribes  to  the  pike  of  the  ^^^^-^^'^tlirHhat  a  man  could  hardly  carry 
fended  tV.eir  citadel;  with  pikes  so  l^;ngamUh^^^  ^^.^      .^^^j       1     ,i 

them"  L\nabns.  v._4,2.'>)      in  t{i«  ^^;^^'''  'l^i'em  on  fire.  Ajax  is  described  as 

upon  the  Greek  ships,  f  "j^^J^,f  ^,^,fa  Veep^^  assailants  with  a  thrusting- 

p  anting  himself  upon  the  V^X:,^lthieVflSt  in  length  (f ..crrbv  vavfiaxo^  ^K  '^'^^'^■ 
pike  of  twenty-two  cubits  othiitj-niieet^^^^^^^^       ^    ^^^^^^^  .^  ^^^^  ^.  l^^.g   ^^ 

ur,,7iv-6t.u,<au.Ko<rt7rT,xi',Tl>ad.  ^^^^.^L  u.„*^|e^^^^^^        vi.310:  viii.  4y4)-the  read- 
eleven  cubits,  in  lentrth-intended  to  ^f '?"' [^^  ^^t.H';";^  ,-^ev  8eKdnr,xv. 
fnl  is  not  settled,  whether  W', ;^^^^'^^^^^^^  sixteenth  century, 

The  Swiss  infantr}^  and  the  ^^^''}^''^/^^^^^^^  phalanx:  close  ranks, 

^^'ere  in  many  respects  a  reproduction  of  t^  ^  composed  of  the  strong- 

deep  files,  long  pikes,  and  the  three  or  torn  nrsiin  pj^^^ed  soldiei-s  receiv- 

est  Ld  bravest  men  in  the.regiment-eUhe,^^^^^^^^^  enabled  them 

in*-  double  pav.  The  length  and  "i^Pf  "J^;^^^/;  ;,"'  at  nnns-  they  were  irresistible 
loV%t  the  cliarge  of  the  heay  cav^^^^^^  Sbreak  S^ainonl  the  pikes,  which 
in  front,  unless  an  enemy  could  find  i"^^"J;;^:;at  confidence  was  in  the  length 
was  sometimes,  though  rarely,  ,^f»"J_T^Xf[tf  dell^Alemagna,  Opere.t.  iv  p. 
of  thepike-Macchiave  1  '=«>f^;iV  n  ^^^'sG^"^  tenere  tale  ordme    che 

iM'dlf^nSZfS^'un^Srn^;  d^i^l'not.- ^£ano  tenere  lordine  .oro 
della  milizia  non  vagliano." 


i« 


CHAPTER  XCIII 

SECOND  AND  THIKD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS  OF  ALEXANDEK-BATTLE  OF 
SECO.Ni^  AJ>  issiTS— SIEC;H   OF    TYRE. 

givincr  to  ^li«,;^^^P^vb   P  at  Gordium  he  pcrtorincd  the  memorable 


ALEXANDER  CUTS  THE  GORDIAN  KNOT.        rgl 

wns  preserved  in  the  citadd  an  ancient  wagon  of  nide  structure 
said  by  the  le2:end  to  have  once  belonged  to  the  peasant  Goidiiis  and 
his  son  Midas— the  primitive  rustic  kings  of  Phryuia,  designated  as 
such  by  the  Gods,  and  chosen  })y  the  people.     Tlie  cortl  (composed 
of  libers  from  the  bark  of  the  cornel  tree),  attaching  the  yoke  of 
this  wagon  to  the  pole,  was  so  twisted  and  eutauded  as  to  form  a 
knot  of  smgular  complexity,  which  no  one  had  ever  been  able  to 
untie.  ^  An  oracle  had  pronounced  that  to  the  person  who  should 
uniie  it  the  empire  of  Asia  was  destined.     When  Alexander  went 
up  to  see  this  ancient  relic,  the  surrounding  multitude,  Phrvgiau  as 
well  as  Macedonian,  Avere  full  of  expectation  that  the  conqueror  of 
the  Granikus  and  of  Halikarnassus  would  overcome  the  ditliciilties 
of  the  knot  and  acquire  the  piomised  empire.     But  Alexander  on 
inspecting  the  knot,  was  as  much  perplexed  as  others  liad  been  be- 
lore  him,  until  at  length,  in  a  tit  of  impatience,  he  drew  his  sword 
and  severed  the  cord  in  two.    By  every  one  this  was  accepted  as  a 
solution  of  the  problem,  thus  making  good  his  title  to  the  empire  of 
Asia;  a  belief  which  the  Gods  ratified  by  a  storm  of  thunder  and 
lightning  during  the  ensuing  night. 

At  Gordium,  Alexander  was  visited  by  envoys  from  Athens  en- 
treating the  liberation  of  the  Athenian  prisoners  taken  at  the  Grani- 
kus, who  were  now^  at  work  chained  in  the  Macedonian  mines.  Hut 
he  refused  this  prayer  until  a  mon^  convenient  season.  Aware  that 
the  Greeks  were  held  attached  to  him  only  by  their  fears,  and  that  if 
opportunity  occurred,  a  large  fraction  of  them  would  take  part  with 
the  Persians,  he  did  not  think  it  prudent  to  relax  his  hold  upon  their 
conduct. 

Such  opportunity  seemed  now  not  unlikely  to  occur.     Memnou 
excluded  from  efficacious  action  on  the  continent  since  the  loss  of 
Habkarnassus,  was  employed  among  the  islands  of  the  JE"-ean  (dur- 
ing the  first  half  of  333  B.C.),  with  the  purpose  of  carrying  war  into 
Greece  and  Macedonia.     Invested  with  the  most  ample  command 
he  had  a  large  Phenician  fleet  and  a  considerable  body  of  Gieciaii 
mercenaries,  together  with  his  nephew  Pharntibazus  and  the  Persian 
Autophradates.     Having  acquired  the  impoi'tant  island   of  Chios 
through  the  co-operation  of  a  part  of  its  inhabitants,  he  next  landed 
on  Lesbos,  where  four  out  of  the  five  cities,  either  from  fear  or 
preference,  declared  in  his  favor;  wiiile  Mitylene,  the  greatest  of  the 
five,  already  occupied  by  a  Macedonian  garrison,  stood  out  a"-ainst 
him.     Memnon  accordingly  disembarked  his  troops  and  commenced 
the  blockade  of  the  city  both  by  sea  and  land,  surroundinir  it  with  a 
dt)uble  palisade  wall  from  sea  to  sea.     In  the  midst  of  this'operation 
he  died  of  sickness;  but  his  nephew  Pharnabazus,  to  whom  he  had 
consigned  the  command  provisionally,  until  the  pleasure  of  Darius 
could  be  known,  prosecuted  his  measures  vigorously,  and  brou'^-ht 
the  city  to  a  capitulation.     It  was  stipulated  that  the  garrison  inUo- 
duced  Iw  Alexander  should  be  dismissed;  that  the  column  record- 


582      SECOND  AND  TIUUD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

ino-  alliance  with  him  should  be  demoBshed;  that  the  MitvlcneanB 
«hfmh  become  allies  of  Darius,  upon  tlie  terms  of  the  old  conven- 
t  0  called  bv  the  name  of  Antalkidas;  and  that  the  c.tizeus  m  b>m- 
ilmient  should  be  recalled,  with  r«tiluti,m  of  hall  their  property 
B  u  Phan  abazus.  as  soon  as  admitted,  violated  the  capuulauon  at 
oi^ce  He  not  on  v  extorted  eont.ibulions,  but  inlrodueed  a  iiarnson 
under  Lvkomede.-  and  established  a  returned  exde  named  Diogenes 
as  de4ror  Such  breach  of  faith  was  ill-calculated  to  a^-isl  the  fur- 
ther extension  of  Persian  intluence  m  Greece. 

I  ad  the  Persian  fleet  been  equally  active  a  year  earlier,  Alexan- 
der's arn.V  could  never  Have  landed  in  Asia.  Nevertheless  ihe 
acqids  tions  of  Chios  and  Lesbos,  late  as  they  were  in  coming  we. e 
kXiv  important  as  promising  future  progress,  beveral  of  the 
Cvclades  Hands  sent  to  tender  their  adhesion  to  the  Persian  cause; 
tlL  fleet  was  expected  in  Eubavi.  and  the  Spartans  began  to  count 
upon  aid T>r  an  anti-Macedonian  movement  But  all  these  hopes 
w^rc  destroved  by  the  unexpected  decease  of  Meninon. 

It  was  imt  merely  the  stlpcrior  ability  of  Menmon,  but  also  his 
established  reputation  both  with  Greeks  and  Persians    which  len- 
dered  his  death  a  fatal  blow  to  the  interests  ot  Darius.     The  Per- 
sk^ns  1  ad  with  them  other  Greek  ofticcrs-brave  and  able-probably 
some  iot  untit  to  execute  the  full  Memnonian  ^ehenjes.     Bu    none 
of  them  had  gone  Ihrouch  the  same  experience  in  the  art  of  ixtr- 
c  sing  command  among  brientals-none  of  them  had  acquired  the 
couflaence  of  Darius  to  the  same  extent,  so  as  to  be  invcste.l  with 
'he  real  guidance  of  operations,  and  upheld  "^T^^^^^yH^^ 
ThonWi  Alexander  had  now  become  master  of  Asia  Minoi,  Jtt   he 
Pei°ians  had  ample  nuaus.  if  effective  y  used,  of  defending  all  tlia 
vet  remained,  and  even  of  seriously  disturlnng  hiin  at  home     Lut 
ItthTemnon  vanishe.l  the  last  chance  of  employing  thc-se  means 
wisdom  or  energy.     The  full  value  of  his  loss  was  je Uer  appre- 
ciated  bv  the  intelliL'ent  enemy   whom  he  opposed,  than   by  the 
feeble  master  whom  "he  served.-    The  death  ot  Memnon,  lessening 
the  effidency  of  the  Persians  at  sea,  allowed  full  leisure  to  reoi- 
"inize  I'he  itiee.lonian  fleet,  and  to  employ  the  undivided  land-force 
for  further  inland  conquest.  .  ,       , 

If  Alexander  was  a  gainer  in  respect  to  his  own  operations  hj  he 
death  of  this  eminent  Khodian,  he  was  yet  more  a  gainer  by  the 
change  of  poliov  which  that  event  induced  Danus  o  adopt.  Ihe 
Pershin  kinir  resolved  to  renounce  the  deleusive  schemes  "t  i'em- 
non,  and  to  take  the  otfonsive  against  the  »'""'''"°"]';^,«" '"''i'^;,  ,"1 
troops  already  summoned  from  the  various  parts  of  the  empi  e,  li.id 
paiM  all  •  arrivll.  and  w.-re  still  coming  in.  Their  luinibers  became 
^re  ier-and  v-reater.  amounting  at  length  to  a  vast  and  "'"'^"d  °"^ 
host,  the  total  of  wl,i..-h  is  given  by  some  as  COO.OOO  >",^;"--by  f  ^^  ,^> 
as  400  000  infantry  and  100,000  cavalry.  Ihe  spectacle  of  this 
showy  and  imposing  mass,  in  every  variety  of  arms,  costmne.  and 


CIIARIDEMUS  PUT  TO  DEATH 


583 

fef:re"'ii,*'i^.iroy,f,r/,.^:;;'%r 

sSd  IH!  .^i-!c;j.s'f  ^'^"tI^  oira;i!rri,;-r 

who  became  conflnuf'n  1  i     p^r   ,  ,s  o,  "t'Lr'hi '"  '""'•  "'™"'"'' 
never  resist  him       p,-,,,,,   So^d  .?,o    r,^     ■         'V^ ''"'''""'■s  could 

tmgents  had  not  yet  ha       ,,v"l^'trri\x^  Init 'moTo/'r,''''''  V"  ^°^'- 

tain  to  trample  down  all  hefoJc  b.  J?,  f  ,  n*  *^°'',""  *""''•  ^er- 
respecting  Xerxes  a  d  bv  st  r?m ,^r  vp»  T"'  ^''"'^'' '""'  ^^oneeived 
a  cjMitury  ami  a  lu.lf  before  Rh  ..,ff 'V^?"^^^^ 
.nis.ake.^lle  descriptio^f  o^ufSn.'"  'n  "e"  u™Cu  .iuJ  "  "-"n-"^ 
dorus,  IS  often  mistrusted  as  baseless  rhe'toVic  \>  -  f "'  ^■'.''" 
the  .se  f-suiro-estfd  illusion  „(  ■i„t..r.  i  *  "  ""  "^  '"  I'ea  ity 

atid  s,.ienlirc  .iudginent!  ='"  """'  "'  "^'P"'"^  '»  t'-^iued 

But  though  such  was  t]ie   npr<;no«;nn   r^f  n  '     ^  •,      .     - 
response  in' the   bosom  of  arinSi^en?  A?i  ™-'''''''  'I  ^""""1  "" 
Greeks  now  near  Darius,  wa   "heltS  e^  rnnrid^'"""^  *,"" 
having  incurred   the   implacable  enmitv  of    It'ov      i       T"-=  '''"' 
force.l  to  quit  Athens  after  the  M.,^,",i^  Alexander,   had  been 

IKUI  fle<l  blether  wilh  Epldalres'  ^ul^^Cifnf "  n,ls''';.'i'f '  ''"l' 
the  apparent  omnipotence  of  bis  .,rm,f ,;,,  V         Darius,  elate  with 

but  one  voice  of  devoted  concurrent  f-L*"'  ''^""i"''-  ""'^  •'^'""S 
asl.ed  the  opini,.,.  of  ^larSur  a  f  11  expre,*^^  T™'-'  '"■'"' 

affirmative  reply.  So  completely  w-ere  iTe  loZ  ^^  nf' •''"?  ••'" 
bound  up  with  the  .success  of  nnri„«  iLim!,  "^i,  ^  Pliiifidemiis 
conviction.s.  however  ttnnn  ifil  ie  nt'.  ,^^  1"'"'  ""*  -'"PPres.,  his 
a  possibility  that  they  ndS^ht  p  o  -e  uL  f,  IH  "i"',"/''."--«  "'''•^  yet 
frankness  as  Demaiitus  hid  one,.  ,,?!  '  "f'^P''^' (with  the  same 
the  vast  multitude  n^befo^im  wei^^  u-'.fl  "'"'"'^  ^r""^'  <''■■" 
paratively  small  number  of  the  n-^rl!,"iT° '^T  ""'I'''  "'<>  "mi- 
place  no  reliance  on  Asbtics  l^ut  to  en  nW  .  "*?  "'''"'<'''  "^'""^  "> 
stibsidizing  an  increased  armVo"  gS  Xrcerrief'Vref  T  ''I 

J:s.rhe"siy r '^;^rX-/::tf tK[  ^"^^'-  ^"^'^ 

courtiers,  it  provoked   ^'^^:S^-^:"^;:;^^,Zt  t^Z 


584       BECO^'D  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

.ere  .ith  the  sp.ctacl.  of  the^v  hnn^nj.  — ;,;^X:^1^:;^;X 

a  combination  of  i°^V'f.;''^^''  '•         •  ;h   to  tS^  il^^^t  his 

less  as  conipaml  ^vith  Maccaolnuu^.  '     \^  >  /^'^^^^^  ^^^j,:    denounced 

empire  coiiUl  b.  a.fendc^d  by  ;^^;;;^;^^    .^^.^^^^i^;,  ^^^  contideuce 
Ch:  lidcmiis  as  a  traitor  wHo  Nvished  to  '^^Sl  "^  J''^,>  .-^^  ,u,„g  ^vil•i 
in  Older  to  betray  him  to  ^^^^'^^'"^  :;•  .,^:     "elam^^^^^^ 
the  reply,  and  still  further  ex;;^P;;^;f  ^  ,.  ^^^       ('haddemus,  and  con- 
iers,seizedNvithhisc>wn  hand,  the  g^^^^^^^^^  V?^>^,,\,ill  discover  too 

t^t^:::^^rT^:rl::.^^l^  of  .hat  I  have  said,     ^y 

^^^fl^d  ^l^K^r  ViSr-^ertain  ^^llT.^^'^^^ 
glory.   Darius  resolved  to  assume  in  P^  -         .«  ^^mma  ^^^^ 

army,  and  march  down  to  ^'■'■■\''^''^^'\'^^^^^^^  and  a-sressive 

xn.nl   his  land-army  became  ^^^  re..lb    impor^mt  a^^^^  ^^.^ 

force,  withwliuh  he  Inmself  ^'1%  ^  a^^',    ^ 
tiP.ct  abandonment  ol  the  plans  <>^  ^^  "^'^        .     the  pr?cis(.  monunu 
f nture  fortune.     He  abandoned  J/^^"^,  !^'0;^{^^^.;,^^^^^^^^         executed. 
Avhen  they  nii.i^ht  have  been  most  ^fl%''^^^^^^^^  Menmon's 

For  at  the  time  of   the  battle   «^  ^]f„  V' '^^^^  "^^^^^^  uot  easy 

counsel  was  originally  pven,  ^^^^^^^f^^'^^^.^^.P^mn  '  o  ^miinumding 
to  act  upon ;  since  the  Persians  had  no  ^  1 1  >  .  1 1  on     o  ^  ^. ^^^^  ^^^ 

position.  But  now,  m  the  ^1?""-^^,^*  r"w  j-e^^  advantages,  indeed, 
tlefense  as  good  as  they  f^"!^/  P?^^^  ^^t  l^,!.i  "  et.  tlfere  was  tlie 
scarcely  to  be  paralleled  ^"l^ewhere.     In  tl  1 1  '-M  ;X  ^,.,. 

liiH'  ofMonnt  Taurus,  barring  the  en  lanct  o  :^' ^Y;':.^.^p,i.v„nble. 
k  ;^x  line  of  defense  (as  will  V^^'^'^'^y  i^^U^^^^  Zis\&e  and 
Next,  even  if   Alexander  had  ^J-^^;^,  '^/^^.^^w  r^  ' 

mastering  Kilikia,  there  would  }e    i^» '^//V;;^^.,^^^^^^     Gales,  and  the 

Mount  Amanus  and  the  sea,   ^'^f  r^.^J^^^^,.;;^^ '    '  msses  ox-^r  Mount 
Gates  of  Kilikia  and  Assyria-and    ft<  r  Uia  •  Jh^  i  ^^^  . 

Amanus  iiselt-a U  indispensable  ^j^^ ;}  .  ^;  "j;;  "^^^^  the  stTongest 
capable  of  being  held,  with  proper  P   '^/'"^  ^ns   a  an  ^^^^^^^..^ 

force  of  attack.     A  better  opportunuj  f^i  ^^f^^V^^^  i^e  himself 

part  of  Memnon's  scheme  could  not  P^  !  f  ^\^^^^^^^  not  be 

must  doubtless  have  reckoned  that  such  aclvania^eb 
thrown  away.  ,        ^^  ^f  the  Persinn 

The  mom<-ntous   change   of  po'i^^'  /^T'  11  JnX  to  the  fleet  af.er 
king,  was  manifested  by  the  ^^^^^V'     'Akmion      Confirmin.^   th 
receiving  intelligence   ot   the   death   ''l^^^^i^^\^,^.  axiu-^vi^^ 
appointment  of  Pharnabazus  (ma(  e  P'-*>vi>i<;"'^   >    r^u''^^^,^%ou  of 
nl^)  as  admiral,  heat  the  same  \^^^^'!^^^t.  Li  ^^^^ 
Mentor  and  nephew  ot   ^^^^'^^^l^")    ^/^^^  f,;^''^  ^^^^^ 
Grecian  mercenaries  who  served  ^^^^  ^ad   t    be  , nco  ix  i  ^^ 

main  Persian  army,     "^re  was  a  clea    p  o(  f  that  tl^^^  ^^^ 

offensive  operations  was  henceforward  to  be  trauslcueu 
sea  to  the  land. 


HEMAKKS   OF   AHKIAN. 


585 


It  IS  the  more  important  to  note  such  desertion  of  policy  on  the 
part  of  Darius,  as  the  critical  turning-r^oint  in  the  Greco  Pershn 
drama- because  Arrian  and  the  otlier  historians  leave  it  out  of  si!^ht 
and  set  before  us  little  except  secondary  points  in  the  case      Thus 
tor  example,  they  condemn  the  imprudence  of  Darius,  for  comino-  to 
tight  Alexander  within  the  narrow  space  near  Issns,  instead^f  wait 
ingforhimon  the  spac.ous  plains  beyond  3Iount  Amanus      Now 
unquestionably  granting  that  a  general  battle  was  inevitable    tld^ 
step  augmented  the  chances  in  favor  of  the  Macedonians.     Bu   it 
was  a  step  upon  wliicli  no  material  consequences  turned;    for  the 
Persian  army  under  Darius  was  liardly  less  unfit  for  a  pitched  Mtt> 
mtlieopen  plain;   as  was  afterward  proved  at  Arbe  a      tL  rei\ 
imprudence-the  neglect  of  tlK3  Memnonian  warning-cons  s^ed  in 
hghting  the  battle  at  all.     Mountains  and    demes  \ere   tif  rear 

invader      If  Darius  erred,  it  was  not  so  much  in  reiinquishino-  the 

nitcheJi  rttU.'  f  T^'  r  ^"  r^'^'^l'^  ^'''''''''^  ''^■''  plain  with  a 
pitched  battle,  to  the  strong  lines  of  defense  offered  by  Taurus  and 
Amanus.  "^  ^<*.'^ius>  uuu. 

The  narrative  of  Arrian,  exact  perhaps  in  what  it  affirms  is  not 
only  brief  and  incomplete,  but  even  omits  on  various  occasions  ?o 
put  m  re  lef  the  really  important  and  determining  points 

While  Imlting  at  Gordium,  Alexander  was  joined  by  those  newly- 
married  Macedonians  whom  he  had  sent  home  to  wmlei  and  who 
now  came  back  with  re-enforcements  to  the  number  of  3,000  infantry 
and  300  cavalry,  together  with  200  Thessalian  cavaln  am  iSo 
Lleians    As  soon  as  his  troops  had  been  sutHeiently  rested,  he  marched 

S^hif  "x/'v    '""'/^^^^''  '''  '^'y^  '^^''^'^^^  Paphlagonia  and 
ivappadokia.     At  Ankyra  he  was  met  by  a  deputation  from  the 

Paphlagonians,  who  submitted  themselves  to  his  discretion     only 

entrea  ing  that  he  would  not  conduct  his  army  into  their  c(  unt  y 

Accepting  these  terms,  he  placed  them  under  the  government  of 

Kallas,  his  satrap  of  Hellespontine  Phrvgia.     Advancln.r  further  he 

beyomThl''R'l''^^  "'•  ^^^^'PP^^^^.^'^^'  ^^-  to  a  considemble  extent 
beyond  the  Halys,  leaving  therein  Sabiktas  as  satrap 

w!.  i?°"  established  security  in  his  rear,  Alexander  marched  south- 
ard toward  Mount  Taurus.     He  reached  a  post  called  the  Camp  of 
v  us,  at   he  northei-n  foot  of  that  mountaiA,  near  ^le  pass  Tuid- 
I'vl^r,  or  kiiikian  Gates,  which  forms  the  regular  communicatk  i 
ueuveen  Kappadokia  on  the  north  side,  and  Kilikia  on  the  so  Uh  ^ 
I'^no^iw  ^  ""'''■     ^^}'''''S  road  ascending  and   descending  was 
^t^o?      •  M     7T*'\'''"'^''^-?'  /^"^  '''SSed,   sometimes  between   two 
steep  and  high  banks;  and  it  included,  near  its  southern  termination 
otie  spot  particularly  obstructed  and  difficult.     From  ancient  times' 
down  to  the  present,  the  main  road  from  Asia  Mino    h  o  K   ik^i 
uid  Syria  has  run  through  this  pass.     During  the  Roman  empire   it 
must  doubtless  have  received  nmny  improvements,  so  as  t    render 


586        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

^l^H^Cvriis  himself  of  ^tliis  fact,  tl.at  lie  had  prepared  a  fleet,  in  case 

6ivp  nolicv  of  Memnon  might  have  been  nuido  sure.     To  Alexautlcr 
infertor  ai  he  ;va.  by  seaftUe  resource  employed  by  the  younger 

*^Tet  IrsameslbePersian  satrap  comtr^anding  at  Tarsus  in  Kilikia 
1,  Jh,V;ecXed  wnVin<'lv  from  llis  mast.r  no  instructions,  or  worse 
InTuone  a^'ed  »8  iStJorant  of  the  existence  of  his  entorpr.smg 
e  em  V  aonh  of  JVount  Taurus,  On  the  first  approach  of  A  exander 
Z  few  Per  ia,  soldiers  occupying  the  pass  tied  without  s^nkmg  a 
bow  being  seemingly  unprepared  for  any  enemy  more  lonmdae 
"an 'movmtaiu  robCe^.     ilexantler  thus    l.ec,nne   master   of   thi 

almost  insuperable  barrier  w.thout  the  '''>^?  "*  f„™  ;..  "°,  '^rrhin- 
in-  dav  he  marched  his  whole  army  over  it  into  KiliUia,  """  "''''°= 
i"u  few-  hours  at  Tarsus,  found  the  town  already  evacuated  bj  Arsa- 

■"It  Tarsus  Alexander  made  a  long  halt;  '""'i'\n,*5nf  Ihiie" hoVln 
tended    Fitlier  from  excessive  fatiiiuc,  or  from  bathing  while  hot  in 
^e  cMlv  water  oTl'eri^  l.e  was  «*^i>^ed  w'th  a  vmlent 

fBver  which  Dre^enllv  increased  to  so  dangerous  a  pilch  that  his  lile 
l^"derp^r«l' of.     Amid  the  grief  and  ah.rin  with  -hich  this  mis- 
fnrtune  filled  the  army,  none  of  the   physicians  wou  d  ^entule  to 
admnfste    remedies,  fr  .m  fear  of  being  held  responsible  for  wMiat 
he  lened  Jo  ho  a  fatal  result.     One  «'«7  3"|  '  .'f'.^re"  and '" 
nanian  named  Philippus,  long  known  0"^  t"'^">  '>     Au"".    er 
on-agedto  cure  him  bv  a  violent   lH''g».t"e/'™"Sl>t-,   Alo."  "f^^ 
dfected  him  to  i.repare  it:but  before  the  time  fortaking  tanned,  lie, 
renewed  Tconfideulial   letter  from   Parmcnio,  entreating   him    to 
;r:.r  ofVhmp pus,  who  had  been  bribed  byl)anus  to  poison  him^ 
Afrer  reidinir  the  letter,  he  put  it  under  his  plllo^^ .     1  lestntl}  came 
Phil^  ^1^ wilh  L  nwdic-liJ^^  .hich.  Alexander  ^^^  M^ 
lowed  without  remark,  at  the  same  time  fiivmg  ^^^^j^PP^^^  f/i^_^^^^^ 
ir.  rL.^    .md  witehinff  the  express  on  of  his  countenance,      ihe  looK, 
wo."''aid  gT-^UiiesIf  l^e  pl^^         -ere  such  as  completely  to  reas- 


OPERATIONS  IN  KILIKIA. 


687 


sure  him.  Phihppus.  indignantly  repudiating  the  calumnv  reneate.l 
IS  full  oonfitieiice  in  the  medicini.  and  pledi^-d  himself  t"  abide  the 
j-Mlt.  At  tirsl  It  operated  so  vi<,Ienlly  as  to  niake  Alexander  seem 
nglv  worse  and  even  to  bring  him  to  deatli's  door^bm  after  a  cS" 
fain  interval  Its  healing  eftects  he.ame  manifest.  The  fever  was  suT 
died,  and  Al-xander  was  pronounced  out  of  danger  to  the  deli  "ht" 
t:nerTShTJVi,4  "''^°-"^'"  ''""^  •^"«-''  to^resto^e trnt'-fli'^ 

m^^iHt  It  ,e^s  Xi::fc:%  ss  tA!:^%^^ 

army,  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  tiie  forward  route  ,ind  of  securing 
he  i«ss  called  the  Gates  of  Kifikia  and  Syria  Tl,"sna  row  ron?f 
hounded  by  the  range  of  Mount  Amanus  on  the  eas  and  .v  Hie  sea 
on  the  west,  had  been  once  barred  by  a  double  cross-w°li  with  ™1es 
for  p.assage,  marking  the  original  boundaries  of  I^IMlda  !^i'svTh 
The  Gates,  about  six  days'  march  bevond  Tarsus  were  found  o.f.rd 
e.  .   hut  the  guard  fled  with  little  "resistance.     At  the  same^  ime' 

andre.g^,^ri;4''thct;r/orrncld^^^^^^^^ 

kian  mountauieers.     Then   retii rn i n. r  tr»  Tovr.!         i  "le  iviU- 

his   forward   marel,  he '  ad'^^i'i" "  1"^!,'^,/  the'  inf  n  r^.^nd  wrh'if 

n%ci  i;yiamus,  next  to  Mallus;  the  genera   body  of  cavalrv   nndpr 
Pii   otas,  bein.r  sent  by  a  more  direct^-oute  acro.^  tL  A leian  nh  n 
Ma  lus,  sacred  to  the  prophet  Amphilociius  as  patron  hero   was^l. id 

disponed  to'^r^e^t  tTlth'?"^/' "^  ''''''  '''''''  ^^'-""  "Te^'aS  wa 

some  troublesome  discord  among  the  citizens  appeased 

It  was  at  Mallus  that  he  received  his  first  rlictin^f  ^^^^^     •     <.• 
resnectino-  D'iriii«  onH  ih^  ,.,  •     -o  uistmct  communication 

enc unneci  -it  SnHn  hM         '^"^  ?''"''''"  '''^^^•>^'  ^^^^^^  was  said  to  be 
auoui  ivvo  aay^  maich  from  the  mounta  u  pass  now  called  Rpvl-,n 

uie  m.iiii  roaa  tiom  Asia  Minor  into  Syria,  after  having  passed  first  over 
la  irus  and  next  through  the  difficult  point  of  groifml  abo?e  snec4 
hed  called  the  Gates  of  Kilikia  and  Syria),  betw-een  Mount  Amanus 
and   he  sea.     Assembling  his  principal  otflcers,  Alexander  comminT 

hin  wi  h""  '•'"•  P"''""°  ".f  ^''""^'  ™^  cncaniped  in  a  smc  ous 
fc..h  ,^,rT    -Y*?'"  '"P^'r'^y  of  ""•"I'ers,  especially  of  cav"C 
Ihough    he  locality   was   thus  rather  favorable  to  the  enemv  v^/ 

to'lel:frflr-Tn;,f"",i'''"''?'\''r.'  '^•'"^"S'^'  ea»ed  upon  AlS^I 
to  lead  them  forthwith  against  h  m      Accordinoiv  Alpvorrior.  ,./ V, 

inorumg.    He  passed  through  Issus,  where  he  left  some  sick  aul 


B88       SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

Here  luiving  Leon  dohnncd  in  "'.'^  "^^  ''  ""i  X„„^(,  ,,is  plans, 
ftorni,  he  received  inte  lyence  "■  ''''  \ »' .°f '1^*^  S  e  i  and  wasnow 
Tl.e  Persian  army,  l.ad  been  "'"f  ^"^  "^.'^^^  .^^'^dy  go^  of 

in  Kilikia,  following  m  bis  real.     It  liaa  aueauj  t     y 

Issiis.  r  <i.„  ;.,inrinr  Ill's  vast  and  miscellaneous 

Darius  had  maveliedoju  of  «'0^"=;'-,^!;  ^f  ,,?,.,  his  harem,  .his 
host,  stated  at  wO.UUU  men.      n'^  ae«crintion,  accompanied 

children,  his  personal  attendants  «f '^^Y"/  ''t.rt.an  riumph.  AH  the 
him,  to  ^.itness  what,  «»«  «>^  »^'i;;'  «  ..^  p.^^d'l  "abundance,  for 
apparatus  of  ostenlatuin  and  '"^"'>  11  e  bU-a^e  was  enormous: 
the  kin?  and  for  bis  Persian  g>"'»^  "^f  ^/.  ^,  Vu^.e  Va"°„ou"h  to  furnish 
of  gokfand  silver  alone,  ;^|„rc  ml  TlenW^^  ^^S 

^j-^  r 'Siphi^r « S^  t^  id^::^^ 

uus',  but  was  sent  under  a  g-"> '-?  ^  -^fj;: 'Z'  ^Z,  was  eager  to 
At  the  bead  of  such  an  o^"^^''"^ .  "'"=,;\"'^e  it  for  him  simply 
tring  on  at  once  a  general  battle.  ^  „  ''^i  "^'jj,"' ..esenee,  be  calculated 
to  klepback  an  enemy,  "^'°"  ;,  '^,!  "'^J,^^  ?  ,',„  no  orders  (as  we 
on  crushing  altoge.ber.  ,A«' ''"'!?'>;  Ue  Tan  us; be  had  admitted 
have  just  seen)  to  .le  end  the  bnc  o    t  e   '"J  ,  j  ),•„„  ^nter 

Alexander  unopposed  into  ^^'''l^'^  .»'"\  ,^,'"  ,', '"s-first,  tl.e  Gates 

n:t'S:i5l%^r  ^i^r  !:t3=^,^  -  moveinen. 

of  Ale.xander,  bitberm  «"',"''■'»  ;;:^,f,.']^!,'"?;.Wcirhreatened  his 
V/e  bav,.  already  noticed  the  '•>"«<=  V>  ,,2  mutOi  uneasiness  among 
life,  occasioning  not  o»b-  " '«"«  l^^U  '"t J^^^^^^^^^  ^^,^  Persians, 
the  Macedonian  army.  AH  ^7„^;«"^,'\Vvm„  immediately  after 
witbabundunt  exaggerations; ''"' " h.™/\'":  ",  them,  t. . rued  away 
recovery,  instead  ot  marching  foruaid  lo^'"l'.,^"V'' ' ,  j  ,.,;„  .^^as 
f?om  them  to  subdue  the  western  P"/  '""  ^f- ^'Scl^^r  It  is  even 
construed  by  Darius  as  an  f'f«f««Vt  the  ^ck  of  the  Persians  in 
asserted  that  Parmenn.  wished  to  »" ^"  t';',^,;," "=  j„ ,„  At  any  rate, 
Kilikia,  and  that  Alexander  at  f^*  ^"'r"  [^  j^  persuasion,  and  was 
Darius,  after  a  certain  interval   ^.»"'™^'", .'erf;, at  the  Macedo- 

in^'^rn^pl?^; trrKl'y  rjm  tt  %t::;Knfr;sist  his  attack. 


DARIUS  CAPTURES  ISSUS. 


689 


Under  this  impression  Darius  resolved  upon  an  advance  into  Kilikia 
with  all  his  army.     Thymodes  indeed,  and  other  intelligent  G.veciau 
advisers— together  with  the  Macedonian  exile  Amyutas— deprecated 
his  new.  resolution,  entreating  him  to  persevere  in  his  original  pur- 
pose.    They  pledged  themselves  that  Alexander  would  come  forth  to 
attack  him  wherever  he  was,  and  that  too,  speedily.  They  dwelt  on  the 
imprudence  of  lighting  in  the  narrow  dehles  of  Kilikia,  where  his 
numbers,  and  especially  his  vast  cavalry,  would  be  useless.     Their 
advice,  however,  was  not  only  disregarded  by  Darius,  but  denounced 
by  the  Persian  councilors  as  traitorous.     Even  some  of  the  Greeks 
in  the  camp  shared,  and  transmitted  in  their  letters  to  Athens,  the 
blind  confidence  of  the  monarch.     The   order  was  forthwith  given 
for  the  whole  army  to  quit  the  plains  of  Syria  and  march  across 
Mount  Amanus  into  Kilikia.     To  cross,  by  any  pass,  over  such  a 
range  as  that  of  Mount  Amanus,  with  a  numerous  army,  heavy  ba^--- 
gage,  and  ostentatious  train  (including  all  the  suite  necessary  for  the 
regal  family),  must  have  been  a  work  of  no  inconsiderable  time;  and 
the  only  two  passes  over  this  mountain  were,  both  of  them,  narrow  and 
easily  defensible.     Darius  followed  the  northernmost   of   the   two, 
which  brought  him  into  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 

Thus  at  the  same  time  that  the  Macedonians  Were  marching  south- 
ward to  cross  Mount  Amanus  by  the  southern  pass,  and  attack  Darius 
in  the  plain— Darius  was  coming  over  into  Kilikia  by  the  northern 
pass  to  drive  them  before  him  back  into  Macedonia.  Reaching  Issus. 
seemingly  about  two  days  after  they  had  left  it.  he  became  master  of 
their  sick  and  wounded  left  in  the  town.  With  odious  brutality, 
his  grandees  impelled  him  to  inflict  upon  these  poor  men  either  death 
or  amputation  of  hands  and  arms.  He  then  marched  forward— 
iilong  the  same  road  by  the  shore  of  the  gulf  which  had  already  been 
followed  by  Alexander— and  encan>ped  on  the  banks  of  the  river 
Piuarus. 

The  fugitives  from  Issus  hastened  to  inform  Alexander,  whom 
they  overtook  at  ^[yriandrus.  So  astonished  was  he  that  he  refused 
to  believe  the  news  until  it  had  been  confirmed  by  some  officers 
whom  he  sent  northward  along  the  coast  of  the  gulf  in  a  small  gal- 
ley, and  to  whom  the  vast  Persian  multitude  on  the  shore  was  dis- 
tinctly visible.  Then,  as.sembling  the  chief  officers,  he  communi- 
cated to  them  the  near  appro.ich  of  the  enemy,  expatiating  on  the 
favorable  auspices  under  which  a  battle  would  now  take  place.  His 
address  was  hailed  with  acclamation  by  his  hearers,  who  demanded 
only  to  be  led  against  the  enemy. 

His  distance  from  the  Persian  position  may  have  been  about  eight- 
een miles.  By  an  evening  march,  after  supper,  he  reached  at  mid- 
night the  narrow  delile  (between  Mount  Amanus  and  the  sea)  called 
the  Gates  of  Kilikia  and  Syria,  througli  which  he  had  marched  two 
days  before.  Again 'master- of  that  important  position,  he  rested 
there  the  last  portion  of  the  night,  and  advanced  forward  at  daybreak 


590        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

northward  toward  Darius.     At  first  the  breadth  of  practicable  road 

^^is  so  confined  as  to  admit  only  a  narrow  column  of  march   .jitli 

^^? cavalry  following  the  infantry;  presently  it  widened,  enabling 

Alexander  to  enlarge  his  front  by  bringing  up  successively  the  divi- 

;i>n8  of  the  phala'nx.     On  approaching  near  to  the  "ver  Pmarus 

which  flowed  across  the  pass),  he  adopted  his  order  of  battle      On 

t  extreme  right  he  placed  the  hypaspists,  or  light  division  of  hop- 

i  cs    next  (reckoning  from  right  to  left),  five  Taxeis  or  divisions  of  the 

nhalknx  under  Ka-uus,  Perdikkas,  Meleager.  Ptolemy,  and  Amyntas. 

S     hefe  three  last  or  left  divisions,  Kraterus  had  the  general  com- 

m  ind  •  himself  subject  to  the  orders  of  Parmenio,  who  commanded  he 

^nth-e  left  ha  f  of^  the  army.      The  breadth  of  plain  between  the 

mountains  on  the  right,  and  the  sea  on  the  left,  is  said  to  have  been  not 

more   han  fourteen  stadia,  t)r  somewhat  more  than  one  English  mile 

Td  a  half.     From  fear  of  being  out-flanked  by  the  superior  numbers 

of  the  Persians,  he  gave  strict  orders  to  Parmenio  to  keep  close  to 

the  sea      His  Macedonian   cavalry,  the  Companions,  together  with 

the  Thessalians,  were  placed  on  l»'«/\gl^V^iT^'f ''^  v^h^PekT 
A-rianes,  and  the  principal  portion  of  the  light  infantry  The  Pelo- 
pmmesian  and  allied  cavaliV,  with  the  Thracian  and  Kretan  light 
infantry,  were  sent  on  the  left  flank  to  Parmenio. 

Darius,  informed  that  Alexander  was  approaching,  resolved  to  tight 
where  he  was  encamped,  behind  the  r» ver  Pinanis.     He  however, 
tlirew  across  the  river  a  force  of  30,000  cavalry,  and  20,000  mfantry 
to  insure  the  undisturbed  formation  of  \^^%™^^^ /^f,^f,,  ^^^f°  n  ^^ 
river.     He  composed  his  phalanx,  or  main  ^1^"«^«^^,^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
hoDlites-   30,000  Greek  hoplites  in   the  center,  and  30  000  Asiatics 
armed  as  hoplites  (called  Kardakes),  on  each  side  of  these  Greeks. 
Tl^ese  men-Sot  distributed  into  separate  divisions,  but  grouped  m  one 
body  or  multitude-filled  the  breadth  between  the  ^jountains^mdthe 
seT     On  the  mountains  to  his  left,  he  placed  a  body  of  20  m  men 
intended  to  act  affainst  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  Alexander.     But 

o  the  gre^nu^  mass  o^f  his  vast  host  he  could  find  no  room  to 

ac     acSrdmgly  they  remained  useless  in  the  rear  of  his  Greek  and 

Wirhop^^^^^^    yet  not  formed  into  any  body  of  reserve,  or  kept 

^^i:^oL^^  for  Jesting  in  case  of  need  J|^  l^j^Vf'ti;  Pina'^s  t^^^^ 
ou4ly  formed,  he  recalled  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Pinarus  the 
SO  000  cavalry  and  20,000  infantry  which  he  had  sent  across  as  a  pro- 
tS  force.^  A  part  of  this  cavalry  were  sent  to  his  extreme  left 
win-  but  the  mountain  ground  was  found  unsuitable  for  them  to 
act.  lo  that  they  were  forced  to  cross  to  the  right  wmg,  where  ac- 
cordingly the  g^at  mass  of  the  Persian  cavalry  became  assembled 
Darius' himself  in  his  chariot  was  in  the  center  of  the  me  behind 
the  Grecian  hoplites.  In  the  front  of  his  whole  line  ran  the  river  or 
rivulet  Pinarus;  the  banks  of  which,  in  many  parts  naturally  Steep, 
he  obstructed  in  some  places  by  embankments 
As  soon  as  Alexander,  by  the  retirement  of  the  Persian  covering 


BATTLE  OF  ISSUS. 


591 


3 


detachment,  was  enabled  to  perceive  the  final  dispositions  of  Darius 
he  made  some  alteration  in  his  own,  transferring  his  Tliessalian 
cavalry  by  a  rear  movement  from  his  right  to  his  left  wino-,  and 
bringing  forward  the  lancer-cavalry  or  sarrissophori,  as  well  as  the 
light  infantry,  Pa^onians  and  archers,  to  the  front  of  his  right.  The 
Agrianians,  together  with  some  cavalry  and  another  body  of  archers 
were  detached  from  the  general  line  to  form  an  oblique  front  against 
the  20,000  Persians  posted  on  the  hill  to  out-flank  him.  As  these 
20,000  men  came  near  enough  to  threaten  his  flank,  Alexander 
directed  the  Agrianians  to  attack  them,  and  to  drive  them  further 
away  on  the  hills.  They  manifestt.'d  so  little  firmness,  and  gave  way 
so  easily,  that  he  felt  no  dread  of  any  serious  aggressive  movement 
from  them.  He  therefore  contented  himself  wUh  holding  back  in 
reserve  against  them  a  body  of  300  heavy  cavalry;  while  he  placed 
the  Agrianians  and  the  rest  on  the  right  of  his  main  line,  in  order  to 
make  his  front  equal  to  that  of  his  enemies. 

Having  thus  formed  his  array,  after  giving  the  troops  a  certain 
halt  after  their  march,  he  advanced  at  a  very  slow  pace,  anxious  to 
niaintain  his  own  front  even,  and  anticipating  that  the  enemy  might 
cross  the  Pinarus  to  meet  him.  But  as  they^did  not  move  he  con- 
liiiued  his  advance,  preserving  the  uniformity  of  the  front'  until  he 
arrived  within  bowshot,  when  he  himself,  at  the  head  of  his  cavalry 
hypaspists,  and  divisions  of  the  phalanx  on  the  right  accelerated  his 
pace,  crossed  the  river  at  a  quick  step,  and  fell  upon  the  Kardakes 
or  Asiatic  hoplites  on  the  Persian  left.  Unprepared  for  the  sudden- 
ness and  vehemence  of  this  attack,  these  Kardakes  scarcely  resisted 
a  moment,  but  gave  way  as  soon  as  they  came  to  close  quarters  and 
fled,  vigorously  pressed  by  the  Macedonian  right.  Darius  who  was 
in  his  chariot  in  the  center,  perceived  that  this  untoward' desertion 
exposed  his  person  from  the  left  flank.  Seized  with  panic,  he  caused 
his  chariot  to  be  turned  round,  and  fled  with  all  speed  among  the 
foremost  fugitives.  He  kept  to  his  chariot  as  long  as  the  ground 
permitted,  but  quitted  it  on  reaching  some  rugged  ravines  and 
mounted  on  horseback  to  make  sure  of  escape;  in  such  terror  that 
he  cast  away  his  bow,  his  shield,  and  his  regal  mantle.  He  does  not 
se(,'m  to  have  given  a  single  order,  nor  to^have  made  the  smallest 
clfort  to  repair  a  first  misfortune.  The  flight  of  the  king  was  the 
signal  for  all  who  observed  it  to  flee  also;  so  that  the  vast  host  in  the 
ivar  were  quickly  to  be  seen  trampling  one  another  down,  in  their 
cltorts  to  get  through  the  difficult  ground  out  of  the  reach  of  the 
enemy.  Darius  was  himself  not  merely  the  center  of  union  for  all 
the  miscellaneous  contingents  composing  the  army,  but  also  the  sole 
commander;  so  that  after  his  flight  there  was  no  one  left  to  irive  any 
general  order.  *=  "^ 

This  great  battle— we  might  rather  say,  that  which  ought  to  have 
been  a  great  battle— was  thus  lost,— through  the  giving  way  of  the 
Asiatic  hoplites  on  the  Persian  left,  and  the  immediate  flight  ^^f 


592        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

Darius —^vitliin  a  few  minutes. after  its  commencement.  But  the 
center  and  ri-ht  of  the- Persians,  not  yet  apprised  of  these  mistor- 
tune^  belKived  willi  irallanlry .  AVlien  Alexander  made  his  rapid  dash 
forward  witli  tlie  right,  under  his  own  immediate  command  tlie  pha- 
lanx in  his  left  center  (which  was  under  Kraterus  and  1  armenio) 
ciil'ier  did  not  receive  the  same  accelerating  order,  or  foiini.  itselt  both 
retarded  and  disordered  by  greater  steepness  in  the  banks  ot  the 
Piu-iris  Here  it  was  charued  bv  the  Grecian  niereenanes,  tlie  best 
troops  in  the  Persian  service.  The  combat  whirh  took  place  Avas 
obst  nate  and  the  Macedonian  loss  not  inconsiderable;  the  general  ot 
division,  Ptolemy  son  oC Seleukus,  with  120  of  the  liont-rank  men  or 
choice  phalandtes,  being  slain.  But  presently  Alexander,  having 
completed  the^out  on  the  enemies'  left,  brought  back  his  victorious 
troops  from  the  l>ursuit,  attacked  the  Grecian  niereenanes  in  Hank 
and  -ave  decisive  superiority  to  their  enemies.  1  hese  Grecian  mer- 
c"na?ks  ^^^^  beaten\md  forced  to  retire.  On  finoing  that  Darius 
himself  had  fled,  they  got  away  from  the  field  as  well  nsthey  could, 
ye^  Seemingly  in  good  order.  There  is  ev(  n  reason  to  suppose -that  a 
part  of  them  forced  their  Way  up  the  mountains  or  inrough  the  Mace- 
d(>nian  line,  and  made  their  escape  southward. 

Meanwhile  on  the  Persian  right,  toward  the  sea,  the  heavy-armed 
PcTsh  n  c  mdry  had  shown  mudi  bravery.     They  were,  bo  d  enough 
to  cross  the  Pinanis  and  vigorously  to  charge  the  Ihessalians;  with 
vhoiTthey  m  d^  a  close  contest,  until  the  news  spread  that 

Dadus  lu'd  disappeared,  and  that  the  left  of  the  army  was  routed. 
Th>  then  turned  their  backs  and  fled,  sustaining  terribie  damage 
from  their  enemies  in  the  retreat.  Of  the  Kardakes  on  the  right 
S  of  the  Grecian  hoplites  in  the  Persian  line,  w^  hear  nothing  nor 
of  the  Macc!d"nian  infLtry  opposed  to  them.  ^^^^ 
dakescame  little  into  action,  since  the  cavalry  on  en  part  of  lie 
field  were  so  severely  engaged.  At  any  nue  they  took  pait  in  t  e 
general  flight  of  the  Persians,  as  soon  as  Darius  was  known  to  have 

^'' The'^rmU^^^  the  Persians  being  completed,  Alexander  began  a  vig- 
orous pu    idt.     The  destruction  and  slaughter  of  the  fugitives  were 
prodigious      Amid  so  small  a  breadth  of  practicable  ground,  nar- 
io^^drmetimes  into  a  defile  and  broken  by  ^^-^'^^^^'^ 
their  vast  numbers  found  no  room,  and  trod  one  another  flown.     As 
any  perished  in  this  way  as  by  the  sword  of  the  conquerors;  mso- 
uch  Uiat  Ptolemy  (afterwards' king  of  Egypt    the  companion  and 
1  i.toian  ^^^^  Alexander)  recounts  that  he  himself  in  the  pursuit  came 
a  ravine  choked  up  with  dead  bodies,  of  which  he  made  a  bridge 
,  pass  over  it.    Tiie  pursuit  was  continued  as  long  as  theligh   o   a 
November  day  allowed;  but  the  battle  had  not  be.^un  til  a  late  hour. 
The  camp  of  ^Darius  was  taken,  together  with  his  mother  his  wife, 
his  sister  his  infant  son,  and  two  daughters.     His  chariot,  his  shield 
aSl  us  bo  v  also  fell  into  the  power  of  the  conquerors;  and  a  sum  of 


TPvEATMENT  OF  REGAL  FEMALE  PRISONERS.     593 

3,000  talents  in  money  was  found,  though  much  of  the  treasure  had 
been  sent  to  Damascus.  The  total  loss  of  the  Persians  is  said  to  have 
amounted  to  10,000  horse  and  100,000  foot;  among  the  slain  moreover 
were  several  eminent  Persian  grandees— Arsames,  Rheoniithres,  and 
Atizycs,  who  had  commanded  at  the  Granikus— Sabakes,  satrap  of 
Egypt.  Of  the  Macedonians  we  are  told  that  300  foot  and  150  horse 
were  killed.  Alexander  himself  was  slightly  wounded  in  the  thi<di 
bv  a  sword.  ^ 

The  molher,  wife,  and  family  of  Darius,  who  became  captives, 
were  treated  by  Alexander's  order  with  the  utmost  consideration  and 
resi)ect.  When  Alexander  returned  at  niglit  from  the  i)ursuit,  he 
found  the  Persian  regal  tent  reserved  and  prepared  for  him.  In  an 
inner  compartment  of  it  he  heard  the  tears  and  wailiugs  <jf  women. 
lie  was  informed  that  the  mourners  were  the  mother  and  wile  of 
Darius,  who  had  learnt  that  the  bow  and  shield  of  Darius  had  been 
taken,  and  were  giving  loose  to  their  grief  under  t.he  belief  that 
Darius  himself  was  killed.  Alexander  immediately  sent  Leoimalus 
to  assure  them  that  Darius  was  still  living,  and  to*^  promise  further 
that  they  should  be  allowed  to  preserve  the  regal  title  and  state— his 
war  agaihst  Darius  being  undertaken  not  from  any  feelings  of  hatred^ 
but  as  a  fair  contest:  lor  the  empire  of  Asia.  Besides  tins  anecdote] 
which  depends  on  good  authority,  many  others,  uncertified  or  untrue' 
were  recounted  about  his  kind  behavior  to  these  princesses;  and  Alex- 
ander himself,  shortly  after  the  battle,  seems  to  have  heard  fictions 
about  it,  which  he  thought  it  necessary  to  contradict  in  a  letter.  It 
IS  certain  (from  the  extract  now  remaining  of  this  letter)  that  he  never 
saw,  nor  ever  entertained  the  idea  of  seeing,  the  captive  wife  of 
Darius,  said  to  be  the  most  beautiful  woman" in  Asia;  moreover  he 
even  declined  to  hear  encomiums  upon  her  beauty. 

How  this  vast  host  of  fugitives  got  out  of  the  narrow  limits  of  Kili- 
kia,  or  how  many  of  them  quitted  that  country  by  the  .same  pass  over 
Mount  Amanus  as  that  by  which  they  liad  entered  it— we  cannot 
make  out.  It  is  probable  that  many,  and  Darius  himself  among  the 
number,  made  their  escape  across  the  mountain  by  various  subordi- 
nate roads  and  by-paths;  which,  though  unfit  for  a  regular  army  with 
baggage,  would  be  found  a  welcome  resource  by  scattered  companies 
Darius  managed  to  get  together  4,000  of  the  fugitives,  with  whom  he 
hastened  to  riiapsakus,  and  there  recrossed  the  Euphrates.  The  only 
remnant  of  force,  still  in  a  position  of  defense  after  the  battle,  con- 
sisted of  8,000  of  the  Grecian  mercenaries  under  Amyntas  andTliy- 
nio<les.  These  men,  fighting  their  way  out  of  Kilikia  (seemin^rly 
toward  the  south,  by  or  near  Myriandrus),  marched  to  Tripolis '"on 
the  coast  of  Phenicia,  Avheit  they  still  lound  the  same  vessels  in 
which  they  had  themselves  been  brought  from  the  armament  of  Les- 
bos. Seizing  suificient  means  of  transport,  and  destroying-  the  rest 
to  prevent  pursuit,  they  immediately  crossed  over  to''  Cyprus' 
aud  from  thence  to  Egypt.     With  this  single  exception,  the  enor- 


594        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

mous  Persian  host  disappears  with  the  battle  of  Issus.  We  bear  of 
no  attempt  to  rally  or  re-form,  nor  of  any  fresh  Persian  force  afoot 
until  two  years  aflervs  ard.  The  booty  acquired  by  the  victors  was 
immense,  not  merely  in  gold  and  silver,  but  also  in  captives  lor  the 
slave-merchant.  On  the  morrow  of  the  battle,  Alexander  ottered  a 
solemn  sacritice  of  thanksgiving,  with  three  altars  erected  on  the 
banks  of  the  Pinarus;  while  he  at  the  same  time  buried  the  dead 
consoled  the  wounded,  and  rewarded  or  complimented  all  who  had 
distinguished  themselves. 

No  victory  recorded  in  history  w-as  ever  more  complete  in  itselt,  or 
more  far  stretching  in  its  consequences,  than  that  of  Issus.    Not  only 
was  the  Persian  force  destroved  or  dispersed,  but  the  efforts  of  Darius 
f  jr  recovery  were  paralvzed  bv  the  capture  of  his  family.     Portions 
of  the  dissipated  army  of  Issus  may  be  traced.  reai)pearing  in  differ- 
ent places  for  operations  of  detail,  but  we  shall  find  no  further  resist- 
ance to  Alexander,  during  almost  two  years,  except  from  the  brave 
freemen  of  two  fortified  cities.     Everywhere  an  overwhelming  senti- 
ment of  admiration  and  terror  was  spread  abroad,  toward  the  force, 
skill   or  good  fortune  of  Alexander,  by  whichever  name  it  might  be 
called— together  with  contempt  for  the  real  value  of  a  Persiati  army, 
in  spite  of  so  much  imposing  pomp  and  numerical  show;  a  contempt 
not  new  to  intelligent  Greeks,  but  now  communicated  even  to  vulgar 
minds  by  the  recent  unparalleled  catastrophe.     Both  as  general  and 
as  soldier,  indeed,  the  consummate  excellence  of  Alexander  stood 
conspicuous,  not  less  than  the  signal  deficiency  of  Darius.    Ihe  lault 
in  the  latter,  upon  which  most  remark  is  usually  made,  was,  that  of 
fighting   the  battle,  not  in  an  open  plain,  but   in  a  narrow  vaiiey, 
whereby  his  superiority  of  number  was  rendered  unprofitable,     but 
this  (as  I  have  alreadv  observed)  was  only  one  among  many  mistakes, 
and  by  no  means  the' most  serious.     The  result  would  have  been  the 
same,  had  the  battle  been  fought  in  the  plains  to  the  eastward  of 
Mount  Amanus.    Superior  numbers  are  of  little  avail  on  any  ground, 
unless  there  be  a  general  who  knows  how  to  make  use  of  them ;  un- 
less they  be  distributed  into  separate  divisions  ready  to  combine  for 
offensive  action  on  many  points  at  once,  or  at  any  rate  to  lend  sup- 
port to  each  other  in  defense,  so  that  a  defeat  of  one  fraction  is  not  a 
defeat  of  the  whole.     The  faith  of  Darius  in  simple  multitude  was 
altof^ether  blind  and  childish;  nay,  that  faith,  though  overweening 
beforehand   disappeared  at  once  when  he  found  his  enemies  did  not 
run  awav   but  faced  him  boldly— as  was  seen  by  his  attitude  on  the 
banks  of  the  Pinarus,  where  he  stood  to  be  attacked  instead  ot  execut- 
ino-  his  threat  of  Heading  down  the  handful  opposed  to  him.     But  it 
wtts  not  merelv  as  a  general,  that  Darius  acted  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  render  the  loss  of  the  battle  certain.    Had  his  dispositions  been  ever 
so  skillful,  his  personal  cowardice,  in  quitting  the  field  and  thinking 
only  of  his  own  safely,  would  have  sufficed  to  nullify  their  effect. 
Though  the  Persian  grandees  are  generally  conspicuous  for  personal 


EFFECT  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  ISSUS. 


595 


courage,  yet  we  shall  find  Darius  hereafter  again  exhibiting  the  like 
melancholy  timidity,  and  the  like  incompetence  for  using  numbers 
with  effect,  at  the  battle  of  Arbela,  though  fought  in  a  spacious 
t plain  chosen  by  himself. 

Happy  was  it  for  Memnon  that  he  did  not  live  to  see  the  renuncia- 
twn  of  his  schemes,  and  the  ruin  consequent  upon  it!  The  fleet  in  the 
A?e;in,  which  had  been  transferred  at  his  death  to  Pharnabazus  thoun-U 
weakened  by  the  loss  of  those  mercenaries  whom  Darius  had  recalled 
to  Issus,  and  disheartened  by  a  serious  defeat  which  the  Persian 
Orontobates  had  received  from  the  Macedonians  in  Karia  was  never- 
theless not  inactive  in  trying  to  organize  an  anti -Macedonian  mani- 
festation m  Greece.  While  Pharnabazus  w^as  at  the  island  of  Siph- 
nos  with  his  100  triremes,  he  was  visited  by  the  Lacedemonian  kin"- 
Agis,  who  pressed  him  to  embark  for  Peloponnesus  as  large  a  force 
as  he  could  spare,  to  second  a  movement  projected  by  the  Spartans 
But  such  aggressive  plans  were  at  once  crushed  by  the  terror-strikin*r 
news  of  the  battle  of  Issus.  Apprehending  a  revolt  in  the  island  o"f 
Uiios,  as  t,he  result  of  this  news,  Pharnabazus  immediately  sailed 
thither  with  a  large  detatchment.  Agis,  obtaining  nothing  more  than 
a  subsidy  of  thirty  talents  and  a  squadron  of  ten  triremes  was 
obliged  to  renounce  his  projects  in  Peloponnesus,  and  to  content 
himself  with  directing  some  operations  in  Krete,  to  be  conducted  by 
his  brother  Agesilaus;  while  he  himself  remained  among  the  islands 
and  ultmiately  accompanied  the  Persian  Autophradates  to  Halikar- 
nassus.  It  appears,  however,  that  he  afterward  w  ent  to  conduct  the 
operations  in  Krete,  and  that  he  had  considerable  success  in  that 
island,  bringing  several  Kretan  towns  to  join  the  Persians  On  the 
whole,  however,  the  victory  of  Issus  overawed  all  free  spirit  through- 
out Greece,  and  formed  a  guarantee  to  Alexander  for  at  least  a  tem- 
porary quiescence.  The  philo-Macedonian  synod,  assembled  at 
Corinth  during  the  period  of  the  Isthmian  festival,  manifested  their 
.loy  by  sending  to  him  an  embassy  of  congratulation  and  a  wreath  of 
gold. 

With  little  delay  after  his  victory.  Alexander  marched  through 
Koele-byria  to  the  Phenician  coast,  detaching  Parmenio  in  his  way 
to  attack  Damascus,  whither  Darius,  before  the  battle,  had  sent  most 
part  of  his  treasure  with  many  confidential  otficers,  Persian  w-omen 
of  rank  and  envoys.  Though  the  place  might  have  held  out  a  con- 
siderable siege,  it  was  surrendered  w  ithout  resistance  by  the  treason 
or  cowardice  of  the  governor;  who  made  a  feint  of  tryin^-  to  convey 
away  the  treasure,  but  took  care  that  it  should  fall  into  the  hands  of 
tne  enemy.  There  was  captured  a  large  treasure— with  a  prodigious 
number  and  variety  of  attendants  and  ministers  of  luxury,  belong- 
ing to  the  court  and  the  grandees.  Moreover  the  prisoners  made 
were  so  numerous,  that  most  of  the  great  Persian  families  had  to 
deplore  the  loss  of  some  relative,  male  or  female.  There  were  among 
them  the  widow  and  daughters  of  king  Ochus,  the  predecessor  of  D^ 


596        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

',K.^t!,e  danghter  of  Dam..  ..rorUer  0^:^Z^:^X^ 
h:a.m,  ami  ot  ^1'='™"  "'■'"'^"v', "!„,,, vUli  ber  child,  sent  up  by 
Sim-,  «i.low  of  the  '''■<:«'>f f„^^'^"'^nirc    v      There ^vere  al.o  sev- 
Jle.r.uon  to  serve  as  an  "'f  ?,£,  °  , '  '^  j*^  ee  kemoniau  and  Athenian,    . 
eral  eminent  Grecian  exdes,  1,  '^'f  °' V'^    .^udil  tit  to  eend  lo  Da- 
*vhohad  fled  to  Danus,  '.'"d^Y^""   ''"  e   hei   prkes-ftilh  the  army  at 
nmscus,  instead  of  "''°«>"?,  '^?' '''e^'ifes   v  erfat  once  released  by 
Issus.     The  Theban  and  -^'V*^ '""  ,^,^,"for  ,i,e  time  put  under  ajrest 
Alexander;  .<l'<;,Lac"'»^^7"-^\  ,^'^a.eDi  n  exiles^.-as  a  person.of 
but  not  detained  long.     Among  }»^Jl'"\         f  ,i,^  great  Athenian 
„oble  name  and  P^'^^-'^f'^P    1;"^^!^™^^  oidv  received  h.s 

officer  of  that  name.  2,' kv  f.^  mcous  and  lionorable  trcaimen  to  re- 
liljerty.  but  was  mduced  \l'-°^Ti'o^^xer  shortly  afterward  from 
SitdS---  ttn'  Scted.byorJer  of  AlexanUer. 

lK,d  been  adopted  by  Mexande  ^  f  ^^    ;^^^^f  Probably  this  >vas  the 
of  Macedonia,  as  tbe  stivionr  o    tl^^^^^^^^^^  J       ^^^^  to  the  son, 

rimimstance  which  ^^'^^'^"^l^^jt^l^^ '"^.^Athcns  or  to^val•d  the  mili- 

rather  than  anv  senti^nent  ^^^^^^^^^^VenL  of  position  between  Iphi; 
tarygeniusof  the  father     Thee    in  e^^^  ^  ^^^^  ^^^^^^^^^i 

kratc^s  the  father  and  H^l^i^;-^;^^^^^^^^^  The  father,  a  dis- 

cvidenccsof  the  downward  mai  hot  lu^      f,eemen,  sustaining  by 

tinguished  othcer   ^«;>^'!??  .^f  ^^.^^^0^11  fellow^itizen^  even 

arms  the  security  and  tUgnit>   of  1  ^,^«J^  .^^^  ,     ,1  family:  the  son, 
interfering  for  the  rescue  «/  ^^^^^.f^  ;;^f  f  ^       native  city  by  Macedo- 

'-;.r:trs?u,Xytu,^oSythrew  away  at  once  his  own 

securitv  and  the  freedom  of  Greece  Alexander  advanced  on- 

Master  of  Damascus  and  f  ^^^^^;\^^^^^^^  ,vhich  he  approached 

.v-ard  to  Phenicia.    ,T^he  lu-st  Phemcian^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^^^^^  ^ 

^as  Marathus,  on  the  n^amland  opP^'^  ^^^^^^^^^.i^,.  towns,  the  do- 
ino-  along  with  that  islet^"^^  ^;,^"'^;^^,  .^  V^at  p,:ii,ee  was  himself 
main  of  the  Aradian  prince  ^^i^^^^'f^'-^^itle  Persian  fleet  in  the 
BoTserving  with  his  nav.d  ^:^^\^^^^\^,  despatched  to 
^srcan;  but  his  son  btra  o  acting  ab  vicei  }  ^^.^^^  ^^^  j^^^, 

A^?xander  Ins  homage  with  a  golde  ;^^;;;^^'i^Xded  in  its  domain, 
at  once  Aradus  with  the  neighboring  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^habitants  of  By- 
The  example  of  Strato  was  .^^^^f^^^^^  f^' ^^^^^^  direction ;  next,  by  the 
bins,  the  next  Phenjcian  ^;;^>^"    ;  ^^<^^^f^^^^^^    Phenician  prosperity. 

ereatcity  of  Sidon.  the  ^""^Z^^lomleil^m^^^^^  invite  his  approach. 
The  Sidonians  even  sent  envo>s^^^^^^  .^.^^^^^  ^^^^^^  „,. 


LETTER  OF  DARIUS. 


597 


years  before)  had  marked  the  recapture  of  their  city  bj'-  the  armies  of 
l)chus.  Nevertheles^^,  the  naval  contingents  both  of  Bybhis  and  of 
Sidon  (as  well  as  that  of  xVradus),  were  at  this  moment  sailing  in  the 
^Egean  with  the  Persian  admiral  Autophradates,  and  formed  a  large 
proportion  of  his  entire  fleet. 

While  Alexander  was  still  at  Marathus,  however,  previous  to  his 
onward  march,  he  received  both  envoys  and  a  letter  from  Darius, 
asking  for  the  restitution  of  his  mother,  wife,  and  children — and 
tendering  friendship  and  alliance,  as  from  one  king  to  another.  Da- 
rius further  attempted  to  show,  that  the  Macedonian  Philip  had  be- 
gun the  wrong  against  Persia— that  Alexander  had  continued  it — 
and  that  he  himself  (Dariu.s)  had  acted  merely  in  self-defense.  In 
reply,  Alexander  wrote  a  letter,  wherein  he  set  forth  his  own  case 
agaitist  Darius,  proclaiming  himself  the  appointed  leader  of  the 
Greeks,  to  avenge  the  ancient  invasion  of  Greece  by  Xerxes.  He 
then  alleged  various  complaints  against  Darius,  whom  he  accused  of 
having  instigated  the  assassination  of  Philip  as  well  as  the  hostilities 
of  the  anti-Macedonian  cities  in  Greece.  "Now  (continued  he),  by 
the  grace  of  the  gods,  I  have  been  victorious,  flrst  over  your  satraps, 
next  over  yourself.  I  have  taken  care  of  all  who  submit  to  me,  and 
made  them  satisfied  with  their  lot.  Come  yourself  to  me  also,  as  to 
the  master  of  all  xVsia.  Come  without  fear  of  suffering  harm;  ask 
me,  and  you  shall  receive  back  your  mother  and  wife,  and  anything 
else  which  you  please.  When  next  you  write  to  me,  how^ever,  ad- 
dress me  not  as  an  equal,  but  as  lord  of  Asia  and  of  all  that  beloug.s 
to  you;  otherwise  I  shall  deal  with  you  as  a  wrong-doer.  If  you  in- 
tend to  contest  the  kingdom  with  me,  stand  and  tight  for  it,  and  do 
not  run  away.  I  shall  march  forw^ird  against  you,  v/herever  you 
iiiay  be." 

This  memorable  correspondence,  which  led  to  no  result,  is  of  im- 
portance only  as  it  marks  the  character  of  xVlexander,  with  whom 
lighting  and  conquering  were  both  the  business  and  the  luxury  of 
life,  and  to  whom  all  assumption  of  equality  and  independence  with 
himself,  even  on  the  part  of  other  kings— ev^erything  short  of  sub- 
mission and  obedience — appeared  in  the  light  of  wrong  and  insult  to 
be  avenged.  The  recital  of  comparative  injuries,  on  each  side,  was 
mere  uiiineaning  pretense.  The  real  and  only  question  was  (as  Alex- 
ander himself  had  put  it  in  his  message  to  the  captive  Sisygambis) 
which  of  the  two  should  be  master  of  Asia. 

The  decision  of  this  question,  already  sufficiently  advanced  on  the 
morrow  after  the  battle  of  Issus,  w^as  placed  almost  beyond  doubt  by 
the  rapid  and  unopposed  successes  of  Alexander  among  most  of  the 
Phenician  cities.  The  last  hopes  of  Persia  now  turned  chiefly  upon 
the  sentiments  of  these  Phenicians.  The  greater  part  of  the  Persian 
fleet  in  the  ^gean  w^as  composed  of  Phenician  triremes,  partly  from 
the  coast  of  Syria,  partly  from  the  island  of  Cyprus.  If  the  Pheni- 
cian towns  made  submission  to  Alexander,  it  was  certain  that  their 


598        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

8hiD«*  and  seamen  would  either  return  home  spontaneously  or  bo  re- 
e    fed    thus    depriVwi^    the  Persian    quiver  of   its   best  remainnig 
.'rrmv      But  if  the  Phenieian  towns  held  out  resolutely  agamst  him, 
OR  and  all,  so  as  to  put  him  under  the  necessity  of  besieging  them 
?n  suXsion-each  lending  aid  to  the  rest  by  sea,  with  superiority  of 
n"  V  1  force,  and  more  thaifone  of  them  being  situated  upon  isle  s- 
U  e  o Xtacl^s  to  be  overcome  would  have  been  so  multiplied,  that 
even  Alexander's  ener-Y  and  ability  might  hardly  have  proved  sufti- 
r  ent  for  tliem:  at  anyVate,  he  would  have  had  hard  work  befo  e 
hm  for  perhaps  two  /ears,  opening  the  door  to  many  new  accidents 
and  effons.    It  was  therefore  a  signal  good  fortune  to  Alexanc  er  when 
he  prince  of  the  islet  of  Aradus  spontaneously  surrendered    o  him 
at  difficult  citv.  and  when  the  example  was  followed  by  the  still 
oreatcr  city  of  Sidon.     The  Phenicians,  taking  them  generally  had 
fopo-itivitietothe  Persians;  neither  had  they  much  confederate 
attachment  one  toward  the  other,  although  as  separate  communities 
they  were  brave  and  enterprising.     Among  the  Sidonians,  tliere  was 
even  a  prevalent  feeling  of  aversion  to  the  Persians,  from  the  c^use 
nbove  mentioned.     Hence  the  prince  of   Aradus,  upon  whom  Alex- 
ander'sTi    ch  tirst  came,  had  little  certainty  of  aid  from  his   neigh- 
bor^ if  he  resolved  to  hold  out;  and  still  less  d  sposition  to  hold  out 
sinirie-handed,  after  the  battle  of  Issus  had  proclaimed  the  uTesistib^ 
force  of  Alexander  not  less  than  the  impotence  of  Persia.     One  after 
another  all  these  important  Phenician  seaports,   except  lyre,  fell 
fnto  the  hands  of  AleLnder  without  strikin-  a  blow.     At  Sidon,  the 
rei-nincT  prince  Strato,  reputed  as  philo-Persian,  ^v;iis  deposed,  and  a 
pei^on  Tuuned  AUlalonymus-of  the  reigning  family,  yet  poor  m  cir- 
f'limstances — was  appointed  in  his  room. 

With  his  usual  rapidity,  Alexander  marched  onward  toward  Tyre; 
the  most  powerful  amJng  the  Phenician  cities,  though  appar^Uy 
ess  a^icient  than  Sidon.  Even  on  the  march,  he  was  me  by  a  depu- 
ation  from  Tvre,  composed  of  the  most  eminent  men  in  the  city, 
and  headed  bv  the  son  of  the  Tyrian  prince  Azemilchus,  who  ^yas 
himself  absent  commanding  the  Tyrian  contingent  in  the  Persian 
fleet  These  men  brou-ht  hirge  presents  and  supplies  for-the  Mace- 
doni-m  army  "o.'-ether  with  a  golden  wreath  of  honor;  announcing 
^Slv  thft^h^^  were^repared  to  do  whatever  Alexander 

commande        In  replv,  he   commended  the  dispositions  of  the  city 
ZZviX  p4  ents,*and  desired  the  deputation  to  commmiicate  at 

honi  thai  he^vished  to  enter  Tyre  ^»-\  ^f  ^.^^I^^'^r^Vt'h^G^^^^^^^ 
The  Phenician  god  Melkart  was  supposed  identical  with  the  (:rrtcian 
Hemki  '  nd  ^was  thus  ancestor  of  the  Macedonian  kings.  His 
temnle  ai  Tyre  wa8  of  the  most  venerable  antiquity;  moreover  the 
iniunction  to  licrifice  there,  is  said  to  have  been  conveyed  to  Alex- 
aX-  iHn  or^^^^^^^^^  T^'rians  at  home,  after  deliberating  on  this 

messUe.'ent  ^t  an  answei  declining  to  comply  and  intimatmgthat 
Sey  would  not  admit  within  their  walls  either  Macedonians  or  Per- 


CONDUCT  OF  ALEXANDER. 


599 


sians;  but  that  as  to  all  other  points,  they  would  obey  Alexander's 
orders.  They  added  that  his  wish  to  sacrifice  to  Hcrakles  might  be 
accomplished  without  entering  their  city,  since  there  was  in  Pahety- 
rus  (on  the  mainland  over  against  the  islet  of  Tyre,  separated  from  it 
only  by  the  narrow  strait)  a  temple  of  that  god  yet  more  ancient  and 
venerable  than  their  own.  Incensed  at  this  qualified  adhesion,  in 
which  he  took  note  only  of  the  point  refused — Alexander  dismissed 
tlie  envoys  with  angry  menaces,  and  immediately  resolved  on  taking 
Tyre  by  force. 

Those  who  (like  Diodorus)  treat  such  refusal  on  the  part  of  the 
Tyriaus  as  foolish  willfulness,  have  not  fully  considered  how  much 
the  demand  included.  AVhen  Alexander  made  a  solemn  sacrifice  to 
Artemis  at  Ephesus,  he  marched  to  her  temple  with  his  whole  force 
armed  and  in  battle  array.  We  cannot  doubt  that  his  sacrifice  at 
Tyre  to  Herakles— his  anr-estral  Hero,  whose  especial  attribute  was 
force — would  have  been  celebrated  with  an  array  equally  formidable, 
as  in  fact  it  was,  after  the  town  had  been  taken.  The  Tyrians  were  thus 
required  to  admit  within  their  walls  an  irresistible  military  force; 
which  niight  indeed  be  withdrawn  after  thq  sacrifice  was  completed, 
but  which  might  also  remain,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  as  permanent 
garrison  of  an  almost  impregnable  position.  They  had  not  endured 
such  treatment  from  Persia,  nor  were  they  disposed  to  endure  it 
from  a  new  master.  It  was,  in  fact,  hazarding  their  all;  submitting 
at  once  to  a  fate  which  might  be  as  bad  as  could  befall  them  after  a 
successful  siege.  On  the  other  hand,  when  we  reflect  that  the  Tyrians 
promised  everything  short  of  submission  to  military  occupation,  we 
see  that  Alexander,  had  he  been  so  inclined,  could  have  obtained  from 
them  all  that  was  really  essential  to  his  purpose,  without  necessity  of 
besieging  the  town.  Tiie  great  value  of  the  Phenician  cities  con- 
sisted in  their  fleet,  which  now  acted  with  the  Persians,  and  gave  to 
them  the  command  of  the  sea.  Had  Alexander  required  that  this  fleet 
should  be  withdrawn  from  the  Persians  and  placed  in  his  service, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  would  have  obtained  it  readily.  The 
Tyrians  had  no  motive  to  devote  themselves  for  Persia,  nor  did  they 
probably  (as  Arrian  supposes)  attempt  to  trim  between  the  two  bellig- 
erents, as  if  the  contest  was  still  undecided.  Yet  rather  than  hand 
over  their  city  to  the  chances  of  a  Macedonian  soldiery,  they  resolved 
to  brave  the  hazards  of  a  siege.  The  pride  of  Alexander,  impatient 
of  opposition  even  to  his  most  extreme  demands,  prompted  him  to 
take  a  step  politically  unprofitable,  in  order  to  make  display  of  his 
po\ver,  by  deiijading  and  crushing,  with  or  without  a  siege,  one  of 
the  most  ancient,  spirited,  wealthy,  and  intelligent  communities  of 
the  ancient  world. 

Tyre  was  situated  on  an  islet  nearly  half  a  mile  from  the  mainland; 
the  'channel  between  the  two  being  shallow  toward  the  land,  but 
reaching  a  depth  of  eighteen  feet  in  the  part  adjoining  the  city.  The 
'-let  wa^  completely  surrounded  by  prodigious  walls,  the  loftiest  per- 


600       SECOND  AND  TiUKD  ASI.VTIC  CASIPAIGNS. 

t  1  !^i,  ,.n  tl,p  side  frontitin-  tlic  mahilnnd.  readied  a  heiglitot 
''Tl1-'>1  m  150  fee?  >vilh  cor  ".pondin;:  solidity  and  ba.e.  Be.u  es 
not  less   ''■  °  1;^"   ?^^' r„"   there  was  a  brave  and  numerous  popv.la- 

llr^itr  ^ide^dCgoo^^         of  -■-.  "-'""-'  ^'"P^-  "'"""""^ 
and  oiher  thiugs  essenlial  to  i  rf™-:<;-  j     t-     .^„,  ^i,,.,,  dHven 

„„valtaek  nu.de  simply  from  '='"  •.  .,,'^^.^,,^'^'or  a"c  most  pm-t  (tlie 
Phenieian  and  Cyprian  ships,  ^^'  ^'' JJ*  i°'4u  admiral.  Alex- 
Tyrian  among  them)  '°'l;^'ff  T"X^BvbluV  S^^^  and  all  the 
ander-niaster  as  he  was  ot  A\;'  l^;./,^,",  ,i,e\eanien  beloneing 
Phenieian  cities  "f.^f  f  '  y^^" "^^ :"  !  ^  ,  "^^u  „  a\  home  and  brin| 
to  these  cilies  would  folo«  'I'J"  *  "V.  A  „,  the  victorious  poten- 
away  their  ships  Jo  JO-  '.im.  ^..     ,'-    ,tsUm  of  the  Cyprian 'cities. 

■niih  decent  consideration;  but  it  was  lo  lou^ei 

had  made  them  his  enemies  \utochradates  in  the 

What  passe<l  among  "'«.P"^"'"/Sf  "X."  aS  Icr  was  master 
^gean,  when  thejr  ^^ere   infoimod   his    U.  t  Ak^^^^^^ 

of  the  other  Phenieian  ^'i V'^'-X-Vu      t1  e  Tvriau  prince  Azcniilchus 
of  Tyre-we  know  very  V^^^^^^J ^'j  l^Z>^,Uy ;  the  Sidoidan 

brouaht  home  his  ships  loi  Ibc  '"-"•"^*^,  "  ,"'  s,,,.  iu.r  against  a  power 
and  Aradian.ships  also  wen     K,,^  DO  long     snm^^^^^^^^^ 

to  whom  their  own  cities  had  submittect,  mil  iie^t 
ongcr  before  they  declared  ;^'^"^-f';f^^^:^^-'^rc^osahev 

phradates  without  Pani.s,  >"^t^a'l  w,  '2  v,, "  e  resisJance  which  it 
as  they  actually  did)  had  «>icrgelicall>  ^'  •^'.,/   -^  aled-tlie  Cvpriot 

U-red  to  Alexander,  as  tl;e  '"  ere^|«^  fe  , Sd  <  n      at  ^i'l<-'  '»  '!'« 

.iiips  -igl't  "«{ ■-P™'^'^;!?,  rm  Xt  i-i'"lse  «  1-Pe..  'Lat  their 
strugirle.  Lastly,  uie  ijnaur,  .  ^  Ah-xauder  una  nst  Persia, 
Phenieian  brethren,  if  ready  to  ^^^^J^^;f;^^'^.^^',^^4Tn<r  a  kindred 
would  be  nowise  hearty  as  ^^l^^^J^^f  '^^^^If^/i^  a^  alfturned  out 
citv.     These  contingencies,    }^»^  Vf ',  "j^^^^^     '^^  promising 

in  favor  of  Alexander  were  in  ^^^^^^^^^^-^  l"!^"-^.^  ,  ^ 
to  justify  the  intrepKl  resoluno     (^^      '   K  d  ^ 
encouraged  by  promises  o    aid  tioin   '  '^  P^>^  "^         j  ^^^^^  ^ij^ir 

OMV  Cartilage.     To  that  city,  ^\  ^«  %^  X^^^^.' ""^/^^ny'^f  their  wives 
wallsforsomereligious  solemnities,  the>    sent  man} 

and  children  ^vithout  any  fleet,  the  Sidonian 

struct  a  solid  mole  200  feet  ''^;^^^'/^;;,^","u,.^    tt^  ovessed  into  his 


SURREXDEK  OF   THE   PRINCES   OF   CYPRl'S.     601 

stones  in  abundance  from  Pahi'fyrus.  and  wood  from  the  forests  in 
Lebanon,  l^ut  llie  woik.  tliough  i)i'()sec-.ited  with  ardor  and  perse- 
verance, undc-r  i)ressijig  in.sligatious  from  Alexander,  was  tedious 
and  toilsome,  even  near  the  mainland,  where  the  Tyrians  could  do 
little  to  impede  it;  and  became  far  more  tedious  as  it  advanced  into 
the  sea,  so  as  to  be  exposed  to  their  obstruction,  as  well  as  to  dam- 
age from  winds  and  waves.  The  Tyiian  triremes  and  small  boats 
perpetually  annoyed  the  workmen  and  destroyed  parts  of  the  work, 
in  spite  of  all  the  protection  devised  by  the  Macedonians,  who 
planted  two  towers  in  front  of  their  advancing  mole,  and  discharged 
projectiles  from  engines  provided  for  the  purpose.  At  length,  by 
unremitting  efforts,  the  mole  was  pushed  forward  until  it  came 
nearly  across  the  channel  to  the  city  wall,  when  suddenly,  on  a  day 
of  strong  wind,  the  Tyrians  sent  forth  a  fireship  loaded  with  com- 
bustibles, which  they  drove  against  the  front  of  the  mole  and  set  tire 
to  the  two  towers.  At  the  same  time,  the  full  naval  force  of  the 
city,  ships  and  little  boats,  was  sent  forth  to  land  men  at  once  on  all 
parts  of  the  mole.  So  .successful  was  this  attack,  that  all  the  Mace- 
donian engines  were  burnt,  the  outer  w-oodwork  wiiich  kept  the 
mole  together  was  torn  up  in  many  places,  and  a  large  part  of  the 
structure  came  to  pieces. 

Alexander  had  thus  not  only  to  construct  fresh  engines,  but  also 
to  begin  the  mole  nearly  anew.  He  resolved  to  give  it  greater 
breadth  and  strength,  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  more  lowers 
abreast  in  front,  and  for  better  defense  against  lateral  attacks.  But 
it  had  now  become  plain  to  him,  that  while  the  Tyrians  were  mas- 
ters of  the  sea,  no  efforts  by  land  alone  would  enable  him  to  take 
the  town.  Leaving  Perdikkas  and  Kraterus,  therefore,  to  recon- 
.'^truct  the  mole  and  build  new  engines,  he  himself  repaired  to  Sidon, 
for  the  purpose  of  assembling  as  large  a  fleet  as  he  could.  He  got 
together  triremes  from  various  quarters — two  from  Rhodes,  ten  from 
the  seaports  in  Lykia,  three  from  Soli  and  ]\Ialius.  But  his  princi- 
pal force  was  obtained  by  putting  in  requisition  the  ships  of  the 
Phenieian  towns — Sidon,  Byblus,  and  Aradus — now  subject  to  him. 
These  ships,  eighty  in  number,  had  left  the  Persian  admiral  and 
come  to  Sidon,  there  awaiting  his  orders;  wiiile  not  long  afterward,  the 
princes  of  Cyprus  came  thither  also,  tendering  to  him  their  powerful 
fleet  of  120  ships  of  war.  He  was  now  master  of  a  fleet  of  200  sail, 
comprising  the  most  part,  and  the  best  part,  of  the  Persian  navy. 
This  was  the  consummation  of  31acedonian  triumph — the  last  real 
and  elfectiv<;  weapon  wrested  from  the  grasp  of  Persia.  The  prog- 
nostic afforded  by  the  eagle  near  the  ships  at  Miletus,  as  interpreted 
by  Alexander,  had  now  been  fultilled;  since,  by  successful  opera- 
tions on  land,  he  had  conquered  and  brought  into  his  power  a 
superior  fleet. 

Having  directed  these  ships  to  complete  their  equipments   and 
training,  with   Macedonians  as   soldiers   on  board,  Alexander  put 


e02        BECOND  AND  THUID  ASkmC  CAMPAIGNS. 

1  •      oif  of  tho  head  of  some  liL-ht  troops  for  an  expedition  of  eleveu 

t^l^^do^'^^-^  --ithout  some  personal  exposure  and 
E^,td  On  iX-n'inu^  to  bidon,  he  found  Kleander  arrived  uilh  a 
hazaril.  ^" /^'■"'rj.f..  (Jivcian  hopliles,  ^velcome  auxiharies  for 
reinforcement  ot   4  OUU  .^^^,  /'^^    j^^^^^^i.^^^Vd  his  tleet  in  the  harbor 

>nde     LuN^"   "S"'--!'"""'  ll'^'t  the  Tyriniis  would  ""t  ".<="■?»   «^: 
anutr,  uJM"o  ,    ...  ,        imriiors  to  be  blocked  up  and 

^^uid'^il^^a  ou^uru^Hl'  ."'vanrSidon,  by  the  Cyprians;  that  on 

^'^l^^S^.^^U^'^otryr.  was  cevtaln       T„e 

Tvr  aui  could  no  longer  offer  ,,bslructi,.n  to  the  mole,  which  w.s 

l-,nnl^^e  1    cro"s  the  channel  and  brought  up  to  the  town.    Lngme.. 

we  re.  Plant'ed  upon    it  to  batter  the  walls;   nu.yable    towe'«  «e,c 

tf  ,1  .M,  t  ,  t-ike  them  bv  assault;  attack  was  also  made  from  sea- 

w  rd      \-et  .  1-   rduc  d  allogeiher  to  the  defensive,  the  Tynans 

r,m  di^i.l-n  e     otetinate  bravery,  and  exhausted  all  the  resources  of 

n  e  ..?v    n  re"  .llit.u'  the  besfegers.     Sr^o  gigantic  was  the  strength 

M  ew^d    fouti..g^the  uu.le,  Snd  even  that  of  the  ""rtlH™  s.d;; 

r.,n  i^,-  S  don   that  none  of  Alexander's  engines  could  make  anj 

bi-^ci^ln  it    but  on  the  south  side  toward  Egypt  he  was  nu.re  sue- 

r  '^fu         "  ar-e  breach  having  been  made  in  this  south  wall,  he  a.- 

dted  it-will Awo  ships  manifed  ^y^"'.^yy"^-^^i^::^Z 

„f  hisDl.alai.x:  he  himself  commanded  in  one,  and  Admttus  in  tiit 

ol.er       \    the  same  time  he  caused  the  town  to  be  menaced  al 

^  md   at  eveiV  api'roachable  point,  for  the  p..rpo^e  of  distraclm^ 

he  nuention  oi-    he  defenders.     Himself  and  Ids  two  ships  having 

b^en  rowed  cU,se  up  to  the  breach  in  the  south  vval ,  boardi.  g 

S  r=t:i^i^"t^^=""^^^^^^^  i  i 
-:- fhi  s\o^inl!'^;;;(  -^:;::^,i^^\rH^ 

^"all';rs';o^\v:rpower•allre.ist.ule.     Atthe^ 
al-o  forced  their  way  into  the  two  harbors,  so  that  l}rt  c.mc  on 

"  Thoulli'th 'w"us  were  now  lost,  and  resistance  L-l  '--"?.  ^If, 
per  e  The  gallant  defenders  did  not  lose  their  courage.  Tl  ej  bar 
c ;  ed  the^treets,  and  concentrated  the.r  strength  -^P^c^Hy  at* 
defensible  post  called  the  Affenonon,  or  chapel  of  Agenor.  licie 
fbe  battle  a-aii  raged  furiously  until  they  were  overpowered  by  tlie 
\ncedonianf  incensed  with  the  long  toils  of  the  previous  siege  as 
^v;lT^bv°  II  e  slaughter  of  some  of  their  pns<mers.  whom  tie 
T  rianl  Inid  kUled  publicly  on  the  batllements      A 11  who  took  shel- 


SACRIFICE  TO   HERAKLES. 


603 


ter  in  the  temple  of  Herakles  were  spared  by  Alexander,  from 
respect  to  the  sanctuary:  among  the  number  were  the  prince 
Azemilchus,  a  few  leading  Tyrians.  tlie  Carthaginian  envoys,  and 
some  children  of  both  sexes.  The  Sidouians  also,  displaving^a  tardy 
sentiment  of  kindred,  and  making  partial  amends  for  the  share 
which  they  had  taken  in  the  capture,  pnjserved  some  lives  from  iho 
sword  of  the  concpieror.  But  the  greater  number  of  the  adult  free- 
men perished  with  arms  in  their  hands;  while  2,000  of  them  who 
survived  either  from  disabling  wounds,  or  from  the  fatigue  of  the 
slaughterers,  were  hanged  on  the  sea-shore  by  order  of  Alexander. 
The  females,  the  children,  and  the  slaves,  were  sold  to  the  slave 
merchant.  The  number  sold  is  said  to  have  been  about  80,000:  a 
total  rather  small,  as  we  must  assume  slaves  to  be  included;  but 
we  are  told  that  many  had  been  previously  sent  away  to  Caithage. 

Thus  master  of  Tyre,  Alexander  marched  into  the  city  and  con- 
summated his  much-desired  sacrifice  to  Herakles.  His  whole  force, 
land  and  naval,  fully  armed  and  arrayed,  took  part  in  the  procession! 
A  more  costly  hecatomb  had  never  been  offered  to  that  God,  when  we 
consider  that  it  had  been  purchased  by  all  the  toils  of  an  unneces- 
sary sie2:e,  and  by  the  extirpation  of  these  free  and  high-spiiited  citi- 
zens, his  former  worshipers.  What  the  loss  of  the  Macedonians  had 
been  we  cannot  say.  The  number  of  their  slain  is  stated  by  Arriau 
at  400,  which  must  be  greatly  beneath  the  truth;  fortlie  courage  and 
skill  of  the  besieged  had  prolonged  the  siege  to  the  prod  i  do  us  period 
of  seven  months,  though  Alexander  had  left  no  means  untried  to  ac- 
complish it  sooner. 

Toward  the  close  of  tlie  siege  of  Tyre,  Alexander  received  and 
rejected  a  second  proposition  from  Darius,  offering  10,000  talents, 
with  the  cession  of  all  the  territory  westward  of  the  Euphrates,  as 
ransom  for  his  mother  and  wife,  and  proposing  that  Alexander  should 
become  his  sonjn-law  as  w^ell  as  his  ally.  "  If  I  were  Alexander 
(said  Parmenio)  I  should  accept  such  terms,  instead  of  plunging  into 
further  peril." — "  So  would  I  (replied  Alexander)  if  I  were  Parmenio; 
but  since  I  am  Alexander.  I  must  return  a  different  answer."  His 
answer  to  Darius  was  to  this  effect- — "I  want  neither  your  money 
nor  your  cession.  All  your  money  and  territory  are  already  mine, 
and  you  are  tendering^  to  me  a  part  in  place  of  the  whole.  If  I 
choose  to  marry  your  daughter,  I  Kliall  marry  her — whether  you  give 
lier  to  me  or  not.  Come  iiither  to  me.  if  you  wish  to  obtain  front  me 
any  act  of  friendship."  Alexander  might  spare  the  submissive  and 
the  prostrate;  but  he  could  not  brook  an  equal  or  a  competitor,  and 
his  language  toward  them  was  that  of  brutal  insolence.  Of  course 
this  was  the  last  message  sent  by  Darius,  who  now  saw,  if  he  had 
not  before  seen,  that  he  had  no  chance  open  except  by  the  renewal 
of  war. 

Being  thus  entire  master  of  Syria,  Phenicia,  and  Palestine,  and 
having  accepted  the  voluntary  submission  of  the  Jews,  Alexander 


I 


604       SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

raert,.ok  ='ny  ^-tllfnn  UTof  m  he  cts.-la.uls  ^vhich  kept 
e,npUe,  to  make  1""  ^  f,  "^f  [,e  VoiMans  will.  Greece,  so  as  to 
open  the  comni.m.cu  ous  ot   the^  i  ^^.^ 

secure  his  rear  against  •  f  ?^.^,  ,,^,,,i»st  him  by  I'ersian  gold; 
.,f  Grecian  soldiers  '>\}^"^^.: "possession  of  the  Persuuis, 
ond  Egypt  was  the  '"f'  ,  f 'f^^"f„/„pon  Greece.  Those  n.eaus 
v.liich  gave  them  the  '">••  »f  "*  ""^."nTkd  bv  the  feeble  coudmon 
.vere  indeed  '^•^  ^^f^^^'g^.Z^Zc  to  contend  with  the  tn- 
ot  the  P^;[«;:'"  tt^;;  '^  ,'  :,otian  adnurals  Ilegelochus  and  Amplu. 
creasing  tlettt  ot  tnt  .na|i  During  the  summer  of   oii  l.c., 

terus  now  numbering  160  ^^ll^,,"'>p„(  Tvre,  lliese  atlmirals 
w  hie  Alexa,.der  was  PJ"J,';f.°f,ioosicWo«."  Lesbos,  and  Tene- 
recovere<l  »lV'\%"Tn  a  e  by  "le  mon  for  the  Persian  interests. 
,,os-whi<-h  had  «;£  X'  invited  them  and  insured  thcr  sum-s>; 
The  inhabitanis  ot  Tencdos  invn  ^^^^^  ^^^^,.^,^j  ^^^.  pi,.„. 

those  of  ChiosattemptedtodoUiesan  ^^.^  .^__^^^,_^^.  ^^^ 

nal-.azus.  who  retained  "'e  c.tv  b>  me      ^^      ^-,,^  Macedonian  a.l 
Apolloni.les  an.l  o"'<;'-^- ;\ ' '  tZTJe  preseully  enabled  to  carry  it 
mirals  laid  siege  «>.  'V '"" 'V, .',  1  1^, ,'  Vas  here  captured  wit4.  Ins 
by  their  friends  ^^.U  n^    Plia   ^^^^^     ^    ^^^^,^,  „„,,  „„u„ed,  tlm' v 

entire  force;  t^^'^'^'^'  ':f"lr;  and  3.000"Grecian mercenaries  Alls- 
store  ships,  several  P"^-''^'^[^' ''  ,f  Meihvinna-arriving  at  Chios 
tonikus.  philo-Persian  despot  "\,;"'.,  -,„,.o_was  entrapped  mlo 
Ihortlv  afterward,  but  -ffnora  ' .  °£  ^  J^P';  „„i„ed  only  Milyleiie, 

the  harbor  and  "«"'''  l'''"!'';'J-,,„, he  \thenian  Chares,  witli  a  gar- 
"'hich  was  heUl  for  tlie  Persians  bj  tK  Athcn  ^^  ^^  _^^,, 

rison  of  2.0tH)  "^«"-.^:^f;'°:eXi  to  evacuate  the  city  on  the  con- 
asainsl  the  Mi'^S^'"'"-  °^.;, '•°t,  "  I'ev.ians  were  thus  expelled  fro  a 
t^°  a"^rra.Si'n^  -T^^         Grecian  islands,  and  from  the 

licinitV  of  Greece  '^"'l  ^l''.f  ^,^"'p,o<-ress  when  Alexander  hims-lf 
Theie   successes  were  '°  J""/e':'   ,,  stopping  in  his  way  to  he- 

directed  his  march  f'^r^.l^i'iV,"  vii   the  last  before  entering  on  the 
siege  Gaza.     This  consid    all ^  tmyi,  tnt        ^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^.^^.^^  ^^_^^  ^  ,, 

dessert  track  between  ^vna  and  Egypt,  ^^^^-^  ,      „„i 

two  miles  from  I  he  sei^..  "^"^.'^^^j'  J,^  „,,,i„  defense  was  derived 
and  encircled  with  a  l"?''  ^  f  •  ""'„,  j  j,  ,^s  .^^ell  as  from  the  mud 
from  the  deep  san<  'mn»^\'""f  >  ,!!  ,"'  1  eto.ded  by  a  brav  man,  the 
,>n,l  quicksand  on  "*  c"^»r^-  ^^^m-lL  of  Arabsf  and  abumiant  pro- 
eunuch  Batis.  with  a  ^','-  "^  r'„"i„  j„e  slrenglh  ot  the  pla.e  Ba  i» 
visi.m  of  every  kind.  ^ '  "'""  jf„,!eover  his  iudgment  was  couhrnud 
refused  to  admit  Alexan.U  i.     *'"'^^  ;^,  „.i  o,  when  Alexander  nrst 


ALEXANDER  WOUNDED. 


605 


The  more  diflicult  the  enterprise,  tlie  g^reater  was  tlie  charm  for  him, 
and  the  greater  woukl  be  the  asloiiishmeut  produced  all  around  when 
he  sliouUl  be  seen  to  have  triumphed. 

He  began  by  erecting  a  mouud  south  of  the  city,  close  by  the  wall, 
for  the  purpose  of  briuging  up  his  battering  engines.  This  external 
mound  was  completed,  and  the  engines  had  begun  to  batter  the  wall, 
when  a  well-planned  sally  by  the  garrison  overthrew  the  assailants 
and  destroyed  the  engines.  Tlie  timely  aid  of  Alexander  himself 
Avith  his  hypaspists,  protected  their  retreat;  but  he  himself,  after  es- 
caping a  snare  from  a  pretended  Arabian  deserter,  received  a  severe 
wound  through  the  shield  and  the  breast-plate  into  the  shoulder,  by  a 
dart  discharged  from  a  catapult;  as  the  prophet  Aristander  had  j)re- 
dicted — giving  assurance  at  the  same  time,  that  Gaza  Avould  fall  into 
his  hands.  During  the  treatment  of  his  wound  he  ordered  the  en- 
gines employed  at  Tyre  to  be  brought  up  by  sea,  and  caused  his 
mound  to  be  carried  around  the  whole  circumference  of  the  town, 
so  as  to  render  it  approachable  from  every  point.  This  Herculean 
work,  the  description  of  which  we  read  with  astonishment,  w^as  250 
feet  high  all  round,  and  two  stadia  (121:0  feet)  broad;  the  loose  sand 
around  could  hardly  have  been  suitable,  so  that  materials  must  have 
been  brought  up  from  a  distance.  The  undertaking  was  at  length 
completed;  in  what  length  of  time  we  do  not  know,  but  it  must  have 
been  considerable — though  doubtless  thousands  of  laborers  would  be 
pressed  in  from  the  circumjacent  country. 

Gazii  was  now  attacked  at  all  points  by  battering-rams,  by  mines, 
and  by  projectile  engines  with  various  mi.ssiles.  Presently  the  walls 
were  breached  in  several  places,  though  the  defenders  were  unremit- 
ting in  their  ellorts  to  repair  the  damaged  parts.  Alexander  at- 
tempted three  distinct  general  assaults;  but  in  all  three  he  was  re- 
pulsed by  the  bravery  of  the  Gazaians.  At  length,  after  still  further 
breaching  of  the  wall,  he  renewed  for  the  fourth  time  his  attempt  to 
storm.  The  entire  Macedonian  phalanx  being  brought  up  to  attack 
at  different  points,  the  greatest  emulation  reigned  among  the  officers. 
The  ^akid  Neoptolemus  was  first  to  mount  the  wall;  but  the  other 
divisions  manifested  hardly  less  ardor,  and  the  town  was  at  length 
taken.  Its  gallant  defenders  resisted  with  unabated  spirit  to  the  last; 
and  all  fell  in  their  posts,  the  incensed  soldiery  being  no  way  dis- 
posed to  give  quarter. 

One  prisoner  alone  was  reserved  for  special  treatment — the  prince 
or  governor  himself,  the  eunuch  Batis;  who,  having  manifested  the 
greatest  energy  and  valor,  was  taken  severely  wounded,  yet  still 
alive.  In  this  condition  he  was  brought  by  Leonnatus  and  Philotas 
into  the  presence  of  Alexander,  who  cast  upon  him  looks  of  vengeanc:e 
and  fury.  The  Macedonian  prince  had  undertaken  the  siege  mainly 
in  order  to  prove  to  the  world  that  he  could  overcome  dillicullies  in- 
superaljJe  to  others.  But  he  had  incurred  so  much  loss,  spent  so 
much  time  and  labor,  and  undergone  so  many  repulses  before  he  sue- 


I 


606       SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

eeedea,  .hat  ,he  pa,m  oO^^-^^  "^s^^^^ 
quised  than  to  the  ">"'"'"'' ;f'„Ybetende.est  point,  is  to  be  added 
!ihicU  «ouUl  stu.g  f  ^,^i^"^f i„'°,,ned  g?e^^^^  pergonal  risk,  received  a 
the  fact,  Ibul  lie  l''!ll'"f,''ro  "escape  from  the  dagger  of  the  pre- 
severe  wound,  besides  bis  "?"""^,.^;';  ,,1^  ground  for  violent  anger; 
tended- Arabian  deserter      "^  ^^^^ '^^  ^.^^'emtld  by  the  appearance  ot 

which  was  moreover  f  " '"'"^'li'^i  .^.d  robust,  but  at  the  same 
Batis-an  euuuch-a  blat  c  man    tail  a  ^^^^^^^  covered  wih 

time  fat  and  >u'"P'>*Vv'fble  circumstances,  repulsive  toeyesfami  - 
blo<,d  and  dirt.  Such  ^»>^;%^';"!u,ed,o  kindle  the  wrath  of  Al 
iar  with  Grecian  gj-mnasUcs,  '^o"  '''"/'^^  '  „{ Tyre,  his  indignation 
exander  to  its  Wfl{'-'^' i;'  "f  '^^.^^Jt' ,he  2,W)0  .nrviving  combatants; 
had  been  satiated  by  the  ''''^S'^f"'  ";■-•(, ,p|ipjj_  there  remaiu- 
ll'ere  to  discharge  tl^«  PJ^f  "-^."^^  ^.^^om  ^4  he  ^resolved  to  in- 
ed  only  the  single  captis  c  up<  u  «  "o"J^  ,  „  ,,  jrected  the  feet  ot 
Diet  a  punishment  as  novel a»  '^^^^\^'^'^^,^,^  ,i„.o„gh  them;  af.er 
Batis  to  be  bored  and  l>ra?<;"  ""f  ;°  "^  ,„  vet  surviving,  was  tei 

which  the  naked  l»?fy"i«^i!i*' driven  by  Alexander  himself  "."1 
,^itb  cords  to_thetailof  acha.iotmiven    J   .  „d  ,i>outs  of   the 

dragged  at  full  speed  am  d  ''^^  *""/;Pi  f  J  „  „  childhood  of  the  (x- 
army.  H«*-'>°  Alexander,  '""'""fi.r''' ,,' :„(!  ,he  ignominious  tr(at- 
ploiLof  his  legendary  »l~  A^','^^'  le^i^^^^^  of  Hck.,;r. 
'ment  described  in  the  "^^l  "'^^f  j',^'  ,(i„ct  of  Homeric  rem.nis- 
This  proceeding  of  Alexi^nder,  me  p  ^j^,;^.^  temperament, 

cences  operating  upon  au  1°*"''''!^"  f°,,  ,i,nt  reread  respecting  the 
stands  out  in  respect  o  «"„\f,"Vhy.  His  remaining  measures 
treatment  of  conquered  towns  " ;"  "'"l^  ^.j^es  and  children  ot  the 
,vere  conformable  to  '•f<=">^^'i"^''f?'^;-,^"f„habitan.s  were  adn.  tt.d 
f;ZZ:^^^  ^^^-^^^^  placed  there  to  hold  the 

-^e't^'^iroV^  fi  «Zing  St  A=fer^Cd  '^- 
Bine  monlhs,  ^ve^e  the  l^^^■^^^f  ,^f ^  ^"i;  t  -ouahout  bis  life.  After 
countered,  or  in  fact  ^^^^^^kI  enco  me   tln^  ^^ 

such  toils,  the  march  to  i;f  P^;,^\\!'.f„Ji  triumph.     ISlazakes,  the  sa- 
•^32  B.  c),  was  an  affair  of  ^^^^  .^f  >^'^^^^^^^^^  J^  a  disaffected  native 
trap  of  Egypt,  having  ^^.\^^^.'"'',"i.t  the  approaching  c(m 
population,  was  "«^V^^?o\TAlexai  ck    a  d  lis  army  from  Gaza  to 
k'ven  days'  n^f  ^^.^^^^^^^.f^.t ' f  eAp?  ccmmaiuiing  the  eastern 
Pelusium,  the  frontier  /^^^^^IVflPoTmicUrthe  command  of  iUpha- 
,ranch  of  the  Nile,  ^^  ^{l^^.f ,  ^.f^^^^  /^o  o^^^^^^        gates  and  a  sub-^ 
tion,  had  come  also    ,K,^'^^^  ^;^J^^i''of  e^^^^^^^         assembled  to  wel- 
missive  novernor,  but  also  ^^«^ ^!  %^i,t^^^^^^  sent  his  fleet  up  the 

^>me  him.  He  placed  a  ^^^T^^^^^eU^^^^^^^^^  ^^"^^  ^^'''  ^'^'  ^""^• 
liver  to  Men.phis.  and  n^''»'^^;^'^  j' J^^^f '  if  ^^  all  the  treasure  in 
Jrhe  satrap,  ^lazakes,  '^^^'^'If'^J'^^^^^^^^^  furniture.  Here 
the  city.  M;0  talents  in  timount,  and  mucn  pieciu 


MARCH  TO  EGYPT. 


607 


Alexander  reposed  some  time,  offering:  splendid  sacrifices  to  the 
gods  generally,  and  especially  to  the  Egyptian  god  Apis;  to  which 
he  added  gymnastic  and  musical  matches,  sending  to  Greece  for  the 
most  distinguislied  artists. 

Frcm  Memphis  he  descended  the  westernmost  branch  of  the  Nile 
to  Kauopus  at  its  mouth,  from  whence  he  sailed  westerly  alon^  the 
shore  to  look  at  the  island  of  Pharos,  celebrated  in   Homer,  and'  the 
lake  Mareotis.  Reckoning  Egypt  now  as  a  portion  of  his  empire,  and 
considering  that  the  business  of  keeping  down  an  unquiet  popidatioa 
as  well  as  of  collecting  a  large  revenue,  would  have  to  be  performed 
by  his  extraneous  land  and  sea  force,  he  saw  the  necessity  of  withdraw- 
ing the  seat  of  government  from  Memphis,  where  both  the  Persians 
and  the  natives  had  maintained  it,  and  of  founding  a  new  city  of  his 
own  on  the  seaboard,  convenient  for  communication  with  Greece 
and  Macedonia.     His  imagination,  susceptible  to  all   Homeric  im- 
pressions  and  influenced   by  a  dream,  first  fixed  upon  the  isle  of 
Pharos  as  a  suitable  place  for  his  intended   city.      Perceiving  soon, 
however,  that  this  little  isle  was  inadequate  by  itself,  he  incTuded  it 
as  part  of  a  larger  city  to  be  founded  on  the  adjacent  mainland.     The 
gods  were  consulted,  and  encouraging  responses  were  obtained  •  upon 
which  Alexander  himself   marked  out  the  circuit  of  the  walls  the 
direction  of  the  principal  streets,  and  the  sites  of  numerous   temples 
to  Grecian  gods  as  well  as  Egyptian.     It  was  thus  that  the  first  stone 
was  laid  of  the  mighty,   populous,   and  busy  Alexandria;  which 
however,  the  founder  never  lived  to  see,  and  wherein  he  was  only 
destined    to  repose  as  a  corpse.     The   site  of  the  place  between 
the   sea  and  the    Lake    Mareotis,    was  found    airy  and   healthy 
as  well    as    convenient  for  shipping  and  commerce.      The    pro- 
tecting   island  of  Pharos  gave    the  means  of    forming  two    good 
harbors  for  ships  coming  by  sea,  on  a  coast    harborless  elsewhere; 
while  the  Lake  Mareotis,  communicating  by  various  canals  with  the 
river  Nile,  received  with  facility  the  exportable  produce  from  the 
interior.     As  soon  as  houses  were  ready,  commencement  was  made 
by  the  mtendant  Kleomenes,  transporting  to  them  in  mass  the  pop- 
ulation of  the  neighboring  town  of  Kanopus,  and  probably  of  other 
tow^ns  besides. 

Alexandria  became  afterward  the  capital  of  the  Ptolemaic  princes. 
It  acquired  immense  grandeur  and  population  during  their  rule  of 
two  centuries  and  a  half,  when  their  enormous  revenues  were  spent 
greatly  in  its  improvement  and  decoration.  But  we  cannot  reason- 
al'ly  ascribe  to  Alexander  himself  any  prescience  of  such  an  impos- 
ing future.  He  intended  it  as  a  place  from  which  he  could  conven- 
iently rule  Egypt,  considered  as  a  portion  of  his  extensive  empire  all 
around  the  ^gean,  and  had  Egypt  remained  tlius  a  fraction,  instead 
of  becoming  a  substantive  imperial  whole,  Alexandria  would  proba- 
bly not  have  risen  beyond  mediocrity. 

The  other  most  notable  incident,  w  hich  distinguished  the  four  or 


608       SECOND  A>;D  THIKD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS 

«.e  ..o„U.s'  stay  of  A'^j-lf,"  .^I;j::^  Jj^^irrcuX-"  Ij^ 

■ ,  le  as  it  ir.arks  his  'Vl'"''' Hg^'^V,  "  "\  "riB„^  last  three  jtais 
i  is  ..f  huinanily  U.s  »';  'l^  iVn  f  ev  n  one,  hiniH'lf  iiKluci.,! 
1  ul  so  tiauscona.d  the  ^^f^  •'»'  °^  i'*,^,", ,i,t  good  foitu.ie,  and  w. 
_  l.e  «ods  had  pivenlo  l'i"i,X'^  1  rit  hehyUhe.is  of  a  ^uperliu- 
pn  V.yzedor  put  do^vnh.se.a^..    -^at  the'  5v.^     ^^ 

l,m   perBonality   seemed     ''^  "-^t^''™',  J^.ile  heroic  legends,  and  to  Ins 

??  ;fng  hitiself  to  he  Oikc  t>--4^«  --/  „farcemin  the^aet  hy 
i„al  human  Pf ''"I'f  ^ii '^ '"  .adf  of  Zeus  Ammon. .  His  march  of 
questioning   Hje   '"';'"'^'"„, '^''d 'e? -ahvays  fa'ig"l"S','^Tvlr     f 
sVveral  days,  through  a  ,^'»"'\y  °'"  „  {ggt   evidences  of    the  favor  of 
,erilous-vvas  disimguished  l-J  ":«"*%,, ,n  ,i,e  thirsty  soldiers  re- 
he  gods,     luexpecied   rain  fell  just  ^u  n  i  ^^.^^^  ,i^i,„„g  of 
drS  water.     ^Vhon   the  guides  lost  t^'^'^/       J,  two  ravens.ap- 
r'sand,ou   ««"dden   two    speaking    seipe      ,^^^ 

peare<l  preceding  the  mauU   anu    ■"  "Aiislobulus,  and  Kal- 

Such  were  the  statements  made  ^J^,  "^'^^'^^^.i^tle  Arriau,  four  cculu. 

isthenes,  companions  «°'\ ^™'^;X ^"''^^'0° '>"" '^''^ ''^f'^Z^ 
ries  afterward,  announces  1''^^°^''^''  \^^^^^],  he  cannot  satisfy  him 
iutervention  on  behalf  »«  ^U xan  ,er  ^n     .^,„^^„„  "^'''■^IS^^'f,^; 
self  about  llie  details.     The  P  'est  oi  ,  ^^^^^^^^  ,j,u  ,uat 

Mn.lHi-  as  b"inz  the  son  of  the  g""' ''";„,„,...  until  lie  was  taken 
h^  cLre.T  w4ul  be  one  of  .u"'°,'^'> ',"1'',^  \vl  o  c'oi  ^Hed  the  oraele 
nvavtoihe  ixods;  while  his  f''.''-'"^  »  "^"^^^^'fr  ,,  at  the  rendering  ol 
C?^u.ir  own  «^tisfaclion    recened  fo.  an  w^^^^  ^eus.     After  profuse 

divine  honors  to  1"™  7"^'\„^<^rqumed  the  oracle  with  a  fu  1  am 
Bacrilices  and  P'-'^^f  "'^' f^''=^''i  ,i  e  son  of  Zeus  Amnion ;  which  lai  1 
sincere  faith  that  he  ^ea  y  «  «^  'J-fi^',  ,  t^nsmilted  to  hini  "-"rO  o  he' 
was  further  confirmed  b>  ?" '•''^- ."'^'    ,  of  Branchidie  near  Sliletus. 
"  '  ...s-that  of  Erythrie  in  lonia, .»'  <  ,"',  •°,     addressed  as  the  sou 
Thou.'h  he  did  notairectly  f  f  "\'''X  ,^"u  u'Wecl  such  a  recogni- 
I    Z^is,  lie  was  pleased  ^\';l\'''f:  "^'^.s  w"  omsbelieved  the  oracle 
"U   and  an-ry  wilh  skeptics  oi  M"««^«: '  political  maiKruver 

o  .!^, mnon.  Plutarch  thinks  'l^^' *l"^^^tn„  t ,«  non-Hellenic  popu- 
of  Alexander,  for  the  purpose  «[  "7  fl  "=1,.^  But  it  seems  rather 
bitiou  over  whom  he  «-.!l.«"  '1!!^'"^^  Se"  x'a^^ration  of  that  exorbi- 
tohave  been  a  genuine  If.  '''•-tinnin^  rei-md  so  largely  inl-i* 'j  :" 
tantvanitv  which  from  the  '**^'""'' f '."yi.ant  to  the  leading  J  a- 
som.  He  was  indeed  =v«^'-«f';'eciarw  a  a  deliberate  insult  to  the 
cedonians  in  many  w;ays.  l"", '^fP'^.S'"' ''j,  always  touched  upon  m 
Semoryof  "'»)?■  .Vll'^on  To  iVmenio,  to  Philotas  o 
moments    of     d.ssat.sfacti  n.  o  ;      i^„^e  of     he  king,    a 

Slmin'^ptiU,';  aSXS'-^^  '^^-^  ^""  '""''  "'  '""^'"  ' ' 


ARRANGEMENTS  AT   MEMPHIS. 


Gog 


appeared  higlily  offeusivc.  Discontents  on  this  subject  amono- the 
Macedonian  oiticers  though  condemned  to  silence  by  fear  and  admi- 
ration of  Alexander,  became  serious,  ai:d  will  be  found  reappearin"- 
ht-Tcaf  ter.  '^^ 

The  last  month  of  i-lexander's  stay  in  Egvpt  was  passed  at  Mem- 
phis. While  nominatini^- various  oiricers  fiir  the  permanent  admin- 
istration of  the  country,  he  also  received  a  visit  of  lleiieloclms  his 
admir.d,  who  broudit  as  prisoners  ArL^tonikus  of  Melhynuia  and 
other  desp(4s  of  the  various  Grecian  cities.  Alexander  ordered  them 
to  be  handed  over  to  their  rcspeciive  cities,  to  be  dealt  wilh  as  the 
citizens  pleased;  all  except  the  Chian  Apollouides,  who  was  sent  to 
Elephantine  in  the  south  of  Egypt  for  detention.  In  most  of  the 
cities,  the  despots  Jiad  incurred  such  violeut  liatred.  that  when  deliv- 
ered up,  th;.w  were  tortured  and  put  to  death.  Pharnabazus  also 
had  been  among  the  prisoners,  but  had  found  means  to  escape  from 
his  guards  when  the  ties't  toucliediit  Kos. 

In  the  early  spring,  after  receiving  reinforcements  of    Greeks  and 
Thraciaus,  Alexam kr  marched  into    Phenicia.     It  was  there  that  he 
regulated  the   all'airs  of  Plicnieia,  Syria  and  Greece,  prior  to  his  iu- 
t(;:Kied  expedition  into  the  interior  against  Darius.     He  punished  the 
inhabitants  of  Samaria,  wiio  had  revolted  and  burned  alive  the  Ma- 
cedonian prefect  Andromaehus.    In  addition  to  all  the  business  trans- 
acted. Alexander  made  costly  presents  to  the  Tyrian  Herakles   and 
offered  splendid  sacrifices  to  other  g-ods.     Choice  festivals  with'trao-- 
edy  were  also  celebrated,  analogous  to  the  Dionysia  at  Athens,  witli 
the  best  actors  and  cliorists  contending  for  the  prize.     The  princes  of 
Cyprus  vied  with  each  other  in  doing^houor  to  the  son  of  Zeus  Am- 
mon; each  undertaking  the  duty  of  choregus,  getting  up  at  Ids  own 
cost  a  drama  wilh  distinguished  chorus  and  actors,  and  striving  toob- 
tam  the  prize  from  pre-appoinled    judges— as  was  practised  amou«^ 
llie  ten  tribes  at  Athens.  "^ 

In  the  midst  of  these  religious  and  festive  exhibitions,  Alexander 
was  collecting  magazines  for  his  march  into  the  interior.  He  had 
alreadysent  forward  a  detachment  to  Thapsakus,  the  usual  ford  of 
the  Euphrates,  to  throw  bridges  over  the  river.  The  Persian  Maz- 
aeiis  was  on  guard  on  the  other  side,  with  a  small  force  of  3,000  men 
AOOO  of  them  Greeks;  not  sutiicient  to  hinder  the  bridges  from  be- 
ing built,  but  only  .to  Iiinder  them  from  being  carried  completely 
over  to  the  left  bank.  After  eleven  davs  of  march  from  Phenicia 
A  exander  and  his  whole  army  reached  lliapsakus.  MaziCus,  on  tlie 
other  side,  as  soon  as  he  saw  the  main  army  arrive,  withdrew  his 
small  force  without  delay,  and  retreated  to  the  Tigris;  so  that  the 
tw^  bridges  were  completed,  and  Alexander  crossed 'forth  with 

Once  over  the  Euphrates,  Alexauder  had  the  option   of  inarchin«" 
clown  the  left  bank  of  that  river  to  Babylon,  the  chief  city  of  the  ^ei^ 
siau  empire,  and  the  natural  place  to  find  Darius.  But  this  march  (as 
H.  G.  IV.— 20 


610       SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

,e  know  from  Xenophon  -""O  -tinl\:d'u>rXhrdeIe'rc^^^^^^ 
Greuks)  woul.lbeone  of  <=''''•«•"«  ^^'^''"^^^vcrlC.za^us  in  retreat- 

against  Alexander.  J^  ,2  I  y  he  lirecled  his  „,arch.  first  nearly 
ISineveh  (Mosul).  -^  i  w^.o..  nn  l.is  left  hand;  next  eastward 
northward,  having  the  E«p  nates  on  1.  s  1^"  "J"^^  mountains  on 
across  Northern  Xlesopot.muahavg  the  Ar„tmaa^  mot      .^  ^^^^^ 

„i.  left  hand.  On  ^--^I'f,,';  ,,?:  „t  bei.4  i"sipht.  he  forded  the 
lutely  undefended.  .f>0' »,^  "^^  iVis  iut-uitrv  cavalry,  and  haggage. 
river  as  soon  "sP<'f'^'l•^^,'"'^'"^\' '"'•'"'  eitrtw  from  the  deptk 
The  difficulties  and  penis  of  "«^r'"f  .^"^^^l*  ;''7\^^^j.;,,,„,_  ,,^A  ',he 
of  the  water  above  then-  breasts  t'^-'P'^'J,".;-.!"  have  rendered 
.lippery  footing.  A  re.olu  e  and  ^^.1.  nt  encmv  nu._^^  ^^^  ^^^ 

t^^rifr'rpVrtTs  in  whaf  his  envies  left   undone,  than  >n 

-•^^j.S7hi:tt^^^ifi\>-g^^^^ 

^  Ui^  overweetung  ^^^^--J X""' AlexUdeJ    ^ile"  oK 

Lldiers,  Alexander  rnaixhed  for  f"  "^  W^      ,'^,;', '  "  j^ on  his  right 
l"V\TdfheGV>rcn7oKurd^^^^^^^^^^^^^  Encounter 

',r"tsma1l  advS  gt'j^d  of  the  Persians,  he  he,,  learnt  from  p.s- 

ont.rs  that  Darius  with  J"' V"'''", '':!lr.L"".;  of '  defeat  of  Issus. 

in- his  captive  f-imily      ^f/i'^,^  e^'^^  ^^^^       ,iis  of  ihe 

either-  to  retr  eve  the  1^^^;''^/^^,  J^.^.J^^'I' ^'^^^^  the  hands  of  the 

future;  nothing,  to  save  his  fleet  fiompa^ino"  ^^ 

S^^se^^"  of  rZsf  "^^  ^a     4l!;  Macedonian 


INACTION  OF  DARIUS. 


611 


exile  Amyntas  a  brave  and  energetic  man,  with  the  best  of  the  Orp 

nn  frr''"T/'''  ^^^?  ,"P  '^'^  P^^^^'-^"  ^'-^"se  ^^  lost;  and  tried  to  set 
up  for  himself,  in  which  attempt  he  failed  and  neriXd  in  p;?.^? 
.  The  satrap  of  E.^^ypt,  pe„etrate!i  with  contempt  fm  t  le  tin  id^S^^of 
his  master,  was  induced,  by  that  reason  as  well  as  by  othe  s  to  frow 
open  the  country  to  Alexander.  Having  incurred^  rodenloral^^^^^^^^ 
^ss  as  well  in  reputation  as  in  territor/,  Darius  had  the  s^ron  'est 
motives  to  redeem  it  by  augmented  vigor  strongest 

..vPr!i^^T-'P?Ml^'^^'^^^^^^^  ^^^^'  tl^'^t'  l^is  mother,  his  wife  and 
several  of  his  chi  dren,  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of    he  co^uiuerm 
Among  the  countless  advantages  growing  out  of  the  y  ctory  of  Issu  * 

^o;;^'^^lL-:ri.^- Xr  ^^I^^^^^^ 
a7.;  Stro^'ri-,Tni;^- 

the  like  chains  hi.nself,  tofard  one  who  had  now  become  Mrsune'' 
nor,  Danus  was  afraid  (o  act  witii  energv  lest  succ«, ThJ.iH  ?."P 
down  evil  upon  his  captive  family.     By'^a'liowin-ALandpi  .-!!.■" 

thing  short  of  surrender  at  discrofinn    tl,ot   nn^^;^!    "^        ?        ,^* 

oj-^  1  1  ^^^^'",^^uli  tlje  lull  deference  due  to  their  rnnk  if  ho  rio 
sired  to  ke<p  „p  tl.eir  price  as  hostages  in  the  e?es  of  Darius  .s4ll 
ro.,i  nfT'-  ''"™y-   ^^  ^="""«'l  ">«'"  «lonS  "{th  Ws arm"  fi'om  the 

the  witeis^oTMrTi  '^'  '^"4!S^•"  ""-  Euplfrates,  and  ^.^.i  tZ.ih 
1110  ttatei,  of  the  1  igns.     To  them,  this  must  have  proved  a   spve'i-P 

StofT'Jf  "■""*  P""""^'  ■'"'  ""^'t  ■•^^'<'  aligned  ,a considerable  "n 
to  watch  them,  at  a  moment  when  he  was  marchinriX  arunknov 

w7V *"^   T'l'i'T''  •='"  ^''  ""'''•'"•y  resources^to  te  Sispo  a  le  , 
Simp  y  for  safe  detention,  the  hostages    would    have   been   befr^ 
padcd  and  might  have  been  treated  with  still  greater  CCTemomn 
a  city  or  a  fortress.     But  Alexander  orobablv  wMsher)  tn  T.^^  ,•  ' 
near  him,  in  case  of  the  possible  conl^ngenc/of  se?K,us  reverse  To 
his  army  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Tignl    Assuming  suchTSor" 


612       SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

Being  tit  leugth  conviuced  t  liit  j;'^.^''  '''^^  J  ™  y,,,;,,^  suir.n.o.K  d 
,vitl.  au%-  prize  short  ot  the  "!"''',  ,.\':;''!'I'''iVc  bo  ffht  losielher 
all  his  forces  to  defend  what  he  ^  'j' >^';\' ^^.v;^^,^  h  ,  ll'ieen  defeated 
a  host  said  to  be  superior...  ...unher  "^ '''•',;  |'^^\"^';en,i,ies  of  the 

a,  ISS..S.     Conliu|re..ts  ''••'■'^«  .'l^,  ,^'^f^/''i'f  ,,,^  .'i\x.rs  Ox.is  and 
vast  Persiaa  terr.io.;y-f"m'    l.e  (  a  pm.^  ^'.^(.e  plains  eastward  ot 

hiniself  from  Babylon,  par.  y  ">■•;  'f.^'^^'',.^  ,^^^,',  Ue    o«-..  abd..t 
the    north,  east,   and    s",''<'';  „:^'      ;''i\k,o'vn  under  Ihe  ...me 
twenty  ...iles  east  of  the  Great  ^''',  ':V„'.U,    rv  ™.d  between   Erze 
of  Erbil,  as  a  oa.;avan  ^'■'''»"  "°  '''"^  "/,      ;.^.,'  eeo.  [,ead.,«a.-.ers, 

ins  slopes,  and  w.lho.it  ■'">  "'•';°  J;  „,.  f„,^  n,^  f^c  n.anieuvers  of 
diawing  up  a .luiuerous  army.  ^H'"';  )'"."-  ,i,ePeisian  olii- 
cavalrv!  and  the  rush  of  «7'1'"\;;-  ^'  'VeV  l"  rt  idallv  s..cl.  ot  the 
ccrs  had  been  caref.i  belorehand  '"  f"J,!.  ,^,  ^..^...vtlu.igi..  the 
slopes  as  they  tho.isht  'nconven,  -nt  Jl^'-^.^^^'Z^^J  ,„«  speeial 
e.-o..nd  to  favor  the  ope.at.on.  ^Z'' '  o',';  V  '  .  j^^,,,  ,,,„i  ,,ten  occa- 
forces,  of  Dari.is-  wlm  ff'^^if^' '  'J '"f,,^  .'^'i  ,;  ,  f  4  na.row  d.- 
sioned  altogether  by  h.s  '^'^  '"■?  •»1^^"'  '';'  '  "  „„ ,  i.js  superior  nun.- 
files  of  Kilikia-and  '  1'^"  ""  ^  v  ,s  even  t  x  o  s  that'  Alexm.der 
SrVl^"  rn'd'-S  hii'on  a;;  i^Z.     n....  the  undere..ded 

^^7o?n.ose  who  looUed  onlv  to  numbers  ^^^>^lJ'^^:!^::J:, 

bela  .„i...t  J';^^''^'^^^':!!::-,^'^':!:^:la  ehanots;  and  f.f- 
1.000.000  of  .nftinl.y,  40,W)0  i'";"'>' ;"",      -  ,  {     ,1,^.  lirst  time  in  a 

!r7v;^b'.«te"'Bih  "dU'rn  ,::br\>aHl^"ad^^^^^ 
Sffii^reiirriXSw 

the  horses  and  terinmating  ui  a  ahaip  point,  to^cincr  wiux 


BATTLE  AKllAY   OF  DAIULS. 


G13 


sword-blades  stretching  from  the  yoke  on  each  side,  and  scvthes  ali^o 
laterally  from  the  naves  of  the*  wheels. 

Informed  of  the  approach  of  Alexander,  about  the  time  when  ihe 
^lacedouiaii  army  lir.st  reached  the  Tigris,  Darius  moved  from  Ar- 
bela,  where  his  baggn-'e   and   trca.-urc  were   left— crossed  by  bririuies 
the   river  Lykus  ^r   Great  Zab,  an  operatif)n  which    occupied  live 
days — and  marched  to  tidvc  Dost  on  the  prepared  ground  near  Ganga- 
mela.     His  battle  array  was  formed — of  the  Baktnans  on  the  extreme 
left,    under  command  of   Bes.-us  the  satrap  of  Baktria  ;  next,    the 
D  due  and  Arachoti,  under  command  of  Barsaentes,  satrap  of  Ara- 
chosia;  then  tiie  native  Persians,   horse    and  foot  alternatiui!:.— the 
Siisians,  under  Oxathres,— and  tlic  Kadusians.     On  the  extrenre  riii-ht 
were  the  contingents  of  Syria  both  east  and  wa^st  of  the  Euphrates, 
under  3Iaz;eus;  then  the^Medes,  under  Atropates;    next,    the   Par- 
tliians,  Sak;.e,  Tapyriaus  and  Ilyrkanians,  all  cavalry,  under  Phra- 
taphernes;  then  tlie  Albanians  ;iud  the  Sakesime.     Darias  him:>elf 
was  in  the  center,  with  the  choice  troops  of  the  army  near  and  around 
him— the  Persian  select  horse-guards,  called  the  Idng's  kinsmen— the 
Persian  foot-guards,  carrying  pikes  with  a  golden  apple  at  the  butt- 
end— a  regimentof  Karian.s,  or  descendants  of  Karians,  wiiohad  been 
abstracted  from  their  ho»nes  and  planted  as  colonists  in  the  interior 
of  the  empire— the  contingent  of  .\Iardi,  good  archers— and  lasllv,  the 
mercenary  Greeks,  of  number  unknown,  in  whom  Darius  placed  hi3 
greatest  contldence. 

Such  was  the  lirst  or  iniin  line  of  the  Persians.  In  the  rear  of  it 
stood  deep  masses  of  B.d)yl(;nians— inhabitants  of  Sittake  down  to  the 
Persian  Gulf — Uxians,  from  the  territory  adjoining  Susiana  to  the 
east— and  others  in  unknown  multituvle. '  In  Vront  of  it  were  posted 
the  scythed  chariots,  with  small  ;idvan(;ed  bodies  of  cavahy — Scyth- 
ians and  iiakti-ians  on  the  left,  with  one  hundred  chai'iors — Arme- 
nians and  Kappa  lokians  on  the  right,  wiih  tiity  more — and  the  remain- 
ing fifty  chariots  in  front  of  the  center. 

Alexander  had  advanced  within  about  seven  miles  of  the  Persian 
army,  and  four  days'  march  since  his  cro.ssing  the  Tigri.s— when  he 
iir-t  learnt  from  Persian  prisoners  !iow  near  his  enemies  were.  Heat 
once  halted,  established  on  the  spot  a  camp  witli ditch  and  stockade, 
and  remained  there  for  four  days,  in  ortler  that  the  soldiers  miixht 
repose.  On  tlie  night  of  the  fourth  day,  he  moved  forward,  vet 
leaving  under  guard  in  the  camp  the  bagg'age,  the  prisoners,  and  the 
inelfeclives.  He  b'uan  his  marcji,  over  a^ranire  of  low  elevations 
which  divided  him  from  the  enemy,  hoping  to  approach  and  attack 
them  at  daybreak.  Bal  his  progress  was  so  I'etaided.  that  day  broke, 
and  the  two  armies  tirst  came  in  sight,  when  he  was  still  on  the  de- 
scending slope  of  tiie  ground,  more  than  three  miles  distant.  On 
seeing  the  enemy,  he  halted,  and  called  together  his  principal  otlicers, 
to  consult  whether  he  should  not  prosecute  his  marcii  and  commence 
the  attack  forthwith.     Though  most  of  them  pronounced  for  the  af. 


It 

II 


II 


614        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

«  ^iUu.  vPt  Pirmenio  contended  that  this  course  would  be  rash  ; 
tr^^^rl^^^^^^  -ithall  ils^ditiicuUies,  "^itura  or  arU 
fip  .1  ^Js  u  iknoun,  and  that  the  enemy's  position  ^vhich  they  ncA/ 
f,.r  tho  ^  Tt  me  ou-ht  to  be  earefullv  reconnoitered.  Adoptiii- 
tldl  latte  view  Al^andi  halted  for  theMay ;  yet  still  retaining  hi. 
wtil  orckT    md  f^  ii  new  entrenched  camp,  to  which  the  ba.- 

battle  ^\^^^,^'  ^^"f  .;^^,^""';^^^     i,ow  brouirht  lorvvard  from  the  preeedir,- 
f^f^encan  pmen       hIm^  spent^he  day,  with  an  escort  of  cav 

clu>  s  ^^^.'^^  P"^,^"'^     ijj  reconnoiterinixboth  the  intermediate  ground 
nnj  fh^^eSy "^'d^d  n^  in  ^pite  of  their  immense 

«,moitritrhf  cavalry.     Parmenio,  with  Polysperchon  and  others. 
7     nT   L To  a  tack  the  enemy  in  the  night;  which  promised  some 
adv'a'  ta.^e     sTnce  Pc^^^^^^  ^vere  notoriously  unmanageable  by 

Bw'^nd  knee  their  camp  had  no  defense.     But  on  t  jeotto  hand 
thP  n  -m  involved  so  many  disadvantages  and  perils,  t  at  AlcxaiR.u 
rejected  i^  dec  aling-^vith   an   emphasis  intentionally  eidir.rcc.l. 
siS  spoke  in  theliearing  of  many  others-that  he  disdained  the 

^annts^  of  stealing  a  victory;  that  he  l^<^l^;^--;^^,^!;;i;{  ^ed 
fonld    Darius  fairly  and  in  open  daylight.     ilaMngtlitnacic    c.stu    u 
Li^^officers  a  few  biief  encouragements,  which  met  with  entlmsiastic 
response  he  dismissed  them  to  their  evening  meal  and  repose 

On  the  next  morning,  he  marshalled  his  army,  consis  iiigof  40,000 

fo(?t   and  7  000  horse,  in  two  lines.     The  first  or  mam  line  was  con  - 

:  1   nn  lu  1  iXt  of  the  ehdit  squadrons  of  Companion-cavalry,  each 

^''Tu   l^vu^^^^^^^  the  command  of  Philotas  son 

::f^p.u^i  X     NexF^ceed^      from  right  to  left)  came  the  A^enia 

I      on  1    nfl  of  ihe  lIvDaspi^t*— then  tlie  remaining  Hypaspi.sUe, 

;;;SerNn.:;;;o^^^^ 

of  i^u  V^lr  1  nx  were  arranged  the  allied  Grecian  cavalry.  Lokriai 
>i.^ i;  n   Phthiot   Malians  and  Peloi>onnesians;  after  whom,  at 
^c^^le  t   c^  S^e  Thessalians  under  Pldlippus-among  tl  e 
the  exlicme  icii,  l.  interior  to  the  :Macedouian  Compan- 

•on  '''Cl  in  L  wo  o  mei  baftles.  Alexander  himself  took  the  com- 
mMnd  of  the  ri-ht  half  of  the  army,  confiding  the  left  to  Parmen.o. 

Behind  thirmain  was  placed  a  second  or  body  of  reserve,  in- 

tonderto  mrd  a-a^^  attacks  in  the  fianks  and  rear,  which  the 
lun^-ior  nm^^^^^^^^^^^  the  Persians  rendered  probable.  For  this  pur- 
nn^r  Vlexwler^  the  right,  the  light  cavalry  or  Lancers 

^i^  P ecm  '  ns  umlLr  Aretes  and  Aristo-half  the  Agrianes,  under 


BATTLE   OF  ARBELA. 


615 


right  and  under  Andromaohus  on  the  left-a  brigade  of  darters  t„i 
der  Balaknis   together  with  Agriunian  darters,  and  scrme  bouVe  ' 

Forewarned  by  a  deserter,  Alexander  avoided  the  places  where  iron 
spikes  had  been  planted  to  damage  the  Macedonian  Cav  In  lie  i  [m 
self,  at  the  head  of  tlie  Royal  Squadron,  on  tiie  extreme  rlVht  led  t^e" 
march  obhquely  in  that  direction,  keeping  his  ri^rht  srmi^wl^u  ^ 
vance.  As  he  nea.ed  the  enemy,  lie'saw  Darius  hiin  e If  w  t  i hJ 
Persian  ett  centre  ininiediateiy  opposed  to  hini-Persian  <tuards  In 
Chans,  Albanians,  and  Karians.  Alexander  went  on  inc  17^^  to  tl  o 
ri^^h  and  Darius  stretching  his  front  towards  the  lef  to  coun  erict 
h.s  movement,  but  still  greatly  outflanking  the  Mace  lonians  to  t'  lo 

-M™i,las,  and  the  action  thus  began.  ''=""^"'  "'  wvali^  uuder 

f,.T''n'^-''^''''"°  ''"'■*•  Pereeiving  the   advauce  of  Menida«    turned 
f    m  Iheire.rcuuous movement  to  attack  iiini,  an.l  at  fl?t  drove hh„ 

P^^;^   '""'  '"W"  »."l'i'"rt«l  I'ytlie  oU.cr  advance,  .WhZnts- 
rteonians  and  Grecian  o'lvilrv      Ti,r»  r>,Kf  •        ^''-ii j;i«^<acunKnTs — 

openin  "in  it  '      "  "*  ^^^  ''"''■  ""'*  "^"^  '"''^'"'^  ^  l^rtial 

sc"he,U.|';l?rtoH,.,7;''  ''"'I  S^'".?.''";.I5a""«  'md  ordered  his 

.,,;,,        ,  '"^  '  to  char-e,  and  Ins  main  line  to  follow  them  c-ilen 

,  tins  on  the  disorder  which  he  expected  that  they  vonl     occa'^ion" 

I.       he  eaanofs  were  fonn.I  of  little  service.     Tl,e  h  rsil  wre  ter' 

1     lon't    wh'  •  "'■  ''T'"''?' '•  '■>'  "''^  -^f««'''"nian  arehe  s  an    Irters 

i  x"-    '.,   .  iHr,?,/?™.''  "'''i^f!"  ^"^«  '"e  "■!"«.  I>"ll  down  tie 
inu.',,  .in,i  kill  the  horses.     Of  the  hundred  chariots  in  n-iri,is'<. 

pru;;''ah;r';Lir"hoT:^''" '''""'''■"''" '™ 

r',1      1  "  """'  v,ho\e  Ime,  many  were  altogether  stonned  or 

s  bled;  some  turned  right  ronnd.  tlie  horses  refusi^^,.  to  f'ue  the 

tmeut'' ','!''"''  "'•"^•i"S.«<-a"-«l"ilh  (he  noise  of  pik?and  .ludd 

1   r^ih  '■''■■;  '"■"";  "■l"'"''  '■'^^■■"='"■•1  *■'<=  Jf.-iccdoniau  line   were  k^ 

As  .soon  as  the  chariots  were  thus  disposed  of,  and  the  Persian 
mam  force  laid  open  as  advancing  behiad  them,  Alexander  gate 


616       SECOND  A^-D  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS.. 

the  san,c  .hne  9^^^'^^''^^:'^^^  \uk  '  linuingS-is  slanuug 
ants  on  liis  nglit  flank.  1**, /'"'^•. *-'','  p,.r».ini  line  and  t  ashed, 
jnovement  to  the  right,  turned  tov^.,rd    he  ^^^^^^^^^  .^^ 

at  the  head  of  a.l  the  (  '>V^ir '^^^'^i  'n  k^nove^^^^^^^^^  of  the  llaklrians. 

it.  ^vliich  l.ad  been  made  by  \^.^^/^^  ^^    \^  ,^  •,  f  h^^^^  straight 

Having  by  this  openii^gx^t  pal  a^^^lm^lc^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^^^ 

toward  the  person  ot  l^^^^^^^  ,/ V; J'^^j  i^  '"Kes^aUhe  faees  of  the 
hand-combat,  and  ^^»^^^;^"'7.^^  V, '''  u^'  .  t ei  .v^  discomposed  by 
Persians.  Here,  as  at  the  ^'/^^^^V^'^^^  f..[:^\,  '  ^  to  ,(•  on  the  use  of 
iW:  ^  mode  of  li<.htiuu-— accustomed  as  thev  ^^cle  lo  i\^\  ^  ,,  r,.,  . 
thi^  mouL  oi  ii,-,n  ,^^.,  ^..  1- -^  ,,f  xhn  \n)Y>Q  foY  rcncwed  attack,  i  i.c> 
m.issiles,  with  /apid  Asheehi  got  '}«;/^    j-     .     ,..,^-.^i,.y  from   irammg 

.vere  unable  to  preveM  ^^^^"^^^"^^  L  Vhile  t\he  sanle  time, 
ground  and  j^ppioae lung  nearer  to  I)      u      >n      t   a  i 

The  Macedonian  phalanx  m  *7;^^-,  V^^  ;,;^if,n^^^^^^^  .  For  a 

protended  pikes,  pressed  upon  ^^'^  ^  ^,^^  I ,  {^i inn^    ,  and  it  might 

^hort  interval,  tiie  ^^^'' ^''^"^^l^:^;^^  if  u-ius's  arno- 
l)avebeenumchproloni:ed-succth        siu   v^  ^^^^^^  ^^^^,^ 

Greeks     Karums,   Persian  guards    legal   *^\"/J\\"'     ,,.  k.^  ^^1^ 

:^;;;^d,-had  the  king's  ---0^--^-^^   "  I^^^ff^^ 
^.t  here,  even  woi>^h;m  at  W^^  ^,  ,.  ,1,, 

Darius  himself.  It  h..a  lhcu  y\\.  Y  ,  .  .  ^^^^^i-^cs  at  Kunaxa, 
younger,  in  attacking  the  army  of  ^^^.^/^^"Hf  ,;;'/i^^^^^  ui  persou- 
o  ah^  the  mnin  bUnv  at  the  ^^^^re  w's  Wc"vc^^vheil  Hav- 
,ince  ho  well  knew  that  victory  ^  f^^^'^f^^J^.:  ^ ^,i'  .tlssus,  Alexan- 
vvr  ab-eadv  once  followed  this  pcheme  f^"^<^*-^;;\' f^^ !  D-mu^  ^vho 
Ife  ideated  it  y iUi  still  --e  sjgna^u.re^  ^^^  ^^"el^uJ  hii  for- 
iKul  been  long  in  fear,  f^-"."V??,ihn  if  became  still  more  alarmed 
midable  enemy  on  ^1»^'  "^"1^"  \\^S^:  ^ ; Jo^e  J^^a^  and  when  the 

when  he  saw  the  scythed    ;\»  ^/j^^^  .^^^^^^^^^^^  mto  an 

3Iaced(.nians,  suddenly  break  ng  ^^^..^^\^  ^..^ps,  pressing 
universal  war-cry,  came  to  close  .^l^^;-^^^^,  .'!•  ,  ^n  which  he  stood, 
toward  and  menadng  %^'^^^;:^^^^'^o^^l.\ih  the  pres- 
The  sidit  and  hearing  of  this  ^^'i^^'^,  ''^^  ''''''"  ^\.,ietelv  overthrew 
tige  already  attaching  to  ^  ^x^mde^  s  name^  ccm^^^  ^^^^^^.^^  ^^ 

11  o  cou-a*^e  and  sell-possession  ot  l>.n ii.s.     n^  j^ 
ImS^ou,,,..  -"';;■•-;-■'', --'..ll-Jiriri!:  1  tMt  short  a  ,ime, 

•n-as  irrepanibly  l"-t.     i  "t-  '^"'=.;, ',,7|., ',^  nrouvd  him  sinvml  dis- 

mutelv  by  tl.at  of  the  n"'"f'--«f '^'    "  I'^^'^jn  ,"r  cc  Uor  of  .•onur.aiul. 
™.yamo,,?ani...roops.k.aM^tl^^^^ 

nor  rhR-f  lo  li.L'ht  for      i';',^,^:,,   1,^,0  <ircumslaiK-e3  tuu  hrst  lo 

•-'r;'af''Vhr',w!-.'e'o;,:r.';fT;cU. 


C03IBAT   ON   THE   PERSIAN   RIGHT. 


617 


the  same  time.  Aretes  with  his  Paeoniaiis  liad  defeated  the  Baktriana 
on  the  right  Hank,  so  that  Alexander  was  free  to  pursue  the  routed 
mam  hotly,— which  he  did  niost  energetically.  The  cloud  of  dust 
raised  by  the  dense  multitude  is  said  to  have  been  so  thick, 'that 
nothing  coukl  be  clearly  seen,  nor  could  the  pursuers  distinguish  the 
track  taken  by  Darius  himself.  Amid  this  darkness,  the  cries;  and 
noises  from  all  sides  were  only  the  more  impressive;  especially  the 
soimd  from  the  wiiips  of  the  cliarioteers,  ))iisliing  their  hoives  lo  full 
:speed.  It  was  the  dust  alone  wiiich  saved  Darius  himself  from  being 
■oV'ert;d;en  by  the  pursuing  cavalry. 

WJiile  Alexander  was  thus  fully  successful  on  his  right  and  center, 
the  sfene  on  his  left  under  Parmenio  was  diirereut.  ]\Iazteus.  who 
•commanded  the  Persian  right,  after  launching  his  scythed  chariots 
(whieh  ma\'  possibly  have  done  more  damage  than  those  launched  on 
the  Persian  left,  though  we  have  no  direct  "in format  ion  about  them), 
foliowed  it  up  by  vigorously  charging  the  Grecian  and  Thes^alian 
Iiorse  in  his  l>ont,  and  also  by  sending  round  a  detachment  of  cavalry 
.to  attack  them  on  their  left  tlank.  Here  the  batile  was  obstinately 
icontested,  and  success  for  some  time  doubtful.  Even  after  the  flight 
ofDurJus.  Parme.i>io  found  himself  so  much  pressed,  that  he  sent  a 
message  to  Alexander.  Alexander,  though  full  of  mortiflcation  at 
Telincpiishing  the  pursuit,  checked  his  troops,  and  brought  them  back 
.to  the  assistance  of  hit:  left,  by  the  shortest  course  across  the  field  of 
battle.  TJUe  two  left  divisions  of  the  phalanx,  under  Simmias  and 
iCratei'us^  iiad  already  shopped  short  in  the  pursuit,  on  receiving  the 
like  iMessage  from  Parmtiiio;  leaving  the  other  four  divisions  to  fol- 
liow  the  advanced  movem.ent  of  Alexander.  Hence  there  arose  a  gap 
in  the  midst  .of  ti,!e  phuhin^,  between  the  four  right  divisions  and  the 
two  left;  ipto  which  gap  &  brigade  of  Indian  and  Persian  cavahy 
darted,  galloping  through  the  midst  of  the  Macedonian  line  to  get 
into  ^l,ie  re;ir  and  attack  the  baggage.  At  first  this  movement  was 
su.ceessful,  the  guard  vyas  found  unprepared,  and  the  Persian  prisoners 
r,o^e  ai  once  to  set  themselves  free;  though  Sisygambis,  whom  these 
]prisonerij  were  above  measure  anxious  to  liberate,  refused  to  accept 
-their  aid,  culher  from  mistrust  of  their  force,  or  gratitude  for  the 
good  treatment  received  from  Alexander.  But  while  these  assailants 
were  engaged  in  pbiuderiug  the  baggage,  they  w^ere  attacked  in  the 
rear  by  tlie  troops  forming  the  second  ^Macedonian  line,  who,  though 
dt  first  taivcn  by  tsurprise,  htid  now  had  time  to  face  about  and  reach 
the  camp.  JVbiny  of  the  Persian  brigade  wx're  thus  slain,  the  rest  got 
off  as  they  coukl. 

^  3Ia2;aMis  maint.iined  for  a  certain  time  fair  equality,  on  his  own 
side  of  the  battle,  even  after  the  flJght  of  Darius.  But  when,  to  the 
paralyzing  effect  of. that  fact  in  itsc^lf,  there  v.as  added  the  spectacle 
of  its  disastrous  effects  on  the  left  half  of  the  Persian  army,  neither 
he  nor  his  soldiers  could  persevere  with  unabated  vigor  in  a  useless 
Qomtmt,    The  Thessalitm  uud  Grecian  horse,  on  the  vjiUer  iiand,  aui- 


618        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

P  umt«io  wus  vidc,r  °,»  his  own  sule  and  with  h.s  own  forces,  before 

^irSueii'^ulsr:™^^^^  *.-  '--•  r>-^ 

41,  ..n  kr  tmvSi-sed  the  whole  Held  of  battle,  and  thus  n.el  faee  to 
f,  .  some  o  he  list  Persian  and  Parthian  eavalry,  who  were  among 
ie  l>s  toreli  e  The  haUle  was  ah-eadv  lost  and  they  were  seek- 
■  , .:  ,1 V  to  es eaiie  \s  thev  eoidd  not  turn  back,  and  had  no  chani  e 
"of  t  ir  in  s  ?icept  b  f^.teing  their  way  through  his  C.'^^P^-''-- 
„w  iiw.  ,.nirh-il  here  was  desperate  and  murderous;  all  i.t  eloso 
on  n  -rs  cut  ,  iru  wi  h  hand  weapons  on  both  sides,  conlrary.to 
?h ;  Pc'^ian  ci.^  oni.  Sixty  of  the  Macedonian  cavalry  were  s,an.: 
ami  r-.ti  l^^^^'e.  nuniber,-^^  llephtestion,  Ka^nus,  and  Jlcm. 

das  tere  wounded,  and  Alexander  himself  encountered  great  person  . 
d^n'.rcr      He  is  sad  to  have  been  victorious;  yet  pnjbably  n  ost     f 
^ese  brave  men  forced  their  way  through  and  escaped,  though  lea^. 
iriir  niMTiv  nf  their  number  on  the  tieUl.  .      i         * 

'"■iS  re  oined  his  left,  and  ascertained  that  it  ^-«f.  ""'.';;:  [?> 
of  d  nux'r,  hut  victorious,  Alexander  resumed  l'!f,,p";;^"' ''{^  V,  \^  ,^ 
Persians,  in  which  Parmenio  now  took  part  1  he  host  o' "•'  '^  "^j^ 
n-^K  1  nuiltitude  of  disorderly  fngilives.  horse  and  loot  m  u,d  (I 
5^'itherTc  -heater  part  of  them  had  taken  no  share  m  he  battle, 
l^fre   asat  1  siS   they?en>ained  crowded  in  stationary  and  unpr.^M- 

of  the  fun-itivcs  were  slain  or  taken,  especially  at  the  P'l^;^;  \  /J\    ' 
Hver  Lvkus-  ^here  he  ^^a8  chlined  to  hall  for  a  ^vhlle,  since  his  i  u 
n^\vell  IS  Uiei7  orses ^vere  exhausted.   At  miclnight  he  again  pushed 
for^axr^vthsuch  cavalry  as  could  follo^v  him,  toArabeh.,  in  hopes 

tlLi^h  lie  r?acl  ed  Arbela  the  next  day.  Darius  had  merely  pas^d 
!  rmT<;h  it  leavin-  an  undefended  to^n.  ^vith  his  bow,  shi  Id. 
dmriof  a  br'^  a^^cl  rich  equipage,  as  prey  to  the  vic^m 

P-irmenio  ha'l  also  occupied  without  resistance  the  P^^f^^^^^^^f"  ' 
n^rthe  field  of  battle,  capturing  the  baggage,  the  camels,  and  the 

^^  ToTtSe  anvthincr  like  positive  numbers  of  slain  or  pnsoners  is 
impos   b le      Acc;;j-ding  to^Vrrian.  '^00,000  Persians  -^^J^^^^^ 
nvmv  more  taken  prisoners.     Diodorus  puts  the  slain  at  90  000   Cm 
Uus  at  40  000      The  ^Macedonian  killc  d  were,  according  to  Ainan, 
not  more  than  100-according  to  Curtius.  ^00     >iorlorus  sta^^^^^^^^^ 
slain  at  500.  besides  a  great  number  of  ^yP^^'^^^^^^K   T^^'^^^^^^^^ 
Arrian  is  obviously  too  great   on  one  ^^^^  tr?l^Mrcerta^n  tbat 
other-  but  whatever  may  be  the  numerical  truth,  it  is  certam  luu 


CAUSES  OF  THE  DEFEAT 


619 


the  prodigious  army  of  Darius  was  all  either  killed,  taken,  or  dis- 
persed at  the  battle  of  Arbela.  No  attempt  to  form  a  subsequent 
army  ever  succeeded;  we  read  of  nothing  stronger  than  divisions  or 
deiachments.  The  miscellaneous  contingents  of  this  once  mighty 
empire,  such  at  least  among  them  as  survived,  dispersed  to  their  re- 
spv'clive  homes  and  could  never  be  again  mustered  in  mass. 

The  defeat  of  Arbela  was  in  fact  the  death-blow  of  the  Persian 
empire.  It  converted  Alexamler  into  tlie  Great  King,  and  Darius 
into  nothing  better  than  a  fugitive  pretender.  Among-'all  tiie  causes 
of  the  defeat — here  as  at  Issus— the  most  ])rominent  and  indisputable 
was  the  cowardice  of  Darius  himself.  Under  a  king  deficient  not 
merely  in  the  virtues  of  a  general,  but  even  in  those  of  a  private  sol- 
dier, and  who  nevertheless  insisted  on  commanding  in  person — 
nothing  short  of  ruin  could  ensue.  To  those  brave  Persians  wliom 
he  dragged  into  ruin  along  with  him  and  who  knew  the  real  facts, 
he  must  have  appeared  as  the  betrayer  of  the  empire.  We  shall  have 
to  recall  this  state  of  sentiment,  when  we  describe  hereafter  the  con- 
spiracy formed  by  the  Baktrian  satrap  Bessus.  Nevertheless,  even 
if  Darius  had  behaved  with  uuimpeacliable  courage,  there  is  little 
reason  to  believe,  that  the  defeat  of  Arbela,  much  less  that  of  Issus, 
could  have  been  converted  into  a  victory.  Mere  immensity  of  num*- 
ber,  even  with  immensit}^  of  space,  was  of  no  efflcacy  without  skill 
as  well  as  l)ravery  in  the  commander.  Three-fourths  of  the  Persian 
army  were  mere  spectators  who  did  nothing,  and  produced  absolute- 
ly no  effect.  The  flank  movement  against  Alexander's  right,  instead 
of  being  made  by  some  unemployed  division,  was  so  carried  into 
effect,  as  to  distract  the  Baktrian  troops  from  their  place  in  the  front 
line,  and  thus  to  create  a  fatal  break,  of  which  Alexander  availed 
himself  for  his  own  formidable  charge  in  front.  In  spite  of  ampli- 
tude of  space— the  condition  wanting  at  Issus,— the  attacks  of  the 
Persians  on  Alexander's  flanks  and  rear  were  feeble  and  inefficient. 
After  all,  Darius  relied  mainly  upon  his  front  line  of  battle,  strength- 
ened by  the  scythe  chariots;  these  latter  being  found  unprofitable, 
tiiere  remained  only  the  direct  conflict,  wherein  the  strong  point  of 
the  Macedonians  resided. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  so  far  as  we  can  follow  the  dispositions  of 
Alexander,  they  appear  the  most  signal  example  recorded  in  antiq- 
uity, of  military  genius  and  sagacious  combination.  He  had  really 
as  great  an  avaihible  force  as  his  enemies,  because  every  company  in 
his  army  was  turned  to  account,  either  in  actual  combat,  or  in  re- 
serve against  definite  and  reasonable  contingencies.  All  his  suc- 
cesses, and  this  most  of  all,  were  fairly  earned l)y  his  own  genius  and 
indefatigable  effort,  combined  with  the  admirable  organization  of  his 
army.  But  his  good  fortune  was  no  less  conspicuous  in  the  unceas- 
ing faults  committed  by  his  enemies.  Except  during  the  short  pe- 
riod of  Memnon's  command,  the  Persian  king  exhibited  nothing  but 
ignorant  rashness  alternating  with  disgraceful  apathy;  turning  to  no 


I 


020        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS 

vi.olefateof  tl.e  cmpiic,  on  two  successive  occ.s.ons,  lo  ll.at  vcrj 
"""^  l^t1u:^rT^"^>>ry  .OS  ..u;,fc..ca  at  once  by 

lUiliiliSI 

,ln,cl!n,s  per  man  to  the  ^'^^^'!-Z"'^!o^^^X^"^'^^ 
•ilrv   200  to  the  Mncedoninn  infnnli}.  aiul  soimuuu.^  "-- 

find  it  greatly  '^>^«'<^,'l<^'i  •jf^/'f"'.^' *^^^'"1!,V  ,c^  fo'uvliltl.s  are  said 

!-^r^cri^r!::incJ^y:ur^,'si!vj-Wr...^^ 

^i;'„".:adhL",;^ded.l,e„w,.aiustaseasonon 

iiiodorate  portion  of  this  immense  ^''^'^''j'^  ^"V'  \'' t  i  .i.li/c  'il.lo  Gre- 

juAuiiui^  r  iviM'r-m  rnosts  bv  solemn  sacuticcs  lo  ixius, 

Ijopulation  ana  tne  «.  naivui.ni  i>iu   i  .     | 

be  rebuilt.  Treating  tl.e  Persian  en.p.re  Xc,  nli  iS  e  Persi  n 
quest,  he.nominated  tbe  v«"""^,%;;'P  •  ^^^'^^^':^Z^,n  t.o 
lMaz.Tus    n  the  satrapy  of   balnlon,    'i''>  P'^   '' \  9  vnuhinoli';  aq 

for  •win"  new  troops  auainst  the  j.aoedremomans  in  P^^1?P^^^'  "<;^;^f  • 
The^a  di  o  Alexan(ler  from  I^aDylon  to  Susa  occupuM  t.ent> 
do^s     an  easv  route  throiioh  a  country  abundantly  supplied.     At 


ALEX.VNDER  FORCES  THE  UXIA^'  PASS. 


621 


Susa  he  was  joined  by  Amvntas  son  of  Andromenes,  with  a  large  re- 
iniorcemeut  of  about  15,000  men— Macedonians,  Greeks,  and  Thra- 
cians.  There  were  both  cavalry  and  infantry— and  what  is  not  the 
least  remarkable,  titty  :\[aeedonian  youths  of  no])]e  family,  soliciting 
admission  into  Alex'ander's  corps  of  pages.  The  incorporation  of 
these  new-comers  into  the  army  afforded  him  the  opportunity  for  re- 
modelliuir  on  several  points  the  organization  of  his  different  divis- 
ions, the  Waller  as  well  as  the  larger.  _        ,     ^      .        * , 

After  some  delav  at  Susa— and  after  confirming  the  Persian  Abu- 
lites,  wdio  had  surrendered  the  city,  in  his  satrapy,  yet  not  without 
two  Grecian  otlicers  as  cruarantees,  one  commanding  the  military 
force,  the  other  governdr'of  the  citadel— Alexander  crossed  the  river 
Eniie'us  or  Pasitigris,  and  directed  his  march  to  the  south  east  to- 
AV'ird    Persis    proper,  the    ancient   heart  or    primitive    seat  from 
whence  the  original  Persian  conquerors  had  issued.    Between  Susa 
and  Persis  lay  a  mountainous  region  occupied  by  the  Uxii— rude  but 
warlike  shepherds,  to  whom  the  Great  King  himself  had  always  been 
obH"-ed  to  pav  a  tribute  whenever  he  went  from  Susa  to  Persepolis, 
beiir-- unable  with  his  ineflicient  military  organization  to  overcome 
the  difficulties  of  such  a  pass  held  by  an  enemy.     The  Uxii  now  de- 
m.mded  the  like  tribute   from  Alexander,  who  replied  by  inviting 
them  to  meet  him  at  their  pass  and  receive  it.     Meanwhile  a  new 
and  little  frequented  mountain  track  had  been  made  known  to  him, 
over  which  he  conducted  in  ])erson  a  detachment  of  troops  so  rapkl- 
ly  and  secretely  as  to  surprise  the  mountaineers  in  their  own  vil- 
ian-es      He  thus  not  only  opetied  the  usual  mountain  pass  for  the 
transit  of  his  main  army,  but  so  cut  to  pieces  and  humiliated  the 
Uxii   that  they  were  forced  to  sue  for  pardon.     Alexander  was  at 
first 'disposed  to  extirpate  or  expel  them  ;  but  at  length,  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  captive  Sisvgamis,  permitted  them  to  remain  as  subjects 
of  the  satrap  of  Susa,  imposing  a  tribute  of  sheep,  horses,  and  cattle, 
the  only  payment  which  their  poverty  allowed.         ^ 

But  bad  as  the  Uxian  pass  had  been,  there  remained  another  still 
^vor<e— called  the  Susian  or  Persian  gates,  in  the  mountains  which 
surn)unded  the  plain  of  Persepolis,  the  center  of  Persis  proper. 
Ariobarzanes,  satrap  of  the  province,  held  this  pass  ;  a  narrow  detile 
walled  across  with  mountain  positions  on  both  sides,  from  whence 
the  defenders,  while  out  of  reach  themselves,  could  shower  down 
missiles  upon  an  approaching  enemy.  After  four  days  of  march,  Al- 
exander reached  on  the  fifth  day  the  Susian  Gates;  which,  inexpiig-^ 
nable  as  they  seemed,  he  attacked  on  the  ensuing  morning.  In  spile 
of  all  the  courage  of  his  soldiers,  however,  he  sustained  loss  without 
dama<nng  his  enemy,  and  was  obliged  to  return  to  his  camp.  He 
was  informed  that  Uiere  was  no  other  track  by  which  this  difficult 
pass  could  be  turned;  but  there  w^s  a  long  circuitous  march  of 
many  days  whereby  it  might  be  evaded,  and  another  entrance 
found  into  the  plain  of  Persepolis.     To  recede  from  any  enterprise 


G22        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

as  impracticable,  was  a  humiliation  which  Alexander  had  never  yet 
endured.  On  further  inciuiry,  a  Lykian  captive,  who  had  been  for 
many  years  tending  sheep  n*s  a  slave  on  the  mountains,  acquainted 
him  wkh  the  existence  of  a  track  known  only  to  himself,  w  hereby  he 
nii^ht  come  on  the  flank  of  Ariobarzanes.  Leaving  Kraterus  in  com- 
m-dud  of  the  camp,  wMth  orders  to  attack  the  pass  in  front,  when  he 
should  hear  the  trumpet  give  signal— Alexander  marched  forth  at 
ni-ht  at  the  head  of  a  light  detachment,  under  the  guidance  of  the 
Lykian.  He  had  to  surmount  incredible  hardship  and  ditficulty— 
the  more  so  as  it  was  mid-winter,  and  the  mountain  was  covered  with 
snow;  yet  such  were  the  efforts  of  his  soldiers  and  the  rapidity  of  his 
movements,  that  he  surprised  all  the  Persian  outposts,  and  came 
upon  Ariobarzanes  altogether  unprepared.  Attacked  as  they  were 
at  the  same  time  by  Kraterus  also,  the  troops  of  the  satrap  w^ere 
forced  to  abandon  the  Gates,  and  were  for  the  most  part  cut  to 
pieces.  Many  perished  in  their  tlight  among  the  rocks  and  preci- 
pices; the  satrap  himself  being  one  of  a  few  that  escaped. 

Tliough  the  citadel  of  Persepolis  is  described  as  one  of  the  strong- 
est of  fortresses,  yet  after  this  unexpected  conquest  of  a  pass  hitherto 
deemed  inexpugnable,  few  had  counige  to  think  of  holding  it  against 
Alexander.  Nevertheless  Ariobarzanes,  hastening  thither  from  the 
conquered  pass,  still  strove  to  organize  a  defense,  and  at  least  to  carry 
off  the  regal  treasure,  which  some  in  the  town  were  alieady  prepar- 
ing to  pillage.  But  Tiridates,  commander  of  the  garrison,  fearing 
the  wrath  of  the  conqueror,  resisted  this,  and  despatched  a  message 
entreating  Alexander  to  hasten  his  march.  Accordingly  Alexander, 
at  the  head  of  his  cavalrv,  set  forlh  with  the  utmost  speed,  and 
jirrived  in  time  to  detain  and  appropriate  the  whole.  Ariobarzanes, 
in  a  vain  attempt  to  resist,  was  slain  with  :dl  his  companions.  Per- 
sepolis  and  Pasargadse— the  two  peculiar  capitals  of  tiie  Persian 
race,  the  latter  memorable  as  containing  the  sepulcher  of  Cyrus  the 
Great— both  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  conqueror. 

On  approaching  Persepolis.  the  compassion  of  the  army  was  pow- 
erfully moved  by'the  sijrht  of  about  800  Grecian  captives,  all  of  them 
mutilated  in  some  frightful  and  distressing  way,  by  loss  of  legs, 
arms,  eyes,  ears,  or  some  other  bodily  members.  Mutilation  was  a 
punishment  conmionly  inflicted  in  that  age  by  Oriental  governors 
even  by  such  as  were  not  accounted  cruel.  Thus  Xenophon,  in 
eulogizing  the  rigid  justice  of  Cyrus  the  younger,  remarks  that  in 
the  public  roads  of  his  satrapy,  men  were  often  seen  who  had  been 
deprived  of  their  arms  or  legs,  or  otherwise  mutilated,  by  penal 
authorhv.  Many  of  these  maimed  captives  at  Persepolis  were  old, 
and  had  lived  for  years  in  their  unfortunate  condition.  They  had 
been  brouglit  up  from  various  Greek  cities  by  order  of  some  of  the 
preceding  Persian  kings;  but  on  what  pretences  they  had  been  thus 
cruelly  dealt  with  we  are  not  informed.  Alexander,  moved  to  tears 
at  such  a  spectacle,  offered  to  restore  them  to  their  reepective  homes, 


PERSEPOLIS. 


623 


with  a  comfortable  provision  for  the  future.  But  most  of  them  felt 
so  ashamed  of  returning  to  their  homes,  that  they  entreated  to  be 
allowed  to  remain  all  together  in  Persis,  with  lands  assigned  to  them, 
and  with  dependent  cultivators  to  raise  produce  for  them.  Alexan- 
der granted  their  request  in  the  fullest  measure,  conferring  besides 
upon  each  an  ample  donation  of  money,  clothing  and  cattle. 

The  sight  of  these  mutilated  Greeks  was  well  calculated  to  excite 
not  merely  sympathy  for  them,  but  rage  against  the  Persians,  in  the 
bosoms  of  all  spectators.    Alexander  seized  this  opportunity,  as  well 
for  satiatiiiir  the  anger  and  cupidity  of  his  soldiers,  as  for  manifest- 
ing himself  in  his  self -assumed  cliaracter  of  avenger  of  Greece  against 
the  Persians,  to  punish  the  wrongs  done  by  Xerxes  a  century  and  a  half 
before.     He  was  now  amid  the  native  tribes  and  seats  of  the  Persians, 
the  descendants  of  those  rude  warriors  who,  under  the  flrst  Cyrus, 
had  overspread  Western  Asia  from  the  Indus  to  the  ^gean.     In  this 
their  home  the  Persian  kings  had  accumulated  their  national  edifices, 
their  regal  sepulchers,  the  niscriptions commemorative  of  their  relig- 
ious or^'legendarv  sentiment,  with  many  trophies  and  acquisitions 
arising  out^of  their  conquests.     For  the  purposes  of  the  Great  King's 
empire,  Babylon,  or  Susa,  or  Ekbatana,  were  more  central  and  con- 
venient residences;  but  Persepolis  was  still  regarded  as  the  heart  of 
Persian  nationality.     It  w^as  the  chief  magazine,  though  not  the  only 
one,  of  those  annual  accumulations  from  the  imperial  revenue,  which 
each  king  successively  increased,    and  which  none  seems   to  have 
ever  dimfnished.     Moreover,  the  Persian  grandees  and  officers,  who 
held  the  lucrative  satrapies  and  posts  of  the  empire,  were  continu- 
ally sending  wealth  home  to  Persis.  for  themselves  or  their  relatives. 
We  may  therefore  reasonably  believe  \vhat  we  find  asserted,  that 
Persepolis  possessed  at  this  time  more  wealth,  public  and  i^rivate, 
than  any  place  within  the  range  of  Grecian  or  Macedonian  knowl- 

ed'^e. 

Convening  his  principal  officers,  Alexander  denounced  Persepolis 
as  the  most"  hostile  of  all  Asiatic  cities— the  home  of  those  impious 
invaders  of  Greece,  whom  he  had  come  to  attack.  He  proclaimed 
his  intention  of  abandoning  it  to  be  plundered,  as  well  as  of  burning 
the  citadel.  In  this  resolution  he  persisted,  notwithstanding  the 
remonstrance  of  Parmenio,  who  reminded  him  that  the  act  would  be 
a  mere  injury  to  himself  by  ruining  his  ow^n  property,  and  that  the 
Asiatics  would  construe  it  as  evidence  of  an  intention  to  retire 
speedily,  without  founding  any  permanent  dominion  in  the  country. 
After  appropriating  the  regal  treasure— to  the  alleged  amount  of 
120  000  talents  in  irold  and  silver(=£27,600,000  sterling)— Alexander 
set  fire  to  the  citiuiel.  A  host  of  mules,  with  5,000  camels,  were 
sent  for  from  IVIesopotamia  and  elsewhere,  to  carry  off  this  prodigious 
treasure;  the  whole  of  which  was  conveyed  out  of  Persis  proper, 
partly  to  be  taken  along  with  Alexander  himself  in  his  ulterior 
^^rches,  partly  to  be  lodged  in  Susa  and  Ekbatana.    Six  thouD- 


024        SECOND  AND  THIRD  ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 

taleuts  more,  found  in  Pjisariradae,  were  adncd  to  the  spoil,  llio 
persons  and  propert}-  of  tlie  inhabitants  were  abandoned  to  the  li- 
cense of  the  sokliers,  who  obtained  un  immense  booty,  not  nurely 
in  gold  and  silver,  but  also  in  lich  clolhing,  furniture,  and  ostcnta- 
lious  ornaments  of  every  kind.  The  nuile  inhabitatits  were  A;nu, 
;he  females  dragijed  into  servitude;  except  such  as  obtained  std'ety 
liy  flight,  or  l)urned  themselves  with  their  property  in  tlcir  own 
houses.  Among  the  soldiers  themselves,  much  angry  scran.blir.g 
took  place  for  the  possession  of  precious  articles,  not  wilhout  occa- 
sional bloodshed.  As  soon  as  tlieir  ferocity  and  cupidity  had  been 
satiated,  Alexander  arrested  the  massacre.  His  encour;igen;eiit  and 
sanction  of  it  was  not  a  burst  of  transient  fury,  provoked  1  y  unex- 
pected length  of  resistance,  such  as  the  hanging  of  the  2,000  'iyrians 
and  the  dragging  of  Batis  and  Gaza — but  a  deliberate  ])ro(  (=r<lii;g, 
intended  partly  as  a  rec(>mpense  and  gratitication  to  the  soldieiy.  but 
.still  more  as  an  imposing  manifestation  of  retributive  vengeance 
against  the  descendants  of  the  ancient  Persian  invaders.  In  hi-  (-v.  n 
letters  seen  by  Plutarch.  Alexander  described  the  mas-af  re  oi.  the 
'..dive  Persians  as  having  been  ordered  by  him  on  grounds  of  jir.ie 
policy. 

As  it  was  now  winter  or  very  early  spring,  he  suffered  1  is  nn;in 
.-imy  to  enjoy  a  month  or  more  of  repose  at  or  near  Persepolis.  IJut 
le  himself,  at  tlje  head  of  a  rnpiiily  moving  divi-ion  traversed  tlm 
interior  of  Persis  proper;  conquering  or  receiving  into  sul  mi.-sion 
I  he  various  towns  and  villaircs.  The  greatest  resistance  ^^hich  he 
«  \perienced  was  offered  by  the  rude  and  warlike  tribe  called  the 
'dardi;  but  worse  than  anv  enemv  was  the  severitv  of  the  season 
;'nd  the  rugged  destitution  of  a  frozen  country.  Neither  physical 
1  i  111  cult  ies,  however,  nor  human  euendes,  could  arrest  the  march  (.f 
Mexander.  lie  returned  from  his  expedition,  complete  master  of 
l\^rsis;  and  in  the  spring,  quitted  that  i)rovince  with  his  whole  army, 
t.)  follow  Darius  into  Media.  lie  left  only  a  garrison  of  V>,vi'0 
'lacedonians  at  Persepoli^,  preserving  to  Tiridales,  who  had  t^m- 
rtndered  to  him  the  place,  the  title  of  satrap. 

Darius  was  now  a  fugitive,  with  the  mere  title  of  kmg.  and  w  ith 
r  simple  body-guard  rather  than  an  army.  On  leaving  Arbcla  after 
t*:e  defeat,  he  had  struck  in  an  easterly  direction  across  the  moun- 
1  tins  into  !Media;  having  only  a  few  attendants  round  him,  and 
1  linking  himself  too  happy  to  preserve  his  own  life  from  an  indefa- 
;  gable  pursuer.  He  calculated  that  once  across  these  mountains, 
Alexander  woidd  leave  him  for  a  time  unmolested,  in  haste  to  march 
s' -.ithward  for  the  pur]M)se  of  appropriating  the  great  and  real  prizes 
oi"  the  campaiirn — Pjabylon.  Susa.  and  Persepolis.  The  last  struggles 
of  this  ill-starred  prince  will  be  recounted  in  another  chapter. 


FIRST   FOUR   ASIATIC  CAMPAIGNS. 


62o 


CHAPTER  XCiy. 


MITJTATIY    OPERATIONS   AND  CONQUESTS  OF  ALEXANDER,  AFTER   HIS 
WINTER-QUARTERS   IN   PERSIS,    DOWN   TO   HIS  DEATH   AT   BABYLON. 

From  this  time  forward  to  the  close  of  Alexander's  life — a  ])eriod 
of  about  seven  years — !iis  time  was  spent  in  concpiering  the  eastern 
half  of  the  Persian  empire,  together  with  various  independent 
tribes  lying  beyond  its  extreme  boundary.  But  neither  Greece,  nor 
Asia  Minor,  nor  any  of  his  previous  western  acquisitions,  was  he 
ever  destined  to  see  again. 

Now,  in  regard  to  the  history  of  Greece — the  subject  of  these  vol- 
umes— the  first  portion  of  Alexander's  Asiatic  campaigns  (froni  his 
crossing  the  Hellespont  to  the  conquest  of  Persis,  a  period  of  four 
years,  March  344,  b.  c.  to  ]March  330,  b.  c),  though  not  of  direct 
b'^aring.  is  yet  of  material  importance.  Having  in  his  first  year 
completed  the  subja  ]^ation  of  the  Hellenic  world,  he  had  by  these 
subscq  lent  campaigns  ab>orbe.l  it  as  a  small  fraction  into  the  vast 
Persian  empire,  renovate  I  under  his  imperial  scepter.  He  h  ;d  ac- 
complished a  result  substantially  the  same  as  would  have  b;'e:i 
brought  a'aoiit  if  the  invasioa  oi'  G/ei^ce  by  Xerxes,  destine;!  a  Cc-u- 
turv  and  a  half  before  to  incorporate  Greece  with  the  Persiaa 
monireliv,  had  succeeded  instead  of  failing.  Toward  the  kinirs  of 
Macedonia  alone,  the  subjugation  of  Greece  would  never  have  b;' 
come  complete,  so  long  as  she  could  reeeiv^e  help  from  the  native, 
Persian  kin'j:s — who  were  perfectly  adequate  ;is  a  countervailing  and 
tutelary  force,  had  they  known  iiow  to  play  their  game.  But  a'd 
hope  for  Greece  from  without  was  extinguished,  when  Babylon, 
Su^a,  and  Persepolis  became  subject  to  the  stune  ruler  as  Pella  and 
Amphipoiis — and  that  ruler,  too,  the  ablest  general,  the  most  insa- 
tiate aggressor,  of  his  age;  to  whose  name  was  attached  the  pi-es- 
tige  of  success  almost  superluunan.  Still,  again-;t  even  this 
overwdielming  power,  some  of  the  bravest  of  the  Greeks  at  home 
tried  to  achieve  their  liberation  with  the  sw^ord:  we  shall  sjc  pres- 
ently how  sadly  the  attempt  miscarried. 

But  thougli  the  first  four  years  of  Alexander's  Asiatic  expedition, 
in  which  he  conquered  the  western  half  of  the  Persian  empire,  had 
thus  an  important  effect  on  the  condition  and  destinies  of  tiie 
Grecian  cities — !iis  last  seven  years,  on  which  we  are  now  about  to 
enter,  employed  chiefly  in  conquering  the  eastern  iialf,  scarcely 
touelied  these  cities  in  any  way.  Tiie  stupendous  marches  to  the 
rivers  Jaxartes,  Indus,  and  Ilypliasis,  which  carried  his  victoriou-i 
armies  over  so  wide  a  space  of  Central  Asia,  not  only  added  nothing 
to  his  power  over  the  Greeks,  but  even  withdrew  him  from  all  deal- 
ings with  them,  and  placed  him  almost  beyond  their  cogaizance. 


(526        MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

To  the  historian  of  Greece,  therefore,  these  latter  campaigns    can 
hmiU   li  r^^^^^^^^^^^  inchKhJi   ^vithin  the   rai.ge    of  his  subject 

11  el^k^erve^'  o^      told  as  examples  of  military  skill  and  energy,  and 
a.  i  lu.tra  In-  the  character  of  the  most  illustrious  general  ot   ai - 
?k,i  tv-mi^e  ^         thou-h  not  a  Greek,  had  become  the  master  of  r. 
Greeks.     But  I  shall  not  think  it  necessary  to  recount  them  in  ar.y 
rlHt-ul    like  the  battles  of  Issus  and  Arbela.  ,      ,     .,      i?    *   i    i , 

A lou  ^iK  or  seven  months  had  elapsed  from  the  battle  of  Arbela 
tothe      mif  vhen  Alexancler  prepared  to  quit  his  most  recent  con- 
Quest-Persis  proper.     During  all  this  tin.e.  Darius  had  remained  at 
Vkb-  tana   the  chief  city  of  Media,  clinging   to  the  hope   that  Alex- 
^iKk     wtn  P<^^^^^^^^    of  the  ihree  southern  capitals  and  the  best  part 
o     he  Per'  Mu  empire,  might  have  reached  the  point  of  satiation, 
and  ni.di   ie     e  him  unmolested  in  the  more  barren  east.     As  soon 
iriiL  kerned  that  Alexander  was  in  movement  toward  him,  he  .en 
fnrw'iVl  his  harem  and  baggasxe  to  Hvrkania,  on  the  south-ea.teri 
bonle    ot     heCasM       sea°' llimself,*wilh  the  small  lorce  around 
SoUowed   n  the  same  direction,  carrying  off  the  treasure  in  die 
ci      (7  000  ta  ents  ==  £1,010,000  in  amount),  and  passed  through  the 
C  liDiaV^rates  h  to  the  territory  of  Parthyenc.     His  only  chance  ^yt.s 
[c;  S^tT^Biktria  at  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  empire,  rumi^g 
tLauntivin  his  way  for  the  i>urpose  of  retarding  pursuers.     Bui 
thrchance  diminished  every  day,  Irom  desertion  among  his  fe^^  iol- 
Inwer^  and  anirrv  disirust  among  many  who  remained. 

E  di't    lavs  .fftir  Darius  had  quitted  Ekbatana,  Alexander  cnte  ed 
it      HoVmany  davshad  been  occupied  in  his  march  from  Perse poh>. 
we  cannot      V    in  itself  a  Ion- march,  it  had  been  further  prolonge 
mrtly        nece;sity  of  subduing  the  intervening  mountaineers  calk 
?^  rtL^tt  klnrpart^^^  by  rumors  exaggerating  the   Persian   iorce     t. 
Eklnta^^^^^  Inm  to  advance  with  precaution  and  regu- 

Hr    rray      Possessed  (/Ekbatana-the  last  capital  stronghold  ot  tl. 
Pel-   an*'kin.s     uid   their  ordinary  residence  during  the    suinme 
nion  hs--he^halted  to  rest  his  troops,  and  estab  ish  a  ^^^^n  ^^  •      '. 
^pemtions  for  his  future  proceedings  eastward.    /^^  "^^^^^^,.^^^;^?''  J^^; 
i^  nrincinal  depot-  depositing  in  the  citadel,  under  the  care  ot  liar 
pairasTea^Jx^-ith  a  gairison  of  6,000  or  7.000  Mac;edonian> 
tlie  accumulated    treasures  of  his  past  conquests  out  of  ^^^f-'^^:^ 
PerseH       amounting,  we  are  told,  to  the  enormous  ^"'^  «f  ^f^^'^^^^^ 
talents   =  £41  400.000,  sterling.     Parmenio   was  invested   ^Mlh    He 
chief  c;mm^ud  of  this  import.mt  post,  and  of  the  military  force     ft 
'nUdia    of  which  territory  Oxodates,  a  Persian  who  had  been  im- 
prisoned at  Susa  by  Darius,  was  named  satrap.  ^^    r  n  f^oc)  are- 
^  kt  Ekbatana  AU-xander  was  joined  by  ^^.^.^f^^.^^^^f.^^i^t'^lS. 
cian  mercenaries,  who  had  marched  from  Lilikia   into  the  ii  i^' »^'' 
probab     ci^lsing  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  at  the  sa"^e  points  as 
Alexamei  himself  had  crossed.     Hence  he  was  enabled  the  bettei  to 
Sism^s  his  Thessalian  cavalry,  with  other  Greeks  who  had  beeu 


PURSUIT  OF  DARIUS. 


627 


serving  during  his  four  years  of  Asiatic  war,  aui  who  now  wished 
to  go  home.  He  distributed  among  them  the  sum  of  2,000  talents 
in  addition  to  their  full  pay,  and  gave  them  the  price  of  their 
horses,  which  they  sold  before  departure.  The  operations  which  iie 
was  now  about  to  commence  against  the  eastern  territories  of  Persia 
were  not  against  regular  armies,  but  against  flying  corps  and  dis- 
tinct native  tribes,  relying  for  defense  chieflv  on  the  dimculties 
which  mountains,  deserts,  privation,  or  mere  distance,  would  throw 
in  the  way  of  an  assailant.  For  these  purposes  he  required  an  in- 
creased number  of  light  troops,  and  was  obliged  to  impose  even  upon 
his  heavy-nnned  cavalry  the  most  rapid  and  fatiguing  inarches, 
such  as  none  but  his  Macedonian  companions  would  have  been  con- 
tented to  execute;  moreover  he  was  called  upon  to  act  less  withlarire 
masses,  and  more  with  small  and  broken  divisions.  He  now,  there- 
fore, for  the  first  time  established  a  regular  Taxis,  or  division^  of 
horse-bowmen. 

Remaining  at  Ekbatana  no  longer  than  was  sufficient  for  these 
new  arrangements,  Alexander  recommenced  his  pursuit  of  Darius. 
He  hoped  to  get  b -fore  Darius  to  the  Caspian  Gates,  at  the  north- 
eastern extremity  or  M'dia;  by  which  Gites  was  understood  a 
mountain-pass,  or  rata  -r  a  road  of  many  hours'  march,  including 
several  dillicult  passes  stroa'hing  eastward  along  the  southern  side  o^f 
tiie  great  range  of  Taurus,  t  .ward  Parthia.  He  marched  with  his 
Companion-cavalry,  the  liglit-aor>e.  the  Agrianians,  and  the  bowmen 
—the  greater  part  of  the  phalanx  k cping  up  as  well  as  it  could— to 
Rliagae,  about  fifty  miles  north  of  Li  >  Caspian  Gates;  which  town 
he  reached  in  eleven  days,  by  exertions  so  severe  that  many  men  as 
well  as  horses  were  disabled  on  the  road.  But  in  spite  of  Till  speed, 
lie  learned  that  Darius  had  already  passed  the  Caspian  Gates.  After 
live  days  of  halt  at  Rhaga3,  indispensable  for  his  army,  Alexander 
])assed  them  also.  A  day's  march  on  the  other  side  of  them  he  was 
joined  by  two  eminent  Persians,  Bagistanes  and  Antibelus,  who  in- 
formed him  that  Darius  was  already  dethroned  and  in  imminent 
danger  of  losing  his  life. 

The  conspirators  by  whom  this  had  been  done  were  Bessns,  satrap 
of  Baktria — Barsaentes,  satrap  of  Drangiana  and  Arachosia— and 
Nabarzanes,  general  of  the  regal  guards.  ^The  small  force  of  Darius 
having  been  thinned  by  daily  desertion,  most  of  those  who  remained 
were  the  contingents  of  the  still  unconquered  territories,  Baktria, 
Arachosia,  and  Drangiana,  under  the  orders  of  their  respective  sa- 
traps. The  Grecian  mercenaries,  1500  in  number,  and  Artabazus, 
With  a  band  under  his  special  command,  adhered  inflexibly  to  Da- 
nus,  but  the  soldiers  of  Eastern  Asia  followed  their  own  satraps. 
Bessus  and  his  colleagues  intended  to  make  their  peace  with  Alex- 
ander by  surrendering  Darius,  should  Alexander  pursue  so  vigor- 
ously as  to  leave  them  no  hope  of  escape;  but  if  they  could  obtain 
time  to  reach  Baktria  and  Sogdiana,  they  resolved  to  organize  aa 


623       MIUT.Un-  OPKRATU^XS  OF  ALEXANDER 

,f  re-i^ting  Alexnn.ler,  >-"';!l    "     ?,t  ",1    hoc  U  ice  set  U.e.xannile 

of  fliglil  from  ll.e  heUl  of  «   ''V  f ^ ''A  ^f orce  of  l\-r.-iu.     For  brave 
vivo,  even  when  nu'ioundc  1  b>    be  |"    '"1'^^,.^^  ,,,  „uce  to  submit 

Ld  energetic  l>;'"'"''';"no  d  <  e  but  to  Ta  We  Danus;  nor  does 
to  tbe  invader,  fbcre  %xas  >Y> '.''P^J^^.J^'t  ^,.^1  anvtbing  ^volse.  At 
it  ai^pear  that  tliS,^""^!?'™  °  ",  °'"  ,,^k Ud  bin!  in  chains  of  gold 
a  village  called  Thara  '»  V' ;''  "•  ;''^,  r"iun<led  by  the  Baktiian 
-placed  hi.n  in  a  '''J^-V^l  V'''  "^.^t  ■  •  eati.ig  as  fast  as  they 
lvoons,-and  thus  earned  hmi  """;'• 'V'V,i,„,tm  with  the  Gve- 
o;;S;'r,ess«s.assunmtg  the  ecmmatul      Att,  bam  ^ 

,ian  mercenaries,  '"'' /'';■  f^,,  '  .J^^  f„""„on/ the  mountains  of  the 
,.rmv  in  disgust,  »'''\f""?'   ,   '  "^a  ,i,e  Caspian  Sea. 
TapVri.  bordenng  <.n    l^  1^ '>>  „>  "C^ca,  tier  strained  cveiy  nerve  to 
O  ,  bearing  this  '"""'-'  '^.^'-^.^^J-on  of  the  person  of  Darins. 
overtake  the  f.ig.l.ves  ""<  ,f^  ,'1°^,'"' ^s    i.'bt  horse,  and  a  body 

A,  ,he  bead  "V'^o^To™  he  .' '''n  -^  i' ^'^^^  ="''^''>-  1"^!'"'  "'""'" 
of  infantry  P"^k<''^  "/'^;„  ,",•,;  „t  Tun.s  and  t«o  days  provisions 
in  instant  march,  ^^'''\'  '  '"^  ...  brin"  on  tbe  main  body  by  easier 
for  each  man:  leaving  1^''  \"i';"  '^"T,,^  a,,a  one  dav.  interrupted 
journeys.  A  forced  "J""'''  "^  .",?,' Wl  now  the  mouth  of  July). 
,„lv  by  a  short  nmldav  repo  c  (,    was  no  ^  .^  informant 

bimigbt  him  at  <l«yhreak  to  the  I    is  an  c      \  ^^_^  ^^,^.^,^^^,_^.  ^^, 

r,agisl.anes  had  quitted.  «>\' ^,t'K  „  Xauce  in  their  flight;  upon 
vornl  it.  having  made  .^"'^ ',»  in^'^he  eSstion  both  of  men  and 
■which  Alexander,  "Ot^y;'''^'^'"  \  ;Vin,.ed  thniut'h  all  th.^  night  to 
„.„-.es,  pnshc.l  °"  ",;'';,  '"-'i^'r, ere  found  hiniself  in.  the  village 
ihe  ensuing  day  at  noon,  f'^,  "  "'  _„,,,,j:|,„  jav.  Yet,  learning 
where  Bessus  had  ';';"'"V;;;'  "",'. i^.fsoWed  to  histeu  their  retreat 
from  .leserters  that  his  "i"^  » "^o  overt'°kin-  'l'^''"-  ""'^^^  ""  ^"','''^ 
by  night  marches,  he  *'^P^"  *•■'»»'  "^  ,fo  .„ed'that  there  was  another 
find  some  shorter  road.     He  was  >'"^'"'^"  Settin"  out  bv  this 

^tcv,  imt  leading  ^-^f^ -^l^j^l^'^/^^te^o  \els  than  forty- 
road  late  in  the  day  AMth  his  ^-^' '^^^  \;^ '^^,7,^  ^n  Bessus  by  coniplete 
five  miles  durin-  the  night,  so  a.  ^^  ,^^"^^  ^^.^^^^   marching  in  dis- 

surprise  on  the  ^^^^^^'^^.^^^'^  expeVt.aion  o  an  enemy,\vere  so 
order  xvitlmut  arms,  an(   1  miV^no^e^^^^^^^^  indefatigable  con- 

panic-struck  at  the  sudde     ^^^  .J^^^^j^^^^^^t  .,„y  attempt  to  resist. 

qneror,  that  tb.ey  dispeisc>d  ^"^^,^^1^^.;;^^^^^^^^^^^  Dadus  to  leave 

l\i  this  critical  moment  Bessus  and  Ba^^^^^^^^  ^^^^.^,  ^.^^^ 

hi.  chariot,  mount  ^^' ^^''^^^^^^ 

^^  :^l^  I^i^niSl^lhJ^ailT^Al^-nder,  whereby  his  nan. 


DISAPPOINTMENT   OF  ALEXANDER. 


629 


would  have  been  employed  against  them,  and  would  have  materially 
lessened  their  chance  of  defending  tiie  easiera  provinces;  tiiey  were 
moreover  incensed  by  his  refusal,  and  liad  contracted  a  feeling  of  lialred 
and  contenipt  to  which  they  were  glad  to  give  elfect.  Casting  their 
javelins  at  him,  they  left  him  mortall}'  womided,  and  then  purslied 
their  flight.  Jiis  chariot,  not  distinguished  by  any  visible  mark,  nor 
known  "even  to  the  Persian  sokliers  themselves,  was  for  some  time 
not  detected  bv  the  pursuers.  At  length. a  3Iacedonian  soldier 
named  Polystralus  found  him  expiring,  and  is  said  to  have  received 
his  last  words,  wherein  he  expressed  thanks  to  Alexander  for  the 
kind  treatment  of  his  captive  female  relatives,  and  satisfaction  that 
the  Persian  throne,  lost  to  himself,  was  about  to  pass  to  so  generous 
a  conqueror.  It  is  al  least  certain  that  he  never  lived  to  see  Alexan- 
der himself. 

Alexander  had  made  the  prodigious  and  indefatigal)le  marches  of 
the  last  four  days,  not  witiiout  dL'slruclloa  to  many  men  and  horses, 
for  the  express  purpose  of  takuig  Darius  alive;.  It  would  have  been 
a  gratification  to  his  vanity  to  exliibit  the  great  king  as  a  helpless 
captive,  rescued  from  his  own  servants  l)y  the  sword  of  his  enemy, 
and  spared  to  occupy  some  subordinate  command  as  a  token  of  os- 
tentatious indulgence".  Moreover,  apart  from  such  feelings,  it  would 
have  been  a  point  of  real  advantage  to  seize  the  person  of  Darius,  by 
means  of  whose  name  AlexanderVould  have  been  enabled  to  stifle 
all  further  resistance  in  the  extensive  and  imperfbctly-knovvn  regions 
eastward  of  the  Caspian  Gates.  The  satraps  of  these  regions  had 
now  wne  thither  with  their  hands  free,  to  kindle  as  much  Asiatic 
sentiment  and  levy  as  large  a  force  as  tliey  couki,  against  the  ]Mace- 
donian  conqueror,  who  was  obliged  to  follow  them,  if  he  wi>hed  to 
complete  the  subjugation  of  the  empire.  AVe  can  understand,  there- 
fore, that  Alexander  was  deeply  mortitled  in  deriving  no  result  from 
this  ruinously  fatiguing  marcli,  and  can  th'3  better  explain  that  sav- 
age wrath  which  we  shall  hereafter  find  him  manifesting  against  the 
satrap  Bessus, 

Alexander  caused  the  body  of  Darius  to  be  buried,  with  full  pomp 
and  ceremonial,  in  the  regal  sepulchers  of  Persis.  The  last  days  of 
this  unfortunate  prince  have  been  described  with  almost  tragic 
pathos  bv  historians;  and  there  are  few  subjects  in  history  better 
calculated  to  excite  such  a  feeling,  if  we  regard  simply  the  magni- 
tude of  his  fall,  from  the  highest  pitch  of  power  and  splendor  to  de- 
feat, degradation,  and  assassination.  But  an  impartial  review  will 
nt)t  allow  us  to  forget  that  the  main  cause  of  such  ruin  was  his  own 
blindness— his  long  apathy  after  the  battle  of  Issus.  and  abandon- 
ment of  Tvre  and  Gaza,  in  the  fond  hope  of  repurchasing  queens 
whom  he  had  himself  exposed  to  captivity— lastly,  what  is  still  less 
pardonable,  his  personal  cowardice  in  botii  the  two  decisive  battles 
deliberately  bro.ight  about  by. himself.  If  we  follow  his  conduct 
throughout  the  struggle,  we  siiall  find  little  of  that  which  renders  a 


030       MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

defeated  prince  either  respectable  or  interesting.  Those  ^^ho  had  the 
greatest  reason  to  denounce  an.l  despise  hun  ^vere  l"«/nends  and 
?ountrvnien,  whom  he  possessed  ample  means  of  ^»^"^^"^'»^^'  3^^ 
hrew  'those  means  away.  On  the  other  hand,  no  one  had  better 
oTounds  for  indulgence  toward  him  than  his  conqueror,  lor  whom  he 
had  kept  unused  the  countless  treasures  of  11^  three  capitals,  and  for 
whom  he  had  lightened  in  every  way  the  dithculties  of  a  conquest, 
in  itself  hardly  less  than. impracticable. 

The  recent  forced  march,  undertaken  by  Alexander  for  the  purpose 
of  -ecurincr  Darius  as  a  captive,  had  been  distressing  m  the  extreme  to 
his  soldiers,  who  required  a  certain  period  of  repose  and  compensa- 
tion     This  was  jrranted  to  them  at  the  town  of  Hekatompylus,  m 
Parlhia,  where  the  whole  army  was  again  united      Besides  abund^ 
unt  supplies  from  the  neighboring  region,  the  soldiers  here  received 
a  donative  derived  from  the  large  booty  taken  in  the  camp  ot  Darius. 
In  the  eniovment  and  revelry  universal  throughout  the  army,  Alex- 
ander himself  partook.     His  indulgences  in  the  banquet  and  wine- 
t^rinking,  to  whi(  h   he  was  always  addicted  when  leisure  allowed, 
were  now  unusually  multiplied  and  prolonged.     Public  sokmmties 
vrcYQ  celebrated,  to'cether  with  theatrical  ( xhibitions,  by  artists  who 
ioined  the  army  from  Greece.     But  the  change  of  most  importance 
in  Alexander's  conduct  was,  that  he  now  began  to  feel  and  act  mani- 
fe^lvas  successor  of  Darius  on  the  Persian  throne;  to  disdain  the 
comparative  simplicity  of  Macedonian  habits,  and  to  assume  the 
pomp,  the  ostentatious  apparatus  of  luxuries,  and  even  the  dress,  ot 

a  Persian  king.  ^    ^  -n,      •  ^^.a 

To  many  of  Alexander's  soldiers,  the  corqucst  of  Persia  appeared 
to  be  consummated  and  the  war  finished  by  the  death  of  Darius 
They  were  reluctant  to  exchange  the  repose  and  enjoyments  oi 
Heluitompylus  for  fresh  fatigues;  but  Alexander,  assembling  the  se- 
lect regiments,  addressed  to  them  an  emphatic  appeal  which  revived 
the  ardor  of  all.  His  first  march  was  across  one  of  the?  paf^^^s  Irom 
the  senith  to  the  north  of  Mount  Elburz.  into  Hyikania,  the  region 
bordering  the  south-eastern  corner  of  the  Caspian  Sea.  Here  he 
found  no  resistance;  the  Hyrkanian  satrap  Phratapheincs,  togetheT 
with  Nabarzanes,  Artabazus,  and  other  eminent  Persians  suriend- 
ered  themselves  to  him,  and  were  favorably  leceiveel.  Ihe  GrceK 
mercenaries,  1500  in  number,  who  liad  served  with  Darius,  but  had 
retired  when  that  monarch  was  placed  under  arrest  by  Bessus,  sent 
envoys  requesting  to  be  allowed  to  surrender  on  capitulation.  But 
Alexander-reproaching  them  with  guilt  for  having  iake-n  service 
with  the  Persians,  in  contravention  of  the  \ote  lassed  by  pe 
Hellenic  synod— required  them  to  surrender  at  diseretmn;  whicn 
they  expressed  their  readiness  to  do,  praying  that  an  ofiicer  migut 
be  dispatched  to  conduct  them  to  him  in  safety.  The  Macedonian 
Andronikus  was  sent  for  this  purpose,  while  Alexander  undertocjlr 
an  expedition  into  the  mountains  of  the  Mardi;  a  name  seemingly 


PHILOTAS. 


631 


borne  by  several  distinct  tribes  in  parts  remote  from  each  other,  but 
all  poor  and  brave  mountaineers.  Tliese  Mardi  occupied  parts  of 
the  northern  slopo  of  the  range  of  Mount  Elburz,  a  few  miles  fiom 
the  Caspian  Sea  (Mazanderan  and  Ghilaii).  Alexander  pursued 
them  into  all  their  retreats — overcame  them,  w  hen  they  stood  on 
their  defense,  with  great  slaugliter — and  reduced  the  remnant  of  the 
half-destroyed  tribes  to  sue  for  peace. 

From  this  march,  w^hicli  had  carried  him  in  a  westerly  direction, 
he  returned  to  Hyrkania.  At  the  first  halt  he  was  met  by  the 
Grecian  mercenaries  who  came  to  surrender  themselves,  as  well  as 
by  various  Grecian  envoys  from  Sparta,  Chalketlon,  and  Sinope, 
who  had  accompanied  Darius  in  his  flight.  Alexander  put  the  Lace- 
daemonians under  arrest,  but  liberated  the  other  envoys,  considering 
Chalkedon  and  Sinope  to  have  been  subjects  of  Darius,  not  members 
of  the  Hellenic  synod.  As  to  the  mercenaries,  he  made  a  distinction 
between  those  who  had  enlisted  in  the  Persian  service  before  the 
recognition  of  Philip  as  leader  of  Greece,  and  those  whose  enlist- 
ment had  been  of  later  date.  The  former  he  libcrateel  at  once;  the 
latter  he  required  to  remain  in  his  service  under  the  command  of 
Andronikus,  on  the  same  pay  as  they  had  hitherto  received.  Such 
was  the  untoward  conclusion  of  Grecian  mercenary  service  with 
Persia;  a  system  whereby  the  Persian  monarchs,  had  they  known 
how  to  employ  it  with  tolerable  ability,  might  well  have  maintained 
their  empire  even  against  such  an  enemy  as  Alexander. 

After  fifteen  days  of  repose  and  festivity  at  Zeudracarta,  the  chief 
town  of  Hyrkania,  Alexander  marched  eastward  his  united  army 
through  Parthia  into  Aria — the  region  adjoining  the  modern  Herat 
with  its  river  now  know^i  as  Herirood.  Satibarzanes,  the  satrap  of 
Aria,  came  to  him  near  the  border,  to  a  town  named  Susia,  sub- 
mitted, and  was  allowed  to  retain  his  satrapy;  while  Alexander, 
merely  skirting  the  northern  border  of  Aria,  marched  in  a  direction 
nearly  east  towarel  Baktria  against  the  satrap  Bessus,  who  was 
reported  as  having  proclaimed  liimself  Kinj^  of  Persia.  But  it  was 
discovered,  after  three  or  four  days,  that  Satibarzanes  was  in  league 
with  Bessus;  upon  which  Alexander  suspended  for  the  present  his 
plans  against  Baktria,  and  turned  by  forced-  marches  to  Artakoana, 
the  chief  city  of  Aria.  His  return  was  so  unexpectedly  rapid,  that 
the  Arians  were  overawed,  and  Satibarzanes  "was  obliged  to  escape. 
A  few  days  enabled  him  to  crush  the  disaffected  Arians  and  to  await 
the  arrival  of  his  rear  division  under  Kraterus.  He  then  marched 
southward  into  the  territory  of  the  Drangi,  or  Drangiana  (the  modern 
Seiestan),  where  he  found  no  resistance — the  satrap  Barsaentes  hav- 
ing sought  safety  among  some  of  the  Indians. 

In  the  chief  town  of  Drangiana  occurred  the  revolting  tragedy,  of 
which  Philotas  was  the  first  victim,  and  his  father  Parmenio  the 
second.  Parmenio,  now  seventy  years  of  age,  and  therefore  little 
q['ialified  for  the  fatigue  inseparable  from  the  invasion  of  the  eastern 


e32       MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDEH. 


been 
or  ligl 


^^c^U.  m  Mj- ^  -ou  vein  .be  Kii;..  ^vl.iIc  in  ,!.■  .suite  of  Aloxan- 
r  hr&vi  the  secoiKl.  Mkar.or.  1,.,(1  tonn,a..,:,.<l  the  .■y,  afr  Us 
'liS,f  rr:.lnt,,-,  but  h».l  aiea  of  ilh,e.s,  f..r,.,.;.u  y  lo>- b,   .  .U  a 


^borttin.ebcfoVe;  the  cklcst.  Pbil-.l.s.  <■'S;•^V,VL'•uika  i!n  4ilU 
erueral  of  the  Von'-punwu-ont.hy,  in  i:iuh  « n.n.uuRi,tica  \miu 
Alexander  from  whom  be  KceivedreiMiial  ('Idas. 

A  revJliion  came  to  I biioias,   l..m  Keb.lunt^  l)rot,,cr  of   a 
youth  named  XikomaebuC  that  a  s^oliUcr,  iir.n.ed  Dimnus  of  O  a  :- 
tA   had  made   boast  to  Kik.mad.us,  his  ii.lm.ate  friend  or  beloxc. 
rer'son  uSdcr  TOWS  of  «crecy,  of  an  ii.lcnded  conspiraey  at-a.^^ 
Sexander   invitin-  him  to  Uecme  an  aeeomrheo.    2Sik<  mnchus  a 
first  struck  vith  abhoireuee,  at  lenpth  Mnudatcd  con^p  laree,  asked 
'  10  Ce  the  n<eom,.liecs  of  Dinmus,  u.d  '•^•«'",'  "'•'";;' J',".J,,,^ 
few  names;  all  <.f  Avbich  he  r»'«"''y,!' ";'");""V.'«V  i'^,,s  tc  d    I  o 
Kebalhms.  for  the  r«iT')se  ot  lem?  t^-wdfrcd.  ^l^t     A,ev ,  eei^ 
f-cts  to  Philoias,   (iiirtalirg  bun   to  neiiticn  tlum  to  Alex.i  t.ei. 
Bu   Philo^'is   niou"h  everv  dav  in  e<n.mi-.r.ieati<  n  with  the  km- 
BcAected  io' do  t\\^    for  tWo  (lays ;  upon  v l.i,  1,  K.  1  a  imis began  to 
"orpect  him  cf  connivaiue,  and'caused  the  revelation  »«  be  n.adc  to 
Alc'sander  through  one  of  the  p'fi'S  "an^ed  Jiet  (  n      i..n.niis  v  ..s 
i, 'Siately  arretted,  but  ran  himself  through  with  his  sword,  and 
exiVircd  without  iinikir.g  any  dtclaiatior.. 

Of  this  (onspiracv,  iTulcr  pictemUcl,  cvcryt  iing  rcFtcd  on  il  o 
to'  mo  V  c^f^kil^oma^hus.  Alexander  iudi,.antly  seDt  for P  nlctn. 
denKUKliu- ^vhv  lie  had  omitted  for  tAvo  days  to  cor.mnmicate  vKl 
he  had  heml.  Tlnlotas  replied  that  the  source  from  ^hich  it  can  e 
Avas  too  eontemptiblc  to  deserve  iiotiee-t  lat^  it  ^voulO  ^^^^^'l 
ridiculous  toattaeh  importance  to  the  simple  {^^^J^'^^-'-'^^f*  ^^VV 
vouth  as  Nikomachus,  ncountinrr  the  f(*ulidi  boasts  aedicFSCCl  to 
him  bv  a  lover.  Alexander  received,  ov  affected  to  receive,  \l^ 
explanation,  jrave  his  hand  to  Philotas,  inviltd  liim  to  supper,  ovu 
talked  to  him  with  his  usual  fannluirity,  ,.,->' 

But  it  soon  appeared  that  ad\antn.<:-Q  "vvus  to  be  tukm  ol  tins  inci- 
dent for  the  disuraee  and  ruin  of  Philul'is,  whose  frectp«jkencrilici^n;^^' 
on  the  pretended  divine  puternitv,— coupled  witli boasts,  thuthe  iaia 
his  fatlicr  Parnienio  bad  been  chY-jf  agents  in  thoconqiu-st  of  Asia,;|^ 
had  neither  been  forgotten  n-vr  forgiven.  Iliese  and  other  SCxl- 
praises,  disparairing  to^'tho  glyry  olf  Alexander,  had  been  divii?^*^^^ 
by  a  m'istre>s  to  whom  Philoias  was  attached;  a  beautiful  Mac(  '*<'^ 
nlan  woman  of  Pvdna,  named  Antigone,  wlio.  having  first  been  made' 
a  prize  in  visiting' Samothrace  by  the  Perpinn  adniind  Autophrud.ivtcs, 
was  afterward  taken  amid  the  spoils  of  DaniuiicuS  by  the  3Iacedd» 


CONSPIKACY  AGAINST  ALEXANDER. 


633 


nians  victorious  at  Issus.  The  reports  of  Antigone,  respecting  somo 
unguarded  language  held  by  Philotas  to  her,  had  come  to  the  kiiowl- 
vdgii  of  Kralenis,  who  brougiit  her  to  Alexander,  and  caused  her  to 
repeat  them  to  him.  Alexander  desired  her  to  take  secret  note  of 
the  confidential  expressions  of  Philotas,  and  report  them  from  time 
Til  time  to  hims;  If. 

It  thus  turned  out  that  Alexander,  though  eontinuing  to  Philotas 
Ills  lii'.di  military  rank,  and  talking  to  him  eonst;intly  with  seeming 
confidence,  had  for  at  least  eigliteen  months,  ever  since  his  conquest 
of  Egypt  and  perhaps  even  earlier,  disliked  and  suspected  him,  keep- 
ing hini  under  per[)etual  watch  through  the  suborned  and  secret 
communication  of  a  treacherous  mistress.  Some  of  the  generals 
around  Alexander — especi'dly  Kraterus,  tlie  first  suborner  of  Anti- 
iiione — fomented  these  suspicions,  from  jealousy  of  the  great  ascend- 
ency of  Parnienio  and  liis  family.  .Moreover,  Piiilotas  himself  was 
oste'ntatious  and  ov^erbearing  in  his  demeanor,  so  as  to  have  made 
many  enemies  among  the  sokliers.  But  whatever  may  liave  been  his 
defects  on  this  head — dofeels  wMiich  he  shared  with  the  other  Mace- 
donian generals,  all  gorged  with  plunder  and  presents— his  lideliiy  as 
well  as  his  military  merits  stand  attested  by  the  fact  that  Alexander 
had  continued  to  employ  him  in  the  highest  and  mostconlidential  com- 
mand throughout  all  the  longsul)se(iuent  interval;  and  that  Parnienio 
was  now"  general  at  Ekbatana,  the  must  important  military  appoint- 
ment which  the  king  had  to  confer.  Even  granting  the  deposition 
of  Nikomachus  to  be  trustworthy,  there  was  nothing  to  implicate 
Philotas,  whose  name  had  not  been  included  among  the  accomplices 
said  to  have  been  enumerated  by  Dimnus.  There  w'as  not  a  tittle  of 
evidence  against  him,  except  the  fact  that  the  deposition  had  been 
made  known  to  him,  and  that  he  liad  seen  Alexander  twice  without 
comnuinicating  it.  Upon  this  single  fact,  however,  Kraterus  and  the 
other  enemies  of  Philotas  Avorked  so  effectually  as  to  inflame  the 
suspicions  and  the  pre-existing  ill-will  of  Alexander  into  fierce 
rancor.  He  resolved  on  the  disgnice.  torture,  and  death  of  Philotas, 
—and  on  the  death  of  Parnienio  besides. 

To  accomplish  this,  however,  against  the  two  highest  officers  in 
the  Macedonian  service,  one  of  them  enjoying  a  separate  and  distant 
command — required  management.  Alexander  w'as  obliged  to  carry 
the  feellnj^s  of  the  soldiers  along  with  him,  and  to  obtain  a  condem- 
nation from  the  army;  according  to  an  ancient  Macedonian  custom, 
in  regard  to  capital  crimes,  though  (;is  it  seems)  not  uniformly  pr;\c- 
tised.  lie  not  only  kcjit  the  resolution  secret,  but  is  even  said  t) 
have  inviicd  Pliilolas  to  supper  with  the  oilier  ollicers.  conversing 
with  him  jast  as  usual.  In  the  middle  of  the  night,  Philotas  was 
arrested  while  asleep  in  his  bed, — [lut  in  chains, — and  clothed  in  an 
i.L!;aoble  garb.  A  military  assembly  was  convened  at  daybreak, 
before  which  Alexander  appeared  witli  the  chief  officers  in  his  con- 
lidencc.     Addressing  the   soldiers  in  a  vehement  tone  of  mingled 


634       ^IILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

sorrow  an.  anger,  ^^  fr^^^V^^^ZX!^ 
providentially  rescued  fiom  a     *  ^^-J-^l^.^'^^  and  Pannenio 

two  men  hitlierto  trusted  as  1 1.  best  1      iQ  DUmius.who  had 

_-thror.gh  tl.c  intended  ''^^f  ^'>.?/^^\n  \Uly  of  Dinunis  was  then 
slain  himself  when  ^''^r^:^-.J^\^,^Z  and  Kebalinus  were 
exhibited  to  ^l^^\"^^;^\^"n'^VitorvV  letter  from  ParuK-nio  to  his 
hromrht  forward  to  tell  ^1^^"  ;/^^^^> :^,^;;,  '  ^le  papers  seized  on  the 
sons^hilotas  --  Nj  --r;    -^-^  ^^^^,  ,^,4  altogether  vague 

^Vr^^'easily  coneeWe    the    im^^^ 

assembled  soldiers  by  such  ^\^"^  "^^T^/^^^  reproaches  against 

revelations  of  his  --^^^;:^^^-^k^us,  tfe  brother-in-law 
treacherous  friends.  ^^"^>/\\;\-;^^^;,,ed  in  their  invectives  against 
of  Philotas,  were  yet  i^^o^^V^Jtho  other  officers  with  whom  the 
the  accused.     They,  as  ^'^^  /^^^^j^^.,,^,^  i^^^  manifestation 

arrest  had  been  concerted   set  tle^^^^^  ^^  p^^ilot^s 

against  him,  ^^^  ^^'^  ^T^V?  wll  c  tl  ougstreSuousi;  denying  the 
^^  as  heard  m  his  deten>e,  nMuc  i,  ft , Joe  indeed  sure  to  be  so,  corn- 
charge,  is  said  to  have  been  leeb  e^  .J^o'e  ^^  '^^^^  with  disadvan- 
in-  from  one  seized  thus  suddeul>  ^ J'^^^l^^^  ,  -  ...Q^^ia  have  been 
lages:  -Idle  a  degree  of  courage,  ab.^^^^  ^^^  ^^,,, 

required  for  any  ^J];;^^  ^  .^\?/„ ^  .J  i"  ircc.mrades  on  the  insupportaWe 
A  soldier  named  bolon  b^^^'^^;";;' '  „  ^.A^  treated  the  soldiers  with 
insolence  of  Philotas,  who  f^V  >  wir  nuaneis^^^^  room  for  his 

contempt,  turning  tl^m  mit  of^^^^^^i^^^/^.^J^tion  (probably  enough 
countless  retmue  ot  ^l'^^^^;^/JS\viththechargeof  treason  a^ 
^vell-founded)  was  "^^^'^l^.X  wit    th^  temp^    ot^he  assembly,   and 
the  king,  it  harmonized  ^;;^J^>  ^  ^'^  V^'rv      The  roval  pages  began  the 

r^lJ^W^ali^aJln^!^^^^  ^^^^  ^'-''  "^^   '"'''' 

sufficiently  ^"f  7;\^;":^  j^^^/^^^rS  ^>nns  enemies.  Aware 

on  the  spot.    But  this  d  d  "^^ J'^y^;^^^^^^^  ll,e  reoal  word,  with  nothing 
that  he  had  been  (ondemned  upon  t^^^^^^  ^^^,^^, 

better  than  the    ^^'^'^""'^^^^^i  .^s  would  justify  theirown 
mined  to  extort  from  1^'"\^.^^";'-  '.^^^  his  father  Parmepio- 

purposes,  not  only  «^S'^"^^\/V'"';;^H;;V"^  Accordingly,  during 

llulm  there  was,  as  y^Jr  "f »  ^^"^  to  in  phcatc^^      A  j^«  ^j^^^^ion 

the  ensuing  night,   Pl"f^^,^;^^7lyth;!c%eing  brother  in  law 

Kraterus,  and  l^^^""^-^^'^^f  ^,f  /  '   n/ini^^^^^^       pbysical  suffer- 
Philotas-themselyes  ^^P^^^^"  ^'^^^^^  ^^.^f^.f  ^^^^^^  a  curtain 

in-.     Alexander  himselt  ^^9  ^^s  at  nww  o  torture,  and 

It'is  said  tlua  Philotas  "^'"^i^^?,^^^,i''^^.^i^e^^^       sneers  against  the 
that  Alexander,  an  unseen  witness,  indulged  in  snc 


PARMENIO  IS  SLAIN. 


685 


cowardice  of  one  who  had  fought  by  his  side  in  so  many  battles.  All 
who  stood  by  were  enemies,  and  likely  to  describe  the  conduct  ot 
Philotas  in  such  manner  as  to  justify  their  own  hatred. 'The  torluriM 
inflicted,  cruel  in  the  extreme  and  long  continued,  wrung  from  lii  i 
at  last  a  confession,  implicating  his  father  along  with  himself.  II; 
was  put  to  death;  and  at  the  same  time,  all  those  whose  names  h.-;  I 
been  indicated  by  Nikomachus,  were  slain  also — apparentl \' by  beiii  ; 
stoned,  without  preliminary  torture.  Pliilotas  had  serving' in  lli..! 
army  a  numerous  kindred,  all  of  whom  were  struck  with  consterna- 
tion at  the  news  of  his  being  tortured.  It  was  the  Macedonian  law 
that  all  kinsmen  of  a  man  guilty  of  treason  were  doomed  to  death 
along  with  him.  Accordingly,  some  of  these  men  slew  themselves, 
others  fled  from  the  camp  seeking  refuge  wherever  they  could.  Such 
was  the  terror  and  tumult  in  Ihe  camp,  that  Alexander  was  obliged 
to  proclaim  a  suspension  of  this  sanguinary  law  for  the  occasion.  ^ 

It  now  remained  to  kill  Pannenio,  wiio  could  not  be  safely  left 
alive  after  the  atrocities  used  toward  Philotas;  and  to  kill 'hini. 
moreover,  before  he  could  have  time  to  hear  of  them,  since  he  was 
not  only  the  oldest,  most  respected,  and  most  influential  of  all  Mace- 
donian oflicers,  but  also  in  separate  command  of  Uie  great  depot  at 
Ekbatana.  Alexander  Summoned  to  his  presence  "one  of  the  Coni- 
panions  named  Polydamas;  a  particular  friend,  comrade,  or  aklc  d.t 
camp,  of  Parmenio.  Every  friend  of  Philotas  felt  at  this  mr)ment 
that  his  life  hung  by  a  thread;  so  that  Polydamas  entered  the  king's 
presence  in  extreme  terror,  the  rather  as  he  was  ordered  to  bring  with 
him  his  two  younger  brothers.  Alexander  addressed  him,  deiumnc- 
ing  Parmenio  as  a  traitor,  and  intimating  that  Polydamas  would  be 
required  to  carry  a  swift  and  confidential  message  to  Ekbatana, 
ordering  his  execution.  Polydamas  was  selected  as  the  attaciied 
friend  of  Parmenio,  and  therefore  as  best  calculated  to  deceive  him. 
Two  letters  were  placed  in  his  hands,  addressed  to  Parmenio;  one 
from  Alexander  himself,  conveying  ostensibly  military  communica- 
tions and  orders;  the  other,  signed 'with  the  seal-ring  of  the  deceased 
Philotas,  and  purporting  to  be  addressed  by  the  son  to  the  father. 
Together  with  these,  Polydamas  received  the  real  and  important  dis- 
patch, addressed  by  Alexander  to  Kleanderand  Menidas,  the  ofllceis 
immediately  subordinate;  to  Parmenio  at  Ekbatana;  proclaiming 
Parmenio  guilty  of  high  treason,  and  directing  them  to  kill  him  al 
once.  Large  rewards  were  offered  to  Polydamas  if  lie  perfortnecl 
this  commission  with  success,  \vhile  his  two  brothers  were  retained 
as  hostages  against  scruples  or  compunction.  He  {>romised  even 
more  than  was  demanded — too  hapj)y  to  purchase  this  reprieve  fi-oni 
what  had  seemed  impending  death.  Furnished  with  native  guides 
and  with  swift  dromedaries,  he  struck  by  the  straightest  road  across 
the  desert  of  Khorasan,  and  arrived  at  Ekbatana  oii  the  eleventh  day 
—a  distance  usually  requiring  more  than  thirty  days  to  traverse. 
Entering  the  camp  by  night,  without  the  knowledge  olf  Parmenio,  he 


'  }| 


636       MILITAUY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

i„TS.  Ou  ll>e  nuin-.m  lie  \Nas  •";"",",  ..hu-cts  iiiiirkoa  out.  by 
;  l.is  jrarAn  uUl>  ^1™"'^;;  '^'^  !„^  "p^  va.nna.  ran  lo  en.V.race 
AlcxamkrV  order  as  1.1^  '^^Yf-niK  welconied  by  the  >in>usiieeiin- 
Ms  old  frUud,  ami  was  ' ''"  \' >  IV  ^^Viofes^edly  romiag  from 
vet.ran,  to  %vl.om  be  P"^''^'^";^  l  'f.,„    .,'io\vas  abso.-be.l  if  persual 

Alexattcler  a„d  Pb.lotas    .^\  '„.:'",,,„,  the  l.at.d  and  sNvord 
be  was  suddenly  assailed  bj  an  ma   .  ^.^^^  .^^  ,^^  f^,i_  i,y 

of  Klean.'.er.     Olbcr  ^''^"^l^^J^Xv  life  bad  departed, 
tbe  remau.ing  .fleers -■e^^l-'-'^,^^^^^^^^^^^^^        „,i^  „,,„„,,.  deed,  bnrst 
Tbe  soldiers  in  Ekbatana.  on  «  ""^  ,  „    ,,„j  ,l,reat(ued  to 

into  furious  njntiny.  -"'^^^^:^^,  flleir  ^C  er,,i,  unless  Polydan,as 
break  in  for  Uie  ,n,ri.ose  »'  ,  "^j''  ^, !  ^.'^,,;.  j  ,„  „„  ,„.  Hut  Kl.au- 
„,ul  the  otliermiinlerers  f  ■"»  f,,  ^^  ,1  .;'exl,ibited  to  tben.  Alexan- 
der, admitting  a  ew  "f''^  ■,  ' '  uti  'o  d'"*  "'''''"'•  "°',.'""""l' 
dLi's  written  orders,  to  «'')"  .,"|;.- "  ^i„;t  of  tbeni  .lispersed, 
;!>\u-,nnrs  or  ^elr.Hanee  and  -nd  u       o        Moa      ^  ,,, 

^S'r  e^  o^Mifb^x^'i^^  •'-" '-  -"-  ^'"-  '- 

Cr  al      Tbe  bead  was  sent  to  A  ^:^;      .'-';,^.,,  ti^-on-bout  tbe  conrs« 
Amons  the  many  tpigicalck.eds^.>^^^^^ 

of  tbis  bistory.  tbere  ;^  >Xn      a     1  is  i.np"l«'^.  'li-P'^y;' ,  ""  ""' 
g,.nerals.     Alexander,  v  ''*^"' "  .  "  ,f ,,;,  foi  ocioiis  motber  Olyn.pias, 
Seeasion  a  P^''-^'?"='\r'';'"' ,  X  '  ,    ,  e  niagiiitnde  of  past  services 
exasperated  ratbertban  S'"™',  .'■/■„.  Vi,;,.edonian  army  direetif.g 
Wb.'n  we  see  tbe  .="'»',^''' ".*  "r '  ^  ,,  .„d.T,  tbe  laceration  and  buni- 
in  person,  and  ""•"■V''?f     ,  irVo   c^  '  e  Pliiiotas.  and  assasMnam.S 
nvr  „f  tlw  ntiked  body  of  llien  ""Ji  T,  ,    •    _.^ve  feel  bow  nuicli  we 
^vin.  tbeir  own  bands  tbe  vHer^.n  1  •   »»  "  ;     )  ;„(„  tbat  of  the 

have  passed  out  o   the  regton  o     ,      k  <^V^^^^^g      j,  i,       t  sur- 
more  savage  I")'''™"':''    '::,,';  e'erov  of  Macedonia,  who   bad 

prising  to  rrad,  "''it  -|"'' ^  ,V;,,,d  e,.nli.lence  of  Philip  as  well .-.» 
Ibarcd  with  P'"™'^^"'"/'^:,^;',;";  e  it.forn.ed  of  such  proceedings, 
of  Alexander,  should  V-"''"?,.' , ",  ib<-  like  possibilities  lo  bimsclt. 
and  cast  about  for  a  ^-^»^':-^^"^^^a  and  .Fisirustcl  with  tbetraus- 
Manv  other  officers  ^^ere  a  ke  ,iU  n.c  t  ^  ^  „^^  |^.,„,,,     ,,,t 

acti.ms.  Hence  •'^1<'Y"'m  Ve  Crtleteeted  sf.eh  strong  exiaes.ions 
lioinefroinliisarmytolace  Im^^^  „._^„^,^,,  ,„„,,.  ,„•.. 

of  indignation,  tha  V'-  ''' '  R  'io  i  by  theniselves,  parting  then,  olt 
nounced  malcontents  ,nto  a  '  ^>'™^>  „' p„inlinL'  any  substitute  for 
from  the  remaining  army.     I";',^f ,",,,,  „ion-cavalry,  he  cast  1  la 

%i:1u'Sl"UVwi'nt' w.:^''spont  by  Alexander  in  reducing 


CAPTURE  OF  BESSUS. 


637 


Drangiaoa,  Gcdrosia,  Arachosia,  and  the  Paropamisada?;  the  modern 
Seiestun,  Afghanistan,  and  the  western  part  of  Kabul,  lying  between 
Ghazna  on  tlie  north,  Kandahar  or  Kelar  on  the  south,  and  Eurrali 
in  t'lie  west.  He  experienced  no  combined  resistanee,  but  liis  ti'oops 
suffered  sev^erely  from  cold  and  privation.  Near  the  southern  tt-nui- 
nation  of  one  of  the  passes  of  the  Hindoo-Koosh  (apparently  north- 
east of  the  town  of  Ivabul,  he  founded  a  new  city,  ealied  Alexandria 
at  Caucasum,  where  lie  planted  7,000  old  soldiers,  Macedonians,  and 
others  as  colonists.  Toward  the  close  of  winter  he  crossed  over  the 
mighty  range  of  the  Hindoo-Koosh;  a  march  of  fifteen  days  through 
regions  of  snow,  and  fraught  wilh  hardship  to  his  army.  On  reach- 
ing tile  north  side  of  these  mountains,  he  found  himself  in  Baktria. 

The  Baktrian  leader  Bessus,  who  had  assumed  the  title  of  king, 
could  muster  no  more  than  a  small  force,  with  which  he  laid  waste 
the  country,  and  then  retired  across  the  river  Oxus  into  ISogdiaua, 
destroying" all  the  boats.  Alexander  overran  B;iktria  with  scarcely 
any  resistancj;  the  chief  places,  Baktra  (Balkh)  and  Aornos  surren- 
dering to  him  on  the  first  demonstration  of  attack.  Having  named 
Artabazus  satnip  of  Baktri.i,  and  placed  Archelaus  with  a  garrison 
in  Aornos,  he  marched  nortlnvard  toward  die  river  Oxus,  the  bound- 
ary between  Baktria  and  Sogdiana.  It  was  a  march  of  extreme 
hardship;  reaching  tor  two  or  three  days  across  a  sandy  desert  desti- 
tute of  water,  and  under  very  hot  weather.  The  Oxus,  six  furlongs 
in  breadth,  deep,  and  rapid,  was  the  most  formidable  river  that  the 
Macedonians  had  yet  seen.  Alexander  transported  his  army  across 
it  on  the  tent-skins  inilated  and  stuifed  wilh  straw.  It  seems  sur- 
prising that  Bessus  did  not  avail  him-;elfof  this  favorable  opportunity 
for  resisting  a  passage  in  itself  so  ditlicult;  he  had  however  beea 
abandoned  by  his  Baktrian  cavalry  at  the  moment  wdien  he  quitted 
their  territory.  Some  of  his  companions,  Spitamenes  and  others, 
terrified  at  the  news  that  Alexan-ler  had  crosseil  the  0:>.us,  were 
anxious  to  make  their  own  peace  by  betraying  their  leader.  They 
sent  a  proposition  to  this  elfect;  upon  which  Ptolemy  with  a  light 
division  was  sent  forward  by  Alexander,  and  was  enabled,  by  ex- 
treme celerity  of  movements,  to  surprise  and  seize  Bessus  in  a  village. 
Alex.inder  ordered  that  he  should  be  held  in  chains,  naked  and  with 
a  collar  round  his  neck,  at  the  side  of  the  road  along  which  the  army 
were  marching.  On  reaching  tiie  spot,  Alexander  stopped  his 
chariot,  and  sternly  d-^manded  from  Bessus,  on  what  pretense  he 
hi  I  tirst  arrested,  and  afterward  shiin,  his  king  and  benefactor  Da- 
rius. Bessus  reolied,  that  he  had  not  done  this  sinLrle-handed; 
otiiers  were  concerned  in  it  along  with  him,  to  jn'ocure  for  them- 
selves lenient  treatment  from  Alexander.  Tiie  king  said  no  more, 
hut  ordered  Bessus  to  be  scourged,  and  then  sent  back  as  prisoner  to 
Baktra — where  we  shall  again  hear  of  him. 

In  his  onward  march,  Alexander  approached  a  small  town,  inhab- 
ited   by    the    Brancliidie;    descendants    of    those   Branchida;   near 


533        MILITARY   OPEUATIO.NS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

ATJi.tnQ  on  the  coast  of  Ionia,  \xbo  had  administered  the  great  tem- 
^1  1  oLlP  ot  \Dol  o  on  Cipe  Poseidiou,  and  who  had  yielded  up 
f^:e'^^^^^Z^^^^  Persian  king  Xerxes  150  years 
lefore  Ti  s  surrender  had  brought  upon  Ihem  so  .nuch  odium,  Iha 
^e^the  dominion  ot  Xerxes. as  -^^--^^^Z^^^'^^ 
rf'timl  with  him  into  ihe  interior  of  Asia,  lit  asbi^ncu  lo  u  tii 
Hnds   n  t  e  di  tant  region  of  Sogdiana,  wliere  their  deseendants  had 

^dcoXthe  army,  tendering  all  that   they  possessed.     Alexander 
u'hen  he     eard  who  they  we?e  and  ^vhat  was  their  parentage  des  red 
the  AUles^^ns  in  his  armv  to  determine  how  they  should  be  trea  ed. 
But  as  these  Milesians  weie  neither  decided  nor  unanimous,  Alex- 
ailr  aim unced  that  he  would  determine  for  himselt.     Having  tust 
occuniX  e  city  in  person  with  a  select  detachment,  he  posted  h  s 
armv  ar^ound  t^^^    walls,  and  then  gave  orders  not  only  to  plunder  it. 
butio  na^^ice   the  entire  populaiion-men,  women,  and  children. 
tI'V  we  si  dn  without  arms  or  attempt  at  resistance,  resorting  to 
notldmr  but  prayers  and  suppliant  manifestations.     Alexander  next 
comrrnded  Uif w.dls  to  be  It^velled.  and  the  sacred  groves  cut  (own. 
scTth  It  no    abUable  site  miuht  remain,  nor  anything  except  solitude 
Tnd  Irmty      Such  was   tie   revenge   taken   upon  these  unhapp> 
vkins^f^^^^^^^^  ancestSrs  in  the  fourth  or  hith  genei^ 

n  km  before     Alexander  doubtless  considered  himself  to  be  executing 
?1      w^nth  of  Apollo  auainst  an  accursed  race  who  had  robbed  the 
emp  e  o   the  god      T  iS  Macedonian  expedition  had  been  pioclaiined 
o  be  undertaken  originally  for  the  purpose  ot  rt-vcnging  upon  die 
coirleZorar    WmVi^      thtMincient  ^vrongs  done  to  Greece  by  Xcixe. 

Inw^^^^  l»Vthe  religious  impul.es  ot  Alex- 

ander  and  worthy  to  be  compared  to  that  ot  the  Carthaginh  n  ^^-"ti' 
Xnib  d   when  he  sacriticed  3,000  Grecian  prisoners  on    he  held  of 
llimera    w^iere  Ids  grandfather  llamilkar  had  been  slain  seventy 

^■'^iirexafrr*  then  continued  his  onward  progress,  first  to  Marakanda 
(sS  S  tbe  chief  town  of  Sogdhnui-next  to  the  river  Jax.., 
w  ei  he  ami  his  companions,  in  their  imperfect  geographical  no  , 
b(  ieved  to  be  the  Tanais,  the  boundary  between  Asia  and  Luu  l  -^ 
In  his  nv  rch  he  lef t  garr  sons  in  various  towns,  but  experienced  o 
iL!^::^  «rdLched  bcKlies  of  the  -^ives  hovc^d  cm  1^ 
tl-ink^  Some  ot  these  bodies,  having  cut  off  a  few  of  hib  toi<?^u^ 
S  vefug'  aftenvard  on  a  steep  and  rugged  mountain  conc^'^;-  ^^ 
be  miassutlable.     Thither  however  Alexander  pursued  them,  at  tue 


FOUNDATION  OF  ALEXANDRIA. 


639 


head  of  his  lii^htcst  and  most  active  troops.  Though  at  first  repulsed, 
he  succeeded  in  scaling  and  capturing  the  place.  Of  its  defenders, 
thirty  thousand  iu  nu^iber,  three-fourths  were  either  put  to  the 
sword,  or  perished  in  jumping  down  the  precipices.  Severed  of  his 
soldiers  were  wounded  w^th  arrows,  and  he  himself  received  a  shot 
from  one  of  thent  through  his  leg.  But  here,  as  elsewhere,  we  per- 
ceiv.'  that  nearly  all  the  Orientals  whom  Alexander  subdued  were 
men  little  suited  for  close  combat  hand  to  hand, — fighting  only  with 
missiles. 

Here,  on  the  river  Jaxartes,  Alexander  projected  the  foundation  of 
a  new  city  to  bear  his  name;  intended  partly  as  a  protection  against 
incursions  from  the  ScythiMU  Nomads  on  the  other  side  of  the  river, 
partly  as  a  facility  for  'himself  to  cross  over  and  subdue  them,  which 
he  intended  to  do  as  soon  as  he  could  find  opportunity.  He  was 
however  called  olf  for  the  time  by  the  news  of  a  wide-spread  revolt 
among  the  newly-conquered  inhabitants  both  of  Sogdiana  and  Baktria. 
He  suppressed  the  revolt  with  his  habitual  vigor  and  celerity,  distrib- 
uting his  troops  so  as  to  capture  five  townships  iu  two  days,  and 
Kyropolis  or  Kyra,  the  largest  of  the  neighboring  Sogdian  towns 
(founded  by  the  Persian  Cyrus),  immediately  afterward.  He  put  all 
the  defenders  and  inhabitants  to  the  sword.  Returning  then  to  the 
Jaxartes,  he  completed  in  twenty  days  the  fortifications  of  his  new 
town  of  Alexandria  (perhaps  at  or  near  Khodjend),  with  suitable 
sacrifices  and  festivities  to  the  gods.  He  planted  in  it  some  Mace- 
donian veterans  and  Grecian  mercenaries,  together  with  volunteer 
settlers  from  the  natives  around.  An  army  of  Scythian  Nomads, 
showing  themselves  on  the  other  side  of  theViv^er,  piqued  his  vanity 
to  crossover  and  attack  them.  Carrying  over  a  division  of  his  army 
on  inflated  skins,  he  defeated  them  wi\h  little  ditticulty,  pursuing 
them  briskly  into  the  desert.  But  the  weather  was  intensely  hot, 
and  the  army  suffered  much  from  thirst;  while  the  little  water  to  be 
found  was  so  bad,  that  it  brought  upon  Alexander  a  diarrhoea  which 
endangered  his  life.  This  chase,  of  a  few  miles  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Jaxartes  (seemingly  in  the  present  Khanat  of  Kokand),  marked 
the  utmost  limit  of  vVlexander's  progress  nortluvard. 

Shortly  afterward,  a  ^racedouiaa  detachment,  unskillfully  con- 
dieted,  was  destroyed  in  Sogdiana  by  Spitamenes  and  the  Scythians: 
a  rare  misfortune,  which  Alexander  avenged  by  overrunning  the 
region  near  the  river  Polytimetu^  (the  Kohik),  and  putting  to  the 
sword  the  inhabitants  of  all  the  t  )wns  wiiieh  he  took.  He  then 
rccrossed  the  Oxus,  to  rest  during  the  extreme  season  of  winter  at 
Zariaspa  in  Baktria,  from  whence  his  communications  with  the  West 
and  with  Macedonia  were  more  easy,  and  where  he  received  various 
reinforcements  of  Greek  troops.  Bessus,  wiio  had  b'een  here  retained 
iis  a  prisoner,  was  now  brought  forward  amid  a  public  assembly; 
wherein  Alexander,  having  first  reproached  him  for  his  treason  to 
Darius,  caused  his  nose  and  ears  to  be  cut  off — and  sent  him  in  this 


G-10 


:military  operations  of  Alexander 


condition  toEklmfann,  to  l-e  finally  shnn  by  the  Males  and  Persians. 
3[utilation  Avas  a  practise  alt.^irether  Oriental  and  non-llelleiiic:  even 
Arrian,  admiring  ;,nd  indul-ent  as  lie  is  towMrd  Ins  hero  censiirrs 
this  pavaire  order,  as  one  anions,  many  proofs  how  nuich  Alexar.oer 
liad  taken  on  Orientjil  dispositions.  AVe  may  remark  that  his  eMieii.e 
wrath  on  this  oeeasion  Avas  fi-nndcd  partly  on  disappointment  that 
Px'^^us  had  frustrated  his  toilsonse  eltorts  for  Uikini^  Daiius  alive— 
partlv  on  the  fact  that  the  satra])  had  committed  treason  against  t.e 
kino's  person,  which  it  was  the  iu)licy  as  well  as  the  teehn^^^  ot 
Alexander  to  surround  with  a  circle  of  Deity.  For  as  to  iraitors 
fi'Minst  Persia,  as  a  cause  and  connlry,  Alexander  had  never  discour- 
."'^ed  and  had  sometimes  siLniallv  recompensed  them.  3iilhrines, 
the  "-overnor  of  Sardis,  who  opened  to  him  the  .Elates  of  tliat  almost 
iM-ii.ref'-nable  fortress  immediately  after  the  battle  of  the  GraMkus— 
the  tra?^or  who  perhaps,  next  to  Darius  himself,  had  done  most  harm 
to  the  Persian  cause— obtained  from  him  high  favor  and  i)romoliou. 

Tlie  rude  biit  spirited  tribes  of  Baktria  and  ^^ogdia^a  were  as  y(^ 
but  imperfectlv  subdued,  seconded  as  their  resistance  was  by  wide 
spaces  of  sandy  desert,  bv  the  neighborliood  of  the  Scythian  Nomads, 
and  bv  the  presence  of  Spitamenes  as  a  leader.  Alexander,  disiribut- 
]wr  hU  army  into  five  divisions,  traversed  tlie  country  and  put  down 
alfrcsi^tanc'e,  while  he  also  took  measures  for  establishing  several 
military  posts,  or  new  towns,  in  convenient  places  After  some  time 
the  wliole  army  Avas  reunited  at  the  cliief  place  of  Sogdiana— 3.ara- 
kaiuhi— wliere"'some  halt  and  repose  Avas  given 

Dm  in<r  this  lialt  at  jiarakanda  (Samarcand)  the  memorable  banquet 
occurred" wherein  Alexander  murdered  Kleitus.  It  has  beeii  already 
related  that  Kleitus  had  saved  Ids  life  at  the  battle  of  the  Granikus, 
bv  cutting  off  the  sword  arm  of  the  Persian  Spithridates  when  already 
uplifted  U)  strike  him  from  behind.  Since  tlie  death  ot  Philolas, 
the  important  function  of  general  of  the  Companion-cavalry  hail  been 
divided  l)etween  Hephsesthm  and  Kleitus.  Moreover  the  lamily  ot 
Kleinis  had  been  attached  to  Philip,  by  ties  so  ancient,  that  his 
sister  Lanike,  had  been  selected  as  tlie  nurse  of  Alexander  himself 
when  a  child.  Two  of  her  sons  had  alfcady  perished  in  the  Asiatic 
b'lttles  If  therefore  there  were  anv  man  who  stood  high  in  the  ser- 
vice,  or  was  privileged  to  speak  his'mind  freely  to  Alexander,  it  was 

^  In  tlds  banquet  at  :Marakanda,  when  wine,  according  to  the  Macedo- 
nian habit,  had  been  abundantly  drunk,  and  when  Alexander,  Kleitus, 
and  most  of  the  other  aucsts  were  already  nearly  intoxicated,  euthu^ 
siasts  or  flatterers  heaped  immoderiUe  eulogies  upon  the  king  s  pasli 
achievements.  They  exalted  him  above  all  the  most  venerated  legen- 
darr  heroes;  they'proclaimed  that  his  superhuman  deeds  proved  nis 
divine  paternilv, 'and  that  he  had  earned  an  apotheosis  like  ITcrakles, 
Avhich  nothing  but  envy  could  withhold  from  liim  even  during  tii3 
life.     Alexander  himself  joined  in  these  boasts,  and  even  took  creuit 


SCENE  AT  THE  BANQUET. 


641 


for  the  later  victories  o    the  reign  of  his  father,  whose  abilities  and 
glory  he  depreciated.   .  To  the  old  Macedonian  officers,  sucii  an  insult 
cast  on  the  memory  of  Philip  was  deeply  offensive.     But  amoiiff 
them  all,   none  had  been  more   indignant  than   Kleitus    with   the 
growing  insolence  of  Alexander-his  assumed  filiation  from  Zeus 
Ammon,  which  put  aside  Philip  as  unworlhy-his  preference  for 
Persian  atteridants   who  granted  or  refused  admittance  to  his  person 
--lis  extending  to  Macedonian  soldiers  the  contemptuous  treatment 
habitually   enaured   by   Asiatics,    and   even    allowing  them   to   be 
scourged  by  Persian  hands  and  Persian  rods.     The  pride  of  a  M-ice- 
donian  general  in  the  stupendous  successes  of  the  last  five  years   was 
effaced  by  his  mortification,  when  he  saw  that  they  tended  only  to 
merge  his  countrymen  amid  a  crowd   of  servile  Asiatics    and   to 
inflame  the  prmce   with   high-flown   aspirations  transmitted   from 
Xerxes  or  Oclius.     But  whatever  might  be  the  internal  thoughts  of 
Macedonian  othccrs,  they  held  their  peace  before  Alexander,  whose 
formidable  character  and  exorbitant  self-estimation  would  tolerate 
no  criticism.  luxi^iaie 

At  the  banquet  of  Marakanda,  this  long-suppressed  repugnance 
found  an  issue,  accidental  indeed  -and  unpremeditated,  but  for  that 
very  reason  all  the  more  violent  and  unmeasured.     The  wine   which 
made  Alexander  more  boastful,  and  his  flatterers  fulsome  to 'excess 
overpowered  altogether  the   reserve   of  Kleitus.     He  rebuked  the 
impiety  of  those  who  degraded  the  ancient  heroes  in  order  to  make 
a  pedestal  for  Alexander.     He  protested  against  the  injustice  of  dis- 
paraging the  exalted  and  legitimate  fame  of  Philip;  whose  achieve- 
ments he  loudly  extolled,  pronouncing  them  to  be  equal,  and  even 
nS'i'   'V^'''''    of  his  son.      Fo?  the  exploits  of  Alexander 
splendid  as  they  were,  had  been  accomplished,  not  by  himself  alone 
but  by  that  unconquerable  Macedonian  force  which  he  had  found 
ready  made  to  his  hands;  whereas  those  of  Philip  had  been  his  own- 

tn  orpnf    f      1  il  ^^'^'f  ^'f^?"J^  prostrate  and  disorganized,  and  had 

to  create  for  himself  both  soldiers  and  a  military  system      The  e:r-at 

'XnTr''  ^^  t^^^/^"^^'-'«  ^^ctories  had  been  Philip-s  old  soldiers 
put  to  dcjr  '^'^'l'''"'^-^'^^  ^"^^"^^  them  Parmenio,  whom  he  had 

Remarks  such  as  these,  poured  forth  in  the  course  languno-e  of  a 
fmm ''.^''''''■'^''^li '^^'''^''^'^•'"^•'"  veteran,  pnjvoked  loud  contradiction 
t  hpfir  t  r'^''  'f'''^  •7'''y^  poigiia.it  offense  to  Alexander;  who  now  for 
ceal  .1  ,n.lT.  "^  !^'',  •'^'^"  outburst  of  disapprobation,  before  con- 
die  n  n  '"^\^,'^"^;^^■"  ^V-'^""  ^>"lv  by  surmise.  But  wrath  and  contra- 
recLr^;  t  l\  ''';'  ^'""  •'^"'  /!*«"^  ^>-^^^'^-^'  only  mad(3  Kleitus  more 
delh  ht  .fL  r  ^.'^^P?^^'^"^-  «;  ^'^  own  feelings,  now  discharged  willi 
ml^Ar  f  V7"-  ^'''''\^P  ^'^"-  P^'"^  "P-     ^i«  P^^ssed  from  tJie  old 

Macedonian  soldiers  to  himself  individually.     Stretching  forth  his 

owe  vonl  r rr"^  ^^"'T^'"^;'  ^''  ^^'cJaimed.  -Recollect  that  you 
owe  your  life  to  me;   this  hand  preserved  you  at  the  Granikus 

H.  G.  IV.— 21 


642       MILITARY  OPERxVTIONS  OF  ALEX.VNDER. 

Listen  to  the  outspoken  lan-uage  of  truth,  or  else  abstain  from  ask- 
rn'la^emen  to  supper,  alul  conune  yourself  to  the  society  of  barbari^ 
slaves  "     AH  the.e  reproaches  slung  Alexander  to  the  quick      B  t 
uoil^u-  ^vas  so  intolerable  to  him  as  the  respectful  sympathy  tor 
V-vZZ\o  \vhich  broui^^ht  to  his  memory  one  of  the  blackest  deeds  of 
hi    lie-iud  the  reminiscence  of  his  preservation  at  the  Granikus^ 
^v^iich  lowered  him  into  the  position  of  a  debior  toward  the  very 
cen^r  umler  whose  reproof  he  was  now  snmrting.     At  length  wrath 
and  intoxication  together  drove  him  into  uncontrollable  lur>^     He 
starte     from  his  coSch,  and  felt  for  his  dagger  to  spring  at  kleitus ; 
but  the  da--er  had  been  put  out  of  reach  by  one  of  his  attendants. 
In  a  loud  ?oice  and  with  the  Macedonian  word  ot  command,  he  sum- 
moned the  body  guards  and  ordered  the  trumpeter   to  sound   an 
al  nn      But  no  one  obeyed  so  grave  an  order,  given  inl^^^. condition 
of  tkunkenness.     His  principal  officers,    Ptolemy,    1  erdikkas  and 
o  heiT  clun-  round  him   held  his  arms  and  b<xly,  and  besought  him 
"stain  fi-om  violence;  others  at  the  same  tipie  tried  to  silence 
Klehus  anc    hurry  him  out  of  the  hall  which  had  now  become  a 
s^en    of   umult  and  consternation.     But  Kleitus  was  not  in  a  humor 
o Confess  himself  in  the  wrong  by  retiring;  -J^^^^*  ^^--^^^^.^^^^^^^^ 
at  the  opposition  now,  for  the  tirst  time,  ottered  to  1\»V  1 1  tVuV.;^.  -in^ 
th'U  his  officers  held  him  in  chains  as  Bessus  had  held  Dauus,  and 
en  hm   nmhing   but   the   name  of  a   king.     Though   anxious  to 
res  niin  his  movt-ments.  they  doubtless  did  not  ^^^^7,  ^7"JP^.;;>\|^;;f,i 
physical  force;  so  that  his  great  personal  3 treng  h,  and  •^ou^m^^d 
efforts,  presentlv  set  him  free.     He  then  snatched  a  pike  lorn  one 
oF the  soldiers,  ru.hed  upon  Kleitus,  and  thrust  him  through  on  the 
Knot   exclaimln<^  "  Go  now  to  Philip  and  Paimenio. 
^So  Soner  was  the  deed  perpetrated,  than  the  feelings  of  Alex- 
andt^r  underwent  an  entire  revolution.     The  spectacle  ol  K  eitus,  a 
KlinJ^corpse  on  the  flooi-the  marks  of  stupefaction  anc   horror 
elident^in  airihe  spectators,  and  the  reaction  ^^o^^^^^^;""^  "/^^^ 
instantaneously   .atiated-plunged   him   at   once  into   ^^^^  ^VfJ>''l 
extreme  of  remorse  and  self-condemnation.  .  ^^^^^^^^^"S    ^^/f,.,'  '" 
hall,  and  retiring  to  bed,  he  passed  three  days  in  an  a-o  1}  ol  disl  e.s. 
Without  food  or  drink.     He  bur>t  into  tears  and  "^"l^'P^i^^^^^.^^^^^^^^^tl 
tions  on  his  own  mad  act;  he  dwelt  upon  the  names  of  Kleitus  and 
Lanike  with  the   debt  of  gratitude   ^^hi(h   he  o^^ed  to  ^"ch.  and 
denounced  himself  as  nnworthy  to  live  ^«fter  luiying  requ   aUuch 
services  with  a  foul  murder.     His  friends  at  lei^g  h  prevailed  o    hi  n 
to  take  food,  and  return  to  activity.     All  joined  in  trying  to    eslo.e 
his  self-satisfaction.     The   ^^i^^^^donian  army  pas.ed  a  rnibl  c ^^^^^^^ 
that  Kleitus  had  been  justly  slain,  and  that    us  body  f^^^^^'^^^ 
unburied;  which  afforded  opportunity  to  Alexandei   torevu^t  me 
vote,  and  to  direct  that  it  should  be  buried  by  his  own  oider     Ihe 
prophets  comforted  him  by  the  assurance  that  his  murderous  impulse 
Lad  arisen,  not  from  his  own  natural  mind,  but  from  a  maddening 


SUCCESS  IN  SOGDIAXA. 


643 


perversion  intentionally  brought  on  by  the  -od  Dionysus  to  ovono-o 
the  omission  ot  a  sacritice  due  to  him  on  tii/.d-irT^f  ti. .  I  avenge 
withl.ekl.     Lastly   the  Greek  sophist  or"  pHi^^l^'l^l^l,^^ 

M^t;s>:Sy^  ;^s'&;i^  ;r^l,"^'!i«^'"^"  ''^^''^ 

entitled  to  prescribe  what  was  r  .'lit  and  iiist   inQtno.i  „f      .'    • 
himself  to  laws  dictated  fr,>m  wifl  o.U     liall  kbeuS  t'./nl   l^'"'"'"' 
was  also  summoned,  along  with  Anaxarchu   t T  kl '  .-^'"'n',';^.'" 
for  the  same  purpose  of  offering  consolatory  Xtio  is     BathPii 
said  to  have  adopted  a  tone  of  discourse  altogether  MfferenT.nf,, 
have  given  offense  rather  than  satisfaction  to  AlexandeT         '  ^ 

lutl°ncce  sitT  for' aeJro'lr'ir'  ""f  ?™^""^'  ^""  '"«■■«  '»  "'e  abso- 

Like  .'"liL'er'eU  ions'  of  1%  flei-y  soulTw , '"  •  '?"='"  ^^''-^^-l- 
powerin'^whileithXl     Rntii   "    •*^,?    ',  '  was  violent  and  over 
pu«euu,  wniie  u  lasted,    iiut  it  cannot  be  shown  tohavc  Ipfi  -invrl,,,. 
able  trace  on  his  character  nor  invoffo^tt.   i..  .-c  .    "  ,*-  leiianj  aur- 
admiratiou  of  AiS    who  has    L  5  bn,'  J  ''''f3".'g  ,"i«  unbounded 

meeting  bin,-'  in  pitched  ball  er\et  s"ia    itrwUr^lie '?1^^    °^ 

ons,  strong  by  nature,  which  h'is  enemies  sought  tide  t^^ndbnlnf 
these  fastnesses  held  by  a  native  cbit^-  n-m.^.l  q;o       -Vi  <-'»e  of 

small  Macedonian  detachment,  were  at  len-th  so  thornmrhu  1?1V 
and  overawed,  tiiat  tl,ey  slew  SpitamenJs,  and  senf  hTs  ^he^d   ^  ,- 
conqueror  as  a  propitiatory  offering  ^  ^"^  ^^^ 

ftntiM'  ""  "^'""i^  ''^'^  ^.^  Xautaka  during  the  extreme  winter  AIcy 

anaer  resumed  operations,   by  attacking  a  stronAort  ca]];,t  th; 

Sogdian  Rock,  whither  a  large'  number  of  fugmvel  had  at^onL^] 

with  an  ample  supply  of  provision.     It  was  a  prlSpi^^^^^ 

be  inexpugnable;  and  would  seemingly  have  pro ve^^^^ 

the  energy  and  abilities  of  Alexander,  liad  no\  the  occii  nntf  .Pn 


e44       MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

puirnable  site  called  the  Rock  of  Chovicnes,  ^vlnch  he  was  also  for- 

lunate  enough  to  reduce.  Scndinc  Kraterus  with  a 

From  hence  Alexander  went  to  r^'^^^'^^f.^^^^/^]]  ^^^^^  . 

ing  the  olsembly  in  a  preparetl  Imrnnguc,  extolled  AlexamU..  s  explo  t. 
"?^Ss'ln"e'"li'lpprautran^^  similar  -n.iments  were  e^ 

to  reply  stood  marked  out  for  the  antipathy  of  Al^^^XJ;  ^^,,^  f^tYi^ 

af  Kieitus  who  had  arraiirned  the  same  sentmients  in  the  banqueting 

n  .  f  A  /rMk  in       was  Iresli  in  the  recohection  of  every  one.     Ihe 

l^lilnin"^^^^^^^^^^  none  ventured  to  express,  at  length 

'Tfl/wS;^i^^tS^{^^  a  peculiar  i^er- 

e<ttoh  s  S^^^  Aristotle,  and  had  ^njoj^ed  throug 

^l  u^cJ:  an'ally  acquLtance  wUh  Al-andc.  durmg^^^^ 
^f  tho  iMttpr       \t  the  recommendation  of  Aristotle,  ls.alllhlUL^c^,  ua^ 
:  c^P^fed  Ale^lnder  in  his  Asiatic  ex^.^ith^n.     He  was^^^^^^^ 
much  literary  and  rhetorical  talent,  which  he  turned  toward  tno 


BANQUET  ATBAKTRA. 


645 


letters;  there  were  ^p-kouc  ..ic^  «.i.  ^    1  •      '\  i^^^'-^   *«^"*J  i^ien  01 

s^iss  ^  s=;  KKS  ris  kS? 

ix.tl„|» U„-,  .„„ d„..„- (mum    T  ,  r,  ,™  ?L^,S*  ""  «•» 

he  IveL  ^  "'*";'"'='  "■"''  P«''f'*'b'  "atural  uuder  the  grandeur  of 

Mmself    by  their   convert  urm    ?i     '     """■"'  ''i'™  '"^  lecreated 

Greel.s-AT>a^'-chut  ll  eon  U.:";  oct'Tr'^of  !'"''''  "'  '"^^° 
dated  themselves  to  the  rhVn  ov.    ,nJ  ,"        T      °,   frgos-accommo- 

Pi.eh  required:'  K°dli:,h^'e.f'eoul    ^o  "do  si,'  "h';  T^'""'  '"  "'1 

Aristotle  su  don  hn  tha?  h,  w  f  "\ '""f ""'  "•""  distasteful. 
nm  he  had  1  u  ,' uieut  ieco,-  i I ,?'',?:'  ff'^  P'"^'''''^"',  ^'^'''^ker,  but 
■'"<1  ar,-ogant  man  who  boast,  fl,-,  u  "''  '1""""'  '"^  "■'^"  '^ '"'''' 
immortrdfly  were  d'eno  de„f  on  .1  „  Alexander's  reinitation  and 

torv.    Of  nerson-U  v-  ni  V      ,  "  '-""'Posuion  and  tone  of  /m  ins- 

-ltalli//hJ',K;7«.b\:iyV.^^^^^^^ 

:;eSTti!:;^'trvf™"-P^^ 

years     n;-  l;,,!"  I       ""  "^''"^  '"  Alexander  during  the  Earlier 

wmiifre^ri' diiJrt^.sr"  °""""  ""^^•'  '""^  -'  ^'---^e" 

banqueT'Sthenef  ht!"?"''''?'''?"  !f  "P  "^^  Anaxarchus  at  the 

wor^>ipWL'arL%isr»s^^^^^^^^ 


646 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


aftenvard  alle-ecl,  that  lie  had  promised  to  comply.     Br.t  lii3  acnir.. 
conduct  aftoicis  reasonable  irroiuid  tor  believmg  that  he  nuu.e  i   ■  •■ 
promise;  l»>r  he  not  <.nlv  tlioughi  it  his  duty  lo  rcluse  the  act  ol  \ 
ship   but  also  to  state  publicly  his  reasons  for  dis^ipproviiig  it;  l 
more  so  as  he  perceived  the  most  of  the  :Niaeedouiaus  present  1 
like  himself.     He  contended  that  the  dislincUou  between  godo  ;  . 
men  was  one  which  could  not  be  confounded  without  imi  i.ty  ; 
Mi-on*'      Alexander  had  amply  earned— as  a  man,  a  general,  a.  u  . 
Uin.r^the  highest  honors  con. patible  with  humanity;  Uit  lo  ex.  .- 
hiufinto  a  god  would  be  both  an  injury  to  him  and  an  ofTer.se  to  l:.e 
cods      Anaxarchus  (he  said)  was  the  last  person  from  whom  such  a 
pioposition  ouirlit  to  come,  because  he  was  one  of  those  whose  oni\ 
iiile  to  Alexander's  society  was  founded  upon  his  capacity  to  gi\e 

instructive  and  wholesome  counsel.  4.  ,^     rpi 

Kallisthenesliere  spoke  out,  what  r.umbcrs  of  his  hearers  felt  J  he 
speech  was  not  onlv  approved,  but  so  warmly  applaude.l  by  the 
Macedonians  present,  especially  the  older  oflicers— that  Alexan(.er 
thoi^ght  it  i>rudent  to  forbid  all  further  discussion  upon  this  (lelicate 
suhircl.  rresenllythe  Persians  ]>resent,  according  to  Asiatic  cus- 
te.m,  approached  him  and  perfdiiud  their  prostration;  sift er  which 
Alexander  piedued,  in  successive  goblets  of  wine,  those  Greeks  and 
jNIacedonians  with  whom  he  had  Ik  Id  previous  concert.  1  o  each  ot 
them  the  'n)blet  was  lanided,  and  each  after  drinking  to  answer  the 
pled-e  approached  the  kir.-,  n.ade  his  prostration  and  then  received 
a  safule  Lastly  Alexander  Kiit  the  pledge  to  Kallislhenes,  who, 
tiher  drinking  fike  li.e  rest,  appreached  him  for  the  purpose  ol  re- 
ceiving the  salute.  P  t  without  any  prostration.  Of  this  omission 
Alexander  was  expre  -sly  informed  by  one  of  the  C(=mpanions;  upon 
which  he  declined  lo  a(:mit  Kallislhenes  to  a  saline  The  latter  re- 
tired, observing,  "Then  1  bhali  go  away,  worseoft  than  otliers  as  lar 

as  the  .<?alute  goes."  ,  ,,        ,,     .  ,.       ,,. 

Kallislhenes  was  imprudent.  ai:d  even  blan^able,  m  mnking  this 
last  observation,  whidi.  without  any  necessity  or  advantage,  ai-gva- 
vated  the  otTense  already  -iveii  to  Alexander.     He  was  more  impru- 
dent still,  if  we  look  simply  to  his  own  personal  safety   m  standing 
forward  publicly  to  protest  against  the  suggestion  for  renckTing  divme 
honors  to  that    prince  and  in  thus  creating  Hie  main  offense  wliieh 
even  in  itself  was  inexpiable.     Bui  here  the  oceasn  n  was  one  serious 
and  important,  so  as  to  ccmvcrt  the  imprudence  intoan  act  of  genuine 
moral  couraiie.     The  (piestion  was,  not  about  obeying  an  oraer  given 
by  Alexander,  for  no  order  had  been  given— but  about  acceptimr  or 
reieeting  a  motion  made  by    Anaxarchus;  which  AlexaiuUr,   by   a 
sh'abbv  preconcerted  inaneuVcr.  afiecteil  to  leave  to  the  tree  c.ecisiou 
of  the  assembly,  in  full  coiitidenee  tiiat  no  one  won  d  In-  t(.umi  in- 
trepid enougii  to  oppose  it      If  one  Gret-k  sophist  made  a  proposition 
in  itself  servile  and  disgraceful,    another  sophist  couU.  do  liin.seii 
nothing  but  honor  by  entering  public  protest  against  it ;  moreespe- 


CHARACTER  OF  KALLISTHENES        ^        ^47 

^1^  ^y  il^St^^i- -,^  -  the  report  in  Arrian)  in 
ander  personally  lllc  ^^^r  "  ^  «nn  ^  '"^^'l-^  admiration  toward  Alex- 
pmof  of  the  propriety  ofKe■f^^^ir'^^'^  ^'^  >"»  ^^self  a 

feellndifferenceif  not  contemnt    fou. '/^'r'^^^°^>"  officers  would 
while  toward  Alexander  thev     nit       "^  "^  ''^^'^^'''"  ^'^^  Kaliisthenes 
actual  worship.     IW  Le  fL -^^^^^  '^'''''''''''   '^^^'^e nee  short  of 

Greek  letters  and  Gr^^^k ci  izc'i^/in  bw  1?'  ""^  'V^^"^'  '^''^  ^'''  '^^'^  of 
iudividual  insolence  ann^^^-u^^^  •  "'  ^''^^'''^  '^^'^^^^^^  ex(;rl>itant 

the.  speech  of  KallistI  c?^  is      Irr  an  dlX^ "' '.f  ''''''''''''  ^^^-^  »' 
ander,  and  strongly  blarncs  the  mn  i  n^^f^  ?''''  ^^'"^  purpose  of  Alex- 
such  is  his  anxi'tv  to  finH  ^"  "^  Anaxarchus;  nevertheless 
blames  KallS^„^  ^'u  l^l^j^iiijf^^^  Z"'  ^^^^^If^er,  that  he  al^ 
m  oifenng  opposition      Hr   m  "i      ,  *^^^^^^".^'f  >  ^oUy,  and  insolence 
Kallisthe,rc8  vvou]    h  vedon^  ''''^  ^^«"^«  ^'-^'th,  timi 
could  have  withclravv     wit  Init  offen'^.W '"  '^^    ''''^''' ^'^  '^^'^^  ^^^ 
m  whicii  no  lettered  Greek  rrlJn^^^        "'  ^^"^  camp  of  Alexander 
liis  freedom  of  speech  ^nds^nn/T  ^'f'^''"^^^  '"'''^'^''^  abnciratin.^ 
Anaxarchus.     mnboin^^rc^T' k'"^  emulating  the  servility  of 
Baktra  when  the  p  opus  io, '   f  tJ^T'''''  ''''''  "^  '^^^'  ^^^^'J  ^t 
silence  wouhl  iKivAe^a^nt-hl^     ^  os  '"'  '•  ^  '^'^^^'  ^"^  ^^^^^ 
sonab le  and  dignified  for  bein<.  fr  ,  J  t   v  ,h  f '"'^  ''  Y^-^'  ^'''^'  '^'^' 
liallisthenes  knew  that  da  .%,•  S           '  '^''""''''  ^o  himself. 

recognize  it  in  the  alterilerea^  Al"^  '"'?  ^"''^'^^^^  ^"'''^^J^^  to 

was,  from  that  dav  .im-M-Li         "       ^  Alexander  toward  him      Ro 

f  A  as  well  as1o\C  iv.tit'^:;;;:;" '^^^^^^ 

de,l  catiou.-for  hatred     „dfoiS.;l'"'  P'™!"'^-'-"  "f  »■«  imen.led 
^ucl,  as  might  serve  to  r»     him-  C    fo  L'f "' "ccu.satory  pretense 

admirersof  tlilcoura<.eo,wf'r, ,  -„  ,  ^"""'^''''''^«'  insolence,  and 
of  Anaxarelius.    B^s uXm  m  Iw.        ''i'"'  r?"""'^  "..ninstthonK  t  o„ 

praises  a,%.ravate<r hi    dner  LVthev";;^.',  '''^ "'"^'' T'""^ '  "'"-■h 
Alexander.     The  pretext  fSrhifrui,^^'';  '7'''  '"  ^^ .'■''P^'-<''<i  lo 
AmoniT  tliose  whr^  ^a,.  .    '/"'^  fuui  was  not  Jong  want  n"- 

thenes,  ^Jh^^^^TZ^^^^^'^S'''^'"^  oon,^r..ation  %f  Kallis- 

■■om  nohle  Mace.h;  .  ',  ami  es  wl^-cH  ■•^i'T'"^''''^  "■■J"'''  ^^'«-'«' 
"'<•"  king.  It  hMd  hapnened  tl  u ',1  i  v„  "^  "'"'"'  "'*^  P<-i-«'n  of 
eompauions  in  the  c  l^e  "  ,    e  in^  n  ^.W '  fT  '"'■"'•  T  "^  ^\'^'X'">der'» 

o  beantielpate.1  in  killin.'ti,.b.;,H-,f,  ','!"'''•  ,AI^'-^'""i<'>-,  angrv 
hefore  all  the  otiier  i«  .pi', '  ,  ,      ' •""','  '.'^  M''nnolans  lo  be scour.vi.a 

filiated  an,l  o!     4. 1-^,*  a  ,  t^'^^t '"'",  "!  '"'«  ''»■•-'••     Thus  T , 
^onot   whicli,  if  \lev.nVl,  r  I  .w1  !  "  ".""•['^^ly  I'Mioeent,  hnt  the  onus- 

'•'i.^cht  have  bein  h  I    pu    .h-  uT''\  ""^\  '"J"'-^'  f"'"'  'I'''  ''oa'. 

on  revenue      IT,.  <.,     P"vl"^"""''  — JI'Tniolaus  heeanje  retolMelv  biM,; 

to  1^.11  Alexander  in  his  cS^^^^X' C^^^^'^IS^:-^  ^^ 


648       MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

an  on  g,,a„l  to.c,|.or.     '^^'^  m>^'t^:^:^7;^^r^y'^ 

divuK'iition  of  their  secret;  >et  " '^  f.y'Ynv.  rcak  drinking  with  liia 

aocid?.«,  tluU  Al^''^«",^'^7''::"r'\    \[;'CTmv  one  o!  the  con- 

offlcers.  and  never  retired  to  bed.     ^;'   f  ,P, ,  ,,d',i,e  scheme  to  his 

spiiators,  iK-coming  a  anned  or  "'P™    "'j/;  ,  [?  4d      Eurylochus, 

ifiend  (harikles   ^vuh  the  names  "f  ''^f;,  ,•;;;,.!  heard,  immedi- 

brotberto  Charikles,  apprised   o  ''",^,^''' conveyed  to  Alexander, 

atelv  inforn.ed  Ptolemy,  through  ^^''«V',\;"'[""e,'e?  arrested  and  put 

Bv  -Alexanders  order,  the  persons  "«'';;;';"  ,^^"\,,,d  themselves 

fo- the  torture;  under  vv  neh  '''^^\n^oler  aceon.pl  ces,  and  even 

conspired  to  kill  hun,  but  >'^'7"'  ''"^XXeiabis  denial  tbey 

denied  that  any  one  else  \v;.s  pnv>  to  the  «'""^^-     ^    ,o,.t  the  levcla- 

pcrsisted,  tl-..gh,f '^-"^;^"^«7-?  -^b  St  up  ^^  arraigned  as 
tion  of  new  names,  lliey  ^\^7^/i\^"  "/,•:,  „  ^okliers  There  then* 
conspirators  before  tl-  as.emblecl  Macecto^^^^^  .^ 

confession  wus  repeated.     It  is  ^;^y^'';;,'^  .'":  udolorious;  denouncing 

ing it,  boasted  o   ibe  V/^^^P^'^^^'"^.  ^f ^^^'^f  ,av^^^^^^^  insnpport- 

the  tyranny  and  cnielty  ot  Alexander  as  iia^i^        nvadeor  not,  tbe 
able  to  a  f i^enmn.     \\  bether  sueh  boa  t  ^^  ^^^!^^"f ]  ^^^^^  ,^  death 
persons  brought  up  were  pronounced  guilt},   anu 
forthwith  by  the  soldiers.  ^  ^^  ^  Macedonian 

The  pages  thus  executed  ^y\ri^''^lJ'l'^ 
families^  ior  whose  ccndemnai^anacco^^^^^^ 
itnecessarytoinvoke-w lathcwas.u  eo^  g      .^^.^^^^  ^^^^j^^. 

—the  sentence  of  the  so  dieis.     ^ «,  ^;^^^^V'  '^^^^  one  of  the  sur- 

thenes-not  a  Macedonian,  but  onl}  l^^\^^^^l;^l^ch  formality 
viving  remnants  of  the  subverted  ctjol  ^1}     {^^^^    ^^^^  ^^  implicate 

.N-as  required.     As  yet   there  ^^^^  "^^f.^^l^^'^'  ^^  to  be,  Her- 

this  philosopher;  for  obnoximis  as  h^  na^^^^^^ 

niolaus  and  his  companions  had.  "^'^'^^^^^  /,)rture  by  pronounc- 
to  purchase  the  chance  of  respite  *' ^"^^^^^^V'^^'^^^'^ering,  unless  con- 
ing' it.  Their  ^'-^^f  ^^^^"^;7:.^,:,^iVwe  c^  u  >t  know  wltther  any  was 
firmed  by  other  ^''^If^l'^l^^^^^^^  even  against  themselves;  but 
taken— were  hardly  of  the  least  \aiue,  ^\\"  ■  ..  ,.  they  tended 
a-ainst  Kallisthenes  they  bad  no  \>^^»7"^^,  ;^;,'^^"\'\V,rc^tse.  therefore, 
indirectly,  not  to  convict  but  toabs<,lve  him  1^^  1^^ .^«^^^^^  ^,^,„,,  ,f 
as  in  that  of  Philotas  before,  it  was  "^^^^^f^^^.^^  conversations, 
suspicious  tendency  from  his  rn)orted^^^^^^^^^  ^^^,,. 

He  was  alleged  to  ^^^^^^^'^^^'^^.^^^^^^  instigating  thci. 
gua-e  to  the  pages,  ho  dmg  ^^I\^^[^ ^;  "^^^^  \^  Xe  of  refuge;  he  w:  > 
to  conspiracy,  and  pomt.ng  out  ^"^^^'"-'ll''^''^^^^^^^^^  Her- 

moreover  well  known  to  have  }']^Xm^^ev^^^^^^^  ^'''^''''^'^'^ 

molaus.  For  a  »"^in.«^^'«,.^'^^^^^'^^^  .^'^^ '7. '^  o^^^^^^^^  as  grounds  ot 
of  Alexander,  such  indications  were  quite  suincicui  a    ^ 

action  against  one  whom  he  hated  Mpx-nider's  mind  disclosed 

On  this  occasion,  we  have  the  '^^^''.'f.f^^^^^^^  by  PlutarcU, 

by  himself,  in  one  of   the  references  to  his  letters  given  vy 


KxVLLISTHENES  HANGED. 


649 


Writing  to  Kraterus  and  to  others  immediately  afterward,  Alexander 
distinctly   stated  that    the  pages   throu-xhout  all  their  torture  had 
(ieposed  against  no  one  but  them.selve.s^     Nevertheless,  in  another 
letter  addressed  to  Antipnter  in  Macedonia,  he  used  the.>;e  expressions 
—  •'  The  pages  were  stoiK^d  ;o  death  by  the  Macedonians;  but  I  myself 
shall  punish  the  sophist,  as  well  as  those  who  sent  him  out  here   and 
liiose  who  hari.or  in  their  cities  conspirators  against  me."  The  sophist 
Kallisthenes  had  been  sent  out  by  Ari.stotle,  who  is  there  desi'>-nated- 
and  probably  the  Athenians  after  him.     Fortunately  for  Aristotle  he 
was  not  at  Baktra,  but  at  Athens.     That  he  could  have  had  any  Con- 
cern in  the  conspiracy  of  the  pages,  was  impossible.     In  this  savage 
outburst  of  menace  against  ids  absent  preceptor,  Alexander  discloses 
the  real  state  of  feeling  which  pr()mi)ted  him  to  the  destruction  of 
Kallisthenes;  hatred  toward  that  spirit  of  citizenship  and  free  speech 
Avhich  Kallisthenes  not  only  cherished,   in  common  with  xVristotle 
and  most  other  literary  Greeks,  but  had  courageously   manifested  in 
hisjirotest  against  the  motion  for  worshipping  a  mortal. 

Kallisthenes  was  lirst  put  to  the  torture  and  then  hanged.  iHis 
tragical  fate  excited  a  profound  sentiment  of  sympathy  antf  indi'>-na- 
tion  among  the  philosophers  of  antiquity.  * 

The  halts  of  Alexander  were  formidable  to  friends  and  companions- 
his  marches,  to  the  unconqucTcd  natives  whom  he  chose  to  treat  as 
euejnies.     On    the  return  of   Kraterus  from   Sogdiana,    Alexander 
began  his  march  from   Baktra  (Baikh)  southward  to  the  mountain 
range  Paropamisiis  or  Caucasus  (Ilindoo-Koosh);  leaving  however  at 
Baktra  xlmyntas  with  a  large  force  of  10,000  foot  and8ro00hor.se  to 
keep  these  intractable  territories  in  subjugation.     His  march  over 
the  mountains  occupied  ten  days;  he  then  visited  his  uewiy-founded 
eity  Alexandria  in  the  Paropaniisadje.     At  or  near  the  river  Kophen 
(Kabool  river),  he  was  joined  by  Taxiles,  a  powerful  Indian  prince 
wiio  brought  as  a  present  twenty-five  elephants,  and  whose  alliance 
was  very  valuable  to  him.     He  then  divided  his  arinv,  sendin^--  one 
division  under  HepluBstion  and  Perdikkas,  toward  the  territory  billed 
Peukelaotis  (apparently  that  immediately  north  of  the  confiuence  of 
the  Kabool  river  with  the  Indus);  and  conducting  the  remainder  him- 
self in  an  easterly  direction,  over  the  mountainous  regions  between 
tlie  Hindoo-Koo.sk  and  the  right  bank  of  the  Indus.     HephiestioQ 
was  ordered,  after  subduing  all  enemies  in  his  wav,  to  prepare  a 
hri(l:re  ready  for   pa.ssing  the  Indus   by  the  time  When  Alexander 
should  arrive.     Astes.    prince  of  Peukelaotis.  was  taken  and  slain 
m  the  city  where  he  had  shut  himself  up;  but  the  reduction  of  it 
cost  lleplKTstion  a  siege  of  thirty  davs. 

Alexander,  with  his  own  half  of  tl^e  army,  undertook  the  reduc- 
tion ot  the  Aspasii,  the  Gura3i,  and  the  Assakeni,  tribes  occupyino^ 
mountainous  and  difl3cult  localities  along  the  southern  slopes  of 
the  Hindoo-Koosh;  but  neither  they  nor  their  various  towns  men- 
tioned—Angseon,  Massaga,  Bazira,  (^a,  Dyrta,  etc.,  except  perhaps 


6o0 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


VICTORY  OVER   PORUS. 


651 


the  remarkable  rock  of  Aornos,  near  the  Indus — can  be  more  exactly 
iiienlitie(i.  These  tribes  were  generally  brave,  and  seconded  by  towns 
of  slnmg  position  as  well  as  by  a  rugged  country,  in  many  parts 
utterly  without  roads.  But  tlieir  defen>e  was  conducted  with  little 
union,  no  military  skill,  and  miserable  weapons;  so  that  they  were 
no  way  ciualitied  to  oppose  the  excellent  combination  and  rapid 
movements  of  Alexander,  toirether  with  the  eontident  attack  and  verv 
superior  arms,  offensive  as  well  as  defensive,  of  his  soldiers.  All 
those  who  attempted  resistance  were  successively  attacked,  overpow- 
ered and  slain.  Even  those  who  did  not  resist,  but  fled  to  the  moun- 
tains, were  pursued  and  either  slauglitered  or  sold  for  slaves.  The 
only  way  of  escaping  the  sword  was  to  remain,  submit,  and  await  the 
fiat  of  the  invader.  Such  a  series  of  im Interrupted  successes,  all 
achieved  with  little  loss,  it  is  rare  in  military  history  to  read.  The 
capture  of  the  rock  of  Aornos  was  peculiarly  gratifying  to  Alexander, 
because  it  enjoyed  the  legendary  reputation  of  having  been  assailed 
in  vain  by  Ilerakles — anil  indeed  he  himself  had  deemed  it,  at  first 
sight,  unassailable.  After  having  thus  subdued  the  upper  regions 
(above  Attock  or  the  confluence  of  the  Kabul  river)  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Indus,  he  availed  himself  of  some  forests  alongside  to  fell 
timber  and  build  boats.  These  boats  were  sent  down  the  stream,  to 
the  point  where  llephsestion  and  Perdikkas  were  preparing  the 
bridge. 

Such  fatiguing  operations  of  Alexander,  accomplished  amid  all 
the  hardships  of  winter,  w  ( re  followed  by  a  halt  of  thirty  days,  to 
refresh  the  soldiers,  before  he  crossed  the  Indus,  in  the  early  spring  of 
826  B.C.     It  is  presumed,  probably  enough,  that  he  crossed  at  or  near 
Attock,  the  passage  now  frequented,     lie  first  marched  to  Taxila, 
where  the  prince  Taxilus  at  once  submitted,  and  reinforced  the  army 
with  a  strong  contingent  of  Indian  soldiers.     His  alliance  and  inform- 
ation was  found  extremely  valuable.     The  whole  neighboring  terri- 
tory subndtted,  and  was  placed  under  Philippus  as  satrap,  with  a 
garrison  and  depot  at  Taxila.     He  experienced  no  resistance  until  he 
reached  the  river  Hydaspes  (Jelum),  on  the  other  side  of  which  the 
Indian  prince  Porns  stood  prepared  to  dispute  the  passage;  a  brave 
man,  with  a  formidable  force,  better  armtd  than   Indians  generally 
were,  and  with  many  trained  elephants;  which  animals  the  Macedon- 
ians had  never  yet  encountered  in  battle.     By  a  series  of  admiiable 
military  combinatiors,  Alexandtreluded  the  vigilance  of  Porus,  stole 
the  passage  of  the  river  at  a  point  a  few  miles  above,  and  completely 
defeated  the  Indian  anny.     In  spite  of  their  elephants,  which   were 
skillfully  managed,  the  Indians  could  not  long  w  ithstand  the  shock 
of  close  combat,  against  such  cavalry  and  infantry  as  the  !Macedo- 
nian.     Porus,  a  prince  of  gigantic  stature,  mounted  on  an  elephant, 
fought  with  the  utmost  gallantry,   lallying  his  broken  troops  and 
keeping  them  together  until  the  last.     Having  seen  two  of  his  sons 
slain,  himself  wounded  and  p«rishing  with  Biii'st,  he  w  as  only  pre- 


served by  the  special  directions  of  Alexander.  When  Porus  was 
brought  before  him,  Alexander  was  struck  with  admiration  at  his 
stature,  beauty,  and  undaunted  bearing.  Addressing  him  first  he 
asked,  what  Porus  wished  to  be  done  for  him.  "  That  you  should 
treat  me  as  a  king,"  was  the  reply  of  Porus.  Alexander,  deii'TJued 
with  these  words,  behaved  toward  Porus  with  the  utmost  coiirtesv 
and  generosity;  not  only  ensurimr  to  him  his  actual  kin^rdom  but 
enlarging  it  by  new  additions.  He  found  in  Porus  a  failhful'  and 
elhcient  ally.  This  was  the  greatest  day  of  Alexander's  life-  if  we 
take  together  the  splendor  and  difficulty  of  the  military  achieve- 
ment, and  the  generous  treatment  of  his  conquered  opp  )nent 

Alexander  celebrated  his  victory  by  sacrifices  to  the  «^ods  and  fes- 
tivities on  the  banks  of  the  Hydaspes.  where  he  also  ga'v'e  directions 
for  the  foundation  of  two  cities— Nikaia,  on  the  eastern  bank   and 
Bukephaha,  on  the  western,  so  named  in  commemoration  of  his  fa- 
vorite horse,  wiio  died  here  of  age  and  fatigue.     Leavino-  Kiaterus 
to  lay  out  and  erect  these  new  establishments,  as  well  as  to  keep  up 
communication,  he  conducted  his  army  onw^ard  in  an  easterly  direc 
tion  toward  the  river  Akesines  (Chenab).     His  recent  victory  had 
spread   terror  around;  the  Glaukae,  a  powerful   Indian  tribe    with 
thirty-seven  towns  and  many  po])ulous  villages,  submitted  and  were 
placed  under  the  dominion  of  Porns;  while  embassies  of  submission 
were  also  received  from  two  considerable  princes— Abisares   and  a 
second  Porus,  hitherto  at  enmity  with  his  namesake.     The  passao-e 
of  the  great  river  Akesines,  now  full  and  impetuous  in  its  curreift 
was  accomplished  by  boats  and  by  inflated   hides,  yet  not  without 
dithculty  and  danger.     From  thence  he   proceeded  onward   in  the 
S!ime  direction,  across  the  Punjab— finding  no  enemies,  but  leavincr 
detachments  at  suitable  posts  to  keep  up  his  communications  and  en° 
sure  his  supplies— to  the  river  Hydraotes  or  Ravee;  which   thou"-h 
not  less  broad  and  full  than  the  Akesines,  w^as  comparativeh  trail 
qjiil,  so  as  to  be  crossed  wi;h  facility.     Here  some  free  Indian  tribes 
Ivathieans  and  others,  had  the  courage  to  resist.     They  first  attempted 
to  maintain  themselves  in  Sangala  by  surrounding  their  town  with  a 
triple  entrenchment  of  wagons.     These  being  attacked  and  carried 
they  were  driven  within  the  walls,  which  they  now  began  to  despair 
of  defending,  and  resolved  to  evacuate  bv  nii^^ht,  but  the  proiect  was 
divulged  to  Alexander  by  deserteis,  and  frustrated  by  his  vigilance 

i^M!w"f.^^  ^'^^  J*^  ^^^^  ^^®  ^^^'^''1  ^'y  storm,  putting  to  the  sword 
J  7, 000  Indians,  and  taking  (according  to  Arrian)  70,000  captives  His 
own  loss  before  the  town  was  less  than  100  killed,  and  1200  wounded 
Two  neighboring  towns,  in  alliance  with  Sangala,  were  evacuated  by 
their  terrified  inhabitants.  Alexander  pursued,  but  could  not  over- 
take them,  exccift  500  sick  or  weakly  persons,  whom  his  soldiers  put 
to  death.  Demolishing  the  town  of  Sagala.  he  added  the  territory 
to  the  dominion  of  Porus,  then  present,  with  a  contingent  of  5  000 
Indians.  ^  ' 


i 


652        MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


VOYAGE  DOWN  THE  INDUS. 


653 


Sar.irala  was  the  easternmost  of  all  Alexander's  conquests.  Pres- 
ently his  march  brought  him  to  the  river  llypliasis  (Siitledge),  the 
last  of  the  rivers  in  Ih^  Punjab — seeniinirly  at  a  point  below  its  con- 
fluence with  the  Beas.  Beyond  this  river,  broad  and  rai)id,  Alexan- 
der was  intornud  th:;t  there  lay  a  de>eit  of  eleven  days'  m'arch,  ex- 
tending to  a  still  greater  river  called  the  Ganges,  beyond  which 
dwelt  the  Gandari(Ue,  the  most  powerful,  warlike,  and  pojiulous  of 
all  the  Indian  tribes,  distinguished  for  the  number  and  training  of 
their  elephants.  The  prospect  of  a  difficult  march,  and  of  an  enemy 
esteemed  invincible,  only  instigated  his  ardor.  lie  gave  orders  for 
the  crossing.  But  here,* for  the  first  time,  his  army,  officers  as  well 
as  soldiers,  manifested  symptoms  of  uncontrollable  weariness;  mur- 
muring aloud  at  these  endless  toils,  and  marches  they  knew  not 
whither.  They  had  already  overpassed  the  limits  where  Dionysus 
and  Herakles  were  said  to  Lave  stopp(  d  :  they  were  travelling  into 
regions  hitherlo  unvisited  either  by  Greeks  or  by  Persians,  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  provoking  and  ( onquering  new  enemies.  Of  vic- 
tories they  were  sated;  of  their  plunder,  abundant  as  it  was,  the}-- 
h;id  no  enjoyment;  the  hardships  of  a  perpetual  onward  march,  often 
excessively  accelerated,  had  exhausted  both  men  and  horses;  more- 
over, their  advance  from  the  Ilydaspes  had  been  accomplished  in  the 
wet  season,  under  rains  more  violent  and  continued  than  the}'  had 
ever  before  experienced.  Informed  of  the  reigning  discontent, 
Alexander  assembled  his  officers  and  harangued  them,  endeavoring  to 
revive  in  them  that  forward  spirit  and  promptitude  which  he  had 
hitherto  found  not  inadequate  to  his  own.  But  he  entirely  failed. 
No  one  indeed  dared  openly  to  contradict  him.  KaMius  alone  haz- 
arded some  words  of  timid  dissuasion;  the  rest  manifested  a  passive 
and  sullen  repugnance,  even  when  he  proclaimed  that  those  who  de- 
sired might  return  with  the  shame  op'Jiaving  deserted  their  king, 
while  he  would  march  forward  with  the  volunteers  only.  After  a 
suspense  of  two  days,  passed  in  solitary  and  silent  mortification — he 
still  apparently  persisted  in  his  determination,  and  offered  the  sacri- 
fice usual  previous  to  tiie  passage  of  a  river.  The  victims  were  in- 
auspicious; he  bowed  to  the  will  of  the  gods;  and  gave  orders  for 
return,  to  the  unanimous  and  unbounded  delight  of  his  army. 

To  mark  the  last  extremity  of  his  eastward  progress,  he  erected 
twelve  altars  of  extraordinary  height  and  dimension  on  the  western 
bank  of  the  Hyphasis,  offering  sacrifices  of  thanks  to  the  gods, 
with  the  usual  festivities,  and  matches  of  agility  and  force.  Then, 
having  committed  all  the  territory  west  of  the  Hyphasis  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  Poms,  he  marched  back,  repassed  the  Hydraotes  and 
Akesines,  and  returned  to  the  Hydaspcs  near  the  point  where  he  had 
first  crossed  it.  The  two  new  cities — Bukephalia  arvi  Niknea — which 
he  had  left  orders  for  commencing  on  that  river,  had  suffered  much 
the  rains  and  iiuiudations  during  his  forward  march  to  the  Hyphasis, 
and  now  required  the  aid  of  the  army  to  repair  the  damage.     The 


heavy  rains  continued  throughout  most  of  his  return  march  to  the 
Ilydaspes. 

On  coming  back  to  this  river  Alexander  received  a  large  re-en- 
forcement both  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  sent  to  him  from  Euro[)e,, 
together  with  2r),000  new  panoplies,  and  a  considerable  stock  of  medi-j 
cines.     Had  these  re  enforcements  reached  him  on  the  Hyphasis,  it- 
seems  not  impossible  that  he  might  have  prevailed  on  his  army  to 
accompany  him  in  his  further  advance  to  the  Ganges  and  the  regions 
beyond.     He  now  employed  himself,  assisted  by  Porus  and  Taxilws, 
in  collecting  and  constructing  a  lleet  for  sailing  dow^n  the  Hydaspcs, 
and  thence  down  to  the  mouth  of  the  Indus.     By  the  early  part  of 
November,  a  fleet  of  nearly  2,000  boats  or  vessels  of  various  sizes 
having  been  prepared,  he  began  his  voyage.     Kraterus  marched  with 
one  division  of  the  army,  along  the  right  bank  of  the   Hydaspcs — 
Hepha3stion  on  the  left  bank  with  the  remainder,  including  200t;le- 
phants;    Nearchus  had  the  conunand  of  the  fleet  in  the  river,  on 
board  of  which  was  Alexander  himself.     He  pursued  his  voyage 
slowly  down  the  river  to  the  confluence  of  the   Hydaspcs  with  the 
Akesines — with  the  Hydraotes — and  with  the  Hyphasis — all  pouring 
in  one  united  stream  into  the  Indus.     He  sailed  down  the  Indus  to 
its  junction  with  the  Indian  Ocean.     Altogether  this  voyage  occupied 
nine  months,  from  November  326  B.C.  to  August  325  B.C.    But  it  was 
a  voyage  full  of  active  military  operations  on  both  sides  of  the  river. 
Alexander  perpetually  disembarked,  to  attack,  subtlue,  and  slaugh- 
ter all  such  nations  near  the  banks  as  did  not  voluntarily  submit. 
Among  them  were  the  Malli  and  Oxydrakie,  free  and  brave  tribes. 
who  resolved  to  defend  their  liberty,  but,  unfortunately  for  them- 
selves, were  habitually  at  variance,  and  could  not  now  accomplish  any 
hearty  co-operation  against  the  common  invader.     Alexander  first  as- 
sailed the  Malli  with  his  usual  celerity  and  vigor,  beat  them  with 
slaughter  in  the  field,  and  took  several  of  their  towns.     There  re- 
mained only  their  last  and  strongest  town,  from  which  the  defenders 
were  already  driven  out  and  forced  to  retire  to  the  citadel.  Thither  they 
were  pursued  by  the  Macedonians,  Alexander  himself  being  among 
the  foremost,  with  only  a  few  guards  near  him.     Impatient  because 
the  troops  with  their  scaling-ladders  did  not  come  up  more  rapidly, 
he  mounted  up  a  ladder  that  happened  to  be  at  hand,  attendeil  only 
by  Peukestes  and  one  or  two  others,  with  an  adventurous  courage 
even  transcending  what  he  was  wont  to  display.     Having  cleared  the 
wall  by  killing  several  of  its  defenders,  he  jumped  down  into  the  in- 
terior of  the  citadel,  and  made  head  for  some  time,  nearly  alone, 
against  all  within.     He  received,  however,  a  bad  wound  from  an 
arrow  in  the  breast,  and  was  on  the  point  of  fainting  when  his  sol- 
diers burst  in,  rescued  him,  and  took  the  place.    Every  person  within 
— man,  woman  and  child — was  slain. 

The  wound  of  Alexander  was  so  severe  that  he  was  at  first  reported 
t/O  be.  dead,  to  the  great  consternation  and  distress  of  the  army. 


654        MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


ORSINES  IS  IIUXQ. 


m5 


il    ( 


However,  he  became  soon  sufficiently  recovered  to  show  liimself,  and 
to  receive  their  ardent  congratuhitions,  in  the  camp  established  at 
the  point  of  junction  between  the  Hydraotes  (Ravee)  and  Akesines 
(C'lieuab).  His  voyage  down  the  river,  though  delayed  by  the  care 
of  his  wound,  was  soon  resumed  and  prosecuted,  with  the  same 
active  operations  by  his  laud- force  on  both  sides  to  subjugate  all  the 
Indian  tribes  and  cities  within  accessible  distance.  At  the  junction 
of  the  river  Akesines  (Punjuud)  with  the  Indus,  Alexander  directed 
the  foundation  of  a  new  city,  with  adequate  docks  and  conveniences 
for  ship-building,  whereby  he  expected  to  command  the  internal 
navigation.  Having  no  further  occasion  now  for  so  large  a  land- 
force,  he  sent  a  large  portion  of  it  under  Kraterus  westward  (seem- 
ingly through  the  pass  now  called  Bolan)  into  Karmania.  He  estab- 
li5,hed  another  military  and  naval  post  at  Pattala,  where  the  Delta  of 
the  Indus  divided,  and  he  then  sailed  with  a  portion  of  his  fleet  down 
the  right  arm  of  the  river  to  have  the  first  sight  of  the  Indian  Ocean. 
The  view  of  ebbing  and  flowing  tide,  of  which  none  had  had  expe- 
rience on  the  scale  there  exhibited,  occasioned  to  all  much  astonish- 
ment and  alarm. 

The  tleet  was  now  left  to  be  conducted  by  the  admiral  Nearchus, 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Indus  round  by  the  Persian  Gulf  to  that  of 
the  Tigris;  a  memorable  nautical  enterprise  in  Grecian  antiquity. 
Alexander  himself  (about  the  month  of  August)  began  his  march  by 
land  westward  through  the  teiTitories  of  the  Arabitae  and  the 
Oritae,  and  afterward  through  the  deserts  of  Gedrosia.  Pura,  the 
principal  town  of  the  Gedrosians,  was  sixty  days'  march  from  the 
boundary  of  the  Oritaj. 

Here  his  army,  though  without  *any  foraiidable  opposing  enemv. 
underwent  the  most  severe  and  deplorable  sufferings;  their  march 
being  througli  a  sandy  and  trackless  desert,  with  short  supplies  of 
food,  and  still  shorter  supplies  of  water,  under  a  burning  sun.  The 
loss  in  men,  horses,  and  baggage  cattle,  from  thirst,  fatigue,  and 
disease,  was  prodigious;  and  it  required  all  the  unconquerable  energy 
of  Alexander  to  bring  through  even  the  diminished  number.  At 
Pura  the  army  obtained  repose  and  refreshment,  and  was  enabled  to 
march  forward  into  Karmania,  where  Kraterus  joined  them  with  his 
division  from  the  Indus,  and  Kleander  with  the  division  which  had 
been  left  at  Ekbatana.  Kleander,  accused  of  heinous  crimes  in  his 
late  command,  was  put  to  death  or  imprisoned;  several  of  his  com- 
rades were  executed.  To  recompense  the  soldiers  for  their  recent 
distre.NS  in  Gedrosia,  the  king  conducted  them  for  seven  davs  in 
drunken  bacchanalian  procession  tiirough  Karmania,  himself  and  all 
his  friends  taking  part  in  the  revelry;  an  imitation  of  the  jovial 
festivity  ajid  triumph  with  which  the  god  Dionvsus  had  marched 
back  from  the  conquest  of  India. 

During  the  halt  in  Karmania  Alexander  had  the  satisfaction  of 
seeing  his  admiral  yearcl^u*,  vrl^o  Jiad  brought  the  fleet  roimd  from 


the  mouth  of  the  Indus  to  the  harbor  called  Harmozeia  (Ormuz),  not 
far  from  the  entrance  of  the  Persian  Gulf;  a  voyage  of  much  hard- 
ship and  distress,  along  the  barren  coasts  of  the  Oritoe,  the  Gedro- 
sians, and  the  Ichthyophagi.  Nearchus,  highly  commended  and 
honored,  Avas  presently  sent  back  to  complete  his  voyage  as  far  as 
the  mouth  of  the  Euphrates;  wiiile  Hephsestion  also  was  directed  to 
conduct  the  larger  portion  of  the  army,  with  the  elephants  and 
heavy  baggaue,  by  the  road  near  the  coast  from  Karmania  into  Per- 
sis.  This  road,  though  circuitous,  was  the  most  convenient,  as  it 
was  now  the  winter  season;  but  Alexander  himself,  with  the  lighter 
divisions  of  his  army,  took  the  more  direct  mountain  road  from 
Karmania  to  Pasargadie  and  Persepolis.  Visiting  the  tomb  of  Cyrus 
the  Great,  founder  of  the  Persian  empire,  he  was  incensed  to  find  it 
violated  and  pillaged.  He  caused  it  to  be  carefully  restored,  put  to 
death  a  Macedonian  named  Polymachus  as  the  offender,  and  tor- 
tured the  Magian  guardians  of  it  for  the  purpose  of  discovering 
accomplices,  but  in  vain.  Orsines,  satrap  of  Persis,  was,  however,' 
accused  of  connivance  in  the  deed,  as  well  as  of  various  acts  of 
murder  and  spoliation :  according  to  Curtius,  he  was  not  only  inno- 
cent, but  had  manifested  both  good  faith  and  devotion  to  Alexander; 
in  spite  of  which  he  became  a  victim  of  the  hostility  of  the  favorite 
eunuch  Bagoas,  who  both  poisoned  the  king's  mind  with  calumnies 
of  his  own,  and  suborned  other  accusers  with  false  testimony. 
Whatever  may  be  the  truth  of  the  story,  Alexander  caused  Orsines 
to  be  hanged;  naming  as  satrap  Peukcst(»s,  whose  favor  was  now 
high,  partly  as  comrade  and  preserver  of  the  king  in  his  imminent 
danger  at  the  citadel  of  the  Malli — partly  from  his  having  adopted 
the  l^ersiau  dress,  manners,  and  language,  more  completely  than  any 
other  ]VIacedonian. 

It  was  about  February,  in  324  B.C.,  that  Alexander  marched  out 
of  Persis-  to  Susa.  During  this  progress,  at  the  point  where  he 
crossed  the  Pasitigris,  he  was  again  joined  by  Nearchus,  who  hav- 
ing completed  his  circumnavigation  from  the  mouth  of  the  Indus  to 
that  of  the  Euphrates,  had  sailed  back  with  the  fleet  from  the  latter 
river  and  come  up  the  Pasitigris.  It  is  probable  that  the  division  of 
HeplKPstion  also  rejoined  him  at  Susa,  and  that  the  whole  army  was 
there  for  the  first  time  brought  together,  after  the  separation  in 
Karmania. 

In  Susa  and  Susiana  Alexander  spent  some  months.  For  the  first 
time  since  his  accession  to  the  throne,  he  had  now  no  military  opera- 
tions in  hand  or  in  immediate  prospect.  No  enemy  was  before  him, 
until  it  pleased  him  to  go  in  quest  of  a  new  one;  nor  indeed  could 
any  new  one  be  found,  excei)t  at  a  prodigious  distance.  He  had 
emerged  from  the  perils  of  the  untrodden  "East,  and  had  returned 
into  the  ordinary  localities  and  conditions  of  Persian  rule,  occupying 
that  capital  city  from  wdience  the  great  Achaemenid  kings  had  been 
accustomed  to  govern  the  Western  as  well  as  the  Eastern  portioni  of 


I 


eo6        MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER 

their  vast  empire.  To  their  post,  and  to  their  irritable  love  of  ser- 
vility, Alexander  had  succeeded;  but  brincinic  with  him  a  restless 
energy  such  as  none  of  them  except  the  tn-st  founder  Cyrus  had 
manilested— and  a  splendid  military  genius,  such  as  was  unknown 
alike  to  Cyrus  and  to  his  successors. 

In  tiie  new  position  of  Alexander,  his  principal  subjects  of  unt?asi- 
ness  were,  the  satraps  and  the  3Iacedonian  soldiers.     During  the 
long  interval   (more   than  five  years)  which  had  elapsed  since  he 
marched  eastward  from  Ilyrkania  in  pursuit  of  Bessus,  the  satraps 
had  necessarily  been  left  much  to  themselves.     Some  had  imagined 
that  he  would  never  return;   an  anticipation  no  way  unreasonable, 
since  his  own  impulse  toward  forward  march  was  so  insatiate,  that 
he  was  only  constrained  to  return  by  the  resolute  opposition  of  his 
own  soldiers;   moreover  his  dangerous  wound  among  the  Malli,  and 
his  calamitous  march  through  Gedrosia,  had  given  rise  to  reports  of 
his  death,  credited  for  some  time  even  by  Olympias  and  Kleopatra 
in  Macedonia.    L'nder  these  uncertainties,  some  satraps  stood  accused 
of  having  pillaged   rich  temples,  and   committed  acts  of   violence 
toward   individuals.     Apart   from  all   criminality,   real   or  alleged, 
several  of  them,  also,  had  taken  into  pay  bodies  of  mercenary  troops,' 
partly  as  a  necessary  means  of  authority  in  their  respective  districts,' 
partly  as  a  protection  to  themselves  in  the  event  of  Alexander's  de- 
cease.    Respecting  the  conduct  of   the  satraps  and  their  ofHcers, 
many  denunciations  and  complaints  were  sent  in,  to  which  Alexanl 
der  listened  readily  and  even  eagerly,  punishing  the  accused  with 
indiscrnninate  rigor,  and  resenting  especially  the  suspicion  that  they 
had  calculated  upon  his  death.     Among  those  executed,  were  Abu- 
lites,  satrap  of  Susiana.  with  his  son  Oxatlires;  the  latter  was  even 
slain  by  the  hands  of  Alexander  himself,  with  a  sarLssa— the  dispen- 
sation of  punishment  becoming  in   his  hands   an   outburst   of  ex- 
asperated temper.     He  also  dispatched  peremptory  orders  to  all  the 
satraps,  enjoining  them  to  dismi.^s  their  mercenary  trooos  without 
delay.     This  measure  produced  considerable  effect  on  the  condition 
of  Greece— about  which  I  shall  speak  in  a  subsequent  chapter.     Har- 
palus,  satrap  of  Babylon  (about  whom  also  more,  presently),    having 
squandered  large  sums  out  of  the  revenues  of  the  post  upon  osten- 
taikous  luxury,  became  terrified  when  Alexander  was  approaching 
busiana,  and  tied  to  Greece  with  a  larire  treasure  and  a  small  body 
of  soldiers.    Serious  alarm  was  felt  among  all  the  satraps  and  ofUcers, 
innocent  as  well  as  guilty.     That  the  most  iruilty  were  not  those 
w.)o  fared  worst,  we  may  see  by  the  case  of  Kleomenes  in  E<n-pt, 
who  remained  unmolested  in  his  government,  though  his  iniciulties 
were  no  secret. 

Among  the  Macedonian  soldiers,  discontent  had  been  perpetually 
growing,  from  the  numerous  proofs  which  they  witnessed  that  Alex- 
ander had  made  his  election  for  an  Asiatic. character,  and  abnegated 
h;3  own  country.     Besides  his  habitual  adgption  of  tire  Persian  cos- 


ASIATIZING  MARRIAGES. 


657 


tume  and  ceremonial,  he  now  celebrated  a  sort  of  national  Asiatic 
marriage  at  Susa.     He  had  already  married  the  captive  Roxana  in 
Baktna;  he  next  took  two  additional  wives— Statira,daughter  of  Da- 
rius— and  1  arysatis,  daughter  of  the  preceding  king  Ociius      He  at 
the  same  time  caused  eighty  of  his  principal  friends  and   officers 
^  some  xx'ry  reluctantly,  to  marry  (according  to  Persian  rites)  wives 
selected  Irom  the  noblest  Persian  families,  providing  dowries  for  all 
ot  them.     He  made  presents  besides  to  all  those  Macedonians  who 
gave  in  their  names  as  having  married  Persian  women.     Splendid 
tesliviiies  accompanied  these  nuptials,  with  h(morary  rewards  di^tri- 
buled  to  favorites  and  meritorious  officers.     Macedonians  and  Per- 
sians, the  two  ini])erial  races,  one  in  Europe,  the  other  in  Asia   were 
thus  intended  to  be  amalgamated.     To  soften  the  aversion  of  the 
soldiers  genera  ly  toward  these  Asiatizing  marriages,  Alexander  issued 
proclamation  that  he  would  himself  discharire  their  debts   inV^n'^- 
all  who   owed  money  to  give  in  their  names  with  an  intimation  of 
the  sums  due.     It  was  known  that  the  debtors  were  numerous-   vet 
few  came  to  enter  their  names.     The  soldiers  suspected  the  procla- 
mation as  a  stratagem,  intended  for  the  purpose  of  detecting  such  aa 
were  spendthrifts,,  and  obtaining  a  pretext  for  puiiishment-  a  re- 
markable evidence  how  little  conJidcnce  or  affection  Alexander  now 
inspired,  and  how  completely  the  sentiment  entertained  toward  him 
was  that  of  fear  mingled  with  admiration.     He  himself  was  much 
hurt  at  their  mistrust,  and  openly  complaiue<l  of  it;  at  the  same  lime 
proclaiming  that  paymasters  and  tables  should  be  planted  openly  in 
the  camp,  and  that  any  soldier  might   come  and  ask  for  money 
enough  to  pay  his  debts,  without  being  bound  to  give  in  his  name 
:'i^'?7  1  A^  """^PJ^^y;  ^l^^T  now  made  application  in  such  numbers  that 
the  total  distributed  was  prodigiously  great;  reachinfr,  acc^ordin'^-  to 
some   to  10,000  talents-according  to  Arrian,  to  not  less  than  20?000 
talents  or  £4,000,000  sterling. 

Large  as  this  donative  was,  it  probably  gave  but  partial  satisfac- 
tion, since  the  most  steady  and  well-conducted  soldiers  could  h-^ve 
received  no  benefit,  except  in  so  far  as  they  might  choose  to  come 
loi^ard  with  fictitious  debts.     A  new  mortification  moreover  was  in 
store  for  the  soldiers  generally.      There  arrived  from  the  various  sa- 
trapies-even  from  those  most  distant,  Sogdiana,  Baktria,  Aria  Dran- 
giana,  Arachosia,  etc.— contingents  of  young  and  fresh  native  troops 
Hniuuntmg  in  total  to  30,000  men;  all  armed  and  drilled  in  the  Mace- 
donian manner.     From  the  time  when  the  31acedonians  had  refused 
to  cross  the  river  Hyphasis  and  march  forward  into  India,  Alexan- 
der saw,  that  fcjrliis  large  aggressive  schemes  it  was  necessarvto  dis- 
band the  old  soldiers,  and  to  organize  an  army  at  once  more  fresh 
and  more  submissive.     He  accordingly  dispatched  orders  to  the  sa- 
traps  to  raise  and  discipline  new  Asiatic  levies,  of  vicrorous  native 
youths;  and  the  fruit  of  these  orders  was  now  seen.     Alexander  re- 
viewed the  new  levies,  whom  he  called  the  Epigoni,  with  gteat  sat- 


C58 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF   ALEXANDER. 


I 


i<=;faction  He  moreover  incorporatecl  many  native  Persians,  both 
officers  and  soldiers,  into  the  Companion-cavalry,  the  most  honorable 
service  in  the  army:  making  the  important  change  of  arming  them 
with  the  short  Macedonian  thrusting-pike  in  place  of  the  missile  i^er- 
Fiau  javelin.  They  were  found  such  apt  soldiers,  and  the  genius  ot 
Alexander  for  militarv  organization  was  so  consummate,  that  he  saw 
himself  soon  reletised'from  his  dependence  on  the  Macedonian  vet- 
erans •  a  chansie  evident  enouirh  to  them  as  well  as  to  him. 

The  novelty  and  success  of  Nearchus  in  his  exploring  voyage  had 
excited  in  Alexamlerau  eager  appetite  for  naval  operations.  Going 
on  board  his  fleet  in  the  Pasitigris  (the  Karun,  the  river  on  the  cast 
Mde  of  Susa)  he  sailed  in  person  down  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  surveyed 
the  coast  as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Tigris  and  then  sailed  up  the 
Litter  river  as  far  as  Opis.  Hephastion  meanwhile,  commanding 
tiie  army,  marched  by  land  in  concert  with  his  voyage  and  came  back 
to  Opis,"  where  Alexander  disembarked.  ,      *   .    •    i     • 

Sufficient  experiment  had  now-  been  made  with   the  Asiatic  levies 
to  enable  Alexander  lo  dispense  with  many  of  his  3Iacedonian  veter- 
ans    Calling  together  the  army,  he  intimated  his  intention  of  send- 
in'^-  home  those  who   were  untit   for  service,  either  from   age  or 
wounds,  but  of  allotting  to  them  presents  at  departure  siithcient  to 
place  them  in  an  enviable  condition,  and  attract  fresh  Macedonian 
substitutes.     On  hearing  this  intimation,  all  the  long-standing  dis- 
content of  the  soldiers  at  once  broke  out.     They  felt  themselves  set 
aside   as  worn  out  and  useless,— and  set  aside,  not  to  make  room  tor 
younWrmen  of  tlieir  own  country,  but  in  favor  of  those  Asiatics 
mto  whose  arms  their  king  had  now  passed     They  demanded  with 
a  loud  voice  that  he  should  dismiss  them  all— advising  him  by  way 
of  taunt  to  make  his  future  conquests  along  with  his  father  Ammon. 
These  manifestations  so  incensed  Alexander,  that  he  leaped  down 
from  the  elevated  platform  on  which  he  had  stood  to  speak,  rushed 
wiih  a  few  of  his  guards  among  the  crowd  of  soldiers,  and  seized  or 
cau^^ed  to  be  seized  thirteen  of  those  apparently  most  forward,  order- 
in^  them  immediately  to  be  put  to  death.-    The  multitude  were  thor- 
oifn-hly  overawed  and  reduced  to  silence,  upon  which  Alexander  re- 
mo°unted  the  platform  and  addressed  them  in  a  speech  of  considerable 
lenn-th.     He  boasted  of  the  great  exploits  of  Philip,  and  of  his  own 
stilf'-reater:   he  affirmed  that  all  the  benefit  of  his  conquests  had 
gone^o  the  Macedonians,  and  that  he  himself  had  derived  from  them 
nothinn-  but  a  double  share  of  the  common  labors,  hardships,  wounds 
and  perils.     Reproaching  them  as  base  deserters  from  a  king  who 
had  gained  for  them  all  these  unparalleled  acquisitions,  he  concluded 
by  giving  discharge  to  all— commanding  them  forllwith  to  depart. 
After  This  speech— teeming  (as  we  read  it  in  Arrian)  with  that  ex- 
orbitant self-exaltation  which  formed  the  leading  leature  in  his  char- 
acter—Alexander  hurried  away  into  the  palace,  where  he  remained 
Shut  up  foi-  two  days  without  admitting  any  one  except  his  immedi- 


PARTIAL  DISBANDING. 


659 


ate  attendants.     His  .guards  departed  along  with  him,  leavino-  the 
discontented  so.diers  stupefied  and  motionless.    Receiving  no  fu^'rther 
orders,  nor  any  of  the  accustomed   military  indications?  they  were 
left  in  the  helpless  condition  of  soldiers  constrained  to  resolve  for 
themselves   and  at  the  same  time  altogether  dependent  upon  Alexan- 
.  der  whom  they  had  offended.  On  the  third  dav,  thev  learned  Umthc 
had  convened  the  Persian  officers,  and  had  irwested  them  w        the 
chief  military  commands,  distributing  the   newly-arrived  Epjo-oni 
into  divisions  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  all  with  Macedonian  milita  "y 
titles,  and  passin,^  over  the  Macedonians  themselves  as  if  they  did 
not  exist.     At  Uiis  news  the  soldiers  were  overwhelmed  with  shame 
and  remorse.     They  rushed  to  the  gates  of  the  palace,  threw  do  vn 
their  arms   and  supplicated  with   tc^irs  and  grc^.ns  for  Alelnder's 
pardon      Presently  he  came  out,  and  was  himself  moved  to  teai-s  by 
seeing  their  prostmte  deportment.     After  testifying  his  full  recoil 
cihation    he  caused  a  solemn  sacrifice  to  be  celebrated,  coupled  with 
a  mulliludinous  banquet  of  mixed  Macedonians  and  Persians      The 
Gvecum   prophets,  the   Persian  magi,  and  all    the   guests    present 
umted  in  prayer  and  libation  for  f Ssion,  harmony,  a^nd  con^^nunUy 
of  empire,  between  the  two  nations.  communuy 

fJl'1  ^'I'V^'^^^te  victory  over  ids  own  soldiers  was  probably  as  grati- 
f}ing  t()  Alexander  as  any  one  gained  during  his  past  life!  can^  ,  I 
as  1   did  a  consoling  retribution  for  the  memorable  stoppa-e  on    1? 
hinks  of  llje  Hvphasis.  which  he  had  neither  forgotten  nor  f on- ive 
He  se  ected  10,600of  the  oldest  and  most  exhaus^ted  aniong  the  sc  b 

tlle'tin^o^'f  ''"  •  ^T-'  T^''\  ^^'"''''''''  '^'''^^^^  to  each  fuUV    un   1 
the  tune  of  arriv-jd  in  Macedonia,  with  a  donation  of  one  t-dent  be 

rem.!in  ^n  T''^''^  that  Kraterus,  who  was  in  bad  Jiealth  shoi^i 
remain  in  Europe  as  viceroy  of  Macedonia,  and  that  Antipater 
should  come  out  to  Asia  with  a  re-enforcement  of  troops.  Pu riu  nt 
to  Ins  resolu  ion.  the  10,000  soldiers  were  now  singled  out  for  return 
and  sepanited  from  the  main  army.  Yet  it  does  not  appear  that  t".ey 
actually  did  return,  during  the  ten  months  of  Alexander's  remaining 

Of  the  important  edict  issued  this  summer  by  Alexander  to  the 
Grecian  cities,  and  read  at  the  Olympic  festival  in  July-direct  n" 
e^ich  city  to  recall  its  exiled  citizens-I  shall  speak  in  a  future  chapter" 

Macedonia  wTT^^r^"'^  il''  "^W^^t  of  organizing  a  land  force  half 
Macedonian,  half  Asiatic.     But  since  the  expedition  of  Nearchus,  he 

1  cirv^'^s'in'rS"^'^"  %^'''^'  ff^"^^^'"°  '^^  ^'^'  ""^^^^  force  also; 
nmWf.  f  ^^"^'^  •''''  indispensable  condition  toward  his  immediate 
r  Zf  ?/\  conquering  Arabia,  and  of  pushing  both  nautical  explo- 
caZ  u  '^^-^''^^^^^^f  "ent  from  the  Persian  Gulf  round  the  Arabian 
coast,  lie  dispatched  oniers  to  the  Phenician  ports,  directinn-  that  a 
numerous  fleet  should  be  built ;  aad  that  the  ships  should  then  be  taken 
^pieces  and  conveyed  across  to  Thapsakus  on  the  Euphrates 
whence  tbey  would  sail  down  to  Babylon.     At  that  pla^,  he  dl- 


660        MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


EXTERMINATION  OF  THE  KOSS.EL 


CGI 


I 


rected  the  ronstrurlion  of  other  ships  from  the  numerous  cypress 
trees  around — as  well  as  the  formation  of  an  enormous  harbor  in  the 
river  at  Hahvlon.  adequate  to  the  aceommodation  of  1000  shij^s  of  war. 
3iikkalus,  a" Greek  of  Klazomeuae,  was  sent  to  Phenicia  with  500  tal- 
ents, to  enlist,  or  to  purchase,  seamen  for  the  crews.  It  was  calcula- 
ted that  these  preparations  (probably  under  the  superintendence  of 
Nearchus)  would  be  completed  by  the  spring,  for  which  period  con- 
tinirents  were  summoned  to  Babylon  for  the  expedition  against 
Arabia. 

In  the  mean  time,  Alexander  himself  paid  a  visit  to  Ekbatana,  the 
ordinary  summer  residence  of  the  Persian  kings.     He  conducted  his 
army  by  leisurely  marches,  reviewing  bv  the  way  the  ancient  regal 
parks  of  the  celebrated  breed   called  Kisa^an  h'orses— now  greatly 
reduced  in  number.     On  the  march,  a  violent  altercation  occurred 
between  his  personal  favorite,  HepluTStion, — and  his  secretary,  Eu- 
menes,  the  most  able,  dexterous,  and  long  sighted  man  in  his  service. 
Eumenes,  as  a  Greek  of  Kardia,  had  been  always  regarded  with  slight 
and  jealousy  by  the  IVIacedonian  officers,  especially  by  IIepha?stion: 
Alexander  now^^took  pains  to  reconcile  the  two,  experiencing  no  diffi- 
culty with  Eumenes,  but  much  with  Hepha'stion.     During  his  stay 
at  l!kbatana,  he  celebrated  magniticent  sacriticcs  and  festivities,  with 
gymnastic  and  musical  exhibitions,  which  were  further  enlivened, 
according  to  the  Macedonian  habits,  by  banquets  and  exccfsive  wine- 
drinking.     Amid  these  proceedings,  Hepha'stion  was  seized  with  a 
fever.      The  viixor  of  his  constitution  emboldened  him  to  neglect 
all  care  or  reffinien,  so  that  in  a  few  days  the  disease  carried  liim  off. 
The  final  crisis  came  on  suddenly,  and  Alexander  was  ^\arned  of  it 
while  sittinic  in  the  theater;  but  though  he  instantly  hurried  to  the 
bedside,  he'found  Hephiestion  already  dead.     His  sorrow  for  this 
loss  was  unbounded,  manifesting  itself  in  excesses  suitable  to  the  gen- 
eral violence  of  his  im])ulses.  whether  of  affection  or  of  anlii)athy. 
Like  Achilles  mourning  for  Patr(»klus,  he  cast  himself  on  the  ground 
near  the  dead  bodv,  and  remained  there  wailing  for  several  hours; 
he  refused  all  care',  and  even  food,  for  two  da3's;  hecuthishairclosy, 
and  commanded  that  all  the  horses  and  mules  in  the  cami)  should 
have  their  manes  cut  close  also;  he  not  only  suspended  the  festivities 
but  interdicted  all  music  and  every  sign  of  joy  in  the  camp;  he  di- 
rected that  the  battlements  of  the  walls  belonging  to  the  neighbor- 
ing cities  should  be  struck  off ;  he  hung,  or  crucified,  the  physician 
Glaukias  who  had  prescribed  for  HephcTstion;  he  ordered  that  a  vast 
funeral  pile  should  be  erected  at  Babvlon,  at  a  cost  given  to  us  as 
10.000  talents  (£2,300,000),  to  celebrate  the  obsequies',  he  sent  mes- 
sengers to  the  oracle  of  Ammon,  to  inquire  whether  it  was  permitted 
to  worship  Ilephsestion  as  a  god.     Many  of  those  around  him,  ac- 
commodating themselves  to  this  passionate   impulse  of   the  ruler, 
began  at  once  to  show  a  sort  of  worship  toward  the   deceased,  by 
devoting  to  him  themselves  and  their  arms;  of  which  Eumenes  set  tlje 


example,  conscious  of  his  own  personal  danger,  if  Alexander  should 
suspect  him  of  being  pleased  at  the  death  of  his  recent  rival.  Per- 
dikkas  was  instructed  to  convey  the  body  in  solemn  procession  to 
Bahylon,  there  to  be  burnt  in  state  when  preparations  should  be 
completed. 

Alexander  stayed  at  Ekbatana  until  winter  was  at  hand,  seekin<T 
distraction  from  his  grief  in  exaggerated  splendor  of  festivals  and 
ostentation  of  life.  His  temper  became  so  much  more  irascible  and 
furious,  that  no  one  approached  him  without  fear,  and  he  was  propi- 
tiated by  the  most  extravagant  flatteries.  At  length  lie  roused  him- 
self and  found  his  true  consohitiou,  in  gratifying  the  primary  pas- 
sions of  his  nature— fighting  and  man-hunting.  Between  3Iedia  and 
Persia,  dwelt  the  tribes  called  Kossiei,  amid  a  region  of  lofty,  track- 
less, inaccessible  mountains.  Brave  and  predatory,  they  had'  defied 
the  attacks  of  the  Persian  kings.  Alexander  now  conducte(l 
ag;;iinst  them  a  powerful  force,  and  in  spite  of  increased  difficulties 
arising  from  the  wintry  season,  pushed  them  from  point  to  point,  fol- 
lowing them  into  the  loftiest  and  most  impenetrable  recesses  of  their 
mountains.  These  efforts  were  continued  for  forty  days,  under  him- 
self and  Ptolemy,  until  the  entire  male  population  was  slaia;  which 
passed  for  an  acceptable  offering  to  the  manes  of  Ilepha^stiou. 

Not  long  aftervvard,  Alexander  commenced  his  progress  to  Baby- 
lon; but  in  slow  marches,  further  retarded  by  various  foreign  embas- 
sies which  met  him  on  the  road.  So  widely  liad  the  terror  of  his 
name  and  achievements  been  s])read,  that  several  of  these  envoys 
came  from  the  most  distant  regions.  There  were  some  from  the 
various  tribes  of  Libya— from  Carthage— from  Sicily  and  Sai'dinia— 
from  the  Illyrians  and  Thracians— from  the  Lucanians.  Bruttians 
and  Tuscans,  in  Italy— nay,  even  (some  affirmed)  from  tlie  Romans! 
as  yet  a  people  of  moderate  power.  But  there  were  other  names  yet 
more  surprising— iElliiopians,  from  the  extreme  south,  beyond  E"-ypt 
—Scythians  from  the  north,  beyond  the  Danube— Iberians  and  Gauls, 
from  the  far  west,  beyond  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  Lej^ates  also  ar- 
rived from  various  Grecian  cities,  partly  to  tender  consrratulations  and 
compliments  upon  his  matchless  successes,  partly  lo  remonstrate 
against  his  sweeping  mandate  for  the  general  restoration  of  the  Gre- 
cian exiles.  It  was  remarked  that  these  Grecian  lej2:ates  approached 
him  \yith  wreaths  on  their  heads,  tendering  goldeu'wreaths  to  him, 
—as  if  they  were  coming  into  the  presence  of  a  god.  The  proofs 
which  Alexander  received,  even  from  distant  tribes  with  names  and 
costumes  unknown  to  him,  of  fear  for  his  enmity  and  anxiety  for 
his  favoi-,  were  such  as  had  never  been  shown  to  any  historical  per- 
son, and  such  as  entirely  to  explain  his  superhuman  arrogance. 

In  the  midst  of  this  exuberant  pride  and  good  fortune,  however. 

dark  omens  and  prophecies  crowded  upon  him  «s  he  ai^proached 

Babylon.     Of  these  the  most  remarkable  was,  the  warning  of  the 

•Giuddean  priests,  who  apprised  him  soon  after  he  crossed  the  Tigris, 


662        MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

that  it  would  be  dangerous  for  him  to  enter  that  city,  and  exhorted 
him  to  remain  outside  of  the  gates.  At  tirst  lie  was  iuchned  to  obey ; 
but  his  scruples  were  overruled,  either  by  arguments  from  the  Greek 
bophist  Anaxarchus,  or  by  the  shame  of  shultiiig  liimself  out  from 
I  he  most  memorable  city  of  the  empire,  where  his  great  naval  piep- 
a-.alions  were  now  going  on.  He  found  Nearchus  with  Ills  tieet, 
who  liad  conse  up  from  the  mouth  of  the  river,— and  also  the  Fhipa 
directed  to  be  huilt  in  Phenicia,  which  liad  come  down  the  river 
from  ThHp>ak.us,  togeiher  with  large  numbers  of  seafaring  men  to 
serve  aboard.  The  ships  of  eypresswood,  and  the  large  docks,  which 
he  had  ordered  to  be  constructed  at  Babylon,  were  likewise  in  full 
progJX'ss.  lie  lo>t  no  time  in  concerting  with  Nearchus  the  details 
of  -du  expedition  into  Arabia  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  by  his  land  force 
and  naval  force  co  operating.  From  various  naval  officers,  who  had 
been  sent  to  .survey  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  now  made  their  reports, 
he  learned,  that  though  there  were  no  serious  difticulties  within  it  or 
along  its  southern  coast,  yet  to  double  the  eastern  cape  which  termi- 
nated that  coast — to  circumnavigate  the  unknown  peninsula  of  Ara- 
bia,—and  thus  to  reach  the  Red^Sea— was  an  enterprise  perilous  at 
least,  if  not  impracticable.  But  to  achieve  that  which  other  men 
Ihouoht  impracticable,  was  the  leading  passion  of  Alexander.  ^  He 
resolved  to  circumnavigate  Arabia  as  well  as  to  conquer  the  Arabians, 
from  whom  it  was  sufficient  offense  that  they  had  sent  no  envoys  to 
him.  He  also  contemplated  the  foundation  of  a  great  maritime  city 
in  the  interior  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  to  rival  in  wealth  and  commerce 
tlic. cities  of  Phenicia. 

Amid  preparations  for  this  expedition— and  while  the  mimense 
funeral  pile  destined  for  Hephtestion  was  being  built— Alexander 
sailed  down  the  Euphrates  to  the  great  dyke  calUd  Pallakopas, 
about  ninety  miles  below  Babylon;  a  sluice  constructed  by  the  an- 
cient Assvrian  kings,  for  the  purpose  of  being  opened  when  the  river 
was  too  full,  so  as  to  let  off  the  water  into  the  interminable  marshes 
stretching  out  near  the  wester--  bank.  The  sluice  being  reported  not 
to  work  well,  he  projected  the  construction  of  a  new  one  somewhat 
further  down.  lie  then  sailed  through  the  Pallakopas  in  order_  to 
survey  the  marshes,  together  with  the  tombs  of  the  ancient  Assyrian 
kinirs  which  had  been  erected  among  them.  Himself  steering  his 
vessel,  with  the  kausia  on  his  head,  and  the  regal  diadem  above  it, 
he  passed  some  lime  among  these  lakes  and  swamps,  which  were  so 
extensive  that  his  fleet  lost  the  way  among  them.  He  stayed  long 
enough  also  to  direct,  and  even  commence,  the  foundation  of  a  new 
citv,  in  what  seemed  to  him  a  convenient  spot. 

On  returning  to  Babvlon,  Alexander  found  large  re-enforcements 
arrived  there— partly  under  Philoxenus,  Menander,  and  Menidas  from 
•Lydiaand  Karia— partly  20,000  Persians,  under  Peukestes  the  satrap. 
He  caused  these  Persians  to  be  incorporated  in  the  files  of  the  Mace- 
donian phalanx.    According  to  the  ctanding  custom,  each  of  thesis 


FUNERAL  OF  HEPILESTION. 


063 


files  was  sixteen  deep,  and  eacli  soldier  «N'as  armed  with  the  long  pike 
or  sarissa  wielded  by  two  liands;  the  loehage,  or  front-rank  man, 
being  always  an  officer  receiving  double  pay,  of  great  strength  and 
attested  valor — and  those  second  and  third  in  the  tile,  as  well  as  the 
rearmost  man  of  all,  being  likewise  strong  and  good  men,  receiving 
larger  pay  than  the  rest.  Alexander,  in  his  new  arrangement,  re- 
tained the  first  three  ranks  and  the  rear  rank  imchanged,  as  well  as 
the  same  depth  of  file;  but  he  substituted  twelve  Persians  in  place  of 
the  twelve  Macedonians  who  followed  after  the  third-rank  man;  so 
that  the  file  was  composed  first  of  the  lochago  and  two  other  chosen 
Macedonians,  each  armed  with  the  sarissa — then  of  twelve  Persians 
armed  in  their  own  manner  with  bow  or  javelin — lastly,  of  a  Mace- 
donian with  his  sarissa  bringing  up  the  rear..  In  this  3Iacedonico- 
Persian  file,  the  front  would  have  only  three  projecting  pikes, 
instead  of  five,  which  the  ordinary  Macedonian  phalanx  presented; 
but  then,  in  compensation,  the  Persian  soldiers  would  be  able  to 
hurl  their  javelins  at  an  advancing  enemy,  over  the  heads  of  their 
three  front-rank  men.  The  supervening  death  of  Alexander  pre- 
vented the  actual  execution  of  this  reform,  interesting  as  being  his 
last  project  for  amalgamating  Persians  and  Macedonians  into  one 
military  force. 

Besides  thus  modifying  the  phalanx,  Alexander  also  passed  in 
review  his  fleet,  which  was  now  fully  equipped.  The  order  was 
actually  given  for  departing,  so  soon  as  the  obsequies  of  Hephaistion 
should  be  celebrated.  This  was  the  last  act  which  remained  for  him 
to  fulfill.  The  splendid  funeral  pile  stood  ready — two  hundred  feet 
high,  occupying  a  square  area,  of  which  the  side  was  nearly  one 
furlong,  loaded  with  costly  decorations  from  the  zeal,  real  and  simu- 
lated, of  the  Macedonian  officers.  The  invention  of  artists  was  ex- 
hausted, in  long  discussions  with  the  king  himself,  to  produce  at  all 
cost  an  exhibition  of  magnificence  singular  and  stupendous.  The 
outlay  (probably  with  addition  of  the  festivals  immediately  follow- 
ing) is  stated  at  12,000  talents,  or  £2,760,000.  sterling.  Alexander 
awaited  the  order  from  the  oracle  of  Ammon,  having  sent  thither 
messengers  to  inquire  what  measure  of  reverential  honor  he  might 
properly  and  piously  show  to  his  departed  friend.  The  answer  was 
now  brought  back,  intimating  that  Hephaestion  was  to  be  worshiped 
as  a  Hero — the  secondary  form  of  worship,  not  on  a  level  with  that 
paid  to  the  gods.  Delighted  with  this  divine  testimony  to  Hephaes- 
tion,  Alexander  caused  the  pile  to  be  lighted,  and  the  obsequies  cele- 
brated, in  a  manner  suitable  to  the  injunctions  of  the  oracle.  Ho 
further  directed  that  magnificent  chapels  or  sacred  edifices  should  be 
erected  for  the  worship  and  honor  of  Hephaestion.  at  Alexandria  in 
Egypt, — at  Pella  in  Macedonia,  and  probably  in  other  cities  also. 

Respecting  the  honors  intended  for  Hephtestion  at  Alexandria,  ho 
addressed  to  Kleomenes  the  satrap  of  Eirypt  a  dispatch  which  be- 
comes in  part  known  to  us.    I  have  already  stated  that  Kleomenes 


664       MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 


was  among  the  worst  of  the  satraps;  having  committed  multiplied 
public  crimes,  of  which  Alexander  was  not  uninformed.  The  regal 
dispatch  enjoined  him  to  erect  in  commemoration  of  Ilephaestion 
ft  chapel  on  the  terra  firma  of  Alexandria,  witii  a  splendid  turret  in 
the  islet  of  Pharos;  and  to  provide  besides  that  all  mercantile  written 
contracts,  as  a  condition  of  validity,  sliould  be  inscribed  with  the 
name  of  Hephiestion.  Alexander  concluded  thus  .  "If  coming  I 
lind  the  Egyptian  temples  and  the  chapels  of  Ilephcestion  completed 
in  the  bes^  manner,  I  will  forgive  you  for  all  your  jjast  crimes; 
and  in  future,  whatever  magniuide  of  crime  you  may  commit,  you 
shall  suffer  no  bad  treatment  from  me."  This  di>patch  strikingly 
illustrates  how  much  the  wrongdoings  of  satraps  were  secondary  con- 
siderations in  his  view,  compared  with  splendid  manifestations  to- 
ward the  gods,  and  personal  attachment  toward  friends. 

The  intense  sorrow  felt  l>y  Alexander  for  the  death  of  IIepha?stion 
— not  merely  an  attached  friend,  but  of  the  same  age  and  exuberant 
vigor  as  himself — laid  his  mind  open  to  gloomy  forebodings  from 
numerous  omens,  as  well  as  to  jealous  mistrust  even  of  his  oldest  offi- 
cers. Antipater  csp'^cially,  no  longer  protected  against  the  calum- 
nies of  Olympias  by  tne  support  of  llephsstion,  fell  more  and  more 
into  discredit;  while  his  son  Kassander,  who  had  recently  come  into 
Asia  with  a  ]NIacedonian  re-enforcement,  underwent  from  Alexander 
during  irascible  moments  much  insulting  violence.  In  spite  of  the 
dissuasive  warning  of  the  Chaldean  priests,  Alexander  had  been 
persuaded  to  distrust  their  sincerity,  and  had  entered  Babylon 
thomrh  not  without  hesitation  and  uneasiness.  However,  when,  after 
having  entered  the  town,  he  went  out  of  it  again  safely  on  his  expe- 
dition for  the  survey  of  the  lower  Euphrates,"he  conceived  himself  to 
have  exposed  them  as  deceitful  alarmists,  and  returned  to  the  city 
with  increased  confidence,  for  the  obsequies  of  his  deceased  friend. 

The  sacrifices  connected  with  these  obsequies  were  on  the  most 
prodigious  scale.  Victims  enough  were  offered  to  furnish  a  feast  for 
the  army,  who  also  received  ample  distributions  of  wine.  Alexander 
presided  in  person  at  the  feast,  and  abandoned  liimsclf  to  convivial- 
ity like  the  rest.  Already  full  of  wine,  he  was  persuaded  by  his 
friend  Medius  to  sup  with*  him,  and  to  ]iass  the  whole  night  in  yet 
further  drinking,  with  the  boisterous  indulgence  called  by  the  Greeks 
Komus  or  Revelry.  Having  slept  off  his  intoxication  during  the  next 
day,  he  in  the  evening  again  supped  with  ^ledius,  and  spent  a  sec- 
ond nidit  in  the  like  unmeasured  indulgence.  It  appears  that  he 
alreadv  had  the  seeds  of  a  fever  upon  him,  which  was  so  fatally  a;^- 
gravated  by  this  intemperance  that  he  was  too  ill  to  return  to  his 
palace.  Pie  took  the  bath,  and  slept  in  the  house  of  Medius;  on  the 
next  morning  he  was  unable  to  rise.  After  having  been  carried  out 
on  a  couch  to  celebrate  sacrifice  (which  was  his  daily  habit),  he  was 
obliged  to  lie  in  bed  all  day.  Nevertheless  he  summoned  the  generals 
to  ^  presence,  prescribing  -a,\[  the  details  of  the  impending  expedi- 


DEATII  OP  ALEXANDER. 


665 


tion,  and  ordering  that  the  land-force  should  begin  its  march  on  the 
fourth  day  following,  while  the  fleet,  with  himself  aboard,  would 
sail  on  the  fifth  day.  In  the  evening  he  was  carried  on  a  conch 
across  the  Euphrates  into  a  garden  on  the  other  side,  wdiere  he  bathed 
and  rested  for  the  night.  The  fever  still  continued,  so  that  in  the 
morning,  after  bathing  and  being  carried  out  to  perform  the  sacrifices, 
he  remained  on  his  couch  all  day,  talking  and  playing  at  dice  with 
Medius;  in  the  evening,  he  bathed,  sacrificed  again,  and  ate  a  light 
supper,  but  endured  a  bad  night  with  increased  fever.  The  next 
tw^o  days  passed  in  the  same  manner,  the  fever  becoming  worse  and 
worse;  nevertheless  Alexander  still  summoned  Nearchus  to  his  bed- 
side, discussed  with  him  many  points  about  his  maritime  projects, 
and  repeated  his  order  that  the  fleet  should  be  ready  by  the  third  day. 
On  the  ensuing  morning  the  fever  was  violent;  Alexander  reposed  all 
day  in  a  bathing-house  in  the  garden,  yet  still  calling  in  the  generals 
to  direct  the  filling  up  of  vacancies  among  the  officers,  and  ordering 
that  the  armament  should  be  ready  to  move.  Throughout  the  two 
next  days,  his  malady  became  hourly  more  aggravated.  On  the 
second  of  the  two,  Alexander  could  with  difficulty  support  the  being 
lifted  out  of  bed  to  perform  the  sacrifice;  even  then,  how^ever,  he 
continued  to  give  orders  to  the  generals  about  the  expedition.  On 
the  morrow,  though  desperately  ill,  he  still  made  the  effort  requisite 
for  performing  the  sacrifice;  he  was  then  carried  across  from  the  gar- 
den house  to  the  palace,  giving  orders  that  the  generals  and  ofiicers 
should  remain  in  permanent  attendance  in  and  near  the  hall.  He 
caused  some  of  them  to  be  called  to  his  bedside;  but  though  he  knew 
them  perfectly,  he  had  by  this  time  become  incapable  of  utterance. 
One  of  his  last  words  spoken  is  said  to  have  been,  on  being  asked  to 
whom  he  bequeathed  his  kingdom,  "  To  the  strongest  "  one  of  his  last 
acts  was  to  take  the  signet  ring  from  his  finger,  and  hand  it  to  Per- 
dikkas. 

For  two  nights  and  a  day  he  continued  in  this  state,  without  either 
amendment  or  repose.  Meanwhile  the  news  of  his  malady  had 
spread  through  the  army,  filling  them  with  grief  and  consternation. 
Many  of  the  soldiers,  eager  to  see  him  once  more,  forced  their  way 
into  the  palace,  and  were  admitted  unarmed.  They  passed  along  b}'- 
the  bedside,  with  all  the  demonstrations  of  affliction  and  sj^mpathy; 
Alexander  knew  them  and  made  show  of  friendly  recognition  as  well 
as  he  could;  but  w^as  unable  to  say  aw^ord.  Several  of  the  generals 
slept  in  the  temple  of  Serapis,  hoping  to  be  informed  by  the  god  i:i 
a  dream  whether  they  ought  to  bring  Alexander  into  it  as  a  suppliant 
to  experience  the  divine  healing  powder.  The  god  informed  them  in 
their  dream,  that  xVlexander  ought  not  to  be  brought  into  the  temple 
— that  it  would  be  better  -for  him  to  be  left  where  he  was.  In  the 
afternoon  he  expired — June  328  u.c. — after  a  life  of  thirty-t-wo  years 
and  eight  months — and  a  reign  of  twelve  years  and  eight  months. 

The  death  of  Alexander,  thus  suddenly  cut  off  by  a  fever  in  the 


I 


eeQ        MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

plenitude  of  health,  viijor,  and  aspirations,  was  an  event  impressive 
as  well  as  important  in  the  higiiest  i)0ssible  degree,  to  his  contem- 
poraries tar  and  near.  Wlien  the  tirst  report  of  it  was  brouglit.to 
Atlieus,  the  orator  Demades  exclaimed — "  It  cannot  be  true:  iT  Alex- 
ander were  dead,  the  whole  habitable  world  would  have  smelled  of  his 
carcass."  This  coarse,  buc  emphatic  comparison,  illustrates  the  im- 
mediate, powerful,  and  wide-reaching  impression  produced  by  the 
sudden  extinction  of  iIk?  great  conqueror.  It  was  felt  by  each  of  the 
many  remote  envoys  who  had  so  recently  conic  to  ])ropitiatethis  far- 
shooting  Apollo — by  every  man  among  the  nations  who  had  sent 
these  envoys — throughout  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  as  then  known 
— to  affect  either  his  actual  condition  or  his  probable  future.  The 
tirst  growth  and  development  of  JVIacedonia,  during  the-  twenty-two 
years  preceding  the  battle  of  Cha3roneia,  from  an  embarrassed  sec- 
ondary state  into  the  tirst  of  all  known  powers,  had  excited  the  aston- 
ishment of  contemporaries,  and  admiration  for  Philip's  organizing 
genius.  But  the  achievements  of  Alex:mder,  during  his  twelve  years 
of  reign,  throwing  Philip  into  the  shade,  had  been  on  a  scale  so 
much  grander  and  vaster,  and  so  completely  without  serious  reverse 
or  even  interruption,  as  to  transcend  the  measure,  not  only  of  human 
expectation,  hut  almost  of  human  Ijclief.  The  Great  King  (as  the 
King  of  Persia  was  called  by  excellence)  was,  and  had  long  been,  the 
type  of  worldly  j.owcr  and  felicity,  even  dow  n  to  the  time  when  Al- 
exander crossed  the  Hellespont.  Within  four  years  and  three  months 
from  tliis  event,  by  one  stupendous  defeat  after  another,  Darius  had 
lost  ;dl  his  AVestern  Empire,  and  had  become  a  fugitive  eastward  of 
the  Caspi:in  Gates,  escaping  captivity  at  the  liandsof  Alexander  only 
to  perish  by  those  of  the  j-atvap  Bessus.  All  antectdent  liistorical 
parallels — the  ruin  and  captivity  of  the  Lydian  Croesus;  the  expulsion 
and  mean  life  (;f  the  Syracusan  Dionysus,  both  of  them  impres- 
sive examples  of  the  mutability  cf  human  condition. — sank  into  trifles 
compared  with  the  overthrow  *of  this  towering  Persian  colossus.  The 
orator  ^Eschines  expressed  the  genuine  sentiment  of  a  Grecian  spec- 
tator, when  he  exclaimed  (in  a  speech  delivered  at  Athens  shortly  be- 
fore the  death  of  Darius) — "What  is  there  among  the  list  of  strange 
and  unexpected  events,  that  has  not  occurred  in  our  time?  Our  lives 
liave  transcended  the  linnts  of  humanity;  we  are  born  to  serve  as  a 
theme  for  incredible  tales  to  posterity.  Is  not  the  Persian  king — who 
dug  through  Atl)os  and  bridged  the  Hellespont, — who  demanded 
earth  and  water  from  the  Greeks, — who  dared  to  proclaini  himself 
in  public  epistles  master  of  all  mankind  from  the  rising  to  the  setting 
sun — is  not  he  now  struggling  to  the  last,  not  for  dominion  over 
others,  but  for  the  safety  of  his  own  person?  " 

Such  were  the  sentiments  excited  by  Alexander's  career  even  in 
the  nuddle  of  330  B.C.,  more  than  seven  years  before  his  death.  Dur- 
ing the  following  seven  years,  his  additional  achievements  had 
carried  astonishment  yet  further.     He  had  mastered,  in  defiance  of 


CHARACTER  OF  ALEXANDER. 


607 


fatigue,  hardship,  and  combat,  not  merely  all  the  eastern  half  of  tl.e 
Persian  empire,  but  imknown  Indian  regions  beyond  its  easternm 
limits.  Besides  Macedonia,  Greece,  and  Thrace,  he  iK)ssesb.  u 
all  that  inmiense  treasure  and  military  force  which  had  once  ren- 
dered the  Great  King  so  formitlable.  By  no  contemporary  man  ha.l 
any  such  power  ever  been  known  or  conceived.  With  tl^e  turn  of 
imaicination  then  prevalent,  many  were  doubtless  disposed  to  take 
hini'^for  a  god  on  earth,  as  Grecian  spectators  had  once  supposed 
with  regard  to  Xerxes,  when  they  beheld  the  innumerable  Persian 
host  crossing  the  Hellespont. 

Exalted  to  this  prodigious  grandeur,  Alexander  was  at  the  time  of 
his  death  little  more  than  thirty-two  years  old — the  age  at  which  a 
citizen  of  Athens  was  growing  into  important  commands;  ten  years 
h'ss  than  the  age  for  a  consul  at  Rome;  two  years  younger  than  the 
age  at  which  Timour  first  acquired  the  crown,  and  began  his  foreign 
conquests.  His  extraordinary  bodily  powers  were  unabated;  he  had 
acquired  a  large  stock  of  military  experience;  and,  what  was  still 
more  important,  his  appetite  for  further  conquest  was  as  voracious, 
and  his  readiness  to  purchase  it  at  the  largest  cost  of  toil  or  danger, 
as  complete,  as  it  had  been  when  he  first  crossed  the  Hellespont. 
Great  as  his  past  career  had  been,  his  future  achievements,  with  such 
increased  means  and  experience,  were  likely  to  be  yet  greater.  His 
ambition  would  have  been  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  the  con- 
quest of  the  whole  habitable  world  as  then  known;  and  if  his  Hfe 
had  been  prolonged,  he  would  probably  have  accomplished  it.  No- 
where (so  far  as  our  knowledge  reaches)  did  there  reside  any  military 
power  capable  of  making  head  against  him;  nor  were  his  sohliers, 
when  he  commanded  them,  daunted  or  bafiled  by  any  extremity  of 
cold,  heat  or  fatigue.  The  patriotic  feelings  of  Livy  dispose  him  to 
maintain  that  Alexander,  had  he  invaded  Italy  and  assailed  Romans 
or  Saninites.  w^ould  iiave  failed  and  perished  like  his  relative  Alex- 
ander of  Epirus.  But  this  conclusion  cannot  be  ac(-epted.  If  we 
grant  the  courage  and  discipline  of  the  Roman  infantry  to  have  \mn 
equal  to  the  best  infantry  of  Alexander's  army  the  same  cannot  be 
said  of  Roman  cavalry  as  compared  with  the  Macedonian  Compan- 
ions. Still  less  is  it  likely  that  a  Roman  consul,  annually  changed, 
would  have  been  found  a^natch  for  Alexander  in  military  genius  and 
combinations;  nor.  even  if  personally  equal,  would  he  have  pos- 
sessed the  same  variety  of  troops  and  arms,  each  effective  in  its 
separate  way,  and  all  conspiring  to  one  common  purpose— nor  t!:e 
same  unbounded  influence  over  "their  minds  in  stimulating  them  to 
full  elTort.  I  do  not  think  that  even  the  Romans  could  have  success- 
fullv  resisted  Alexander  the  Great;  though  it  is  certain  that  he  never 
throughoiit  all  his  long  marches  encountered  such  enendes  as  they, 
nor  even  such  as  Saninites  and  Lueanians— coml.iiung  courage,  pa- 
triotism, discipline,  with  effective  arms  both  for  defense  and  for  close 
combat. 


668       MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER 

Amon;^  all  the  qualities  Avhich  go  to  constitute  the  highest  military 
excellence,  either  as  a  general  or  as  a  soldier,  none  was  wanting  iu 
the  character  of  Alexander,  Together  with  his  own  chivalrous  cour- 
age— sometimes  indeed  both  excessive  and  unseasonable,  so  as  to  form 
.the  only  military  defect  which  can  be  fairly  imputed  to  him — we  trace 
iu  all  his  operations  the  most  careful  dispositions  taken  beforehand, 
vigilant  precaution  in  guarding  against  possible  reverse,  and  abun- 
dant resource  in  adapting  himself  to  new  contingencies.  Amid 
constant  success,  these  precautionary  combinations  were  never  dis- 
continued. His  achievements  are  the  earliest  recorded  evidence  of 
scientitic  military  organization  on  a  large  scale,  and  of  its  overwhelm- 
ing etfects.  Alexander  overawes  the  imagination  more  than  any 
other  personage  of  antiquit}',  by  the  matchless  development  of  all 
that  constitutes  effective  force — as  an  individual  warrior,  and  as 
organizer,  and  leader  of  armed  masses;  not  merely  the  blind  impetu- 
osity ascribed  by  Homer  to  Ares,  but  also  the  intelligent,  methodized, 
and  all-subduing  compression  ^vhich  he  personifies  in  Athene.  But 
all  his  great  qualities  were  fit  for  use  only  against  enemies;  in  which 
category  indeed  were  numbered  all  mankind,  known  and  unknown, 
except  those  who  chose  to  submit  to  him.  In  his  Indian  campaigns, 
amid  tribes  of  utter  strangers  we  perceive  that  not  only  those  w  ho 
stand  on  their  defense,  but  also  those  who  abandon  their  propert}-,  and 
flee  to  the  mountains  are  alike  pursued  and  j^laughtered. 

Apart  from  the  transcendent  merits  of  Alexander  as  a  soldier  and 
a  general,  some  authors  give  him  credit  for  grand  and  beneficent 
views  on  the  subject  of  imperial  government,  and  for  intentions 
highly  favorable  to  the  improvement  of  mankind.  I  see  no  ground 
for  adopting  this  opinion.  As  far  as  we  can  venture  to  anticipate 
what  woTdd  have  been  Alexander's  future,  we  see  nothing  in  pros- 
pect except  years  of  ever-repeated  aggression  and  conquest,  not  to 
be  concluded  until  he  had  traversed  and  subjugated  all  the  inhabited 
globe.  The  acquisition  of  universal  dominion — conceived  not  meta- 
phorically, but  literally,  and  conceived  with  greater  facility  in  con- 
sequence of  the  imperfect  geograpical  knowledge  of  the  tiine — was 
the  master-passion  of  his  soul.  At  the  momcoit  of  his  death,  he 
was  commencing  fresh  aggression  in  the  south  against  tlie  Arabians, 
to  an  indefinite  extent;  while  his  vast  projects  against  the  western 
tribes  in  Africa  and  Europe,  as  far  as  the  Pillars  of  Herakles,  were 
consigned  iu  the  orders  and  memoranda  confidentially  communicated 
to  Kraterus,  Italy,  Gaul  and  Spain,  would  have  been  succes- 
sively attacked  and  conquered;  the  enterprises  proposed  to  him 
when  in  Baktria  by  the  Chorasmian  prince,  Pharasmanes,  but 
postponed  then  until  a  more  convenient  season,  would  have  been 
next  taken  up,  and  he  would  have  marched  from  the  Danube 
northward  round  the  Euxine  and  Palus  M.TOtis  against  the  Scyth- 
ians and  the  tribes  of  Caucasus,  There  remained  moreover  "^  the 
Asiatic  regions  east  of  the  Hyphasis,  which  his  soldiers  had  refused 


HIS  IMMENSE  PROJECTS. 


6G9 


to  enter  upon,  but  which  he  certainlv  would  have  invaded  -it  a 
future  opportunity,  were  it  only  to  efface  the  poionant  huniilia- 
tion  of  havmg  been  compelled  to  relinquish  his  proclaimed  i)urpo^e 
Though  this  sounds  like  romance  and  hyperbole,  it  was  nothing- more 
than  the  real  msatiate  aspiration  of  Alexander,  who  looked"  upon 
every  new  acquisition  mainly  as  a  capital  for  acquiring  more-  •'  You 
are  a  man  like  all  of  us,  Alexander  (said  the  naked  Indian  to  him)— 
except  that  you  abandon  your  home  like  a  meddlesome  destroyer  to 
invade  the  most  distant  regions;  enduring  hardship  yourself  and 
inflicting  hardship  upon  others."  Now,  how  an  empire  thus  bound- 
less and  heterogeneous,  such  as  no  prince  has  ever  yet  realized  could 
have  been  administered  with  any  superior  advantages  to  subjects  it 
would  be  difficult  to  show.  The  mere  task  of  acquiring  and  maintain- 
ing—of keepmg  satraps  and  tribute-gatherers  in  authbritv  as  well  as 
in  subordination— of  suppressing  resistances  ever  Jiable^to  recur  in 
regions  distant  by  months  of  march— would  occupy  the  whole  life  of 
a  world-conqueror,  without  leaving  any  leisure  for  the  improvements 
suited  to  peace  and  stability,  if  we  give  him  credit  for  such  puiDoses 
in  theory.  '■ 

But  even  this  Inst  is  more  than  can  be  granted.     Alexanders  acts 
indicate  that  he  desired  nothing  better  than  to  take  up  the  traditions 
of  the  Persian  empire;  a  tribute-levying  and  army-levying  svstem 
under  Macedonians  in  large  proportion,  as  his  instruments; yet Virtly 
also   under  the   very  same  Persians  who  had  administered  before 
provided  they  submitted  to  him.     It  has  indeed  been  extolled  amon<^ 
his  merits  that  he  was  thus  willing  to  reappoint  Persian  grandees 
(putting  their  armed  force  however  under  the  command  of  a  Mace- 
donian officer)— and  to  continue  native  princes  in  their  dominions  if 
they  did  willing  homage  to  him,  as  tributary  subordinates.     But  all 
this  had  been  done  before  him  by  the  Persian  kings,  whose  system  it 
was  to  leave  the  conquered  princes  undisturbed,  subject  only  to  the 
payment  of  tribute,   and  to  the  ol)ligation  of  furnishing  a  military 
contingent  when  required.     In  like  manner  Alexander's  Asiatic  em- 
pire would  thus  have  been  composed  of  an  aggregate  of  satrapies  and 
<Iependent  principalities,    furnishing  money  and  soldiers-  in  other 
respects,  left  to  the  discretion  of  local  rule,*  with  occasional  extreme 
intlictions  of  punishment,  but  no  systematic  examination  or  control 
Upon  this,  the  condition  of  Asiatic  empire  in  all  ages,  Alexander  would 
have  gratted  one  special  improvement:  the  military  organization  of 
the  empire,  feeble  under  the  Achaemenid  princes,  would  have  been 
greatly  strengthened  by  his  genius,  and  by  the  able  officers  formed 
in  Ills  school,  both  for  foreign  aggression  and  for  iiome  control 

Ihe  Persian  empire  was  a  miscelJuneous  ai^greirate,  with  no  strono- 
Jeeling  of  nationality.  The  IVfacedonian  co^nqueror  who  seized  its 
throne  was  still  more  indifferent  to  national  sentiment.  He  was 
neither  Macedonian  nor  Greek.  Though  the  absence  of  ihis  prejudice 
has  sometimes  been  counted  to  him  as  a  virtue,  it  only  made  room  iu 


it 


t 


670       MILITAKY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXAKDER. 

mvomnion  for  prejtuliccs  still  worse.    The  substitute  for  it  was  an 
Txo,  W  a  It  pc.r'mal  I y  aud  self-estimation,   manifested  even  m  bis 
end  "t  yeaS;  and  inLmed  by  extraordinary  suecess  into  the  behet 
i  X4o  par^'ntage;  whieb,  while  selling Inni  above  the  idea  of  com- 
mu  ion\N'^tb"any  speeial  nationality,  made  him  conceive  all  mankind 
^^ubieetb  under  one  conimon  scepter  to  be  wielded  by  himselt.     To 
?bisuniver"il  empire  the  Persian  king  made  thenearest  approach,  ac- 
cod^u"  to    1,0  opinions  then  prevalent.      Accordmgly  Alexander, 
whei  victor  ous  accepted  the  position  and  pretensions  ot  the  oyer- 
rhrownpSn  court  as  approaching  most  n.™riy  to  his  full  due 
He  becanie  more  Persi.  n  than  eitlier  ilacedon.an  or  Greek.     V\  bile 
hims^U  "  doptiug,   as  far  as  he  could  safely  venture,  the  personal 
ImbiTs  of  the  Pe  °s  an  court,  he  took  studied  pains  to  trauslorm  his 
Macedonian  officers  -into  Persian  grandees,  encomagmg  and  even 
fort  in  '  intermarriaees  with  Persian  according  to  Persian  rites.     At 
1  rtbne  of  Uexander-s  death,  there  was  comprised,   in  his  written 
o  de  s  'iven  to  Kraterus,  a  plan  for  the  wholesale  transportM.on  of 
fnh  ibUants  boU,  out  of  Europe  into  Asia,  and  out  of  Asia  into  Europe, 
n  order  to  tt^se  these  populations  into  one  by  mulliplymg  mterraar- 
rH?i^  nd  intercourse    Such  reciprocal  translation  of  peoples  would 
;fe  been   elt  as  emin..nUv  odioiis,  and  could  not  have  been  acconi- 
Xhed  without  coercive  authority.     It  is  rash  to  speculate  on  t.nex- 
ecuted   purposes;  but.   as  far  as  we  can  judge,  such  compulsory 
m    .'  uS  o    the  different  races  promises  nothing  tavorable  to    he 
h!mpine1s  of  anv  of  ll.em.  though  it  might  serve  as  an  imposing 
nnveliv  and  memento  of  imperial  omnipotence.     . 

In  rlspect  of  intelligence  and  combining  genius,  Alexander  was 
lIeUen\c  tolhefull;  in  respect  of  disposition  and  purpose   no  one 
cmd  be  less  Hellenic.     The  acts  attesting  his  Oriental  violence  of 
impulse  umr.e"ured  self-will,  and  exaction  of  jeverence  above  the 
U    ts  of  humanity-have  been  already  recounted.     To  describe  1  mi 
,'   1^0.  o    Hellas,  imbtied  with  the  political  maxims  of  Aristotle, 
;  U  ben   on  the  systematic  diffusion  of  Hellenic  culture  tor  the  im- 
provement  of   mankind-is,  in   my  judgment,   an  estimate   of  h  s 
chiraeer  contrary  to  the  evidence.    Akxaader  is  indeed  said  to  have 
inv ittd  sn4estiois  from  Aristotle  as  to  the  best  mode  of  colomzmg; 
It  his  temper  altered  so  much,  after  a  few  years  of  Asiatic  con- 
uest    that  he  came  not  only  to  loce  all  deference  for  Aristotle  s 
?dviee  but  even  to  hale  him  bitterly.    Moreover,  though  the  philoso- 
pher's fuHsu-gcstio.K  have  not  been  preserved,  yet  we  are  to  Id  gen- 
e  ',llv  th  t  he  Tec  onunended  Alexander  to  behave  to  the  Greeks  as  a 
.aiero    resident,  or  limited  chiel-and  to  the  barbarians  (non-v 
He  lenesVasa  master;   a  distinction  substantially  coinciding  «ith 
tl  at  DO  nted  out  bv  Bi.rke  in  his  speeches  at  the  beginning  of  the 
-        n  ..rTcu  yya°,  between  the  principles  of  ^^vernmem  proper  to  be 
followed  bv  England  in  the  Amencnn  colonies  »■>'• '"  ^^   "^h  India^ 
Ko  Greek  "thinker  believed  the  Asiatics  to  be  capable  of  that  tree 


! 


ALEXANDER  AND  ARISTOTLE. 


671 


civil  polity  upon  winch  the  march  of  every  Grecian  community  wag 
based       Aristotle  did  not  wish  to  degrade  tlie  Asiatics  below  the 
level  to  which  they  had  been  accustomed,  but  rather  to  preserve  th(^ 
Greeks  from  bemg  degraded  to  the  same  level.     Now  Alexand(^r 
recognized  no  such  distinction  as  that  drawn  by  his  preceptor      He 
treated  Greeks  and  Asiatics  alike-not  by  elevating  the  latter  but  bv 
degrading  the  former.     Though  he  employed  all  indiscriminately  -is 
instruments,  yet  he  presently  found  the  free  speccli  of  Greeks  and 
even  ot  Macedonians,  so  distasteful  and  offensive,  that  his  nrefer 
ences  turned  more  and  more  in  favor  of  the  servile  Asiatic  sentiment 
and  customs.     Instead  of  hellenizing  Asia,  he  was  tending  to  asia- 
tize  3Iacedonia  and  Hellas.     His  temper  aud  character,  as  modified 
by  a  few  years  of  conquest,  rendered  him  quite  unfit  to  follow  the 
course  recommended  by  Aristotle  toward  the  Greeks-quite  as  unfit 
as  any  of  the  Persian  kings,  or  as  the  French  Emperor  Nanoleon    to 
endure  that  partial  frustration,  compromise,  and  smart  from  free 
criticism,  which  is  inseparable  from  the  position  of  a  limited  cliief 
Among  a  multitude  of  subjects  more  diverse-colored  than  even  the 
army  of  Xeixes,  it  is  quite  possible  that  he  midU  have  turned  his 
power  toward  the  improvement  of  the  rudest  portions      We  are  told 
(though  the  fact  is  difficult  to  credit,  from  hL  want  of  time)  that^^ 
abolished  various  barbarisms  of  the  Hyrkanians,  Arachosians,  and 
bogdians.      But  Macedonians  as  well  as  Greeks  would  have  been 
pure  losers  by  being  absorbed  into  an  immense  Asiatic  a"-o-reirate 

Plutarch  states  that  Alexander  founded  more  than  seventy  new 
cities  in  Asia,     bo  large  a  number  of  them  is  neither  veritiMh'le  nor 
probable,  unless  we  either  reckon  up  simple  military  posts,  or  borrow 
from  the  list  of  foundations  really  established  by  his  successors     Ex- 
cept Alexandria  in  Eoypt,  iione  of  the  cities  founded  by  Alexan- 
der himself  can  be  shown  to  have  attained  any  great  develoi.ment 
JNearly  all  were  planted  auKmg  the  remote,  warlike  and  turbulent- 
peoples  eastNX'^ud  of  the  Caspian  Gates.     Such  establishments  were 
really  fortified  posts  to  hold  the  country  in  subjection:  Alexander 
lodged  in  them  detnchinents  from  his  army,  but  none  of  these  de- 
tachments can  well  have  been  large,  since  he  could  not  afford  ma- 
terially to  weaken  his  army,  while  active  military  operations  were 
still  going  on,  and  while   further  advance  was  'in  contemplation. 
3lore  of  these  settlements  were  founded  in  Soirdiana  than  elsewhere- 
but  respecting  the  Sogdian  foundations,  we  know  that  the  Greeks' 
Whom  he  established  there,  chained  to  the  spot  only  by  fear  of  his 
power,  broke  away  in  mutiny  immediately  on  the  ne\vs  of  his  oeath' 
feome  Greek  sohliers  in  Alexander's  arniv  on  the  Jaxartes  or  the 
Wydaspes,  sick  and  weary  of  his  interminable  marches,  might  prefer 
being  enrolled  among  the  colonists  of  a  new  city  on  one  of  these  un- 
Known  riyers,  to  the  ever-repeated  routine  of  exhaustino-  duty      But 
It  IS  certain  that  no  volunteer  emiirrants  would  go  forth  to  settle  at 
distances  such  as  their  imaginations  could  hardly  conceive.     The  ab- 


I'r 


e72       MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

sorbins  appetite  of  Alexander  ^'as  conquest,  to  the  east  TN-cst  south 
and  north  the  cities  ^vhich  he  planted  were  established,  for  the  niost 
mrt  as  garrisons  to  maintain  his  most  distant  and  most  precarious 
acQuisitions.  The  purpose  of  colonization  was  altogether  subor- 
dinate; and  that  of  hellenizing  Asia,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  was  not 
even  contemplated,  much  less  realized. 

This  process  of  hellenizing  Asia-in  so  far  as  Asia  was  ever  hellen- 
izcd-which  has  often  been  ascribed  to  Alexander,  was  in  reality  the 
work  of  the  Diadochiwho  came  after  him;  though  his  conquests 
doubtless  opened  the  door  and  established  the  military  ascendency 
wdch  rendered  such  a  work  practicable.     The  position,  the  aspira- 
Tion.    Im    the  interests  of  these  Diadochi-Antigonus,  Ptolemy 
Seleukus   Lysimachus,  etc.-were  materially  different  from  those  of 
Alex'inder     They  bad  neither  appetite  nor  means  lor  new  and  re- 
mote conquest;  their  great  rivalry  w^is  with  each  other;  each  sought 
?o  strengthen  himself  near  home  against  the  rest.     It  became  a  mat- 
er of  ^^h  ion  and  pride  with  them,  not  less  than  of  interest,  to  found 
new  c  ies  immortalizing  their  family  names.     These  foundations 
were  chietlv  made  in  the  regions  of  Asia  near  and  known  to  Greeks, 
where  Alexander  had  planted  none.     Thus  the  great  and  numerous 
f^»undations  of  Seleukus  Nikator  and  his  successors  covered  Syria, 
^  Xo tamia,  and  parts  of  Asia  Minor.      All  these  regions  were 
known   o  Greeks,  ami  more  or  less  tempting  to  new  Grecian  immi- 
^•m  s-notoutof  reach  or  hearing  of  the  Olympic  and  other  testi- 
vds  as  the  Jaxartes  and  the  Indus  were.     In  this  way  a  considerable 
Mux  of  new  Hellenic  blood  was  poured  into  Asia  during  the  cen- 
urv  succeeding  Alexandei-probably  in  great  measure  from  Italy 
and  Sic  Iv,  where  the  condition  of  the  Greek  cities  became  more  and 
more  calamitous-besides  the  numerous  Greeks  who  took  service  as 
ndividua  s  under  these  Asiatic  kings.     Greeks,  and   Macedonians 
sDeakin-  Greek,  became  predominant,  if  not  in  numbers,  at  least  in 
frportanc^.  tliroughout  most  of  the  cities  in  Western  Asia.     In  pai- 
™uhr  the  Macedonian  military  organization,  discipline  and  admin- 
m  Von   were  maintained  systematically  among  these  Asiatic  kings 
in  the  account  of  the  battle  of  Magnesia,  fought  by  the  Seleukid 
kin'^  Antiochus  the  Great  against  the  Romans  in  190  B.C.,  the  Mace- 
donlan  Dhalanx   constituting  the  main  force  of  his  Asiatic  army,  ap- 
P^s  hi  ail  its  completeness:  just  as  it  stood  under  Philip  and  Perseus 

^%Vhrn'^i''tt  said,^^  that  Asia  became  hellenized  under  Al- 

exander s  successors,  the  phrase  requires  explanation.  Hellenism 
r^roperlv  so  called-the  a,-gregate  of  habits,  sentiments,  energies,  and 
intelligence  manifested  bv  the  Greeks  during  their  epoch  of  auton^ 
omy-nr^^^^  passed  over  into  Asia;  neither  the  highest  qualities  of 
the  Greek  mind  nor  even  the  entire  character  of  ordinary  Greeks. 
This  genuine  Hellenism  could  not  subsist  under  the  overruling  com- 
pression of  Alexander,  nor  even  under  the  less  irresistible  pressure  oi 


HOW  FAR  ASIA  WAS  HELLENIZED. 


673 


his  successors.     Its  living  force,  productive  genius,  self-or«>-iiiizin«r 
power,  and  active  spirit  of  political  communion,  were  slitFed    and 
gradually  died  out.    All  that  passed  into  Asia  was  a  faint  and  imrti-il 
resemblance  of  it,  carrying  the  superticial  marks  of  the  ori-anal 
The  administration  of  llie  Greco  Asiatic  kings  was  not  Ilelleniclis  it 
has  been  sometimes  called),  but  completely'" ^^spotic   as  that  of  the 
Persians  had  been  before.     Whoever  follows  their  history   until  the 
period  of  Roman  dominion,  will  see  that  it  turned  upoii  the  tastes 
temper,  and  ability  of  the  prince,  and  on  the  circumstances  of  the 
regal  family.     Viewing  their  government  as  a  system,  its  i)rominent 
ditlerence,  as  compared  with  their  Persian  predecessors,  consisted  in 
their  retaining  the  military  traditions  and  organization  of  Philip  and 
Alexander;  an  elaborate  schem<,'  of  discipline  and  m:uieuveriu<'-  which 
could  not  be  kept  up  without  permanent  official  grades  and  a'hi-hcr 
measure  of  intelligence  than  had   ever  been  displaved  under^liie 
Acha}menid  kings,  who  had  no  military  school  or  training  whatever 
Hence  a  great  number  of  individual  Greeks  found  employment  iii 
the  military  as  w^ell  as  in  the  civil  service  of  these  Greco-Asiatic 
kiuo-s.     The  intelligent  Greek,  instead  of  a  citizen  of  Hellas  became 
the  instrument  of  a  foreign  prince.;  the  details  of  government  were 
managed  to  a  great  degree  by  Greek  officials,  and  always  in  the 
Greek  language. 

Moreover,  besides  this,  there  was  the  still  more  important  fact  of 
the  many  new  cities  founded  in  Asia  by  the  Seleukida3  and  the  other 
contemporary  kings.      Each  of  these  cities  had  a  consider.ihh^  i,,- 
iiision  of  Greek  and  Macedonian  citizens,  among  tlie  native  Orieni- 
als  located  here,  often   brought   by  compulsion   from  nei:'-hborin<'> 
villages.     In  what  numerical  ratio  these  two  elements  of  fiie  civir 
population  stood  to  each  other,  we  cannot  say.     But  the  Greeks  and 
Macedonians  were  the  leading  and  active  portion,  who  exercised  the 
greatest  assimilating  force,  g.ive  imposing  effect  to  the  public  mani- 
testations  of  religion,   had  wider  views  and  sympathies,  dealt  with 
the  central  government,  and  carried  on  that  contracted  measure  of 
municipal  autonomy  which  the  city  was  permitted  to  retain       In 
these  cities  the  Greek  inhabitants,  though  debarred  from  political 
ireetlom,  enjoyed  a  range  of  social  activity  suited  to  their  tastes      In 
each,  Greek  w^as  the  language  of  public  business  and  dealino--  each 
tormed  a  center  of  attraction  and  commerce  for  an  extensive' nei«di- 
horhood;  all  together,  they  were  the  main  Hellenic,  or  quasi-Hellenic 
element  in  Asia  undLM-  the  Greco-Asiatic  kings,  as  contrasted  with 
me  rustic  villages,    where   native  manners,    and   probably   native 
speech,  still   continued  with  little  modification.      But  the  Greeks 
ot  Antioch,  or  Alexandria,  or  Seleukeia,*  were  not  like  citizens  of 
At  liens  or    Jhebes,  nor  even  like  men  of  Tarentum  or  Ephesus 
vvhile  they  communicated  their  language  to  Orientals,  they  became 
themselves  substantially  orientalized.      Their  feelimis,    judgments 
ana  habits  of  action,   ceased  to  be  Hellenic.     Polybius,  when  he 


H  G.  IV. 


-22 


t  I 


574        MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  ALEXANDER. 

vkited  Alexandria,  looked  %vitli  surprise  and  aversion  on  the  Greeks 
Sere  resident  thouirh  tliey  were  superior  to  tlie  non-Hellenic  popu- 
H.ion  'vbo m  he  conliderei  wortldess.  Greek  social  ^^l^^^s  festivals, 
andle'^^^^^^^  passed  with  the  Hellenic  settlers  into  Asia;  all  becom- 
h^ct\Km^ed  and  transformed  so  as  to  suit  a  new  Asiatic  abode^ 
Tmnoit-  ift  social  and  political  consequences  turned  upon  the  dilTu- 
J  on  o  the  an^  a^e,  and  upon  the  establishment  o  suc^i  a  common 
medium  of  communication  throughout  Western  Asia.  But  rJtei  a  , 
thfS^  was  not  so  much  a  Greek  as  a  foreigner  with 

Grer^n   P^^^^^^^  ^^'^  superticial  manifestations;  dis- 

Umni^hed  fundamentally  from  those  Greek  citizens  with  whom  to 
present  history  has  bt^en  concerned.  So  he  would  have  been  consul- 
?rpd  bv  SoDhokles,  by  Thucydides,  by  Sokrates.       ,    ,      ,       .  . 

Thus  much  is  iecWsaiy/in  order  to  understand  the  bearing  o 
A^^lXconquests,  nc^  only  upc,n  the  Keltic  p<>rnihMic^  bu 
UDOU   Hellenic   attributes   and   peculiarities.      ^\  hile   cruslim^L^  u   • 
Seeks  as  communities  at  home,  these  conquests  opened  a  widei 
ran^e  to  the  Greeks  as  indiyiduals  abroad;  and  produce.l^perhaps 
Se^l^st  of  all  their  effects-a  .^reat  increase  of  ntercommunication 
mump'\cation  of  roads,  extension  of  commercial  aeal-g.  and  en  laired 
facilities  for  the  acquisition  of  geographical   ^^<>^^'^^'^^- „/,.^^.  . 
already  existed  in  the  Persian  empire  an  easy  and  conyenient  lONa 
?oad  (eVablished  by  Darius  son  of  Hystaspes,  and  described  as  ^^e]\ 
aradmired  by  Herodotus)  for  the  three  months'    ourney  between 
Sanlis  and  Susa;  and  there  must  haye  been  another  regular  ro.d 
from  Susa  and  Ekbatana  to  Baktria    Sog(iian^  and  Ind.a      .U^^^^^ 
Vnder  had  he  lived,  would  doubtless  haye  multiplied  on  a  still  lai.-er 
La  fil  ^communications  both  by  sea  and  land  between  the  yariou^ 
mrts  of  hTs  w^r  d-empire.     We  read  that  an^.ong  the  gigantic  pro]c^-ts 
?vlch  he  was  contemplating  when  surprised  by  death   one  was  the 
Construction  of  a  road  all  along  the  northern  eoas   of  f^''^^' "^^J^.^ 
«rtho  Pillars  of  Herakles.     He  had  intended  to  found  a  new  mari- 
time city  on  the  Pe^^^^^^  Gulf,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Euphrates,  and  o 
n^ui  much  outlay  for  regulating  the  flow  of  water  in  its  louei 
course      The  riyer  would  probably  have  been  thus  made  again  to 
affrd  the  same  convenience,  both  for  navigation  and  »•>•^^atlon   as 
U  appea^^^^  to  have  furnished  in  earlier  times  under  the  ^^^'^'^'^^y 
on-mn  kings.     Orders  had  been  also  given  for  constructing  a  fleet   o 
txDore  the  Caspian  Sea.     Alexander  bebeyed  that  sea  to  be  ton- 
ne&'ith  the  Eastern  Ocean,  and  intended  to  nuike  it  his  p<)mt,  o^ 
den'irture  for  circumnavi-ating  the  eastern  limits  of  Asia.   ^^  hitU 
coSntry  ye   remained  for  him  to  conquer     The  yovage  ^^]l^yV^ 
formed  by  Nearchus.  from  the  mouth  of  the  Indus  to  tha    of  the 
Euphr^^^^^^^  was  in  those  days  a  splendid  maritime  =^^^7;^!"^^"    .  ^ 

w-hFch  another  still  gi'cater  was  on  the  point  ^>y;;\^i^&,^^^^^^^^^e  Vt^^^ 
cumnavieation  of  Arabia  from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  the  Ked  .ta, 
tZgh  hSe  we  must  remark,  that  this  same  yoyage  (from  the  mouth 


CONDITION  OF  GREECE  IN  334  B.C. 


675 


of  the  In.liis  round  Arabia  into  tlie  Red  Sea)  had  been  performed  in 
thirty  months,  a  century  and  a  half  before,  by  Skylax  of  K^rvanda 
ur.der  the  orders  of  Darius  son  of  Hystaspes;  yet!  ufoul^h  reco^^^^^^^ 
by  Herodotus,  forgotten  (as  it  would  appear)  by  AlexSr  and  hi^ 
con  emporanes^     This  enlarged  and  systematic  explom  Ln  of  tt 
earth,  combined  with  increased  means  6f  communication  ZoncrlH 
miiabitants,  is  the  main  feature  in  AIexan(ler's  career  whicH^es^ents 
W.^rp?n"f  i^i  ^•^^^^^^^"f  q^ences  beneficial  to  humanity. ^"''' 
We  read  t.hat  Alexander  felt  so  much  interest  in  the  extension  of 
science,  t hat  ?ie  gaye  to  Aristotle  the  immense  sum  of  800  talents  ?n 
money,  placing  under  his  directions  several  thousand  men  for  the 
purpose  of  prosecuting  zoological  researches.     These  eS  Arationa 
.'ire  probably  the  work  of  those  enemies  of  the  philosopher  wlm 
decried  him  as  a  pensioner  of  the  Macedonian  court;  b^,t  t  is  prob^ 
able  enough  tha   Philip,  and  Alexander  in  tiie  early  part  of  his  rei-^n 
may  have  helped  Aristotle  in  the  dillicult  process  of  gettin?  o'e  her 
facts  and  specimens  for  observation-from  esteem  tS ward' hhS  ne^ 
son  ill.y,  rather  than  from  interest  in  his  discoveries.    The^ntXun 
turn  of  Alexander  was  toward  literature,  poetry  and  his  ory        -f! 
wasfond  of  the  Iliad  especially,  as  well  \aLf  tL  Anic    rSia^^^^ 
7J^V^'?f'''  •?? '"S  directed  to  send  some  books  to  him  if  & 
Asia    selected  as  the  most  acceptable  packet  yarious  t^oedies  of 
^schylus,  Sophokles.  and  Euripides,  with  the  dithyrambicl)^^^^^^^^ 
1  elestes  aud  the  histories  of  Phlistus.  ^imuic  poems  or 


CHAPTER  XCV. 

GRECIAN   AFFAIRS  FROM   THE   LANDING    OF  ALEXANDER  IN  ASIA  TO 

THE   CLOSE   OF   THE   LAMIAN   WAR. 

Even  in  334  b  c,  when  Alexander  first  entered  upon  his  A^i-itin 
campaigns,  the  Grecian  cities,  great  as  well  as  S.  K)  en  ^  M 
<  f  all  their  free  agency,  and  existed  only  as  appenda-^es  of  iL  kincr 
dom  ot  Macedonia.     Seyeral  of  them  were  occup.e    1  n  :^ Leedon  an 

cr  fo^'  :u;^:>^"^,  '^  '''^'^  f^r'^  -^^^  ^--^  "p-  -"  >  --3 

loite  i,)i  sippoit.  There- existed  iinionc:  tu-]n  tui  common  irl,-i  r.r 
publjc  .ent.nent  formally  pr„<.Inin,ed  n.Td  aef<Ml  o  rex 'c  sn  i  1 
n  su  led  Alexander  s  purpose  ,o  eneom-age.     The  mii  Peri  a,'  semi 

lection  of  -Allien  Demosllienes  was  wont  to  appeal   i,i  a,n!m'itii,<r  tho 
Atheiimns  to  action   again.t  Macedonia,  but'^now  ex  inct  a  d°.,  n 
planted  i,y  nearer  apprehensious-l.nd  been  converted  b^A  ex  uider 

mbmuT.  P^-'P''^'^''.''^  t  P'''^'"'''  ^T  l-^odship,  and  a  help  I'or  enSl 
submission  during  his  absence  tn  Asia.     Greece  had  become  «  nrnv 
.nco  of  Macedonia;   the  affairs  of  the  Greeks  (observrA^iswUe 


676 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


in  niustratiD-a  plnlosophical  discuss^ion)  are  'in  the  Imnds  of  lie 
kino- ''  A  pifblic  svDod  of  the  Gi  ec-ks  sat  from  time  to  time  at  Corinth ; 
bu  Tt  represented  onlv  pl.ilo-Macedonian  senliment ;  all  tha  we  know 
<f  i4pi oeeedings  eciisisted  in  congratuhitions  to  Alexander  on  his 
victories  The?e  is  no  Grecian  history  of  public  or  political  import: 
Xh^iJm^no  facts  except  the  local  and  municipal  details  o  each  city 
_'! the  streets  ami  fountains  which  ^ve  are  whitening."  to  use  a 
nhri<^e  of  Demosthenes— the  good  management  of  the  Athenian 
linMnces  bv  ihe  orator  Lvkurgus,  and  the  contentions  ot  orators 
respecting  private  disputes  or  politics  of  the  past 

But  tlum-h  Grecian  historv  is  thus  stagnant  and  suspended  during 
thf  firc^t  veins  of  Alexander's  Asiatic  campaigns,  it  might  at  any 
monient  liuve  become  animated  with  an  active  H^irit  of  belt-emanci- 
m  on  if  he  had  experienced  reverses,  or  it  the  Persians  had 
a  dni^tered  their  own  affairs  with  skill  and  vigor.  I  have  already 
!a  i  ItlnU  duringtlie  first  two  years  of  the  war,  the  Persian  flee 
^^omd  rather  To  sav.  the  Phenician  fleet  in  the  Persian  service) 
r  d  a  decided  superi.>ritv  at  sea.  Darius  possessed  untold  treasures 
.^•idch  mVdit  have  indeti'nitely  increased  that  superiority  and  multi- 
plied h^^n  cans  of  transmarine  action,  had  he  chosen  to-follow  tne 

Iv  •  of  Memnon,  by  acting  vigorously  from  the  .ea  ^^"^\^:^^^^  >  ^^^ 
the  defensive  by  land.  The  movement  or  quiescence  of  the  Gieeks 
Iheref ore  depended  on  the  turn  of  affairs  in  Asia;  as  Alexander  him- 

"Dmin";;!^^^.  of  334-333  B.C.,  Memnon  with  the  Persian  fleet 
appe  redtobe  making  proirress  among  the  ishnn  s  in  the  .Egean 
and   1  e  anti-Maccd(mran  Greeks  were  expecting  him  fur  her  west- 
^va n    in  E  i  )(Ba  and  Peloponnesus.     Their  hopes  being  dashed  Ivv'  his 
nexpecte     eTea.l    and  still  more  by  Darius's  abandonment  of  the 
Memnon^n  plans,  they  had   next  to  wait  for  the  chance  of  what 
mhhrbe  achieved  by  the  immense  Persian  land-force.     Even  down 
rTle  eve  o   the  battle  of  Tssus,  Demosthenes  and  others  (as  has 
a  ready  been  mentioned)  were  encouraged  by  their  corresponde-ii  s 
in  A  ia  to  anticipate  success  for  Darius  even  in  P'tehed  ba  Ue.     BiU 
after   the   ffreat  disaster  at  Issus.  during  a   year  and  a  half  (from 
November  333  B.C.,  to  March  or  April  331  b.c),  no  hope  was  possi- 
ble     The  Persian  force  seemed  extinct,  and  Darius  was  so  paralyzed 
bv   the  captivity  of  his  family,  that  he  suffered  even- the  citizens  of 
•J^-re  and  Gaza  to  perish  in  their  gallant  efforts  o    ^^f^"^^' ^^^^^^f 
tho  least  attempt  to  save  them.     At  length,  in  the  spring  of  331  b.c 

e  niospects  again  appeared  to  improve.  A  second  Persian  army, 
coun  le4  ike  the  flVlt,  was  assembling  eastward  of  the  Tigns; 
Alexander  advanced  into  the  interior,  many  weeks'  march  from  the 
;iore^  of  the  Mediterranean,  to  attack  them;  and  Ihe  Persians  doubt- 
less transmitted  encouragements  with  money  to  ^^'^''^''''%!^li;^. 
Greece  in  hopes  of  provoking  auxiliary  movements  Presently 
(October  331  B^c.)  came  the  calastrophe  at  Arbela;  after  which  no 


ATHENS  DURING  ALEXANDER'S  LIFE.  677 

demonstration  against  Alexander  could  have  been  attemptedwith  any 
reas  )iiable  hope  of  success,  '^ 

Sucli  was  the  varying  point  of  view  under  wiiich  the  contest  in 
Asia  presented  itself  to  Grecian  spectators,  during  the  three  years  and 
a  half  between  the  landing  of  Alexander  in  Asia  and  the  "battle  of 
Arbela.  As  to  the  leading  states  in  Greece,  we  have  to  look  at 
Athens  and  Sparta  only;  for  Thebes  had  been  destroyed  and  de- 
molished as  a  city;  and  what  had  been  once  the  citadel  of*^the  Kadmeia 
was  now^  a  Macedonian  garrison.  Moreover,  besides  that  garrison 
the  Boeotian  cities,  Orchomenus,  Platsea,  etc.,  were  themselves 
strongholds  of  Macedonian  dependence;  being  hostile  to  Thebes  of 
old,  and  having  received  among  themselves  assignments  of  all  the 
Iheban  lands.  In  case  of  any  movement  in  Greece,  therefore  An- 
tipater,  the  viceroy  of  Macedonia,  might  fairly  count  on  findiii"-  in 
Greece  interested  allies,  serving  as  no  mean  check  upon  Attica  * 

At  Athens  the   reigning  sentiment   was  decidedly  pacific.     Few 
were  disposed  to  brave  the  prince  who  had  just  given  so  fearful  an 
evidence  of  his  force  by  the  destruction  of  Thebes  and  the  enslave- 
ment of  the  Thebans.     Ephialtes  and  Charidemus,  the  military  citi- 
zens at  Athens  most  anti-Macedonian  in  sentiment,  had  been  de- 
manded as  ])riso!iers   by  Alexander,  and  had   withdrawn   to  Asia 
there  to  take  service  with  Darius.     Oiher  Athenians,  men  of  enero-y 
and  action,    had    followed  their  example,  and   had  fought  against 
Alexaniler  at  the  Granikus,  where  they  became  his  prisoners,  and  were 
sent  to  Macedonia  to  w<n-k   in  fetters  at   the  mines.     Ephialtes  per- 
ished at  the  siege  of  llalikarnassus,  w^hile  defending  the  place  with  the 
utmost  gallantry;  Charidemus  suffered  a  more  unworthy  death  from 
the  shameful  sentence  of  Darius.     The  anti-Macedonian  leaders  who 
remained  at  Athens,  such  as  Demosthenes  and  Lykurgus,  were  not 
generals  or  men  of  action,  but  statesmen  and  onitors.     They  were 
fully  aware  that  submission  to  Alexander  was  a  painful  necessity 
though  they  watched  not  the   less  anxiously  for  any  reverse  which 
might  happen  to  him,  such  as  to  make  it  possible  for  Athens  to  head 
a  new  struggle  on  behalf  of  Grecian  freedom. 

But  it  was  not  Demosthenes  or  Lykurgus  who  now  o-uided  the 
general  policy  of  Athens.  For  the 'twelve  vears  betw^een  the  de- 
struction of  Thebes  and  the  death  of  Alexander,  Pliokion  and  De- 
mades  were  her  ministers  for  foreign  affairs;  two  men  of  totally  op- 
posite characters,  but  coinciding  in  pacific  views,  and  in  looking  to 
tne  iiivor  of  Alexander  and  Antipater  as  the  principal  end  to  be  at- 
^juned.  Twenty  Athenian  triremes  w^ere  sent  to  act  with  the  Mace- 
^.onian  fleet  during  Alexander's  first  campaign  in  Asia;  these,  to- 
getner  with  the  Athenian  prisoners  taken  at  the  Granikus,  served  to 
hiiu  further  as  a  guarantee  for  the  continued  submission  of  the 
Athenians  generally.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  pacific  policy 
ot  I'hokion  was  now  prudent  and  essential  to  Athens,  though  the 
same  cannot  be  said  (as  I  have  remarked  in  the  proper  place)  for  his 


678 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


advocacv  of  the  like  policy  twenty  years  before  when  Philips 
p  nvcr  w^is  irrowin-  und  .night  have  been  arrested  by  yigxm)us  op- 
t,.,.itic)n  it  suired  the  purpose  of  Antipater  to  ensure  his  hold  upon 
Athens  by  frequent  presents  to  Demades,  a  man  of  uxurn.us  and 
ex  rava-ant  habits.  But  Phokion,  incorruptible  and  poor  to  the 
end,  dedined  all  siniihir  offers,  tliough  often  made  to  him  not  only 
bv  Antipater,  but  even  by  Alexander.  ,      .  •  iv,r 

'It  deserveJ  parliculav  notice,  that  though  the  Macedonizuig  policy 
wa-  now  decidedly  iu  the  ascendant-accepted,  even  by  dissentients, 
as  \he  only  course  admissible  under   the  circumstae.ces,  and  con- 
tirmed    the  more    by   each    successive    victory  of    Alexander-yet 
statesmen   like  Lykurgus  and  Demosthenes,  of  notorious  anti-A  ace- 
doAian  sentiment,  stilf  held  a  conspicuous  and   influential  posi  ion. 
thou«'h  of  course  restricted  to  matters  ot  internal  ad.nin.stration. 
Thus  Lvkur'ais  continued  to  be  the  real  acting  minister  of  finance, 
for  tiiiee successive  Punathenaic  intervals  of  four  years  each   or  lor 
an   uninterrupted  period   of  twelve    years.     He  superintended  not 
merelv  the  entire  collection,  buf  also  the  entire  disbursement  of  the 
Dublic revenue;  rendering  strict  periodical  account,  yet  with  a  finan- 
cial authority  greater  than   had  belonged   to  any  statesman   since 
Perikle^      He  inipioved  the  gvmnasia  and  stadia  of  the  city-mnlti- 
plied  the  donatives  and  sacred  furniture  in  the  temples.-enlar|ed 
or  constructed   anew,   docks  and   arsenals.-provided  n  considei- 
nble  Slock  of  arms  and  equipments,  miiitary  as  well  «?  .i^^val-and 
maintained  four  hundred  triremes  in  a  seaworthy  condition  for  t   e 
protection  of  Athenian  commerce.     In  these  extensive  functions  he. 
was  never  superseded,  though  Alexander  at  one  V'^^.'^\"  /^[iSIn 
the  surrender  of  his  person,  which  was  reiused  by  the  Athenian 
per.ple      The  main  cause  of  his  first  hold  iiiu>n  the  public  mind.was 
ins  known  and  indisputable  pucuniary  probity,  wherein  he  >vas  tne 

^'Ti\'i  Deimyi^e^^       he  did  not  hold  any  such  commanding  pub- 
lie  appointments  as  Lykurgus;    but  he  enjoyed  great  este-em  and 
svmi  athv  from  the  people  generally,  for  his  marked  line  of  public 
clmUd  Ilurincr  thr^  past      The  proof  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  one 
ven   siUiSt   fact^.     The  indictment  against  Ktesiphon's  motion 
for  crowning  Demosthenes,  was  instituted  by  ^schmes.  and  oftieial 
e^try  madeof  it  b.fore  the  death  of  Philip-whieh  event  occurred  in 
AnjAist  386  B.C.     YetYEschines  did  not  venture  to  bring  it  c)"  J« 
triaUmtil  Auirust  000.  B.C..  after  Antipater  had  subdued  the  i  Ha  cd 
riv.noof   the  Lacediemonian  kingAgis;  and   even  at  that  advanta- 
geous moment,  when  the  Macedonizers  seemed  in  full  triumph  he  sig- 
nallv  failed.     We  thus  perceive,  that  though  Phokion  and  Dema- 
des were  now  the  leaders  of  Athenian  affairs,  as  representing  a  pol- 
icy which  cverv  one  felt  to  be  unavoidable-yet  the  preponderant 
sentiment  of  the  people  went  with  Demosthenes  and  Lykurgus.     in 
fact  we  shall  see  that  after  the  Lamian  war.  Antipater  thought  it 


AGIS  TAKES  ARMS  IN  GREECE.  ^73 

requisite  to  subdue  or  punish  this  sentiment  bv  rl]^fv^,..^•  • 

Phenicia,  during  the  spring  of  331  bc      This  ns^or  in,    ,  f    ;^   V 

dence  of  Demosthenes  as  to  his  known     and  formdiable"  nem     ^ 
It  was   not  from  Athens,  but  from  So  irfi   tli  t  n   t    Vrf.  V    • 

tan.  had  not  been  concerned.     Their  kino-   Are liid.i,     1^'   u  h^i     i 
been  active  conjointly  with  Atliens   in  the  S  .pVv.i   w 
uphold    the  Piiokians  against  Pim      am    the  T  ,oL      ''' Z'V"?  ^^ 
ward, withdrawn  himself  fromcX^i^J^uf'^^r^ 
tines  in  Italy,  and  had  been  slain  in  a  battlea-'ii     t  th^AI      -J;,  n^ 
He  was  succeeded   by  his  son  A"-is    a  l)rivp   1,  /i  n L      ^^f  ;^s,ipiaiis. 

tor  untiOIiioedonian  operal bus    in   Greece      Tou-ir-l    fl,,,   „i,  i 

summer  333  B.C.,  a  li.'lle  before  ll.e  l,atl  e  of  1 1  i^,.  .15  "u,?i 
tin n  n"p"  ""™''  "'  "^'''T'  ">  'Ol'^i'  '"^  ""'l  money  f,i,„edei" 
direc^nof 'rn"e?e";   A'  '"l"^'  T""""''  ""T  Were  not  zeaim  s    ,  ,'  e 

tl.,^  -i:       *  /.   -r  ^i-i«^Acui(u  1    ,11   IvlllKia.      As  soon     liowev^r     mu 

"i     h  :.^;'"h  e..f  ",'nf  ?"?  '"'""■"•  "r-^'  P''"^^^  "'  ti,e  ^lisp^!;,   , 
C.."^  1       V'^     1"^^^  '^"'*  ten  triremes;  wii  eh  he  emnloved  m  d^r  lu^ 
b  other  Agesdaus.  iu  making  lumself  master  of  K?ee-fedn^ 

«fr  i  ./  ^      himself  soon  afterward   went  to    that   isl-md    h- ?    " 
strengthened  himself  by  a  division  of  the  Greek    ne-ee  .trie    wo 
had  fought  under  Darius  at  Issus.     In  Krete   lie  (p.^."  ./,"  We^^^ 
considerable  temporary  success;  and  even    n  Pel  mnnX.reo^^ 
ga  ize<     some  d^Muonstrations   winch  Alexander  ^uAm^ioL';; 

t  me    Pir'  •  "'^^  ^''''''  'V'Vro.^^  '»  thespnn<r  of  ^31  B.c    ^   \      , 
time.  Phenicia,  Egypt,  and  all  the  naval  n  nsterv  of  the  .E-e-n     i  1 

CmlVJof'r r  ^  "'  ''''  T"^'"''^''^  sothat'lhe  Pe^sfe'bad  ;^^^ 
direct  means  of  acting  upon  Greece.     Probably  Amphoterus  recov 


680 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


ered  Krete,  but  he  had  no  land-force  to  attack  Agis  in  Peloponue 

^^lu  October  331  B.C.,  Darius  was  beaten  at  Arbela  and  became  a 
fu-iiive  in  Media,  leaving  Babylon,  Susa.  aud  Persepolis  with  the 
bulk  of  his  immense  treasures,  as  a  prey  to  the  conqueror  durmg  the 
cominff  winter.  After  such  prodigious  accessions  to  Alexanders 
force  It  would  seem  that  auv  anti-Macedonian  movement  during  tlu- 
sprin-of  330B.C.,  must  have  been  obviously  hopeless,  and  even  in- 
sane "  Yet  it  was  just  then  that  king  Agis  found  means  to  enlarge 
his  scale  of  operations  in  Peloponnesus,  and  prevailed  on  a^con^der^ 
able  body  of  new  allies  to  join  him.  As  to  himself  persona  1},  he 
and  the  tncedsemonians  had  ber-n  previously  in  a  state  of  proclaimed 
w^u-with  Macedonia,  and  therefore  incurred  ittle  additional  risk; 
more  over,  it  was  one  of  the  effects  of  the  Asiatic  af:^^ ers  to  cast 
Supon  Greece  small  bands  of  soldiers  who  had  hitherto  foum 
service  in  the  Persian  armies.  These  men  willingly  came  to  Cape 
T^Tmrus  to  enlist  under  a  warlike  king  of  tSparta;  ^o  t liat  Agis 
found  himself  at  the  head  of  a  force  which  appeared  considert.ble  to 
Pe  oponnesians.  familiar  only  with  the  narrow  scale  of  Grecian  ^^ar- 
muX  though  insiirnif^cant  as  against  Alexander  or  his  viceroy  in 
Mac^lonia.  ^^n  unexpected  ray  of  hope  broke  out  f».om  the  revc^^^ 
of  Memnon,  the  Macedonian  governor  of  Thrace.  Antipatei  ^  as 
U  us  compe  le(l  to  withdraw  some  of  his  forces  to  a  considerable 
distance  fom  Greece;  while  Alexander,  victorious  as  he  was.  being 
inRr'isorMedia,  east  of  Mount  Zagros,  appeared  in  the  eyes  of  a 
Greek  to  have  reached  the  limits  of  the  habitable  world.  Of  tins  par- 
tial encouragement  Agis  took  advantage;  to  march  out  of  Lakon  a 
wd  h  aU  1  eiroops.  mercenary  and  native,  that  he  could  muster.  He 
called  on  the  Peloponuesians  for  a  last  effort  against  Macedonian  do- 
mkdon  while  Darius  still  retained  all  the  eastern  half  of  his  em- 
pire, and  while  support  from  him  in  men  and  money  might  yet  be 

""' Relp^^^^^^^^  this  war.  we  know  very  few  details.  At  first,  a  tlush 
of  success  appeared  to  attend  Agis.  The  El.ians.  the  Acha;ans  (except 
PeS  the  ArcMdians  (except  Megalopolis)  and  some  other  Pelo- 
ponnesi  ns,  joined  his  standard;  so  that  he  was  enabled  to  co  lect  an 
army  stated  at  20.000  foot  and  2.000  horse.  Defeating  the  fust 
Macedonian  forces  sent  a-ainst  him,  he  proceeded  to  lay  siege  to 
Kopohs:  which  citv,  now  as  previously  was  the  stronghold  o 
Macedonian  influence  in  the  peninsula,  and  was  P'obab  y  occ.ipied 
by  a  Macedonian  garrison.  An  impulse  manifested  .^tsc'lf  at  A  1  e  . 
in  favor  of  aotive  svmpathy,  and  equipment  of  a  fleet  to  aid  tin. 
antrMTcedonian  effort.^  It  was  resisted  by  Phokix>n  and  Deniades, 
doubtless  upon  all  views  of  prudence,  but  especially  upon  one  tu  an- 
cial  -round  taken  bv  the  latter,  that  the  peopli- would  be  compelled 
to  fore-o  ihe  The6ric  distribution.  Even  Demosthenes  himself, 
under  circumstances  so  obviously  discouraging,  could  not  recom- 


DEFEAT  AND  DEATH   OF   AGIS. 


681 


I 


mend  the  formidable  step  of  declaring  against  Alexander— thouirh 
lie  seems  to  have  indulged  in  the  expression  of  general  anti-Macecfo- 
nian  sympathies,  and  to  have  complained  of  the  helplessness  into 
which  Athens  had  been  brought  by  past  bad  policy.  Antipater, 
closin.;-  the  war  in  Thrace  on  the  best  terms  that  he  could,  hastened 
into  Greece  with  his  full  forces,  and  reached  Peloponnesus  in  time  to 
relieve  Megalopolis,  which  had  begun  to  be  in  danger.  One  decisive 
b  ittle.  which  took  place  in  Arcadia,  sufficed  to  terminate  the  war. 
Agis  and  his  army,  the  Laceda3nioniaus  especially,  fought  with  gal- 
Imtiy  and  desperation,  but  were  completely  defeated.  Fivo  thou- 
sand of  their  men  were  slain,  including  Agis  himself:  who,  though 
covered  with  wounds,  disdained  to  leave  the  field,  and  fell  resisting 
to  the  last.  The  victors,  according  to  one  account,  lost  3,500  men; 
according  to  another.  1000  slain,  together  with  a  great  many  wounded. 
This  was  a  greater  loss  than  Alexander  had  sustained  either  at  Issus 
or  at  Arbela;  a  plain  proof  that  A^is  and  his  companions,  however 
unfortuiuite  in  the  result,  had  manifested  courage  worthy  of  the  best 
days  of  Sparta. 

The  allied  forces  were  now  so  completely  crushed,  that  all  sub- 
mitted to  Antipater.  After  consulting  the  phi'.o-Macedoniau  synod 
at  Corinth,  he  condemned  the  Achfeans  and  Eleians  to  pay  12()  tal- 
ents to  Megalopolis,  and  exacted  from  the  Tegeaiis  the  punishment 
of  those  among  their  leading  men  who  had  advised  the  war.  But 
he  would  not  take  upon  him  to  d(,'termine  the  treatment  of  the  Lace- 
dxmonians  without  special  reference  to  .Vlextinder.  Requiring  from 
them  fifty  hostages,  he  sent  up  to  Alexander  in  Asia  some  Lacedae- 
monian envoys  or  prisoners,  to  throw  themselves  on  his  mercy.  We 
are  told  that  they  did  not  reach  the  king  until  a  long  time  afterward, 
at  Baktra;  what  he  decided  about  Sparta  generally,  we  do  not  know. 

The  rising  of  the  Thebans,  not  many  months  after  Alexander's 
accession,  had  been  the  first  attempt  o*f  the  Greeks  to  emancipate 
themselves  from  Macedonian  dominion;  this  enterprise  of  Agis  was 
the  second.  Both  unfortunately  had  been  partial,  without  the  possi- 
bility of  any  exte-isive  or  organized  combination  beforehand;  both 
ended  miserably,  riveting  the  chains  of  Greece  more  powerfully  than 
ever.  Tiius  wis  tlie  self-defensive  force  of  Greece  extinguished 
piecemeal.  The  scheme  of  Agis  was  in  fact  desperate  from  the 
very  outset,  as  against  the  gigantic  power  of  Alexander;  and  would 
perhaps  never  have  been  undertaken,  had  not  Agis  himself  been 
already  compromised  in  hostility  against  Macedonia,  before  the  de- 
slructioii  of  the  Persian  force  at  Issus.  TJiis  unfortunjite  prince, 
without  any  su{)erior  ability  (so  far  as  we  know),  manifested  a  devoted 
courage  and  patriotism  worthy  of  his  predecessor  Leonidas  at  Ther- 
mopylae; whose  renown  stands  higher,  only  because  the  banner  which 
he  upheld  ultimately  triumphed.  The  Athenians  and  ^tolians, 
neither  of  whom  took  part  with  Agis,  were  now  left,  without  Thebes 
and  Sparta,  as  the  two  great  military  powers  of  Greece;  which  will 


682 


GKECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


appear  presently,  when  we  come  to  the  last  strugde  for  Grecian 
independence— the  Lamiau  war;  better  combined  and  more  promis- 
iiiu'.  yet  not  less  disastrous  in  its  result. 

I'iioiiiih  the  strongest  considerations  of  prudence  kept  Athens 
quiei  during  this  anti-Macedonian  movement  in  Peloponnesus,  a 
powerful  sympathy  must  have  been  raised  among  her  citizens  while 
the  struiiule  was  going  on.  Had  Agis  gained  the  victory  over  Anti 
pater,  the  Athenians  might  probably  have  dechired  in  his  favor;  and 
althoiigii  no  independent  position  could  have  been  permanently  main- 
lained'^aiiainst  so  overwhelming  an  enemy  as  Alexander,  yet  con- 
sidering iliat  he  was  tlioroughly  occupied  and  far  in  the  interior  of 
Asia,  Greece  might  have  held  out  against  Antipater  for  an  interval 
not  inconsiderable.  In  the  face  of  such  eventualities,  the  fears  of  the 
Macedonizing  statesmen  now  in  pow  er  at  Athens,  the  hopes  of  their 
opponents,  and  the  reciprocal  antipathies  of  both,  must  have  become 
unusuaily  manifest;  so  that  the  reaction  afterward,  when  the  Mace- 
donian power  became  more  irresistible  than  ever,  was  considered  by 
tiie  enemies  of  Demosthenes  to  offer  a  favorable  opportunity  for 
ruining  and  dishonoring  him. 

To  tiie  political  peculiarity  of  this  juncture  we  owe  the  judicial  con- 
test between  the  tw  o  great  Atheinan  orators;  the  memorable  accusation 
of  ^Eschines  against  Ktesiphon,  for  having  proposed  a  crown  to  Demos- 
ll)^.n(^.^_aiKl*tlie  still  more  nu mora ble  defense  of  Demosthenes,  on 
behalt  ol  his  friend  as  well  as  of  himself.  It  was  in  the  autumn  or  win- 
ter of  o87-3o6  B.C.,  that  Klesiphon  had  proposed  this  vote  of  public 
honor  in  favor  of  Demosthenes,  and  had  obtained  the  (proboulenma) 
preliminary  acquiescence  of  the  senate;  it^^as  in  the  same  Attic  year, 
and  not  lonir  atterward,  that  ^Eschines  attacked  the  proposition  under 
the  Graphe^Paranomon,  as  illegal,  unconstitutional,  mischievous,  and 
founded  on  false  allegations.  :More  than  six  years  had  thus  elapsed 
since  the  formal  entry  of  the  accusation;  yet  ^schines  had  not  chosen 
to  bring  it  to  actuartrial;  which  indeed  could  not  be  done  without 
some  risk  to  himself,  before  the  numerous  and  popular  judicature  of 
Aih(  ns.  Twice  or  tin  ice  before  his  accusation  was  entered,  other  per- 
sons had  moved  to  confer  ihe  same  honor  upon  Demosthenes,  and  had 
been  indicted  under  the  Graphe  Paranomon;  but  with  such  signal  ill- 
success,  that  their  accusers  did  not  obtain  so  much  as  one-fifth  of  the 
suifrajics  of  the  Dika.sts,  and  therefore  incurred  (under  the  standing 
rcLiulalion  of  Attic  law)  a  penalty  of  1000  drachma?.  The  like  dan- 
g<T  awaited  iEschines;  and  although,  in  reference  to  the  illegality  of 
Kiesiphon's  motion  (which  was  the  direct  and  ostensible  purpose 
aimed  at  under  the  Graphe  Paranomon),  his  indictment  was  grounded 
on  special  circumstances  such  as  the  previous  accusers  may  not  have 
been  able  to  show,  still  it  was  not  his  real  object  to  confine  himself 
within  this  narrow  and  technical  argument.  He  intended  to  enlarge 
the  range  of  accusation,  so  as  to  include  the  whole  character  and 
policy  of  Demosthenes;   who   would    thus,   if    the   verdict  went 


ACCX^SATIONS  OF  ^SCHINES. 


683 


against  him,  stand  publicly  dishonored  both  as  citizen  and  as  politi- 
cirui.  Unless  this  latter  purpose  were  accomplished,  indeed,  iEs- 
chines gained  nothin,^  by  bringing  the  indictment  into  court;  for  the 
mere  entry  of  the  indictment  would  have  already  produced  the  effect 
of  preventing  the  probouleuma  from  passing  into  a  decree,  and  the 
crown  from  being  actually  conferred.  Doubtless  Ktesiphon  and 
Demosthenes  might  have  forced  .^schines  to  the  alternative  of  either 
dropping  his  indictment  or  bringing  it  into  the  Dikastery.  But  this 
was  a  forward  challenge,  which,  in  reference  to  a  purely  honorary 
vote,  thevhad  not  felt  bold  enough  to  send;  especially  after  the  cap- 
ture of  Thebes  in  3-J5  B.C.,  when  the  victorious  Alexander  demanded 
the  surrender  of  Demosthenes  with  several  other  citizens. 

In  this  state  of  abeyance  and  conproniise — Demosthenes  enjoy- 
ing the  inchoate  honor  of  a  comp]i;n"ntary  vote  from  the  senate, 
iEschines  intercepting  it  from  being  mi  tire  1  into  a  vote  of  ihe  peojile 
— both  the  vote  and  the  indictment  hi  I  remained  for  ratlier  m')re 
thati  six  years.  But  4lie  accuser  now  felt  encouraged  to  push  his 
indictment  to  trial  under  the  reactionary  party  feeling,  following  on 
abortive  anti-Macedonian  hopes,  which  succeeded  to  the  complete 
victory  of  Ant  ip  iter  over  Agis,  and  which  brought  about  the  accusa- 
tion of  anti- Macedonian  citizens  in  Naxos,  Thasos,  and  other  Givcian 
cities  also.  Amid  the  fears  prevalent  that  the  victor  would  cairv  his 
resentment  still  further,  ^schines  could  now  urge  that  Athens* was 
disgraced  by  having  adopted  or  even  approved  the  policy  of  Demos- 
thenes, and  that  an  emphatic  condemnation  of  him  was  the  only  way 
of  clearing  her  from  the  charge  of  privity  with  those  who  had  raised 
the  standard  against  Macedonian  supreniacy.  In  an  able  and  bitter 
harangue,  ^schines  first  shows  that  the  motion  of  Ktesiphon  was 
illegal,  in  consequence  of  the  public  official  appointments  held  by 
Demosthenes  at  the  moment  when  it  was  jiroposed— next  he  enters 
at  "large  into  the  whole  life  and  character  of  Demosthenes,  to  prove 
him  unworthy  of  such  an  honor,  even  if  there  had  been  no  formal 
rounds  of  objection.  He  distributes  the  entire  life  of  Demosthenes 
into  four  periods,  the  first  ending  at  the  peace  of  346  B.C.  between 
Philip  and  the  Athenians — the  second,  ending  with  the  breaking  out 
of  the  next  en.suin^  war  in  341-340  B.C. — the  third,  ending  with  the 
disaster  at  Chicroneia — the  fourth,  comprising  all  the  time  following. 
Throughout  all  the  four  periods,  he  denounces  the  conduct  of 
Demosthenes  as  having  been  corrupt,  treacherous,  cowardly,  and 
ruinous  to  the  city.  What  is  more  surprising  still — he  expressly 
charges  him  with  gross  subservience  both  to  Philij)  and  to  Alexander, 
at  tlie  very  time  when  he  was  taking  credit  for  a  patriotic  and 
intrepid  opposition  to  them. 

That  Athens  had  undergone  sad  defeat  and  humiliation,  having 
been  driven  from  her  independent  and  even  presidential  position  into 
the  degraded  character  of  a  subject  Macedonian  city,  since  the  time 
when  Demosthenes  first  began  ix)litical  life — was  a  fact  but  too  indis- 


684 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


putable.  ^schincs  even  makes  this  a  part  of  his  case;  arraigning 
the  traitorous  nnsnianagcnient  of  Deniostlienes  as  the  cause  of  so 
melancholy  a  revolution,  and  denountiiig  liim  as  candidate  forinibiic 
ccm])liment  on  no  better  plea  tlian  a  series  of  public  ealjiniities. 
Having  thus  animadverted  on  the  conduct  of  Deniostlienes  i>rior  to 
the  battle  of  Cha-roneia,  ^schincs  proceeds  to  the  more  recent  past, 
and  contends  that  Demosthenes  cannot  be  sincere  in  liis  pretended 
enmity  to  Alexander,  because  he  lias  let  slip  three  successive  occa- 
sions.'all  hiddy  favorable,  for  instigating  Athens  to  hoslilily  against 
the  Macedonians.  Of  these  three  occasions,  the  earliest  was,  when 
Alexander  first  crossed  into  Asia:  ihe  secor.d,  imnudiately  before 
the  battle  of  Issus;  the  third,  during  the  flu>h  of  success  obtained  by 
Aais  in  Peloponnesus.  On  none  of  these  occasions  did  Demosthenes 
caH  for  any  public  action  ."gainst  Macedonia;  a  proof  (according  lo 
^schines)*tiiat  his  jinti-Macedonian  professions  were  insincere. 

I  have  more  than  onte  n  narked,  that  considering  the  bitter 
eiimitv  between  the  two  orators,  it  is  rarely  safe  to  trust  the  unsup- 
ported allegation  of  either  against  the  ofher.  But  in  regii-rd  lo  the 
last  mentioned  charges  advar.ced  by  ^schines,  there  is  enough  of 
known  fact,  and  we  have  independent' evidence,  such  as  is  not  often 
before  us,  to  appreciate  him  as  an  accuser  of  Demosihe  nes.  Tlie 
victorious' career  of  Alexander,  set  forth  in  the  preceding  chapters, 
proves  amply  that  not  one  of  the  three  jicriods,  here  indicated  by 
^schines,  presented  even  decent  encouragement  for  a  reasonable 
Athenian  patriot  to  involve  his  country  in  warfare  against  so  formid- 
able an  e^nemy.  Nothing  can  be  more  frivolous  than  these  charges 
a"-aiust  Demejsthenes,  of 'having  omitted  promising  seasons  for  anti- 
Maeedonian  operation.  Partly  for  this  rease)n,  probably,  Demos- 
thenes does  not  notice  them  in  his  reply;  still  more,  perhaps,  on 
another  ground,  that  it  was  not  safe  to  speak  out  what  he  thought 
and  felt  about  Alexander.  His  reply  dwells  altogether  upon  the 
period  before  the  death  of  Philip.  Of  the  boundless  empire  subse- 
Quentlv  acquired,  by  the  son  of  Philip,  he  speaks  only  to  mourn  it 
as  a  wretched  visitation  of  fortune,  which  has  desohited  alike  the  Hel 
lenic  and  the  barbaric  worlel— in  which  Athens  has  been  engulfed 
along  with  others— and  from  which  even  those  faithless  and  trim- 
ming Greeks,  who  helped  to  aggrandize  Philip,  have  not  escaped 
better  than  Athens,  nor  indeed  so  well. 

I  shall  not  here  touch  upon  the  Demosthenic  speech  De  Corona  m 
a  rhetorical  point  of  view,  nor  add  anything  to  those  encomiums 
which  have  been  pronounced  upon  it  with  one  voice,  both  in  ancient 
and  in  modern  times,  as  the  unapproachable  masterpiece  of  Grecian 
ematory.  To  this  work  it  belongs  as  a  portion  of  Grecian  history; 
a  retrospect  of  the  efforts  made  by  a  patriot  and  a  statesman  to 
uphold  the  dignity  of  Athens  and  the  autonomy  of  the  Grecian 
•world,  against  a  dangerous  aggressor  from  without.  How  these 
efforts  were  directed,  and  how  they   lamentably  failed,   has  been 


TRIU31PH  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


685 


recounted  in  my  preceding  chapters.  Demosthenes  here  passes 
them  in  review,  replying  to  the  criminations  against  his  public  con- 
duct during  the  interval  of  ten  years,  between  the  peace  of  346  B.C. 
(or  the  period  immediately  preceding  it)  and  the  death  of  Philip.  It 
is  remarkable,  that  though  professing  to  enter  upon  a  defense  of  his 
whole  public  life,  he  nevertheless  can  afford  to  leave  unnoticed  tlmt 
portion  of  it  which  is  perhaps  the  most  honorable  to  him— the  early 
period  of  his  first  Pliilippics  and  Olynthiacs— when,  though  a  politi- 
cian as  yet  immature  and  of  no  established  footing,  he  was  the  first 
to  descry  in  the  distance  the  perils  threatened  by  Philip's  aggrandize- 
ment, and  the  loudest  in  calling  for  timely  and  energetic  precautions 
against  it,  in  spite  of  apathy  and  murmurs  from  older  politicians  u.s 
well  as  from  the  general  public.  Beginning  with  the  peace  of  o40 
B.C.,  Demosthenes  vindicates  his  own  share  in  that  event  against  the 
charges  e)f  ^schines,  wiio  he  denounces  as  the  cuuse  of  all  the  mis- 
chief; a  controversy  which  I  have  already  tried  to  elucidate  iu  a 
former  chapter.  Passing  next  to  the  period  after  that  peace — to  the 
four  years  first  of  hostile  diphmiacy,  then  of  hostile  action,  against 
Philip,  which  ended  with  the  disaster  of  Clueroneia — Demosthenc-s  is 
not  satisfied  with  simple  vindication.  He  reasserts  this  policy  as 
matter  of  pride  and  honor,  in  spite  of  its  results.  He  congratulates 
his  countrymen  on  having  manifested  a  Pan  Hellenic  patriotism 
worthy  of  their  forefathers,  and  takes  to  himself  only  the  credit  of 
having  been  forward  to  proclaim  and  carry  out  this  glorious  senti- 
ment common  to  all.  Fortune  has  been  all  verse;  yet  the  vigorous 
anti-Macedonian  policy  was  no  mistake;  Demosthenes  swears  it  by 
the  combatants  of  Marathon,  PlattTa  and  Salamis.  To  have  hael  a 
foreign  dominion  obtruded  upon  Greece,  is  an  overwhelming  calam- 
ity; but  to  have  had  this  accomplished  without  strenuous  resistance 
on  the  part  of  Athens,  would  have  been  calamity  aggravated  by 
dishcmor. 

Conceived  in  this  sublime  strain,  the  reply  of  Demosthenes  to  his 
rival  has  an  historical  value,  as  a  funeral  oration  of  extinct  Athenian 
and  Grecian  fre.edom.  Six  years  before,  the  orator  had  been  ap- 
pointed by  his  countrymen  to  deliver  the  usual  public  oration  over 
the  warriors  slain  at  Chaeroneia.  That  speech  is  now  lost,  but  it 
probably  touched  upon  the  same  topics.  Though  the  sphere  of  ac- 
tion of  every  Greek  city,  as  wx'll  as  of  eveiy  Greek  citizen, 
was  now  crainpeel  and  confined  by  irresislible  ]\nicedonian  force, 
there  still  remained  the  sentiment  of  full  political  freedom 
and  dignity  enjoyed  during  the  past — the  admiration  of  ancestor-; 
who  had  once  defended  it  successfully — and  the  sympathy  wit.i 
leaders  who  had  recently  stood  forward*^  to  uphold  it,  however  un- 
successfully. It  is  among  the  most  memorable  facts  in  Grecian 
history,  that  in  spite  of  the  victory  of  Philip  at  Chaironeia— in  spite 
of  the  subsequent  conquest  of  Thebes  by  Ah^xander,  and  the  danger 
of  Athens  after  itr^-in  spite  of  the  Asiatic  conquests  which  had  since 


686 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


thrown  all  Persian  force  into  the  hands  of  the  Macedonian  kin^-— the 
Athenian  people  could  never  be  persuaded  either  to  repudiate  De 
niosthenes,  or  to  disclaim  sympathy  with  his  political  policy.    How 
much  art  and  ability  was  employed  to  induce  them  to  do  so  by  his 
numerous  enemies,  the  speech  of  ^Eschines  is  enough  to  teach  us 
And  when  we  consider  how  easily  the  public  sicken  of  schemes  whicli 
end  in  misfortune— how  great  a  mentjd  relief  is  usually  obtained  by 
throwing  blame  on  unsuccessful  leaders— it  would  have  been  no  mat- 
ter of  surprise,  if,  in  one  of  tiie  many  prosecutions  wherein  the  fame 
of  Demosthenes  was  involved,  the  Dikasts  had  given  a  verdict  un- 
favorable to  him.     That  he  always  came  olf  acquitted   and   even 
honorably  acquitted,  is  a  proof  of  rare  fidelity  and  steadiness  of  tern- 
per  in  the  Athenians.     It  is  a  proof  that  those  noble,  patriotic,  nnd 
l^al-Hellenic  sentiments,  which  we  constantlv  find  inculcated  in  liis 
orations    throughout  a  period  of  twenty  yeaVs,  had  sunk  into  the 
minds  of  his  hearers;  and  that  amid  the  many  general  allegations  o^' 
corruption  against  him.  loudly  proclaimed  by  his  enemies, Ihere  was 
no  one  well-ascertained  fact  which  they  could  substantiate  before  the 

The  indictment  now  preferred  by  iEschines  ngainst  Ktesiphon  only 
procured  for  Demosthenes  a  new  triumpii.  When  the  suffrao-cs  of 
the  Dikasts  were  counted,  ^schines  did  not  obtain  so  much  jfs  cne- 
fitth.  He  became  therefore  liable  to  the  customary  fine  of  1000 
drachmae.  It  appears  that  he  quitted  Athens  immediately,  without 
paying  the  fine,  and  retired  into  Asia,  from  whence  he  never  returned 
He  is  said  to  have  opened  a  rhetoiicnl  school  at  Rhodes,  and  to  have 
gone  into  the  interior  of  Asia  during  the  last  year  of  Alexander's  life 
(at  the  time  when  that  monarch  'v\as  ordaining  on  the  Grecian  cities 
compulsory  restoration  of  all  Iheir  exiles),  in  order  to  procure  assist- 
ance for  returning  to  Athens.  This  project  was  disappointed  by 
Alexander  s  death.  *^ 

.^1^^'^".°^^  suppose  that  ^schines  was  unable  to  pay  the  fine  of 
1000  drac-hmae.  or  to  find  friends  who  would  pay  it  for  him  It  was 
rot  therefore  legal  con^pulsion.  but  the  extreme  disappointment  and 
humiliation  of  so  signal  a  defeat,  wliich  made  him  leave  Aihen=«  We 
must  remember  that  this  was  a  gratuitous  chalk  n£re  sent  by  himself- 
that  the  celebnty  of  the  two  rivals  had  brought  together  auditors  not 
mere^  from  Athens,  tut  fiom  various  other  Grecmn  cities;  and'that 
the  effect  of  the  speech  of  Eemoslhenes  in  his  own  defense— delivered 
with  all  his  perfection  of  voice  and  action,  and  not  only  electrifying 
hearers  by  the  sublimity  of  its  public  sentiment,  butalsofuli  of  admir 
ai)l}  managed  self  praise,  and  contemptuous  bitterness  toward  his  rival 
—must  have  been  inexpressibly  powerful  and  commanding.  Piob- 
ai^]};  tJie  friends  of  ^sdnms  became  themselves  angry  with  him  for 
having  brought  the  indietment  forward.  For  the  effect  of  his  defeat 
must  have  been  that  the  vote  of  the  senate  which  he  indicted,  was 
brougtit  forward  and  passed  in  the  public  assembly;  and  that  Dcmos- 


ACCUSATION   AGAINST   DEMOSTHENES. 


687 


thenes  must  have  received  a  public  coronation.  In  no  other  way, 
under  the  existing  circumstances  of  Athens,  could  Demosthenes  have 
obtained  so  emphatic  a  compliment.  It  is  hardly  surprising,  there- 
fore, that  such  a  mortification  was  insupportable  to  JEschiiies.  He 
l)cc;uiie  disgusted  with  his  native  city.  We  read  that  afterward,  in 
his  rhetorical  school  at  Rhodes,  he  one  day  declaimed,  as  a  lesson  to 
his  pupils,  the  successful  oration  of  his  rival,  De  Corona.  Of  course 
it  excited  a  burst  of  admiration.  "  What,  if  you  had  heard  the  beast 
hims'.'lf  si)eak  it!  " — exclaiuied  ^^schines. 

From  this  memorable  triumph  of  the  illustrious  orator  and  defend- 
ant, we  have  to  pass  to  another  trial — a  direct  accusation  brought 
against  him,  from  which  he  did  not  escape  so  successfully.  AVe  jire 
compelled  here  to  jump  over  five  years  and  a  half  (August  330  B.C.  to 
January  334  B.C.)  during  which  we  have  no  information  about 
Grecian  history;  the  interval  between  Alexander's  march  into  Bak- 
tria  and  his  return  to  Persis  and  Susiana.  Displeased  with  the 
conduct  of  the  satraps  during  his  absence,  Ale-xander  put  to  death 
or  punished  several,  and  directed  the  rest  to  disband  without  delay 
the  mercenary  soldiers  whom  they  had  taken  into  pay.  This  per- 
emptory order  filled  both  Asia  and  Europe  with  roving-^  detachments 
of  unprovided  soldiers,  some  of  whom  sought  subsistance  in  the 
Grecian  islands  and  on  the  Lacedaemonian  southern  coast,  at  Cape 
Tsenarus  in  Lakonia. 

It  was  about  this  period  (the  beginning  of  324  B.C.)  that  Harpalus, 
the  satrap  of  Babylonia  and  Syria,  becoming  alarmed  at  the  prospect 
of  being  punished  by  Alexander  for  his  ostentatious  prodigalities, 
fled  from  Asia  into  Greece,  with  a  considerable  treasure  and  a  body  of 
5,000 soldiers.  While  satrap,  he  had  invited  into  Asia,  in  succession, 
two  Athenian  women  as  mistresses,  Pythionike  and  Glykera,  to  each 
of  whom  he  was  much  attached  and  whom  he  entertained  with  lavish 
expanse  and  pomp.  On  the  death  of  the  first,  he  testified  his  sorrow 
by  two  costly  funereal  monuments  to  her  memory;  one  at  Babylon, 
the  other  rn  Attica,  between  Athens  and  Elesis.  With  Glykera  he  is 
said  to  have  resided  at  Tarsus  in  Kilikia — to  have  ordered  that  men 
should  prostrate  themselves  before  her  and  address  her  as  queen — and 
to  have  erected  her  statue  along  with  his  ownatRhossus,  a  seaport  on 
the  confines  of  Kilikia  and  S^'ria.  To  please  these  mistresses,  or  per- 
haps to  ensure  a  retreat  for  himself  in  case  of  need,  he  had  sent  to 
Athens  profuse  gifts  of  wheat  for  distribution  among  the  people,  for 
which  he  had  received  votes  of  thanks  with  the  grant  of  Athenian 
citizenship.  Moreover  he  had  consigned  to  Charikles,  son-in-law  of 
Phokion,  the  task  of  erecting  the  monument  in  Attica  to  the  honor  of 
Pythionike,  with  a  large  remittance  of  money  for  the  purpose.  The 
profit  or  embezzlement  arising  out  of  this  expenditure  secured  to  him 
the  goodwill  of  Charikles — a  man  very  different  from  his  faiher-in- 
lawr  the  honest  and  austere  Phokion.  Other  Athenians  were  prob- 
ably conciliated  by  various  presents?  so  that  when  Harpalus  found  it 


688 


GRECIAN   AFFAIRS. 


convenient  to  quit  Asin,  about  the  beninning  of  324  ec  he  had  al- 
ready acquired  some  liold  loth  on  the  public  of  Athens  and  on  rc me 
of  her  leading  men.  He  s^iled  w  ith  his  treasure  and  his  armament 
straight  to  Cape  Sunium  in  Attica,  from  ^vheuce  he  sent  to  askisheller 
and  i^rotection  in  that  ( ity. 

The  first  reports  tiansmitted  to  Asia  appear  to  have  proclaimed 
that  the  Athenians  had  welcomed  Ilarpalus  as  a  friend  and  ally 
thrown  off  the  Macedonian  yoke,  and  i)rcpar('d  for  a  war  to  re-estab- 
lish Hellenic  freedom.  Such  is  the  coh)r  of  the  case,  as  presented  in 
the  satyric  drama  called  AgvB,  exhibited  before  Alexander  in  the 
Dionysiac  festival  at  Susa.  in  February  or  March  S24  b.c.  Such 
news,  connecting  itself  in  Alexander's  mind  with  the  recent  defeat  of 
Zopyrion  in  Thrace  and  other  disorders  of  the  disbanded  mercena- 
ries, incensed  him  so  much,  that  he  at  first  ordered  a  fleet  to  be 
equipped,  determining  to  cross  over  and  attack  Athens  in  person. 
But  he  was  presently  calmed  by  more  correct  intelliirence,  certifying 
that  the  Athenians,  had  positively  refused  to  espouse  the  cause  of 
Harpalus. 

The  fact  of  such  final  rejection  by  the  Athenians  is  quite  indisputable. 
But  it  seems,  as  far  as  we  can  make  out  from  imperfect  evidence, 
that  this  step  was  not  taken  without  debate,  nor  without  symptoms 
of  a  contrary  disposition,  suflficient  to  explain  the  rumors  first  sent 
to  Alexander.     The  first  arrival  of  Harpalus  with  his  armament  at 
Sunium,  indeed,  excited  alarm,  as  if  he  were  coming  to  take  pos- 
session of  Peiraeus;  and   the  admiral   Philokles  was  instructed   to 
adopt  precautions  for  defense  of  the  harbor.     But  Harpalus,  sendino- 
away  his  armament  to  Krete  or  to  Ta>narus,  solicited  and  obtained 
permission  to  come  to  Athens,  with  a  single  ship  and  his  own  per- 
sonal attendants.      What  was  of  still  greater  moment,  he  brought 
with  him  a  large  sum  of  monev.  amounting,  we  are  told,  to  upward 
of  700  talents,  or  more  than  £160,000.     We  must  recollect  that  he  was 
already  favorably  known    to  the   people  by  larjre  presents  of  corn, 
which  had  procured  for  him  a  vote  of  citizenship.     He  now  threw 
himself    upon   their  gratitude   as   a   suppliant    seeking    protection 
against  the  wrath  of  Alexander;  and  while  entreatingfrom  the  Athe- 
nians an  interference  so  hazardous  to  themselves,  he  did  not  omit  to 
etjcourage  them  by  exaggerating  the  means  at  his  own  disjiosal.    He 
expatiated  on  the  universal  hatred  and  discontent  felt  against  Alex- 
ander, and  held  out  assurance  of  being  joined  by  powerful  allies, 
foreign  as  well  as  Greek,  if  once  a  city^like  Athens  would  raise  the 
standard  of  liberation.     To  many  Athenian   patriots,  more   ardent 
tlian  long-sighted,  such  appeals  inspired  both  svmpathy  and  confi- 
dence.    Moreover  Harpalus  would  of  course  purchase  every  influen- 
tial partisan  who  would  accept  a  bribe;  in  addition  to  men'likc  Cha- 
.  rikles,  who  were  already  in  his  interest.     His  cause  was  espoused  by 
Hyperides,  an  earnest  anti-Macedonian  citizen,  and  an  orator  second 
.only  to  Demosthenes.    There  seems  good  reason  for  believing  that. 


DEMAND  OF  ANTIPATER. 


689 


at  first,  a  strong  feeling  was  excited  in  favor  of  taking  part  with  the 
exile;,  the  people  not  being  daunted  even  by  the  iilea  of  war  with 
Alexander. 

Piiokion,  whom  Harpalus  vainly  endeavored  to  corrupt,  resisted  of 
course  the  proposition  of  espousing  his  cause.  And  Demosthenes 
also  resisted  it,  not  less  decidedly,  from  the  very  outset.  Notwith- 
standing all  his  hatred  of  JVIacedonian  supremacv,  he  could  not  be 
blind  to  the  insanity  of  declaring  war  against  Alexander.  Indeed 
those  who  study  his  orations  throughout,  will  find  his  counsels  quite 
as  much  distinguished  for  prudence  as  for  vigorous  patriotism.  His 
prudence  on  this  occasion,  however,  proved  injurious  to  his  political 
position ;  for  while  it  incensed  Hyperides  and  the  more  sanguine 
anti-Macedonians,  it  probably  did  not  gain  for  himself  anythino-  be- 
yond a  temi>orary  truce  from  his  old  macedonizing  opponents.    ^ 

The  joint  opposition  of  politicians  so  discordant  as  Demosthenes 
and  Phokion,  prevailed  over  the  impulse  which  the  p:irtisans  of  Har- 
palus had  created.     No  decree  could  be  obtained  in  his  favor.    Pres- 
ently however  the  case  was  complicated  by  the  coming  of  envoys 
from  Antipater  and  Olympias  in  Macedonia,  requiring  that  he  sliould 
be  surrendered.     The   like  requisition   was   also   addressed   by  the 
Macedonian  admiral  Philoxenus,  who  arrived  with  a  small  squadron 
from  Asia.     These  demands  were  refused,  at  the  instance  of  Phokion 
no  less  than  of  Demosthenes.     Nevertheless  the  prospects  of  Macedo- 
nian vengeance  were  now  brought  in  such  fearful  proximity  before 
the  people,  that  all  disposition  to  support  Harpalus  gave  way  to  the 
necessity  of  propitiating  Alexander.     A  decree  was  passed  to  arrest 
Harpalus,   and   to  place  all  his  money  under  sequestration   in  the 
acropolis,  until  special  directions  could  be  received  from  Alexander- 
to  whom,  apparently,  envoys  were  sent,    carrying   with   them  the 
slaves  of  Harpalus  to  be  interrogated  by  him,  and  instructed  to  so- 
licit a  lenient  sentence  at  his  hands.     Now  it  was  Demosthenes  who 
moved  these  decrees  for  personal  arrest  and  for  sequestration  of  the 
money;  wlierel)y  he  incurred  still  warmer  resentment  from  Hyper- 
ides and  the  other   Harpalian   partisans  who  denounced  him   as  a 
subservient  creature  of  the   all-powerful  monarch.     Harpalus  was 
confined,  but  presently  made  his  escape;  probably  much  to  the  satis- 
lactioj^   of   Piiokion,    Demosthenes,    and   every   one  else;  for  even 
those  wiio  were  most  anxious  to  get  rid  of  him  would  recoil  from  the 
odium  and  dishonor  of  surrendering  him,  even  under  constraint,  to  a 
certain  death.     He  fled  to  Krete,  where  he  was   feoou  after  slain  by 
one  of  his  own  companions. 

At  the  time  when  the  decrees  for  arrest  and  sequestration  were 
passed  Demosthenes  requested  a  citizen  near  him  lo  ask  Harpalus 
pubucly  in  the  assembly,  what  was  the  amount  of  his  money,  which 
the  people  had  just  resolved  to  impound.  Harpalus  answered,  720 
talents;  and  Demosthenes  proclaimed  this  sum  to  the  people,  on  the 
authority  of  Harpalus,  dwelling  with  some  emphasis  upon  its  mag- 


690 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


nitude  But  \vben  the  money  vnnxo  to  l>e  coiinled  in  the  acropolis, 
it  was  discovered  tliat  there  was  in  reality  no  more  than  3oO  talents. 
Now  it  is  said  that  Deinosilienes  did  not  at  once  communicate  to  the 
pr'ople  this  prodiiiious  deficiency  in  the  real  sum  as  compared  with 
the  announcement  of  Harpalus,  lepeated  in  the  public  assembly  by 
himself  The  impression  prevailed,  for  how  long  a  lime  we  do  not 
know  that  720  llarpalian  talents  had  actually  been  lodged  in  the 
acropolis;  and  when  the  truth  became  at  length  known,  great  sur- 
prise andoutcrv  were  excited.  It  was  assumed  that  the  missing  halt  ot 
the  sum  setforth  must  have  been  employed  in  corruption;  and  sus- 
picions prevailed  against  almost   all   the  orators,  Demosthenes  and 

llyperides  both  included.  -,     ,    .   ..  *      * 

In   this  stale  of  doubt,  Demosthenes  moved   that   the   senate  of 
Areopacnis  should  investigate  tlie  matter  and  report  who  were  the 
presumed  delinquents  lit  to  be  indicted  before  the  Dikastery;  he  de- 
clared in  the  speech  accompanving  his  motion  that  the  real  delin- 
riuents   whoever  they  midit  be,  deserved  to  be  capitally  i)unisned. 
The  Areopacites  delayed  their  report  for  six  months,  though  Demos- 
thenes is  said  to  have  called  for  it  with  some  impatience.      bcarch 
was  made  in  the  houses  of  the  leading  orators,  excepting  only  one 
who  was  recenlly  married.     At  length  the  report  appeared,  en umer- 
mu^r  several  names  t)f  citizens  chargeable  with  the  appropriation  ot 
this^inoney,  and  specifying  how  much  had  been   taken   by  each. 
A  mono-  these  names  were  Demosthenes  himself,  charged  with  ^0  tal- 
cnt<— bemades  charged  wiih  6,000  golden  staters— and  other  citizens 
with  dillerent  sums^atiachcd  to  their  names.     Upon  this  report,  ten 
iml  lie  accusers  were  appointed  to  prosecute  the  indictment  against 
the  persons  specified,  before  the  Dikastery.    Among  the  accusers  was 
llvperides  whose  name  had  not  been  comprised  in  the  Areopagitic 
report      Demosthenes  was  brought  to  trial  first  of  all  the  persons  ac- 
cused   before  a  numerous  Dikastcj-y  of  1500  citizens,  who  confirmed 
the  report  of  the  Areopagites,  found  him  guilty,  and  condemned  him 
to  pay  fifty  talents  to  the  state.     Not  being  able  to  discharge  this 
Iar«Te  fine,  he  was  put  in  prison;  but  after  some  days  he  found  means 
to  "escape,    and  fled  to  Tia-zen  in  Peloponnesus,  where  he  passed 
some  months  as  a  dispirited  and  sorrowing  exile,  unUl  the  death  ot 
\lexander      What  was  done  with  the  other  citizens  included  in  the 
Areopagitic  report,  we  do  not  know.    It  appears  that  Denuidcs— who 
was  aniontr  those  comprised,  and  who  is  especially  attacked,  along 
wilh  Demosthenes,  by  both  Hyperides  and  Deinarchus— did  not  ap- 
pear to  take  his  trial,  and  therefore  must  have  been  driven  into  exile; 
vet  if  so  he  must  have  speedily  returned,  since  he  seems  to  have 
been  at  Athens  when    Alexander  died.     Philokles  and  Aristogeiton 
were  also  brought  to  trial  as  beitii:  included  by  the  Areopagus  in  the 
list  of  deUnquents,  but  how  their  trial  ended,  does  not  appear. 

This  condemnation  and  banishment  of  Demosthenes— unquestion- 
ably  the  greatest  orator,  and  on3©f  the  greatest  citizens,  in  Athenian 


DEMOSTHENES  CONDEMNED. 


691 


antiquity— is  the  most  painful  result  of  the  debates  respect in'>-  the 
exile  Harpalus.     Demosthenes  himself  denied  the  charge;  but  un- 
fortunately we  possess  neither  his  defense,  nor  the  fads  alleged  in 
evidence  against   him,    so  that   our  means  of   forming  a  positive 
conclusion  are  imperfect.     At  the  same  time,  juduing  from  tlie  cir- 
cumstances as  far  as  we  know  them,  there  are  several  which  go  to 
show  his  innocence,  and  none  which  tend  to  prove  him  iruilty.     If 
we  are  called  upon  to  believe  that  he  received  money  from'^Harpalus 
we  must  know  for  what  service  the  pavmeut  was  made.     Did  De- 
mosthenes  take  part  with   Harp-dus,  and  advise  the   Athenians  to 
espouse  his  cause?    Did  he  even  keep  silence,  and  abstain  from  ad- 
vising them  to  reject  the  propositions?     Quite  the  reverse.     Demos- 
thenes  was  from  the  beginning  a  declared  opponent  of  Harpalus  and  of 
all  measures  for  supporting  his  cause.     Plutarch   indeed  tells'  an  an- 
ecdote—that Demosthenes  began  by  opposing  Harpalus,   but  that 
presently  he  was  fascinated  by  the  beaiitv  of  a  golden  cup  amon"- 
the  Harpalian  treasures.     HaipMlus,  perceiving  his  admiration   seiU 
to  him  on  the  ensuing  night  the  golden  cup,  touether  with  twenty 
talents,  which  Demosthenes  accepted.   A  few  days  afterward  when 
the  cause  of  Harpalus  was  again  debated  in  the  public  as^embiv   the 
orator  appeared  with  his  throat  euvelf)ped  in  woolen  wrappers 'and 
affected  to  have  lost  his  voice  upon  which  the  people,  detectin-  this 
simulated  inabdity  as  dictated  by  the  bribe  which  had  been  jrlven 
expres.sed  their  displeasure  partly  by  sarcastic  taunts,  partly  by  indig- 
nant murmuring.     So  stands  the  anecdote  in  Plutarch.     But  we  have 
proof  that  it  is  untrue.    Demosthenes  may  indeed  have  been  disabled 
by  sore-throat  from  speaking  at  some  particular  nssemblv  so  far  UK- 
story  may  be  accurate.     But  that  he  desisted  from  opposin-  Harpa- 
lus (the  real  point  of  the  allegation  against  him)  is  certainly  not  tri-e 
for  vye  know  frimi  his  accusers,  Deinarchus  and   Hyperides   th'it'it 
was  he  who  made  the  final  motion  for  imprisoninn-  Ilarpalu'^'and  'Se- 
questrating the  Harpalian  treasure  in  trust  for  Alexander      In  f-ict 
Hyperides  himself  denounces  Demnsij, ones  as  having  from  subser- 
yience  to  Alexander,  closed  the  door  against  Harpaliis  and  his  pros- 
pects     Such  direct  and  contiijued  opposition  is  a  conclusive  pivH)f 
that  Demosthenes  was  neither  paid  nor  bought  by  Haipalu<?     The 
only  service  which  he  rendered  to  the  exik^was  by  refusiu'r'  to  de- 
liver him  to  Antipater,  and  by  not  preventing  his  Wa]>e  fmm  im- 
prisonment.    Now  in  this  refusal  even  Phokion  concurred  and  prob- 
ably the  best  Athenians  of  all  parties  were  desirous  of  favorin"-  the 
escape  of  an  exile  whom  it  would  have  been  odious  to  hand  over  to 
a  xMacedonian  executioner.     In  so  far  as  it  was  a  crime  not  to  Inve 
prevented  the  escape  of  Harpalus,  the  crime  was  committed  as  mvch 
oy  l^hokion  as  by  Demosthenes,  and  indeed  more,  seeino-  that  Phokion 
was  one  of  the  generals,  exercising  the  most  important  administra- 
tive duties— while  Dempsthenes  was  only  an  orator  and  mover  in  tlie 
assembly.    Moreover,  Harpalus  had  no  means  of  requiting  the  p^r- 


692 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


sons,  wlioevcr  tlicy  wore,  to  wl)om  he  owed  liis  escape;  for  the  same 
nioticn  v;bich  decreed  his  arrest  decreed  also  the  sequestration  of  his 
inDney,  aiul  thus  removed  it  from  his  own  control. 

The  charire  therefore  made  against  Demosthenes  by  his  two  accus- 
ers, that  he  received  money  Jrom  Harpnlus.  is  one  which  all  the 
facts  known  to  us  tend  to  refute.  But  this  is  not  qr.ite  the  whole 
case.  Had  l;(mosthenes  the  means  of  cnilezzling  the  nioney  after 
it  had  passed  out  of  the  control  of  Ilarpaius?  To  this  question  also 
we  may  reply  in  the  negative,  so  far  as  Athenian  practice  enables  us 

to  iudue. 

Demosthenes  had  moved,  and  the  people  had  voted,  that  these 
treasures  should  be  lodged,  in  trust  for  Alexander,  in  the  acropolis,  a 
place  where  all  the  Athenian  public  nionc  y  was  habitually  kept— in  the 
back  chamber  of  the  Parthenon.  AVhen  placed  in  that  chamber,  these 
new  treasures  would  come  under  the  custody  of  the  officers  of  the 
Athenian  exchequer,  and  would  be  just  as  much  out  of  the  reach  of 
JVmosthenes  as  the  rest  of  the  public  money.  What  more  could 
Phokion  himself  have  done  to  preserve  the  Harpalian  fund  intact, 
than  to  put  it  in  the  leccirnized  place  of  surety?  Then,  as  to  the  in- 
termediate process  of  taking  the  money  from  Harpalus  up  to  the 
acropolis,  there  is  no  proof— and  in  my  judgment  no  probability— 
that  Demosthenes  was  at  all  concerned  in  it.  Even  to  count,  verify, 
and  weigh,  a  sum  of  above  £80,000— not  in  banknotes  or  bills  of  ex- 
change but  subdivided  in  numerous  and  heavy  coins  (staters,  dar- 
ics,  tetra-drachms),  likely  to  be  not  even  Attic,  but  Asiatic— must 
liave  been  a  tedious  duty  requirinc  to  be  performed  by  competent 
reckoners,  and  foreiiru  to  the  habits  of  Demosthenes.  The  olFieers 
of  the  Athenian  treasury  must  have  gone  through  this  labor,  provid- 
intr  the  slaves  or  mules  requisite  for  carry inu"  so  heavy  a  burden  up 
lolhe  acropolis.  Now  we  have  ample  evidence,  from  the  remaining 
inscriptions,  that  the  details  of  transferring  and  verifying  the  pub- 
lic property  at  Athens  were  performed  habitually  with  laboiious  ac- 
curacy. Least  of  all  would  such  accuracy  be  found  wanting  in  the 
case  of  the  large  Harpalian  treasure,  where  the  very  passing  of  the 
decree  implied  ureat  fear  of  Alexander.  If  Ilnrptdus,  on  being  pub- 
licly questioned  in  the  assembly— What  was  the  sum  to  be  carried 
up  into  the  acropolis— answered  by  stating  the  amount  which  he  had 
oriirinally  brought,  and  not  that  which  he  had  remaining— Denios- 
thenes  mi<rht  surely  repeat  that  statement  immediately  after  him, 
without  being  understood  thereby  to  bind  himself  down  as  guar- 
anty for  its  accuracv.  An  adverse  pleader,  like  Hyperides.  might 
indeed  turn  a  point  in  his  speech—"  You  told  the  assembly  that 
there  were  700  talents,  and  now  you  produce  no  more  than  half  "— 
but  the  imputation  wrapped  uj)  in  these  words  against  the  probity  of 
Demosthenes  is  utterly  groundless.  Lastly,  when  the  true  amount 
was  ascertained,  to  make  report  thereof  was  the  duty  of  the  officers 
of  the  treasury.     Demosthenes  could  learn  it  only  from  them,  and  it 


SPEECH  OF  DEINARCHUS. 


693 


might  certainly  be  proper  in  him,  though  in  no  sense  an  imperative 
duty,  to  inform  himself  on  the  point,  seeing  tiiat  he  had  uncon- 
sciously helped  to  give  publicity  to  a  false  statement.  The  true 
statement  was  given,  but  we  neither  know  by  whom,  nor  how  soon 

Reviewing  the  facts  known  to  us.  therefore,  we  find  them  all  tend- 
ing to  refute  the  charge  against  Demosthenes.  This  conclusion  will 
certainly  be  strengthened  by  reading  the  accus.atory  speech  composed 
by  Deinarchus,  which  is  mere  virulent  invective,  barren  of  facts  and 
evidentiary  matter,  and  running  over  all  the  life  of  Demosthenes  for 
the  preceding  twenty  years.  That  the  speech  of  Hvperides  also  was 
of  the  like  desultory  character,  the  remaining  fnioinents  indicate 
Even  the  report  made  by  the  Areopagus  contained  uo  recital  of  facts 
—no  justiUcatory  matter— nothing  except  a  speeiticatiou  of  names 
with  the  sums  for  which  each  of  them  was  chargeable.  It  appears 
to  have  been  made  ex-pdrte,  as  far  as  we  can  ju^dge— that  is,  made 
without  hearing  these  persons  in  their  own  defense,  unless  they  haj)- 
pened  to  be  themselves  Areopugltes.  Yet  this  report  is  held  forth 
both  by  Hyperides  and  Deiaarclius  as  being  in  itself  conclusive 
proof  which  the  Dikasts  could  not  reject.  AVhen  Demosthenes  de- 
manded, as  every  defendant  naturally  would,  that  the  charge  auainst 
him  should  be  proveil  by  some  positive  evidence,  Hyperides  sets 
aside  the  demand  as  nothing  better  than  cavil  and  special  pleadin-- 

One  further  consideration  remains  to  be  noticed.  Only  nine 
months  after  the  verdict  of  the  Dikastery  against  Demosthenes 
Alexander  died.  Presently  the  Atlienia;is  and  other  Greeks  rose 
against  Antipater  in  the  struggle  called  the  Lamian  war.  Demos- 
thenes was  then  recalled;  receiving  from  his  countrymen  an  enthu- 
siastic welcome,  such  as  had  never  been  accorded  to  any  returuin  >• 
exile  since  the  days  of  Alkibiades,  took  a  lea-ling  part  in  the  man^- 
agem-jnt  of  the  war,  and  perished  ou  its  disastrous  termination  alon  «• 
with  his  accuser,  Hyperides.  ^ 

Such. speedy  revolution  of  opinion  about   Demosthenes,  counte- 
nances the  conclusion  which  seems  to  me  suggested  by  the  other  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case— that  the  verdict  against  him  was  not  judicial 
but  political;   growing  out  of  the  embarrassing   necessities  of  the 
time. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Harpalus,  to  whom  a  declaration  of 
active  support  from  the  Athenians  was  matter  of  life  and  death 
distributed  various  bribes  to  all  consenting  recipients,  who  coul  l 
promote  his  views— and  probably  even  to  some  who  simply  refrained 
from  opposing  them;  to  all,  in  short,  except  pronounced  opponents. 
If  we  were  to  judge  from  probabilities  alone,  we  should  say  thir, 
Hyperides  himself,  as  one  of  the  chief  supporters,  would  also  1;  j 
among  the  largest  recipients.  Here  was  abundant  bribery— notori- 
ous in  the  mass,  though  perhaps  untraceable  in  the  detail— all  con- 
summated during  the  flush  of  promise  which  marked  the  earl/ 
discussions  of   the   Harp:ilian   case.     When   the   tide  of  Rcntiraeiil 


694 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


I 


turned — when  fear  of  Macedonian  force  became  the  overwhelming 
sentiment — wlien  ilarpalus  and  his  treasures  were  impounded  in 
trust  for  Alexander— all  these  numerous  receivers  of  bribes  were 
already  compromised  and  alarmed.  They  themselves  probably,  in 
order  to  divert  suspicion,  were  among  the  loudest  in  demanding 
investigation  and  punishment  against  delinquents.  IMoreover,  the 
city  was  responsible  for  700  talents  to  Alexander,  while  no  more  than 
350  were  forthcoming.  It  was  indispensable  that  some  definite 
individuals  should  be  pronounced  guilty  and  punished,  partly  in 
order  to  put  down  the  reciprocal  criminations  circulating  through 
the  city,  partly  in  order  to  appease  the  displeasure  of  Alexander 
abont  the  pecuniary  deticiency.  But  how  to  find  out  wlio  were  the 
guilty?  There  was  no  official  Prosecutor-general;  thr  number  of 
persons  suspected  would  place  the  matter  beyond  the  reach  of  pri- 
vate accusations;  perhaps  the  course  recommended  by  Demosthenes 
himself  was  the  best,  to  consign  this  preliminary  investigation  to  the 
Areopagites. 

Six  monihs  ehipscd  before  these  Areopagites  made  their  report. 
Now  it  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  all  tliis  lime  could  have  l)een 
spent  in  the  investigation  of  facts — and  if  it  had  been,  the  report  win  n 
published  wonld  have  contained  some  trace  of  these  fads,  instead  of 
embodying  a  mere  list  of  nanus  and  sums.  The  probability  is,  thnt 
their  time  was  passed  quite  as  much  in  party  discussions  as  in  inves- 
tigating facts;  that  dissentient  parties  were  long  in  coming  to  ;.n 
agreement  whom  they  should  sacrifice;  and  that  when  they  did 
agree,  it  was  a  political  rather  than  a  judicial  sentence,  singling  out 
Demosthenes  as  a  victim  highly  accei)table  to  Alexander,  ami  em- 
bodying Demades  also,  by  way  of  compromise,  in  tlie  same  list  of 
delinquents — two  opposite  politicians,  both  at  the  moment  obnoxious. 
I  have  already  observed  that  Demosthenes  Mas  at  that  time  unpop- 
ular with  both  the  reigning  j^arties;  with  the  philo-^Iacedonians, 
from  long  date,  and  not  without  sufficient  reason;  with  the  anti- 
Macedonians,  because  lie  had  stood  prominent  in  opposing  Harpalus. 
His  accusers  count  uptui  the  hatred  of  the  former  against  him,  as  a 
matter  of  course;  they  recommend  him  to  the  hatred  of  the  latter, 
as  a  base  creature  of  Alexander.  The  Dikasts  doubtless  included 
men  of  both  parties;  and  as  a  collective  body,  they  might  probably 
feel,  that  to  ratify  the  list  presented  by  the  Areopagus  was  the  only 
way  of  finally  closing  a  subject  replete  with  danger  and  discord. 

Such  seems  the  probable  history  of  the  Harpalian  transactions.  It 
leaves  Demosthenes  innocent  of  corrupt  protit,  not  less  than  Pho- 
kion;  but  to  the  Athenian  politicians  generally,  it  is  noway  credit- 
able; while  it  exhibits  the  judicial  conscience  of  Athens  as  under 
pressure  of  dangers  from  without,  worked  upon  by  party  intrigues 
within 

During  the  half  year  and  more  which  elapsed  between  the  arrival  of 
Harpalus  at  Athens  and  the  trial  of  Demosthenes,  one  event  at  least  of 


IMPERIAL  RESCRIPT. 


69o 


considerable  moment  occurred  in  Greece.  Alexander  sent  Nikanor  to 
the  great  Olympic  festival  held  in  this  year,  with  a  formal  letter  or 
rescript,  directing  every  Grecian  city  to  recall  all  its  citizens  that  were 
in  exile,  (except  such  as  were  under  the  taint  of  impiety.  The  re- 
script, which  was  publicly  read  at  the  festival  by  the  herald  who  had 
gained  the  prizo  for  loudness  of  voice,  was  heard  with  the  utmost 
enthusiasm  by  20,000  exiles,  who  had  mustered  there  from- intima- 
tions that  such  a  step  was  intended;  It  ran  thus:  "  King  Alexander 
to  the  exiles  out  of  the  Grecian  cities.  We  have  not  been  authors  of 
your  banishment,  but  we  will  be  authors  of  your  restoration  to  your 
native  cities.  We  have  written  to  Antipater  about  this  master 
directing  him  to  apply  force  to  such  cities  as  will  not  recall  you  of 
their  own  accord." 

It  is  plain  that  many  exiles  had  been  pouring  out  their  com- 
plaints and  accusations  before  Alexander,  and  had  found  him  a 
willing  auditor.  But  we  do  not  know  by  what  representations  this 
rescript  had  been  procured.  It  would  seem  that  Antipater  had 
orilers  further,  to  restrain  or  modify  the  confederacies  of  the  Achsan 
and  Arcadian  cities;  and  to  enforce  not  merely  recall  of  the  exiles 
but  restitution  of  their  properties.  ' 

That  the  imperial  rescript  was  dictated  by  mistrust  of  the  tone  of 
sentiment  in  the  Grecian  cities  generally,  and  intendc^d  to  fill  each 
city  with  devoted  partisans  of  Alexander— we  cannot  doubt.  It 
was  on  his  part  a  high-handed  and  sweeping  exercise  of  sovereio-nty 
—setting  aside  the  conditions  unlcr  which  he  had  been  named  leader 
of  Greece— disdaining  even  to  inquire  into  particular  cases,  and  to 
attempt  a  distinction  between  just  and  unjust  sentences— overrulino- 
ni  the  mass  the  political  and  judicial  authorities  in  every  city.  It  pro"^ 
claimed  with  bitter  emphasis  the  servitude^  of  the  Hellenic  world 
Exiles  restored  under  the  coercive  cnder  of  Alexander  were  sure  to 
look  to  Macedonia  for  support,  to  despise  their  own  home  author- 
ities, and  to  till  their  respective  cities  with  enfeebling  discord.  Most 
of  the  cities,  not  daring  to  resist,  appear  to  have  yielded  a  reluctant 
obedience;  but  both  the  Athenians  and  jEtolians' are  said  to  have 
refused  to  execute  the  order.  It  is  one  evidence  of  the  disi!:ust  raised 
by  the  rescript  at  Athens,  that  Demosthenes  is  severely  reproached 
by  Deinarchus,  because,  as  chief  of  the  Athenian  Theorv  or  sacred 
legation  to  the  Olympic  festival,  he  was  seen  there  publicly  consort- 
uig  and  ill  familiar  converse  with  Nikanor. 

In  the  winter  or  early  spring  of  323  B.C.  several  Grecian  cities  sent 
envoys  into  Asia  to  remonstrate  with  xVlexander  ai^ainst  the  measure; 
^ve  may  presume  that  the  Athenians  were  among  them,  but  we  do 
not  know  whether  the  remonstrance  produced  any  effect.  There 
appears  to  have  been  considerable  discontent  in  Greece  during  this 
winter  and  spring  (322  B.C.).  The  disbanded  soldiers  out  of  Asia 
stiU  maintained  a  camp  at  Tsenarus;  where  Leosthenes,  an  energetic 
Athenian  of  anti-Maeedooian  sentiments,  accepted  the  command  of 


696 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS 


them  nnd  even  attracted  frcBli  mercenary  soldiers  from  Asia,  under 
concert  with  various  confederates  at  Athens,  and  with  the  ^±.tohans. 
Of  the  money,  said  to  be  5.000  talents,  brought  by  Harpalus  out  ot 
Asia  the  irreaterpart  had  not  been  taken  by  Harpalus  to  Athens,  but 
ai)paVently  left  wilh  his  officers  lor  the  maintenance  of  the  troops 
who  had  iiccompanied  him  over.  ^  -,      j-  j    ^ 

Such  was  the  sreneml  position  of  affairs  when  Alexander  died  at 
Babylon  in  June  323  B.C.  This'astoundiug  news,  for  which  no  one 
could  have  been  prepared,  must  have  become  diffused  throughout 
Greece  durin'--  tlie  niontlj  of  July.  It  opened  the  most  favorable 
prospects  to  ^all  lovrrs  of  freedom  and  sufferers  by  JMacedonian 
dominion  The  imperial  militarv  force  resembled  the  gigantic  Poly- 
phenms  after  his  eve  had  been  blinded  by  Odysseus:  Alexander  had 
left  no  competent  heir,  nor  did  anv  one  imagine  that  his  vast  empire 
could  be  kept  together  in  effective  unity  by  other  hands.  Antipater 
in  Macedonia  was  threatened  with  the  defection  of  various  subject 

neighbors.  ,      .    ,.  , ,  .-xi  j   *^ 

Ko  sooner  was  the  death  of  Alexander  indisputably  cei'titied,  than 
the  anti-Macedonian  leaders  in  Athens  vehemently  instigated  the 
people  to  declare  themselves  first  champions  of  Hellenic  freedom,  and 
to  or"-anize  a  confederacy  throughout  Greece  for  that  object.  Demos- 
thene'swas  then  in  exile;  but  Leosthenes,  Hyperides  and  other  or- 
ators of  the  same  parlv.  found  themselves  able  to  kindle  in  their 
eountrvmen  a  warlike  feelinir  and  determiiuition,  in  spite  of  decided 
opposition  on  the  part  of  Phokion  and  his  partisans.  The  rich  men 
for  the  most  part  took  the  side  of  Phokion ;  but  the  mass  of  the  citi- 
zens were  fired  by  the  animating  recoiled  ion  of  their  ancestors  and 
bv  the  hopes  of  reconquerinii-  Grecian  freedom.  A  vr)te  was  passed 
publiclv  proclaiming  their  resolution  to  that  effect.  It  was  decreed 
that  200  quadriremes  and  40  triremes  should  be  equipped  ;  that  all 
Athenians  under  40  years  of  age  should  be  in  military  requisition; 
and  that  envovs  should  be  sent  around  to  the  various  Grecian  cities, 
earnestly  invoking  their  alliance  in  the  work  of  self-ernancipatiou. 
Phokion  thou'di  a  pronounced  opponent  of  such  warlike  projects, 
still  remained  at  Athens,  and  still,  apparently,  continued  in  his  func- 
tions as  one  of  the  generals.  But  Pytheas,  Kallimedon,  and  others 
of  his  friends,  fled  to  Antipater,  whom  they  strenuously  assisted  in 
'  trvino-  to  check  the  intended  movement  throughout  Greece. 

'  Le'^.sthenes,  aided  bv  some  money  and  arms  from  Athens,  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  the  mercenaries  assembled  at  T»narus,  and 
passed  accross  the  Gulf  into  ^tolia.  Here  he  was  joined  by  the 
^tolians  and  Akarnanians,  who  eagerly  entered  into  the  league 
with  Athens  for  expelling  the  ^Macedonians  from  Greece.  Proceed 
ing  onward  toward  Thermopyla?  and  Thessaly,  he  met  with  favor 
and  encourasiement  almost  everywhere.  The  cause  of  Grecian  free- 
dom was  espoused  by  the  Phokiuns,  Lokrians,  Dorians,  ^nianes 
Athamanes,  and  Dolopes;  by  most  of  the  Malians,  (Etaans,  Thessa 


DEMOSTHENES  RECALLED  TO   ATilEXS. 


697 


Hans,  and  Achaeans  of  Phthiotis;  by  the  Inhabitants  of  Leukas,  and 
by  some  of  the  Molossians.  Promises  were  also  held  out  of  co-oper- 
ation from  various  Illyrian  and  Thraciaii  tribes.  In  Peloponnesus, 
the  Argeians,  Sikyonians,  Epidaurians,  Tra^zenians,  Eleians,  and 
Messenians,  enrolled  themselves  in  the  league,  as  well  as  the  Karys- 
tians  in  Eubcea.  These  adhesions  were  partly  procured  by  Hyper- 
ides and  other  Athenian  envoys,  who  visited  the  several  cities;  while 
Pytheas  and  other  envoys  were  going  round  in  like  manner  to  ad- 
vocate the  cause  of  Antipater.  The  two  sides  were  thus  publicly 
argued  by  able  pleaders  before  different  public  assemblies.  In  tliese 
debates,  tiie  advantage  was  generally  on  the  side  of  the  Athenian  or- 
ators, whose  efforts  moreover  were  powerfully  seconded  by  the  vol- 
untary aid  of  Demosthenes,  then  living  as  an  exile  in  Peloponnesus, 

To  Demosthenes  the  death  of  Alexander,  and  the  new  prospect  of 
organizing  an  anti-Macedonian  confederacy  with  some  tolerable 
chance  of  success,  came  more  welcome  than  to  any  one  else.  He 
gladly  embraced  the  opportunity  of  joining  and  assisting  the  Athe- 
nian envoys,  who  felt  the  full  value  of  his  energetic  eloquence,  in 
the  various  Peloponnesian  towns.  So  effective  was  the  service  which 
he  thus  rendered  to  his  country,  that  the  Athenians  not  only  passed 
a  vote  to  enable  him  to  return,  but  sent  a  trireme  to  fetch  him  to 
Peiraeus.  Great  was  the  joy  and  enthusiasm  on  his  arrival.  The 
archons,  the  priests,  and  tlie  entire  body  of  citizens,  came  down  to 
the  harbor  to  welcome  his  landing,  and  escorted  him  to  the  city. 
Full  of  empassioned  emotion,  Demosthenes  poured  forth  his  grati- 
tude for  having  been  allowed  to  see  such  a  day,  and  to  enjoy  a  tri- 
umph greater  even  than  that  which  had  been  conferred  on  Alkibiades 
on  returning  from  exile;  since  it  had  been  granted  spontaneously, 
and  not  extorted  by  force.  His  fine  could  not  ])e  remitted  consist- 
ently with  Athenian  custom;  but  the  people  ]^assed  a  vote  granting 
to  him  fifty  talents  as  superintendent  of  the  periodical  sacrifice  to 
Zens  Soter;  and  his  execution  of  this  duty  was  held  equivalent  to  a 
liquidation  of  the  fine. 

What  part  Demosthenes  took  in  the  plans  or  details  of  the  w\ar, 
^ye  are  not  permitted  to  know.  Vigorous  operations  were  now  car- 
ried on  under  the  military  command  of  Leosthenes.  The  confeder- 
acy against  Antipater  included  a  larger  assemblage  of  Hellenic  states 
than  that  which  had  resisted  Xerxes  in  480  n.c.  Kevcrtheless,the  name 
of  Sparia  does  not  appear  in  the  list.  It  v,asa  melancholy  drawback 
to  the  chances  of  Greece,  in  this  her  last  struggle  for  emancipation, 
that  the  force  of  Sparta  had  been  altogether  crushed  in  the  gallant 
bat  ill-concerted  effort  of  Agis  against  Antipater  seven  years  before, 
and  had  not  since  recovered.  The  great  stronghold  of  Macedonian 
iaterest,  in  the  interior  of  Greece,  was  Bo?otia.  Plalasa,  Orchomenus 
and  other  ancient  enemies  of  Thebes,  having  received  from  Alexan- 
der the  domain  once  belonging  to  Thebes  herself,  M'ere  well  aware 
that  this  arrangement  could  only  be  upheld  by  the  continued  pres- 


698 


GRECIAN  AFFAIKS. 


I 


sure  of  Macedonian  supremacy  in  Greece.  It  seems  probable  also 
that  there  were  Macedonian  garrisons  in  the  Kadmeia — in  Corinth — 
and  Megalopolis;  moreover  that  the  Arcadian  and  Achaean  cities  had 
been  macedonized  by  the  measures  taken  against  them  under  Alex- 
ander's orders  in  the  preceding  summer;  for  we  find  no  mention 
made  of  these  cities  in  the  comir.g  contest.  The  Athenians  equipped 
a  considerable  l.-md-force  to  join  Leoslhenes  at  Tijerniopyke;  a  citi- 
zen force  of  5,(X)0  infantry  Jind  500  cavalry,  with  2,000  mercenaries 
besides.  But  the  resolute  opposition  of  the  Ka^otian  cities  hin- 
dered them  from  advancingbeyond  3Iount  Kitharon,  luitii  Leosthe- 
nes  himself,  maiciiing  from  Thermopylae  to  join  them  with  a  part  of 
his  :irmy,  attacked  the  Ba'otian  tioops,  gained  a  complete  victory, 
and  opened  the  passage,  lie  now  proceeiled  with  the  full  Hellenic 
muster,  including  yEtolians  and  Aihenijins,  into  Thessaly  to  meet 
Antipater,  who  was  advancing  from  Macedonia  into  Greece  at  the 
head  of  the  force  immediately  at  his  disj csjil — 13,CC0  infantry  and 
600  cavalry — and  with  a  tleet  of  110  Srhips  of  war  cooperating  on 
the  coast. 

Antipater  was  probably  not  prepared  for  this  rapid  and  imposing 
assemblage  of  the  combine  d  Greeks  at  Thermopyla',  nor  for  the  en- 
ergetic movements  of  L(osth(  nes.  Still  less  was  he  prepared  for  the 
defection  of  the  Ihessalian  eavahy,  who,  having  always  ioimed  an 
important  dement  in  the  Macedonian  Jiimy,  now  lent  their  strength 
to  the  Greeks.  He  dispatched  urgent  messnges  to  the  INIacedonian 
commtinders  in  Asia — Kraterus,  Leonnatus,  Philotas,  etc.,  soliciting 
reenforcemenfs;  but  in  the  mer.ntime  he  thought  it  expedient  to  ac- 
cept the  challenge  of  Leosthcncs.  In  the  battle  which  ensued,  how- 
ever, he  was  completely  defeated;  and  even  cut  off  from  the  possibil- 
ity of  retreating  intolViactdonia.  No  better  resource  was  left  to  him 
than  the  fortitiid  town  of  Lnmia  (near  to  the  river  Spercheius,  be- 
yond the  southern  border  of  Thessaly),  where  he  calculated  on  hold- 
ing out  until  relief  came  from  Asia.  Leosthenes  immediately  com- 
menced the  siege  of  Lamia,  and  pressed  it  with  the  utm(;st  energy, 
making  several  attempts  to  storm  the  town.  But  its  foitifications 
were  strong  with  a  garrif^on  ample  and  efllcient — po  that  he  was  re- 
pulsed w  ith  considerable  loss.  Unfortunately  he  possessed  no  bat- 
tering train  or  engineers,  such  as  liad  form.ed  so  powerful  an  element 
in  the  military  successes  of  Philip  and  Alex;;nder.  He  therefore, 
found  himself  compelled  to  turn  the  siege  into  a  Ikckade,  ni  d  to 
adopt  syst(^niatic  measures  for  interee]^tlng  the  sup}>ly  of  pro\  isions. 
In  this  lie  h;id  every  chance  of  surcc  edirg.  aid  of  capturing  the  per- 
son of  Antij)alcr.  Hellenic  prospects  hxjked  hiipht  jind  ( ncor.riijiing; 
nothing  was  lieard  in  Athens  and  the  other  cities  except  (orgrjltula- 
tions  and  thanksgivings.  Phokion,  on  hearing  the  eontidcnt  lan- 
guage of  those  arounel  him,  remarked — "The"  stadium  (or  short 
course)  has  been  done  bii!li;intly ;  bu*  I  fear  we  si  all  not  lave 
strength  to  hoUl  out  lor  tlie  lemg  course."'     At  this  tiiticcl  moment, 


ANTIPHILU>S  SUCCEEDS  LEOSTHENES. 


699 


Leosthenes,  in  inspecting  the  blockading  trenches^  was  w^ounded  on 
tiie  iiead  by  a  large  stone,  ])rojected  from  one  e)f  the  catapults e)M 
the  city  walls,  aud  expired  la  two  days.  A  funeral  oration  m  his 
honor,  as  well  as  in  that  of  the  other  combatants  against  Antipater 
was  pronounced  at  Athens  by  Ilyperides. 

Tne  eiealli  of  this  eminent  general,  in  the  full  tide  of  success,  was 
a  hard  blow  struck  by  fortune  at  the  cause  of  Grecian  freedom.'  Fe)r 
the  last  generation,  Athens  had  produced  several  excellent  orators, 
and  one  wdio  combined  splendid  oratory  with  wise  and  patriotie^ 
counsels.  But  during  all  that  time,  ne^ne  of  her  citizens,  before 
Leosthenes,  hael  displaNxnl  military  genius  and  ardor  along  with  Pan- 
HelleiHC  purposes.  Ills  death  appears  to  have  saved  Antipatt^r  fre)m 
defeat  and  captivit3\  The  ditbcult  was  very  great,  of  keeping  to- 
gether a  miscellaneous  army  of  Greeks,  who,  after  the  battle,  t^isily 
p.'rsuaded  themselves  that  the  war  was  finished,  and  desired  to  go 
Iionie — perliaps  under  promise  of  returning.  Even  during  the  life- 
time of  Leosthenes,  the  .Etolians,  the  most  powerful  e*on\ingent  of 
the  army,  had  obtained  leave  to  go  home,  from  se)me  domestic  urg- 
ency, real  or  pretended.  When  he  was  slain,  there  was  no  second  in 
command;  nor,  even  if  there  h;id  been,  could  the  personal  influence 
of  one  oilicer  be  transferred  to  .-mother.  Pvcferencc  was  made  to 
Athens,  where,  after  some  debate,  Antiphilus  w\as  chosen  com- 
mander, after  the  proposition  to  name  Phokion  had  been  made  and 
rejected.  But  during  this  interval,  there  was  no  authoritv  to  direct 
military  operations,  or  even  to  keep  the  army  touether.  'Hence  the 
precious  moments  tor  rendering  the  blockade  really  stringent,  were 
lost,  and  Antipater  was  enabled  to  maintain  himself  until  the  arrival 
of  Leoimatus  from  Asia  to  his  aid.  How  elangerous  the  position  of 
Antipater  w^as,  we  may  judge  from  the  fact,  that  he  solicitenl  peace, 
hut  was  required  by  the  besiegers  to  surrender  at  discretion— with 
which  condidon  he  refused  to  comply. 

Antiphilus  appears  to  have  been  a  brave  and  competent  officer. 
But  Ixifore  lie  could  reduce  Lamia,  Leonnatus  wdth  a  Macede)niaii 
nrmy  had  cre)ssed  the  Hellespont  from  Asia,  and  arrived  at  the  fron- 
tiers of  Thessaly.  So  many  of  tiie  Grecian  contingents  had  left  the 
camp,  tliat  Antiphilus  was  not  strong  enough  at  one-e  to  ce)ntinue  the 
blockade  and  to  combat  the  relieving  army.  Accordimilv,  he  raised 
the  blockaele,  and  moved  off  by  rapid  marches  to  attack  LeonmUus 
apart  from  Aniipater.  He  accomplished  this  operation  witli  vigor 
and  siiceK'ss.  Through  the  suj^erior  efficiency  of  the  Thessalian  cSv- 
alry  under  ]\renon,  he  gained  an  imiwrtant 'advantage  in  a  cavnlry 
battle  over  Leonnatus,  who  was  himself  slain  ;  and  the  Macedonian 
phalanx,  having  its  flanks  and  rear  thus  expe)sed,  retired  from  the 
plam  to  more  difficult  grounel,  leaving  the  Greeks  masters  of  the 
held  with  the  dead  bodies.  On  the  very  next  day,  Antipater  came 
up,  bringing  the  troops  from  Lamia,  and  took  conmiand  of  the  de- 
feated army.     He  did  not  however  think  it  expedient  to  renew  tlie 


700 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


PHILIP  ARIDJ3US  PROCLAIMED  KING. 


701 


combat,  but  withdrew  his  army  from  Thcssaly  into  Macedonia,  keep- 
iuir  in  iiis  march  the  high  ground,  out  of  llieVcach  of  cavalry. 

During  the  same  time  generally  as  these  operations  in  ThcFsaly,  it 
apjiears  that  war  was  carried  on  actively  by  Fea.  We  hear  of  a  de- 
scent by  Mikion  with  a  Macedonian  fleet  at  Rhamnus  on  the  eastern 
coast  of  Attica,  repulsed  by  Phokion  ;  also  of  a  Macedonian  fleet,  of 
240  sail,  under  Kleitus,  engaging  in  two  battles  wiih  the  Athenian 
fleet  under  Eetion,  near  the  islands  called  Echinades,  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Achelous,  on  the  western  ^lolian  coast.  The  Athenians  were 
defeated  in  both  actions,  mid  great  efforts  were  made  at  Athens  to 
build  new  vessels  for  the  purpose  of  filling  up  the  losses  sustained. 
Our  information  is  not  t^ulticient  to  reveaHhe  purposes  or  details  of 
these  proceedings.  But  it  seems  probable  that  the  MaeedoiJan  fleet 
were  attacking  ^tolia  through  Qiniadae.  the  citizens  of  which  town 
had  recently  been  expelled  by  the  ^Etolians;  and  perhaps  this  may 
have  been  the  reason  why  the  ^lolian  contingent  was  withdrawn 
from  Thessaly. 

in  spite  of  such  untoward  events  at  sea,  the  cause  of  Pan-Hellenic 
liberty  seemed  on  the  whole  prosperous.  Though  the  capital  oppor- 
tunity had  been  missed,  of  taking  Antipater  captive  in  Lamia,  still 
lie  had  been  ex])elled  f n  m  Greece,  and  was  unable,  bv  means  of  his 
own  forces  in  Macedonia,  to  regain  his  footing.  The  Grecian  con- 
tingents had  behaved  with  bravery  and  unanimity  in  prosecution  of 
the  conmion  purpose;  and  what  had  been  already  achieved  was  quite 
suflicieiit  to  justify  the  rising-,  as  a  fair  risk,  promising  reasonable 
hopes  of  success.  Nevertheless  Greek  citizens  were  not  like  trained 
Macedonian  soldiers.  After  a  term  of  service  not  much  prolonged, 
they  wanted  to  go  back  to  their  families  and  properties,  hardly  less 
after  a  victory  than  after  a  defeat.  Hence  the  army  of  Antiphilus 
in  Thessaly  became  much  thinned,  though  still  remaining  large 
enough  to  keep  back  the  Macedonian  forces  of  Antipater,  even  aug- 
mented as  they  had  been  by  Leonnatus— and  to  compel  him  to  await 
the  still  more  powerful  re-enforcement  destined  to  follow  under  Kra- 
terus. 

In  explaining  the  relations  between  these  three  Macedonian  com- 
manders— Antipater,  Leonnatus,  and  Kraten:s — it  is  necessarv  to  go 
back  to  June  323  b.c,  the  period  of  Alexander's  death,  and  to  re- 
view the  condition  into  which  his  vast  and  mighty  empire  had  fallen. 
I  shall  do  this  briefly,  nm\  only  so  far  as  it  bears  on  the  last  struggles 
i.nd  final  subjugation  of  the  Grecian  world. 

On  the  unexpected  death  of  Alexander,  the  camp  at  Babvlon  with 
its  large  force  became  a  scene  of  tliscord.  He  left  no  offspring,  ex- 
cept a  child  named  Herakles,  by  his  mistress  Barsine.  Roxana,  one 
of  his  wives,  was  indeed  p:-egnant;  and  amid  the  uncertainties  of  the 
moment,  the  first  disposition  of  many  was  to  await  the  birth  of  her 
child.  She  herself,  anxious  to  shut  out  rivalry,  caused  Statira,  the 
queen  whom  Alexander  had  last  married,'  to  be  entrapped  and  assas- 


sinated along  with  her  sister.  There  was  how^ever  at  Babvlon  a 
brother  of  Alexander,  named  Aridaeus  (son  of  Philip  by  a  Thessaliuu 
mistress),  already  of  full  age  though  feeble  in  iutelliVence,  toward 
whom  a  still  larger  party  leaned.  In  ^Macedonia,  theixj  were  Olym- 
liias,  Alexander's  mother— Kleopatra,  his  sister,  widow  of  the  Epi- 
lolic  Alexander— and  Kynane,  another  sister,  widow  of  Amvntas 
(cousin  of  Alexander  the  Great,  and  put  to  death  by  him);  all  of  "them 
disposed  to  take  advantage  of  their  relationship  to  the  deceased  con- 
queior,  in  the  scramble  now  open  for  po^ver. 

After  a  violent  dispute  between  the  cavalry  and  the  infantry  at 
Babylon,  Aridaeus  was  proclaimed  king  under  the  name  of  Philip 
Arida3us.  Perdikkas  was  named  as  his  guardian  and  chief  minister- 
among  the  other  chief  oflicers,  the  various  satrapies  and  fractions  of 
the  empire  were  distributed.  Egvpt  and  Libva  were  assiuned  to 
Ptolemy;  Syria  to  Laomcdon;Kilikia  to  Philotas';  Pamphylia,^Lvkia 
jiml  the  greater  Phrygiti,  to  Antigonus;  Karia,  to  Asander;  Lydia,  to 
Menander;  the  Hellespontine  Phrygia,  to  Leonnatus;  Kappadokia 
and  Paphlagonia,  to  the  Kardian  Eumenes;  Media,  to  Pitlion.  The 
eastern  satrapies  were  left  in  the  hands  of  the  actual  holders. 

In  Europe,  the  distributors  gave  Thrace  with  the  Chersonese  to 
Lysimachus;  the  countries  w^est  of  Thrace,  including  (along  with 
Iflyrians,  Tribaili.  Agrianes,  and  Er)irots)  Macedonia  and  Greece  to 
Antipater  and  Kralerus.  We.  thus  find  the  Grecian  cities  handed 
over  to  new  masters,  as  fragments  of  the  vast  intestate  estate  left  by 
Alexander.  The  empty  form  of  convening  and  consulting  a  synod 
ot  deputies  at  Corinth,  was  no  longer  thought  necessary. 

All  the  above-named  officers  were  considered  as  local  lieutenants 
administering  portions  of  an  empire  one  and  indi visible  under 
Aridasus.  The  principal  officers  who  enjoyed  central  authoritv 
bearing  on  the  entire  empire,  w^ere,  Perdikkas.  chiliarch  of  the 
horse  (the  post  occupied  by  Hepha^stion  untii  his  death),  a  sort  of 
vizir,  and  Seleukus,  commander  of  the  Horse  Guards.  No  one  at 
this  moment  talked  of  dividing  the  empire.  But  it  soon  appeared 
that  Perdikkas,  profiting  by  the  weakness  of  Arida?us,  had  deter- 
mined to  leave  to  him  nothing  more  than  the  imperial  name  and 
to  engross  for  himself  the  real  authoritv.  Still,  however,  in  his  dis- 
putes with  the  other  chicifs,  he  represented  the  imperial  family,  and 
tiie  integrity  of  the  empire,  contending  airainst  severalty  and  'local 
mdependence.  In  this  task  (besides  his  brother  Alketas),  his  ablest 
and  most  effective  auxiliary  was  Eumenes  of  Kardia,  secretary  of 
Alexander  for  several  years  until  his  death.  It  was  one  of  the 
earliest  proceedings  of  Perdikkas  to  wrest  Kapi^adokia  from  the 
local  chief  Ariarathes  (who  had  contrived  to  hold  it  all  through 
the  reign  of  Alexander),  and  to  transfer  it  to  Eumenes,  to  whom  it 
had  been  allotted  in  the  general  scheme  of  division. 

At  the  moment  of  Alexander's  death,  Kraterus  was  in  Kilikia, 
at  the  head  of  an  army  of  veteran  Macedonian  soldiers.     He  had 


702 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


ANTIPATER  TREATS  WITil  THE  CITIES. 


703 


l>een  directed  to  conduct  ihem  home  into  Macedonia,  with  orders 
to  remain  there  himself  in  pkce  of  Anlipater,  who  was  to  come 
over  to  Asia  with  fresh  re-entoi cements.  Kraterus  had  with  him  a 
paper  of  written  instructions  from  Alexandi-r,  embodyin.i^  projects  on 
tiic  most  gigantic  scale;  for  western  conquest — transportation  of 
inhabitants  by  wholesale  from  Europe-  into  Asia  and  Asia  into  Europe 
— erection  of  magniticeut  religious  edifices  in  various  parts  of  Greece 
and  31acedonia,  etc.  Tliis  li^t  was  submitten  by  Perdikkas  to  the 
oflicers  and  soldiers  around  him,  who  dismissed  the  projects  as  too 
vast  for  any  one  but  Alexander  to  tldnk  of.  Kra1e:us  and  Anti- 
pater  had  each  a  concurrent  claim  to  Greece  and  Macedonia,  and 
tiie  distributors  of  the  empire  had  allotted  these  countries  to  them 
jointly,  not  venturing  to  exclude  either.  Amid  the  conflicting  pre- 
tensions of  these  great  Macedonian  officers,  Leonnatus  also  cherished 
hopes  of  the  same  prize,  lie  was  satrap  of  the  Asiatic  territory 
bordering  upon  the  liellespont,  and  had  received  propositions  from 
Kleopatra,  at  Pella,  inviting  him  to  marry  her  and  assume  the  gov- 
ernment of  Macedonia.  About  the  Siime  lime,  urgent  messages  were 
also  sent  10  him  (ihiough  Hekalanis  despot  (;f  Kardia)  from  Anti- 
pater,  imuicdiateiy  after  ihe  dcfert  preceiiing  the  siege  of  Lamia, 
entreating  liis  co-operation  against  the  Greeks.  Leonnatus  accord- 
ingly came,  intending  to  assist  Antipater  against  the  Greeks,  but  also 
to  dispossess  him  of  the  goveriimtnt  of  jMacedonia  and  marry  Kleo- 
patra. This  scheme  ren.aincd  iiriexccutcd.  because  (as  has  been 
aln  ady  related)  Leonnatus  was  slain  in  his  fir.st  encounter  with  the 
Gneks.  To  them,  his  death  was  a  grave  misfortune;  to  Antipater, 
it  was  an  advantage  which  more  than  countervailed  the  defeat,  since  it 
relieved  him  from  a  dangerous  rival. 

It  was  not  till  the  ensuing  summer  that  Kratrnis  found  leisure  to 
conduct  his  army  into  3Iac(  donia.  Ey  this  junction,  Antipater,  to 
whom  he  ceded  the  command,  found  bin. self  at  the  head  of  a  powerful 
army — 40,000  heavy  infantry.  5.000  ca\alry,  and  3.CC0  archers  and 
slingers,  lie  again  marched  into  Thcssaly  against  the  Greeks  under 
Aniiphilus;  and  the  two  r.rmies  am.e  in  sight  en  the  Tl.e^salian 
I^lains  near  Krannon.  The  Grecian  ainiy  corsistcd  of  25, COO  infr.ntry 
and  3.500  cavalry — the  latter,  Thessalians  urderMer.on.  of  {.dmimble 
efficiency.  The  soldiers  in  general  were  brave,  but  insubordinate; 
while  tiie  contingents  of  many  cities  had  gone  heme  without 
returning,  in  spite  of  urgent  remonstrances  from  the  commander. 
Hoping  to  be  rejoined  by  these  absentees,  Antiphilus  and  3Ienon  tried 
at  first  to  defer  fighting;  but  Antipater  forced  them  to  a  battle. 
TJiough  Menon  with  his  Thessalian  cavalry  defeated  and  dispersei'i 
the  Macedonian  cavalry,  the  Grecian  infantry  were  unable  to  resist 
the  superior  number  of  Autipater's  infantry  and  the  heavy  pressure 
of  the  phalanx.  They  wx're  beaten  back  and  gave  w*ay,  yet  retiring 
in  tolerable  order,  the  Macedonian  phalanx  being  incompetent  for 
pursuit,  to  some  difiicult  neighboring  ground,  where  they  were  soon 


' 


joined  by  their  victorious  cavalry.     The  loss  of  the  Greeks  is  said  to 
have  been  500  men;  that  of  the  Macedonians,  120. 

The  defeat  of  Krannon  (August  823  B.C.)  was  no  way  decisive  or 
ruinous,  nor  would  it  probably  havccrushed  the  spirit  of  Leosthenc^ 
had  he  been  alive  and  in  command.     The  coming  up  of  the  absentee 
contingents  might  still  have   enabled  the  Greeks^  make  head.     But 
Antiphilus  and  Menon,  after  holding  council,  declined  to  await  and 
accelerate  that  junction.     They  thought  themselves  under  the  neces- 
sity of  sending  to  open  negotiations  for  peace  with  Antipater-  who 
however  returned  for  answer,  that  he  would  not  recognize  or'treat 
v.-itli  any  Grecian  confederacy,  and  that   he  would  receive  no  proi/o- 
sitions  except   from    each  city    severallv.      Upon  this  the  Grecian 
commanders  at  once  resolved  to  continue  the  war,  and  to  invoke 
re-enforcements  from  their  countrymen.     But  their  own  manifesta- 
tion of  timidity  had  destroyed  the  chance  that    remained  of  such 
re-enforcements  arriving.     While  Antipater  commenced  a  vicrorous 
and  successful  course  of  action  ag;i.inst  the  Thessalian  citie?  sepa- 
rately, the  Greeks  became  more  and  more  dispirited  and  alarmed 
City  after  city  sent  its  envo3-s  to  entreat  peace  from  Antipater  who 
gruited  lenient   terms  to  each,  reserving  only  the  Athenians  and 
^Etolians.    In  a  few  days,  the  combined  Grecian  army  was  dispersed  • 
Antiphilus  with  the  Athenians  returned  into  Attica;  Antipater  fol' 
lowed  them  southward  as  far  as  Boeotia,  taking  up  his  quarters  at 
the  Macedonian  post  on  the   Kadmeia,  once  the  Hellenic  Thebes— 
within  two  days'  marcli  of  Athens. 

Against  the  overwhelming  force  thus  on  the  frontiers  of  Attica  the 
Athenians  had  no  means  of  defense.     The  principal  anti-Macedonian 
orators,  especially  Demosthenes  and  Hvperides,  retired  from  the  city 
sit  once,  seeking  sanctuary  in  the  temples  of  Kalauria  and  JE<nna 
1  hokion  and  Demades,  as  the  envoys  most  acceptable  to  Antipater 
were  sent  to  Kadmeia  as  bearers  of  the  submission  of  the  citv  and 
petuioners  for  lenient  terms.     Demades  is  said  to  have  been  at  this 
tune  disfranchised  and  disqualified  from  public  speaking— havino- 
been  indicted  and  found   guilty  thrice  (some  say  seven  tinres)  under 
the  Graphe  Paranomon;   but  the  Atlieinans  passed  a  special  vote  of 
relief,  to  enable  him  to  resume  his  functions  of  citizen.     Neither 
Phokion  nor  Demades,  however,   could  prevail   upon  Antipater  to 
acquiesce  in  anything  short  of  the  surrender  of  Athens  at  discretion  • 
the  same  terms  as  Leosthenes  had  required  from  Antipater  himself  at 
Landa.     Kraterus  was  even  bent  upon  marching  forward  into  Attica 
t()  dictate  terms  under  the  walls  of  Athens;  and  it  was  not  without 
difiieulty  that  Phokion  obtained  the  abandonment  of  this  intention- 
after  which  he  returned  to  Athens  with  the  answer.     The  people 
having  no  chojce  except  to  throw  themselves  on  the   mercy  of  x\nti- 
pater,  Phokion  and  Demades  came  back  to  Thebes  to  lemn  ids  deter- 
mination.    This   time,  they  were  accompanied  bv  tlie   philosrphcr 
Xenokrates— the   successor  of  Plato  and  Speusippus,  as  presidiii' 


•o" 


704 


GRECIAN  AFFAIRS. 


teacher  in  the  school  of  the  Academy.  Though  not  a  citizen  of 
Athens,  Xenokrates  had  long  resided  there;  and  it  was  supposed  that 
his  dignilied  character  and  intellectual  eminence  miglit  be  efficacious 
in  mitigating  the  wrath  of  the  conqueror.  Aristotle  had  quitted 
Athens  for  Clialkis  before  this  time;  otherwise  he,  the  personal 
friend  of  Ant i pater,  would  have  been  probably  selected  for  this 
painful  mission.  In  point  of  fact,  Xenokrates  Vlid  no  good,  "being 
harshly  received,  au(l  almost  put  to  silence  by  Antipater.  One 
reason*  of  this  may  be,  that  he  had  been  to  a  certain  extent  the 
rival  of  Aristotle;  and  it  must  be  added,  to  his  honor,  that  he 
maintained  a  higher  and  more  independent  tone  than  either  of  the 
other  envoys. 

According  to  the  terms  dictated  by  Antipater,  the  Athenians  were 
required  to  pay  a  sum  equal  to  the  whole  cost  of  the  war;  to  sur- 
render Demosthenes,  Ilyperides,  and  seemingly  at  least  two  other 
anti-Macedonian  orators;  to  receive  a  Macedonian  garrison  in  ^lu- 
nychia;  to  abandon  their  democratical  constitution,  and  disfranchise 
all  their  poorer  citizens.  Most  of  these  poor  men  were  t-o  be  trans- 
ported from  their  homes,  and  to  receive  new  lands  on  a  foreign 
shore.  The  Athenian  cclonists  in  Samos  were  to  be  dispossessed, 
and  the  island  retransferrcd  to  the  Samian  exiles  and  natives. 

It  is  said  that  Phokion  and  Demades  heard  these  terms  with  satis- 
faction, as  lenient  and  reasonable.  Xenokrates  entered  against  them 
the  strongest  protest  which  the  occasion  admitted,  when  he  said — 
"If  Antipater  looks  upon  us  as  slaves,  the  terms  are  moderate;  if  as 
freemen,  they  are  severe."  To  Phokion's  entrcity,  that  the  intro- 
duction of  the  garrison  might  be  dispensed  with.  Am  ipater  replied  in 
the  negative,  intimating  that  the  garrison  would  be  not  less  service- 
able to  Phokion  himself  than  to  the  Macedonians;  while  Kallimedon 
also,  an  Athenian  exile  there  present,  repelled  the  proposition  with 
scorn.  Respecting  the  island  of  Samos,  Antipater  was  prevailed 
upon  to  allow  a  special  reference  to  the  imperial  authoiily. 

If  Phokion  thought  these  terms  lenient,  we  must  imagine  that  he 
expected  a  sentence  of  destruction  against  Athens,  such  as  Alexan- 
der had  pronounced  and  executed  against  Thebes.  Under  no  other 
comparison  can  they  appear  lenient.  Out  of  21,000  qualified  citi- 
zens of  Athens,  all  those  who  did  not  possess  property  to  the  amount 
of  2,000  drachmae  wqyc  condemned  to  disfranchisement  and  deporta- 
tion. The  number  below  this  prescribed  qualitication.  v>ho  came 
under  the  penalty,  was  12,000,  orthree-tifths  of  the  whole,  ll.cy 
were  set  aside  as  turbulent,  noisy  democrats;  the  9,000  richest  citi- 
zens, the  "party  of  order,"  were  left  in  exclusive  possession,  not 
only  of  the  citizenship,  but  of  the  city.  The  condemned  12, COO 
were  deported  out  of  Attica,  some  to  Thrace,  some  to  the  Illyriaii  cr 
Italian  coast,  some  to  Libya  or  the  Kvrenaic  territory.*.  Besides  the 
multitude  banished  simply  on  the  score  of  comparative  .poverty,  the 
marked  anti-Macedonian  politicians  were  banished  also,  including 


MACEDONIAN  OCCUPATION  OF  GREECE. 


705 


Agnonides,  the  friend  of  Demosthenes,  and  one  of  his  earnest  advo- 
cates when  accused  respecting  the  Harpalian  treasures.  At  he  re- 
quest of  Phokion,  Antipater  consented  to  render  the  deportation 
es  sweeping  than  he  liad  originally  intended,  so  far  asfo  permit 
some  exiles,  Agnonides  among  the  rest,  to  remain  within  theSts 
of  Peloponnesus  We  shall  see  him  presently  contemplating^  aTt  l 
more  wholesale  deportation  of  the  .Etoliau  people  ^ 

It  is  deeply  to  be  lamented  that  this  important  revolution   not 
on  y  cutting  down  Athens  to  less  than  onehilf  of  her  cit  zen  nonn 
ton,  but  involving  a  deportation  fraught  with  indlvdual  hardsh  p 
and  suffering,  is  communicated  to  us  only  in  two  or  three  sentenrp« 

0  Plutarch  and  Dipdorus,  without  any  Jetails  from  contempo^^^^^^ 

tution,  but  the  comparison  disgraces  the  name  of  that  admirable 
lawgiver,  whose  changes,  taken  as  a  whole,  were  prodigk^usly  hK 
and  enfranchising,  compared  with  what  he  found^eslablS     The 
deportation  ordained  by  Antipater  must  indeed  have  brought  upon 
the  poor  citizens  of  Athens  a  state  of  suffering  in  foreio-n  lands  an ul a 
gous  to  that  which  Solon  describes  as  havin|  preceded  wf Sei  ach 
theia,  or  measure  for  the  relief  of  debtors.^  What  rulerthc  9  000 
remaining  citizens  adopted  for  their  new  constitution   we  do  not 
.pTV  ,'^}^'r^'  "i^y  did,  must  now  have  been  subjec  To  the  con 
sent  of  Antipater  and  the  Macedonian  garrison,  which  entered  Mu- 
nychia,  under  the  command  of  Menyllus,  on  the  twentieth  dav  of 
he  month  Boedromion  (September),  rither  more  thanTmonth '/fter 
contrast  "ftw''".?";!    The  day  of  its  entry  presented  a  soi  o^^u 

ihTmf,tovtnf%^^^^  ^^^^  annual  ceremony  of 

llie  mysteries  of  Eleusinian  Demeter,  the  multitudinous  festal  oroces- 

"'"LlZ'Tr'T''''^  ^^^  ^?^  ^^^^^^^  f^^^  Athens  to  Eleu^  8 
One  the  earliest  measures  of  the  9,000  was  to  condemn  to  denth 

;  ho'hTd'nlro"  I'^rn"^'!^'  «-d|^^i-Su-hed  ant'>SoTiLn  ora?o^^ 
hner^u.   brot^^  Hyperides,  Aristonikus,  and 

1  rSM-e^n  Ti,f  t  "^  ^!^^^,^?,af  er^-ard  celebrated  as  Demetrius 
me  llicileiean  The  three  last  having  taken  refuo^e  in  ^<nn«i  and 
Demosthenes  in  Kalauria,  all  of  them%vere  out  of  the  itad    of  m 

i  this  mise?^blf '  ^''  ""%'  '^^^^"^  '''''  '^  ^^^  Macedon^^  swoi-  h 
At  this  miserable  season,  Greece  was  full  of  similar  exiles   the  anti 

iamian  w  '""^'  '%  ''  '''\'\'  ''''''  ^^'^^^^^  liad  tal'n  part  n"tt 
The  time  ihe  7.t  u*'?''  ^^  Antipater,  called  in  the  language  of 
sdze  tZ J  L^^  'r  1^'"^^'''  "^^'^  everywhere  on  the  lookout  to 
aswellaTfrom^x^^^^^^^^^^  "'""'  ^^^^V^  «^  ^1^«  orators,  from  other  cities 
as  \\ell  as  Irom  Athens,  were  slain;  and  there  was  no  refuae  excent 

&n"n?m:i1i-''"  '?'  f'l'''  ^^^"^^  One  of  thase  fffic^^^^^^^^^ 
om  witl,  «  r    Archias,  who  had  once  been  a  tragic  actor,  passed 

the  tl7rpi  At?r-^'''°^' ""!  ^*'Tr^'"  '''^'^'^''  to  ^gina,  where  he  seized 

--drac.'fn^thprn  f ^!«;f-"yP^rides,  Aristonikus,  and  Himer^eus 

aragging  them  out  ot  the  sanctuary  of  the  ^akeion  or  chapel  of 


706 


GRECIAN  xVFFAIRS. 


jEakus.  They  were  all  sent  as  prisoners  to  Anlipatcr,  -vvho  had  by 
this  lime  marched  forward  with  his  army  to  Corinth  and  Kleonaj  iu 
Peloponnesus.  All  were  there  put  to  death,  by  his  order.  It  is 
even  said,  and  on  respectable  authority,  that  the  tongue  of  liyperides 
was  cut  out  before  he  was  slain;  according  to  auollier  statement,  he 
himself  bit  it  out— being  put  to  the  torture,  and  resolving  to  make 
revelation  of  secrets  impossible.  Respecting  the  details  of  his  death, 
there  were  several  ditlerent  stories. 

Having  conducted  these  prisoners  to  Antipater,  Archias  proceeded 
with  his  Thracians  to  Kalauria  in  search  of  Demosthenes.  The  tem- 
of  Poseidon  there  situated,  iu  which  the  orator  had  taken  sanctuary, 
was  held  in  such  high  veneration  that  Archias,  hesitating  to  drag  him 
out  by  force,  tried  to  persuade  him  to  come  forth  voluntarily,  under 
promise  that  he  should  suffer  no  harm.  But  Demosthenes,  well 
aware  of  the  fate  which  awaited  him,  swallowed  poison  in  the  tem- 
ple, and  when  the  dose  was  beginning  to  take  effect,  came  out  of  tiie 
sacred  ground,  expiring  immediately  after  he  had  passed  the  bound- 
ary. The  accompanying  circumstances  were  recounted  in  several 
di&erent  ways.  Eratosthenes  (to  whose  authority  I  lean)  affirmed 
that  Demosthenes  carried  the  poison  in  a  ring  round  his  arm;  others 
said  that  it  was  suspended  in  a  linen  bag  round  his  neck;  according  to  a 
third  story,  it  was  contained  in  a  writing-quill,  which  he  was  seen 
to  bite  anti  suck,  while  composing  a  last  letter  to  Antipater.  Amid 
these  contradictory  details,  we  can  only  affirm  as  certain,  that  the 
poison  which  he  had  provided  beforehand  preserved  him  from  the 
sword  of  Antipater,  and  perhaps  from  having  his  tongue  cut  out. 
The  most  remarkable  assertion  was  that  of  Demochares,  nephew  of 
Demosthenes,  made  in  his  harangues  at  Athens  a  few  years  after- 
ward. Demochares  asserted  that  his  uncle  had  not  taken  poison, 
but  had  been  softly  withdrawn  from  the  world  by  a  special  provi- 
dence of  the  gods,  just  at  the  moment  essential  to  rescue  him  from 
the  cruelty  of  the  Macedonians.  It  is  not  less  to  be  noted,  as  an 
illustration  of  the  vein  of  sentiment  afterward  prevalent,  that  Archias 
the  Exile-Hunter  was  affirmed  to  have  perished  in  the  utmost  dis- 
honor and  wretchedness. 

The  violent  deaths  of  these  illustrious  orators,  the  disfranchise- 
ment and  deportation  of  the  Athenian  Demos,  the  suppression  of  the 
public  Dikasteries,  the  occupation  of  Athens  by  a  :Macedonian garri- 
son, and  of  Greece  generally  by  Macedonian  Exile  Hunters— are 
events  belonging  to  one  and  the  same  calamitous  tragedy,  and  mark- 
ing the  extinction  of  the  autonomous  Hellenic  world. 

Of  Hvperides  as  a  citizen  we  know  only  the  general  fact,  that  he 
maintained  from  first  to  last,  and  with  oratorical  ability  inferior  only 
to  Demosthenes,  a  strenuous  opposition  to  Macedonian  dominion 
over  Greece;  though  his  persecution  of  Demosthenes  lespecting  the 
Harpalian  treasure  appears  (as  far  as  it  comes  before  us)  discredit- 
able. 


CHARACTER  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


707 


Of  Demosthenes,  we  know  mdre— enough  to  form  a  judgment  of 
hnn  both  as  citizen  and  statesman.     At  the  time  of  his  death  he  was 
about  sixty-two  years  of  age,  and  we  have  before  us  his  tirst  Philippic 
delivered  thirty  years  before  (353-351  b,c  ).     We  are  thus  sure,  that 
even  at  that  early  day,  he  took  a  sagacious  and  provident  measure  of 
the  danger  which   threatened   Grecian  liberty   from  the  enemy  and 
encroachments  of  Philip.     He  impressed  upon  his  countrymSu  this 
coming  danger,  at  a  time  when  the  older  and  more  influential  politi- 
cians either  could  not  or  would  not  see  it;  he  called  aloud  upon  his 
fellow-ciizens  for  personal  service  and  pecuniary  contributions  en- 
forcing the  call  by  all  the  artifices  of  consummate  oratorv,  when  such 
distasteful  propositioiis  only   entailed    unpopularity   upon   himself 
At  the  period  when  Demosthenes  first  addi-essed  these  earnest  a^'eas 
to  his  countrymen,  long  before  the  fall  of   Olvnthus,  tlie  power  of 
Phiipthoug.,  formidable,  might  have  been  kept  perfectly  well  with- 
WnLfp^f  f}^''^^'''^  ^"d  Thrace;  and   woijd   prJbably  have 
been  so  kept,  had  Demosthenes  possessed  in  351  i3.c.  as  much  pub- 
lic intluence  as  he  had  acquired  ten  years  afterward,  in  841  b  c 

Throughout  the  whole  career  of  Demosthenes  as  a  public  adviser 
down   o  the  battle  of  Ch^roneia,  we  trace  the  same  combinaUon  of 
earnest  patrio  isin  with  wise  and  long-sighted  policy.  During  the  three 
years'  war  which  ended  with  thebStle^f  ClLroneia,  the  Ithen  ans 
m  he  main  followed  his  counsel;  and  disastrous  as  were  the  ultimate 

snon  nL'''u^'''^T^^"'  ''•'^'.'  ^^^  ^'^"^'^  Demosthenes  could  not  be  ?e- 
spouMble— Its  earlier  periods  were  creditable  and  successful  its  o-en- 
eral  scheme  was  the  best  that  the  caso  admitted,  and  its  diploimitic 
management  imiversally  triumphant.  But  what  invests  the  purposes 
Zf^rlY  ^/.P^'^^^'^^l^e^^^^  ^'itb  peculiar  grandeur,  is,  that  they  were" 

vn.Tf^  /td^'°r'^'   f  V.°  '"^  ^^'^^^^"t  '^''Sre^  Pan-Hellenic  also.  It 
whnrPT^  i     '  ^l«"t^l^'^the  sought  to  defend  against  Philip,  but  the 
whole  Hellenic  world.      In  this  he  towers  above  the  ffreate^  of  his 
predecessorsforhalf  a  century  before  his  birth-PerilTes   Ar^hida 
n.l^      f'^'''.T^^^^'?T'''''°'^'^^>  ^^^<^«^  policy  was  Athenian,  Spartan 

ini^^fnn  nf%'  '^'^  ^fT""'     ^^  '^'''''  "^«  ^ack  to  the  time!  of  the 

nrasion  of  Xerxes  and  the  generation  immediately  succeedino-  it 

when  the  struggles  and  sufferings  of  the  Athenians  against  Persia 

rre.'r.o'''%f '"^'^r^^^  """^^^^^^  '^''''''y  ^^  ^^'''''^  ^^^^^  collective 
Greece.     The  sentiments  to  which  Demosthenes  appeals  throughout 

his  numerous  orations,  are  those  of  the  noblest  and  largest  pSriot- 

^^.l.WnW  •  '""^"ir  '^'^  ""."^^'"^  ^'"^^^-^^  sentiment,  of  an  autono- 
mous Hellenic  world,  as  the  indispensable  condition  of  a  (li.-niticd 
and  (lesirable  existence-but  inculcating  at  the  same  time  that  iho.c 
blessings  could  only  be  preserved  by  toil,  self-sacrifice,  devotion  of 
lortune,  and  willingness  to  brave  hard  and  steady  personal  service 
t  rom  the  destruction  of  Thebes  by  Alexander  in  335  b.c  to  the 
Lamian  war  after  his  death,  the  policy  of  Athens  neither  was  nor 
could  be  conducted  by  Demosthenes.     But  condemned  as  he  was  to 


708 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 


.•      •  r.fPir>nov  iiP  vpt  rendered  material  service  to  Athens, 
comparative  incfflcacy,  he  ^t  renaeitu  opposing  the  alii- 

llyperides— tleexai,gcraieu  p.u  declared  against  Alexan- 

have  P/^^'^^l^  Vto  .hTcbar^fo^hr^^  Harpalus 

der.  In  respect  ^^J^^^^^^^^^  believin-  bim  innocent.  The  Lam- 
I  bavealreadyshovvn  reasons    nbc^  bis  original  sug- 

ian  war,  the  closmg  scene  ot  Ins  f^^'^'^^  '  ^^^^^lent  But  he  threw 
gestion  ^-^^;^^:^::^  a  dor "nd™^^^^^  instrumental 
liimself  mto  itMitli  ^l"^^^®;3.t"r^f  ^V,    '•  ^^^^^^        it  obtained  from  so 

of  success     ^,l^c^^^'\^^"^,^?,^^;'  A^  mutual  hostility 

tractions  in  the^  ^^^Ke/s-an  J  on  the  probability  of  having  only 
among  the  principal  ^ffi^^^.f-^""!^^^^  with  little  or  no  re- 

to  make  head  against  A^^^P^^^!^,^.^,^^^^  Enterprise  ultimately 

enforcement  from   A^^^^  U  so  noble  an 

proved,  yet  he  risk  ^as  one  lai  ^  been  protracted  another  year 

object  at  stake;  ^nd  could  the  ^^alnave^o^^  different.     We  shall 

its  termination  would  probably  ^^^^%'',^^''    ^siatir  events.     After  a 

see  this  presently ,when  ^^^  .^^^^^^.^Jtersite^^^^  and  dis- 

catastrophe  so  ruinous   extinguishng  tree  s^^^^  ^^.^^^^^j^. 

S'S^nn^'^r  a^sSat  %^^oi  Hxl'^^o.  to  prolong  Ms  ex- 

ally  also,  lor  l^Tl^Uorv  hlAn^^s  o?  the  public  affairs  o£  the 
stimulating  m>d  ';;l7"''«2,;';;4d'  o    .i,  assembled  countrymen,  a 
moment,  which  he  had  »*"^"-°^^" „"';,„      fiiese  harangues  serve 
few  remain  for  the  admiration  of    o.  eray      Ih^^t  'i        h 
to  u.,  not  on'y  as  evidence  oh  Sim 

Si':rCt  ^Ise  oH^erecian  life,  as  enacting  and  working  re- 

ality. 


CHAPTER  XCYI. 

™m  the  i^mian  wak  to  the  c^^-  op^he  history  o.  fhee 

hellas  and  hellemsm. 

The  death  of  Demosthenes,  with  Us  trag^^^^^^^^^ 
counted  in  my  last  chapter,  is  on  ^^/^J^.f^^  K^^^  in  a 

prolonged  life  of  Phokion,  as  agent  of  Macedonian  supnnwc^ 


ATHENS  UNDER  ANTIPATER  AND  PHOKION.    709 


and 
he 


cityhnfdepopuatcd,  where  he  had  been  born  a  free  citizen   ai 
whicli  he  bad  so  long  helped  to  administer  as  a  free  communitv    Th. 
dishonor  o    Phokion's  position  nuistliuve  been  agsravatX^  the  d^ 
tress  m  Athens,  arising  both  out  of  the  violent^^orta   o  f  of  one" 
ha  f  of  its  free  citizens,  and  out  of  the  compulsoiy  re   mi  of  the 
Athenian  settlers  from  Samos;  which  island  was  now  tTen  from 
Athens,  after  she  had  occupied  it  forty -three  years,  and  ix^^ored  t^ 
|?f,^^^"?^a«  people  and  to  their  recalled  exiles,  by  a  re^cr  pt  of  Pei 
dikkas  in  the  name  of  Aridieus.     Occupying  this  obnoxious  elevi" 
Uon  Phok,o.i  exercised  authority  with  his  usual  probity  aXldness" 
Exerting  himself  to  guard  the  citizens  from  being  annove  1  ^  d  'or 
ders  on  the  part  of  the  garrison  of  Munychia,  he"  kept  'up  iYie X 
intercourse  with  its  commander  Menylkis,  though  r.fus  m^  a        es 
ents  both  from  hini  and  from  Aulipater.     He  wns  anxiouslo  bestow 
the  gift  of  citizenship  upon  the  philosopher  Xenoknaes  wl  o  wmI 

nffJr  r"^'-^'  'i'r^'?^  non-freeman;  but  Xenokrates  d^^cTi  ed  he 
offer,  reniarking,  that  he  would  accept  no  place  in  a  constU  tion 
against  which  he  had  protested  as  envoy.  This  mark  of  couri  ^^^^^^^^ 
independence,  not  a  little  remarkable  while  the  ilacedon^ns  wo  l 

ciI^^\?!rT^L'^^^^^^^  P""-^^  ^°d  remodeled  the 

cto  if'  -^  '  f^'^S^H^^'^i^,  and  others,  as  he  had  done  at  Athens-  in- 
sta  ling  in  each  an  oligarchy  of  his  own  partisans-somedme  with 
a  Macedonian  gariison-and  putting  to  deitli,  deportin-  or  ^xod  i/i 
hostile  or  intractable^  or  democratFcal  citizens.^  HavrngcXletef 
the  sub.ingation  of  Peloponnesus,  he  passed  across  the^cSh  ^a 
Gul  to  attack  the  ^tolians,  now  the  only  Greeks  remaining  unsub- 
dued It  was  the  purpose  of  Antipater,  not  merely  to  conqlier  this 
warlike  and  rude  people,  but  to  transport  them  in  mass  across  into 
Asia,  and  march  them  up  to  the  interim-  deserts  of  the  emrSe  Hh 
army  was  too  powerful  to  be  resisted  on  even  ground  soXt  all  tlie 
more  accessible  towns  and  villages  fell  into  his  hands  '  But  he" 
la  .defended  themselves  bravely,  withdrew  their  families  nttthe 
high  towns  and  mountain  tops  of  their  very  rugired  country  and 

teruf whoh"  '''  ''  ^'''  Macedonian  in  vadefs.  Nevertheless  'k  a 
teru>  Mho  had  carried  on  war  of  the  same  kind  with  Alexander  in 
Spgdiana,  manifested  so  much  skill  in  seizing  the  points  of  commu 

^^^^  Zr^:.''''''T^^ '''  ^^"^^'  ^"PP^-^  and'mluc^i  them  t" 
Thl%f  ;^^^^^^^'    apid    the    winter  which  had  now  supervened 
1  he  .Etolians,  m  spite  of  bravery  and  endurance   must  Ton  w; 
been  compelled  to  surrender  fronl  cold  and  bun  'er  had  no   the  un- 
expec  ed  arrival  of  Antigonus  from  Asia  comrmuiic  ted    ucl    news 

back  to  Macedonia,  with  a  view  to  the  crossing  of  the  He  lesDont 
and  operating  in  Asia.  ^    They  concluded  a  p^ac^cation  w  th^^ 
^tohans-postponing  till  a  future  period  their  design  of  depo^! 


710 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR 


■   „  .i,,t  ,^onnl(>— and  withdrew  into  Macedonia-,  where  Antipater 
iei<^SC^lianee  with  Kraterus  by  giving  to  him  his  daughter 

tioa  would  not  be  U.'tter  served  by  brealcing  •''*  l'!"Vf,' '.  f  ,?no  ,S 
in°r  the  new  propositiou.     To  tliis  step  lie  was  advised  by  .E'iine»es 
his  abW  friend  and  coadjutor,  steadily  attached  to  the  interest  o 
t le  .e.'al  fauh-    and  withal  personally  hated  by  Aniipatcr.     L  t 
Alkelaf  brother  of  Perdikkas.'represented  that  it  would  be  haa  id- 
rn  s  to  provola"  openly  and  immediately  the  wrath   of  Antipate  . 
Tcrordi^X  Perdi'ukas  resolved  to  accept  Kikjca    or  the  moment 
but  to  s°ul  her  away  after  no  long  time,  and  take  I^  "IP^"^'  '» 

titous     Be  n'' aveL  to  this  marria.M,  and  probably  instigated  by 
O  vni";;  alio   r>ef.likkas  and  Alketas  put_  Ky-»-|  '»  ^-^f^''^^  j^  ' 
th;;  in.U.'natiou  excited  among  the  soldiers  by  this  deed  ^^-'^J"  'V' 
ousas  to  menace  their  safety,  a.id  they  were  forced  to  permit  the 

Tn  lie  inlri.n.es  ^vcl•c  going  on  through  the  ^^^f^\^IJ^^^'^ 
^vhi  e  the  Lamian  war  was  still  effectively  prosecuted  by  t  ' e  0 nx  ;S 
About  the  uutunm  of  the  year,  Antigonus  (called  ^^onophUia  m^^^^^^ 
the  satrap  of  Phryda,  detected  these  secret  intrigues  of  Perdikkas, 
>vho  f or  hat  and  other  reasons,  began  to  look  on  him  as  an  enem> , 
Tnd  lo  plot  ag^^^^^^     life.    Apprised  of  his  danger,  Antigonus  made 


CASUALTIES  OF  THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 


/^ 

4 


11 

with^FI^STe  t^!S^^^l^^f:i^-^fr  -1 1-teru3 

outtheLamian  war-  the  n-nvc  of  Prnr  L^i^        .^    ^""''^i'"^'  tJn'ongh- 

at  least  weakened   if  no   mrilv^ert    i.^.Vp    J    ,''''"',°"''l  ''■■>'■«  "^"-'i 
earlier,  the  forces  of  .H  i  'rter\nust  nl  I?     ^^''?h  f"^''""^  ^'""^^^ 
hi.n.  and  the  battle  "f  SnnoVw^  ,   '^,7ob'  1^^^™  11.:^ 
issue.     As  soon  as  Perdikkas  became  hostile  r^  it]^    ,     a  diftcrent 

IK.liey  to  sustafn  and  seek  nllianc^  ^t  "th    G  "eeks'Ts  we'  sln^V'l 
him  present  V  do  n<»-  with  tho  y^'nU-mo      ^n  ^'^^J^^'  ^^  ^^e  shall  find 

accidental,  AutipaTer  o  t  l^efai^  in  erv  '  of '%  f'""'''  "'"fP^^-^'y 
ing  which  his  hinds  were  not  oni;f'eeLt,mied\,'!r'''''  '^'"i 
unexpected  strength  from  Leoimalus  nm  Tf,  ,T  .'"'  ?"'*■  ""** 
Lamianwar.  The  disastrous issefti.n?  '^'•'"ens,  to  close  the 
part  the  effect  of  t^SXs  amcmo-  w  If '"''" '''"'''f?^^ 
death  of  Leosthenes  him  e If  '  S  ?sm  e  fs  w  ."T'  '"'"''"'«  "^« 
proving  that  the  proiect  was  desnerxt.,  -1  ""^  •'"  ''®  reffarded  as 
its  promoters,  who  M  ftXiil,?^'*'!?.'  ■"""'"•'eived  on  the  part  of 
of  their  case   the  effects  of  dVsPn-,twf^°"'.?'"??S  "'«'  P^l'^'bimics 

In  the  spring  oft2lBcA,Zr^r.n;^'&*'f  '^'••'T'"."'""  c-hiefs. 
operati<,nJ  will,  Proleniv  ffovernnr^^f^^       Kraterus,  having  concerted 

began  their  conflict  vvhl  Sfk-  s  lh!?-'lf?L?rf ''  '■"'°  ^''^  ^"^ 
alon^  with  him,  marched  against  i^^y^WoXek  pSL- "t  ^'"'' 
his   brother  Alketa.s.  in   coniunction  w!  h  T  1,    ""'"ny;  leavmg 

maintain  his  cause  in  IC-T.padok  a  and  Asif  Mf^  %iif.r''"'>'" 
couragcd  by  the  advei^o  fooUn<r  nf  fi.«  aV      i    ^iinor.     Alketas,  dis^ 

ttp  the%„t^rprisc"  al^hope, .'  :^  C' R,,^^^^^^^^^^ 

ms perished. 'Neo,,,olen,t'wa"ldl  el  by  E,,^;;;^':rhrso;;V^ 
after  a  personal  conflict  desperate  in  the  evV-mnl  ,    i  °1"  ''"'"'• 

and  at  the  cost  of  a  severe  l^d '."o  hfm'self ""Ifrr  Ihe^iX'/he 


712 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 


fnnnrl  TCmtenis  still  alive,  though  expiring  from  his  wound.     Deeply 
^ffl-  t  ;^  .t  tl  r^i-l  t  he  d  d  his  utmost  to  restore  the  dying  man;  and 
^stftlnf  p  oVc^a^  be  Impossible,  caused  his  dead  body  to  be  honor- 
1        J  ,!;,.}l  H  Mtul  tnnsm  tied  into  Macedonia  for  burial. 

oVi  r  of  t      T  at  frencral  vvSs  so  overbearing  and  tyrannical  m  Ins 
to  near  oi  u.        ■">   :,  nffipprs— and  w  thai  so  unsuccessful  m 

H " tir^t' oS^^^^  P«  on  tl"  Pelusiac  branch  of.  the 

X  le     thatch  s  own  arniy  mutinied  and  slew  him.     His  troops  joined 
P  i^;^nv  who.rc^^^  behavior  gained  their  goodwill.     Only 

nvo  clH^s  ato  this  revolution,  a  messenger  from  Eumenes  reached 
P  Pnmn  announcin<r  Lis  victory  and  the  death  of  Kraterus.     Had 
?/iXm<"been^eceivedb/Peidikkas  himself  at  the  head  of 
i   .rmv?he  course  o^  subsequent  events  might  have  been  sensibly- 
nVvpd^ ' -Fume^     would  have  occupied  the  most  commanding  posi- 
'f    t:  ^^H    IS  Jener^^^^        the  kin^s  of  the  Alexandrine  family,  to 
tion  m  A^f  \  f  f  7^/;;^  ,^^^l{,^^  f,.eiii,gs  attached  him.     But  the  news, 
S.^:  at\h   mo^^^^^^^^  did,  caused  throughout  the  army  only 

he  mo^st   vicS^  '^S^^'"^^  ^'■'"^'   "^^  simply  as  ally  of 

the  ^^ps\\i'*;^.;\'_;  i^j*  ^^  cause  of  death  to  the  esteemed  Kraterus. 
the  odious  P^X   ,wUke  as  and  M  ^^-as  voted  by  the  soldiers 

"^^^^^f  Ko  11^1 'in"  kept  'with  him  henceforward  by 

ji  public  ^"^"^>^  ^         soldiers      At  the  same  time  several  oflicers 
S^d  "pSkas  in't^^^^^^^^     and  also  Atalanta  his  sister,  were 

^^"^^*  *^.^  ^pnfh  of  Perdikkas  and  the  defection  of  his  soldiers,  com- 

^^Z  nremndeiwe  w^^^  into  the    hands  of    Antipater, 

?.tni.ivT.d^^^^^  Antipater  was  invited  to  join  the  army. 

,^ow  c^nsis   n.^^^^^  botli  of  Ptolemy  and  Perdikkas  united 

HewasT^^^^^  guardianship  of  the  Persons  of  the 

Vin<Ts  and  ^vi  h  the  sort  of  ministerial  supremacy  previously  held  by 
P^-^^kl^^^  He  was  however,  exposed  to  much  difficulty,  and  even 
To  4e  It  personal  damrer,  from  the  intrigues  of  the  princess  Eury- 

Uk?  ^irdTp  a  ed  a  masculine  boldnessi  n  publicly  haranguing  the 
soklieTs-aK^^^  the  discontents  of  the  army,  who  claimed  pres- 
ent formedy  promised  to  them  by  Alex^mder,  which  there  were 
no  funds  to  liquidate  at  the  moment.     At  Triparadisus  in  Suia, 

\^.t  mter  made  a  second  distribution  of  the  satrap  es  of  the  empire; 
;oShat  mo^^^^^       yet  coinciding  in  the  main  -;|1^  t^'-^^^y^jf ;,  - 

been  drawn  up  shortlv  after  the  death  of  Alexander.     To  I  tolcm} 

^^s  assured  Egvpt  and  Libya-to  Antigonus,  tbe  Greater  Phrygia, 

Lvkia  and  Pamphylia— as  each  had  had  before.  . 

ASi4 mif  Was^placed  in  command  of  the  principal  Hacedoniai 

army  iS  Asia,  to  crush  Eumenes  and  the  other  chief  adherents  of 


DEATH  OP  ANTIPATER. 


713 


Perdikkas;  most  of  whom  had  been  condemned  to  death  bv  a  voto 
of  the  Macedonian  army.  After  a  certain  interval,  Antipater  himself 
acconipanied  by  the  kings,  returned  to  3Iacedonia,  haviKudS  bv 
artifice  a  renewed  demand  on  the  part  of  his  soldiers  for  Si%  proiS 
presents.  The  war  of  Antigonus,  first  against  Eumenes  iEpa 
dokia.  next  against  Alketas  and  the  other  partisans  of  Perdikkas^fa 
Pi  .d.a  las  ed  lor  many  momhs.  but  was  at  length  successful  v 
tmislied  Eumenes,  beset  by  tlie  constant  treacherv  and  insubor  f 
nation  of  the  Macedonians,  was  defeated  and  driven  oTot  theS' 
He  took  refuge  with  a  handful  of  men  in  the  impregnable  and  wl  i 

blocltfp'f '^  "^?^"'^^  ^^  Kuppadokia,  where  E^S  out  a  long 
blockade,  apparently  more  than  a  3  ear,  against  Antigonus  ^ 

Before  the  prolonged  blockade  of  Nora  had  been  brought  to  a  clo«e 
Antipater,  bein.i^of  very  advancedage.  fell  into  sickness,  ?md  presentT^ 
died_     One  of  h.s  latest  acts  was,  to  put  to  death  the  Athen  an  ora 
tor  Demades  who  had  been  sent  to  xMacedonia  as  envoy  to  so  fc  t  the 
removal  ot  the  Macedonian  garrison  at  Munychia.     Antipatef  h^T^ 
promised,  or  given  hopes,  that  if  the  oligarchy  which  he  h^d  cons  i 
tuted  at  Athens  maintained  unshaken  adherence  to  MacedonT  he 
would  withdraw  the  garrison.     The  Athenians  endeavored  to  pre 
vail  on  Phokion  to  go  to  Macedonia  as  solicitor  for  the  fulfillment  of 
this  promise;    but  he   steadily  refused.     Demades,  who    vH  inlw 
undertook  the  mission    reached  Macedonia  at  a  moment  vei-y  Sn^ 
toward  for  himself.     The  papers  of  the  deceased  Perd  kS  lad 
come  into  possession  of  his  opponents;   and  among  tJieni  had  been 
found  a  letteT  written  to  him  by  Demades,  inviting  him  to  cross  over 
and   rescue  Greece  from   her  dependence    "onlm  old  and  ?o^Ln 
warp  "-meaning  Antipater.     Tliis  letter  gave  g.^at  offense  to  An 
tipater-the  rather    as  Demades  is  said  to  have  been  h  shabim"! 
pensioner-and    sti  1    greater  offense  to  his  son   Kassai  der     X 
c^msed  Dernadeswith  his  son  to  be  seized-fiist  killed  the  ^oi^ 
he  immediate  presence  and  even  embrace  of  the  father-and   hen 
s  ew  the  father  himself,  with  bitter  invective  against  his  ingra   tudt 

;^;v^di|ai  :-^,^n!i^'a:i  :-Sn^  ^orfetir' s^^ 

no  fS  S^fto^llrteV''^  ^'^'^™-'=  ^  "^  ^^^^  ^ 
Antipater  by  his  last  directions  appointed  Polysperchon  one  of 
Alexander's  veteran  officers,  to  be  chief  administrator  with  fun 
powers  on  behalf  of  the  imperial  dvnasty;  while  he  aS '-ned  to  1^^^^ 
own  son  Kassander  only  the  second  placl  as  chilia^roi"^^^^^^^^ 
the  body-guard      He  thought  that  this  disposition  of  pcmlrwo^M 

was  oScf  a'nH^^f'r'^^^'^^'"  throughout  tl/e  empire,  as  PolyspeTchon 
^vas  older  and  of  longer  military  service  than  any  other  anion- 
Alexander's  generals.  Moreover.  Antipater  was  espc^cially  afm?d  of 
kiting  dominion  fall  into  the  hanas  of  che  princesses;  all  of  whom- 
Olympias,  Kleopatra,  and  Euryd ike- were  energetic  charactrrs    and 


714 


THE  LAMIAN   WAR. 


the  fint  of  the  three  (who  had  relired  to  Epirus  from  enmity  toward 
^B;^thc^'.^:"o/ Ant'iX'w 're  disappointed  from  the  begiuni,^. 

be«    .    Kassander  would  not  .ubtnit  to  '1^<;\ ^^^'.""''f  P  ^'■;;- ^n  1    of 
,f»  P„lvsnerchon  as  his  superior.     lnmie<iiatelv  aftei^  tlic  (l"^-*"'  »' 
fn.inau-r    but  U'fore  it   biame  publicly  known,   Ku..sancler  dij,- 
^rS Nik^o^vUl,  pretended  orSers  from  A^,''  1-'-    °.  aIS 
'^^7"r  i^ut'vbf  rTfr"*-:  ew  5  "^^  \t\t.[e,u"r  ,"u?^ieeau;e.  to 

ESj"%^^^;iui-S^lm^^^ 

Zr  n^^ut  occupy     i  4  1?  a  huntins-party  in  tbe  country 

Tit  the  same  tin  e  «-nt  coulidential  adherents  to  Ibe  Helespont 
,n  1  ot  er  tlTees  in  furtherance  of  his  sebemes;  and  especially  to 
eo  trae  alliauee  with  Auligonus  in  Asia  and  with  Fto len.y  m  Egypt^ 
l?is  .nvovs  beiu-  general!?  well  received,  he  himself  soon  quilted 
MaeedonL  sudd?nfy,  and  went  to  concert,  measures  with  A"  JS^'""^ 
ilaceuonia.uu        >  piolemv,  and  still  more  that  of 

AndZus  to  aid  im^gainst  Polyspcrehon  and  the  imperial 
♦hnn  ..  rp'ilitv  vet  slill  a  respected  name.     But  now,  tiic  pieRUDtt 

Bipi^^L^com  nand-and  to  combat  Kassander  in  Europe  by  .i^su- 
r.o  tbemselves  the  general  goodwill  and  support  of  the  GicAs. 
Thw  l,i<t  nl.iect  was  to  be  obtained  by  granting  to  the  urcciss  ...tii 
in  fel^r'ai^'dTnt  and  by  subverting  ''- A^/jpa;^™;;;;'  'S^f'^'^'' 

A?ii  a'tin  t  t'^fecLuter-  n.ereSs  ot  thegreat  JJaccdpnian  olhc«., 

t  o'we;"  stelXtending  to  divide  and  «PP™?";;;<: ''-rp^^,  .'  >  ?■ 
the  fidelitv  and  military  skill  of  Eumenes.    At  his  disp9sal  roljspu 
ehon  plaSd The  iinperL  treasures  and  soldiers  in  Asuj;  cspeca  J 
the  brave  \)ut  faithless  and  disorderly  Argyraspides.     Oh  mpias  also 
uddress^  to  him  a  pathetic  letter,  asbins  his  counsel  as  the  onlj 


SKILL  AXD  FIDELITY  OF  EUMENES.  7|g 

o^  Epinfsin'  r>iL'';i^,':?:.'r  ir':hel,id''^''"p''" ''°'  \?  -"- '" 

abstain  from  vindicave  a  ui  Z'!  vteo<?'<'"Bot  ?'  ''"'''  '" 
mendations,  honorable  as  well  to  hrSenfe' as  to  1.il  i'  ""'^"'■ 
were  disregarded  by  the  old  queen  She  c™e  i,  ?.  I?  '"™<'>V«y. 
take  the  management  of  affairs-  an  '-IthnLnr  °  Macedonia  to 
mother  to  tlie  great  conqToro^ra  serf  ns^Vf"'  "T,"'!?-  ""«■  °f 

exploits  ot  antiquitT^  Wiule    even  inT^!,,'^  "'"'•'  ""'"'"'■^^''le 

Argyraspides  ^  soldiers,  the  Macedonian 

we'^ri^al'rp^etnTfollowT  If  fs"'^!.,1?;":^l('^  '=-^'"'''^"<'?  "'  -"-'' 
did  not  ibando/As ia  at  once    at  tSfdeath  o?  'x^r''f  "'"*,  "'^'^ 
centrate  their  attention  onXcectnia  alone    sl,^"'"''-*"'''  """^  S^^- 
menes  to  aid  tliera.     To  keep  toSer  in  nntfv    ?I       .'°°  °'''""  ^"• 
Asia  was  manifestly  impractkabfe  even  "v      iHstn^^^^^^ 
Indeed,  we  read  that  Olympias  wished  for  Ik  ^rnf.^V''"'"y' 
not  trusting  any  one  but  iiim'  as  proteltorot '  ireMld' riexaX' 
In  Macedonia  apart  from  Asia,  Eumenes,  if  the  vtolent  f em n^.     f 

&iTa,^t^  artbi"tL^^rdS  tZeAFBi^f 

sen°t°entovs'?f  Pefla''^"^^  °  11  "^^.oT"  ""'^'  f  '^'  ^^^^  cities  had 
posed  as  theyV^'riJ^of  I^  ^Z<i:Jr^f]^^^^  ^^^ 


716 


THE  LAMIAX  WAR. 


moment  to  know  what  course  the  new  Macedonian  autlionty  would 
adoDt  Polyspercbon,  pcisuaded  that  they  would  all  adhere  to  Kas- 
sander  and  that  his  only  chance  of  combating  that  rival  was  by 
enlistiiU  popular  sympathy  and  interests  in  Greece,  or  at  least  by 
subvertTii'^  these  Antipatrian  oligarchies— drew  up  m  conjunction 
with  his  counselors  a  proclanir.tiou  which  he  issued  in  the  name  ot 

^^Aft^rrecitins  the  steady  £?ood-will  of  Philip  and  Alexander  to- 
ward Greece,  he  afRrraed  thnt  this  feeling  had  been  interrupted  by 
the  untoward  Lamian  war,  originating  with  some  ill-judged  Greeks, 
and  ending  in  the  intliction  of  many  severe  calamities  upon  the  va- 
rious cities    But  all  these  severities  (he  continued)had  proceeded  from 
the  generals  (Antipater  and  Kralerus) .  the  kings  were  now  determmcrt 
toreclress  them.     It  was  nccordindv  proclaimed  that  the  political  con- 
stitution of  each  citv  should  be  restored,  as  it  had  stood  in  the  tmies 
of  Philip  and  Alexander;   that  before  the  thirtieth  of  the  month 
Xanthikus,  ail  those  who  had  been  condemned  to  banishment  or  cie- 
norted  by  the  generals,  should  be  recalled  and  received  bark;  that 
their  properties  should  be  restored,  and  past  sentences  against  them 
rescinded;  that  they  should  live  in  amnesty  as  to  the  past,  and  good 
feelino-  as  to  the  future,  with  the  remaining  citizens      From  this  act 
of  recfdl  were  excluded  the  exiles  of  Amphissa,  Trikka,  Pharkadon. 
and  llerakleia,  together  with  a  certain  number  of  Megalopolitans 
implicated  in  one  particular  conspiracy.     In  the  particular  case  of 
i\nUe  cities   the  governments  of  which  had  been  denounced  as  hos- 
tile by  Philip  or  xUexander,  i-pecial  reference  and  consultation  was 
opened  with  Pella,  for  some  modification  to  meet  the  cncumstances. 
As  to  Athens,  it  was  decreed  that  Samos  should  be  restored  to  her, 
but  not  Oropus;  in  all  other  respects  she  was  placed  on  the  same  ioot- 
incr  as  in  the  days  of  Philip  and  Alexander.     '  All  the  Greeks  (con 
cUuled  this  Droclamation)  shall  pass  decrees,  forbidding  every  one 
either  to  bear  arms  or  otherwise  act  in  hostility  against  us— on  pain  or 
exile  and  confiscation  of  goods,  for  himself  and  his  family.     On  this 
and  on  all  other  matters  we  have  ordered  Polyspercbon  to  take  proper 
measures.     Obey  him— as  we  have  before  written  to  you  to  do   tor 
we  shall  not  omit  to  notice  those  who  on  any  point  disregard  our 

proclamation.  ,  .  ^t      i     t)  i   ^^^^ 

Such  was  the  new  edict  issued  by  the  kings,  or  rather  by  Polysper- 
cbon in  their  names.  It  directed  the  removal  of  all  the  garrisons, 
and  the  subversion  of  all  the  oligarchies  established  by  Antipater  alter 
the  Lamian  war.  It  ordered  the  recall  of  the  host  of  exiles  then  ex^ 
Dclled  It  revived  the  state  of  things  prevalent  before  the  deatu  or 
Alexander— which  indeed  itself  had  been,  for  the  most  p:»rt,  an  ag- 
irre"-ate  of  macedonizing  oligarchies  interspersed  with  Macedonian 
garrisons  To  the  existing  Antipatrian  oligarchies,  however  it  was 
a  death-blow,  and  so  it  must  have  been  understood  bv  the  Grecian 
envoys— including  probably  deputations  from  the  exiles,  as  well  as 


NIKANOR  SEIZES  PEIR.^.US.. 


717 


frlf?  f^S"!  the  civic  governments-lo  whom  Polyspercbon  deliv- 
credit  at  Pella  Not  content  with  the  general  edict,  Polyspercho^^ 
addressed  special  letters  to  Argos  and  various  other  cities,  cominandin^i 
that  the  Antipatrian  leading  men  should  be  banished  with  confisca^ 
tion  of  property,  and  in  some  cases  put  to  deatii;  the  names  beinff 
probably  furnished  to  him  by  the  exiles.  Lastly,  as  it  was  clear  t  a? 
such  stringent  measures  could  not  be  executed  without  force --he 
rather  as  these  oligarchies  would  be  upheld  by  Kassander  from'with- 
out-Polysperchon  resolved  to  conduct  a  large  military  force  into 
Greece,  sending  thither  first,  however,  a  con^derabie  detachment 
for  immediate  operations  under  his  son  Alexander  ^^""lenL, 

^  To  Athens,  as  well  as  to  other  cities,  Polyspercbon  addressed  sne 

exiles.     At  Athens  such  change  was  a  greater  revolution  than  else- 
where  because  the  multitude  of  exilel  and  persons  depor  ed  I  ad 
been  the  greatest.     To  the  existing  nine  thousand  Athenian  cUizens 
It  was  doubtless  odious  and  alarming,  while  to  Phokion  w   h  the 
other  leading  Antipatrians,  it  threatened  not  only  loss  of  power  but 
pmbab  y  nothing  le.ss  than  the  alternative  of  flight  or  death    'The 
state  of  interests  at  Athens,  however,  was  now  s.tgularly  novel  and 
comphc^ited.     There  were  the  Antipatrians  ana  the  nine  thousand 
qualified  citizens.     There  were  the  exiles,  who,  under  the  new  edi?t 
speedi  y  began  re-entering  the  city,  and  reclaiming  their  ciulenshi  ', 
inZf''"  '^''''  properties.     Polyspercbon  and  hit  son  were  known 
to  be  soon  coming  with  a  powerful  force.     Lastly,  there  was  Nikanor 
who  Jield  Munychia  with  a  garrison,  neither  for'  pSvsperdiin   n^^^^ 
for  the  Athenians,  but  for  Kassander,  the  latter  being  him  e^f 'a^so 
expected  with  a  force  from  Asia.     Here  then  were  several  parties 

The  first  contest  arose  between  the  Athenians  and  Nikanor  resnect- 
ing  Munchia,  which  th^.required  him  to  evacuate  pui^^ant Tthe 
recent  proclamation.     Nikanor  on  his  side  returned  an  evasive  an 
swer,  promising  compliance  as  soon  as  circumstances  permitted   but 
m  the  mean  time  entreating  the  Athenians  to  continue  iS  nee  wi 
Kassander  as   hey  iiad  been  with  his  father  Antipater.     He  seen  so 
have  indulox'd  hopes  of  prevailing  on  them  to  declare  in  liL  fa  or-- 
and  not  without  plausible  grounds,  since  the  Antipatrian  leadeisld 
a  large  proportion  o    the  nine  thousand  citizens  could  no   b  t  dre" 
the  execution  of  Polysperchon's  edict.     And  he  had  also  wharw is 
of  stiU  greater  moment-the  secret  connivance  and  supporlof  Ph,^ 
kion,  who  put  hiinself  in  intimate  relation  with  Nika  Ti  he  In^^^ 
before  done  with  Menyllus-and  who  had  greater  reason  than  inv 

heldtV^^'^'^l  '^^  ''''''  f  Polyspercbon.^  At  a  pS  assem W  ^ 
held  in  Pe  raeus  to  discuss  tlie  subject,  Nikanor  e^-en  ventured  to  pre- 
dion'whn'^'"'^"  -^  the  company  and  under  the  introduction  of 
Phokion,  who  was  anxious  that  the  Athenians  should  entertain  the 


'^^g  THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 

•ti.n  nf  illiance  with  Kassander.  But  with  the  people,  the 
proposition  of  aUu^^^  get  rid  altogether  of  the  foreign  garrison,  and 
prominent  \n  i»li  wab  lo  gt^t  i  ;,„,,, r^hi-^  fnr  which  obieet,  ot  course, 
Jo  procure  the  evacuation  of  ^I^^/^^^^lTa^^^^^  nine  tliou- 

thc  returned  exiles  would  be  even  «^^'^[f^^^°^^''^'ear  any  propositions 

rom  Nikanor  .N  hiic  ye^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  themeansof.es- 

his  person.     It  \^.f^^'? devious  wrath  from  his  fellow-citizens,  to 

XnfheTleaJTed  ^^^^  ^^^'^^  '^'  ^^^'^"^^^ 

passed  «^n]'""f  f.,f'l?'"^^3V°u"ra  Kevertlioless  Phokion,  di.rc- 
tection.  under  f  I'okion  as  f  "^';^'-  ■  affiniiing  that  ho  would 
garding  such  a  decree,  '9°^  "f.'^^f  "p  "sen  ly  that  officer,  making 
fnmself  be  »>^?™f  ""^  ^^^^^^^^^^  took  Pei^us  by 

an  "".'^''Peft'-J  ^ '^,f,,fj'^"J,  a  under  military  occupation, 

surprise,  placed  both  »"?»''*"'"[,,/.,,„,,,  ijv  a  ditch  and  palisade. 

and  cut  off  i'^'><'">""°'f''"TJ  uVeni.^ns  ru"*ed  to  arms;  but  Pho- 

On  this  palpal^  «  ^SS'-^'f  ^eir  ardtJ  ^nd  cle™'^^^^^^         to  head  then 

Uion  a^  g-:-^^/  f/^'^'^^o;"^  '^fpdVius  l-efore  Nikanor  should  have 

,ion,  all  the  posts  ^l'i<=l'  'i^J'^l'^  '°  f,^";e"d  hrcommission  from 

calamity  to  the  Athenians    ^^^^  J^=         .  j^  ^'       ^nd  commercial, 

:  mV"n?i;.rwhrc">Iunych^  would  -ot  bave  aff^^^^^^^^ 

operations  in  Greece  against  Poly^f  rchon  "pon  ^^^om  thercloic^ 
the  loss  fell  hardly  less  severely  1^?^  ,"Pon  t^be  Athe^^^^^^  iNow 
Phokion,  in  his  fuhctiun  as  general,  had  he  been  foicwainea  oi  ine 


ARRIVAL  OF  ALEXANDER. 


719 


danger,  might  have  guarded  against  it,  and  ought  to  liave  done  so 
This  was  a  grave  dereliction  of  duty,  and  admits  of  hardly  any- 
other  explanation  except  that  of  treasonable  connivance.  It  seems 
that  PJiokion,  foreseeing  his  own  ruin  and  that  of  his  friends  in  the 
triumph  of  PolysptM'chon  and  the  return  of  the  exiles,  was  desirous 
of  favoring  the  seizure  of  Peineiis  by  Nikanor,  as  a  means  of  con- 
straining Athens  to  adt)pt  the  alliance  with  Kassande'-,  which  alli- 
ance indeed  would  probably  have  been  brought  about  liad  Kassander 
re;iched  Pemeus  by  sea  sooner  thtin  the  first  troops  of  Polysperehoa 
by  land.  PJiokion  was  here  guilty,  at  the  very  least  of  culpable 
neglect,  and  probably  of  still  more  culpable  treason,  on  an  occasion 
seriously  injuring  both  Polysperchon  and  the  Athenians;  a  fact 
which  we  must  not  forget  when  we  come  to  read  presently  the  bitter 
animosity  exhibited  against  him. 

The  news,  that  Nikanor  had  possessed  himself  of  Peiraeus  pro- 
duced a  strong  sensation.  Presently  arrived  a  letter  addressed  to 
him  by  Olympias  herself,  commanding  him  to  surrender  the  place  to 
tlie  Athenians,  upon  whom  she  wished  to  confer  entire  autonomy 
ButNikauor  declined  obedience  to  her  order,  still  waitino- for  sup- 
port from  Kassander.  The  arrival  of  Alexander  (Polysperclion's 
son)  with  a  body  of  troops,  encouraged  the  Athenians  to  believe  that 
he  was  come  to  assist  in  carrying  Peirseus  by  force,  for  Ihe  purooso 
of  restoring  it  to  them.  Their  hopes  however  were  ao-ain  disap- 
pointed Though  encamped  near  Peiraeus,  Alexander*  made  no 
demand  for  the  Athenian  forces  to  co-operate  with  liim  in  attackin-^- 
It;  but  entered  into  open  parley  with  Nikanor.  whom  he  endeavored 
to  persuade  or  corrupt  into  surrendering  the  place.  When  this  ue^-o- 
tiation  failed,  he  resolved  to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  his  father  T\dio 
was  already  on  his  march  toward  Attica, with  the  main  army'  His 
own  force  unassisted  was  probably  not  sufficient  to  attack  Periceus 
nor  did  he  choose  to  invoke  assistance  from  the  Athenians,  to  whom 
he  would  then  have  been  compelled  to  make  over  the  place  when 
taken,  which  they  so  ardently  desired.  The  Athenians  were  thus 
as  tar  from  their  object  as  ever;  moreover,  by  this  delay  the  oppor- 
tunity of  attacking  the  place  was  altogether  thrown  away-  for 
Kassander  with  his  armament  reached  it  before  Polysperchon     ' 

It  was  Phokion  and  his  immediate  colleagues  who  induced  Alex- 
ander to  adopt  this  insidious  policy;  to  decline  reconquering-  Pcira?us 
tor  the  Athenians,  and  to  appropriate  it  for  himself.  To  Phokion 
the  reconstitution  of  autonomous  Athens,  with  its  democracy  and 
restored  exiles,  and  without  foreign  controllins:  force— was  an  assured 
sentence  of  banishment,  if  not  of  death.  Not  having  been  able  to 
obtain  protection  from  the  foreign  force  of  Nikanor  and  Kassander 
he  and  his  friends  resolved  to  tlirow  themselves  upon  that  of  Alex- 
ander and  Polysperchon.  They  went  to  meet  Alexander  as  he 
entered  Attica— represented  tlic  impolicy  of  his  relinquishing-  so 
important  a  military  position  ag  Peirteus,   while  the  wa|  was°vut 


720 


THE  L  AMI  AN  WAR. 


imfinislied, — and  oifered  to  co-operate  with  him  for  tliis  purpose,  by- 
proper  management  of  the  Athenian  public.  Alexander  was  pleased 
with  these  suggestions,  accepted  Pliokion  with  the  others  as  his 
leading  adherents  at  Athene,  and  looked  upon  Peirteus  as  a  capture 
to  be  secured  for  himself.  Numerous  returning  Athenian  exiles 
accompanied  Alexander's  army.  It  seems  that  Phokion  was  desirous 
of  admitting  the  troops  along  with  the  exiles,  as  friends  and  allies 
within  the  walls  of  Athens,  so  as  to  make  Alexander  master  of  the 
eity — but  that  this  project  was  impracticable,  in  consequence  of  the 
mistrust  created  among  the  Athenians  by  the  parleys  of  Alexander 
with  Nikanor. 

The  stratgeic  function  of  Phokion,  however,  so  often  conferred 
and  re-conferred  upon  him — and  his  power  of  doing  either  good  or 
evil — now  a]iproached  its  close.  As  soon  as  the  returning  exiles 
found  themselves  in  sulTicient  numbers,  they  called  for  a  revision  of 
the  list  of  state  officers,  and  for  the  rc-cstablishment  of  the  demo- 
cratical  forms.  'J'hey  passed  a  vote  to  depose  those  who  had  held 
oflice  under  the  Antipatrinn  oligarchy,  and  who  still  continued  to 
hold  it  down  to  the  actual  moment.  Among  these  Phokion  stood 
first:  along  with  him  were  his  son-in-law  Charikles,  the  Phalerean 
Demetrius,  Kallimedon,  Nikokles,  Tluidippus,  Hegemon,  and  Phi- 
lokles.  These  persons  were  not  only  deposed,  but  condemned,  some 
to  death,  some  to  banishment  and  confiscation  of  property.  Deme- 
trius, Charikles,  and  Kallimedon  sought  snfi  ty  by  leaving  Attica; 
but  Phokion  and  the  rest  merely  went  to  Alexander's  camp,  throwing 
themselves  upon  his  protection  on  the  faith  of  the  recent  understand- 
ing. Alexander  not  onlv  received  them  courteously,  but  gave  them 
letters  to  his  father  Polvsperchon,  requesting  safety  and  protection 
for  them,  as  men  who  had  embraced  his  cause,  and  who  were  still 
eauer  to  do  all  in  their  po\(-er  to  support  him.  Armed  with  these 
letters,  Phokion  and  his  companions  went  through  Bopotia  and 
Phokis  to  meet  Polvsperchon  on  his  march  southward.  They  were 
accompanied  by  Deinarchus  and  by  a  Plata^n  named  Solon,  both  of 
them  passing  for  friends  of  Poiysperchon. 

The  Athenian  democracy,  just  reconstituted,  which  had  passed 
the  recent  condemnatory  votes,  was  disquieted  at  the  news  that 
Alexander  had  espoused  the  cause  of  Phokion  and  had  recommended 
the  like  policy  to  his  father.  It  was  possible  that  Poiysperchon  might 
seek,  with  his  powerful  army,  both  to  occupy  Athens  and  to  capture 
Peiraeus,  and  might  avail  himself  of  Phokion  (like  Antipater  after 
the  Lamian  war)  as  a  convenient  instrument  of  government.  It 
seems  plain  that  this  was  the  project  of  Alexander,  and  that  he 
counted  on  Phokion  as  a  ready  auxiliary  in  both,  Now  the  restored 
democrats,  though  owing  their  restoration  to  Pol3'sperchon,  were 
much  less  compliant  toward  him  than  Phokion  had  been.  Not  only 
they  would  not  admit  him  into  the  citv,  but  they  would  not  even 
acquiesce  in  his  separate  occupation  of  Munychia  and  Peiraeus.     Ou 


PHOKION  BEFORE  POLYSPERCHON. 


721 


the  proposition  of  Agnouides  and  Archcstratus,  they  sent  a  deputa- 
tion tQ  Poiysperchon  accusing  Phokion  and  his  comrades  of  high 
treason;  yet  at  the  same  time  claiming  for  Athens  the  full  and  undi- 
muHshed  benefit  of  the  late  regal  proclamation— autonomy  and 
democracy,  with  restoration  of  Peiraeus  and  Munychia  free  and 
ungurrisoned. 

The  deputation  reached  Poiysperchon  at  Pharyges  in  Phokis    as 
early  as  Phokiou's  company,  which  had  been  detained  for  some  days 
at  Llateia  by  the  sickness  of  Demarchus.     That  delay  was  unfortu- 
nate for  Phokion.    Had  he  seen  Poiysperchon  and  presented  the  letter 
ot  Alexander,  before  the  Athenian  accusers  arrived,  he  ini<rht  prob- 
ably have  obtained  a  more  favorable  reception.     But  as  th'e  arrival 
of  the  two  parlies  was  nearly  simultaneous,  Poiysperchon  heard  both 
of  them  at  the  same  audience,  before  King  Philip  Aridteus  in  his 
throne  with  the  gilt  ceiling  above  it.     When  Agnonides  —chief  of 
the  Athenian  deputation,    and   formerly  friend   and   advocate    of 
Demosthenes  in  the  Harpalian  cause— found  himself  face  to  face  Avith 
Phokion  and  his  friends,  their  reciprocal  invectives  at  first  produced 
nothing  but  confusion;  until  Agnonides  himself  exclaimed— "  Pack 
us  all  into  one  cage  and  send  us  back  to  Athens  to  receive  judo-m'eut 
from  the  Athenians."     The  king  laughed  at  this  observation   blit  tha 
bystanders  around   insisted  upon  more   orderly  proceedino-s    and 
Agnonides  then  set  forth  the  two  demands  of  the  Athenian's— con- 
demnation of  Phokion  and  his  friends,   partly  as  accomplices  of 
Antipater,  partly  as  having  betray  d  PeiivTus  to  Nikanor— and  the 
full  benefit  of  the  late  regal  prod  i  n  r.ion  to  Athens.     Now,  on  the 
last  of  these  two  heads,  Polysperciioii  uns  no  way  disposed  to  yield 
-nor  tp  liand  over  Peiraeus  to  the  Athenians  as  soon  as  he  should 
take  it.     On  this  matter,  accordingly,  he  replied  by  refusal  or  eva- 
sion.   But  he  was  all  the  more  disposed  to  satisfy  the  Athenians  on 
the  other  matter— the  surrender  of  Phokion;  especially  as  the  senti- 
ment now  prevalent  at  Athens  evinced  clearly  that  Phokion  could 
not  be  again  useful  to  him  as  an  instrument,     thus  disposed  to  sacri- 
fice Phokion,    Poiysperchon  heard    his   defense  with   impatience 
interrupted   him  several  times,    and  so  disgusted  him,  that  he  at 
lengdi  struck  the  ground  with  his  slick,  and  held  his  peace      Heo-e 
mon,  another  of  the  accused,  was  yet  more  harshly  treated.     Wlfen 
he  appealed  to  Poiysperchon  himself,  as  having  been  personally  cog- 
nizant of  his  (the  speaker's)  good  disposition  toward  the  Athenian 
people  (he  had  been  probably  sent  to  Pella,  as  envoy  for  redress  of 
grievances  under  the  Antipatrian  oligarchy),  Poiysperchon  exclaimed 
—    Do  not  utter  falsehoods  against  me  before  the  kino-."    Moreover 
king  1  liihp  himself  was  so  incensed,  as  to  start  from  his  throne  and 
snatch  his  spear,  with  which  he  would  have  run  He"-emon  throuo-h 
—imitating  the  worst  impulses  of  his  illustrious  brother— haa  he  not 
been  held  back  by  Poiysperchon.    The  sentence  could  not  bo  doubt- 
lui.    Phokion  and  his  companions  were  delivered  over  as  prisoners 


722 


THE  LAMIAN  AVAR. 


Su;"fe1;rag:d'lVrA.Ueuiausruow  restored  to  freedom  aud 
through  f -"P|;'''-;;^|,;'^:r,^,^eir  h    assc'uSlT-as  to  be  convened 

siouof  .0  >,nportan,_^a    ,Kd,   to-^-'j^^^,^,,,  p,,eeeding;  for  the 

recollect  that  diuit  ci)&^     ,  ,.^,.torJ      "npmnslheues  aud  Us  principal 
racy  had  been  forcibly  «^^^^^l^^^; ^^^,^1^'!^^^^^^^^  the 

leaders  had  been  slain,  some  «^^^^^f  .^^^  ^t  ^^^/^f 
poorer  multitude   in  "r^^^;;"^?^^'^,^^^  all  the  pub- 

had  been  banished  or  ^1^'P5^^^^^J°^^.,    f  ^."^.^^         a  vast  mass   of 

^^^^^^^rY^u^hl'^^d  i^^S^^^^^^  of  .hicb 

iiuhvidual  suffeiii  g  au      ra^^^^  unexpected  contingency 

XlSa^fhrll^n  ^^  ^^^ 

.-hen  these  -en  returned  ^-^  f^  f;^,^,;^^  u^^^^^^^  ^hatied 

.Viibors  Phokion  ^^l^;^  ,^3^  j;^^  ^^.^^^^^^^^^^  l^is  friends, 

st;^^^^h^^M^^  ^-^-■ 

^t^:::"^^.^  citizens  thus  saw  ^^'^o^JZ'^^^^^^^^^^^ 
them,  for  the  first  time  after  their  return,  the  common  ieeimg 


DEATH  OF  PIIOKIOX. 


"723 


antipathy  against  him  burst  out  in  furious  raanifcstalions.     A2:noni- 
des  the  principal  accuser,  supported  by  Epikurus  and  Dcmophilus, 
found  their  denunciations  welcomed  and  even  anticipated,  whenthev 
•arraigned  Phokion  as  a  criminal  who  liad  lent  his  hand  to  the  sub- 
version of  the  constitution,— to  the  sufferings  of  his  deported  fellow- 
citizens,— and  to  the  holding  of  Athens  in  subjection  undc^r  a  forein-n 
potentate;  in  addition  to  which,  the  betrayal  of  Peirieus  to  Nikanor 
constituted  anew  crime;  fastening  on  the  people  the  yoke  of  Kas- 
sander,  when  autonomy  had  been  promised  to  them  by  the  recent 
imperial  edict.     After  the  accusation  was  concluded,  Phokion  was 
called  on  for  his  defense;  but  lie  found  it  impossible  to  obtnin  a 
hearing.     Attempting  several  times  to  speak,  he  Avas  as  often  inter- 
rupted by  angry  shouts;  several  of  his  friends  were  cried  down  in 
like  manner;  until  at  length  he  gave  up  the  case  in  despair;  and 
exclaimed,   "For  myself,  Athenians,  I  plead  guilty;   I  pronounce 
against  myself  the  sentence  of  death  for  my  political  conduct:  but 
why  are  you  to  sentence  these  men  near  me,  who  are  not  guilty?" 
"Because  they  are  your  friends,  Phokion"— was  the  exclamation  of 
those  around.     Phokion  then  said  no  more;  while  Agnonides  ju-o- 
posed  a  decree,  to  the  effect,  that  the  assembled  people  should  decide 
by  show  of  hands,  whether  the  persons  now  arraigned  were  guilty 
or  not;  and  that  if  declared  guilty,  they  should  be  put  to  death. 
Some  persons  i^resent  cried  out,  that  the  penally  of  torture  ought  to 
precede  death;  but  this  savage  proposition,  utterly  at  variance'  with 
Athenian  law  in  respect  to  citizens,  was  repudiated  not  less  by 
Agnonides  than  by  the  Macedonian  officer  Kleitus.     The  decree  was 
then  passed;  after  which  the  show  of  hands  was  called  for.     Xcarlv 
every  hand  in  the  assembly  was  held  up  in  condemnation;  each  man 
even  rose  from  his  seat  to  make  the  effect  more  imposing;  and  some 
went  so  far  as  to  put  on  wreaths  in  token  of  ti-iumph.     To  many  of 
them,  doubtless,  the  gratification  of  this  intense  and  unanimous  vin- 
dictive impulse,— in  their  view  not  merely  legitimate,  but  patriotic, 
—must  have  been  among  the  happiest  moments  of  life. 

After  sentence,  the  five  condemned  persons,  Phokion,  Kikokles, 
Thudippus,  Hegemon,  and  Pythoklcs,  were  consiirned  to  the  supreme 
magistrates  of  police,  called  The  Eleven,  aud  led  to  prison  for  the 
purpose  of  having  the  customary  dose  of  poison  administered.  Hos- 
tile bystanders  ran  alongside,  taunting  and  reviling  them.  It  is  even 
said  that  one  man  planted  himself  i]i  the  front,  and  spat  upon  Pho- 
kion; who  turned  to  the  public  officers  and  exclaimed — "Will  no 
one  check  this  indecent  fellow?"  This  was  the  only  emotion  which 
he  manifested;  in  other  respects,  his  tranquillity  and  self-possession 
were  resolutely  maintained,  during  this  soul-siibduing  march  from 
the  theater  to  the  prison,  amid  the  wailings  of  his  frisnds,  the  broken 
spirit  of  his  four  comrades,  and  the  fiercest  demonstrations  of  anti- 
pathy from  his  fellow-citizens  generally.  One  ray  of  comfort  pre- 
sented itself  as  he  entered  the  prison.    It  was  the  nineteenth  of  the 


721 


THE  LAMLVN  WAR. 


month  Miinvchion,  the  day  on  which  the  Athenian  Horsemen  or 
SnlSts(  he  richest  dass'in  the  city,  men  for  the  most  part  of 
o^iVarchical  sentiments)  celebrated  tlieir  festal  procession  with  wreaths 
onthei  heads  in  honor  of  Zeus.  Several  of  these  hosemen  halted  m 
passing,  took  off  their  wreaths,  and  wept  as  they  looked  through 
the  oraliiiffs  «>f  the  prison.  ^, 

kin-  asked  whether  he  had  anything  to  tell  his  son  Phokus,  Pho- 
kion  replied-"  I  tell  him  emplmlically,  not  to  hold  evd  memory  ot 
thp\thenians  "  The  drau-ht  of  hemlock  was  then  administered  to 
a  I  five-to  Pliokion  last.  Having  been  condemned  for  treason,  they 
were  not  buried  in  Attica;  nor  were  Phokion's  friends  allowed  to 
I 'ht  a  funeral  pile  for  the  burning  of  his  body;  which  w^s  earned 

5   of  Attica  into  the  Megarid,  by  a  hired  agent  named  Konopion. 

n  Uhere  burned  by  fire  obtained  at  Megara.     The  wife  of  Phokion 
with  her  maids,  poured  libations  and  marked  the  spo    by  a  smud 
mound  of  earth;  she  also  collected  the  bones  and  brought  them  back 
r^^hensin  he^  bosom,  during  the  secrecy  of  night.     She  buried 

hem  near  her  own  domestic  hearth,  with  this  address-- Beloved 
Ilesnia  i  confid..  to  thee  these  relics  of  a  good  man.  Restore  Ihem 
to  his  own  family  vault,  as  soon  as  the  Athenians  shall  come  to  then- 

^"^  Af t'er  a  short  time  (we  are  told  by  Plutarch)  the  Athenians  did  thus 
rorio  to  t  eir  senses  They  discovered  that  Phokion  had  been  a 
f.d'fil  ad  excellent  public  servant,  repented  of  the.r  seventy 
o war  him.  celebrated  his  funeral  obsequies  at  the  public  expenses 
~d  a  statue  in  his  honor,  and  put  to  death  Agnonides  by  pub  he 
jidichil  sentence ;  while  Epikurus  and  Demophilus  fled  from  the  city 
•md  wore  slain  bv  Phokion's  son.  .  ..     ^i 

These  facts  are  ostensibly  con-ect ;  but  Plutarch  omits  o  no  ice  the 
real  explanation  of  them.  MVithin  two  or  three  months  after  the 
death  of  Phokion,  Kassander,  already  in  possession  ot  PeiniBUS  and 
^i^yc\n^  became  also  master  of  Athens;  the  oligarchical  or  Pho- 
k  on  c  D-uW  an-ain  acquired  predominance;  Demetnus  thePhalereau 
was  iSeU  f?-om  exile,  and  placed  to  administer  the  city  under 
Kassander  as  Phokion  had  administered  it  under  Antipater. 

No  won  ler  that  under  such  circumstances,  the  memoiy  of  Pho- 
kion should  be  honored.  But  this  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
.Dontane^^^^^^^  change  of  popular  opinion  respecting  him  I  see  no 
rLsmfwl  v  such  chamre  of'  OT>inion  should  have  occurred,^  nor  do  I 
hXve  t  at  it  did  occur.  The  Demos  of  Athens,  banished  ixud 
eported  in  n^^^  best  ground  for  hating  Phokion,  and  were 

n?t  h'kely  tO  become  ashamed  of  the  feeling.  Though  he  was  person- 
anymiufand  incorruptible,  they  derived  no  benetit  from  these  vir- 
tues To  them  it  was  of  little  moment  that  he  should  steadily  refuse 
all  oresents  from  Antipater,  when  he  did  Antipater's  work  gra  ui- 
?ously  Considered  as^  judicial  tri.il.  the  hist  scene  of  Pholuon 
before  the  people  in  the  theater  is  nothing  better  than  a  cruel  imi^o.- 


LIFE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  PHOKION. 


725 


ture;  considered  as  a  manifestation  of  public  opinion  already  settled, 
it  is  ()ne  for  which  the  facts  of  the  past  supplied  ample  warrant. 

We  cannot  indeed  read  without  painful  sympathy  the  narrative  of 
an  ohl  man  above  eighty,— personally  brave,  mild,  and  superior  to 
all  pecuniary  temptation,  so  far  as  his  positive  administration  was 
concerned,— peI•i^hing  under  an  intense  and  crushing  storm  of  popu- 
lar execration.     But  when  we  look  at  the  whole  case— when  we  sur- 
vey,  not  merely  the  details  of  Phokion's  administration,  but  the 
grand  public  objects   wiiicli  those  details   subserved,  and  toward 
wliich  he  conducted  his  fellow-citizens— we  shall  see  that  this  judg- 
ment is  fully  merited.     In  Phokion's  patriotism— for  so  doubtless  i?e 
himself  sincerely  conceived  it— no  account  was  taken  of  Athenian 
independence;  of  the  autonomy  or  self-management  of  the  Hellenic 
world;  of  the  conditions,  in  reference  to  foreign  kings,  under  whicli 
alone  such  autonomy  could  exist.     He  had  neither  the  Pan-Hellenic 
sentiment  of  Aristeides,   Kallikratidas.  and  Demosthenes— nor  the 
narrower  Athenian  sentiment,  like   the  devotion   of  Agesilaus  to 
i^p.irta,  and  of  Epaminondas  to  Thebes.     To  Phokion  it  was  indiffer- 
ent whether  Greece  was  an  aggregate  of  autonomous  cities,  with 
Athens  as  first  or  second  among  them— or  one  of  the  satrapies  under 
the  Macedonian  kings.     Now  this  was  among  the  most  fatal  defects 
of  a  Grecian  public  man.     The  sentiment  in  which  Phokion  was 
wanting,  lay  at  the  bottom  of  all  those  splendid  achievements  which 
have  given  to  Greece  a  substantive  and  pre  eminent  place  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  world.     Had  Themistokles,   Aristeides,   and  Leonidas 
resembled  him,  Greece  would  have  passed  quietly  under  the  dominion 
of  Persia.    The  brilliant,  though  clieckered,  century  and  more  of 
independent  politics  wliich  succeeded  the  repulse  of  Xerxes  would 
never  have  occurred.     It  was  precisely  during  the  fifty  years  of  Pxo- 
kion's  political  and  military  influence,  that  the  Greeks\vere  degraded 
from  a  state  of  freedom,  and  Athens  from  ascendency  as  well  as  free- 
dom, into  absolute  servitude.     In  so  far  as  this  great  public  misfortune 
can  be  imputed  to  any  one  man— to  no  one  was  it  more  ascribable 
than  to  Phokion.     He  was  strategus  during  most  of  the  long  series 
of  years  when  Philip's  powder  was  growing;  it  was  his  duty  to  look 
ahead  for  the  safety  of  his  countymen,  and  to  combat  the  yet  imma- 
ture giant.     He  heard  the  warnings  of  Demosthenes,  and  he  pos- 
sessed exactly  those  qualities  which  were  wanting  to  Demosthenes- 
military  energy  and  aptitude.     Had  he  lent  his  influence  to  inform 
the  short-sightedness,  to  stimulate  the  inertia,  to  direct  the  armed 
efforts,  of  his  countrymen,  the  kings  of  Macedon  midit  have  been 
kept  within  their  own  limits,  and  the  future  history  of  Gi-eece  might 
have  been  altogether  different.     Unfortunately,  he  took  the  opposite 
side.    He  acted  with  iEschines  and  the  philippizers;  without  receiv- 
ing money  from  Philip,  he  did  gratuitously  all  that  Philip  desired— 
by  nullifying  and  sneering  down  the  efforts  of  Demosthenes  and  the 
other  active  politicians.     After  the  battle  of  Chaironeia,  Phokion 


726 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 


received  from  Philip  first,  and  from  Alexander  afterward,  ma  ks  of 
eltteni  not  shown  toward  any  other  Athenian.     1  his  was  both  the 
fr  at  and  the  proof  of  his  past  politieal  action-anti-llellenic  as  Mell 
us  an  i-Athen  an.     Having  done  much,  in  the  earlier  part  of  his  hie, 
to  promote  the  subjugation  of  Greece  under  the  ^^lacedoman  kings 
be   contributed   somtnvhat,   during   the  latter   half     to   lig^  e.i       ^ 
severity  of  their  dominion;  and  it  is  the  most  hononible  point  in  Ins 
character  that  he  always  refrained  from  abusing  their  marked  favor 
toward  himself,  for  purposes  either  of  personal  gam  or  of  oppression 
over  his  fellow-citizens.     Alexander  not  only  wrote  letters  to  him 
even  during  the  plenitude  of  imperial  power,  in  terms  of  respecttul 
fdend>hip.  but  tendered  to  him  the  largest  presents-at  one  tune   he 
sum  of  100  talents,  at  another  time  the  choice  of  four  towns  on  the 
coSt  of   Asia  Minor,   as  Xerxes  gave  to  Themistokles      lie  vvvn 
expressed  bis  displeasure  when  Phokion,  refusing  everything,  con- 
sented only  to  request  the  liberation  of  three  Grecian  prisoners  con- 
lined  at  Sardis.  n;^,.'..  i-,--,,-.      ti« 
The  Lamian  war,  and  its  consequences,  were  Phokion  ^Vx.m.     lie 
continued  at  Athens,  throughout  that  war,  freely  declaring  ^^l-\^^^^ 
ao-ainst  it;  for  it  is  to  be  remarked,  that  in  spite  ot  his  knoAMi  ]\L  ce- 
donizing  politics,  the  people  neither  banished  nor  degiadtd  him,  but 
contented  themselves  with  following  the  counsels  of  otl)ers.     On  the 

disastrous  termination  of  the  war.  Phokion  .^^"^^^^J^^V  ui     ?^!m! 
and  dishonorable  function  of  satrap  under  Antipatcr  at  A  hens,  ^vith 
tbe  Macedonian  garrison  at  Munychia  to  back  him.     He  became  the 
subordinate  agent  of  a  conqueror  who  not  only  slaughtered  the  chief 
Athenian  orati)rs,  but  disfranchised  and  deported  the  Demos  m  mass. 
Having  accepted  partnership  and  responsibility  in  these  proceedings, 
Phokion  was  no  lon-ersafe  except  under  the  protection  of  a  foreign 
prince      After  the  liberal  proclamation  issued  in  the  name  ot  the 
Macedonian  kings,  permitting  the  return  of  the  banished  Demos  he 
sou'-bt  safety  for  himself,  first  by  that  treasonable  connivance  which 
enabled  Nikanor  to  seize  the  Peir* us,  next  by  courting  Polysperchon 
the  enemy  of  Nikanor.     A  voluntary  expatriation  (along  with  hi^ 
friend  the  Phalerean  Demetrius)  would  have  been  less  ^I'mf  ^ous, 
and  less  discreditable,  than  these  maneuvers,  which  still  further 
darkened  the  close  of  bis  life,  without  averting  from  him,  after  all, 
tbe  necessity  of  facing  the  restored  Demos.     The  intense  and  unani- 
mous wrath  of  the  people  against  him  is  an  instructive,  though  a 
distressing  spectacle.     It  was  directed,  not  against  the  man  or  the 
administrator-for  in  both  characters  Phokion  bad  been  blameless 
except  as  to  the  last  collusion  with  Mkanor  in  the  seizure  of  the 
Peir«us-bul  a-ainst  his  public  policy.     It  was  the  last  pro  est  of 
extinct  Grecian  freedom,  speaking  as  it  were  from  the  tomb  in  a 
voice  of  thunder,  against  that  fatal  system  of  mistrust,  inertia,  sclt- 
eeeking,  and  corruption,  which  bad  betrayed  the  once  autonomous 
Athens  to  a  foreign  conqueror. 


DEFEAT  OF  POLYSPERCHON, 


727 


I  have  already  mentioned  that  Polysperchon  with  his  army  was  in 
Phokis  when  Phokion  was  brought  before  him,  on  his  march  to- 
ward Peloponnesus.  Perhaps  he  may  have  been  detained  by  nesro- 
tiation  with  the  ^tolians,  who  embraced  his  alliance.  At  any  nitc, 
he  was  tardy  in  his  march,  for  before  lie  reached  Attica,  Kassander 
arrived  at  Peir.Tus  to  join  Nikanor  with  a  fleet  of  thirty-five  shijis 
and  4,000  soldiers  obtained  from  Antigonus.  On  learning  this  fact, 
Polysperchon  hastened  his  march  also,  and  presented  himself  under 
the  walls  of  Athens  and  Peirieus  with  a  large  force  of  20,000  Mace- 
donians, 4,000  Greek  allies,  1000  cavalry  and  sixty-five  elephants; 
animals  which  were  now  seen  for  the  first  time  in  European  Greece. 
He  at  first  besieged  Kassander  in  Peiraeus,  but  finding  it  difficult  to 
jirocure  subsistence  in  Attica  for  so  numerous  an  army,  he  marched 
with  the  larger  portion  into  Peloponnesus,  leaving  his  son  Alexander 
with  a  division  to  make  head  against  Kassander.  Either  approach- 
ing in  person  the  various  Peloponnesian  towns — or  addressing  them 
by  means  of  envoys — he  enjoined  the  subversion  of  the  Antipatrian 
oligarchies,  and  the  restoration  of  liberty  and  free  speech  to  the  mass 
of  the  citizens.  In  most  of  the  towns,  this  revolution  was  accom- 
plished; but  in  Megalopolis,  the  oligarchy  held  out;  not  only  forcing 
Polysperchon  to  besiege  the  city,  but  even  defending  it  against  him 
successfully.  He  made  two  or  three  attempts  to  storm  it,  by  mov- 
able towers,  by  undermining  the  walls,  and  even  by  the  aid  of  ele- 
phants; but  he  w^as  repulsed  in  all  of  them,  and  obliged  to  relinquish 
the  siege  wuth  considerable  loss  of  reputation.  His  admiral  Kleitus 
was  soon  afterward  defeated  in  the  Propontis,  with  the  loss  of  his 
whole  fleet,  by  Nikanor  (whom  Kassander  had  sent  from  Peiraeus) 
and  Antigonus. 

After  these  two  defeats,  Polysperchon  seems  to  have  evacuated 
Peloponnesus,  and  to  have  carried  his  forces  across  the  Corinthian 
Gulf  into  Epirus,  to  join  Olympias.  His  part}^  was  greatly  weak- 
ened all  over  Greece,  and  that  of  Kassander  proportionately  strength- 
ened. The  first  effect  of  this  was,  the  surrender  of  Athens.  The 
Athenians  in  the  city,  including  all  or  many  of  the  restored  exiles, 
could  no  longer  endure  that  complete  severance  from  the  sea,  to 
which  the  occupation  of  Peiraeus  and  Munychia  by  Kassander  had 
reduced  them.  Athens  without  a  port  was  Iwirdly' tenable;  in  fact, 
Peirajus  was  considered  by  its  great  constructor,  Themistokles,  as 
more  indispensable  to  the  Athenians  than  Athens  itself.  The  sub- 
sistence of  the  people  was  derived  in  large  proportion  from  imported 
corn,  received  through  Peineus:  where  also  the  trade  and  indus- 
trial operations  were  carried  on,  most  of  the  revenue  collected,  and 
the  arsenals,  docks,  ships,  etc.,  of  the  state  kept  up.  It  became  evi- 
dent that  Nikanor,  by  seizing  on  the  Peiraeus,  bad  rendered  Athens 
disarmed  and  helpless;  so  that  tbe  irre'parable  mischief  done  by 
Phokion,  in  conniving  at  that  seizure,  was  felt  more  and  more  every- 
day.    Hence  the  Athenians,  unable  to  capture  tbe  port  themselves 


728 


THE  LAMIAN   WAll. 


and  hopeless  of  obtaining  it  throngh  Polysperchon,  ^elt^  conRtramed 
to  listen  to  the  partisans  of  Kassander,  Nvho  proposed  hat  terms 
should  be  made  lith  him.  It  ^vas  a-recd  that  they  should  become 
Sc^itd'm^^^  of  Kassander;  that  they  should ha^J  full  enjoymen 
of  their  citY  with  the  port  Peirfeus,  their  ships,  and  revenues:  hat 
S^e  ex  iJs  and  deported  citizens  should  be  ^^:^dni  tted  tin.  the  pohti^ 
^1  franchise  should  for  the  future  be  enjoyed  by  all  citizens  aUio 
possessed  1000  drachmre  of  property  -°d  jipward;  tha  Kas^nde 
ihould  hold  Munychia  .vith  a  governor  and  ^^'^^^'-i^^^;,  "^  j^^^^^^^^ 
a"-ainst  Polysperchon  vvas  brought  to  a  close;  and  that  he  should 
aiso  name  son  e  one  Athenian  citizen,  in  ^vhosc  bauds  the  supreme 
government  of  the  citv  should  be  vested.  Kassander  named  Deme^ 
frius  the  Phalerean  {Le.  an  Athenian  of  the  Deme  Phalerum)  one  of 
Ihe  colleagnes  of  Phokion;  uho  had  gone  into  volunatry  exile  since 
the  death  of  Antipater,  but  had  recently  returned.  .  „..^,.^:^,, 

This  convention  restored  substantially  at  Athens  the  Antipatrian 
government;  yet  ^vi^hout  the  severities  ^vhich  had  marked  its  orig- 
fnal  esSblishment-and  ^vith  some  modifications  in  various  ways 
It  made  Kassander  virtuallv  master  of  the  city  (as  An  ipater  had 
been  before  him),  by  means  of  his  governing  nominee,  upheld  by  the 
ff^rri^on  and  bj-^ the  fortification  of  Munychia;  which  had  now  been 
Slv  enlarged  and  strengthened,  holding  a  Practical  command 
over  kircTus  though  that  port  was  nominally  relinquished  to  the 
Athenians  But  there  was  no  slaughter  of  orators,  no  expulsion  of 
A  izens  moreover  even  the  minimum  of  1000  drachmae,  fixed  for 
Sf  ^o  iu'lfSiise!  though  excluding  the  -nltitude,  must  have 
been  felt  as  an  improvement  compared  with  tlie  higher  ^^n^t  ^f  2  000 
drachm.T  prescribed  by  Antipater.  J^^ssander  was  not  like  1"« /'^tl 
at  the  head  of  an  overwhelming  force,  master  o  Greece.  He  had 
Polvsperchon  in  the  field  againit  him  with  a  rival  army  and  an 
Sabllhed  ascendency  in  n^uiy  of  the  Grecian  cities;  it  ^^^s  there- 
fore his  interest  to  abstain  from  measures  ot  obvious  harshness  to- 

"T^a^i^^'el^Jl^^^hoice  of  the  Phalerean  Demetrius  appears 
to  have  been  judicious.  That  citizen  continued  to  administer  Athens, 
a^  satrap  or  ^despot  under  Kassander,  for  ten  years.  He  was  an 
rccomplLied  litemry  man,  friend  both  of  the  Pl^/^^^P^^f ^  .^heophn^^ 
tus  who  had  succeeded  to  the  school  of  Aristotle-and  of  the  i  he  oi 
Deinarchus.  He  is  described  also  as  a  person  of  e^'Pf  ^^^^^'if^^"'^,; 
urious  habits;  toward  which  he  devoted, the  most  «  ^  e  A  en  m 
public  revenue,  1200  talents  in  amount  if  Duns  is  to  be  lehev ul 
His  administration  is  said  to  have  been  discree  and  n^^^^^'^^^^e^  ^^^^^ 
know  little  of  its  details,  but  we  are  told  that  he  made  sun  ptuar) 
laws,  especially  restricting  the  cost  and  ostentation  of  funerals  He 
himself  extolled  his  own  decennial  period  as  one  of  abundance  and 
flourishing  commerce  at  Athens.  But  we  learn  from  others,  and  the 
fact  is  highly  probable,  that  it  was  a  period  of  distress  and  humiha- 


CENSUS  TAKEN  AT  ATHENS. 


729 


tion,  both  at  Athens  and  in  other  Grecian  towns;  and  that  Athenians 
as  well  as  others,  welcomed  new  projects  of  colonization  (such  as 
that  of  Ophelias  from  Kyreue)  not  simply  from  prospects  of  advan- 
tage, but  also  as  an  escape  from  existing  evils. 

What  forms  of  nominal  democracy  were  kept  up  during  this  inter- 
val, we  cannot  discover.  The  popular  judicature  must  have  been 
continued  for  private  suits  and  accusations,  since  Deinarchus  is  said 
to  have  been  in  large  practise  as  a  logographer,  or  composer  of  dis- 
courses for  others.  But  the  fact  that  360  statues  were  erected  in 
honor  of  Demetrius  while  his  administration  was  still  going  on, 
demonstrates  the  gross  flattery  of  his  partisans,  the  subjection  of  the 
people,  and  the  practical  abolition  of  all  free-spoken  censure  or  pro- 
nounced opposition.  We  learn  that,  in  some  one  of  the  ten  years  of 
his  administration,  a  census  was  taken  of  the  inhabitants  of  Attica; 
and  that  there  were  numbered  21,000  citizens,  10,000  metics,  and 
400,000  slaves.  Of  this  important  enumeration  we  know  the  bare 
fact,  without  its  special  purpose  or  even  its  precise  date.  Perhaps 
some  of  those  citizens,  who  had  been  banished  or  deported  at  the 
close  of  the  Lainian  war,  may  have  returned  ami  continued  to  reside 
at  Athens.  But  there  still  seems  to  have  remained,  during  all  the 
continuance  of  the  Kassandriun  oligarchy,  a  body  of  adverse  Athe- 
nian exiles,  watching  for  an  opportunity  of  overthrowing  it,  and 
seeking  aid  for  that  purpose  from  the  ^tolians  and  others. 

The  acquisition  of  Athens  by  Kassander,  followed  up  by  his  cap- 
ture of  Panaktum  and  Salamis,  and  seconded  by  his  moderation 
toward  the  Athenians,  procured  for  him  considerable  support  in 
Peloponnesus,  whither  he  proceeded  with  his  army.  Many  of  the 
cities,  intimidated  or  persuaded,  joined  him  and  deserted  Polysper*- 
chon;  while  the  Spartans,  now  feeling  for  the  first  time  their  defense- 
less condition,  thought  it  prudent  to  surround  their  city  with  walls. 
Thi^  fact,  among  many  others  contemporaneous,  testifies  emphatic- 
ally how  the  characteristic  sentiments  of  the  Hellenic  autonomous 
world  were  now  dying  out  everywhere.  The  maintenance  of  Sparta 
as  an  unwalled  city,  was  one  of  the  deepest  and  most  cherished  of 
Lykurgean  traditions;  a  standing  proof  of  the  fearless  bearing  and 
self-con fideuce  of  the  Spartans  against  dangers  from  without.  The 
erection  of  the  walls  showed  their  own  conviction,  but  too  well  borne 
out  by  the  real  circumstances  around  them,  that  the  pressure  of  the 
foreigner  had  become  so  overwhelming  as  not  to  leave  them  even 
safely  at  home. 

The  warfare  between  Kassander  and  Polvsperchon  became  now  em- 
bittered by  a  feud  amon^  the  members  of  the  Macedonian  imperial^ 
family.  King  Philip  Arid^us  and  his  Avife  Eurydikc,  alarmed  and 
indignant  at  the  restoration  of  Olympias  whicli  Polysperchon  was 
projecting,  solicited  aid  from  Kassander,  and  tried  to  place  the  force 
of  Macedonia  at  his  disposal.  In  this,  however,  they  failed.  Olym- 
pias, assisted  not  only  by  Polysperchon,  but  by  the  Epirotic  prince 


730 


THE  LAMIAN  W^iiK. 


^akidrs  made  her  entry  into  Macedonia  out  of  Epinis,  apparently 
in  the  autumn  of  817  li.c.  Slie  brought  ^vith  her  Roxana  and  her 
child— the  widow  and  son  of  Alexander  the  Great.  The  Macedonian 
soldiers,  assembled  by  Philip  Arida^us  and  Eurydike  to  resist  her, 
were  so'  overawed  bv  her  name  and  the  recollection  of  Alexander, 
that  tlu-y  refused  to  tiu'lit,  and  thus  ensured  to  her  an  easy  victory. 
Philip  and  Eurydike  became  her  prisoners;  the  former  she  caused  to 
be  slain;  to  the  latter  she  offered  only  an  option  between  the  sword, 
the  nalter,  and  poison.  The  old  queen  next  proceeded  to  satiate  her 
revenue  against  the  family  of  Antipater.  One  hundred  leading 
Macedonians,  friends  of  Kassander,  were  pui  to  death,  together 
with  his  brother  Nikanor;  while  the  sepulcher  of  his  deceased 
brother  lollas,  accused  of  having  poisoned  Alexander  the  Great,  was 

broken  up.  '  ,      ,  -.      . 

During  the  winter,  Olympias  remained  thus  completely  predomi- 
nant in  Macedonia;  where  her  position  seemed  strong,  since  her 
allies  the  ^toliaiis  were  masters  of  the  pass  at  Thermopylae,  while 
Kassander  was  kept  employed  in  Peloponnesus  by  the  force  under 
Alexander,  son  of  Polysperchon.     But  Kassander,  disengaging  him- 
self from  these  embarrassments,  and  eluding  Thermopylae  by  a  mari- 
time  transit  to  Thessaly,  seized  the  Perrhabian  passes  before  they 
had  been  put  under  guard,  and  entered  Macedonia  wuthout  resist- 
ance.    Olvmpias,   having  no  army  competent  to  meet  nim   in  the 
tield,  was 'forced  to  shut  herself  up  in  the  maritime  fortress  of  Pydna, 
with  Roxana,  the  child  Alexander,  and  Thessalonike,  daughter  of 
her  late  husband  Philip  son  of  Amyntas.     Here  Kassander  blocked 
her  up  for  several  months  by  sea  as  well  as  by  land,  and  succeeded 
in  defeating  all  the  efforts  of  Polysperchon  and  ^akides  to  relieve 
her.     In  the  spring  of  the  ensuing  year  (316  B.C.),  she  was  forced  by 
intolerable  famine  to  surrender.     Kassander  i^romised  her  nothing 
more  than  personal  safety,  requiring  from  her  the  surrender  of  the 
two  great  fortresses,  Pella  and  Amphipolis,  which  made  him  master 
of  Macedonia.     Presently,  however,  the  relatives  of  those  numerous 
victims,  who  had  perished  bv  order  of  Olympias,  were  encouraged 
bv  Kassander  to  demand  her  Hfe  in  retribution.     They  found  little 
dlflicuhy  in  obtaining  a  verdict  of  condemnation  against  her  from 
what  was  called  a  31acedonian  assembly.     Nevertheless,  such  was 
the  sentiment  of  awe  and  reverence  connected  with  her  name,  that 
no  one  except  tlie  injured  men  themselves  could  be  found  to  execute 
the  sentence.    She  died  with  a  courage  worthy  of  her  rank  and  domi- 
neering character.     Kassander  took  Thessalonike  to  wife— confining 
Roxana  with  the  child  Alexander   in   the  fortress  of  Amphipolis— 
where  (after  a  certain  interval)  he  caused  both  of  them  to  be  slain. 

While  Kassander  was  thus  master  of  Macedonia— and  while  the 
imperial  family  were  disappearing  from  the  scene  in  that  country— 
the  defeat  and  death  of  Eumenes  (which  happened  nearly  at  the 
same  time  as  the  capture  of  Olympia:)  removed  the  last  faithful 


KASSANDER  FOUNDS  KASSANDREIA. 


ly* 


731 


partisan  of  that  family  in  Asia.  But  at  the  same  time,  it  left  in  the 
hands  of  Antigonus  such  overwhelming  preponderance  throughout 
Asia,  that  he  aspired  to  become  vicar  and  master  of  the  entire  Alex- 
andrine empire,  as  well  as  to  avenge  upon  Kassander  the  extirpation 
of  the  regal  family.  His  power  appeared  indeed  so  formidable,  that 
Kassander  of  Macedonia,  Lysimachus  of  Thrace,  Ptolemy  of  Egvpt, 
and  Seleukus  of  Babylonia,  entered  into  a  convention,  w^iich  gradu- 
ally ripened  into  an  active  alliance,  against  him. 

During  the  struggles  between  these  powerful  princes,  Greece  ap- 
pears simply  as  a  group  of  subject  cities,  held,  garrisoned,  grasped 
at,  or  coveted  by  all  of  them.  Polysperchon,  abandoning  all  hopes 
m  Macedonia  at  the  death  of  Olyrnpias,  had  been  forced  to  take  ref- 
uge among  the  JEtolians,  leaving  his  son  Alexander  to  make  the 
best  struggle  that  he  could  in  Peloponnesus;  so  that  Kassander  was* 
now  decidedly  preponderant  throughout  the  Hellenic  regions.  After 
fixing  himself  on  the  throne  of  Macedonia,  he  perpetuated  his  own 
name  by  founding,  on  the  isthmus  of  the  peninsula  of  Pallene  and 
near  the  site  where  Potidaea  had  stood,  the  new  city  of  Kassandreia- 
into  which  he  congregated  a  large  number  of  inhabitants  from  the 
neighborhood,  and  especially  the  remnant  of  the  citizens  of  Olyn- 
thus  and  Potidtea— towns  taken  and  destroyed  by  Philip  more  than 
thirty  years  before.  He  next  marched  into  Peloponnesus  with  his 
army  against  Alexander  son  of  Polysperchon.  Passing  throu^^h 
Ba^otia,  he  undertook  the  task  of  restoring  the  city  of  Thebes  which 
had  been  destroyed  twenty  years  previously  by  Alexander  the  Great, 
and  had  ever  since  existed  only  as  a  military  post  in  the  ancient  ciki- 
del  called  Kadmcia.  The  other  Bceotian  towns,  to  whom  the  oli 
Theban  territory  had  been  assigned,  were  persuaded  or  constrained 
to  relmquish  it;  and  Kassander  invited  from  all  parts  of  Greece  the 
Theban  exiles  or  their  descendants.  From  sympathy  with  these  ex- 
iles, and  also  with  the  ancient  celebrity  of'^the  city,  many  Greeks, 
even  from  Italy  and  Sicily,  contributed  to  the  restoration.  The 
Athenians,  now  administered  by  Demetrius  Phalereus  under  Ka.^- 
sander's  supremacy,  were  particularly  forward  in  the  work;  the 
Messenians  and  Megalopolitaus,  whose  ancestors  had  owed  so  much 
to  the  Theban  Epaminondas,  lent  strenuous  aid.  Thebes  was  re- 
established in  the  original  area  which  it  had  occupied  before  Alexan- 
der's siege;  and  was  held  by  a  Kassandrian  garrison  in  the  Kadmeia, 
destined  for  the  mastery  of  Bo'otia  and  Greece. 

xVflcrsome  slay  at  Thebes.  Kassander  advanced  toward  Pelopon- 
nesus. Alexander  (son  of  Polysperchon)  having  fortified  the  Isth- 
mus, he  was  forced  to  eml)ark  his  troops  with  his  elephants  at  Me- 
gara,  and  cross  over  the  Saronic  Gulf  to  Epidaurus.  He  dispos- 
sessed Alexander  of  Argos,  of  3Iessenia,  and  even  of  his  position  on 
the  Isthmus,  where  he  left  a  powerful  detachment,  and  then  returned 
to  Macedonia.  His  increasing  power  raised  both  apprehension  and 
-hatred  in  the  bosom  of  Antigonus,  v;ho  endeavored  to  come  to  terms 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 

with  him.  but  in  vain.  Kassander  preferred  the  alliance  with 
P  olemy  Seleukus,  and  Lvsimachus-against  Antigonus,  who  was 
DOW  master  of  nearly  the  whole  of  Asia,  iuspiring  common  dread  to 
Xof  them  Accoidingly.  from  Asia  to  Peloponnesus,  with  arms 
ard  mo  ey',  Antigonus" 'dispatched  the  Milesian  Aristodemus  to 
St -en "hen  Alexander  against  Kassander;  whom  he  further  de- 
nounJed  as  an  enemv  of  the  Macedonian  name,  because  he  had  slam 
Ohmpias,  imprisoned  the  other  members  ot; the  regal  ^^^^^^Iv,  and  re- 
established the  Olynthian  exiles.  He  caused  the  absent  Kassander  to 
he  condemned  by  what  was  called  a  Macedonian  assembly,  upon 

''"ntil^lurfe-claimed,  by  the  voice  of  this  assembly,  that 
alUhe  Greeks  should  be  free,  6elf-3,overning,  and  exempt  from  gar- 
H  ons  or  miUtary  occupation.  It  was  expected  that^  these  brilliant 
momises  would  enlist  partisans  in  Greece  against  Kassander  ;  ac- 
corSngly  P^o  emy,  rule?  of  Egypt,  one  of  the^enemies  of  Antigonus, 
[ho  "ft  fit  toissii^  similar  proclamations  a  few  months  afterward, 
end?r  n-  to  the  Greeks  the  same  boon  from  himself  These  pronv 
les  n^Ther  executed,  nor  intended  to  be  executed^  by  either  of 
the  kings,  appear  to  have  produced  little  or  no  effect  upon  the 

^Th^e^* arrival  of  Aristodemus  in  Peloponnesus  had  reanimated  the 
party  of  Alexander  (son  of  Polysperchon),  against  wliom  Kassander 
^al'A'm  obliixed  to  bring  his  full  forces  from  Macedonia^    1  hough 
TucceVsful  a-ai^nst  Alexander  at  Argos.  Orchomenus  and  other  places, 
Kassander  was  not  able  to  crush  him,  and  presently  thought  it  pru- 
dent to  g'lin  him  over.     He  offered  to  him  the  separate  governmen 
of   Pdoponnesus,  though   in   subordination   to  himself.    Alexandei 
accepted  Uie  offer,  becoming  Kassander's  ally-and  canned  on  war 
joXtihrm,  against  Aristodemus,  with  varying  success,  un  il 
he  was  presently  alsassinated  by  some  private  enemies.     >^evertl  e- 
less  his  widow  Kratesipolis.  a  woman  of  courage  and  energy,  sli.l 
maintained  herself  in  considerable   force  at  Sikyon.     Kassander  s 
most  obstinate  enemies  were  the,^tolians  of  ^'^^^m  we  now  hi^^^ 
hear  formal  mention  as  a  substantive  confederacv.     These  -^to^  a n. 
became  the  allies  of  Antigonus  as  they  had  been  before  of  Pol} - 
cnerchon   extending  their  predatory  ravages  even  as  far  as  Attica. 
Pi^o^cl^d  alainst  foreign  garrisonsf  partly  by  their  rude  and  fierce 
h-ibits  partly  by  their  mountainous  territory.- they  were  almost  the 
onb  Greeks Vli^o  could  still  be  called  free      Kassander  tried  to  keep 
them  in  check  through  their  neighbors  the  Akarnanians,  whom  le 
induced  to  adopt  a  more  concentrated  habit  of  residence,  ponsoh- 
dating   their  numerous  p^^tty  townships   into    a  few  considerable 
town^Stratus,  Sauria,  and  Agrinium-convenicnt  posts  for  Mace- 
donian garrisons.     He  also  made  himself  master  of  Leukas,  A    .- 
Ionia,  and  Epidamnus,  defeating  the  lllyrian  king  Glaukias^  so  that 
his  dominion  now  extended  across  from  the  Thermaic  to  the  AUn- 


FORCES  OF  ANTIGONUS  IN  GREECE. 


733 


atic  Gulf.  His  general  Philippus  gained  two  important  victories 
over  the  ^toliaus  and  Epirots,  forcing  the  former  to  relinquish  some 
of  their  most  accessible  towns. 

The  power  of  Antigonus  in  Asia  underwent  a  material  diminution, 
by  the  successful  and  permanent  establishment  which  ISeleukus  now 
acquired  in  Babylonia;  from  which  event  the  era  of  the  succeeding 
Seleukidae  takes  its  origin.  In  Greece,  however,  Antigonus  gained 
ground  on  Kassander.  He  sent  thither  his  nephew  Ptolemy  with  a 
large  force  to  liberate  the  Greeks,  or  in  other  words,  to  expel  the 
Kassandrian  garrisons;  while  he  at  the  same  time  distracted  Kas- 
sander's attention  by  threatening  to  cross  the  Hellespont  and  invade 
Macedonia.  This  JPtolemy  (not  the  Egyptian)  expelled  the  soldiers 
of  Kassander  from  Euboea,  Baotia,  and  Phokis.  Chalkis  in  Eubcca 
was  at  this  time  the  chief  military  station  of  Kassander;  Thebes 
(which  he  had  recently  re-established)  was  in  alliance  with  liim;  but 
the  remaining  Boeotian  towns  were  hostile  to  him.  Ptolemy,  having 
taken  Chalkis — the  citizens  of  which  he  conciliated  by  leaving  them 
without  any  garrison — together  with  Oropus,  Eretria,  and  Karystus 
—entered  Attica,  and  presented  himself  before  Alliens.  So  much 
disposition  to  treat  with  him  was  manifested  in  the  city,  that  Dem- 
etrius the  Phalerean  was  obliged  to  gain  time  by  pretending  to  open 
negotiations  with  Antigonus,  while  Ptolemy  withdrew  from  Attica. 
Nearly  at  the  same  epoch,  Apollonia,  Epidamnus,  and  Leukas, 
found  means,  assisted  by  an  armament  from  Korkyra,  to  drive  out 
Kassander's  garrisons,  and  to  escape  from  his  dominion.  The 
affairs  of  Antigonus  were  now  prospering  in  Greece,  but  they  were 
much  thrown  back  by  the  discontent  and  treachery  of  his  admiral 
Telesphorus,  who  seized  Elis  and  even  plundered  the  sacred  treas- 
ures of  Olympia.  Ptolemy  presently  put  him  down,  and  restored 
these  treasures  to  the  god. 

In  the  ensuing  year,  a  convention  was  concluded  between  Antig- 
onus on  one  side— and  Kassander,  Ptolemy  (the  Egyptian)  and 
Lysimachus,  on  the  other,  whereby  the  supreme  command  in  Mace- 
donia Avas  guaranteed  to  Kassander,  until  the  maturity  of  Alexander 
son  of  Roxana;  Thrace  being  at  the  same  time  assured  to  Lysimachus, 
Egypt  to  Ptolemy,  and  the  whole  of  Asia  to  Antigonus.  It  was  at 
the  same  time  covenanted  by  all,  that  the  Hellenic  cities  should  be 
free.  Toward  the  execution  of  this  last  clause,  however,  nothing 
was  actually  done.  Nor  does  it  appear  that  the  treaty  had  any  other 
effect,  except  to  inspire  Kassander  with  increased  jealousy  about 
Roxana  and  her  child;  both  of  whom  (as  has  been  already  stated)  he 
caused  to  be  secretly  assassinated  soon  afterward,  by  the  governor 
Glaukias,  in  the  fortress  of  Amphipolis,  ^vhere  they  had  been  con- 
fined. The.  forces  of  Antigonus,  under  his  general  t*tolemy,  still  re- 
mained in  Greece.  But  this  general  presently  (310 B.C. ) revolted  from 
Antigonus,  and  placed  them  in  co-operation  with  Kassander;  while 
Ptolemy  of  Egypt,  accusing  Antigonus  of  having  contravened  the 


734 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 


treaty  by  garrisoning  various  Grecian  cities,  renewed  the  war  and 
the  triple  alliance  against  him. 

Polvsperclu.n-wlio  had  hitherto  maintained  a  local  dominion  over 

varioils  pans  of  Peloponnesus,  with  a  military  force  distributed  in 

iVIessene  and  other  towns-was  now  encouraged  by   Antigonus    o 

espouse  the  cause  of  Herakles  (son  of  Alexander  by  Barsme),  and  to 

Dlace  him  on  the  throne  of  Macedonia  in  opposition  to  Ivassander. 

This  vounn;  prince  Herakles.  now  seventeen  years  of  age,  was  sent  to 

Greece  from  Pergamus  in  Asia,  and  his  pretensions  to  the  throne  were 

assisted  not  only  by  a  considerable  party  in  Macedonia  itself  but  also 

bv  the  .Etolians.     Polysperchon  invaded  Macedonia,  with  tayoi-ab^ 

prospects  of  establishing   tlie  young  prince;  yet  »^e  thought  it  ad- 

vantLgeous  to  accept  treacherous  propositions  trom  I^f  ^ande     who 

offered  to  him  partnership  in  the  sovereignty  of  Macedonia,  with  an 

independent  army  and  dominion  in  Peloponnesus.      I'^lv^perchon 

temoted  by  these  offers,  assassinated  the  young  prince  Herakles,  and 

withdrew  his  army  toward  Peloponnesus.     But  he  found  such  unex- 

nected  opposilion'in  his  march  through  Bojotia,  from  Bceotians  and 

teloponnesians,  that  he  was  forced  to  take  up  his  winter  quarters  m 

Lokris  (309  B.C.).     From  this  time  forward,  as  far  as  we  can  make 

out   he  commanded  in  Southern  Greece  as  subordinate  ally  m-  part- 

ner  of   Kassander;  whose   Macedonian  .tloniinion,  thus  conhnned, 

seems  to  have  included  Akarnania  and  Amphilochia  on  the  Ambia- 

kian  Gulf,  together  with^the  town  of  Ambrakia  itself,  and  a  supre- 

macv  over  many  of  the  Epirots. 

The  assassination  of  Herakles  was  speedily  followed  by  tlnit  of  Kleo- 
patra,  sister  of  Alexander  the  Great,  and  daughter  ot.Pnlip  and 
Olympias  She  had  been  for  some  time  at  Sardis,  nominally  at  lib- 
erty, yet  under  watch  by  the  governor,  who  received  i'i%^^ders 
from  Antiironus;  she  was  now  preparing  to  quit  that  place,  for  the 
purpose  of^joining  Ptolemy  in  Egypt,  and  ot  becoming  his  wife.  She 
had  been  invoked  as  auxiliary,  or  courted  in  marriage  by  several  of 
the  great  Macedonian  chiefs,  without  any  result.  Now  however 
Antio-onus,  afraid  of  the  influence  which  her  name  might  throw  into 
the  s?ale  of  his  rival  Ptolemy,  caused  her  to  be  secretly  n^^Jj;  ^^  l'^ 
she  was  preparing  for  her  departure;  throwing  the  blame  o  the  d,ed 
on  some  of  her  women,  whom  he  punished  with  death.  AJl  tl^e^ela 
tivesof  Alexander  the  Great  (except  Thessalonike  wife  of  Kassander 
dau-hterof  Philip  by  a  Thessalian  mistress)  had  now  successnel} 
perilhed,  and  tdl  by  the  orders  of  one  or  other  among  his  pnncipal 
officers.     The  imperial  family,  with  the  prestige  of  its  name,  tliu.^ 

came  to  an  end.  _  .  .  -  ,  „„t^o 

Ptolemy  of  E-ypt  now  set  sail  for  Greece  with  a  powerful  arm.v 
ment.  He  acquired  possession  of  the  importanl  cities-Sikyou  and 
Corinth— which  were  handed  over  to  him  by  Kratesipolis,  widow  a 
Alexander  son  of  Polysperchon.  He  then  made  Known  oy  procid- 
raation  his  purpose  as  a  liberator,  inviting  aid  from  the  Peloponnesian 


ARRIVAL  OF  DEMETRIUS  POLIORKETES.        735 

cities  themselves  against  the  garrisons  of  Kassander.  From  some  he 
received  encouraging  answers  and  promises;  but  none  of  them  made 
any  movement,  or  seconded  him  by  armed  demonstrations.  He 
tliuught  it  prudent  therefore  to  conclude  a  truce  with  Kassander  and 
retire  from  Greece,  leaving  however  secure  garrisons  in  Sikyon  and 
(\)nnth.  The  Grecian  cities  had  now  become  tame  and  passiv*^ 
Feeiing  their  own  incapacity  of  self-defense,  and  averse  to  auxiiijiry 
eir  ;rts,  which  brouglit  upon  them  enmity  without  any  prospect  of  ad. 
vantage— they  awaited  only  the  turns  of  foreign  interference  and  the 
behests  of  the  potentates  around  them. 

The  Grecian  ascendency  of  Kassander,  however,  was  in  the  follow- 
ing year  exposed  to  a  graver  shock  than  it  had  ever  yet  encountered 
--by  the  sudden  invasion  of  Demetrius  called  Poliorketes  son  of 
Antigonus.     This  young  prince,  sailing  from  Ephesus  with  a  formid- 
able armament,  contrived  to  conceal  his  purposes  so  closely   that  he 
actually  entered  the  harbor  of  Peiraeus  (on  the  26th  of  the  month 
I hargelion-May)  without  expectation,  or  resistance  from  any  one; 
his  fleet  being  mistaken  for  the  fleet  of  the  Egyptian  Ptolemy      The 
Phalerean  Demetrius,  taken  unawares,  and"attempting  too  late  to 
guard  the  harbor,  found  himself  compelled  to  leave  It  in   posses, 
sion  of  the  enemy,  and  to  retire  within  the  walls  of  Athens-   wiiiie 
Dionysius,  the  Kassandrian  governor,  maintained  himself  with  his 
garrison  in  Muuychia,  yet  without  any  army  competent  to  meet  the 
invaders  in  the  held.     This  accomplished  the  Phalerean,  who  had 
administered  for  ten  years  as  the  viceroy  and  with  the  force  of  Kas- 
sander, now  felt  his  position  and  influence  at  Athens  overthrown 
and  even  his  personal  safety  endangered.     He  with  other  Athenians 
went  as  envoys  on  the  ensuing  day  to  ascertain  what  terms  would  be 
granted.      1  he  young  prince  ostentatiously   proclaimed,  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  his  father  Antigonus  and  himself  to  restore  and  guar- 
antee to  the  Athenians  unqualified  freedom  and  autonomy.     Hence 
the  1  halerean  Demetrius  foresaw  that  his  internal  opponents  con- 
demned as  they  had  been  to  compulsory  silence  during  the  last  ten 
years   would  now  prochdm  themselves  with  irresistible  violence  so 
that  there  was  no  safety  for  him  except  in  retreat.    He  accordin^Hy 
asked  and  obtained  permission  from  the  invader  to  retire  to  Thebes 
rroni  whence  he  passed  over  soon  after  to  Ptolemy  in  E^'-ypt      The 
Athenians  m  the  city  declared  in  favor  of  Demetrius  Poliorketes- 
who  however  refused  to  enter  the  walls  until  he  should  have  besieo-ed 
and  captured  ^runychia,  as  well  as   3[egara,  with  their  Kassandrian 
garri.^ons.     In  a  short  time  he  accomplished  both  tliese  objects      In- 
deed energy,  skill,  and  effective  use  of  engines,  in  besieging  fortified 
places,  were  among  the  most  conspicuous  features  in  his  character- 
procuring  for  him  the  surname  whereby  he  is  known  to  history      He 
proclairned  the  Megarians  free,  leveling  to  the  gi'ound   the  fortitica- 
Tions  of  Munychia,  as  an  earnest  to  the  Athenians  that  they  should 
be  relieved  for  the  future  from  all  foreign  gaiTison 


736 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR 


f 


After  these  successes.  Demetrius  Poliorketes  made  his  trmmphant 
entry  into  Athens.     He  announced  to  the  people  in  formal  assemb  y, 
that  they  were  now  again  a  free  democracy,  hberated  from  all  do- 
minion either  of  soldiers  from  abroad  or  oligarchs  at  home.     lie  also 
proniised  them  a  further  boon  from  his  father  Antigonus  and  Inmself 
--150  000  medinuii  of  corn  for  distribution,  and  ship-timber  in  quan- 
tity sufficient  for  constructing  100  triremes.     Both  these  announce- 
ments were  received  with  grateful  exultation.     The  feehngs  ot  tiie 
Se  were   tS  ified   not  merely  in  votes  of  thanks  and  admira- 
Ton    toward   the   young   conqueror,  but    also    in  effusions  of  un- 
measured and  exorbitant  flattery     Stratokles  (who  has  already  been 
More  us  as  one  of  the  accusers  of  Demosthenes  in  the  Harpalian 
S)  with  others  exhausted  tlieir  invention  in  devising  new  varieties 
^compliment  and  adulation.     Antigonus  and  Demetrius  were  pro- 
claim Jd  to  be  not  only  kings,  but  gods  and  saviors:  a  high  priest 
of    the  e  saviors   was^o    be  annually   chosen,   after  ^^^om   each 
successive  year  was  to  be  named  (instead  of  being  named  afte    the 
fi  ^of    he^nne  Archons.ashad  hitherto  been  the  custom    and  the 
d-tes  of  decrees  and  contracts  commemorated;    the  month  Muny- 
c    on  was  re'l^mied   as   Demetrion-two  new  tribes,  to   be  called 
Antigonis  and  Demetrias,  were  constituted  in  ^^^^>tion  to  Uk.  p  e 
ceding  ten:-the  annual  senate  was  appointed  to  consist  of  600  mem- 
bers hi  stead  of  500;  the  portraits   and  exploits   of  Antigonus   and 
DemeTrius  were  to  be  woven,  along  with  those  of  Zeus  and  Athene, 
into  the  splendid  and  voluminous  robe  periodically  carried  m  pro- 
cession as  an  offering  at  the  Panathenaic  festival;  the  spot  of  g  ound 
wTere  Demetrius  had  alighted  from  his  chariot,  was  consecrated  with 
TnaUnr  erected  in  hono^of  Demetrius  Katrebates  or  the  Descender 
Several  other  similar  votes  were  passed,  recognizm-  and  worshiping 
^  iod^  the  saviors  Antigonus  and  Demetrius.     Nay,  we  are  told 
^haftemples  or  altars  wefe  voted  to  Pl^il-^phnxlite,  in  honor  of 
Phila  wife  of  Demetrius;  and  a  like  compliment  was  paid  to  his  tv.o 
m  s  resses,  Le*na  and   Lamia.     Altars  are  said  to  have  been  also 
dedicated  to  Adeimantus  and  others,  his  convivial  cmnpanions  o 
flatterers.     At  the  same  time  the  numerous  statues,  which  had  been 
erected  in  honor  of  the  Phalerean  Demetrius  during  his  decennial 
government,  were   overthrown,  and   some  of  them  -yen  turned  U> 
icrnoblc  purposes,  in  order  to  cnst  greater  scorn  upon  the  past  r   xr 
f he  demonstrations  of  servile  flattery  at  Athens,  toward    ^emet^^^^^^ 
Poliorketes,  were  in  fnct  so  extravagantly  overdone,  that  he  himsc  t 
is  said  to  hive  been  disgusted  with  them,  and  to  have  expressed  con- 
tempt for  these  degenerate  Athenians  of  his  own  time 

In  reviewing  such  degrading  proceedings,  ^ve  must  recollect  tha 
thirty-one  yeaVs  had  now  elapsed  since  the  battle  of  Choeroneia,  am 
that  during  all  this  time  the  Athenians  had  been  under  the  practical 
ascendencv,  and  constantly  augmenting  pressure,  of  foreign  poten- 
tates    The  sentiment  of  this  dependence  on  Macedonia  had  been 


ATHENS  WITHOUT  FORCE  OR  HOPE. 


737 


continually   strengthened    by   all    the   subsequent   events— by    the 
capture  and  destruction  of  Thebes,  and  tlie  subsequent  overwhelmito- 
conquests  of  Alexander— by  the  deplorable  conclusion  of  the  Laniian 
war,  the  slaughter  of  the  free-spoken  orators,  the  death  of  the  ener- 
getic military  leaders,  and  the  deportation  of  Athenian  citizens— 
lastly,by  the  continued  presenee  of  a  Macedonian  garrison  in  Peiiunis 
or  Munychia.     By  Phokion,  Demetrius  Phalereus,  and   the  otlicr 
leading  statesmen  of  this  long  period,  submission  to  Macedonia  had 
been  inculcated  as  a  virtue,  while  the  recollection  of  the  dignitv  and 
grandeur  of  old  autonomous  Athens  had  been  effaced  or  denounced 
as  a  niischievous  dream.     The  fifteen  years  between  the  close  of  the 
Laniian  war  and  the  arrival  of  Demetrius  Poliorketes  (32:^807  b  c  ) 
had  witnessed  no  free  play,  nor  public  discussion  and  expression'  of 
conflicting  opinions;  the  short  period  during  whicii  Phokion  was 
condemned  must    be  excepted,   but   that   lasted  only  long  enough 
to  give  room   for  the  outburst  of  a  preconceived  but  suppressed 
antipath3\  ^^ 

During  these  thirly  years,   of  which  the  last  half  had   been  an 
aggravation  of  the  first,  a  new  generation  of  Athenians  had  grown 
up,  accustomed  to  an  altered  phase  of  political  existence      How  few 
of  those  who  received  Demetrius  Poliorketes,  had  taken  part  in  the 
battle  of  Clueroueia,  or  listened  to  the  stirring  exhortations  of  De- 
mosthenes in  the  war  which  pi-eceded  that  disaster!    Of  the  citizens 
who  yet  retained  courage  and  patriotism  to  struggle  again  for  their 
freedom  after  the  death  of  Alexander,  how  manv  must  have  perished 
with  Leosthenes  in  the  Lamian  w\ar!    The  Athenians  of  807  a  c 
had  come    to   conceive  their  own   city,  and   Hellas   generally,  as 
dependent  first  on  Kassander,  next  on  the  possible  intervention  of  his 
equally  overweening  rivals.   Ptolemy,  Antigonus,  Lysimachus,  etc. 
Ii  they  shook  off  the  yoke  of  one  potentate,  it  could  only  be  by  the 
protectorate  of  another.     The  sentiment  of  political  self-reliance  and 
autonomy  had  fled;  the  conception  of  a  citizen  military  force  fur- 
nished by  confederate  and  co-operating  cities,  had  been  superseded 
by  the  spectacle  of  vast  standing  armies,  organized  by  the  heirs  of 
Alexander  and  of  his  traditions 

Two  centuries  before  (510  B.C.),  when  the  Lacedgeraonians  expelled 
the  despot  Hippias  and  his  mercenaries  from  Athens,  there  spran-- 
up  at  once  among  the  Athenian  people  a  forward  and  devoieiT 
patriotism,  which  made  them  willing  to  brave,  and  competent  to 
avert,  all  dangers  in  defense  of  their  newly  acquired  libertv  At 
that  time,  the  enemies  by  whom  they  were  threatened,  were  Laced.'w- 
monians,  Thebaus,  ^giuetans.  Chalkidians,  and  the  like  (for  the? 
i^ersian  force  did  not  present  itself  until  after  some  intervid  and 
attacked  not  Athens  alone,  but  Greece  collectiveiv).  Tiiese  hostilo 
lorces,  though  superior  in  number  and  apparent  value  to  those  of 
Athens,  were  yet  not  so  disproportionate  as  to  engender  hopelessness 
and  despair.    Very  dillercut  w^ere  the  facts  in  807  c.c,  when  De- 


H.  G. 


IV. -24 


738 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 


1 


metrhis  Pol iorkrtes  removed  tlie  Kassaudriau  mercenanes  with  their 
fortress  Munychia,  and  proclaimed  Athens  tree.  To  maintain  that 
f^eedo^n  by  tlieir  own  strenunh— in  opposition  to  the  evident  supe- 
riuritv  of  ormnized  force  residing  in  the  potentates  around,  one  or 
more  of  whom  had  nearly  all  Greece  under  military  occupation— 
WIS  an  enterprise  too  hopeless  to  have  been  attempted  even  by  men 
such  as  the  combatants  of  Marathon  or  the  contemporaries  of 
Perikles  "  Who  would  be  free,  themselves  must  strike  the  blow  ! 
but  the^Athenians  had  not  force  enough  to  strike  it;  and  the  liberty 
proclaimed  by  Demelrius  Poliorketes  was  a  boon  dependent.  ui)ou 
him  for  its  extent  and  even  for  its  continuance.  'Ihe  Atlieiuan 
assembly  of  that  day  was  held  under  his  army  as  masters  ot  Attica, 
as  it  had  been  held  a  few  months  before  under  the  controlling  lorce 
of  tlie  Phalercan  Demetrius  toirether  with  the  Kassandrian  governor 
of  Munvchia;  and  the  most  fulsome  votes  of  adulation  proposed  in 
lionor  of  Demetrius  Poliorketes  by  his  partisans,  though  perhaps 
(lisappoved    by    many,  would    hardly    tind    a   single    pronounced 

^^One^man  however,  there  was,  who  ventured  to  oppose  several  of 
the  votes— the  nephew  of  Demosthenes— Democharcs,  who  deserves 
to  be  commemorated  as  the  hist  known  spokesman  ot  free  Athenian 
citizenship.  We  know  only  that  such  were  his  general  politics,  and 
that  his  opposition  to  tlie  obsequious  rhetor  Stratokles  ended  in 
banishmeKt,  four  years  afterward.  He  appears  to  have  discharged 
the  functions  of  general  during  this  period-to  have  been  active  in 
strengthening  the  fortifications  and  military  equipment  of  the  city— 
and  to  have  been  employed  in  occasional  missions. 

The  altered  politics  of  Athens  were  manifested  by  impeachment 
against  Demetrius  Phalereus  and  other  leading  partisans  ot  the  laic 
Kassandrian  government.  He  and  many  others  had  already  gone 
into  voluntary  exile:  when  their  trials  came  on,  they  were  not  torih- 
comin*^  and  all  were  condemned  to  death.  But  all  tht)se  wiio 
remained,  and  presented  themselves  for  trial,  were  acquitted;  so 
little  was  there  of  rectionary  violence  on  this  occasion.  t?tratokk'S 
also  proposed  a  decree,  eoinmenioraling  the  orator  l.ykurgiis  (who 
had  been  dead  about  seventeen  yiars)  ly  a  statue,  an  honorar} 
inscription,  and  a  grant  of  maintenance  iu  the  Prytaneum  to  Ins 
eldest  surviving  descendant.  Among  tlio^e  who  accompanied  tlic 
Phalerean   Demetrius   into   exile   was   the    rlitior   or    logoiin.pner 

Deinarchus.  ,  ,    x- ,-  i       i,^ 

The  friendship  of  this  obnoxious  Phalerean.  and  of  Kassnr.der  also, 
toward  the  phiiosoph<  r  Theopbrastus,  sec  ms  to  have  been  or.e  nunn 
cause  which  occasioned  the  enactment  ol  a  resirietive  law  against 
•  the  libertv  of  philoso]>hizin£r.  It  was  (U-cieed.  on  ihc  pioposnion  oi 
a  citizen  named  ^^o])hokles,  that  no  ].hiio>o]'her  .-hould  be  allowed  lo 
open  a  school  or  teach,  except  under  .*<pe(  ial  Rinclion  obtained  troin 
a  vote  of  the  Senate  and  people.     Such  was  the  disgust  and  npi)ie- 


LOXG   SIEGE  OF   RHODES. 


739 


hension  occasioned  by  the  new  restriction,  that  all  the  philosophers 
witii  one  accord  left  Athens.     This  spirited  protest,  against  au  hori- 
tative  restriction  on  the  liberty  of  philosophy  and  t?achincr  found 
responsive   sympathy  among  the  Athenians.     The  celebrity'  of  the 
schools  and  professors  was  in  fact  the  only  characteristic  mark  of 
dignity  still  remaining  to   them-when  their  power   had   become 
extinct,  and  when  even  their  independence  and  free  constitution  had 
degenerated  into  a  mere  name.     It  was  moreover  the  great  temntation 
for  young  men,  coming  from  all  parrs  of  Greece,^ to  visit  Athens 
Accordingly  a  year  had  hardly  passed,  when  Philon-impeachin- 
bophokles,  the  author  of  the  law,  under  the  Graphe  Paranomon— 
prevailed  on  the  Dikastery  to  tind  him  guilty,  and  condemn  him  to  a 
fine  of  hve  talents.     The  restrictive   law  being  thus  repealed    the 
piulosophers  returned.     It  is  remarkable  that  Democharcs  stood  for- 
ward as  one   of  ite  advocates;    defending   Sopliokles  against   the 
accuser  Philon.     From   scanty  notices  remaining  of  the  soeech  of 
Democharcs.  we  gafTier  that,  while  censuring  the  opinions  no  less 
than  the  characters  of  Plato  and- Aristotle,  he  deno.inced  yet  more 
bitterly  their  pupils,  as  being  for  the  most  part  ambitious   violent 
and  treacherous  men.     He  cited  by  name  several  among  them   who 
had  subvorted  the  freedom  of  their  respective  cities,  and  committed 
gross  outrages  against  their.fcllow-citizens.  uiiuiucu 

Athenian  envoys  were  dispatched  to  Antigonus  in  Asia,  to  testify 
the  gratitude  of  the  people,  and  communicate  the  recent  com  nil- 
meutary  votes.  Antigonus  not  only  i-eceived  them  graciouslv  but 
sent  to  Athens,  according  to  the  promise  made  by  hi^  ^on  i'  i-i.-P-p 
present  of  150,000  modi mni  of  wheat,  with  timber  suffideni  for  100 
ships.  He  ;xt  the  same  time  directed  Demetrius  to  convene  at  Athens 
a  synod  of  deputies  from  the  allied  Grecian  cities,  where  resolutions 
might  be  taken  for  the  common  interests  of  Greece  It  was  his 
intiirest  at  this  moment  to  raise  up  a  temporary  self-sustaining 
auhonty  in  Greece,  for  the  purpose  of  upholding  the  alliance  with 
um^elf,  during  the  absence  of  Demetrius;  whom  he  was  compelled 
to  summon  into  Asia  with  his  army— requiring  his  services  for  the 
war  against  Ptolemy  in  Syria  and  Cyprus. 

The  following  three  years  were  spent  by  Demetrius— 1  In  victori- 
ous operations  near  Cyprus,  defeating  Ptolemv  and  making  himself 
mas terof  tliat  island;  after  which  Antigonus  and  Demetrius\ssumed 
U\e  title  of  kingfi^  and  the  example  was  followed  by  Ptolemv  in 
Egypt  by  Lysimaehus,  in  Thrace-and  by  Seleukus,  in  Babylonia 
Mesopotamia,  and  Syria— thus  abolishinir  even-  the  titular  rVmem- 
brance  of  Alexander's  family.  2.  In  aif  unsuccessful  invasion  of 
Egypt  by  land  and  sea,  repulsed  with  great  loss.  3.  In  the  siege  of 
Khodes.  The  brave  and  intelligent  citizens  of  this  island  resisted 
tor  more  than  a  year  the  most  strenuous  attacks  and  the  most  for- 
imdable  siege-equipments  of  Demetrius  Poliorketes.  All  their 
ptfortfi  however  would  have  been  in  vain  had  thev  not  been  aasistod 


740 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 


bylai-e  re-enforcements  and  supplies  f'-"""^  J^'^^^^' ^v^^chu^ 
mid  Ka^^sander  Such  are  the  comlitions  under  which  alone  ex  en 
?W  nK;riSi  ie  and  intelligent  Greeks  can  now  retain  their  circum. 
'cnhKe^of  a  ononiyr  The  .^iege  wus  at  length  ternunuted  by 
r;Sromise:  the  Kh.dhL  submitted  to  enroll  themse^^^^^  as  a  he^ 
rf  Deinetrius,  yet  under  proviso  not  to  act  against  Ptolemv.  /o^^;;/^ 
[v^  ,tt(  r  thev  carri(  d  heir  grateful  devotion  so  iar,  as  to  eieet  a 
e  UD le  to  him  c "lied  the  Ptolema^um,  and  to  wciship  hiui  (under 
trtcUon"of"he  oracle  of  Ammon)  as  a  god.  ^^AmulstMhe  roc  s 


and  shoals  through  which  Grecian  cities  were  now 

s 

St 


mfl    Qhoa  S    tlirOU2.ll    Wllieu    ijrn«-i<ni   «.iiivc   ..^^-   - 

"t  rr-uli  on  every  si.lc  by  king.  "-^%.P'"-f '   [''i^U'^'i 
..lv,.s,  ...d  alter«a,<l  ly  the  f;iant-roi,uU.c  -.1  Ko  «--'''';,  K'°^ 


condemned  to 

thcm- 

ians 

.onducied  therr;;:;ihic;;f;;M;;wmrire;aer  prudence  and  dignity 

''^.;:^ntou!:X-tL  of  Demetrius  from  Greece  to  Cyprus^ 
K-^  -m  r  and  Poly.perchon  renewed  the  war  in  Peloponnesus  and 
Urnd"  1  hor  ood.  We  make  ont  no  particulars  respecting  h 
war  iCiEtolians  were  in  hostdity  with  Athens,  and  committed 
^,  roving  dep  ed^i(>ns.  The  fleet  of  Athens,  repaired  or  increased 
I^^JmN  thnber  received  from  Antigonus.  was  n.ade  to  lurmsh  th  i  y 
^^vhi  ernes  to  assist  Demetrius^in  Cyprus,  and  was  empUn'ed 
er  .   n   (mVrations  near  the  island  of  Amorgos,  wl.ereiu  it  sufteied 

defe  it  T^^^ 

PxeentthatKa-vandergaincil  -round  upon  the  Athenians,  and  that 

bo^\i^te(m^?^of1ioa  B.c^  he  was  l>l-k.uju|g,  or  thr^U^g.^ 
bl(>(  k-iue  \thens.  The  Athenians  mvokcd  tne  aid  of  Demct  lus 
p:.lioSer  who,  having  recently  concluded  ^^  ^^^^^S 
with  the  Rhodiaus.  came  airain  across  Irom  Asia  with  a  po\\ ei  u 
flee  and  army,  to  Aulis  in  Bceotia.  He  was  received  at  Athens  n  i  h 
demo'lilatio^s  of  honor  equal  or  superior  to  ^|'-^;\  "f^^  /^^^  ^^ 
his  previous  visit.  He  seems  to  have  passed  a  year  and  a  ^^alt,  pai  > 
a  AU.en.  partlv  in  military  operations  carried  successfully  oei 
n  Muv  m  Vs  of  Gieece  He  compelled  the  Boeotians  to  evacuate  tlie 
S    Lm  etyofCh^^^  to' relinquish  their  all  ance  with  Ivas- 

s^nl^      Hc^dr.ve  that  pnnce  out  of  Attica-expelled  his  garn.on 
f  om   iie  t^^vo  frontier  tortresses  of  Attica-Phyle  and  Panaktum- 
an      >  rsued  him  as  far  as  Thermopyke.     He  ^M^Uired   or  ob  a.ne^^ 
bv  br.bing  the  garrisons,  the  imi.ortant  towns  ^'^^  ^^^^^^^^  N^^S^^' ^'^^^^ 
Sikvon-    mastcTing  also  .Egium,    Bura.    all    the  .Aicudian    to^^ns 
(excJnt  AInntineia)   and  various  other  towns  in  Peloponnesus.     He 
S    >i^tc^  as  u-eiident,  the  great  festival  of  the  Hercea  at  Aijos^on 
which  occasioA  he  married  Deichimeia,  sis  er  of  P^^^^f ' /^  '^.  y^^!*^ 
kins  of  Epirus.     He  prevailed  on  the  Sikyouians  to  tiansfe    to  a 
shon  di.iance  the  site  of  their  city,  conferring  upon  the  new  city  the 
name   of   Demetrias.     At  a   Grecian   synod,   ^"f  ^'^"^^^  ^^..^V^  the 
under  his  own  letters  of  invitation,  he  received  by  acclamation    he 
appointment  of  leader  or  Emperor  of  the  Greeks,  as  it  had  been  con- 


RETURN  OF  DEMETRIUS. 


r4i 


ferred  on  Philip  and  Alexander.  He  even  extended  his  attacks  as 
far  as  Leukas  and  Koikyra.  The  greater  part  of  Greece  seems  to 
have  been  either  occupied  by  his  garrisons,  or  eulisied  among  his 
subordinates. 

So  mucli  was  Kassander  intimidated  by  these  successes,  that  he  sent 
envoys  to  Asia,  soliciting  peace  from  Antigonus;  wlio,  however, 
elale  and  full  of  arrogance,  refused  to  listen  to  any  terms  sliort  of 
siirreader  at  discretion.  Kassauder,  thus  driven  to  despair,  renewed 
his  applications  to  Lysimachus,  l^tolemy,  and  Seleukus.  All  these 
p:in.;es  felt  equally  menaced  by  the  power  and  dispositions  of  Antig- 
onus— and  all  resolved  upon  an  energetic  combination  to  put  him 
down. 

After  uninterrupted  prosperity  in  Greece,  throughout  the  summer 
of  302  B.C..  Dem.'lrius  returned  from  Leukas  to  Athens,  about  the 
month  of  September,  near  the  time  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries.  He 
was  welcomed  by  festive  processions,  hymns,  jia^aus,  choric  dances, 
and  bacchanalian  odes  of  joyous  congratulation.  One  of  these 
hymns  is  preserv^ed,  sung  by  a  chorus  of  Itiiyphalli — masked  revel- 
ers, with  their  heads  and  arms  encircled  by  wreaths — clothed  in 
white  tunics,  and  in  feminine  garments  reaching  almost  to  the  feet. 

This  song  is  curiou-,  as  indicating  the  hopes  and  fears  prevalent 
among  Athenians  of  that  day,  and  as  alfording  a  measure  of  their 
self-appreciation.  It  is  moreover  among  the  latent  Grecian  docu- 
ments that  w^e  possess,  bearing  on  actual  and  present  reality.  Tne 
poet,  addressing  Demetrius  as  a  God.  boasts  that  two  of  the  greatest 
and  best-beloved  of  all  divine  beings  are  visiting  Attica  at  the  same 
moment — Demeter  (coming  for  the  season  of  her  mysteries),  and 
Demetrius,  son  of  Poseidon  and  Aphrodite.  "To  thee  we  pray  (the 
hymn  proceeds);  for  other  Gods  are  either  afar  off — or  have  no  ears 
— or  do  not  exist — or  care  nothing  about  us;  but  tliee  we  see  before 
us.  not  in  wood  or  marble,  but  in  real  presence.  First  of  all  things, 
establisli  peace;  for  thou  hast  the  power — and  chastise  that  Sphinx 
wiio  domineers,  not  merely  over  Thebes,  but  over  all  Greece — the 
^Etolian,  who  (like  the  old  Sphinx)  rushes  from  his  station  on  the 
rock  to  snatch  and  carry  away  our  persons,  and  against  v»'hom  we 
cannot  fight.  At  all  times,  the  ^Etolians  robbed  their  neighbors; 
but  now,  they  rob  far  as  well  as  near." 

Effusions  such  as  these,  wiiik;  displaying  unmeasured  idolatry  and 
subservience  toward  Demetrius,  are  yet  more  I'emarkable,  as  betray- 
ing a  loss  of  force,  a  senility,  and  a  consciousness  of  defens(dess  and 
degraded  position,  such  as  we  are  astonished  to  find  publicly  pro- 
claimed at  Athens.  It  is  not  only  against  the  foreign  potentates  that 
tile  Athenians  avow  themselves  in(;apable  of  self-defense,  but  even 
against  the  incursions  of  the  ^loliaiis— Greeks  like  themselves, 
though  warlike,  rude,  and  restless.  When  such  were  the  feelings  of 
a  people,  once  the  most  daring,  contident,  and  organizing — and  still 
the  most  intelligent — in  Greece,  we  may  see  that  the  history  of  the 


742 


THE  LA.A[1AX   Wx\.R 


Greeks  ns  a  separate  nation  or  rare  is  reaching  its  clope—and  that 
from  h'Miceforwanl  ihev  must  betonie  merged  iii  one  or  otiier  of  tiiu 
stnn.iier  ciinenls  that  siinouud  iheni. 

Afrer  his  past  successes,  Demetrius  passed  some  months  in  enjoy- 
ment and  hixury  at  Athens.  lie  was  lodged  in  the  Parthenon,  being 
considered  as  a  guest  of  the  Goddess  Athene.  But  his  dissohite 
habits  provoked  tuc  louder  comments,  from  being  indulged  in  such 
a  domicile;  while  the  violences  which  he  ollered  to  beautiful  youths 
of  good  fanuiy  led  to  various  scenes  truly  tragical.  The  subseivicnt 
manifestations  of  the  Athenians  toward  him,  however,  continued 
unabated.  It  is  even  affirmed  that,  in  order  to  compensate  for  some- 
thino-  which  he  had  taken  amiss,  they  passed  a  formal  decree,  on  the 
proposition  of  Stratokles,  declaring  that  everything  which  Deme- 
trius miirht  command  was  holy  in  regard  to  the  Gods  and  just  in  re- 
gard to  men.  The  banishment  of  Demochares  is  said  to  have  been 
brought  on  by  his  sarcastic  comments  upon  this  decree.  In  the 
month  Munvchion  (April)  Demetrius  mustered  his  forces  and  his 
Grecij'.u  allies  for  a  nuirch  into  Thessaly  against  Kassander;  but  be- 
fore his  departure  he  was  anxious  to  be  initiated  in  the  Eleusinian 
mysteries.  It  was,  however,  not  the  regular  time  lor  this  (cremony; 
the  Le>ser  Mvsteries  being  cekbn.ted  in  Febir.ary,  the  Greater  in 
September.  The  Athenians  overruled  the  dihit  u'lty  by  passing  a 
special  vote,  enabling  him  to  be  initiated  at  once,  and  to  receive,  in 
inmiediate  succession,  the  preparatory  and  the  tinal  initiation,  be- 
tween which  ceremonies  a  year  of  interval  was  habitually  required. 
Accordinglv  he  placed  him'elf  disarmed  in  the  hands  of  the  priests, 
and  received  both  first  and  second  initiation  in  the  month  of  April, 
inimediatclv  before  his  departuie  from  Athens. 

Demetrius  condircted  into  Thessaly  an  army  of  50,000  men;  of 
Avhom  25,000  were  Grecian  allies— so  extensive  wab  his  sway  at  this 
ii.oment  over  the  Grecian  cities.  But  after  two  or  three  months  of 
hostilities,  partiallv  successful,  against  Kas.-ander.  he  was  summoned 
into  Asia  by  Antigonus  to  assist'in  meeting  the  formidable  ainiy  of 
t!ie  allies— Ptolemy,  Seleukus,  Lysimachus,  and  Kassnnder.  Before 
K  tirinir  from  Greece.  Demetrius'conchuied  a  truce  with  Kassander, 
whereby  it  w  as  stijndated  that  the  Grecian  cities,  both  in  Europe  and 
Asia,  should  be  p(  rnianentlv  iiutonomous  and  free  from  garrison  or 
(ontrol.  This  stipulation  served  only  as  an  honoiable  pretext  for 
leaving  Greece;  Demetrius  had  little  expectation  that  it  would  be 
observed.  In  the  ensuing  spring  was  fought  the  decisive  battle  of 
Ipsus  in  Phryda  (B.C.  300)  by  Antigonus  and  Demetrius,  iigainst 
Ptol<mv,  Seleukus,  and  Lysiniachus;' with  a  large  army  and  many 
eUphanls  on  both  sides.  Antigonus  was  coiiipleteiy  deleated  and 
slain,  at  the  age  of  more  than  eighty  years,  liis  Asiatic  dominion 
was  broken  up,  chiefly  to  the  profit  of  Seleukus,  whose  dynasty  be- 
came from  lienceforw  ard  ascendant,  from  the  coast  of  Syria  eastward 


BATTLE  OF  IPSUS. 


743 


to  the  Caspian  Gates  and  Parthia;  sometimes,  though  imperfectly 
further  eastw^ard,  nearly  to  111 c  Indus. 

The  effects  of  the  battle  of  Ipsus  were  speedily  felt  in   Greece 
The  Athenians  passed  a  decree  proclaiming  themselves  neutral   and 
excluding  both  the  belligerent  parties  from  Attica.     Demetrius  re- 
tiring with   the   remnant  of   his  defeated  army,  and  embaikiu'o-  at 
Ephesus  to  sail  to  Athens,  was  met  on  the  voyage  by  Athenian  "en- 
voys, w^ho  respectfully  acquainted  him  that  he  would  not  l)e  admitted 
At  the  same  time,  his  wife  Deidameia,  wiiom  he  had  left  at  Athens' 
was  sent  away  by  the  Athenians  under  an  honorable  escort  to  Me<rara' 
while  some  ships  of  war  which  he  had  left  in  the  Peireeus  wTre^'also 
restored  to  him.     Demetrius,  iuvlignant  at  this  unexpected  defection 
of  a  city  which  had  receiilly  heaped  upon  him  such  fulsome  adula- 
tion, was  .^lU  further  mortified  by  the  loss  of  most  of  his  olherrws- 
sessious  Hi  Greece.     His  garrisons  were  for  the  most  part  expelled 
and  the  cities   passed  into  Kassandrian  keeping  or  dominion'     His 
fortunes  were  indeed  partially  restored  by  concluding  a  peace  with 
beleiikus,  who  married  his  dau-hter.     this  alliance  withdrew  De- 
melrius  to  Syria,  while  Greece  appears  to  have  fallen  more  and  more 
under  the  kassandnan  parties.     It  was  one  of  these  partisans   La- 
chares,  who,  seconded  by  Kassander's  soldiers,  acquired  a  despotism 
at  Athens  such  as  had  been  possess- 'd  by  the  Phalerean  Demetrius 
but  employed  in  a  manner  far  more  ciuel  and  oppressive      V{>rious 
exiles,  driven   out   by  his   tyranny,   invited   Demetrius  Poliorketes 
who  passed  over  again  from  Asia  into  Greece,  recrovercd  portions  of 
Peloponnesu.s.  and  laid  siege  to  Athens.     He  blocked  up  the  city  by 
sea  and   land     so   that   the   pres.siire  of  famine  presently   became 
intolerable.     Laehares  having  made   his  escape,  the  people  opened 
their  gates   to   Demetrius,  not  without  great  fear  of  the  treatment 
awaiting  them.     But  he  behaved  with  forbearance,  and  even  with 
generosity.     He  spared  them  all,  supplied  them  with  a  largb  donation 
otcorn,  and  contented  himself  with  taking  military  occupation  of  the 
city,  naming  his  own  friends  as  m-id^-lrates.     He  put  garrisons  how- 
^^T"'i"^?^  ^"'^  ^"^^*  Peira-as  an  I   Munvchin,  but  also  into  the  hill 
called  Museum,  a  part  of  the  walled  circle  of  Athens  itself  (b  c  29S) 

VVhile  Demetrius  was  ihus  slren<rtheninu:  himself  in  Gn-ece  he  lost 
ail  his  footinu-  hotii  in  Cyprus,  Syria,  and  Kiiikia,  which  passed  into 
the  hands  of  Piolomy  and  Seleukus.  New  prospects  however  were 
opened  to  him  in  Macedoiua  by  tlie  death  of  Kassander  (his  brother- 
m-!aw,  brotlierof  hiswife  Phila)  and  the  fandlv  feuds  suj)ervcninc'' 
tliereunon.  Phdippus,  eldest  son  of  KassuKJer,  suc(;eeded  his  father"^ 
but  (lied  o.  sickness  after  somcthinii-  more  than  a  year.  Between  the 
tw^()remainini>-sons,  Antipatei-  and  Alexander,  a  sm-uinary  hostility 
DroUe  out.  Antipater  siew  his  motiier  Thessaloiiike.  and  thn  alenetl 
the  lite  of  his  brother,  who  in  his  turn  invited  aid  hotii  from  D-me- 
inus  and  from  the  Epir<Mic   king  Pyrrhus.     Pvrrhus  being  ready 


^i» 


744 


THE  LAMIAN  WAR. 


first  marched  into  Macedonia,  and  expelled  Ant ipatcr;  receiving  as 
L  s  iT^ompenL  the  tcrritorv  called  Tymplura  (bet.vecn  Epirus  and 
M-icedonlirto-e^  with  Akarnani.),  Amphilochia.  and  he  town  of 
ASiki  wl^^^^^  leeame  henceforward  his  chief  city  and  residence. 
Anip-ter's^^^^^^^^  shelter  in  Thrnce  uith  his  father-in-law  Lysnna- 
^    s    bv  whosi  order,  ho^vcvcr,  l.c  was  presently  slam.     Demetrius, 

0  unie  1  w  roi^^^^  natters,  was  more  tardy  in  oDeyiu?  the  sum- 
monT  but  o,/  ,  tering  into  Macedonia,  he  found  himself  strong 
ro°H.to\h  possess  and  kill  Alexander  (who  bad  indeed  invited 
li^m  Tmt  is  si    to  have  lai<l  a  train  for  assassinating  hmi),  and  seized 

l^'l^Wcfdo  i-n  crown-  not  ^vithout  the  assent  of  a  considerable 
"TotZu^^r^^^^  and  the  deeds  of  Kassander  and  his  sons 

"^'dISiIL' became  thus  master  of  Macedonia,  together  with  the 
rreateTiw^^^^  including  Athens,  Megai;a,  and  1^;"^^;  ^^  ^el- 

u^inesus  lie  un.leitook  an  expedition  into  Bceot.a  for  the  p  r- 
^o<e  of  conquerinir  Thebes;  in  which  attempt  he  succeeded,  i^^t^i  ; 
outadcS^^^^  that  citv,  which  made  an  obstinate  resislance. 

1  e  Mt  •  s  x^^  ill  raH)lia'tlie  historian,  llieronymus  r^  Kardia 
^e^e  at^^^hec?  friend  and  {-^ow-citiz^n  of  Kumene.     l^d  G^^^^ 
!,«  n  ivliole  was  mann£(  (I  bv  AnliL'omia  (iiftiTwaid  called  Aiiticonus 

.',  rin"  ain"s  faU:er-s  lilYlinK.;  even  ll,o»gh  Do^K.tnus^vas  deprived 

•"••vrl,n=;  ard  rfcnvard  remaned  (tuiul  Ins  death  in  <;»d  B  c.)  a  cap 
(il-e    .  the  tamis  ef  Sekaikus.     Afi.  r  a  brief  possession  of  .be  cnnvn 
of    M.cedonia    sueeessivelv  by  Sele.ilci.!.,  Ptolemy  Kera.;n..^    SIo- 
W-er    \n™patei    and  Sosthenei-Antip.mis  Gonatas  regained  Urn 
Lfuxer  Ant  pa  e.    a  ^.^igonid  kings  maintaine.    it  ti.Uil 

.     ^%      f  T^  ,1  ,n  in  1(!S  r  r  •  when  Perseus,  tbe  last  of  tbcm,  was 
l^'^crtti^rn!  Sd 'bis' kitgdouV  incorporated  ui.b   tbe  Roman  con- 

*^"nf  Greece  darin- Ibis  period  we  can  give  no  account,  except  that 
tbe  ".?ater^u  be?of  i.  <ities  were  in  dependence  upon  Demetrius 
l.nr1  is  in  A  i^onus;  eiiber  tinder  occui>ntion  by  3  acedonian  gar- 
?i'  oi  or  .1  e  b^bHi  1  depots  xvlio  leaned  on  oreign  n,erccnaru'S 
a'nd  Mac'edonran  sf.pport.  Tbe  spirit  of  the  G-'Us  u^  bvok«.,  and 
ilieir  b-ibits  of  combined  sentiment  and  action  Iiudi.i.-uppc.Kd.  i  i.e 
n  i^ion of  t":;Sai.ls  indee<l  a«-akeiK d  tbe-.n  btio .^J^'fi'-P-'-y;-  ™ 
V       1      1  i-  .f  Ti,,.,Miir»r»vl'T»  in   '^^9  EC.     b')  intolerauie  \\  as  iiio 

phi  most  Of  the  Gallic  horde  with  their  king  Brennus perished     B^^^ 
th\^  burst  of  spirit  did  not  interrupt  the  conlinuance  of  tlie  3.act(io 
ula^dominlTiu  ^s•hich  Antigonus  Gonatas  conUnuea  .o 


rk 


POLITICAL  NULLITY   OF  ATHENS. 


745 


hold  throughout  most  of  a  long  reign. .  He  greatly  extended  the  sys- 
tem begun  by  his  predecessors  of  isolating  each  Grecian  city  from  al- 
liances with  other  cities  in  its  neighborhood — planting  in  most  of 
them  local  despots — and  compressing  the  most  important  by  means 
of  garrisons.  Among  all  Greeks,  the  Spartans  and  the  ^tolians 
stood  most  free  from  foreign  occupation,  and  were  the  least  crippled 
iii  tlieir  power  of  self-action.  The  Achtean  league  too  develo|)ed  it- 
self afterward  as  u  renovated  sprout  from  the  ruined  tree  of  Grecian 
liberty,  though  never  attaining  to  anything  better  than  a  feeble  and 
pu;iy  life,  nor  capable  of  sustaining  itself  without  foreigu  aid. 

With  this  afier-growth,  or  half- revival,  I  shall  not  meddle.  It 
forms  the  Greece  of  Polybius, which  that  author  treats,  in  my  opinion 
justly,  as  having  no  history  of  its  own,  but  as  an  appendage  attached 
to  some  foreign  center  and  principal  among  its  neighboi's — iMacedo- 
11  ia,  Egypt.  Syria,  Rome.  Each  of  these  neighbors  acted  upon  the 
destinies  of  Greece  more  powerfully  than  the  Greeks  themselves. 
The  Greeks  to  whom  these  volumes  have  been  devoted — those  of  Ho- 
mer, Arcliilochu-^,  Solon,  ^sehylus,  Herodotus,  Thucvdides,  Xeno- 
phon,  and  Denxjsthenes — present  as  their  most  marked  characteristic 
a  loose  aggregation  of  autonomous  tribes  or  communities,  acting  and 
reacting  freely  among  themselves,  with  little  or  no  pressure  from 
foreigners.  The  main  interest  of  the  nariative  has  consisted  in  the 
spontaneons  groupinic  of  the  ditTerent  Hellenic  fractions — in  the  self- 
prompted  co-operations  and  conflicts — the  abortive  attempts  to  bring 
about  something  like  an  etiVctive  federal  organization,  or  to  maintain 
two  permanent  rival  confederacies — the  energetic  ambition,  and  he- 
roic endurance,  of  men  to  whom  Hellas  was  the  entire  political 
world.  The  freedom  of  Helles,  the  life  and  soul  of  this  history  from 
its  commencement,  disappeared  completely  during  tlie  first  years  of 
Alexander's  reign.  After  following  to  their  tombs  the  generation  of 
Greeks  contemporary  with  him,  men  like  Demosthenes  and  Phokion 
born  in  a  state  of  freedom — I  have  pursued  the  history  into  that  gulf 
cf  Grecian  nullity  which  marks  the  succeeding  centuiy;  exhibiting 
sad  evidences  of  the  degrading  servility,  and  suppliant  king-wor- 
ship, into  which  the  countrymen  of  Aristeides  and  Perikles  had  been 
driven,  by  their  own  conscious  weakness  under  overwhelming  pres- 
sure from  without. 

1  cannot  better  complete  that  picture  than  by  showing  what  the 
lea  ling  demoeratical  citizen  became,  under  the  altered  atmosphere 
which  now  bedimmed  his  city.  Demochares,  the  nephew  of  Demos- 
thenes, has  been  metitione  1  as  one  of  the  few  distiugui-^hed  Athenians 
in  this  last  generation.  He  was  more  tli.ui  once  chosen  to  the  high- 
c>t  public  oifices;  he  was  conspi(,'uous  for  his  fr-'C  speech,  both  as  an 
orator  and  as  an  historian,  in  the  face  of  powerful  enemies;  he  re- 
mained throughout  a  long  life  faithfully  attached  to  the  demacrati- 
cal  constitution,  and  was  banished  for  a  time  by  its  opponents.  Ia 
the  year  280  B.C.,  he  prevailed  on  feke  Athenians  to  erect  a  public 


/-i 


IG 


SICILIAX  AND  ITALIAN   GREEKS. 


monument,  with  a  commemorative  inscription,  to  liis  uncle  Denios- 
iht'iies.  h^eveu  or  eight  years  afterward,  Democliare.s  himself  died, 
uireJ  nearly  eighty,  "llis  son  Laches  proposed  and  obtained  a  public 
decree,  that  a  statue  should  be  erected,  with  an  annexed  inscription, 
lo  Iris  honor.  We  read  in  the  decree  a  recital  of  the  distingin.slied 
public  services,  Avhereby  Demochares  merited  tliis  compliment  from 
liis  countrymen.  All  that  the  prt)poser  of  ihc  decree,  his  sou  and 
feih>w-cilizen,  can  find  to  recite,  as  ennobling  the  last  half  of  the 
latiier's  public  life  (since  his  return  from  exik-),  is  as  follows: — 1.  lie 
contracted  ll»e  public  expenses,  and  introduced  a  more  frugal  manage- 
ment. '2.  lleundertook  an  eml)assy  lo  King  Lysimachus,  from  whom 
he  obiained  two  presents  for  the  people,  one  of  thirty  talents,  the 
other  of  one  hundred  talents.  3.  He  proposed  the  vote  for  sending 
envoys  to  King  Ptolemy  in  Egypt,  from  whom  fifty  talents  were  ob- 
tained for  the  people.  *  4.  He  went  as  envoy  to  Antipater,  received 
from  Intn  twenty  talents,  and  delivered  them  to  the  people  at  the 
Eleusinian  festival. 

When  such  begging  missions  are  the  deeds  for  which  Athens  both 
employed  and  recompensed  her  mo.-t  eminent  citizens,  an  historian 
accustomed  to  the  Grecian  world  as  (lescrii)ed  by  Herodotus.  Thucyd- 
idrs,  and  Xenophon,  fceis  that  the  life  has  departed  from  his  sub- 
ject, and  with  sadness  and  humiliation  brings  Jiis  narrative  to  a 
close. 


CHAPTER  XCVIL 

SICILIAN   A?vD   ITALIAN   (J REEKS. — AGATHOKLES. 

It  has  been  convenient,  throughout  all  this  work,  to  keep  the 
history  of  the  Italian  and  Sicilian  Greeks  distinct  from  that  of  the 
Central  and  Asiatic.  We  parted  last  from  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  at  the 
death  of  their  champion,  the  Corinthian  Timoleon  (o87  B.C.).  by  whose 
energetic  exploits,  and  generous  political  policy,  they  had  been  almost 
reijenerated — rescued  from  foreign  enemies,  protected  against  intes- 
tine discord,  and  invigorated  by  a  large  re-en lorctment  of  new  colo- 
nists. For  the  twenty  years  next  succeeding  the  death  of  Timoleon, 
tl.e  hi.^lory  of  Syracuse  and  Sicily  is  an  absolute  blank;  which  is 
deeply  to  be  regretted,  since  the  j  osition  of  the.^e  cities  included  so 
much  novelty— ^so  nuiny  subjects  for  debate,  for  peremptory  settle- 
ment, or  for  amicabie  ccmpi(in;i^e — that  the  annals  of  their  proceed- 
'ings  must  have  been  pe(uliaily  interesting.  Twenty  years  after  the 
death  of  Tinu.lefm.  we  find  the  government  of  Syracui^e  described  as 
an  oliiiarchy;  implying  th;;t  the  constitution  established  by  Timoleon 
must  have  been  changed  either  by  violence  or  by  consent.  The  oli- 
garchy is  stated  as  consisting  of  600  chief  men,  among  whom  Sosis- 


ARCniDAMUS  SLAIN. 


747 


trains  and  Herakleides  appear  as  leaders.  W^e  hear  generally  that 
th(i  Syracusans  had  been  engaged  in  w^ars,  and  that  Sosistratus  either 
first  originated,  or  first  firmly  established,  his  oligarchy,  after  an 
exp:,'dition  undertaken  to  the  coast  of  Italy,  to  assist  the  citizens  of 
Krolon  against  their  interior  neigldx/rsand  assailants  the  Bruttians 

Not  merely  Kroton,  but  other  Grician  cities  also  on  the  coast  of 
Italy,  appear  to  have  been  expo.sed  to  causes  of  danger  and  decline, 
sim.lar  to  those  which  were  operating  upon  so  many  other  portions 
of  the  Hellenic  world.  Their  non-Hellenic  neighbors  in  the  interior 
were  growing  too  powerful  and  too  aggressive  to  leave  them  in  peace 
or  security.  The  Messapians,  the  Lucanians,  the  Bruttians  and 
other  native  Italian  tribes,  were  acquiring  that  increased  str'eno-th 
which  became  ultimately  all  concentrated  under  the  mighty  republic 
of  Rome.  I  have  in  my  preceding  chapters  recounted  the  acts  of  the 
two  Syracusan  despots,  the  elder  and  younjrer  Dionysius  on  this 
Italian  coast.  Though  the  elder  gained  some  advantaf^e  over  the 
Lucanians,  yet  the  interference  of  both  contributed  onlylo  enfeeble 
and  humiliate  the  Italiot  Greeks.  Not:  long  before  the  battle  of 
Ch«roneia(340-3:}8B.c.),  the  Tarentines  found  themselves  so  hard 
pressed  by  the  Messapians,  that  they  sent  to  Sparta,  their  mother 
city,  to  entreat  assistance.  The  Spartan  king  Archidamus  son  of 
Agesilaus,  perhaps  ashamed  of  the  nullitv  of  "his  country  since  the 
close  of  the  Sacred  AVar,  complied  with  their  prayer,  and  sailed  at 
the  head  of  a  mercenary  force  to  Italy.  Mow  long  his  operations 
there  lasted,  we  do  not  know;  but  they  ended  by  his  being  defeated 
and  killed,  near  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Clucroneia  (338  b.c  ). 

About  six  3'ears  after  this  event,  the  Tarentines,  being  still  pressed 
by  the  same  formidable  neighbors,  invoked  the  aid  of  the  Epirotic 
Alexander,  king  of  the  Molossians,  and  brother  of  Olympias  These 
Epirots  now,  during  the  general  decline  of  Grecian  force,  rise  into  an 
miportance  which  they  had  never  before  enjoyed.  Phil  i p  of  Macedon 
having  married  Olympias,  not  only  secured'his  l)ro!her-in-law  on  the 
Molossian  throne,  but  strengthened  his  authority  over  subiects  not 
habitually  obedient.  It  was  through  Macedonian  interference  that 
the  Molo.ssian  Alexander  first  obtained  (thmgh  subject  to-AIacedo- 
man  ascendency)  the  important  city  of  Ambrakia;  which  thus  pas.^ed 
out  ot  a  free  Hellenic  community  into  the  capital  and  seaport  of 
the  Epirotic  kings.  Alexander  farther  cemented  his  union  with 
Macedonia  by  marrying  his  own  niece  Kleopatrn.  daughter  of  Philip 
ami  Olympias.  In  fact,  during  the  lives  of  Philip  and  Alexander 
the  Great,  the  Epirotic  kingdom  appears  a  sort  of  adjunct  to  the  Mace- 
donian; governed  by  Olympias  either  jointly  with  iier  brother  the 
Molossian  Alexander— or  as  regent  after  his'dcath. 

It  was  about  the  year  after  the  b.-ittle  of  Issus  that  the  Molossian 
Alexander  undertook  his  expedition  from  Italy;  doubtless  instio-ated 
m  part  by  emubition  of  the  Asiatic  dories  of  his  nephew  and  unme- 
sake.     Though  he  found  enemies  more  formidable  than  the  Persians 


:i! 


748 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


at  lasus,  yet  bis  success  wfis  at  first  considerable.  He  gained  victories 
over  tbe  Messt'.pians.  tlie  Lucanians,  and  tlie  Samnites;  be  conquered 
tbe  Lucanian  to\\n  of  Consenlia,  and  tbe  Brutlian  town  of  Tereina; 
be  estublisbed  an  alliance  witb  Ibe  Pcediculi,  and  excbanged  friendly 
messages  witb  ibe  Romans.  As  far  as  wq  can  make  out  from  scanty 
data,  be  seems  to  have  calculated  on  establisbing  a  compnbensive 
dominion  in  tbe  soutli  of  Italy,  over  ail  its  peculation— over  Greek 
cities.  Lucanians,  and  Eruttia^ns.  He  demanded  and  obtained  tbree 
hundred  of  tbe  chief  Lucanian  and  Messapian  families,  whom  he 
sent  over  as  bostaires  to  Epirus.  Several  exiles  of  these  nations 
ioiued  him  as  partisuis.  He  further  endeavored  to  transfer  the  con- 
gress of  tbe  Greco-Italian  cities,  which  bad  deen  usually  held  at  the 
Tarentine  colonv  of  Herakleia,  to  Thurii;  intending  probably  to  pro- 
cure for  himself  a  compliant  synod  like  tbat  serving  tbe  purpose  of 
bis  Macedonian  nepbew  at  Corinth.  But  tbe  tide  of  his  fortune  at 
leno-th  turned.  The  Tarentines  became  disgusted  and  alarmed:  bis 
Lucanian  partisans  proved  faithless;  the  stormy  weather  in  the  Cala- 
brian  Apennines  broke  up  tbe  communication  between  bis  different 
detachments,  and  exposed  them  to  be  cut  off  in  detail.  He  liimself 
perished,  by'  tbe  bands  of  a  Lucanian  exile,  in  crossing  tbe  river 
Acheron'  and  near  the  town  of  Pandosia.  This  was  held  to  be  a 
memorable  attestation  of  tbe  prophetic  veracity  of  the  oracle;  since 
he  had  received  advice  from  Dodona  to  beware  of  Pandosia  and 
Acheron;  two  names  which  be  well  knew,  and  tlierefore  avoided,  m 
Epirus— but  which  be  bad  not  before  known  to  exist  in  Italy. 

Tlie  Greco-Italian  cities  bad  thus  dwindled  down  into  a  prize  to  be 
contended  for  between  the  Epirotic  kings  and  tbe  native  Italian 
powers— as  tbev  agnin  became,  still  more  conspicuously,  fifty  years 
arterward,  durinij'tbe  war  between  Pyrrhus  and  tlje  Romans.  Tl»ey 
were  now'left  to  "seek  foreign  aid,  where  they  could  obtain  it,  and  to 
become  tbe  prey  of  adventurers.  It  is  in  this  capacity  tbat  we  hear 
of  them  as  receiving  assistance  from  Syracuse,  and  that  the  formid- 
able name  of  Agathokles  first  comes  before  us— seemingly  about  320 
B.C.  Tbe  Syracusan  force,  sent  to  Italy  to  assist  the  Krotoniates 
airainst  tbeir  enemies  the  Bruttians,  was  commanded  by  a  general 
named  Antander,  whose  brother  Agathokles  cerved  with  him  in  a 
subordinate  command. 

To  pass  over  tbe  birth  and  childhood  of  Agathokles— respecting 
which  romantic  anecdotes  are  told,  as  about  most  eminent  men— it 
appears  tbat  his  father,  a  Rbegine  exile  named  Karkinus,  came  from 
Tberma  (in  tbe  Carthaginian  portion  of  Sicily)  to  settle  at  Syracuse, 
at  tbe  time  when  Timiileon  Invited  and  received  new  Grecian  settlers 
to  the  citizenship  of  tbe  latter  city.  Karkinus  was  in  comparative 
poverty,  following  tbe  trade  of  a  potter;  which  his  son  Agathokles 
learned  also,  being  about  eighteen  "years  of  age  when  domiciliated 
with  Ids  father  atX'^racuse.  Though  starting  from  this  bumble  be- 
ginning, and  even  QOtorious  for  the  profligacy  and  rapacity  of  his 


■■giig»i»«iiM-wii-jBiwfjn!iiw»imtow»>'-  •' 


AGATHOKLES  LEAVES  SYRACUSE. 


749 


youthful  habits,  Agathokles  soon  attained  a  conspicuous  position, 
partly  from  his  own  superior  personal  qualities,  partly  from  tbe  favor 
of  a  A'caltliy  Syracuse  named  Damas.  The  young  potter  was  hand- 
some, tall,  and  of  gigantic  strength;  he  performed  with  distinction 
the  military  service  required  from  him  as  a  citizen,  wearing  a  panoply 
so  heavy,  that  no  other  soldier  could  fight  with  it;  he  was,  moreover, 
ready,  audacious,  and  emphatic  in  public  harangue.  Damas  became 
much  attached  to  him,  and  not  only  supplied  him  profusely  witli 
money,  but  also,  when  placed  in  commynd  ot  a  Syracusan  un.i v  airainst 
the  Ai'-ri  gen  tines,  nominateil  him  one  of  the  subordinate  ofliCers.  In 
this  capacity  Agathokles  acquired  great  reputation  for  courage  in 
battle,  ability  in  command,  and  fluency  of  speech.  Presently  Damas 
died  of  sickness,  leaving  a  widow  without  children.  Agathokles 
married  the  widow,  and  thus  raised  himself  to  a  high  fortune  and 
position  in  Syracuse. 

Of  the  oligarchy  which  now  prevailed  at  Syracuse,  we  have  no 
particulars,  nor  do  we  know  how  it  had  come  to  be  substituted  for 
the  more  popular  forms  established  by  Timoleon.  We  hear  only 
generally  that  the  oligarchical  leaders,  Sosistratus  and  Herakleides, 
were  unprincipled  and  sanguinary  men.  By  this  government  an 
expedition  was  dispatched  from  Syracuse  to  tbe  Italian  coast  to  assist 
the  inhabitants  of  Krotoii  against  their  ;;ggressive  neighbors  the 
Bruttians.  Antander,  brother  of  Agathokles,  was  one  of  the  gen- 
erals commanding  this  armament,  and  Agathokles  himself  served  in 
it  as  a  subordinate  officer.  We  neither  know  the  date,  the  duration, 
nor  tlie  issue  of  this  expedition.  But  it  afforded  a  fresh  opportunity 
to  Agathokles  to  display  his  adventurous  bravery  and  military  genius, 
wliich  procured  for  him  high  eucommin.  He  was  supposed  by  some, 
on  his  return  to  Syracuse,  to  be  entitled  to  tbe  first  prize  for  valor; 
but  Sosistratus  and  the  other  oligarchical  leaders  withheld  it  from 
him  and  preferred  another.  vSo  deeply  was  Agathokles  incensed  by 
this  refusal,  that  he  publicly  iuveighetl  against  them  among  the  peo- 
ple, as  men  aspiring  to  despoti-m.  His  opposiliou  l)eiag  unsuccess- 
ful, and  drawing  upon  him  the  enmity  of  the  government,  he  retired 
to  the  coast  of  Italy. 

Here  he  levied  a  military  band  of  Grecian  exiles  and  Campaniau 
mercenaries,  which  he  maintained  by  various  enterprises  for  or  against 
the  Grechin  cities.  He  attacked  Kroton,  but  was  repulsed  with  loss; 
he  took  service  with  the  Tarentines,  fought  for  some  time  agauist 
their  enemies,  but  at  length  became  suspecl;ed  and  dismissed.  Next 
ho  joined  himself  with  the  ir^habitants  of  Rhegium,  assisting  in  the 
defense  of  the  town  against  a  Syracusan  aggression.  He  even  ni-ide 
two  attempts  to  obtain  admission  by  force  into  Syracuse,  and  to 
seize  the  government.  Though  repulsed  in  both  of  liiein,  he  ne\  t-r- 
theless  contrived  to  maintain  a  footing  in  Sicily,  was  appointed  gen- 
eral at  the  town  of  Morgantium,  and  captured  Leontini,  within  a 
short  distance  north  of  Syracuse.    Some  time  aftei'ward  a  revolution 


y\: 


750 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


took  place  at  Syracuse,  whereby  Sosistrutus  and  tlie  oligarchy  were 
dispossessed  and  exiled  witli  many  of  tiieir  partisans.  » 

Under  the  new  government  Agathokles  obtained  his  recnll,  and 
soon  gained  increased  ascendency.  The  dispossesssd  exiles  contrived 
to  raise  forces,  and  to  carry  on  a  formidable  war  against  Syracuse 
from  without;  they  even  obtained  assistance  from  the  Carthaginians, 
so  as  to  establish  themselves  at  Gela,  on  the  southern  confines  of  the 
Syracusan  territory.  In  the  military  operations  thus  rendered  neces- 
iiary,  Agalhokles  took  a  forward  part,  distinguishing  himself  among 
the  ablest  and  most  enterprising  officers.  He  tried,  with  1000  soldiers, 
to  surprise  Gela  by  night;  but  tinding  the  enemy  on  their  guard,  he 
was  repulsed  with  loss  and  severely  wounded;  yet,  by  an  able  ma- 
neuver, he  brought  off  all  his  remaining  detachment.  Though  thus 
energetic  against  the  public  enemy,  however,  he  at  the  same  time 
inspired  both  hatred  and  alarm  for  his  dangerous  designs  to  the  Syra- 
cusans  withm.  The  Corinthian  Akestorides,  who  had  been  named 
general  of  the  city — probably  from  recollection  of  the  distinguished 
services  formerly  rendered  by  the  Corinthian  Timoleon — becoming 
persuaded  that  the  presence  of  Agathokles  was  fi.U  of  peril  to  the 
city,  ordered  him  to  depart,  and  provided  men  to  assassinate  him  on 
the  road  duiing  the  night.  But  Agathokles,  suspecting  their  design, 
disguised  himself  in  the  garb  of  a  beggar,  appointing  another  man  to 
travel  in  the  manner  which  would  be  naturally  expected  from  him- 
self. This  substitute  was  slain  in  the  dark  by  the  assassins,  while 
Agathokles  escaped  by  favor  of  his  disguise.  He  and  his  partisans 
appear  to  have  found  shelter  with  the  Carthaginians  in  Sicih\ 

Not  long  afterward,  another  change  took  place  in  the  government 
of  Syracuse,  whereby  the  oligarchical  exiles  were  recalled,  and  i)eace 
made  with  the  Carthaginians.  It  appears  that  a  senate  of  600  was 
again  installed  as  the  chief  political  body;  probably  not  tlie  same 
men  as  before,  and  with  some  deniocratical  modifications.  At  the 
same  time,  negotiations  were  opened,  through  the  mediation  of  the 
Carthaginian  commander  Hamilkar,  between  the  Syracusans  and 
Agathokles.  The  mischiefs  of  intestine  conflict,  amid  the  numerous 
discordant  parties  in  the  city,  pressed  hard  upon  every  one,  and 
hopes  were  entertained  that  all  might  be  brought  to  agree  in  termin- 
ating them.  Agathokles  affected  to  enter  cordially  into  these  projects 
of  amneety  and  reconciliation.  The  Carthaginian  general  Hamilkar, 
who  had  so  recently  aided  Sosistratus  and  the  Syracusan  oligarchy, 
now  did  his  best  to  promote  the  recall  of  Agathokles,  and  even 
made  himself  responsible  for  the  good  and  pacific  behavior  of  that 
exile.  Agathokles,  and  the  other  exiles  along  with  him,  were  ac- 
cordingly restored.  A  public  assembly  was  convened  in  the  temple 
of  Demeter,  in  thepreser.ee  of  Hamilkar;  where  Agathokles  swore  by 
the  nitst  awful  oatlis,  with  his  hands  touchingthe  alt^ir  and  statue  of 
flie  goddess,  that  he  would  behave  as  a  good  citizen  of  Syracuse, 
tiphdd  faithfully  the  existing  govcrumcnt,  andcaiuy  out  tbeengMgc- 


;^LVSSACRE  AT   BYRACUSE. 


751 


ments  of  the  Carthaginian  mcdijitors — abstaining  from  encroach- 
ments on.  the  rights  and  ])ossessi()n3  of  Carthagi'  in  Sicily.  His  oaths 
and  promises  were  delivered  with  so  much  apparent  sincerity, 
accompanied  by  emphatic  harangues,  that  the  people  were  persuaded 
to  name  him  general  and  guardian  of  the  peace,  lor  the  purpose  of 
realizing  the  prevailing  aspirations  toward  harmony.  Such  appoint- 
ment was  recommended  (it  seems)  by  Hamilkar. 

All  this  train  of  artifice  had  been  concerted  by  Agathokles  with 
Hamilkar,  for  the  purpose  v)f  enabling  the  former  to  seize  tho 
supreme  power.  As  e:eneral  of  the  city,  Agathokles  h.id  the  direc- 
tion of  the  military  force.  Under  pretense  of  marching  against 
some  refractory  exiles  at  Erbita  in  the  interior,  he  got  together  3,000 
soUliers  strenuously  devoted  to  him— mercenaries  and  citizens  of  des- 
perate character — to  which  Hamilkar  added  a  re-enforcement  of 
Africans.  As  if  about  to  march  forth,  he  mustered  his  troops  at 
daybreak  in  the  Tiraoleontion  (chapel  or  precinct  consecrated  to 
Timoleon),  while  Peisarchus  and  Dekles,  two  chiefs  of  the  senate 
already  assembled,  were  invited  with  forty  others  to  transact  with 
him  some  closing  business.  Having  these  men  in  his  power, 
Agathokles  suddenly  turned  upon  them,  and  denounced  them  to 
the  soldiers  as  guilty  of  conspiring  his  death.  Then,  receiving 
from  the  soldiers  a  response  full  of  ardor,  he  ordered  them  immedi- 
ately to  proceed  to  a  general  massacre  of  the  senate  and  their  leading 
partisans,  with  full  permission  of  licentious  plunder  in  the  houses  of 
these  victims,  the  richest  men  in  Syracuse.  The  soldiers  rushed  into 
the  streets  with  ferocious  jo}""  to  execute  this  order.  They  slew  not 
only  the  senators,  but  many  others  also,  unarmed  and  unprepared; 
each  man  selecting  victims  personally  obnoxious  to  him.  They 
broke  open  the  doors  of  the  rich,  or  climbed  over  the  roofs,  massacred 
the  proprietors  within,  and  ravished  the  females.  They  chased  the 
unsuspecting  fugitives  through  the  streets,  not  sparing  even  those 
who  took  refuge  in  the  temples.  Many  of  these  unfortunate  sufferers 
rushed  for  safety  to  the  gates,  but  fcmnd  them  closed  and  guarded  by 
special  order  of  Agathokles;  so  that  they  were  obliged  to  let  them- 
b^elves  down  from  the  walls,  in  which  many  perished  miserably. 
For  two  days  Syracuse  was  thus  a  prey  to  the  smguinary,  rapacious, 
and  lustful  impulses  of  the  soldiery;  four  thousand  citizens  had  been 
already  slain,  and  many  more  were  seized  as  prisoners.  The  political 
purposes  of  Agathokles,  as  well  as  the  passions  of  the  soldiers,  being 
then  sated,  he^irrested  the  massacre.  He  concluded  this  bloody  feat 
by  killing  such  of  his  prisoners  as  were  most  obnoxious  to  him,  and 
banishing  the  rest.  The  total  number  of  expelled  or  fugitive  Syra- 
cusans is  stated  at  6,000;  who  found  a  hospitable  shelter  and  home  at 
Agrigentum.  One  act  of  lenity  is  mentioned,  and  ought  not  to  be 
omitted  amid  this  scene  of  horror,  Deinokrates,  one  among  the 
.prisoners,  was  liberated  by  Agathokles  from  motives  of  former 
lrieud.ship:  he  too,  probably,  went  into  voluntary  exile. 


ili 


P 


P 


752 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


After  fi  massacre  thus  pei-petrated  in  the  midst  of  profound  peace, 
and  in  the  full  confisUMice  of  a  solemn  act  of  mutual  reconciliation 
isnuiediiitely  preceding — surpassing  the  worst  deeds  of  the  elcfer 
DioiiYsiu-j.  and  indcc*!  (we  might  almost  say)  of  all  other  Grecian 
('(■spots — Agathokles  convened  what  he  called  an  assembly  of  the 
people.  Such  of  the  citizens  as  were  either  olig;;rchieal,  or 
VvCidiliy,  rr  in  anyway  unfriendly  to  him,  had  heen  already  either 
Blidn  orexT^elled;  so  that  the  assembly  probably  included  few  besides 
his  own  soldiers.  Agathokles — addressing  ihem  in  t(  nns  of  congrat- 
ulation on  the  recent  glorious  ex])l()it,  whercl  y  the}''  had  puiged  the 
city  of  its()li;.'-archical  tyrants — proclaimed  thnt  the  Syracus.m  people 
had  now  reconcjuered  their  full  liberty.  He  affected  to  be  weary  of  the 
toils  of  command,  and  anxious  only  for  a  life  of  quiet  equalitj'  as  one 
among  the  many;  in  token  of  which  he  threw  off  his  general's  cloak 
and  put  on  a  common  civil  garment.  But  those  whom  he  addressed, 
fresh  from  the  recent  massacre  and  plunder,  felt  that  their  whole 
security  depended  upon  the  maintenance  of  his  supremacy,  and 
loudly  protested  that  they  would  not  accept  his  resignation. 
Agathokl's,  wit'i  pretended  reluctance,  told  them,  that  ''if  they 
insisted,  he  would  comply,  but  upon  tlie  peremptory  condition  of 
enjoying  a  single-handed  authorit}-,  wiihout  any  colleMgues  or  coun- 
selors for  whose  misdeeds  he  was  to  be  refponsil)lc.  The  assembly 
replied  by  conferring  upon  him,  with  unanimous  acclamations,  tie 
post  of  genernl  v»-itli  unliniitcd  j'ower,  or  dcsp(  t. 

Thus Vas  constiiuted  a  new  despot  of  Syracuse  a!)out  fifty  years 
af  er  tJie  decease  of  the  chler  Dionysius.  and  twenty-two  j^ears  after 
Timoleon  had  rooted  out  the  Dionysian  dynasty,  establishing  on  its 
ruins  a  free  polity.  On  accepting  the  post,  Agathokles  took  pains  to 
proclain  that  he  would  tolerate  no  further  maWcre  or  plunder,  and 
that  his  government  would  for  the  future  be  mild  and  beneficent, 
lie  particularly  studied  to  conciliate  the  poorer  citizer.s,  to  whom  he 
promised  r.bolition  of  debts  and  a  new^  distribution  of  lands.  How 
far  he  carrie<l  out  this  project  systematically,  we  do  not  know; but  he 
conferred  positive  donations  on  many  of  the  poor— which  he  had 
abundant  means  of  doing,  out  of  tli^c  properties  of  the  numerous 
exiles  recently  expelled.  He  was  full  of  promises  to  every  one,  dis- 
playing courteous  hnd  popular  manners,  and  abstaining  from  all 
ostentation  of  guards,  or  ceremonial  attendants,  or  a  diadem.  He  at 
the  same  time  jipplied  himself  vigorously  to  strengthen  his  miliiary 
and  naval  force,  liis  magazines  of  arms  and  stores,  and  his  revenues. 
Ho  speedily  extended  his  authority  over  all  the  territorial  domain  of 
Syracuse,  vdih  her  subject  towns,  and  carried  his  arms  successfully 
ov.  r  many  otlier  ]»arts  of  Sicily. 

The  Carthagnian  general  Hrmilkar,  whose  complicity  or  conniv- 
ance had  helped  Agathokles  to  this  blood-stained  elevation,  appears 
to  have  permitteci  him  without  opposition  to  extend  his  dominion 


n»i8Wi»iiiMl»ti"«llBIB»i|ii 


AKROTATUS  TAKES  COMMAND. 


753 


over  a  large  portion  of  Sicily,  and  even  to  plunder  the  towns  in 
alliance  with  Carthage  itself.  Complaints  having  been  made  to 
Carthaire,  this  officer  was  superseded,  and  another  general  (also 
named  Hamilkar)  was  sent  in  his  place.  AVe  are  unable  to  trace  in 
detail  ihe  proceedings  of  Agathokles  during  the' first  years  of  his 
despotism;  but  he  went  on  enlarging  his  sway  over  the  neighboring 
cities,  while  the  Syracusan  exiles,  whom  he  had  expelled,"foun(i  a 
home  partly  at  Agrigentum  (under  Deinokrates),  partly  at  Messene. 
About  thj  3'ear  314  13.C.,  we  hear  that  he  made  an  attempt  on  Mes- 
sene, wiiich  he  was  on  the  point  of  seizing,  had  he  not  been  stopi)ed 
by  the  interference  of  the  Carthaginians  (perhaps  the  newly-appointed 
liamilkar).  who  now  at  length  protested  against  his  violation  of  the 
convention;  meaning  (as  we  nmst  presume,  for  we  know  of  no  other 
convention)  the  oath  which  had  been  sworn  by  Agathokles  at  Syra- 
cuse under  the  guaranty  of  the  Carthaginians.  Though  thus  dis- 
appainted  at  ^lessene,  Agathokles  seized  x^Lbakaeimni — where  he  slew 
the  leading  citizens  opposed  to  him — and  carr'ed  (^n  his  aggressions 
elsewhere  so  effectively,  that  the  leaders  at  Agrigentum,  instigated 
by  the  Syracusan  exiles  there  harbored,  became  convinced  of  the 
danger  of  leaving  such  encroachments  utu'esisted.  The  people  of 
Agrigentum  came  to  the  resolution  of  taking  \ip  arms  on  i)ehalf  of 
the  liberties  of  Sicily,  and  auied  themselves  with  Gela  and  Messene 
for  the  pnrpose. 

But  the  fearful  example  of  Agathokles  himself  rendered  tbem  so 
apj)rehensive  of  the  dangers  from  any  miliiary  leader,  at  on^e  native 
and  energetic,  that  they  resolved  to  invite  a  foreigner.  Sorjo  Syra- 
cusan exiles  were  sent  to  Sparta,  to  choose  and  invoke  soni'j  Spartan 
of  eminence  and  abilit}',  as  Archidamus  had  recently  been  called  to 
Tarentum — and  even  more,  as  Timoleon  had  been  biought  from 
Corinth,  with  results  so  signally  beneficent.  The  old  Spartan  king 
Kleomcnes  (of  the  Eurysthenid  race)  had  a  son  Akrotatus,  then 
unpopular  at  home,  and  well  disposed  toward  foreign  warfare.  This 
prince,  without  even  consulting  the  Ephors,  listened  at  once  to  the 
envoys,  and  left  Peloponnesus  with  a  small  squadron,  intending  to 
cross  by  K(^rkyra  and  the  coast  of  Italy  to  Agrigentum.  Unfavorable 
winds  drove  him  as  far  north  as  Apollonia,  and  delayed  his  arrival 
at  Tarentum;  in  which  city,  originally  a  Spartan  colony,  he  met 
with  a  cordial  reception,  and  obtained  a  vote  of  twenty" vessels  to 
assist  his  enterprise  of  liberating  Syracuse  from  Agathokles.  He 
readied  Agrigvntnm  with  favorable  hopes,  was  received  witi<  all  the 
honors  due  ;o  a  Spartan  prince,  and  undertook  the  conuuarjl.  Bit- 
terly (lid  he  disappoint  his  party.  lie  was  incompeten*;  as  a  general; 
he  dissipated  in  presents  or  luxuries  th.e  money  intcided  for  the 
camp:di:n,  emulating  Asiatic  despots;  his  conduct  was  arrogant, 
tyrannical,  and  even  sanguinary.  The  disgust  whicLi  he  inspired 
was  brought  to  a  height,  when  he  cauijed  ScsistruLo;,  the  k^dfc:  of 


7o4 


SICILIAN  A:;D  ITALIAN  GKELKS. 


the  Syracusan  exiles,  to  be  assassiualtd  at  a  banquet.  Immediately 
the  exiles  rose  in  a  body  to  avenge  this  minder;  Avhile  Akrolatus, 
deposed  by  the  Agrigeiiline^J,  only  found  fsafely  inflight. 

To  this  youni!:  t-'j;artau  luinee,  fiad  he  p()sses-s(  d  a  noble  heart  and 
energetic  qualities,  tliere  %vas  here  i)resented  a  CJireer  of  equal 
grandeur  with  that  of  Tinioleon — against  an  enemy  r.blc  indeed  and 
formichible,  yet  uot  so  huperiur  in  forec  as  to  render  success  impos- 
sible. It  is  inelancholy  to  see  Akrotatus,  from  f^imple  %vorthlessness 
of  character,  throwing' away  such  an  opi)ort unity ;  at  a  time  when 
Sicily  was  the  only  soil  on  wliieh  a  glorious  Hellenic  career  was  still 
open — wheu  no  similar  exploits  were  practicable  by  r.uy  Hellenic 
leader  in  Central  Greece,  from  the  overwhelming  superiority  of  force 
possessed  by  the  surrounding  kings. 

The  misconduct  of  Akrotatus  broke  up  all  liopes  of  active  opera- 
tions against  Agathokles.  Peace  was  present U'  concluded  with  the 
latter  by  the  Agrigentines  and  their  allies,  under  tlie  mediation  of  the 
Carthaginian  general  Hamilkar.  By  the  terms  of  this  convention,  all 
the  Greek  cities  in  Sicily  were  declared  autonomous  yet  under  the 
hegemony  of  Agathokles;  excepting  only  Ilimera,  Selinus,  and  llera- 
kleia,  which  were  actually,  and  were  declared  still  to  continue, 
under  Carthage.  Messene  was  the  only  Grecian  city  standing  aloof 
from  this  convention;  as  such,  therefore,  still  remaiiiing  open  to  the 
Syraeusan  exiles.  The  terms  were  so  favorable  to  Agathokles,  that 
tTiey  were  nuich  disapproved  at  Carthage.  Agathokles,  recognized  as 
chief  and  having  no  enemy  in  the  Held,  employed  himself  actively  in 
strengthening  his  hold  on  the  other  cities,  and  in  enlarging  his  mili- 
tary means  at  home.  He  sent  a  force  against  JNIessene,  to  require  the 
expulsion  of  the  Syracusan  exiles  from  that  city,  and  to  procure  at 
the  same  time  the  recall  of  the  Messeidan  exiles,  partisans  of  his 
own,  and  companions  of  his  army.  His  generals  extorted  these  two 
points  from  the  Messenians.  Agathokles,  having  thus  broken  the 
force  of  Messene,  secured  to  himself  the  town  stili  more  completely, 
by  sending  for  th9se  Messenian  citizens  who  had  chiefly  opposed 
him,  and  putting  them  all  to  death,  as  well  as  his  leading  opponents 
at  Tauromenium.  The  number  thus  massacred  was  not  less  than  six 
hundred. 

It  only  remained  for  Agathokles  to  seize  Agrigentum.  Thither  he 
accordingly  marched.  But  Deinokrates  and  the  Syracusan  exiles, 
expelled" from  Messene,  had  made  themselves  heaid  at  Carthage, 
insisting  on  the  perils  to  that  city  from  the  encroachments  of 
Agathokles.  The  Carthtiginians  alarmed  sent  a  fleet  of  sixty  sail, 
wiiereby  alone  Agrigentum,  already  imder  siege  by  Agathokles,  was 
perserv'ed.  The  recent  convention  was  now  bioken  on  all  sides,  and 
Agath(  kles  kept  no  further  measures  with  the  Cartliuginians.  He 
ravaged  all  their  Sicilian  terrlToiy,  and  destroyed  some  of  their  forts; 
while  the  Carthaginians  on  their  side  made  a  sudden  descent  with 
their  fleet  on  the  harbor  of  Syracuse.     They  could  achieve  uolhiDg 


nmunnwiM 


WAR  WITH  THE- CARTHAGINIANS. 


700 


more,  however,  than  the  capture  of  one  Athenian  merchant-vessel 
out  of  two  there  riding.  They  disgraced  their  acquisition  bv  the 
cruel  act  (not  uncommon  in  Carthaginian  warfare)  of  cutting  off  the 
-hands  of  the  captive  crew;  for  wiiich,  in  a  few  days,  retaliation  was 
exercised  upon  the  crews  of  some  of  their  own  ships,  taken  by  the 
cruisers  of  Agathokles.  ' 

Tlie  defense  of  Agrigentum  now  rested  principally  on  the  Car- 
thagmiaus  in  Sicily,  who  took  up  a  position  on  the  hill  called 
Eknomus— in  the  territory  of  Gela,  a  little  to  the  west  of  the  A^ri- 
gentiue  border.  Here  Agathokles  approached  to  offer  them  battle— 
having  been  emboldened  by  two  important  successes  obtained  over 
Deinokrates  and  the  Syracusan  exiles,  near  Kentoripa  and  Gallaria 
So  superior  was  his  force,  however,  that  the  C^arthaginians  thou^rht 
u  prudent  to  remain  in  their  camp;  and  Ajjathokfes  returned^in 
triumph  to  Syracuse,  w^here  he  adorned  the  temples  with  his  lecently 
acquired  spoils.  The  balance  of  force  w^as  soon  altered  by  iha 
dispatch  ot  a  large  armament  from  Carthage  under  Hamilkar,"  con- 
sisting of  130  ships  of  war,  with  numerous  other  transport  ship^ 
carrying  many  soldiers— 2,000  native  Carthaginians,  partly  men  of 
rank— 10,000  Africans— 1000  Campanian  heavy-armed  and'lOOO  Bal- 
earic sliugers.  The  fleet  underwent  in  its  passage  so  terrific  a  storm 
that  many  of  the  vessels  sank  wMth  all  on  board,  and  it  arrived  wiili 
very  diminished  numbers  in  Sicily.  The  loss  fell  upon  the  native 
Carthaginian  soldiers  with  peculiar  severity;  insomuch  that  when 
the;  news  reached  Cartilage,  a  public  mourning  was  proclaimed  and 
th'j  city  w^alls  were  hung  with  black  serge. 

Those  who  reached  Sicily,  however,  w^re  quite  sufficient  to 
place  Hamilkar  in  an  imposing  superiority  of  number  as  compared 
with  Agathokles.  He  encamped  on  or  near  Eknomus,  summoned 
all  the  re-en torcemeuts  that  his  Sicilian  allies  could  furnish,  and  col- 
lected additional  mercenaries;  so  that  he  was  soon  at  the  iiead  of 
40,000  infantry  and  5.000  cavalry.  At  the  same  time,  a  Carthaginian 
armed  squadron,  detached  to  the  strait  of  Messene,  fell  in  with 
twenty  armed  ships  belonging  to  Agathokles,  and  cajit'iired  them  all 
with  their  crews.  The  Sicilian  cities  we  reheld  to  Auatliokles  prin- 
cipally by  terror,  and  were  likely  to  turn  against  him',  if  the  (\-irtha- 
giuians  exhibited  sutlieient  strength  to  protect  them  This  the 
despot  kncAV  and  dreaded;  especially  respecting  Gela,  which  was  not 
lartrom  the  Carthaginian  camp.  Had  he  announced  himself  openly 
as  loteadrng  to  place  a  garrison  in  Gela,  he  feared  that  the  citizens 
might  forestall  him  by  calling  in  Hamilkar.  AccordinL^U'  he  detached 
thither,  on  various  pretenses,  several  small  parties  of  soldiers  who 
presently  found  themselves  united  in  a  number  sutlieient  to  seize  the 
town.  Agathokles  then  marched  into  Gela  with  his  main  force 
Disti-ustmg  the  adherence  of  the  citizens,  he  let  loose  his  soldiers 
vpon  them,  massacred  four  thousand  persons,  and  compelled  the 
remainder,  as  a  condition  of  sparing  their  lives  to  bring  in  to  him 


I 


756 


SICILIAN  AND   LTALL\N  GREEKS. 


all  their  money  a^d  valuables.     Having  by  this  atrocity  both  struck 
universal  terror  and  enriched    himself,   he    advanced    onward  to- 
ward the  Carthaiiinian  camp,  aud  occupied  a  hill  called  Phalaiion 
opposite  to  it.     The  two  camps  were  separated  by  a  level  plain  or 
valley  nearly  five  miles  broad,  through  which  lan  the  river  Ilimera. 
For  some  days  of  the  hottest  season  (i he  dog-days),  both  armies 
remained  stationary,   neither  of  them  choosing  to  n^ake  the  attack. 
At  length   Agathokles  gained  what  he  ihought  a  favorable  oppor- 
tunity.     A   detachment    from   the  Carthaginian  camp  sallied  l(rth 
iu    pursuit   of    some  Grecian  plunderers;  Agathokks  poslcd  some 
men   iu  ambush,   who  fell  upon  this  detachment  unawares,  threv/ 
it   into   disorder,    and  pursued   it    back   to   the   camp.      Following- 
up  this  partial  .-uccess,  Agathokles  brought  forward  his  whole  force, 
crossed  the  river  Himera,  and  began  apeneral  attack.     This  advance 
not  being  expected,  the  Grecian  assailants  seemed  at  first  on  The 
point  of  succeeding.     Thev  filkd  up  a  portion  of  the  ditch,  tore  vp 
the  stockade,  and  were  forcing  their  way  into  the  camp.     1  hey  were 
however  repu;.3d   by  redoubled  elTorls,  and  new  troops  coming  \:p, 
on   the  part  of   the  defenders;  mainly,  too.   by  the  very  elVective 
action  of  the  lOOO  Balearic  slingers  in  Hamilkar's  army,  who  hurled 
stones  weidiino:  a  pound  each,  r.gainst  which  the  Grccinn  armor  wv.n 
an  inadequate  defense.  Still  Agathililes,  no  way  discouraged,  caused 
the  attack  to  be  renewed  on  several  points  at  once,  and  with  appar- 
ent    success,    when  a   re-enforcement   landed    from   Carlh.nge— the 
expectation  of  which  may  perhaps  have  induced  Ilamilkar  lo  re- 
frain  fiom   nnv  general   attack.     These   new  troops  joined  in  the 
ba!tle.  coming  V.pon  the  rear  of  the  Greeks;  who  were  iMimidated 
and  disordered  by  such  unforeseen  assailants,  while  tic  Carthagin- 
ians in  their  front,  animated  lo  more  energetic  rf(  it,  tirst  repulsed 
them   from   the   camp,    and    then   pressed   thMr    vgorously   back. 
After  holding  their  cround  for  some  timeagnir.M  their  double  enemy, 
the  Greeks  at  hnjrth"^  ficd  in  disorder  lack  to  ilieir  own  camp,  recross- 
ini:  the  river  Himera.     The  interval  was  b(  tv.een  four  and  live  miles 
of'^nearly  level  uround,  over  wiiich  tl'<  y  were  actually  pursued  and 
severely  handled  by  the  Carthagiri;iii  cj.valry, 5.000  in  number.  More 
over,  in  crossing  the  river,  manv  of  ihim  drank  eagerly,  from  thirst, 
fatiii'ue,  and  thc^  heat  of  the  weather;  the  snltnessof  the  wnter proved 
so  (iestructive  to  them,  that  numerous  dead  bodies  are  said  to  havr 
been   found  unwounded  on    the   banks.      At  length  they  obtained 
shelter  in  their  own  camp,  after  a  loss  of  7,000  men;  while  the  loss 
of  the  victors  is  estimated  at  500. 

Ac:athokles,  after  this  great  disaster,  did  not  attempt  to  maintain 
his  Vamp,  but  set.  it  on  tire,  and  returned  to  Gela;  which  was  well 
fortified  and  Drovisioned.  cap:;ble  of  a  long  defense.  Here  he 
intended  to  maintain  himself  against  Hamilk.\r,  at  least  until  the 
^vracusan  harvest  (proi)ably  already  begun)  should  be  conn  kted. 
But  Uamilkar,  having  ascertained  the  strength  of  Gela,  thought  it 


PLAN   OF  AGATHOKLES. 


757 


I 


prudent  to  refrain  from  a  siege,  and  employed  himself  in  operations 
for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  his  party  at  Sicily.  His  great  vic- 
tory at  the  ilimera  had  produced  the  strongest  ellect  upon  many  of 
the  Sicilian  cities,  who  were  held  to  Agathokles  by  no  other  bonds 
except  those  of  fear.  Hamilkar  issued  conciliatory  proclamalious, 
inviting  them  all  to  become  his  allies,  and  marching  his  troops 
toward  the  most  convenient  points.  Presently  Kamarina,  Leoniiui, 
Katana,  Tauromenium,  Messene,  Abaka^num,  with  several  other 
smaller  towns  and  forts,  sent  to  tender  themselves  as  allies;  and 
the  conduct  of  Hamilkar  toward  all  was  so  mild  and  equitable,  as 
to  give  universal  satisfaction.  Agathokles  appears  to  have  been 
thus  dispossessed  of  most  i)art  of  the  island,  retaining  little  besides 
Gela  and  Syracuse.  Even  the  harhor  of  Syracuse  was  watched  by 
a  Carthagiiriau  fleet,  placed  lo  intercept  foreign  supplies.  Return- 
ing to  Syracuse  after  Hamilkar  had  renounced  all  attempts  on  Gela, 
Agathokles  collected  the  corn  from  the  neighborhood,  and  put  ihe 
fortifications  in  the  best  state  of  defense.  He  had  every  reason  to 
feel  assured  that  the  Carthaginians,  encouraged  by  their  recent  suc- 
cess, and  re-enforced  by  allies  from  the  whole  island,  would  soon 
press  the  siege  of  Syracuse  with  all  their  energy;  while  for  him>elf, 
haled  by  all,  there  was  no  hope  of  extraneous  support,  and  little 
hope  of  a  successful  defense. 

In  this  apparently  desperate  situation,  he  conceived  the  idea  of  a 
novelty  alike  daring,  ingenious,  and  effective;  surrounded  indeed 
with  difficulties  in  the  execution,  but  promising,  if  successfully  exe- 
cuted, to  change  altogether  the  prospects  of  the  war.  He  resolved 
to  carry  a  force  across  from  Syracuse  to  Africa,  and  attack  the  Car- 
thaginians on  their  own  soil.  No  Greek,  so  far  as  we  know,  had  ever 
conceived  the  like  scheme  before;  no  one  certainly  had  ever  executed 
it.  In  the  memory  of  man,  the  African  territory  of  Carthage  had 
never  been  visited  bv  hostile  foot.  It  was  known  tiiat  the  Cartha- 
ginitms  would  be  not  only  unprepared  to  meet  an  attack  at  home, 
but  unable  even  to  imagine  it  as  practicabb;.  It  was  known  that  their 
territory  was  rich,  and  their  African  subjects  harshly  treated,  dis- 
contented, p.nd  likely  to  seize  the  first  oi)portunity  for  revolting.  The 
landing  of  any  hostile  force  near  Carth:ige  would  strike  such  a  blow, 
as  at  least  to  cause  the  recall  of  the  Carthaginian  armament  in  Sicily, 
and  thus  relieve  Syracuse;;  perhaps  the  consequences  of  it  might  be 
yet  greater. 

How  to  execute  the  scheme  was  tlie  grand  difficulty — for  the  Car- 
thaginians were  superior  not  merely  on  land,  but  also  at  sea.  Aga- 
thokles had  no  chance  except  by  keeping  his  purpose  secret,  5U)d 
even  unsuspected.  He  fitted  out  an  armament,  annoimced  as  fibout 
to  sail  fortli  from  Syracuse  on  a  secret  expedition,  auainst  some  un- 
known town  on  the  Sieili.in  coast.  He  selected  for  this  purpose  his 
best  troops,  especially  his  horsemen,  few^  of  whom  had  been  slain  at 
the  battle  of  the  Himera:  he  coiild  aot  trtiusport  hoises,  but  he  put 


4 

i 


758 


SICILIAN  AND   ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


the  horsemen  aboard  with  their  saddles  and  bridles,  entertaining  full 
assurance  that  he  could  procure  horses  in  Africa.  In  selecting  sol- 
diers for  his  expedition,  he  was  careful  to  take  one  member  fron\ 
many  different  families,  to  serve  as  hostngc  for  the  tidilify  of  those 
left  behind.  He  liljerated,  and  enrolled  among  his  soldiers,  many 
of  the  strongest  and  most  resolute  slaves.  To  provide  the  requisite 
funds,  his  expedients  were  manifold;  he  borrowed  from  merchants, 
seized  the  money  belonging  to  orphans,  stripped  the  women  of  their 
precious  ornaments,  and  even  plundered  the  riche.-t  temples.  By 
ail  these  proceedings,  the  hatred  as  well  as  fear  toward  him  was 
aggravated,  especially  among  the- more  opulent  fandlies.  Agalhokles 
publicly  proclaimed,  that  the  siege  of  Syracuse,  which  the  Cartha- 
ginians were  now  commencing,  would  be  long  and  terrible — that  he 
and  his  soldiers  were  accustomed  to  hardships  and  could  endure 
them,  but  that  those  who  felt  themselves  unequal  to  the  effort  might 
retire  v»'ith  their  properties  while  it  was  yet  time.  Many  of  ihe 
wealthier  families — to  a  numl>er  stated  at  1600  persons — profited  by 
this  permission ;  but  as  they  v.'cre  leaving  the  city,  xYgathokles  set 
his  mercenaries  U]>on  lhe?n,  slew  them  all,  and  appropriaied  tlieir 
possessions  to  himself.  By  such  tricks  and  enormities,  he  pi(*vi(icd 
funds  enough  for  an  armament  of  sixty  sliips,  well  filled  with  sol- 
diers. Not  one  of  these  soldiers  knew  where  they  were  going;  there 
was  a  general  talk  about  the  madness  of  Agathokles;  neverlhe]ess 
such  was  their  Confidence  in  his  braverv  and  militarv  resource,  tiial 
they  obeyed  his  orders  without  asking  questions.  To  act  as  viceroy 
of  Syracuse  during  his  own  absence,  Agathokles  named  Atander  his 
brother,  aided  bv  an  ^tolian  otticer  named  Ervmnou. 

The  armament  was  equi]){>ed  and  ready,  without  any  suspicion  on 
the  part  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet  blockading  the  harbor.  It  hap- 
pened one  day  that  the  approach  of  some  corn-ships  seduced  this 
fleet  into  a  pursuit;  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  being  thus  left 
unguarded,  Agathokles  took  the  opportunity  of  striking  with  his 
armament  into  the  open  sea.  As  soon  as  the  Carthaginian  fleet  saw 
him  sailing  forth,  they  neglected  the  corn-ships,  and  prepared  for 
battle,  which  they  presumeil  that  he  was  come  to  offer,  ''j'o  their 
surprise,  he  stood  out  to  sea  as  fast  as  he  could;  thc}'^  then  juished 
out  in  pursuit  of  him,  but  he  had  already  got  a  considerable 
advance  and  strove  to  keep  it.  Toward  nightfall  however  they 
neared  him  so  much,  that  he  was  only  saved  by  the  darkness. 
During  the  night  he  made  considerable  way;  but  on  the  next  day 
there  occurred  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  so  nearly  total,  that  it  became 
perfectly  dark,  and  the  stars  were  visible.  The  mariners  were  so  ter- 
rified at  this  phenomenon,  that  all  the  artifice  and  ascendency  of 
Agathokles  were  required  to  inspire  them  with  new  courage.  At 
length,  after  six  days  and  nights,  they  approached  the  coast  of 
Africa.  The  Carthaginian  ships  had  pursucti  them  at  a  venture  in 
the  direction   toward  Africa;   and  they  appeared  in  sight  juEt  as 


mrmmmmi^ 


I 


HE   BURNS  HIS   VESSELS. 


759 


Agathokles  Was  nearing  the  land.  Strenuous  efforts  were  employed 
by  the  mariners  on  both  sides  to  toueh  land  first;  Agathokles  secured 
that  advantage,  and  was  enabled  to  put  himself  into  suv-^h  a  posture 
of  defense  that  he  repulsed  the  attack  of  the  Carthaginian  ships, 
and  secured  the  disembarkation  of  his  own  soldiers,  at  a  point  called 
the  Latomia*  or  Stone-quarries. 

After  establishing  his  posifion  ashore,  and  refreshing  his  soldiers, 
the  first -proceeding;  of  Agathokles  was  to  burn  his  vessels;  a  proceed- 
ing which  seemed  to  carry  an  air  of  desperate  boldness.  Yet  in 
truth  t!ie  ships  were  now  useless — for,  if  he  was  unsuccessful  on 
land,  they  were  not  enough  to  enable  him  to  return  in  the  face  of  the 
Carthairinian  fleet;  they  were  even  worse  than  useless,  since,  if  lie 
retained  them,  it  was  requisite  that  he  should  leave  a  portion  of  his 
army  to  guard  them,  and  thus  enfeeble  his  means  of  action  for  the 
reallV  important  achievements  on  land.  Convening  his  soldiers  in 
assembly  near  the  shii^s,  he  first  offered  a  sacrifice  to  Demeter  and 
Persephone — the  patron  goddesses  of  Sicil}^  and  of  Syracuse  in  par- 
ticular. He  then  apprised  his  soldiers,  that  during  the  recent  cross- 
ing and  danger  from  the  Carth.iginian  pursuers,  he  had  addressed  a 
vow  to  these  goddesses — engaging  to  make  a  burnt-offering  of  his 
sliips  in  their  honor,  if  they  would  preserve  him  safe  across  to 
Africa,  The  goddesses  had  granted  thi-5  boon ;  they  had  further,  by 
favorably  responding  to  the  siicrifice  just  offered,  promised  full 
success  to  his  African  projects;  it  became  therefore>  incumbent  on 
him  to  fulfill  his  vow  with  exactness.  Torches  being  now  brought, 
Agathokles  took  one  in  his  hand,  and  mounted  on  the  stern  of  the 
admiral's  ship,  directing  each  of  the  trierarchs  to  do  the  like  on  his 
own  ship.  All  w(ire  set  on  fire  simultaneously,  amid  the  sound  of 
trumpets,  and  the  mingled  prayers  and  shouts  of  the  soldiers. 

Though  Agathokles  had  succeeded  in  animating  his  soldiers  with 
a  factitious  excitement,  for  the  accomplishment  of  this  purpose,  yet 
so  soon  as  they  saw  the  conflagration  decided  and  irrevocal)le — thus 
cutting  off  all  their  communication  with  home — their  spirits  fell, 
and  they  began  to  despair  of  their  prospects.  Without  allowing 
them  time  to  dwell  upon  the  novelty  of  the  situation,  Agathokles 
conducted  them  at  once  against  the  nearest  Carthaginian  town, 
called  Megale-Polis.  His  march  lay  for  the  most  part  through  a 
rich  territory  in  the  highest  cultivation.  The  passing  glance 
which  we  thus  obtain  into  the  condition  of  territory  near  Cartilage 
is  of  pecular  interest;  more  especially  when  contrasted  with  the 
desolation  of  the  same  coast,  now  and  for  centuries  past.  The  corn- 
land,  the  plantations  both  of  vines  and  olives,  the  extensive  and  well- 
stocked  gardens,  the  size  and  equipment  of  the  farm-buildings,  the 
large  outlay  for  artificial  irrigation,  the  agreeable  country-houses 
belonging  to  wealthy  Gurthaginians,  etc.,  all  excited  the  astonish- 
ment, and  stimulated  the  cupidity,  of  Agathokles  and  his  soldiers. 
Moreover,  the  towns  were  not  only  very  nuDierous,  but  all  open  and 


I! 


i 


760 


SICILIAN   AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


unfortified,  except  Cnvtbace  itself  and  a  few  otliers  on  the  coast. 
The  Carthaginians,  besides  having  little  fear  of  invasion  by  sea.  were 
disposed  to  mistrust  tlieir  subject  cities,  wliich  they  ruled  habitually 
with  harshness  and  oppression.  The  Lii)y-Phen:eians  appear  to  have 
been  utuise<l  to  arms— a  race  of  timid  cultivators  and  traffickers,  accus- 
tomed to  subjection  and  practised  in  the  deceit  necessary  for  lightening 
it.  Aiiathokles,  havinij  marched  through  this  hind  of  abundance, 
assaulfed  Meiralc-Polis  without  delay.  The  inhalntants,  unprepared 
for  attack,  distracted  with  surprise  and  terror,  made  little  resistance. 
A^'Hthokles  easilv  took  the  town,  abandoning  both  the  ]>ersonsof  the 
inhabitants  and  all  the  rich  property  within,  to  his  .-oldiers,  who  en- 
riehed  themselves  with  a  prodigious  l.o(ty  both  from  town  and  coun- 
try—furniture, cattle,  and  slaves.  Froni  hence  he  advanced  further 
southward  to  the  town  called  Tunes  (the  modern  Tunis,  at  the  dis- 
tance of  onlv  fourteen  miles  south-west  of  Carthage  itselQ.  which  he 
toDk  by  storm  in  like  manner.  lie  fortitied  Tunes  as  a  permanent 
position;  but  he  kept  his  main  force  united  in  camp,  knowing  well 
tha*  he  should  presently  have  an  imposing  army  against  him  in  the 
field,  and  severe  battles  to  light. 

The  Carihadnian  fleet  had  pursued  Agathokles  during  his  cross- 
in"-  from  Syracuse,  in  perfect  ignorance  of  his  plans.  When  he 
landed  in  Africa,  on  their  own  trrritory,  and  even  burned  his  fleet, 
tliey  at  first  flattered  themselves  with  the  belief  that  they  held  him 
prisoner  But  as  soon  as  thev  saw  him  commence  his  march  in  mil- 
itary array  against  :Me!xaloy,oHs,  they  divined  his  real  purposes,  and 
were  filled  with  apprehension.  Carrying  off  the  brazen  prow-orna- 
ments of  his  burned  and  abandoned  sliips,  they  made  sail  for  Car- 
thage sending  forward  a  swift  vessel  to  communicate  first  what  had 
occurred.  Before  this  vessel  arrived,  however,  the  huuling  of 
Agathokies  had  been  already  made  known  at  Carthage,  where  it 
excited  the  utmost  surprise  aiid  consternation;  since  no  one  sui^posed 
that  he  could  have  accomplished  such  an  adventure  without  having 
previously  destroyed  the  Carthaginian  army  and  fleet  in  Sicily. 
From  this  extreme  dismay  they  were  presently  relieved  by  the  arri- 
val of  the  messengers  from  their  fleet;  whereby  they  learned  the  real 
state  of  affairs  inlSicily.  They  now  made  the  best  preparations  in 
their  power  to  resist  Agathokles.  Han  no  and  Bomilkar,  two  men  of 
leadincr  families,  were  "named  generals  conjointly.        ^ 

Thev  were  bitter  political  rivals,— but  this  very  rivalry  was  by 
some  construed  as  an  advantaire,  since  each  would  serve  as  a  check 
upon  the  other,  jind  as  a  guarantee  to  the  state;  or.  what  is  more 
pr()i)able,  each  h.id  a  party 'Sufficiently  strong  to  prevent  the  separate 
election  of  the  other.  These  two  generals,  unable  to  wait  for  distant 
succors,  led  out  tiie  native  forces  of  the  city,  stated  at  4O,C00 
infantry,  1000  cavalry— derived  altogether  from  citizens  and  resi- 
dents—with 2,000  war-chariots.  They  took  post  on  an  eminence 
(somewhere  between  Tuaes  and  Carthage)  not  far  from  Agathokles; 


VICTORY  OF   xlGATHOKLES. 


761 


Bomilkar  commanding  on  the  left,  wiiere  the  ground  was  so  difficult 
that  he  was  unable  to  extend  his  front,  and  was  obliged  to  admit  an 
unusual  depth  of  files;  while  Hanno  was  on  the  right,  having  in  his 
front  rank  the  Sacred  Band  of  Carthage,  a  corps  of  2,500  dis- 
tinguished citizens,  better  armed  and  braver  than  the  rest.  So  much 
did  the  Carthaginians  outnumber  the  invaders — and  so  confident 
were  they  of  victory — that  they  carried  with  them  20,000  pairs  of 
handcuffs  for  their  anticipated  prisoners. 

Agathokles  placed  himself  on  the  left,  with  1000  chosen  hoplites 
round  him  to  combat  the  Sacred  Band;  the  command  of  his  right  he 
gave  to  his  son  Archagathus.  His  troops — Syracusans,  miscellane- 
ous mercenary  Greeks,  Campanians  or  Samnites,  Tuscans,  and 
Gauls — scarcely  equalled  in  numbers  one-half  of  the  enemy.  Some 
of  the  ships'  crews  were  even  without  arms — a  deficiency  which 
Agathokles  could  supply  only  in  appearance,  by  giving  to  them  the 
leather  cases  or  wrappers  of  shields,  stretched  out  upon  sticks.  The 
outstretched  wrappers  thus  exhibited  looked  from  a  distance  like 
shields;  so  that  these  men,  stationed  in  the  rear,  had  the  appearance 
of  a  reserve  of  hoplites.  As  the  soldiers,  however,  were  still  dis- 
couraged, Agathokles  tried  to  hearten  them  up  by  another  device  yet 
more  singular,  for  which  indeetl  he  must  have  made  deliberate  pro- 
vision beforehand.  In  various  parts  of  the  camp,  he  let  fly  a  num- 
ber of  owls,  which  perched  upon  the  shields  and  helmets  of  the 
soldiers.  These  birds,  the  favoiite  of  Athene,  were  supposed  and 
generally  asserted  to  promise  victory;  the  minds  of  the  soldiers  are 
reported  to  have  been  much  leassured  by  the  sight. 

The  Carthaginian  war-chariots  and  cavalry,  which  charged  first, 
made  little  or  no  impression;  but  the  infantry  of  their  right  pressed 
the  Greeks  seriously.  Especially  Hanno,  with  the  Sacred  Band 
around  him.  behaved  with  the  utmost  bravery  and  forwardness,  and 
seemed  to  be  gaining  advantage,  when  he  was  unfortunately  slain. 
His  death  not  only  discouraged  his  own  troops,  but  became  fatal  to 
the  army,  by  giving  opportunity  for  treason  to  his  colleague  Bomil- 
kar. This  man  had  long  secretly  meditated  the  project  of  rendering 
himself  despot  of  Carthage,  xis  a  means  of  attaining  that  end,  he 
deliberately  sought  to  bring  reverses  upon  her;  and  no  sooner  haci  he 
heard  of  Hanno's  death,  than  he  gave  orders  lor  his  own  wing  to 
retreat.  The  Sacred  Band,  though  flghting  with  unshaken  valor, 
were  left  unsupported,  attacked  in  rear  as  well  as  front,  and  co;:i- 
pelled  to  give  way  along  with  the  rest.  The  whole  Carthagini.i.i 
army  was  defeated'  and  driven  back  to  Carthage.  Their  camp  IrU 
into  the  hands  of  Agathokles,  who  found  among  their  baggage  tln\ 
very  handcuffs  which  they  had  brought  for  fettering  their  expected 
captives. 

This  victory  made  Agathokles  for  the  time  master  of  the  open 
country.  He  transmitted  the  news  to  Sicily,  by  a  boat  of  thirty 
oars,  constructed  expressly  for  the  purpose—  since'  he  had  no  ships 


|^!i' 


762 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN    GREEKS. 


of  his  own  remaining.  Having  fortified  Tunes,  and  established  it 
as  his  central  position,  he  commenced  operations  aloug^  the  eastern 
coast  (Zeuiiitana  and  Byzakium,  as  the  iiorlhern  and  southern  por- 
tions of  it^vere  afterward  denominated  by  the  Komans)  against  the 
towns  dependent  on  Carthage. 

In  that  cilv,  meanwhile,  all  was  terror  and  despondency  in  conse- 
quence of  the  recent  defeat.     It  was  well   known  that  liie  African 
subjects  generally  entertained  nothing  but  fear  and  hatred  toward 
the  reigning  city."    Neither  the  native  Libyans  or  Africans — nor  the 
mixed °:ice\alled  Liby-Phcenicians,  who  inhabited  the  towns— could 
be  depended  on  if  their  services  were  really  needed.     The  distrcL^s  of 
the  Carthaginians' took  the  form  of  religious  fears  and  repcutjtnce. 
They  looked  back  with  remorse  on  the  imj^iety  of  their  past  live;^, 
and  on  their  omissions  of  duty  toward  the  gods.      To  the  Tyrian 
Herakles,  they  had  been  slack  in  transmitting  the  dues  and  ])resents 
required  by  tlieir  leligion;  a  l;;:ck\v;;rc.ne.^s  which  they  now  endeav- 
ortd  to  maUe  up  by  Handing  envoys  to  Tyre,  with  pi  avers  and  sup- 
plications, with  rich  presents,  t.nd  especially  with  modelsin  gold  j.ud 
fcilver  of  their  sacred  temples  anil  shrines.  *  Toward  Kronus,  or  Mo- 
loch, ihey  also  felt  that   they  had   conducted   iliemselves  sinfully. 
The  worship  acceptable  to  that  god  required  the  iLacrifice  of  young 
children,  born  of   free  and  opulent  parents,  and  even   the   thoicc 
child  of  the  family.     But  it  was  now  found  out,  on  investigaticn, 
that  many  jiarenls*  had  recently  put  a  fraud  upon  the  god,  by  sur- 
reptitiously luying  poor  children,  feeding  them  well,  and  then  sac- 
rificing them  as  their  own.     This  discovery  sec  med  at  once  to  explain 
ANhy  kronus  had  become  offended,  and  what  had  brought  upon  them 
the  recent  defeat.     They  made  an  emphatic  atonement,  by  selecting 
200  children  from   the  most   illustrious  families  in  Carlhfige,  and 
offering  them  up  to  Kronus  at  a  great  public  sacrifice;  besides  which 
800  parents,  finding  them.^elves  denounced  for  similar  omissions  in 
the  past,  displaved  their  repentance  by  voluntarily  immolating  their 
own  children  for  the  public  safety.    *The  statue  of  Kronus— placed 
with  outstretched  hands  to  receive  the  victim  tendered  to  him,  wiih 
lire   immediately  vnderneath — was  fed  at  that    !-olen;nily  eerlainly 
with  200,  and   probably  with  5C0,  living  children.     By  this  n.on- 
strous  holocaust  the  full  religious  duly  being  discharged,  and  for- 
giveness obtained  from  the  god,  the  niental  distress  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians was  healed. 

Ilaviiig  thus  relieved  their  consciences  on  the  score  ef  k  I'gious 
ebligation,  the  Carlhaginians  dispatched  cnvcys  to  II;  n  ill  ar  in 
Sicily,  acquainting  him  vvith  the  recent  calamity,  desiring  L:m  to 
send"  a  re-enforcc-nicnt,  and  transmitting  to  him  the  brazen  ]  row- 
ornaments  taken  from  the  ships  of  Agathoklcs.  They  vA  the  ^an.e 
lime  equipped  a  fresh  armv,  with  which  they  marched  forth  to  att:itk 
Tunes.  Agati.okles  had  fcjrtitied  that  town'  and  established  a  strc  ng 
camp  before  it;  but  Lc  had  withdrawn  his  main  force  to  prosecute 


SURIJEXDEU  OF   ADRUMETLT^I. 


763 


operations  against  the  mariiitne  towns  on  the  eastern  coast  of  the 
teriitory  of  Carthage.  Among  tliese  towns,  he  first  atfackcid  Neapolis 
with  suce^ess,  gran  ling  to  the  iuhahit.ui.'s  favorable  terms.  He  then 
advanced  fu'-lher  southward  toward  Adrnmetiun,  of  which  he 
commenced  the  siege,  with  the  assistance  of  a  neighboring  Libyan 
prince  named  Elymas,  who  now  joined  him.  AVhile  Agathokies 
was  engiiged  in  the  siege  of  Adruniet.im,  the  Carthaginiansattacked 
his  posiuon  at  Tunes;  drove  his  soldiers  out  of  the  fortified  camp 
into  the  town,  and  began  to  batter  the  defenses  of  the  town  itself. 
Apprised  of  this  dniirer  while  besieging  Adrumetum,  but  never- 
theless reluctant  to  raise  the  siege — Agathokies  left  his  main  army 
before  it,  stole  away  with  onlya  few  soldiers  and  some  camp-fol- 
lowers, and  conducting  them  to  an  elevated  spot — half-way  between 
Adrumetum  and  Tunes,  yet  visible  from  both — he  caused  them  to 
kindle  at  night  upon  this  eminence  a  prodigious  number  of  fires. 
The  effect  of  these  fires,  seen  from  Adrumetum  on  one  side  and  from 
the  army  before  Tunes  on  the  other,  was  to  produce  the  utmost 
terror  at  both  places.  The  Carthaginians  besieging  Tunes  fancied 
that  Agathokies  with  hi^  whole  army  was  coming  to  attack  them, 
and  forthwith  al)andoned  the  siege  in  disorder,  h^.iving  their  enu-ines 
behind.  The  defenders  of  Adrumetum,  interpreting^  these  firc^:^  as 
evidence  of  a  large  re-enforcement  on  its  way  to  join  the  besiegin*'- , 
army,  were  so  discouraged  that  they  surrendered  the  town  on  capitu"^ 
lation. 

By  this  same  stratagem— if  the  narrative  can  be  trusted— Agatho- 
kies both  relieved  Tunes,  and  acquired  possession  of  Adrunietiim. 
Pushing  his  coneiuests  yet  further  south,  he  besieged  and  took 
Thapsus,  with  several  other  towns  on  the  coast  to  a  considerable  dis- 
tance southward.  He  also  occupied  and  fortified  the  important 
l)o4tion  called  Aspis,  on  the  south-east  of  the  headland  Cape  Bon, 
and  not  far  distant  from  it;  a  point  convenient  for  maritime  com- 
munication with  Sicily. 

By  a  series  of  sucli  acquisitions,  comprising  in  all  not  less  tlian 
200  dependencies  of  Carthage,  Agathokies  be^came  master  along  the 
eastern  coast.  He  next  endeavored  to  subdue  the  towns  in  the 
interior,  into  which  he  had  advanced  as  far  as  several  davs'  march. 
But  he  v/as  recalled  by  intelligence  from  his  soldiers  at  Tunes,  that 
the  Carthaginians  had  marched  out  airain  to  attack  them,  anei  had 
already  retaken  some  of  his  conquests.  Returning  suddenly  ))y 
forced  marches,  he  came  upon  them  by  surprise,  anel  drove  in  tlieiV 
advanced  parties  with  considerable  loss;  while  he  also  gained  an 
important  victory  over  the  Libyan  prince  Elymas.  who  had  rejoined 
the  Carthaginians,  but  was  n'ow  defeated  and  slain.  The  ('artlia- 
ginians,  however,  though  thus  again  humbled  and  discoui-aged,  still 
maintained  the  fiekl,  strongly  intrenched,  between  Carthage  and 
Tunes. 

Meanwhile  the. affairs  of  Agathokies  at  Syracuse  had  taken  a  turn 


I 


I 


764 


SICILIAN  AXD  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


imo^pectcdlv  f;.vorable.  He  l.nd  left  that  city  blocls.d  "P  P-''f' »  ;? 
irscimdvilh  a  ^ic■U.rious  <uen;y  c-ncaiDlcd  mar  il ;  foi  lint  sup- 
ples fou.VainUsiou  .^ith  diHiohy.     In  ,bi.  <,"f''"'";'.  ";'';'■  '.Y,[' 

n-pwi-u-era  ainK.uuoiiijr  llieir  ric(  nt  (itfeut  m  All  ta .  >  cl  ..1.  o  i.i lufc 
t^Mbe^  'zl-.i  rn.vv-oi'ii.  nuLls  u.Uu  fi(.m  tbe  sb,,«  ot  A£iub.>U  s 
,"  onlied   ibo   envoys  to  couctal   tl.e  nal   liu;b   ai.d   lo  ^pund 

.-.rra.f  of  whidi  l.e  iroduccd  ibe  piow-i  vij.nunt^-an  im(.oulttd 

■Ee   LTl  tie  sblps  bud  icallv  been  deployed      Somlii.g  tnvws 

^^tb  a  e4  evidences  ir.lo  irvracnJe.  to  be  c^liibiud  lo  AnU;n.le.-  M>d 

.e";,.!^  a«,Uo,ities.  Hanulk.r  .ien.anded  f k,„i  t  k  n,  '^l^i;^^^ 

U  ?  '«i,b"oiiKTrUbevi...g' .be  infcn.aiou  ami  ^^^^l^ 

.uccessfni   resistance,  v.cre  disposed  '<>.,™°'■P'y^.';"IS,^^; '°ai, , 
/Vinliau   in-iMed    on   b(  idinir  cut   iinlil   tbey    bad  lulUi    uiai  .i). 

Tbifrc^oimu'a/n.ander  r.i^.p.cd.    A.  ,be  «-»;.^ '-^;-^»'|f™,^-« 
those  cili7eus  of  f-vracuse  w  :o  were  rehiUves  oi  liieids  oiu.e  exiles 
'vS  1   Tie   cv<  er^,^   ,bcm  nil  to   leave  He  city  inmicialely   ^v  U. 
heir  wi've^ and  familii'S.     No  less  limn  S.0<^«  P'-^'^^^^Vn'mH^  f 
.un.ler  tbis  mandate.    Tbey  vvereconsisrncd  '«  '  '^;  "t-^^,^  '  V'"",^  ' Vii 
and  bis  annv  witbo.U;  wbo   not  only  sufTeied  'l*""  '"  Pf.^;,"." 
Treated  thein'witl.  kindness.     Syracuse  was  now  •'    «,"r  "*  ^f^^; . 
V11  d  wrelcliedness  and  despondency;  Tiot  less  from  bis  ate  '^al'iii 
lo^s  exVn     on  u'an  Irom  ll"..  prief  of  those  vvbo  ^e'-'-^l  "^  /lieu 
re  fliivcs  in  Africa  bad  perish. d  -nilh  Asalhokles      Hi.milkar  1  .lU 
[™  .la  np  bis  batterin^-engines,  and  -''\P>-^P;'""|'°,»^;>^''  .'J^ 
town,  whe'n  Keaichus,  the  messenger  from  'V-^"  l"'^  "^.^  '''"^'«,  ^'^^^'J 
AfricTifter  a  vovaffe  of  five  davs,  having  under  fa^ol  01  "'"t.i^'-f* 
^I^^pl^d   Ih;.;^.  on^  just  .scnped.  ^^-]':{^-'^^^^-J':^. 
Liia  the  Svraousan  oovcTDiiKnt  h;arned  the  real  ^  "^/;' ^^  „\  .-nVit 
torinus  position  of  Airathokles.     There  was  do  f  urthe    talk  ot  capit 
ulation:   Hanulkar-haviui^  tried  a  partml  assauh    wh  ch  ^.    v^o 
ouslv  rcsisted-withdrew  his  army  aud  detached  f'/'^  J^    '^  ^^ ''' 
forc;«m(nt  of  5,000  men  to  the  aid  of  his  c^""^^;"^^'^/";^,!'^?^    ,,.,. 
Durincr  some  months,  he  seems  to  have  employed  V\f  ^/^^^/"Xi  ^ 
tial  operations  for  extending  the  Carthagmiaa  don^m  on  f^u^^^^ 
Sicilv.     But  at  lencrtli  he  concerted  measures  with  ^^'^  J;^  ,"^^^-j^^ 
exile  Deinokrates,  who  was  at  the  head  of  a  "^'r^^^'^^t.      Ills  fleet 
exiled  countrvmen,  for  a  renewed  attack  upon  Syracuse      1   f  "^^ 
already  blockaded  the  harbor,  and  he  now  witii  his  amiy     Uttd  a 
120,000  men,  destroyed  the  neighboring  lands,  hoping    «  ^tane  ou 
the  inhabitants.     Approaching  close  to  the^walls  ot  ^I'^^i^J' 1^^.^_"^ 
cupied  the  Olympieion,  or  temple  of  Zeus  Olympms,  "<;f >J^^J^^!! 
Annpus  and  the  interior  coast  of  the  Great  Harbor,    .^rom.    f  ^^^.^ 
probably  under  the  conduct  of  Deinokrates  and  the  other  exiles,  well 


mimimmmmmmmm^^ 


I 


HAMILKAR  IS  SLAIN. 


765 


acquainted  with  the  ground— he  undertook  by  a  night-march  to  as- 
cend the  circuitous  and  ililtlcult  mountain  track,  for  the  purpose  of 
surprising  the  lort  calh  d  Euryhius,  at  the  hi-liest  point  of  Epipolie, 
and  the  western  apex  of  the  Syracusau  lines  of  forlilication.  This 
was  the  same  enterprise,  at  tlie  same  hour,  and  witii  the  same  mai"n 
purpose,  as  that  of  Demosthenes  during  the  Athenian  siege,  after  lie 
liad  brougiit  the  second  armameiii  from  Athens  to  the  relief  of  JSi- 
kias.  Even  Demosthenes,  tiiough  conducting  his  march  witJi  greater 
precaution  than  llamilkar,  and  successful  in  surprising  the  lort  of 
Euryjilus,  had  been  driven  down  again  with  disastrous  loss.  More- 
over, since  his  time,  this  fort  Euiyalus,  insieaci  of  being  lett  de- 
tached, had  been  embodied  by  the  eider  Dionysius  as  an  integral  por- 
tion of  the  fortifications  of  the  city.  It  formed  the  aj^ex  or  j)oini  of 
juncdou  for  the  two  converging  walls — one  skirting  the  nortliern 
clitf,  the  other  the  southern  cliff,  of  Epipolue.  Tlie  surprise  intended 
by  llamilkar — difficult  in  the  extreme,  if  at  all  practicable — ^eem3 
to  have  been  unskillfully  conducted.  It  was  attempted  with  a  con- 
fused multitude,  incapable  of  that  steady  order  requisite  for  night 
movetneuts.  His  troops,  losing  tiieir  way  in  tiie  darkness,  straggled 
and  even  mi-^look  each  others  for  enemies,  while  tlie  8y  racusaa  guards 
from  Euryalus,  alarmed  by  the  noise,  attacked  them  vigorously  and 
put  them  to  the  rout.  Their  loss,  in  trying  lo  escape  down  the  steep 
declivity,  was  prodigious,  and  llamilkar  himself,  making  brave 
efforts  to  rally  tliem,  became  prisoner  to  the  Syracusans.  AVhat 
lent  peculiar  interest  to  this  incident,  in  the  eyes  of  a  [uous  Greek, 
was  that  it  served  to  illustrate  and  confirm  the  truth  of  prophecy. 
Hamilkar  had  been  assured  by  a  prophet  that  he  would  sup  that 
night  in  Syracuse,  and  this  assurance  had  in  part  emboldened  him. 
to  the  attack,  since  he  naturally  calculated  on  entering  the  city  as  a 
conqueror.  He  did  indeed  take  his  evening  meal  in  Syracuse,  literally 
fultilling  the  augury.  Immediately  after  it  he  was  handed  over  to 
the  relatives  of  the  slain,  who  first  paraded  him  through  the  city  in 
chains,  then  inflicted  on  him  the  worst  tortures,  and  lastly  killed 
him.     His  head  was  cut  oil  and  sent  to  i\.frica. 

The  loss  and  humiliation  sustained  in  this  repulse — together  with 
the  death  of  Hamilkar,  anil  the  discord  ensuing  between  the  exiles 
under  Deinokrates  and  the  Carthaginian  soldiers — completely  broke 
up  the  besieging  army.  At  the  same  time  the  Agrigentines,  profit- 
ing by  the  depression  both  of  Carthaginians  and  exiles,  stood  for- 
ward ))ublicly  proclaiming  themselves  as  champions  of  the  cause  of 
autonomous  city  government  throughout  Sicily,  under  their  own 
presidency,  against  both  the  C^irthaginians  on  one  side,  and  the 
despot  Agathokles  on  the  other.  They  chose  for  their  general  a 
citizen  named  Xenodokus,  who  set  himself  with  vigor  lo  the  task  of 
expelling  everywhere  the  mercenary  garrisons  which  held  the  cities 
in  subjection.  He  began  first  with  Gela,  the  city  immediately  ad- 
joining Agrigentum,  found  a  party  of  the  citizens  disposed  to  aid 


I 


766 


SICILIAN   AND   ITALIAN    GliEEKS. 


him  and.  iu  conjunction  with  them,  overthnnv  the  Agathoklean  gar- 
rison. Tilt'  Geloans,  thus  lilx^rated,  seconded  cordially  his  efforts  to 
extend  the  like  benetits  to  others.  The  popular  banner  proclaimed 
by  Ai^riirentum  proved  so  welcome,  that  many  cities  eagerly  invited 
her  afd  To  shake  off  the  yoke  of  the  soldiery  iu  their  respective  cita- 
dels, and  reirain  tlieir  free  governments.  Enua,  Erbessus,  Echetla, 
Leonliui,  aiPd  Kamarina.  were  all  thus  relieved  from  the  domin- 
ion of  Au^athokles,  while  other  cities  were  in  like  manner  emanci- 
pated from  the  sway  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  joined  the  Agrigeu- 
tine  confederacy.  The  Agathoklean  government  at  Syracuse  was 
not  strong  enouiih  to  rc'si>t  such  spirited  manilesiations.  Syracuse 
still  co!itfnued  to  be  blocked  up  by  the  C^irlhaginiau  fleet,  tliough 
the  blockade  was  less  etlicacious.,  aiid  supplies  were  now  introduced 
more  abundantly  than  before. 

The  ascendencv  of  Agathokles  was  thus  rather  on  ihe  wane  m 
Sicily;  but  in  Africa,  he'had  become  more  powerful  than  ever— not 
without  perilous'  hazards  which   brought    him  occasionally  to  the 
brink  of  ruin.     On  receiviuir- from  Syracuse  the  head  of  .Uie  captive 
Hamilkar,  he  rode  forth  close  to  the  Vamp  of  the  Carthaginians,  and 
held  it  up  to  their  view  in  triumph:  they  made  respectlul  prostration 
before  it,  but  the  sight  was  astounding  and  mournful  to  them.  AVhila 
they  were  thus  in  despondency,  however,  a  strange  vici-ssitude  was 
on  the  point  of  putting  their  \nemy  into  their  hands.     A  violent 
mutiny  broke  out  in  the  camj)  of  Agathokles  at  Tunes,  arising  out 
of  a  drunken  altercalion  between  his'  son  Archagathus  and  an  JEto- 
lian  officer  named  Lvkiskus,  which  ended  in  the  murder  of  the  latter 
by  the  former.     The  comrades  of  Lykiskus  rose  in  arms  with  iury 
to  avenge  him,  calling  for  the  head  of  Archagathus.     They  found 
sympathy  with  the  whole  army,  who  seized  the  opportunity  of  de- 
n'landing^ heir  arrears  of  outsianding  pay,  chovse  new  generals,  and 
took  reiiuiar  i)Ossessi()n  of  Tunes  witii  iis  defensive  works.    Tlie  Car- 
thaginians, informed  of  this  outbreak,  immediately  sent  envoys  to 
ireat  with  the  mutiueei-s.  offering  to  Ihem  large  presents  and  double 
pay  in  the  service  of  Carthage.  "Their  (.-ffer  was  at  first  so  favorably 
entertained  that  the  envovs  returned  with  contident  hopes  of  success 
when  Agathokles,  as  a  last  resource,  clothed  himself  in  mean  garb  and 
threw  himself  on  the  mercv  of  the  soldiers.     He  addressed  tlu  m  m 
a  pathetic  appeal,  implorirs:  them  not  to  desert  him,  and  even  drew 
his  sword  to  kill  hims-elf  before  their  faces.     With  such  art  did  he 
manacre  this  scene  that  the  feelings  of  the  soldiers  underwent  a  sud- 
den aiid  complete  revolution.     They  not  only  became  reconciled  lo 
him,  but  even  erected  him  with  enthusiasm,  calling  on  him  to  re- 
sume the  dress^and  functions  of  general,  and  promising  unabated 
obedience  for  the  future.     AgathoKles  gladly  obeyed  the  call,  and 
took  advantage  of  their  renewed  ardor  to  attack  forthwith  the  Cartha- 
ginians, who,^  expecting  nothing  less,  were  defeated  with  considerable 
loss. 


WAR  m  THE  INTERIOR 


767 


In  spite  of  this  check,  the  Carthaginians  presently  sent  a  consider- 
able force  into  the   interior,   for  the  purpose  of '^reconquerim'-  or 
regaining  the  disaffected  Numidian  tribes.     Th?y  met  with  good 
success  in  this  enterprise;   but  the  Numidians  were  in  the  main 
faithless  and  indifferent  to  both  the  belligerents,   seeking  only  to 
turn  the  war  to  their  own  profit.     Agathokles,  leaving  his  son  in 
command  at  Tunes,  followed  the  Carthaginians  into  the  interior 
witii  a  large  portion  of  his  army.     The  Carthaginian  generals  were 
cautious,   and  kept   themselves   in   strong  position.     Nevertheless, 
Agathokles  felt  contident  enough  to  assail  them  in  their  camp;  and 
after  great  effort,  with  severe  loss  on  his  own  side,  he  gaine<l  an 
indecisive  victory.     This  advantage,  however,  was  countervailed  bv 
ihe  fact,  that  during  the  action   the  Nunudians  assailed  his  camp 
slew  all  the  defenders,  and  carried  off  nearly  all  the  slaves  and  bair- 
gage.     The  loss  on  the  Carthaginian  side  fell  most  severely  upon  the 
Greek  soldiers  in  their  pay;  most  of  them  exiles  under  Klinon   and 
some  Syracusan  exiles.     These  men  behaved  with  signal  gallantry 
and  were  nearly  all  slain,  either  during  the  battle  or  after  the  battle' 
by  Agathokles. 

It  had  now  become  mallifest,  however,  to  this  daring  invader,  that 
the  force  of  resistance  possessed  by  Carthage  was  more  than  lie  could 
overcome — that  though  humbling  and  impoverishing  her  for  the 
moment,  he  could  not  bring  the  war  to  a  triumphant  close;  since  the 
city  itself,  occupying  the  isthmus  of  a  peninsula  from  sea  to  sea.  and 
surrounded  with  the  strongest  fortifications,  could  not  be  beseioed 
except  by  means  far  superior  to  his.  We  have  already  seen  that 
though  he  had  gained  victories  and  .seized  rich  plunder,  he  had  not 
been  able  to  provide  even  regular  pay  for  his  soldiers,  whose  fidelity 
was  consequently  precarious.  Nor  could  he  expect  re-enforcemenl*s 
from  Sicilj;  where  his  power  was  on  the  whole  declining,  thou'di 
Syracuse  itself  was  in  less  danger  than  before.  He  therefoi-e  • 
resolved  to  invoke  aid  from  Ophelias  at  Kyrene,  and  dispatched 
Orthon  as  envoy  for  that  purpose. 

^  To  Kyrene  and  wiiat  was  afterward  called  its  Pentapolis  (i  e  the 
five  nei.o-hboriug  Grecian  towns,  Kyrene.  its  port  Ap(^llonia.  Ba'rka, 
reucheira,  and  Ilesperidcs).  an  earlier  chapter  of  this  history  has 
already  been  devoted.  UnforSunatelv  information  respecting  them, 
for  a  century  and  more  anterior  to  Alexander  the  Great,  is'^almost 
wholly  wanting.  Established  amonii'  a  J.ibyan  population,  many  of 
whom  were  domiciliated  with  the  Greeks  as  fc'llow-res'dents.  these 
Kyreneans  had  imbibed  many  Libyan  habits  in  war,  in  neace,  and 
in  religion;  of  which  their  fine  breed  of  horses,  employed  both  for 
the  festival  chariot-matches  and  in  battle,  was  one  e.\ampk\  The 
Libyan  tribes,  useful  as  neighbors,  servants,  and  customeiN,  were 
frequently  also  troublesome  as  enemies.  In  413  b.c.  we  hear  acci- 
dentally that  Hesperides  was  besieged  by  Libvan  tribes,  and  rescued 
by  some  Pcloponnesian  hoi)lites  on  their  way 'to  Syracuse  durin-r  the    ' 


i 


'  'i 


I 


768 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


AthoDi'in  MC^e     About  401  B.C.  (pliortly  after  the  close  of  the  Pelo- 

fom,ern  ;%•,  the  same  cHy  .as  again  so  '-'-i-I^-f;   ''j;,;^^,-rer 

f.nimk'i  that  she  thiew  optn  her  citizenship  to  ai  )  Oieek  iitw  iciiier 

vb  "    oul'l  aul  in  repelli!;g  th.m.     This  ^"fff^^'^TZ:;^^^ 

severil  of  the  Mes-senians,  iusl  then  expelled  from  Pel.  poiii.iHis, 

mU  p  LciLed  bv  the  SpaVtins;  they  ^ out  to  Africa   but  l,econnng 

ivolved  in  iutestine  %vaifaie  among  tlic  citizens  of  KMcne,  a  l.ii.ue 

roD  .lion  of  them  pcrislu.l.     E.xcept  the.e  scanty  nonces,  \ve  hear 

io"h  ng°°out    he  Greco-Libyan  P.ntapolis  i„  rel"""-!  ^^^iri'i'e 

nffr"    before  the  time  of  Alexander.     It  would  appear  that    he 

mde%ith  Xe  native  African  tribes,  between  the  gulls  called  tlic 

Gl'catu   and  lesser  ?vrtis,  xvas  divided  between  Gyrene .(meamag 

t  e  liVrenaie  Pentapolis)  and  Carlhage-at  a  I'oufilary  pom    «    ed 

e  \lArs  of  the  Pliilseni.  ennobled  by  a  eommem..raiive  legend 

mme  i  tel     east  of  these  Altars  vvas  Automala,  the  westernnios 

fTc^orv  of  Kvrene.     We  cann..t  doubt  that  the  relations,  comn.erei.;.! 

nnd  o?herV'se  bH  vcen  Kviene  and  C-arlhage,  the  two  great  einpona 

on  the  coTs!  o'r  Africa,  were  constant  and  often  luera.i.-e-though 

"In  the Ve!r  331  n.c.  vvhen  the  victorious'Alexander  overran  Egypt 
ibe  it  leil?il  nts  of  Kv  cne  sent  to  tender  presents  and  submission  to 
dm     n     4came  eiirollcd  among  his  subjects.     We  •"'^r  nothing 
more  about  them  until  the  last  year  of  Alexander's  life  (324  n  c   to 
^TJ^^T  AhZt  that  time,  the  exiles  fv.m.  Kyrene  and  Baika, 
;;obai.lv  enouah  eml.olde.wd  by  the  rescript   of  Alexander  (p.o- 
c  ■  n  el  at  the  Olvn.pic  festival  of  824  B.C.,  and  direc  inp  that  a 
G  e    an  exiles,  except  .hose  guilty  of  sacrilege,  should  be  i;eca 
forthwith)  d.'tcrmined  to  accomplish  their  return  by  force.     To  thi» 
e        he    iV4e™i'om  Krete  an 'officernamed  Thimhron ;  who,  laiv- 
in"  shin  Harpalus  after  his  flid.t  from  Athens  (lecounied  n  a  pie- 
lb.^  chap  e.)   had  quarteied  himself  in  Krete,  vvith  ll;'.-.'f«'^;;  e. 
Un.ip"?,nd'',he  6.3)0  mercenaries,  brought  over  f^^om  Asia  b>  tl^  t 


Tlnmbroii  willin-ly  cnrricd  over  his  army  to  their 


fncT   intend  n.'-  to  conquer  for  himself  a  principality  in  Libya,     lie 
Cd;.d   ne.r  Kvrcnc     defeated    the    KvrencMn    forces  ^vllh    grea 
^a^htc"^cS' himself  master  of  ^P^^lor^in   thejorti^^^ 
of  that  citv   distant  from  it  nearly  ten  miles.     The  to\\ns  ot  liMii 
fnd  Ile'^^^^^^^^^^^  l^Jm^so  that  he  ^vas  smmg  enough  t> 

force   iVKvreneans  to  a  disadvantageous  treaty      They  covenanted 
o  pa    500  talents-to  surrei.d<>r  to  hitii  half  of  their  -:|r<a^;; 
for  hii  ulterior  proiects-and  to  leave  him  in  possession  ot  Apoh<. 
Ilia     Wl    e  he  plundered  the  merchants  in  the  harbor,  he  prodainu 
is'  intention   of  subjugating  the  independent    I^^^^y^^)^  f I^^^^,^ 
T^robablv  of  stretching  his  conquests   to   Carthage.      His   scben.c. 
^cl.^  W^^^^      frustnued  by  one  of  his  own  olbcers,  a  I^J^j^^^^^^f^ 
Mnasikles-  who  deserted  to  the  Kvreneans,  and  encouraged  them  to 
set  a^idetiie  recent  convention.     Thimbron,  after  seizmg  such  cili- 


KYRENE  U^DER  PTOLEMY. 


769 


zens  of  KjTcne.as  happened  to  be  at  Apollonia,  attacked  Kyrene 
itself,  but  wa.s  repulsed;  ;nid  the  Kyreneans  were  then  bold  enou"-]i 
to  invade  the  terntory  of  Barka  and  Ilesperides.  To  aid  tiiesc  two 
cities,  Thinibron  moved  his  quarters  f com  Apollonia;  but  duriii<T  his 
absence,  Muasikles  con! rived  to  surprise  that  valuable  port;llius 
mastering  at  once  his  base  of  opera  lions,  the  station  for  his  fleet,  and 
all  the  baggage  of  his  soldiers.  Thimbroii's  fleet  could  not  be  'ion" 
maintained  without  a  harbor.  The  seamen,  landing  here  and  tiiere 
for  victuals  and  water,  were  cut  off  by  the  native  Libyans,  while  lh(3 
vessels  were  dispersed-  by  storms. 

The  Kyr^-neans,  now  full  of  hope,  encountered  Thimbron  in  thci 
field,  and  defeated  him.  Yet.  though  reduced  to  distress,  he  con- 
trived to  obtain  possession  of  Teucheira;  to  which  port  he' invoked 
as  auxiliaries  2,o00  fresh  sohliers,  out  of  the  loose  mercenary  bands 
dispersed  near  Cape  Ticnarus  iu  Peloponnesus.  This  re-enforcement 
again  put  him  in  a  condition  for  battle.  The  Kyreneans  on  their 
side  also  thought  it  necessary  to  oblain  succoi-,  partiv  from  the 
neighboring  Libyans,  partly  from  Carthage.  They  got' together  a 
force  stated  as  30.000  men.  with  wiiich  they  met  fiim  in  the  field. 
But  on  this  occasion  they  were  totally  routed,  with  tiio  loss  of  all 
their  generals  and  much  of  their  army.  Thimbron  was  now  in  the 
full  tide  of  success;  he  pressed  both  Kyrene  and  the  harbor  so  vig- 
orously, that  famine  began  to  prevail,  and  sedition  broke  out  anioifg 
the  citizens.  The  oligarchical  men,  exi)elled  .bv  the  mere  popular 
party,  sought  shelter,  some  iu  the  camp  of  Thimbron,  !^omc  at  the 
court  of  Ptolemy  in  Egypt. 

I  liave  already  mentioned,  that  in  the  partition  after  the  decease 
of  Alexander,  Egypt  had  been  assigned  to  Ptolemy.  Seizing  with 
eagernes.3  the  opportunity  of  annexing  to  it  so  valuably  a  possession 
as  the  Kyrenaic  Pentapolis,  tliis  chief  sent  an  adequate  force  under 
Ophelias  to  put  down  Thimbron  and  restore  the  exiles.  His  success 
Avas  complete.  All  the  cities  in  the  Pentapolis  were  reduced ;  Thim- 
bron, worsted  and  pursued  as  a  fugitive,  w^as  seized  in  his  flight  by 
some  Libyans,  and  brought  prisoner  to  Teucheira;  the  citizens  of 
which  place  (by  permission  of  the  Olynthian  Epikides,  governor  for 
Ptolemy),  first  tortured  him,  and  then  conveyed  him  to  Apollonia  to 
be  hanged.  A  final  visit  from  Ptolemy  himself  regulated  the  affairs 
of  the  Peirtapolis,  which  were  incorporated  with  his  dominions,  and 
placed  under  the  government  of  Ophelias. 

It  was  thus  that  the  rich  and  flourishing  Kyrene,  an  interesting 
portion  of  the  once  autonomous  Hellenic  world,  passod  like  the  rest 
under  one  of  the  .Mac-ionian  Diadochi.  As  the  proof  and  uu-irantee 
ot  this  new  sovereignty,  we  find  erected  within  tlie  walls  of  ib.e  citv. 
a  strong  and  completely  detached  citadel,  occupied  by  a, Macedonian 
or  Egyptian  garrison  (like  Munychia  at  xithens),  and  forming  thj 
stronghold  of  the  viceroy.  Ten  years  afterward  (b.c.  312)  the  Kyre- 
neans made  an  attempt  to  emancipate  themselves,  and  besieged  tiiis 
H.  G.   IV.— 25 


'« 


f^f;^;^^:^^^;?'f^^i^^m=it'^ 


770 


SICILIAN   AND   ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


PERFIDY  OF  AGATHOKLEa 


m 


cifulel-  but  bciii-  again  put  down  by  an  army  aud  fleet  ^vllicll 
miemy  cUspatcircd  under  Agi-s  fron.  E.Tpt.  kyrene  passed  once 
morf  under  llie  viceroyaltv  ot  Opbcllas, 

^^y^  ^oy  Acaihoklcs  now  seat  envoys,  mvokin-  bis  aid 
n.rVn^t  C-irtin-J  Ophelias  was  an  officrr  of  consK  eration  and 
exDerh^  ^^'rved  under  Alexander,  and  l^^d  inarried  an 

Xn  an  wif"  Eulbv(like-a  lineal  descendant  from  Milt.ades  the 
Vic  or  o  Marathon,  and  belonging  to  a  fannly  sti  1  distinguished  a 
A  he  I'T  In  Wviling  Ophelias  to  undertake  jointly  the  conques  of 
r  ril  i-e  the  envoys  proposed  that  he  should  himself  hold  it  when 
^na  i  Ted  Aga  lok  es  (thev  said)  wished  only  to  overthrow  the 
(^ Xgtln  dominion  in  Sicily,  being  well  aware  tliat  he  could  not 
hold  Unit  island  in  c«)njuuction  with  an  Atrican  dominion.   ^ 

\Vop^^^^^        such  an  invitation  proved  extremely  seducing     He 
AVIS  d  eady  on'the  look-out  for  aggrandizement  toward  the  west,  ana 
JndseDtm  exploring  nautical  expedition  along  the  northern  coast  of 
Vfricl    eien^o  some   distance   round   and    beyond   the   fetrait   o 
Gmdtar      Moreover,  to  all  ndiitary  adventurers,  both  on  sea  and 
on  land  the  s^^ason  was  one  of  boundless  speculative  promise   ^  They 
Ind  be  ore  them  not  only  the  prodigious  career  of  Alexander  himself 
hut  the  sifccLful  encro-achments  of  the  great  officers  his  successors^ 
In  the  scrond  distribution,  made  at  Triparadeisus.  of  the  Alexandr.no 
eniDire   Antipater  had  assigned  to   Ptolemy  not  merely  Egypt  and 
V  Inn   but  a£o  an  ur.definrd  amount  of  te.iitoiy  west  of  Libya,  to 
h  'jft^rwar^^^  conquest  of  ^v  hi  eh  was  known  to  have 

ieen  among  the  projects  of  Alexander,  haf  ^  jy^d  ^'J^^f/v^  J^,!^",? 
conquest  Ophelias  was  now  specially  called,  eithei  as  ^^e  ^icero>  »^ 
the  indenendent  equal  of  Ptolemy,  by  the  invitation  of  Agathokles. 
l"X^^^  in  the  service  of  Alexander  not  to  fear  long  marches^ 
he  em^)raced  the  proposition  with  eagerness.  He  "°^^;^t«ok  .^?^ 
xpcS  on  from  Kvrene  on  the  largest  scale.  Through  his  wife « 
elati  c<^  he  was  enabled  to  make  known  his  projects  at  Athens, 
^vher"  as^^'"  «s  in  other  parts  of  Greece,  they  found  "^"ch  favor. 

xtlaKic^-^^^^^  the  wealth,  the  fertile  landed  possessuns 

^[^Hhfill^ritlm^^siKon  of  her  ^^^-^^"-^  P^^^^^^  ,  tf^n   d 
lo  seduce  men  dissatisfied  with  their  homes,  and  not  well  mloimtu 

of  the  intervening  difficulties.  ^^;„r./q   Onhellas  at 

Under  such   hopes,  many  Grecian   colonists  joined   Ophc^^^^^^ 
K,vTene,  some  even  with  wives  and  children.     The  total  Dumner  is 


stated  at  10.000.  Ophelias  conducted  them  forth  at  the  head  of  a 
well-appointed  army  of  10,000  infantry,  600  cavalry,  and  100  war- 
chariots;  each  chariot  carrying  the  driver  aud  two  fighting  men. 
Marching  with  this  miscellaneous  body  of  soldiers  and  colonists,  he 
reached  in  eighteen  days  the  post  of  Autoinoljc — the  westernmost 
factory  of  Kyrene.  From  thence  he  proceeded  westward  along  the 
shore  between  the  two  Syrtes,  in  many  parts  a  sandy,  trackless  desert, 
without  wood  and  almost  without  water  (vviih  the  exception  of  par- 
ticular points  of  fertility),  and  infested  by  serpents  many  and 
venomous.  At  one  time,  all  his  provisions  were  exhausted.  He 
passed  through  the  territory  of  the  natives  called  Lotophagi,  ne^ir 
the  lesser  Syrtis;  where  the  army  had  nothing  to  eat  except  the  fruit 
of  the  lotus,  which  there  abounded.  Ophelias  met  with  no  enemies; 
but  the  sufferings  of  every  kind  endured  by  his  soldi*  is— still  more 
of  course  by  the  less  hardy  colonists  and  their  families — were 
most  distressing.  After  miseries  endured  for  more  than  two  months, 
he  joined  Agathokles  in  the  Carthaginian  territory;  with  what  abate- 
ment of  number  we  do  not  know,  but  his  loss  must  have  been  con- 
siderable. 

Ophelias  little  knew  the  man  whose  invitation  and  alliance  he  had 
accepted.  Agathokles  at  first  received  him  with  the  warmest  pro- 
testations of  attachment,  wx'lcoming  the  new-comers  with  profuse 
hospitality,  and  supplying  to  them  full  means  of  refreshment  and 
renovation  after  their  past  sufferings.  Having  thus  gained  the  con- 
fidence and  favorable  sympathies  of  all,  he  proceeded  to  turn  them 
to  his  own  purposes.  Convening  suddenly  tlie  most  devoted  among 
his  own  soldiers,  he  denounced  Ophelias  as  guilty  of  plotting  against 
his  life.  They  listened  to  him  with  the  same  feelings  of  credulous 
rage  as  the  Macedonian  soldiers  exhibited  when  Alexander  denounced 
Philotas  before  them.  Agathokles  then  at  once  called  them  to  arms, 
set  upon  Ophelias  unawares,  and  slew  him  with  his  more  immediate 
defenders.  Among  the  soldiers  of  Ophelias,  this  act  excited  horror 
and  indignation,  no  less  than  surprise;  but  Agathokles  at  icmrth 
succeeded  in  bringing  them  to  terms,  partly  by  deceitful  pretexts, 
partly  by  intimidation:  for  this  unfortunate  army,  left  without  any 
comniander  or  fixed  purpose,  had  no  resource  except  to  enter  into 
his  service.  He  thus  found  himself  (like  Antipater  after  the  death 
of  Leonnatus)  master  of  a  double  army,  and  relieved  from  a  trouble- 
some rival.  The  colonists  of  Ophelias— more  unfortunate  still,  sinco 
they  could  be  of  no  service  to  Agathokles — were  put  bv  him  on 
board  some  merchant  vessels,  which  he  was  sending  to'  Syracuse 
with  spoil.  The  weather  becoming  stormy,  many  of  these  vessels 
foundered  at  sea — some  were  driven  off  and  wrecked  on  the  coast  of 
Italy — and  a  few  only  reached  Syracuse.  Thus  miserably  perished 
the  Kyrenean  expedition  of  Ophelias;  one  of  the  most  commanding 
aud  powerful  schemes,  for  joint  conquest  and  colonization^  that  ever 
»^  out  from  nny  Grecian  city. 


I 


772 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


It  ^^■on\i\  have  fared  ill  Avitli  Airalholdcs,  had  tlje  Cartliagmians 

boon't    a«  d   and  icadv  to  attmk  biir.  in  the  confusion  innnediatcly 

succc^lin^^^         death   of  Ophelias.     Il  v.ould  aho  have  t^rec    yet 

vor4  with  C'arlha-e,  had  Ai^athohles  been  in  a  i^osition  to  a  tac^ 

e    durin.^  the   t<  rdblc  sedition  excited  nearly  at    he  s.me  time. 

^^^i  lib" hci-  whUf;  by  the  genernl  Loniilkar.     This  trai  or  as  has l>eeu 

deuy  stated)  had^  lon-"clieiishrd  the  desi.i^n  to  render  himself  des- 

0     md  had    been  Vva?chin-  lor  a  favorable  opportunity.     Having 

puVos^^^^^     caused  the  loss  ot^hc  lirst  lattle-fought  m  conjunction 

^?rhis^iavc  colleague  Hanna,  ajrainst  AgnthoUk-s-a.e  had  sinc^ 

c  ivried  on  the  uar  with  a  view  to  his  own  project  (which  explains   i 

prt  the  continued  reverses  of  the  ^'^»l-^!-^^^r'"t;/d'M.rr''ivu!lf.i. 
hnt  the  time  was  come  for  openly  raising  his  standard.  Availing 
hh  ..  f  of  a  nnlitarv  muster  in  the  quarier  o  the  city  called  he- 
ap li'  he  first  dismi;sed  the  general  body  of  the  soid.ers,  retaining 
S  himrnlv  a  trustv  band  of  COO  citizens,  and  4.0C0  mercenaries. 
\t  the  hc:ilcf  thesc;he  then  fell  upon  the  nnsuspecting  city;  di- 
v\Iin<'-  them  into  live  detachments,  and  slaughtering  inciiscrimmately 
t]*>e  unarmed  citizens  in  the  streets,  as  well  as  in  the  great  market 
Tii-ice  Vt  fist  the  Carthaginians  were  astounded  an(  paralvzed. 
Gr.dualiv  however  thev  took  courage,  stood  upon  their  defense 
a^rainst  the  as.Milants,  ccmibntcd  them  in  the  streets,  and  poured  up- 
on them  nn>siles  firm  the  hou^e-tops.  After  a  prolonged  ccmtlict 
the  i.a: tisans  of  Bomilkar  found  themselves  worsted,  and  were  glad 
to  avail  themselves  of  the  mediation  of  some  elder  citizens.  1  liey 
laid  down  their  arms  on  p.romise  of  pardon.  The  promise  was  fait h- 
f.i']-'  kept  by  the  victors,  except  in  regard  to  Bomilknr  himself;  ^^ho 
v's'haD-ed  in  the  market  place,  having  first  undergone  severe  t.)r- 


some  time  againsi  uien   i-uvm^    ui.^w...     ^....^  ^^^ \;n,.,n 

other  hand,  r?-enforced  by  the  army  from  Kvrene  was  stronger   h.m 
(>ver      So  elate  did  he  feel,  that  he  assumed  the  title  of  king,  follovv  - 
in-  herein  the  exr.mple  of  the  great  :\racedonian  officers.  Antigoniis, 
Piolemv   Seleukus,  Lvsimachus.  and  Kassander;  the  memory  ot  Al- 
exander'bcin-  now  discarded,  as  his  heirs  had  been  already  put  to 
*i(alh       \-a{hokles.   already  master  of  nearly  all   the   dependent 
towns  eastlmd  south-east  of  Carthage,  proccaled  to  carry  his  arms 
to  the  north-west  of  the  citv.    He  attacked  Ltica— the  second  cit\ 
next  to  Carthaire  in  importp:nce.  and  older  indeed  th:in  Carthagcit- 
^{.ff— situated  on  the  western  or  opposite  shore  of  the  Carthaginian 
Gulf    and  visible  from   Cartha-e,  though  distant  froni  it  tweuty- 
spxeii  miles  around  the  gulf  on  land.     The  Lticans  had  hitherto  n.- 
mained  faitliful  to  Carthage,  in  spite  of  her  reverses,  and  of  defcc 
lion  elsewhere      A'-athokles  marched  into  their  territory  with  such 
unexpected  rapidity  (ne  had  hitherto   been   on  the  south-east  ol 


AGATHOKLES  CAPTURES  UTICA. 


773 


Carthage,  and  he  now  suddenly  moved  to  the  north-west  of  that 
city),  that  he  seized  the  persons  of  three  hundred  leading  citizens, 
wiio  had  not  yet  taken  the  precaution  of  retiring  wilhiu  the  city! 
Having  vainly  tried  to  prevail  on  the  Uticaus  to  surrender,  he  a*s- 
sailcd  their  walls,  attaching  in  front  of  his  battering  engines  the 
tliree  hundred  L'licau  prisoners;  so  that  the  citizens,  in  hurling  mis- 
siles of  defense,  were  constrained  to  intlict  death  on  their  own  com- 
rades and  relatives.  They  neveriheless  resisted  the  assault  with  un- 
shaken resolution;  but  Agathokles  found  means  to  force  an  en- 
trance through  a  weak  pail  of  the  walis,  and  thus  became  master  of 
the  city.  He  made  it  a  scene  of  indiscriminate  slaughter,  massacring 
the  inhabiiants,  armed  and  unarmed,  and  hanging  up  the  prisoners. 
He  furtiier  captured  the  town  of  Hippu-Akra,  about  thirty  miles 
north-west  of  Uiica,  which  had  also  remained  faithful  to  Carthage — 
and  which  now,  after  a  brave  defense,  experienced  the  like  pitiless 
treatment.  The  Carthaginians,  seemingly  not  yet  recovered  from 
their  recent  shock,  did  not  interfere,  even  to  rescue  these  two  im- 
portant places  ;  so  that  Agatiiokles,  firmly  established  in  Tunes  as  a 
centiM"  of  operations,  extended  his  African  dominion  more  widely 
than  ever  ail  round  Carthage,  both  on  the  coast  and  in  the  interior; 
while  he  interrupted  the  supplies  of  Carthage  itself,  and  reduced  the 
inhabitants  to  great  piivations.  He  even  occupied  and  fortified 
strongly  a  pla('e  called  llippagretii,  between  Utica  and  Carthage; 
thus  pushing  his  posts  within  a  short  distance  both  east  and  west  of 
her  gates. 

In  this  prosperous  condition  of  his  African  affairs,  he  thought  the 
opportunity  favorable  for  retrieving  his  diminished  ascendcMicy  in 
Sicily;  to  wliich  island  he  accordingly  crossed  over,  with  2.000 men, 
leaving  the  command  in  Africa  to  ills  son  Archagatlius.  That  young 
man  was  at  lirst  successful,  and  seenu'd  even  in  course  of  enlarging 
his  father's  conquests.  His  general  Eumachus  overran  a  wide  range 
of  interior  Nunjidia,  capturing  Tokie,  Pheiline,  ^leschelae,  Akrfs. 
and  another  town  bearing  the  same  name  of  Hippu-Akra — and  eu- 
rieiiing  his  soldiers  with  a  considerable  plunder.  But  in  a  beC(jnd 
expedition,  endeavoring  to  carry  his  arms  yet  further  into  the  in- 
terior, he  was  worsted  in  an  attack  upon  a  town  called  ^liltine,  and 
compelled  to  retreat.  VV^e  read  that  he  marched  through  one  moun- 
tainous region  abounding  in  wild  cats — ;ind  another,  in  which  there 
were  a  great  number  of  apes,  who  lived  in  the  most  tame  and  fa- 
miliar manner  iu  the  houses  with  men — being  greatly  caressed,  and 
even  worshiped  as  gods. 

The  Carthaginians  however  had  now  regained  internal  harmony 
and  power  of  action.  Their  seuate  and  their  generals  were  enuilous, 
both  in  vi2,-or  an  1  in  provident  conibinalious,  against  the  common 
enemy.  ^  They  sent  forth  80,000  men,  a  larger  fi>rce  than  they  had 
yet  had  in  the  tield;  'forming  three  distinct^  camps,  under  Hanno,  Im- 
ilkon,  and  Adherbal,  partly   in   the   interior,  partly   on   the  coast. 


Pi 


774 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


Archngatlius.  leaving  a  sufficient  giinrd  at  Tunes,  marclied  to  meet 
them,  (listril)uting  liis  army  in  three  divisions  also;  two  under  him- 
self and  ^schrion,  besides  the  corps  under  Eunuichus  in  the  moun- 
tainous region.  He  was  however  unsuccessful  at  all  points.  Hanno 
contriving  to  surprise  the  divi>ion  of  ^Eschrion,  gained  a  complete 
victory,  wherein  ^^schrion  himself  with  more  than  4,000  men  were 
slain.  *  Imilkon  was  yet  more  fortunate  in  his  operations  against 
Eumachus,  whom  he  entrapped  by  simulated  tight  into  an  nmbus- 
cade,  and  attacked  at  such  advantage,  that  the  Grecian  army  was 
routed  and  cut  off  from  all  retreat.  A  remnant  of  them  defended 
themselves  for  some  time  on  a  neighboring  hill,  but  being  without 
water,  nearly  all  soon  perished,  from  thirst,  fatigue,  and  the  swoid 
of  the  conqueror. 

By  such  reverses,  destroying  two-thirds  of  the  Agathoklean  army, 
Archagathus  was  plnced  in  serious  peril.  He  was  obligee,  to  con- 
centrate his  force  in  Tur.es,  calhng  in  nearly  all  his  outlymg  detach- 
ments. At  the  same  tiuu-,  lho>e  Liby-Flienicinn  cities,  and  rural 
Libyan  tribes,  who  had  before  joined  Agiithokles,  now  -detached 
themselves  from  him  when  his  power  was  evidently  declining,  and 
made  their  ])eace  with  Curthjige.  The  victorious  Carthaginian  gen- 
erals establi^hed  fortilied  camps  around  Tunes,  so  as  to  restrain  the 
excursions  of  Archngatlius;  wliile  wiih  their  fleet  they  blocked  up 
his  harbor.  Presently  provisions  becan)e  shoit,  and  nuch  despond- 
ency prevailed  among  the  Grecian  ainiy.  Archngatlius  transmitted 
this  discouraging  news  to  his  father  in  bicily,  with  urgent  entreaties 
that  he  would  come  to  the  rescue. 

The  career  of  Agalhokles  in  Sicily,  since  his  departure  from 
Africa,  had  been  checkered,  and  on  the  whole  unproductive.  Just 
leforc  Ills  arrival  in  the  island,  his  generals  Leptines  and  Demoph- 
ilus  had  gained  an  important  victory  over  the  Agrigentine  forces 
<-ommanded  by  Xtnodokus,  who  were  disabled  from  keeping  the 
field.  This  dTsasier  was  a  falal  discouragement  both  to  the  Agri- 
gentines,  and  to  the  cause  whic  h  they  had  espoused  as  champions — 
free  and  autonomous  city-government  with  equal  confederacy  for 
self-defense,  under  the  presidency  of  Agrigentum.  The  outlying 
( it ies  confederate  with  .^grigentum  were  left  without  military  jiro- 
t«  ction,  ard  exposed  to  tlie  attacks  of  Leptines,  animated  and  forti- 
f  ed  by  the  recent  arrival  of  his  master  Agathokles.  That  despot 
lauded  at  Seiinus — subdued  Herakleia,  Therma,  and  Kephaloidion. 
on  or  near  the  northern  coast  of  Sicily— then  crossed  the  interior  of 
the  island  to  Syracuse.  In  his  march  iie  assaulted  Kenloripa,  hav- 
ing some  partisans  within,  hut  v.as  repulsed  with  loss.  At  Apol- 
louia,  he  was  also  unsuccessful  in  his  first  attempt;  but  being  slung 
Tviih  mortification,  he  lesunud  the  assault  next  day,  and  at  length  by 
gieat  efforts,  carried  the  town.  To  avenge  his  loss  which  had  been 
severe,  he  massacred  most  of  the  citizens,  and  abandoned  the  town 
to  plunder. 


AGATHOKLES  IN   SICILY. 


7.0 


Froiu  hence  he  proceeded  to  Syracuse,  Avhich  he  now  revisited  after 
an  absence  of  (apparently)  moie  than  two  years  in  Africa.     Durin"- 
all   this   interval,   the    Syracus.ni   harbor   had    been    watched    bv   "a 
Cartliagiiiiau  lleet,  obstrucling  the  eutrv  of  provisions,  and  causino- 
partial  scarcity.     But  there  was  no  blockading  army  on  land  •  uoT 
had  the  dominion  of  Agathokles,  upheld  as  it  was  by  his  brother 
Antander  and  his  mercenary  force,  been  at  all  shaken.     His  arrival 
inspired  his  partisans  and  soldiers  with  new  courage   while  it  sore-id 
terror  Ihroughenit  most  parts  of  Sicily.    To  contend  with  the  Cartha- 
ginian blockading  squadron,  he  made  efforts  to  procure  maritime  aid 
from  the  Tyrrhenian  ports  in  Italy;  while  on  land,  his  forces  were 
now  preponderant— owing  to  the  recent  elef eat.  and  broken  spirit  of 
the  Agrigentines.     But  his  prospects  were  suddenly  checked  bv  the 
euterpiismg  move  of  his  old  enemy— the  Syracusau  exile  Dc^nok- 
rates;   who  made    profession  of  taking    up  that  generous   policv 
which  the  Agrigentines  had  tacitly  let  fall-announcing  himself  as 
the  champion   of   autonomous  citv-government,  and  equal  cohfed- 
era(3y  thi-oughout  Sicily.     Deinoknltes  received  ready  adhesion  from 
most  ot  the  cities  belonging  to  the  Agrigentine  confederacy— all  of 
them  who  were  alarmed  by  finding  that  the  weakness  or  fears  of 
then-  presiding  city  had  left  them  unprotected  airainst  Acrathokles 
Ue  was  soon  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  army— 20.000  foot'^and  1500 
horse      Morever  a  large  proportion  of  ids  ariny  were  not  citizen  mil- 
itia,  but  practiced   soldiers  for   the   most  part  exih^s  driven   from 
their  Iiumes  by  the  distractions  and  violences  of  the  A^'-athoklean 
sera.     For  military  purposes,  both  he  and  his  soldiers  wer?  far  more 
strenuous  and   effective   than   the  A-riirentines   under  Xenodokus 
hae    been.     He  not   only  kept  the  field  against  Aiiathokles.  l)ut  sev- 
eral  times  offered  him  battle,  which   the   despot  did  not  feel   con- 
fidence  enough    to   accept.     Agathokles  could   do   no  more  tiian 
maintain  himselt   in  Syracuse,  while   the   Sicilian  cities  generally 
were  put  in  security  against  his  aixgressions. 

Amid  this  unprosperous  course' of  affairs  in  Sicily,  Ao-athokles 
received  messengers  from  his  son,  reporting  the  defeats  in  Africa 
Ireparmg  immediately  to  revisit  that  country,  he  was  fortunate 
en')u-l)  to  obtain  a  re-enforcement  of  Tvrrhenian  ships  of  war  which 
enabled  lum  to  overcome  the  (\arthaginian  blockadin-  squadron  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Syracusan  harbor.  A  clear  passaire  to  Africa 
was  thus  secured  for  himself,  toirether  with  ample  supplies  of  im- 
p<.rted  provisions  for  the  Syracusans.  Thoudi  still  unal)le  to  combat 
Uemokrates  in  the  field.  Agathokles  was  emboWened  by  his  recent 
naval  victory  to  S"nd  for  Leptiiu^^  with  a  foice  to  invade  the  A-n-i- 
gentines— the  j'alous  rivals,  rather  than  the  allies,  of  Deinokrafes 
Ihe  Agrigentine  a;my— under  the  general  Xmodokus,  whom  Lep- 
tines had  before  defeated— consisted  of  citizen  militia  mustered  on 
the  occasion;  while  the  Agathoklean  mercenaries,  conducted  by 
Leptmes,  had  made  arms  a  profession  and  were  used  to  fightin"-  as 


776 


SICILIAN-  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


well  as  to  hardships.  Here,  as  elsewhere  in  Greece,  we  find  the 
civic  and  pariotic.  cncrLn-  trampled  down  hy  prolessioual  soldier- 
ihip,  and  reduced  to  operate  only  as  an  ob!-e(iuious  instrument  lor 

adnnnistralive  details.  ....        ^  .  -     k     •       4-      t-  ,.o^ 

Xenodokus,  conscious  of  the  inferiority  of  his  Agngentme  foice, 
was  reluctant  to  hazard  a  battle.  Drive  n  to  this  m.prucience  b};  tne 
taunts  of  his  soldiers,  he  was  defeated  a  second  lime  by  Leptines, 
...ul  became  so  apnrehensive  of  the  wrath  of  the  Agrigentines,  that 
he  th^Hidit  it  expedient  to  retire  to  Gela.  After  a  period  of  rejoic- 
ing iof  his  recent  victories  hv  lar.d  as  well  as  by  sea,  Agathokles 
Tvi^'sed  over  to  Africa,  where  he  found  his  son,  with  the  army  at  'I  unes 
inWeat  despondency  and  privation,  and  almost  mutiny  for  want  oi 
piv  Thev  still  jimountcd  to  6  000  Grecian  mercenaries,  6.000 
G-ui'ls  Samnites,  and  Tvrrhenians— 1500  cavalry— and  no  less  than 
G  000  (if  the  number  be  correct)  Libyan  war-cluiriots.  There  were 
ai^o  a  numerous  body  of  Libvan  allies;  faithless  time-servers,  watch- 
inn-  for  the  turn  of  fortune*  The  I'artha-inians,  occupying  strong 
c-imps  in  the  vicinity  of  Tunes,  and  abundantly  supplied,  awaited 
mtiently  the  destroying  effects  of  privation  and  suffering  on  their 
enemies  Fio  desperate  ^vas  the  position  of  Agathokles,  that  he  was 
compelled  to  no  forth  and  fidit.  Having  tried  in  vam  to  draw  the 
(  art han-inians  down  into  the  plain,  he  at  length  atta(ked  them  in  the 
fn'l  ^tren-nh  of  their  intrenchments.  But,  in  spite  of  the  mo-t 
strenuous  efforts,  his  troops  were  repulsed  with  great  slaughter,  and 
driven  back  to  their  camp.  r  j-       i  a 

The  ni'-ht  succeeding  this  battle  was  a  scene  of  disorder  and  panic 
in  both  camps;  even  in  that  of  th(!  victorious  Carthaginians.  The 
litter  accordlncr  to  ihe  ordinances  of  their  religion,  eager  to  return 
their  'heartfelt  thanks  to  the  god^  for  this  great  victory,  sacrificed  to 
them  as  a  choice  olTerin'j:  the  hnnd>oniest  prisoners  captured.  Dur- 
ing this  process,  the  tent  or  tidxriiacle  consecrated  to  the  gods, 
close  to  the  altar  as  well  as  to  the  general's  tent,  accidentally  took 
lire  The  tents  Ik ini:  formed  by  mere  wooden  posts,  connected  bv 
a  thatch  of  hay  or  straw  botl/on  roof  and  sides,— the  tire  spread 
i-ipidlv  and  the  evMre  camp  was  bu-ned,  together  with  many  soldiers 
who  tried  to  a'rest  the  confla nation.  So  distracting  was  the  terror 
occ-vsioned  by  this  catastrophe,  that  the  whole  Carthagiidan  army  for 
the  time  disjpersed;  o.m\  Agathokles,  had  he  been  prepared,  might 
have  destroyed  them.  But  ithappeneil  that  at  the  same  hour,  his 
own  camp  was  thrown  into  utter  confusion  by  a  different  accident, 
rendering-  his  soldiers  incap:d)le  of  being  brought  into  action. 

n\^  position  at  Tunes  had  now  become  desperate.  His  Libyan 
allies  had  all  declared  airainst  him,  after  the  recent  defeat.  He  could 
neither  continue  to  hold  Tunes,  nor  carry  away  his  troops  to  Sicily; 
for  he  had  but  few  vessels,  and  the  Carthaginians  were  masters  at 
«;en  Seein*'-  no  resource,  he  resolved  to  embark  secretly  with  his 
youno-er  sdn  Ilerakleides;   abandoning  Archagathus  and  the  army 


AGATHOKLES  DESERTS  HIS  ARMY 


rj">' 


/ 17 


to  their  fate.     But  Archagathus  and  the  other  officers,  suspecting  his 
purpose,  w^ere  thoroughly  resolved  that  the  man  who  had  bio\idit 
them  into  destruction  should  not  thus  slip  away  and  betruy  tiierii 
As    Agathokles    was  on    the   point   of   going   abojird   at    night,   he 
found  himself  watched,  arrested,  and  held  prisoner,  by  the  iudiiiiiant 
-oldi.'ry.     The  whole  town   now  became  a  scene  of  disoniei^  and 
tumult,  aggravated  by  the  rumor  that  tiie  enemy  were  marching  up  to 
attack    them.     Amid  the  genend  alarm,  the  guards  who  had    been 
set  over  Agathokles.  thinking  his  services  indispensable  for  defense, 
brought  him  out  with  his  fetters  still  on.     When  the  sold iors  saw 
him  in  this  condition,  their  sentiment  toward  liim  airaiu  reverted  to 
pity  and  admiration,  notwitiisl;andiug  his  projected  Sesertiou;  more- 
over they  ho|)ed  for  his  guidance  to  resist  the  impending  attack. 
With  one  voice  they  called  upon  the  guards  to  strike  off  his  chains 
and  set  him  free.     Agathokles  was  again  at  liberty.      But,  insensible 
to  everytiiing  except  his  ow^n   personal   safety,  *^he   presently  stole 
away,  leaped  unperceived  into  a  skiff,   with  a  few  attendants,  but 
witiiout  either   of  his  sons,— an;l  was   lucky  enouuh  to  arrive,  in 
spite  of  stormy  November  weather,  on  the  coast  of  ISicily. 

So  terrible  was  the  fury  of  the  soldiers,  on  discovering  that  Agath- 
Okies  had  accomplished  his  dcserlion,  that  tiiey  slew  both  his  sons. 
Archagathus  and  Herakleides.  No  resource  was  left  but  to  elect 
new  generals,  and  make  the  best  terms  they  could  with  Carthage. 
They  w^ere  still  a  formidable  botly,  retaining  in  their  hands  various 
other  towns  besides  Tunes;  so  that  the  Carthaginians,  relic vsil  from 
all  fear  of  Agathokles.  thought  it  prutlent  to  grant  an  easy  capitula- 
tion. It  was  agreed  that  all  the  towns  should  be  restored  to  tiie 
Carihaginians,  on  payment  of  800  talents;  that  such  soldiers  as  chose 
to  enter  into  the  African  service  of  Carthage,  should  be  received  on 
full  pay;  but  that  such  as  preferred  returning  to  Sicily  should  bo 
transported  thither,  with  permission  to  reside' in  the  Carthaginian 
town  of  Solus  (or  Soluntum).  On  these  terms  the  convention  was 
concluded,  and  the  army  finally  broken  up.  Some  indcetl  among 
the  Grecian  garrisons,  quartered  in  the  outlying  posts,  being  rash 
enough  to  dissent  and  hold  out,  were  besieged  and  taken  by  the 
Carthaginian  force.  Their  commanders  were  crucified,  and  the 
soldiers  condemned  to  rural  work  as  fettered  slaves. 

Tlius  miserably  terminated  the  expedition  of  Agathokles  to  Africa, 
after  an  interval  of  four  years  from  the  time  of  his  landing.  By  the 
mita  mirantes,  who  looked  out  for  curious  coincideuces^'Cprobabiy 
Timjijus),  it  was  remarked  that  his  ultimate  Hight,  wiih  the  slaughter 
of  his  two  sons,  oi-curred  exactly  on  the  same  day  of  the  year  foTlow- 
ing  his  assassination  of  Ophelias.  Ancient  writers  extol,  with  good 
reason,  the  bold  and  striking  conception  of  transferring  the  war  to 
Africa,  at  the  very  moment  when  he  was  himself  besieged  in  Syra- 
cuse by  a  superior  Carthaginian  force.  But  while  admit  tin"- ^ho 
military  resource,  skill,  aud.euerg/  of  Agathokles,  we  must  not 


778 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


for"-et  that  his  success  in  Africa  was  materially  furthered  by  the 
treasonable  conduct  of  the  Carthaginian  general  Boniilkur— an  acci- 
dental coincidence  in  point  of  lime.  Nor  is  it  to  be  overlooked, 
that  Agalhokies  missed  the  opportunity  of  turning  his  tirst  success 
to  account,  at  a  moment  when  the  Carthaginians  would  probally 
have  purchased  his  evacuation  of  Africa  by  making  large  concessions 
to  hini  in  ISicilv.  He  imprudently  persisted  in^  the  war,  though  the 
complete  conquest  of  Carthage  was  beyond  his  strength— and  though 
it  was  still  more  beyond  his  strength  to  prosecute  effective  war, 
simultaneously  and  for  a  long  time,  in  Sicily  and  in  Africa.  The 
Atriean  subjects  of  Carthage  were  not  attached  to  her;  but  ceilher 
were  they  attached  to  him;— nor,  in  the  long  run,  did  they  do  him 
any  serious  good.  Agathokies  is  a  man  of  force  and  fraud— con- 
summate in  ihe  use  of  both.  His  whole  life  is  a  series  of  successful 
adventures,  and  strokes  of  bold  ingenuity  to  extricate  himself  from 
difficulties;  but  there  is  wanting  in  him  all  piedelermined  general 
plan,  or  measured  range  of  ambition,  to  which  these  single  exploits 
•miiiht  be  made  subservient. 

After  his  passage  from  Africa,  Agathokies  landed  on  Ihe  western 
corner  of  Sicily  near  the  town  of  Eiicsta,  which  was  then  in  alliance 
with  him.  He  sent  to  Syracuse  for  a  re-enforcement.  But  he  was 
hard  pressed  for  money;  he  suspected,  or  pretended  to  suspect,  the 
Eiiestaans  of  disaHection;  accordingly,  on  receiving  his  new  force, 
he  employed  it  tocomn.it  revolting  massacre  and  plunder  in  Egesta. 
The  town  is  reported  to  have  contained  10,C00  citizens.  Of  these 
Asathi.kles  caused  the  poorer  men  to  be  for  the  most  part  murdered; 
the  richer  were  cruelly  tortured,  and  even  their  wives  tortured  and 
iiulilated,  to  compel  revelations  of  concealed  wealth;  the  children 
of  both  sexes  were  transported  to  Italy,  and  there  sold  as  slaves  to 
the  Bruttians.  The  original  population  being  thus  nearly  extirpated, 
Agalhokies  chanced  the  name  of  the  town  to  Dikaopolis,  assigning  it 
as  a  residence  tos^uch  deserters  as  might  join  him.  This  atrocity,  more 
suitable  to  Africa  than  Greece  (where  the  mutilation  of  women  is 
almost  unlieard  of),  w  as  probably  the  way  in  which  his  savage  pride 
obtained  some  kind  of  relaliiilory  satisfaction  for  the  recent  calamity 
and  humiliation  in  Africa.  Under  the  like  sentiment,  he  perpetrated 
another  deed  of  blood  at  Syracuse.  Having  karned  that  lh\3  soldiers, 
w  hom  he  had  deserted  at  Tunes,  had  after  his  departure  put  to  death 
his  two  sons,  he  gave  orders  to  Antander  his  brother  (viceroy  ot  Syra- 
cuse), to  massacre  all  the  relatives  of  those  Syracusans  who  had 
served  him  in  the  African  expedition.  1  his  order  was  fultilled  by 
Antander  (we  are  assured)  accurately  and  to  the  letter.  Neither  age 
nor  sex— grandsire  or  infant— wife  or  mother— were  spared  by  the 
Acathoklean  executioners.  We  may  be  sure  that  their  properties 
were  plundered  at  the  same  time:  we  hear  of  no  muldntions. 

Still  Agathokies  tried  to  maintain  his  hold  on  the  Sicilian  towns 
which  remained  to  him;  but  his  cruelties  as  well  as  liis  reverses  had 


BATTLE  OF  TORGIUM. 


779 


produced  a  strong  sentiment  a<rainst  him,  and    even    his    general 
Pasiphilus  revolted  to  join  Deinokrates.     That  exile  was  now  at  the 
he:id  of  an  army  stated  at  20,000  men,  the  most  formidable  milit-irv 
force  in  Sicdy;   so  that  Agathokies,  feeling  the  inadequacy  of  his 
own  means,  sent  to  solicit  peace,  and  to  offer  temptin--  conditions 
He  announced  his  readiness  to  evacuate  Syracuse  altot'-ether   and  to 
be  Co'.iteut,  if  two  maritime  towns  on  the  northern  coast  of  the  island 
— Thcrma  and  Kephaloidion— were  assigned  to  his  mercenaries  and 
himself.     Under  this  proposition,  Deinokrates,  and  the  other  Syra- 
cusan  exiles,  had  tiie  opportunity  of  entering  Syracuse,  and  recon-. 
stituting  the  free  city-goverument.     Had  Deinokrates  been  another 
Tinioleon,  the  city  might  now  have  acquired  and  enjoyed  another 
temporary  sunshine  of  autonomy  and  prosperity;  but  his  ambition 
was  thoroughly  seltish.      As  commander  of  this  laro-e  armv    he 
enjoyed  a  station  of  power  and  license  such  as  he  w^as'^not  likely  to 
obtain  under  the  reconstituted  city -government  of  Syracuse      He 
therefore  evaded  the  proposition  of  Agathokies,  requirimr  stiil  iaro-er 
concessions;  until  at  length  the  Syracusan  exiles  in  his"' own  army 
(partly  instigated  by  emissaries  from  Agathokies  himselO  beo-an  to 
suspect  his  selfish  projects,  and  to  waver  in  their  fidelity  to  him 
Meanwhile  Agathokies,  being  repudiated  by  Deinokrates,  addressed 
himself  to  the  Carthaginians,  and  concluded  a  treaty  with  them 
restoring  or  guaranteeing  to  them  all  the  possessions'that  they  had 
ever  enjoyed  in  Sicily.     In  return  for  this  concession,  he  rec-cived 
from  them  a  sum  of  money,  and  a  laige  supply  of  corn 

Relieved  from  Carthaginian  hostility,  Asrathokles  presently  ven- 
tured to  march  against  the  army  of  Deinokrates.  The  latter  was  in- 
deed greatly  superior  in  strength,  but  many  of  his  soldiers  were  now 
lukewarm  or  disaffected,  and  Agathf)kles  had  established  amon"- 
them  correspondences  upon  which  he  could  rely.  At  a  n-reat  b-tttle 
fought  near  Torgium,  many  of  them  went  over  on  the  fi^'ld  to  \ff- 
athokles,  giving  to  him  a  complete  victory.  The  army  of  Deinokrate's 
was  completely  dispersed.  Shortly  afterward  a  considerable  body 
among  them  (4,000  men,  or  7,000  men  according  to  different  state- 
ments) surrendered  to  the  victor  on  terms.  As  soon  as  they  had  de- 
livered up  their  arms,  Agathokies,  regardless  of  his  covenant  caused 
them  to  be  surround  3d  by  his  own  army,  and  massacred. 

It  appears  as  if  the  secret  victory  had  been  the  result  of  a  secret 
and  treacherous  compact  between  Agathokies  and  Deinokrates-  and 
as  if  the  prisoners  massacreed  by  Agathokies  were  tiiose  of  whom 
Deinokrates  wished  to  rid  himself  as  malcontents;  for  immediately 
aner  the  battle,  a  reconciliation  took  place  between  the  two  A^^ath- 
okles  admitted  the  other  as  a  sort  of  partner  in  his  despoMsm-  while 
Deinokrates  not  only  brought  into  the  partnership  all  the  military 
means  and  strong  posts  which  he  had  been  two  years  in  acquirinfr^ 
but  also  betryed  to  Agathokies  the  revolted  general  Pasiphilus  wiUi 
the  town  of  Gela  occupied  by  the  latter.    It  is  noticed  as  sin^lar 


780 


SICILIAN  AND  ITALIAN  GREEKS. 


DEATH  OF  AGATHOKLES. 


781 


tlint  Agnthoklos,  generally  fnilliless  and  unscrupulous  toward  both 
frieutls  and  enemies,  kept  up  the  best  understandiug  and  coulideuce 
■wilb  Deiuokrates  tollie  end  of  his  life. 

The  despot  had  now  regained  full  power  at  Syracuse,  togetlier  with 
a  great  exl^-nt  of  dominion  in  Sicily.  The  ren»ainder  of  his  restless 
existence  was  s]>ent  in  operations  ot  hostilit}'  or  piundera<rainst  moie 
northerly  enemies — the  Lipaiacan  isles — the  Italian  cities  and  the 
Bruttians — the  islaml  of  Korkyra.  We  are  unable  to  follow  his  pro- 
ceedings in  detail.  He  was  llinatened  with  a  formidable  alljick  by 
the  Spartan  prince  Klconymus,  who  was  invited  by  the  Tareniincs 
to  aid  them  auainst  the  Lucauians  and  Romans.  But  Kleonymus 
found  enough  to  occupy  himself  elsewhere,  without  visiting  Sicily, 
He  collected  a  considerable  force  on  the  coast  of  Italy,  undertook 
operations  with  success  against  the  Lucanians,  and  even  captured  the 
town  of  Thurii.  But  the  Romans,  now  pushing  their  intervention 
even  to  the  Taienline  Gulf,  drove  him  off  and  retook  the  town;  more- 
over his  own  behavior  was  so  tyrannical  and  profligr.te,  as  to  draw  up- 
on him  universal  hatred.  Returning  from  Italy  to  Korkyra,  Kleony- 
mus made  himself  master  of  that  important  island,  intending  to  em- 
ploy it  as  a  base  of  o])erations  both  against  Greece  and  against  Italy. 
Hefailed  however  in  various  expeditions  both  in  the  Tarentine  Gulf 
and  the  Adriatic.  Demetrius  Poliorketes  and  Kassander  alike  tried 
to  conclude  an  alliance  with  him;  but  in  vain.  At  a  subsequent  period 
Korkyra  was  besieged  by  Kassander  with  u  large  naval  and  military 
force;  Kleonymus  then  retired  (or  perhaps  had  previously  retired)  to 
Sparta.  Kassander.  having  reduced  the  island  to  great  straits,  was 
on  the  point  of  taking  it,  when  it  was  relieved  by  Agathokles 
with  a  powerful  armament.  That  despot  was  engaged  in  operations 
on  the  coast  of  Italy  against  the  Bruttians  when  his  aid  to  Korkyra 
was  solicited;  he  destroyed  most  part  of  the  Macedonian  fleet,  and 
then  seized  the  island  for  himself.  C)n  returning  from  this  vi(  torious 
expedition  to  the  Italian  coast,  where  he  had  left  a  detachment  of  his 
Ligurian  and  Tuscan  mercenaries,  he  was  informed  that  these  mer- 
cenaries had  been  turbident  during  his  absence,  in  demanding  the 
pay  due  to  them  from  his  grandson  Archagathus.  He  caused  them 
all  to  be  slain  to  the  nund)er  of  2.000. 

As  far  as  we  can  trace  the  events  of  the  last  years  of  Agathokles, 
we  find  him  seizing  the  towns  of  Kroton  and  Hipjionia  in  Italy,  es- 
tablishing an  alliance  with  Demetrius  Poliorketes,  and  giving  his 
daughter  Lanassa  in  marriage  to  the  youthful  Pyrrlius  king  of  Epi- 
rus.  At  the  age  of  seventy-two  still  in  the  plenitude  of  vigor  as  well 
as  of  power,  he  was  projecting  a  fresh  expedition  against  the  Car- 
thaginians in  Africa,  with  two  hundred  of  the  largest  ships  of  war, 
when  his  career  was  brought  to  a  close  by  sickness  and  by  domestic 
enemies. 

He  pr(>claimed  as  future  successor  to  his  dominion,  his  son,  named 
Agathokles;  but  Archagathus  his  grandson  (sod  of  Archagathus  who 


had  perished  in  Africa),  a  young  prince  of  more  conspicuous  quali- 
ties, had  already  been  singled  out  for  the  most  important  command 
and  was  now  at  the  head  of  the  army  near  ^Etna.     The  old  Agatho- 
kles, wishing  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  his  intended  successor,  sent 
his  favored  son  Agathokles  to  iEtna,  with  written  orders  dire'ctiu"- 
that  Archagathus   should  yield  up  to  him  the  command.     Archa*^ 
gathus,  noway  disposed  to  obey,  invited  his  uncle  Airathokles   to  a 
banquet,  and  killed  him;  after  which  he  contrived  the  poisoning-  of 
his  grandfather  the  old  despot  himself.     The  instrument  of  his  pur- 
pose was  Msenon,  a  citizen  of  Egesta,   enslaved  at  the  time  when 
Agathokles  massacred  most  of  the  Egesteau  population.     The  beauty 
of  his  person  procured  him  much  favor  with  Agathokles;  but  he  hac^ 
never  forgotten,  and  had  always  been  anxious  to  avenge,  the  bloody 
outrage  on  his  fellow-citizens.     To  accomplish  this  purpose,  the  op- 
portunity was  now  opened  to  him,  together  with  a  promise  of  pro- 
tection through  Archagathus.     He  accordingly  poisoned  Agathokles 
as  we  are  told,  by  means  of  a  medicated  quill,   handed  to  him  for 
cleaning  his  teeth  after  tlinuer.     Combining  together  the  various  ac- 
counts, it  seems  probable  that  Agathokles  was  at  the  time  sick— that 
tliis  sickness  may  have  been  the  reason  w^hy  he  was  so  anx:ous  to 
strengthen  the  position  of  his  intended  successor— and  that  his  death 
was  as  much  the  eiiect  of  his  malady  as  of  the  poijon.     Archagailius 
after  murdering  his  uncle,  seems  by  means  of  his  armvto  have  Uiude 
himself  real   master  of  the  Syracusan  power;  while  the  old  despot, 
defenseless  on  a  sick  bed.  could  do  no  more  than  provide  for   the 
safety  of  his  Egyptian  wife  Theoxena  and  his  two  young  children, 
by  dispatching  them  on  shipboard  whh  all  his  rich  movable  treasures' 
to  Alexandri  1.     Having  secured  this  object,  amid  extreme  grief  on 
the  part  of  those  around,  lie  expired. 

The  great  lines  in  the  character  of  Agathokles  are  weU  marked. 
He  was  o(  the  stamp  of  Gelon  and  the  elder  Dionysius— a  soldiir  of 
fortune,  who  raised  hiinself  from  the  meanest  l)eL>innings  to  the  sum- 
mit of  political  power,— and  who,  in  the  acquisition  as  well  as  maiii- 
teuance  of  that  power,  displayed  an  extent  of  energy,  perseverance, 
and  military  resource,  not  surpassed  by  any  one,  even  of  the  gener- 
als formed  in  Alexander's  school.  He  was  an  adept  in  that  art  at 
which  all  aspirmg  men  of  his  age  aimed— the  handling  of  mercenary 
soldiers  tor  the  extinction  of  poHtical  liberty  and  securhv  at  \u)iui\ 
and  for  predatory  aggrandizement  abroad.  I  have  already  nolicel 
the  opinion  delivered  by  Scipio  Afiicauus— that  the  elder  Dionvshi.:! 
ami  AgHthokles  Avere  the  niost  daring,  sagacious,  and  capable  "men 
ot  action  within  his  knowledge.  Apart  from  this  enleriu-ising  -enius 
employed  in  the  service  of  unmeasured  personal  ambition,  we  know 
nothing  of  Agathokles  excent  his  sanguinary,  faithless,  and  nefari- 
ouA  dispositions;  HI  whicli  attributes  also  he  stands  pre-eminent a!)oye 
an  hi;  known  contemporaries,  and  above  nearly  all  predecessors. 
Aotwuhslaiiding  his  often  praved  perfidy,  he  &et5ms  to  h:.ve  h:id  a 


TS5 


OUTLYING   HELLENIC   CITIES. 


geiiitilitv  and  apparent  simplicity  of  manner  (the  same  is  rccouutctl 
of  CasaV  Borgia)  which  amused'meu  and  put  them  off  their  guard, 
throwing  them  perpetually  into  his  trap. 

Agathokles,  however,  though  among  the  worst  of  Greeks,  was  yet 
a  Givek.  During  liis  government  of  thirty-two  years,  the  course  of 
events  in  Sicily  continued  under  Hellenic  agency,  without  the  pre- 
ponderant intervention  of  any  foreign  power.  The  power  of  Agath- 
okles indeed  rested  mainly  on  foreign  mercenaries;  but  so  had  that  of 
Dionysius  and  Gelon  before  him;  and  he,  as  well  as  they,  kept  up 
vigorously  the  old  contiict  against  the  Carthaginian  power  in  the 
island.  Grecian  history  in  Sicily  thus  continues  down  to  the  death 
of  Agathokles;  but  it  continues  no  longer.  After  his  death  Hellenic 
power  and  interests  become  incapable  of  self-support,  and  sink  into 
a  secondary  and  subservient  position,  overridden  or  contended  for 
by  foreigners.  Syracuse  and  the  other  cities  passed  from  one  despot 
to  another,  and  were  torn  with  discord  arising  out  of  the  crowds  of 
foreign  mercenaries  who  had  obtained  footing  among  them.  At  the 
same  time,  the  Carthaginians  made  increased  efforts  to  push  their 
conquests  in  the  island,  without  finding  any  sufficient  internal  resist- 
ance; so  that  they  would  have  taken  Syracuse,  and  made  Sicily  their 
o'.vn,  had  not  Pyrrhus  king  of  Epirus (the  son-in-law  of  Agathokles) 
interposed  to  arrest  their  progress.  From  this  time  forward,  the 
Greeks  of  Sicily  become  a  prize  to  be  contended  for— first  between 
the  Carthaginians  and  Pyrrhus— next  between  the  Carthaginians  and 
Pomans— until  at  length  they  dwindle  into  subjects  of  Rome;  corn- 
growers  for  the  Roman  plebs,  clients  under  the  patronage  of  the  Ro- 
man Marcelli.  victims  of  the  rapacity  of  Verres,  and  suppliants  for 
the  tutelary  eloquence  of  Cicero.  The  historian  of  self-acting  Hellas 
loses  sight  of  them  at  the  death  of  Agathokles. 


CHAPTER  XCVIII- 

OUTLYING  HELLENIC  CITIES 

1.  Tn  Gaul  and  Spain, 

2.  On  the  Coast  of  the  Euxine. 

To  complete  the  picture  of  the  Hellenic  world  while  yet  in  its 
period  of  full  lif^,  in  freedom  and  self-action,  or  evea  during  its 
decline  into  the  half-life  of  a  dependent  condition — we  must  say  a  few 
words  respecting  some  of  its  members  lying  apart  from  the  general 
history,  yet  of  not  inconsiderable  importance.  The  Greeks  of  Mas- 
salia  formed  its  western  wing;  the  Pontic  Greeks  (those  on  the 
shores  of  the  Euxine),  its  eastern;  both  of  them  the  outerpaost  radia- 
tions of  Hellenism,  where  it  was  always  militant  against  foreign  elc- 


MASSALIA. 


7B3 


ments,  and  often  adulterated  by  them.     It  is,  indeed,  little  that  we 
have  the  means  of  saying;  but  that  little  must  not  be  left  unsaid. 

In  my  twenty-seventh  chapter,  I  briefly  noticed  the  foundation 
and  first  proceedings  of  Massalia  (the  modern  Marseilles),  on  the 
Mediterranean  coast  of  Gaul  or  Liguria.  This  Ionic  city,  founded 
by  the  enterprising*  Pliolaeans  of  Asia  Minor,  a  little  before  their 
own  seaboard  was  subjugated  by  the  Persians,  had  a  life  and  career 
of  its  own,  apart  from  tiiose  political  events  which  determined  the  con- 
dition of  its  Hellenic  sisters  in  Asia,  Peloponnesus,  Italy,  or  Sicily. 
The  ^lassaliots  maintained  their  own  relations  of  commerce,  friend- 
ship, or  hostility  with  their  barbaric  neighbors,  the  Ligurians,  Gauls, 
and  Iberians,  without  becoming  involved  in  the  larger  political  con- 
federacies of  the  Hellenic  world.  They  carried  out  from  tlieir 
mother-city  established  habits  of  adventurous  coast-navigation  and 
commercial  activity.  Their  situation,  distant  from  other  Greeks  and 
sustained  by  a  force  hardly  sufficient  even  for  defense,  imposed  upon 
them  the  necessity  both  of  political  harmony  at  home,  and  of  pru- 
dence and  persuasive  agency  in  tlieir  mode  of  dealing  with  neighbors. 
That  they  were  found  equal  to  this  necessity,  appears  sufficiently 
attested  by  the  few  general  statements  transmitted  in  respect  to 
them;  though  their  history  in  its  details  is  unknown. 

Their  city  was  strong  by  position,  situated  upon  a  promontory- 
washed  on  three  sides  by  the  sea,  well  fortified,  and  possessing  a  con- 
venient harbor  securely  closed  against  enemies.  The  domain  around 
it,  however,  appears  not  to  have'been  large,  nor  did  their  population 
extend  itself  much  into  the  interior.  The  laud  around  was  less 
adapted  for  corn  than  for  the  vine  and  the  olive;  wine  was  supplied 
by  the  Massaliots  throughout  Gaul.  It  was  on  shipboard  that  their 
courage  and  skill  was  chiefly  displayed;  it  was  by  maritime  enter- 
prise that  their  power,  their  wealth,  and  their  colonial  expansion 
were  obtained.  In  an  age  when  piracy  was  common,  the  Massaliot 
ships  and  seamen  were  effective  in  attack  and  defense  not  less  than 
in  transport  and  commercial  interchange;  while  their  numerous 
maritime  successes  were  attested  by  many  trophies  adorning  the 
temples.  The  city  contained  docks  and  arsenals  admirably  provided 
with  provisions,  stores,  arms,  and  all  the  various  muniments  of 
naval  war.  Except  the  Phenicians  and  Carthaginians,  these  Massal- 
iots were  the  only  enterprising  mariners  in  the  Western  jVIedilerra- 
nean;  from  the  year  500  B.C.  downward,  after  the  energy  of  the  Ionic 
Greeks  had  been  crushed  by  inland  potentates.^  The  Iberian  and 
Gallic  tribes  w^ere  essentially  landsmen,  not  occupying  permanent 
stations  on  the  coast,  nor  having  any  vocation  for  the  sea;  but  tlie 
Ligurians,  though  cliiefly  mountaineers,  were  annoying  neighbors  to 
Massalia  as  well  by  their  piracies  at  sea  as  from  their  depredations  by 
land.  To  all  these  landsman,  however,  depredators  as  they  were, 
the  visit  of  the  trailer  soou  made  itself  felt  as  a  want,  both  for  import 
»iid'  wxport;  uud  to  ibis  want  th«  Mausaliots,  with  thwj  €oIoni<.*«/' 


784 


OUTLYING  HELLEXIC  CITIES. 


were  the  only  niinislcr?,  alonp:  the  Gulfs  of  Genoa  and  Lyons,  from 
Luiia  (ibe  frontiers  of  Tuscany)  to  the  Dianium  (Cape  della  ^ao)  in 
Spain.  It  was  not  until  tlic  iiist  century  before  the  Christiim  era 
that  tliey  were  cutslrippcd  in  this  career  by  Narbou,  and  a  few  other 
neighbors,  exaliediulo  Roman  C(;lonies. 

Along  the  coast  on  both  sides  of  their  own  city,  the  ^FasFnliots 
planted  coloniea,  each  commended  to  the  protection,  and  ( onsccrated 
l)y  the.statu3  and  i  eeuliar  rites,  of  their  oun  patron  Goddess,  the 
T-jihesian  Artemis.       To\vard  the  east  were   '1  auroentium,  Olbia, 
Antij^olis,  Isika.a,   and  the  Portus  Monaki;  toward  the    west,   on 
the  coast  of  Spain,  Mere  Rhoda,  Emporia',  Alone,  H(meroskopium, 
and  Artemisium  or  Dianium.    These  colonies  were  estabiisiud  chiefly 
nn  outlying  capes  (.r  sometimes  islets,  at  once  near  and  safe;  they 
were  intended   more  ns   f-l  elle^  and  accommc.dation    for  n.aritime 
tratlie.  and  as  depots  for  tiade  with  the  interior,— than  for  the  pur- 
pose of  spreading  iidand  jind  includiLg  a  numerous  (mtlying  pcpu- 
lation  round  the  walls.     ']  he-  circumstances  of  Em]  oriae  were  the 
most  remarkable.      That  town  was  built  ori«rirally  (-n  a  little  unin- 
habited islet  cf  the  coast  of  Iberia;  after  a  certain  i'i;ter\al  it  became 
extended  to  the  rejoining  maiidcnd,  and  a  I  (  dy  of  rative  Ibcrir.ns 
were  admitted  to  joint  residence  within  the  new\vallcd  circuit  there 
established.     Ti.is  new  circuit,  however,  was  dividcfl  in  haif  by  an 
intervening  wall,  on  one  side  of  which  dwelt  the  Iberians,  on  the 
other  sitie   the  Greeks.     One  gate   alone  was  permitted,  for  inter- 
communicalion,  guarded  night  and  day  by  appointed  magistiates, 
one  of  whom  was  perpetually  on  the  rpot.     Every  night  one  third  of 
the  Greek  citizens  kept  guard  on  the  walls,  or  at  k-ast  hdd  them- 
selves prepare<l  to  do  so.     How^  long  these  strict  and  fatiguing  pre- 
cautions were  found  necessarj',  we  do  not  know;  but  after  a  certain 
lime  they  wore  relaxed  and  the  intervening  wall  disappeared,  so  that 
Greeks  and  Iberians  freely  coalesced  into  one  communiij'.     It  is  not 
often  that  we  are  allowed  to  see  so  much  in  detail  the  early  difficul- 
ties and  dangers  of  a  Grecian  colony.     JNIassalia  itself  was  situated 
under  nearly  similar  circumstances  among  ll:e  rude  Ligurian  Salyes; 
we  liear  of  these  Ligurians  hiring  themselves  as  laborers  to  dig  on 
tlie  fields  of  Massaliot  proprietors.     The  various  trit>es  of  Ligurians, 
(tjuiIs,  and  Iberians  extended  down  to  the  coast,  so  that  there  was  no 
road  a.long  it.  nor  any  communication  except  by  sea,  until  the  con 
quests  of  the  Romans  in  the  second  and  first  century  before  the 
Christian  era. 

The  government  of  !Ma^sali:\  was  olicrarchical,  carried  on  chiefly  bv 
a  Pen.ate  or  Great  Counc.l  of  Six  Hundred  (called  Timuchi),  elected 
f-u'lifc — and  by  a  snudl  council  of  fifteen,  chosen  among  this  larger 
body  to  take  turn  in  executive  duties.  The  pubiic  habits  of  Vhe 
adndnistrators  are  said  to  have  been  extremely  vigilant  and  circum- 
S'pect;  the  i)rivateh,ibitsof  the  citizens  frugal  and  temperate — amaxi 
mum  being  fixed  by  law  for  dowries  and  marriage  ceremonies,    TUey 


PYTHEAS  OF  MASSALIA. 


785 


were  careful  in  their  dealings  with  the  native  tribes,  with  whom  they 
appear  to  h:ive  maintained  relations  generally  friendly.  The  histo- 
rian Ei)horus  (whose  History  closed  about  840  li.c.)  respected  the  G:uds 
as  e>peeiaily  phil-Hellenic;  an  impression  which  he  could  hardly  iiave 
derived  from  any  liiit  Massaiiot  informants.  The  Massaliols  (who  in 
the  first  century  before  Christ  were  trilingues,  speaking  Greek,  Latin, 
and  Gallic)  e(mtributed  to  engraft  upon  These  unlettered  men'  a  cer- 
tain retinement  and  variety  of  wants,  and  to  lav  the  foundation  of 
that  taste  foi"  letters  which  afterward  beean"ie  laruely  dill  used 
throughout  tiie  Roman  Province  of  Gaul.  At  sea  aud^in^trafiic,  the 
Phenicians  aad  Carthaginians  were  their  formidable  rivals.  TJiis 
was  among  the  causes  which  threw  them  betimes  into  alliance  and 
active  co  operation  witli  Rome,  under  whose  rule  they  obtained 
favorable  ti-eatment,  when  the  blessing  of  freedom  was  no  longer 
wiihiii  their  reach.  ""^  • 

Enough  is  known  about   Massalia  to  show  that  the  city  was  a 
genuine  specimen  of  Hellenis.n  and  Hellenic  influences— acang  not 
by  force  or  constraint,  but  simply  by  superior  intelligence  and  activ- 
ity—by power  of  ministering  to  wants  which  must  otherwise  have 
remained  unsupplied— and  by  the  assimilating  eifeci   of  a  lettered 
civilization  upon  ruder  neighbors.     This  is  the  more  to  be  noticed  as 
it  contrasts  strikingly  with  the  Macedonian  influences  which  have 
occupied  so  much  of  the  present  volume;  force  admirably  organized 
and  wielded  by  Alexander,  yet  still  nothing  but  force.     The  loss  of 
all  de'.ails  respecting  the  history  of  Massalia  is  greatly  to  be  lamented- 
and  [lardiy  less,  that  of  the  writings  of  Pytheas,  an  intelligent  Massal- 
lotic  navigator,  who,  at  this  early  age  (380-320  B.C.),  with  an  adven 
turous  boldness  even  more  than  Phokjean.  sailed  through  the  Pillars 
of  Herakles  and  from  thence  northward  along  the  coast  of  Spain 
Gaul,  Britain,  Germany— perhaps  yet  further.     Probably  no  Greek 
except  a  Massaiiot  could  have  accomplished  such  a  voj^age;  which 
in  his  ease  deserves  the  greater  sympathy,  as  there   was'n'o  other 
reward  for  the  difficulties  and  dang.,'rs  braved  except  the  gratification 
of  an  intelligent  curiosity.     It  seems  plain  th.it  the  publication  of 
his  •'  Survey  of  the  Earth  "—much  consulted  by  Eratosthenes,  though 
the  criticisms  which  have  reached  us  through  Polybius  and  Strabo 
awell  chiefly  upon  its  mistakes,  real  or  supposed— made  an  epoch  in 
ancient  geographical  knowdedge. 

From  the  western  wing  of  the  Hellenic  worid,  w-e  pass  to  the 
eastern— the  Euxine  Sea.  Of  the  Pentapolis  on  its  western  coast 
S)uth  of  the  Daniibe  (Apollonia,  Mesembria,  Kalatis,  Odessus,  and 
prooaoly  Istrus)— and  of  Tyras  near  the  mouth  of  the  river  so  called 
iio\v  Duiesier)— we  have  little  to  record;  though  Istrus  and  Apol- 
lonia  were  among  the  towns  vvliose  political  constitutions  Aristotle 
thought  worthy  of  his  examination.  Hue  Herakleia  on  the  south 
coast,  and  Pantikapasum  or  Bosporus  between  the  Euxine  and  the 
i:'alus  JMseotis  (uow  sea  of  Azof),  are  not  thus  uukuowa  to  history- 


786 


OUTLYING  HELLENIC   CITIES. 


nor  can  Sinope  (on  the  south  coast)  and  Olbia  (on  the  north-west)  bo 
altogether  passed  over.  Thougli  lying  apart  from  the  political 
haid.ship  of  Athens  or  Sparta,  all  these  cities  were  legiliiiiate  members 
>f  the  Hellenic  brotheriiood.  All  supplied  spectators  and  competilors 
/or  the  Pan-Hellenic  lesiivabs — pupils  to  the  rhetors  and  philosophers 
— purchasers,  and  sometimes  even  rivals,  to  the  artists.  All  too 
Avt'ie  (like  Massalia  and  Kyrene)  adulterated  partially — Olbia  and. 
Bosporus  considerably — by  admixture  of  a  uon  Hellenic  element. 

Of  Sinope,  and  its  three  dependent  colonies  Kolyoia.  Kerasus  and 
Trapezus,  I  iiave  alreaiiy  said  something,  in  describing  the  retreat 
of  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks.  Like  Massalia  with  its  dependencies 
Antipolis,  Niksea,  and  others — Sinope  enjoyed  not  meielj'  partial 
independence,  but  considerable  prosperity  and  local  dignity,  at  the 
time  when  Xenophon  and  bis  companions  marched  through  those 
regions.  The  citizens  were  on  terms  of  equal  alliance,  mutually 
advantageous,  with  Korylas  prince  of  Faphlagoada,  on  the  bordei'a 
of  whose  territory  they  dwelt.  It  is  probable  that  they  figured  on 
tlie  tribute  list  ot  the  Persian  king  as  a  portion  of  Paphlagonia,  and 
paid  an  annual  sum;  but  here  ended  their  subjection.  Their  behav- 
ior toward  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  pronounced  enemies  of  the 
Persian  king,  w  as  that  of  an  independent  city.  Neither  they,  nor 
even  theinland  Paphlagonians,  warlike  and  turbulent,  were  molested 
w  ith  Persian  governors  oi  n.ilitary  occupation.  Alexander  however 
numbered  them  among  the  subjects  of  1  ersia;  and  it  is  a  ren.arkable 
fnct,  that  envoys  from  Sinope  were  found  remaining  with  Darius 
almost  to  his  last  hour,  after  he  hm\  bectme  a  conquered  fugitive, 
and  had  lost  his  aimies,  his  citpitals,  and  his  treasures.  These 
Sinopian  envoys  fell  into  the  hands  of  Alexander;  who  set  them  at 
lil)eiiy  wilh  the  remark,  that  since  they  were  not  members  of  the 
lielleuic  confcdeiacy,  but  subjects  of  Persia — their  presence  as 
envoys  near  Darius  was  very  excusable.  The  position  of  Sinope 
placed  her  out  of  the  direct  range  of  the  hostilities  carried  on  by 
Alexander's*successors  against  each  other;  and  the  ancient  Kappado- 
kian  princes  of  the  jMithridatic  fannly  (professedly  desreiielants  of 
the  Persian  AchanienidaE'),  who  ultimately  ripened  into  the  kings  of 
Pontus,  had  not  become  sufficiently  powerful  to  swallow  up  her 
independence  until  the  reign  of  Pharnakes.  in  the  second  century 
before  Christ.  Sinope  than  passed  under  his  dcaninion;  exchanging 
(like  others)  the  condition  of  a  free  Grecian  city  for  that  of  a  subject 
of  the  barbaric  kings  of  Por.tus,  with  a  ciiaeiel  and  n^ercenary  garri- 
S(m  to  keep  her  citizens  in  obeclience.  We  know  nothing  however 
of  the  intermediate  events. 

Respecting  the  Pontic  Ilcrakleia,  our  ignorance  is  not  so  complete. 
That  city — much  nearer  than  Sinope'  to  the  mouth  of  the  Thracian 
Eospejrus,  and  distant  by  sea  frcm  Byzantium  only  one  long  day's 
voyage  of  a  row-boat — was  established  by  Megarians  and  Ba^olians 
ou  the  coast  of  the  Mariandvni.     These  natives  were  subdued,  and 


POLITICAL  DISCORD  AT  HERAKLEIA. 


787 


reduced  to  a  kind  of  serfdom;  whereby  they  became  slaves,  yet  with 
a  proviso  that  they  should  never  be  sold  out  of  the  territory.  Ad- 
joinins^,  ou  the  westward,  between  Herakleia  and  Byzantium,  were 
ithe  Bithynian  Thracians— villagers  not  merely  independent,  but 
warlike  and  fierce  wreckers,  who  cruelly  maltreated  any  Greeks 
stranded  on  their  coast.  We  are  told  in  general  terms  that  the 
government  of  Herakleia  w^as  oligarchical ;  perhaps  in  the  hands  of 
the  descendants  of  the  principal  original  colonists,  who  partitioned 
among  themselves  the  territory  with  its  Mariandynian  serfs,  and 
who  formed  a  small  but  rich  minority  among  the  total  population. 
We  hear  of  them  as  powerful  at  sea,  and  as  being  able  to  manj 
through  their  numerous  serfs,  a  considerable  fleet,  with  which  they 
invaded  the  territory  of  Leukon,  prince  of  the  Kimmerian  Bosporus. 
They  were  also  engaged  in  land-war  with  Mithridates,  a  prince  of  the 
ancient  Persian  famdy  established  as  district  rulers  in  Northern 
Kappadokia. 

Toward  380  370  B.C.  the  Herakleots  became  disturbed  by  'olent 
party-contentions  within  the  city.  As  far  as  we  can  divine  from  a 
few  obscure  hints,  these  contentions  began  among  the  oligarchy 
themselves;  some  of  whom  opposed  and  partially  threw^  open  a  close 
political  monopoly— yet  not  without  a  struggle,  in  the  course  of  which 
an  energetic  citizen  named  Klearchus  was  banished.  Presently  how- 
ever the  contest  assumed  larger  dimensions;  the  plebs  souirht  admis- 
sion into  the  constitution,  and  are  even  said  to  have  required  abolition 
of  debts  with  a  redivision  of  the  lands.  A  democratical  constitution 
was  established;  but  it  was  speedily  menaced  by  conspiracies  of  the 
rich,  to  guard  against  which,  the  classification  of  the  citizens  was  al- 
tered. Instead  of  three  tribes  and  four  centuries,  all  were  distributed 
anew  into  sixty-four  centuries,  the  tribes  being  discontinued.  It 
would  appear  that  in  the  original  four  centuries,  the  rich  men  had 
been  so  enrolled  as  to  form  separate  military  divisions  (probably 
their  rustic  serfs  being  armed  along  with  them)  while  the  three 
tribes  had  contained  all  the  rest  of  the  people;  so  that  the  effect  of 
thus  multiplying  the  centuries  was,  to  divest  the  rich  of  their  sepa- 
rate military  enrollment,  and  to  disseminate  them  in  many  different 
regiments  along  with  a  greater  number  of  poor. 

Still  however  the  demands  of  the  people  were  not  fully  granted, 
ane!  dissension  continued.  Not  merely  the  poorer  citizens,  but  alsei 
the  population  of  serfs — homogeneous,  speaking  the  same  language, 
and  sympathizing  with  each  other,  like  Helots  or  Penestaj— wiien 
once  agitated  by  the  hope  of  liberty  were  with  difficulty  appeased. 
The  government,  though  greatly  democratized,  found  itself  un- 
able to  maintain  tranquillity,  and  invoked  assistance  from  without. 
Application  was  made  first,  to  the  Athenian  Timotheus — next,  to 
the  Theban  Epaminondas;  but  neither  of  them  would  interfere— nor 
was  there,  indeed  any  motive  to  tempt  them.  At  length  applica- 
tion wa&  made  to  the  exiled  citizen  Klearchus. 


788 


OUTLYING  HELLENIC   CITIES. 


This,  cxiie,  now    about  forty  years  of  nge.  intelligent,  fiudacious 
find  imprint  ipltd,  lad  pusstd'loyr  years  at  Alliens  partly  in  iiejiring 
the  les-sons  of  Plato  and  U(  krjiKF— and  hvA  watchtd  >Nilli  emulous 
curiot^ity  the  brilliant  fortune  of  the  despot  Diouysiusal  Syrjieuse,  in 
v.hom    both  tlje^e   pljilosofliers  took  interest.     Luring  lii^  banisli- 
nu  nt,  moreover,  be  had  done  \vl. at  was  ecmiucn  wiih  Grecian  ex- 
iles; he  had  taken  service  with  the  cnen.y  of  his  native  city,  the 
neighboring   prince  "Milhrid^tes,  aiid  piobably  enough  against  the 
city  itself.     As  an  officer,  he  distinguished  hiniself  n.ueli;  acquiring 
renown  with  the  prince  and  influence  over  the  minds  of  the  soldiers. 
Hence  his  fiiends,  and  a  ]  arty  in   llerakleia.  became  anxious  to  re- 
call him,  as  moderator  and  protector  under  the  grievous  political  dis- 
cords prevailing.     It  was  the  <  ligarchical  party  who  invited  him  to 
c<me  back,  at  the   head  of  a  l(  dy  of  trocps,  as  their  auxiliary  in 
keeping  down  the  plebs.     Klearchus  accepted  their  invitation;  but 
with  the  fyll   purpose  of  making  himself    the  Dionysius  of  llera- 
kleia.    Obtaining  from  3Iitliridates  a  powerlul  body  of  m.ercenaries, 
under  secret  promise  to  hold  the  city  only  as  bis  prefect,  he  marched 
tl.ither  with  the  proclaimed   purpose  of  niaintaiting  order  and  up- 
holding the  •lovernment.     As  his  n.ercenaiy  soldiers  were  soon  found 
troublesome  companions,  he  obtained  permission  to  ccnstruct  a  sc]  a 
rate  stromrhold  in  the  city,  under  color  of  keeping  them  apart  in  the 
stricter  discipline  of  a  barrack.     Having  thus  sccur.'d  a  strong  po- 
sition, he  invited  ^Iiihridat(  s  to  the  city  to  receive  the  promised  p(-s- 
se-sion;  but  instead  of  performing  this  engagement,  he  detained  the 
prince  as  a  pri.-oner,  and  only  released  him  on  payment  of  a  ct^nsiel- 
erable  ransom.     He  next  cheated  still  more  grossly  the  oligarchy  who 
had  recalled  him;  dene^uncing  their  past  misrule,  declaring  himself 
their  mortal  enemv.  and  espousing  the  pretensions  as  well  as  the  an- 
tipathies of  the  plebs.     The  latter  willingly  seconded  him  in  his 
measures— even  extreme  measures  of  cruelly  anel  spoliatie)n — against 
their  political  enemies.     A  large  uund)er  of  the  rich  were  killeel,  im- 
prisoned, or  impoverished  and  banished;   their  slaves  or  serfs,  too, 
were  not  only  manumitted  by  order  of  the  new  despot,  but  also  mar- 
ried  to  the  wives  and  daughters  of  the  new  exiles.     Ti.e  niost  trag- 
ical scenes  arose  out  of  these  forced  marriages;  many  e)f  the  wom.en 
even  killed  themselves,  some  having  first  killed  their  new  husbands. 
Among  the  exiles,   a  party,  driven  to  despair,  pre)cured  assistance 
from  without,  and  tried  to  obtain  by  force  readniittance  into  the  ciiy ; 
but  they  were  totally  defeated  by  Klearchus,  who  after  this  victory 
became  more  brutal  and  unrelenting  than  ever. 

He  was  now  in  irresistible  power;  despot  of  the  whole  city,  plebs 
as  well  as  oligarchy.  Such  he  continued  to  be  for  twelve  years,  dur- 
ing w^hich  he  displayed  great  warlike  energy  against  exterior 
enemies,  toirether  with  unabated  cruelty  toward  the  citizens.  He 
further  indulired  in  the  most  overweening  insolence  of  personal  de 
meanor,  adopting  au  oriental  costume  and  ornaments,  and  proclaim- 


SATYRUS  BECOMES  DESPOT. 


789 


ing  himself  the  son  of  Zeus — as  Alexander  the  Great  did  afler  him. 
Amid  all  these  enormities,  however,  his  literary  tastes  did  not 
forsake  him;  he  ce)llectcd  a  library,  at  that  time  a  very  rare  posses- 
sion. Many  were  the  conspiracies  attempted  by  sutferiiig  citizens 
against  this  tyrant;  but  his  vigilance  battled  anel  punished  all,  x\t 
length  two  young  men,  Cliion  and  Leonides  (they  too  having  been 
among  the  heaiers  of  Plato).  fou»idan  opportunity  to  stab  him  at  a 
■Dioiiysiac  festival.  They,  with  those  who  secondeel  them,  were' 
slain  bv  his  guards,  after  a  gallant  resistance;  but  Klearchus  himself 
died  of  the  wound,  in  torture  and  mental  remorse. 

His  death  unfortunately  brought  no  relief  to  the  Herakleots.  The 
two  sons  whom  he  left,  Timotheus  anel  Dionysius,  were  both  mi- 
nors; but  his  brother  Satyrus,  administering  in  their  name,  giasped 
the  scepter  and  continueel  the  despotism,  with  cruelty  not  merely  un- 
diminishe  1;  but  even  aggi'avated  and  sharpened  by  the  past  assassi- 
nation. Not  inferior  to  Ids  predecessor  in  iutelligenceand  vigilance, 
Satyrus  was  in  this  respect  different,  that  he  was  altogetlier  rude  and 
unlettered.  Moreover  he  was  rigidly  scrupulous  in  preserving 
the  crown  for  his  brother's  children,  as  soon  as  they  ohould  be  of 
age.  To  ensure  to  tliemHu  uadisturb  j.l  succession.  I12  te^ok  every  pre- 
caulJon  to  avoid  begetting  children  of  his  own  wife.  After  a  rule  of 
scN'en  years,  Satyrus  died  of  a  lingering  and  painful  distemper. 

The  government  of  Herakleia  now  devolved  ou  Timoiheiis,  who 
exhibited  a  e!OUtrast,  alike  marked  and'benelicent,  with  his  father 
a1i>l  uncle.  Renouncing  all  their  cruelty  and  constraint,  he  set  at 
liberty  every  man  whom  he  found  in  prison.  He  was  strict  in  dis- 
pensing justice,  but  mild  and  even  liberal  in  all  his  dealings  toward 
the  citizens.  At  ths  same  time,  he  w?^s  a  man  of  adventurous  cour- 
age, carrying  on  successful  war  against  foreign  enemies,  and  making 
his  power  respected  all  around.  With  his  younger  brother  Dion\'slus, 
he  maintained  perfect  harmony,  treating  him  as  an  equal  and  paVluer. 
Though  thus  using  his  power  generously  to\vai\l  the  Herakleots,  he 
was.  liowever,  still  a  elespot,  and  retained  the  characteristic  marks 
of  despotism — the  strong  citadel,  fortified  separatel}^  from  the  town, 
with  a  commanding  raercenarv  force.  After  a  reign  of  about  nine 
years,  he  dieel,  deeply  mourned  by  every  one. 

Dionysius,  who  succeeded  him,  fell  upon  unsettled  times,  full 
both  of  hope  and  fear;  opening  chances  of  aggrandizement,  yet  with 
many  new  dangers  and  uncertainties.  The  sovereignty  which  he 
inherited  doubtless  included,  not  simply  the  city  of  He'rakleia,  but 
also  foreign  depenelencies  anel  possessions  in  its  neigiiborhoe)el;  for 
his  three  predecessors  had  been  all  enterprising  chiefs,  commanding 
a  considerable  aggressive  force.  At  the  conunencement  of  his  reign, 
indeed,  the  ascendency  of  Memnon  and  the  Persian  force  in  the  norlh- 
W(»ritern  part  of  Asia  Minor  was  at  a  higher  pitch  than  ordinary;  it 
appears  too  that  Klearchus — and  proba))ly  his  successors  also — had 
alw^ays  taken  caro  to  keep  ou  the  best  terms  with  the  Pep^lan  court. 


700 


OUTLYING  HELLENIC  CITIES. 


But  presently  came  the  invasion  of  Alexander  (334  B.C.),  with  the 
battle  <)f  the  Granikus,  which  totally  extinguished  the  Persian  power 
ill  Asia  Elinor,  ami  was  followed,  after  no  long  interval,  by  the 
entire  conquest  of  the  Persian  empire.  The  Persian  control  being 
iiow  removed  from  Asia  Minor— while  Alexander  with  the  ureal 
Macedonian  force  merely  passed  through  it  to  the  east,  leaving  "vice- 
roys behind  him — new  hopes  of  independence  or  aggrandizement 
.  began  to  arise  among  the  native  princes  in  Bithynia.Pai>hlagonia,  and 
Kappadokia.  The  Bithynian  prince  even  contended  successfully  in 
the  held  against  Kalus,  who  had  been  appointed  by  Alexander  as 
eatrap  in  Phrygia.  The  Herakleot  Diouysius,  on  the  other  hand, 
enemy  by  position  of  these  Bithynians,  courted  the  new  Macedonian 
potentates,  playing  his  political  game  with  much  skill  in  everv  way. 
He  kept  his  forces  well  in  hand,  and  his  dominions  carefuly  guarded; 
he  ruled  in  a  mild  and  popular  manner,  so  as.to  preserve  among  the 
Herakleots  the  same  feelings  of  attachment  which  had  been  inspired 
by  his  predecessor.  While  the  citizens  of  the  neichborinii  Sinope 
(as  has  been  already  related)  sent  their  envoys  to  Darius,  Dionysius 
kei)t  his  eyes  upon  Alexander;  taking  care  to  establish  a  footing  at 
Pella,  and  being  peculiarly  assiduous  in  attentions  to  Alexander's 
sister,  the  princess  Kleopatra.  He  was  the  belter  qualified  for  this 
courtly  service,  as  he  was  a  man  of  elegant  and  ostentatious  tastes, 
and  had  purchased  from  his  namesake,  the  fallen  Syracusan  Diony- 
sius,  all  the  rich  furniture  of  the  Dionysian  family,  highly  available 
for  presents. 

By  the  favor  of  Antipater  and  the  regency  at  Pella,  the  Ilerakleotic 
des])ot  was  enabled  both  to  maintain  antl  extend  his  dominions,  until 
the  return  of  Alexander  to  Susa  and  B.'ibylon  in  324  B.C.  All  other 
authority  was  now  superseded  by  the  personal  will  of  the  omnipotent 
conqueror;  who,  mistrusting  alfhis  delegates— Antipater,  the  prin- 
cesses, and  the  satraps — listened  readily  to  complainants  from  all 
quarters,  and  took  particular  pride  in 'espousing  the  pretensions  of 
Grecian  exiles.  I  have  already  recounted  how,  in  June  324  B.C., 
Alexander  promulgated  at  the  Olympic  festival  a  sweeping  edict, 
directing  that  in  every  Grecian  city  the  exiles  should  be  restored  - 
by  force,  if  force  was  required.  Among  the  various  Grecian  exiles, 
those  from  Herakleia  were  not  backward  in  sohciting  his  support,  to 
obtain  their  own  restoration,  as  well  as  the  expulsion  of  the  despot 
As  they  were  entitled,  along  with  others,  to  the  benefit  of  the  recent 
edict,  the  position  of  Dionysius  became  one  of  extreme  danger.  He 
now  reaped  the  full  bcnetit  of  his  antecedent  prudence,  in  having 
maintained  both  his  popularity  with  the  Herakleots  at  home,  and  his 
influence  with  Antipater,  to  whom  the  enforc(ment  of  the  edict  was 
entrusted.  He  was  thus  enabled  to  ward  off  the  danger  for  a  time; 
and  his  good  fortune  rescued  him  from  it  altogether,  by  the  death  of 
Alexander  in  June  323  B.C.  That  event,  coming  as  it  did  unexpect- 
edly upon  every  one,  filled  Dionysius  with  such  extravagant  joy, 


DIONYSIUS  MARRIES   AMASTRIS. 


791 


that  he  fell  into  a  swoon ;  and  he  commemorated  it  by  erecting  a  statue 
in  honor  of  Eutliymia.  or  the  tranquilizing  goddess.  His  position 
however  seemed  again  precarious,  when  the  Ilerakleotic  exiles  re- 
newed their  solicitations  to  Perdikkas;  who  favored  their  cause,  and 
might  probably  have  restored  them,  if  he  had  chosen  to  direct  his 
march  toward  the  Hellespont  against  Antipater  and  Kraterus,  instead 
of  undertaking  the  ill-adviied  expedition  against  Egypt,  wherein  he 
perished. 

The  tide  of  fortune  now  turned  more  than  ever  in  favor  of  Diony- 
sius. With  Antipater  and  Kraterus  the  preponderant  potentates  in 
his  neighborhood,  he  was  on  the  best  terms;  and  it  happened  at  thi.^ 
juncture  to  suit  the  political  views  of  Kraterus  to  dismiss  his  Persian 
wife  Amastris  (niece  of  the  late  Persian  king  Darius,  and  conferred 
upon  Kraterus  by  Alexander  when  he  himself  married  Statira),  for 
the  purpose  of  espousing  Phila  daughter  of  Antipater.  Amastris 
was  given  in  marriage  to  Dionysius;  for  him  a  splendid  exaltatio'n— 
attesting  the  perscmal  influence  which  he  had  previously  acquired. 
His  nevv  wife,  herself  a  woman  of  ability  and  energy,  brought  to  him 
a  large  sum  from  the  regal  treasure,  as*  well  as  the  means  of  greatly 
extending  his  dominion  round  Herakleia.  Noway  corrupted  by  this 
good  fortune,  he  still  persevered  both  in  his  conciliating  rule  at  home, 
and  his  prudent  alliances  abroad,  making  himself  especially  useful  to 
Antigonus.  That  great  chief,  preponderant  throughout  most  parts 
of  Asia  Minor,  was  establisiiing  his  ascendency  in  Bithynia  and  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Propontis,  by  founding  the  city  of  Antigonia  in 
the  rich  plain  adjoining  the  Askanian  Lake.  Dionysius  lent  elfective 
maritime  aid  to  x\ntigonus,  in  th:it  war  which  ended  by  his  conquest 
of  Cyprus  .from  the  Egyptian  Ptolemy  (307  B.C.).  To  the  other 
Ptolemy,  nephew  and  general  of  Antigonus,Dionysius  gave  his  daugh- 
ter in  marriage;  and  he  even  felt  himself  powerful  enough  to  assume 
the  title  of  king  after  Antigonus,  Lysimachus.  and  the  Egyptian 
Ptok'.my  had  done  the  like.  He  died,  after  reigning  thirty  years  with 
consum'mate  political  skill  and  unintcTupted  prosperity— except  that 
during  the  la.st  few  years  he  lost  his  health  from  excessive  corpulence. 

Dionysius  left  three  cliildren  under  age — Klearchus,Oxathres  and 
a  daughter— by  his  wife  Amastris;  wliom  he  constituted  regent, 
and  who.  partly  through  the  cordial  support  of  Antigonus,  maintained 
the  Ilerakleotic  dominion  unimpaired".  Presently  Lysimachus,  king 
of  Thrace  and  of  the  Thracian  Chersonese  (on  the  isthmus  of  which 
he  had  founded  the  city  of  Lysimaclicia),  coveted  this  as  a  valuable 
alliance,  paiil  his  court  to  Amastris,  and  married  her.  The  Hera- 
kleotic  queen  thus  enjoyed  double  protection,  and  was  enabled  to 
avoid  taking  part  in  tlie  formidable  conflict  of  Ipsus  (BOO  B.C.)  where- 
in the  allies  Lysimachus,  Kas.^ander,  Ptolemy,  and  Seleukus  were 
victorious  over  Antigonus.  The  latter  being  .'-lain,  and  his  Asi:itic 
])o\ver  crushed,  Lysimachus  got  possession  of  Antigonia,  the  recent 
loundation  of  his  rival  ia  Bithynia,  and  changed  its  name  to  Niktea. 


79!^ 


OUTLYJNG  HELLENIC   CITIES. 


After  accrtain  time,  however,  Lysimachus  became  desirous  of  marry- 
ing  Ardinoe,  daughter  of  the  Egyptian  Ptolemy;  accord iiigly,  A mas- 
tris  divorced  herself  from  him,  and  set  up  for  herself  separately  as 
regent  of  Herakleia.  Ikr  two  sons  heirg  now  nearly  of  age," she 
founded  an^l  fortified,  for  her  own  residence,  the  neighboring  city  of 
Amastris,  about  sixty  miles  eastward  of  Herakleia  en  the  coast  of 
tlie  Euxine.  These  young  men,  Klearclius  and  Oxaihres,  assumed 
the  goveriunent  of  lleraklein,  r.iul  entered  upon  various  wtirlike 
Mitrrprises;  of  which  we  know  only,  that  Klcan  bus  accompanied 
Lysimachus  ill  his  expedition  against  the  Gctie,  sharirg  the  fate  of 
that  prince,  who  was  defeated  and  taken  ]  risoner.  Loih  afterward 
obtained  their  rckase,  and  Kiearchus  returned  to  Herakleia;  where 
I'.e  ruled  in  a  cruel  and  <  pprcssivenianner,  aid  even  committed  the 
enormity  (in  conjunction  with  his  Irotlier  Oxatlues)  of  killirg  his 
mother  Amastris.  This  crime  was  avenged  by  lier  former  husband 
Lysimachus;  who,  coming  to  Herakleia  under  professions  of  friend- 
ship ^B.c.  286),  caused  Klearclius  and  Oxathres  to  be  put  to  death, 
seized  their  treasure,  and  keeping  separate  possession  of  "tl:e  citadel 
only,  allowed  the  Herakleots  to  establish  a  ]i<tpular  government. 

Lysimachus.  however,  was  soon  persuaded  ly  his  wife  Arsinoe  to 
make  over  Herakleia  to  her,  as  it  had  been  formerly  possessed  by 
Amastris;  and  Arsinoe  sent  thither  n  Kynijean  officer  named  Hera- 
kleides.  who  carried  with  him  force  suflTcient  to  reestabli.-h  the  for- 
mer despotism,  with  its  oppressions  and  cruelties.  For  other  pur- 
poses too,  not  less  mischievous,  the  infiuence  of  Arsinoe  was  all- 
powerful.  She  prevailed  upon  Lysimachus  to  kill  his  eldest  son  (l-y 
a  former  marriage)  Agatbokles,  a  }'oung  prince  of  the  most  estimable 
and  eminent  qualities.  Such  an  atrocity,  exciting  universal  abhor- 
rence among  the  subjects  of  Lysimachus,  enabled  his  rival  Selcukus 
to  attack  him  with  success.  In  a  great  battle  fought  between  tlu  se 
two  princes,  Lysimachus  was  defeated  and  slain — by  the  hand  and 
javelin  of  a  citizen  of  Herakleia,  named  ^Falakon. 

This  victory  transferred  the  dominions  of  the  vancjuishcd  prince  to 
Seleukus.  At  Herakleia,  too,  its  effect  was  so  j^owerful  that  the 
citizens  were  enabled  to  shake  off  their  despotism.  They  at  first  tried 
to  make  terms  with  the  governor  Herakleides,  offering  him  money  as 
an  inducement  to  withdraw.  From  him  they  obtaineil  only  an  angry 
refu^^al;  yet  his  subordinate  officers  of  mereeuaries,  and  commanders 
of  detaclied  posts  in  the  Ilerakleotic  territory,  mistrusting  their  own 
power  of  holding  out,  accented  an  amicable  compromise  with  tlie 
citizens,  Avho  tendered  to  them  full  liquidation  of  arreais  of  pay,  to- 
gi^ther  with  the  citizenship.  The  Herakleots  were  thus  enabled  to 
disctud  Herakleides,  and  regain  their  popular  government.  Th(y 
signalized  their  revolution  by  the  impre>sive  ceremony  of  demolish- 
ing their  Bastiie — the  detached  fort  or  stronghold  within  the  city, 
Avhieh  had  served  for  eighty-four  years  as  the  characteristic  symbol, 
and  indispensable  engine,  of  the  antecedent  despotism.     The  city, 


SITUATION  OF  HERAKLEIA. 


793 


now  again  a  free  commonwealth,  was  further  re-enforced  by  the 
junction  of  Nyniphis  (the  historian)  and  other  Herakleotic  citizens, 
w!;o  hid  hitherto  t)een  in  exile.  These  men  w;ere  restored,  and  \vel- 
con:ed  uy  their  fellow-citizens  in  full  friendsliip  aftd  harmony;  yet 
wiUi  express  i)roviso,  that  no  demand  should  be  made  for  the  restitu- 
tion of  their  properties,  long  since  confiscated.  To  the  victor  Seleu- 
kus, however,  and  his  oliieer  Aphrodisius,  the  bold  bearing  of  the 
newly  emancipated  Herakleots  proved  offensive.  They  would  proba- 
bly have  incurred  great  danger  frcm  liini.  had  not  his  mind  been  first 
set  upon  the  conquest  of  Macedonia,  in  die  accojuplishmeut  of  which 
he  was  murdered  by  Ptoiemy  Keraunus. 

The  Herakleots  thus  became  again  a  commonwealth  of  free  citi- 
zens, without  any  detached  citadel  or  mercenary  garrison;  yet  they 
lost,  soeniingly  through  the  growing  force  and  aggressions  of  some 
inland  dynasts,  several  of  their  outlying  dependencies — Kierus,  Tium, 
and  Amastris.  The  two  former  they  recovered  some  time  afterward 
by  purchase,  and  they  wished  also  to  purchase  back  Amastris;  but 
Eumenes,  who  held  it,  hated  them  so  much  that  he  repudiated  their 
money,  and  handed  over  the- place  gratuitously  to  the  Kappadokian 
chief  Ariobarzanes.  That  their  maritime  power  was  at  tliis  tinie  very 
great,  we  may  see  by  the  astonisjung  account  given  of  their  immense 
ship^, — nuiiierouslv  manned,  and  furnished  with  many  brave  com- 
batcuits  Oil  the  deck— which  fouglit  with  eminent  distinction  in  the 
naval  battle  between  Ptolemy  Keraunus  (murderer  and  successor  of 
Seleukus)  and  Antigonus  Gonatas. 

It  is  not  my  puipose  to  follow  lower  down  the  destinies  of  Hera- 
kleia. It  maintained  its  internal  autonomy,  with  considerable  mari- 
time power,  a  dignified  and  prudent  administration,  and  a  partial, 
though  sadly  circumscribed,  liberty  of  foreign  action — until  the  sue- 
eessful  war  of  the  Romans  against  Mithrid.ites  (B.C.  60).  In  Asia 
Minor,  the  Hellenic  cities  on  the  coast  were  partly  enabled  to  post- 
pone the  epoch  of  their  subjugation,  by  the  great  division  of  power 
which  prevailed  in  tlie  interior;  for  the  potentates  of  Bithynia,  Perga- 
mus,  Kappadokia,  Pontus,  Syria,  werfc  in  almost  perpetual  discf)rd 
— while  all  of  them  were  menaced  by  the  intrusion  of  the  warlike 
and  predatory  Gauls,  who  extorted  for  themselves  settlements  in 
Galatia(B.c  276).  The  kings,  the  enemies  of  civic  freedom,  were 
ke[)t  partially  in  check  by  these  new  and  formidable  neighbors,  who 
Were  themselves  however  hardly  less  formidable  to  the  Grecian  cities 
on  the  coast.  Sinope,  Herakleia,  Byzantium, — and  even  Rhodes,  i.i 
spite  of  the  advauttige  of  an  insular  position, — isolated  relics  of  what 
had  (mee  been  an  Hellenic  aggregate,  become  from  lienceforward 
ciibbed  and  confined  by  inland  neighbors  .alniosi  at  their  gates — de- 
pendent on  the  barbaric  potentates,  between  Avliom  they  were  com- 
pelled to  trim,  making  themselves  useful  in  turn  to  all.  It  w^as, 
however,  frequent  with  these  barbaric  princes  to  derive  tlieir  wives, 
mistresses,  ministers,  negotiators,  officers,  engineers,  literati,  artists. 


794 


OUTLYING  HELLENIC   CITIES. 


actors,  and  intermediate  agents  both  for  oniaraent  and  recreation — 
from  some  Greek  city.  Among  tlieni  all,  more  or  less  of  Hellenic 
intluence  became  thus  msinuuleil;  along  uiiii  the  Greek  languaiic 
Wiiich  spread  its  roots  everywhere — even  among  the  Gauls  or  Galu- 
tians,  the  rudest  ;-ud  latest  of  the  foreign  inuiiigrauls. 

Of  the  Grecian  maritime  towns  in  the  Euxiue  south  of  the  Danube 
— Ap«jllonia,  Mesembria,  Odessus,  Kallatis,  Tomi,  and  Lstrus — ^ive 
(sccmhigly  witliout  Tomi)  formed  a  coutedcrate  Pentapolis.  About 
the  year  312  li.c,  we  hear  of  theni  as  under  the  power  of  Lysima- 
ch us  king  of  Thrace,  who  kept  a  garrison  in  Kallatis — probably  in  the 
rest  also.  They  made  a  struggle  to  shake  off  liis  yoke,  obtaining 
assistance  from  some  of  the  neighboring  Thracians  and  iScylhians, 
as  well  as  from  Antigonus.  Bui  Lysimachus,  after  a  contest  which 
Bcems  to  have  lasted  three  or  four  years,  overpowered  both  their 
allies  and  them,  reducing  them  again  into  subjection.  Kallatis  sus- 
tained a  long  siege,  dibmissing  some  of  its  iuellective  residents;  who 
were  received  and  sheltered  by  Eumelus  prince  of  Bosporus.  It  was 
in  pii.^-hing  his  conquests  yet  further  northward,  in  the  steppe  between 
the  riv(,'rs"Dauube  and  Dniester,  that  Lysimachus  came  into  conliict 
with  the  power!  ul  prince  of  the  Getai — DromicLietes;  by  whom  he 
w  as  defeated  and  captured,  but  generously  released.  I  have  already 
mentioned  that  the  empire  of  Lysimachus  ended  with  his  last  defeat 
and  death  by  Selcukus— (2^1  B.C.).  By  his  death  the  cities  of  the 
Pontic  Pentapolis  regained  a  temporary  independence.  But  their 
barbaric  neighbors  became  more  and  more  formidable,  being  le-en- 
forced  seemingly  by  inimigration  of  fresh  hordes  from  Asia;  thus  the 
Sarmatians,  who  in  Herodotus'  time  were  on  the  east  of  the  Tanais, 
appear,  three  centuries  afterward,  even  south  of  the  Danube.  By 
these  tribes — Thracians,  Geta?,  Scythians  and  Sarmatians — the  Greek 
cities  of  this  Pentapolis  were  successively  pillaged.  Though  renewed 
indeed  afterward,  from  the  necessity  of  some  place  of  traffic,  even 
for  the  pillagers  themselves — they  were  but  poorly  renewed,  \Nith  a 
large  infusion  of  barbaric  residents.  Such  was  the  condition  in 
which  the  exile  Ovid  found  Tomi,  near  the  beginning  of  the  Christian 
era.  The  Tomitans  were  more  than  half  barbnric,  and  their  Greek 
not  easily  intelligible.  The  Sarmalian  or  Gelic  horse-bowmen,  with 
their  poisoned  aiTows.  ever  hovered  near,  galloped  even  up  to  the 
gr.tes,  and  carried  off  the  unwary  cultivators  into  slavery.  Even 
within  a  furlong  of  the  town,  there  wjis  no  secuiity  either  for  person 
or  propert}'.  The  residents  were  clothed  in  skins  or  leather;  while 
li.e  women,  ignorant  both  of  Svpinning  and  weaving,  were  employed 
either  in  grinding  corn  or  in  carrying  on  their  heads  pitchers  of 
water. 

By  these  same  barbarians,  Olbia  also  (on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Hypanis  or  Bug  near  its  mouth)  became  robbed  of  that  comfort  and 
prosperity  which  it  had  enjoyed  when  visited  by  Herodotus.  In  his 
day,  the  Olbians  lived  on  good  terms  with  the  Scythian  tribes  in  then* 


OVID  AT  TOMI. 


795 


neighborhood.  They  paid  a  stipulated  tribute,  giving  presents  besides 
to  the  prince  and  his  immediate  favorites;  and  on  these  conditions, 
their  persons  and  properties  were  respected.  The  Scythian  prince; 
Skyles  (son  of  an  Hellenic  mother  from  lstrus,  who  had  familiarized 
hini  vvitii  Greek  speech  and  letters)  had  built  a  line  house  in  the  towMi, 
and  spent  in  it  a  mouth,  from  attachment  to  Greek  manners  ami 
religion,  while  his  Scythinn  army  lay  near  the  gates  without  molcst- 
ingany  one.  It  is  true  that  this  proceeding  cost  Skyles  his  life;  for 
the  Scythians  would  not  tolerate  their  own  prince  in  the  practice  of 
foreign  religious  rites,  though  they  did  not  quan-el  with  the  same 
rites  when  observed  by  the  Greeks.  To  their  o.wn  customs  the 
Scythians  adhered  tenaciously,  and  those  customs  were  often  sangui- 
nary, ferocious,  and  brutish.  Still  they  were  warriors,  rather  than 
robbers — they  abstained  from  habitual  pillage,  and  maintained  with 
the  Greeks  a  reputation  for  honesty  and  fair  dealing,  which  became 
proverbial  with  the  early  poets.  Such  were  the  Scythians  as  seen 
b}'-  Herodotus  (probably  about  440  to  430  B.C.);  and  the  picture  drawn 
by  Ephorus  a  century'  afterward  (about  340  B.C.)  appears  to  have 
been  not  materially  difTereut.  But  after  that  time  it  gradually  altered. 
New  tribes  seem  to  have  come  in — the  Sarmatians  out  of  the  East — 
the  Gauls  out  of  the  West;  from  Thrace  northward  to  the  Tanais 
and  the  Palus  Ma^otis,  the  most  different  tribes  became  intermingled 
— Gauls,  Thracians,  Gette,  Scythians,  Sarmatians,  etc.  Olbia  was  in 
an  open  plain,  with  no  defense  except  its  walls  and  the  adjoining 
river  Hypanis,  frozen  over  in  the  winter.  The  hybrid  Helleno- 
Scythian  race,  formed  by  intermarriages  of  Greeks  with  Scythians — 
and  the  various  Scythian  tribes  who  had  become  partially  sedentary 
cultivators  of  corn  for  exportation — had  probably  also  acquired  habits 
less  warlike  than  the  tribes  of  primitive  barbaric  type.  At  any  rate, 
even  if  capable  of  defending  themselves,  they  could  not  continue 
their  production  and  commerce  under  repeated  hostile  incursions. 

A  valuable  inscription  remnining  enables  us  to  compare  the  Olbia 
(or  Borysthenes)  seen  by  Herodotus,  with  the  same  town  in  the 
second  century  B.C.  At  this  latter  period,  the  cit}-- was  diminished 
in  population,  impoverished  in  finances,  exposed  to  constantly  in- 
creasing exactions  and  menace  from  the  passing  barbaric  hordes'  and 
scarcely  able  to  defend  against  them  even  the  security^  of  its  walls. 
Sometimes  there  approached  the  barbaric  chief  Saitapharnes  with 
his  personal  suite,  sometimes  his  whole  tribe  or  horde  in  mass,  called 
Sail.  Whenever  they  came,  they  required  to  be  appeased  by  pres- 
ents, greater  than  the  treasury  could  supply,  and  borrowed  only 
from  the  voluntary  help  of  rich  citizens;  while  even  these  presents 
did  not  alwavs  avert  ill-treatment  or  pilhurc  Alreadv  the  ciiizeiL^  of 
Olbia  had  reoelled  various  attacks,  partlv  by  taking  into  pay  a  semi- 
Hellenic  population  in  their  neighborhood  (Mix-Hellenes,  like  the 
Lib3''Pheniciaii>^  in  Africa);  but  the  inroads  became  more  alarming, 
and  their  means  of  defense  less,  through  the  uncertain  fidelity  of 


796 


OUTLYING  HELLENIC  CITIES. 


these  IMLx-IIellenes,  as  well  as  of  their  own  slaves — the  latter  proba- 
l)Iy  barbaric  natives  purchased  from  the  interior.  In  tliC  niivlist  of 
])ublic  poverty,  it  was  necessary  to  enlarge  and  stren^ihen  liie  fortifi- 
cations; for  they  were  threatened  with  liie  advent  ot  the  Gauls — who 
inspired  such  terror  that  the  Scythians  and  other  barbarians  were 
likely  to  seek  their  own  safely  by  extorting  aihnis&ion  witliiii  the 
Avalis  of  Olbia.  jVIoreover  even  corn  was  scarce,  and  extravagantly 
dear.  There  had  been  repealed  failures  in  the  pi  educe  of  the  h;nds 
around,  famine  was  apprehended,  and  efforts  were  needed,  greater 
than  ihe  treasury  could  sustain,  to  lay  in  a  stock  at  the  public  ex- 
pense. Among  the  many  points  of  contrast  with  Herodotus,  this  is 
P'jrhaps  the  most  striking;  tor  in  his  lime,  corn  was  the  gicat  pro- 
duce and  ihe  principal  export  from  (jlbia;  the  growtli  had  now  been 
suspended,  or  was  at  least  perpetually  cut  off,  by  lucieafccd  devassla- 
tion  and  insecurity. 

After  perpetual  attacks,  and  even  several  captures,  by  barbaric 
neighbors — this  uniorlunale  city,  jibout  t^.fiy  years  before  tiie 
Christian  era,  was  at  length  so  niisc  rably  sacked  by  tbe  Geta?,  as  to 
become  for  a  lime  abandone<i.  Presenily,  however,  the  fugitives 
partially  returned,  to  re-estal»lish  themselves  on  a  reduced  scale.  For 
the  very  same  barbarians  who  had  pc  i^ecuted  ;.nd  plundered  ihem, 
stiil  required  an  emporium  with  a  certain  amount  of  import  and 
export,  such  as  none  but  Greek  settlers  could  provide;  moreover  it 
was  from  tlie  coast  near  Olbia,  and  from  the  care  of  iis  inluibilanls, 
that  many  of  the  neighboring  tribes  derived  their  sujiply  of  salt. 
Hence  arose  a  puny  after-growth  of  Olbia — preserving  the  name, 
traditions,  and  part  of  the  locality,  of  the  deserted  <iiy — ^^by  the 
return  of  a  i)ortion  of  the  colonists  with  an  infusion  of  bcythian  or 
Sarmatian  residents;  an  infusion  indeed  so  large,  as  seriously  to  dis- 
helleuize  botli  the  speech  and  ihe  personal  names  in  the  town. 

To  this  second  edition  of  Olbia,  the  rhetor  Dion  Ciirysoslom  paid 
a  summer  visit  (-about  a  century  after  the  Christian  era),"^  of  which  he 
has  left  a  brief  but  interesting  account.  Within  th.e  wide  area  once 
lilied  by  the  original  Olbia  ihe  former  circumference  of  which  was 
marked  by  crumbling  wails  and  towers — the  second  town  occupied  a 
narrow  corner;  with  poor  houses,  low  walls,  and  temples  having  no 
other  ornament  except  the  ancient  statues  mutilated  by  ihe  plun- 
derers. The  citizens  dwelt  in  jxrpetual  insecurity,  constanliy  under 
arms  or  on  guard;  for  the  barbaric  .horsemen,  in  spite  oi  sentinels 
ported  to  announce  their  approach,  often  carried  off  prisoners,  cattle, 
or  property,  from  ihe  immediate  neighborhood  of  iJie  gates.  The 
picture  drawn  of  Olbia  by  Dion  contirms  in  a  remarkable  way  lliat 
given  of  Tomi  by  Ovid.  And  what  imparls  to  it  a  louehiiii-  interest 
18,  that  the  Greeks  wiiom  Dion  saw  contending  with  the  dilficulties, 
privations,  and  dangers  of  this  inhosi)ilable  out]iosl,  still  retained 
the  nctivity.  the  elegance,  and  the  intellectual  aspinitions  of  their 
loilie  breed;  in  this  respect  much  superior  to  the  1  omiLans  of  Ovid. 


GREEKS  OF   BOSPORUS. 


797 


In  particular,  they  were  passionate  admirers  of  Homer:  a  consid( 
able  proportion  of  tlie'Greeks  of  Olbia  could  repeat  the  Iliad  fro 


der- 
proportion  or  uie  ureeKs  or  uioia  coma  repeat  tiie  mad  irom 
memory.  Achilles  (localized  under  the  surname  of  Pontarches,  on 
numerous  islands  and  capes  in  the  Euxine)  was  among  the  cliief 
diviije  or  heroic  persons  to  whom  they  addressed  their  prayers. 
Amid  Grecian  life,  degraded  and  verging  toward  its  extinction,  imd 
stripped  even  of  the  purity  of  living  speech — the  thread  of  im.'tgina- 
tive  and  traditional  sentiment  thus,  conliuues  without  suspension  or 
abatement. 

Respecting  Bosporus  or  Pautikapjcum  (for  both  names  denote  the 
same  city,  though  the  former  name  often  comprehends  the  whole 
annexed  dominion),  founded  by  Milesian  settlers  on  the  European 
side  of  the  kimmerian  Bosporus  (near  Kertch).  we  first  hear,  Jibout 
the  period  when  Xerxes  was  repulsed  from  Greece  (480-479  B.C.).  It 
was  tlie  center  of  a  dominion  including  Phanagoria,  Kepi,  ilermo- 
nassa,  a!id  otlier  Greek  cities  on  tiie  Asiatic  side  of  the  sirait;  and  is 
said  to  have  been  governed  by  what  seems  to  have  be;  u  an  oligarchy 
— called  the  Arcluean  iktid;e,  for  forty-two  years  (480-4:J8  Jic.)^ 

After  them  we  have  a  series  of  princes  standing  out  individually 
by  name,  and  sueceedinir  each  other  in  the  same  family.  Spartokus 
I.  was  succeeded  by  Selcikus;  next  comes  Spartokus  II. ;  then 
Satyrus  I.  (407-393  B.C.);  Leukon  ((393-353  B.C.);  Spartokus  III. 
(3.'>3-3tS  BC);  Parisades  I.  (348-310  b.  c);  Satyrus  II.,  Prylanis, 
Eumelus  (310-304  b.c  );  Spar! okus  IV.  (304-284  B.C.);  Parisades  II. 
During  the  reigns  of  these  prince-;,  a  connectiem  of  some  intimacy 
sub-isled  between  Athens  and  Bosporus;  a  connection  not  politl- 
cjil,  since  the  Bosporanic  princes  had  little  interest  in  the  contentions 
about  Hellenic  hegemony — but  of  private  intercourse,  commercial 
interch  inge,  and  reciprocal  goo  I  olfije^.  The  eastern  corner  of  the 
Tanric  Chersonesu-,  between  Pantikapaeuai  and  Theodosia,  was 
M'ell  suited  for  the  productioa  of  corn;  while  plenty  of  fish,  as  well 
as  salt,  was  to  be  had  in  or  near  the  Palus  Mteotis.  Corn,  salted 
fish  and  meat,  biles,  and  barbaric  slaves  in  considerable  numbers, 
were  in  demand  among  all  the  Greeks  round  the  .Egean,  and  not  least 
at  xVthens,  where  Scythian  slaves  were  numerous,  while  oil  and 
wine,  with  other  products  of  more  southern  rciiions,  were  accept- 
able in  Bosporus  and  the  other  Pontic  ports.  Thi-^  important  traffic 
seems  to  have  been  mainly  carried  on  in  ships  and  by  capital  belong- 
ing to  Athens  and  other  JEgean  maritime  towns;  and  must  have 
beeti  greatly  under  the  protection  and  regulation  of  the  xVthenians, 
so  long  as  their  maritime  empire  subsisted.  Enterpiising  citizens 
of  Athens  went  to  Bosporus  (as  to  Thrace  and  the  Tiir.ician  Cher- 
scnesus)  to  push  their  fortunes;  merchants  from  other  cities  fonnd 
it  advantageous  to  settle  as  resident  strangers  or  metics  at  Athens 
where  they  were  more  in  contact  witli  the  protecting  authority,  and 
obtained  readier  access  to  the  judicial  tribunals.  It  was  probably 
during  the  period  preceding  the  great  disaster  at  Syracuse  in  413 


798 


OUTLYING  HELLENIC  CITIES. 


B.C.,  that  Athens  first  acquired  her  position  as  a  mercantile  center 
for  the  trade  with  the  Euxiuc;  which  we  afterward  find  her  retaining, 
even  with  reduced  power,  in  the  time  of  Demosthenes. 

How  stroni;-  was  the  position  enjoyed  by  Athens  in  Bosponis,  dur- 
ing lier  unimpaired  empire,  we  may  judge  from  the  fact,  that  Nj'm- 
phapum  (south  of  Panliivapajum,  between  that  town  and  Theodosia) 
was  among  lier  tributary  towns,  and  paid  a  talent  annually.  Not 
until  tiie  misfortunes  of  Athens  in  the  closing  years  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war.  did  Nymphteum  pass  into  the  hands  of  the  Bosporanic 
princes;  betrayed  (according  to  ^schines)  by  the  maternal  grand- 
father of  Demosthenes,  the  Athenian  Gylon ;  who  however  probably 
did  nothing  more  than  obey  a  necessity  rendered  unavoidlible  by  the 
fallen  condition  of  Athens.  We  thus  sec  that  Nymphaeum,  in  the 
midst  of  the  Bosporanic  dominion,  was  not  only'a  member  of  the 
Athenian  empire,  but  also  coutained  influential  Athenian  citizens, 
engaged  in  the  corn-trade.  Gylon  was  rewarded  by  a  large  grant 
of  land  at  Kepi — probably  other  Athenians  cf  Nymphaum  were 
rewarded  also — by  the  Bosporanic  prince,  who  did  not  grudge  a 
good  price  for  such  an  acquisition.  We  find  also  other  instances, 
— both  of  Athenian  citizens  sent  out  to  reside  with  the  prince 
Satyrus, — and  of  Pontic  Greeks  who,  already  in  correspondence  and 
friendship  w  ith  various  individual  Atlieniyns,  consign  their  sons  to 
be  initiated  in  the  commerce,  society,  and  refinements  of  Athens. 
{!^uch  facts  attest  the  correspondence  and  intercourse  of  that  city, 
during  her  imperial  greatness,  with  Bosporus. 

The  Bosporanic  ])rince  Satyrus  was  in  the  best  relations  with 
Athens,  and  even  seems  to  have  had  authorized  re presentalivts  there 
to  enforce  his  requests,  which  met  with  very  great  attention.  He 
treated  the  Athenian  merchants  at  Btsporus  with  equity  and  even 
favor,  granting  to  them  a  preference  in  the  export  of  corn  when  there 
was  not  enough  for  all.  His  son  Leukon  not  only  continued  the 
preference  to  Athenian  exporting  ships,  but  also  granted  to  them 
remission  of  the  export  duty  (of  one  thiitieth  rart),  whi(  h  he  exacted 
from  all  other  traders.  Such  an  exemption  is  reckoned  as  equivalent 
to  an  annual  present  of  13,0C0  medimni  of  corn  (the  medimnus  being 
about  H  bushel);  the  total  quantitj^  of  corn  brought  Ircm  Bof-poius 
to  Athens  in  a  fu]l  year  being  4C'0,CC0  medimn}.  It  is  easy  to  see 
moreover  that  such  a  premium  must  have  thrown  nearly  the  w  bole 
exporting  trade  into  the  hands  of  Atl-.enian  merehants.  The  Athe- 
nians re^quited  this  favor  by  public  votes  of  giatitude  and  honor, 
conferring  upon  Leukon  the  citizenship,  tcgeUier  with  in:mi,nity 
from  .-ill  the  n-guhsr  burdens  attaehirg  to  properly  at  Athrns.  1 1.(  re* 
was  Ivinsi:  in  that  cilv  nont  v  bel<  n«2ini!'  to  Leiikcn;  who  was  there- 
fore  open  (under  the  i;roi;e)sition  of  Leptines)  to  that  condiiional 
summons  for  exchange  of  properties,  teehnieally  termeel  Antidosis. 
In  his  time,  moreover,  the  corn-traele  of  Bosporus  appears  to  have 
be^n  further  extended;  for  we  Ie4irii  that  he  established  an  export 


THEIR  POLITICAL  CONDITION. 


799 


from  Theodosia  as  well  as  from  Pantikapoeum.  His  successor  I  ari- 
sades  I.  com  inning  to  Athenian  exporters  of  corn  the  same  privilege 
of  inimunitv  from  export  duty,  obtained  from  Athens  sti  1  higher 
honors  than  Leukon;  for  we  learn  that  his  statue,  together  with 
those  of  two  relative.^,  was  erected  in  the  agora,  on  the  motion  ot 
Demosthenes.  Tlie  connection  of  Bosporus  with  Athens  was  dura- 
ble as  well  as  intimate;  its  corn-trade  being  of  high  importance  to 
tlie  subsistence  of  the  people.  Every  xVthenian  exporter  was  bound 
bv  law  to  bring  his  car2:o  in  th^  first  instance  to  Athens.  1  he 
freighting  and  navigating  of  ships  for  that  purpose,  together  with  the 
advance  of  money  by  rich  capitalists  (citizens  and  metics)  upon  in- 
terest and  conditions  enforced  bv  the  xithenian  judicature,  was  a 
standincr  and  profitable  business.  And  we  may  appreciato  the  value 
of  equitable  treatment,  not  to  say  favor,  from  the  kings  of  Bosporus 
—when  we  contrast  it  with  the  fraudulent  iind  extortionate  bv^havior 
of  Kleomenes,  satrap  of  Egypt,  in  reference  to  the  export  of  Egyptian 

corn.  ^  ,    . 

The  political  condition  of  the  Greeks  at  Bosporus  was  somewhat 
peculiar  The  hereditarv  princes  (above  enumerateel),  who  ruled 
them  suhstantiallv  as  despots,  assumed  no  other  title  (m  respect  to 
the  Greeks)  than  that  of  Arclion.  They  paid  tribute  to  the  powerful 
Scythian  tribes  who  bounded  them  on  the  European  side,  and  even 
thouoht  it  necessary  to  carry  a  ditch  across  the  narrow  isthmus,  from 
somx^point  near  Theodosia  northward  to  the  Palus  Mseotis,  as  a  pro- 
tection ac-ainst  incursions.  Tiieir  dominion  did  not  extend  further 
west  than  Theodosia;  this  ditch  w^as  their  extreme  western  b'^unelary ; 
and  even  for  the  land  within  it,  they  paid  tribute.  But  on  the 
Asiatic  side  of  the  strait,  they  were  lords  paramount  for  a  consider- 
able distance,  over  the  feebler  and  less  warlike  tribes  who  pass  under 
the  common  name  of  Mieotoe  or  ^Lneetje— the  Sindi,  Toreti,  Dandaru, 
Thates  etc  Inscripticms,  yet  remaining,  of  ParisadesL,  record  him 
as  kin^^  of  these  various  barbaric  tribes,  but  as  Archon  of  Bosporus 
and  Theodosia.  His  dominion  on  the  Asiatic  sule  of  the  Kimmerian 
Bosporus,  sustained  by  Grecian  and  Thracian  mercenaries,  was  ot 
considerable  (though  to  us  unknown)  extent,  reaching  to  somewhere 
near  the  borders  of  Caucasus.  -n.    .     .  -, 

Parisa<les  I.  on  his  eleath  left  three  sons— Satyrus,  Prytanis,^  and 
Eumelus.  Satyrus,  as  the  eldest,  succeeded ;  but  Eumelus  claimed 
the  crown,  sought  aid  without,  and  prevailed  on  various  neighbors— 
among  them  a  powerful  Thracian  king  named  Ariopharnes— to  e^ 
pouse'^his  cause.  At  the  head  of  an  army,  said  to  consist  of  20.000 
hoiNC  and  22  000  foot,  the  two  allies  marched  to  attnck  the  territories 
of  Satyrus  who  advanced  to  meet  them,  with  2,000  Grecian  merce- 
naries anci  2,000  Thracians  of  his  own.  re-enforced  by  a  numerous 
body  of  Scythian  allies— 20,000  foot,  and  10,000  horse,  and  carrying 
with  him  a  plentiful  supply  of  provisions  in  wagons.  He  gained  a 
complete  victory,  compelling  Eumelus  and  Ariopharnes  to  retreat 


800 


OUTLYING  HELLENIC  CITIES. 


juhI  seek  refuire  in  tl.e  regal  rcsldcnrc  of  tlie  latter,  rrar  llic  river 
'lliap-is-  a  fortress  l)uilt  of'timber,  aid  eiirr(;iintk(l  with  f(  rest,  river, 
nuiish  aud  loek,  so  as  to  be  very  diff.euli  of  rprroach.  t-atyrus, 
liaving  tirst  plundered  the  (oi.iiiiry  around,  A\li.eh  supplied  a  rich 
iMiOty  of  prisoners  and  rattle,  proceeded  to  r.ssaii  Ins  ei.eniKs  m  tleir 
almost  iu.praclieuLle  positron.  But  II.ou.lIi  he,  and  31eni.^l<i:s  his 
reneral  of  nureenaries,  injide  the  most  strenuous  (llorts,  i.i.d  ev(?ii 
carried  some  of  the  cAitworks,  they  were  repulsed  fr(>m  the  Irrtnss 
it<elf-  and  Satyrus,  exposinir  himself  forwaidly  to  extiieale  Aienis 
kus  received  a  wound  of  \Oiieh  he  shortly  died-afier  a  reign  of 
nine  months.  T^leniskus.  raising  the  siege,  withdrew  the  aimy  to 
Gargaza;  from  whence  he  conveyed  hack  the  regal  coipse  to  Pauti- 

kapieum.  .  _        .       .-x-      *     i      j 

Prvtanis,  the  next  brother,  rejecting  nn  cffcr  of  partition  tendered 
by  Eumeius,  {>sumed  the  scepter,  and  marched  Corlh  to  continue  the 
stru""le.  liut  the  tide  of  fortune  now  turned  in  favor  of  Eumeius; 
who~t~oo'k  Garsjaza  with  several  other  places,  worsted  his  brother  in 
battle  and  .^oblocked  him  up  in  the  isthmus  near  the  Paluf  3'aotis, 
that  he  was  forced  to  capitulate  and  resign  his  pretensions.  Ein^^'ii^a 
entered  Panlikapaium  as  conqueror.  Nevcrihckhs,  the  defeated 
Trvtanis  in  epile  of  his  recent  covenant,  made  a  renewed  attempt 
u'Ton  the  crown;  a. herein  he  was  again  b;;ftlcd,  forced  to  escape  to 
KeiTi  and  there  slain.  To  assure  himself  of  the  throne,  Eunielus 
lut  to  death  the  wives  and  children  of  loth  his  two  brothers,  Satyrus 
and  Prvtanis— to-ether  with  all  their  principal  friends.  Ore  yenilb 
alone— Parisades,"^ on  t)f  Satyrus— escaped  and  found  prolectiou  wiili 
tne  Scvtliian  i-rince  Agarus.  ,,.      v  ^ 

Eumeius  had  now  jmt  down  all  rivals,  yet  his  recent  cruellies  had 
occasioned  wrath  and  disgust  j.mong  the  Bosporanic  eitiz.  ns.  Ho 
convoked  them  in  assemblv.  to  excuse  his  past  conduct,  and  pre^m- 
ised  c-3od  o-overnment  for  the  future;  at  the  same  lime  guaranteeing 
to  them  their  full  civic  constitution,  with  such  privilegesand  immuui 
ties  as  they  had  before  enjoved,  and  freedom  from  direct  taxation. 
Such  assurances,  combined  probably  with  an  imposing  mercenary 
force  appeased  or  at  least  silenced  the  prevailing  oisaLeetwiJ. 
Eumeius  kept  his  promises  so  far  as  to  govern  in  a  mild  and  popular 
spirit  While  thus  renderin£:  himself  acceptable  at  home,  he  main- 
tained an  energetic  forei-n  policy,  and  made  several  conquests  among- 
the  surnmnding  tribes.  ^Ile  constituted  himself  a  sort  cjf  protector 
of  the  Euxine,  roressing  the  piracies  of  tlie  Heniochi  and  Acha-i 
(among  the  (^aucasian  meHintains  to  the  eas:)  as  well  as  of  the  Tauri 
in  the Y:hersonesus  (Crimea);  much  to  the  satisfaction  ot  the  Byzan- 
tines, Sinopians.  and  other  Pontic  Greeks.  He  received  a  portion  ot 
the  fu<ntives  from  Kallatis,  when  besieged  by  Lysimachus,  and  pro- 
vided for  them  a  settlement  in  his  dominions.  Having  thus  acquired 
great  reputation,  Eumeius  was  in  the  full  career  of  conquest  and 
a'^'^randizement,  when  an  accident  terminated  his  life,  after  a  reiga 


I 


DECLINE  OF  THE  BOSPORANIC  DYNASTY.      801 

of  rather  more  than  five  years.     In  returning  from  Scythia  to  Panti- 
kapjcum,  in  a  four-wheeled  carriage  (or  wagon)  and  four  wnth  a  tent 
upon  it,  his  horses  took  fright  and  ran  away.     Perceiving  that  they 
were  carrying  him  toward  a  precipice,  he  tried  to  jump  out;  but  his 
sword  becoming  entangled  in  the  wheel,  he  was  killed  on  the  spot. 
He  was  succeeded  bv  his  son  Spartokus  IV.,  who  reigned  twenty 
years  (304-284  B.C.);  afterward  came  the  son  of  Spartokus,  1  arisae^es 
if;  with  whose  name  our  information  breaks  off.      ,    ,      ^      ,        , 
Tliis  dynasty,  the  Spartokidte,  though  they  ruled  the  Greeks  ot 
Bosporus  as  despots  by  means  of  a  mercenary  force— yet  seem  to 
jrive  exercised  power  with  eeiuitv  and  moderation.     Had  i^umelus 
liVed   he  might  probably  have  est^iblished  an  extensive  empire  over 
the  b'arbaric'  tribes  on  all  sides  of  him.     But  empire  over  such  sub- 
iectswas  seldom  permanent;  nor  did  his  successors  long  mamtam 
even  as  much  as  he  leit.     We  have  no  means  of  following  their  for- 
tunes in  detail;  but  we  know  that  about  a  century  B.C.  the  then 
rei-nin-  prince,    Parisades  III.,    found    Inn^f If    so    pressed    and 
SMUcezr^i  by  tlic  Scythians,  that  he  was  forced    like  Olbia  and  the 
Pentapolis)  to  fore-x)  his  inelependeuce,  and  to  call  in,  as  auxiliary  or 
master  the  formielable  Mithridates  Eupalcn' of  Pontus;  from  vchom 
a  new  dynasty  of  Bosporanic  kings  bi'gan— subject    however,  alter 
no  lonf  interval,  to  the  dominion  and  interference  of  liome.    ^  ^ 

Thelviithrldatic  princes  lie  beyond  our  period;  but  the  cities  of 
Bosporus  under  the  Spartokid  princes,  in  the  fourth  century  B.C., 
deserve  to  be  ranked  among  the  conspicuous  features  of  the  living 
Hellenic  w^orld.     They  were  not  indeed  purely  Hellenic,  but  pre- 
sented a  considerable  admixture  of  Scythitui  or  Oriental  manners; 
antilo"-cu3  to  the  mixture  of  the  Hellenic  and  Libyan  elements  at 
Kyreue  with  its  Battiad  princes.     Among  the  facts  attesting  the 
wealth  and  power  of  these  Spartokid  princes,  and  of  the  Bosporanic 
cennnumity,  we  may  number  the  imposing  groups  of  mighty  sepul- 
chral tumuli  near  Kertch  (Pautikapa3um);  some  of  which  have  been 
recently  examined,  while  the  greater  part  still  remain  unopened. 
These  spacious  chambers  of  stone— enclosed  in  vast  hillocks  (Kur- 
gans),  cvclopian  works  piled  up  with  prodigious  labor  and  cc^st-- 
have  been  femnd  to  contain  not  only  a  profusion  of  ornaments  ot  tae 
precious  metals  (<^old,  silver,  and  electron,  or  a  mixture  of  four  parts 
of  '^•old  to  one  of  silver),  but  also  numerous  vases,  implements,  and 
works  of  art,  illustrating  the  life  and  ideas  of  the  Bosporanic  popu- 
lation     "The  contents  of  the  tunmli  already  opened  arc  so  multita- 
rious    that  from  the  sepulchers  of  PantikapiXMim  alone,  w^e  niignt 
become  aceiuainted  with  everything  which  served  the  Greeks  either 
for  necessary  use,  or  for  the  decoration  of  domestic  life.       btatues, 
reliefs,  and  frescoes  on  the  walls,  have  been  founel,  on  varied  sub- 
jects both  of  war  and  peace,  and  often  of  very  fine  execution;  besides 
these,  numerous  carvings  in  wood,  and  vesscils  of  bronze  or  terra 
cotta;  with  necklaces,  armlets,  bracelets,  rings,  drinking-cups,  etc., 

H.  G.  IV.— 2G 


802  (OUTLYING  HELLENIC  CITIES. 

or  precious  r.e^-^.^^^^:;^J^:^t.^''  .n?^; 

chains  and  ""'".P'f '5'"^,,';™'  ""^;';4;i  ,w Nte  e  .IcsUnc.l.     But 
partially  o"<^»'''  !'•"';/";'    "'i^,/"'''..""^  ""'  "^  "'«  "'^""'"''^ 

Avorkbhop,  antl  tl  e  1 1.  feoo  ^^^^  ^^^^     ^^^  cuterpns.ng 

it  has  been  the  purpose  of  this  history  to  present. 

I  have  now  brought  down  the  history  of  Greece  to  the  pomt  ^^ 
tii^k^d  out  in  U.e  pref.uje  ^J^Ji^^:^^;!^'^^^^ 

flicted  (according  to  Homer)  upou  victims  oveUakeu  by  tlio  day  oi 
"' On?branch  of  intellectual  energy  tUere  .vas,  and  one  »'one  jl.icU 

have  been  scarcely  adverted  to  n  "''^  "f  "^^  -.tn^i  Mvc  1  o  '^il 

lt?it.;tfUVe^::£Te^^^^^^^^^^^ 

r  to  vL'well  as'to  pldtopl.v ;  Plato  as  citizen  <^^^^'^^^ 

n  "ude  in  m    preJent  work  a  record  of  tliem  -^^V^'^^^'^'f;^;, 
and  m'  e.U.nate  of  tl.cir  H-culativ^.cliaracter.s  ics;    ml     In^^ 

•  zir  ^:;i:r;il  :^r;i;c;n-;.^'^ctan;^:^\;:i  "atilr^rcxpect^ 


APPENDIX. 


803 


tions  of  tlieir  readers;  but  is  reserved  for  the  special  historian  of 
philosophy.  Accordingly,  I  have  brought  my  history  of  Greece  to  a 
close,  without  attempting  to  do  justice  either  to  Plato  or  to  Aristotle' 
I  hope  to  contnl)ute  something  toward  supplying  this  defect  the 
mugnilude  of  whic^li  I  fully  appreciate,  in  a  separate  work  d-v'oted' 
specially  to  an  account  of  Greek  speculative  philosopliy  in  the  fourtJi 
century  u.c. 


APPENDIX. 

ON  ISSUS  AND  ITS  NEIGIIBORnoOD  AS  CONNECTED  "WITH  THE 

BATTLE. 

The  exact  battle-field  of  Issus  cannot  be  certainly  assisned  upon  the  evidence 
accessible  to  us.  But  it  may  be  determined  within  a  fev?  miles  north  or  soutfv 
and  what  is  even  more  nuportant-tbe  preneral  features  of  the  locality  as  we  1 
as  the  prelnmnary  movements  of  the  contending  armies,  admit  of  being  clearly 
conceived  and  represented.  The  Plan,  of  the  country  round  the  Gulf  of  Istus 
will  enable  the  reader  to  follow  easily  what  is  certain,  and  to  underste^id  the 
debate  about  what  IS  matter  of  hj-pothesis.  ucisutuu  me 

That  the  battle  was  foiiglit  in  some  portion  of  the  narrow  snace  infervpnino- 
between  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Gul/ of  Issus  and  the  weiern  Slnfof  M^^^^ 
Ama.ius-that  Alexander's  left  and  Darius's  right  rested  on  the  sea  ai^  th J  p 
right  and  left  respectively  on  the  mountain-that  Darius  came  imon'/lexan^^^^^ 
unexpectedly  from  the  rear,  thus  causing  him  to  return  llackTdysmtreh^^^^^^^^^ 
ni-)i  T  '.f'  ^"'^  to  re-occupy  a  pass  which  he  had  already  passed  througlia^ 
r^;  ;;'^^^KS.?S±^I?^f  S' ^^^  Wea.  to  me^.St  open  to  ^JZ 


erroneously  states  that  Issim  was  upon  the  river  Pinariis,  wWcli  he  even  caS 
fje  /..ni.9  r.^er  (Erdkunde,  Theil  iv":  Abth.  2  pp.  ir97'-180«^^  We  know  alo  that 
this  river  was  at  some  distance  north  of  the  niaritime  pass  called  th^  Gates  Sf 
Kihkia  and  Assyria,  through  which  Alexander  passed  and  repassed 

But  when  weproceexl,  beyond  these  data  (the  last  of  them  only  vague  and  rela- 
tive), to  fix  the  exact  battle-field,  we  are  reduced  to  conjecture     DrThrl^^^^^ 

ve,T^?blyU^dim^int'nn^^'^*''"^  ^^"^^^^^  ami  ifiS 

rl7  ^i  -^  ttie  dittei-ent  opinions  of  various  geographers 

Pllim-on  nnJS'''"  ^' n  ¥^  ?>^^'\  ^^^^  ^e  added-Mr.  Ain.sworth^s  Essay  on  the 
S-?^?r.?/'^n^^TJ,^'^^^**^^^"i  the  transactions  of  the  Geographical  Soc'etv  for 
183<)-Mutzeirs  Topographical  Notes  on  the  third  book  of  §uSs  Cm-fe^^ 
p  nrS  se^i""'^  of  Ritters-s  Erdkunde  pubhshed  only  this  5%ar  S) ^ ch.  xxvIl 
We  know  from  Xenophon  that  Issus  was  a  considerable  town  close  to  the  sea 
n^TZi'^V  '"^''''^'  ^^'?"'.  ^'^^  "''^'^  Pyramus.  and  one  day's  rnarch  northward  of 
the  iraritime  pass  called  the  Gates  of  Kilikia  and  Syria.    ThaV;  it  was  nea  -he 
norfcn-ea^tern  corner  of  the  K\  ulf ,  may  also  be  collected  f  rom  Strabo  '^i^o  r?cko  il 
the  shortest  line  across  Asia  Minor,  as  stretching  fromSinope  or  AmTsis  fo  /.?us 
7;?,?.  rS;^?!^''*'  •'''^''  'J^:^""  ^^^  Egyptian  sea  as  having  its  noi^hern  terSation  a? 
dKPrm?^  1  "^^  ""'r  fl"-  ^' '  i  "^^^i?- '  ^9).  The  probable  site'of  Issus  has  been  differently 
AnJw  ^"'^  ^'^A^'S^'T^  authors:  Rennell  (Illustrations  of  the  Geography  of  the 
Anabasis,  pp.  43-  IK)  places  it  near  Oseler  or  Yusler;  as  far  as  I  can  ludVe  this 
seems  too  tar  distant  from  the  head  of  the  Gulf.  toWard  the  south       *'  ^  ' 


m 


In  respect  to  the  niaritime  pass,  called  the  Gates  of  Kilikia  and  Syria,  there  is 
acli  discrepancy  between  Xenophon  and  Arrian.    It  is  evident  tiiat?  in  Xen^ 


APPENDIX. 


T^Pared  during  the  seventy  yeai-i.  'i^^Vo , '  nhon-g  time.  Kilikia  vas  o«cup.^"    v 
Ss?S?  a  probable  reason  ^vhy.    I^-JlXuMary.  maintained  a  ceitam  degr.^ 

Tlie  "wt  still  retained  its  old  ^^f^^^^'^^/J^.f.h'     But  that  name,  in  Arnan  s  do- 
"t..   „_.!  +r. +Ho  if.w  PTOund  skirting  vue^t a,.         t.^ward  Eavas.     At  soiue 


tween  \lexander  and  Danus  >nu^  S"T  with  the  Pinarus.    Moreovei ,  ti-^.-    y^ 

S\     Des  Monceaux  notices  six  f"-^°'^,??estea?ns  between  Bayas  and  Aj^s 
castle  oOIerkes  and  Bayas;  "Of,';  fi,'■■«„^°4^£'e^^'s  the  Pinarus,  cannot  be  se^ 

'^^S^^^^^^^^i^!^  „-„.„„„„.  ...an  in  .„e 

Bes 


'u?thont  mo^Tw  fess  of-.doubt  Xenophon  and  Aman  in  tl,e 

thesea-from  the  'HZa7id passes^  an hichcros.t         ^^^^ved  by  ancient  autlunN 
itself     But  this  distinction  seems  ^^^^  "'niliil'Vv^enes     Strabo  uses  the  pi'^fso 

means  by  the  «.am_e_words  thj*  ^^"^h  1  bj,^,.,jt  „,,,,„»     I" /act  Strabo  -.„  5, 


I 


APPENDIX. 


805 


But  he  do«s  not  use  this  last  ilhrase  to  dosiirnate  the  nasciif^P  ot-ot.  «^  o^ 

tl.h.k  tliat  the  words  mean.as  the  trLS  xtSrUvl  the  n     -7r  J^i.  7^^^-"'"-  ^•'"'  f 

pcriy«s.lm«n^•m.^"   TheAvo,xlsSei  si?ni^V  ^^h^^^^^^ 

moiintflir.  whofo  if  o,n^;,w,,i  *k..  a  ..      "^^  r,'*^"":\'  l'^^^''  I'diius      ciossed  -»ver  trie 


the  mountain.    That  which  Xenophon^ and  Arri^^^^^^  P^.^^,^^  ''^'''^ 


aTO'tt,  /cat  Ta?  Aeyo^eVa?  ei/  t^  KiAikio  TruAa?. 

themselves  conclusive-  still  II  o^lfhr.mLs?,.,?  '  f^'  l*?.,!"'*).  and  are  not  in 
with  the  prohabiliUes  it  e  ease  *rWs  "s  wai  hov"Jer  w»'"  ^nj"™"™ 
less  f,-equ«,ted  than  the  mariHme  line  of  ritd  thi-ourf,  t^e  r  Jf.  S¥?i'l''"'""i 


Mr.  AinswJrthdn  h\^'v<^^T^^"fuTn-^-\'-  ^^^'^^^^  ^^^ounas,  and  agahist  which 
several  ver?fi4iWeobjtct^^ns  """  '''''^  ^^'"^^^  ^^^^"^  ^^^^^  produced 

^Itoe'S^tl^yA^l^^^^  ^^-  Thiriwall  insists.  When 

thP  Pnc«  ^f  T^-^  I  the  Ten  Tliousand  went  to  Myrianurus  in  their  wnv  to 

always  coycide  with  thP?it.!?M-"  the  «^uaZ  road  of  march-which  does  not 
letusassimeth«Vt^.,^^^^  .  But  to  waive  this  supposition,  however- 

pasS'nJ  by  iyriam5ms^  there'^v-A';'^/^  rn  f '"■'^^"  ^^^^^  leading  to  Beylan  y^thU 
to  Ko  somewhat  out^^HJfv^t-^'^f*'".''''  T^''^'^,^"  enough  to  induce  Alexander 
portan^Xvct  wUh  1^^^^^  ^l''^^'' ^^  ^'^l^  Myriandrus.    For  it  was  an  im- 

reverse.    Suppose  him  rm^^^^^^^^^  '"  ^"''^  ^^''^^^  ^"  ^^^^^  of  a  possible 

assistance  tTlKetreatTb^^^^^  ^J^^/'Tf'-  ^''^fr^'^-l^  ^^'^"^^1  beaniaterial 
well  as  ihe  other  SiSrt^  a.ssured  himselt  betorehand  of  Myriandrus  as 

iBiE^^^^  ?^^t'!™^;:^.s^-!r  i;f ^,-Sa^ 
nothing  to  .ose^&ijri,;'.;;:?  ^xni:;iVo::,'f  eSc^o";  ^.^.iSxiroi^^^ti 


806 


APPENDIX. 


„  t.-rri^  oQ  was  necessary  to  secure  Myriandms. 
las  march  to  Sochi  for  as  Icvn^  a  n^  j     .vent  to  Mynan- 

There  is  no  more  ;!;?Jf  l^l^^.^.J^^^'from  Taisus  (still  more  out  of  his  hue  ot  ad 
va!iee)'to  Soli  and  Anchuilus.  and  others  think),  that  the  site  of  Myrian- 

^«iSS?^n^eanden.on  occupies  tl^J^h^of^AAc^^^J^-^  ;i^-;^ 
fo^dXprJbably  by  order  of  A  exander  h  mself)  m  c^^  ^,^^  ^,^.^^^^  i.l,. 

vSv  of  Issus.    Accordmg  to  Ritter  p     -  Jl ).     a^c-  ^^  .^^^  Europe,  as  at 

;^f"esSblishing  there  V"V X^rXcS  U  e^S^hh  ^^^^^  The  importanee^^ 

flip  other  Alexandria  for  the  '^^^•'^'^rvl;  wp  ereatlv  exaesrerated.    1  know  no 
IhP  site  of  ScanderoonJn  antiquity,  is  here  greau>e     ks  ^^^  j^ -^  ^^^.. 

S-oof  ^hat  Alexander  had  the  ^lea  vvhieh  ^^^^ei  ascribes  lo^^^^^  ^^^^ 
Fin  that  his  successors  had  no. such  idea,  «„^^,^^^j;j;?,.ing  the  course  of  trade 
of  Intioch  and  Seleukeia  (m  ^'Xy'^^};fl^^^^^^^^  This  latter 

SpThe  Orontes.  and  therefore  dne^^^  of  Aleppo;  a  city.(Bera.a   of 

town  is  only  of  i^H^orta  c-e  as  bem^  tue  ^^^^^^^  ^^^  ^^^  ^^^^.  ^^  ^^.^  j^^st, 

little  consequence  \"/.^^^>^^:^>;  ^ee  RiUer,  p.  1152. 
and  Seleukeia  among  the  lubt.  &ec  xuulc  ,  f 


INDEX. 


Abantcs,  1.617. 

Aixi-'ra,  the  army  of  Xerxes  at,  ii.  256. 

Abrokomas,  ill.  Gi)9, 7(X? 


Dorlcjllldasat,  iff.  K!l;  A..aiihms    iiYlp     kn,  "s  at  ^'i?^ 't'^''''"''''''^'''' '"'  "'•=»*'' 

Peloponnesus,  i.  444,  46^.  '         "'  "^^  ^hthiotis  and  rcioponucsus,  1.  ii2;  of 

Aehaemenes.  ii.  2S!T- 


Aehaemenes,  ii.  28'? 
Achoeus,  i.  I'Wj 


Aeharnrp.  Ar<'hfHaiYiiio  o*  <t   e-.To 


ehradlna,  capture  of,  by  iVoon.  iv.  .S'l 

\i;^^o<:^^S^'t^^t^^;:£'^S^^^  capture  of^y  Xerxes, 

hie  reserve  fund  in,  ii.  .->:«  sea  '      ^^  "^  *^"Ptu.e  by  Aerxes,  ii.  299 ;  inviola- 

a,  queen  of  Karia,  iv.  57.5.  57?! 


Aeharnce,  Arehldamus  at,  ii.  528  seq. 
Aeholous,  1.  1!)5.  * 

Achilleis,  the  basis  of  the  Iliad,  i.  STS. 
Achilles,  1.  UK)  seq.,  2f)3  scci. 
Aehradina,  capture  of,  by  iVeon.  iv.  .S'l 
Acropolis  at   * ""  ■•   • 

ii. 

bk 

A(la,  queen  of  KaHVCiv!  575,17^; 

AdnlSSl^lSsiif  1'  -^!,^---tokles.  at  Salamis.  ii.  302. 
Aflinetus  and  Themlstokles,  ii.  ;591 
A<  i-aiuun,  Tinioloon  at,  iv.  3U7,  311. 
A(  rast  us,  1.  190,191,  1!)3  seq. 
A(lra.5tus,  the  Phrygian  exile,  i.  .549 

^!a'","l79"2ti.*'''^*"'''''^  ^^  Agathokles,  Iv.  763. 
^■ikid  genealogy,  i.  146, 15,0  seq. 
^.akus,  i.  147  seq.  ^ 

i'£fi.y/f  =  ^""^  "'^  Argonauts,  1. 173  seq.;  and  Circe.  1. 183. 


^A'i<lsat  Sparta,  i  475  ^^  Clueroueia  on,  iv.  510. 


604. 


^-eas,  1.  161;  de'ath  of.  1.  ice. 
^^  ,'ialeus,  i.  ;»4. 


"^na^iy^t^^^f^ii^lj^j^^^  the  hostages  taken  fr 

anddeathof:aa4.Vii  67^'-'"''"''"^^''  ^^^  ^*^  Salamis.  ii 
.o^icisthciis   1    isti-.  ' 


from  them  by  Kleotneues 
iERis"thcus:L'ik?-^-  *'''  "•  ^"^-  ""  "•  ''^'  ^'  '^'''''■''^'  ^^^'"'"^ 

^e  ESi;^]l^'Sli:''  "*•  '''  ^"l-  ^«'^^""o»  Of  Athens  and  her  dependencies  after 
Agyptos,  i.  96. 


808 


IKDEX. 


iEimnostns  and  Dionyslus,  iv.  182. 

/V   OHS,  i.  20r).  -AfJ  seq.  -pplnnid^  1.  2W;  and  Doric 

J  ii;i'l[,?;';Vu'e  S.  ..  -  s....-,  «.  sccona.  t  n.  sec,,      o  «..a, ..  >U  .  „ 
U-,;,li'  f  aU;  the  suLsntrapy  of.  and  Pharnaba.us.  lU.  61.. 


^iisssisiiiii^il 


'SP«S!*Ai-  If, 


i"'«^¥^'s;'^f<^ 


ft?iss;s;vA^iiiinus,  1.360. 

Aethlius,  i.  1|>*; 

check,  iv.  732.  oivmplc  games,  i.  451. 

,gii^-M;jfe|^:  Vi»i30,  ,«^.p, «.  ana  0«s.es  transferred  .o  Sparta, .. 

aSisU-  iin.l  MeaaWes.  1.  i"l.  ,.,  ,,-„,„„. 

Abasias,  lii.  ^(4. 


f  tWiopls  ,.t  Xrktinus,  i.  360.  reconquered  by  Duke- 

^S.^e«« Uary  sett  ement  ot, .  1-.,  .xp p,..,„„„ne.uj,  l,45r  se^; 


INDEX. 


809 


anprmont  his  floot,  iil.  6r,l;  an-l  Spitlirifiates,  iii.  n.~l;  and  Pharnabaz'n.  ronff^rpn'-f* 
botvv«'«}n, iii.  65:!;  large  prcparatious  and  recall  of,  troin  Asia,  iii,  fij«, (iTo,  «!7!;  relati')'i.4 
of  .Sparta  witli  her  iiei^hljors  and  allies  after  tlie  acee.s.^iou  of,  iii.  65S;  ou  the  north- 
ern frontier  of  Boeotia,  iii.  GTl;  victory  of,  at  Koroneia,  iii.  670  seq.;  and  Tele'iti  i.-< 
capture  of  the  Lon^' Wall.s  at  Corinth,  and  of  I.echjeuni  by,  iii.  69();  captuV  >  of 
Peiritnim  and  (ISnoe  bj',  iii.  COl;  and  the  Isthmian  festival,  lii.  692;  and  the  cnvov.s 
from  'liiebcs,  in.  o;);5,  6!)?;  and  the  destruction  of  the  Lacedcemonian  mora  bv  Tnliiiv- 


^l^aul^sl;  i!.paMunonua,s.  ui.  »,u,  iv.  yti;  in  ASia,  B.C.  :*b;  iv.  75,  76;  in  E-'v 
the  iudei>endence  of  Messene,  iv.  114;  death  and  character  of,  iv.  116. 

A^'esipolls,  iii.  699,  735,  75:\  756. 

A^etus  and  Aristo,  ii.  1S6. 

A^'is  II.,  invasion  of  Attica  by,  b.c.  425,  ii.  C39;  advance  of,  to  Leuktra,  B.C.  419,  ii.  7^6; 
Invasion  of  Argos  by,  u.  788;  retirement  of,  from  Argos.  ii.  791  s<-n  ;  at  the  battl-  of 
Mantineia.  B.C.  118,  ii.  793;  invasion  of  Attica  by,  iii.  118.  L«)8;  moveijient..  of,  after  the 
f;f,''^".'?/^".*"«''*ster  in  Sicily,  iii.  l&l;  applications  from  Eub(ea  and  Lesbas  to  vHc. 
Th;../iv:n  •iPi^'o-a'-^f^'^-?,^  P'^^^^  from  the  four  hundred  to,  iii.  213;  repair e  of.  l/y 
iTv  H?«->i^,i\oi^T''"  '/™>^'^.f  attempt  of,  to  surprise  Athens,  iii.  273;  invasions  or  Elis 
•■-'.7 1  ■«i.  o-w^  (iCcirii  or,  111.  nov. 

Agis  III.   i.  496  soq.,  Iv.  .595,  679. 

Agnonides,  iv.  72i). 

Agones  and  festivals  in  honor  of  gods, !  75 

Agora,  Homeric,  i.  325  seq.;  and  Boule,  i.  331. 

Agoratus,  ill.  :;2:i,  :]26. 

Agr|gcutine  generals;  accusation  and  death  of,  iv  107 

i^v  ■'^^r.^tejJ^'V^vPV^'''^'-''^'  '^'-  ^^hJ^^'  '66;  defeat  of,  by  Leptines  and  Demopliilus. 
IV.  1(4,  aeieat  of,  by  Leptnies,  iv.  77.5. 

Agrigentum,  1.  718;   Phalaris  of,  ii.  216,  345;  and  Svracuse    before    b  c    ''.m    ii   '115- 

?nor";hf  "t^v?^  *'*=^'^^*T  t'^<^,»^'"'ttleof  HimeA  ii.3^   and  S   ,Sm^ 
after  the  Theronian  dyna.sty,  ii.  822;    and  Hannlba 's  captUre-of   Seliuus  iv  1 1? 
defensive  preparations  at,  against  Hannibal  and  Imiliion,  iv.  1.53;  strS  .   we  lUj; 
fv  1-^^n  n.V;?,h  V^'  ?•''■  ^"^.'.7-  ¥'   »>l^>ckade  and  capture'of,  by  the  Cart.,  gin     ns 
i^ainst  D  o  ,v«  n=  '  G'".Ji-^  *a^-^  Syracu.san  generals  at,  iv.  157.  1.59.  161;  decIaraUon  of. 
by  A^ithoSes  iV :  751       '  ^^"^^^^"'^  ^"d  the  fresh  colonization  of,  iv.  331;  siege  ofi 

AgyllaTplunder  of  tile  temple  at,  iv.  229. 

Agyrium,  Dionysius  and  3Iagon  at,  iv.  218. 

Agyrrhins,  m.  706. 

Ajax,  son  of  Telamon,  1.  1.50,  303. 

Ajax,  son  of  Oileus,  i.  irx.),  205,  208. 

^AfhfM.'f'iJ-Ir.'  o^ri'"''";"  *'p  T^^'^'-^.^s  to,ii.256:  induced  by  Brasidas  to  revolt  from 
^mfederl^^^^^^^^^^^  Brasidas  at,  ill.  G02  seq.;  opposition  of,  to  the  Olynthian 

Akarnan  and  Amphoterus.  i  194 

AKrn-.niSis^fl'^'Sn  "^i/"'  ''■''■  ^~^  ^IvP^  expedition  of  Agesianus  ag.-iinst,  iii.  697. 
AKcU  n.^nuins,  i.  4^seq.,  .44  seq.;  and  Athens,  alliance  bctwcn,  il.  f.2l;  under  Demos- 

AiSkfotMuJS^'''''''"'  "■^^^'  """'^  Amphilochiaus,  pucillc  treat/of,  witi;  the 
Akastus,  wife'of,  and  Peleus,  1. 112. 
Akesines  crossed  by  Alexander,  iv.  651. 
Akne  in  Sicily,  i,  718. 
Akragas,  1.  718. 

Akrisius,  Danac  and  Perseus,  I.  98  seq. 
Akrotatus,  iv.  753. 
Aktoeon,  i.  131. 
Aicte,  Braslda.s  in,  it.  706. 
Aknsilaus,  his  treatment  of  mythos,  1.  241. 
AUcsa,  f(mndation  of,  iv  1S3. 
A  .alia,  Phokrcan  colony  at,  ii.  116. 
Alazones,  i.  657. 
Aleyone  and  Keyx,  I.  122. 
Alete.s,  i.  2*.)0. 
Aleus,  i.  144. 

'^^o^Vo^i^^i^^^'^^^^^^^^  Xerxes's  invasion,  ii.  271;  embassy 

Alexander  th.^V-r^^it  ^  tll'^^!^''rA^^'''^'^^  '?*'^'''''-  "^''  ^"'^^'^'^  <>*"  ^i^^tmti,  ii.  327. 
AH'xano*  r  me  (jieat.  Ins  visit  to  Ilium,   .  215,  iv.  559-  succes.sors  of  -Mui  Tiimn  I    "^v 
eompari.son  between  the  invasion  of.  and  that  of  xlrxSTSc!  birth  oMv'^^^ 


810 


I'MDEX. 


niaroh  of,  into  Greece,  b.c.  a>6,  iv  fs^s  ^!?"'  \|i\i',,„*i,y  claimed  by,  under  the  eonven- 

Tiirace  to  Thebes,  iv.  WO,  <^'\Pi"r»^  iAoH^r<i  at  Athens  iv.  545;  at  Corinth,  B.C.  .iv).  i\ . 
the^u?ren(lerof  anti-Macedonian  I  aders  at  A^^^^^  .        ^.^ecian  historva 

Sf;  an<l  Diogenes,  iv.  .^l';/,?^^«JS^;,!^^T,^of  his  A  >vith  Grecian  Ins- 

blank  in  the  reign  of,  iv.  .>4^,  F'*""*?  V"  '     „#    «,-  fUD-  military  endowments  ol,  iv. 
ton"    iv  ViS.  r25;  Pan-.H<'y^^""i.rnrincfhesix  vS^^^^^^^^^  «f'  ^^'- 

^.  A%.,iv,5(;h  d^enKiv.  i^pa..tU.ns^^  Oran,ku^ 


:^:^i^:  S'del^aie  of:  -ith^Pa-^-/o  ^t  M«.tu^    ^^ -£^^^  ^,^ 

capture  of  Halikarnas.sus  by,  i:^.^-  f^^^j^/gJ^KJ  knot:  iv.  581;  refuses  to  liberate 
(lia  bv.  iv.  577;  at  Kelaenae.  iv.  oTS.  cms  in.  v  Rubiupation  of  Paphlagonia  and 

the  Athenians  captured  at  t^^,^;^  "JVn 'rr^  n^iVd  entirs  Tarsus,  iv.  bsfij^eq.;  opera- 
Kappndokia  bv.  iv.  ^^^Pas.ses  Mo  nt  Taur^  nm_i        jj     j.^„,,„,s,iv.  5S7:  return  of 
tionsof.  in  Kilikia,  iv.  5S7;  march  ''fi'^*""^Xi  '    jv   591;  liis  courteous  treatment  of 
from  Myriandrus.  iy   589;  V^.^^Tlv    iv    5^  Si    his  tVeatnvent  of  Gi;eelvS  taken  at 
Darius's  mother,  wife    and  .famll>.iv.5J^v^''^^;;^^^^^,^^  with  Danus,  iy.  597, 

Damascus,  iv.  5%:  in  PheimMa  iv.  .-%■  JOO.^^^^^^        1^^  ^^^  "f,SyV^"^^'?'hu 

&«;  siege  and  capture  (^  ^^l^}*?  vAV  WYT-  siece  and  capture  of  Gaza  by,  iv.  m,  Ids 
m-  his  march  toward  Egypt,  ^^.^'^Sf.'^' /"^,.^  jhp  Fiiphrates  at  Thapsakus.  iv.  )()9; 
cnieltv  to  natis.  iv.  COfi:  in  Eirypt,  J^- «^' ^?^^'\^  615;  surrender  of  Susa  and  Babylon 
fords  tl^ Tlpris.  IV;  61*^  vU.^y^>^  ^A^:^  at  Persep<^,  iv,.^std.mg^ 


?;;;:d"^e  Tigris;  iv:  61(1:  -^^^^;^\i^^^su\^'i^i:'^po^i^i^ri^^    sui^juga- 

to  iv  6t}t);  his  march  froni  Susa  toFt  isepmis.  >   •       -^  ^ 

t  on  of  Persls  bvviv.  624;  at^Ekbatana  iv.^fr-<   ^^^^^^^^^  ^^ ^  ^^  „„t  taking  Danus 

iv  6W;  pursues  Darius  into  Parthia.  iV  «•-.,  '''  •  J^j-  ^  Hekatompylus.  iv.  6.^  m 

aUve.  iv.  62S;  Asiatizing  t^^ndencies  f  iv,  a^,  W4.  J^W  a^  and  envoys  with  Darius, 
Hvrkania,iv.  631;  his  treatment  of  t^ie  <^!^,^'vJJ^^,^\fj^";;„a  Philotas  put  to  death  l>y, 
Iv^  631;  in  Aria  and  pranginna.  iv  (..    fio6  Parm^^^^^^  ^^^  Caucasum  by,  iv  <J^ 

iv.  6.04   in  Gedrosia.    V.  ^^-^-J"';^  Jo»"dntion  or  ai  ^lassacre  <.f  the  Pran^\>i|l^ 

in  Baktria  and  Sogdiana  ly  6.;.  and  R^ss"«'  »  Scvthians.  iv.  6:«»,  (>l:l;  Kleitus  Icilled 
bv  iv  Vi\>\  at  Marakanda.  iv-.  (j.^^,  »4(t,  ana  ^y*;.?-.  .^  ^^^^.j,  ^f  Chorienes  by,  lv.M3; 
K-;   v:w.)r42.  r44;  capture  of  the  So^^^^^^  es  against    iy.  (48; 

nnd  Roxana.  iv.  ^44;  and  Kallisthenes^  conspiracy  i  j  ivW9;  crosses  the  Indus 
??"lu?es''the  country  between  Him  ooKoosh^^^^^^  p^^^^l,^  iv  6.51; 

and  the  Hvdaspes,  and  •^^^♦;f  J«  J/J"^V  >r,'^:'^i:ov"a-e  ^^  tlie  Hydaspes  and  the 

??fusal  of  his  army  to  "^{if^"  J/^^!!*  ^  V^:  Slalll.  iv  aC^r  posts  on  the  I"'His  established 
Tndr.s  iv  6.52;  wounded  in  attacking  t  nfina  I  i.i   ..  I  6.55;  and  the  tomb  of 

bv   iv.'  Si;  hik  bacchanalian  Process  on  tlirmighKa^^^^^^^^  ^^  j^^^  jiacedpn- 

CvVus  the  Great,  iv.  655;  satraps  of ,  V'^^^V-.  InHs  down  the  Pasitigris  and  up  the 
ian  soldiers,  iv.  657;  Asiatic    evies  of    v.  6..    sails  do^^n^^^^^^^^  ^^ 

Tigris  to  obis,  iv.  <i5«v^»'"^^^\|i''i'^"d  o^rJinVnavS^^^  Asia.  iv.  659,661;  his 

priparatlons  of,  for  the  conquest  an^^^^^J^^^eitor^^^'-^tio"  «f  *''^  ,^^'?^f''>,V^''c'.';i 
erief  for  the  death  of  p,Pli»^*^,\^!,-„,^rmis  embassies  to,  B.C.  323.  iv.  061;  his  sail 


jv.  (xm;  wis  iii^H"'^'^ „AVi  HoQth  of  iv  666-  nroDanic  acuu-vt-iiit-iii.->  y-^.  --  -.-    „ 

excited  by  the  career  and  death  or.  ivhw  p^  absence  of  nationality  in,  iv.  6<( , 
lived  longer,  iv.  667;  character  of  .as  ruler,  ^;- ^J:  "^^tj^,,  Romans,  iv.  667;  unrivaled 
Livy 's  opinion  as  to  J  s  cbarjce^  i^f  -l^e  ha  I  at^oJccd^^^^^^^  ^i^^^^^^t  ^^'vT- 

excellence  of.  as  a  nnlitarv  man,  'T; '^^  "  j^.  g-j.  Asia  not  Hellenized  by,  iv.  6.2, 
culture,  iv.670;  cities  bounded  in  Asia  b^^^  »^'^  ^V^r^U' ' 

increased  interc(immnnicaU on  pro,tucea  d>  im  i  ^^  crossed  the  Hel- 

science  and  literature,  iv.  ^'^•'  s\a*^-^[,^f/n^[rree^^^  his  earlier  Asiatic  canv 

iesnont  iv.  675;  possibility  of  emancipating  iTre  tee  ^  exiles,  iv.  694  seq.;  his 

paiS  iv.  675;  h\rescript  direcUng  fhe    f^aU  of  Gre^c^ian  e^  ^^^  .^  ^^^^  .,^. 

family  and  Sfnerals  after  his  di  at^^  1  ^.^  ^v      ^^^^^  j^,  -y.^. 

^^^'^^^^^^^^  l^t  ''''  ^^'  '''^  '^• 
A  exan.ler.  son  of  Polysperclion,  i.v   .19.  .21).  .31. 

Alexander,  son  of  Kassander.  iv.  .4,s 
Alexander,  king  of  the  Molosslans,  Iv.  .47. 


INDEX. 


811 


Alexander,  son  of  Amyntas,  iv.  48. 
Alexander  of  Epirus,  marriagt!  of,  iv.  517. 
Alexander,  the  Lynkestian,  iv.  518. 


Alexandreia  Troas,  i.  215. 

Alexandria  in  Egypt,  iv.  608;  ad  Caucasum,  Iv.  637;  ad  Jaxartem,  iv.  639. 

Alexandrine  chronology  from  the  return  of  the  Herakleids  to  the  first  Olympiad,  L 

Alexikles,  iii.  224,  226,  227. 

Alkaeus,  his  fliglit  from  battle,  i.  636;  opposition  of,  to  Pittakus,  I.  636,  iL  51:  subjec- 
tive character  of  his  poetry,  i.  229. 

Alkamenes,  sou  of  Teleklus,  i.  5()6. 

Alkatnenes,  appointment  of,  to  go  to  Lesbos,  iii.  164;  defeat  and  death  of,  iil.  167. 

Alkestis  and  Admetus,  i.  112. 

Alkctas.  iii.  seq.,  7!K),  798,  iv.  228, 

Alkibiades,  atthe  battle  of  Delium,  ii.  691;  education  and  charactei-  of,  ii.  768;  and 
S(»krates,  ii.  770;  conflicting  sentiments  entertained  towards,  ii.  772;  attempts  of,  to 
revive  his  family  tie  with  Sparta,  ii.  773;  early  politics  of,  ii,  773;  adoption  ot  anti-La- 
eonian  politics  by.  ii.  773;  attempt  of,  to  ally  Argos  with  Atlicns,  B.C.  420,  ii,  774;  trick 


projected  contention  of  ostracism  between,  ii,  810;  his  support  of  the  Egesta^au 
envoys  at  Athens,  b.c.  416,  ii.  8:32;  and  the  Sicilian  expedition,  ii,  834,  83?,  84;j;  attack 
upon,  in  connection  with  the  mutilation  of  tiie  Herman,  iii.  ^%  40,  6S  seq.;  tlie  Eleu- 
siniau  mysteries  and,  iii.  49,  6S,  273;  plan  of  action  in  Sicily  projiosed  by,  iii.  ,5S;  at 
Mcssone  in  Sicily,  iii.  (50;  at  Katana,  iii,  60;  recall  of,  to  take  his  trial,  iii.  (il,  7i>; 
escape  and  condemnation  of.  iii.  70  seq.;  at  Sparta,  iii.  83  seq.;  Lacedaiinonians  per- 
suaded by,  to  send  aid  to  Chios,  iii.  168;  expedition  of,  to  Chios,  iii.  168;  revolt  of 
Miletus  from  Athens,  caused  by,  iil.  172;  order  from  Sparta  to  kill,  iii.  188;  escape  of, 
to  Tissaphernes,  iii.  188;  advice  of,  to  Tissaphernes,  iii.  188;  acts  as  interpreter 
between  Tissaphernes  and  the  Greeks,  iii.  189;  oligarchical  conspiracy  of, 
with  the  Athenian  officers  at  Samos,  iii.  191;  counter-maneuvers  of,  against  Phrv- 
nicims,  iii.  194;  propo.sed  restoration  of,  to  Athens,  iii.  194,  193;  negotiations  of,  with 
Peisander,  iii.  196,  199;  and  the  Athenian  democracy  at  Samos,  iii.  216,  219;  at  Aspen- 
dus,  iii.  244;  return  of,  from  Aspendus  to  Samos,  iii.  251;  arrival  of,  at  the  Hellespont, 
from  Samos,  iii.  251;  arrest  ol:  Tissaphernes  by,  iii.  25;3;  escape  of,  from  Sardis,  iii.  253; 


,  ?xpediti( 
to  Asia,  B.C.  407,  iii.  274;  dissatisfaction  of  the  armament  at  Samos  with,  iii.  276; 
accusations  against,  at  Athens,  B.C.  407,  Iii.  277;  alteration  of  sentiment  toward,  aC 
Athens,  B.c,  407,  iii.  277;  and  Nikias,  different  behavior  of  the  Athenians  toward, 
iii.  278;  dismissal  of,  from  his  command,  B.C.  4t)7.  iii.  279;  at  ^gospotami,  iii,  312;  posi- 
tion and  views  of,  in  Asia,  after  the  battle  of  ,^gospotaiui,  iii.  380;  assassination  of, 
iii.  ;)82;  character  of,  iii,  382. 

Alkidas,  ii.  592,  593,  613. 

Alicmx'on,  i.  Ill,  seq. 

AIkiiia?<)nids,  curse,  trial,  and  condemnation  of,  1,  573;  proceedings  of,  against  Hip- 
pias,  ii.  67;  rei)uilding  of  Delphian  teniple  by,  ii,  68;  fal.se  imputation  of  treachery 
on.  at  the  battle  of  Marathon,  il.  145;  demand  of  Sparta  for  the  expulsion  of,  ii.  5iJ8. 

Alkiiian.  il.  45,  47,  49, 

Alkmene,  i,  99, 

Allficorical  Interpretations  of  mythes,  1,  254,  256,  258, 

Ajl.'gory  rarely  admissible  in  the  interpretation  of  mythes,  L  48. 

Aioids,  the,  i.  12.3. 

Al  ).s,  sanguinary  rites  at,  I.  117. 

Akluea,  and  the  burning  brand,  i,  22", 

Ahhiemenes,  founder  of  Rhodes,  i,  .303. 

AUh;einenes  and  Katreus,  i,  169, 

Al\  ;itt«^s  and  Kyaxares,  i.  653;  war  of,  with  Miletus,  1,  664  seq.;  sacrilege  committed 
o.v,  1.  61)1;  long  reign,  death,  and  sepulchre  of,  i.  6t>l. 

Anialtheia.  the  horn  of,  i.  129. 

Anianu.s,  Mount,  march  of  Darius  to,  Iv,  583. 

Auiasis,  ii.  13(i;  death  of,  ii.  125. 

Aiiiasis  and  Polykrates,  ii  136. 

Ain.istris,  iv,  ?.)1. 

Anidzuus,  legend  of, ',  159  seq. 


IHDEX. 


"""i^^  5.VV,  projected  '>',V';<-,V,''i;'  l^Tmoi^^^^^^^^^^^  "»"•  "■  «»>  P^Uic  conveu- 

Amlirvsus  refortiftc.ition  of,  IV.  o^H. 

!SlS?ef  £y^->ou!l'l£  "^  "'>  "'  ^•'"="^'=-^- 

4U8,  iii.  3TU,  .S73. 
Ainompharctiis,  li.  oa». 
AinorKcs.  iii.  IWi;  capture  of,  ill.  1T». 

AiupliiJirftWS'  i.  l'.^».  lyi-  ^       .     v.      •••   co- 

Amphiktyon,  i.  1^,  IOd.  ,     0^3.  condemnation  of  Sparta  by,  in.  Kd; 

AmpMktyonles,  or  «du.lve  relirt,.,,  I^^^^^^^^^  of  ,hc  Pythian 

Amphi^tyouy  at  Kalauyia,  i.  lij^       T)roiectea  attack  upon,  ii.  632. 

i;;;Rr;ll;;fh£SA'sri^sSS:^.X|o^^^^^^  o.-,  with  t.^  Ambrak-ot^, ».  ess. 

S\'J\.\.io„;a5ai,,»t,,,,..nMSj;;*r;,p^^^^ 

WW  iv  '>ri()' claim  of  Atlien.s  to,  iv.'i^,  .-*,  n'ln 


p/u::^af^V^he*i;attloof.ii74.l:n..t 


Tw'ucc  alter  ine  uuiii«^ 
751;  neglect  o^,  by  fhc 


525,589,593. 


bFihc  Athenians,  ii.  «^  ^^'-i^^Vi^  deK^t;  of  Ou^  Atl^oninns  at  iv. 
krat. sat,  iv.  77;  failure  of  Tunothoxjs^^^^^^  '^Snlo'lv.  m  sie,^e  a"<|  capture 
Sf=  {;?Sfp?i^^'3^s'sca.l^'?S^       0^]^  -ith  the  Athenian,  respecting,  i^ .  .m 

i;!!i:HSulns:'SJsStioS'  S;*ii&i^t' Ainens,  Iv.  492;  violent  proceedings  of  the  Am- 
l)hiktyonb  acainst,  iv.  49;i. 

Amphitryon,  1.  W. 

Amphoterus  and  Akaman,  1.  wp. 

Ain>klae,  i.  4.^7;  conquest  of,  i.  ^e. 

ASintas,  and  the  ffl!,sl?t'"aVu  ""-]•>  l?n    iv  46-  and  the  Olyntliian  confederacy.Jii.  743 
A|n^"-^«/'#.^^,^;\UikS^l  iii  77"^:;.^  m-  ^e.  ^T;  death  of,  iv.  48;  assistance 

of  iphikrates  to  the  lamily  of.jv    48. 
AmvAtas,  son  of  A.nt!ochus,  iv.  o.'o. 
Aim-ntas  son  of  renl.kkas,  iv.  oi.. 
Auaktorium,  i.  t4i,  u.  wa. 

AS!ScrSin?of,i.yDion,iv.268. 

AnaxaKoras,  ii.  511.      „    -  ,   .qq 
Anaxandrides.  bigamy  of,  i.  4S9. 

iSSibm'y:  iii^5-A!l^;^u' th^Hellespont,  ill.  Wr,  death  of.  iU.  7OT. 

Anaxikrates,  ii.  421. 
Anaxilaus,  ii.  i^'J,  '^• 
Anaximander,  ii.  SAK 

ii;;l;';S;;<^onf.  uieS'iS.o.JS  t.>c  HermK,  lU.  63,  Ci 

Audrot^cos,  death  of,  i.  1*55. 

Andrc;!clus.  i.  fi26. 

Andronia-he  and  Helenus,  i.  205. 

!iiliE'3iS'>|lK^S.Se?'.i:  S  .lege  of.  by  Alkibiades  and  Kenon,  iii.  ^Ti. 
Anin.aK  ^vorship  of,  in  Egypt,  i.  ttio.  ^ 

Anl'.flklfHs  \^\bassv  of,  to  Tiribazu.s  ill.  7()();  en>ba.8ies  of,  to  Pei-sia,  HI.  aO,  u*^>. 

i;;S'Knl"ffl!S.:.i^^'i;f  uic^cri:i!i.^coiL  PUeuida  and  Eg3Pt".t 

probable,  i.  422. 


liN  DEX. 


813 


Antenor,  1.  205,  211. 
Antigone,  i.  192. 


Ptolemy,  iv.  TW;  Roxaima  and  her  soti  Alexander  put  to  death  by.lv.  7;J3;  niurdrra 

Kleopatra,  sister  of  Alexander,  iv.  734;  Athenian  envoys  sent  to,  iv.  739;  death 

of,  iv,  743. 
Antigonus  Gonatas,  iv.  741. 
Antiloclius,  death  of,  i.  2(W. 
Antimachus  of  Kolophon,  i.  188. 
Antiochus,  at  Samos  aud  Notium,  ill.  275. 
Antiochus,  the  Arcadian,  iv.  67. 
Antiope,  i.  187  seq. 
Antipater,  embassy  of,  from  Philip  to  Athens,  Iv.  446,  417,  4«,  4.')0,  452;  made  viceroy  of 

Macodonia,  iv..=)rxS;  and  Olynipias,  iv.  5.58.605;  defeat  of  A?is  bv,  iv.  6S0;  submission  o( 


Antipater,  son  of  Kassander,  iv.  743. 

Antiphlius,  iv.  699,  703. 

Antiphon,  iii.  197,  205,  223,  2:55. 

Antiquity,  Grecian,  a  religious  conception,  i.  265;  stripped  of  its  religious  character 

by  chronology,  i.  265. 
Antisthenes,  atKaunus,  iii.  183. 
Antistrophe,  introduction  of,  ii.  83w 
Anytu.s,  iii.  261,  327. 
Aorno.s,  rock  of,  iv,  619. 
Apate,  i.  51. 

Apaturia,  excitement  at  the,  after  the  battle  of  Arglnusce,  ill  298. 
Aphareus,  i.  141. 
Aphei  las,  i.  144. 

Aphep.sion  and  Mantitheus,  iii.  61. 
Aphet»,  Persian  fleet  at,,ii.  2S7,  23S,  239. 
Ai)hrodito,  i.  49, 76. 
Apis,  i.  95. 
Ajwdektse,  ii.  77. 


Crcesus,  ii.  110. 
ApoUodorus,  his  genealogy  of  Hellen.  i.  103  seq. 
Apollodoru.s  and  the  Theoric  fund,  iv.  423. 
ApoUokrates,  iv.  277,  27S,  286. 

Apol Ionia,  1.  7;42;  and  the  Illyrians,  i.  752;  and  the  Olynthlan  confederacy,  ill.  744. 
Apollonules,  IV.  (lOi,  609. 
Aprlcs,  reign  and  death  of,  i.  702. 
Apsyrtus.  i.  175. 

Arabia,  Alexander's  project  with  regard  to,  Iv.  659,  661. 
Araehosia,  Alexander  in,  iv.  0:^. 
Aradus,  surrender  of.  to  Alexander,  Iv.  596. 
Arbela,  battle  of,  iv.  615. 
Arl)itratiou  at  Athens,  ii.  433. 
Arcadia,  1.  442;  state  of,  b.c.  560,  I.  516,  soq.;  and  Rparta,  i.  51R,  ii.400;  proeoedincs  in, 


lence  of,  iv.  54;  envoy  to  Persia  from,  iv.  66.  67;  protest  of,  against  tlx-  lio;idship  of 
Thebes,  iv.  67;  alliance  of  Athens  with,  iv.  7!;  and  Eleinns.  iv.  87,  91;  occui>;ition  and 
plunder  of  Olympia  by,  iv.  Sfi,  90  seq.;  celebration  of  the  Olympic  games  by,  i''  "' 


seizure  of,  at  Tegea,  by  the  Theban  harmost,  iv.  93. 
Archagathus,  iv.  773,  777. 
Arehegetes,  Apollo,  1.  74. 
Arehelaus,  iii.  253;  siege  of  Pydna  by,  iii.  252. 
Archcplolcnuis,  iii.  2:>5. 
.Vr-ldus.  ffUist  of  Syracuse,  i.  716. 
Ai-eluas,  the  riiebah,  iii.  763,  765. 


•« 


S12 


INDEX. 


4oS,  iii.  oTU,  373. 

Alnor^rU.  iii.  IWi;  capture  of,  lil.  1T8. 

Aniphiaraus,  i.  l'.H>.  lijl.  .     ,       ••:   co- 

Amphiktyon,  i.  liU,  105.  j     ,^3  condemnation  of  Sparta  by,  ni.  82a: 

Amphiktyonies,  or  exclusive  reli^^^^^^^^^  of  the  rythian 

^Sim:4'l5';:"L'7arviSn^  Ampblssians,  iv.  493  seq. 

An'iphiktyony  at  l^''*'-'*""^''/- \fr,s's  proiected  attack  upon,  li.  632.      ,  ,  ^     ,,  ,j„q 

expodition  against  li.  'J^',,^^]^?  I^.^  |'':^,^\oV ed  to  \thons.  (.n  the  peace  of  Niki.nsii, 
peace  after  the  battle  of  .11  .4-.  "''J/*  ^^"".V  V-  -Hini  of  Athens  to.  iv.  47,  TJ;  II' u- 
tTi-  n^gle«?t  of,  by  the  Athenians,  n.  «*f',\y-.'^?'lV  ".VXats  of  the  Athenians  at,  iv. 
kratl.sat,  iv.  77:  failure  of  Twvy^cv^^,^^^  4  e  a  nf  to  iv-  :M8:  siege  and  capture 
St  S?%l^iv.t^ -a  •  i'?;fi!p'  Il-S  with  the  Athenian,  respecting,  iv.  .m 
iilljjhSuiSSs^ltloS^  f:{;*iSiii;st  Aihens,  iv.  492;  violent  proceedings  of  the  Am- 
phiktyons  against,  iv.  49:3. 

AniphiliTf>».  i-*-'^-    ^  .  me 

Amphoterus  and  Akaman.  1.  iv|p. 

Aniyklae,  i.  A'y,  conquest  of,  i.  ^^. 

AnivntasUndthePei^sistratlds  l."^^^^^         4fi.  and  the  Olvnthlan  confederacy,  Hi.  7A 
AU^Vmas,  father  of  Fh.hp^^^  i,  ,6,  |,,  ueath  of,  iv.  48;  assistance 

of  Iphikrates  to  t>ie  laniily  of.  H.  48 
A  nvntas,  son  of  A.nti<.ehus,  iv.  o.>_5,  o89,  59J. 
Amvntas;  s.m  of  I'enl  kkas,  iv.  oi.. 
Anaktorium.  i.  i4l,  u.  ots. 

ASuScrSlnpof,byDlon,lv.268. 

Anaxagoras.  ii.  511.  -  ,   .qq 

Anaxandrides.  bitiamy  of.  1.  489. 

i^^iS^m'^i^i^^^^^^^o-'^  ill.  Wy,  death  of.  iU.  707. 
Anaxikrates,  Ij- 42]. 
Anaxilaus,  11.349,  m 
Anaxiniander,  ii.  .Kt'.  . 

l!:?,S^';,.'r?.n".i:"E,'i!SlL'ot  U,o  Hcrm^,  111.  63, 65. 

Audroi;c<>s,  death  of,  i.  1K5. 

Andri.Hlus,  1.  626. 

Andronia-he  and  Helenus,  1.  205. 

AiKlromachus,  iv.  ."505.  t,'-^*^  \  orw  ...  ..-. 

illllK^s  SVe^'^^^of'vfr-fbc'nii 'o\le^^^     ^  .lege  of,  by  Alkiblades  and  Kenon.  id.  J.l. 

Ai.in.als  ^vorship  of,  in  Eyypt,  i-  W'O-  ^ 

AnSkifHs  'c^mbassv  of.  to  Tiribazu.s.  ill.  7(5.;  eml^assies  of,  to  Persia,  111.  .19,  ...; 

probable,  i.  422. 


IJN  DEX. 


813 


Antenor,  1.  2()5.  211. 

Antif?one,  1.  192. 

Aiitigouus  an<l  Perdikkas,  iv.  710;  and  Eumr>,nes,  Iv.  713:  great  power  of,  iv.  731;  allianee 
of  Kassander,  Lysiniacliu.s.  uiul  I'tolt'iny.  against,  iv.  731,  «3?,  71!),  7]2;  measures  of, 
against  Kassander,  iv.  731,  733;  naoification  of,  with  Ka-ssaudcr,  Lysimachus,  ;infl 
Ptolemy,  iv.  733;  Roxanua  an<l  her  son  Alexander  put  to  death  by.  iv.  7;j3;  niurdcra 
Kleopatra,  sister  of  Alexander,  iv.  734;  Athenian  envoys  scut  to,  iv.  739;  death 
of,  iv,  743. 

Antigouus  Gonatas,  iv.  741. 

Antilochus,  death  of,  i.  2U.3. 

Antiinaehus  of  Koloplion,  i.  183. 

Autiuchus,  at  Sanios  and  Notium,  ill.  275. 

Antiochus,  the  Arcadian,  iv.  67. 

Antiope,  i.  187  seq. 

Antipater,  embassy  of,  from  Philip  to  Atliens,  Iv.  44fi,  447,  448,  450,  452;  made  vlcerov  of 
Macedonia,  iv.,-).-),S:  and  Olynipias,  iv.  5.53,605:  defeat  of  Agis  bv,  iv.  mO;  submissioii  of 
all  Greece  to,  iv.  6S1;  Grecian  hostilities  against,  after  Alexander's  death,  iv.  607:  anl 
Kraterus,  iv.  702,  711;  victory  of,  at  Krannon,  iv.  702;  terms  impos'.>d  upon  Athens  bv, 
iv.  7tM;  remodels  the  Pelopouuesian  cities,  iv.  7U9;  contest  and  i)aeirieation  of,  with 
tho  .Etolians,  iv.  709;  made  guardian  of  Alexander's  family,  iv.  712;  death  of,  iv.  713; 
last  directions  of,  iv.  714. 

Antipater,  son  of  Kassander,  Iv.  743. 

Antiphlius,  iv.  699,  703. 

Antiphon,  iii.  197,  205,  223,  23.5. 

Antiquity,  Grecian,  a  religious  conception,  i.  265;  stripped  of  Its  religious  character 
by  chronology,  1.  265. 

Antisthenes,  atKaunu.s,  iii.  183. 

Antistrophe,  introduction  of,  ii.  83. 

Anytus,  iii.  261,  327. 

Aornos,  rock  of,  iv.  619. 

Apate,  i.  51. 

Apaturia,  excitement  at  the,  after  the  battle  of  Arglnusos,  111.  298. 

Aphareus,  i.  141. 

Aphei  las,  i.  144. 

Aphepsion  and  Mantitheus,  iii.  61. 

Apheta3,  Persian  fleet  at,»ii.  2S7,  23S,  2S9. 

Apiirodite,  i.  49, 76. 

Apis,  1.  95. 

ApodektiB.  ii.  77. 

Apollo,  i,  53;  legends  of,  I. 


Cnjesus,  ii.  110. 

Apollodorus,  his  genealogy  of  Hellen,  I.  103  seq. 

Apollodorus  and  tlie  Thcoric  fund,  iv.  423. 

Apolloki-ates,  iv.  277,  278,  286. 

ApoUonia,  i.  742;  and  tlie  Illyrians,  I.  752;  and  the  Olynthlan  confederacy,  ill.  744. 

ApoUonides,  iv.  CM,  609. 

Apries,  reign  and  deatli  of,  i.  702. 

Apsyrtus.  i.  175. 

Arabia,  Alexander's  project  with  regard  to,  iv.  6.59,  661. 

Araciiosia,  Alexander  in,  iv.  6:56. 

Aradus,  surrender  of.  to  Alexander,  iv.  596. 

Arhela,  battle  of,  iv.  615. 

Arbitration  at  Athens,  ii.  433. 

Arcadia,  i.  442;  state  of,  rs.c.  .560,  i.  516,  seq.;  and  Sparta,  i.  518,  il.400;  prooeedincs  in, 
alter  the  battle  of  Leuktra,  iii.  827;  inv.isions  of,  bv  Arehidamus,  iv.  .58,  87;  mission 
of  Epaminondas  to,  iv.  72;  dissensions  in,  iv.  91;  enibassv  of  yi^sehines  to,  iv.  431. 

Ar(>adians,  i.  443,  516;  sympathy  of.  v/ith  Messenians,  i.  513;' impulse  of.  toward  a  Pan- 
Arcadian  union,  iii.  829;  application  of.  to  Alliens  and  Thebes,  for  aid  airainst  Sparta, 
iii.  832;  Epaminondas  and  tlie  consolidation  of,  iii.  8:>1;  energetic  action  a»i<l  inso 
lence  of,  iv.  54;  envoy  to  Persia  from,  iv.  (M\.  r)7;  protest  of,  airainst  the  lieadship  of 
Thebes,  iv.  67;  alliance  of  Athens  with,  iv.  71;  and  EhM'ans.  iv,  87,  91;  oceupati<m  and 
plunder  of  Olympia  by,  iv.  8(5,  ;X)  seq.;  celel)ration  of  the  Olympic  j 
seizure  of,  at  Tegea,  by  the  Theban  harmost,  iv.  92. 

Archagathus,  iv.  773,  777. 

Archegetes,  Apollo,  1.  74. 

Arch(>laus,  iii.  25:3;  siege  of  Pydna  by,  iii.  252. 

Archeptolemus,  ill.  2:35. 

Ar.'lii  IS.  <eUist  of  Syracuse,  i.  716. 

Arclua.s,  tlie  Thebaii,  iii.  763,  765. 


Olympic  games  by,  iv.  88; 


814 


INDEX. 


Archias,  the  Exile  Hunter,  iv.  716. 

Archidamus  II.,  speech  of,  upalnst  war  with  Athens,  il.  503;  invasions  of  Attica  by,  ii. 
rvi'i,  :>12,  5.S2;  his  expedition  to  Tlata^a,  ii.  5<)U. 

Archidamus  III.,  invasions  of  Areadhi  l)y,  iv.  fiS,  F6;  and  the  independence  of  Messene, 
iv.  74.  114;  and  riiilonielus,  iv.  "t'.l;  expedition  of,  against  Megalopolis,  iv.  Gl'D;  aid  to 
the  Pholiians  at  Tin  imopyhT?  under,  iv.  4C1,  46o,  67y,  747. 

Archiloohus,  i.  22".),  762,  ii.  'I.^.  4<i  seq. 

Archinu.s,  decrees  of,  iii.  oLS,  37S. 

Architects  at  Atlieus,  under  Perlkles,  il.  4Gfi. 

Architecture,  Grecian,  between  B.C.  600-550,  il.  57 

Archonides.  iv.  ]S3. 

Archons  after  Kodms.  1.  ."irifi;  the  nine,  1.  568;  judpes  without  appeal  till  after  Kleis- 
thenes,  1.  .'iW:  effect  of  Kleistlunes's  revolution  on,  ii.  7."),  80;  limited  functions  of, 
0  rter  the  Persian  war,  ii.  o8T;  limitation  of  the  functions  of,  by  Periiilcs,  ii.  433, 
4:8. 

Ardvs,  i.  7r>3.  ,       ,  ,  ^     ^  , 

Areopagus,  senate  of,  1.  567;  and  the  Ephrta>,  1.  571:  powers  of,  enlarged  hy  Solon,  1. 
59o;  under  the  Rolonian  and  Kleisthenlan  constitutions,  ii.  i^o;  in  early  Athens,  ii. 
!::0;  oligarchical  tendencies  of,  ii.  4?1:  venenible  character  and  large  powers  of.  ii. 
;:.?:  at  vf.riance  with  the  growing  democratical  sentiment.  P.c.  4S(!-46(),  ii.  4:54;  cen- 
t(r  of  action  for  the  oligarchical  party,  ii.  43-1:  power  of,  abridged  by  I'erlkles  and 
Ephialtes,  ii.  438. 

Ares,  1. .% 

Arnte.  iv.  215,  263,  293. 

Argadeis,  i.  .558. 

ArgoDUS  and  Philip,  iv.  16. 

Arganthonius  and  the  Phoka^ans,  11.  115. 

Argeion  Demos,  proceedings  of,  ii.  806. 

Ar'-:elan  genealogies,  1.  94.  ,  ,         .    ,     ,,, 

Argeins,  attempts  of ,  to  recover  Thyrea,  I.  521;  defeat  and  destruction  of,  by  Kieo- 
jnenes,  n'.  410;  trick  of.  with  their  calendar,  ii.  786:  at  Epidarus,  ii.  788,  800;  at  the 
battle  within  the  Lf>ng  Walls  of  Corinth,  iii.  ("kSS;  n:uncuvtr.^  of,  respecting  the  holy 
truce,  iii.  699;  and  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  Iii.  716;  and  Mardonius,  il.  320. 

Arges.  i.  49. 

Aririlus,  acquisition  of.  bv  BrasMas,  11.  698. 

Arginusjp,  iiattle  of,  iii.  2S5;  recall,  impenchment,  defense,  and  condemnation  of  the 
eenerals  at  the  battle  of,  iii.  2<J0;  Inaction  of  the  Athenian  fleet  after  .the  battle  of. 
Hi.  310. 

Argo,  the,  1.  171.  ,  ^     ^         ..     r.   j 

Argonautic  expeditfon,  1.  171  seq.;  monuments  of.  1.  176  seq.;  how  and  when  attached 
to  Kolchis,  1.  179;  attempts  to  reconcile  the,  with  geographical  knowledge,  1. 180  seq; 
continued  faith  in.  i.  1S1. 

Argos,  rise  of.  coincident  with  the  decline  of  Mykena?.  i.  l:>8;  occupation  of,  by  the 
Dorians,  i.  289;  and  peiorhboring  Dorians  greater  than  Sparta  in,7ai  B.C.,  i.  446;  Dorian 
settlements  in,  1.  417,  448;  early  ascendency  of,  1.  449,  453;  subsequent  decline  of,  i. 
4.53:  acqr.isitlon  of  Sparta  frf>m.  i.  520;  mllitarv  classification  at,  i.  526;  struggles  of, 
to  rec(»ver  the  headship  of  Greece,  I.  527;  and  Kleonae,  i.  52S;  victoilous  war  of 
Sparta  acainst,  B.e.  496^,  Ii.  iS:!;  prostration  of,  p,.r.  496-5.  11.  185;  assistance  of,  to 
yEirlna,  ii.  261;  neutralltv  of,  on  the  inva.sion  of  Xerxes,  11.269;  position  of,  on  its  al- 
liance with  Athi'Tis  about  B.C.  461,  11.  411;  uncertain  relations  between  Sparta  and, 
B.C.  421,  if.  751:  position  of,  on  the  Peace  of  Niklas,  ii.  756;  the  Thousand-regiment 
at,  il.  756;  induced  bv  the  Corinthlnns  to  head  a  new  Peloponnesian  alliance,  B.C. 
4->1.  ii.  7.57;  joined  by  T.Tantlneia,  11.  757;  joined  by  the  Corinthians,  ii.  760;  joined  by 
Elis.  11.  76!>;  refusal  of  Tegea  to  join,  II.  >r^]:  and  Sparta,  projected  alliance  between, 
ii.  7«13;  and  Boeotia,  prr^j^-eted  alliance  between,  ii.  76!;  conclusion  of  a  lifty  years' 
peace  between  Sparta  and,  il.  766;  and  Athens,  alliance  between,  11.775,  7<.;  embas- 
sy from,  for  alliance  with  Corinth,  Ii.  784;  attac-k  of,  upon  Epidaurus,  ii.  786,  787; 
invasion  of,  by  the  Lacetlaemonians  and  their  allies.  B.C.  418,  ii.  788;  Alkibiades  at, 
n.r.  418,  ii.  71U;  political  chansre  at,  through  the  battle  of  Mantinea,  B.r.  4!S.  ii.  801; 
treaty  of  peace  between  Sparta  and,  B.C.  418,  ii.  801;  alliance  between  Sparta  and, 
B.C.  41^,  il.  801;  renounces  alliance  with  Athens,  Elis,  and  Mantineia,  ii.  8*)2;  oli- 
carehlcal  revolution  at,  11.  803,  804;  restoration  of  democracy  at,  ii.  8()6;  renewed 
alliance  of,  with  Athens.  11.  S()fi;  Alkil>lades  at.  B.C.  416,  il.  807;  Laceda}monian  in- 
tervention in  behalf  of  the  oligarchy  at.  Ii.  807;  envoys  from,  to  the  Athenian  De- 
mos at  Samos,  ill.  221:  alliance  of.  with  Thebes,  Athens,  and  Corinth,  against  Spar- 
ta, Iii.  660;  consolidation  of  Corinth  with,  iii.  687;  expedition  of  Agesipolis  against, 
ill.  690;  violent  Intestine  feud  at.  III.  821. 

Ar'jros.  Amphilochian.  capture  of.  by  Phormlo,  Ii.  521;  attack  of  Anibraklots  on,  il. 
"57;  Enrylochus's  proje«"ted  attack  iipon,  il.  6.32. 

Argus,  Host  ruction  of  Argeians  in  the  grove  of,  ii.  1S4. 

Aria,  .-Mexander  in,  iv.  631. 

Ariadne,  i.  166 seq. 


INDEX. 


815 


Arlreus  flight  of,  after  the  battle  of  Kunaxn,  111.508;  and  Klearchus,  iii.  511,  513;  and 
the  Greeks  after  the  battle  of  Kunaxa,  iii.  513,  511,  517,  52.5. 

ArioSzanes.'uiterventic)!!  of,  in  Greece,  iv.  56;  revolt  of,iv.  75  seq.;  at  the  Susian 
Gates,  iv.  621;  death  of,  iv.  6:22. 

Aristaawasand  Megabates,  ii.  161;  revolt  of,  il.  161,162;  application  of ,  to  Sparta,  11. 

16:3;  application  of,  to  Athens,  ii.  164;  march  of,  to  Saruis,  ii.  16o;  desertion  of  the 

Ionic  revolt  by,  ii.  168. 
Aristarchus,  the  Athenian,  in.  2*1. 
Aristarchus,  the  Laeedasmonlan,  ill.  584. 


death  and  p(jverty  of,  11. 394. 
Arlsteus,  ii.  494, 559. 

Aristo  and  Agetus,  il.  186.  _. 

Aristocrats,  Grecian,  bad  morality  of,  u.  0^. 
Aristodeinus,  i.  286. 
Aristodemus,  king  of  Messenia,  1.  508. 
Aristodemus  Malakus,  i.  713. 
ArLstodemus,  "the  cowai-d,"  Ii.  285,  33«. 
Aristodemus,  the  actor,  iv.  438. 
Aristodikus,  ii.  Ii5. 
Aristogeiton  and  Harmodius,  il.  6-3. 
Aristokles  and  Hlpponoldas.  11.  797,  790. 
Aristokrates,  king  of  Orchoinenus,  i.  510,  514. 
Aristokrates,  the  Athenian,  iii.  16?. 
Aristomaehe,  iv.  191. 
Aristomcnes,  i.  507,  510. 

Aristonlkus  of  Methynina,  Iv.  604, 609.  „,,.,„    ac,         ,  t-i  «  r.ii 

Aristophanes,  iii.  39U;  his  reason  for  showing  up  Sokrates,  Iii.  iA;  and  Kleon,  il.  <41, 

745. 
Ari.-<toteles,  the  Spartan,  iv.  215.  ,  .  .      .  _,..  , 

Aristotle  on  Spartan  women,  i.  487;  on  the  Spartan  laws  of  property,  i.  502;  meaning 
of  the  word  Sophist  in,  iii.  4lU;  formal  logic  of,  iii.  '145;  novelties  ascribed  to 
Sokrates  by,  ill.  442:  and  Hermeias,  iv.  475;  ristiuctiou  of  Alexander  by,  Iv.  5^' 
and  Alexander,  political  vhnvs  of,  compared,  iv.  G'.U. 

Aristoxenus  of  Tarentum,  iv.  310. 

Aristus  and  Xlkoteles,  I  v.  181. 

Arkas  and  Kallisto,  i.  143. 

Arkesllaus  th(^  Second,  1.  771;  the  Third,  i,  772. 

Arktinus,  ^thiopis  i>f,  1.  :)66. 

Armenia,  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  in,  ill.  542. 

Armenus,  i.  176. 

Arrhibffius,  ii.  692, 717, 719.  ,  j.,       r,  i  i^n   ^.,  ■!-.„— 

Arrian  on  the  Amazons,!.  16:?  seq.;  conjecture  of,  respecting  Geryon,  1.  1.9;  on  Dart- 
us's  plan  against  Alexander,  iv.  585. 

Aisakes  at  .\ntandrus,  iiL  250. 

Arsames,  iv.  .586. 

Arsinoe,  iv.  792. 

Arsires,  iv.  564. 

Art,  Grecian,  ii.  56. 

Artabanus,  il.  240.  ,  _,       ,        ,,.„,,.    ^     ,  « 

Artabazus,  Xerxes'  general,  siege  of  Potldsea  and  Olynthus  by,  11.  315;  jealousy  of, 
against  Mardonius,  11.  322;  conduct  of,  at  and  after  the  battle  ol  Plataea,  li.  663;  and 
Pausanlas,  ii.  374,  :>si. 

Artabazus,  satrap  of  Daskyllum,  Iv.  .357,  ;172,  395. 

Artabazus,  Darius's  general,  iv.  628, 6:^.  ..  ■,  „,  2.,  t-  i-<» 

Artaphernes,  satrap  of  Sanlis,  Hlppias's  application  to,  11.  160;  and  Histlaeus,  li.  l.<», 
176;  proceedings  of,  after  the  reconquest  of  Ionia,  li.  178;  and  Datis,  Persian  arma- 
ment under,  11.  188;  return  of,  to  Asia,  after  the  battle  of  Marathon,  il.  467. 

Artaphernes,  the  Persian  envoy,  ii.  669. 

Artaxerxes  Longimanus,  ii.  393,  669. 

Artaxerxes  Mnemon,  accession  of.  111.  488;  and  Cyrus  the  Younger,  ill.  08O,  488,  506;  at 
Kunaxa,  iii.  407,  509,  511;  death  of,  iv.  118. 

Artayktes,  li.  34:3. 

Artemis,  i.  53;  wor.ship  of.  In  Asia,  1.  623. 

Artemis,  liimnatls,  temple  of,  i.  508. 

Artemisia,  ii.  :M,  308,  311. 


816 


INDEX. 


INDEX. 


817 


ArtcmisiUTn.  rp?=olntIon  of  Greeks  to  oppose  Xerxes  at,  ii.  2^;  Groc^  fleet  at,  11.  2T7, 

•.V?:  sea  fiKht  of.  ii.  28^;  retreat  of  the  Greek  fleet  from,  to  Salaams,  li.  ^1. 
Artluir,  roinanees  of.  i.  27li. 

Artisan?,  at  Athens,  i.  6WJ.  ,  tt    »    i-    /^.     «  „  i  "lo 

Art^  riKiimeiitary  state  of,  in  Homeric  anil  Ilesiotlic  Greece,  1.  o4b. 

i:;K;ii^v^Snle  eSfes^;;;  K^S;^oi£^  in.  i.  (;.,seq.;  collective  ci^ilization  in^ 

without  individual  freedom  of  development,  i.  US(,;  state  of,  before  the  Persian 
mouarchv.  ii.  lt'4:  conquests  of  Cyrus  the  (ireat  in,  li.  119;  expedition  of  On  ek  ik-et 
auaiust.  bx.  47S,  ii.  373;  Alkibiades  in.  ili.  2m,  m-,  iii.  380;  expedition  of  Tmioiheus  to. 
iv  50.  75;  Agesiiaus  in.  iv.  75;  measures  of  Alexander  betore  going  to.  iv.  a^;  pas- 
sage of  Alexander  to,  iv.  r.6»;  review  of  Alexander's  army  m,  iv.  oWJ;  cities  tounded 
by  Alexander  in.  iv.  671;  Helleuized  by  the  Diadochl.  not  by  Alexander,  iv.  6.1;  how 

ASa5lSi"r,G'reeknnS*.\!^l'^non -Hellenic  people  of,  i.  630;  features  of  the  country 
of  i.  tun-  Phrygian  music  and  worship  among  Greeks  in,  i.  f.4y;  predominance  of  te- 
nialo  influence-  in  the  legends  of,  i.  (i5«J;  Cimmerian  invasion  of,  i.  (361  scq.;  conquest 
of.  by  tlie  Persians,  ii.  118;  arrival  of  Cyrus  the  Younger  in,  iii.  2&i,  y06. 

Asia.  Upper,  Scythian  invasion  of,  i.  W>2.      „,,,,,„       ^   .   ,«« 

Asiatic  customs  and  religion  blended  with  Hellenic  in  the  Troad,  I.  420. 

Asiatic  Dorians,  i.  ('>;>S.  .  ^,_    ^       ,       t^-  i     »  e- 

Asiatic  frenzy  grafted  on  the  joviality  of  the  Grecian  Dionysia,  1.  6o. 

Asiatic  Greece,  deposition  of  despots  of,  by  Aristagoras.ii.  1G2.  

Asiatic  Greeks,  conquest  of,  by  Crcesus,  i.  (:6a:  state  ot.  after  Cyrus's  conquest  pt 
Lydia.  li.  113;  application  of,  to  Sparta,  B.C.  516,  ii.  113;  alliance  with,  against  lersia, 
abandoned  by  tlie  Athenians,  ii.  166;  successes  of  Persians  against,  li.  K..;  reconquest 
of.  after  the  fall  of  Miletus,  ii.  175;  first  step  to  the  ascendency  of  Athens  ovt-r,  n.  o.>^; 
surrender  of,  to  Persia,  by  Sparta,  iii.  610;  !.nd  Cyrus  the  Younger,  iii.blO;  and  Tis- 
saphernes,  iii.  610;  application  of,  to  Sparta  fur  aid  against  1  issapherius,  ni.  ol^; 
after  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  iii.  750;  Spartan  project  for  the  rescue  of,  ui.  .-.o. 

Asidates,  iii.  5W». 

Askalaphus  and  lalmenus,  i.  119. 

Asklepiads,  i.  14(;. 

Asklepius,  1.  145  seq. 

Asopiu.s,  son  of  Phormlo,  11. 588.  .,.    v,  ...,      *  t.!   *        -i  oo. 

Asopus.  (jreeks  and  Persians  at,  before  the  battle  of  Plataea,  li.  .>^4. 

Alpendius'Phenician  fleet  at,  B.C.  411,  iii.  244,  250;  Alkibiadesat,  iii.  248;  Alkibiades' re- 
turn from,  to  Samos,  iii.  251;  Alexander  at.  iv.  oi6. 

AssemMj!  Spartan  popular,  i.  4(a,  473;  Athenian  judicial,  ii.  7G,  79;  Atlienlan  politi- 
cal, ii.  ^7. 

Assvria.  relations  of.  with  Egypt,  1.  69«. 

Aswyrian  kin^s.  their  command  of  human  labor.  I.  r,85.  „       ,  ,^        .,      „ 

Assyrians  and  Medes.  i.  651.  681;  conirnsted  with  Pl)enlclans,  Greeks,  and  Egyptians, 
i.  686;  and  Piienicians.  effect  of,  on  the  Greek  mind,  i.  706  seq. 

Astakus,  ii.  530,  534. 

Astevia.  i.  50. 

Astorius  1.  Ift4» 

Astra-His,'  i.  50;  and  Eos,  children  of.  1.  .')0.  ,     ^       ,_     ,  n.-. 

Astronomy  and  physics,  knowledge  of.  among  the  early  Greeks,  I.  347. 

Asty-iges,  story  of,  ii.  104. 

AFtvanax,  death  of,  i. '335.  ...   ^^^      ^  ^,  .  ,  ^, 

Astyochus.  expedition  of ,  to  Tonla.  Iii.  174;  at  Lesbos,  in.  I.d;  at  Chios  and  the  oppo- 
site coast,  iii.  179:  accidental  escape  of,  iii.  181;  and  Peidaritus,  iii,  isi;  and  Ti.ssa- 
phernes,  treaty  between,  iii.  1S2;  mission  of  Lichae  and  others  it  sji  cting,  lii.  IW; 
victory  of,  over  Charminus,  and  junction  with  Antisthenes,  iii.  183;  at  ilhodcs,  ill. 
241;  at  Miletus,  iii.  243;  recall  of,  iii.  244. 

Atalanta,  i.  77. 127.  ..     „,,,.,       .,.  ^,^   tt  .        *  --.   »— 

Altarneus,  captured  and  garrisoned  by  Derkyllidas,  ill.  618;  Hermeias  of,  ui.  4 to. 

Ate,  i.  51. 

Athamas,  i.  115  seq. 

Athenagoras,  lii.  &4.  »...«,       ,,       ^       .t.,.  -r.       »i       « 

Athene,  birth  of.  i.  52;  various  representations  of,  I.  77;  her  dispute  with  Posoidon.  i. 
78,  153;  Chalkloekus,  temple  of.  and  Pausauias,  iL  S84;  Polias,  reported  prodigy  in 
the  temple  of,  on  Xerxes'  approach,  ii.  295.  ,  .,      ,     . 

Athenian  victims  for  the  Minotaur,  i.  1(55;  ceremonies  commemorative  of  the  destnic- 
tion  of  the  3Iinotaur,  1.  166;  democracy,  Kleisthenes  therealautliorof,  ii.  .S;  people, 
judicial  attributes  of.  il.  79;  nobles,  early  violence  of,  ii.  t-5;  energy,  development  «)t, 
after  Kleisthenes'  revolution,  ii.  lUO;  seamen,  contrasted  with  the  lonians  at  1-ade, 
ii.  173;  dikasts,  temper  of,  in  estimating  past  services,  ii.  212;  democracy,  origin  or 
the  apparent  flcklentss  of,  11.  214;  envoy,  speech  of,  atGelo,  11.  352;  parties  am-  pon- 


tics, effect  of  the  Persian  war  upon,  li.  SSr,;  emj)ire,  ii.  .TC"  4U  47-5  173  iii  ^vi  v.> 
powei%  increase  of,  after  tht.  formation  of  the  DeJi.in  t^outV  iV-  vi-  '  ii  4..  tnvViK? 
&'nV?V'S'n^^t'if^''"'^  tlie  Heiots.ij.  410:  democracy,  consuuin  a  ioa  of;  H.  .i  ;  a  •  na." 
ment  against  Samos,  under  PeriKles.  Sophokles,  etc.,  ii.  4dS;  private-  eitizens    -A    ■  :\ 

euvtj^s  I/O,  11.  ■±,'50,  naval  attack,  ii.  48);  envoy,  renlv  of  t<»  tUt.  « ',»i.i,^rii,-.,,» 
envoy,    at     the     Spartan    assembly,    ii.'soi;     expetj    ion    to     rava^^e^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

Ji^'.^':^.\^:if',V-^^^*,'  /"7"''^'"?"'^'^   ^^    Potidi^a  a/ul   Clialkid  c    Til  Tcxs    n  c  ^^^^^^^^^ 
li.    a(.D;    assembly,     debates     m,    respecting     Mitylene,     ii     597     00()-    a^^tMiiblv 
about  the  LaccHkeim^nian  prisoners  in  Spi^akteiui.  ii   646rasseml^\^n  D^m^^^^ 

i^^  Y^^^toXl  ^'"Plupolis.  li.  739;  fleet,  opi^rations  of,  nt^ar  MeJseiie  a  id  Weuium 
B.C.  42,.,  ii.  820;  assembly,  and  tlie  expedition  to  Sicily,  ii.  SU,  hII^  treasurv  ab  n     ' 

.r^vi"'  f,-""-  ^  ?•'  V  -^^^^  "^'^^  ^"  **^^  J^^'^^b*'^  «f  Syracuse, 'iii  1:>3,'  21,'  135?  U  ;  pl-i's  ners 
at  Syracuse,  in   lo3  .seq.;  fleet  at  Samos,  b.c.  412,  liij79:  dei  locracv  seciliVtts  i u 
agaimst  corruption,  iii.  1«6;  assembly,  vote  of,  in  favor  of  olife^xSSal  cham^^      ' 
sm  •nfro,?«/'o'''^  Koionus,    II.  207;  democracy.  reconstitu^i()n"of,  a    Smos  iii '2'V 

41(1   i-?.  -Si'  ^»-^^'  ^^^^'  concentration  of,  at  Kardia,  iii.  253;  fleet  at  B<]sphorus  b  (• 
ii-lnus  ?'iS  f.o^'^f '"if"'!'"^'  "h  ^^'   assembly,  debates'in.  on  the  £aiJr  1  at 
Aifeinusce,  ill   292-.Tm;   fleet,  inaction  of,  after   the   battle  of    Arcinusa?    iii    31  • 

n  ^Vr'ir!^;.^ '"'  ^?"V/?  ^"^  ^Egospotami,  iii.  312;  fleet,  capture  of.  at  ifSsi  ota  nV 
of  ii  'wV-  min  .'  ?.Vfl,;'V''''  '''/^''''  t»»«  »>^ttle.of  ^gospotami.  iii.  316  tramly/grovv  I 
Bc4^S<Snd4fHVi'ijr  .''"'-■''  of  comedy  on,  iii.  391;  character  not  corrupted  bet weoii 
B.C.  4S0and  4(b   iii.  413;  confederacy,  new,  b.c.  378.  iv.  171;  and  Theban  cavalrv  Ivtr 

DenuitSe.s'fv.'lsf  ^'  '^•^- '"""'  '^-  '•^''  ^'^"^^'^  ^"^'^^"^  ^^  '^^  adiStration 'of.  by 
Athenians   W  the  Herakleid.s,  I.  100;   and  SIgeium.  1.  220;  and  Samians    eon(•.•^<^ 

iir^..  n  O.V   K       ,  ^  "»yj^-^if^;b  li-  •i<>6;  Pan-Hellenic  patriotism  of.  en  Xerxes 's  ii vi- 
oV  A',,";^'"'  hopeless  situation  of,  .-if ter  the  battle  of  TherinonV4  it 'i5-^.on(liic(. 
of,  on  the  approach  of  Xerxes,  ii.  294  seq.;  victory  of  at  H^\u,\t  u  ^r^iu-^^^^^^^^ 
awarded  to,  after  the  battle  of  Salamis,  ii.  313   under  PaSniis  'i nfeia  ii    '^ 

MeSari  Rp  Ml  il  ii»?  ^i.'l-.'",!'  Prj'qeeduigs  of,  in  Cyprus,  Phenlela,  4-vpt  ami 
flieKma.  B.C.  4W),  li.  41o;  ,lefeat  the  .^.Kinetaiis,  Bx'.  459.  ii.  413-  tlcfont  ,,f  ^tti,,^^;,',. 

42o''i^aU'h'\'i;?nst''TSss^,^v'Tf '  Ji  '1'^"^!'  "^^V^^  Pelopon4suVmiVer'folndS 
vic'tSs  of  ^n/^-v  Jr  f=  ,    ^'  "•  1*=  ^^^1^'^^  ^^^'  '^'^•^^'S  ^*^>  in  Egypt,  B.C.  460-4;w,  ii.    20; 
VIC  lories  or.  at  t^yprus.  under  Anaxikrates.  ii.  421;  defeat  of  at  KnrnnJ-^    u    <o-. 

fheTmn  rp'n7&*^'  ''^^^'U'^'^  '^^""^"'^  *^^  Perikles  and  Ephialt.^sN    4^^^^^^^ 
trnee^?  i-Q°^.if  *?*:''^'  ";.-^-'"'  s«^"le"ients  of,  in  the  .Egean.  during  tlieTliirtvv  ears' 
Pnf  M'Ji- 1^?^'..H^K*i^'''P  of,  respecting  Corinth  and  Korkyra.  il.  4;.S;  victorv  of  ntar 
cxl&?&\!^ofi^^^^^  "'^H'  counter-d'emand  of  upon  Spn  ta?fof 

SanTar  if  ^ifi.  ii^rJi'VH^'^  answer  of.  to  the  Spartans  before  the  Pelopon- 
Kari.l^bl-'  in  fhA  I.^F^  *^^  ^ginetans  from  ^gina,  b.c.  431,  ii.  531;  ravaire  of  the 
5  .-m-,,V;Vthi'^  Peloponnesian  war,  ii.  5152;  Irritation  of.  at  their  ossesirom  t  e 
fhclrfPP  iL*^nJ''^*'P7°°f^'''"-^'M-'^^':  energetic  demonstration  of,  b  c.  42^^  i?  5."- 
.IffimoSSF'.fW?.?^'^"'^^-^''-'''''';*^  .**'**  revolted  Mitvlenrcan.s,  ii.  m)  mi;  and  Lace-' 
ea^<?f  fhf  -i^Pylus.  armistice  between,  11.645;  demands  of,  in  ret\irn  for  tlic^re- 
afS  ?h,^  hnm^""'  f 'A'^iV'"""^  mSnhakterla,  ii.  (^7;  and  Bojotians.  debate  Ixtwten 
?n  fl  lm«Sit^!f  ?hP  n?foi'V'Vv-?N^^  discontent  of,  with  Sparta,  on  ?he  non- 

PilnolU  ii  ^   uf  Q?o  ^?^*^  of  Hildas,  il.  7.'>1;  recapture  of  Skione  by,  ii.  762;  and  \m- 
nf  V?tn^!!  -^^^'J^'F^'V^^^'^-  sit^eeand  capture  of  Melos  J)v,  ii.  8  5  .sen  •  treitn'ient 
neart^     ofc^-^'/'"''  his  alieged  i>rofanation  of  tiie  my.steries,  iii.SVvKtory  of 
feat  of  a?FSit'''l  oS?7''-*^"?.?^  "'•  '^,'  f^/^earance  of," toward'  Xikia's,   fi^Vf  del 
411  i,-    'ni   i^v  i**^'."l'  ^•^-  ^l^'  ."1-  1"^';  conduct  of,  on  receiving  Nikias's  dispatch  b  c 
c tisans    eAnflit='^H''7  ''^'  'V  *^.^  ¥^'^^^  ^f  Syracu.se.  b.c.^413,  iii.  12(^    find  s^nV- 
mAn?  If  fV"?J^*^.*'^*^S*'"'  in  t''*'  threat  Harbor,  iii.  122,  125,  135    141-   nostnoiiJ 
Sle  of    in'tir.';?^'?'^*  ^T^'  Syracuse  by  an  eclipse  of  the  moo  i.   iii'.  iSfw^^k: 
ade  of,  in  the  harbor  of  Syracuse,  ill.  137,  144 ;   and  Corinthians  near  Naupak- 


J 


818 


INDEX. 


tus  1.1.  «  resolutions  Of,. .ftor  the  dlsr.«.o,;otSyrn«^ 

I/-'  di"  iii  175  l7iV.  victory  of,  m>ar  ^'lij''^^"^,  V^tH-i  r  c  411  i  i.  ~'^;  inoderation  of . 

r.n  tl'O  deposition  of   the   * '."^^>  /'"   J,  T.i.nriiabazus,  about  Ciialkcdon,  in.  <^y-, 
S     Kvzikus.  ill.  2ro;  couvc-iitK.n  of  y  h  n  '       ,^,,,..,rd  Alkll.iades  ami 

c-r)tuiv  of  Byzautiiini  l>y.  *"^2*^'^'  ,Vi"^^\i  Wr:  ivmorse  t)f.  alter  the  death  of  the 


^::  ii  S?B^;li;  Vv:  7^;  and  CJaHdeinus^iiJ^l«^ner^-:;^^—  ,nn^  Me^ 

n    iancVof  Olynthus  rejected  by,  BC^X^,  n.^-J'.t^^^  3^^  iv.  ^;  Pi-o"]  if 

thVme  iv  S715-,  clianpe  in  the  character  of,  ^^^  J^^f  J"  ^^  ^  on  of,  to  Olvnthtis,  B.C.  34'J. 

?5k„'K'  ir^fXn^v'o^<ilbL-m.nMon  of  Greece, B.C.  323,  Iv.  m.  hUple.s 
con'mio'iiot'.B.c.aB-aoi.lv.  j"-.,^.,^  .,,,„,„  I  gs-i;  tro.itment  of  homlcWe  In,  I. 

Interest  free  at,  I.  i)t>J<;  P«4"£,?^  l^tti^r.t\nr^  between  the  d»Mnocracy  at,  and  ^olon  s 


cesses  of,  «'-^'«j",«I.,!^,^^y\'rto"ii  "l64rt7eament  of  Darius's  herald  a;,  n.lJ^l;traUors 
application  of  -VH^     ?    a^o/^n    wnr  between,  fron 
•J^-c,  mK  i}-^:-!^,^rl.J^k  ^2  fleJt  of-,  the  sa 


applieaium  oi  .■viir-ic.sv,.^.-  •;•,—„■„,.  i.^tw^en  from  B.C.  488  to  481,  ii.  -itjs,  4iJi  i"»^ 
Sf.^B  c.  490.  ii.  2iG,  i(JG;  a«rt  ^!^na  wai  ^fj^^,  /;"tKe  ^'alvation  of  Greece,  li- 2';3;  and 
trri.wth  of  the  naval  force  or,  u.  '^'^' "v-  on.  p>nn  Wplleuic  con CTCRS  convened  L>>, 

3.t2  conduct  of,  in  the  ropul^^  of  tl^^^^i^Sdizenient  of,  ii.  37U  seq.;  Inc^-^ase  ,*^J 
Rv).  nlinsof  Themistokles  for  tne  navai  aKt,!''"^'^.  pj,.j.,,,s  „  37-^>.  headship  of  tiie 
n^'tiVs  and  commerce  at,  after  the  enlargenien  ^f  f  "^  !f^  "hr'.:^'  op<n  separation 
niedGi?elc8  transferred  from  Sparta  t'^' ";';:  Vdl'ieader  of  the  allied  Greeks,  i. 
b  tween  H.  :^6,  395;  proceedings  of,  «"  i'**^W^?'l^.ar  changes  in  the  Kleis 

S7«  stfmulus  to  democracy  at,  fjJ^nVovciI  fwu  iT  ^»7-lon^  sighted  ambition  im- 
thenein  constitution  at.  after  the  P^siau  wai^^^^^^^^^^^^^  exercised  by,  n. 

T)vt?d  to,  ii.  397;  enforcing  sanction  of  the  conft do ac^^o  Greeks,  ii.  407;  as 

SV..   incr^isintf  power  and  unpopularity   or,  ai"<^"f--'-yfifi  <?  403-  bones  of  Theseus 

U  4^1  and  the  Peloponnesians,  five  years'  truoebet^^cen  1.^4.-1    a  .. 

bkween  B.C  4-A  ii.  421;  ^md  of  the  confederac>    i^y^sf^^^^^^  ^^^  decline  of , 

poSlion 'and  pvo^P^-^^^s  ot.  about  B  c.  4W    i.  4^^  con^^^  despondency  aUatter 

ii.  12«;  and  Delphi,  B.C.  452-44^  ^o,:fiVnnrta  tiiirtv  vears'  truce  between,  ii.  429;  and 
tledefeatat  Koronela,i.  429;  and  Sparta^  m  early,  ii.  41^;  i.^^reaso 

Mecrara,  feud  between,  ii.  4->;  "^^^^'^snates  ana  ^^^    f  ^Pigteides  and  of  Penkles,  li. 
?:^3e!nocra..eal_»entl-,,.«.,^^^^^^^^^ 


of  democratical  sentiment  »[' "<;^^'f^i^/''ii"VcVic\af  party  at  il.  4:U;  maritime  eiu- 
431;  clmice  oi-  r^^^^y^^^  "^^^^S^TiCm,  L;  ^mmercial  .relations  of. 
P"n  "f s".- 1^2'' .*'lf^\.„:;U  11  i^iJ   noliti(-al  condition  of ,  bety 


INDEX. 


810 


li.  527;  clamor  at,  on  Archidamus's  ravage  of  Acharnae,  li.  528;  measures  for  tiie  perl 
mauoiit  defense  of,  b.c.  43],  li.  532:  alliance  of  SitaJkes  with,  ii.  534,  576;  freedom  of 
individual  thoui>ht  and  action  at,  ii.  53'.);  position  of.  at  the  time  of  Perikles;'s  funcril 
oration,  li.  511;  the  plague  at,  ii.  543.  G26;  proceedings  of ,  on  learning  the  revolt  of 
Mitvione,  il.  5^i;  exliausted  treasury  of ,  B.C.  428,  ii.  589;  new  politicians  at,  after 


daMnonian  occupation  of  Dekeleia  on,  iii.  1.58;  dismis.sal  of  Thraciau  inei-cenariis 


Oropus  by,  lii.  2(!-3;  arrival  of  the  Paralus  at,  f rojn  Samos,  iii.  2'!5;  constitutional  moral 


'Wr,  iii.  213;  complaints  at,  against  Alkibiades.  B.C.  407,  iii.  277;  conflicting  sentiments 

"^  ^"      '  *      ■  ■■■  ^ "  ta 

10 
of 


citizouship  at,  B.C.  40;^  iii.  379  seq.;  development  of  dramatic  genius  at,  between  tiio 
timo  of  Kleisthenes  and  of  Eukleides,  iii.  :JS4,  389;  accessibility  of  the  theater  at,  iii. 
•  .^'>;  growth  of  rhetoric  and  philosophy  at.  ill.  399;  literary  and  pliilosophical  anti- 


roim  d  new  maritime  confederacy,  e.c.  378,  iii.  771;  synod  of  new  confederates  at, 


82i) 


IKDEX. 


toWard  peace  wirh  ^1  ;»\^i'.;  ^if  o,  ;.' "nd  the  P^acoof.BX.3a,iu  804  !«fi,  ana>P^Y>  '^^^ 

iiiisiiiilllglSlli 

fersuiSlor  or  the  Chera^e'etJ^^-^j,;^^ 


s  fe-s^rs^nf  T^"g^\f^  A;Hif  5^^^ 

i]u-ou?h.  ii.  216. 
AtlaP,  i.  •'".  •">!• 
Atossa,  ii.  1 !  I. 
Atrei<i>^,.i- '|;''« 

Atrono'sY  r.l.  5,5  ^^^  raiisanias.  Iv.  517;  death  of,  Iv.  519. 

El-boil',  i.  i'^'\  I)ior:.;.ia,  i.  •>.- 


INDEX. 


821 


Ai(ica,  r.njTinal  distribution  of,  i.  151;  division  of,  by  Kekrops,  i.  Ky'];  obseuri  v  of  thr» 
civil  condition  of,  before  Solon,  i.  55?;  aIIet,'Pd  duoileeimnl  division  of  "in  <'-irlv 
tunes,  i.  55<;  four  Ioni(t  tribes  in,  i.  558;  oric:inal  separation  ami  siibse(jn.>n't  cnisoli- 
darion  of  coinnuiiuries  in,  i.  mry,  lonjr  contiiuiance  of  the  cantonal  nvdin^r  in  i' ',m- 
state  of,  after  Solon's  legislation,  i.  m>,  Spartan  expeditions  to,  a.tcainsL  Hinn'ias  ii' 
1)9;  Xerxes  m,  ii.  -f^iix  Lacedi^enionian  invasion  of,  under  Pleistoanax  ii  "i'i- 
Archulamus's  invasions  of,  ii.  5,!5,  542,  58->;  LaceiliBmonian  invasion  of  h  c  4»7  iL 
593;  invasiou  of,  by  Agis,  b.c.  413,  iii.  118;  king  Pausanias's  expedition  to.'  iii  ':U'3  ' 

Auw.  1,  144.  ,  ^. 

Auutvis,  i.  124. 

Aulis,  Greek  forces  assembled  at,  against  Troy.  1. 198;  Agesilaus  at,  HI.  641. 

Ausoniaus,  i.  716. 

Autokles  at  the  Congress  at  Sparta,  b.c.  371,  ill.  803;  in  the  Hellespont,  iv.  121. 
Autolylius,  1.  114. 
Azan,  L  144. 

Babylon,  i.  683;  Cyriis's  capture  of ,  ii.  119;  revolt,  and  reoonquest  of,  by  Darius  il  131- 
Alexander  at,  iv.  (i:.'i)seq.,  661;  HarpaUis,  satrap  of,  iv.  im.  -     •       . 

ISabylonian  scale,  i.  452;  kings,  tiieir  comnnnd  of  linnian  labor,  i.  («:>. 

IJabyloiuaus,  industry  of,  i.  684;  deserts  and  predatory  tribes  surroundiug,  i.  oom. 

Bucchiads,  i.  446,  53(J. 

Bacchic  rites,  i.  61,  62.  65,  185. 

Bacchus,  birth  of,  i.  184;  rites  of,  I.  185. 

Bad,  meaning  of,  in  early  Greek  writers,  I.  324. 

BagciBUS  and  Orcetes.  ii.  130. 

lla'-voas,  iv.  4(4,  562,  655. 

Btktria,  Alexander  in.  iv.  637,  6:^.  G4.3. 

]!arlrs^  a^ncilnKrefiau  \  H'r  1?>^^  <-'reclan  military  feeling,  contrast  between,  ii.  721. 

Birdy'lis,  defeat  of,  by  Fiiiiip',  iv^^lS. 

Biirka  foundation  of,  i.  771;  Persian  expedition  from  Egypt  against,  i.  773;  capture  of. 
1.  7 < 4;  submission  of,  to  Kambyses,  ii.  1'26.  oj  t-      b  ,         «,  i^^^^c  i^j., 

Basil  ids,  i.  629. 

liatis,  governor  of  Gaza,  iv.  «(>6. 

B  itt;is  founder  of  Iv^^rcue,  i.  765  seq.;  dynasty  of,  i.  770;  the  Third,  i.  772. 

Bp^»^yklans.  i.  W2. 

B"IieropIion,  i.  115.  ' 

Belus,  templt-  of,  i.  683. 

B  -quest,  Solon's  law  of,  I.  601. 

Bcsus,  iv.  627,  6.>S.  6ln- 

Bias.  1.  98,  109  seq.;  of  Priene,  ii.  661. 

Bisaltte,  the  king  of,  i.  759,  Ii. 


:o<. 


Bitliynia,  Derkyllidas  in  iii.  617. 

Bytliynians,  i.  (>41. 

Boar,  the  Kalydonian,  i.  125,  126. 

^00*^^''^',^'"^"^^^^'^  of  with  Thessal.v,  1.  295;  transition  from  mythical  to  historical,!. 
i'^'U?  -l^^  'eli''  t-on federation  of,  i.  4;iS;  Mardonius  in,  ii.  316.  320;  Pausanias's  march 
to,  n.  32.i;  supremacy  of  TlK^bes  m.  restored  hv  Sn.irfn  ii    ins  au:-  «Y,^«rHfi/.„  Qf 

f,  by 


!!*  T  l.l;.^.'?"--'  ^!,^.,^^"'^!.'''''?li-  ^^18;/t:tireinent  of  the  Spartans  from,  after  the  battle 
'" "  "  successes  of 


and  Athen- 

at  peace  during  the  One 

the  peace  of  Nikias,  Ii. 


Jans,  d»'l)ate  between,  after  the  battle  of  fDelium,  ii.  687;  a 
iT;' --'*>'''^^^®  between  Athens  and  Sparta,  ii.  ?25;  repudiate 
(49.  ,.-,0;  refuse  to  join  Argos,  B.C.  421,  ii.  759. 
Bom il tear,  iv.  761,  772. 


Iforeas,  i.  50, 154,  155. 

Bospliorus,  Alkibiades  and  the  Ath«?iian  fleet  at  the,  iii.  258;  Autokles  in  the.  iv.  121; 

disputes  between  Philip  and  Atlieiis  about,  iv.  480. 
Bosijonis  or  Pantikapieum,  iv.  797. 
Boftiaians.  i.  755. 

I'.oule.  Homeric,  i.  325;  and  Agora,  i.  330. 
Bi-anc-hida^  and  Alexander,  iv.  6;]8. 
Bnisidas,nrst  exploit  of,  ii.  pi,  and  Knemus,  attempt  of,  upon  Peira-us,  iii.  575:  at 

1  3  uis,  11.  b-V>;  sent  with  Helot  and  other  I'doponnesian  hoplites  to  Thrace,  Ii.  674i 


822 


INDEX. 


ii  ^^K•  uroceedmps  of.  rt  f^' J;'';*';^' •.:  Avo.  revolt  ot  Skiont'  to,  n.  o-*,  *^'^"„v'f  « 
t';   ;.   ii  -Till-  oauture  of  Lckyttins  in  .  u.  <•».  J.J,.,  Iv-  ^,n.  ^f-r'Tm^l  ascoiutcnoy  of.  11. 

Jb^acts  ofLysander.  lii.  603. 
SSMnvlSSn  oloreece  by.  Iv.  744. 

giKr^r'judTcial.  in  Grecian  cities,  ii.  m 

Priseis,  L  '-^'l-^, 
Bi-ornias  iv.  .Slto. 
Pr.mtcs,  i.  nO. 
Ilrundusium.  i;  4m 
Brute,  the  Troinn.  i.  281  seq. 
Bruttians,  Iv.  219,  ^"Jb. 

Brvns.  ii.  S(»S. 
Bu<llni,  1.  658 
Biikephalia,  iv  fial.  to2. 
Bura,  destniction  of,  m.  •'«• 

Bvbhl^'suSnder  of.  to  Alexamlor  iv  ^  ^g,  Pausanias  at  ii  J^jj^,  381; 

ralabrian  peninsula,  Dionysius's  projected  wall  across,  iv.  239. 

Asathoklos  on  'heeastorn  coast  ot.jv.  f;.j5  'jj^l.,,  u>t™uce  of,  Into  the  Great  Har- 
Carthaclnlan  invasion  o(SlcU>.B.c.  ■!!»,■  „,.    b-i.  and  Greeks, 

Ca^ThSlSrn7?nV,n^h^e^-ic.ansa.«e.enee^^^^^^ 

fiAt  known  collision  between,  '•   ''J- r^^'^ovrr  the  Selinuntinos.  iv.  140;  };^^^p-|  "f 

;,Ver?^ar.tVr?nesas   IV  ajjpeaee  of  T^^^^^^^^^ 

Ac^rriroV?r^^!.»1';MjU^^^^ 

kles  to  Africa  aeainst,  'v-  .»';jcj  f'""'  ''tJ^tips  ',„  linniUlia.  Iv,  •'a.^i-'frSo -v 

§SSS;^^»SS?ihe  Solon,an,  tu.  7,6;  In  .he  Archon»h.p  o,  Nausin.k.s, 

iii.  nT.  ,  ,.„ 

Centaur  Nessus.  1.  l  JJ. 

(Vntinianes,  i.  ^2.  ^^..-^.n  r»f  mvthes.  I.  R2. 

Ceremonies,  religious-  a  source  o£  myxnes,. 


INDEX. 


823 


ChaV.rlas,  conductor,  at  Naxos,  ill.  .308;  defeat  of  GorRopas  by,  ill.  710;  proceedings  of. 
bi'twtcii  V..C.  :W7-oT8,  lii.  774;  at  Thebes,  iii.  783;  victory  of,  near  Xaxo.'<.  iii.  7S5;  at  Co- 
rinth, iv.  .">4;  iu  Ef,'ypt,  iv.  116;  and  Chui-ideinus,  iv.  1:>4;  death  of,  iv.  353. 

Chaareas.  iii.  20ri,  214, 

Cheroneia.  victory  of  the  Thebans  over  Ouomarchus  at,  iv.  3?2;  battle  of,  b.c. 
;i.J8,  iv.  5<)7. 

Chaldoean  priests  and  Alexander,  iv.  661,  664. 

ChaMaian.s,  i.  682. 

Chalkedon  and  Alklbiades,  iii.  258,  262. 

Chalkideus,  expedition  of,  to  Chios,  iii.  166, 168;  and  Tisaphernes,  treaty  between,  iii. 
172;  defeat  and  death  of,  iii.  175. 

Chalkidians,  Thracian,  i.  759,  ii.  56.=),  673;  of  Euboea,  successes  of  Athens  against,  Ii.  9~>. 

Chalkldike,  .success  of  Tiiiioihtnis  in.  iv.  78;  three  expeditions  from  Athens  to,  b.c. 
3U)-34S,  iv.  423;  success  of  Philip  in,  iv.  425,  426. 

Cluilkis,  L  616;  retin'ment  of  the  Grreek  fleet  to,  on  the  loss  of  three  triremes,  II.  27S. 

Chalybos,  i.  662,  lii.  545,  5^17. 

Ciiampions,  select,  change  In  Grecian  opinions  respecting,  i.  522. 

Cliaonians,  i.  602. 

Chaos,  L  4;t;  and  her  offspring,  i.  49. 

Chares,  assistance  of,  to  Phllus,  iv.  61;  recall  of,  from  Corinth.  Iv.  71;  unsuccessful 
attempt  of,  to  seize  Corinth,  iv.  72;  in  the  Chersonese,  B.C.  .rxS,  iv.  125;  at  Chios,  iv. 
353;  in  the  Hellespont,  iv.  354;  accusation  of  Iphikrates  and  Timotheus  by,  iv.  354; 
and  Artabazus,  iv.  357;  conquest  of  Sestos  by,  iv.  o73;  expedition  of,  to  Olynthus,  iv. 
424;  at  the  battle  of  Chperoueia,  iv.  .508;  capitulation  of,  at  Mitylene,  iv.  mi. 

Charidemus,  iv.  51;  and  Iphikrates,  iv.  77;  and  Timotheus,  iv.  79;  and  Kephtsodotus. 
iv.  123;  and  Kersoplentes.  iv.  123,  125;  and  the  Athenians  in  the  Chersonese,  B.C.  3tk>- 
358,  iv.  123;  and  Miltokvthes,  iv.  124;  his  popularity  and  expedition  to  Thrace,  iv.  400; 
expedition  of,  to  Chalkidike,  iv.  423;  put  to  death  by  Darius,  iv.  .583. 

Charidemus  and  Ephialtes,  banishment  of,  iv.  546. 

Charikles  and  Peisand(>r,  iii.  63;  expedition  of,  to  Peloponnesus,  B.C.  413,  iii.  118. 

Cliarilaus  and  Lykurgus,  i.  467;  the  Samian,  ii.  142. 

Cluirites,  the,  i.  53. 

Charite.sia,  festival  of,  i.  118. 

Charlemagne,  legends  of,  1.  279. 

Charmande,  dLspute  among  the  Cyrelan  forces  near,  ill.  502. 

Charminus,  victorv  of  Astyochus  over,  iii.  183. 

Charon  the  Thebun,  iii.  763. 

Charondas,  ii.  2;>5. 

Charopinus,  ii.  165. 

Cheirisophus,  iii.  528;  and  Xenophon,  iii.  .5:15,  538,  545;  at  the  Kentrltes.  iii.  540;  mission 
of,  to  Byzantium,  iii.  557;  return  of,  from  Byzantium,  iii.  569;  elected  sole  general  of 
the  TenThou.sand  Greeks,  iii.  571;  death  of,  iii.  572. 

Chersonese,  Thracian,  ii.  287;  connection  <}f,  with  Athens  under  Peisistratus,  ii.  65; 
attacked  bv  the  Athenians,  b.c.  479,  ii.  343;  operations  of  Perlkles  in,  il.  45S;  n^tire- 
ment  of  Alklbiades  to,  b.c.  407,  iii.  279;  fortification  of,  by  Derkyllidas,  lii.  617;  par- 
tial readmi-ssion  of  Athenians  to,  B.C.  3(^5,  iv.  76;  Epaminondas  near,  iv.  79,  8  1;  Timo- 
theus at,  iv.  79,  81,  119;  Ergophilus  in  the,  iv.  119;  Kotys  iu  the,  iv.  121;  Kephisod<jtus 
in  the.  iv.  122;  Charidemus  and  the  Athenian  In  the,  iv.  123;  restoration  of,  to  Athens, 
B.C.  3.58,  iv.  12.5,  351;  Kersobleptes  cedes  p.artof,  to  Athens,  iv.  373;  .speech  of  Demos- 
thenes on,  iv.  480;  mission  of  Demosthenes  to.  iv.  482;  votes  of  thanks  from,  to 
Athens,  iv.  486. 

Cliians  at  Lade,  Ii.  443;  activity  of,  in  promoting  revolt  among  the  Athenian  allies,  Iii. 
171;  expedition  of,  against  Lesbos,  ilL  174;  improved  condition  of,  B.c.  411,  iii.  241. 

Chimajra,  the,  i.  51. 

Chios,  foundation  of,  1.  629;  Histigeus  at,  ii.  170;  an  autonomous  ally  of  Athens,  ii.  455; 


171;  harassing  operations  of  the  Athenians  against,  e.g.  412,  ill.  175, 179;  prosperity  of, 
between  B.c."  480-412,  iii.  176:  defeat  of  Pedaritus  at,  iii.  198;  removal  of  Mlndarus 
from  Bliletus  to,  lii.  245;  vovage  of  Mindarus  from,  to  the  Hellespont,  ill.  2.50:  revo- 
lution at,  f ui-thered  by  Kratesippidas.  iii.  2(56;  escape  of  Eteonikus  from  Mitylene  to, 
iii.  288,  297;  Eteonikas  at,  iii.  308;  revolt  of,  from  Athens,  b.c  358,  iv.  1351,  3.57;  repulse 
of  the  Athenians  at,  b.c  358,  iv.  353;  acquisition  of,  by  Menmon,  iv.  582;  capture  of. 
by  MacedoTiian  admirals,  iv.  604. 

Cliivalry,  romances  of.  i.  279. 

Chliilon,  iii.  763. 

Choric  training  at  Sparta  and  Kretc,  Ii.  47. 

Chnrienes,  Alexander's  capture  of  the  rock  of,  Iv.  614. 

Chorus,  the  Greek,  ii.  47;  improvements  in,  by  Stesichorus,  ii.  50. 

Ct-.ronicle  of  Turpin,  the,  i.  279. 


m4 


INDEX. 


Chronolo(>ical  calonlatlon  dostroys  tho  roH^'lons  chnrnotor  of  mythical  P^.f'"<^"jf,P^'^S:, I' 
«^i?-  t;vl»le  from  Clinton's  Fasti  Ht'.llrnici,  i.  :!<»;:  imputations,  the  valu.-  >".'i*P.^;»- 
7U'nt  on  the  trust worthinoss  of  the  genealogies,  i.  310;  evideuce  of  early  poet.,,  1.  6U. 

Chr..nr)loKists,  modern,  i.  :>tK        .         .  ^  ,  ,  .^,i 

riironoloirizinc  attempts  indicative  of  tneiital  propross.  t.  oil.  .,.<,,.« 

Chrr.uo:o''V  <>f  nivrtueal  events,  various  .schemes  of,  i.  M;  Alexaiulrinc,  from  the  re- 
turn of  the  Herakieids  to  the  first  Olympiad,  i.  4ij. 

Chrvsaor.  i.  47,  51. 

Cl)rvseis,  i.  201. 

ChrVslppus,  i.  Till.  ,      . .,       ,  .••  oco 

Ciirysopulis,  oceupation  of,  by  the  Athenians,  hi.  258. 

Cimmerian  invasion  of  Asia  Minor,  i.  Ci).  o^,.*>,?o^o  «  R^n 

Cunuierians.  i.  CCyi;  driven  out  of  their  country  by  the  Scythians,  1.  660. 

C' inn.n^  ttisfrHelii^iici,  chronological  table  from,  i.  ?.(.6;  opinion  on  the  computa- 
tion-; of  the  date  of  tiie  Trojan  war,  i.  'MK  vindication  of  the  ireuealogies,  i.  olO. 
Cotn«d  monev.  first  introduction  of,  into  Greece,  i.  45-'.  ,.. 

Comedv  i-rovvth,  devL-lopment,  and  intluenee  of,  at  Atliens.  111.  .?^',».       ^  .^  „ 

Comic  p«ets,  i)efore  Aristopiianes,  iiL  oLM);  writers,  mistaken  estimate  of,  as  witnesses 

and  critic-s.  iii.  :;'.«2.  .  ^       ,         ..      ,  .^r.-, 

Commemorative  influence  of  Grecian  rites,  1.  Jii.  .         ,,      ,.      .  ,,« 

Con!S  at  Coriuth,  B.c.  421.  ii.  758;  at  Sparta,  B.C.  421,  11.  7M;  at  Mantlncla.  K.c.  119, 

clinftffiontl'&ms^'a'in^^^^^^^^^  Athenians  to.  111.  212;  morality,  necessity 

forereatimr,  in  the  timeof  Kleisthenes,  ii.86.  ,  ,  „.„    t  .i^.'  ..  • 

Corinth,origin(.f,  i.  115;  Dorians  at,  i.  2',Ki;  early  distinction  of,  i. . 34(1:  Isthmus  of,  i. 
•197;  Ilcrakleid  kings  of,  i.  44;,;  Dorian  settlers  at,  i.  447;  despots  txt,  I.  r.ll;  great  power 
of,  under  Periaiider,  i.  M^i;  Sikyon  and  Megara,  analogy  of.  i.  i>:i<.;  v-oyage  from  to 
Gades  in  the  .seventh  and  sixth  centuries  B.C.,  i.  6.5;  relations  of  Korkyra  with,  1. 
7U)-  and  Korkyra,  j(.hit  settlements  of,  1.  741;  relations  between  the  colonies  of.  i. 
74o!  decision  of,  respecting  the  tli.spiite  between  Thei)es  and  Platavi,  n. 94:  protest  of, 
at  hefirstconvoeiiti.mat  Sparta,  ii. '.t8;  Pan-Hellenle  congress  at  the  I.^thmus  f^, 
ii  HU-  r-ish  of  Peloponne.sians  to  the  Isthmus  of.  after  the  battle  ot  Thermoply.-^, 
ii'  ''s:','  throwing  hatred  of,  to  Athens,  B.C.  4r.l.  ii.  412:  operations  of  the  Athenians  in 
the  (i'ulf  of,  B.C.  45.->,  ii.  419;  and  Korkyra.  war  between,  ii.  -184;  and  Athens,  after  the 
naval  battle  between  C»)rinth  and  Korkyra.  ii.  49t);  congress  at,  B.C.  421,  Ii.  .:..;  and 
Svraeuse.  embassy  from,  to  Sparta,  iil.  S:?;  svnod  at,  B.C.  412,  Hi.  Mr,  altered  fetdiiig of, 
Kfter  the  capture  of  Athens  by  Lysander,  iil.  :m^,m;  a  l.ance  of,  wth  Thebes, 
Athens,  and  Argos,  against  Sparta,  iil.  669;  anti-Spartan  allies  at  iii.  6.0;  battle  of , 
ill  6?^  67S-  Pharnabazus  and  the  anti  Spartan  allies  at,  iii.  fiSl;  ph  lA-Laconiau 
partv'at,  b.c  -Jtri,  iii.  6s,-,;  coup  d\tat  of  the  government  at,  hi.  (W6;  and  Argcs,  con- 
solidation of,  B.C.  :^J2,  iil.  6S7;  victory  of  the  Cacedfemonians  within  the  Long  Walls 
at,  iii.  GS.S;  the  Long  Walls  of,  partly  pulled  down  by  the  Lacedoemonians  ui.  0S9; 
the  Loru'  Walls  of,  restored  by  the  Athenians,  and  taken  by  Age.silau.s  and  Teleu- 
tias  iii.  690  sea.;  and  the  peace  of  Antalkidas,  iii.  715,  717;  apbhcation  of,  to  Athens, 
for  aid  against  Thebes,  iii.  >^.5;  Iphikrates  at,  iii.  R47;  and  the  I^'tj'^ian  rescript  in 
favor  of  Thebes,  iv.  CS:  project  of  tiie  Athenians  to  seixe,  B.C.  ..66.  iv.  .3;  peace  of , 
with  Thebes,  B.C.  366,  iv.  7!;  application  from  Syracuse  to,  B.C.  ^14,  Iv.  29.;  messaj^e 
from  Hiketas  to,  iv.  :^3:  Dionysius  the  Younger  at,  iv.  :y)9;  re-enforcement  from,  i«) 
Timoleon.  iv.  3i.i9,  311,  313;  efforts  of,  to  restore  Syracuse,  iv.  M!»;  Phnip  chosen  chief 
of  the  Greeks  at  the  congress  at,  iv.  514;  convention  at,  under  Alexander,  b.c.  ...o, 
ii.  5?'?;  violations  of  the  convention  at,  by  Alexander,  iv.  531;  Alexander  at,  b.c. 

Corinthian  envoys,  speech  of,  to  the  Athenian  assembly.  In  reply  to  the  Korkyra-aiis, 
iv.  4S6;  speech  of,  to  the  Spartan  assembly  against  Athens,  u.  498;  speech  of,  at  tho 
congress  of  allies  at  St.arta,  11.  51^. 

Corint'iian  genealogy  of  Eumelus,  1.  115. 

Corinthian  territory.  Nikias's  expedition  against,  11.  665;  war.  commencement  of,  Iil. 
m);  Gulf,  naval  conflicts  of  Corinthians  and  I^acedtemonians  in,  ill.  184.  , 

Corinthians,  early  commerce  and  enterpii.se  of,  i.  5;i();  behavior  of,  at  sal  anus,  u. 
:n3:  defeated  by  Myronldes,  il.  415;  procure  the  refusjil  of  the  Samians  aitplu-atiou 
to  Sparta  for  ahl  against  Athens,  il.  47(!;  instigate  Potida^a,  the  Chalk  dians.  and 
Bottla-ans,  to  revolt  from  Athens,  ii.  494;  defeat  of,  near  Potidaen.  ii.  491;  strive  to 
excite  war  against  Athens  after  their  defeat  near  Potidi^a,  li. -I!r7;  repmliate  the 
m-aee  of  NikLis,  ii.  719,  7.-^1;  induce  Argos  to  head  a  new  Peloijonnesian  alliance,  ii. 

i— .     T jt„»..    t.^    4,^i«     A...,..^»c    il    t-.Q    •7-r(l.     iikin      A  rrrfio      il    7fi():     !1 111)1  ie.ltlon    OI.    tO     tlie 


757;   hesitate   to  join  Argos,  11.  759,  7J9;   join   Argos.   ii.  760; 


.  760;  aiiplication  of,  to  the 
p7i'(.rianTand  Attien"ians7B'.c.'42i,  ii.'761;  and  Athenians,  naval  battle  lietween,  near 
Naupaktius,  iii.  161;   and  I^cedoemonians,  naval  and  land  conflicts  between,  B.C. 

(reditur  anil  debtor,  law  of,  at  Athens,  before  Solon,  1.  530;  Roman  law  of,  I.  614. 


INDEX. 


825 


Croesua  and  Solon,  alleged  Interview  between,  i.  6(17;  mor.il  of  ILnodotus's  story 
about,  i.  6n'.»;  reign  and  conquests  of,  i.  665;  power  and  .•illiances  of,  ii.  KM;  and 
Cvrus,  war  between,  ii.  1i>7;  and  the  oracles,  ii.  li>8,  Ud;  solicits  the  alliance  of 
Sparta,  ii.  1()9;  fate  of,  iiupres.sive  to  the  Greek  mind,  ii.  112. 

Cumfe  in  Campania,  i.  712. 

Cychules,  i.  615;  Themistokles  levies  fines  on,  ii.  312. 

Cycle,  epic,  i.  551. 

Cyclic  poets,  i.  551. 

Cyclopes,  i.  49. 


the  princes  of.  to  Alexander,  Iv. 
Cvroi>a?dia.  Xenopliou's,  ii.  Ii4. 
Cyrus  the  Great,  earlv  history  and  rise  of,  ii.  104;  and  Crnesus.  war  b<;tween,  il.  107; 

and  the  Lacedgemohiaiis,  ii.  113;  conquests  of,  in  Asia.  ii.  119;  capture  of  Babylon 

by,  ii.  119:  exploits  and  death  of,  ii.  123;  effects  of  his  conquests  upon  the  Persians, 

ii.  123;  the  tomb  of,  iv.  59. 


jiopes  ^     . 

tration  and  prudent  Ix-havior  of.  iii.  490;  forces  of,  collected  at  Sardls,  iii.  490;  march 
of.  from  Sardis  to  Kunaxa,  iii.  492;  a.ssistance  of  Epyaxa  to.  iii.  493;  review  of  his 
troops  at  Tvriaeum,  iii.  493;  and  Syenuesis,  iii.  495:  at  Tarsus,  iii.  495;  desertion  of 
Xenias  and'Pasion  from,  iii.  490;  at  Thapsakus.  iii.  .500  .seq.;  lii  Babylonia,  ill.  502; 
speech  of.  to  his  Greek  forces  in  Babylonia,  iii.  503;  his  conception  of  Grecian  supe- 
rioritv.  iii.  503;  his  present  to  the  prophet  Silnnus,  iii.  505;  passes  the  undefended 
tn>nch,  iii.  505;  at  Kunaxa.  iii.  506;  character  of.  iii.  5!»'.);  pi-()l)able  conduct  of,  toward 
Greece,  if  victorious  afc  Kunaxa,  iii.  511;  and  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  iii.  610. 

Daedalus,  i.  165,  189. 

I);H:non  of  Sokr:ites,  iil.  4.35. 

D:ein.His,  i.  83,  81.  S'i  seq.;  and  gods,  distinction  between,  i.  256  seq.;  admission  of,  as 
partially  evil  beings,  i.  2.5<). 

Dama.scus.  capture  of.  by  tlie  Macedonians,  iv.  59.'5. 

Damasitliymus  of  Kalyndus,  ii.  308. 

Daiiae.  legend  of,  i.  98. 

Daiiaos  and  the  Danaides,  I.  97.  » 

Dancing,  Greek,  ii  49. 

Daplmjcus,  at  Agrigentum,  iv.  156  seq.;  death  of,  iv.  167. 

DarJamis,  son  of  Zeus.  i.  196. 

Darius  Hvstaspes.  accession  of,  ii.  12R;  discontents  of  the  satraps  under,  il.  129;  revolt 
of  Babvlon  against,  ii.  130;  organization  of  the  Persian  empire  by,  ii.  1:^2;  twenty 
satrapies  of.  ii.  Ki^:  organizing  tendency,  coinage,  ro;ids,  aiul  posts  of,  ii.  l:)5;  and 


.....apK.  ,-, , ..  -  „,  , 

Svloson,  ii.  I3(};  conquering  dispositions  of,  il.  114:  prol»able  consequences  of  an  ex- 
pediti'>n  l)v,  against  Greece  before  going  against  Scythia,  ii.  148;  invasion  of  Scythia 
by,  ii.  1 19;  his  o:-ders  to  the  lonians  at  the  bridge  over  the  Danube,  ii.  1.54;  return  of, 
to  Susa  fro!n  Scvthia,  ii.  159;  revenge;  of,  against  the  Athenians,  ii.  169;  preparations 
of,  for  iiiva<ting  Greece,  ii.  180;  submission  of  Greeks  to,  befon;  the  battle  of  Mara- 
thon, ii.  180;  herahls  of,  at  Athens  and  Sparta,  ii.  181;  instructions  of,  to  Datis  and 
Artaphernes,  11. 188;  resolution  of,  to  invade  Greece  a  second  time,  ii.  2:36;  death  of, 
ii.  tm 

Darius,  son  of  Artaxerxes  Mnemon,  iv.  11^. 

Darius  Codomannus.  encouragement. of  anti-Macedonians  in  Greece  by.  i v.  531;  his 
accession  and  preparations  for  defense  atrainst  Alexander,  iv.  .562;  irreparable  mis- 
chief of  Memium's  death  to.  iv.  .58.*:  cliange  in  tlie  plan  of.  after  Memnon's  death. 
iv.  583,  584;  puts  Charidemus  to  death,  iv.  583;  Arrinn's  criticism  on  the  plan  of, 
against  Alexander,  iv.  585;  at  Mount  Amanus.  iv.  588;  advances  into  Kilikia,  iv.  .5S<(; 
at  Issus  1)efor(>  the  l)attle,  iv.  5s;i;  defeat  »)f.  at  Issus,  iv.  .591;  capture  of  his  mother, 
wife,  and  familv  bv  Alexanfler,  iv.  593.  611;  bis  correspondoice  witli  Alexander,  iv. 
59r,  6ii3;  inaction  of.  after  the  battle  of  Issus.  iv.  611;  defeat  of.  at  Arbela,  iv.  61r,;  a 
fugitive  in  Media,  iv.  ♦;2i.  626:  pursued  bv  Alexanderinto  Parthia,  iv.(>27;  conspiracy 
against,  bv  Bessiis  and  otliers.  iv.  (i-.'7;  dc:itii  of,  iv.  62<.>;  Alexander's  disappointment 
in  not  taking  him  alive,  iv.  629;  funeral,  fate,  and  conduct  of,  iv.  629. 

Darius  Xothus.  iii.  486;  death  of,  iii.  488. 

Daskon,  attack  of  Dionysius  on  the  Carthagian  naval  station  at,  Iv.  210. 

Datames,  Iv.  114.  ,       „   .„„.  ,^ 

Datis,  siege  and  capture  of  Eretria  by,  ii.  196;  conquest  of  Karystus  by,  IL  1%;  Persian 


nil 


ii 


826 


INDEX. 


nr-nnmpTit  at  Samos  umlpr,  n.  19R;  conqupst  of  Naxns  an^l  otbor  Cycladcs  by,  i!.  ISO; 
fSoanmcrof  Towarrl  D^'lus,  ii.  18ti;  at  Marathon,  ii.  11.1,  202;  return  of.  to  Asia, 

pS^Sor  ^l^^u^An^TSi  AthS^s  before  Solon,  i.  5S0;  Roman  law  of,  i.  614. 

DeKs  u;«?*SStlon^r:r'lV.5^olable  at  Athens,  i.  58C,  588;  distinction  between  the 

Drincioal  amliiiterest  of,  in  an  early  soeictv,  i.  d-^^..  „  .  «^r 

D^nso;  means  of.  superior  to  tliose  of  attack  in  ancient  Greece.  1.  o45. 

Deianeira,  i.  129. 
Dcinokrates,  iv.  754.  <«5,  «i9. 

Koitk'l  niuncluded  in  the  twelve  great  ones.  1.  53;  of  guilds  or  trades,  L  223. 

Dekamnichus,  ill.  742.  ,  ^    ^  ,       „,  -«-  mi 

Dekarchits  established  by  Lysander.  lil.  ;-!'i,  «>».  n-  no  i-o. 

Dekeleia.  legend  of,  i.  140;  iortiflcation  of.  by  the  Lacedeemonlans,  ill.  11.,118,1..8, 

A^is  at,  iii.  158,  273. 
Dth\^n.f^'Sval,'J618;  early  splendor  and  sul)sequent  decline  of,  i.  779;  revival  of,  b  c. 

r»Snm  '  mnnokrate«?'s  march  to,  and  fortification  of,  B.C.  424,  ii.  6S1;  battle  of ,  B.r. 
4rM/'&5-  S  ami  Japture  of.  by  the  Boeotians,  B.C.  424,  ii.  689;  Sokratcs  and  Alki- 

DeHofloSL*fe.m"l  aM.'77r^^^^  of  Datis  toward,  Ii.  189;  the  confederacy  of, 

^tr^o  ."v  the  svnoli  of^ll  401:  first  breach  of  union  in  the  confedrracy  of,  ii  4 04; 

revest  oF'Thios  from  the  confederacy  of,  ii,  40p;  to  Athens,  ^- ^^[^^^'^'Zvlm^ 

confederacv  of .  Into  an  Athenian  empire,  ii.  424;  pnrihcar  on  Of,  bj  the  AtUtLians, 

ii  iW-  restoration  of  the  native  population  to,  B.C.  421,  11.  .<)-'. 
Delphi 

earl} 

tenii 

^^;^^^t'^^ri^n'^^^^  the  Spartans  on  Var  wit)} 

ifhen"  BC  &  17505:  reply  Af  the  <n-acle  at,  about  S<>kn.t«'S,  iii  4;^.  Agpsipol.s  and 
theSleat  iii  H9;>;  claim  of  the  Phokians  to  tlie  pr-sidencv  of  the  temple  at  n. 
•iv%Ulon?eius%i'izesan(l  fortifies  the  temple  at,  iv.  SCS;  Philonudus  takes  part  of 
fhe  treasures  In  the  temple  at,  Iv.  8(i9;  employment  of  the  treasures  in  the  temple 
at  brOnoS^ar"huli"371^  Phavllus  (lesp.dis  the  fmple  at,  iv.  :«>4;  peculation  of 
?he  treasur^Tat  V  43S;  miserable  deatliof  all  concerned  ii)  the  spo  lation  of  the 
temple  at!^v^  470;  relations  of  the  Loknans  of  Amphissa  with,  iv.  491;  Amphikty- 
onic  meeting  at,  B.C.  Sfl),  iv.  491. 

Delphi.-^  Apollo,  reply  <,f,  to  the  remonstrance  of  Croesus    i.  110. 

Delphians  and  Amphlktyons,  attack  of,  upon  Kirrha,  iv.  491. 

KK'  ?eproof'o"f  Philip  by,  iv.  511;  peace  of.  iv.  513;  remark  of,  on  hearing  of 
AlelaSdlr^s  death,  iv.  CW;  >facedonizing  policy  of.  iv.  677;  and  Phokian,  embassy 
of.  to  Antipater.  iv.  7(fi;  death  of,  iv.  713. 

Sema?Sa^  Kl^Ss;!!:  f^i.^n.;  conversations  of.  with  Xerxes,  ii.  250,  279.  286; 
advice  of,  to  Xerxes  after  the  death  of  Leonidas,  li.  2bb. 

DeSi:?;«r^  f^;  W^f  oi^fenlnflueice'J.n  the  worship  of.  i.  50;  how  represented  In  Homer 
S  HesK  ii  fifirnom^^^^  hymn  to,  (Wseq.;  legends  of.  differing  from  the  Homeric 
hymn,  i.  70:  Hellenic  importance  of,  i.  (0, 

Eemeinus  'piss  admJnSrkullii  of.  at  Athens,  iv.  728;  retires  to  Egypt,  iv.  735; 

r)enu.trii\"po'?i"?keJe;  "S  \thens.  iv.  7:«,  740.  741,  74:^.  exploits  of.  B.C.  ^-:504.  iv.  7:39; 
his  si"  cesses  in  Siecea^^^  Iv.  7^0;  march  <.f.  through  Thessaly  into 

aAIiv.  7|-fr?turn  of .  f  rom  Asia  to  Greece,  iv.  74.;.;  acMUires  tj.e  crown  of  Mace- 
donia, iv.  74:>.  Greece  under,  iv.  744;  captivity  and  death  of.  iv.  ,  li. 

Demiurci.  1.  567. 

Demochares.  iv.  7W,  742.  746. 

r»*.iiiopr'ici.>s  Grecian  securit  es  against  corruption  In.  in.  IHh.  ,    ,      »  .r.^ 

De       Sv    \theuian   i.5^^  eff.'ct  of  th.-  i.lea  of  upon  the  minds  of  the 

AtheiitSsiil(H-  at  Athens,  stinud.is  to,  fr.mi  the  Persiiin  war,  ii.  ::SH:  nconstitu- 
«on  of  at  sim<^^  of,  at  Athens,  b.c.  411.  iii.  2d>\  tf,  and  b  c.  40: . 

m  ^?5?Vj9- mode^^^  of  -\thrnian.  iii. -2:58,  373;  at  Samos  contra.sted  with  the  oli- 

DSI^iilcIl'leSe^';:;  AVhe!i5nd  thllThirty,  iii.  S23,  325;  sentiment.  Increase  of.  at 

Atht-ns  between  B.C.  479-!.):'.  ii-  !:]1. 
Demokedes  romantic  historv  of,  ii.  144. 
Demouax.  reform  of  Kyxcu;;  by,  i.  7'.2;  constitution  of,  not  durable,  i.  .<;.. 


*x 


INDEX. 


827 


ESlo&tS^'tl^'fiSSun  AkSnania.  li.  628;  expedition  of.  against  .y.tolia.  11  629-. 
s'lves  Naupaktiis  ii.  m;  goes  to  protect  Amphilochian  Argos,  n.  6.32;  his  victory 
cm-r  Eurv  lochus  at  01p£^,  ii.  6:32;  his  triumphant  return  from  Akarnauiato  Athens, 
i  «8;  foi-tifles  and  defeiuls  Pylus,  ii.  tUU;  application  of  for  re-en l_orcem^^^^  trom 
Athens,  to  attack  Sphakteria,  ii.  6.-.1;  victory  of  .in  Sphakteria  ii  0;>b;  attempt  of,  to 
surprise  Megara  aiAl  Nisa^a  ii,  675;  scheme  of, .tor  invading  V;*;^'^3- "f -.Vt^n  lit,' 
unsuccessful  descent  upon  B(eotiai)y,  ii.  681;  his  evacuation  of  the  lort  at  i^pi'lau; 
riis  ii  8(G;  expedition  of,  to  Sicily,  iii.  112,  118,  126;  arrival  of,  at  Syracuse,  in  lA 
plaiis  of,  on  arriving  at  Syracuse,  iii.  128;  night  attack  of  upon  Epipola?,  in.  128;  s 
ironosa  s  for  removing  from  Syracuse,  iii.  i:51;  and  Niklas,  resolution  of,  after  the 
linal  defeat  in  the  harl^^r  of  Syracuse,  iii.  144;  capture  and  subsequent  treatment  of. 
iii  150  154-  respect  for  the  memory  of.  iii.  ISa;  death  ©f,  lii.  loo. 

E::;;i:iSSHjJ^':S^1l?sr^Jl£iS;e  of.  as  public  a^y^-  in  the  Atheulaji 

r^^^^a^^  ?StSf^SiSSeHl^  ^rl^rtrSnif/g'^Sf  £f  J^l^fSIl 
iv  377-'  action  and  matter  of.  iv.  379;  first  known  as  a  composer  of  speeches 
for  othe?s.  iv  379;  speech  of.  against  Leptines  iv  379;  speech  of,  on  the  byni- 
rnoriPs  iv  -^7  seo  •  exhortations  of.  to  personal  effort  and  sacrifice,  iv  389,  429; 
?SmmJndS ions^f.  ?n%1u-ia^a^  Me|alopolis.  iv  :M.;  first  PhiUppic  ot^-^^l 
nmv^iipiits  of  at  Athens  BC  351.iv.  40<5;  earliest  Olynthiac  of,  iv.  411;  practical 
eff??tS  his  speeches  iv  412   s^  Olynthiac  of,  iv.  414;  allusions  of,  to  the  Theo- 

n>  fund  W  4^1M17;    third  Olynthiac  of ,  iv.  416;    insulted   by  Meidias,  iv.  420;   re- 

poached  for  his  absence  front  the  battle  of  Tamyn^,  J^-^^S  '  f  ^.f  oTvnthi^^^^^^ 
Vnhopa  and  Is  chosen  senator  for,  B.C.  349-348,  iv.  421    order  of  the  Olj  ntnidCs.  oi, 
iv  4-^'-  sSeakfin  fav^^^^  n.c.  ai7,  iv.  438;  and  the  first  embassy  from  Athens 

toSipivL?4i6;  failure  of,  in  his  speech  before  Philip,  iv.  41:3;  ami  the  motion 
of  P  okrates  for  peace  and  alliance  with  Philip,  iv.  448;  and  the  exclusion  of  the 
Phokians  from  the  peace  and  alliance  between  Athens  and  Philip,  iv4;.2;  and  the 
LcS  embaiiV f  r<^^^^  to  Philip,  iv.  4.>i,  456,  459,  460;  and  the  tliird  embassy 

f?Sn  Athens  S  Phi  ip,  iv.  461;  charges  of.  against  ^sehines,  Iv.  469;  and  the  peace 
aSlliiiice  of  \th'Mis  with  Philip,  B.C.  346.  iv.  470;  recommends  ucouiescence  in  the 

AmplXon'c  dil^iiiy  of  Philip.  R".  471;  vigilance  ^"^iS"pllffinnlc  ^oH?  l^'lll' 
after  b  c:^l(i.  iv.  476;  speech  on  the  Chersonese  and  third  i^njliPPlp  of ,iv.  48U,  in- 
creased influence  of,  at  Athens,  B.C.  341-338,  iv.  481;  mission  of.  to  the  Chersonese 
aSBvzamium.  iv.  'fe2V  voteof  thanks  to.  at  Athens,  iv.  486;  reform  in  the  adminis- 
Sion  of  the  Athenia^i  marine  by,  iv  487  s^q.;  his  opposition  to  the  procejHiin^^ 
^schines  at  the  Amphiktyonic  meeting,  B.C.  :p,  iv  49b;  on  the  spetnal  Amp  ikty- 
onic  meetinc  at  Thermopylee.  iv.  496;  advice  of.  on  hearing  of  the  fortitication  ot 
Seiabv  Philip  iv  5^11;  m  ssion  of,  to  Thebes,  B.C.  3:39,  iv.  501  seq.;  crowned  at 
Athens,  V.  mM^:  at  the  battle  of  Cha^roneia  iv.  507.  508;  confidence  shown  to, 
after  tiie  battle  of  Chteroneia.  iv.  509,  .513;  conduct  of.  on  the  death  of  Philip,  i>. 
&"  corrlspSndlnce  of ,  w^^^^  Persia,  iv.'532;  accusation  against,  respecting  the  revolt 
of  TSesSnst  Alexander,  iv.  .540;  position  and  policy  of.  in  Alexandei-s.tine, 
?v.  6  8- amf  ^.schints.  judiciai  contest  between,  iv.68-i:  accusation  aga^^^^^^  in  the 
affair  of  Harpalus,  iv.G87;  recall  of.  from  exile  iv.  69.;  flight  of ,  to  Kdlauria,  iv  703, 
condemnation  and  deatli  of,  iv.  705;  life  and  character  of,  iv.  .O*. 

Derkyliidl?,\^n  !S:  ill:  61^  61§,  6:39;  at  Abydos  and  Sestos.  Hi.  680;  superseded  by  An- 

DSSJMS^^Sll'.^ii 'So;  at  Sikyon.  I.  i>47.  551;  at  Corinth,  i.  551;  of  Asiatic  Greece. 

deposition  of.  by  Aristagoras.  ii.  IGJ;  Siciliau,  11.  o4b,  3by. 
Deukalion.  i.  102. 

Dexippus.  iii.  558.  574.  Iv.  153, 157, 166. 
Diadoclii,  Asia  Hellenized  by,  iv.  672. 
Diagorus,  prosecution  of,  iii.  6.3. 
Dialectics,  Grecian,  ii,  55,  iii.  397,  400,  456. 
Dietatt)rs  in  Greece,  i.  541. 
Dido,  legend  of,  1.  707. 
Diganima  and  the  Homeric  poems,  i.  362. 
Di'itrephes,  ill.  160. 

Dikteus,  vision  of ,  ii. 299.  ^^.       .        •,  ^„„„    At-r  <ri    iw. /.nnott 

Dikasteries  not  established  by  Solon    .  594;  Athenian,  il-.Pf.^.qv,, i^y^Jji^^^^^V.S"^!*^ 

tution  of,  by  Perikles,  ii.  431,  4:38;  working  of,  at  Athens,  11.  446;  jurisdiction  of,  ovir 

DfS^S^t;i^efiSsri:58bf&1^:  Athenian,  11.80.212;  under  Perikles,  ii.  483. 

438,  444,  448. 
Dikon  of  Kaulonia,  Iv.  231. 

DimSsl'ilis  hisf.l'rical  versij:is  of  mythes,  I.  252;  statement  of,  respecting  the  gene 
rals  at  Argiuusce,  iii.  294. 


828 


INDEX. 


Diodotns,  sp*H»ch  of,  ii.  603.     ^ 
Diotieiios  and  Alexander,  iv.  ;>17. 
Diokleides,  iii.  ♦«,  W. 

Dioklrs  ShS  Sj-racuS:  Ihelws  of,  Iv.  132;  aid  to  nimera  under.  Iv.  114.  banishment 

DIo  Chrvsostom's  attvmpt  to  hlstoriclze  the  legend  of  Troy,  i.  213. 
Dio  Chrvsostom  at  ()U)ia,  iv.  TW. 

g!:ra,';^S;^y'?'ClaS'i;v!-in^T2:  atTeos  an^  T^bo«  ,11.  17.;^nt  ivriletus  and 

U  ^W-  uo  itS  V  ews  of,  iv.  JIS:  maintains  the  Elder  to  the  last,  Iv.  21^:  his  vis,t!=  to 
PHoponSesus  and  Athen.s,  iv.  249:  conduct  of.  on  the  accession  of  D  ony«ius  the 
YounI'eriv2r>l;  efforts  of,  to  improve  Dionysius  the  Youn^-er,  iv.  2;.2;  entreats 
P  atKv  s^rDionysius  the  Y()un^^^^^^  and  Plato  urpres  Dionysius  the  \onntrer 

U  refo?m  hUnself;iv  257;  and  Plato.  intriKues  of  Philistus  against^^  iv.  2^^;  a  lena- 
tion  of  Dionvsius  the  Younger  from,  iv.  •>;-.•.»;  Danishment  of,  iv.2w:;  property  of 
confii-ated  byDionvsius  the  Younger,  iv.  262;  resolution  of,  to  avenge  himself  on 
DmiJ^fiirthe  Younger,  and  free  Syracuse,  iv.  262,  264;  forces  of,  at  Zakynthus,  iv. 
2S2W5  expedition  of.  against  Dionysius  the  Younger,  iv.  2W;  entry  of,  into  Sy ra- 
7.nV  Bc  ^57  iv  '^O-  Chosen  general  by  the  Syracusans,  iv.  270;  captures  EpipoUe 
k  d  EurValus'iv,  270;  bloSad     of  Ortygia  l.y;  iv.  271,  273  2S3;  negotiations  of  D  o- 

iVHius  the  Younger  with,  iv.  271,  2T7;  victory  of ,  over  Dionysius  the  Yoiuwer.  iv. 
^71  intrigues  of  Dionvsius  the  Younger  against,  iv.  274,  276;  suspicions  of  the  Svra- 
ci4ans"  gainst,  iv.  274,  276,  2S6;  and  Heraklei<ies,  iv.  274,  277.  283,  2«4,  288;  deposition 
andVSreVitof  fron.  Syracuse,  iv.277;  at  Leontini,  Iv.  279,  279;  repulse  of  Nypsiusand 
nS-iie  of  Syracuse  by,  iv.  281;  entry  of,  into  Syracuse.  B.C.  :]56,  iv.  281;  entry  of,  into 
Ortvgla  iv.  £6;  con(li let  of.  on  his  final  triumph,  iv.  2H(i;  his  omission  to  grant  frec- 

hmucf  Svracuse,  iv.  2S7;  opposition  to.  as  dictator,  iv.  2sS;  tyranny,  unpopularity 
an!!  disqiiietude  of.  iv.  •i^•y;*  death  and  character  of,  iv.  2l'l;  and  Timoleon.  contrast 
between,  iv.  S-T?. 
Diunv.sia.  Attic,  i.  62.  787. 
Dionysiac  fesrlval  at  Athens,  B.C.  319.  Iv.  420. 

D!ou^-slus\hI' eS!  am  HI.  6514;  demonstration  against,  at  Olympla.  B.C.  m 

ill  ri  iv.  230  seq.;  triremes  of.  captured  In-  Iphikrates.  iii.  ,\i,;  first  appearance  of 
at  Svfacuse,  iv.  151;   movement  of   the  rtermokratean  party  to   erevate.  iv.  1(,(); 
harangue  of  against  the  Syracusan  generals  at  Agrigentum,  iv.  161;  one  of  the  g^n- 
"4  s".f  Syraeuse,  iv.  161;  first  exoedltion  of,  toGela,lv.  !C;5;  accusations  of.  against 
his  colleagues.  Iv  163;  election  of^  as  sole  general,  iv.  163;  stratagem  of  to  obtain  a 
body-guard,  iv.  l&l;  establishes  himself  as  despot  at  Syracuse,  iv.  Ib6  1.4;  second 
e^imiitkm  of.  to  Gela.  iv.  UW;  charges  of  treacliery  against,  iv.  1.1.  1.4;  mutiny  of 
theSyracusail  horsemen  against,  iv.  171;  and  Indlkon,  peace  between,  iv.  1.4  seq.; 
sympathy  of  Sparta  with.  iv.  175.  207;  strong  position  of.  after  his  peace  with  Imil- 
kon     V.  176;  fortification  and  occupation  ol' Ortygia  by,  iv.  176;  redistribution  of 
nrooerty  by.  iv.  176;  exorbitant  exactions  of.  iv.  178;  mutiny  of  the  Syracusan  sol- 
ditX against,  Iv.  178;  besieged  In  Ortygia,  Iv.  178  seq.;  strengthens  his  despotism, 
iv^lSl  seq."  conquers  ^tna,  Naxus,  Katana,  and  Leontini,  iv   182;  at  Enna   iv    lh2; 
resolution  of .  to  make  war  upon  Carthage,  B.C.  4<)0.  iv.  ik3;  a'l^J»|»'>"«lJ;»n.lJ,^.»Ji«^"8 
at  Syracuse  by,  iv.  184  seq.;  preparations  of,  for  war  with  Carthage,  pc.  o9!)-.,'.).   iv. 
?86  189;  iinproved  behavl!,^  of,  to  the  Syracusans.  B.C.  390,  Iv.  isti;  conciliatory  policy 
of  toward  the  Greek  cities  near  the  Strait  of  Messene,  B.C.  3'.«).  iv.  InS;  niarnasv  of, 
with  Doris  and  Aristoniache.  iv.  188,  191;  exhorts  the  Syracu.'^an  assembly  to  ^^ar 
atrainst  Carthage,  Iv.  102;  permits  the  plunder  of  the  Carthaginians  at  Syracuse,  iv. 
J?it?cla?esw<ir  against  laithage,  n.c.  31.7,  iv.  193;  inarches  against  the  Carthagin- 
laMs  in  Sicily,  B.C.  397,  iv.  193;  siege  and  capture  of  Motye  by,  Iv.  194;  revolt^of  the 
Sik^s  from  iV  20();  provisions  of,  for  the  .lefense  of  Syracuse  against  the  Cartha- 
gn  ans  Sc  396.iv.iR';  naval  defeat  of.  near  Katana.  iv.  201;  retreat  of,  froni.Ka- 
tViii  to  Syracuse.  B.C.  395.  iv.  2<r,>:  Syracusan  naval  victi.ry  over  the  Caithaginians 
in  the  absence  of.  iv.  r?(i5;  speech  of  Theodorus  against,  iv.  2(t6;  discontent  ot  the 
s"  racMisans  with,  B.C.  395,  iv.  •Ji.6:  and  Pharakidas,  iv.  2o7;  attacks  the  Carthaginian 
camo  before  Syracuse  and  sacrifices  his  mercenaries,  iv.  2Ul>;  success  of,  by  sea  ana 
laml  against  the  Carthaginians  before  Syracuse,  iv.  21tt ;   secret  treaty  of,  with 
Imilkon  before  Syracuse,  i v.  211;  and  the  Iberians,  iv.  211;  capture  of  Libyans  b.v. 
Iv  212-  difficulties  of.  from  his  nu-rcenaries.  iv.  215;  re  establishmtmt  of  Messene  by, 
iv  215-  conquests  of,  in  the  i-.terlor  of  Sicily,  B.C.  :^.  iv.  216;  at  Touromenium,  iv. 
216  218-  and  the  Sikels.  B.c.  394-393.  iv,  216;  declaratiim  of  Agrigentum  pgajnsi.  B.C. 
393'.  iv.'217;  victory  of.  near  Abaka>na,  iv.217;  exiiedition  of,  against  Rli(;guim,  B.C. 
r:y3  iv.  217;  repulses  Magou  at  Agyrium,  iv.  218;  ptaus  ol,  pginnst  the  Gre.-k  cities  in 
Southern  Italy,  iv.  218;  alliance  of,  with  Lucaiuans  against  the  It'!'''^'t 't'' ^',';^',,*7- 
219;  attack  of,  upon  Khegium,  B.C.  oUO.  iv.  220;  expedition  of,  against  the  Italiot 


INDEX. 


82') 


Greeks.  B.C.  389,  Iv.  222;  his  capture  and  generous  treatment  of  Itnliot  Greeks 
iv.  222;  besieges  and  grants  peace  to  Rhegium,  iv.  22 >;  capture  of  Kiu- 
lonia  and  Hippouium  by,  iv.  224;  capture  of  Rhegium  by,  iv.  224,  226;  cruelty 
of,  to  Phyton,  iv.  226;  and  Sparta,  aseendencv  of,  B.C.  387,  iv.  227;  capture 
of  Krotou  by,  iv.  228;  schemes  of,  for  conquests  in  Elbrus  and  Illvria,  iv  228- 
plunders  Latium,  Etruria,  and  tiu^  temple  of  Agvlla,  iv.  229;  i)oetlcal  c'o)npf)sitions 
of,  iv.  259;  dislike  and  dread  of,  in  Greece,  iv.  230,  232;  harshness  of,  to  Plato,  iv  235- 
new  constructions  and  improvements  by.  at  Syracuse,  b.c.  3>87-.383,  iv.  2'56-  reii.'w.s 
the  war  with  Carthage,  B.c.  ;'J^3,  iv.  2;S7;  disadvantageous  peace  of ,  with  Carfhage 
B.C.  Mi.  iv.  238;  projected  wall  of,  across  the  Calabrian  ijeniusula,  iv.  239;  relations 
of.  with  Central  Greece,  b.c.  3S2-3«9,  iv.  239;  war  of.  with  Carthage,  B.C.  .3«i8  iv  •>!()• 
gains  the  tragedy  prize  at  the  Lenasan  festival  at  Ath.ms,  iv.  240;  deaf  '■  -'  ' 
acter  of,  iv.  250;  family  left  by,  iv.  240;  the  good  opinion  of,  enjoyed  by 
last,  iv.  249;  drunken  habits  of  his  descendants,  iv.  295. 


ith  and  char 
Dion  to  the 


feat  of,  by  Dion,  iv.  271;  bloekade<l  in  Ortygia  by  Dion.  iv.  273;  intrigues  of  against 

Dion,  iv.  274.  275;  his  fiight  to  Lokri.  iv.  277;  return  of,  to  Syracuse,  Iv.  2:;o;  at  Lokri 

iv.  296;  his  surrender  of  Ortygia  to  Timoleon.  iv.  309;  at  Corinth,  iv.  309.  ' 

Dionysius  of  the  Pontic  Herakleia,  iv.  789. 

Dionysos,  worship  of,  i.  59,  62,  64;  legend  of,  in  the  Homeric  hymn  to,  i.  63;  alteration 
of  tlie  primitive  Grecian  idea  of,  i.  65. 

Diopeithes,  iv.  480. 

Dioskuri,  i.  141.  , 

Diphilus  at  Naupaktus,  b.c.  413,  ill.  161. 

Diphrldas,  in  Asia,  iii.  703. 

Dirke,  1.  186. 

Discussion,  growth  of.  among  the  Greeks,  ii.  55. 

Dithyramb,  ii.  50. 

Dodoiia,  i.  245. 

Doloneia,  1.  383.  388. 

D()h>nkians  and  Miltiades  the  first,  ii.  66. 


288;  their  occupation  of  Argos,  Sparta,  Messcuia.  and  Corinth,  i.  2s9;  earlv  Kretan 

1.  448;  in  Argolis  and  the  Dorian  islands  in  the  .■Egean,  i.  4.55;  of  Sparta  and  Stenvk- 

jerus,  i.  457;  divided  into  three  tribes,  1.  475;  Messeuian,  i.  515;  Asiatic,  i.  .50;  of  iEgiiia, 

li.  97. 
Doric  dialect.  I,  462.  ii.  50;  emigrations,  i.  300. 
Dorieus,  the  Spartan  prince,  aid  of,  to  Kinyps,  1,  769;  and  the  Krotoniates.  il.  2:32.  2:5!; 

Sicily,  ii.  319. 
Dorieus,  the  Rhodian.  ill.  181.  251;  capture  and  liberation  of,  iii.  279;  treatment  of.  by 

the  Athenians  and  Lacedajmonlans,  ill.  649  seq.;  and  Hermokrates  in  the  .Bxean, 

IV.  12".*. 
Doris,  i,  105,  4:r.. 

Doris,  wife  of  Dionysius,  iv.  183,  19L 
Doriskus,  X<  rxes  at,  ii.  252. 
Dorkis,  ii.  375,  376. 
Dorus,  i.  103. 

Drako  and  his  laws.  1.  .569. 

Dramatic  genius,  development  of,  at  Athens,  iii.  384. 
Draii-iaim.  Alexander  in,  iv.  631,  636. 
Drepane,  i.  174. 

pr\  ()i)ians.  settlements  of.  formed  ov  sea,  i.  44S. 
Dryopis,  1.  4;35. 

Duketius,  the  Sikel  prince,  i.  722,  ii.  831. 
Dvnuuies,  Hylh-is,  and  Pampiiyli,  i.  475. 
Dyrrhachium,  i.  742. 

Earliest  Greeks,  residences  of,  i.  414. 

Early  poets,  historical  value  of,  1.  312. 

Eehenms,  i.  lOl,  144. 

Echidna,  i.  .51, 

Eclipse  of  the  sun  In  a  battle  between  Medes  and  Lydlans,  I.  C54;  of  the  moon,  B.C. 

413,  iii.  13,-,;  of  the  moon,  u.c.  3;]L  iv.  610. 
Edda,  the,  1.  280. 


830 


INDEX. 


EiSS,?.'-tou;Sat.on  of. ..  6.«;  Darius  at.  Iv.  caO-,  Alexander  at,  Iv.  ««,  C«.  Par„,en.o 
Ekrtlku»"«?e'u..on  of.  to  Khodes.  11..  703. 

ifetlw---- ----■»-'--"'•  «''"'""■^''""'^" 

JcSl'l'K  ?'f '"ilflSn  of,  by  Pha.p,  IV.  499. 

Ku'^PhoSan  eolony  at, ...  117,822. 

ll;:ul«  vel^"VKMUnus,  Tyrta^us,  and  MImnermus, ...  47. 

il::Ri!,''Serude;V  ) r' S  the  I,thmlan  Rame..  1; '«•  .I'^J.^illf, SS'frSrrSe'^^n^'c 

Elekti-yon,  death  ",r.li«:    „.  .^„       ,  profanation  of.  by  AltlWadcs  and  others.  .11. 

■'''i:;:st;;.,"i;;sr,s.n  o^T.-~.  'Ky'ii^'Vfiit^-'rt'-iJiSvns,  ,.i.  ^.   ,  „^  „, , 

El..u«him,'i»,  seizim;  anj.' ,"    "J  '  "c*.  of  n,v"  ter  "sto.  I.  711:  early  independenee  of, .. 

■'■'Sl^^e.lSf  ni'f;f'i.>e'Ti;iKr.;rm.  ^T^aPture  of,  .11.  ^ 

EM  'tluala,  m^tltutl..,,  of,  at  Platoa  11;  .fS-      ^,„,|„„,  „,, ,.  jgo;  p|c,,  Triphyl ia  and 

S'l!;epYifST>0&:".;X'nSl'touif:tiom\'to^ 

Siiartu  and  Aehaia,  Iv.  85, 

El.vnii,  i.  709.  ,  ^^ 

Fiiii'THnt.-s  to  Ionia,  tne,  l..itw.  .    ,,  ,. 

|;;ii^:;'^ru;n^'.':::ii^'ia:'.'^  -  tbe  iJ-^^^      occupation  ot  PCoponnesus.  ..292,  ^ollc, 

EJ';;;::ioK».'?^:' "*■«»'•»■• 

Emporiee.  Iv.  TS-l. 
Eiulius.  iii.  2.'>fi.  <,  ,  vt. 

Ent'.vinion,  stories  of,  i.  i^-*- 
Ent'ti,  the,  i.  212. 
Enioncs.  i.  i'X\  ^ 

Enna,  IMonyslns  Pt,  i\-  i^-J- 
Ennoa  Hodoi,  li.  40b,  4oH. 

InSn^  sJvicSan  attack  upon.  iv.  19S.  202. 
Eos.  i.  51). 


tratus.  iii.  803,  iv.  72;  an.    -^.f '^  \^\\'^.;,\Veci  <'*s  ami  viewiof.  aft(«r  tlio   ••.^ttU' of  U;uk- 


INDEX. 


831 


Thessaly,  to  rescue  Pelopidas,  Iv.  60;  mission  of,  to  Arcadia,  iv.  72;  Tliehan  fleet  and 
naval  expedition  under,  iv.  79;  and  Meneldeidas,  iv.  W),  8(i;  and  the  df.struetioii  of 
Orchomeuus,  iv.  81;  and  tlie  avre.st  of  Arcadians  liy  ttio  Thehan  liarniost  at  ['e-ep 
iv.  <«;  attempted  siirpris(>  of  Mantineia  by  tlie  cavalry  of,  iv.  96;  at  tlie  battle  of 
Mautineia,  iv.  99;  death  of,  iv.  107;  character  of,  iv.  109  scq. 

Epeians,  i.  121,  292. 

Epeiu.s  of  Panopeus,  i.  205,  209. 

Epeunaktee,  i.  7:30. 

Epherius  i  (•.26;  captnre  of,  by  Croesus,  i.  666;  defeat  of  Thrasyllus  at,  iii.  260;  Lysander 
at,  iii.  274.  :]09;  capture  of,  by  Alexander,  iv.  571.  .y^anwer 

Eplietse,  i.  570. 

E|»ldaltes,  the  Aloid,  i.  ]2'?. 

Ep'aialte.s,  the  general,  iv.  546,  .775. 

Ephialtes,  the  statesman,  ii.  4:57,  439;  and  Perikles,  constitution  of  dikasteries  bv  IL 
431;  .ludicial  reform  of,  ii.  4:!7.  ^ ' 

Ephors,  Spartan,  i.  46S,  4ii9,  470;  ii.  763;  appointment  of,  at  Athens,  iii,  322. 

Ei)horus,  1.  250.  479. 

Epic  cycle,  i.  351. 

Epic  poems,  lost,  i.  a50;  recited  in  public,  not  read  in  private,  1.  357;  variations  in  the 
moile  of  recitin;,',  i.  360;  lonf,^  besides  tlie  Iliad  and  Odyssey,  i.  306. 

Epic  poetry  in  early  Greece,  i.  :148. 

Epic  poets  and  their  dates,  i.  :«1. 

Epic  of  the  middle  ai:?^es,  i.  2S0. 


Epimenides,  visit  of,  to  Athens,  i.  6L 

Epimenides,  of  Krete,  i.  574. 

Epiinetheus,  i.  .50,  89. 

Epipolae.  iii.S9;  intended  occupation  of,  by  the  Syracusans,  iii.  91:  occupation  of  l)v 
the  Athenians,  iii.  91;  d:'feut  of  the  Athenians  at,  iii.  lOS;  Demosthenes's  ni^dit- 
attack  upon,  iii.  12S;  capture  o£,  by  Dion,  iv.  270;  capture  of,  by  Timoleon,  iv.  314. 

Epirots,  1.  403,  4«8,  '^2;  attack  of,  upon  Akaruania,  ii.  5'i;;. 

Epirus,  discouraging  to  Grecian  colonization,  i.  748;  Dionysius's  schemes  of  conquest 
m,  IV.  228. 

Epi states,  ii.  78. 

Epitadas,  u.  657. 

Epitadeus,  the  Ephor,  1.  282. 

Epodus,  introduction  of,  ii.  51. 

Epyaxa,  and  Cyrus  the  Youncrer,  iii.  493. 

tne,  revolt  of,  from  Athens,  iii.  172. 

Erasinides,  trial  and  imprisonuient  of,  iii.  291. 

Eratosthenes,  iii.  331,  :U~i,  370. 

Erechtlieion,  restoration  of,  ii.  463. 

Ereehtheus,  i.  151,  154,  156. 

Eresus,  Thrasyllus  at.  iii.  245. 

Eivtna,  i.  616,  619;  assistance  of,  to  the  Milesians,  ii.  165;  siccre  ?nd  capture  of,  bv 
Datis,  11.  190;  fate  of  captives  taken  l)y  Datis  at,  ii.  207:  naval  defeat  ot  the  Athen- 
iv^Js?^^'*'  ^"'      '  Pliokiou  at,  iv.  419;  Philippising  faction  at,  iv.  480;  litKjration  of, 

Er.wphilus,  iv.  119. 

Erichthonius,  i.  151,  153,  196. 

Eriphyle,  L  IIK). 

Eros  i.  49;  and  Aphrodite,  function  of,  1.  49. 

Erytheia,  i.  179. 

Erythrae,  i.  (129,  iii.  169. 

Eiyx,  defeat  of  Dionvsius  at,  Iv.  240, 

Eryxo,  and  Learclius,  i.  771. 

Eteokles,  i.  119,  1K8,  i;d. 

^m\"i'^"'^'i''^'^!^?- *'">./*''•  ^^'^^'^  Plia.sos,  iii.  2.59;  at  Mitylene,  IJl.  286;  escape  of,  from 
iii  -V-?"-'  t<>  <^!iios,  111.  28S,  296;  at  Chios,  iii.  308;  removal  of,  from  Chios  to  Epiiesus, 
111.  M);  m  .Ej,au:i.,  111.  708,  710.  /^ 

Elhioj)ians  and  Egyptians,  i.  6;)1. 

Etruria,  plunder  of,  by  Dionysius,  iv.  229. 

Eua:phnus:!iid  Polyehares,  I.  508. 
'}-.'.*^l!'i'"  ^^^*''  '■«-j-'ii"''=«i  f'f  c^reeks  to  op|)o.se  Xerxes  at  the  strait  on  the  north  of,  ii. 
V..,,  advance  of  the  Persian  lleet  to,  ii.  291;  revolt  and  recouquest  of,  by  PeriJiles,  ii. 


832 


INDEX. 


42S;  application  from,  to  Apis.  iil.  1<U;  rovolt  of,  from  Athens,  B.c.  4  1.  lii,  229  Pclo- 
poiiSan  neot  sumn.unod  by  Mindarus.  Iil.  24S;  bruise  joining  Bo^otia  and  ill. 
249  "v3;  resttm-(l  from  Thebes  by  Athens,  B.C.  a5S,  iv.  35..;  rev-.,  ol  from  Athens  n.c. 
^-,«^-U')  iv  41H-  intriiiues  of  Philii)  in,  iv.  4IS;  expediti«m  of  I'hokion  to,  u.c.  o-..i,  iv. 
4l1n  hostilities  Vn,  ^c!  34<>-:ys.  iv.  421;  riiilippizing  factious  in,  D.c.  ;;12,  iv.  480;  expe- 
dition of  I'hoicion  to,  B.C.  o-ll,  iv.  482. 

Eub(fa  in  Sicily,  ii.  oTHt. 

Euboic  scale,  i.  4r)l,  Am,  620. 

Euboic  synod,  iv.  lh~2. 

Eubulus.  iv.  o«»,  -Hi),  4:14,  435,  449. 

Eudamidas,  iii.  74'.),  7")"^. 

Eiiemerus's  treatment  of  mythos,  i.  2oO. 

Eukleides,  archoiiship  of,  iiL  37tJ. 

Eukles.  ii,  f«»,  7i)t>,  lir-i. 

Eumiiehus,  iv.  2r)y,  2W. 

Eumelus  of  Bosporus,  iy.  799. 

iilmeSiVvyfltiVfAm/^Hepha^^^  and  Pordikkas.  Iv.  701 ;  victory  of,  over 

Kraterus  and  Neoptolemus,  iv.  711;  attempts  of,  to  uphold  Alcxauder  Ja  dynabty  m 
Asia,  iv.  711;  and  Antitjouus,  iv.  712. 

Eumolpus,  i.  1")."). 

Eunt>nms,  iii.  'iM. 

Eupatrida",  i.  "><>(). 

Eupliaes,  i.  iH^j. 

Euphemus,  speech  of,  at  Kamarina,  in.  79. 

Euphiletus  and  Meletus,  iii.  65. 

Eui)hr;eus,  iv.  iU4, 47y.  „      ^,  .  y-.       i        *  «ii  t<o    K^^■^ 

Euphrates,  Cyrus  the  Younger  at,  iii.  501:  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  at,  iii.  Slo;  Alex- 
ander at,  iv.  (KW,  663. 

Euriphles,'fauUs  imputed  to,  i.  240;  story  about  the  dramas  of,  «iii»\  the  Athenian 
prisoners  in  Sicily,  iii.  154;  iEschylus  and  Sophokles,  m.  OK.;  and  Dekanmichus,  iiL 

Euripus,  bridge  across,  iii.  249,  252. 

Europa,  i.  164,  183. 

Eurotas  crossed  by  Epaminondas,  iii.  8a^. 

Euryalus,  Hanulkar's  attempt  on,  iv.  7t4. 

Eurvbates,  ii.  2<)1. 

Eurvbiades.  is.  277,  ."W. 

Eurvdike,  widow  of  Amyntas,  iv.  49. 

EurVcUke,  gran<ldaughter  of  Philip,  iv.  710,  712. 

Euryleon,  ii.  :54!:i. 

Euryloclms,  ii.  6:51.  6;W. 

iSr^melloS;  at  KllfeSf.  h'^I^I  'l<^  Sophokles.  expedition  ot  to  Korkyra  ami  Sicily. 

Ii.  (.:■",  (W,;  at  Pylr.'^.  ii.Hl,  Col;  cxi>editioas  of,  to  Sicily,  ii.  b26,  828,  in.  112;  return  of, 

from'Sicily  toAthcus,  ii.  ir-.-'). 
Euryiiome,  and  Zeus,  of!  spring  or,  i.  53. 
Euryptolemu.s.  iii.  -xj-J,  301,  302. 
Euryp>  lus,  i.  1!>4. 
Eurvstheus,  i.  1L>0,  lOG,  134. 
Eurytos,  i.  124. 
Eurytus,  il.  2r>5. 
Eutaea,  AgeJ  ilaus  at,  B.C.  370.  iii.  R">1. 

ES^nf(>^'k  si  mI 'nu'lV.^Vm:  t%,  763,  iii.  555;  first  sight  of,  by  the  Ten  Tliousand 
Greck.s,  iii.  'is;  inciiuenous  trilxs  on,  iii.  rf^:  the  (xreeks  on,  anil  the  Ten  Thousand, 
lii.  5."(i;  Xenopliori'sjdt  a  of  lonnding  a  new  city  on  the,  iii.  5*;^ 

Evagoras,  iii.  7i>l,  7iu,  724. 

Family  tie,  In  legend.iry  Greece,  i.  334;  rites  in  Greece,  i.  561. 

Fates,  i.  .'d;  and  (  roesus,  ii.  112.  . 

Fe.stivals,  Grecian,  i.  75.  lOO.  778.  786,  787;  at  Athens,  ill.  392. 

riction.  i'huisible,  i.  2('l.  3'l2. 

Fictitiius  matter  in  Greek  tradition,  k  259. 

Financial  changes,  Kleistheneun,  ii.  77. 

Five  Thousand,  the,  at  Atlu  ns,  iii.  208,  22:3,  231. 

Fleece,  Golden,  legend  «>f,  i.  116. 

Flute,  u.^e  of,  in  Suarla,  ii.  4;-i.  .  ...,,.   j   i  ooo 

Fortification  of  towns  in  «r)rly  Groi  ce,  1.  ai3;  of  the  Grecian  camp  m  the  Iliad,  i.  382. 

Four  ilui.dred,  the  oligarchy  of,  iii.  208. 

Frenzy,  religious,  of  women,  1.  62.  . 


II^DEX. 


800 


^SSI:  ^^^^'"^"y  "*  A^^'^"^  o^«r  slain  warriors,  ii.  471;  obsequies  of  HephjBstlon,  Iv. 
Fuuerals,  Solon's  regulations  about,  i.  602. 

Gia!':  4f.'l!i  ^2?"^^'  ''^"^  ^^"^^^  '«'  ^'^  '''^  «^^^^th  and  sixth  centuries.  b.c.  U.  675. 

Gfesylus.  iv. 285. 

"^^JT^^i^SllS^  -wiS?^JSr^^?T'S3:  iJ-i^'-'^^'  ^^^r  ^-*  «--'-•  '■  ^^- 

Gamori,  i.  515;  at  Syracuse  '  "  ^^'  ^^^^i^"'  i-  ^81.  ^^l  Nemean,  L  785. 

Ganymedcs,  i.  1!>G.  ' 

Gauganiela,  battle  of,  iv.  615. 

(Jedrosia,  Alexander  in,  iv. 

''ii;;3i;'s,;si?s^^s.Sffes  if  8^s.';?^d'HS^^.^''  "•  ?*^'  ^^-  ^««p-t  "^• 

142;   expeditions   of   Dionysius  to   'iv    1(S'  1(W-   r^mlnS'^^l' '''^^  Selinus,  iv; 

(telo,  ii.  270.  348-357. 
Gel  mi,  i.  65^. 

GenSKi^rSSi&ian  '  ?^h^-$^'  ?^"^?"«  ^^  ^yr^^-n..,  Ii.  S^o. 
^CIimS's^i^[c;,l?a^^1.l?/,=4(?^^^"'^-  '''  "^y""^al.  i.  150.  266;   Egypti 


ian.  1.  267; 


'^^^^iS^MBBiP^'^^^^'-^i^^s^-'^'  ^'^'-  '•  -= 


iEt( 


Generals,  Iileisthenean.ii.  75. 

'^^pi^^ny^i^'^i^S^  ^^^  «"^^'-  ^^^'ons,  i.  322; 

non-n.embt>rs  of,  under  Solon  i^y^-'         ^"^^^  between  Greciau  and  Roman,  i.3-24; 
Geographical  knowledge.  Hesiodi'cand  Homeric  i  S4fi 
G,.,,,™phy.  fabulous,  i.lTr;  Homeric.  tSfo'/'t'hf itreat  of  tho  Tea  Ilaousaad 

Go™reJ:i?if  ^  "'■»"«'■'  "•»>"  "y  ^'ote^t  external  influences,  1. 2T5,  mythes,  1. 23 
Geronthrae.  conquest  of,  i.  505. 
Geryon,  i.  .Ol,  ir<>. 

GetfP  Alex.iuder's  defeat  of,  iv.  aJl. 

Gisantes,  birth  of,  i.  50. 

Gill  us.  ii.  147. 

Gi.skon.iv.  i:J9,  327. 

Gl;uik;e,  iv.  651. 

Glauke,  i.  114. 

GhulkutL  h^^'''^^  °^'  *«  Plato's  Republic,  ill.  425. 

Gnomie.'Greek  poets,  Ii.  52. 

trrioinon.  whence  obtained  by  the  Greeks  J  Tiir. 

f<    ,"*'^^,'^*-^  .^n<^'  uods,  twelve  great  i  53 

Gods,^Grecian.  how  conceived  by  the  Greeks,  i.  49.  221;  and  demons.  1.  256;  and  men 

GoSS:th^^r^'^-^i«- 

G!!J!.f ot",f'  ^^"^  <='9rmthian,  Iii.  102,  107. 

Gonlin^i^I^i^i'STmV'^''^^^  ^'•^'"'  ^--  ^• 

Gorgons^i.  {js.''"""'"'  "'  ^^'  ^^'  *"'  *1.^'  ^^i^- 
ffurgopa's.at  iEgina,  Iii.  709. 

of.Tn  GreecJ  'l*S^  wl/i?^  Y^^.^^V'  ^'"*^'^^^'  »•  ^^'  ^^^''^<^'  ^-  ^^  earliest  changes 
Greece,  t  .^l^N  '    '  ^'  ^"^*^' ''  ^^'  ^^'^"ee  from  monarchical  to  oligSchic^rfn 

Grace  "'nie'i-i^''^'"'*^"'  ^^^"^ss  of,  ii.  85. 
GraL'ce,  i.  51. 

11  G.  1V.-37 


834 


INDEX. 


Grrcci.  1.  122. 
Gracia  Ma«na,  i.  f-S2. 

gSnllcusllStt'^th"  W^5fU.;  AtT^enlonsoapUimlatthe.  iv.  582. 

Grarhe  l'*'^^vJ^^'"\P".H">-'Lte'*aiS-  i'  "w>q  •'    n>  thology,  sources  of  our  Informa- 

tiou  on,  1.  1^'';  •"™|^v^^&^?''JJ',.^,|,V*,^^        1  268-  townsman,  inU'lk'ctual  ao.jui.si- 

of,  1.  Irf.;  colomes  ;",f"."''^,S"';^ '„'>',,,  ,,„  the  Greek  miiKl.  i.  '.xi;  art.  beKimiiiiKS 
"' i'V'S  ;S,^^^ep  ^f'^rw'areh'w-ctureVu^  KovemmeMs,  weakness  of,  ii.  ffi;  worl.l. 
!'n ?heTh?rtv  vl-irs    nRv.?!^"!".!.!  barbarian  military  teellnR.  eontnist  be  ween, 

rivt'rs.m,  i.  oJb,  <1  mc  m^^^  l.ftween  the  land  states  and  sea- 

i  :W7;  islan^^,„^^°lij';7l7,V  the  c^nt^iuV^^^^  3!v.);  minei aland  other  iiroductions 

S'^^^'m  ;^ciimate^.Ti^«;  dlffSe^  the  inhabitants  of  ditferent  parts  of. 

parties  ":  •^'••' 'f^' P'^^i'S  ?f  ^4')"  bad  nor  ility  of  the  rich  and  j,'reat  in,  ii..t;:2li;  at- 
luK  111.  betvveen  B.C.  44.1^^^^^^^^  4-^7    ii  cii;  warlike  preraiwtions  in,  dnrinK  the 

i.iospherieal  distu  baiKes    n.  B.t^^^  after  the  capture  of  Athens  oy 

winter  ot  B.C.  4  4-4 1, ,  '.\\-„  '  ;fj,Y^VSn  V,t  the  Th^  Athens,  iii.  1^1;  degradation 

I  V.sander.  "'•  •f*'/*rVt^3ki/la^^^^       718  "4  effect  of  the  battle  of  Leuktra  on.  iii.  S15. 
,)f.  by  the  iK'ace  of  Antalklda.s,  *";  {'»'  *-~:^o_.^a  ^y  03.,.  state  of.  B.C.  :5<'H^:i5'.>.  iv.  840; 

of,  on  Alexanderv  access.oii,  ^"^-/^hji'lr^YJ^ ^k     tc^^^^^  on  tlie  destruction  of 

?tes  b^iSe?  !v:;j.|re^j^^ 

•S/S'lefrs'befel^"  Al"  xa^^^^^ 
fJreeee  Proper,  ^T<>-7^'^.^y ';*'',Lf f.-  ,,,„^,,e  and  the  mvthcs.  1.  225;  tradition,  matter 

tury.  B.C..  1.  44;  I^.'^^fFy' ?.  ,i-,n  -^n  '  ii  4V-  Dhilosophy  in  the  sixtli  century  B.C..  11. 
o'.V.  fle^^  ':i"^r&mlsn\n  •l?1>?7,  OT;  neS:'ff"klamis.  ii.  2%.  fleet  at  Mykale.  fL  :^:|8; 
21t.:  fleet  at  Artrimsuinii^^^^^^  '        ^     ^^  expedition  of.  against  Asia,  K-C.  4.8,  n. 

fS   .^'lu'raiJanVl^^iptainrslaiS^^       of  CyrJia.iriii.  :)22;  heroes,  analogy  e,f  Alexan- 
der to  the  iv.m  their  love  of  antiquities,  i.  224;  their  distasto 
Greeks,  r«'  \"  'V  I'v  ,7f  ?h..  ir.st  I  ^-'7  H     lu'rii-   1.  ttW.  :!1S,  405  in  Asia  Minor,  1.  G4.'5;  extra- 
Ki<i;S;iSuonhy^^ca  hi"  :;;Vst  Iwo  centuries,  i.  125;  advuucc  of,  in  gov- 


I 


INDEX. 


835 


ornment  in  thr^  seventh  .-iml  sixth  ccntnrio.<;  n.c,  i.  5.39;  musical  modes  of,  1.  641-  and 
1'  lenieians  in  Meily  and  Cypru.s,  i.  (-.74;  contrasted  with  Egyi)tians,  Assyr  ans  -id 
Phenieian.s.  1.  (.80;  influence  of  Pheiiieians,  Assyrians,  anclKgyptiuiVfoir,  i  T^'  ad 
Car:  i.agi.uans,  first  known  colIisi,>ii  between,  i.  707;  JSieilia!i  and  Italian  ni  neta  -y 
and  staru-al  sealo  of,  1.  72(  ;  in  Siciiy.  prosperity  of,  between  b.c.  7.T.  and  4^-/  i    7  4- 
n.  ^KMly  ainl  in  Greece  Proper,  dilference  between,  i.  721:  Italian,  between  i  c' 
,1     .n<,i,:^i;  their  talent  for  eoniniand  over 'barbarians,  i.  757;  first  voyage  of  to 
Ml.ya,  1,  .<.4;  and  Libyans  at  Kyrene,  i.  7(;:);  political  i.sokuion  of,  i.  77(rtenyn  •'ies 
ii' IIV''".*-LL'J"".>»  'i'f.»<"!H,  'if^t'V  J'-C.  ^M),  1.  777;  growlii  of  union  among,  between  bc 
«.(..)i<i.  1,  tti;  ri.se  of  philosophy  and  <iialeeiies  among,  ii.  5,-);  writing  anioim  ii  ¥r 
Asiatic,  after  Cyrus's  con.juest  of  Lydia,  ii.  li;J;  Asiatic,  application  of,  to  Spal'ta' 
5K.  B.C.,  11.  11.;;  and  Danu.s,  Ijefore  the  baltle  of  Marathon,  ii.  LSO;  einiuei  t,  lial) le  to 
be  corrupted  by  succes.s,  u.  209;  and  l^ersi.ius.  religious  cuicept ion  of  his  ory  com- 
mon to,  11.  241:  northeni,  and  Xerxes,  ii.  2m,  271;   c;;nfedei-ate,  engagement  "f 
against  .such  as  loiiied  Xerxes,  u.  272:  effect  of  the  battle  of  TliennopylS  on  ii  2<lfi' 
and  the  battle  ot  balaims  n.  ;XMJ;  Medizing,  and  Mardonius,  ii.  CIC;  Medising,  at  pia: 
t<«a,  11.  .J2.J;  at  Plataea  ii    524;  at  BIykale,  ii.  aj'J;  Asiatic,  first  step  in  the  asceirdencv 
of  Athens  over.  11   ^42;  8  c  lian.  early  government  of.'ii.  8.1G;  Sicilian,  progress  ot^ 
between  the  battle  of  Salaiuis  and  Alexander,  ii.  300;  allied,  oppose  the  fortifiea' 
5.1-"  of  Athens,  ii.;^7,  369;  allied,  transfer  the  helidsliip  from  SpTta  to  Atheis  B?" 
4. ..  11.  3.0;  allied,  Aristeides'  a.ssessineut  of,  iii.  379;  allied,  under    Vthens  substitiiVn 
money-payment  for  personal  service,  ii.  4iJ0;  effect  of'  the  Atheniai^^disalte  •    a 
birdy  upon,  lu.  1(4;  and  Tissaphernes,  Alkibiades  acts  as  interpreter  between  iii 
1S9;   Asiatic,    surrender  of,  by  Sparta  to  Persia,  iii.  610:  Asiatic,  and  Cvrus  the 
Younger,  iii.  010;  Asiatic,  and  Tissaphernes,  iii.     Oil ;  the  Ten  Thousand,  tJiVir  posi 
tion  and  ca-ciimstances,  iii.  491;  Ten  Thousaml  at  Kunaxa,  iii.  5o0;  Tc-n  ThousSnd 
after  the  battle  of  Kunaxa,  iii.  50.);  Ten  Thousand,  retreat  of,  iii  514,  5.-,l  .5  4- Ten 
Jnousand.  atter  their  return  to  Trapezus,  iii.  55,^,-594;  Asiatic,  their  ai  plicathin  to 
Sijarta  f  (,r  aid  against  Tissaphernes,  iii.  612;  in  the  service  of  Alexan   !4^  n  As  a  iv 
.%1;  uiipropitiqu.-^  eircumstances  for,  in  the  Lamiau  war,  iv.  710;  Italian    presse.i 
upon  by  enemies  from  the  interior,  iv.  747.  , '^^^H'xu,  pici,t,m 

G ry  1 1  us,  (lea t h  of,  i v.  99. 
Guilds,  (irecian  deities  of.  I.  223. 
Gyges.  i.  50,  2.*2. 
Oylippiis.  expedition  of,  to  Syracuse,  iii.  87, 100,  lOfi,  119. 136, 140. 

Cry  .ides,  distribution  of,  into  channels  by  Cyrus,  ii.  121. 

Hades,  1.  52  seq. 

Hienion  and  Antigone,  1.  192. 

Hahaitus,  Ly.sanderat,  iii.  664. 

Halikarnassus,  i.  .{O.},  039:  capture  of,  by  Alexander,  Iv.  577. 

Halomiesus,  dispute  between  Philip  and  the  Athenians  about,  Iv.  478. 

riai\  s,  tne,  1.  010. 

Hamilkar,  defeat  and  death  of,  at  Himera,  ii.  354. 

eSl  St'he''iim??iamV!^^^^^  '^'  '^^'  ''^^P^^^^^^^d  in  Sicily  by  another  gen- 

'^a!!!iSth  of ''iv  704  ^^  '^^^""^^■^'  ^^-  ■^^'5;  attempt  of,  upon  Syracuse,  iv.  704;  defeat 
Ilannibal,  expeditions  of,  to  Sicily,  iv.  141-148, 153. 
Hanno,  silly  fabrication  of,  iv.  313. 
Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton,  ii.  63. 
Harinosts,  Spartan,  iii.  OUO,  6U4  OOC. 
Harpagiis,  ii.  115,  118. 
Harpalus.  iv.  65.  121. 
Harpies,  the,  i.  47.  172. 
Hel>e,  i.  53. 
Hector,  i.  197,  203. 
Hegemony,  Atlienian,  ii.  396. 
Kegesippus.  iv.  477. 
Heuesi.^tratus,  ii.  320.  339.  iv.  571,57?. 
Hekabe,  i.  197. 

^^lnniTreyollX7(?Cm  ^^^'  "^^  '^^  Argonauts,  1. 180;  and  the  mythes,  I.  Sll;  and  the 
Hekatompylu's,  Alexander  at,  iv.  630. 
HekatoneheiiTs,  the,  i.  5,  50. 

jlekatonymus  and  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  Hi.  .560. 
gen(isV>f  i  ^lii  "*''^'^'=^^"  ^f'  *•  1'^!  ^^^  I'aris,  i.  198;  and  Achilles,  I.  828;  various  le- 

Heleiuis  aiid  An'dromacho,  i.  222. 
H.' ha^a,  1.  .5%;  11.70,79. 
lieiiasts,  ii.  8U. 


II 


836 


INDEX. 


Heliko,  destrnction  of,  iii.  799. 

Helios,  1.  :>(>,  22:i. 

HeliSiiiiis'troam^Titof  mythcs,  i.  211;  contrasted  with  Saxo  Grammaticus  an.l 

JlflTa'^div'sUm  ^^^^^^^  proTHT.  i.  m-,  mountain  systems  of.  I  392;  islands  and  r.lo- 

nit'S  (>l',  i.  :W;  mi>st  uncicut,  1.  iti. 
Helle  unci  Phryxus.  i.  m. 
Ht'Ilen  and  his  sons.  1.  ivo. 

Holleni^'iillS^n^id^ustoms  in  the  Troad.  1.  220;  cities,  i.  41. 
Ht'lleniou  at  Nuukratis,  J.  a>i. 
Hellenism,  definition  of,  'v.  J(). 

Hellenotiiniiie,  ii.  oTy.  Id-  :•;]>.  ^  „  ^^„sc,p(|  y>y  Xerxes,  ii.  251:  retreatinp:  march 

Hellespont,  briclK-'^  of  Xe^^^^^ 


cross  the,  iv.  5t>4.  ,     p,„  „-£,  nrw, 

Heloris,  unsuccessful  expedition  of  iv  ^ib  ^i»'jJ-J^^.   jt^ome,  capitulation  of,  ii.  420; 
Helots,  i  481;   P%»^{""a?.^";iJ  je^i  a  S?-  bought  bal-k  to  Pylul^  ii.  :sS;-ancl  the  in- 

?|?ffn"ona?oVik'by  Epfm^^^^^^^  ^''  ^^^^^   ^^^   ^^•«- 

senians,  iiL  842.  ,      .  „  ^„  .  -^^ 

Helus  conquered  by  Alkamenes,  1.  JtK). 
Hephfestion,  iv, 
Hephrestos,  1.53,79. 
Hercoon  near  Mykenoe,  i.  W.         ,,     ,     .^ 

ii;s"e.rv2;iicr.^™!-w?.J:!;'iiro  ii:,f?ho„«a,.d  creeks «,  m.  sa 

Herikleia  in  Italy,  i.  7-.'y:_il.  460 

Herakloia  in  Sicily,  ii.  ici'iJJ'.""  ^^./V-o  r-n  w  "fi? 

Jlcrakk'ia  Traehinca.  ii.  WO,  .S-l.iii.  (ja9,  G.O.  iv.  *,b<. 

Hcraklci.l  kings  of  Corinth,  1.44;..  victory  of ,  over  Philistus,  iv.  27^;   and 

«\SS'^i^^4!^5^S^'S,S•;%i?^  c^;:ov^?^^  iv.  2..;  death  of.  iv.  2S9. 

H'n?kieide:s  governor  of  the  Pontic  Ilcrakleia     v.  .o2. 

Heraklcids,  1.     ,  101.  2^5;  Ly<V«»  [  >:»f  ^^y  of,  i.  W8  overthrows  Orchome- 

^;;^:^Srtl||?kSS V&ran;\fellls,  i.'lS;^''^  Laomedon,  i.       ;  Ty rian.  tcm- 

^l^i^i^  1^d"5?2JnS.  1. 137;  temple  of.  near  Argos.  burnt,  il.  725;  Lakinian. 

robe  of, 'iv.  228. 
Herippidas,  iii.  ft>^^,  6ih,  6K4.  .      a-  ai 

Henna?,  mutilation  of,  at  Athens,  iiL  4d.61. 
Hermei:is  of  Ataraeus,  iv.  4i5. 
Hermes,  i.  5.1,  79. 
Herniione,  1.  l:^>7.  ,     .-„ 

Herniolans,  iv.  (547.  ,     ,  ,       ,  ^on 

Hermotybii  and  Kalasir  es    .692.  Trojans,  i.  209;  treatment  of  mythes  by. 

Herodotus,  on  :.Imos.  i.  iw.i;  <^",Hj^*^";7""f,Vi  v  of  si  In  and  Cra>sus,  i.  (KJ7;  his  desunp- 
i.  2-13;  his  view  of  Lykur^-us,  i.  4W..;  l;y'|,f^Vf,.^^^''^','uV  stine^^^^^^^  between  what  ho 
tion  ^f  Scythia,  1.  ^-^'•^^^-•^^^X^'l^a^^-^^^  democracy 

professes  to  have  sccii  ai  d  "^'^V  iA'J^Vw  o\i  rvriil  ii  105-  his  narrative  of  Darius's 
[;p,.n  the  Athenitjns,  i.   m-  ■^]l]l\}\l^^^'':}^^^^^^^^^  with  tlio 

nuirch  into  Scythia,  d.  l^jly'f;^"  »  • -/•  h  ^ovii-a  m^^^^^^^  conceptionof.il. 

^i^l:^:^:^:¥!v;:n,^::^T:&.^:.^^^^     doubts  about  tL  motives 

nS^Js^lSpe^^th^li^s^-urS  i.  82;  Greek. at  Aulis,  i.  198;  Greek, 

analogy  of  Alexander  to,  iv.  500. 


INDEX. 


837 


Heroic  race,  1.  Rl;  legends,  I.  2.'i5. 

"i:^;n;ii:VK."r:i!sr;;?e:?l.tL'i(if:p5:;.t'';;li..°^'''''''-'^  •"'■'  '*»^«'"  ••  «> 

He  :ioiie.  i.  11)7. 

llesi»eriil(s,  dragcm  of,  i.  51. 

lit  sper!(ies.  town  of.  I.  771. 

llestia,  i.  50.  79. 

IlcsliiccH  on  Ilium,  i,  215. 

Jlcliene.  ii.  511. 

Hetwries  at  Atliens,  ii.  351,  iU.  196. 

Iliel-ax"  in'  7(i?*'  ^"^'*^''^*^'  ^-  ^>  ^^^  meters  superadded  to,  il.  46. 
Hiei-o  of  Syracuse,  ii.  357. 
Hieroiimeinou,  i.  411. 

^^iit^oill'  *iV'''l'  ''P^  *^r  Syracnsans,  iv.  297;  mess-nnEre  of,  to  Corinth  and  to  TimoTeon 
IV.  .Oj;  defeat  of,  at  Adrauiun,  iv.  :!(»7;  and  Ma-ou.  iv.  ;in.  :;!.S:  llitrht  of  from  Sv7"' 
cuse  to  Leontmi,  iv  814;  cai.ituiatioa  of,  witii  Timoloon.    v    :«!;  iavitSs  the  Cart^^^ 

lSv^'\^V^u^:i?^'''l^'-^^^H  ^^'^{<^^^'  «^"-'-<'"'lf^r,  and  death  of  iv.  ;S  '" 

^ll'/dV.sS,1v.  wi;.'"'"''''''  ''^'  '''• '^''  Alexander  reduces  the  country  between  the 

Hipi)archus,'ii.  62. 

Hipparinus,  son  of  Dionysius,  iv.  294. 

Hippeis,  Solonian,  1.  51)1. 

Hippiasof  Elis,  iii.  4UJ. 

Hlppias  the  Peisistratid,  ii.  63,  67,  160, 

Hippo,  ii.  22(1. 

Hippodaineia.  i.  183,  1.34. 

Hippodamus.  ii.  4>)i. 

Ilippokleides,  i.  551. 

Ilippokrates  the  physician,  I.  234. 

Hippokrates  of  Gela,  ii.  8ti 

Ilil.|.()krafes  the  Athenian  general,  ii.  675,  GSO,  GSl,  GS4. 

Hi|»|)onikn,s,  i.  531. 

Il1'!\ou\\m"'-*'''^-^-"— M.^'  ^^'  ''^^^'  r^f'Stablishment  of,  iv.  239. 

Historians,  treatment  of  mvthesbv,i.  242.  ' 

!w.V7'"V  l»'0'3l''.PV'^;^ti^«  evidence  indispensable  to.  1.  25,9;  sense  of  modern  time*? 

•    h'reS\-d^S'^l^!:nir  vl!}':;";'^''*'IF  ''^'''  \  ''^^-^  «-<'l^^"-'< '.  thr.sh?Lard  oV^r  S 
cv.mpared  I  5{V^"^         '  '""^"^^  ''^^^*  '■'^*-''"'*l  to  Greece,  L  282;  and  legendary  Greece 

"J^ld;it^'^ii;XS^l?mme!i^4f  °  ""'  '''•"^'  '■  ^'''  «^  ^"^^^^^  "^ythes.  1.  218;  appll- 

^the'sI^vmlliJS'^'*"?  *''  ''■'"'P'  ^''•f^V'^'^'  1-  226;  of  EnglaTid,  how  conceived  down  to 
fir^M  ..H  »rf^'^/"''"^"'''^''i-?l';  ••"i<l  le.tren<l,  Grecian,  blank  between,  i.  8(i  ;  Greci.an 
to  'Lr     I)-    /•.•'■*"'  ''•''■  ''"*•»  -''f^''  '■••^■'^;  Grecian,  second  j.eriod  of,  fro  i  bc    sS 

Homer  nnfrV^^^^^ 

Ho    pH^  7  .,,1  1''-  '  '■■^'^''"'''.">;/'*^^.*v'-'""'=  personality  and  po(>ms  of,  i  854. 
"'"Hvims  i    i:->^\  '^7'''l^''-^'-^'i*^^^^^  ■'^'•';  '*'-^»'^  <>f  the  birth  of  Herakles,  i. 

„S^';!;:^.K^!Ji;;v;^^r^^^i^?:,^^- ^7iJ^'  ^"*^>''  ^^^^  "^'  p-tiaii^Sivi;d;t 

Hr)!Merids,  the  pfKtIcul  Kens  of.  I.  :l.x5.        

G^welh  ^—1"/m^^^       /^>r- i- •'■''•';  I'"."l'^  of  dealin-with.in  legendnrv  and  historical 
Wece,  i.  oor,  tribunals  tor,  at  Athens,  i.  57U;  Drako's  laws  of,  retained  by  Solon,  i. 

Homoiol,  Spartan,  1.  2;30,  504. 

Hoplites,  i.  55S. 

Home,  tlie.  i.  53. 

Horko.s,  1.  51. 

Horse,  the  wooden,  of  Troy,  1.  205 

HosSSm/iinl^'.^i^^^^^^.rf'Sr"^"  ""'  ''''  democracy,  B.C.  403,  ill.  37«. 
Huni.in  sacrifices  in  (ireece,  i.  lis. 
tiyaklntida  and  the  Lacedaemonians,  ii.  317. 


/ 


838 


INDEX. 


Hy.iklTitbns.  1.  ina. 

Hyblu'ivii  M«'t::n-:i,  i.  •!». 

H^:la"S:  AliSim.lrr  at  the.  iv.  050;  Alexander  sails  down  the,  Iv.  C53. 

Hvdra.  tiio  I^'infe:vii,  1.  51. 

Hvkkura,  cNtptur"  of,   ii.  '-• 

Hyliis.  and  Htvakks,  1.  It-i. 

jliiS'iert.  1.  C4,  6«.  70. 79,  81,  ^^;  at  festivals  in  honor  of  gods.  I.  75. 
nVpasp'istjp.  iy.  rw-M^ 

Hybfibolus.  11.  S.»,  81U. 
Hyporides.  iv.  513, 
Hvporion,  i.  49,  5i). 
H\  poniKMit'S,  iv.  .^14. 
HVjHTinne.stra,  i.  J«-  ^ 

Hvpha.si<5,  Alexandt'r  at,  iv  652. 
HVt)omelonrs,  Spartan,  i-f)..-*^- 
Hyrkauia,  Alexander  in,  iv.  «^1. 

lalmonos  and  Askalaphos,  1. 119. 

lapt'tids  in  H»-siod,  i.  bJ. 

lapetos,  i.  41»,  50. 

lapvKians,  i.  »:a. 

Ia.sus.  capture  of,  m.  ITs- 

Iberia  in  Spain,  !.().:>. 

ir.prians  and  Dionysius,  Iv.  ^11. 

Ida  in  Asia.  i. Jv^- 

Lla  in  Crete.  Zens  at,  1.  50. 

Idan thyrsus,  ii.  lo2. 

Idas,  i.  110.  .  .   ,,   i.oB 

IdoiiK  ne.  Demosthenes  at,  ii.  635. 

Idriens,  iv.  !7:i.  .   , 

inild'aiuVfhc  Trojan  war,  1.  ^;  and  Odyssey,  date,  stmctnre,  and  authorship  of,  1. 

:':5:V-:R)1. 
rlvilA.'DKsins'ssehemesrTcv.nn^^  ^„^  Brasidas  before,  ii.  7^3; 

^'fey:;;?^  PMulJo"'?;  1-^;  ^::fSirof,  by  Alexander,  iv.  368. 

i^;s!^i:?iyailSbal,lnvasUm 
iL^^-liSpanVrnl^rf'^^irfa^ U!^  So^e  ^yracuse.^v.  201;  flight  of,  from  Syracuse, 
iv   ni;  miserable  end  of,  iv.  212.  ^  ,    ,  ^, 

KflS^llexander  at,  Iv.  &19, 653;  voyage  of  Nearchus  from  the  mouth  of.  to  that  of  the 

I,;;;^2?V!  mSlufactivrln.,  at  Athens.  1.  600. 

iSf^\tS  mS^itJesl^ntrasted.  i.  398 

luo,  i.  llfi. 

Inscriptions.  I.  -w.  • 

Interest  on  lonns,  1.  5%,  Rl.^. 

Interpreters.  Egyptian,  i.  69a. 

lo  lecend  of,  i.  95.  . 

lonVan.  the  name  a;"fl'r"'^<:V- wiifover  the  Danube,  11. 155:  abandonment  of.  by  the 
lonians.  i.  '»)2;  an.    TJanus  s  1  ndee  ';7^\.\".f,,.';^i":q„..  after  the  l»attle  <.f  Mykale,   i.  ..1. 

Athenians.  11.  166;  at  Lade.  li.  ^'-.-.^Vi,.  Attk-T.  i  .55.S  5.511;  cities  in  Asia,  i.  621,  ()0;>.  .o«, 
Ionic  emWntion.i.  •^«J*j!^^«^;;/i[^V  '«i!^  .^.\!i;osoph^  Sicilians  and  Athens, 

i\"i>J?l!Sh^K "and  the  AThVJfun  laws,\li.  oT.. 

Inhi'^enelu,  i.  200. 

Inliiklos,  i.  li-y.  _„„fa  on.l  Qncee^'^.es  of.  111.  f^S9,  697;  defeat  of  Anaxibiiis 

lS.;krat;.,militaryimprowm^^ 


INDEX. 


889 


fJfSi^^lS.S^,S;?r?JKt^f  C^:SS%»^^'  »-  Thrace  and  Macedonia,  Iv.  49,77; 

rphikratcs  the  Yount;er,  iv.  5%.  ' 

Ipsus,  battle  of,  iv.  TJo. 

Iran,  territory  of,  ii.  107. 

Irasa,  i.  7(;(;. 

Iris,  i.  51. 

Iron  race,  the,  i.  83. 

I.sa,::,'()nis,  ii.  70,  US. 

IschuKoras,  11.  724. 

Ischolaus,  iii.  875. 

Isciiys,  i.  114. 

I.si'las.  iv.  97. 

Islands  in  the  ^gean,  I.  405. 

is;";:,"!;"  aurtpSopiiii":  iv.'',:?',?/  T'  '-^=™"<'"  "'■  '"•  ■=■• 

;3;T;^?;;;^|^i'in:'j^',£'EiSi^!;iSi4;f??^   »-"-  «'•  «"■  ''»■  •»; «-« 

Issus,  Alexander,  "at,  before  the  battle,  iv.  587;  Darius  at  befnro  tho  i.n+fi^    •     r-on 
buttle  of,  iv.  5;>1;  inaction  of  Darius  after  the  battle  of  ?v  bTl    nmn.«  n'^  "i'^'  ''r  ''^^j 
as  connected  with  the  l)attle,  iv  S03  oaiue  oi,  iv.  on,  and  iis  neighborhood 

^'K^;  nL^l^e^'*"''  ^-  '"'  ■•''=  ^^^'^"'^  oicluded  from,  1.  124;  b.  c.  412,  iii.  lOT;  and  Agesi- 

Is^one,  Korkyraean  fugitives  at,  ii.  607,  666  sea. 
Itaha,  1.  70i».  ^ 

Italian  Greeks,  i.  720,  7a3,  iv.  226,  747. 
It  Uiai!s.  i.  72o. 

Italy,  the  voyage  from  Greece  to,  i.  715;  Grecian  colonies  in  i    71'^  711   -Pi-  rio,.u«n  «^ 
Gr.ek  power  in,  after  the  fall  of  Sybaris,  ii.  233;  Southcnl;  affirm  of.  ^^J.  ^^[^/^ 

_  Itliunie,  i.  509,  410,  '' 

Jason,  i.  ir?,  171. 

Jason  ot  Plicrae,  liL  790,  79S,  819,  821. 

.Taxartcs,  Alexander  at  the,  iv, 

Jocasta.  i.  iS(j. 

Jiirkui',  i.  (;.>S. 

Juiy-trial,  characteristics  of,  exhibited  in  the  Athenian  dikasterlos,  ii.  447. 

Kabala,  victory  of  Dionysius  at,  iv,  237. 
Kabcirichus,  iii.  T(kj. 

^immi'm^iiL  i^T?""'  '''"^''^  ^''  ^^  Pha)bldas,  iii.  749;  surrender  of.  by  the  Laeeda3 

Kadnuis,  i.  is.-?. 

Kalais  and  Zetes,  I.  154, 

Kfdasirie^  and  Hermotvbil.  i.  69.3. 

^dS:;ai,eS;iS!^Sr?C^'7{if'  '■  '-  *^^  ^^^^^^^^^^  ^"^^^  armament  at,  Iii,  795; 
Kajclias  wanderings  and  death  of,  1.  208. 
Xi  ('  Akte,  foundation  of,  ii.  821, 
Kiliias,  treaty  of.  ii.  422. 
Kallias.  son  of  Kalliades,  il.  494. 

v->i  !r  ^l  f^vf  '^??^'y^^  '^t  Sparta,  B.C.  371,  ill.  803. 

Ka    lasof  (;halkis,  iv.  419,  .1.S2. 

{V^    !!'ius.  theLaceda?monian,  iii.  327,  600. 

Kalhkles,  iu  Plato,  iii.  419. 

jvalliki-atidas,  iii.  280,  841. 

^  I  aaiaclms.  the  poleinarch,  ii.  197, 

KaJhmis.  11.  45.  47. 

Kaiiijii.l.-y,  i.  G,-)r. 

Kaiiinpiis,  iv.  29].  ;>93. 

Ka!]ii-rhoe.  i.  51,  295. 

Ivailistlu-nos.  I  he  historian,  i.  351. 

Kiilu^u:::n::\!^n^^^  of.  iv.  121.454. 


Kal  1  j xeii us.  iii. >.»•.), '.-Jo.iV.jOi-,. 

TC-!  !•  V  ' '■'.'  '''V"  'J^'""i-'"d  Greeks  at,  iii.  573. 

K:i!.\-I onian  (,orir,  i.  ir.,  127. 

Kunuuiiiu.  i.  718;  ic^turatiou  of,  to  iiul..'pcndence.  ii.  363;  and  the  Athenians,  Iii.  60? 


810 


INDEX. 


INDEX. 


I 


I 


Athenian  and  Ryracns.in  envoys  at,  111.  79;  neutral  policy  of,  B.C.  415,  lit.  82;  evacua- 
tion of,  iv.  170;  aud  Tiniulcon,  iv.  ool. 

K;iinbys«'S,  i.  77:{,  ii.  125. 

Kiinduuk's,  i.  (>4.S. 

Kuuopie  branch  of  the  Nile,  opening  of,  to  Greek  traffic,  i.  GOO. 

Kapanmis,  1.  lytl,  1!)3. 

Kappadokia  subdued  by  Alexander,  iv.  585. 

Kardia,  Athenian  fleet  at,  iii.  I'yy;  alliance  of,  with  Pliilip,  iv.  480;  Eumeues  of,  iv.  56L 

Kanluchiaus,  and  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  iii.  5:37, 

Karia,  resLstance  of.  t<»  Dauriscs,  ii.  l(iS. 

KaruKinia,  Alexander's  bacchanalian  procession  through,  iv. 

Karu»'ian  festival,  ii.  27G. 

Karncius  Apt^llo,  i.  74. 

Kara  us,  i.  jsO. 

Karpathus,  i.  a)3. 

Karystus,  ii.  165,  4()3. 

Kassander,  Alexander's  treatment  of,  iv.  713;  schemes  of,  on  Antipater's  death,  iv. 
711;  and  I'oly.sperchon,  war  between,  iv.  7,:(i;  gets  pc>ssession  of  Athens,  iv.  727;  in 
Peloponnesus,  iv.  T-Hh  def«'at  of  Olynipias  by,  iv.  13o;  confederacy  of.  witli  Lvsinia- 
chus,  Ptolemy,  and  Scleukus  against  Antigouu.s,  iv.  7;;i,  7a;;,  740,  712;  founds  ijiassan- 


of  Denntrius  I'oliorkiies  in  (irecee  against,  iv.  74U;  truce  of,  with  Demetrius  Poli- 

orkctes,  iv.  7l:j;  deatli  of,  iv.  743. 
Kassandra,  i.  'AVt. 
Ka.stor  and  I'ollux.  i.  139. 
Katabothra.  i.  .7J6. 
Katana,  i.  717;  and  >Etna,  ii.  SKV,  Alklbiados  at,  iii.  «);  Nikias  at,  iii.  P2;  conquest  of,  by 

Dionysius,  iv.  lS;i;  Cartlmgian  naval  victory  near,  iv.  201;  Hikefcas  and  Maguu  at,  iv. 

;{i  1. 
Katonakophori,  i.  .'iSO. 
Katreus  and  Allhienienes,  1.  167. 
Kaulonia,  i.  72S,  iv.  2:22,  221;  Dikou  of,  iv.  231. 
Kaunus,  Antisthenes  at,  iii.  183. 
Kcba linns,  iv.  <>:'2,  fti.;. 
KeJcrops,  i.  15.i;  the  second,  i.  157. 
Kel.'eaie,  Alexander  at,  iv.  578. 
Keleos,  i.  Ci!,  156. 

Kentrites,  tlie  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  at  the,  iii.  540. 
K<>piiallonia,  i.  713,  ii.  5.!<>.  rM. 
Kephalus  and  Dionysius  at  Syracuse,  Iv.  319. 
Kephisodotus,  iv.  123,  121. 
Kerasus,  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  at,  iii.  559. 
Kersobleptes,  iv.  123;  and  Charidemus.  iv.  121;  intrigues  of,  against  Athens,  Iv.  .373; 

and  the  i)eace  and  alliance  between  Athens  and  I'hilip,  iv.  449;  defeat  of,  by  Philip, 

iv.  476. 
Kertch,  tumuli  near,  Iv.  801. 
Keto,  i.  5i. 

Keyx  and  Alcyone,  1.  122. 

Kili'iia,  Alexainler  in,  iv.  .587;  Darius  in,  iv.  5S9. 
Kinion  and  Theinistokles,  ii.  SS'J;  (.-apture  of  Skyros  by,  ii.  403;  victories  of,  at  the  Eu- 

rymedon,  ii.  iUl;  trial  and  ac-quittal  of.  ii.  4o7,  437:  and  the  Spartan  applicatiun  for 

aid  ai;aiJist  tiie  Helots,  ii.  410.  137;  recall  of,  friMu  ostracism,  ii.  417;  death  of,  ii.  421; 

political  party  of,  ii.  434;  and  Perikles,  ii.  418,  4o5,  439;  character  of,  ii.  435;  ostracism 

of,  ii.  4;i7. 
Kinionian  treaty,  the  so-called,  II.  422. 
Kiriadon,  con.^uiraey  and  character  of,  iii.  635. 
Kin-,',  the.  in  legendary  Greece,  i.  323,  329;  the.  In  historical  Greece,  I.  3:50;  English 

theory  of  a,  i.  5:36. 
Kiiij^'s,  i;.,'yntia!i,  1.  696. 
Kingship,  m.scontinuance  of,  in  Greece  generally,  i.  330,  Sai;  in  medlajval  and  modem 

Europe,  i.  5:U. 
Kiuyps  antl  Dorieus,  i.  769. 
Kiriiia,  i.  7S2,  iv.  489,  494. 
Kirriueans,  punishment  of,  I.  783. 
Ki-ssidas,  iv.  "vS. 

Klarius,  temple  of  Apollo  at,  i.  657. 
Khwonienie,  i.  C^X),  iii.  169,  175,  179. 
Kleander  of  Gela,  ii.  319. 
Klcander  the  LKicedicmoulau,  ill.  574,  576,  578,  585,  Iv.  635. 


841 


Sleaad rides,  ii.  42;S. 

vicarclius  the  Lacedaemonian,  at  the  Hellespont  iii  2P-  at  RvTonfi,,.,,  •••  o— 

vlear--lius  of  riie  Pontic  Herakleia,  iv.  788. 


JvI'^aTidridas,  il.  457 
Kleaad rides,  il.  42:-!. 
Kl( 

C 

Ti , 

Klear'-hus  of  ri'ie  Pontic  Herakleia,  iv 

Kle.iri  las,  ii.  751. 

Kl(  iiiias,  i.  5S4. 

Kleistheiics  of  Sikj'on,  i.  193,  ;355,  597. 

Kleisthenes  the  Athenian,  revolution  in  Attic  tribes  hv  i  nc^  twr.  „„*:.. 

call  of,  ii.  93;  developm(^nt  of  Athenian  enSiviafteJ'ii  S  oull^^^^'^I^^Jl^  ''^"''  '''^■ 

turion  of,  alter  the  Persian  war,  ii! 387       "*^^^^  ^^^*'  *^  ^^'  changes  in  the  cousti- 
Klei|)})ides,  ii.  5«4. 
Kleitarchus,  iv.  4S(),  482. 
Kleitu.s  the  Illyrian,  iv.  535. 
Kleitus.  Alexander's  general,  iv.  568,  641. 
Kleobulus  and  Xenares,  ii.  764. 
Kleokritus,  iii.  ;3iO. 
Kloonibrotus,  iii.  708,  785,  789,  809,  S14 

.h,.^m„,,ta„s.  11. 186,  m  ^>i^en,JL£!r^r^:s:i!^J^S,S!;i1[;,S\&,--^ 

Kleomenes  III.,  I.  469. 

Kh'omenes,  Alexander's  satrap,  iv.  656. 


Kl''on,  of  Halikarnassiis,  iii. 
Kleonfp,  and  Argos,  i.  420. 
Kleonike  an<l  Pansanias,  ii.  375. 
Kleonynius,  iv.  780. 

Kleopatra,  wife  of  Philip,  iv.  521,  526,  5^1. 
Keopatra,  daughter  of  Philip,  iv.  526,  700,  7^. 
Kleophon,  ni.  256,  318.  ' 

Kleopus,  i.  629. 

Kleruchies  Athenian,  revival  of,  e.g.  36.5,  iv.  77 
mirii'.'srT:  '''"'''"•  '"^  C^»a^^i«.  "•  9C;  in  Lesbos,  ii.  m 

Klonas,  musical  improvements  of,  ii.  45. 
Jvlorho,  1.  nl. 
Klymene,  i.  50. 
Klytemnestra,  i.  ia5. 
Knemus,  ii.  5(15,  570,  575. 

Knidus,  settlement  of,  i.  303;  maritime  conte«?ts  neir  nr  410  ,•;;  101. 

Knights  of  Athens,  iii.  379.  " 
Knopus.  i.  629. 
Kodrias,  I.  no. 

KenSl;.lS:^^"^^"^^^^''i-556. 

Ka'os,  i.  49,  50. 

K.eratadas,  iii.  263,  581,  584. 
Ivors,  lU  ir,;;,  ifs6,  m. 
Kokalus,  i.  ltj9. 

Kolokreu{!f  iH?^*"  ^"^  Tartessus,  I.  675. 

Kl)lehis'i)i] 'ili^?,'^^"  Thousand  Greeks,  iii.549.  .558. 
KolLphAn,  i'Mar?  ^^'•^''^"""t.c  expedition,  i.  173,  179. 
KoTslpodcs,  i.  550. 


after  the  battle  of  iEgospota- 


Antisthenesand 
reverses  of  Sparta 


ii»  oi.wiin  f.piiu.s,  I.  (40:    and  Corinth,  jouit  setMements  of  l. 


842 


INDEX. 


741;  coinmerce  of,  i.  743;  and  Corinth,  disputes  botwoen,  il.  491;  application  of  tho 
Epidaniiilan  d<>nKK'rary  to,  11.  4S1;  and  Corinth,  hostilities  iK'tween,  il.  484,  4tSS;  and 
Coiintli,  decision  of  the  Athenians  between,  li.  4.HJS;  ollKarehlcal  violence  at,  ii.  (ill; 
veu^cance  of  the  victorious  Demos  at,  B.C.  427,  ii.  iW'y,  Nikostratus  and  Allcidas  at,  ii. 
613;  revolutions  at,  contrasted  witli  tho.se  at  Atlieiis,  ii.  6111;  distress  at,  B.C.  4:;'),  ii. 
(>;>;>:  expedition  of  Euryniedon  and  Sophokles  to,  ii.  C<)(i;  and  muster  of  the  Athenian 
armament  at,  ill.  52;  Demostlx-nes's  vojage  from,  to  Sicllj',  iii.  127;  renewed  tr<»uble.s 
at,  iii.  2r)?>;  Laceda*monian  expedition  against,  iii.  792;  expedition  of  Ipbikrates  to, 
iv.  7r)5;  Kleonymus  and  Agathokles  in,  iv.  780. 

Korkyritau  envoys,  speech  of,  to  the  Athenian  assembly,  ii.  48.'>;  captives  return  homo 
from  Corinth,  ii.  (509;  oligarchical  fugitives  at  Istone,  ii.  617,  iM. 

Korkyneaus  and  Xerxes's  invasion,  li.  270;  attack  Epidamnus,  ii.  4S2;  remonstrate 
with  tlie  Corinthians  and  Peloponnesians.  ii.  483;  seek  the  alliance  of  Athens,  ii.  4S4. 

Korobius  and  the  foundation  of  Kyrene,  i.  7(55. 

Koroneia,  Athenian  defeat  at,  ii.  076;  Theban  victory  at,  iv.  427,  678. 

Koronis  and  Asklepius,  i.  145. 

Korynephori,  i.  55tJ. 

Kos,  settlement  of,  L  303;  capture  of,  by  Astyochus,  ilL  183;  revolt  of,  from  Athens,  iv. 
352,  ;i57. 

Kossjel,  Iv.  660. 

Kottos,  1.  4*). 

Kot typhus,  iv.  494,  497. 

Kotyora,  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  at.  111.  559. 

Kotvs  and  Iphlkrates,  iii.  774.  iv.  78, 119,  122;  and  Athens,  iv.  77,  121,  123;  and  Timo- 
theus,  iv.  79.  119, 121;  and  Miltokythes,  iv.  122;  capture  of  Sestus  by,  iv.  122;  assassina- 
tion of,  iv.  1S3. 

Kranaus,  i.  157. 

Krannon,  battle  of,  iv.  702. 

Kraterus  and  Philotas,  iv.  033;  and  Antipater,  iv.  701,  712;  death  of,  iv.  712. 

K rates,  comedy  of,  iii.  :^I0. 

Kratesippidas,  iii.  259,  266. 

Kratinus.  iii.  '.tHO. 

Kreon,  king  of  Thebes,  i.  113, 102. 

Kreon,  archon  at  Athens,  i.  557. 

Krosphontes,  I.  286,  459. 

Kretan  settlements  on  the  Gulf  of  Tarentum,  i.  168;  and  Phrygian  worship,  i.  046. 

Kretans  and  Minos,  i.  168;  in  the  time  of  Homer,  i.  :it1;  and  Xcixes,  ii.  270. 

Krete,  migrations  of  Dorians  to,  I.  302;  early  Dorians  in,  L  448;  Pliukekusln,  iv.  463. 

Kretheis  and  Poleus,  1.  112. 

Kretheus,  descendants  of,  L  111. 

Kreusa,  i.  151,  157. 

Krlmesus,  Titnoleon's  victory  over  the  Carthaginians  at  the,  Iv.  323. 

Krios,  i.  49,  50. 

Krissa,  1.  782. 

Kritias  and  Sokrates,  11.216;  return  of,  to  Athens,  Iii.  321;  and  Theramenes,  iii  327  seq., 
3.J2  seq.;  death  of,  Hi.  345. 

Krius,  ii.  18<j,  188. 

Krommyon,  capture  of,  Iii.  689;  recovery  of,  iii.  697. 

Kromniis,  capture  of  Lacedauuonians  at,  iv.  87. 

Kroiiium,  Dlonyslus  at,  iv.  238. 

Kronos,  i.  49,  51. 

Kro 


Krypteia,  1.  4S3. 

Kteatos  and  Eurytos,  1.  124. 

Ktesias  and  Herodotus  on  Cyrus,  11.  105;  on  Darius,  ii.  151. 

Ktesiphon,  iv.  tK2. 

Kunaxa,  battle  of,  lil.  507. 

Kuretes,  ceremonies  of,  I.  62 

Kyaxares,  i.  65:3,  662. 

Kydouia,  ii.  570. 

Kyknus,  1.  2(X». 

Kvlon  the  Athenian,  attempted  usurpation  of,  I.  57-i. 

Kvlon  of  Kroton,  ii.  2:31. 

Kyllyrii  at  Syr.icuse,  11.  346. 

Kynioeans  arid  Pactyas,  il.  114. 

Kyme.  i.  (»);  Alki blades  at,  ill.  275. 

Kynegeirus,  ii.  202. 

Kvnossema.  battle  of,  iii.  248. 

Kvnuiians,  1.  443;  in  Arfeolis,  i.  522. 

Kypselus,  1.  551;  fall  of  the  dynasty  of,  i.  553. 


INDEX. 


843 


K.yrnie,  foundation  of.  i.76i;  situation,  fertility,  and  prosperity  of.  l.  766-  and  iho 

k.vtiiera,  capture  of,  l)y  the  Atlieiilans.'ii.  670. 
II.vthiiuiH,  occup;Uion  of,  bv  Pliilip,  -v.  499 

"^^Sm.^";^!  bl^ui^  iS^Isi: ''-  '*^""" "''  '••""^  ^"^^"^'  "^- '''''  ''^^'^  ^''  ^y  M'»<i- 

Labdaluni.  iii.  92,  105. 

LaoevUcnionian  envo;v^s  to  Persia,  B.C.  430.  Ii.  .558;  embassv  to  Athens  about  tJie  orison 
.■r.s  1.1  S:,hakteria,u.6oS;  re  ent^^.rceineut  to  liinsidas  in  Ch;dkl(like  i  .724-  e  m.vs   "t 
('  congress  at  Corinth,  b.c.  421.  ii.  75S;  envoys  at  Athens,  about  P  u,  .kt  in  a    i  Pv- 
liis,  li.  ,br,  embassy  to  Athens,  against  the  alliance  of  Alliens  with  \iiu^        \yi 
M'(|.;  ariny  11  79.^  assonibly.  speech  of  Alklbiides  in.  iii.  8.?;  lleet  u  i   or  A-,"::,.  „.  H 

inh;'3!/;r-''>^^;.o^^^^'  "^^^^""yy  ^^■'  "^'«»"  ^•'•'^t'*^.  ^^^-  -^^^-^  ni<.m,  destV-icVio  not-  a    l.v 

IphKiatis,  ill.  694;  auxiliaries  to  the  I'hokians  at  TliernioDvii^  iii  4(;)  '     ^ 

I/M'e,liL,nomans  and  Cyrus  the  Great,  i!.ll;5;  attack  of,  up  on  Poivkrpti-s  ii  r?7-  and 

r  hemistokles  il   389,  890;  and  Manlonius's  offer  of  peacL  t.,  the  Ath  nians  ii'^i.? 

:!,  .''''^' ^''^:  •'"*  ?l  t'i^'V  'i»i?.s against  the  Helots,  ii.  41U;  dismiss  tiu'iVA  1  enianauxi  I 

ar  rs  ag'Mnst  the  Helots,  li.  411;  expedition  of.  into  Bneotia,  B.c.4:\S.  ii   4uf  v  cto.-y 

f.  at  ranagra,  11. 417;  proceedings  of,  on  I'hormio's  victory  .  ver  the  P  do  x  n-  esi  n 

Ilea  ne;;r  Rhiuin,  ii.  5:0;  proceedings  of.  for  the  recovery  of  Pylus.  ii  oV^   occumt  i  m 

of  ^Pii.ikteria  by.  ii    643;   blockade  .)f.  In  Sphakteria.  il.  615,  6.51  fei;  off^;4  of ^pe^^^^^^^^^^ 

•om.  after  the  captiire^of  Sphakteria,  ii.  668;  assassination  of  Helots  bvii  ItKkI 

e  peace  of  Nikias.  il,  749,  liberate  the  Arcadian  subjects  of  Ma    tim  ia  and  I'd  /,, t 

IK' Ots  at  Lepreum.  ii.  762;  exclusion  of,  from  the  Olvmoic  festlva      i  781  sV  Vie 

l^^]?"^^  f^f^^^'f''^?  Epidaurus  B.C..419,  ii.  788;  their  kllioi^h;vasi<;^J  .^^^^^ 

kV. '  • 'r\^-'*l^^'i5  ^' '^^  *^9  ^^^''■^^^'"S'^  '>y.  iii-«^;  fortification  of  Drkelela  bv  iii  118 
1D>.;  and  the  F(nir  Hundred,  iii.  •?2l;  recapture  of  Pylusby.  iii.  2ri»;  defeat  of  at  Vrd 
^  ^^'«J..^^!|,.^,'J,reP^^V.n_eut  of.  by  tlie  Athenians,  aft^-r  the  restorfaion  of  de'noclw 

i'""i  i'^^"^S  r^'^l^''''^'V'l^"^>'^^'•'^'^^      demanded  by,  iii.  381;  the  Cyn^ini  s  uu^ 
B  <•"•  V,V  5m  V^    \  .•^;   '  ■'=  *\""'^  Por-.eus.  ii  .  676.  (UJ;  and  Corinthian.s,  conflicts  between 
?iiVu  c  "nV^^b  r.^ '^^^^^^  tiie  Long  Walls  of  Corinth,  iii.  ,W.8:  andthoOIy   -' 

m  H    ^21.    i      '^9 't '"•  '^•''  ^r-i^'"**^ '>f  the  Kadnieia  at  Thebes  by,  iii.  719  sen  •  trial 

IjMr.je.-iis,  i.  51, 

Laronia.genenlogy  of,  i.  i;3*^;  population  of,  i.  476;  gr.adual  cononost  of    i    "rtl-  invi 
si.ms  of,  by  Epamlnondas,  iii.  m,  Iv.  96;  western^lbstr4Sof•  fi?'n-Spana?i^^ 

tt  and  <E,Hp,f::'i:^s:'*  ^*'  "• ''-  ^'"'"'■y  ^^ '''''  ^^^«*^"  «^^^  «'■  i--  ^- 

Lak-cs  and  marshes  of  Greece,  I.  396. 
pun;iehus.  ii.  8:i4,  iii.  58.  95. 
Lanua.  Antipater  at,  iv.  698. 
K;inii:Hi  war,  iv.  I'm,  710. 

L;:u:i^s!:':^s;^iSJ^t.^};  rs^'^'  «^'  "^^  strombichides.  m.  241, 

L^'.iiike,  iv.  610. 

La  )':oon,  I.  2(15. 

Lao:'ied>n,  I.  78,  196. 

LaiMy.s:'  )s.  Zcm.s,  .i  117, 

b:iIV'.V-tias  and  Timoleon,  Iv.  334 

i^.:i'i>..:j,  Asi;!(ic,  i.  (i;2. 

L  ;.>:i,  ii.ie  of.  by  Xerxes,  ii.  217,  251. 

Li-;thenes and  Euthykrates,  iv.  125 

I  ;iii!',^,^'*^"'  '^"'^  ^'^'^^'^  languages,  i.  711. 

I  :  ;  ;  r;/^."'*^7'"*'V'"^^''P'''*^f^'  relationsidpof,  1.  710 

L    aim,  plunder  of,  i>y  Dionysius,  iv.  229. 

{^.'Uona  and  Zeu.s,  otf.spring  of,  i.  53. 

L;uiriuni.  mines  of,  ii.  2(^3 

't^d  psnSi' diitine^  ^  1^''  *'*"  ^"'""'  ^-  ^''^  ^^<i-  ^^^  Zaleukus,  i.  7^7; 

111.  *'-'^'"'*'"^'  distinction  between,  n.  14 1,-  enactment  and  repeal  of, 


■111. 
I-avard's  Nineveh  and  its  remains,  I.  687 
Lebc>(h,s,  revolt  of,  from  .Vthens.  iii.  172.' 


at  Athens,  ii. 


844 


i:ndkx. 


T  ...onH  of  1).  motor  1  TO-  of  tho  Dolplilun  orr.t-le.  i.  73;  of  lo,  i  05;  of  Ilorsiklcs.  i.  100, 
^n!;;  of  ?ni  .r  wui;  of  ?he  Minyio'f  rom  Le.uuos.  i.  m;  and  history,  Urociau,  blank 

lS^^P^  ^^'-^-\f%:^l!-  r^^?^^  ?K;hI?'Siti;f  afterward 

allo-'orizori/heroic  historieiztd,  i.  255;  of  suiuts,  i.  2.8;  of  Asia  Mmor.  i.  fcoU. 
I>i  kythiis,  capture  of,  by  Brusiclas,  ii.   'J8. 
I^lcVfs,  i.  4-Jl. 

KiS;.s  ami  the  Argonauts,  i.  \T2;  early  condition  of,  i.  763;  conquest  of.  by  Otanes. 

ii.  157;  3Iiltla<les  at,  ii.  157. 
lA'iulins;  )i(;U.sfs,  i.  614. 
Loolcratis,  iv.  510. 
Leon  and  Dioniedon,  iii.  lio,  M-i. 
Leon  the  Spartan,  iii  liW  241. 
Leon,  nii'Jsion  of,  to  I'crsia,  iv.  W,  6^ 
L<»oHi(his  at  Theruiopylse,  ii.*275,  27'J  seq. 

LeollllaS  (^li^iS^V  of.  Hi.  74<>;  at  Sparta,  lil.  751;  Tftebes  under,  Iii.  760,  762;  con- 

LSn[  f  ^iVf'inU^sS;.^  mS-n^/m  aU  ii.  S30;  Den.os  at,  apply  to  Athens,  il.  831, 
s'.'V.  MniVsiVis  at,  B.C.  :»6.  iv.  16.-.,  182.  2*)0:  the  mercenaries  «)f  Diony.'^ius  at  iv  215, 
FhilLstus  aJ!  fv.  273;  Dion'at,  iv.  'hs.  '^79;  Hiketas  at,  iv.  315,  321;  surrender  of,  to  fi- 
r.)olei)n,  iv.  328. 

I^osthenes  the  admiral.  Iv.  120. 

ii:SehS{l^pSl^lJ^i''Sl;  chosen  king  of  Sparta,  ii.  1S7;  and  iEginetan  host- 

aKi's,  ii.  18H,  25'.>;  at  Mykale.  ii.  :ilO;  bauLshment  of,  ii.  3m. 
Ijfcotyehides,  son  of  Ayls  XL.  iii.  <w2,  63;{. 


l:^S;inm  l^d  EllsV^^iir-io^rB^^sWean  HHiots  at  ii.  762. 

Lejilines,  brother  of  Dlonysin.s,  iv.  I'jS,  2o2,  2U2,  Zoi;  vo6. 

Lepun*'«  the  Athenian,  iv  3?y.  ^ 

I.cptiiies,  general  of  Agathokles,  Iv.  n[,  «.5. 

Lesbians,  their  application  to  Sparta,  li.  491.  ».K„»,a  h   irn.  Athpninn  klernchs 

Lesb«^>^  early  history  of.  i.  6:'^^;  autonomous  ally  of  Athens,  il.  155;  Athenian  Kerucns 

V«   ii'n'v  an   lieition  from  t'.  Agis,  iii.  IW;  expedition  of  the  Chians  against,  di. 

a   ThrasyFlS ai!  i^^^^  245TKallikraf  Idas  in,  in.  Is2;  Thrasybulu.s  in,  iii.  705;  Memnon 

in,  iv.  .-kS2;  recovery  of,  by  Macedonian  admirals,  iv.  WM. 
Let  tie,  1.  51. 
LetO.  i.  50,  53. 
Leuka.s,  1.741. 
L<>ukon  of  Bosporus,  iv.  .OS. 

Lcuklra'u;^  >:a{S^'[;f?i;L  W^!  m-atment  of  Spartans  defeated  at.  ill.  820;  extension 
of  Thel4  1  n  Vver  after  the  battl.«  oi*-,  iii.  8:]1;  procc-edings  in  I'e Opoinicsus  :.fter  the 
battle  f  iiV  si  iv.  45;  position  of  Sparta  aftJ-r  the  battle  of,  iii.  82:.;  proe..<dings  n 
Arcadia  :dVc^rt^^ei)attle  of,  iii.  b'^. 'proceedings  and  views  ol  Kpammondas  alter 

Ll*!i^*'Svoyag^^^^^^^^  Greeks  to.  1.  764;  nomads  of.  i.  767;  expedition  of  Kambyses 

Liby?«'ns  ami  Cil-eeks  at  ICyrene,  1.  7611;  and  Dionysius,  iv.  212. 

LiKSuS'&nl^H Vii  Orestes.  1.  519;  ii.  170;  mission  of,  to  Miletus,  iii.  183.  185,  243. 

Lilyba-um,  defeat  of  Dionysius  near,  iv.  210. 

Liiiios,  i.  51. 

Lion,  the  Nemean,  i.  51. 

■  iJ^;'\i^^'.don  as'ti'^hiTciiancesuf  Alexander,  if  he  had  attacked  the  Romans, 
iv.  C.r.T. 

Loans  on  interest,  i.  586,  614. 

L'icalilies,  ('iJcal,  i.  HI'. 

Loehages,  Spiirt.m,  1.  5'2fi.  .      „, 

Lochus.  Spartan,  i.  525;  Mneedonlan,  Iv.  5M. 

Lcuoiraphi'is  and  ancient  my thes,  i.  2;;6.  210.  ,      ,oq  .>n  ooa   '»o«.  i-Hr.nv. 

L)>kri,  Epiz.phviii;n,  early  history  of,  i.  782;  and  Dionysius,  Iv.  188,  m,  226,  228,  Diony- 
sius the  y<;iin'ger  at,  iv. -.i"?,  207.  , 

lA)krian  coa.st  oi.poslte  Ktdi<»a.  Atlienmn  rav;ige  «.f,  d.  .>.n.  ,  ,       i,  .y-.  .,„a  vhn. 

I^>krians.  i.  l:n:;  C>/...li:ni.  I.  1:.7;  Itidian.  i.  TX,;  of  Opus  and  Leouldiis,  ii.  27o;  and  Iho- 
kiiins,  iv.  :;t.O,  :;;o;  ol  .\inpliissa,  iv.  lyo. 

Liikris  and  Alliens,  ii.  418,  427. 


INDEX. 


845 


Long  Walls  at  Megara,  ii.  113;  at  Athens,  ii.  415,  417,  419,  401,  iii.  320,  631:  at  Corinth  iiL 

6S8. 
Lucanians,  iv.  2ir.,  200. 
Lydia,  early  history  of,  i.  648. 

Lydian  musi(i  and  instruments,  i.  614,  618;  monarchy,  1.  668,  ii.  109.  , 

Lydians,  i.  615,  618,  ii.  113. 
Lykious,  Zeus,  i.  142. 
Lykaiubes  and  Archilochns.  11.  46. 
Lykaon  and  liis  fifty  sons,  i.  142. 
Lylcia,  coiKpU'st  of,  by  -Vlexaudcr,  Iv.  577. 
Lykidas,  tlie  Atlienian  .senator,  ii.  319. 
Lykomede.s,  iv.  .54,  (JH,  72. 
Lylcophron.  son  of  Periander,  i.  5.5.'?. 
Lykophron,  despot  of  Plieri»,  iv.  374.  301,  .393. 
Lykurgus,  tlie  Spartan,  laws  and  discipline  of.  i.  463,  596. 
Lykurgus  the  Atlienian,  iv.  677,  73S. 
Lykus,  i.  157;  and  Dirke.  i.  186. 
I,ynkeus  and  Idas,  i.  140. 
Lyre,  Hermes,  the  Inventor  of,  I.  79. 
Lyric  poetry,  Greek,  i.  358,  ii.  43,  53. 


troduetion  of  gold  and  silver  to  Sparta  by,  iii.  625;  intri'?U(^s  of.  to 
king,  iii.  6;ao,  668;  and  Agesilaus,  ill.  632,640,  642;  and  the  Boeotian  war, 


of,  iii 


Lysikles,  ii.  589. 

Lysikies,  general  of  Chseroneia,  iv.  .509. 


make  iiimself 
iii.  661;  death 


Phormlsius'3 

oration  of, 

rical  oration 


Antl- 

with 

and 


dor's  (U  litli,  iv.  GlHi;  Kassander  in,  iv.  \d);  Demetrius  Poliorketes  acquires  the  crown 
of,  IV.  .14. 

Wnce.loniau  dynasty,  i.  757;  envoys  at  Atliens,  iv.  417,  4.50,  452;  phalanx,  i v.  r.(«    554, 
663;  mterv(>ntions  in  Greece,  k.c.  3:)6-;i-55,  iv.  5:50;  pike,  Iv.  552,  570;  troops,  iv.  555;  offi- 
ce rs  of  Alexander's  army  in  Asia,  iv.  561;  lleet,  master  of  the  ^gean,  iv.  601;  soldiers 
Ol  Alexander,  mutiny  of,  iv.      seep 
M.;iced()uians,  i.  403,753;   conquered  by  Megabazus,  ii.  157;  poverty  and  rudeness  of, 
IV.  :ibi.;  military  aptitude  of,  iv.  557;  small  loss  of.  at  the  battle  of  the  Granikus. 

iv.  Jrj. 
M.ulia.m  and  Podalelrius,  i.  146. 
M;eandi-iai^i.  139. 
?lieoniiinsM<i  Lydians,  i.  61b. 

Magians,  ma.s.sacre  of,  after  the  ass.'i.ssi.iation  of  Smerdis,  il.  120. 
]>l;iKisirates  of  early  Athens,  ii.  4:50;  Athenian,   from  the  time  of  IVrikles,  iL  431, 

'»u3,  43S. 
51.ij,'na  Gra^eia.  i.  736. 

l^ingnesia,  i.  625,  632;  XriAcs's  d< ft  iie.u-,  ii.  279. 
.'Magiietes,  TlH'ssalian  and  A.siatie,  i.  4:52. 
Magon,  off  liatana,  iv.  201;  near  Abaka^ia.  iv.  217;  at  Agyrium,   Iv.  218;   death  of. 


Magon  and  Hiketns,  iv.  311;  death  of,  iv.  321. 
Maia  and  Zeus,  offspring  of,  i.  53. 


846 


l^'DEX. 


M;ik rones  jiiid  the  Ten  Thousand.  111.  548. 

^I'liiins,  i.  4.*J. 

M.iiii,  iv.  r..-,:;. 

Miilhis,  Aloxaiidor  at,  iv.  Wt. 

IklnnuTkuft  and  Timolmn.  Iv.  n27. 

Slantineia  and  Ttp-a.  i.  MT,  ii.  72^  7n7,  7^8;  nnd  Spartn.  i.  :«r,  il.  s..i>.  w-j,  ,U  73;.;  .-nd  Ar- 
cos  ii  762-  eonprrss  at.  il.  ^H',;  l.attU'of,  B.r.  4is.  ii.  VX^;  cxiH-ditionof  Ajitfiipolis  to,  nL 
7:lv'ro-tstaMislinu'nt  of.  iii.  Til;  niareli  of  Ajre.siians  aKainst,  iii.  s:U;  niustor  of  P«lo- 
i.onnf«ian  tneniifs  to  TIrIks  at.  iv.  '.»:.;  atKiuptcd  suipiis.'  of,  |).v  the  eavalrv  of 
Ep.miinoiidas,  iv.  %;  battle  of,  B.c.  CG2,  iv.l)9,  108;  peaee  coneliided  after  tlte  batlie 
of  iv  l'»"S 

JI;  I'tinViaiis  and  the  Pan-Arcadian  union,  iv.  91;  opposition  of,  to  Theban  intei-\en- 

tion,  Iv.  i);^. 
?Tantinieo-Tefreatic  plain,  iv.  101. 
J.l;iiititheus  and  Aphepsion,  iii.  64. 
Jlinto,  i.  fi-^S.  _      ^ 

Jlarakanda,  Alexander  at,  iv.  638,  o40. 
Maiathon.balth'of,  ii.  201. 
K:ii-athus  sjiiK  iM««»rs  to  Alexander,  iv.  59«. 
Iklardiand  Airxander.  iv.  «;24,  <i:T().  ,      ,     „ 

Jl.irdonins,  in  b.nia.  il.  179;  in  Thrace  and  Macedonia,  H 

Mount  Athos,  ii.  17!t;  nrces  Xerxes  to  invade  Grreee,  11 


after  the  battle  of  Salands,  ii.  -.iW;  forces  left  with,  in  Thessal.v.  ii.  •>! 
Inc  Greeks,  after  Xi-rxe.s's  retreat,  ii.  :Jir.;  in  Po-otia,  ii,  ;:ir..  .■r2(>-  -"^^ 
Athens  by.  il.  oir>,  oliS;  at  Athens,  ii.  3ii<;  and  his  I'hokiau  contin 
Asopus,  il.  ^25:  at  P1ata*a.  ii.  :r26 


7?i1;  floet  of,  destroyed  near 

2:'-'^,  240;  adviec  of.  to  Xerxes 

and   JMedis- 

nf  peaee  to 

ri-r.  ..,1 


.■!2i>;  offers 
ent,  ii.  ^^i 


un  the 


Jlarine,  nulilary.  unfavorable  to  oligarchy,  1.  5-17. 

Siaritinie  and  inland  cities  contrastetl,  i. 

Marpessa  and  Idas,  i.  140.  ^v.    c       *  ■    too 

Jlarriage  in  hr^endary  Greece,  i.  SU;  among  the  Spartans,  i  488. 

Marshes  an«l  lakes  of  Greece,  i.  8%.  , 

Masistius,  ii.  o23 

Maskanies,  ii.  o?^7. 

Massiigeta^,  i.  r..*S. 

Massalia,  i.  ♦i7f.,  707,  737,  iv.  (83. 

Maziu.s  Vt'mapsakii!^^  SV,  aV  tVe  battle  of  Arbela,  iv.  617:  surrender  of  Babylon 
by.  iv.  <»!;  appointed  .satrap  of  13abylou  by  Alexander,  iv.  620. 

Maz.-ires,  ii.  409  seq. 

Medea  and  the  Argonauts,  i.  1.3. 

Medes,  early  history  of,  i.  ♦ol. 

M»-dia,  Darius  a  fugitive  in,  iv.  624,  626. 

Medius,  iv.  (".65. 

Med  us,  i.  176. 

Medusa,  i.  51,  98. 

Mcgabates,  il.  161. 

M'.'gabazus,  il.  156, 157. 

Megabyzus,  ii.  420. 

Megakles,  i.  573.  ,     ,  ,       .      „..^ 

Mesalcpolis.  capture  of,  by  Aprathokles,  Iv.  <60.  ,  .r     t^       .        ..  pa 

Megalopolis,  foundation  of,  i.  "ils,  iii.  S39  seq.;  the  eent^^r  of  the  Pan- Arcadian  confed- 
eracy. 111.  S!3;  disputes  at,  iv.  113;  and  Sparta,  iv.  3:19,  'MO,  375,  339,  39a. 

Megapenthes  and  Perseus,  1.  91>.  .     ^         ,   „,„  ,  *   »    e-r    ^ 

Meuara    earlv  historv  of.  i.  530,  .'5.54;  Corinth  and  Silkyon,  analogy  of.  i.  5:)5;  and 

'  Athoiis,  i.  577,  ii.  412.*427.  4!»5,  671,  Long  Walls  at,  11.  113;  Brasidas  at,  ii.  6ii;  revolution 
at,  ii.  6'?9;  Philippizing  fiictiou  at,  iv.  479, 

Megara  in  Sicily,  i.  54[);  ii.  :;50. 

MeL'arian  Si<Ml.y,  i.  717.  _^  ,.,,,.  x,        i.  o.^  i-  ♦.. 

Meg.irians  under  Pausania-s,  and  Persian  eavalrj' under  Masistiu.s,  il.  323;  repudiatt 
the  peace  of  Nikias,  ii.  749,  750;  refuse  to  join  Argos,  ii.  759;  recover^of  Msa-a  by 

Mcgari!,  Athenian  ravage  of,  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  ii.  ool. 

Meidias  of  Ske])sis.  iv.  614. 

Meiljas  the  Athenian, i  v.  t2tl. 

Mcilanion  and  Atalanta,  i.  128. 

Melaini)us.  i.  (>;'.,  l(i<).  245.  ii.  2S3. 

Meiftnippus  and  Tydeus,  i.  191,  193 

Melanthus.  i.2'.»9. 

Meleavjer.  legend  of,  i.  125. 

Mei<-agi-ides.  i.  126. 

Mtlcsippus,  ii.  525. 


INDEX. 


847 


Melian  nymph.s,  i.  49. 

MHissUs,  ii.  ir,;);  iii.  397,  399. 
Melkartli,  tempje  of,  L  670. 

Melo's?settleineiit'of,  i.  302;  expedition  against,  under  Nikias,  ii.  G27;  capture  of,  ii. 

815;  Antisthenes  at,  iii.  18;3. 
Meninon,  son  ot  Titiionus,  i.  203,  ,  ,       ,•       • 

Menmon  the  Uhcnlian,  operations  of.  between  Alexander's  accession  and  landing  m 

\sia  iv  547,563;  and  Mentor,  iv.  .562;  advice  of,  on  Alexander's  landing  in  Asia,  iv. 

5(;i-  made  commander-in-cldef  of  the  Persians,  iv.  .573;  at  Halikarnassus,  iv.  577;  his 

l)rogre.ss  with  tlie  Persian  fleet,  and  death,  iv.  582;  change  iu  the  plan  of  Xbu-iiw 

aftei-  his  death,  iv.  583. 
M'  .nplds,  Alexander  at  iv.  696. 
Jlen,  races  of,  in  *'  Works  and  Days,"  i.  83. 
Meiide  and  Athens,  ii.  716. 
IMenedreus  and  tlie  Anibrakiots,  ii.  (w4. 
Meiiekleiilas  and  Epamiuoudas,  iv.  60,  80. 
Menwkl«>s,  iii.  30J. 
Jlenelaus,  i .  i;>5. 
Menestl.eus,  1.  2m,  298. 
JleiKTekeUS,  i.  191. 
Moncetius,  i.  50,  51. 
Meiion  the  Thessalian,  iii.  .501,  523. 
Menon  the  Athenian,  1  v.  122. 

Mentor  the  Rhodian,  iv. '74, 562.  „        ^,      .,,  ,  .  t 

:\leicenary  soldiers,  multiplication  of,  in  Greece  after  the  Peloponnesian  war,  Iv. 

;;si. 
Mernmads,  Lydlan  dynasty  of.  i.  649.  . 

Meroe,  eonneetiou  of,  witli  Egyjitian  institutions,  1.691. 
:>I(>s.supians,  I  7;>];  and  Tarentlnes,  iv.  747. 


.'l(>S.SUpKins,  I.  (.>>;  aiui    liuemine.-^,  iv.  «■*(.  „   ,       „  .  -,         i--    non   t       -n  i 

Messene,  fouTKiarion  of,  1.  507,  718;  foundation  of,  by  Epammondas,  hx.  &39,  iv.  ;)6;  and 

__Sparra,iv.  e5..ins,375,3«-..       .       _  ^ ,  o,..  ^^^^es  at,  il.  828;  Athenian 

and  Diouysius,  iv.  187  seq. 


M-v'sene,  in  Sicily,  re-colonization  of,  by  Anaxilaus,  ii.  349;  Laches  at,  ii.  828;  Athenian 

fleet  near.  ii.  82S  ;  AUciblades  at,  iii.  60;  Nikias  at,  iii.  76;  ai 

215;  Iniiikon  at,  iv.  ISS;  and  Timoleoii,  iv.  313. 
Mes.seiiia,  Dorian  settlements  in,  i.  2S9, 419.  ^    .  ^,         .  «^o  * 

Mi^ssenian  genealogy,  i.  141;  wars,  i.  .506-516;  victor  proclaimed  at  Olympia.  B.C.  o68,  iv. 

Messenians  and  Spartans,  earlv  proceedings  of.  i.  4«);  expelled  by  Sparta,  iii.  624,  iv. 

215;  plan  of  Ei)aininonaas  for  tlie  restoration  of,  iii.  8:3;^. 
?.lesseniaiis  in  Sicily,  defeated  by  Naxiaus  and  Sikels,  ii.  828. 
3ietaiieira,  i.  66. 
M.tapoutium,  i.  730. 
Methana,  Ath(>uian  garrison  at,  il.  666. 
Methone,  i.  7tiO;  Philip  at,  iv.  373. 

Methonc  in  Peloponnesus.  Athenian  assault  upon,  ii.  530. 
Methvmna,  ii.  5S2,  585;  Kallikratidas  at,  iii.  282. 
Metlcs,  and  the  Thirty  at  Athens,  iii.  331. 
M'tis  and  Zeus  daughter  of,  i.  52. 
]\letrodorus,  i.  251. 
Midas,  i.  643,  647. 


Middle  ages,  monarchy  in,  i.  534. 
Mikythus,  ii.  a59,  .XI. 


Milesian  colonie's  in  the  Troad,  1.  420. 

Milesian.s  and  Liclias,  iii.  243;  and  Kallikratidas,  iii.  2S1. 


ii.  467;  revolt  of,  from  Athens,  iii.  170,  176;  Tissaphernes  at,  iii.  172,  185;  Lichas  at,  lii. 

185;  Peloponnesian  fleet  at,  iii.  202,  241,  243,  245;  revolution  at,  by  the  partisans  of 

liV.saiider,  iii.  JM);  capture  of,  by  Alexander,  iv.  573. 
Military  array  of  legendary  and  historical  Greece,  i.  344;  divisions  not  distinct  from 

civil  in  any  Grecian  cities  but  Sparta,  i.  526;  force  of  early  oligarchies,  i.  54b;  order, 

Egyptian,  "i.  692;  arrangements,  ii.  621;  Kleisth(,^nean,  ii.  75. 
Miltrjs,  iv.2r)7. 

Miltiades  the  First,  ii.  66.  ,  .       ., 

Miltiudes  i!ie  Second,  ii.  67;  and  the  bridge  over  the  Danube,  u.  1)5;  his  retirement 


Miltokytties,  iv.  121,  124 


S48 


INDEX. 


f* 


INDEX. 


Miltnn  on  tho  onrly  sorlog  of  British  klnt^a,  1.  282;  hia  troatmont  of  British  fabulons 

history,  i.  JS;?. 
Mim)i«'rnuis,  ii.  47. 


Mineral  produt-tions  of  (ireeco,  i.  459. 

Kinoa,  capture  of,  by  Nlkias,  IL  Gil, 

SJi'ius,  i.  lo4. 

Minotaur,  the.  i.  165. 

Miuyae,  1.  Iti,  aol. 

Miiiyas,  1.  US. 

Mistake  of  ascribing  to  an  unrecordlng  age  the  historical  sense  of  modern  times,  I. 

Mitford,  his  view  of  the  antl-monarchial  sentiment  of  Greece,  1.  536. 
Mithrifiates  the  Persian,  iii.  5;]^. 
Mithridates  of  Pontus,  iv.  768. 
Jlithrines,  iv.  571,  64U. 

Olympla,  IL  585:  prisoners 


Mitylensean  envoys,  speech  of,  to  the  Peloponncslans  at 

•,ent  to  Alliens  by  I'aches,  11.  597,  5'Jii. 
Mitylenoeans  at  Si^'oium,  i.  l-^O. 

"'tyle.x'.  1.  63:j;  political  dissensions  and  (poets  of,  I.  635;  revolt  of,  from  Athens,  ii. 
S2;  blockade  of,  by  Paches,  11.  5!>:>se(i.;  and  the  Atheiii:in  assembly,  ii.  ri'Jl,  CUU;  loss 
ud  recovery  of,  by  Alliens,  B.C.  4»:3.  iii.  175;  iZallikratidas  at,  iii.  2K',;  removal  of 


Mityle; 

58'J    " 

am 

Kallikratidas  from.'  iii.  285,  2SC;  Eteouikus  at,  iii.  '^,  286;  blockade  of,  by^Memnom 

iv.  5S2:  surrender  of,  by  Chares,  iv.  (itH. 
Mnsippus,  expedition  of,  toKorkyra,  iv.  792. 
Mnemosyne,  i.  49,  5i5. 
Muf'sipldlus,  ii.  3U2. 
Maerie  and  Crcesus,  11.  112. 
Molionids,  the,  i.  124. 
Molossian  kingdom  of  Epirus,  iv.  747. 
Molossians,  I.  475. 
Molossus,  1.  15U. 
Momus,  i.  51. 
Monarchy,  in  mediaeval  and  modem  Europe,  1.  534;  aversion  to,  In  Greece,  after  the 

expulsion  of  Hippias,  11,  llCi. 
Money,  coined,  not  known  to  Homeric  or  Heslodic  Greeks,  1.  348;  coined,  first  intro- 
duction of,  into  Greece,  1.  452. 
Money-lending,  and  ancient  philosophers,  I.  583. 
Money -standard,  Solon's  debasement  of,  1.  5S;J;  honestly  maintained  at  Athens  after 

Solon,  i.  5S9. 

Monsters,  oflfspring  of  the  gods,  I.  53. 

Monstrous  natures  associated  with  the  gods,  I.  47. 

Monts  de  Piete,  i.  614. 

Monuments  of  tlie  Argonautic  expedition,  1.  173. 

Moon,  eclipse  of,  B.C.  413,  ill.  i;J5;  eclipse  of,  B.C.  331,  Iv.  610. 

Mopsus,  i.  628. 

Mora,  Spartan,  1  525;  destruction  of  a  Spartan,  by  Iphilcratcs,  III.  694. 

Moral  and  social  feeling  in  legendary  Greece,  i.  332. 

Moralizing  Greek  poets,  ii.  52. 

Mosynreki  and  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  ill.  559. 

Mothakes,  i.  5<)4. 

Motye,  capture  of,  by  Dionysius,  Iv.  196;  recapture  of.  by  Imilkon,  Iv.  19& 

Motyum,  Duketius  :it,  iii.  821 

Mountainous  systems  of  Greece,  I.  392. 

Mailer  on  Sparta  as  the  Dorian  tvpe.  i.  466, 

Multitude,  sentiment  of  a,  compared  with  that  of  individuals.  111.  2:58. 

Mimychia  and  Pireeus,  Thennstokles's  wall  round,  11.  371;  Menyllus  In,  Iv,  70'2,  714; 

Nikanor  in,  iv.  717, 
Muse,  insplrp.tion  and  authority  of  the,  1,  2'2.5. 
Muses,  tlie,  i.  5:1 
Music,  ethical  effect  of  old  Grecian,  i..512;  Greek,  Improvements  In,  about  the  middle 

i}*  the  seventh  century  B.C.,  11.  44. 
Musical  modes  of  the  Greeks,  i.  644. 

MvOo^,  i.  226,  273, 
Muiilat<^d  Grecian  captives  at  Persepolls,  iv,  622. 

Mutilation  of  dead  bodies  In  legendary  and  historical  Greece.  1,  3-36;  of  Dessus,  Iv.  029. 
Mutiny  at  A;.hens  immediately  before  Solon's  legislation,  I,  581. 
Mygdonla,  i,  (;43. 
My  kale,  Pan-Iouic  festival  at,  i.  C24;  the  battle  of,  II.  310. 


84Q 


Mykalessus,.  massacre  at.  III.  160 
Myiccna',  1.  '.'fil 

Mynanacus,  Alexander's  march  from  Killkia  to,  Iv.  558;  Alexander's  return  from  ir 
Myrkinus,  ii.  156,  163.  '     ' 

Myrmidons,  origin  of,  1.  147. 
Myron,  i.  518. 
Myronides,  ii.  415. 
Myrtilu.s,  i.  13;^. 

Mysia.  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  in.  iii  589 
Mysians,  i.  («4.  611,  MH.  '      "  ''*^- 

Mysteries,  principal  Pan-Hellenic  i  61   cfi  rh  ra.  «.,  i 

Mystic  legen.Js,  c.)ntrast  of   with  P.Vn;  ?'  f,'  ?"'^  "^.^thes,  i.  261. 

^  iiynins.  1.  *U;  »)rotherhoods,'i  sri    ^^^'''  *•  ^'  ^-^^nds,  contrast  of,  with  Homeric 

S  ^'^vS-KS^  "^"  ^'^«"^^"^"^-  '^^^  --^  -  "  Wo^s  and  Days,"  i.  8T;  meanin.  of 
Mythes,  how  to  be  tohl,  i.  ^^-  tt__,    ,.      . 


3S|S§;'lS;jSSKJag;!  ^J^t^^  «*■-"-='«».  ty  What  causes  ™. 

'!;Tiqa,X'S,li'SSs^'■J.■•?^"™  '»  "">  eonfeaerat,cn  ol  ,he  Ehinc,  an,  that 

Naukratis,  i.  699,  703.  * 

^aKkSp'omK;'^!!^,?^^  near,  ii.  .57-  Euryloc-hus's 

Nausinlku^  census  in  th^ai-chSip'^^^^  m'rlf"''^  ^^"^^  ""'> ""-  ^''^  "i-  m^"^^'"''  ^ 
^aval  attack,  Athenian,  ii.  4v^V    "  "  i       '  "*•  "^• 

xtIJ^J:^"^  ^^Y^  Sikels,  defeat  of  Messenians  bv  ii  oo>:, 

ljVarchu3  voyages  of,  iv^     ,     .     "'' 
^«/'bucliadnezzrir,  i.  7(iJ  ' 

NoeSiSf  if  jer'*"""  Helen.  1 195. 

{»/  COS,  1.  ,{jO  sen. 
.Nektanebis,  iv.  ii'?,  ns. 
^^L-  eids  down  to  Kodrus,  i.  110 
>ci«  us  and  Pelias,  i.  im. 

NenlelS.  ^  m:  '^'''  ^^  ^'''  ^^"^^'' ''  '^S.  785. 
Ni'obuio'and  Archilochus,  ii.  47 
^i'on  the  Cyreian,  iii.  565  seq..  57=> 
Neon  tiie  Corinthian,  iv.  248?' 
^foptol.Mnus,  son  of  Aclnlles,  i.  127,  204  208 
^<"p»ln.us  the  actor,  iv,  4SS.  *       '  ^■ 

{*;'-pliele,  i.  no. 
^ereus,  i.  51. 


850 


INDEX. 


Ncroi<ls,  i.  m.     ^         .  ,.„ 
Ni'ssus,  tho  cpntjxur,  i.  1^. 
Nestor,  i.  110. 
Nit  bolunurn  Lied.  I.  2S0. 
Kil-'tra  on  tlie  Hydaspcs,  iv. 

Niki'fs'at  Minoa.  if.- 021:  position  and  cbprnctcr  of,  il.  m^t^m\  Kloon.  U  (>24;  at  Mejos^ 
■^       •.i-\  5,/th/.  (\)rinihi'^u  torritorv,  ii.  ('■'-'r.  at  Mciidc  and  Slii(«no,  »■  y\i  PP'^'-^.VUii: 

8  2!  Ms  plan  of  notion  in  Sicily,  lit.  ^^ ^^^lll'U!'^^'^^'^^^;^: ^S^t  O^my^^k^ 
stratagem  of,  foj.  "PP'""^'*^'!*'"?^' ^•y™^^'^' *^.  • /o^  tl';  >  O  vn  pi^i*  >  at  Syrk-i.sf . 

at  Syracuse,  in,  '^;."»^f.V,l''^«V^-   fori  e'lAnce^  Athenians  towarc}.  iii.  77;  at 

after  the  final  defeat  i»  .*'''" J'^vv?Pn^e  t{\  u "  in     iii  diVS  m^^^^^^^^^ 
Atl.enians.on  their  retreat  fnimSyia^^^^^^^^^ 

SrVl? <fc"aSLK   Sn?a}"V^dlS'H1^f55%i"ioub£  Thucydides  about. 

ill:  l;-?,;  Opinion  and  mistake  of  the  Athenians  about.  Ul.  lob. 
Nikodronius,  ii.  "-W. 
Kikokles,  iii.  72'.t.  . 

Kikoniaehus  the  Athenian,  iii.  3.(. 
Nikoniachus  the  Miicedouian,  iv. 
Nikostratus.  ii.  C.l:),  718. 
Nikotele.s,  iv.  181. 

Niin:^^  ^- N^nns,  siege  of.  I.  654;  capture  of.  i.  662;  and  Babylon.  1.  681;  site  of.  and 

its  remains,  I.  i>S«.. 
Ninon  and  Kylon,  ii.  2ol. 

Sisa^:;:  c.Seoted  with  Me.ara  by  •' Lorn.  Walls  "ii.  413;  surrender  of.  to  the  Atheni- 
ans, ii.  (;77;  recovery  of,  by  the  Megarians.  iii.  201. 

Nisus,  i.  157.  ICli.  *  »«  q- 

Nt>bles,  Athenian,  early  violence  of,  11.  8o. 
Nomads,  Libyan,  i.  7(58. 
Nomios  Apollo,  i.  HI. 
Nonioi.hvlakes,  ii.  440. 
Nomolheta-.  *.  r.!):*.,  niU.  il.  441,  iii.  372. 
Non-Aniphiktyonic  races.  I.  «4. 
Non-Hellenic  practices,  1.  41«. 

NonmirilpfpabS  at,  II.  595;  recolonized  from  Athens,  ii.  596;  battle  of,  Ul.  ^5. 

Nrind.lia,''Agathokles  and  the  Carthaginians  In,  Iv.  767. 
NvniplKTenni.  iv.  506. 
Nvmphs,  i.  4!t,  'A. 
Nypsius.  iv.  278.  2S0.  281. 
Nyx,  i.  49,  51. 

8f;.i;'of'>mSf  haSny  if  Athens,  after  the  battle  of  .Egospotaml,  Ul.  317. 

Obie  or  Obes,  i.  4 16. 

Oceanic  nymplis,  i.  50. 

Oceanus.  i..">'),  T)!. 

Ochus,  iv.  ll't,  4?J.  5fi2. 

Ode(>n,'V)niMint?  of,  ii.  4ri.->.  ^ 

0(i"s  at  festivals  in  honor  of  pods,  1.  o.      . 

0«lin  and  other  frods_ degraded  Into  men.  1.  Zto. 

Odrysian  kincTS,  ii.  57|i.  ,       ,    ,„   „„.  .j_„  ,  4p.q.  <;tpnl«  awav  the  Palladium,  i. 

'^]^p;:sJ„'^ij."f?;i„V'^';r.:5T.^;  ikr;;,^fer'ora„«"a,ro7,  ■. «« so,,.-,  ..t  .he 

(?:('hali"a,  cai)ture  of,  i.  V<ff). 
^dipus,  i.  liM't. 


INDEX. 


851 


CEncusand  h{.'=;  off.'.prlng,  i,  125. 
(Kuoe,  ii.  525,  iii.  2;54,  093. 
(Knomaiisand  Pi'lops,  i.  l;>3. 
tEcnopiiyta,  Athenian  victory  at,  ii.  418. 
<Kiiotria,  i.  7l(i. 
ll']aotrians,  i.  710,  72:3,  733. 
<i:ta.  path  over  Mount,  ii,  277. 
(Ktcei,  i.  483. 

Ortice,  admissibility  of  Athenian  citizens  to,  ii.  82. 
«->/-r.vKO.'?,  i.  153. 

Okypete,  i.  51. 

Oli)ia,  iv.7!llseq. 

OiJKJirchical  government,  change  from  monarchical  to,  in  Greece  i  «ii8-  mrtv  nt 

Oliu'-archies  in  Greece,  i.  .')3D,r>15,  54t>,;-vi7.  .^vLiieui,,  iii.  o^u. 

Oligarciiy,  conflict  of,  with  despotism,  1,  r>45;  vote  of  the  Atheniati  i<j<:or.iV.w  {.,  f....^ 

m:  mMSf!^M^''''  ^''  ^"  ^'''^''^  ^^lUed^me"  Hi^S^nh^Sr?!^!^ 
Olpjifi,  Denostlienes's  victory  at,  li.  C32. 
O  ympia,  Agesipulis,  and  the  oracle  at,  iii.  699;  Lysias  at,  iii.  7r>8;   paneavrical  ontion 

ArSdians!1v.'yc;."-  '^''  ^^^^P^^^^^^^  «*-.  by  the  Arcadians,  iii.  Sii,  9KuS  of  "by  the 
Ol.vmpias,  iv.  pG2   fi15,  517,  519;  and  Antipater,  Iv.  559,  CM;  intrigues  of  after  Mex-ni- 

doi;:s  deatli,  iv.  71U;  return  of,  from  Epirus  to  Macedonia,  ivlnl seq:,Srde^th  of. 

Olympic  games,  and  Aethlius,  i.  104;  origin  of.  1  124-  nresidonnv  of  i  00/1  )-o.  «„* 

i.u9;   interference  of,  with  the  defen.se  of  Tleruioinlfeiiiy^' fm^ 

O  ympieion  near  Syracuse,  battle  of,  ill.  73. 
Olympus,  1.  .393. 

''a^'ifr'ii,'^^ SmS?ne^1'??l?  '^^  ''''  *^^  ^^^'^^^^  ^'  Demosthenes,  iv.  414; 

Ojynt hiacs  of  Demosthenes,  order  of,  iv.  423. 

Oneirus,  i.  51,  :iSi. " 

Onesn'ns  n^iS*'  ^P^"^^^ondas  at,  iv.  51. 
Ononiakles,  iii."  2.35. 
pnoniakritus,  ii.  238. 
•|.?A".?rni"'^'''*^^.t*J<?  treasures  In  the  temple  at  Delphi,  iv  371-  mieoosse=!  of  iv  q7i 

Opliella.s,  iv.  7fi8,  7G9.  '     ' 
Ophis,  tlie.  iii.  735. 
<^I>ici,  1.  711. 

1  I^■!H;^'o  ?*V?1^^'?  \^y^^^  to,  iv.  a^ss. 

Xeries's  PnvSsi!',n  TSfs  ''^' ''  '^^'  ^""^  *^^  ^^"^^^  ^'y^^^^^'  *'  '^^  ^^^wers  of.  on 
^y^m^^S^fj^f!^'^  authority  of,among  the  Greeks,  i.  415;  In  Boeotia  consulted 

IIlvlll'Mnenlls'  ohHv'ST^''-^''/-  ?^^f-^^-'  ^"^  Thebes,  I.  13.3.  HI.  821. 

'nieiles  ^S  ^1    m  "Si    and^^Sj^^V'*"^^^'''"  ^^''  ^'  ^    "^'  ''•  '!>!;   r-wolt  of.  from 
iv.  Ki.  ^l'^"ta,  111.  00.J,  and  the  Puu-Arcadiau  union,  iii.  S3U;  destruction  of, 

f>i-eithyia,  i.  151. 

^lestes,  1.  m-  and  Asamemuaa  tran.^ferred  to  Sparta,  i.  138. 


s:)2 


INDEX. 


Orestes,  bones  of,  i.  r.ll). 

orotis,  iv.  479.  4S2. 

( »r','ies,  postHoni<>ric,  i.  CO. 

OnTPtes,  ii.  KiO.  V.yj. 

Ofoiites,  tlie  Persian  noMeman,  ill.  503. 

Ofontes,  the  Persian  satrap,  iii.  7v;s. 

Orphans  in  legendary  and  historical  Greece,  1.  336. 

OrplHMitelestce,  i.  576. 

Orphi  •  TheoKony,  i.  53;  egg,  i.  56;  Ufe,  the,  1.  5S;  brotherhood.  L  64. 

Ol•sin«•^^  iv.  (i;"i. 
«)rth;i  ,>)rida),  i.  543. 
Ortliros.  i.  51. 

Oi'-f  vSa.'i.' 71 H;  fortification  and  occupation  of,  by  Dionyslus,  iv.  176;  Dion. v  si  us  lie- 
.a-'-d  in.  iv.  ITS;  blockade-  of,  by  Dion.  iv.  ^JO,  a'TS,  2s:5;  sallies  of  Nypsius  troni,  iv. 
27f<.  I'M);  Dion's  entry  into,  iv.  -^86;  surrender  of,  to  Tinioleon,  iv.  309;  advantage  of, 
to  Timoleou,  iv.  311;  siege  of,  by  Hiketas  and  Mapon.  iv.  311;  Tinioleon's  demolition 
of  the  Dionysian  works  in,  iv.  ;>17;  Tinioleon  erects  courts  of  justice  In,  iv.  bol. 

Oscan,  Latin, "and  Greek  languages,  i.  711. 

Oscans,  i.  711. 

Ossu  and  Pellon,  i.  394.  ^     ,,.     i  uxi  ^  j  rnr  «i 

Ostracism,  similaritv  of,  to  Solon's  condemnation  of  neutrality  In  sedition.  1.  605;  11. 
81U  seu  ;  of  Hyperbolus,  ii.  85,  SUt;  of  Kimon,  li.  4:!7;  of  Thucydidcs,  son  of  Melesias, 
li.  4W;  projected  conteutiou  of,  between  iSikias  and  Alkibiades,  ii.  810  seq.;  at  Syra- 
cuse, ii.  S^ti. 

Otanes,  ii.  128,  141, 158. 

Otiiryades,  i.  521. 

Othrys,  1.  3y;Jseq. 

Ot<»s  and  Ephialtes,  i.  123. 

Oxus  crossed  by  Alexander,  Iv.  637. 

Oxylus.  i.  V^\  iS7,  aitO. 

OxythemisKuroncCUs,  i.  461. 

Paches,  at  Blitylene,  li.  585.  592;  at  Notium,  U.  595;  pursues  the  fleet  of  Alkidas  to  Pat- 
nios,  ii.  595;  s«-nds  31  vtyleiuen  prisoners  to  Atliens,  ii.  59«;  crunos  and  death  of,  ii.  Wo. 
Pa.-onians.  1.  75<;;  con(iuest  of.  by  Megabazus,  ii.  1.57;  victory  of  Philip  oyer,  iv  o48. 
Pagasfo  conquest  of,  by  Philip,  iv.  IWU;  importance  of  the  Gulf  of,  to  Philip,  iv.  i'JS. 
Pugondas,  ii.  r.S3. 
I'aktyas,  the  Lydian;  li.  113. 
Paliieir.on  and  Ino.  i.  116. 
I'alaphatus,  his  treatment  of  mythes,  1.  252. 
Palamedes,  i.  2<XJ. 
Palike,  foundation  of,  ii.  821. 
Palladium,  capture  of,  i.  214. 
Paliakopas,  iv,  ij*>2. 
Pallas,  i..5o,  51. 

Pali.'is,  >ou  of  Pandion,  1. 157. 

l'alus3LT3otis,  trii)eseast  of,  i.  nrxS.  .„  ^.  ^- 

Pammems,  expedition  of,  to  ^legalopobs.  Iv.  113,  oTi,  395. 
I'amphyli,  Hylh-is,  and  Dymaiu-s,  i.  476. 
I'amiihylia,  conquest  of,  by  Alexander,  Iv.  577. 
I'anakunn,  ii.  7*j.>.  7'i«. 

Pan-Arcadian  Ten  Thousand,  iii.  843,  iv.  91.  ^ 

Pau-Arcadiai;  union,  iii.  629,  iv.  91. 
Pandion,  i.  153. 

PaiKlion,  sou  of  Pliineus,  1. 155. 
Pandion  II.,  i.  157. 

Pan'Heil'enic'pioceeding,  the  earliest  approacli  to,  1.  737;  feeling,  growth  of,  between 
D.o.  77r^5i'.<>,  i.  7:?;  cliaraeter  of  the  four  great  games,  1.  7S5;  congress  at  tin-  IsUiinus 
of  Corinth,  ii.  261;  patriotism  of  the  Athenians  on  Xerxes's  invasion,  ii.  2«>S;u)ii«'n 
under  Spaita  after  the  repulse  of  Xerxes,  ii.  377;  schemes  ttud  sentiment  of  1  eri- 
klcs.  ii.  4r>:;;  pretcns<s  of  Alexander,  iv.  54S. 

Panlonir  festival  and  Amphiktyony  in  Asia,  i.  624. 

l'anoi>t<'s  Argos,  i.  95. 

Pant;dron,  i.  513. 

PaiitikapaMim,  Iv.  797.  801. 

Paphlagoiiia,  submission  of,  to  Alexander,  iv.  585. 

Paphlagoniaiis,  and  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  iii.  569. 

Para;;raphe.  iii.  373. 

Parali,  at  t>an;os,  ill.  201. 


INDEX. 


853 


Paralii,  i.  579. 

I'araliis.  arrival  of,  at  Athens  from  &amos,  iii.  205. 

I'.iranonion,  Graplie,  ii.  442,  iii.  208. 

I'aris,  i.  li)?,  ^Ol. 

Paris;u!(>s  I.,  iv.  789. 

Parmenides,  iii.  39S. 

Paniienio,  embassy  of,  from  Philip  to  Athens,  iv  416  418   J-il-  onenflnna  of  .•„  a   ■ 

P.iropand'^adVe,  subjugation  of,  by  Alexander,  iv.  636. 

Paros,  TheraiMones  at,  iii.  252. 

ParthenicV!,  i.  678. 

Parthenon,  ii.  1(15. 

Parthia,  Darius  pursued  by  Alexander  into,  iv  6'>7 

Par;^Sis,tlK^:l?  iSiiiiS,^l^^!^Si1!l7'  t>f '  ''^  ^'' '  P'-^P^^^^  ^y  ^S^«'  ''  49^ 

Parysatis,  daughter  of  Darius  Nothus,  iv,  «j57. 

Pasinielus,  iii.  (iST. 

Pasion  and  Xenias.  iii.  499. 

Pasiphae  and  the  IMinotaur,  I.  165. 

I'asippidas,  banishment  of,  iii.  257. 

Patizeithes,  conspiracy  of,  ii.  127. 

Patrokleides,  amnesty  propo.sed  by,  III  .317 

Pat roklus,  treatment  of,  in  the  Iliad,  i.  378. 

Patrons  Ai)o!lo,  i.  74. 

Pausauijis  the  historian,  on  the  Achaians,  i.  106;  his  view  of  mythes  i  9^9-  hi<  Viict^^^r 

^  i,'L'i'?..;!r  ^vx'is.'.S'n'  s^  '^'zr^.r^r  ^^^^"^  k^^t^?; 

Pausanias.theSpartan  regent,  at  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth  il  .S20-  it  PHt-r^  n  "9q -y-. 
misconduct  ot,  after  the  battle  of  Pinfv.  ii  ^~t.  ,..,v\     \     2    'J}^  i  latoe,  ll.  o^^,  ..27; 

.nana  o,  the  aVeo...  L  ^it^o^l^S^  deall;  ^il'lfS;  Si.fS.'lESlS.TSl; 
^hV^-^.^t"''',*'^^  Spartan  king,  and  Lysander,  iii.  311;  his  expedition  to  Attiei  bM  ^i^. 

crnti^^]^aS:^Mc^:ih!^SAS7^6       ^^'  ^•""^^'""^'^t^o"  of,  iv.  665;  and  the  demo- 
Pa  iisanias  the  Macodouiau,  iv.  49,  517. 
I'eilaritus,  iii.  ISO,  l^s, 
Peiiiiis,  i.  579. 
Pedigrees,  mythical,  connect  gentes,  i.  150. 

nisaii'lor  thoi„icednpnioninn  admiral,  iii.  a51   (557 

reislstl'aliil^'i^morii'ss;  ;^"^'^^  ^^'  "•  ^'  ^^"^  ^*^^-^^«  "^  ^lbe«s,  il.  298. 
Peithias,  the  KorkvrjBaii,  ii.  610. 

P^iaKus^i!^143!"  "''^^'  '•  ^^^'  ^^  ^®"^»"S  ^^'-'^  Imbros,  ii.  157. 
Peltiis,  i.'li2,  m. 
I'elias,  i.  109,  112. 
]'e;i.)n  and  Ossn,  i.  .'504. 
V  i;'no:']:^;^'^.!;-^|;,[;-^li:y  tales  at,  BA..  346,  IV.  455;  under  Philip,  Iv.  557. 

r^l:^'i:t'^S^1u%^i;i!;:i!l],}l^^^^^  of,against  the  philo.T.„.onian 

7S..;  vi,-torv  Of    ,t'T  ■'   ri   iii   4'  i     tI  ^'"'  /^''-•'^iJ'-^'-:  V-V  '"^'=  '""'  F.p.-nninondas.  iii. 

^41.>xander  .>f*^Mu.t  "        ' '"      '"''•' ''''''  '''^"'^'' '''  '*' '''''' 

'  mS:!il:;i;i^!^ri%'r  ,!?^'^  AMienfan.empire.  ii,  47.;  w.r,  eom- 

at  Coriuii,   1  c  "p  1  ii    (•;;■  Z.  V  '  ^'"",;.r  ^"•^"f"*^  «>'.Tr.  ii.  .Wt.  r,7();  allies,  synod  of, 

iiuin,  I..C.4U,  iii.j^,  iievt,  under  liieramenes,  iii.  i??;  fleet  at  Rhodes,  iii.  issi 


851 


INDEX. 


•>!')•  nt".t«^-otnrn  of.  from  Rh6.1fs  to  Milrtu?.  iil.  W:;  flp<  t,  .lis-rM-t.-nt  in.  :;t  .;H<lus. 
Tii  •■  1  /kT  rti'ct.i-apture  of,  at  Kyzic-us.  Hi.  ^i:  tleot,  yny  of.  by  rynts.  ni  ;Y-'--/-':  »: 
Ku.Vh-v  V.ss-inhlvof.;it  Sparta,  r.r.  i;'!,  Jii*oi;J;  conf.-.hM-acy.  A.iu  us  at  the  laud 

ivi  NVoV,  ;  si-\n-i  in  inipraiit.  i.  114:  .•oiuhu-t of.  .-.ttor  {li(>  l.attle  ..f  Tl.cnr.op.vloP.  il.  21U; 

^  aix^r^l-^nSl^s^y^^^^^i^'  ii-  :J1':  "i"'   ^»^''  f<"t'lic:a.i<m  of  Athens,  n.  3(...  :Vt';   live 

V  nrs-tnu'  ofNviih  Ath(iis.ii.  4-J);    i.ositir.n  au.l   views  of    in    eomnu-i.c-ni^       « 

51'2;.slaiiKl»t»rof  ucutial  iniM)iuT.s^b.y.  )^ -^-'^-jV^.A^^I-'Jr      '       =1^"^*"  Ai...UMiua.  ii. 


uti  m  of  a^^  B.o.4-<i,  i.  440:  (lilTcrcnrc  h(  twn-n  the  liistrH  v.iii.n,  i;  c.  4:.0an.    ,,h 

iVv  iKDU  MtioKo     which  V—  r-Pliovp.l  tolo  iixli-eii-u^-.  i.  4':.;  s.-rtl-rii.  inhab't- 

mts  of  K-Vm-rth  '  b«>ri^^^      M  T  sion,  i.  4C2:  ev.-ms  in,  ciiuiuK  t he  iiivst  twenty  years 

;  "th    Al'  0      ut  1  e  ^.n   -  V.  ■■■.     ■.'•.  vovat'.,.  „{  Tolniicles  round,  Ii.  41i»;  ravages  of  bv 

fVu    uheii^ans  U  S3    fU7;  pol.tieal  relations  in.  B.C.  421.  il.  7H3;  expedition  of  Alkl- 

ull  nto  the  interior    f    i.  7S.5;  exnedition  of  K<nion  and  Pharnaba/.us  to.  in.  m-, 

in  mnnavieation  of  1 A^  Tiniotlieus,  ii.  ISC:  proceedings  in.  after  the  battle  of  Leuk- 

tr^  i      sS  iv-fiV  expeO^  of  Epanunondas  to,  iii.  Jvo.  iv.  51.  n(>.  S;-,;  state  of.  B.C. 

%•)  iv  ■%•  vi^  ts  of  Dion  to.  iv.  249;  ilisuni-.n  of.  B.C.  :56(l-.3.^9    iy.  ass;  affairs  of.  B.C. 

'.t^7 \l)  yj   -iq.  war  in    BC   ^2-.^,  Iv.  3":  intervention  of  I'hilip  in,  after  B.r.  .116, 

w'^-  ex^.?ditron  of'philip  to.  iv.'  514-  Kassander  and  Polysperchuu  iu.  iv.  720.  729; 

Kas.sander  and  Alexander,  sou  of  Polysperchuu  lu,  iv.  t2U. 

P(>lops,  i.  i:^>.  ,  ^_ 

Pelusiuni.  Alexander  at,  vi.  606. 

PenestiH,  Thessalian,  i.  429. 

Pentakosiomedinini.  i.  ."iW.  .    -  ^.     -r.      .    ..    „i  i-oo 

Pentapolis.  on  the  south-west  coast  of  the  Euxinc,  vl.  196. 

Ptiirekonters.  Sj>artau,  i.  526. 

Pt-ntckostys,  i.  r/i"). 

Penth»'Sileia,  1.  I'lit.  202. 

Penthens  and  Atrave,  i.  184. 

Perdikka'sII  ^re^hSiions  and  pvococdinffs  of,  toward  Athens  11    492,  494,  r,.^4.  wr>.  m, 
^)^na^c:m^i!ii.  iur,;  applleaVion  of,    t-  Sparta  ii  <;  :3;   and     ^ras.ia^    relations  be- 

twoen  IL  fi7:>  71S,  Tl'.>:  .i<>ins  Sparta  and  Ai^'os,  ii,  bUo;  Ueata  of,  lu.  <4l. 
Perdikkas.  bro'ther  of  Philip,  iy.  78,  121,  12fi.  ^44. 
I'erdikkas.  Alexander's  general,  iv.  bba,  lOl,  «1U,  il4. 

Per5a!nusVn  Mvsia,  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  at.  iii.  r,'^^^ 

T>criinder  the  Corinthian  desi)Ot,  power  an<l  character  of.  i.  551. 

Pek(sdifTcren'-e  between  the  (ien.o.-n^       after,  and   the  constitution  of  kleis- 
ti4ncs  ii  4  effext  of .  on  constitutional  morality,  ii.  tX':  at  the  battle  of  Tai.ju,-!^ 
417;  expe  itions  of  .to  Sikyon  and  Akarnania.  ii.  4i;»;.  l-obcy  <.f,  ^f-^^"-  i^:^^^^ 
connVicstof  Eubo-a,  bv  ii.  4^8;  and  Ephialtes.  constiturion  c.f  dikaslerics  by,  ii  4.51; 
uK  rnoi^^  life  a^'l  character  of.  ii.  +sr,;  «"<'•  EphiMtes.  judicial  in- 

form of  ii' 4^51 ,  4:1^;  real  nature  of  the  constitutional  chan.ws  cffticted  1>>  •  ".,'^1^5 
eomn/eneement  of  the  ascendency  of.  ii.  4;i9;  and  Kimon.  cnnpronuse  betNycen,  ii. 
I  rt"  •  ErcoScepti  n  of  the  relation  between  Ath.ns  and  her  ;'"i«;^.  "•^^•;- •\";i 
A  h.ni'an  kleruchs  by,  ii.  4.^M;  an.l  Thueydides,  son  of  31elesias.  u.  4M;  Pan-Hellenic 
M-hemes  and  sentiment  of.  ii.  4r.:^:  city  improvements  at  xUhens  under,  ii.  404.4rK,; 
shVtTire  at  Athens  under,  ii.  4»W:  attempt  of.  to  convene  a  (jrecian  con^ri>s  at 
U he;  s  i.  itTfsophokles.  «'tc..  Athenian  arn,an,ent  nndor.  11  4<^^:  Inneral  '•Tations 
of  n  471-  demand  of  the  Spartans  for  his  tnnishment.  ii.  5<«.  nl2;  indirect  attacks 
fhispolitica  opponents  upon,  ii.  iVK);  his  famiy  relations,  and  connection  ^ylth 
Asmsi-  MO  .^11-  charKcs  of  peculation  airalnst,  ii.  :-n:  spce.-h  of.  1»  fore  the  1  clo- 
;.oSsian  w  ir  ii  =^14-  and  the  ravai,'es  of  Attica  by  Archidamus.  ii.  r.25;  lost  speecdi 

rl;:  !-h!ract^r  of.  ii.  552;  new  class  of  politicians  at  Athens  after,  li.  557;  and  Mkias 
compared,  ii.  fi21. 

IvI-inlhusiT'Si  and  Athens,  iii.  2'%  ir.  486;  siege  of,  by  Philip,  iv.  482.  4&1. 
Peria'ki.  i.  476,  4-'^»;  Libyan,  i.  7(>9,  7.0.  i?2. 
Pero,  Pias,  and  Melampus,  I.  109.  ^ 
pcrseid  dynasty,  i.  99. 

Persri!o!is.''AlVxan(lcr-s  march  frnm  Susa  to,  iv.  C21;  Alexander  at,  iv.  622,  C55;  Alexan- 
der's return  from  India  to,  iv.  (>55. 
Purses,  i.  50. 


INDEX. 


855 


Porsens,  exploits  of,  i.  98. 

Persia,  api)lication  of  Athens  for  alliances  with,  ii.  93;  state  of,  on  the  formation  of 
the  confederacy  of  Uelos,  ii.  ;xSl:  treatment  of  Theniistokles  in,  ii.  393;  opi-rations  of 
Athens  and  the  Delian  confederacy  against,  Li.  404;  and  Athens,  treaty  between, 
B.C.  4r)0,  ii.  421;  surrender  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  by  Sparta  to,  iii.  GIU;  and  r,!ie  peace 


B.C.  :^(i,  iv.  71;  state  of,  b.c.  :3(12,  iv.  114,  IIH;  alarm  at  Athens  about,  B.C.  o54,  iv.  .i-5!»; 
projected  invasion  of,  by  Pliilip,  iv.  514;  correspondence  of  Demosthenes  with,  iv. 

Persian  version  of  the  legend  of  To,  1.  95;  noblemen,  conspiracy  of.  against  the  false 
Smerdis,  ii.  128;  empire,  organization  of,  by  Darius  Hystaspes,  ii.  lo2;  envoys  to 
Macedonia,  ii.  157;  armament  against  Cyprus,  ii.  107;  force  against  Miletus,  ii.  171; 
fleet  at  Lade,  ii.  174;  fleet,  and  Asiatic  Greeks,  ii.  114;  armament  under  Datis,  ii.  IS;;, 
2tio;  fleet,  before  the  battle  of  Salamis,  ii.  279,  288,  297,  ;5UU;  army,  march  of,  Iroin 
Thermopvhe  to  Attica,  ii.  297 ;  fleet  at  Salamis,  ii.  :^.> ;  fleet  after  the  battle  of  Sala- 
mis. ii.  311.  ;)14  ;  armv  under  Mardonius,  ii.  o>0 :  fleet  at  Mykale,  ii.  :J40 ;  army  at  My- 
kale,  ii.  :^1  ;   armv  after  the  defeat  at  Mykale,  ii.  342;  war,  effect  of,  upon  Atho- 


Sparta,  B.C.  397,  iii.  (UO,  648;  king,  Thebans  obtain  money  from,  iv.  397;  forces  in 
Phrygia  on  Alexander's  landing,  iv.  562.  564;  Gates,  Alexander  at,  iv.  621;  fleet  and 
armies,  liopes  raised  in  Greece  by,  B.C.  o;54-:iDi,  iv.  676. 

Persians,  condition  of.  at  the  rise  of  Cyrus  the  Great,  ii.  106;  conquests  of,  under  Cy- 
rus the  Great;  ii.  118.  12:3;  the  first  who  visited  Greece,  ii.  146;  conquest  of  Thrace  by, 
undiu-  Darius  Hystaspes,  ii.  156;  successes  of.  against  the  revolted  coast  of  Asia 
Minor,  ii.  164;  attempts  of,  to  disunite  the  lonians  at  Lade,  ii.  171;  narrow  escape  of 
Miltiades,  from,  ii.  176;  cruelties  of,  at  Miletus,  ii.  176;  attempted  revolt  of  Thaso.s 
from,  ii.  ISO;  at  Maratiion,  ii.  191,  203;  after  the  battle  of  Marathon,  ii.  202;  change  of 
Grecian  feeling  toward,  after  the  battle  of  Marathon,  ii.  204;  their  religious  con- 
ception of  history,  ii.  «42:  at  Tiiermopylae,  11.379.  279;  in  Psyttaleia.  ii.  305,  3U9;  at  Sa- 
lamis, 307;  at  Platsea,  ii.  325;  at  Mykale,  ii,  69;  between  Xerxes  and  I>arius  Co<lomaii- 
nus,  ii.  36<i;  necessity  of  Grecian  activity  against,  after  the  battles  of  Plataea  and 
Mykale,  ii.  39S;  heralds  from,  to  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  iii.  515;  impotence  and 
tiinidity  of,  iii.  524;  imprudence  of,  in  letting  Alexander  cross  the  Hellespont,  iv. 
5(>l;  defeat  of,  at  the  Granikus,  iv.  5()6;  defeat  of,  at  Issus,  iv.  551;  incorpomtiou 
of,  in  the  Macedonian  phalanx,  iv.  663. 

Persis,  subjugation  of,  by  Alexander,  iv.  624;  Alexander's  return  from  India  to, 
iv.  655. 

Personages,  quasi-human,  in  Grecian  mj'thology,  i  222. 

Personal  ascendency  of  the  king  in  legendary  Greece,  i.  324;  feeling  toward  the  gods, 
the  king,  or  individuals  in  legendary  Greece,  i.  332;  sympathies  the  earliest  form  of 
social  existence,  i.  3;35. 

PtM-sonalities,  great  predominance  of.  in  Grecian  legend,  i.  330. 

Personality  of  divine  agents  in  mythes.  i.  48. 

Personification,  tendency  of  the  ancient  Greeks  to,  i.  222. 

Pestilence  and  suffering  at  Athens  after  the  Kyloniau  massacre,  i.  574. 

Petalism  at  Syracuse,  ii.  92,  820. 

Peuke,  Iv.  5:34. 

Peukestes,  iv.  653,  655. 

Pezetreri,  iv.  554. 

Phreax,  exi^edition  of,  to  Sicily,  iL  8.S2. 

Phahekus  succeeds  to  the  command  of  the  Phoklans,  Iv.  397:  decline  of  the  Phokian'? 
under,  iv.  4:38, 462;  opposition  to,  in  Phokis,  iv.  4:39;  opposition  of,  to  aid  from  Atheiijs 
to  Thermopylae,  iv.  440;  position  of,  at  Thermopylae,  iv.  439,  462;  death  of,  iv.  470. 

Phalanthus,  oekist  of  Tarentum,  i.  731. 

Phalanx,  Macedonian,  iv.  508,  553.  603. 

Phalaris,  ii.  216,  346. 

Plialerum,  Xerxes  at,  ii.  246. 

Phalinus,  iii.  512. 

Phanes  and  Zeus,  i.  56. 

Phanosthenes,  iii.  279. 

Pharakidas,  iv.  207. 

Pharax,  iii.  619. 

Pharax,  the  officer  of  Dionysius,  iv.  2S4,  297. 

Pharis,  conquest  of,  i.  505. 

Pliarnabr.zus  and  Tissaphernes,  embassy  from,  to  Sparta,  iii.  165;  and  Derkyllfdas, 
111.241,612,618,6:59;  and  Athens,  iii.  249,  258;  Athenian  victory  over,  iii.  2riO;  conven- 
tion of,  about  Chalkedon,  iii.  262;  and  Alkibiades,  iii.  262,  :>80;  and  Greek  envoys,  iii. 


85G 


INDEX. 


orj?  '>-r.-  ♦>ftor  tho  bntflr^  of  ;Pl<rr»spotnmI.  ill.  :^0:  nr\<}  AnnxlMus.  HI,  "77,  W');  nnd  I.y- 

K  "  1  -  «r.7  r,7!».  <W1:  and  Ahy.ios.  iii.  CTS*;  and  the  antiJSpurtau  allu'S  at  Coiint)  , 
iii  (Isi;  and  the  Wyraciisans.  iv.  120;  anti-Macf.louiau  etf orts  of ,  iv.  ol>a;  capture  ul, 
v,-itii  his  force,  at  Chios,  iv.  W^.         ,  ,,  ,       ,      ,„ 

Ph:ir.-dus,  PolvdanuLS  i>f,  ill.  7Si);  and  Halus,  iv.  453. 

Ph:is-lis,  Alexander  at,  iv.  517. 

I'h.i^vilus,  iv.  oyi.JiW. 

Pheldi'fi^the  TeVnUid,  L  450;  claims  and  projects  of,  as  representative  of  Herakles,  i. 
4.-)!;  and  the  Olympic  games,  i  152;  coiuub'e  aud  scale  of,  i.  4j2,  ■ioo;  various  Uescrip- 

?B;S^i;:!^-iU™'!^mliS'fS?!n,  to  Greece  not  nrcO^able,  I.  422;  situation  and 
'  it  es  of,  i.  (;c.!t;  reeonquest  of.  by  Darius  Nothus,  iv.  472;  Alexander  in,  iv  S^H.  W-.». 

Pheni.-ian  v.rsion  of  tlie  legend  of  lo.  i.  95;  colonies,  1.  0.1;  fleet  at  Aspendus,  in.  214, 
■>•>,)•  towns  sniTcnderof,  to  Alexantier,  iv.  51K>,  5i>7.  ,  ^ 

Piu-nlci  ns  in  Horn  rie  times,  i.  :S41;  historical,  i.  W9.  fi81,  m,  689,  705:  tind  Persi.-.ns, 
sul)iu-ati(.n  of  Cyprus  by,  ii.  1h7;  and  Persians  at  Miletus,  u.  170;  and  Persians,  re- 
?olKiucstof  .Siatic«_;i-<.'ks  l,y,  ii.  lIC;  and  the  cutting  through  Athos,  11.  24(.;  and 
Greeks  in  Sicily,  ii.  :U7;  in  Cyprus,  iii.  <24. 

plleS'  ilexai^I^l^of!- iv  ^:  HS'SI;  despots  of.  iv.  ai2;  Philip  and  the  despots  of,  iv 
•   4  ?n  :  (^  Pi'^^M  the  oath  of  allifince  with  Athensat,  iv. 457;  Alexainler  ot,  and 

Pei.rpidas.'  iv.  57.  G9,  7'J,  81;  Alexander  of,  subdued  by  the  Thebaus,  ii. !«;  hostilities  of 
Alexander  of,  ag:unst  Atheus,  Iv.  120. 

Pheivkydes,  i.  244,  (392. 

Piieretinie,  i.772.  ,    ,-r, 

Ptiitieus,  eponym  of  an  Attic  rteme,  1.  IM. 

Phllnil*  M  JiSl^'cieJC^iuMl  as  a  hostage  at  Thebes,  iv.  57,  m  accession  of.  iv.  1^.  Oifi; 
as  siioordinate  governor  in  Macedonia,  iv.  ;Ul,  :J1..;  position  ol,  on  tiie  de;!th  ot  1  ei- 
dikkas.  iv.  :;4r:  capture  of  Amphipolis  by.  iv    358;  his  allKUUv.  with  Olyntiuis  and 
hosiiiities  against  Athens,  iv.  mi;  capture  of  Pydna  and  P()t.da^a  by.  n    o«>^^.    n- 
crea.sed  {.ower  of,  B.C.  358-:«6,  iv.  :^«2;  marriage  of,  with  Olvinpias.  iv.  .,..J;  Jutt  i;;ue 
of   with   Kersoble]>tes   against    Athens,    iv.    b^:S;    his   acini ry    and    c(.n.imst   of 
Methone.  iv.  :;r3;  and  the  despots  of  Phera3,  Iv.  374,  :i91:  development  r.l  -^i-^;;  ;'n; 
£n    military  fol-oe  nnder,  iv.  :::<5;   and  Onomarrhus.  iv.  ;92:   conciuest  <u    P  e r.^ 
and  Pa"as.'e  by.  Iv.  o93:  checked  at  Thermopylae  by  the  Atlienians,  iv.  .94;  power 
and  .utitude  of,  b.c«.  :J52-o4l,  iv.  :S97:  naval  power  ami  operations  of,  B.C.  .<;...  iy  o.;S; 
in    Thrace.   B.C.   ;i-.l,  i v.  4(10:   hostility  of   to  Olynthus.    B  c.  .3oI-.J.tI),.  iv    40.,    fU;    t 
of  hi"  1     If-brothers  to  Olvnthus,  iv.  4US;  Intrigues  nt\  in  Olynthus.  ly.  4(b;  destine 
li^.nof    heOiynthian  confederacy  by,  iv.  4;>.,  410.  4i:5.  424  4Jo;  Athenian  <--l«';  't -'^ 
to  Olvnthus  against,  Iv.  415;  intrigues  of,  in  Euba-a,  iv.  41S;  and  Athens  ov..rtur.s 
frpeee  between.  B.C.  S4.S,  iv.  4:?,;  Thebans  invoke  the  ad  of  against  t  h-  ^  '<.'>;';",';:. 
iv  J?;'t-  -mil  Thermoovlo?  iv    441.  457,  4.t8.    Ifil.  4(i4.  4G5;  embassies  from   Aili;  n^  to.  n . 
iI^,"^>,lS  ent!?^s  I^Slinsfnmi.'iv.  44(i,  447;,  448,  450,  452;  synod  of  allies  nt  Athens 
abou^  iv.  447;  peace  and  alliance  between  Athens  and.jv  44,  4.-).S  4US,  4.;).  4m,  labii- 
?a  i      sof  ^'se^ines  an<i   Philokrate#  about,  iv.  451.4.57,  45S;  in  THrace.  iv.  454,  4^t 
letter  of,  taken  by  ^Ischines  to  Athens,  iv.  458.  4fil;. surrender  of  J'^jiki-s  t«     in    4<,», 
declared  sympathy  of.  with  the  Thebans,  B.C.  :ii(;,  iv.  4.U:  visit  of  ^Esclr.iie.-,  to,  in 
Phokis^  iv  4(IV  admitted  into  the  Amphiktyonic  a.ssemhly,  iv.  JCd;  ascendency  of, 
Lamiv^  4^^7   namecl  presi.ki.tof  the  I'ythian  festival,  iv.  4(i7;  l'",s««o»  of  .after 
the  Sacred  war,  iv.  471;  letter  of  Is(^krates  to,  Iv.  4,2;  movemetits  of.  attei   H;<.-  -^-IS 
iv47ti-  warnings  of  Demor,thenes  against,  after  n.c  34«.  iv  4.(;;  mission  of  P.v!    < 
fri»m.  to  Athens,  iv.  477,  and  Athens,  dispute  between,  about  Halonnesus.iv   4,r;.t   d 
Kar    .  ,  iv.  431;  and  Athens,  disputes  between,  about  the  Bosphorus  and  H^'    ^'^l'"  'f; 
V.  470;  at  Perinthus  and  the  Chersonese,  iv.  4S2,  48  ;  and  AthcMis,  .Uclare.t  on    f  ^^ ai 
bJcween.  iv.  48:5;  makes  jK-ace  with  Byzantium,  Chios,  and  other  slan.ls.  :,tt:u    s  t  ic 
Scythians,  ami  is  defeated  by  the  Triballl.  iv.  -18(5;  and  the  Amphissmns,  iVJ"'^,  *^ 
foiti  icati  m  of  Klateia  bv.  iv.  499,  5(H1;  application  of.  to  Thebe.-^  f<»»"J'V^!:!  '^^^^'^''f 
the  \  hH    ians.  iv.  409.  r>.r2;  a  lliance  <.f  Athens  and  Thebes  against,   v.  :=«r2.  :>tW;  buc  rs  of 
'      "  ti.e  IV  oponKe..ians  for  aid.  iv..5..«;  victory  of,  at  Chay^m 

ori'aniziti<  n  of,  1  v.  5: f^,  5.52;  aii.l  the  Athenians,  peace  of  DcnKulesb.■t^^c<n.  .%.  ..U, 
on  r  frv  v,,tesat  Athens  in  favor  of ,  iv.  5i:V,  expe.lition  of  ,„to  Prloponiu-s  is  v. 
5  4-  at  the  congress  at  Corinth,  iv.  514;  pnj.arations  of,  f<.r  the  invasioi  td  Persia, 
iv  -.15;  repudiates  Olympias,  and  marries  K^Icopatra,  iv.  515;  ae.d  Al^'-^i'VlVr' I!';^*  Pn 
sions  between,  iv.  51^;  assassinatiov  of,  iv.  5  7,  52;!;  character  of,  iv  519;  discord  m 
tlic  family  of,  iv.  52:'.;  military  eu...  1  luu  of  Macedouia  belorc,  iv.  oo4. 

Philli)  Avi<'."ivus,  iv.  701,  710. 

l'li:lii)pi,  fouiulation  of,  iv.  362. 

Phiappics  of  Demosthenes,  iv.  477,  481. 


INDEX. 


857 


Phllipplzfng  factions  in  Megnra  and  Eui)n^a,  Iv.  479, 
Philippus,  the  Theban  po!em;irch,  iii.  7fi2,  703. 
I'liilippus.  Alexander's  physician.  iv.5S7. 


J^iile'jy.ve,  the,  i.  118. 


Pnlliskus,  iv.  .5ti. 

Philistides.  iv.479.  482. 

Pailistiis,  Ills  treatment  of  mythes,  i.  250;  banishment  of,  iv.  2;?4;  recall  of.  iv  aj'>-  in- 
trigues of.  .against  Plat,)  and  Dion.  iv.25S;  tries  to  intercept  Dion  in  the  Gulf  of 
Tarenrum,  iv.  2a;  at  Leontini.  iv.  27:^>;  defeat  aufl  death  of,  iv.  27.1 

Pfiilokrates,  motion  of  to  allow  Philip  to  send  envoys  to  Athens,  iv.  4.57;  motion  of 
WV}:^  ^''V'".>  ^V»  P^i'ljP.  J^'-  Ml;  iiiotions  of,  for  peace  and  alliance  with  Philip,  iv 
nation  of"  iv" 41-0^"''     '  ^  ^^'  ^^-  ^^^'  '^''  '^'  i'»P«a<^lii"e"t  and  condumiial 

Phi'loktetes,  i.LiU,  208. 

Piiilolaus  and  Diokles,  I.  4:39. 

P!iilome!a,  1.  153. 

^t.w?TA'Jh^.  *';  ^i  fl''?''  .Iv^  ^^^^^"^  ^V  Pr^r>h\,  iv.  .3<?7;  and  Archidamu.s,  Iv.  %7;  and 
the  Pythia  at  Delphi,  iv  3(>8;  suc-essful  battles  of,  with  the  Lokrians,  iv.  .369;  d  -f eat 
and  death  of.  i v. :],():  takes  part  of  the  treasures  in  the  temple  at  Delphi,  iv.  309 

Piiilonomus  and  the  Spartan  Dorians,  i.  4.57. 

Pliilosoj>l!ers,  niytiies  allcirorized  iiy,  i.  254 

^ri'!1t'^*''^'"  JJ^*'"^^^'^^  '"i*^  Hesiodic,  i.  2:32;  Ionic,  1. 201;  ethical  and  social  among  the 

P.iilotas,  alleged  conspiracy,  and  execution  of,  iv.  632. 
l':idox<MMis  Jiiid  Dionysius,  iv.  230. 
I'liiiiens.  i.  155,  272. 
Plile'jy.ve,  the,  i.  118. 

Of  Chai-ies  to.'iv.  62;  a:.KlTheb;;s:i^;73.""' "'  ^"  "'' """'  "^  *^^'^^'^'.^^-  ^''  assistaucS 

Pho'be.  i.  50. 

]'h(«bidas.  at  Thebes,  ill.  748,  750,  751,  784. 

J'jKenx.  i.  1S3. 

^*ii.*275;''  ^■^""'^'^'•""  '^*''  *•  ^^'  su»-rcndcr  of,  to  Harpagus,  Ii.  115;  Alkibiades at, 
Piiokfean  colonies  at  .\lalia  and  EIe;i,  ii.  llfi  ^ 

Phokfeans,  exploring  voyages  of.  i.  (i76;  effects  of  their  exploring  voyages  unon  Gre- 
cian knowledge  and  faii^-y,  i.  676;  emigration  f)f.  ii.  lir,  ^  voyages  upon  ure 

a'rm'v.'u!  5I7""'''''*'  ''''"  ""'  Thermopyte,  i.  431;  townships,  ravage  of,  by  Xerxes's 

^*lIo^?n'i''^V•'•t1?!•  i^PPl'P'iti^n  of  Leonidas  to,  ii.  275;  at  Leuktra,  iii.  814;  and  the  pres*- 

•  .^  iTsf  I    siVt','^'  M,M*.?"'^'^"'  '>'•  ;i6-5;   Thebans  strive  to  form'a  confederacy 

a.^,ai.ist,  1%.  ,^(.9   take  J  e  treasures  in  the  temple  at  Delphi,  iv.  ;m  r>Tl  :m,  4:39;  war 

^i.T;»  5  ^''?,^"^'■/^l''•^•  T  Kd,a,.s  and  Thessallans,  iv.  370;  umler  Onomandiu.s,  iv.  374^ 
PJ  1  .V  ,1^  ^'l-^^-'^'vlo^-  ^■•^S'."'']?'-  PhaliBkus.  iv.  m,  402;  Thebans  invoke  th-..  aid  ,f 
Philip  agunsl,  iv.  4.J9;  applicatum  of .  to  Athens,  iv.  4.39;  exclusion  of,  from  the 
peacea.id  alliance  betxv.-en  Philip  and  Athens,  iv.  4:50,  4.58;  envoys  fro.i  to  Phllii) 
IV.  4;.:.,  4:>.;  motion  of  Philokrates  about,  iv.  4G1:  at  Tlermcmyhi  iv  4  '^treat  nt 
nlaSs!  h-.'Sl'  '^^■^^^"^^'^-  ^  P'"'^l>'  i^'-  46«;  restoration  of,  by  Se  I'hebans  aid  Athe 

^'pnhl'in'  K-'''?;<.'' K^l^^'it^?^'  ^"'  ^^'  ''}}^^!^^^^r  '1"'^  policy  of,  Iv.  380.  400.  677,  696,  725;  in 
Iv.ilMca  iv.  19,  4sl;  at  Megara,  iv.  .17'.»:  in  the  Propontis,  iv.  485;  and  Alexander's  de- 
mand that  the  anti-Macedonian  leaders  at  Athens  should  be  surrei  dcTedTiv  516-  .and 
lMhMno?V;."-w'^-^i  ''^'  ^"^  Antipater,  iv.  703;  .at  Atlu-us,  under  Antinat^r,'iv.  7o;>;  .ami 
;,•  ,:  1  .•  'l'^'  '^  s«'Q::  liiid  Alexander,  .son  of  Polysperchon,  iv.  720;  condemna- 
.;>.  t.f  •')  -o;-'^^'  "^'  '"'•  ''^'  '^**^^''^''^  sentiment  of  the  Atheniank  towal-d,  after  his 

U(  lit  il,  1  V  ,    I  44 

^'5ho  Tl,''VT''^\^'''V.^',!^y^f  ^^*^^"«'  "•  ^^^'  ^'"^^  o^'  ^'y  Athens,  ii.  427;  invasion  of.  by 
•,«,.  >Vh?"''  -^'r  '^'^'-'l'-  '^^'  a»-:eusation  of  Thebes  against,  before  the  Amphiktvonio 
HVi  4<|!)  si)*/  '  resistance  ot,  to  the  Amphiktyouic  assembly,  iv.  365;  Philip  in,  iv. 

Phoku.s.V.  14S. 

Phoicylides.  il.  .53. 

Plioi-kys  and  Keto,  progeny  of,  i.  51. 

Pliorinio  at  PotidjB:i.  ii  494;  at  Amphilochian  Argos,  ii.  521;  at  Naupaktus,  il.  557;  his 

\  jctori.'s  ov»-r  the  P.doponncsian  fleet,  ii.  569,  572;  in  Akaruania,  ii.  574, 
Phornndus,  disfranchising  proposition  of,  iii.  371. 
Pnoromus.  i.  91. 
Phraortes,  i.  653. 

Phratrics,  i  550.  564;  and  geutos,  non  members  of,  i.  564. 
Phrikonis,  i.  (i32. 


858 


INDEX. 


Phrv.la.  Po^ian  forces  In.  on  Alexandor's  landing.  Iv.  5G2,  5(^;  submission  of  to  Al- 
oxantUT,  iv.  571.  ,         ,,   .       „»*>.«  rroolr?  i  59  fiO:  music  and  worship,  l.  <>44. 

pi;;^K!r;ho^n;^d ian ,  M^;:^--'^,^ ^;S"ai^i  lli^ibiudcs,  lii.  193;  .lepo.it ion  of. 
^'//ifl^^^.I^u-'^KoS^aredlmS.^!  ai^ssiuation  of,  UL  225;  decree  res,>ect- 

in}?  tlie  nn'inory  of,  iil.  235. 
Phiynon,  iv.  !:>»•>. 
Phrvxus  and  Helle,  1. 116. 
PhthiotisandDeukalion,  i,  lir-  .^ 

^u'cti?,  first  use  of,  in  the  sense  of  nature,  1.  ~Si. 
Pli\e-Atheno.  ii.59.  ,^ 

Phii':'!  occupatPof  j^^  olii^archy  at  Thebes,  ill.  763. 

K5S^s?i"icl\^-^^^^^^^  the  Greeks,  i.  '^ 

Phytalids,  their  tale  of  Demetcr,  i.  »U. 
Pljyton,  iv.  225.  .  ^.  *  -=o 

Piei  iaiis,  original  seat  or,  1.  «od. 

?S;,^fvl' Al«a'i..t?incl  D.r|ns  on  «...  Iv.  ^^. 
Pindar,  his  treatment  of  niytues,  i.  2oi. 
Pindus.  i.  :»:5. 
Piracy  in  early  Greece.  1.  •SJb,  Ai.y 

?£Ss  S;^£  o!?nr,.'R%-uto.  451, 513;  Iv.  6=4;  and  Eleian«,  i.  5.3. 515. 

Pissuthnes.  ii.  468,  iii.  48b. 

Pit:tno,  i.  ('>ol.  •*  „«  «   r^i; 

Pittakus,  power  and  merit  of,  i.ru,b. 
P-ilnie  at  Athens,  ii.  5-i:i;  revival  of.  u.  Tu^fi. 
i-  .ii,u(  ''i  ''V;r,  .  ,•  „„    rti^r.iit..«    ipt,\v»'en.  I 


Plat.T-ans  at  Marathon,  ii.  107.  ;  ^     n^turn  of  the  Heraklelds,  i.  2S:..  his 

Pinto,  his  treatment  of  "lyth^f; J- ^fij- 2^1'  ^^Z'.,^^^^^^^^  ur,  42S;and  Xen- 

Republic  and  the  Lykurt;ean  in^^t  titions.J.  \    '  ^^^^'iV'nsion  an.l  iniproveineiitM,f  the 

opAon.  evidence  of  abimt  ^ok^i*  ;'f •  '  V''  >,.''p„\.nos  •  of  his  diah.Kues.  iii.  4....:  ami 

?r±he'ei;!aa-^?k?SuU"'it'"^.?  ^Z1S;;,.  of  M.c.aonl..  iv.  344. 
Plausible  fiction.  1.  260, 31  i. 
i'SSi  &S.  1. 463. 4«J,  m:  on  tho  ephor  Epltadeus.  1.  500;  on  Pcrlkles,  iU 

55"' 
Plut.arch  of  F.retria,  iv.  419. 
Plyntcria,  iii.  214.  . 

Podalfirius  .and  Machaon,  i.  iw. 

unoiiuc  or  moralizing,  'I-  52. 
pi.lemarch,  Atheninn.  i._r)»vs, 
PoU'm-'ircl'.s.  Ri>artau,  i.  ;>2t>. 
Poh-marchus,  iii.  :>n. 

Political  club  at  Alhei.s  ill.  m  periklcs,  ii.  5^6. 

Politicians,  ncW  elass  of,  at  Ain(  ns.  aiw,i 
pOllis'  dcf.at  of.  by  Chabnas,  Hi.  .bS. 
Puliux  aud  Castor,  i.  I'oU. 


IKDEX. 


859 


Polyarchus,  iv.  .11'). 

Poly  blades,  iil.  VA. 

Polybius,  his  iraiisformatiim  of  mythos  to  history,  I.  20<5;  perplexing  statement  of,  re- 
spectini,'  the  war  bet  wen  Syl):irLs  and  Krotou.  Ii.  23b;  the  Greece  of,  iv.  744. 

Polycliaris  and  Eua'pliuus,  i.  BiivS. 

I'olydamas  of  Pharsabis,  iii.  7S:». 

I'olydamas  tiie  Macedonian,  iv.  G.35, 

I'olVdainidas  at  Mende,  ii.  718. 

Polykrates  of  Saiiios,  ii.  136. 

I'olynikes,  i.  18:-^,  I'Jl,  194 

I'olyphron,  iv.  48. 

Puly.sp(»rchon,  appointed  by  Antipater  ns  his  sncces.=;or,  iv.  714;  plans  of,  iv.  7M; 
edict  of,  at  Pella.  iv.  7i5;  Phokion  and  A;;noiiidcH  lieurd  before,  iv.  72U;  and  Kassan- 
der,  iv.  726,  73;5,  740;  fli.alit  of,  to  Alttdia,  iv.  731. 

Polystratus,  one  of  the  Four  Hundred,  iii.  231,  237. 

Folyxpna,  death  of,  i.  205. 

l\)lyzelus  and  Hiero,  ii.  359. 

1'onipe.y  in  Colchis,  i.  176. 

1 'on tic  Greeks,  iv.  7S5. 

J'ontic  Herakleia,  iv.  7S6-79.1. 

Pontus  and  Ga^a,  children  of,  1.  51. 

Popular  belief  in  aucicnt  mythes,  i.  25G,  258. 

I'  )nis,  iv.  651. 

Poseidon,  i.  50,  53;  prominence  of,  in  ^olid  legends,  i.  108;  Erechtheus,  I.  151;  and 
Athene,  i.  15;i;  an  1  Laoniedcm,  i.  196. 

Positive  evidence,  in«lispensablo  to  historical  proof,  1.  2.58. 

Positive  tendencies  of  the  Greek  mind  in  tlie  time  of  Herodotus,  Ii.  60. 

Po.st-Homeric  poems  on  the  Trojan  war,  i.  202. 

Potidcca  and  Artaliazus,  ii.  315;  relations  of,  with  Corinth  and  Athens,  ii.  492;  desicrns 
of  Perdikkas  and  the  Horinthians  upon,  ii.  49.1;  revolt  of,  from  Athens,  ii.4!t.3,  Athe- 
nian victory  near,  ii.  494;  blockade  ot,  by  the  Athenians,  ii.  195, 5:j4, 517  ,.559;  Brasitlas's 
attempt  upon.  ii.  724;  capture  of,  by  Philip  and  the  Oiyuthiaus,  iv.  36U. 

Praisiae,  expedition  of  Pytiiodorus  to,  iii.  UG. 

Praxitas,  iil.  <W8  seq. 

Priam,  i.  157,  ii.  115. 

Priene,  i.  C-21,  r.2ti,  4-!=!. 

Priests,  EKVptiaii,  i.  692. 

Primitive  and  historical  Greece,  I.  a3.9,.^t9. 

Private  proi)erty,  rij^^iits  of,  at  Athens,  iii.  37.5. 

Probability  aloiie  not  sullicient  for  historical  proof,  i.  257. 

Pro-Bouleutic  Senate,  Solon's,  1.  592. 

Probuli,  board  of,  iii.  164. 

Prodi kus,  iii.  4i)9,  415. 

Prtetes  and  las  daughters,  i.  97. 

Prokne,  1.  153. 

Prokris,  i.  154. 

Prometheus,  i.  50;  and  Zeus,  i.  SI,  R9,  91;  and  Pandora,  i.  87;  and  Epimotheus,  1. 83. 

Property,  ri;^hts  of,  at  Athens,  i,  586,  583. 

Projiheeies,  Sibylline,  i.  220. 

Propontis,  Pliokiou  in,  Iv.  4S5. 

Propykea,  biiildini,'  of,  ii.  465. 

Pi'otagoras,  iii.  407,  4U9,  416. 

Prote.silaus,  i.  200;  ii.  343. 

I'rothous,  iii.  809. 

Proxeuus  of  Tes'ca,  iii.  830. 

Pi-ytaneium,  Solon's  regulations  about,  1.  003. 

Prytanes,  ii.  77. 

I'ry tallies,  ii.  77. 

Prytanib,  iv.  m). 

I'sammenitu.s,  ii.  12.5, 

Psanimetiehus  I.,  i.  696. 

Psammetichus  aud  Tamos,  Iii.  724. 

Psammis,  I.  7<i2. 

I'sephisin,  Demophantus's  democratieal,  iii.  233. 

Psephisms  aiul  laws,  distinctions  1)et\veen,  ii.  441. 

Psyttaleia,  Persian  troops  in,  ii.  305,  ;]<»:). 

Ptolemy  of  Alorus,  iv.  -IS;  and  I'elopidas,  iv.  .57;  assas.^.inatlon  of,  Iv.  73. 

Pt:olem.y  of  E,;ypl,  attack  oi'  I'erdikkas  on,  iv.  712;  alliance  of,  with  Knssander,  Lysi- 
niaehuo,  and  Seleukus  against  Antigoims,  iv.  731,  7:!.;,  741,  742;  proclamations  ol'i  to 
the  Greeks,  iv.  732;  Lysimachus  and  iCassander,  pacilicatiou  of,  with  Antigonus.  iv. 
7;J;i;  in  Greece,  iv.  7;^"). 

Ptolemy,  nepliew  of  Antigonus,  iv.  733; 


860 


INDEX. 


Pnbllo  jmonklntr.  its  early  orirln  and  intollrctual  effects,  i.  C31. 

Pui!  iHb?5u  xaiuler's  n..nr,.u-sts  in  the.  iv.  Ool. 

?;?'liS::^S^.f!i^' Ainlilt^sfrums.  il.  493;  slego  of.  by  Archolaus.  iii.  252;  and  Philip,  .v. 

VyhvAorso,  i.  HI. 

:i;.;;i;jnK\^;'tho  La-'^m-i^'^- ^^'  fe;  ;K!lo|^.l.;aiht  V i...  l.y  th.  Athenun., 

ii  "is-  rocaph.re  of.  l.y  the  Laceil^inouians,  ui.  2ui. 
ryi:inu<ls.  EKvptian,  i.  t'lH, 
Fvn-hiv  and  Dtuka  i..n.  i.  K>2. 

K;:;:!u;s:  Kof  EpiJuJanll  Antipatc;r,  son  c^^^^  iv-  741. 

Fv  haSoras.  tlu'  i.hilc.soph»;r,  i.  ^s2  u- 2-23-^J.  2o5. 
Pythagoras,  the  tphesian  despot  i.  bZi. 
Pytlia'-corean  ordir,  u.  21t.,  2;2!i.  ^->. 
Pythagoreans.  Pluto  and  Lioii,  iv.  246. 

gEhSfthe;  Jf  Delphi,  and  Philomelus.  iv.  36S. 

^^S  ^;S"S 'Si.  672,^755.  821.  iv.  467. 

Pvtiiius,  the  Phrygian,  ii.  248. 
Pvthodorus.ii. -.86  8^1).  Ill  110. 
Python,  mission  of.  to  Athens,  iv.  477. 
pythonikus,  iii.  49,  62. 

Quadriremes.  iv.  190. 

R.ices  of  men  in  "Work  and  D^yS'''';.^-   ,  p,  070-  views  naramonnt  in  the  nor.ieric 
Prli^hms  ceremonies  asoiirce  of  "^ythes  1  Rl,  -  >'  ;^^^,.  ^-r^.^^ks.  i.227,  2:5:5;  le.sti%als. 

PJiadamantlius  and  Miuos,  i.  lOi). 
liliapsodes,  i.  :-455.  359. 

l;l,.'iiiiin.  1.  -■:*■■  1  "•  -''I'"-  IV!  ,  "!.",,,'[;/■,■  ,;.iit>rtlH'  Atl.ri.lwlis  at.  ill.  ir,  iyi.-.li..>n» 

::r^si^i^ion?i:i:!^:  ;^^.'- i.>:iv:*i^sr;;i.«;;^/^.  w.  216. 2ir.  ^^o.  223;  and  Dumysms 

tiu^  Yount;er.-iv.  2<J<;;.'rinioleou  at.  iv.  M. 
l;iictoric.  ii.  4:")!;  iii.  3y.,_4li|t. 

]l!,luiu,  PlioniiU.  1"  "%^;«     ''H.Vi  ■■  ;>,„„efl.-ii.  tifot  nt,  til.  185, 703,  W,  2?r,;  D^rioiis  i»t. 
''?;,■''^^'f;"";u';'.f  rVlim  SlilSa!  Sh.  'S ?uvolt  or.  rro...  AtHou^,  IV.  3.21  ..ege  or,  b,  DC 

r.l'"iSS  r;,d  V;,c"«aill%rcha..roneto.  iv.  5.1. 

Kluelvus  of  aanios,  ii.  50.  % 

pK'SSHoJi^ic.  1.60;  ecstatic.  1.61. 

Kivi-rs,  of  Greece,  i. ..%., 

Romances  of  cliivalry,  i.<r<».    ,..^„  ,  /.,«  .       ,. 

?;;;;;?;:;i'\"s';;l.o.tf;T.;r"i'L?;:;:'i"5&,'i.UVs  o„i.ioa  as  to «.  chanco»  or  Ai«aT,dor, « 

Komi'lSSt  orVim;';^^^^^  531);  1.W  or  debtor  ami  crt-dltoi-  at,  I.  013. 
Roxana,  iv.  613.  7<A).  710,  io«J,  «oo. 

a::;?.!  &^:p^'h?.'S.'l"TL?;;^  s;«?s  ^-iiiffiv.  ..cs,  4=3,  po..ition  or  mmp  artor 

thr  seconci.  iv.  471;  the  tluni,  iv.  4.V.K 
Saeritices,  i.  81;  human,  in  trreece.  i.  u». 

Saints,  lei^ejuis  of,  L  2»S. 

Sakidas,  ii.  r,l.  ».>       .     „i. 

lililSJirihe  sS,>cnt  of.  i.  143;  war  between  AUiens  and  Megara  about.  I.  5n;  retreat 


INDEX. 


861 


of  the  Greek  fleet  from  Artemlsinm  to,  ii.  201,  201;  the  battle  of,  i'.  202-nM-  Pprsian 
and  Greek  llcet.s  atler  tlie  luitlle  of.  ii.  5S2:  migration  of  Atli(>iii.ins  to,  on  .^Irnlo- 
mus's  approach,  ii.  318,  seizure  of  prisoners  at,  by  tho  Tliirty  Tyrants  ar,  Atlieii.s  iii. 

Salamis  in  (!yprus,  i.  150,  iii.  724. 
Suliiioncus.  i.  1U8. 

Saniiati  exiles,  application  of,  to  Sparta,  ii.  1:57;  attack  of,  on  Siphnoc?  ii  i.'is-  .at 
Zanklc,  11.  ((.  '  1  .     •   '     ,   .lu 

SaTiiiaiis  a)id  Athenians,  contrast  between,  ii.  140;  .sl,uii,'htf'r  of  I)y  Oimes  i'  ]•>•  -f 
Lade,  ii.  113;  mii^ration  of,  to  Sicily,  ii.  174;  transfer  of  tlic  fmid  of  ti.(-  c/>i'if,',i!.i-a<"v 
aTh"  V^'-'Vm^  Alliens  proposed  by,  ii.  424;  application  of,  to  aparta  foj-  aid  again.st 

-*\.  tlll^  1 1  S^    ll»    'ill*. 

Saninites,  iv.  218. 

Samo.s,  roundation  of,  I.  623:  condition  of,  on  the  accession  of  Darius  ITvst-isncs  ii 


V,.>  .1.  .'^  -:».tm-iMuns,  ij.  i',),,  4(ii;  anil  :>mctus,  dispute  between,  about  Pricne  ii 
4^>b-,  Athenian  armament  af,'ainst,  under  Peiikles,Sophokles,et.'.,ii.4C,8;bloeKa.le<l'  ii! 
4(.0;  Kovernimmt  of.  after  it.s  capture  l)y  Periklcs,  ii.  47:);  deinocratical  revolutioii'ac 
!i-  •><?]  lJ^^Y«^i"tul  Athenian  fleet  at,  bc.  412.  iii.  17!);  oli-archieal  conspinicv  at,  iii. 
lUl,  2U2;  cmljassy  f roiu  the  Four  Hundred  to,  iii.  214,  2i;i;  Athcniau  dciuoclwv  re- 
constituted at,  in.  21.j;  the  Atlit'iiiau  democracy  at,  and  Alkii>ia(ies.  iii  21t;-  ea"-'M-. 
ness  of  tlie  Athenian  democracy  at,  to  sail  to  Peiranis,  iii.  2W;  envoys  fron  \p'o3 
to  the  Athenian  Demos  at  iii  220;  Atiienian  democracy  at,  contraste<l  with  tlio 
olm'arclij;  of  the  Four  Hundred,  iii.  2:J3;  Strombiehides's  arrival  at.  fro.-n  th-  Helles- 
pont, in.  241;  Alkibiades's  return  from  xispendiis  to.  iii.  251;  Alkibiades  sails  fro-n 
to  the  Hellespont,  iih  24:^;  Alkii)iades  at  B.C.  407.  iii.  243;  Alkibiades  leaves  Antioelms 
in  command  at,  ill  2. o;  di^^satisfaction  of  tlie  armament  at,  with  Alkibiades  iii  '>7(i' 
Konan  at,  ui.  28();  Lysander  at,  iii.  316," 324;  conquest  of,  by  Timotheus  iv  TO  ^ 

Sainotiiraciaus,  exploit  of,  at  Salamis.  ii.  303.  ' 

Sxiisala,  canture  of,  by  Alexander,  iv.  651. 

Sapnho,  i.  229,  531). 

Sanlinia,  proposition  of  Bias  for  a  P.xn-Tonic  emigrration  to  ii  iia 

irVr^'V^'f;  W^v^"^^'  ''y^^'y^JS.  »•  11'.':  -H^ivcliof  Ari.sta'-oras 'to.  and  bumin-of, 
1 .  10.);  march  of  Xerxes  to,  and  collection  of  Ids  forces  at.  ii  243-  march  of  X.-Pveq 
li.  24h;  retirement  of  the  Persian  army  to,  after  their  defeat  at  MVkale  ii  3I>-  Al'lM 
buid.'ssiiiipnsonment  at,  and  escape  from.  iii.  253;  forces  of  Cvrns  t\v''  YoiniK'^-r 
collected  at.  m.  49();  inarcii  of  Cyrus  the  Youn-er  from,  to  Kuuaxa,  ill.  492;  v  c&y 

of  Ai,'esilausneaiMii.  01.,  .surrender  of   to  Alexander,  iv.  571. 
Sarissa.  iv.  552,  575. 

Sariaaiians,  i.  6^. 

Sarpe.l'.jii,  i.  164. 

Sata.-ipes.  i.  OSt). 

Satrapies  of  Dnrius  Hvstaspes,  H.  133. 

iatvrus  of  HerSdeH  Iv  -S9^^'^^^'  ^"^^^"*^°'s  of,  Ii.  130;  of  Alexander,  iv.  655. 

Satyrus  the  actor.  iv.'378,  4;i3. 

Satyrus  H.  of  Bosp;)rus.  iv.  799. 

^''j^[J^^J"iJI!}^»aticus  and  Snorro  Sturleson  contrasted  with  Pherekydes,  and  Hellani- 

§^'n!fk-^'"'"^'^^r"  -I"''  Euboic,  i.  452.  455;  ^ginacan,  Euboic,  and  Attic,  I.  620. 

Scandinavian  Teutonic  epic,  i.  280.  .   •   w. 

Scardiis,  i.  393. 

Science,  physical  commencement  of,  amons?  the  Greeks,  i.  2:33 

bcientitic  views,  opposition  of,  to  religious,  among  the  Greeks,  i.  2'57-'>:l3 

heission  between  tlie  superior  men  and  the  multitude  among  the  Greeks,  i.  233 

Sculpture  at  Atbeus,  under  Periklcs,  ii.  4(15.  ' 

Scylla.  i.  47,  IG."). 

Scythia,  i.  655;_parius's  invasion  of,  ii.  149. 


y  tliians,  i.  65.5,  iv.  795;  invasion  of  Asia  Minor  and  Upper  Asia  by.  I.  6.";9;  sn-ong  im- 
l^''S^'^^l^''x'i^^^;.l]r::']J^:i^'^''^^^^  attack  of  Puilip  <.n. 


Sc 

pre 

iv,  48(i,  639;  and' Alexander,  iv.  043! 
Se<-essi  >n  of  the  mythical  races  of  (Jreece,  i.  296 
Sei.sachth.'i-.i,  or  debtor's  relief  law  of  Solon,  I.  5S2. 
Selene,  i.  5<). 
Seh 

iv.  7:' 


''il?"-nV.l"l'?,"9?,^C,"^'<^^  Kassander,  Lysimachus.  and  Ptolemv  against  Anticronous, 
frTj;'  '  ■■•■*• -i.''  '42;  kassander,  Lysiinachus,  anri  Ptolemy,  T»aciiication  of,  w*th  Anti- 
gonus,  IV.  i.J3;  and  tlie  Pontic  Herakleia,  iv.  7;!2;  death  of,  iv  ;;)' 
Ne  innntines.  defeat  of,  by  the  Rgesta'ans  .and  Cartliaginians  iv  'i  U) 
Selinus.  i  718;  and  Egesta,  ii.  8.3->  iv.  i;v,);  application  (.f,  'o  Syracuse,  iv.  1:^.9;  capture 
of  V^  If;\imil>al,  IV.  112;  abandonment  of,  by  the  rest  of  Sicily,  iv.  IK;  Hermokrates 
ut,  IV.  iiy. 


8G2 


INDEX. 


Selli.  1. 172.  ^  ^^^  jj.  2-3  262. 
Sibyl,  the  Erythm'ja''/-J'/-2oo 


4r.r>.  li. -ti2,  •(">,  f^i^' '^^["o.>o.  relatioiis   of.    <"  /tlnnis   aim    »-5i '»       •  ^      ion  aiis   m, 


l£u;;u?Si&|nSat.  1.  220;  and  Peislstratus.  ii.  CT. 

likerpriii (•*«,' Dukct Ins, !:  pA,..  ,-•  Sicily,  i.  ^21.  Iv.  2G0. 

Sik.-ls.  1.  710:  in  Itnly.  i-  ^U,  .2...  in  Siclij .  .  ^^ 

Sikiunus,  ii.  Slfc..  31  .  condition  of.  1.  5.^:  <^^sP"^^i'V-  j  ms  r>f-);  (v.vinth  an-l 

K'^a".'i  i"S.'J?'A^^"i -""^Whroi  at,  IV.  60, 02,  63. 

Silphium,  i.  70..  ,,  902  mediation  of, 

ii!:;:;!^Kr^rii;-otenK.,  o^,n  *„  .a.t.o  or  T.e™ory.«....^.  - 

sirens,  the,  i.  4*. 


INDEX. 


Rlrls,  or  Tlerkalcia,  i.  729. 

Sisygainbis,  Iv.  (iir,  621. 

Sisyphus,  i.  11-1. 

Sitalkes,  ii.  .'xJy,  576. 

Slthonia,  i.  7(31. 

Sittako,  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  at,  lit  519. 

Skedasu.^,  iii.  811. 

SkepsLs,  Derkyllidas  at,  iii.  625. 

Skilliis,  XcnoMiiou  at,  iii.  o'.tl 


c  '»• 


s 
li. 


Skione,  revolt  of,  from  Atlions  to  Brasidas,  ii.  711;  dispute  about  aft(>r  the  one  year'; 
truce  between  Atliens  an<l  Sparta,  ii.  71ii;  blockade  of,  by  the  Ai,hcuiaus,  B.c.  i^,  ii 
7!0;  capture  of,  by  t!ie  xViheuiaus,  B.C.  lai,  li.  762. 

Skirl taj,  ii.  794,  795,  iii.  S-U. 

Skylax,  ii.  l.'i:^,  161,  iii.  241. 

Skylletium,  i.  7:38. 

Skyros,  conquest  of,  by  Kimon,  ii.  403. 

.Skytalism  at  Aryos,  iv.  S24. 

Skythini,  and  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  iii.  548. 

Slavery  of  debtors  in  *itlica  before  Solon,  i.  58U. 

Slaves  in  legendary  Greece,  i.  3^9. 

Smerdis,  ii.  126. 

Sinintliian  Apollo,  i.  74,  219. 

riinyrua,  i.  627,  6.'3U. 

Social  W'ar,  iv.  o")2,  .357. 

Soeratlc  philosophers,  their  unjust  condemnation  of  rhapsodes,  1.  357. 

Sogdian  ruck,  capture  of,  l>y  Alexautier,  iv,  64:J. 

Sogdiana,  Alexander  in,  iv.  6:JS,  64U. 

Sokrates,  his  treatment  of  the  discrepancy  between  scientific  and  religious  views  i 
2:;i;  treatment  of,  by  The  Athenians,  i.  2;J5;  and  the  sophists,  ii.  152;  at  t!ie  battle  of 
Delium,  ii.  6!K);  and  Alkibiades,  ii.  770;  and  Kritias,  ii.  7;(l;  at  tlie  Athenian   \s.s.-m- 
biy,  on  tlie  generals  at  Arginusae,  iii.  :]()2;  and  the  Thirty,  iii.  ;]28,  :>J8;  dislike  of 
t()  teaching  for  pay,  iii.  403;  life,  character,  philosophy,  teaching,  and  death  of,  iii. 

Solemnities  and  games,  i.  104. 

Soli  in  Cypi'us,  i.  607. 

Sollium.  Atlienian  capture  of,  ii.  530. 

S<.lon,  civil  condition  of  Attica  before,  i.  557;  life,  character,  laws,  and  constitution 
of,  J.  5?6-61o. 

Sophokles.  his  OEdipus,  i.  1S7;  his  treatment  of  mythes.  i.  23S;  Perikles,  etc.,  Athenian 
armament  under,  against  Samos,  ii.  468;  ,^Eschylu.s  and  Euripides,  iii.  ;i87. 

Sophokles  and  Eurymedon,  expeditions  of,  to  Sicily  and  Korkyra,  ii.  Wl,  666,  828. 

Sosis,  iv.  276. 

Sosistratus,  iv.  746,  749,  754. 

Sparta  and  Myl:eiuie,  i.  l:l7;  occupation  of,  by  the  Dorians,  1.  2S9,  443,  45S,  475;  and  the 
disunion  of  Greek  towns,  i.  418;  not  strictly  a  city,  i.41i);  inferior  to  Argos  and  neigh- 
boring Dorians,  b.c.  778,  i.  446;  first  historical  view  of,  i.  459;  not  the  perfect  Dorian 
type,  i.  l^Ui;  pair  of  kings  at,  i.  469;  classiftcation  of  the  populatiini  ac,  i.  475;  syssitia 
and  public  training  at,  i.  486;  partition  of  lands,  ascribed  to  Lykurgus,  i.  4i«-5U4; 
jirogressive  increase  of,  i.  5iHJ;  and  Lepreum,  i.  515;  and  Mantineia,  i.  518;  and  Ar- 
cadia, i.  51S;  and  Tegea,  i.  51i);  bones  of  Orestes  taken  to,  1.519;   acquisitions  of, 
toward  Argos,  i.  520;  extensive  possessions  and  power  of ,  n.c.  540,  i.  52:5;  military 
institutions   of,   i.    525;    recognized    superioritv   of,   i.    .527,  (i58;    peculiar  !::overn- 
ment  of,  i.  5:J;;;  exclusive  character  of  her  festivals,  i.  78r ;  musical  and  poetical 
t(!ndencies  at,  ii.  47;  choric  trainhig  at.  Ii.  47  ;  first  appearance  of,  as  head  of 
Peloponnesian  allies,  ii.  95, 98;  preparations  at,  for  attacking  Athens,  after  the  failure 
of  Kleomenes,  il.98;  and  Croesus,  ii.  109;  and  Asiatic  Greek.s,  ii.  ll;j,  iv.  .59.  61;   and 
Samian  exiles,  ii.  I:f7;  and  Aristagoras,  ii.  163;  treatment  of  Dai-ius's  herald  at,  ii.  isi; 
appeal  of  Athenians  to,  against  the  Medism  of  .l<:'>:ina,  ii.   182;  war  of,  agaiiHt 
Argos;  B.C.  499-495,  ii.  183;    no  heralds  sent  from  Xerxes  to,  ii.  264;  Pan-H'ilenic  con- 
gress convened  by,  at  the  Istlimus  of  Corinth,  ii.  261;  leaves  Athens  undefendetl 
a.gainst  Mardonius,  ii.  317;  headship  of  the  allied  (rrei^ks  transferred  from,  to  Athens, 
11.  3.5;  anil  Athens,  first  open  separation  between,  ii.  Su,  378,  ;395;   secret  promise  of, 
to  th(>  Thasians,  to  invade  Attlen,,  ii,  KKJ;  restores  thesupremacvoi  Thebes  in  i3a(etia, 
ii,  40S,  416;  and  the  rest  of  Peloponnesus,  Itetweeu  B.C.  477-157,  ii.  409;  earthquake  and 
revolt  of  Helotsat,  B.C.  4&1,  ii.  4!i9;    Athenian  auxiliaries  to,  againsit  the  Helots,  ii. 
410;  Athenians  renounce  the  alliance  of,  b.c.  464,  ii.  411;   and  Athens,  fxve    veat-.s* 
truce  between,  ii.  421;  and  Delphi,  b.c.  452-447,  ii,  427;  and  Athens,  thirty  vears'"tru;;e 
between,  ii.  429.  ai).i>Iit'ation  of  Sandans  to,  ii.  470;  imperial,  compared  with  imp!  rial 
Atiien.s,  ii.  ■.M)l,  iii.  Wil;  and  her  su»)ject  allies,  ii.  476;    and  Athens,  eonfederacirs  of, 
n.  4S();    promise  of.  to  the  Potidtieans,  to  invade  Attica,  ii.  194;   application  of  the 
Lesbians    to,  ii.  495;    assembly   at,  before    the   Peloponnesian    war,  ii.  497;   rela- 
tions   of,   with  her  allies,  ii.  497;    congress  of  allies  at,  b.c.  432,  ii.  505,   rcq-ii- 


804 


INDEX. 


4Q1    n    ''lOS    51o-  pfforts    of,  to    raise    a 
'^Vmcsi.-^S^'wa;:    U.   5>4;    and    the   Mity- 


Mith  her  neiK'hl.ors  am  "i  5'"' ","t  n  kAtV^  i^  and  Thebes,  war  between, 
kleia  Traehynui,  iii.  (>o!).  <><U;  and  i''"*^'\Vi"  iL  PoHnth  and  Arfros  against,  ni. 
fc'%^^,  iiiN'Hl;  «;ii^tnsf  Thebe?'  A  ens!  Co rluEh;  ami  Ar&>s.  iii.  670,  GTlt 
W<J;  proceedings  of,  a^'ainst  ^"*^'",f'.^Jv;  V^'  it^.,,  and  Koroneia  to,  ui.  b.8; 
consequences    of    the    >'f  ^U'S  of    C      nth,  ;,)i     eonsress  at,  on 

hostility   of.  to   P»rV''^^V?'l'^.'^Zwh^nS^^^ 

them^aeeof  Antulkidas.iu   .  n;  aiidthe  pe.K^^  .^  ^^  ^sospotami,  lii. 

cations  of,  for  Persian  »ifl' !"•. 'l'V>"|ii.  ini^Jo  T^^^^^  proceedings  of,  after  the 
7;!i);  and  C^rec-lan  ontonun  y,  ih.  .■.^.  '■  J.  i»'»^"  V^>-  oppressive  conduct  of  toward 
T>. -u'e  of  Antalkidas.  ni.  731;  restores  1  l'\i^'7;  "/•,.>  aftVr  the  neace  of  Antalkidas, 
S  antiAela,  n.c.  SS(,,  111,735;  '"J«^'V;,^:7;"^.  fifSr  thelJS^-e  oJAntalki-las  liL  7:^; 
iii  7:57;  naval  competition  of  Atheii^s  wjtn,  alter  UR-tH^^^^^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^^ 

of  Athens  to  ix-aco  with.  ''■<^-,(^i"_ '"■'*%  S  defeat  at  Leukti-a  on.  111.  61.; 
S71.  111.  m\m>.  823;  effect  <>'  the  "'^^'^ '  °', J"  p„\n„.a„oe  and  aetlve  eneriiy, 
and  Athens,  difference    bet w«n     In    I»i.6l»eem.m a ^^^^_^^    m.^S":  '«"«■ 

liient'oi  ';?c??J',S"?i*?nr°o';^'  tffi/  A'Sn-rVrom   LeuKtra,  111.  .830;    ,.os,t,on 


Ix;in<I.'r'sde;ith.  iv.  Cu*.*.  ,.ni,ors  1  4(58;  popular  assembly, 


INDEX. 


865 


of'ih';T;r,™i'j.'Sii^;^^^^^^^^^ 


p?«Si«BSH  €iS!E^ 

32.];  and  the  continental  lonians  after  thP  hotH«  ^f  T^frto,  J 11  oVo  i'^'  ^*  Plataja,  li. 
of  the  oracle  at  Delphi  tSfon  war  with  Atfienl  b  ?^^>  »'  k^lA  ^ 'V^rable  answer 
Athenians  to,  before  the  Polom^nno^inn  vtoJ^  il  -ir  V.    -^  ^1  ^i^'  ^^^^  answ(;r  of  tho 

.after  tho  battle  of  Leuktra  i  i  ^X)- rofnl:^!  5  J  i  "'-.^l^;  retirement  of,  from  Bojoti.-i 
Messene.  iv.  S;?!.  losj  Luf  Diiu.  Vm  '  ^^  acknowledge  the  iudependeuce  of 

Spartl,  1.  183,  184. 

Spartokidaa,  iv.  797. 


iemonlans,  ii.  filS,  657;  block- 
lease  of~the  pri;onc,-sTn"ii  'sic"  DemU'lhPneT''"^'"^V?  «"?''<^«|y  to  Athens' for'theT-c- 
attack.  ii.  {!5*;  c<m(litiou  of  on  IheTtf^f-t  f.f- n''^"''?^'''"  ^'^'^  ro-enforcements  to 
tory  of  Deni()sth(a.c>i  aiKl  Kleoi  over  t^hSi.^^?''"''*'^^^^".?^^'?'^  ^^'««i^7  "•  '!^«:  vic- 
da^monians  Jn,  li.  C59;  arrival  of  prlson^^^^^  ^^1  ^^}.\r*^ridev  of  I^ce- 

^,  prisoners  taken  at,  ii.  752-  disk-aLhiseni^nf  -{f  ^!^  '/^*  Athen.s,  li.  6(!2;  restoration  of 
Sphinx,  the,  i.  5'  isr  ^ui>riauchisement  of  restored  prisoners  from,  II.  7U2. 

laWei'lhe^  A^ijf i^ii:^^'"^^^^^'  ^'''  6^3.  651. 

'^^^H^'/'k^-^'^"^  ^^^^^"^^^  raised  With  regard  to  Euglaud.  but  not  with  regard 
Stasippus,  iii.  830. 
Statlra,  iv.  593,  611,  057. 

Statues  Greek,  identified  with  the  beings  they  renresentPfl  t  'm 
Stenyklerus,  Dorians  of,  i  457  '^^"«3  mey  rcprescutea,  1.  JTi 

Steropes.  i.  50. 

sfc:SS?i4i.'7i2.^''''^  ''"^''  ^^^  "*^^'^°'  *•  20G;  dialect  of.  II.  50. 

Sthenolaidas,  the  ophor,  11.  501. 

btrabo  on  the  Amazons,  i  1G2'  hix  version  «f  *k^  a 

and  New  Ilium.  i.21f.;  h  s  tranXiSdJon  of  «;vfH?'''l''H^  *•  ^'^^'  on  Old 

Strangers,  reception  of.  in  lSSrl"aV;2!'..?^,'V,yf_^^^    <-«  history.  1.  251. 

of  Athenian,  after  the  Persian  war, 


S  rangers,  reception  of.  in  legendary  Greece,  13;^ 
Strategi.  Kieistheueau,  iL  75;  enlarged  functions  of 


li. ;««. 
.Stratola.s,  iv 


Rtroiihe,  introduction  of,  ii.  50. 

Stnithas,  victory  of,  over  Thimbron  HI  702 

Srr.v_mon,  Greek  settlements  east  of,'in  Thfece,  1. 761;  Xerxes's  bridges  across  the.  Ii. 

Styx,  I.  51. 

Subterranean  course  of  rivers  in  Greece  I  lOG 

Sureession,  Solon's  laws  of,  i.  601.  '         ' 

r>un,  1.  (41). 

Suppliants,  reception  of,  In  legendary  Greece  1  ^'U 

Susian  Gates,  Alexander  at.  Iv.  621 
SyaKTus.  reply  of,  to  Gelon,  i.  i;38.  ' 

sr  ^^^-'^'^'^^ -'' '^  "».  --"s^"  i?"^-^"  "^  '■  '^'  ^'*  "•  ^^  ^^^"^■ 

Thuririi''',',^ '^'^^'^  "^'  *•  '^'  'l^'f^'a*'  "f.  ^y  the  Krotoniatcs.  ii.  233;  descendants  of,  at 

II  G.  1V.-28 


866 


INDEX. 


S^S^?^^SJa;S.d  Cyrus  the  younger,  mm 

g^lrSioB  at^AthenMli.  77S;  speech  of  Demosthenes  on  the,  iv.  3^. 

IvJIt^ilS' Macedonian",  Iv.  554.  _,_„  **>,„r,inT,  PXTipdltion.  P.c, 


INDEX. 


8G7 


cominc:  into  the  hands  of  Timoleon,  iv.  310;  efforts  of  Corinth  to  reconstitute,  iv. 
311);  influx  of  colonists  to,  on  the  invitation  of  Corinth  and  Timoleon,  iv.  319;  Timt)- 
leon  marches  from,  against  the  Carrh;i)?inlans,  iv.  ;?23 ;  Timoleon  lays  down  his 
power  at,  iv.  3:30;  great  influence  of  Timole<m  at,  after  his  resignation,  iv.;i;i,  ;>i4; 
residence  of  Timoleon  at,  iv.  3;53;  Timoh^on  in  the  public  assembly  of,  Iv,  3:54;  the 
constitution  established  by  Timoleon  at,  exchanged  for  a  democracy,  iv.  Tkl;  ex 
pedition  from,  to  Kroton,  about  b  c.  32<>,  iv.  748;  revolutions  at,  about  B.C.  ajo,  iv. 
1 19,  ?50;  massacre  at,  by  Agathokles  in  collusion  with  Hamilkar,  iv.  751;  Agathokles 
constituted  despot  of,  iv.  75:i;  Hamilkar's  unsuccessful  attempt  to  take,  iv.  TGI; 
barbarities  of  Agathokles  at,  after  his  African  expedition,  iv.  778. 

Syrphax,  iv.  571. 

Syssitia,  or  public  mess  at  Sparta,  I.  485. 

Tachos,  iv.  115. 

Tagus,  Thessallan,  i.  430. 

Talos,  i.  173. 

Tamos,  i«.  724. 

Tamynoe,  Phoklon's  victory  at,  Iv.  420;  Demosthenes  reproached  for  his  absence  from 
the  battle  of,  iv.  421. 

Tanagra,  i)attle  of,  ii.  417;  reconciliation  of  leaders  and  parties  at  Athens,  after  the 
battle  of,  Ii.  41S. 

Tantalus,  i.  132. 

Taochi,  and  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  Hi.  545, 

Taphians  in  Hoiiut's  time,  i.  341. 

Tarentines  and  ithegians,  expedition  of,  against  the  lapygians,  Ii.  364;  and  Messa- 
pians,  iv.  74?. 

Tarentum,  foundation  of  cities  In  the  Gulf  of,  1.  168;  Greek  settlements  on  the  Gulf 
of,  I.  728;  foundation  and  position  of,  i.  730. 

Tarsus,  i.  (i75;  Cyrus  the  Younger  at,  iii.  495;  Alexander  at,  iv.  586. 

Tartarus,  i.  49,  51,  52. 

Tartessus,  I.  C73;  not  visited  by  Greeks  before  b.c.  (>)0,  I.  675;  Koleeus's  voyage  to,  i. 
519,  »j75. 

Tauri  in  the  Crimea.  I.  658. 

Tauromenium,  i.  713;  conmiencement  of,  Iv.  201;  repulse  of  Dionysius  at,  Iv.  216;  cap- 
ture of,  by  Dionysius,  iv.  218;  Timoleon  at,  Iv,  305. 

Taurus,  Mount,  Alexander  at,  iv,  585. 

Tax  larch,  i.  526. 

Taxila,  Alexander  at,  Iv.  650. 

Tearless  Battle  the  iv.  58. 

Tegoa  and  Mantinela,  i.  517,  il.  725,  758;  and  Sparta,  1.  519;  bones  of  Orestes  taken  from, 
I.  519;  refusal  of,  to  join  Argos,  B.C.  421,  ii.  761;  plans  of  the  Argeian  allies  against, 
B.C.  418,  ii.  792;  march  of  Agls  to  the  relief  of,  B.C.  418,  il.  792:  revolution  at,  B.C.  370, 
iii.  8.30;  seizure  of  Arcadians  at,  by  the  Theban  harmost,  iv.  92;  Eparalnondas  at, 
B.C.  ;%2,  Iv.  %,  98,  t>9;  march  of  Epandnondus  from,  b.c.  362,  iv.  101. 

Te^ryra,  victory  of  Pelopidas  at,  iii.  788, 

Telamon,  i.  148. 

Tflegonus,  i.  2(^. 

Tel(;klus,  conquests  of,  i.  505;  death  of,  i.  505. 

Teh'ontes,  1,  558. 

Tek-phus,  l.  144,  200. 

Teleutias  and  Agesilaus,  capture  of  the  Long  Walls  at  Corinth  and  of  Lechceum  by, 
iii.  69U;  expedition  of,  to  Rhodes,  iii.  703, 706;  at  ^Egiua.iii.  708,  710;  attack  of,  on  the 
Peirffius,  id.  711;  at  Olynthus,  iii.  752. 

Telines,  11.  318. 

Telys.  of  Sybarls.  II.  232. 

Temenion  and  Solygeius,  i.  447. 

Temenus,  Kresphontes,  and  Aristodemus,  I.  285;  and  Kresphontes,  family  of,  lowest 
in  the  series  of  subjects  for  heroic  drama,  i.  290. 

Tempe,  remarks  of  Herodotus  on  the  legend  of,  1.  245;  Grecian  army  sent  to  defend; 
against  Xerxes,  ii.  27<>;  abandonment  ol:  the  defense  of,  against  Xerxes,  11.  271. 

Temple  of  Eleusls  built  by  order  of  Demeter,  I.  67. 

Tenedos,  continental  settlements  of,  1.  6*1;  recovery  of,  by  Macedonian  admirals, 
iv.  604. 

Teji,  appointment  of  the,  at  Athens,  ill.  347;  measurec  of  the,  at  Athens,  HI.  348;  peace 
between  the,  at  Athens,  and  Thrasybulus,  Hi.  351;  treatment  of  the,  at  Athens,  B.C. 
403,  Hi.  370. 

Ten  generals  appointed  to  succee<l  Alkibiades,  iii.  278. 

Tennes,  the  Sidonian  prince,  iv.  473. 

Ten  Thousand  Greeks,  position  and  circumstances  of,  HI.  401;  commencement  of  their 
retreat,  iii.  514;  Persian  heralds  to,  on  commencing  tlieir  retreat,  iii.  515;  negotia- 
tions and  convention  of  Tissaphernes  with.  Hi.  516;  rinarrel  of,  with  Ariajus,  iii.  517; 
retreating  march  of,  under  Tissaphernes,  Hi.  518;  at  the  Tigris,  iii,  519;  at  the  Greater 


8G8 


INDEX. 


7ab  iii  521-  summoned  by  Ari»us  to  surrendor,  Ul.  r,2r);  difUrrss  of ,  after  tho  soiz- 
S^of  the  IViK-rals.  iii.  5'/;  new  Kenerals  api»ointed  l»>  ii.  r,27;  Krei't  ascendency  of 
X^Mionhon  over  il  5JU;  crossinK  of  the  (ireat  Zab  by.  iii.  "kK;  harassiiiK  attaclis  of 
ilfe  K-rsi"  n  ckval  T^  iii.  5;«;  retreat  of,  along  the  ^ijjris  iii.  '^U  and  the  Kan lu- 
cMans  ii  °57.  at  tliV>  Kentrites  iii.  WO  seq.;  in  Armenia,  in.  WJ;  and  t  he  (.lialybes,  i 
^^uiVh^^>ehi.  iii.  :>15;.an<I  theSicythlui.  iU.  547;  fif^V si«m  ..f    h^J;-.  xine  Uy,  d  . 


^'^aS;^ni^^\n:^^^t^rU^^  and  Arist^crehns.  liL 

'Sv,  Snder  the  LileodaMi'umi'ans.  iii.  5.S8.  Ml,  ill.  (H-',  615;  in  Hys  a    u.  :.Si);  Xenoph.m  s 
firewell  of  iii.  51)1;  elTeets-of  their  retreat  on  the  Greelc  mind,  iii.  &W. 

?eos''f«u«dS^^  on  the  conquest  of  Harpaj^us,  il.  115;  loss 

Xto  AtSs,  B.C.  412,  iii.  171;  capture  of  by  tlac  Lacedoemoniaus,  ai.  2.0. 

Tereus,  L  153.  *    ^#  .t  ^.^ 

Terpnder.  1.  360;  musical  improvements  of,  iL  44. 

Tenkrian.s?the,  1. 218;  and  Myslans,  ethnical  affinities  and  migrations  of,  i.  642. 

T«'ukrus,  i.  lf>U. 

Teukrus  the  metic.  III.  61.  ^    •      m         i  onn 

le'JllSlTull^KaSd^n'a^il'n  ^P^^^^^^^^  the  Grecian,  i.  '2S0;  points  of  dis- 

TlV^"es^XeS"hanU'and"py^^^^^^^  predictions  ascribed  to.  I.  347;  stwestion 

of  reVpectiiirthe  twelve  Ionic  cities  in  Asia.  i.  m\;  pliilosopliy  and  celebrity  of, 

i.  216. 
Thaietas   IL  47  48 
Thiiniyris,  analogy  between  the  story  of,  and  that  of  Marayas,  i.  045. 

ThallSSs"  Cyrus  the  Younger  and  his  forces  at.  Hi.  400;   Alexander  crosses  the  Eu- 

Th^I'so'f  island''of!^:7R2;  attempted  revolt  of.  from  t^e  Persians.  ii.lS<);  contributi^^^ 
levied  bvXnrxes  on.  ii.  2rHi;  revolt  of.  froni  the  confederacy  of  Delos,  ii.  4!»7;  block- 
ade and  c^,nJuesTof,  B  c.'4<U-46:i.  ii.  4U«;  application  of,  to  Sj-arta.  for  aid  against 
AtheS"  ii-^W:  expulsion  of  the  Lacedaemonians  froni,  in.  i^:  reduction  of.  by 
Thrasyllus.  iiL  269;  slaughter  at,  by  Lysander,  iii.  316. 

Theag1Iil?3  of  Vlhegium.  the  first  to  allegorize  mythical  narratives,  i.  254. 
Thi'aitenes,  desiKJt  of  Megara,  i.  551.  ^    _ ,  ,.,  .„„ 

Theater,  Athenian,  accessibility  of,  to  the  poorest  citizens,  hi.  386. 
Thchaid  of  Antlmachus,  i.  188, 

?!;::r.i;l;\SftiS^t'Jf  ^S^.Sr<CcK>i^t?SS!'t.'ii'ti,  2Sfi;  leaders  put  to  de..th  .after 
the  battle  of  Platfea,  il.  r>!6;  prisoners  in  the  night  surprist; at  Vlata?a,  slaughter  of. 
Ii  MyrmflitarV^^^  of,  ii.  (WG;   band  of  Three  Hundred,  li.  (xSl;  exiles  at 

TltKs\and''Kiotans,  I.  147;  against  the  seven  chief s,  i.  100 ;  appHcn tion  of  to 
linatlr  assistance  against' Athens,  11.  %;  and  Xerxes's  invasion  ii.  2.;.;  ^1^=^ 
l^  the  Athenians  at  Plata^a,  Ii.  Xil;  night  surprise  of  Platrea  by,  u.c.  4..1,  li.  .1.,  (  np- 
tiUofrln  he  night  surprise  of  hafoa.  11.  518;  captured  n  the  night-surpnse  of 
iSS  si  lughter  of,  il.  ^W,  hundliation  of  Agesilaus  by,  111.  C^;  i'l'V^'V,'/'  'f  u-  v! 
AtStfir  a  i  against  Sparta,  b.c.  35,  111.  662;  and  Spartans  at  the  battle  of  Koio- 
ne£,"ii  .l76;'^and  the  jH^acl  of  Antalkidas,  iii-^'^*;  ^,^H"i«'^»"  ^^4  m  ^r'o" dSun 
from  Boeotia  by,  B.a  ^.  iii- TS8;  Invas^i  of  ^^  J-kls  i^J^i^-^-^'l^ ';^  '  ^  ^  *^"/^^^ 


ance  under  Pammenes  «:"t  by ,  to  Artalm^us    v  ;^2^  as.is^^ 


514;  !•»  volt  of,  against  Alexander,  iv.  5J7. 

TlTJbes  And  fSomenos,  I.  122;  legends  of.  i  IjT.;  J^^  foumlod  by  Tlad^       thrsleges 
principal  families  at.  i.  li;^l;  foundation  of,  by  AiaphiiiU,  i.  U-d;  i»oemson  the  sieges 


INDEX. 


869 


^^^.^I^uul  ^'"'■'i^^  of  the  fallen,  i.  192;  second  siege  of,  I  192?  early  l(Sls  a  ion  A? 
Bceotia  restored  by  Sparta,  ii.  408,416;  mastery  of  Athens  over  Bc^aTff  4 K^.i^^ 
-->.-^i*      r    ,» '  1    •    '^'■^'   ^''    **^     ^*i'i    Sparta,   war    between     bc     ii^n    m     rru 


r.r>r   i.      r  '  "'^""la^i^itLiua  (u  i!.upnron  at,  iv.  68;  application  of  to  Per<5ia  ro  Vk? 
tiun  of  against  Sparta,  l)efore  the  Amphlktyonlc  asS blV   iv  sS-  aecn4t1nn  of' 

Tlsehes  in  Egypt,  i.  (i9U. 
Theft,  laws  of,  at  Athens,  I.  603. 
Theia,  i.  49,  50. 
Thenus,  i.  49,  5;3. 

^cSige'oV'^iSer^rom'^'a^  Aristeides,  rivalry  between,  Ii.  261,  385; 

Xerxes  So?!  tie  S  me  o  An  r'.  n.'l"*"''  S!^  C«ri„th,  at  Salamis,  ii.  :302;  ids  message  £, 
of  S  ainTs  ii  31  V  Wi^^^^^  'A-  -^l^'  }'^''  }?T^i^  to  Xerxes  after  the  battle 

banie  of  S-\ iani  s  ii  -lii.  Jjlof  ""  the  Cvclades.  n.  312;  honors  rendered  to,  after  tho 
n  .... .  of  fol  *hi  •    •     ■*•  ^<^»^atagem  of,  respecting  the  fortification  of  Athens  il  368- 

I  uaascntures  of,  on  tlie  second  charge  of  Medism,  ii.  391-  and  Admetns  ii  ^'n- 

ThiN IJJnis,  i.  53i  ii.  52  ^I^eech  of,  against  Dionyslus,  iv.  206. 

'^^^SZ^'Ahll^^hSiZ^^f^^^^^  *•  ^i  ""t  Hesiod;  i.  49:  Orphic,  i.  55;  Hes'.odic 

ThPol W  H.O  fZ^^^^^'h  {r^''  Hesiod Ic  legend  of  Pan doro  In ,  I.  90. 

IvSa,  ill  fiT  ""  ^^'■"^'  ^-  '^^'  ^""P^^^  "'^  ^*^^^^  ^^'o*"  Leontini  and 

Theology'  triple,'  of  the  pagan  world.  I.  262. 
Tho'^E*^"i''^"^'/*^*^  historian,  his  treatment  of  mythes,  I,  250. 
rheoric  board  at  Athens,  creation  of,  ill.  712. 

iv  7>s-  n!rf'Voml?f/.v."ff  ""f  D^'mosthenes  to,  iv  415,  417;  motion  of  Apollodorus  about. 

V  U-  Pn.V  C-    ?.  r^'^f  I''  ^>}''  IIVP'^'^P^*"!  J"«^  ''^^'»»"^  "'«  t'-^ttle  of  Chcurotu^ia, 

,ii,.;  of'/       .V    "/^^'^'^  '^'  '^-  '^'•'  attempt  of  the  Athenian  property  clasnes  to  evade 
TheJ.Son  hi.  :Si!'^  recourse  to,  iv.  128;  application  of,  to  military  purposes,  iv.Sk 
Thcors,  ii.  -Iu9.' 
Tiicra,  ii.  ;X)0;  foundation  of  Kyrenc  from,  i.  764. 


870 


INDEX. 


2r.l;  Jifcu^itioii  of  th.>  Kenorals  «'iV\']?«lVoii^a  ili  -UK- sc'o^^^^^^^  rnibassy  of.  to  Sparta, 

;;)•  S?'Si£^lK!?SatJ;!Jf  ?ill^M  tS  SSa^^^S^ciaUou  m  the  senate, 
iii::«i;  condemnation  and  death  of  m  the  Four  Hundred,  iii.  222;  his 

'^^;;SShn1eirt^of^t' eSllkiVo^th^^^  to  Sparta.  iiL  234. 

Th'nnrfeelV  movements  from  to  Thermopylae,  ii.  279;  capture  of.  by  Archcs- 

.  TlurnSie  Gulf.  ori|?lnal  "f^"Pants  on,  i. 753  centuries,  II.  426;  Phoklan  defensive 

Tlu'nnopylee,  Greeks  north  of.  in  the  fr^f  tvvo  jentiuie^^  .  thtMjass  of,  ii. 

wall,  at.  1.  «1;  resolution  of  Greeks  t    *^!^"\*-*.r^^^^  Xerxes  from  Therma  to. 

2T:t-   path  over  Mount  CEta  avoid  mp,   i.  277:  movements  or  At  rxe»^  Persian  at- 

ii  279^  ln.pre.ssionsof  X-rx'.'^J^X^e  ainm^'    t' defeild  Vf  o^  Persians 

tacks  uv<>n,  repulsed,  i  .  ^i  ^^^^^'^^^^..^"'""tcr^^^^^  Xerxes  respectin;,'  the  dead 

approaclied  their  rear,  ii.  ^;  nuaneiivers  a.^erioen^i    .  commemorative  of 

{it,ii.2yi;  numbers  slam  at,  on  l><\th  ^idis  ".  ,^i,  in^c^^^^  and  Xerxes,  ii.  293:  eon- 
the  battle  at,  ii. '491;  effect  of  the  batt  e  of,  on  the.GreeKS^  ^^  ^^^ 

duct  of  the  Pelononnesians  after  the  imttlef^f.i^^^^^^ 

Athenians  after  th^  battle  (^f,  ii.2WOnmarchusat^^^^^^^  t^^..^.  application 

the  Athenians,  iv.  3W;  position  J^f  ^'^'^'^J^p'^-Mi '  ^V  ^  c  S17  Iv.  4:«,  440;  importance 
of  the  Phokians  to  Athens  for  aid  against  PhiUp  at,  B^^^  ,^^  iv.'457;  pla"«.«f 

of,  to  Philip  and  At_hens^^.34*,  iv.  ^1.  nmicn  or  ^"»  'P  ^^;,  Athenians  to  join  him 
Philip  aKainst  B.C.  'MP.,  ^J-J^J^''}^  ^-surrender  of ,  to  Philip,  Iv.  463;  professions 
iHlii^^ii^^tl^^^ou^n^^^^  o^  ^^«  Amphiktyons  at.  B.C. 

TSi^fVig'^ontum  and  Gelo,  11.  351;  and  Hiero.  11.  357;  severe  treatment  of  Hime- 
Th^^SSndS  "hfSrJhSSeSikn.  Ifihe  Theban  banquet  to  Mardonlus,  U.  321. 
Thersites,  1.' 2(»2  328. 

?KSri  mVS°e^:and  the  Minotaur,  1.  166;  f .t^^-^^MJliesThe^t  S^^^^ 
IsB^'^d^k'^^'^^^^'^  ^oVsoiraaJi-oi  r/ttlca  by.  1.  565;  bones 

of,  conveyetl  to  Athens,  ii.  403. 
Thesmol,  ill.  569.  ,<.,-« 

Thesmophona,  festival  of,  i.  W. 

TSr^Sg'^hSd^trTatmentof.by  Thebes.  B.C.  423.  IL  725;  severity  of  TTiebes  toward, 

?Rlsi;SeTaUK^  of^^^^^^^  expulsion  of.  from  Boootia.  after  the  bat- 

tic  of  Leuktra,  iii.  821. 
Thespls  and  Solon,  story  of,  i.  6Ub. 

KlSSKn^iriesAiuonlerly  confederacy  of  1.  «!•  ^11^!?""  ra'"^'  *'""'""' 

Tlici 


i.  57S;  mutiny  of,  i.  :iH1. 
Thetis  and  Ptleus.  i.  149.  .       jj  nr.  ,inf -it  ind  death  of.  ii,  703,  iv.  769. 

?£S»s^S;i;^  tLc?Jai^luo-f  lauS  a;^^^  l^Lykurgus.  i.  497.  ^,  ^.. 


moEX. 


871 


Thirty  at  Athens,  nomination  of,  Iii.  .32:^;  proceedings  of,  iii.  325;  execntlons  bv,  iii. 
325;  :i27,  .SJl;  discord  amoncj,  iii.  327;  three  thousand  hoplites  nominated  l)v, 
iii.  .'529;  disarming;  of  hoplites  l>y,  iii.  3.'?0;  murders  and  spoliations  by,  iii.  a"il, 
337;  tyranny  of,  after  the  death  of  Theramenes,  iii.  3:56;  intellectual  teachinp:  forbid- 
den by,  iii.  337;  and  Sokrates,  iii.  3;^;  growing  insecurity  of.  iii.  338;  disgust  in 
Greece  at  the  enormities  of,  iii.  M\;  repulse  and  defeat  of,  by  Thrasybulus  at  Phyle, 
Iii.  .543;  seizure  and  execution  of  prisoners  at,  EleusLs  and  S.alamis  by,  iii.  344;  defeat 


Athens  rescued  from  the,  iii.  5%:  the  knights  or  horsemen  supporters  of  the,  iii. 
590;  Athens  under  the,  a  specimen  of  the  Spartan  empire,  iii.  59i;  compared  with 
the  Lysandr  an  Dekarchies.  iii.  599;  aud  Kailibius,  iii.  6U0;  put  down  by  the  Athe- 
nians themselves,  iii.  605. 

Thorax  and  Xenophon,  iii.  56:3. 

Thrace,  Chalkidic  colonies  in,  i.  759  seq.;  Greek  settlements  east  of  the  Strymon  in, 
i.  761;  conquest  of,  by  tlie  Persians  under  Darius,  ii.  425;  and  Macedonia,  marcli  of 
Mardonlus  into,  ii.  171;  contributions  levied  by  Xerxes  on  towns  in,  ii.  122;  Brasl- 
das's  expedition  to,  ii.  674,691;  war  continued  in,  during  the  one  year's  truce  be- 
tween Atliens  and  Sparta,  il.  714;  Alkildudes  ami  Thrasybulus  in,  B.c.  407,  iii.  26'.>; 
Iphikrates  in,  between  B.C.  ;387-378,  iii.  774;  Iphikrates  in,  B.C.  :3('.8-365,  Iv.  49;  Philip  in, 
B.C.  :i51,  iv.  35)9;  and  B.C.  3-16,  iv.  453,  454;  and  B.C.  :U2r-?A},  iv.  480;  Alexander's  expedi- 
tion into,  iv.  53:^;  march  of  Alexander  from,  to  Thebes,  iv.  54(.l. 

Thraeian  influence  upon  Greece,  i.  62;  race  in  the  North  of  Asia  Minor,  i.  641;  Cherso- 
nesus,  i.  763;  subject-allies  of  Athens  not  oppressed  by  her,  ii.  416;  mercenaries 
under  Diitrephes.  iii.  160. 

Tlu-acians,  in  tne  time  of  Herodotus  and  Thucydides,  i.  .335;  and  Phrygians,  aflfinities 
betwetai,  i.  642,  644;  affinities  and  migrations  of,  i.  642;  numbers  and  abode  of.  i.  758; 
general  character  of,  i.  758;  Asiatic  characteristics  of,  i.  759. 

Thrasius,  iv.  322.  :-r27. 

Thrasybulus  of  Syracuse,  11.  .360. 

ThrasyV>uliis,  the  Atlienian,  speech  of,  at  Samos,  iii.  216;  efforts  of,  at  Samos,  in  favor 
of  Alkibiades,  iii.  217;  in  Thrace,  iii.  269;  accusation  of  the  generals  at  Arginusai 
by,  iii.  292;  flight  of,  from  Attica,  iii.  327;  occupation  of  Phyle,  and  repulse  and 
defeat  of  the  Thirty  by,  iii.  lit?;  occupation  of  Peiruaes  by,  iii.  315:  victory  of,  over 
the  Thirty  at  Peiraeus,  iii.  :345;  increasing  strength  of,  at  Peireeus,  ill.  'diS;  straitened 
condition  of,  in  I^eiraeus,  iii.  350;  at  Pelraeus,  king  Pau.sanias's  attack  upon,  iii.  :i')0; 
and  the  Ten  at  Athens,  peace  between,  iii.  ;i51;  and  the  exiles,  restoration  of,  to 
Athens,  iii.  .353;  honorary  reward  to,  iii.  380;  aid  to  the  Thebans  by,  iii.  665;  acquisi- 
tion of,  in  the  Hellespont  and  Bosporus,  iii.  705;  victory  of,  in  Lesbos,  iii.  705;  death 
and  character  of,  iii.  705. 

Thrasldua?s,  ii.  STu;  cruel  government,  defeat  and  death  of,  ii.  359,  iii.  622,  624. 

Thrasykles  and  Strombichides,  expedition  of,  to  Chios,  iii.  171. 

Tlirasyllus,  ii.  790.  791;  at  Samos,  B.C.  411,  iii.  216;  at  Lesbos,  iii.  il^t;  eluded  by  Mindarus, 
iii.  245;  at  Elaeus,  iii.  '247;  repulse  of  Agis  by,  iii.  259;  expedition  of,  to  Ionia,  iii.  260; 
and  Alkiliiades,  at  the  Hellespont,  iii.  262. 

Thrasymachus,  rhetorical  precepts  of,  ill.  409;  doctrine  of.  In  Plato's  Republic, 
iii.  42;]. 

Three  thousand,  nominated  by  the  Thirty  at  Athens,  ill.  329. 

Thucydides,  altered  intellectual  and  ethical  standard  in  the  age  of,  I.  231;  his  treat- 
ment of  ancient  mythes,  i.  241,  247  seq.;  his  version  of  the  Trojan  war,  i.  218;  on  the 
dwellings  of  the  earliest  Greeks,  i.  314;  his  date  for  the  return  of  the  Heraklelds,  L 
293;  silence  of,  on  the  treaty  between  Athens  aud  Persia,  ii.  422;  his  judgment  respect- 
ing Perikles,  ii.  552,  554;  first  mention  of  Kleon  by,  ii.  5'.)7,  598;  reliections  of,  on  the 
Korkyraju  massacre,  B.c.  427,  11.617;  judgment  of,  on  lileon's  success  at  Pvhis.  ii. 
6<iO;  and  the  capitulation  of  Amphipolis  to  Brasidas,  ii.  699;  banishment  of,  ii.  702; 
on  Kleon's  views  and  motives  in  desiring  war,  B.C.  422,  ii.  726;  passages  of,  on  the 
battle  of  Amphipolis,  ii.  242  seq.  nn.;  feelings  of,  toward  Brasidas  and  Kleon.il. 
7:37;  treatment  or  Kleon  hy,  ii.  737,  739;  dialogue  set  forth  by,  between  the  Athenian 
envoys  and  Executive  Council  of  Melos,  ii.  81'2,  816;  his  favorable  judgment  of  the 
Athenians  at  the  restoration  of  the  democracy.  B.o.  411,  iU,  237;  study  of.  by  Demos- 
thenes, iv.  378. 

Thucydides,  son  of  Melesias,  ii.  423;  rivalry  of,  with  Perikles.  ii.  461;  ostracized,  ii.  464. 

Tliurluns,  defeat  of.  by  the  Lueanians,  iv.  230. 

Tiiurii,  foundation  of,  ii.  460;  few  Athenian  settlers  at,  ii.  461;  revolution  at,  B.C.  413,  iv, 
1'28. 

Thyamia.  surprise  of,  by  the  Phliasians  and  Chares,  Iv.  62. 

Tiivestean  banquet,  tlie,  i.  135. 

Thyestes,  i.  1:35. 

ThVmoehares,  defeat  of,  near  Eretria,  iii.  229, 

Thvmodcs,  iv.  589,  593. 

Thynians.  i.  612. 


872 


INDEX. 


Thyrca,  conqTioet  of,  i.  Kl;  capturo  of.,  by  NIklas.  B.c.  424.  IL  C71:  stipulation  about, 
h'ctwten  Sparta  antl  Argos,  B.c.  420,  ii.  «w». 

f  Sc'lnli^to  that  of  tlK'.  iv.  6*4;  Alexander's  voyage  up  the.  to  Opis,  iv.  bo,. 
Tiiphusios  Apollo.  oriKin  of  the  name,  i.  <-J. 
Timfeus's  treatment  of  niythes,  i.  m 
Tinia?oras.  his  mission  to  Persia,  and  execution,  iv.  66 
TimahUra.  L  139. 

Tlmasion  and  Xenophon,  ill.  5bd. 
Tlnu'Kt'nidas,  death  of,  ii.  336. 
Timocracy  of  Solon,  i.  592. 
Timokrates  the  Rhodiau,  iii.  6oa. 
TiniokratesofSyracnsp.lv   t'J8. 
Tiiiiokreon  and  Tht  nnstokles,  li.  389. 

Timnleon'  "S^Hil^eni  oV.'to  aid  Syracuse.  Iv.  299,  302;  life  and .  character  of  before 
«  r  Ui  iv  2»9  and  Timonhanfs.  iv.  2SW;  preparation-^  of,  for  his  «xped  (  on  to  S>  i.y 
Ju^'^v  i3t^V»ySl'e  o?  Co'rinth  6.',  Sicily,  iv. ;«];  niessaf^'o  f^o"'  W^^.-  as  to,  ly 

y^t  R&um,  iv.  :m;  at  Tauromen.um,  iv.  :^;  at  Adranuin.  iv.  ot:,  -^l  :  !>' ^,  ,"|' " 
rt.4f  of  at  SvracaW  iv  3U7;  surrender  of  OrtyKia  to,  iv.  ij(K.;re  «iiforeeiiient  fro'"  C(^ 

I^f  nVvldi  to  iv  sil-  return  of,  from  Adrunnm  to  Syracuse.  iv.3i:5;  MtssiMu-  d<-.<-la  es 
in  ?avor  of  i;  3l3  cain  re  of  Epipolse  by.  iv.  311;  favur  of  the  u<».ls  tn^vanl  iv  .  , 
Sr,-^xscS.s  hi^sucV^  s^^^  to  the  god.s,  iv.  31<;;  temptations  and  conduct  <.t  ,  i  1  <«- 
?:mi^^  miter  of  Syracuse,  iv.  317;  demolition  of  the  Dioiiyisan  st  ..i.^liol.  in 
nrtv^ii  bviv  37- erection  of  courts  of  justice  at  Synicu.sr  l»y.  iv  3  ;^;  rv|':'»  of 
?xfu-sfo  SyVacuse  i.y  W^  capltulaUon  of  Ilikitas  with,  at  Leont  ni  iv  3-  ;  i;»ts 
down  the  dSots  in  Sieilv.  iv.3-il,3:W;  march  of.  from  Syracuse  against  the(  ar  ha- 
•  ToVJ  VJ  s-)-".  aM^  Thr^  iv  :l>7- victory  of.  over  the  Carthagiiiiaus  at  tlu"  Ivrl- 

SIS  wr^^e^aiS  M^rku^V.  ^seL  pkrtial  defeat  of  hi>^J^:o<;P^.  v  J-.^:^  ic- 
forv  of  ov^Hiketas  at  the  Damurias,  iv.  ■^■,  surrender  of  If '''t'"' »"\' \'  ,'^,^,^  ;'/*^ 
iv  s4  'rSace  of.  with  the  Carthaginians.  Iv. 328;  capture  of  M.^sscne ^'^.jl  V. .»'  'J  ,  >' 
v'SS-  Kys  down  his  power  at  Syracuse,  iv.  3:^1;  ^n-at  iJillu<'nce_  (>f,  aft  •  is  i  s- 
iL^at^'on  at  Syracu.se.  1%.  331.  3^U;  and  the  immigration  «.f  new  Gri-ek  sottlcis  ito 
«:I>u.  \v  •-!•  residence  of  at  Syracuse,  iv.  :^U;  in  the  puldic  as.semb!y  at  hj  raruh.-, 
fv  fe  nnciinuftS  S<?or^^^^^  spirit  of .  iv.  S^',;  freedom  and  prospei- 

Uvin'Sl  "ntrcK luc^^^^^^^^^  diath  and  obsequies  of,  iv.  oAr,  and  Dion,  con^ 

IrLt  be^eeilriv.  S!;rthe  constitution  established  at  Syracuse  by,  exchanged  for 
an  oligarchy,  iv  7l<i. 
Timomachus  in  the  Hellespont,  Iv.  122. 

?i;;;;;l£e;^^^j;^^'KS;*H\^4;clrcumnavigntJon  ^,r^loponne.u.  b^-.  m.  TSO; 

t^^l^S^  it^^'^r^^S^iAn,^^  eJp^ln  ^V  Asia  |;i  .! 
Bc  3W  V  !«•  a  Charidemus.iv.7S,79;  successes  of .  in  M"V.7«''"'"  ^"';  .  *  '  :?'4. 
dikVrV-mv'vUiv  78-  failure  Af ,  at  Amphipolis,  n.c.  :?(;4,^v  .'.»;  and  ^''^>^'')''-^^ 
itVe  ChtVsom^^^^^^^^^^  3<i  Iv.  119:  in  the  lleiiesponr,  B.c  3.'-,7.  iv.  ^^•>>: -7'"^';/  •'"  Vv' 
by  Chares,  iv.  355;  arrogance  and  unpopularity  of,  iv.  3o6,  exile  and  death  of,  iv. 

?is^5SrkSd'fhe^?i'Th!S2uId*?^^^  ^,  542;  embassy  of  Antalkldas  Konon, 

ami  o\he?8  to.  id.  7U?  and  Antalkidas  at  Susa,  iii.  714;  and  the  peace  of  Ant.,lkul..s. 
iii.  71.'5;  an.l  Orontes,  111.  729. 

Tisiimenus,  s<m  of  Orestes.  1.  287,  289. 

TisiMnenus,  the  Athenian,  decree  of,  ill.  3T2. 
r'.slphonus,  despot  of  Phcrae,  iv.  344.  *„  e^„^«  t>  ^    ^1"  in  lfi«^- ind  Chr.l- 


INDEX. 


873 


"!:  fit  ."""iKlf .till.  S;"''*''  '"■  '"■■  """  0»'-'=J"'l'las,  lU.  CI2.  CIS;  and  AgcsUaus, 
Titan  Ides,  tlie,  i.  49. 
Titans,  the,  I.  49,  51;  the  Orphic,  1.  56, 

rSiTlHf 'nf^^  "'•  """"■  Peloponnesus,  It  4»;  defeat  and  death  of.  II.  4K. 

;^'ireTlSSs'';=iS^^^^^  to  Its  reception,  t 

Torglum,  vlct,)i-y  „r  iKathokles  over  Ce  nokmcs  at  Iv  779 

Kfffi-.l^'ITK  """  '''"'""■«  "'•  "y  B'asIdasT5)?^<4'i,t?ro  of,  by  Kleon,  II.  ^l. 

Trades.  Grecian  deities  of,  i.  2-i.  ^'*'*'''^'  *'  **^- 

Tradition,  Greek,  matter  of,  uncertified  i  2.«w-  finttH/Mio  «,„**..     .     ^ 
fraud,  i.  '259.  '  ""^*^^""««.  »•  ■»»,  nctiUous  matter  In,  does  not  Imply 

Tl'.MirOilv         Atlmilin,!         rv>^...<-V.       ^U       5JI      r,^-  .    .. 

111.  385; 
,j,        u    ,;- V,,.., .... ..,.,.  ..departure 

TXm'delS  o*f'phflinZ  'w  S^Pl'r/""  ^^*'\^,  ^^^»  '^*'  Media,  iii.  505 
Tri.>es  and  demes  o?K!5.sS;en^  7"'""^  ^'  Alexander  over.  Iv.  533. 
Trinakia,  town  of,  Ii.  822.  •       •^- 

Ti-'SjlIanf  "JS  *°'  '■  ''''  ^"^  ^"^'  '■  515.  iv.  56,  85. 

T;i[:;flil!'lt6r  ^'  '^^^  ^^^^'^  ^^'•'•'-  »•  ?«2'  P-»-««o«  of  past  time  by  Varro,  1.  262. 

KiEoI!SS?Al.SnS!ri?J'  "'^  ^'^^  ^^^^^^«  ^^^  *^°  Olympic  games.  Ii.  297. 

Tritonis,  Lake,  prophecies  about,  I.  768. 

Trittyes,  1.  559. 

Troad,  the,  I.  217. 

Truas  Alexandreia,  f.  215. 

Troas,  historical,  and  the  TeukrIans.  1.  218. 

Trnezen,  removal  of  Athenians  to.  on  Xerxes's  annroieli   n  9qi 

Trojan  war  Thucydides's  version  of.  1.  219;  the  date  of  i4w% 

Trojans,  allies  of,  i.  200;  new  allies  0/  i  'M>-  and  Phr^frV  „    7'^^ 

Trophonius  and  Agamedes,  1. 119        '  '  ^  ^^  l^tirygians,  I.  218. 

Tros,  1.  19fi. 

Troy,  legend  of,  I.  196. 

thaginiaus  over  Agathokles  near  iv  775- n.wn^^         *'^-  '■'^'  V^'  v'«'-,ory  of  the  Car- 
near,  Iv.  770;  Agathokles  desmf Ws  armV  af  unH^V^^^^^^     "itfie  Carthaginian  camp 

Turnin,  chronicle  of,  i.  279  ^  ^^  ^^'  ^"^  ^^^^  capitulate,  iv.  776.  *^ 

Tyche,  near  Syracuse,  Iii.  89. 

Tydeus,  I.  129,  190. 

Tyndareus  and  Leda,  I.  139. 

Tyndarlon,  Ii.  830. 

Tyndarls.  foundation  of,  Iv,  216. 

Types,  manifold  of  the  Homeric  gods,  I.  224. 

Ty phSeu??'5o^''^^'*''^'  offspring  Sf,  i'si.  ^' 

Tyro,  different  accounts  of  I  ills    ^  capture  of.  by  Alexander,  Iv.  .'i98. 

Tyrrhenians,  O.  Muller's  view  of  the  origin  of  i  6"-, 

Tyrtaeus  and  the  first  Messeniaii  war  I  ^»fi  r;,7  ^'Jl:  „«,„,„„        ,  .     ,.. 

senian  war.  I.  511;  poetry  of.'fi^rageallfd  nil^VeS  of?il!T^  ''^'  *"  ^^"^  '^^^''^  ^^^- 
Uranos,  1.  49. 

Utica,  I.  671 ;  capture  of,  by  Agathokles,  Iv.  772. 
Uxll,  conquest  of,  by  Alexander,  Iv.  621. 

VETO'S  triple  division  of  pagan  theology.  1.  262;  his  triple  partition  of  past  time.  L 

Venetl,  the,  I.  211. 

Villagers  regarded  as  Inferiors  by  Hellens,  I.  418,  419. 


874 


INDEX. 


Villages  nuTnerouB  In  early  Greece,  1. 419. 

Volsunga  Saga,  i.  280. 

war.  the  «r.t  sacred,  ,.  -m-  .M|6;  tbe  social,  Iv.  352, 357,  the  second  sacred,  Iv.  363, 

438  seq.;  the  third  sacred,  iv  489. 
V^vfF'ffeSZ.n^  rHo'mer'fi.  361;  his  theory  on  the  composition  of  the  Uiad  and 

WoS!  SoS  laws  respecting,  i^.  ,  „  , 

Wooden  hort»e  of  Troy,  the,  i.  •'"=';f^'.  -,.  ^.ffp-o  from  the  Thcogony  and  Homer,  i. 

Jt^SMESS'^KStlk,  .w  tracesoMon.  a„. 

the  Homeric  age,  i.  361;  among  the  ureeks.  il.  a5. 
Xanthippus  and  MlUladcs  11.  205  208. 

XcS?is  aid  Pasipn,  deserUon  of  Cyrus  by.  lil.  499. 

xSok'4Ts;emb^ksy^oi,\o  Antipa^^^^^^  ^.  ,j,j^  j^     j.^^  Pythagoras.!. 

X^nophanes,  his  condemnation  of  anclenUcg^^^^^^  and  school  of,  ii.  221 

'>:«•  his  treatment  of  ancient  ^nyth^s,  J- ff/„^"}   .jr/)- on  Spartan  wonien,  I.  468;  his 

Xenophon    his  treatment  of   ancient  mj  thes  1.  ^•*';  *'"    j^^n^e  of,  a»)OUt  Sokrates. 

^O'Spi^'ia,  ii.  ^W:  on  tlu^dikayer ies  JL  4.;  a   d  P^^^^  ^^yvV'n'^S 

iii  431;  the  preceptorial  and  Positive  exnoriaii^  condemnation  of 

remarks  of,  on  tlie  accusation  against  S"^/if_*^^Jrmy  ii,.  491;  dream  of.  after  the 
Sokratcs,  iii.  477;  and  his   oij^^i^lK  o^he  C^yre^an  arm^^^  ^^  ^^^^  Thousand, 

seizure  of  the  generals,  in.  52t.,  ^  V<  i?>^  ^i*  ^"n"  ^,>,,^rId  o  the  Ten  Thousand,  hi. 
after  the  seizure  of  the  P^PiL^^l^' "*,-^='^^'  afte?  be  ui  chosen  a  general.  Hi.  528;  great 
5^7;  first  speech  of,  to  the  Ten  J^^^^'l^^^^l^Jn^iuim  seq.;  and  Cheinsophus,  li. 
a.sc-en<lency  acqulreil  ^y.  ^^^/J^.l  Jp"  ^ians  iii.  5^^^^^  in  the  mountains  of  the  Kaidu- 
5.S5.5:«.f>ir,;  prowessof.against^thePersiaii^s^^iu^.^  ^^^  ^^„  Thousand  at 

ch ians,  ill.  f&7;  at  the  Kentrites  I.  5J),  propo^^^^^^^^  ^;^  Euxine;  Hi.  r,62;  charges 
Trapezus,  iii.  5SS;  his  idea  of  founding  a  nevv  cit>     ^^    ^   ^^j^   sole   command   of 

against,  and  speeches  of,  at  Kotyoia,  ill.  ^'^•,  "'\i\*^r,7|.  and  Kleauder.  Hi.  5.0; 
???Ten  ThousaTul   m,iLT..;  at  Herak    ia  and^  the  Ten  Thousand, 

r,77;  at  Byzantium,  ill.  S'";  an^l  A"  hI  -^sk^'-ind  \rlstarchus,  ill.  585;  and  Seuthes,      . 
ii  f>^l;  rejoins  the  Ten  Thousand   ii.-^^.anf[^^  ^^  Perganuis  in  Mysia,  iii. 

5S6,587  his  poverty  and  sacrifice  t«.Z  us  Mtimmos^  ,        ^^^^^^         Cyreiaiiarmy 

^^^^  ^li^^S  SM ^  &f^:niS^i^^  ,_,„  ,,  Oreece.  ii. 

rnvasion  of  Greece.  11.2  U>.  r,^nAn  Kls  forc.^    hVre^^  ^^"^  '^^'^fr 

inarch  of.  to  Sardis.  and  collection  f  his  J^J^^J^fJ^^t  „n  of  his  bridges  across  the 
across  the  Hellespont,  i-243;  wrath  of.  on  th^^^  .^^^   ^^^^^^  ,,Hdges  of  .over 

Hellespont.li.  246;  PVJ"«^|"^'^5i^Jl  of  across  "he  Isthmus  of  Mount  Athos,  i  .  24(.; 
the  Hellesp<mt.  ii.  24-,:  ship  canal  of,  across  inti-*^^^^^  ^^^^  ^  ^'^.i^^l' 

bridges  of.  across  the  Strymon  11.  Jl.,  (Itmands  or  ^^  ^j^^  I'hrygian.  li.  24S; 

siourii.  ^T.  2f4;  march  of,  from  Sardis  u^^4!i,  mm      j  crossing  of  the  Hel- 

marc-h  of,  to  Ahydos.  11  248;  respect  sho^n^o  HJurn^^y.  u.  ^^.^^^^  ^ 

lespont  by,  11.  251;  march  of,  to  Doriskusll.^u,  revie  .  j^^,     j,   252;  number  oi 

atDorlskus.ii.  25<\252;  n«»"her  ng  of  tlve  army  or  a^^^  255,279,286;  march  of. 

the  army  of.  11.  p;   conversa    ons  of .  with  I  e^^^  -^^^  marches  tr)  Akan 

from  Doriskus  along  Thrace.  ii.2o^  .crosses  ine^ix^^^^  ^  reaching  the 

thus.  ii.  256  march  of,  to  P«^""«' I^h^'I' ^^J%„own  i^^^^^^  in  Greece.  11.  2f4; 

boundary  of  Hellas,  li.  258;  preparations  of  ,knov^n  ^^lore  ^^^^^  ^^^^^      j . 

h??alds  of,  obtain  ^"hmlssion  from  m^my  GreH^-  n^^  inability  of  northern 

trust  in  Greece  on  the  invasion  or.  ii.^<*,  "»" ''•'"^-  resistiner  the  invasion  of.  ii. 
Greeks  to  r^ist,  11.  2r.9;  inability  of  Gelon  to  jmn  g^.'^rgfting  rn  ^^   ^^^ 

270;  the  Thessalians    and  the   ii™i«V  thVdef^nV  ofTempe  ac:^^^^  ^"1>- 

Tempe  against  11.  270;  abandonm|^nt_of  the  defense  or^  ^^^^     .^  ^72;  engagemen 
mission  of  nothem  Greeks  to.  after  J^^  "^cireai  tlrst  encounter  of  the  fle.  t 

of  confe<lerate  Greeks  against  such  as  3  ™.i..v  ^'j^^rmatoThermopylw.  ii.270 
of.vvlth  that  of  the  Greeks,  ii.  278;  no%ements^^^^  ^  of.  with  his  land 

destruction  of  the  fl^-^t  «>f ,  by  storm  at  M^^^^^^  <iefenders  at  Thermopy  ae J^  • 

force,  near  Trachs,  11.  -^'^VoPJ^^t  the  motives  ascribed  by  Herodotus  to,  ii.  280, 
280;  at  Thermopylae,  doubts  about  the  monves  ^ 


INDEX. 


875 


tlio  mountain-path  avoiding  Thermopylae  revealed  to.  il.  282;  impressions  of, 
after  the  combat  with  Leonidas.  ii.  286;  Demaratas's  advice  to.  after  the  death 
of  Leonidas,  ii.  286;  maneuvers  ascribe<l  to.  respecting  the  dead  at  Thermopylae, 
ii.  2'.»1;  losses  of,  repaired  after  the  liattle  of  Thermopylae',  ii.  2'.W;  abandonment  or 
Attica  on  the  approach  of,  ii.  2^1;  occupation  of  Attica  and  Athens  by,  ii.  )i97;  con- 
versation of.  with  Arcadians,  on  the  Olympic  games,  ii.  297;  detachment  of,  against 
Delphi,  ii.  297;  capture  of  the  Acropolis  at  Athens  by,  ii.  298;  reviews  his  fleet  at 
Phalerum.  and  calls  a  council  of  war,  ii.  3t)0;  resolution  of.  to  fight  at  Salamis,  ii. 
301;  Them  istokles's  message  to,  before  t lie  battle  of  Salamis,  ii.m];  surrounds  the 
Greeks  at  Salamis,  ii.o(»5;  and  the  fleets  at  Salamis,  position  of,  ii.  3(X);  fears  of,  after 
the  battle  of  Salamis.  ii.  :^M;  resolves  to  go  back  to  Asia  after  the  battle  of  Sala- 
mis, 11.  310;  sends  his  fleet  to  Asia  after  the  battle  of  Salamis.  ii.  310;  Mardonius's 
proi)osal  to,  after  the  battle  of  Salamis.  ii.  310;  Themistokles's  message  to,  after  the 
battle  of  Salamis.  ii.  311 ;  retreating  march  of,  to  tlic  Hellespont,  ii.  312;  and  Arta- 
yktea.  11.344;  causes  of  the  repnl.se  of,  from  Greece,  ii.  365;  comparison  between 
Mic  invasion  of,  and  that  of  Alexander,  ii.  366;  death  of,  iii.  485. 
Xiithus,  i.  103,  lt)5;  and  Kreusa,  1. 15i. 

Zai).  the  Great,  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  at,  iii.  521;  crossed  by  the  Ten  Thousand 

Greeks,  iii.  532. 
/iagreus,  1.  56. 
Zakyntlius.  i,  743;  Tlmotheus  at,  Hi.  791;  forces  of  Dion  mustered  at,  iv.  5i63,  266;  Dion's 

voyage  from,  to  Herakleia,  iv.  267. 
Zaleukus,  i.  727. 
Zalmoxis,  I.  267. 
Zankle,  i.  718;  fate  of,  ii.  348. 
Zariaspa.  Alexander  at,  iv.  640. 
Zelos,  i.  51. 

Zcno  of  Elea,  iii.  397,  399. 
Zephyrus,  i.  50. 
Zetes  and  Kalafs,  i.  154. 

Zethus  and  Amphion,  Homeric  legend  of,  1. 182, 187. 
Zeugitiie.  1.  591. 
Zeus,  i.  48,50,  51,5-1;  Homeric,  1.  54;   account  of.  in  the  Orphic  Theogony,  I.  56;  myth- 

and 

Zeus'in  the  first  and  eighth,  i.  ^83. 
Z<nis  .\mmon.  Alexander's  visit  to  the  oracle  of,  iv.  &M, 
Zeus  Laphystios,  i.  157. 
Zeus  Lykcjeus,  i.  142. 

Zeus  Mcilichios,  Xeuophon's  sacrifice  to,  iii.  589. 
Zepyrus,  il.  131. 


COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY   LIBRARIES 

This  book  is  due  on  the  date  indicated  below,  or  at  the 
expiration  of  a  definite  period  after  the  date  of  borrowing,  as 
provided  by  the  library  rules  or  by  special  arrangement  with 
the  Librarian  in  charge. 


DATE  BORROWED 

DATE  DUE 

DATE  BORROWED 

DATE  DUE 

C28(946)MIOO 

884 


G9131 
V.4 


884 

Grote 

A  history  of  Greece 


G9131 
v.4 


I   ! 


FFB  i2  1947 


